Democracy in Southern Europe: Colonialism, International Relations and Europeanization from Malta to Cyprus 9781788312578, 9781838600945, 9781786735591

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Isabelle Calleja Ragonesi is Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University of Malta. She completed her PhD under the supervision of Professor Robert Leonardi from the European Institute at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

‘Here is a detailed insight into the transition to, and workings of the postsovereign state and the multi-level governance that defines it. What this book makes abundantly clear is the significant interaction and integration of domestic and international spheres in the process of state democratization. A meticulous and critical, parallel political history of the two Mediterranean small island states of Cyprus and Malta invites readers to acknowledge and assess the influence of trans-territorial actors: in particular, Britain as the reluctant colonial power; and the European Community/Union. With post-1945 Southern Europe locked in her sights, and drawing on multiple sources, Calleja Ragonesi makes a powerful case for a reassessment of mainstream, functionalist or elitist, interpretations of the democratic transition in this region, which remains a “work in progress”.’ Professor Godfrey Baldacchino University of Malta, Malta / University of Prince Edward Island, Canada

DEMOCRACY IN SOUTHERN EUROPE Colonialism, International Relations and Europeanization from Malta to Cyprus

Isabelle Calleja Ragonesi

Published in 2019 by I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd London • New York www.ibtauris.com   Copyright © 2019 Isabelle Calleja Ragonesi   The right of Isabelle Calleja Ragonesi to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by the author in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.   All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof, may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher.   References to websites were correct at the time of writing.   Library of European Studies    ISBN: 978-1-78831-257-8 eISBN: 978-1-78672-559-2 ePDF: 978-1-78673-559-1   A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library   A full CIP record is available from the Library of Congress   Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: available   Printed and bound by in Great Britain

CONTENTS Preface ix Chapter 1 DEMOCRATIZATION IN SOUTHERN EUROPE AS SHOWN IN THE POLITICAL LITERATURE OF THE REGION 1 Introduction 1 A Focus on the Domestic Scene: The Functionalist Approach 1 A Model of Retarded Development 2 Southern Europe Returns to the Fold: The Successful Transition 3 The Comparative Approach and the Importance of Chronology 4 The Influence of the Developmental and Modernization Schools 4 The Elitist Approach and the Role of Domestic Players – the First Phase: The Politics of Conflict and Dis-unified Elites 5 Fascist and Colonial Models of Government 6 The Elitist School – the Second Phase: From Dis-unified to Consensual Elites 7 The Elitist School – the Third Phase: Politics Conducted by Consensually Unified Elites 8 Pacted Transitions and the Application of Game Theory 9 Game Theory and the Four-Player Model 10 Variations on the Model 10 The Model in Action 10 The Key Role of the Domestic Players and the Subsidiary Role of the External Players 12 The External Factor – Phase One: The Macro Climate and the Functionalist Approach 12 The External Factor – Phase Two: The Micro Climate and the Elitist Approach 14 A Politics of Consensus under the Influence of Consensually Unified Elites 15 The Inclusion of External Factors in Models of Democratization 16 Phase Three: Integrating Domestic and External Variables 17

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From Bilateral to the Multilateral, from the National to the Supranational 20 The Twenty-First Century and the Concept of the Reverse Wave 22 Conclusion 26 Chapter 2 DEMOCRATIZATION IN SOUTHERN EUROPE – AN EXTERNAL MODEL OF TRANSITION: COLONIAL VERSUS AUTHORITARIAN TRENDS 29 Introduction 29 The Absence of External Players in Democratization Models 30 The Global Order and Different Regime Types: Similarities of the Colonial and Authoritarian Models 30 The Premodern Phase: The Discourse of Fragmented Nationalism and the Dominance of Dis-unified Elites 31 Hijacking the Fragmented Nation State 32 The Problem of Smallness and Island Micro States 34 Democratization: Consolidating Sovereignty and the Nation-State Model 35 The Four-and-a-Half-Player Model: The Modern Phase 40 The International Climate 42 The Postmodern Phase: Nation to Federation – Independence to Integration 44 The Postcolonial Model 46 The Post-Truth Phase: Supranational versus the Intergovernmental 46 Conclusion 48 Chapter 3 MALTA AND CYPRUS: THE CASE OF GUIDED DEMOCRACIES – DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION FROM COLONIAL RULE 51 Introduction 51 History: Points of Commonality 51 History: Points of Divergence 52 The Transition Begins: The Functionalist Approach – Government Prior to British Rule 53 Constitutional Developments 54 The Emergence of a Party System 56 The Transitions Begin: The Elitist Approach – The Extremes Emerge 58 Economics and the Emergence of Unions 59 Transition and Public Opinion 60

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External Players Enter in Full Force 61 The Independence Constitutions 63 Negotiating the Constitutions 64 Lack of Consensus – Cyprus 64 Lack of Consensus – Malta 67 Seeking the Support of Other External Players: The UN 69 The Politics of Collusion 70 The Impact of the Cold War 72 Democratic Transition or Attempts at Continued Hegemony? 74 The Extremes Threaten the Transition 75 Completed Transitions in a Climate of Uncertainty and Unpreparedness 76 Conclusion 78 Chapter 4 NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES – CYPRUS AND MALTA: CONSOLIDATING DEMOCRACY AND ITS SUBSEQUENT BREAKDOWN 81 Introduction 81 Background 82 The Collapse of Democratic Government 83 Phase One: Working and Living with the Constitution 83 Preliminary Attempts at Settlement 85 Phase Two: Attempts at Constitutional Revision 91 Phase Three: Failure to Compromise, Coercive Action and the Counter State 98 Conclusion 106 Chapter 5 MALTA AND CYPRUS: CONSOLIDATING THE NATION STATE – NEGOTIATING A COMPROMISE: THE SECOND TRANSITION 109 Introduction 109 Different Points of Departure 110 Cyprus in 1964 and Malta in 1981: The Extent of Regime Breakdown 110 Enter External Actors 113 Background to Mediation 115 The Talks Begin 121 The Changing Environment 124 The Breakdown of Talks 127

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Rising Violence 129 Last-Ditch Attempts to Save the Talks 131 Conclusion 133 Chapter 6 CONSOLIDATING DEMOCRACY UNDER A FEDERAL MODEL: MALTA, CYPRUS AND THE EU 135 Introduction 135 History of EU Relations 135 Changing Conditions 137 The Long Haul 138 The Suitability of Malta and Cyprus for EU Membership 139 Divergent Views on Membership 141 Impact on the Party Systems 142 Successfully Co-opting the Opposition 144 Preparing for Accession and Adopting the Acquis 144 Structured Dialogue and the Transformation of the State 145 Commission Feedback 148 Accommodating the Opposition 149 Membership and the State Transformed 152 A Decade Post Accession: Democratization Progression or Regression? 156 Conclusion 161 Conclusion FROM DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION TO EUROPEANIZATION Assessing the Model The Model’s Trajectory: From Dependency to Europeanization Whither the Model? The Way Forward

163 163 167 169

Notes 173 Bibliography 239 Index 285

PREFACE This work focuses on the phenomenon of democratic transition through decolonization, where external actors played an overriding role. The author reconstructs the history of transition to democracy in the two islands of Malta and Cyprus, using primary source documentation. These patterns of democratization are then tested in the context of the major theories in the field to determine to what extent they follow conventional patterns of transition in the area. Both islands’ experiences are thus placed within the wider framework of Southern Europe:  similar geographic, political, cultural and socio-economic factors favouring the use of a comparative methodology. However, despite the existence of a rich resource base of historical and theoretical studies, the theories developed in Southern Europe focus on transitions from authoritarian rule and are not sufficient to explain democratization in Cyprus and Malta. For the conventional model of Southern European democratization is based on a ‘four-player’ scenario emphasizing the role of domestic elites in securing democratization, and discounts the role of external players. By drawing on existing models, and later insights that indicate that external actors also played a role in the authoritarian transitions, this study posits a new model of democratization. It remains faithful to a ‘four-player game’ but extends it to include a ‘four-and-a-half ’ and a ‘fiveplayer’ model. These two models incorporate and detail the role of external players alongside that of domestic players in democratization in the region. Consequently, these models are a better indicator of democratic transition, and the process of Europeanization in Southern Europe, and enable the author to explain more accurately democratization in Malta and Cyprus.

Chapter 1 D E M O C R AT I Z AT IO N I N S OU T H E R N E U R O P E A S SHOW N I N T H E P O L I T IC A L L I T E R AT U R E O F T H E   R E G IO N

The idea of some objective reality, existing as it is, independent of any subjective perception of it, apparently makes sense . . . [however] . . . Perhaps our human situation is such that we cannot know anything beyond our experiences; perhaps we are, each one of us individually, confined to the theatre of our own minds. Nonetheless, we can conceive what it means to assert an objective reality beyond the stream of our experiences.1

Introduction This chapter deals with the literature on democratization in Southern Europe. Its aim is to identify the approach taken in explaining democratic transition in the region. The literature, viewed chronologically, shows the changing perspective towards the process. This objective is facilitated by the abundant empirical and theoretical data available,2 though it is far less abundant in the case of Malta and Cyprus.3 In line with the early work on the region, the first section draws on the functionalist approach, and outlines the macro climate, and the similarities of the socio-economic and historical fabric of the Southern European region. Next the work homes in on the later literature, and in line with their focus, incorporates the micro climate and, drawing on the elite approach, concentrates on the different roles of key domestic players in the region. The chapter then shifts to the role of external players in democratization, drawing on a body of literature that became increasingly abundant from the late 1980s. The chapter concludes by focusing on a relatively new school that argues that both internal and external factors played an important role in transition in the area, and that in today’s interdependent and global climate one cannot easily distinguish between the two.

A focus on the domestic scene: The functionalist approach Southern Europe: A region apart Most of the literature on Southern Europe focuses on the domestic scene and the internal dynamics of the region. The early literature drawing on the functionalist

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approach was fairly unanimous in arguing that sustainable democratization in Southern Europe occurred late. Though the region was credited with possessing many of the requirements needed for it to fit the democratic mould,4 it was seen until recently5 as peripheral, backward and feudal, with a stagnant economy and a corrupt and paternalistic political system.6 The general view was that this was a consequence of the late industrialization of the region, and in the case of Cyprus and Malta of never fully participating in industrialization at all. Late industrialization meant an undeveloped proletariat and a weak politicized middle class. Essential changes in class relations, distribution of resources and economic diversity, prerequisites of modernization, occurred only in the mid-twentieth century. Consequently, the political conflict, and the resultant political liberalization that took place in Western Europe in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, did not take place here until much later in the twentieth century.7 This did not preclude rapid change and growth. However, change was from an agrarian to a services economy, heavily dependent on emigrant remittances and tourism. The region never fully experienced the intermediary industrial phase found in Western Europe.8 The politicization of labour within the context of industrial democracy therefore occurred late, in the context of small- and medium-sized firms as opposed to the large- and medium-sized industries of continental Europe, and over a few generations, unlike Northern Europe where the process evolved over centuries. The consumerization and modernization of society was a process where modernization preserved and gave new life to traditional structures. Thus the general consensus was of modernization without development as the model which characterized Southern Europe.9

A model of retarded development This model was characterized by social relations that never fully undertook the changeover from systems of power and cultural values based on status to those based on contracts, unlike societies where the market economy had prevailed. Instead we get the ruralization of the city, and late urbanization.10 This led to the transformation of economic and institutional structures in Southern Europe, without the corresponding cultural changes. Late, and only partial, industrialization created an unhealthy and over-intimate relationship between the political and economic domain in Southern Europe, resulting in insufficient penetration of market mechanisms here. Consequently the state took over and had a decisive impact on the economic, social and political life of these countries.11 Southern European politics was therefore characterized by individual and vertical relationships rather than collective and horizontal ones.12 This relationship was reinforced by the synchronization of democratic and welfare government in Southern Europe.13 This lack of synchrony between social and productive structures, and the lack of a strong state technocracy, was said to account for the clientelistic character of the Southern European welfare system:14 a system that pandered to individual needs, rather than providing universal well-being, thus dividing

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society into groups, instead of unifying it through mechanisms of solidarity. The result was the growth of societies similar to those of industrialized countries but linked to reproductive structures15 typical of latecomers to industrialization. Consequently, Southern Europe featured clientelism and patronage, characterized by the presence of status rather than contractual systems.16 These characteristics explained late democratization in the region and the fragile forms polyarchy took here. Democratization in Spain, Greece and Portugal in the 1970s was regarded with some scepticism. Democratic government in Italy, Malta and Cyprus was seen as uncertain and unstable.17 Military right-wing elements in Spain,18 continued reserved powers in the Portuguese constitution19 and the weakness of the Greek state made their continuation as democracies uncertain. There were few expectations of the region catching up with the progressive and democratic culture of the European Community (EC).20

Southern Europe returns to the fold: The successful transition In the mid-1970s, however, Spain, Portugal and Greece made successful transitions to democracy. Italy underwent a second transition that promoted democratic consolidation.21 Malta and Cyprus were also sustaining fledgling democracies. By the 1980s, democratization here was more successful than in South America, or in Eastern Europe, the other third-wave22 attempts.23 Here democratic government remained fragile and unconsolidated.24 In Southern Europe democracy was consolidated25 even in Cyprus, though partition continues to act against the spirit of democracy.26 Material drawing on the functionalist approach abandoned the image of the region as the poor, discarded and discredited periphery of Europe.27 Southern Europe was now viewed as economically successful, socially advanced and accruing the habits of a democratized culture.28 This shift allowed Southern Europe to throw off its peripheral status29 and integrate successfully with the continent. Spain, Portugal and Greece became members of the EC in the 1980s and more recently of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Cyprus and Malta are among the most prepared and advanced new members of the 2004 enlargement, with among the highest gross domestic products (GDPs) from the new member states.30 Academics attempted to explain this phenomenon. New material focused on the region’s early exposure to democratic practices31 and saw it as the forerunner of many of the liberal and democratic structures that characterized Europe.32 Southern Europe, it was now argued, adopted liberal and democratic patterns of government early33 and had long possessed the characteristics needed to support a sophisticated and differentiated democratic society.34 These included an economy with a wide dispersion of resources and a long practice of trade35 that fostered a powerful trading bourgeois, who provided an alternative to the power of the establishment. Academics stressed that the criteria, social, political and economic, that Dahl specified as necessary for a democracy were present in the region early:36 independent city traditions, diverse associational groups, multi-tiered

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class structures. Also present were numerous religious bodies and differentiated Church structures. Southern Europe was also ethnically diverse, with a linguistic mix that encouraged a multicultural society. Land holdings were also dispersed, and this allowed the presence of alternative power blocs to the state: the landed aristocracy and the Church.37

The comparative approach and the importance of chronology Faced with the only contemporary example of a successful democratization of a whole region,38 attempts to understand the process escalated.39 Models were updated to factor in the Southern European third-wave transitions. Huntington in 1991 spoke of three waves of democratization.40 The first-wave democratization was viewed as largely home grown,41 forged through evolution, in a climate of expanding suffrage, economic growth (though this altered by the end of the century) and welfare reform. The second wave after the First World War was seen as democratizing as a result of foreign impetus, and though domestic arrangements furthered democratization, the coordinators in nearly every case were external players.42 Third-wave democracies were seen to share characteristics in common with both first- and second-wave transitions.43 Democratization in Southern Europe was portrayed as a fairly long-drawn-out affair resembling first-wave cases.44 On the other hand many Eastern European states adopted democratic institutions overnight, compressing into a matter of weeks and months a process that elsewhere had taken over two centuries to reach fruition.45 Also in common with the first wave, Southern European democratization was seen to have been a result of largely domestic conditions and change, and negotiated by the domestic elites.46 In many South American and Eastern European states, however, international factors were seen to have played the determining role in the collapse of their authoritarian and totalitarian governments and in the introduction of liberal democracy.47

The influence of the developmental and modernization schools The literature of the early third wave was also influenced by the approach taken in the work of the first and second wave that placed democratization within the construct of developmental and modernization theories.48 These schools posited that states moved forward by adopting notions of progress and the institutions, mechanisms, methods and doctrines of the Anglo-American world.49 The modernization school also stressed the need for certain socio-economic targets to be reached in living standards, GDP and literacy rates before democratic government would take root. These models posited that transitional societies moved towards modernity cum democracy. Their immediate points of reference were Lipset’s hypothesis: that the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy; Dahl’s hypothesis: that democratization will take

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place only under conditions in which power resources have become widely distributed; and Lerner’s hypothesis: that urbanization starts modernization and is followed by increased literacy, media exposure and economic and political participation followed by democratic governance.50 The early material influenced by these theories highlighted the importance of socio-economic, historical and cultural variables as positive indices to democratization. Successful democratization was a result of socio-economic and political change facilitated by the area’s proximity to Western Europe, its shared history, similar political and civic arrangements and value systems.51 This literature showed that democratic transition in Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy in the 1970s had been a long-drawn-out affair and a result of a combination of factors including industrialization, the politicization of class, the maintenance of a healthy civic culture and the existence of some pseudo-democratic institutions.52 Democratic governance in Malta and Cyprus was also viewed in this light.53 Southern European democracies were now viewed as almost comparable with First World cases. Most of them had an average inflation of 2.5 per cent and a GDP growth of over 3 per cent.54 There was little argument that the macro climate in Southern Europe, even in the worst-case scenarios of Malta and Cyprus, was capable of supporting democratic government.55 More detailed data, however, enabled researchers to embark on a new approach that emphasized the specific dynamics that characterized the region. In the 1980s, Pridham’s model on regime transition in Spain, Portugal and Greece surfaced, using a different dialectic. This was a dialectic that spoke in terms of a case study in Mediterranean democracy based on the similarities in the backwardness of their socio-economic conditions and political cultures which needed to be reconstructed, and the simultaneousness of the regime transitions that were all now in the habitation phase.56 The emphasis here was on successful democratization despite poor social and economic conditions, implying that other conditions must have been responsible for the phenomenon.57

The elitist approach and the role of domestic players – the first phase: The politics of conflict and dis-unified elites In this new research, a perceptible shift occurred away from the functionalist approach and its emphasis on the macro climate to a more elitist approach and a focus on the micro climate. Democratization in Southern Europe from the early 1980s was increasingly studied in terms of the immediate political input into the process and a vast amount of work surfaced on the role of elites in ensuring a successful transition to democracy. However, in line with the first phase of the functionalist school, early elite behaviour was not seen as conducive to democratization. This literature emphasized a politics of exclusion in the region, overshadowed by banditry and the role of counter groups in the political forum.58 This was illustrated in the rampant practice of patronage and clientelism which peaked in the system of Mafia in Italy.59

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The focus of this literature was the Italian case, which elaborated on the undemocratic practices of government that debilitated political rule in Italy: the practice of dividing government posts according to the electoral spoils of war, the rampant growth of political fiefdoms that lay outside of and challenged the recognized legal order and the growing practice of allowing the interests of party to come before those of government. Corruption and inertia were the result, and the Italian government was increasingly viewed as representing the interests of the few and largely inaccessible to the majority. Books on Italian government abounded explaining this state of affairs and creating a whole new vocabulary. Such terms as partitocrazia,60 lottizioni61 and sotto governo62 came to describe Italian democracy, with the result that a mezzogiorno, a southern model of democratic transition, surfaced. This model emphasized the role of different elites in bringing about the debacle that wrecked democratic government.63

Fascist and colonial models of government In explaining this phenomenon, the literature characterized the elites of the region as highly dis-unified64 prior to the 1970s. These dis-unified elites derived from, and represented, a number of irreconcilable cleavages. Society here was portrayed as being torn asunder by a huge political divide that split most of the nations in this region into two units.65 These weak and fractured nations provided the conditions for the right wing to capture the state and prohibit the opening up of the system. As a result, the politics of Southern Europe become a world apart and while a body of work developed on democratic governance in Western Europe, in the south the literature concentrated on formatting a model that explained the development of various forms of inept right-wing governments. The most extreme cases were the fascist governments of Spain and Portugal, controlled by dictators and operational right up to the 1970s. In Greece, fascist government was replaced after the Second World War by a limited democratic government that, however, operated largely without full participation of the left also right up to the 1970s.66 Only in Italy did democratization proceed unabated despite problems of governance under a dominant right.67 In Cyprus and Malta, the literature showed colonial regimes as forestalling full democracy.68 This literature drew on fascist/neo-fascist and colonial models and showed the region operating within a system of governance based on oligarchic control and extreme popular exclusion, resulting in a constitutional order resting on advanced corporatism. This was a model of class domination that on the mainland took the form of a fascist dictatorship based on a civilian and legalistic order where the national elite sought legitimacy by promoting national aggrandizement. This justified right-wing rule, for it promoted the state, and excluded the communist forces that were said to threaten the integrity of the state.69 In Cyprus and Malta the colonial model mirrored in many ways the Southern European authoritarian model, and here also a limited political pluralism prevailed, resulting in a

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constitutional order resting on advanced corporatism. Here too the bugbear of communism was used to justify the continued rule of a select few.70

The elitist school – the second phase: From dis-unified to consensual elites However, in line with the reassessment of the region taking place within the functionalist school, from the 1970s the literature on governance came to view both the neo-fascist and colonial models of government in Southern Europe somewhat differently. Juan Linz, working with the Spanish model, formulated a theory of governance that came midway between that of the totalitarian and the democratic model. This was the authoritarian model that supported a form of limited pluralism. These authoritarian regimes, he tells us, ‘are political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate or guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities; without extensive or intensive political mobilisation . . . but one under which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power’.71 Neo-fascist regimes in the literature were increasingly presented as systems of government which, by allowing the growth of pluralist politics through civil society and the development of alternative power blocs to the state, by slowly introducing semi-democratic procedures of government and by encouraging fairly open economic systems, established the basic structures for future democratic regimes.72 Pinkney presented colonial government in the same light and, drawing on African cases, supported the thesis that the democratic transitions from colonial and/or authoritarian rule are the ones most likely to succeed.73 These systems were characterized by dis-unified elites and reflected the main cleavage pattern here: those representing the establishment, the governing elites and the counter elites that came out against the system. This pattern, however, changed from the 1950s. Rapid industrialization, liberalization and modernization of the economy altered the occupational and territorial distribution of the population.74 The result was a softening of the left/right cleavage as economic resources become more widely and fairly distributed, and the mediating middle class, the missing bourgeois, come to the fore. The working classes became consolidated and started to take on the attributes of an industrialized proletariat. The ruling class became fragmented as it was faced with new and contradictory loyalties.75 These changes at the cleavage base and at the elite level altered political behaviour in Southern Europe. The great national schisms, which had engendered a politics of conflict between the included and excluded, were finally bridged. The duopolistic method of politics between elites and counter elites was slowly replaced by a four-player game. Within each category of elites, we now find groups prepared to consider alternative visions of the state. Within the ranks of the establishment, elites oriented to the business and cultural fabric of the Western Hemisphere increasingly found the constraints of non-democratic/colonial government unprofitable. Within the opposition, groups surfaced that were prepared to compromise on social and economic demands in exchange for access

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to the political market. In each camp the bunker mentality was slowly being eroded by the moderates, the extremes were being conjoined by the centrists. Southern European politics became increasingly characterized by consensual elites.76

The elitist school – the third phase: Politics conducted by consensually unified elites By the 1980s, new elitist models of democratization emerged. Successful democratization is now largely explained in terms of reconciled cleavages of the state. This is accomplished by a new breed of elites,77 practising a new type of consensual politics. The picture conveyed is of democratic transitions being negotiated by elites who are orderly, rational and logical in their undertakings and lay the foundations for effective, open and fair government. Drawing on numerous theories, including those of Lijphart,78 Dahl,79 Lipset and Rokkan,80 a detailed Southern European model of elite interaction that sustains democratic government surfaces. This literature81 goes out of its way to undermine the functionalist approach, stressing the negative economic indicators in the region at the points of transition and emphasizing that successful democratization occurred as a result of the positive actions of the elites, rather than because of the underlying socioeconomic structures in place.82 Manuel, on Portugal, tells us ‘that the country underwent this transition without fully going through the process of economic modernisation’.83 Colomer, on the Spanish case, states that ‘the socio-economic modernisation of the country in the 60s should be included in any explanation for its successful democratisation’. However, he insists that ‘the main point to be stressed is that there is nothing previously determined in the economic, social or cultural structures regarding a political outcome such as a regime change to democracy . . . [this] outcome depends on the initiative, the strategies and the luck of the political actors’.84 Koutsoukis reinforces this argument in his Greek case study on political leadership: ‘It is the elite . . . that sets the goal of socio-economic development and initiates or resists systematic change’ and thus allows and makes possible a democratic transition.85 Pappas, on Greece, reiterates this same formula, stating that democratic reform would only be possible here if it came from the top echelons. To reinforce these arguments, he points to the fact that these transitions took place just after the oil crisis of 1973 at a low point in Europe’s economic fortunes.86 Numerous other models surfaced,87 showing the role of the elites not just at the point of democratic take-off but also including the changing character and composition of the elites over time, and their changing relations within the grassroots cleavage patterns that they represented.88 Schmitter identifies the different actors’ interests as defined by their positions within the social fabric, and stresses the importance of mobilization and pressure from below as a catalyst on the more dominant groups in liberalizing the regime, and emphasizes the links between the populace and the elites through party organizations and interest groups.89

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Morlino also emphasizes that the phases of transition and democratic installation are characterized by choices at both the elite and mass levels.90

Pacted transitions and the application of game theory The central focus of the literature was the pacted and consensual Spanish transition, viewed as the example par excellence of the perfect transition:  a consensual transition based on a series of legal pacts that incorporated all the main Spanish interest groups. Linz draws a picture of transition here as representing a political innovation without parallel. The process takes place, he tells us, by the peaceful abdication of power by the political ruling class of an authoritarian regime. This class forsakes the attempt to retain non-democratic institutions in order to maintain power, and chooses instead to allow democratic institutions, and thereby permits the opening of the system to those whom it had previously excluded.91 Edles, in Symbol and Ritual in the New Spain, tells us that for pactmen,92 Spain is the very model of elite settlement. It epitomizes transition from above or transition through transaction. It is, he adds, the perfect case study for the corporatist, elite-centred and rational choice models, which came to the fore in the 1970s, and in effect became the theoretical modus operandi in what became known as transitology, that is, the study of political transitions.93 These new models saw politics in terms of a number of experienced individuals94 who are the negotiators of the transition and the representatives of the cleavages that must be pacified and neutralized. Southern European analysts championed the elite, rational choice and corporatist approaches95 and drew on the pact school that saw politics as rational individuals, practising an encoded behaviour of reciprocal self-interest, based on the ability to be objective and compromise. This behaviour is best illustrated through the application of game theory96 to the science.97 The game theory model showed democratization in Southern Europe as a chess game:  as a series of moves and counter moves. Burton98 showed that a number of elite actions were possible in transitions, and that moves that encouraged the inclusion of new groups furthered democratization, whereas elite exclusion destroyed the chance of democratic government. In his model, Di Palma emphasizes the tools of gradualism and accommodation in helping transfer loyalties, reiterating that democratization was ultimately a matter of political crafting.99 Actors in this model are shown to be engaged in a war of the moment, in which dramatic options are available, and the outcome depends on their choices, for these schools hold that the real motivating factor in transition is the desire on the actors’ parts to maximize utility to achieve their goals.100 The focus of this work is thus on regime change at the micro level and on the strategic role of political leadership and elite styles.101 Thematically democratic transition is conceptualized in terms of a battle of political legitimacy among the post-coup political elites that becomes manifested in the transition’s main cleavage issues, which are slowly neutralized through the politics of reconciliation.102 Bruneau conceptualizes the transition period ‘as a chaotic heady time’ emphasizing a probabilistic model of

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political change in which the choices, strategies, calculations and miscalculations of the relevant actors determine a transition’s political outcome.103 Of importance is what systems they operate under, how they behaved and operated in negotiating the transitions104 and what their raison d’etre was for favouring and forwarding these transitions. ‘Democracy thus becomes the institutionalisation of continual conflict.’105

Game theory and the four-player model The literature also contains references to hardliners and moderates. All the political groupings contained hardliners and moderates. Successful democratic transition was presented as a pact between the regime moderates, who were able to bring their respective hardliners to the table and persuade them to accept the new modus operandi. In order to accomplish this, however, the moderate players in the regime had to have sufficient autonomy so that they could over time conduct strategic, as well as tactical, negotiations with the players from the moderate opposition. Conversely, the moderates in the opposition needed a degree of organizational presence, power and followers in the polity to play their part in the negotiation pacts. This is in essence a four-player game.106

Variations on the model This literature emphasizes an ideal type, based on the presence of consensually unified elites and the superiority of pacted transitions. However, generally other conditions prevailed. Dis-unified elites also successfully negotiated transitions, though in the process they became consensually unified, or the transitions would inevitably fail. Most transitions involved methods other than the use of pacts.107 Indeed, only Spain can be said to really approximate the ideal of the pacted reform.108 Successful transitions also hinged on a number of other key variables: the role of charismatic figures,109 the role of swingmen,110 civilian rather than military leadership, continuity of both the legal system and its personnel,111 the granting of political amnesties, whether all the key elites were included and participated in drawing up and endorsing the final constitutional document112 and whether privacy in the negotiations prevailed, in order to allow the different players room for manoeuvre to endorse compromises, which, though essential, may not have been popular at the grass roots.

The model in action The Southern European model of democratization was thus more accurately reassessed. A positive macro climate supported and reinforced a positive micro climate. Democratization was now reassessed as a modality of ongoing change,

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characterized by a politics of gradualism, reform and compromise. At the point of transition, elite behaviour fluctuated between policies of repression and reform.113 Concessions did little to allay the general discontent; however, key opposition groups did take advantage of these political mechanisms to advance their political goals, infiltrating co-opted organizations such as trade unions114 and participating in the electoral process despite its skewed approach. The result was the growing legitimacy of the opposition.115 Conservative elements fearing reform put pressure on the government to retract these concessions. Attempts at change were subsequently abandoned and replaced by a politics of repression. In the most extreme case, that of Greece, a coup forestalled further democratization and installed a military regime. Everywhere else repressive measures were followed by increased violence and protest. In Spain, this culminated in the assassination of Prime Minister Carrero Blanco. In Portugal, rumours of coups and counter coups were heard in the army barracks.116 In Italy, terrorist action escalated and peaked in the assassination of Aldo Moro, the Christian Democratic prime minister, by the Brigate Rosse.117 Rising violence, however, eroded what was left of the legitimacy of government in Southern Europe. Key elites that had supported the regimes now abandoned ship. In Spain, Portugal and Greece, the Church slowly withdrew its support.118 In Cyprus and Malta it split its support, with the rank-and-file clergy increasingly coming out against the official stance of the upper echelons of Church power.119 Those elites who belonged to the business and professional community, and had been educated in the neo-liberal environment of Western Europe, had little sympathy for governments based on limited liberties, and partially closed markets, nor did they understand the continued necessity for expunging the left, or the right as the case may be, from the political market. By the end of the 1970s/early 1980s, the will of Southern European regimes to continue exercising repression evaporated. A  politics of compromise and gradualism first applied in the 1950s became irrevocable. Governments were captured by the moderates throughout the region, allowing the inclusion of new and peripheral groups and the consolidation of democracy.120 This is most clearly illustrated in the Burton model, also structured around the four-player scenario.121 Only in the Spanish case was the model of Reforma-Pactada carried out, and a thread of continuity linked the democratic regime to its predecessor. In Portugal and Greece, coup d’états forestalled this and a politics of rupture took place. In Italy, the transition after the war was based on a complete break with the past; however, the second transition did contain the element of continuity found in the Spanish case.122 In Cyprus, the new constitution bore little resemblance to past practice. Though in Malta the new constitution did bear some resemblance to previous documents, both here and in Cyprus the removal of the colonial regime meant a total break with the past. Nowhere but in Italy in the 1970s was the politics of inclusion fully practised.123 In the case of Portugal, Greece, Malta and Cyprus, the transition was largely undertaken by a select few, and this is reflected in the constitutional documents that required changes in the 1970s and 1980s in order to further entrench democratic practice.

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However, in all cases, the transitions were carried out largely from the portals of government itself in an orderly fashion. Portugal was the only exception, since after the coup of 1974 numerous left-wing civilian groups captured the process, and change for a time flowed from the grass roots. However, left-wing moderates in government regained control of the process and completed the transition. The transitions were largely peaceful with the exception of Cyprus, and where violence occurred, it usually originated from the extremes both on the left and right,124 though some politics of repression was still applied up until the early 1980s. In most cases, the transitions were conducted by the right wing, the exceptions being Portugal and Malta.125 In all cases, relatively peaceful alteration of government occurred.126 Despite shortcomings, successful transition in Southern Europe had taken place, and the literature seemed to have done full justice to explaining this phenomenon. The model was complete.

The key role of the domestic players and the subsidiary role of the external players However, by the late 1980s, in the new post–Cold War environment, the model seemed inadequate to fully explain patterns of democratization that had surfaced under the impetus of new theories and data on the external domain. Nor could the model fully explain the cases of Malta and Cyprus where patterns of elite behaviour in democratization differed from the cases of Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy. For though at the macro level authoritarian and colonial models seemed to dovetail, at the micro level differences could be observed. Many of these differences could be put down to the different roles played by external elites in the two models. Nevertheless, the Mediterranean model of transition based on the four-player game theory had allowed no room for the external variable. The Southern European four-player model was based on the assumption that democratization was largely the result of domestic factors.127 Gunter et al. tell us that most studies to date had focused on internal aspects and none had focused on a multidimensional assessment.128 Schmitter noted that domestic factors played a predominant role in the transition, and that the transition should be seen largely in terms of national forces and calculations.129 Pridham supported this view: ‘the external impact remained ultimately secondary to domestic developments.’130

The external factor – phase one: The macro climate and the functionalist approach This is not to say that the external factor in democratization in Southern Europe was not acknowledged. In the case of Portugal and Greece, it was well documented that the immediate origins of the coups in 1974 lay in the unpopular foreign policy options followed by the Portuguese government in Africa, and the Greek government in Cyprus. It was also well known that foreign players did their best

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to ensure that this process was not interrupted or derailed.131 In Italy the 1946 transition was made possible as a result of the country’s defeat to the Allies, though the actual transition is largely portrayed as being carried out by domestic actors.132 The importance of the international economy as an influence on domestic change at the socio-economic level and thus on long-term democratization was also widely acknowledged.133 The early literature on democratization, in line with the functionalist approach, incorporated the role of external players under the guise of the modernization and dependency schools. These argued that socio-economic determinants, imperative for successful transition in developing countries, could be stimulated or repressed by the influence of external players from the developed world. It was also recognized that by the early 1970s the region had reached a high degree of integration with the international system. Menges in 1978, writing on Spain in the 1950s and 1960s, spoke of the importance of loans from the United States, Spanish emigration to Europe and the growth of tourism in the development of the Spanish socio-economic and political system.134 Maravall and Santamaria, writing in the mid-1980s, stated that the Spanish market was linked to international markets, and this revised economic strategy produced some spectacular results between 1960 and 1970 . . . [and] unintended consequences, which made it much more difficult for the regime to confine other social groups within the conservative patterns that had characterised the previous two decades.135

Diamandouros, on Greece, reiterated much the same point.136 Kohler, writing in 1982 on Portugal, emphasized the importance of membership of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in the 1960s in liberalizing the economy.137 Pridham in the 1980s also stressed the importance of the external economy in inducing change, as did much of the literature on the area written up to the early 1980s. Those writing under the influence of colonialist and imperialist models indicated the positive influence of departing overlords, who attempted to set up democratic political systems prior to their departure.138 Other models pointed to the importance of the external climate as a locus of influence on the democratizing state, such as Rosenau’s,139 which emphasized the importance of external geographic, regional and ideological pressures on domestic transitions, Hague and Harrop,140 that outlined how ideology, economy and organization in the international arena impacted on the domestic fronts, and Hanreider’s,141 based on the notion of penetrated systems. These models, however, drew largely on the macro climate and took a structuralist approach when assessing the impact of the external climate on domestic transitions. The literature, with a few exceptions,142 emphasized that the role of the external was helpful but peripheral. International factors were viewed as secondary, or dependent variables, in the process. Both the functionalist and elitist schools saw successful transition as a result of indigenous factors, and external stimuli only effective once the required socio-economic and political key variables were in

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place. The literature tended to emphasize the fact that the first phase of the third wave of transitions, unlike the second wave, was largely home-grown affairs, and that the ‘international climate can provide the impetus for transition but it cannot produce a successful democratic outcome unless many other conditions are present’.143 Consequently, this literature on Southern Europe did not incorporate the external factor within their theoretical mainframe.

The external factor – phase two: The micro climate and the elitist approach This started to change in the mid-1980s and early 1990s, and consequently a slow reassessment of the Southern European success story took place. The collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, signifying the end of the communist era, and the subsequent democratization of Eastern/Central Europe made clear the importance of external factors in the process. This phenomenon coincided with the growing evidence of the beneficial influence of EU membership on the recently democratized states of Southern Europe. In 1991, Pridham published Encouraging Democracy:  The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe,144 which challenged previous assertions that transition to democracy in the region was primarily a result of internal reassessment. The external dimension, which had been viewed as peripheral, incidental and additional to the process of domestic transition, was now explored anew and slowly imputed as a factor in the literature on the elite model of democratization. The emphasis was on the inclusion of the micro politics of external actors and their impact on the decisions of domestic actors negotiating transition.145 In 1987, Morlino, writing on Italy, stated that the international dimension in the move to democratic transition had enormous potential relevance and may be the crucial intervening variable.146 Opello, writing on the Portuguese case, also asserted that ‘the international context was the more important of the two in broadly conditioning a democratic outcome’ and that ‘the international dimension here provided the overall confining conditions with which all domestic actors had to deal’.147 Story and Pollack, on Spain, contended that the close relationship developed with the United States and Spain’s geostrategic position and its wish to exert its influence in external affairs were important in the transition, as was American determination to keep Spain within the Western Bloc.148 The literature on the region also started to emphasize a more interdisciplinary approach to the study of democratization. International relations theory merged with political theory in explaining the simultaneous transitions in Southern Europe. This was made possible by the post-1990 phenomenon that allowed the literature in the field of international relations to be freed from the arid theorizing of the realist school, which was dominated by the traditionalists in the Cold War years.149 These presented largely biased accounts150 of the harsh realities of a post1945 bipolar world where foreign policy options were deeply impoverished. As a result, a more lucid, objective and complex literature on the Cold War emerged both in the fields of history, influenced by the rise of the revisionist and postrevisionist schools, and in international relations.151

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This shift allowed a more objective reassessment of the role played by the superpowers in their sphere of influence, that of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, and the United States and her allies in Southern Europe. This literature on democratization in Southern Europe gave a more detailed and accurate assessment of the role of external players and showed that foreign power penetration, largely American, had produced both positive and negative results on regime change.152 Diamandouros in Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies tells us that transition in Southern Europe occurred in an international and regional context that affected democracy negatively and positively.153 This new material also brought into focus the role of external players in the context of the left/right cleavage and the fourplayer game, complementing research on the domestic front. The starting point was the politics of the Cold War, coexistence and détente which were seen to have an important bearing on the transitions.154 After the Yalta Conference, the Cold War entailed the exclusion of the socialists in Southern Europe. The highly volatile nature of the Cold War, and the centrifugal cleavage structure it created at the international level, impacted with dramatic effect at the domestic level and militated against the practice of democratic governance. American, and to a lesser extent British, methods here were coercive, intrusive and gave little attention to the niceties of democratic politics. The United States shored up authoritarian regimes in Spain and Portugal. The United States also blatantly supported the right in Greece, Italy, Malta and Cyprus. Leonardi and Tovias refer to the Cold War context of the Italian case where the United States felt compelled to intervene and establish a client relationship in order to subvert the threat of a communist rise to power. Verney and Couloumbis detail the near total dependence of Greece on the great powers and its client–state relationship with the United States. In 1952, the United States threatened to cut all aid to Greece if the electoral law was not changed from a proportional representation (PR) to a majority system which kept the right in power for the next eleven years.155 Thus, external actors at the domestic level replicated the same conflict between the communists and capitalists on the international scene. In Cyprus, British interests meant that the Turkish minority, with 18 per cent of the population, were given important rights of policy initiation and of veto in the constitution of 1960. In 1974, the Greeks, with American support, invaded Cyprus and attempted a right-wing coup in order to foil Makarios’156 more consensual and centrist politics that offered a real chance of conciliation with the Turkish minority.157 Ultimately, his politics was viewed as subversive and conciliatory towards the communists. In Malta, the British did not eliminate the use of corrupt practices in elections, though they were aware that they benefited the right wing.158

A politics of consensus under the influence of consensually unified elites By the 1970s, this scenario changed and the left wing was slowly included. The neutralizing of the left/right cleavage on the international scene was very evident especially in the turn the Euro-communist parties took. This made possible the

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same pacifying of the cleavages domestically.159 Coexistence meant that hardline stances had softened, and the communists were no longer persona non grata in Southern Europe. Kohler160 refers to the activities of the USSR in the area as intensive and refers to the abundant aid given to the Portuguese Communist party. The new Euro-communists also influenced the actions of communist parties in Greece, Spain and Portugal, contributing to the moderate stance taken by all three, which resulted in the acceptance of liberal democratic formulae eschewing concepts such as the dictatorship of the proletariat and the nationalization of the means of production. In Southern Europe, democratization peaked when coexistence was at its peak. The left formed a government, or part thereof, in Malta, Italy and Portugal in the 1970s and in Greece and Spain in the early 1980s. Portugal most clearly exemplifies this case. In the 1970s, the local socialists affiliated with the Socialist International and developed strong ties with the Social Democrats in Western Europe especially the German, British and Swedish parties.161 Once the moderate socialists gained the initiative in the transition, the West moved rapidly to shore up the sixth provisional government,162 which came to power on 19 September 1975, rapidly proclaimed a new constitution and was to make way for the first constitutional government of 1976. Across the board, both left and right in Europe and the United States felt that the moderate left was the best domestic ally to derail communist ambitions in Portugal in 1975. Maxwell labels this type of intervention as subtle and skilful, as a policy of subtle support for the socialists was initiated and the hard-line right was avoided.163 Until recently this material was not readily available,164 and such information as the role of the CIA in Italian politics in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s165 has only now surfaced. This new approach that rated democratic practice as more important than the promotion of ideological or party politics was reflected in the increasing number of countries that gave democracy and human rights a more prominent place in their foreign policy:  Canada, Sweden, Norway and Germany, to name a few.166 After 1989, liberal democracy was seen as the most desirable form of government. In the ex-communist region a degree of democratic cooperation surfaced, reflected in the rise of such organizations as the Visegrad Group. The United States was now seen as a promoter of democracy167 and the free market.168 In Southern Europe, pressure for democratization in the 1970s came from a number of external players all with democratic credentials, including NATO as a security and defence arm, EFTA as a member organization and the EC as a prospective member.

The inclusion of external factors in models of democratization Influenced by this new data, new theoretical models surfaced that included the role of external players as an integral ingredient in democratic transition in the region. Valenzuela’s model included, among other scenarios, democratization through defeat.169 Ethier’s model factored in transition through external forces.170 Baloyra’s model, which surfaced in 1987, distinguished between four patterns of transition, two of which were largely externally driven: a Delayed External scenario

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where deterioration and re-equilibration considerably short of a liberalization endgame is precipitated by external factors that produce the breakdown as well as a short period of implementation and a Late External scenario where deterioration leads to breakdown and one or more installations, followed by a very conflictual implementation contested by a more explicit civil–military alliance and a late endgame. In this regard, Portugal is the classic case.171 Stepan’s eight paths to democracy also included three which were primarily influenced by external determinants: internal restoration after external conquest, internal reformulation and externally monitored installation. In all three cases, democratization is precipitated from abroad and takes place through a process of defeat and penetration. Linz and Stepan’s three-way model, which is similar to Stepan’s model, also included a stage two which involved an abandonment of democracy. A  non-democratic country can overthrow a democracy and instal a non-democracy, or a non-democratic regional hegemony can use force in the outer reaches of its empire to forestall democratic process, or a democratic victor can install democracy in a defeated territory.172 Pinkney also included the external factor in his numerous models on democratization in the developing world though he is emphatic on the point ‘that external influences are seldom offered as a principle explanation’.173 However, he gives us one of the few models that brings together the domestic and foreign aspects of elite interaction in democratization: the impact of colonial rule and decolonization on democratic transition.174 These models, reflecting the Cold War period, deal with the enforced aspect of the external in democratization: democratization through defeat, through penetration, through colonization. The emphasis is on the early role played by external players and the collaboration and later takeover by domestic players.

Phase three: Integrating domestic and external variables By the early 1990s, the literature on democratization was increasingly influenced by other disciplines and the interactive approach. The literature on globalization, regionalization, federalism, supranationalism, peace studies, small state studies and promotional democracy emphasized an environment where external and internal frontiers were blurred.175 Here the world is an overlapping and interdependent domain, the global village, where the external cannot but infringe on the internal and bring the key doctrine of the twenty-first century, democratization, to the domestic unit.176 This shift is apparent in the new models of democratization. Here the external factor is given a key role. The most comprehensive account of the process of democratic transition is perhaps that of Huntington, which has provided the theoretical formula to view democratization at different periods, and in different contexts. His analysis includes three waves of democratization: the first long wave between 1828 and 1926, the second short wave between 1943 and 1962 and the final third wave starting in 1974 and continuing into the twenty-first century. Huntington also points to the existence of reverse waves between 1922 and 1942

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and between 1958 and 1975. He however emphasizes that not all transitions occurred during democratic waves.177 According to Huntington, the key influences driving the different waves all had their roots in international phenomena. The first wave had its roots in the American and French Revolutions;178 the second wave started in the Second World War179 and was triggered by the end of Western colonial rule.180 In the third wave, the movement was global181 and the spread of democracy had implications for international relations182 which positively influenced the process. The end result was a snowballing183 and escalation of the process. Huntington indicated a number of external variables that triggered the third wave including the unprecedented economic global growth of the 1960s, changes in doctrines and activities of the universal Catholic Church and changes in the policies of external actors. Thus, he sees the problems of legitimacy of the Southern European authoritarian systems as being in part triggered by external influences.184 Whitehead’s innovative research also took up this theme and incorporated a number of new external options to older models of democratization: democratization through consent, democratization through incorporation and democratization through convergence. In the three models, the distinction between national and external actors has become somewhat artificial and incomplete, and a variety of intermediate possibilities between two extremes of foreign occupation and domestically driven transitions exist. In support of this hypothesis, he argues that bridging domestic institutions or actors, such as the Church, or monarchy, generally needed a considerable degree of international support and protection, if they were to carry out a stabilizing role in the regime, in the cause of democratization. Democratic oppositions were often also closely linked to international politics, although in the case of Southern Europe their negotiations were mostly guided by domestic reasons.185 In his model the boundaries between internal and external causes are blurred, and external influences are received on a voluntary and consensual basis, and frequently at the request of the domestic unit.186 Di Palma elaborates on this theme by including democratization through diffusion, and through demonstration. Diffusion, he argues, was a key ingredient of democratic development as democracy is promoted by suppliers187 and consumers, by the attractiveness of the imported product and the consumers’ willingness to become worthy of the product.188 He argues that the demonstration effect on democratization began in the nineteenth century, in the immediate geography, or politico-cultural periphery, of Western Europe, East Central Europe and Southern Europe, and by way of the latter to Latin America. As it expanded beyond the immediate periphery, and moved into the twentieth century, Di Palma posits that the demonstration effect was joined by a new force, namely the direct exportation of democracy by democratic powers with global, regional or colonial clout.189 He suggests that this process escalated in an international context that became more favourable to democracy. He concludes that democratization does not occur in an international vacuum, and therefore external actors may affect the behaviour of domestic political actors,190 a case in point being the removal of a veto on democracy by a hegemon.191

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Di Palma also explores the increasingly controversial role of aid in furthering democratization and reinforces Whitehead’s assertion that external aid can best help democratization if it is mutually sought. It is one thing for foreign agents to offer incentives, and disincentives, it is another for them to step directly into the fray for, if democratisation seems to demand some convergence between regime and opposition then the intervention of foreign agents may well thwart that process . . . by choosing sides [foreign actors are] likely to increase domestic animosities . . . the stigma of foreign meddling is likely to attach itself to the forces which are favoured . . . [and] choosing sides and undercutting other political forces some of which may still hold reservations about democratisation may not defeat the latter but rather cause them to curtail or reconsider their search for a modus vivendi with other forces.

Therefore, he concludes, there is a clear advantage if the foreign agents who wish to help and perhaps to act as formal mediators are not hegemons but agents with less at stake, other countries of more equal standing in the region or less partial supranational and regional organizations.192 Pridham’s work also attempts to list the external phenomena that can aid democratization: geopolitical, economic, historical and cultural. The international linkages include the organizational, bilateral and multilateral; domestic linkages include the role of opposition and the role of different elites; and the internal– external dialectic includes linkages between domestic and foreign actors and the impact of international cleavages on opinion at home. His hypothesis is that the ‘external dimension will not be perceived solely in terms of the one way external input into the domestic arena . . . instead it will be treated as a complex two way process in which domestic actors react to and often in turn react upon their international environment’.193 His work links democratization with globalization and focuses on interactive, overlapping models that make short shrift of the notion of self-contained, independent units in today’s world. This theme is further developed in Rayner’s model of Constraints of International Negotiations based on global vulnerability, historical obligation, economic realities and market needs.194 It is a theme also taken up by Gill who emphasizes the importance of the internationalization of the state and the globalization of society, including global finance and debt, global migration, new processes of regionalization, the role of globalizing elites and the resultant growth of new identities and social movements. The stress is on global structural change which has reinforced the position of the global elites, widening social inequalities within and between nations, and exacerbating disparities in interstate power relations, for globalization has tended towards the spread of power of international mobile capital. This is reflected in the increased status of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and such economic grading as Moody’s where marginalization from global capital markets can be compared to excommunication from the Catholic Church in its heyday. Restrictions imposed by these groups are quasiconstitutional, involving direct restrictions on the policy autonomy and economic

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sovereignty of nations, in order to ensure and support the rule of global market forces. The result is the transformation of the basis of political authority, legitimacy and accountability, away from national governments, towards transnational and global markets as states compete to attract and retain foreign direct investment.195

From bilateral to the multilateral, from the national to the supranational This new scenario is most noticeable in the growth of two phenomena in the study of the internal–external dynamic: the shift from bilateral to multilateral and the growth of regional and supranational units. Changes in defence, security and economics required states to work in tandem, and pool resources, leading to the growth of multilateral organizations. The limitations of political sovereignty also led to the rise of supranational organizations, where political and economic powers were devolved to joint bodies. These strengthened units were better able to deal with the numerous new contingencies of a twenty-first-century global order. The result is a larger and more varied number of international players. By the 1970s, multilateral and supranational organizations had become more sophisticated, coherent and assertive. By the early 1990s, the literature on democratization was focusing on the input of international organizations, including the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the IMF, NATO, interest groups including environmental and business, the papacy, international agencies and non-governmental agencies.196 In this literature, the EC is viewed as the international organization with the greatest influence. The option of EC membership, and access to its markets, was an important motivation for Southern European states to open up their economies.197 However, one cannot measure EU influence solely in economic terms. Diamandouros on the Greek regime in 1967 states that it was Europe ‘which had the greatest political, economic and cultural influence over the country’.198 ‘At the European level, democracy received its greatest support. Throughout the post-war period, non-democratic regimes in Greece, Portugal and Spain were widely and increasingly condemned by West and North European states and were generally regarded as outcasts of the European democratic community.’199 It was the Western European mindset that cultivated a vision of authoritarian government as disreputable and out of synch with the norm – liberal democratic government. By the 1970s, the EC had become the main external actor in the region. In the meantime, it had developed a new foreign policy approach based on the practice of subtle, voluntary, persuasive and non-interventionist politics. Its role in the region differed considerably from that of external players in the post–Cold War period.200 The EU encouraged democratization by working with democratic groups. Several EU countries worked with left- and right-wing forces, and with employer and trade union organizations. Kohler points out that none of the major Portuguese political parties and trade unions during the transition had been set up without foreign support, that West European intervention had been essential and had taken place largely at the level of transnational party cooperation.201 EC

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actors through international party federations were able to monitor political developments.202 Though some extremist parties received foreign funding, by and large the EU funded only those parties with bona fide democratic credentials. Unlike the earlier decades, it was often the socialist parties that were funded. In Portugal, the Europeans favoured the moderate socialists in order to derail the extreme left. In Europe, EU membership was increasingly seen as the only game in town and a guarantee of irreversible democratization. Many of the new constitutions were drafted under Western supervision, and the internationalization of political actors during the process proved important in ensuring successful democratization, which was a sine qua non for membership. Though both the United States and the EU were seen as guarantees of democracy and a counter weight to Russia,203 the United States adopted a low-key stance,204 allowing the EU most leverage in the area. The United States also followed the EU lead here and often favoured the left while steering clear of parties that lacked democratic credentials.205 In assessing the role of a supranational organization in democratization, however, studies needed to focus on understanding both the impact of the international on the domestic and, in turn, how the external is altered by domestic change.206 Notions of national and international started to merge and mutate as new levels of governance surfaced, and previous notions of the state, of sovereignty and of jurisdiction, altered. It became increasingly unclear where the national ended and the international commenced. Whitehead concluded that democratization in Southern Europe was also about the definition of a modern national identity and the creation of a consensus about where these nations belong in the international system. Membership of the EU seemed to stabilize and render irreversible the democratization process, because it also resolved much larger and more profoundly unsettling issues linked to ethnicity and identity. Thus, democracy was inextricably linked to both a nation’s national and international orientation.207 Recent literature also focused on democratization in states of different dimensions, and their relationship to the European Union (EU). Goetschel argued that small states in the international system usually never attained the degree of sovereignty which larger states realized, and therefore small states gave special attention to the implications of national agreements on their autonomy, especially in the case of integrated systems.208 He also argued that the international environment today offered small states new opportunities to defend their interests so that size has no a priori negative impact, the case par excellence being that of the EU.209 Dahl also takes up this argument, asserting that the nation state itself becomes inadequate, and is gradually transformed into a kind of local government within a larger international system, and the concept of a polity or a political system no longer refers to a single integral unit but to a complex entity consisting of a number of interrelated units, some subordinate or partly subordinate to others.210 Thorhallsson, however, points out that though the economies of smaller states are more dependent on other economies,211 the administrative workings of smaller

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states in the decision-making process (of certain institutions, for example the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the EU) are characterized by greater informality and flexibility, and national officials of smaller states have greater room for manoeuvre in negotiations, and therefore the administration of small states is able to deal with EU demands as efficiently as, if not more so than, administrations of larger states.212

The twenty-first century and the concept of the reverse wave The literature on the third wave emphasized the poor quality of democracies in South America, but elsewhere was largely positive.213 In Southern and Central/ Eastern Europe the projections were positive, as both internal and external factors were perceived as supporting the transitions to consolidated democracies.214 However, unlike the propitious international climate of the last half of the twentieth century, characterized by thaw, coexistence and détente, the twenty-first century began with the 11 September bombing, the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, the 2003 war with Iraq and numerous skirmishes involving Russian troops in its immediate neighbourhood.215 New divisions surfaced between the North and South, and the East and West, characterized by ideological differences that culminated, on the one hand, in the nationalisms of the Bush and Putin doctrines and, on the other, in the rise of a new fascism of Islamic State (IS) on the Mediterranean southern borders.216 Consequently, the more recent literature on democratization emphasized variables that both facilitated and compromised transition and consolidation of democracy,217 in a region where numerous states were undergoing radical political change, albeit often veering towards democratic state models. In 2011, political change, fuelled by protests in Tunisia, spread through the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region,218 reminiscent of the Southern Europe transitions of the 1970s and the Central/Eastern European transitions of the 1990s. This fourth wave was precipitated by internal and external factors of a mixed variety, some inimical to a transition to democratic government.219 Internally, the states of the MENA region are a diverse group in terms of sociopolitical and economic norms. The Tunisian model characterized by a strong middle class, a diverse economy and developed political structures, for instance, differs radically from the tribal politics and rentier economy of Libya.220 However, overall, the new political systems that have surfaced in the region post-2011 are presently characterized by weak governments, political vacuums, civil wars and the rise of non-state actors perpetrating terrorist threats.221 This scenario has contributed further not only to instability on the African continent, but has been exported across the Mediterranean to the fringes of Europe, primarily through increased numbers of asylum seekers, and the rise of terrorist threats.222 On the fringes of Eastern Europe, the collapse of the Soviet Empire, and the expansion of the EU to its frontiers, has resulted in a weakened Russia, focused on national and security issues. Russia became intent on ensuring that its immediate neighbourhood would not be sucked into the orbit of the EU, resulting in the

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loss of its buffer zone and new shared frontiers with an enlarged and empowered European federation. The result has been conflict between Russia and its former federated states including Belarus, Georgia and the Ukraine.223 Presently, on its external borders, the EU is surrounded by a ring of unstable polities, and this scenario has reinforced its tendency towards a fortress Europe.224 Internally the expansion of the EU to the East has culminated in a twenty-eightmember union, with the gargantuan task of ensuring unity in diversity. The enlargement has also radically changed the dynamic between the different states. The new EU GDP, lowered by membership of the Eastern states, did not affect the Southern European states’ status as net beneficiaries. Membership of Eastern/ Central Europe did affect Southern European competitiveness, as investment shifted eastwards towards dynamic, newly opened markets, with cheaper labour and production costs. This shift also coincided with the 2007 global economic recession and banking crisis, which has impacted with a deleterious effect on Southern Europe.225 The economies of Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece and Cyprus were all hard hit by recession and the credit crunch.226 Membership of the euro placed constraints on the fiscal responses to the crisis that could be utilized by Southern European states, primarily the devaluation of their currencies. EU rescue deals for Portugal and Greece, and talk of a ‘Grexit’, have placed Southern Europe membership of the EU, and more specifically the euro, in a controversial light. The Economist227 in 2010 argued that the Southern European states were never meant to join the Euro and were not prepared for such a contingency. Though Southern Europe was supported on its path to EU convergence, it remains questionable as to how far the allocated regional funds actually assisted Southern European states in developing their economies.228 In Italy, percentages, in terms of implementing structural funds, have been low. In Spain and Portugal, the figures have been high and the process largely successful. However, these distributive mechanisms tend to reap benefits when the economy is doing well. Indeed, in the past half-decade, prosperity levels as measured by per capita incomes have stagnated or fallen across Southern Europe.229 In 1980, per capita income in Spain and Greece was barely half that in France; per capita income in Portugal was a fourth of French GDP. Currently, prosperity in Greece and Portugal remains barely half that of France. It is predicted that in the global economy the share of Southern Europe will half to 6 per cent between 1980 and 2018.230 Despite this bleak scenario, Southern European states did prepare for euro entry. One of the most onerous tasks embarked upon was the overhaul of their social systems. This process began before entry into the euro and gathered momentum in Spain, Portugal and Italy. In Greece, however, from its inception it failed to deal with the major overhaul needed, and the reform process became gridlocked, leading to high unemployment and rising poverty. After 2000, reform slowed down everywhere and was only partially successful in Italy and Portugal. In Greece, the economy continued to decline. EU austerity measures, linked to a monetary policy supported by a market-driven convergence approach, coupled with inadequate short-term fiscal support, and insufficient growth policies, have

24

Democracy in Southern Europe

placed their welfare states under increasing strain. This has required further welfare reform and cuts in social spending, which is said to be eroding social and labour rights and wreaking havoc in the region. The refusal to write off part of the Greek loans, which are being utilized primarily to pay off existing loans and interest fees, has brought Greece to the brink of Euro exit. The optimistic view of Southern Europe as a developed region in the literature of the 1980s, the 1990s and the early twenty-first century has been somewhat reversed in recent publications.231 With the Euro crisis of 2008, Southern Europe was once again seen as out of step with its richer and more stable neighbours.232 The states were viewed as profligate and indolent, and the derogatory term ‘PIGS’ was bandied around to describe the economies and at times the people of Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain. Pendaliu233 argues that the raised profiles of these states became compromised by the homogenization brought about by closer European integration after the signing of the Schengen treaty (1985), the introduction of the Single European Act (1986), the creation of the Eurozone and 9/11. The EU became focused on a closer fortress Europe, and diversification became passé. In this climate, the essence of Southern Europe was lost. Whereas previously it was the optimal model of the Spanish transition that had characterized democratization in the region, today it is the Italian234 and Greek235 cases that come to mind. In the case of Italy, a sophisticated literature has long characterized the country as a difficult democracy at best, and in Greece, projections of economic collapse have kept the country constantly in the news. The literature of the twenty-first century resuscitates an earlier model of Southern European politics, one that harps on the economic impasse in the region, riddled by a politics of clientelism and patronage, that have not been eradicated with EU membership.236 In Greece a populist politics, conducted by the two main parties, led to state resources, including land, becoming spoils of those who won the elections, resulting in the total pillage of the nation’s wealth. Sotiropoulos237 shows that reforms to the bureaucracy in Spain, Greece, Portugal and Italy, to make the civil service more accountable, were aborted due to resistance from the administration and changes of government. Adopting Magone’s categorization238 we can argue that though government structures in Southern Europe have been influenced by Europeanization, their bureaucratic institutions reflect their status as weak or slightly flawed democracies. The fragility of Southern European democracies is also reflected in the seismic changes in their political markets. We have seen a rise in the volatility of their party systems, governments have been frequently overturned and governing parties have suffered a serious decline in Greece and Italy, with politicians being replaced by technocrats. New left-wing popular parties have surfaced – Podemos in Spain and Syriza in Greece among others, reflecting a populace preference for a social market economy and the extension of liberal social mores such as gay marriage and the decriminalization of the drug regime. In Italy, Berlusconi, with no experience in, or ties to, politics, used his roots in commerce and finance to build up Forza Italia into a political party, heralding a post-democracy phenomenon, of the rise of parties with weak political roots, and lacking identification with the

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cleavage system but reliant on the media system. Innovation and change in this climate is not emanating from the formal political arena, where politicians are viewed as inept and corrupt, and in cahoots with the unpopular banking elites, but from small political and economic groups. This phenomenon corresponds with the growth of civil society protest movements, and direct citizen participation, reflected in the increasing use of referenda.239 We have also witnessed the rise of extreme parties, reflecting centrifugal forces in the party system, that have chaffed at rules laid down at Maastricht, which have removed much of the economic policy autonomy of national governments.240 Technocratic governments at the national level now mirror technocratic government at the EU level. In democracies, policies cannot be imposed on citizens without a minimum of consent and social support needs to be mobilized. This reality has surfaced with a vengeance in Greece where a referendum on 5 July 2015 led to a 60 per cent vote against continuing a package of EU austerity measures.241 Though an EU package was eventually agreed at the parliamentary level, the left-wing government, eroded of support, called for new elections. Southern Europe has also been impacted by Schengen that has facilitated the shifting of populations within the EU, while the instability of the adjacent regions has resulted in rising numbers of asylum seekers entering the EU primarily through Mediterranean ports. Population movements have impacted on the politics of national identities, and on issues of inclusion and exclusion, resuscitating latent cleavages. The result is a rise of political extremism, utilizing discourses scapegoating minorities for present problems, which is reminiscent of the 1930s.242 The German chancellor Angela Merkel expressed the common view that the large number of asylum seekers reaching the EU shore in an irregular manner is presently the Union’s greatest challenge, one which the Union has shown an abysmal failure to deal with competently.243 With waves of refugees moving across Europe, it is evident that Dublin II244 is a dead letter; but no effective burden-sharing instrument has taken its place. This has resulted in chaotic national responses to what is essentially an EU problem calling for an EU solution. The decline in support for the Union,245 seen as responsible for many unpopular domestic reforms, and the continuing democratic deficit, whereby its institutions are viewed as beyond the influence and grasp of the common man, has resulted in EU membership being viewed as eroding democracy within. Some argue that democracy is now being seen as a phenomenon of the nation state and the supranational model as eroding one with the other. Deals are increasingly brokered behind closed doors, utilizing qualified majority voting (QMV) and leaving little room for manoeuvre for the isolated beleaguered state, as in the recent case of Greece.246 However, Greece also illustrates that a beleaguered nation could not deal with the 2008 economic crisis, the recent euro crisis or the migration crisis that hit its shores after 2012 on its own. Indeed, the solutions touted called for more, rather than less, integration to absorb the negative impact of global politics and economics. At the same time, the original agenda for pushing for membership of the EU and the euro, for both Southern and Eastern Europe, seems to have been

26

Democracy in Southern Europe

forgotten. Prime Minister Soares was aware that Portugal was too weak to join the euro but pushed to further lock Portugal into Europe to ensure that the country would never again be a dictatorship.247 Neither Southern nor Eastern Europe was economically prepared for membership. A governance gap between the North and the South, characterized by a clientelism which buries merit and frustrates reform, was and remains evident. Their entry however was seen as facilitating democratic government, and stabilizing the region, for a divided Europe was and is viewed as ‘feeding parochialism, encouraging stereotyping, and ultimately encouraging extremism’.248 The EU referendum in the UK is also a stark reminder that democratization in the region is dependent on the implementation of a successful formula between different levels of governance in the EU that allows for the proper functioning of the local, regional, national and supranational spheres.

Conclusion Pridham draws our attention to the continued absence of analytical tools in the area of transitology and is critical of a literature that presents internal–external linkages loosely and blandly.249 The notion of a fully fledged theoretical model resembling that used to explain domestically driven transitions, to explain the role of the external in democratic transition, still remains an exercise in fantasy, for, as Sidjanski points out, even in the compact area of Southern Europe there are different national cases, different kinds of external actors, different degrees of influence, different time contexts and different phases of transition.250 Theoretical linkages still remain weak, and the domestic and foreign policy inputs are still detailed as two separate aspects. A  model that would be universally applicable remains on the drawing board. The new integrative approach, however, which draws on different disciplines, and gives ample space to the role of both internal and external players, does provide a framework under which both authoritarian and colonial cases can be more fully understood. Drawing on the literature and theories explained in this chapter, the next chapter will attempt a more nuanced approach to the study of democratization in Southern Europe where the external factor is given its due importance. By integrating both domestic and external models of democratization, and incorporating the cases of Malta and Cyprus into the mainstream literature on democratization in Southern Europe, the next chapter will attempt to illustrate a more developed model of democratization. This model draws on a number of different disciplines and is interactive. It views the domestic and external domains simply as one, and sees the external as reflecting domestic policy needs, and the domestic mutating in order to fulfil external demands. The model is based on a dual dynamic of authoritarian and colonial transitions; incorporates both the functionalist and elitist schools; takes place against a historical backdrop; includes four, four-and-a-half and five-player scenarios; and posits a link between democratization and state transition from weak, penetrated and fragmented states, to sovereign nations, and finally to

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integrated states within a federal framework. The model includes all the Southern European states and is based on their experience. However, its primary purpose is to provide a format through which the study of democratization in Malta and Cyprus can take place. Chapter 3 introduces us to the case of Malta and Cyprus: the colonial model of transition. Using the five-player model, it explores the role of external players in the evolution of weak, fragmented and penetrated systems on the path towards forms of national self-identity and independence. In political terms the evolution is from a repressive colonial government, albeit with some liberal and democratic tendencies reflective of its alma mater, to variations of limited and shared government, to eventual self-government. This latter phase was followed by a period of decolonization and a truncated and disputed independence. The transition was also to democratic government. The chapter, according to the functionalist mode, gives an overview of the socio-economic and political developments of the two islands prior to the transition and sees to what extent they were supportive of democratic structures. It then homes in on the actual transition and, drawing on the elitist school, emphasizes the role of the different players in the process, with particular focus on the role of the external actors. This is illustrated in Chapter 4 which details transition breakdown in Cyprus (1963/4) and Malta (1981). In both states arguments over domestic arrangements, primarily enforced constitutional formulae, were also reinforced by conflicting views over foreign policy, which resulted in domestic elites drawing on and exploiting the resources of external elites for their own ends. In Cyprus, state breakdown occurred after only three years, in which time the five-player model continued to operate. The breakdown of the state was devastating and resulted in civil war. In Malta, however, post-independence echoes of the four-and-ahalf-player game became evident as internal elites slowly mutated towards the consensual model. Party government alternated according to the electoral process, and successful constitutional revision took place. External players also started to practise a more consensual politics on the island. These practices were never fully abandoned and account for the less devastating breakdown of the state in the late 1970s. Chapter  5 follows a period of conflict resolution and attempts at a second transition, which was paralleled by the transition of both islands to a more secure sovereign status, and more developed notions of nationhood. These transitions took place in Cyprus in 1974 and in Malta in 1987, when new constitutional arrangements provided the framework under which a semblance of order and peace resulted. In Malta conflict resolution took place under the four-and-ahalf-player model, largely under the auspices of domestic elites, where new constitutional arrangements had majority support, and the resultant cleavage reconciliation meant that the body politic recognized and approved of the current political order. The role of the external elites in the process was greatly reduced, and was not now enforced, but more sought after, and voluntary in nature. Conflict resolution in Malta also occurred at a time when any remnants of the Cold War were fast fading. This reality, along with the fact that it was the more pragmatic

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politics of the EU that was influential here, meant that the external elites could play a more consensual role than in previous years. In Cyprus, however, attempts at a second transition again took place under a five-player model, under fairly rabid Cold War conditions, where the external elites continued to play a central and predominant role. The outcome was a second enforced transition, negotiated once again without majority support, and relying for its continued existence on these same external players. Though in early 1974 some chance of real conflict resolution was possible, negotiated primarily by the domestic elites, foreign players once more presented Cyprus with a fait accompli, and the division of Cyprus into two states. The status quo did provide the two states of Cyprus with a more reconciliatory cleavage base within more secure state borders. This, however, was a status quo based on two separate notions of sovereignty and nationhood. Chapter 6 is based on a four-and-a-half-player model and emphasizes the shift on both islands from varying types of independence and sovereignty to a new model of integration within a federated framework. The focus is both islands’ new status as EU members and posits that over time this will bring increased harmonization between external and internal domains on Malta and Cyprus. For this, new federated status will finally provide the framework under which both states can finally reconcile long-standing divisions of ethnicity, region, culture and class. The result would be the practice of more consensual politics, where domestic elites pool their resources in order to afford both islands better access to the new opportunities, and to stave off any new threats resulting from their changed status in the global order.

Chapter 2 D E M O C R AT I Z AT IO N I N S OU T H E R N E U R O P E   – A N E X T E R NA L M O D E L O F T R A N SI T IO N :   C O L O N IA L V E R SU S A U T HO R I TA R IA N   T R E N D S

The most important feature of the game is the activity of the pieces. What distinguishes the grand master is the ability to sense the critical moment in a game and a finer understanding of various positional problems for the odd piece here or there makes little difference. Rather ingenuity and the will to win may prove decisive.1

Introduction This chapter will focus on developing a model of democratization in the context of the role of external players in Southern Europe. The model will draw on the empirical and theoretical material that is available on Southern Europe, much of which has been touched upon in the first chapter. It will also draw on original data from the cases of Malta and Cyprus, countries that to date have remained largely peripheral to the study of democratization in Southern Europe.2 Data and models that are specific to the role of domestic players in the process will also be factored in. At the same time, since much that occurs on the international circuit is often but an extension and replication of domestic action, domestic models here have been transposed and altered to comment on the international order. Finally, it will also draw on data that focuses on the international context of democratization but is not specific to the Southern European case. The model, in line with current dogma, draws on a number of different disciplines and is largely interactive. It views the domestic and external environment simply as one domain and sees the external as reflecting domestic policy needs, and the domestic mutating to fulfil external demands.3 The model incorporates most of the Southern European states and is based on their experience; however, its primary purpose is to provide a format through which the study of democratization on the islands of Malta and Cyprus can take place. The model is based on a regional study;4 however, it draws on both middle-range and universally applicable theories.

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The absence of external players in democratization models Though models of democratic transition have been innovative in the way they have incorporated functionalist and elitist approaches,5 they remain inadequate.6 Some models use a functionalist approach and comment on the macro level. These reveal a similarity in the socio-economic and historical variables supporting democratization in the area. Other models function at the micro level, at the level of elite interaction, and are structured around a four-player game7 and on the supposition that democratization is promoted by domestic elites. External factors, though increasingly mentioned, have only recently been factored in as an integral ingredient of the process and remain peripheral to both functionalist and elitist models.8 Recent studies on the region have focused on the elitist approach and on the micro-managed aspect of democratization.9 These include those researching the external dimension.10 Accordingly, this chapter will shift from a macro to a micro approach with an emphasis on the latter.

The global order and different regime types: Similarities of the colonial and authoritarian models The starting point of any model of democratization is to assess the viability of the regime to democratize.11 Functionalist models analyse the type of regime in socio-economic and political terms.12 The countries under study prior to democratization (authoritarian/colonial)13 were regime types most likely to sport conditions conducive to adopting democracy.14 Authoritarian government is rule by the few and thus in essence accepts the notion of some plurality of vision at governmental level.15 Colonial government also accepted this stance since its representatives were bred in a democratic culture that increasingly criticized any government that was not based on the notion of popular sovereignty and the will of the people.16 In both models one often found semi-parliamentary systems, a limited franchise, an embryonic party system and interest groups that could serve as alternative power blocs to the state. In both regimes, civil society and the private economy were tolerated.17 However, in authoritarian regimes, these semidemocratic conditions were home grown rather than imported, as was the case in many colonial regimes.18 These models differed radically from totalitarian systems, where the state monopolizes both the political and economic space leading to lack of alternative doctrines that could question the establishment.19 Prior to democratization, both models were viewed as unacceptable on the international circuit.20 Colonial rule, whose legitimacy had always been circumspect, was now in a world dominated by notions of self-determination eroded of any support even within Britain.21 The authoritarian dictators were increasingly abandoned by those groups that had previously supported them. The Church, the business elite and even sections of the nobility found the practices of their government incompatible with their present aims, including that of making closer contact with the outside world,22 especially that of adjacent and affluent democratic

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31

Western Europe.23 Elites in these countries were now no longer prepared to shore up regimes that lacked legitimacy in a world dominated by the ideals of liberal democracy. The countries of Southern Europe, however, differed radically from their western neighbours in the context of state-ness and nationhood.24

The premodern phase: The discourse of fragmented nationalism and the dominance of dis-unified elites The first law of democratization states that ‘democracy is a form of governance of a modern state. Thus, without a state, no modern democracy is possible’.25 Cleavages of ethnicity must be reconciled prior to transition, and autonomy, unity and identity reconciled.26 A  territorial unit must lie within consolidated state boundaries and possess a unified sense of national identity.27 Linz and Stepan assert that in the case of Southern Europe the issue of state-ness had been resolved and was not a problem.28 However, this statement evidently did not include the cases of Malta and Cyprus, which as colonies and ex-colonies still had their sovereign status in question, and in the case of Cyprus a national identity still in question.29 One can also argue that in the case of all the Southern European states, conflicting notions of nation also delayed democratization.30 In this regard a distinction has to be made between state31 and nation, for when the latter was resolved, the former still remained in question, as the permeability and fragility of state frontiers in the region made these countries targets for external players and they became defeated or penetrated systems.32 All the states of the region came late to statehood, and all were bedevilled by problems of conflicting notions of nation.33 In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when the first democratic wave occurred, Southern Europe lay at the periphery of the region, unable to accrue the resources and make the changes needed to compete with, challenge and access the states of the Western European core. Southern European states were either in decline as was the case with Spain and Portugal,34 struggling for independence and then preoccupied with consolidating the state as was the case with Italy and Greece,35 or in the case of Malta and Cyprus still under colonial rule.36 This meant that independence and the centralization and consolidation of state units and of their boundaries, that had been completed in much of Western Europe, came late in the day here. Consequently, notions of nation and sovereignty remained bedevilled by unresolved cleavages of ethnicity, region and class.37 Conflicts which in the older sovereign states of Europe had been largely resolved by the end of the nineteenth century remained in abeyance in Southern Europe. Society here was torn asunder by a huge political divide that split most of the nations in the region into two.38 A cleavage structured around a huge cultural polarization of religious traditionalism versus a growing liberal radicalism gave rise to two different sociopolitical and cultural traditions, which coexisted and represented different versions of the state. One was conservative, catholic, traditional, closed, semi-feudal and centred in the countryside. The other was nascently liberal, urban, enlightened, oriented towards Europe and concentrated in the cities.39

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This great schism was reinforced in most of Southern Europe by a clerical/anticlerical cleavage, a North/South – urban/rural – cleavage and a linguistic/ethnic cleavage. Anti-clerical sentiment came to be part of the baggage of liberal and left-wing forces that saw the Church as the enemy of change and progress. Those who represented linguistic and ethnic minorities also ranged themselves against the centralist State that claimed the sole right to interpreting the concept of nation and saw the forces of the left as their natural allies. In much of Southern Europe, cultural and monetary resources tended to be more abundant in the north – that is, in Italy, Portugal, Malta and Cyprus, though in the latter case after 1964 resources were relocated to the south. In Spain, the division lay between a poor centre and a rich and advanced periphery.40 The cleavage structure and elite behaviour of nineteenth- and early-twentiethcentury Southern Europe did not differ that radically from the rest of the continent. Like elsewhere the interpretation of the national discourse remained the prerogative of the few, and those elites that represented the liberal, urban and secular traditions of State could work with, and to a large extent seemed to be an extension of, the more conservative forces. By the end of the century, however, these liberal forces exhausted their capacity for further change and more radical and revolutionary forces demanded sweeping reforms. The anarchists and communists, the new forces of the left, tapped into the historical, cultural and social traditions of the rising industrial proletariat and presented an alternative interpretation to the national discourse. In Western and Northern Europe consolidated state structures provided room for manoeuvre, with the conservative groups less fearful of the forces of the left threatening traditional institutions and therefore being more prepared to compromise. Here conservative governments bowed to the inevitable and incorporated these forces under the new politics of democratization.41 In Southern Europe, however, fragile and unconsolidated state structures were unable to implement this process. Increasingly, this politics of exclusion gave rise to what Wiarda referred to as ‘dos Spains’, ‘dos Portugals’.42 Here the state divided into two rival and competing forms; two interpretations of the nation coexisted and become mutually exclusive, to the extent that we can talk of two nations, in Spain, Portugal, Greece, Italy, Malta and Cyprus.43 The fragile and unconsolidated nature of these states, coupled with an insecure sense of nationhood, and at times a lack of sovereignty, impacted on the underlying social construct and postponed the ability of the elites to conduct a politics based on consensus and compromise, needed for successful democratic transition.44

Hijacking the fragmented nation state The forces of the right – a home-grown authoritarian model In the authoritarian model, these irreconcilable class, religious and ethnic cleavages allowed the forces of the right to capture the state and prohibit the shift towards a more pluralist government. In Spain, the political spectrum was controlled by the

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33

extremes: at one end the communists and the Republicans and at the other end the conservatives, the monarchy and the Church. The result was the civil war of 1936–9. Similar patterns of politics were observed in Greece, Portugal and Italy. Fascist figures taking advantage of these divisions extolled the politics of a unifying nationalism and were able to muster enough support for Mussolini to rise to power in Italy in 1922, Franco to take over in Spain in 1939 and Salazar in Portugal in 1932. In Greece, a semi-democratic system limped on until authoritarian figures in the army took over in 1967.45 The forces of the right – an imported colonial model In Cyprus and Malta, external players forestalled the development of the national domain and the extension of liberal and democratic rights.46 In Malta, a sense of nation was evident at elite level as early as 1800; however, they identified with cultural and linguistic norms from outside the island. Malta prior to British colonization belonged to the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and the aristocracy and middle classes adopted Italian culture and spurned their native Maltese ‘as the language of the kitchen’ with no orthography, and little literary value. These elites regarded the defence of Italian rather than Maltese as a method of maintaining their independent status as Britain attempted to cultivate the English language on the island. Long-term, however, British policy succeeded, for the new middle classes derived their wealth from British endeavour and adopted English habits. The result was the existence on the island of two mutually exclusive groups, who inhabited different geographical areas, were schooled in different linguistic and cultural norms and had different associations of patria.47 In Cyprus previous colonizations by Greece and Turkey meant that at the time of transition, the population was largely Greek but with also an 18 per cent Turkish presence. The elites continued to identify with either Greece or Turkey from where they drew their respective linguistic, religious and cultural habits. British colonization of the island in 1878 further forestalled the growth of a Cypriot identity. Here also two mutually exclusive groups came to inhabit different geographical areas, were schooled in different linguistic and cultural norms and had different associations of patria.48 In Malta and Cyprus, lack of consensus over the character of the state was reinforced by a class overlap. The old established elites identified with an Italian culture in Malta or a Greek culture in Cyprus, whereas the new elites identified with Britain on Malta and with Turkey in Cyprus.49 On both islands, linkages with colonial players, in one case created, and in the second case inflated, the ethnic cleavage base. By co-opting the conservative forces and excluding the more liberal left-wing elements on the islands, they were able to maintain control, limit sovereignty and curtail democratization of the system.50 This lack of national unity and a sense of consolidated identity on both islands delayed demands for independent government. In Cyprus, this was reflected in the calls for enosis (integration with Greece) and taksim (division of the island and the union of the Cypriot Turkish part with Turkey).51 In Malta, there were calls for integration with

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Italy in the 1930s from a small group of conservative right-wingers and demands by the Labour Party in the late 1950s that Malta integrate with Britain.52

The problem of smallness and island micro states Negative domestic conditions which militated against the unitary state, and delayed democratization, also affected the region’s position within the international realm. Unresolved issues of sovereignty weakened the states of Southern Europe53 which were also disadvantaged by their peripheral status.54 All had problems of economic sustenance,55 and, with the exception of Spain and Italy, all were also small states. In international relations the focus is on the uneven distribution of power, and therefore the small state is seen as weak and lacking power. This lack of power prohibits it from acting independently, and its predominant concern is to survive the negative consequences of great power intervention.56 Small states, however, need to function on the international circuit for a variety of reasons including access to international markets, which are a prerequisite to economic prosperity and a means of stability. However, foreign powers often influence the trade revenues of an economically dependent state, and may easily blackmail it, and structural factors may often be too strong to leave the small state much choice.57 Cyprus and Malta were also island micro states, and so the likelihood of external intrusion was at its greatest. Island micro states, as a result of insularity, vulnerability, distance from the mainland, lack of a hinterland and often lack of resources, are far more susceptible to external intrusion and dominance than most other states. Negativities of small scale are here enhanced. Far more resources are needed to defend small island territories, and though not easily taken if an adequate defence system is in place, it is also harder to repel enemies with hard power or displace enemies already in place. Additionally, since islands lack the resources concomitant with a hinterland, they are often dependent on other territories that can provide a hinterland by proxy.58 Those states that were weakest at home were those that found it hardest to survive on the international circuit.59 All the Southern European states found themselves weak on the international circuit and often relatively powerless.60 In the context of international relations realist theory, which viewed the international realm as a theatre of powerful and powerless states, and dominant and dominated states,61 the Southern European states fell into the latter category.62 All could be viewed as either defeated states, colonized states or penetrated states.63 This is reflected in the role external actors played in the different regimes prior to and at the point of democratic transition. It was all-pervading in the colonial states but was also a variable in the authoritarian transitions. It was least evident in Spain64 and most conspicuous in Cyprus.65 In other words, the extent of the external role in the transitions depended on how robust a sense of national identity and state-ness was at that point, and what resources were available to maintain this independence.

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35

Democratization: Consolidating sovereignty and the nation-state model Spain and Portugal – the ancient regime: Weak states, delayed democratization Throughout the twentieth century, all the Southern European states were mutating towards more consolidated nation-state models that showed a preference for democratic models of governance, albeit with setbacks.66 Spain and Portugal were the first to consolidate their domains. By the sixteenth century, they were powerful nations with empires.67 Despite a serious decline in their fortunes, remnants of former grandeur and power reinforced their position on the international circuit. Here domestic control over national issues was never in doubt, and sovereignty remained intact even in the critical months when crisis and chaos reigned:  in the silent Portuguese coup by Salazar in 1933, in the Spanish civil war of 1936, in the death of Franco in 1975 and in the staggering Portuguese defeats in their colonies in the 1970s and the subsequent army uprisings at home.68 However, one could also argue that Spanish and Portuguese separateness and insularity from the international domain allowed them to resist the pull of democratization and maintain governmental systems that were out of synch with the politics of the region.69 The five-player model: Greece and Italy – new nations: Defeated states, failed democratizations The cases of Italy and Greece were somewhat different. Both states had recently gained independence.70 In the mid-twentieth century these states were still highly fragmented, Greece more so than Italy, with unconsolidated state structures and poor and underdeveloped economies. Both were unable to sponsor successful foreign policies. The result was devastation in two world wars. The First World War heralded the end of their first attempts at democratization, and the Second World War resuscitated these attempts. External pressures in these two states hastened the path to democratization. However, attempts at democratization here after the Second World War were democratizations by defeat, where American leverage was considerable in these two war-exhausted states that were also frontline states in the new Cold War scenario. External influences long-term delayed rather than hastened democratization in these two countries.71 American leverage in these two states increased in the immediate post-war years once the United States realized that strong communist movements in both states made a communist takeover in Italy and Greece possible. This resulted in a largely proscribed left-wing movement in both countries and only a partial system of democratic government being operational. The result was that in both cases the new regimes lacked consensus; however, they were too weak to ensure immunity from external interference in local politics. Governments here were constantly in crisis, and democratic practice was eroded as the party systems became more polarized. This situation was worsened by the habit of the United States continually supporting right-wing governments here. In Greece, weak sovereignty

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left her vulnerable to the incursions of the superpowers intent on furthering their interests. The result was a failed transition and the imposition with the support of the United States of a right-wing authoritarian government in 1967 with little legitimacy at both the grass-roots and elite level, and only kept in place through the intervention of the army.72 These first transitions occurred at the peak of the Cold War when international cleavages were manifest, and both the United States and the USSR exhibited dominant and intrusive behaviour. Both were transitions through defeat and took place when both realms were weak and fragmented at home and in the international realm. The transitions were dominated by external actors and largely unsuccessful. Both transitions replicated at home the manifest left/right cleavage dominating the international scene. Since both states fell into the Western sphere of influence, the right-wing dominated the process of transition and ensured that the left had little chance of becoming parties of government. This lengthened the period of time before a politics of consensus could be said to be fully in place.73 Italian democracy proved to be more robust74 than the Greek. In the first place, the constitution that came into force in 1948 that ushered in democratic government was a document formatted and approved across the political spectrum including the communists. The 1948 transition was therefore a result of a politics of consensus and compromise.75 Though external elites were present, a national space was created which allowed the domestic elites the room to manoeuvre and negotiate where necessary.76 Italy’s relatively recent sovereign status meant that the politics of integration and centralization was not yet complete, and lines of fracture along the state fabric were still evident.77 However, Italy after the Second World War reacted to the trauma of a failed fascist politics of nationalism by sponsoring a politics of federalism, was one of the first European states to promote federal politics on the continent and was a founding member of the European Economic Community (EEC). A politics of European integration was to aid Italy’s transition to democracy.78 The five-player model: Malta and Cyprus – colonized states: Limited sovereignty: Failed democratizations In the colonial regimes, democratization occurred in the 1960s79 and through decolonization.80 Therefore, independence and democratization took place simultaneously.81 Democratization through decolonization entails a number of processes occurring in tandem.82 Normally, the final contours and parameters of the state have not as yet been determined. Usually, ex-colonial powers do not just depart83 but also hang on to certain spheres of power.84 When they bodily remove themselves from the country, they have a tendency to leave certain issues of state unresolved.85 Decolonized states also continue to identify with their colonizer, who has normally impacted on their sense of identity.86 Even when ethnicity triggers demands for self-determination, this does not imply that the unit is homogenous in its demands.87 Conflicting notions of sovereignty are often present and are expressed by the different construct of the state carried by the indigenous elites,

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37

who have been influenced by their colonial experiences and frequently differ in their visions, from that of the grass roots influenced by a more indigenous culture.88 Elite relations in colonial states also differ radically from other states since the sense of other, the sense of us and them, around which establishment and opposition politics is built, does not develop internally, but within a construct that includes the colonizer.89 Often internal elites do not fully develop the art of compromise needed for consensual politics and the carrying out of a positive-sum game.90 For in the final analysis it is the colonial overlord who determines and is responsible for the outcome, and this allows local elites to abdicate responsibility for decisions taken.91 On independence, the domestic elites often do not yet have full knowledge of the running of a state. Nor, in many cases, do they have the tools; for many of the institutional structures will have only recently been set up, and the economic structures will still be derivative of their previous dependent status.92 Thus, colonies undergoing democratization are in effect overloaded, coping with the transition both to democracy and to full sovereignty.93 This is reflected in the role of external players in the process of the democratic transition which is all pervading. In Malta and Cyprus, the external elite oversaw the transitions and had the final say. It was these external elites who determined when and how independence would take place and determined the final framework of the state. It was they who bestowed democratic government on the two islands. More importantly, one of the critical conditions for a successful transition, that it is primarily the outcome of the domestic environment, was not met.94 All these conditions were worsened by a British tendency to speed up the process of decolonization.95 The transitions in Malta and Cyprus were similar to the post-war transitions in Greece and Italy, in that they took place under an international environment still dominated by the contingencies of the Cold War. America was still recovering from the realities of Cuban politics and saw the potential for a second Cuba in any trouble spot. The Mediterranean Sea divided two equally troubled areas in the eyes of the Atlantic Alliance (NATO). On the northern shores lay Southern Europe: poor, undeveloped and exposed to the temptations of leftist politics. In the south lay a Middle East, with essential oil deposits, seeking independent status and easily wooed by the militant doctrines of the communist cause.96 The external player that oversaw these transitions was Britain. Until recently the dominant power in the Mediterranean, and colonial overlord of much of North Africa in the 1960s, it no longer possessed the economic or military means to defend this heritage and ensure continued influence in the area. The results were transitions overseen by a weak external player, which weakened further both islands’ security in the global order and made possible the intrusion of other external actors.97 The situation was worsened by the fact that both Malta and Cyprus were essential defence networks in this Cold War scenario. Malta lay in the middle of the Mediterranean, defending the southern rim of Europe. Cyprus lay at the edge of Europe – a bridge to three continents. Russia in this period was attempting to extend her influence in the area and fulfil an ambition centuries old of entering the Mediterranean Sea. When Britain undertook to cede these two

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islands, it was evident that America and her NATO allies would want to ensure that these two islands remained within the Western sphere of influence.98 The involvement of numerous external elites battling for different sides only increased the chances of a failed democratic transition. Unlike the authoritarian systems where home-grown governance in the 1950s and 1960s provided the space for the slow neutralization and reconciliation of the cleavage base, cleavages in the colonial regimes were reinforced.99 The result is that the transition to independent and democratic government in the 1960s on both islands was undertaken by dis-unified elites where differences existed over ideological and institutional formulae.100 The outcome was polarized political systems that could not create the right conditions for transition take-off, let  alone for the consensual pacted transitions101 reminiscent of the authoritarian states. In Malta, though other external players were appealed to and consulted, it was still Britain who oversaw the transition.102 However, Britain wanted to ensure the continued support of the island after independence and believed that this would be best accomplished by supporting the right wing. As a result, transition involved consensus primarily between these two players and sidelined the left wing.103 In the case of Cyprus, there were numerous foreign elites who were intimately involved in the politics of the island. Britain granted both Greece and Turkey an equal say along with itself in the drafting of the Zurich agreement, in the treaty of defence and in the constitution of independence.104 Greek and Turkish Cypriots that represented 80 per cent and 18 per cent of the population, respectively, were also given an equal say in the negotiating process,105 though negotiations were completed without the agreement of the Greek-Cypriots.106 Greece and Turkey, both intent on retaining control of Cyprus, were also given a say in certain crucial policy areas of the newly independent Cyprus.107 In Malta, however, the document of transition in principle granted the island sovereignty.108 In Cyprus, the independence constitution was circumvented by a number of clauses that restricted its sovereignty.109 This state of affairs reduced the 1960 independence to a farce, allowed little space for internal elites to resolve their differences110 and format a workable state construct and worsened relations between two of the key players  – Greece and Turkey. This situation increased the number of external players, as the United States became a broker in Cypriot affairs since Greece and Turkey were key members of NATO, and any friction between them could destabilize and weaken the military alliance.111 Over time Russia was also drawn into the fray, used as a counter pawn by Makarios in the face of seemingly pro-Turkish US interference.112 Thus, post independence and post transition it was external players with interests that differed radically who continued to call the shots and dictate policy.113 The colonial transitions of the 1960s differed radically from the authoritarian transitions of the 1970s where domestic players called the shots and where a large consensus was present.114 In Malta and Cyprus, these less than optimal conditions resulted in documents of transition in which the new contours of government were not acceptable to a sizeable majority of the population.115 Inevitably, democratic transition on both islands was not followed, as in the case of Spain,

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39

Portugal and Greece, by democratic consolidation, but by governmental crisis, which was expressed in a blatant disregard of both the institutional and procedural mechanisms of democracy, which numerous domestic elites felt that they could not relate to, and had had no say over.116 In both cases this necessitated a second transition, based on a more consensual style of politics that would result in a document of transition with wider support. This situation was made worse by the newness of both islands’ sovereign status which impacted on their relations with external players. Recently decolonized states tend to be chauvinistic in their nationalist aspirations, keen to flex their muscles and play a role on the world stage and exhibit their independence.117 In the authoritarian states with a longer history of sovereignty, chauvinistic foreign policy endeavours had already been expressed and overcome at an earlier point in time. This allowed these states to adopt a more pragmatic and consensual foreign policy at the point of transition, which helped them to consolidate their position in the region, and was more accepting of certain tendencies towards dependency.118 In Malta and Cyprus, the governments’ first priority was to protect and distance themselves from previously intrusive regional players. This goal was reflected in both islands’ choice of foreign policy:  neutral and non-aligned, which was reinforced further by governments’ endeavours to extend their international relations and make wide-ranging contacts. The islands could neither accept nor at the same time throw off their status of dependency, but both endeavoured to extend the list of countries that would support this dependency. Ultimately, both developed relations with countries in the immediate vicinity and in the Soviet sphere of influence. Both also adopted a non-conciliatory and autocratic approach to foreign policy. The end result was the development of a negative and suspicious relationship with the countries in the immediate region and in the Western sphere of influence, which only increased the politics of interference and force on their part.119 In Cyprus, foreign policy endeavours left it weak on the international circuit, with no major players prepared to come to its defence.120 This weakness was further reinforced on the domestic front, for attempts to reach consensus, consolidate the national domain and develop a sense of Cypriot identity failed.121 The document of independence not only exacerbated further an already polarized and manifest ethnic cleavage but also did not provide the framework for an independent state. Britain still retained the undisputed right to host a military base on the island, and no clause of the constitution could be changed without the consent of the three guaranteeing powers. In effect, the Cypriot constitution was a paper constitution; under its mantle, the people of Cyprus were not granted sovereignty and were not given the final say in the running of their state.122 In the crisis that followed the attempt to work the constitution in 1964, in the de facto partition of 1974 and in the attempted de jure partition of 1983, it was always foreign elites that finally determined the course of action.123 The breakdown of democracy in 1964 was followed by a second failed attempt at democratic transition in 1974.124 The continued interference of external players, coercive in nature, and the limitations of Cypriot sovereignty provided neither the space nor

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Democracy in Southern Europe

the tools for the domestic players to reach consensus and conflict resolution.125 Unresolved politics of identity, of nationhood and sovereignty meant that though democratic governance evolved on the island, it did so under the construct of two different states.126 These transitions in Southern Europe all occurred under a five-player game where dis-unified external elites exhibited coercive and intrusive behaviour in their dealings with these countries. These methods reinforced the negative practices of the domestic dis-unified elites, resulting in a zero-sum game127 and failed democratic transitions. Second attempts at democratic transition, however, quickly followed and were successful.128 These took place under a four-and-a-halfplayer game where all the countries had entered the modern phase characterized by more developed socio-economic and political conditions and the consolidation of the nation state. This enabled a shift from dis-unified to consensually unified elites. This was mirrored by a corresponding shift taking place within the international domain. The result was consensually unified external elites operating in these countries under a pragmatic, voluntary and consensual model. These methods reinforced the behaviour of consensually unified domestic elites and resulted in a positive-sum game. As these states shifted towards a third postmodern phase where national models mutated towards a federal model symbiotic of the European core, democratic government was further consolidated.

The four-and-a-half-player model: The modern phase A colonial model – the case of Malta Malta, on independence, was granted sovereignty and jurisdiction and consequently the island started to mutate towards a model that resembled more closely those of the authoritarian regimes in the 1960s and early 1970s. Slowly the island coalesced into a more stable national unit, with less porous and more consolidated territorial dimensions and a new sense of state-ness.129 Once the state felt more confident to manage its economic agenda, it began to exercise its right under the new constitution to manage its own foreign policy.130 The Labour government extended its policy of dependency to a number of players across the political divide.131 In line with current trends, the island also started to practise a more multilateral foreign policy. Malta became a member of a number of organizations, including the nonaligned movement, the European Community and the Council of Europe, and played an important role in such multilateral organizations as the Seabed Authority and the Council for Security and Co-operation in Europe.132 Increasingly, external players influenced the island’s political agenda more at the request of the domestic players and according to their requirements.133 The conditions were created for the domestic players to consolidate transition and resolve a number of contentious constitutional issues in 1974.134 However, in searching for a model of independence, Malta was more in line with the North African newly decolonized nations, who rejected a West European

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41

model of governance reminiscent of colonial bondage and adopted a socialist model with authoritarian leanings. The unreconciled left/right cleavage which was exacerbated in the 1964 transition became manifest in government attempts to put the island at the service of the proletariat and reconstruct the state according to a left-wing model. The shift towards consensual politics directed by consensually unified elites which resulted in the constitutional revisions of 1974 and had placed Malta very much on a par with the 1974/6 transitions in the authoritarian states was reversed. A politics of extremism and coercion surfaced, followed by a polarization of the political system, the deterioration of democratic practice, a whittling away of the institutions, a slow erosion of the separation of powers and finally the breakdown of government and increased violence.135 This necessitated a second transition on the island which was completed in 1987 with further constitutional changes.136 A more mature state, with a more complete political identity, Malta was now a more robust national and sovereign unit, more self-confident and more capable of practising a consensual politics and assuaging the left/right cleavage on both the domestic and international relations front. This was illustrated in the growing consensus over foreign policy between the two major parties, most evident in the Labour government’s decision to ensure Malta’s security and neutrality, by signing a treaty with Italy and accepting Malta’s place within the Western sphere of influence.137 Malta’s transition in 1987 was therefore made possible by a new politics of national consensus which was reflected and reinforced by a more consensual, pragmatic and integrationist climate on the international front.138 These were also to be the key factors that allowed successful democratic transition in the authoritarian states in the 1970s. The authoritarian model – Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy By the late 1970s, in Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy, state formations were more solid and based on a more confident and consensual notion of national identity.139 Intense conflict over institutional and ideological formulae was largely resolved, and system structures were less polarized, with most of the political groupings prepared to inhabit the centre of the political spectrum. This was most evident in the transformation of the extreme left parties into Euro-communist parties and the preparedness of the conservative right to accept the participation of the left in government in the 1970s in Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy.140 Consequently, in different degrees, all the above nations were in possession of moderate and consensual elites at transition take-off.141 None of the states formatted a democratic transition on the perfect fourplayer model regarded as solely a domestic endeavour. Even in Spain, which had previously been regarded as the case par excellence for this method of play, more recent literature outlines the role of external players in supporting the transition. In Greece and Portugal, the transitions and the shift from dis-unified to consensual unified elites were fraught with problems, and the process remained incomplete for a number of years. This made future consensus over alternative regime structures harder. In Portugal a period of rupture, conflict and chaos

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Democracy in Southern Europe

preceded consensus, and negotiations were dominated by the left who ensured continued control of the political process by entrenching in the constitution a council that operated under a reserved powers clause. This was not removed until 1982. In Greece, the 1974 transition was criticized for its undeniable continuities with its discredited predecessors and the return to power of the same political leaders who had dominated Greek political life in the post-Second World War period.142 However, the emergence of Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) as the second largest party, the defeat of the traditional centre and the removal of the monarchy completed and legitimized the transition.143 Though more robust national domains meant that they were capable of negotiating transitions based on some of the principles of the four-player theory,144 these transitions needed, and were heavily reinforced by, external factors. Portugal and Greece prior and post transition remained very dependent on foreign aid.145 On the international circuit, their weak status was reflected in external defeats. These fiascos eroded further the legitimacy of their authoritarian regimes.146 A  more consensual and democratic climate in Europe, and globally, provided a stable environment for the transitions, supporting them and ensuring their long-term success. In this context, one can refer to Huntington’s process of snowballing147 and Whitehead’s processes of contagion and consent.148 All three models stress the impact of the external domain on democratization of states in the third wave.

The international climate Southern Europe in the 1970s and 1980s was therefore conditioned by a more moderate and consensual external climate than previously.149 At this point, we witness a transformation of external elite behaviour from dis-unified elites to consensually unified elites underpinned by a general agreement on the necessity of democratization.150 This altered external environment impacted positively and worked in tandem with internal developments in the authoritarian states of Southern Europe and in Malta. The international sphere throughout the twentieth century was undoubtedly progressively becoming more democratic. France, Britain, Germany, the United States and the USSR were the dominant players on the international scene in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Their buoyant, innovative and successful practices were a result of newly developed liberal democratic economic and political structures. These countries then transposed these practices on the global scene, slowly democratizing international relations.151 This was reflected in such documents as Wilson’s Fourteen Points and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and such organizations as the League of Nations and the United Nations.152 This transformation was neither smooth nor continuous. It occurred in fits and starts, and there were numerous setbacks along the way. Britain and France, democracies at home, continued to practise imperialist politics in their colonies. The USSR transformed Marx’s doctrines into a totalitarian dictatorship. International practice here was one maintained by

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blood and iron. The clash between capitalism and communism was to give rise to the politics of extremes: a politics of paranoia and fear. This was most evident in the practice of a hitherto democratic United States of furthering its interests abroad through coercion and by supporting and promoting right-wing rather than democratic movements here.153 However, the process was ongoing, and democratic practice, applied only between the older, more established democratic states, increasingly began to be applied globally. Huntington’s thesis on the three waves of democracy, and the concurrent reverse waves as applied to single states, is also applicable to the international scene. Each wave showed a corresponding shift towards democratic practice on the international scene. The process of decolonization proved unstoppable. The death of Stalin, the backlash against Vietnam and the politics of McCarthyism in the United States, Helsinki and new Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreements signalled a thaw in the Cold War, coexistence and détente. The United States and Russia in this environment were both increasingly prepared, especially against the alternative scenario of mutual assured destruction (MAD), to accept each other’s different political views.154 The result was more pragmatic domestic and external elites practising consensual politics. Though realist and neo-realist international politics continued to predominate, democratic states increasingly demanded democratic principles from states that they were funding and interacting with. US policy both in South America and Southern Europe became more focused on the indirect support of democratic forces and the growth of democratic culture rather than the previously blind, intrusive and often indiscriminate support of right-wing governments.155 The politics of democratization was also apparent in the successful growth of the European Community which used the tools of federation and the politics of consensus and cooperation in order to incorporate the periphery and successfully harmonize the international relations of the region and adjacent regions.156 The European Union had by the 1970s developed a fledgling foreign policy which directed much of its energies towards the furtherance of democratization in Southern Europe, its nearest neighbour. The United States was happy to leave much of the spade work here to its European allies.157 This two-way dynamic was further supported by the changing parameters and increasing fluidity in the borders between the national and international realm. The advance of the twentieth century heralded the decline of the self-sustaining, anti-democratic, centralized and closed imperialist sovereign state that replicated its politics of force on the international scene. In its stead, we see the rise of the federation, which, though initially sustained by force, slowly began to mutate into a voluntary cooperation between states, underpinned by democratic, liberal and consensual politics. Federated units began to create a new fluidity between the domestic and international spheres, allowing greater interaction and overlap that resulted in a blurring between the two domains. This new fluidity protected the domestic unit from isolation and peripherality, at the same time ensuring that its relationship in the international order was based more on a consensual and democratic politics, rather than one of force and dependency.158

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Democracy in Southern Europe

The EU was seen as a natural ally by the states of Southern Europe, a near neighbour untouched by the vicissitudes of the Cold War. The Union successfully promoted democratization in the region, adopting a pragmatic and consensual approach in its dealings with Southern Europe. She offered aid and encouragement, and eventual membership to her club if desired, but otherwise kept a low profile and largely entered the foray only when requested.159 Previously, authoritarian states undergoing second transitions were now far more consolidated and under their own remit opened up their systems to the concept of a more balanced view of governance that included the left wing.160 The EU also made it clear that democratic rather than right-wing credentials were the primary requirements for continued assistance for the region.161 EU politics in the early transition years had a positive impact on all the Southern European states. In Italy, membership of the club acted as a spur to escalate economic development and rationalize political methods.162 In Spain, Portugal and Greece, the promise and wish for membership encouraged the opening up of their economies, gave direction to policy and acted as a catalyst for a number of key movements negotiating transitions.163 Accession provided these states with new territorial, economic, scientific and cultural resources; new experiences in the practice of governance; and greater clout on the international circuit.164

The postmodern phase: Nation to federation – independence to integration The post-authoritarian model This development of a more multilateral, integrationist and federalist approach in the National–International nexus also worked in tandem with the development of a more decentralized democratic philosophy on the domestic front.165 Italy’s 1948 constitution had put in place the legislation required to decentralize the Italian system and grant levels of autonomy to its different regions.166 Spain’s political reform act of 1976 and its constitution of 1978 also provided for different levels of autonomy for its regions.167 These constitutional formulae were seen as a means of assuaging ethnic and regional cleavages in these countries. However, new models of democratization globally were also demanding rights of greater participation of the citizen in the system and greater consideration for the views of different groups within the system.168 The centralizing philosophy of the nation state increasingly came under censure, and the rights of minorities gained credence.169 Models of decentralization and local government seemed more appropriate to the needs of efficient and democratic government of the modern welfare state.170 Models of decentralization on the domestic front also needed to keep pace with the calls for more integrationist models on the international terrain, which were viewed as the only way to deal with the new demands of the twentieth-century global order.171 By the third quarter of the twentieth century, the nation-state model was increasingly passé and unsuited to the needs of modern governance both on the domestic and international fronts. As governments in Europe ceded sovereignty

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to the EC in certain key areas of policy which they felt could be more profitably managed at a supranational level of governance, the EC in turn pushed notions of regionality and subsidiarity on the nation states in an endeavour to provide legitimacy for EC decision making. This worked in tandem with a growing cognizance at EC level that the union was above all a union of regions, of diverse needs and resources, and that for the institution to be a success, these different needs and resources would have to be catered for.172 It is no coincidence that the articles in the Italian constitution pertaining to regionalization were only implemented in the 1970s, when the development of the EU’s regional policy and the subsequent distribution of structural funds to the impoverished regions of Europe made a regional level of governance in the different member states essential.173 This new integrationist approach, fostered at the international level, provided the best forum for the assuaging and neutralizing of key cleavages at the domestic level, especially those pertaining to ethnicity and territory. The practice of consensual politics on the international circuit now supported and provided additional space for the practice of consensual politics at home. Issues of territory and ethnicity that had not been dealt with at nation-state level were now catered for.174 In Italy, European Community membership provided the country with the resources to complete her transition. It ensured that her newly established political institutions were locked into a wider political framework supported by states that had a longer experience of democratic governance. It also provided the country with much needed funding to complete the economic transition that followed Italy’s political renewal. Finally, it also provided Italy with the resources so desperately needed by a young state undergoing transition in an increasingly global order. It was the politics of the EU that ensured that the politics of regionalism did not tear apart the delicate fabric of the Italian state. The EU also absorbed much of Italy’s surplus labour and provided remittances that made a substantial contribution to Italy’s exchequer. Membership of the union also increased Italy’s standing abroad.175 For Spain and Portugal, membership of the community helped both countries overcome their peripheral status and establish a new equilibrium in Europe and globally based on a new sense of equality. Membership helped Portugal and Greece overcome a number of limitations associated with smallness, providing them with resources including that of an enlarged hinterland previously unobtainable. Research has shown that these small states coped very well within this new club, often surpassing larger states in preparedness and efficiency when dealing with community work. Spain’s stature today in the international community has been greatly enhanced by EU membership and through the forum of an EU foreign policy has been able to play a far greater role in international debate. In Spain and Portugal, EU funding has also helped to accelerate economic growth. The result was a pattern of external influence increasingly taking place at the bequest of local government, benevolent and consensual in nature, and over time operating within a federated structure where a relationship of equals was slowly established.176 These new developments in internal–external linkages helped set the stage and provided the ingredients for consolidated democracies here.

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Democracy in Southern Europe

The postcolonial model Malta, on independence, came to meet some of the above criteria. Post independence, the role of the external players increasingly tended to be largely at the bequest of local government. In 1972 the way forward was prepared for the severing of all colonial links with Britain, which was completed in 1979, and this left room for a diversification of foreign policy. Though in the early years Malta’s foreign policy tended to lurch between a politics of rabid nationalism and a more consensual politics of multilateralism, increasingly it shifted more towards the latter. In 1980, Malta’s treaty of security and defence with Italy placed her squarely within the Western sphere of influence.177 Malta’s foreign policy in the late 1980s and 1990s mutated towards a more multilateral and federalist direction that culminated in the request for full EU membership in 1990.178 Despite disagreement over approach between the two main parties, the direction was now ascertained. The island’s socio-economic and political structures were revamped in the light of the Acquis Communautaire179 and the Copenhagen180 criteria.181 In 2004, EU membership and a new politics of integration brought consensus to the island, a more solid and unified sense of national identity and an assuaging of the left/right cleavage. A new form of politics directed by consensually unified elites in Malta could be observed as Maltese members of the European Parliament (MEPs) across parties united in their struggle to extract the best conditions for the island from Brussels. In 1990, the south of Cyprus also applied for EU membership, and negotiations started afresh for reconciliation and union under the auspices of the EU. Governments in both Athens and Nicosia have gradually come to see the EU as a potentially more credible instrument of conflict management with respect to Greco-Turkish disputes and more effective than NATO.182 The major players involved in the Cyprus dispute are all today EU members or aspiring ones. In this context, Theophylactou quotes Axelrod’s logic that in this new situation all the conflict of interest has disappeared because the players will have no difficulty in jointly selecting the mutually optimal outcome, now that one exists:  that of a solution under EU membership.183 However, the South in a referendum in 2004 refused union under a federated structure, though the North voted overwhelmingly in favour. In May 2004, the South became part of the EU and the latter is now determined that the North will soon follow. In Cyprus today, the EU offers the only forum under which different and conflicting foreign and domestic demands stand the chance of being neutralized. Conditions internally and more so externally had made the notion of a consolidated national unit based on agreed perceptions of sovereignty nigh on impossible. Differing perceptions of sovereignty, both internally and externally, however, may now be accommodated and reconciled under a larger federated unit.

The post-truth phase: Supranational versus the intergovernmental In 2018, the democratic credentials of the EU, and its ability to steer states towards consolidated democracies, have been challenged.184 The union in

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a space of eighteen years grew from twelve to twenty-eight states. The 2004 enlargement, excluding Malta and Cyprus, required the new states to make both political and economic transitions.185 All the new states sported a GDP that fell below 75 per cent of the old member states.186 The new states brought unresolved national cleavages, new ethnic conflicts and different constitutional histories favouring a more societal rather than individual bias.187 Integration, requiring facilitation of the four freedoms (goods, capital, services, labour), and the redistribution of resources took place against a backdrop of the politics of neo-liberalism, recession, economic crisis, austerity programmes and an increasingly unstable external regime that has culminated in the largest global migratory movement since the Second World War.188 Unfavourable domestic and international conditions have strained the redistribution of resources and facilitated a transition from latent to manifest cleavages in terms of class, identity and religion. The outcome has been the growth of Euro-scepticism and emotional responses predicated on national discourses which has strained the old dialectic of supranational versus intergovernmental progression of the union to its limits.189 This environment has had a debilitating effect on the EU states but the Southern European nations can be said to have been the most greatly affected. Less robust in economic and political terms than the Western and Northern enlargements, the demands of deepening and widening in an era of austerity have taxed these states to their limits. Unresolved issues of democratization, including the continued politics of patronage and clientelism, the continued traditional poverty of the region and the inequality of the distribution of income, were much greater than in the EU15.190 Here weak economies with low wages, low productivity, high unemployment and high public and/or private debt, and permissive legislation, established a fragile economic base, supported by structural and cohesion funds and a housing bubble.191 Membership of the EU, rather than domestic shortcomings in the Southern European states, has been viewed as precipitating these problems. The EU neoliberal austerity programmes, viewed as a one-fits-all approach, were deemed responsible for fuelling the crisis, rather than assisting the besieged Mediterranean states. The call has been for less rather than more EU, for the return of the dominance of the sovereign nation state. Relations with the EU have been seen as coercive, rather than conciliatory and voluntary. The neo-liberal EU supply-side economics is not seen as the answer to Southern European economic woes, rather debt write-offs are recommended. The interdependent formula which was long seen as being at the centre of the EU success story is now regarded as a mismanaged interdependence, hastily applied and disadvantaging growth and recovery. In the long run, this formula has been viewed as contributing further to the instability of the Southern European states.192 Talk has flourished of a ‘Grexit’ from the Euro,193 and from Schengen,194 and there have been rumours of the growth of a core Europe club, and a European periphery, that would include Southern European states unable to fulfil their EU obligations. Greece has threatened a departure from the euro and sought Russian support to strengthen her hand when dealing with the EU core.195 The fraying of union solidarity has strengthened the national

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impetus, and membership is increasingly regarded as an international institution rather than a political union. Though Southern Europe remains peripheral to the core, statistics indicate that in terms of economy and governance it maintains a more solid position than that of the Eastern/Central European periphery.196 It is also far more integrated within the institutions of the EU; this arguably indicates that the region brokers more power when interacting with the core.197 During recession, membership of the euro, support for local banks and provisions for bailouts arguably offered Southern European economies some support. Migrant flows into Greece and Italy have, in part, been accommodated by other EU states. In terms of security, EU membership provides a mutual defence guarantee.198 EU membership makes great demands on the Southern European democracies, competing with western and northern states, with more robust economies and more sophisticated democracies. However, membership also provides these states with a security, derived from belonging to a reputable union and the largest economic bloc in the world. This ensures that though some reversals in democratic trends have been viewed in the region, there remains a certainty that these consolidated democracies will not unravel.

Conclusion Despite previous assertions to the contrary, current literature indicates clearly that in all the Southern European transitions the external actors played a key role. It is also clear, however, that their role varied according to the geostrategic importance of the country in question, the politics and cleavages of the country involved, the country’s ability to withstand the incursions of foreign players, the type and number of foreign players involved and finally the point in time under study. The conciliatory and voluntary role the EU played199 in democratic transition in Southern Europe was very different from the often intrusive and negative role played by the United States post 1945. The role played by external actors in a postauthoritarian and defeated Italy in 1945 was very different from that played in the post-authoritarian, sovereign and independent states of Spain and Portugal in 1975. Finally, the role of external actors in the process of democratic transition differed from the authoritarian states to the colonial state of Southern Europe. However, what emerges clearly is that in Southern Europe the process of democratization was ongoing and as the century moved forward the chance of consolidation escalated. Democratization in all the countries in the area was aided by the following: positive socio-economic and political indices200 and a growing sense of national identity and state sovereignty coupled with a more robust and consolidated sense of territory. This was accompanied by a resolution of state cleavages, including that of left and right, which allowed a politics of consensus to develop. This was mirrored in an ongoing process of democratization on the international scene which shifted international practice from a politics of coercion to a politics of compromise. In the twenty-first century, a negative international environment, poor economic performance, fragmented party systems and

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unresolved regional tensions and disputes have tested this formula to its limits; however, it has not unravelled, and EU membership may well be the glue keeping it all together. From this material and drawing on a number of models, a new model of external democratization in Southern Europe can be extrapolated: a model based on a chronological, cumulative and progressive notion of ongoing development. The model places the development of the Southern European states on a timeline of world events which, in line with Huntington’s thesis,201 shows a progression towards increased democratization on the international circuit, albeit with setbacks. This is mirrored on the domestic front as all the countries make the progression from fractured, weak, defeated and penetrated states to a more robust sovereignty and finally a more integrated approach under a developing system of federalism dealt with in Olafsson’s independence/dependence continuum.202 The model also brings out clearly the close links between the internal and external domains and at the same time shows that the distinction between the two domains becomes increasingly harder to detect as all the players, both internal and external, shift from a politics of rampant conflict to one of compromise and consensus under a more integrated and federalist politics (Figure 2.1). Polity Functionalist Approach Politics Prior to Democratization Authoritarian/Colonial - Semi-democratic institutions - Wide dispersion of economic resources - Numerous associational and political groups

Conducive to democratisation

Pre-Modern

Post–Modern

Modern

Dependence

Independence

1960

Integraon

1974

Cold War Italy [A] 1st Greece [A] 1st

1980

Detente Cyprus [C] 1st Malta [C] 1st

Cyprus [C] 2nd

Key A = Authoritarian C = Colonial 1 = 1st transition 2 = 2nd transition

1990 Collapse of Berlin Wall

Portugal [A] (E.C 1986) Spain [A] 1st (E.C 1986) Italy [A] 2nd (E.C 1958) Greece [A] 2nd (E.C 1981)

2004 Malta and Cyprus

Malta 2nd

Successful transition

Consolidating democracy through EU accessions

Failed Transition by defeat or Decolonisation

Five-Player Model 1. Establishment extreme 2. Establishment centre 3. Opposition centre 4. Opposition extreme ALL DOMESTIC PLAYERS 5. Enforced external extreme players

Ideal Type Four Players (Based on aright-wing government) 1. Establishment extreme – army, nobility 2. Establishment centre – Church, business – Christian Democrats 3. Opposition centre – Social Democrats Unions 4. Opposition extreme – regional groups and communists

Operating under disunited domestic and external elites

Operating under consensually unified elites

Figure 2.1  Politics Elitist Approach

Four-and-a-Half-Player Model 1. Establishment extreme 2. Establishment centre 3. Opposition centre 4. Opposition extreme ALL DOMESTIC PLAYERS 4. 5 Voluntary external moderate players

Operating under consensually unified domestic and external elites

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This pattern of behaviour is best illustrated by Higley’s and Burton’s model203 showing the shift from dis-unified elites to consensually unified elites in the domestic terrain. The model here however is extended to comment on the same pattern of politics on the international circuit. Linz and Stepan’s four-player model204 is also incorporated to illustrate the role of different players in the process. However, this model is also extended to include the external players in the transitions to democracy in the different states. In this regard, a four-anda-half-player model and a five-player model are incorporated. In the five-player model, dis-unified domestic elites are supported by external actors who are extremist, conflictual and coercive. These dis-unified elites play a negative and destructive role in the process of democratization. In the four-and-a-half-player model, consensually unified domestic elites are supported by external actors who are moderate, reconciliatory, encourage consensus and intervene on a voluntary basis and ultimately contribute positively to democratization in these regimes. The model therefore shifts from a five-player to a four-and-a-half-player model in accordance with the ongoing process of democratization in all the states of Southern Europe. This model will be tested on the cases of Malta and Cyprus, the two Southern European states whose transitions to democratic governance were most affected by the role of external players.

Chapter 3 M A LTA A N D C Y P RU S :   T H E C A SE O F G U I D E D D E M O C R AC I E S   – D E M O C R AT IC T R A N SI T IO N F R OM C O L O N IA L   R U L E

Under most circumstances and for the majority of us, transitions are difficult. During a transition, (even one that involves going from a bad situation to a good one) you are moving from a state of relative equilibrium to a state of disequilibrium . . . you are thrust into a new situation that can involve new stimuli, new relationships, new rules, new roles, new problems. Because many of these factors or events are unfamiliar to us, they bring with them unpredictability and ambiguity.1

Introduction This chapter explores the role of external players in Malta’s and Cyprus’s transitions to independent democratic government. This evolution was from a repressive colonial government, albeit with some liberal and democratic tendencies reflective of its alma mater, to variations of limited and shared government, to eventual self-government. This latter phase was followed by decolonization and eventual truncated independence. Transition to independent government was also transition to democratic government, for the two processes worked in tandem. Britain, the mother of democracy, bequeathed its own patterns of government to her European colonies2 who adopted this democratic mainframe wholeheartedly.3 This chapter, in line with the functionalist mode, gives an overview of the socioeconomic and political developments of the two islands prior to the transition and sees to what extent they were supportive of democratic structures. It then homes in on the transition and, drawing on the elitist school, emphasizes the roles of the different players, with particular focus on the role of the external actors.

History: Points of commonality A detailed comparative political study of Cyprus and Malta has never been attempted;4 in fact, one could say that it has been largely proscribed. There are

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a number of reasons for this, but certainly one that recurs often is that political scientists have viewed the rabid ethnic cleavage on Cyprus as setting it apart from what is seen as the far more homogenous case of Malta. Current political literature on Cyprus tends to place it within the theoretical and comparative studies of ethnicity.5 In Malta, the framework for analysis has been that of small states and island studies.6 However, only a cursory look at the history of the two islands is needed for one to be struck at how much in fact they do have in common. Both islands are located in the Mediterranean, with similar geographical and climatic conditions, though Cyprus is more mountainous. Both are located at superbly strategic sites, Malta at the centre, Cyprus at the tip of the Mediterranean where three continents meet. Both islands have been annexed by the dominant regional empire of the time, undergoing numerous invasions to service the strategic needs of these hegemonies. Consequently, the two islands have always been very much exposed to the vagaries of the international scene and their history and social developments closely linked and largely dependent on external conditions. Up to the fifteenth century, the history of both islands was very similar. Both fell under the suzerainty of the Phoenicians and the Romans; both then became exposed to Byzantines, Normans and then Venetians. Both were ceded to the Crusading Orders and found themselves in the fore of the battle between Christendom and Islam. Both sustained a period under Islamic rule and as a result had their European and Christian cultures tempered by a Muslim and Arabic/ Turkish interface.7 Both island inhabitants developed a chronic psychosis vis-à-vis their European identity, taking all measures to shore it up, and at the same time finding it hard to come to terms with their North African and Asiatic linkages.8 On both islands a sense of heterogeneous identity was somewhat diffused by the constant exposure to external influences. In Cyprus this occurred as a result of the 1570 Ottoman invasion, the largest impact being the 18 per cent settlement of Turks on an island that had been largely Greek.9 In Malta it was to be the ninthcentury Islamic invasion of the island and the adoption of an Arabic linguistic heritage, which coincided with the adoption of the vernacular in Europe.

History: Points of divergence However, from the sixteenth century the histories of the two islands started to diverge. It was external forces that brought these winds of change. Malta succeeded in defeating the Turks in the great siege of 1565: a unique and amazing feat for, as Royle points out, ‘Only rarely has an island fought off a determined invader.’10 It therefore continued to lie within the European sphere of influence, Italian, French and British, its early Arab influence becoming increasingly diluted. This homogeneity in the external cultural influences that the island was exposed to resulted in a population unified around a common religion and language, with cultural differences emanating from different class perspectives, rather than any ingrained ethnic divide.11 Consequently, a sense of Maltese identity emerged early,

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albeit with somewhat different interpretations of it developing in the North and the South.12 Cyprus fell under Ottoman rule and the island was exposed to a different cultural heritage. This situation was accentuated by the settlement of a number of Turks. Over time, a problem of ethnicity emerged. The Turkish minority practised a different religion, spoke a different language and adhered to different cultural practices.13 When nationalist aspirations were in full force in the nineteenth century, a unified sense of national identity around a common heritage and history never developed here. The inhabitants of Cyprus continued to consider themselves Greek and Turk rather than Cypriot, even after independence.14 The role of external players was therefore paramount in establishing the main contours of island identity, impacting on their cultural, linguistic and religious mainframes. This impact was also continuous since the colonizers reinforced their control and extended their influence by tapping into the establishments and attempting to reinvent these islands’ identities in their own image. Their influence also impacted on the socio-economic base and dictated defence, foreign policy and external affairs. Their impact also extended to the micro policies of these island states, since the rules of procedure, the methods of play and the key personnel were also dictated by them.15

The transition begins: The functionalist approach – government prior to British rule Democratic transition began on both islands in the nineteenth century. Though both islands were under the rule of autocratic regimes prior to the British arrival, pretensions of democratic self-rule were rife. In Malta it was emphasized that the island had not been forcefully colonized but voluntarily ceded to the British. In a charter of 1802, the local elites pointed to the long history of local government on the island and asked for these traditional rights of self-rule to be respected.16 In Cyprus the local elites greeted the news of British rule with the hope that this would lead to full political liberty. Soon after arrival the British did install consultative councils, in 183517 in Malta, and 1878 in Cyprus. The British high commissioner and the governor, however, retained unlimited powers and could at any time overrule them. Nevertheless, the methods and practice of democratic self-rule were introduced fairly early. The literature on Malta and Cyprus under British rule tends to stress the negative factors equated with the regime: the withholding of political rights, the exploitation of the countries’ resources, the imposition of high taxes, the lack of economic aid and the establishment of dependent fortress economies.18 However, when one places the islands within the context of regional development, a different picture emerges. Semi-democratic institutions, the growth of liberal doctrines, the introduction of reform, the provision of employment to different class scales and the introduction of a more laissez-faire and open economy gave rise to a more egalitarian, democratic culture. The results were an increase in educational levels,

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a more equitable distribution of resources, the rise of a politically conscious labour movement, a more differentiated middle class with a growing liberal bias and an economy on both islands that was healthier than neighbouring Sicily or Greece.19 By the 1930s, on both islands there was also a strong party and interest group network in place. The 1920s and 1930s were also characterized by numerous demonstrations and protests across the class divide demanding greater political rights and improved economic conditions.20 However, Malta (1800) was colonized earlier than Cyprus (1878). Thus British rule was longer, more enduring and deeply entrenched. In the nineteenth century, the island was influenced by the liberal democratic ethos of British culture and by the early twentieth century, when the rise of fascism was threatening the newly emerging democratic traditions in various Southern European states, Malta had already internalized many of these cultural norms, aided by a politics of Anglicization.21 In Cyprus, British liberal traditions were short lived, Anglicization never took root, the world wars put an end to political reform and by the 1940s the Cypriots in their majority refused further reform since union with Greece was now considered the only option.22 The existence of an undisputed national unit, with confirmed boundaries and a solid sense of nation, is of paramount importance in democratic transition. In Malta the island nationals exhibited pretensions of sovereign rights as early as the sixteenth century.23 Though in 1802, under the Treaty of Amiens, it was considered as part of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and was to be returned to that jurisdiction, majority opinion on the island did not favour this.24 Later proposals to integrate Malta with Britain, Italy and Libya were favoured by only a minority.25 Though fragmented and diffused, by 1800 a notion of Maltese national identity was certainly evident.26 In Cyprus, Greek-Cypriots under Turkish rule were given some recognition of nationhood; however, the island looked to the Greek mainland as its mentor, and sought national inspiration there, and with the exception of a small left-wing contingent under AKEL27 developed no real notion of Cypriot identity and nationhood. The Turkish minority saw their security and well-being tied up with Turkey and saw themselves as being Turkish first.28

Constitutional developments Since both islands were military outposts, the British were reluctant to cede any power and autocracy, rather than self-rule, was envisaged. Under local pressure, and growing recognition of the undemocratic base of colonial rule, the British introduced a measure of native inclusion in government. Consultative councils were installed in 1835 in Malta29 and 1878 in Cyprus. However, the majority of the councillors were British, native councillors were not elected, but co-opted, and the high commissioner and governor could at any time overrule these councils.30 In Malta these years were characterized by repeated calls for self-government and at the constitutional level there was a marked improvement in the rights of the Maltese. The 1849 constitution introduced the elective principle. The 1887

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constitution introduced the power of deciding questions of finance. Conflict over the use of languages in public schools, however, led to the revoking of this constitution and the introduction of the 1903 constitution, which was a throwback to the 1849 constitution, and the official majority principle. After the First World War, economic stagnation, and international support for the principal of selfdetermination, led to the ‘Sette Giugno’ riots. Discontent was somewhat assuaged by the 1921 constitution which introduced the principle of local government under a diarchy, where Maltese administered local affairs, and security, defence and foreign affairs remained under British control. However, political crisisrelated church–state issues led to numerous suspensions of the constitution, and finally in 1936 it was revoked. In 1947, a new constitution supporting a unicameral system and universal suffrage was introduced. In 1961, a new constitution replaced diarchy by the rule of one government: the government of Malta with full legislative and executive powers. In defence and external affairs, however, these powers were enjoyed concurrently with the UK government.31 In Cyprus the quest for self-government, and constitutional changes, was more limited. The first constitution of 1878 bestowed benevolent autocracy, the High Commissioner had unlimited powers, members were nominated and official members were in the majority. The 1882 and 1925 constitutions introduced the electoral principal, and the natives were in the majority.32 However, the council could make no law to alter the constitution, and an order in council, that is the British presence, could overrule it at any time. The undemocratic nature of these constitutions set them against the Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865 which outlined certain liberal and democratic principles to be applied to the constitutions of the colonies. In 1931 this constitution was revoked, when the Greeks and Turks voted together to defeat a bill on revised tariffs. The revised tariffs were then imposed by an order in council.33 Growing discontent and a deteriorating economic scenario culminated in the riots of 1931 and demands for union with Greece. In 1946, local elites were invited to form part of a consultative assembly which would discuss a new constitution.34 The right refused, viewing acceptance as a tactic renunciation of their aim of union with Greece. The left accepted, and the assembly met in 1947.35 Their proposals for a constitution similar to that of Malta, and providing for self-government, however, were turned down. Instead, one providing limited home rule was granted. Its limitations however, including the wide-ranging powers reserved for the governor, made it unacceptable to most Cypriots, and it was dissolved in 1948.36 In 1954, the British suggested a new constitution based on the proposals of 1948 but stated that no change in the status of the island was contemplated, and that the Cypriots should never expect to be fully independent.37 A number of British Labour MPs criticized a constitution with a legislature composed of an elected minority, and a majority of colonial officials and appointees, and a Labour Party resolution deplored the policy.38 The Liberal Party in Britain also demanded a more democratic constitution.39 In 1956, the British suggested yet another constitution with an assembly composed largely of elected officials but where no law could be passed without the assent of the governor. This formula was once again rejected.40

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In Cyprus demands for democratic government, however, became increasingly concurrent with demands for self-determination and union with Greece. This was already apparent in the riots of 1931 and in the negotiations that took place in the 1940s and 1950s.41 Demands for enosis surreptitiously changed the method and format of negotiations. From the 1940s, demands for self-government became bedevilled and at time secondary to the issue of national identity and ethnic rights.42 The Turkish minority were also less prepared to work within formulae of unitary government and demanded separate representation, including partition and union with Turkey.43 The British increasingly viewed the situation in the light of different ethnic demands. The British 1956 White Paper on constitutional reform for the first time proposed a minister of Turkish affairs. The Foot–Macmillan partnership plan presented to the Commons on 19 June 1958 stated that Cyprus was not a colonial problem but an international one and suggested a partnership between the island’s two communities and British, Greek and Turkish governments; that the administration of the island would be directed by council  – composed of British, Greek and Turkish representatives and six Cypriot ministers, four from the Greek and two from the Turkish community; and that external affairs, defence and security would be reserved to the governor, acting after consultation with the Greek and Turkish governments. The plan, however, was unanimously rejected by Greeks, Turks and Cypriots.44

The emergence of a party system Malta therefore had had a much longer experience of self-government than Cyprus, eighty-five years compared to thirty-eight years in Cyprus under superior constitutional arrangements. Consequently, Malta’s political process followed a pattern similar to that on the continent. Lipset and Rokkan’s hypothesis stated that drastic change and modernization here engendered conflicts that threatened to destroy the social fabric, but that the implementation of liberal/democratic governments in these regimes in the nineteenth century enabled these conflicts to be transformed into peaceful differentiation through the process of cleavage orientation and later party identification.45 This process was also successfully accomplished in Malta where different elites worked together under the rule of law and representative institutions. By the end of the nineteenth century, the present party system was already in place. The Reformist and Anti-Reformist parties, the antecedents of today’s Labour and Nationalist parties, had aligned themselves along the left/right spectrum. The result was to be a stable two-party system which at times was joined by other parties but always reverted to the two-party formula which represented, and over time neutralized, the dominant cleavage on the island, that of class.46 The other dominant issues prior to independence were language  – Italian versus English – and religious versus secular authority. These secondary cleavages were derivative of and overlapped with the class cleavage. Italian represented the cultural baggage of the old elites and English the new. The traditional elites

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supported the Church. The new elites were secular in temperament regarding the Church as an ally of the establishment. At times these secondary cleavages overlapped with the dominant cleavage and threatened to polarize the system. The religious conflicts of the 1930s and the 1960s and the language conflicts of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were cases in point.47 With time, however, these cleavages were largely eradicated. English and Maltese became the new languages of the state, and Italian during the Second World War started a slow decline.48 Secularization gathered momentum and was increasingly regarded as inevitable. Other aspects of the social unit reflected a cross-cutting cleavage pattern and helped create consensus. There was general agreement over language use and religious affiliation, and an ethnically homogeneous population. Though class divisions became increasingly entrenched as the new unions and interest groups of the twentieth century were co-opted by the parties and put to use in defending the class divide,49 the changing class pyramid and cross-cutting cleavages enabled a politics of compromise, albeit threatened at times, to surface and take hold.50 Politics in Cyprus developed very differently. The short bouts of representative government, and the stringent limits under which they functioned, gave the Cypriots little opportunity to gain experience of participating in democratic politics. Nor were they able to take responsible decisions on local questions, since any controversial issue tended to be decided by an order in council. The absence of liberal, democratic governance meant that there existed no forum for the inevitable social conflicts to be transformed into peaceful differences, through the process of cleavage orientation and later party identification, as in the case of Malta.51 We do not see the development of an effective and representational party system in Cyprus prior to independence. In the 1940s a large number of parties emerged, but the only party with real representation and an effective organizational structure was communist AKEL, founded in the 1920s under the acronym KKK. No other left-wing party emerged to challenge AKEL. The right was represented by an individual, Makarios, rather than a party, and more importantly an individual from the Church.52 Cleavages in Cyprus were overlapping rather than cross-cutting – differences in language, religion, national affiliation, cultural baggage and at times class reinforcing the ethnic cleavage. This was reflected in a party system where only two parties supported a politics of the centre. Most of the other parties were extremist, focusing on ethnicity, and the capitalist/communist praxis. Seven groupings/parties supported enosis, two focused on Turkish separatism, five had a communist agenda, four an anti-communist agenda. These parties attempted to interact with the three poles of power in the Cypriot political system – AKEL, the Orthodox Church and the Cyprus is Turkish Party (CTP); however, they tended to be more extreme than the latter and exerted pressures on AKEL, the Church and the CTP to follow suit. The result was a party system dominated by extremist positions creating a centrifugal pattern of politics.53 Attempts were made to neutralize these cleavages. Centrists advocated a politics of self-determination and full independence, as did AKEL, calling for reconciliation between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots. The Pan-Cyprian Federation

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of Labour advocated a non-sectarian approach, as did certain left-wing political affiliations and newspapers both Turkish and Greek. These advocated working across the ethnic divide using class as a cross-cutting cleavage.54 However by the mid-1950s, it was the extremist groups that were in the ascendant and controlling the agenda. EOKA (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) and TMT (Turk Mukavemet Teskilati, a Turkish underground organization) advocated nonreconcilable agendas and, using a politics of violence, polarized the situation further. They also attempted to eliminate any conciliatory and centralizing forces, viewing them as traitors.55

The transitions begin: The elitist approach – the extremes emerge The transition to independent, democratic government on both islands took off in the 1950s. By then representative elements on Malta and Cyprus were searching for alternative formulae of government. On both islands a chaotic and negative environment subsisted. Dire economic conditions prevailed, with rising unemployment, and British economic retrenchment leading to soaring balance of payment deficits.56 The period was also one of great political instability that was to fracture the political mainframes along the cleavages of ethnicity in Cyprus, and class in Malta, with drastic results in both, but more so in Cyprus. In Cyprus in 195457 a campaign of terrorism by the Greek-Cypriot right wing opened and lasted till 1958.58 This campaign was supported by the Cypriot Orthodox Church,59 and the Greek government sought the union of Cyprus with Greece.60 The campaign was directed at the British. However, it also targeted certain Turkish-Cypriots61 and a number of left-wing Greek-Cypriots.62 The British reacted by putting into place a politics of repression.63 The TurkishCypriots responded by setting up the TMT and practising a politics of terror in the name of partition and union with Turkey.64 The outcome was a politics of conflict prior to transition, rather than compromise essential to any successful transition. The demands of the two ethnic groups were mutually exclusive and non-reconcilable. These demands were increasingly supported by external players who encouraged a hard-line stand and the practice of a zero-sum political game. In Malta in the 1950s, the political scene changed rapidly. The party system had become highly diffuse and quite a few politicians changed parties. Both the Labour and Nationalist parties witnessed splits, the small parties became increasingly marginalized, but the transition to a two-party formula had not yet taken place. Governments were short-lived. In this highly volatile environment, the left/right cleavage became manifest and dominated the political scene and was most evident in the shift from a multiparty to a two-party formula,65 supported by an enfranchised working class.66 When Dominic Mintoff took over as head of the Labour Party, a perceptible shift to the left was discernible. His style heralded a more radical and anti-clerical approach that appealed to a working- rather than middle-class conscience. Geared to alleviating the lot of the impoverished masses,

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it was a philosophy that regarded the elites – local and foreign – as the exploiters, concerned only with retaining their privileged status and therefore the enemy of change and progress. The Church was regarded as the linchpin of this establishment using Catholic doctrine to influence the mass vote. Mintoff disagreed on a number of issues with the Catholic Church in Malta and publicly stated so.67 The Church saw its position threatened and hardened its stand, shifting to a more radical, antileft position. It labelled the party as communist, instructing its laity not to vote for it, interdicting its executive and proscribing its papers.68 Like in Cyprus, the outcome was a polarized non-reconcilable politics of conflict.

Economics and the emergence of unions The economic environment contributed to this politics of discord. Malta and Cyprus were dependent on Britain. It was the source of most of their exports and imports, the largest employer and provider of revenue.69 After the Second World War, Britain’s own reduced economic standing necessitated retrenchment and her colonies were the first to feel the pinch.70 The islanders felt cheated, viewing British actions as an abdication of their commitment here. The islanders attempted to ensure continued British economic support71 reflected in the increased activity of the trade unions.72 The PEO (Pan-Cyprian Federation of Labour) in Cyprus73 and the GWU (General Workers Union) in Malta,74 powerful well-organized left-wing unions, organized numerous strikes protesting job losses and company closures.75 These unions also ensured that economic interests would be of paramount importance when independence negotiations commenced.76 Union action generated a reaction from the right-wing cognizant of the monopoly these unions had obtained over workers’ concerns. With Church support they endeavoured to bolster the conservative Christian and Orthodox trade unions. This increased the number of trade unions and fractured and politicized the trade union movement, with unions now positioning themselves on the left/right spectrum in Malta and Cyprus and along the Greek/Turkish divide in Cyprus. The previous membership of Turkish-Cypriots in the PEO was slowly reversed as the Turkish-Cypriots set up their own unions. On both islands there were attempts to reverse this process. Attempts were made to set up trade union congresses and the British TUC was called in to help. However, all endeavours failed as the left in Malta and the right in Cyprus were intransigent.77 This proliferation of trade unions is mirrored at the party level, and in the late 1950s a number of new parties surfaced. In Cyprus and Malta, the Church recognized that politics was being secularized and fought back. In Malta, Archbishop Gonzi organized a policy of party infiltration. He persuaded Herbert Ganado, who had left the Nationalist Party (PN) and formed the DNP (Democratic Nationalist Party), to become a member of the executive of the Nationalist Party. He also persuaded Paul Boffa, ex-leader of the Labour Party, to start up a new workers’ party. This, however, never succeeded. He also persuaded Toni Pellegrini, who had resigned from the Malta Labour Party, to found the Christian Workers

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Party and to try and draw in previous supporters of Boffa’s more middle-of-theroad politics.78 In Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios was careful to keep the most important political parties under his control.79 Prior to the election of 1959 he offered AKEL, the communist party which garnered over 30 per cent of the vote, seats in the House of Representatives in return for their support.80 When he realized that EDMA (National Democratic Front of Fighters), the political arm of EOKA, was falling outside his orbit, he immediately made plans to dissolve it.81 When the centre created their own party, the Democratic Union, which took a stand independent of Makarios, the archbishop immediately started to make plans to set up his own left-wing party.82

Transition and public opinion The political and economic environment prior to the transitions was therefore not propitious. This was reflected in the general attitude towards the transition. In Malta, the demand for independence had been preceded by calls for other formulae. In the 1930s, Enrico Mizzi’s Nationalist Party exhibited strong proItalian sentiments.83 In 1943, Mabel Strickland called for integration with Britain.84 In 1956, the Labour government also called for integration with Britain.85 This project was driven largely by economic considerations: the improved well-being of the worker, protected by the superior wages and welfare benefits of the British Isles. The referendum needed to actualize the policy, however, returned a negative vote of 44.2 per cent from a total poll of 59.1 per cent. The Labour Party then made a U-turn and called for ‘a break with Britain motion’ in Parliament in 1957, which was seconded by the Nationalist Party.86 It was followed in 1958 by a call for a new legislature with a platform of independence87 followed by the resignation of the government.88 In the late 1950s, the Malta Labour Party (MLP) also considered some form of integration with Italy89 and in the early 1960s the PN made overtures to the Italian government to consider an association agreement between the two.90 By the late 1950s, however, the majority of the elites saw independence as the best option. In October 1961, the British ended diarchy with the granting of the Blood Constitution,91 which enabled the Maltese government to prepare for independence.92 In the 1962 elections, the Nationalist Party was returned to government and they called for independence, backed by the Labour Party.93 However, some elites remained unconvinced. The minor parties – centrist, religious and pro-British  – feared immediate independence on two counts:  that Malta could not survive economically and that a long period of economic transition was needed to stave off disaster. The second concern, shared by the Catholic Church, was that an independent Malta would have no protection from extremist elements, primarily the Labour Party, viewed as a proto-communist movement, with the potential to drive Malta to civil war, endorse coups and establish an atheistic dictatorship.94 Among the general populace there was consternation and unease at the notion of independence.95 Being less informed, and less knowledgeable of the short- and

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long-term consequences, only increased the levels of uncertainty here. The man in the street was not even certain that independence would take place, and the shifting of the original independence date only added to this uncertainty.96 Much of the detailed negotiations remained inaccessible, no general consultation took place and information was received with no certainty that it was accurate.97 We find a similar but more calamitous environment in Cyprus. Here independence was not the first option, neither at the elite nor at the popular level. The Greek-Cypriot community called for integration with Greece.98 The TurkishCypriots argued that the island should be returned to Turkey in accordance with the Treaty of Lausanne, or partitioned, with the Turkish-Cypriot zone incorporated into a union with Turkey.99 Only AKEL considered independence the best option, though not under the construct of the London and Zurich agreements.100 Semifascist Greece was hardly an acceptable political model for AKEL. Nevertheless, AKEL found it hard to sustain such a programme, were accused of being traitors and were targeted by EOKA and marginalized politically. Consequently, even AKEL sporadically called for enosis.101 The only other group to consider independence seriously was a small Turkish-Cypriot body which was victimized by TMT and was never able to gain any real control of the political forum except through the press. Only under duress did the elites on Cyprus reluctantly accept independence. In the 1950s violence increased, and Makarios realized that without compromise there was no chance of resolving the problem, and that immediate enosis was not possible. Makarios adopted AKEL’s stand on 7 September 1958, telling the Greek government that he would accept independence under UN auspices.102 The Turkish-Cypriots also abandoned notions of partition and accepted independence with certain guarantees.103 However, the hawks in both communities continued to call for enosis and partition.104 Within the mainstream these two solutions also continued to be bandied about, casting doubts over the veracity of the independence campaign.105 As in Malta, there were also those who preferred British rule.106 The Orthodox Church felt safe under the status quo. The communist threat and the fear of government under AKEL made the conservative forces view independence with trepidation. Finally there was the fear of the politics of race on both sides, though this was a more overwhelming concern for the Turkish-Cypriots who, constituting a minority of 18 per cent, feared majority rule. At the popular level, the period before independence, like in Malta, was one of uncertainty and unease. An unknown and threatening future was viewed with trepidation by the majority.107

External players enter in full force External players and international politics polarized the situation further. In Cyprus, a large number of foreign players became involved. Britain used its politics of divide and rule, employing Turkish-Cypriot auxiliaries in the 1950s to help with Greek-Cypriot deviancy, and police areas threatened by EOKA. When representative government was introduced, the British kept control of the council

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by relying on the Turkish vote as an assent to legislation. The Greek-Cypriots also claimed that Turkish-Cypriot extremist groups including Turkish resistance organisation (TMT) were handled with kid gloves unlike their Greek-Cypriot counterparts that were banned. The British also encouraged Turkish input as a way of countering what they saw as excessive Greek influence on the island.108 This politics of divide and rule contributed to the rising violence and extremism within and between the two groups in the late 1950s and early 1960s.109 It also increased the number of external players. Up to the mid-1950s Britain was the key external player, and Greece played only a secondary role, cognizant that Cyprus was British. However, Britain attempted to neutralize Greek-Cypriot demands for selfdetermination by raising the question of Turkish-Cypriot rights. This encouraged the presence of the Turkish government in Cypriot affairs.110 The British attitude towards the Greek government also altered in the 1950s and towards the end of the decade they made it clear that Cyprus was an international rather than a colonial problem.111 The increase in external players complicated further decolonization and democratization. By making Cyprus an international concern the British emasculated the Cypriots, allowing them little say in the process and consequently little responsibility for its outcome.112 The presence of Greece and Turkey further polarized the ethnic cleavage on the island, encouraging a politics of ‘winner takes all’ and a zero-sum game, where the concerns of the island, and island identity, played second fiddle to notions of Greek and Turkish union. An impotent local government could do little to resist the inflated demands being made by these external players.113 The case par excellence was British demands in the sphere of security and defence which included the right to permanent ownership and exclusive sovereignty of a 100-square-mile military base in Cyprus.114 In Malta, the role of external players was far less explosive. Britain was the key player. Other players including the Vatican, Italy,115 the United States116 and the USSR117 were interested in the decolonization and democratization process, but Malta was regarded as a British sphere of interest and foreign intervention was very discreet. When Mintoff in 1958 put out feelers to the Italian government, on integrating Malta with Italy, the Italian government ignored this proposal, despite Malta’s importance for the defence of its southern flank.118 The Vatican also kept a low profile in the religious dispute between the Labour Party and the Church in the 1950s and 1960s.119 As a result, these external interests did not impact heavily on Malta’s cleavage base; they did not exacerbate further the clerical/anti-clerical or the left/right divide. As in Cyprus, however, Britain used a politics of ‘divide and rule’ on Malta and exploited domestic divisions. The British promoted the interests of the Church, the conservatives and the Anglophiles, to further their own interests. In the independence negotiations, the British made it clear that they would rather deal with the right wing that supported their own defence and security interests.120 Consequently, they conceded to certain of their demands even when they ran contrary to public opinion in Malta and Britain.121 One such example was the human rights issue on corrupt practices during elections in the constitution.122 British support for the right wing encouraged in left-wingers a politics of resentment, of

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being victimized and excluded. Like Cyprus, it created a negative environment. The left wing believed they had lacked input in the independence constitution and consequently felt little responsibility for its continued maintenance.123 This behaviour exacerbated the class and clerical/anti-clerical cleavages on the island which were to become explosive in the 1960s and 1970s, polarizing politics to dangerous proportions. Both countries therefore started negotiations in a climate of uncertainty, where consensus was absent. Neither the general public nor the majority of the elites fully participated in the process.124 Unlike Cyprus, however, Maltese domestic players had a great say in the process and though hindered they were never emasculated.125 The transition was effected with the support of the domestic players and despite concessions made, largely to their advantage, nothing on the lines of the British defence agreement with Cyprus was attempted here, and sovereignty was granted to the island, providing the most important criteria for democratization.126

The independence constitutions On Cyprus once the Greek-Cypriots bowed to the inevitability of independence, Makarios pushed for a solution under the UN, approaching the Eastern Bloc in an endeavour to counter NATO influence, a forum which he saw as furthering British and Turkish interests. A number of draft Cypriot resolutions were put forward by several countries.127 However Britain, with the United States in tow, continued to demand the NATO route and pushed Greece to do the same.128 In February 1957 at the UN, talks between Fatin Rustu Zorlu and Evangelos Averoff, the Turkish and Greek representatives, led to a rapprochement between Greece and Turkey and to the Paris talks of 18 December. Here at a NATO meeting informal discussions on Cyprus took place which they agreed to continue in Paris in January 1959 during a meeting of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC).129 The Turks in Paris insisted that at the next meeting in Zurich the premiers should be present. The result was the 11 February Zurich Declaration, initialled by the two countries, confirming that Cyprus would become an independent state with a Greek-Cypriot president and a Turkish-Cypriot vice president and detailing the basic structure of the Republic of Cyprus. The two foreign ministers then flew to London and conferred with Selwyn Lloyd. Hastily this London conference of 17 February 1959 was widened to include delegations headed by Makarios and Fazil Kutchuk. The purpose of the three governments was to present the Cypriots with a fait accompli which they would be forced to accept, and indeed on 19 February the London agreements were finally initialled.130 The draft agreements which heralded Cyprus’s transition to independent democratic government were negotiated and initialled by foreign players, the Cypriots only being brought in to legitimize the deal.131 The settlement involved a draft constitution and three treaties. Three committees were set up to oversee it and decide on the specifics. A London joint committee composed of representatives from Britain, Greece, Turkey and the two Cypriot communities was charged with drafting the final treaties. A  joint constitutional

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commission, composed of representatives of the two communities, and of the Greek and Turkish government, with their legal advisors, was given the task of drafting the constitution, which however was bound by the twenty-seven articles laid down at Zurich. Finally a transitional committee in Nicosia, composed of the governor and Cypriot members, was responsible for the adaptation of government machinery in preparation for independence.132 In Malta, the settlement that ushered in independence included a draft constitution and a treaty of defence. The negotiations took place between the British and the Maltese. The constitution granted the island sovereignty, and by and large its provisions proved to be suited to the political character and needs of the new state.133 The defence treaty negotiated with Britain was of a transitory nature and could be altered or terminated.134 The transition on Malta was therefore far superior to that of Cyprus. However, shortcomings could also be observed in the Maltese transition that were reminiscent of the Cyprus case.

Negotiating the constitutions The greatest indictment levied against the Maltese transition was that only one section of the Maltese elite fully participated in the negotiations: the right, which included the Nationalist Party and the Catholic Church. Though the minor parties and the MLP were consulted, the negotiations took place between the UK government and the government of Malta.135 During the negotiations not enough was done to include the views of the left. In this regard, the negotiations on Cyprus in the transitional committee proved to be superior, for though they took place within a predetermined structure, they included the major contesting parties, the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots, who participated as equals and endeavoured to accommodate each other’s views.136 The second indictment levied against the negotiations was that pertaining to the defence treaty. The opposition made it clear that any defence treaty should be signed after independence as an act of a sovereign state, and that it should in no way curtail sovereignty.137 The treaty however was negotiated and signed prior to independence. In Cyprus, there seems to have been less disagreement over the defence agreements since across the board they were viewed as an act of force, discriminatory and prejudicial to their rights. All Cypriots were critical of the large base areas over which Britain was to retain sovereign rights. Indeed Rauf Denktash138supported Makarios fully in this regard, and the Turkish-Cypriot centre were only prepared to accept it because they had to placate the British to ensure that their rights would be guaranteed.139

Lack of consensus – Cyprus On both islands the documents of transition generated disagreement. In Cyprus, the negotiating parties attempted to work within the constraints imposed by

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the external players. Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots worked fairly amiably and consistently on the transition committee. Both Denktash and Kutchuk supported Makarios in his battle with the British over the size of the sovereign bases.140 However, the domestic players involved were hardly representative. Makarios did endeavour to bring in elements from the centre and the left of centre but he was forestalled by Georgios Grivas,141 and EDMA, and many of those he favoured were replaced by more extreme right-wing individuals, many of them ex-EOKA men.142 In the Turkish camp, there was a lack of agreement between Denktash and Kutchuk which became more pronounced over time. Here the more reconciliatory left-of-centre forces, and the rabid nationalist semi-fascist forces, were excluded from the process. The Turkish government did not look kindly on divergent views, and a party system that would represent them, prior to the conclusion of the negotiations.143 The general view of the conditions obtained was negative. In May 1960, after most details had been completed, the Democratic Union, a centre-left party, had this to say of the agreements: Only men showing contempt for the intelligence of the people could represent the shameful London and Zurich agreements as a victory. They are nothing but an insult to the liberation struggle. It is a false allegation that Cyprus has acquired her freedom through these agreements. The invitation extended to Makarios in February 1959 was not an invitation for an honourable democratic discussion, there was not even a subject for discussion. It was a contrived affair aimed at exerting moral and psychological blackmail on those invited so that the agreements could be represented as having received the approval of the peoples’ representative.

The document goes on to specify the shortcoming of the agreements: Foreign occupation continues through the British military bases, and the presence of Greek and Turkish HQs with military powers. The establishment of a military base will create a tense atmosphere in our relations with friendly people. Instead of a single independent state a communal partition has been established, and the island’s foreign policy as a result will be dependent on the will of the minority. The Presidential system tramples on the democratic principle that the executive power is accountable to the houses of representatives, and the agreements clash with the principles of the UN charter that recognises the right of self-determination for all people.144

It was however the bi-communal aspect of the constitution that worried the GreekCypriots most. The constitution, it was argued, contained the seeds of partition. It continued the old colonial and Ottoman practice of creating separate categories of citizenship, and separate municipalities and separate elections for the different ethnic groups. In the legislature separate majorities of Greek and Turkish members were required to modify fiscal, electoral or municipal laws. Hitchens argues that

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the legacy of inter-communal tension and distrust that had been created primarily by outside powers was then built into an imposed constitution.145 Its translation into a geographical and administrative reality weighed most heavily on the GreekCypriots. As pointed out to the British prime minister, ‘The proposals for separate municipalities has been the most embittering and far outweighed the advantages of any other changes.’146 Makarios, working on the transitional committee, attempted to respect this aspect of the agreements but found it nigh-on impossible. The British governor Hugh Foot in fact observed that Makarios had met Kutchuk and had agreed that temporary legislation be put in place to give certain powers to the Turkish municipal committees but that he was facing increasing difficulties with some of his own people, especially as a result of a dispute with Grivas over the conditions, and that he and his closest supporters were worried.147 Nothing could persuade the Greek-Cypriots that the arrangements being made were not devised to please the Turks, and to encourage territorial partition148 already evident, they felt, in Turkish attempts to alter the composition of the population on the island through repatriation.149 The Turkish-Cypriots, however, saw domestic rather than external players as responsible for the inability to move towards independent democratic government. They held EOKA and the Greek-Cypriots responsible for the perpetual state of tension and for forcing them to consider partition, since they were not prepared to treat the Turkish-Cypriots as a community and would not accept that Cyprus was a joint venture.150 Undoubtedly, the Turkish-Cypriots contemplated going beyond the spirit of the constitution and establishing a bi-zonal state. The municipal councils were regarded as the first stage in the separation of their communal affairs, and the Turkish-Cypriots called for a separation in several areas including the civil service,151 co-operatives, banks and trade unions. Denktash drew attention to the need for the commercial separation taking place in the months prior to independence. The co-operative central bank, he tells us, had refused to advance money to separate Turkish societies with the purpose of discouraging such a separation. He adds that members of the Turkish community were also unable to transfer or buy property without paying immovable property tax which went to the Greek municipalities. The setting up and recognition of a Turkish Chamber of Commerce was also advocated. The Turkish community also asked the British government to help them carry out a survey of the industrial and commercial possibilities of the Turkish community. Requests were also made for Turkish representatives on the boards of authority such as the Cyprus Inland Telecommunications Authority (CITA) and the Electricity Authority of Cyprus (EAC).152 Kutchuk and Denktash asked the Turkish government for a loan of two million pounds, which the Turkish community intended to use to form itself into a separate economic unit, sanctioned under the Zurich agreements. This, they explained, would involve separate Turkish banks, factories, co-operative societies and import-and-export firms and the eventual partition of the central bank of Cyprus.153 The Turkish-Cypriots also called for complete independence in social and cultural affairs. Separation of the educational and welfare departments

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had been promised by the British. Denktash also asked for a number of intercommunal schools to be placed under Turkish-Cypriot jurisdiction. The governor, however, refused, and made it clear that separation had gone far enough.154 These demands should also be viewed in the light of Greek-Cypriot action. The Political Programme of the United Democratic Front of Reconstruction has this to say on schooling in Cyprus: ‘All Greek children in the state of Cyprus have the right to a free education [we must ensure] to give to the Greek youth real national teachers who will create real Christian-Greek youth, those who deny the Greekness of the nation have no right to be teachers.’155 The Greek-Cypriot right wing envisaged an educational policy that viewed the Cypriot nation in terms of Greekness. This attitude impinged on most areas of policy, and on the decision-making mechanisms. Only the left wing attempted to shift the emphasis to construct a Greco-Turkish interface. However, they were unsuccessful.

Lack of consensus – Malta In Malta in the months prior to independence, the elites made no real attempt to work together. The small parties argued against independence.156 The Labour Party and the smaller parties only attended the initial in what was meant to be a series of preliminary discussions on the drafting of the constitution, prior to the round table conferences organized by the British. The Labour Party stated that its views were not given due consideration and along with the smaller parties withdrew from the forum.157 The discussions therefore had to take place under British initiative. The governor at the opening of the second session of the first legislature in October 1963 had this to say of the negotiations: Mr Sandys announced his intention to convene an Independence Conference in which all parties in the legislature would be invited to send representatives. The conference was held in London in July 1963. The draft constitution prepared by the Government of Malta was adopted as the basis of discussion and although ensuing talks revealed wide areas of agreement there remained divergent views on certain aspects which at the time it was not found possible to reconcile. [Nonetheless] It was declared that Malta would become independent not later than May 31st . . . the Secretary of State invited my Prime Minister to hold discussions in Malta with representatives of all political parties in an endeavour to secure agreement. He added that should they fail to reach agreement outstanding issues would be referred to either the people of Malta or the British government. Whether in the particular circumstances of the moment any such discussions can be fruitful is not free from doubt.158

The negotiations on the constitution took place between the British government and the Maltese government and it was the Maltese government draft constitution which was largely adopted.159 The only other player which received the ear of both British and Maltese governments was the Church. The main area of contention

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in drafting the constitution was over the secular status of the island. The Labour Party presented a list of issues which they insisted should be included in the constitution. Among them were those that touched on religion and the Catholic Church. These became immortalized as the six points. They included separation of Church and state, the state to be secularized with equal treatment of all religions, recognition of civil marriage, privilegium fori to be limited, censorship of films and books to be carried out exclusively by the government without allowance for Church interference and violence in certain cases to be admissible.160 The British thought many of the Labour Party demands reasonable161 and a number of them were also supported by Pelligrini and Ganado, leaders of the smaller parties, though they were adamantly against the six points.162 These included the suggestion that where the prime minister has to act in accord with recommendations put forward, the court can make an enquiry on whether he has done so, and that in court procedure there be two posts: one of director of public prosecution, the other of attorney general, rather than one.163 In the final draft of the constitution, however, these suggestions do not figure, despite the fact that many of them were supported by the British government and would have strengthened the democratic credentials of the constitution. These included Article 28/4, stating that public morality, decency and public order should be interpreted according to principles accepted in Western European democracies; Article 41/3, stating that the electoral commissioners be appointed by the head of state on the advice of the prime minister and the leader of the opposition; and other articles specifying provisions for parliamentary enquiry, that it is the House of Parliament that ratifies treaties of a political nature, and that any person has the right to petition the courts regarding the constitutional validity of laws.164 In some cases the British argued that the constitution was not the right place to guarantee such rights: civil marriage, impartial broadcasting and the ensuring of burial on sacred ground regardless of political and religious beliefs. The British thought the other demands should be adopted. These included the right of parents to exempt their children from religious teaching in schools and a provision on undue influence in elections on the lines of Article 101 of the Representation of People’s Act in the British constitution. The Labour Party also wanted a clause deleted that stated that anything done by the Catholic Church in the exercise of its spiritual powers should not be considered inconsistent with the fundamental rights provision. The British had this to say on the clause:  ‘we think the Government draft quite unreasonable and can hardly believe that the Prime Minister put it forward.’165 The British, however, had to battle the Borg Olivier government intent on protecting Church interests. The clause on fundamental rights was altered; however, other provisions, including freedom of conscience during elections, seen as fundamental, were not incorporated. On the latter provision, the British Labour MPs made it clear that it was an essential clause in any democratic constitution, and that they were not prepared to ratify the Malta constitution in the British Parliament if it was not incorporated.166 However, at the last moment they backed down. Documentation shows that the British government brokered a deal with

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the Maltese government. In return for a defence treaty that did not stipulate the impossibility of bringing nuclear weapons on the island, the clause was dropped.167 Similar tactics were adopted on Cyprus. In 1957, the British Labour Party came out in support of the Greek-Cypriots’ call for enosis and self-determination,168 stating that ‘as soon as we get into power you will have immediate self-determination’.169 Barbara Castle, a Labour MP, in 1957 also stated that ‘all constitutional talks on the basis of self-government have failed because they have not been preceded by firm guarantees of self-determination’.170 The British Labour Party was also critical of the British government’s stand over the bases on the island, insisting that the present agreements impinged on the sovereign status of the island, and that the area required was excessive. When, however, the party realized that Cypriot union with Greece and the ceding of the bases would militate against British security and defence interests on the island, the party adopted the government stand on independence.171 The split between the left and right in Britain over the issue of the bases, over enosis and over the religious practices act was eliminated in the face of national self-interest.

Seeking the support of other external players: The UN Consequently, on both islands certain elites felt that recourse to the British to ensure a fair and democratic transition was in vain, and they turned to other foreign actors. Both appealed to the United Nations as a neutral third party. In April 1964, representatives from the Malta Labour Party addressed the Committee of twenty-four who were already bound by a General Assembly resolution of 11 December 1963 to do nothing to obstruct the path of independence on Malta.172 One of these representatives, Anton Buttigieg, pointed out that the draft constitution represents the views only of the Nationalist Party and completely disregards the views of the opposition . . . that the government draft was presented for the approval of the legislative assembly, but only one single evening was devoted to its consideration. Only a general debate was allowed with no committee stage and no chance for amendments by the opposition [that] the fundamental issue of human rights to be enshrined in the new constitution remains unsettled [and that] power is being reserved in the constitution to suppress the fundamental rights of a large section of the population at any time.

The question of new elections prior to independence was also brought up since these were not being held.173 The debate on Malta in the UN opened on 30 April 1964. Pavel Shakhov, the representative of the USSR, noted that ‘nothing had been done during the past year to implement the special committee’s recommendations of a year ago calling for the immediate holding of general elections under the supervision of the UN’.174 Sadok Bouzayen, from Tunisia, stated ‘that it would seem that all the constitutional

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arrangements were made with one single party and that the views expressed by the opposition were completely ignored’.175 Dicko, speaking for Mali, stated that the opposition parties, such as the Progressive Constitutional Party, the Democratic National Party and the Christian Workers Party are also apprehensive at the time when the island is at the threshold of attaining independence. This means that a very substantial proportion of the population have no confidence in the present constitution.176

The committee ultimately passed the buck back to the British as the legitimate power negotiating independence but it did note that ‘the transfer of power to the people of Malta [should be] in accordance with the freely expressed wishes and desires of the population of Malta’.177 The question of Cyprus came up before the UN in 1954 when Greece requested the General Assembly to consider the application of the principle of selfdetermination.178 The same request was repeated several times over the next few years; however, Britain always succeeded in blocking discussion in the General Assembly. In 1956, the British countered Greek demands by placing on the agenda the question of Greece’s support of terrorism in Cyprus. In 1957, the Assembly adopted a resolution calling for a peaceful, democratic and just solution in Cyprus. In 1958, the General Assembly reiterated the sentiments of its earlier resolution. As in the case of Malta, UN intervention tended to be largely ineffectual and left the British to resolve the problem, only with a parting injunction to safeguard the democratic wishes of the people. Ironically, this was also to be the attitude of the domestic elites. When discussions became critical and non-negotiable demands made compromise impossible, the domestic elites turned to the British to resolve the situation. Mintoff was quoted by the British as saying that ‘he was thoroughly committed to independence . . . [but that he] did not want a referendum [but] preferred that the British Government should take their own decisions on the points of difference between the two constitutions because he thought they would give him something’.179 The Cypriot view was similar; the British quoted, ‘The Greek Cypriot stance [on] the need for a single assembly [adding that] both the Greeks and Turks took the point of view that the other side was being unreasonable and why should they budge [since] in the end Britain was sovereign and she should decide.’180 Britain found itself in a position of having to act as referee between domestic players.

The politics of collusion These players, however, also viewed the role of Britain as one of collusion.181 In Malta the Labour Party suspected the British of colluding with the Nationalists. The Nationalists’ signing of the defence agreements in tandem with the independence constitution was seen as proof of this by a Labour Party which

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had insisted that any defence treaty should be signed afterwards.182 On Cyprus, Makarios and the Greek-Cypriot left wing took much the same line, stating that ‘only provisional decisions should be taken in London, any final decisions should be left to be ratified after the people are consulted’ and were aghast at the demands made by the British and threatened to postpone independence unless they were revised whereas the Turkish-Cypriots were more amenable to British demands.183 Accusations were also rife that ‘the talks were taking place under a veil of secrecy’.184 At the GWU annual conference in 1964, a resolution was passed against the Maltese government’s method of conducting negotiations on the future of Malta behind the people’s back in London.185 In Cyprus long discussions among the British, as to whether the new electoral bill and municipal report should be published then, or whether they should be kept secret for a while longer, because their publication might have adverse effects on the negotiations, gave credence to these suspicions. ‘If we publish,’ said the British officials, ‘the measures can be attacked as a step to partition and it will injure the talks and put the Greek group in a weak position.’186 These suspicions were further fuelled by the fact that in both cases the independence bills were a rushed job, put together in under a year and pushed through the House of Parliament in one sitting.187 The British secretary of state commented on this state of affairs in the case of Malta stating that the draft constitution . . . had been published such a short time before the assembly debate that there had been no chance to study it properly [that] the debate itself was confined to a single evening and no opportunity was given to the opposition to submit amendments [that] only 26 out of 50 members of the assembly had voted for it [and that as a result] the constitution simply represents the views of the Nationalist party and [has] permitted the suppression of human rights in the interest of the Catholic Church.188

In addition, on both islands the usual democratic criteria applicable prior to the dissolution of a colony were not fully met. In Cyprus elections prior to independence were called, but no referendum took place.189 In Malta a referendum did take place, but no elections were called since Britain feared the likelihood of a left-wing victory.190 Criticism was also levied against the electoral systems. The Greek-Cypriot left wing complained that the multi-member constituency system was undemocratic.191 In Malta the left complained of clerical interference in elections.192 In both cases, the implication was that the electoral system favoured the right wing who the British found easier to work with. Sir Wakefield clearly expressed this opinion stating that all opposition parties agreed for the need for fresh elections before independence, but the British Government was determined to keep the present inept Maltese government in power because it hoped to persuade that government to grant defence facilities. This was tantamount to Neo Colonialism.193

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The impact of the Cold War On both islands, the left believed that the transition should be the domain of domestic players. John Clerides from the Democratic Union, speaking of the Macmillan plan, said, Why should representatives of the Government of those two countries (i.e. Greece and Turkey), over whom his majesty’s subjects in Cyprus have no control, be established in Cyprus? And be consulted in matters which concern only the British subjects of Cyprus? This is clearly giving rights to the Governments of Greece and Turkey to interfere with our legislation and administration.194

Most of the Greek-Cypriots at the time also subscribed to EOKA’s view that our main enemy is America, without America we would have gained our freedom because the UNO would have voted in favour of Cypriot freedom in September 1954 but . . . America finds voters at the UN in favour of colonialism. America emboldens the British who would have left Cyprus if they had been unsupported.195

The left in Malta were also insistent that the British should leave unconditionally and let the island get on with their own affairs.196 On both islands external players, aware of anti-Western and pro-Soviet domestic elites, were determined to keep the islands within their sphere of influence. Zorlu, the Turkish representative, speaking with Averoff, his counterpart from Greece, had this to say about the situation: ‘the status [of Cyprus] was not really a form of independence. It would be necessary to write into the constitution, the alliances, and also the right of veto on both sides with regard to the two communities. The island must be Turkish-Greek, and the sovereignty outside the British bases must be shared between Turkey and Greece.’ The British secretary of state for the colonies who was present at this meeting added that ‘Her Majesty’s Government was concerned about three things; the bases, to keep the Russians out, and Turkish-Greek agreement’.197 On Malta the same concerns were paramount. Lord Lambton, a British MP, had this to say on Malta just prior to independence: ‘If he [Mintoff] were returned to power I  do not believe he would consider allowing Britain to continue to maintain her sovereignty, but would play off the East against the West, balancing the aid he got from us with the aid he would take from Russia, the island could therefore slip into the Soviet Bloc, and a type of limited Cuba could be established there.’198 These views were reinforced by the domestic elites. On Cyprus the extreme right spoke of growing links with the communist infidel. On Malta the leaders of the small parties wrote to the British government warning them of the unnecessary duplication of the Cyprus position in Malta if independence is prematurely granted. NATO and the UN would then be involved in the islands’

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security through Cold War tactics. Kruschev’s intervention in Cyprus199 . . . is mirrored by Mintoff ’s telegram dated February 5th to Kruschev, Johnson and U. Tant [asking them to intervene in the Malta case] which followed Mintoff ’s recent visit to Israel, and his known contacts with Russian and Afro-Asian Embassies.200

Both islands were also viewed as indispensable to British interests. Talking on Cyprus, Britain’s prime minister Eden in 1953 made it clear that ‘enosis would never happen’201 and Henry Hopkinson, Churchill’s colonial minister in 1954, ‘duly told the House of Commons that some commonwealth territories [referring to Cyprus] could never expect to be fully independent’.202 In a top-secret briefing note in 1950, British military chiefs spelled out the importance of Cyprus to Britain: Cyprus was a vital link in the chain of British bases running through the Mediterranean to the Middle East and beyond. The effect on Turkey and other Middle Eastern countries and indeed the United States of any abrogation of British sovereignty is likely to be so serious that it is strategically necessary for Cyprus to remain British.203

After the First World War, Western Europe’s growing dependence on Middle Eastern oil increased the strategic value of the island. After the Second World War, Cyprus also came to be seen as a vital base from which to prevent the right flank of NATO being turned by Eastern Bloc forces in a third world war.204 At the end of 1952, the British cabinet agreed to switch the headquarters of Britain’s Middle Eastern forces from the Suez base to Cyprus. By 1954, the island became the new home for MI6’s regional base, controlling MI6 stations at Beirut, Tel Aviv, Amman, Jeddah, Baghdad, Tehran, Basra, Damascus, Cairo and Port Said. The island also now housed important early warning radar and electronic spying stations, and the Cyprus air bases came to be seen as playing a crucial part in deterring Soviet expansion.205 In the case of Malta, its importance was also gauged in the context of what was happening in Cyprus. Cyprus in early 1964 was on the verge of civil war and the continued retention of the island became uncertain. This increased the importance of Malta as a military facility. Decolonization also threatened the last remaining British bases. Egypt no longer hosted British bases, and the Libyan regime was becoming increasingly unstable and undependable. A British secret report informed the British government that ‘on February 23rd the Libyan government had announced that they did not intend to renew or extend the British or American agreements and that foreign bases in Libya would not be [used as] a source of aggression against an Arab state’.206 The British cabinet also emphasized that there was increasing evidence that the Egyptian Government was intensifying pressure to compel us to evacuate our bases in the Mediterranean and if they

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The British prime minister summed up the position succinctly: Developments in Cyprus and Libya cannot but weaken our position in both places. This could mean that Malta would become the only place in the Mediterranean East of Gibraltar where our forces had any prospect of security of tenure . . . she would be the only practical alternative for a stockpile in the Mediterranean and would thus become the main UK base for the mounting of operations in the Mediterranean whether these were purely national operations or in support of an American intervention.208

A military and naval review of Britain’s position in the Mediterranean, Middle and Far East came up with a similar assessment: ‘On a stock pile from which to support intervention in Libya and US/UK plans for operations in Lebanon and Jordan was in Cyprus . . . if however facilities in Cyprus were denied us, Malta would be the only practical Mediterranean alternative.’209

Democratic transition or attempts at continued hegemony? Continued hegemony of the islands therefore remained the priority. On Cyprus this was achieved. Britain, Greece, Turkey and the United States ran rough shod over the rights and liberties of all Cypriots and not only negotiated ‘independence’ over their heads, but even within the parameters of the Zurich agreements they were not prepared to grant the local elites any room for manoeuvre. Turkey made it clear to the local Turkish-Cypriots that the last word lay with Ankara:  ‘The Turkish Prime Minister had spoken strongly to Denktash and made it clear that the Turkish-Cypriot leaders must abide by the policy set down by Ankara.’210 On the constitutional committee, Kutchuk told the British governor ‘that there were many outstanding points and that agreement could have been reached with the Greek-Cypriot delegates but that repeatedly the Greek delegates intervened to make agreement impossible’.211 The Greek minister, talking to the British diplomat A. D. M. Rose, highlighted the relationship between Greece and the Greek-Cypriots: Mr Averoff said we have to be very careful about nationalist sentiment in the young state of Cyprus. The situation is not the same as in February 1959. We cannot repeat the same arm-twisting performance, we will help to keep up the pressure, but this has to be done with great discretion. We must not expect firm commitments from him [Makarios] at this stage. He must be allowed to say that he had given no commitments though we of course must be convinced that he is committed . . . we realised that Averoff and Zorlu might wish to withdraw from

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the scene but this did not mean that they would cease to give us their valuable help or apply pressure on Makarios behind the scenes.212

Makarios, however, became more intransigent and adopted policies that the Greek government did not approve of, and they became less prepared to support the archbishop.213 Several attempts made on his life prior to independence were traced back to EOKA personnel who very likely had the backing of the Greek government.

The extremes threaten the transition As the negotiations advanced, extreme elements recommended alternative action. Mabel Strickland commented on this in Malta: ‘the prospects of a British withdrawal were sharpening rather than softening differences between the two main contestants for power.’214 Mintoff sent a letter on 26 December 1963 to the secretary of state where he threatened that if the human rights demanded by the MLP were not gained through peaceful means, the party had unanimously approved a motion that would call for violence and that several countries including Algeria had offered help, including arms.215 Mintoff on several occasions also threatened to stage a coup after independence stating ‘that under the constitutional conditions established by Britain free elections were not possible. It was therefore the responsibility of the Maltese to determine their own constitution, and after a constituent assembly had done so new elections would be held.’216 The GWU, the MLP’s main ally, however refused to endorse a politics of violence, and the MLP was doubtful whether the GWU would participate since they noted that ‘the workers were in no mood for trouble’.217 Neither the British nor the Nationalist Party thought this outcome likely. However, the British did think that a prolonged general strike was possible, and that the police would become exhausted and incapable of suppressing mob violence. Plans were made: to increase the police force by 25 per cent, for a Maltese regiment to be trained and allocated for internal security, for an advisor to be appointed to report on the problems and for an enabling clause to be inserted in the constitution so that the prime minister in case of emergency could call on external troops for aid.218 The possibility of a coup was discussed in the House of Commons during the debate on Maltese independence, Michael Foot from the Labour Party stating that I hope that the Malta Labour Party will do all it can despite all its legitimate grievances, despite the fact the British house of commons has behaved in the most monstrous manner in the way in which independence has been given to Malta . . . if events occur in Malta as in some other territories Mr Sandys will be responsible.219

The implication that violence might follow independence was fairly explicit.

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Threats of violence on Cyprus also escalated on independence. Too many interests had been bypassed. The extremes in both camps had been denied self-determination, the more moderate Greek-Cypriots could not stomach the bi-communal aspect of the constitution and the more moderate Turkish-Cypriots saw evidence all around them of the non-implementation of the agreements. The British were well aware of the difficulties of implementing agreements which ran counter to so many interests. In March 1960, the colonial office stated that ‘we mustn’t go too far in getting Makarios to accept an agreement against his own extremists . . . too much pressure might defeat our purpose, already he has difficulties after signing the London agreements’.220 By January 1960, a plot to overthrow Makarios was discovered.221 By April 1960, Makarios was threatening civil disobedience and the declaration of a republic prior to independence222 as opposition grew over the base agreements with the British.223 By 3 May, Makarios is said to have lost control of the situation,224 and by 15 May Makarios boycotted both the talks and the transitional council.225 Kutchuk responded to these events by stating that if they persisted they would lead to civil war.226

Completed transitions in a climate of uncertainty and unpreparedness On both islands there was a general feeling of foreboding that violence would follow independence, and that governments would be annexed by the extremes. The climate worsened with the delay in the granting of independence. The Turkish foreign minister speaking to the British reiterated ‘the dangers which might result from any delay in final settlement [and] that certain sections of the community were losing patience with the Greek leaders, and their own, and might try to seize control of the Turkish community, and lead it into opposition to the London and Zurich agreements in hope of obtaining arrangements more favourable to the Turks’, adding that there were ‘a lot of arms among the Turkish community’.227 Kutchuk indicated ‘the confused situation in the Turkish-Cypriot community and said that it would come to partition in the end’, that though ‘he was optimistic about coming to an agreement, he was pessimistic about relations with the Greeks after independence [and that] he saw no hope’.228 In the Greek community it was emphasized that the ‘postponement of independence had done harm’,229 ‘that it was verging on civil war [and that the] Archbishop can no longer control the various cliques’.230 The Labour attaché from Tel Aviv, commenting on the situation in 1960, stated that one finds a less than optimistic picture of the future . . . this is not a country where one sees wild elation at the prospect of independence . . . there is far too much uncertainty on how things will turn out . . . The harsh possibilities of the future are only too keenly realised and there is general skepticism of the confident statements of the country leaders. The impression one has is of everyone watching everyone else; Turk and Greek, Right and Left, and even within those divisions it seems that nobody has quite made up their mind

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on the major issues. There is a feeling of inadequacy to meet the future and over the whole situation hangs the contradictions inevitably inherent in the settlement.231

On Malta the governor described the situation as one of widespread disillusion with the British Government, among those who are not ardent Labour or Nationalist supporters . . . there is much disarray at the conference . . . it seems to many that Britain has decided to cut Malta adrift . . . and that the leaders of Malta do not know where they are going. There is widespread disenchantment with both the British and Maltese leadership. I  think a referendum held now would return a result against independence. The Archbishop is against, the fishermen, the civil servants there is a big lack of leadership. The people are not being carried by the politicians. There is some resurgence of Italianism an echo of old discords and there is bewilderment, dismay and some resentment at the London decision from all the people I have talked with. Not one has spoken with enthusiasm about independence, but with resignation and deep foreboding.232

However, Malta was more prepared to take up the mantle of statehood. Malta’s civil service by 1964 was a well-organized institution, and even the highest grades were staffed by Maltese. The governor himself stated, ‘Everyone accepts that Malta is perfectly capable of managing her own affairs.’233 The independence constitution in fact recognized that the machinery of government existed prior to independence, and built on a public service organized departmentally, together with legislative and judicial branches, and superimposed upon them the doctrines and institutions of responsible government. As a result, the machinery of government exhibited features of integration, continuity and change234 that were more predominant than that of mal-integration evident in the inadequacies in the constitution pertaining to the position and role of the civil service which later handicapped this institution from fully playing its role post independence.235 In Cyprus a local executive was absent, and at the executive and administrative level the country was still largely in the hands of the British, and the public service was still primarily staffed by British personnel. Only months prior to independence, the British were insisting ‘a workable system must be evolved [for] if a hasty hand over takes place there would be a big danger of breakdown’. They were also worried that ‘the Cypriots have no experience of operating ministerial government [that though] they form the back bone of the public service, Cypriot officers are inexperienced in senior administrative work’. To forestall problems with the running of the administration by unpractised hands, the British suggested that ‘interim institutions should be set up as close to the final pattern [envisaged at independence], for example a communal house of representatives for each community, a combined assembly, an impartial tribunal to hear complaints of discrimination in legislation, a public service commission’. It was also recommended that the ‘training of civilian staff ’ should immediately take

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place. Nevertheless, they concluded that there would be ‘great difficulties to get the institutions up and functioning in a year’.236

Conclusion Prior to transition both islands fulfilled many of the socio-economic and political requirements recommended by the functionalist school. Like elsewhere in Southern Europe, however, delayed modernization meant that the left wing was largely proscribed, resulting in a rabid and manifest class cleavage. The actual transitions were lacking in many of the prerequisites envisaged by the elitist school. The four-player model237 was not fully operational. On neither island were the elites consensually unified,238 sections of the elites did not participate in the process and many core issues remained unresolved. In both cases the constitutions were criticized for lacking certain democratic criteria and for not being ratified democratically. Grass-roots support was uncertain and the proscription of violence was in doubt. On Malta some variables of the four-player game were present. A clear political model of establishment and opposition was recognizable. On one side lay the Nationalist Party and the Church, on the other the Malta Labour Party and the General Workers Union. The Malta Labour Party as the official opposition was meant to play the role of the reconciliatory centrist who pulls in the extremes. However, it was the General Workers Union that took a more reconciliatory and centrist stand in the independence debate. As a grouping, it was more prepared to concentrate on the economic contingencies that resulted from the transition and therefore to practise a more pragmatic politics. It refused to give way to the ideological extremities echoed by the MLP and made it clear that it would not participate in a politics of violence. It was the GWU that shifted the MLP towards the centre of the axis. On the right the Nationalist Party adopted a centrist stand, and it was the Church that made excessive demands. However, Koster claims that at points in time the Nationalists were more Catholic than the Church itself, and he contends that the famous clause that stated that ‘nothing done by the Roman catholic church in the exercise of its spiritual powers or duties shall be held to be in contravention of any of the provisions of this charter’, that raised such censure by the socialist parties, was their handiwork.239 Nor would the Nationalists agree to the alteration of one of the most contentious clauses, that on electoral practice.240 The four-player model was also befuddled by the presence of the smaller parties who supported the Church and establishment on several issues, but who came out against independence, and at times aligned themselves with the opposition. Nor did the four-player model work effectively in negotiating the transition since most of the debate, and the resultant compromises, took place only on one side of the spectrum between the Maltese and British government who represented the establishment, relegating the opposition to a secondary role. In Cyprus this model worked even less effectively. The model is based on the notion of the left/right cleavage around which the whole fabric of party systems

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in political theory is based. In the Malta case the notion of four key players representing the centre and extremes of a government and opposition around a left/right cleavage is representative of a politics on the island that has always been largely dictated by class. In Cyprus the main division is the ethnic cleavage, which centres around two contending versions of government rather than a government and opposition:  a Greek-Cypriot majority ranged against a Turkish-Cypriot minority. Under the Zurich agreements, both communities are given nearly equal standing in the negotiations. Within each camp we then find a three-way divide: the official stance represented by Makarios on the Greek-Cypriot side and Kutchuk on the Turkish-Cypriot side, the extreme right represented by EOKA on the one hand and TNT on the other and finally the more centre-left conciliatory groupings that advocated working across cleavage lines, AKEL on the Greek-Cypriot side and a number of union leaders on the Turkish side. The moderates, however, were emasculated, and on both sides the extreme camps wreaked devastation. The Greek-Cypriots refused to abandon enosis, and the Turkish-Cypriots continued to hanker for taksim. The transitions were also not home-grown affairs but largely dictated to, and overseen by, external actors who impacted negatively on elite relations during the process. In both cases, ‘the fifth player’, ‘external actors’, was more in evidence here than in the authoritarian transitions of Southern Europe in the 1970s. Decolonization and democratization took place in tandem. Here, small, isolated, peripheral, weak and defeated island states negotiated transitions under conditions where sovereignty, jurisdiction and independence were lacking, inhibiting and constricting the decision making of the domestic elites. In many instances, the role of external players exhibited patterns of consent and contagion and was similar to that played out in the transitions of the 1970s elsewhere in Southern Europe. External actors also at times attempted to promote a politics of compromise and consensus. There were many instances when it was the fifth player who attempted to cajole the establishment into a more centrist stand. On Malta the Vatican played the role of moderator and applied pressure on the Maltese Church as part of the right-wing establishment to take a more moderate stance. The British attempted to persuade the Nationalist government to take a more conciliatory stance towards the secular and human rights demands put forward by the Labour Party. On Cyprus both the Greek and Turkish governments pushed the Greek and Turkish-Cypriot right-wing elements to accept independence rather than integration or separation. The British pushed both wings to cede to certain demands made by their opposite number, pushing the Greek-Cypriots to accept separate municipalities for the Turkish-Cypriots and urging the Turkish-Cypriots to halt the process of dual organizations in all areas. However, on both islands, the fifth player, the external actors, also practised a politics of coercion and encouraged a politics of extremism, and a zero-sum game. On Malta and Cyprus, the main agenda for the external players remained the defence of their own national interests, and therefore continued control of the islands. Foreign players exacerbated the left/right cleavage on the islands by working with the right wing, and excluding the left. In Cyprus, Greece and Turkey

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pandered to the extremists, egged on by their own nationals. When Greece, under pressure from the British and Americans, attempted to support a more moderate stance, that of independence, there were fears that a politics so unattuned to the wishes of the Greek people would bring down the government. On both islands, both the left and right in Britain abandoned any pretence of defending politically correct democratic stances such as self-determination in Cyprus or the furtherance of secularization and human rights in Malta. Instead they worked with, and furthered the demands of, those domestic elites who would best service their own interests – the right wing in the Greek and Turkish-Cypriot communities, and in Malta. The next chapter focuses on domestic elite attempts to consolidate these transitions and subsequent breakdowns of democratic government in Malta and Cyprus.

Chapter 4 N EW LY I N D E P E N D E N T S TAT E S   – C Y P RU S A N D M A LTA :   C O N S O L I DAT I N G D E M O C R AC Y A N D I T S S U B SE QU E N T B R E A K D OW N

The point is that for a constitution to last, it has to be one that is accepted from diverse groups in the community and that these same groups wish it to survive.1 Our constitution was created under difficult circumstances. It was not the result of discussions that took place within a constituted assembly created for such a purpose. As a result it lacked that element of compromise which brings with it the consensus of all those who had participated or at least the majority of them.2 The constitution had been imposed . . . it had arrested the development of the Republic [and] . . . placed it in a straitjacket . . . it was unworkable and grossly unfair [and] suffered from a fundamental defect that its basic articles could not be amended. Such a provision did not have legal value because a present constituent power had no right to restrict the constituent power of the future . . . it was also to ignore reality and deny progress.3

Introduction This chapter focuses on Malta and Cyprus consolidating newly independent democracies, and their subsequent failure and regime breakdown. External actors played an important part in this process. On Cyprus, they contributed to regime breakdown. On Malta, despite certain shortcomings they contributed to democratic consolidation and endeavoured to reduce regime breakdown. On both islands, political developments prior to breakdown were similar. Governments attempted to work and then revise the document of transition, the constitution, followed by partial success on the one hand, and failure on the other. The result was a polarization of cleavages, rising violence, the growth of counter state activity and rumours of coups and civil wars. This pattern of behaviour was observable in all the Southern Europe transitions in the 1960s and 1970s.4 In the authoritarian cases, however, external factors in the 1970s contributed positively to democratization.5

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In Malta and Cyprus, colonial cases, their role differed radically in method and extent.

Background Malta and Cyprus now entered the postcolonial phase, under right-wing governments,6 though strong organized left-wing movements also prevailed,7 supported by powerful unions.8 The role of the Church, the largest landowner, was to remain paramount.9 Democratic governance was to come under threat from the demagogic practices of national charismatic leaders:10 Makarios who was right-wing, and Mintoff who was left-wing. Their policies however were similar. Both adopted protectionism in employment and basic consumer provision and supported strong union structures, welfare reform and home-grown industries.11 Their governments were intent on bolstering fledgling economies dependent on remittances derived from their role as military bases.12 This dependence was threatened when Britain after independence reduced her military obligations, making reductions in spending and employment.13 Using five-year plans, both looked to the construction and tourist industry to finance growth. Both islands depended on Britain for their import/export trade and when they diversified looked to the European Community,14 Italy and Germany.15 On independence both found their room for manoeuvre constrained by the treaties of defence with Great Britain, and in Cyprus, with Greece and Turkey,16 and requested their abrogation.17 Both understood the importance of links with Britain18 and with colonial affiliates, who provided resources normally derived from hinterlands.19 Both sought to extend their external relations outside the Western bloc and strengthen their position on the international circuit.20 Makarios and Mintoff therefore adopted neutral, non-aligned stances, supporting denuclearization and demilitarization.21 They also appealed to the developing world and communist states, playing off aid garnered here against that obtained from the West to increase the pay-offs and call the shots.22 Both, however, obtained most of their economic and security needs from the West.23 Both saw themselves as a bridge of peace between two continents and endeavoured to cultivate good relations with North African and Middle Eastern neighbours.24 Both insisted that the naval, air and military capabilities of their islands would not be used to the detriment of the region.25 They were among the earliest states to recognize and support the PLO.26 Both developed close relations with Nasser,27 and Mintoff with Ghaddafi. Both used membership of the AfroAsian Peoples Solidarity Organisation to strengthen independence.28 Both islands made controversial arrangements with far-flung states that had limited legitimacy with the Western powers, including North Korea and Russia.29 These arrangements included the procurement of weapons and technical expertise to build up security and defence systems.30 The contingencies of independence led both governments to work with the communists,31 which increased the wrath and involvement of the Western powers.32 This propensity increased as the left became more popular, and

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government exhibited authoritarian tendencies, leading to the assertion that Malta and Cyprus were adopting Cuban politics.33

The collapse of democratic government Under similar conditions, both islands attempted to strengthen postcolonial domains. However, 1963 in Cyprus and 1981 in Malta signalled the collapse/ deterioration of democratic government. The consolidation of democracy from the first procedural phase to the second normative phase had failed. Many problems encountered by the domestic elites consolidating the transitions were a result of unresolved issues during the transition phase.34 Some emerged post independence and were the teething problems of any new democracy. Others were a result of the role of the external players prior to and post independence.35 The problems encountered by Cyprus, however, were far more serious, the room for manoeuvre far less and the role of external players far more insidious and wide-ranging. In Cyprus the problems of democratization were exacerbated by an overlapping, and manifest, ethnic cleavage that was utilized by external players to ensure continued control.36 Government collapsed far earlier in Cyprus followed by civil war,37 unlike Malta where this level of political disengagement never occurred. In Cyprus despite several attempts, a second successful democratic transition did not occur but instead partition took place in 1974,38 unlike Malta where by 1987 a national government of consensus was in place.

Phase one: Working and living with the constitution Post transition a number of differences were already apparent between Malta and Cyprus. On Malta fears of potential coups proved ill-founded, and despite grievances the majority supported the island’s independence.39 On Cyprus the possibility of a coup was always present since many still sought the alternative of union with either Greece or Turkey.40 This was reflected in the continued inability of Cypriots to identify with the Cypriot nation,41 whereas in Malta despite divisions the Maltese had no problem in identifying themselves as a separate unit.42 This condition was facilitated by a workable and developed political system which allowed the growth of a stable two-party system and functioning legislative, executive and judicial bodies.43 In Cyprus a stable party system never developed and the different arms of the state functioned in fits and starts.44 These conditions were in part the result of the independence bequeathed to the two islands by their colonial overlords. Real versus apparent independence On both islands, problems with working the constitution surfaced immediately. On Malta, however, conditions were more conducive to democratization. Malta

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was sovereign under the constitution of 1964, and though the treaty of defence with Britain placed limitations on her conduct in security, defence and foreign affairs, the treaty could be abrogated.45 In Cyprus the constitution did not grant full sovereignty, which was further limited by the treaty of defence with Britain and the treaty of guarantee with Britain, Greece and Turkey which could not be abrogated.46 The US Department of State had this to say of Cypriot independence: ‘Generally, the Cyprus solution as embodied in these documents establishes a permanent influence of the Greek, Turkish and UK Governments in the affairs of Cyprus.’47 A superior or inferior and more or less equitable constitution Malta’s constitution gave the island a unitary state, under a parliamentary government, with simple majority rule, except for certain areas of constitutional change where a two-thirds majority was required. A PR system supported by a 16 per cent threshold for party entry in Parliament,48 and only one strong cleavage, that of class, resulted in a two-party system becoming entrenched post-1964. Parliamentary rather than presidential government, always a preferable mode in newly democratized states, meant that power was more widely distributed and the possibility of the leader of state taking on demagogic powers more difficult. The two-party system gave the political forum the stability required to function in the early critical years and provided the party in power with the parliamentary majority needed to run government. The unitary character of the state also reduced the chances of fragmentation through push/pull factors generated by demands from the periphery. The Cyprus constitution was criticized for the complexity of its nature and the inherent difficulties in applying its numerous articles.49 The 1960 constitution gave the island a unitary state but a bi-communal character, under which elections took place under separate majorities, and where much of the legislation also required separate majorities to change or update. Certain areas of governance fell under separate mandates, and different institutions were created for educational, cultural and religious affairs.50 The bi-communal character of the state encouraged fragmentation, which exacerbated push/pull factors generated by demands of ethnicity.51 This situation was further exacerbated by the lack of a strong party structure, for elections of parliamentary members under separate majorities made the division of parties along the ethnic cleavage inevitable.52 Finally the presidential system tended to restrict rather than distribute power, a sine qua non for the proper functioning of a multi-ethnic society.53 Majority as averse to minority support for the constitution In Malta, working the constitution was facilitated by the fact that the party in power, the Nationalists, had been responsible for drawing it up and had a vested interest in making it work.54 It was also, with reservations, accepted by the opposition.55 The 1966 elections gave the Nationalists the majority necessary to work the articles of the constitution and make changes to secondary legislation. In Cyprus

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it was the minority, the Turkish-Cypriots, that had supported the constitution.56 The government of Makarios aimed at revising a constitution it had been forced to accept.57 Attempts to work the constitution after independence proved futile. The coalition aspect of government, reinforced by the requirement of separate majorities to pass even the most crucial bills such as tax, resulted in a situation where the Turkish-Cypriot minority could hold the Greek-Cypriot majority to ransom if government did not run to their liking.58

Preliminary attempts at settlement The case of Cyprus The Cyprus government did attempt to work the constitution.59 However, the republic had to start its life by settling the most contentious of the constitutional provisions: on separate municipalities, the 70/30 ratio in the public service and the creation of a Cypriot army. These had remained unresolved in the independence negotiations.60 The Turkish-Cypriots emphasized the importance of these clauses to uphold the other checks on the Greek-Cypriot majority in the constitution.61 The Greek-Cypriots, however, believed that the enforcing of the bi-communal constitution would lead to a federated state and the break-up of Cyprus.62 These irreconcilable views reflected different visions of the nation: one based on a joint partnership between two ethnic groups, the other focusing on the ascendancy of a Greek-Cypriot nation which included a protected minority. These differences facilitated a division still ongoing today on the type of state, whether federal or unitary.63 In the first three years of independence, the elites were taken up with trying to resolve the issue of separate municipalities.64 Work began on municipal partition. Ad hoc committees were set up to examine municipal boundaries.65 However, the same objections made prior to independence were raised, that the Greek and Turkish areas were so mixed that boundaries were impossible.66 The situation worsened with the polarized approach adopted67 especially by the press.68 Only a minority were prepared to make the necessary compromises. In 1961 the Turkish-Cypriot People’s Party surfaced, led by two lawyers – Ahmet Muzaffer Gurkan and Ayhan Hikmet. It was in favour of a unitary approach and attacked the high-handed methods of the Turkish-Cypriot leadership, criticized the push towards municipal partition and called for closer cooperation with the Greek-Cypriots. Many Cypriot-Turks, however, did not want the inter-communal discussions to succeed. In December 1961, eleven of the fifteen Turkish-Cypriot Members of Parliament revolted against Kutchuk’s attempts at further reconciliation evident in his preparedness to ratify the tax bill.69 The explosion of a mosque was rumoured to have been undertaken by Turkish extremists to halt the discussions.70 On 23 April 1962, Gurkan and Hikmet, who were also journalists using the press to support reconciliation across ethnic lines, were murdered by Turkish-Cypriot extremists. Fringe groups increasingly called for taksim.71 The mainstream under Kutchuk

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and Denktash were attacked on all fronts as different moderates and extremists lobbied for either more consensual or more extremist positions.72 Though they endeavoured to tighten political control, gain consensus and pull in the extremes,73 the centre was slowly eroded by the extremes.74 In the Greek-Cypriot community, there were also those who were intent on scuppering any deal.75 Makarios, though popular at the grass roots, had no party to sustain him.76 The right moved increasingly towards the extreme and, under the influence of Grivas and Nikos Sampson,77 pushed for union with Greece.78 The left, dominated by AKEL, the communist party, was willing to work with Makarios,79 but many groups, local and foreign, frowned on the relationship.80 Anti-communism in the early 1960s encouraged a divisive polarity of left and right which eliminated the only cross-cutting cleavage within and across community lines.81 Talks were made more difficult by lack of communication. Both Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots were ignorant of what was happening in the others’ community. Divisions in each community sharpened, levels of intolerance rose, leading to intra-community armed gangs.82 Kutchuk and Clerides continued to work on constitutional implementation but none of the pending issues were resolved.83 The Cypriot army was only instituted after 1964 since Makarios demanded a unitary force, disregarding the arrangements for separate Greek and Turkish units.84 The quota system in the civil service was never fully implemented, the Greek-Cypriots arguing that it did not reflect population figures, and that not enough competent Turkish-Cypriots were available to fill the posts.85 On the municipal issue, a solution did seem possible.86 In February 1961, the Greek-Cypriots put forward a proposal that there would be two councils in each town and a coordinating committee, but no municipal boundary. Kutchuk’s response was positive. In March 1962, Clerides presented Kutchuk with proposals for unified municipalities, with a predetermined budget for the Turkish quarter, proportional employment for Turkish-Cypriots and a Turkish-Cypriot deputy mayor in the main towns.87 Both Kutchuk and Denktash viewed these proposals as favourable, and the Turkish-Cypriot separatists feared that they could be persuaded in time to accept unified municipalities88 which it was argued were more economic and efficient.89 In December 1962, agreement between the two communities seemed to have been reached.90 However, a few days later, Kutchuk made a statement that the archbishop’s approach was unrealistic.91 The Turkish-Cypriots also argued that the GreekCypriots were frustrating the setting up of separate municipalities by delaying the demarcation of boundaries.92 Renewed attempts in early 1963 offered short-term hopes of reconciliation leading to a solution;93 however, by June 1963, the TurkishCypriots refused further discussions along these lines.94 Turkish-Cypriot attempts at compromise were undermined by their own political elites,95 above all external, since Turkey made it clear that the compromise brokered by Denktash was not acceptable.96 Stalemate and the continued use of Article 7897 brought home to Makarios the constraints and deficiencies of the constitution.98 Makarios now refused to acknowledge the use of separate majorities in matters totally unrelated to issues of

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ethnicity, and he reacted by increasingly ignoring or bypassing the constitution.99 The provisional legislation on the municipalities was not extended but was replaced with new legislation that set up improvement boards passed without TurkishCypriot consensus.100 The Turkish-Cypriots tabled their own legislation to ensure continuity of the municipalities.101 The Turkish-Cypriots now feared that the 1960 constitution would be revoked and they reacted by becoming more inflexible.102 In response, the Greek-Cypriots shifted their emphasis from efforts to implement the constitution to modifying it.103 The case of Malta On Malta, the constitution functioned well. Unlike Cyprus, there were no pending articles. The Labour Party, however, also immediately set about trying to change those clauses they objected to most and over which they had not had a say during independence discussions.104 These limited secularization and enabled the Church to coerce the electorate into marginalizing the Labour Party.105 Talks were initiated with the local church.106 Though the talks did not start off on a positive note,107 the external environment for a resolution of the Church–State conflict was positive. Pope John XXIII’s two encyclical letters, Mater et Magistra and Pacem in Terris, emphasized that in the context of socialist parties the laity should make a distinction between ideology and practice. People could now vote socialist without this carrying any reprobation.108 Mintoff emphasized these changes109 and Church doctrine impacted on Maltese social structures, encouraging a split within the clergy with a sizeable number advocating reform.110 Progress in these talks was recorded. It was believed that the Church would remove the interdict on the MLP prior to the 1966 elections. However, the untimely removal of the acting intermediary brought the talks to a halt.111 The 1966 elections were won by the Nationalist Party. The Labour Party called foul play, pointing to the continued Church interdict.112 The party emphasized the threat to democracy on the island emanating from the Catholic Church, and the need to alter the constitution, emphasizing the clause on corrupt practices during elections which had been so hotly contested in the 1964 debate.113 Talks were resumed after the elections and a document favourable to the party was agreed upon. The archbishop, old and in the process of being replaced, was criticized for not negotiating a better settlement for the Church.114 And when the agreed text was sent to the Vatican, the latter objected to certain clauses. However, this letter was kept secret and the document was duly signed on 4 April 1969. The Church agreed that on questions of spiritual sanctions capable of influencing voting at elections, it would not ‘impose mortal sin as a censure’. The agreement also determined what ought to be the position of the church in a lay state. ‘In a modern society,’ the agreement ran, ‘a distinction must be made between the political community and the church. The very nature of the church demands that it should not meddle in politics.’115 ‘The agreement is generally considered to have provided Mintoff and his party with the key to power, for which they had only to wait till the 1971 elections.’116 Conflict between Church and state did not come to

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an end. However, the agreement solved the most contentious issues for the MLP that had been in abeyance for the last fifty years, brought a temporary peace, tilted the balance of power in favour of the MLP and served as a base from which the next revisions could take place. The agreements now left the opposition free to pursue other areas of governance that were impacting negatively on democratization. They pointed to corruption in government.117 They were critical of the electoral commission, which was accused of altering the electoral boundaries to favour the Nationalist Party.118 For the first time the number of seats per district varied, some electing six seats, others five. The commission argued that according to the last electoral register the number of voters in each district was not proportional and that a major revision of the districts at this late stage was not possible.119 The Labour Party, however, contended that the commission had introduced six seats in certain districts in order to favour the party in power.120 The Labour Party also contended that TV air time for political broadcasts favoured the Nationalist Party and took the issue to court and won it.121 The 1971 elections were won by the Labour Party by a margin of one seat and twenty-one votes in the fifth district. But for those twenty-one votes the anomaly that was to occur in the 1981 elections would have occurred earlier.122 The Labour Party would have found themselves with a majority of the votes but a minority of the seats in Parliament. However, the first test of a successful transition had taken place in Malta: that of a legitimate transfer of government from the right wing to the left through the electoral process. The role of external players Throughout the early post-transition phase, the workings of government, and attempts to harmonize the demands of different groups, were influenced by external players. The islands had to work under postcolonial structures.123 They also remained dependent on the remittances and employment opportunities that emanated from the bases.124 Britain provided both with a hinterland in terms of imports, exports, as a receiver of immigrants looking for jobs or educational facilities, and with expertise in the areas of infrastructure, industry and education.125 Both became members of the sterling area.126 However, unlike Malta, remittances from the base stopped only a couple of years after independence in Cyprus.127 Cyprus drew on aid from Greece and Turkey, the other two co-guarantors with standing forces on the island. This aid increased as the crisis deepened, as did the linkages with these hinterlands in terms of religious affiliation, cultural inspiration, job and educational possibilities.128 Dependence therefore continued not only in economic but also in legal, security and defence terms. The use of both bases in operations in the Middle East, which was anathema to Borg Olivier and Makarios, brought home this dependence.129 Both islands attempted to reduce dependence. Economic ties were developed with North Africa and the Middle East including Libya and Egypt130 and further afield including Russia.131 This behaviour increased the activities of the external players and alerted the United States, which began monitoring left-wing

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activities in both states.132 On Malta both Britain and Italy exerted pressure to ensure that Borg Olivier’s attempts to develop relations with Russia were stillborn.133 The increasing popularity of the Labour Party, its shift to the left, the emasculation of its moderates and the increased links between the party and the General Workers Union were viewed with trepidation by the West, who attempted to provide subtle support for the continuation of Borg Olivier’s government.134 On Cyprus, by mid-1961 there was a growing fear of AKEL that had more than 30 per cent of the vote and was viewed as a possible party of power.135 The presence of a Soviet Diplomatic Mission that cooperated with AKEL, provided Soviet scholarships and mopped up agricultural exports was looked upon with consternation.136 By the end of 1961, there was a shift in emphasis in Western diplomatic efforts to anti-communist tactics. Britain and other NATO players, primarily Germany and the United States, sought different methods to fund Cyprus and also put pressure on Makarios to work less with AKEL, encouraging him to set up a party of his own.137 In Cyprus, these tactics further complicated inter-communal harmony and put other more serious local issues on hold. The tendency to view problems in terms of left and right exacerbated the cleavages within the Greek and Turkish communities and encouraged the rise of the extreme right demanding solutions based on separate units and identities.138 Fear of communism, coupled with Makarios’s adoption of a Third World non-aligned philosophy, and rising discord, convinced the external players led by the United States that Cyprus should be closely monitored, and NATO membership considered.139 Within a couple of years, Cyprus became an international problem with wide-ranging implications within the Cold War scenario. External intrusion increased,140 and Makarios’ first priority became the prising of security and defence policy out of the grasp of the guaranteeing powers. Attempting to neutralize NATO, Makarios strengthened his ties with the Soviet, communist and Third World.141 The Soviet Union responded by offering its support to the Cypriot government.142 From here both the Greekand Turkish-Cypriots procured arms.143 Members of Borg Olivier’s government and the electorate also increasingly favoured a more independent foreign policy based on neutrality;144 however, Borg Olivier also discussed the possibility of Malta becoming a NATO base with Britain, emphasized the island’s European heritage and sought alliances with Western and Southern European states.145 This policy allayed the fears of the dominant external player, Britain, who anxiously watched a now independent Malta receive external players within what had been a British sphere of influence.146 Italy, who also saw Malta as a geographical extension of her domain and an essential factor in the defence of her southern flank, was the first to step in.147 Italian relations in the 1960s at grass-roots level seem to have been strained.148 Though originally reluctant,149 Italy offered the Maltese government substantial aid in terms of expertise, finance and education.150 Italian involvement was seen as part of a collaborative NATO effort to ensure that Malta remained within the Western sphere of influence.151 Italy also joined Britain in monitoring political events on the island, attempting to

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cajole them in the direction of the West.152 Germany also provided substantial aid to the island in terms of investment and the setting up of industrial concerns.153 On Malta as the first post-independence elections drew closer the role of external players also became more intrusive. Britain, Italy and the United States set about finding unobtrusive methods to help the Nationalist Party get re-elected.154 An assessment was made of the implications for the Western alliance of a Labour victory.155 Discussions among NATO members focused on incorporating Malta and making it a fully fledged NATO base.156 The United States viewing Malta as Britain’s sphere of influence pushed it to ensure the successful completion of this project.157 Britain seemed confident that a Nationalist government would accede to NATO demands, though NATO’s popularity had plummeted on the island prior to elections. However, Britain was sceptical of success with a Labour government and feared that a Labour victory would mean the immediate abrogation of the defence treaty.158 In both states external players attempted to increase their leverage by offering support. However, on Malta their influence was purposely muted to avoid harming Borg Olivier’s chances of re-election159 and not to be accused of interference in the affairs of a sovereign state. External influence did not exacerbate the left/ right cleavage on Malta; on the contrary, the Nationalist Party and Labour Party collaborated in their efforts to persuade the British to rethink downsizing, and government worked closely with the GWU to ensure that these measures would have the least possible impact on the Maltese workforce.160 Both parties agreed that the bases should not be used against their immediate neighbours since this harmed Malta’s regional potential. A perceptible shift in the right-wing electorate towards the centre was observed in foreign policy, and increasingly Malta’s future was seen more in terms of neutrality.161 External players facilitated a moderate and conciliatory stance on Malta. This was evident in the Vatican input in the discussions between the Maltese Church and the Labour Party which supported an amicable solution. In economic terms, the island had some success in setting up its own industries and could look towards a time when British aid would not be imperative. In legal and security terms, the opposition was already talking of abrogating the defence treaty. The first six years of independence had resulted in the island’s consolidation of its sovereignty and growing confidence in exerting its democratic mandate. A politics of compromise and consensus had been established, laying the ground for the second stage – the transfer of government from right to left and constitutional revision. In Cyprus, the physical presence of a number of external players, reflected in their standing armies, coupled with their presumed legal rights, only increased, as did both communities’ economic dependence. Their actions only exacerbated the divisions between the two communities further. There was no respect for the sovereignty of the island and blatant interference existed everywhere, but was most evident in the open support for the development of a counter communist drive that ran roughshod over domestic policy choices. Their say, which was final, acted against democratic practice and a politics of consensus. This became evident as the island moved remorselessly towards the second phase of constitutional revision.

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Phase two: Attempts at constitutional revision Constitutional revision following democratic transition is commonplace. The party in power at the time of transition will endeavour to create a constitution in its own image. The Portuguese constitution reflected the leftist leanings of the socialist government in its insistence that socialist principles determine economic action in the state. With the consolidation of democracy, these clauses were seen as unnecessary and removed.162 It is also rare for all parties to be involved in the drawing up of the constitution. Even in the Spanish transition, the Basques were not properly consulted.163 Consolidation of democracy requires that all major groups are reconciled to the law of the land and their version of the state incorporated. Italy ensured that her constitution after the war catered for regional demands.164 Finally, drafting a constitution is a process of trial and error; the draftees may not be clear about which structures would best suit the state. Mistakes will need to be rectified and La Palombara tells us that it was agreed that many of Italy’s constitutional features would not be self-executing but would require later legislation.165 In Malta and Cyprus, in addition to the above cited problems, the choice of constitutions had not been an act of sovereignty, but imposed by foreign actors.166 Makarios and Mintoff both argued that the constitutions had been imposed, lacked legitimacy, favoured those groups that had collaborated with the external players and did not bestow the islands with full sovereignty.167 In Malta, the referendum had not shown clear majority support,168 and on Cyprus no referendum had taken place. It was also argued that, ultimately, they derived their legitimacy from an act of the British Parliament rather than national ones. In both cases, constitutional revision had been made difficult. On Malta the Labour government pointed out that a simple majority of Maltese MPs had ratified the constitution,169 which incorporated the immutability of certain clauses, and demanded a two-thirds majority to change them.170 On Cyprus, Makarios argued that the constitution suffered from a fundamental defect in that its basic articles could not be amended, and that such a provision did not have legal value, because a present constituent power had no right to restrict the constituent power of the future. It was also, he added, to ignore reality and deny progress, since all constitutions needed to be altered in the context of the changing needs of the state.171 Greek-Cypriots also argued that the constitution was sui generis, and that in no other constitution had an 18 per cent minority been given powers that practically equalled those of the majority.172 In Malta and Cyprus, the demands for revision sprang from fear that the constitutions did not protect the basic interests of certain groups.173 In Malta, the Labour Party remained opposed to the non-secular aspects of the constitution, which allowed certain fundamental rights such as marriage to be placed outside the remit of the state and enabled the Church to interfere in politics from the pulpit. The monarchical aspects of the constitution threatened the republican doctrines of the Labour Party.174 In Cyprus the Greek-Cypriots wanted constitutional revision because they feared that its bi-communalism would lead to geographic separation

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of the two communities and taksim.175 The postcolonial constitutions, as they stood, threatened to exacerbate the left/right and ethnic cleavages and further the interests of one side at the expense of the other.176 The case of Malta On Malta, constitutional change was largely a domestic issue played out under a four-player model. The Labour government pushed for constitutional revision, threatening to incorporate the changes unilaterally if consensus proved impossible.177 It stressed its electoral mandate and organized demonstrations outside Parliament.178 However, when the opposition was approached, they were not receptive to the idea.179 The government responded by suspending the constitutional court.180 By early 1974, Mintoff was determined to push through revision, though reluctant to divulge exactly what he wanted changed. The right wing of the Nationalist Party stated that they would never agree to any changes. The party moderates181 however were disposed to change,182 through consultation and legal recourse183 forestalling crisis. Both sides insisted on confidentiality. Delegations from both parties were chosen representing different views, including the most intransigent. The Labour government was reluctant to put forward suggestions, fearing that they would be removed from their context and attacked at the public level. They therefore proposed writing a new constitution. The Nationalist Party refused, arguing that it would break the fundamental laws of the land and destroy the principle of legal continuity.184 Inbuilt prejudice on both sides deferred preliminary agreement. It was finally agreed that a list of those clauses that each felt had to be altered would be submitted at the same time in order not to disadvantage either group. Discussions then proceeded smoothly. Discussions on the Malta constitution were divided into two areas  – those involving the change or addition of clauses and those that involved procedure. The list submitted by the Labour government were reminiscent of those submitted in 1964. Foremost among these were alterations to Clause 2 on the entrenched position of the Church. The Labour delegates believed that it would be easier to deal with the Vatican on this issue; however, the Nationalists thought it would be better if agreement was first reached with the Maltese Church.185 The party, they added, in the case of Clause 2, was prepared to accept any agreement that the Labour government reached with the local church. The Maltese Church proved amenable since they regarded the most controversial issues as having been resolved in 1969.186 On 19 July 1974, discussions were opened with the Vatican187 and Dr Edgar Mizzi, attorney general,188 and were completed with the local church by 21 July and then confirmed by the Vatican.189 A definition of corrupt practices was entrenched in the constitution, and a subclause that referred to the religion of Malta as the Roman Catholic religion was not anchored.190 Section 2, which imposed on the government the duty to provide the teaching of religion, had a new Section 40 added, stating that ‘no person shall be required to receive instruction in religion . . . if he so requires’.

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The agreement of 1969 was entrenched in the constitution under Subsection 2 of Section 2, specifying that ‘the authorities of The Roman Catholic Church have the duty and right to teach which principles are right and which are wrong’.191 The talks were completed without a hitch, though a number of priests complained about the hastiness and the secretiveness of the discussions.192 On the other changes submitted by the Labour Party, there was minimal disagreement. Consensus was quickly reached on the electoral changes needed: that all districts elect the same number of seats, and that the voting age be set at eighteen.193 The remaining changes concerned the nature of the state: the replacement of monarchy with a republic. There was some disagreement among the Nationalists, Borg Olivier being reluctant to abandon the monarchy. However, the majority agreed that the monarchy was an anachronism.194 The constitutional changes initiated by the Labour Party were secular and liberal. Those initiated by the Nationalists were of a more legal nature. The opposition wanted to ensure that the mechanisms of the state functioned well and could not be tampered with. To ensure that there would be no reoccurrence of the constitutional court suspension of 1971, they insisted that a clause be inserted in the constitution stating that at times when it was not constituted, the most experienced judges would have the right to call for the constitutional court, and the court of appeal, to be constituted automatically. To facilitate the process, it was also suggested that three rather than five judges would be adequate to make up the court. These changes were inserted as Article 95.195 A second proposal further securing the right of property ownership was also inserted, stating that for all property that was confiscated by the state its owner be given due and fair compensation.196 The final deliberations involved the method to be used to alter the constitution. Polemic surfaced over Article 6 which stated that certain clauses not only needed a two-thirds majority to be altered but also popular approval. The Labour government was against the use of the referendum. It feared that if certain proposals were made public, dissenting groups would make capital of the information and drive a wedge between those that were still not fully convinced.197 The government therefore proposed bypassing the referendum, arguing that agreement from both sides of the House made it unnecessary. The Nationalist Party argued that this was unconstitutional.198 However, according to Section 67, the laws of the constitution unless otherwise stated could be altered by a majority of the House; the clause which specified that a referendum was needed was not itself listed as one of those entrenched clauses, and therefore could be altered with an simple majority as indeed happened.199 All changes were passed with a large majority, only six Nationalist MPs dissenting.200 The constitutional changes of 1974 marked a high point in Malta’s consolidation of democracy. The agreements involved the main parties on the island, and compromise was reached on all the major issues. On both sides there were sections of the party that wished to wreck the accords. At one point the discussions were suspended as a result of sabotage from Labour supporters. After the intercession of the prime minister, the stalled talks recommenced.201 A number of Nationalist MPs also disagreed with the accords, as did a number of priests and the Constitutional

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Party.202 Mifsud Bonnici stressed that consensus was reached at the risk of splitting the Nationalist Party.203 However, both sides were able to pull in the extremes and convince those that remained uncertain. Discussions in Parliament were kept to the minimum,204 since these would only have provided room for dissenters to cause division. There were certain issues in the constitution that were patched up and not fully resolved; one such case was the law on elections.205 Certain additions were considered sui generis, for instance the inclusion of the employment commission.206 However, as Mifsud Bonnici stated, ‘We were happy that we managed to steer the reforms successfully for with the recognition and acceptance of the constitution by the MLP its legitimacy was sustained by the majority, and in this way we had consolidated democracy on the island.’207 The case of Cyprus In Cyprus the will and the power to negotiate and concede where necessary was absent.208 The 1960 constitution was never fully implemented, and the articles relating to the ethnic and municipal issues were left pending.209 Nor did the constitution serve as the basis for stable governance, since the government spent an inordinate amount of time on interpretation and implementation with questionable success.210 Respect for the constitution by the diverse parties was also questionable.211 The ambivalent wording of Article 78 that had given the Turkish-Cypriots the right to veto any financial legislation was used to delay the implementation of impending articles, which in turn encouraged in the GreekCypriots a habit of ignoring, or bypassing, constitutional provisions.212 By 1962, the Greek-Cypriots felt the constraints of the constitution. In January 1962, President Makarios spoke publicly of his intention to seek revision of the constitution. In 1963, he stated that the people of Cyprus had an absolute right to make amendments without seeking the consent or approval of any country.213 By the end of the year the pressure from the Greek-Cypriot side had become immense. Makarios intimated that he planned to invite the Turkish-Cypriot leaders early in 1964 to negotiate certain amendments on separate majorities in the House of Representatives, separate municipalities, the 70/30 ratio in the civil service, separate majorities in connection with tax legislation and the separate administration of justice.214 If the Turks refused he would amend the constitution before the next general election of 1965, arguing that ‘he did not see why any revision should depend on the goodwill of the Turks who were a minority of 18%’.215 The majority of the Greek-Cypriot members of the House supported this stance, though some had reservations since they feared Turkish reprisals.216 However, unlike Malta because of the treaty of guarantee, an insulated process of treaty revision undertaken largely by domestic actors was impossible. The GreekCypriots therefore sought the support of the international community including the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO), the Communist bloc, the non-aligned movement and the UN. Zenon Rossides, Cyprus’s permanent delegate to the UN, spearheaded the campaign for Cypriot independence. Citing

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the UN declaration on the abolition of all forms of racial discrimination, he drew attention to Article 11 which stated that measures intended for the protection of racial groups within a state should in no circumstance have as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate rights for different racial groups; Article 6 which stated that everyone should have equal access to the public service in his country; and Article 7 which stated that there should be equal justice for all. He argued that the declaration had legal force and stressed the duty of states to comply with the declaration and amend their constitutional laws accordingly, since Article 4 provided that all states should take effective measures to revise government policies and rescind laws having the effect of creating and perpetuating racial discrimination.217 The Turkish-Cypriots, however, were not prepared to consider any alteration of a constitution which they regarded as their sole protection against the erosion of their community rights.218 They were prepared to sanction the change, or removal of certain clauses that made government unworkable;219 however, these changes had to take place within the confines of what had been agreed.220 For the TurkishCypriots the preparedness of the Greek-Cypriots to work the constitution, in the context of the large measure of autonomy granted to them, would be an acknowledgement and acceptance of their role as a community in Cyprus.221 Any alteration at this early stage, they argued, was only an alias for uncurbed majority rule. The Turkish-Cypriots had no inducement to change their stance, as long as they had the support of the Turkish government.222 This attitude was only strengthened by constant warnings from the Greek government that constitutional revision was only possible with the agreement of the Turkish government.223 Greece, Turkey and Britain warned Makarios against unilateral constitutional revision. Sir Dennis Allen told the Greek-Cypriots that to ask the Turkish-Cypriots to sit round the table to discuss constitutional revision would be tantamount to asking a condemned man to discuss with his judges the manner of his execution.224 Makarios was advised that a slower, less radical and more piecemeal approach might be more effective.225 However, on 30 November 1963, Makarios put forward his thirteen points for a comprehensive reassessment of the constitution. These included constitutional processes leading to unified municipalities, unification of the judiciary, the abolition of separate majorities in the House of Representatives and of both communal chambers and the abolition of the right of veto of the president and the vice president.226 Makarios’s demands were wide-ranging and aimed at removing all those articles that supported the bi-communal state.227 Before the Turkish-Cypriot community could respond, the Turkish government made it clear that no constitutional revisions would be considered.228 Makarios immediately sent back the telegram reiterating that he did not recognize the right of Turkey to interfere in the internal decisions of the Cypriot government.229 Consequently, Kutchuk set about preparing a response on the lines that the Turkish community would not discuss or consider any amendments to the constitution.230 However, before this communiqué reached Makarios, Cyprus was already fast descending into civil war.

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The role of external players During constitutional revision a similarity can be observed in the behaviour of Makarios and Mintoff. Both feared external intrusion. The Labour Party in 1971 suspected that if successfully elected the British might deter their takeover. The British, it was argued, might respond as they had in Australia, where the prime minister had been removed by the governor general, and replace Mintoff with a more moderate member of the party.231 Douglas Marchant in an article entitled ‘Britain’s Coup D’État’ talks about the British practice of organizing the unconstitutional removal of leaders in ex-colonies who are not supportive of British policy. Marchant quotes the case of Lesotho and Oman in 1970, and Uganda in 1971, and asks whether Malta, where the election of the Labour Party with only one seat seems to have brought on a state of panic in Britain, would be next.232 The British speculated about the possibility of bringing about Mintoff ’s fall.233 The fear of an external coup was also uppermost in the minds of the Cypriots. Both communities feared enosis or taksim, as the case may be, and the annexation of the island by either Greece or Turkey. Elites in both communities also feared the removal of their current head and his replacement by someone more understanding of Greek and Turkish policies.234 Makarios was to suffer many assassination attempts, and in 1974 his overthrow by the Greek government.235 Both governments attempted to insulate the proceedings in accordance with the four-player game. Mintoff in 1971 spoke of abrogating the treaty of defence with Britain.236 In negotiations with the British, the treaty was to be extended until 1979 but no further. Mintoff reluctantly accepted treaty extension since Malta was still dependent on British funding,237 and negotiated with Britain, seeking increased payment for the continued use of base facilities. Britain proved obdurate and offered only a minimal increase.238 Mintoff attempted to coerce Britain by indicating that he had other options including funding from Libya.239 Several NATO members, including the United States, Germany and Italy, offered to provide some of the additional funding and leaned on Britain to up her offer.240 A new defence treaty was signed in 1972. It differed from that of 1965, in that it specified more precisely the British remit on the island both in terms of power and geography. It also specified that the base facilities could not be used against Middle Eastern and North African states.241 The Labour government also immediately declared head of NATO forces in Malta persona non grata and disabused NATO of any pretensions of right of use. Mintoff also officially declared the government’s policy of neutrality and non-alignment, reiterating that Maltese ports would be closed to warships of both superpowers.242 Makarios in 1963 also declared constitutional revision to be an internal matter, warning that no outside right of intervention would be recognized.243 Makarios reiterated this statement in March 1963, when in the face of the Turkish foreign minister Feridun Cemal Erkin’s threat of partition, he insisted that the treaty of guarantee did not give the guarantor powers the right to intervene in the island’s internal affairs, and warned that in such an event, Cyprus would appeal to the UN.244 The Cypriot government started to seek ways to modify the

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London and Zurich agreements, especially Article 4 which gave Turkey the right to intervene unilaterally to prevent the modification of immutable basic articles of the constitution.245 Makarios endeavoured to play a four-player game, but the behaviour of external actors differed from that of Malta where compliance had been the name of the game. The priority of the external actors here was the continued use of Cyprus for defence purposes and therefore the maintenance of the status quo through the London and Zurich agreements.246 The Greek-Cypriots suggested that Greek and Turkish guarantees should be abrogated, and that Britain remain the sole guarantor, since they also realized that the island could not do without British aid.247 Makarios appealed to the UN to declare the treaties of guarantee and alliance invalid, adding that Cyprus needed to be freed from the threat of Turkish intervention.248 He also asked the UN to support him in changing the constitution to a one-man-one-vote basis and incorporating a normal code of human rights.249 Makarios, like Mintoff, feared NATO. His stand towards the alliance post independence resembled that of Borg Olivier’s – ambiguous and not ruling out membership.250 However, most GreekCypriots were against NATO membership251 and after 1964 fought against falling under their remit.252 Makarios also emphasized the island’s neutral status, drew support from Third World and non-aligned countries and castigated the treaties for the rights they gave Britain to launch attacks against their Middles Eastern neighbours.253 However, both islands looked to Britain as the lesser evil. Makarios and Mintoff both drew on British advice during constitutional revision. Makarios appealed to Sir Arthur Clark, the British high commissioner, to advise him on how to proceed.254 Clark agreed that constitutional revision was necessary, as did Duncan Sandys, the secretary of state.255 Clark, against the wishes of certain sections of the British government, became involved in the negotiations, advising Makarios on his list of constitutional articles prior to submission.256 Turkey, however, would not accept any revision and leant on those reconciliatory groups in the Turkish-Cypriot camp that countenanced change.257 Greece assured the Cypriot government that it concurred with its aims, but also pushed to reduce them.258 Makarios then appealed to the UN, where he had more room for manoeuvre. However, on Malta, negotiations on both the treaty of defence, and on constitutional revision, had been with a government with near total support, the Maltese archbishop travelling to London to mediate and support Mintoff ’s stance for increased aid in the revised defence treaty. In Cyprus, though British strategic needs dictated a conciliatory stance towards the government, Britain could not afford to favour one side.259 Unable to deliver, her input created a sense of false hope for the Greek-Cypriots, encouraging unrealistic demands.260 The Maltese government also approached Britain when constitutional revision commenced.261 British legal experts were asked to advise the Maltese constitutional committee on the legality of certain constitutional clauses that were to be altered, added or removed, and on the best procedure to be adopted.262 The Maltese government also had to determine whether problems would be encountered in its drive to change the status of the island from that of a monarchy to a republic.263

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Britain, however, intimated that none were foreseen.264 In reality Britain did not want to get involved and, as in the case of Cyprus, was unprepared to step in if a constitutional coup occurred. Unlike in Cyprus, however, British input proved to be both positive and less necessary. Vatican input also facilitated revision.265 Ultimately, constitutional revision in Malta proved to be largely a domestic issue, supported by a neutral external climate. In Malta, the support and space accorded to the domestic elites by foreign players facilitated the agreements of 1969, 1972 and 1974. The success of these agreements promoted the view that the elites could resort to legal mechanisms to achieve their ends. This belief helped to create consensus for the new state and discouraged recourse to para-legal and coercive methods in seeking to fulfil one’s agenda. Constitutional revision in Cyprus was not possible for external players would not countenance it. As the Greek-Cypriots perceived that constitutional revision was impossible, they increasingly abandoned the tools of state and resorted to coercive and violent methods. Consequently, the third and final phase that culminated in regime breakdown unfolded very differently on the two islands though similar behaviour patterns could be observed.

Phase three: Failure to compromise, coercive action and the counter state The case of Malta In Malta, the Labour government introduced far-reaching and much-needed changes. The centre in Maltese politics shifted, and many on the right agreed that change was long overdue. Economic and welfare reform lifted the island’s sclerosis, creating a more egalitarian social order266 with a greater dispersion of resources,267 eroding the sharp class distinction that had divided the island into two nations.268 In 1972 Malta adopted the decimal system, the income tax and social security system were overhauled and a new system of pensions was introduced. Numerous bills enhancing the position of women were also introduced including a bill revising inheritance rights, and the status of women in marriage, and another, allowing women to sit as jurors. The Church was brought within the full jurisdiction of the state. Nationalization of key resources also took place including telecommunications, broadcasting, banking and air transport, and free market institutions were tempered by certain mechanisms adopted from command economics including bulk buying. A  system of worker self-management was introduced at the dry docks.269 From 1976, however, we observe an erosion of this consensus. In an endeavour to strengthen the economy and to support the transformation needed to establish a classless society,270 the government pushed for the large-scale nationalization of resources.271 It also attempted to eliminate all institutions that cultivated a politics of elitism, including those in education and medical welfare.272 From 1976, the government clashed with interest groups and trade unions across the political spectrum. Government attempted to silence the opposition by co-opting

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or eliminating it.273 The greatest victory was the statutory fusion of the GWU with the government in 1978. Attard Kingswell, the head of the union, had been against this merger, but he was removed from his post.274 In 1977, new conditions of work were introduced in the public sector. The CMTU, the main opposition federation of trade unions, ordered partial industrial action. Many of the strikers were locked out, suspended without pay or dismissed.275 In the same year, the doctors in Malta took partial industrial action. They were immediately locked out of the government hospitals and subsequently the government fired a substantial number.276 Consequently, there were no major industrial disputes in the public sector for seven years.277 This lack of consultation between the government and the different groups of civil society was censured by the International Labour Organisation (ILO).278 The government became increasingly heavy-handed with its adversaries. In 1977, a circular was issued by the Department of Education banning teachers from publishing literary works, making broadcasts or performing without prior permission of the minister.279 The following year the government banned British journalists from entering Malta.280 In 1975, Xandir Malta, the only Maltese television station, became government property and though by law impartial, its output was now controlled by government.281 A number of laws in the late 1970s also restricted the rights of individuals. These included the Press Act X 1974 amended by Act XVII in 1978, where the onus of proof was transferred from the prosecution to the defendant.282 There were also scores of complaints of corruption, rampant clientelism283 and discrimination covering appointments, promotions, transfers, allocations of housing, bank facilities and granting of licensing and permits.284 The judiciary also came under threat. In cases heard against the government in 1976, 1977 and 1980, the judges were suspended by government for ruling against it. Cases instituted against the government were delayed, sometimes for several years, and the public became increasingly sceptical of winning a case.285 A law of 1981 removed a large part of a judge’s discretionary power, and a resolution of 1984 allowed the minister to use his authority to supplant decisions of the court. An Act to amend the code of organization and civil procedure curbed the power of the courts to exercise jurisdiction over ministerial and other discretion. The Act was described by the international commission of jurists in Geneva as an act which ‘strikes at the basic principles of the rule of law’.286 Criminal activity at the fringes of the party in power increased and went unchecked. In 1979 the building that housed the Times of Malta (TOM), the most widely read paper on the island, was burnt down, the house of the leader of the opposition was also ransacked and his wife and family assaulted. On the same day Nationalist Party clubs in Valletta, Floriana and Birkirkara were attacked, as was the office of the church newspaper Il-Hajja.287 Violence was also evident at state level, and police brutality sharply increased, reaching a peak with the death of Nardu Debono who was asked to report to the police station in connection with a letter bomb that was sent to the residence of the commissioner of police, Lawrence Pullicino. His dead body was discovered the next day. Subsequent evidence showed that he had died at the police station.288

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Acts of violence from the right also increased. Several high-profile Labour members were targets of bomb attacks. The most extreme case was that of Karen Grech, killed by a letter bomb on 28 December 1977. Karen was the daughter of Professor Edwin Grech who had broken strike action and reported for work at St Luke’s Hospital during the 1977 doctors’ strike against the government. The letter bomb had been addressed to her father.289 By the late 1970s, politics had become polarized. The MLP lost control of the violent elements.290 It was those MPs and ministers with the most extreme left-wing views that were dictating the agenda. Criminal and violent elements also found themselves on committees and close to certain government ministers.291 With the marginalization of the opposition and the government monopoly of state institutions,292 an alternative model of the state, a state within a state, emerged. At this point, we witness the rapid expansion of the Nationalist Party machine that was to serve as the main focus of the counter state.293 Unable to access resources at home, the party now appealed to its international contacts. It used international territory to maintain their campaign, setting up a television station that broadcast from Sicily after the party was refused a licence to set one up locally.294 Other key areas with international aid, especially British, were also reinforced. Of importance was the ensuring of transparency at elections through the setting up of their own monitoring apparatus in the elections of 1981.295 There were also rumours of the party planning to set up a paramilitary arm in response to Mintoff ’s build-up of an army and police force loyal to the party.296 1981 heralded the failure of democratic practice with election results that kept the party with an absolute majority of votes out of government.297 The Nationalist Party responded by refusing to accept the legitimacy of the Labour government and stating that it would not participate in the mechanisms of the state.298 The case of Cyprus In Cyprus, the descent was much faster. Here there was no national memory of a government of consensus. On independence, attempts were made at consolidating the nation in socio-economic terms. Like Malta, Cyprus in 1960 was seen in terms of backwardness and underdevelopment,299 its economy rural, distorted by war and colonial rule. The first five-year economic plan300 set up the planning machinery, and the economy grew rapidly. Gross domestic product averaged a rate of growth of 6.2 per cent annually: Gross national product rose by 24 per cent;301 employment increased; population in agriculture fell, but rose in manufacture, construction and services. Hotel building and tourism expanded. Earnings and investment rose. Emphasis was put on education and on improving the infrastructural base and communication facilities. Makarios’s policies were markedly pro-labour. The first five-year plan had as its objectives full employment, improved social benefits, freedom of association, industrial peace and increased productivity. As in the case of Malta, however, the economy tended to be dominated by organizations of foreign origin – one in particular, the Cyprus mines corporation, was a major employer.302

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In political terms, however, its public institutions were primitive and weak, and had had little time to evolve. By 1964, the island still had no national institutions which were free from colonialism or outside domination. The influence of the Orthodox Church persisted and secularization essential in democratization did not take off.303 Makarios as president dominated the political scene and increasingly adopted a demagogic approach.304 The first cabinet in 1960 consisted largely of ex-EOKA chiefs,305 which meant that a clear-cut distinction between pro-Makarios forces and the ex-guerrillas never emerged. Makarios did not have a party to support him, and the parties on the right never garnered much support.306 The Cypriot Confederation of Labour (SEK), the union equivalent, also remained weak.307 The strongest political party was the communist AKEL which sought to neutralize the ethnic cleavage through class appeal.308 In the first government, it held five of the thirty-five Greek-Cypriot seats in the House of Representatives. Though other left-wing parties could not compete with AKEL, for its moderate stance brought it votes309 and it was supported by the largest union in Cyprus, the PEO, it was constantly being undermined by both internal and external elites. The Cypriot political system revolved around the president, the executive and the cabinet, and not the party system.310 A  stable representative party system did not emerge.311 Those parties with any real electoral strength were extreme and polarized the system, with the exception of AKEL. The TurkishCypriot parties operated outside the Greek-Cypriot party system, creating a parallel party system with its own left/right axis.312 This party system was also polarized, consisting of persecuted left-wing parties and extreme right-wingers. In effect, the ethnic cleavage polarized the system, encouraged the growth of extreme nationalist right-wing parties with non-reconcilable agendas, while effectively eliminating the more moderate left-wing parties that sought to work across ethnic lines. This increased with Greek-Cypriot criticism of the status quo, and continued calls for enosis,313 and with the Turkish-Cypriot refusal to trust unitary organizations and preference for institutions which would facilitate separation.314 By the beginning of 1963, a worsening political situation encouraged the slow disengagement of the Turkish-Cypriots from the political and economic life of the nation.315 Between 1960 and 1963, Cypriots saw no evidence of a collective effort to sustain the national sphere. When problems occurred, attempts at legal recourse did not prove fruitful. Both the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots took legal action when deadlock was reached. In the municipal issue, both Turkish- and GreekCypriots appealed to the supreme constitutional court; however, the judgement316 did not bring the communities any nearer to a solution. Once the Greek-Cypriots perceived that constitutional revision was not possible, they discarded the tools of state and resorted to coercive action. Early in 1963, central government threatened to take Turkish-held municipal property and obstruct their setting up of a Development Bank. The government also refused to issue the annual grant to the Turkish community. The telephone lines of the Turkish municipality were cut, and there were fears that the central government would take over the

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municipal market.317 Makarios wanted the Turkish-Cypriots to move immediately to unified, local government.318 The Turkish-Cypriots fought back through diplomatic channels, by instigating acts of violence and organizing mass street demonstrations.319 Once government adopted strong arm action, it lost control of the security of the state. Armed bands grew in both communities, as diverse groups felt the need to provide for their own protection, and from mid-1963 there was rapid importation of arms. Inter- and intra-communal violence escalated.320 Failure to secure the demands of each community increased the wrath and numbers of the groups at the fringes.321 From May 1963 negotiations came to an almost complete halt, and the mediating centre in each community became increasingly driven by the extremes.322 On 3 December 1963, an attempt was made to blow up the statue of an EOKA leader; protest demonstrations by Greek-Cypriot schoolchildren followed. If the Greek-Cypriots insisted on amendments to the constitution, the Turkish-Cypriots would insist on partition, they countered.323 Each community withdrew to the bunker and eliminated those who continued to advocate cross-party and cross-ethnic ties.324 The situation worsened with the rise of the communist threat after the 1962 debacle in Cuba. In both communities, left-wingers and centrists were replaced by right-wingers and extreme nationalists. By the end of 1962, Makarios was planning the appointment of committees entirely of rightists in the five main towns, and the three communist mayors already in place were to be removed.325 Anti-communist zeal was also used as an excuse to silence the Turkish-Cypriots who would not toe the party line. Cross-cutting cleavages were eradicated and each community dug itself in, reinforced its own version of the State of Cyprus and awaited the crisis. What followed was the slow elimination of the Turkish-Cypriots from government326 and the rapid build-up of a Turkish-Cypriot regime.327 With the Turkish municipal law enacted by the Turkish community chamber, there emerged the beginning of an island-wide Turkish administration establishing separate and dual control in every sphere of government and social life.328 This was, in Makarios’s words, the setting up of a state within a state. The Greek-Cypriot response was the Akritas Plan, designed to end the new republic by quickly suppressing the TurkishCypriot reactions to imposed constitutional change before outside intervention could be mounted. The plan was triggered by an incident that occurred during a bout of intensified searches. One of these on 21 December resulted in the death of two Turkish-Cypriots by Greek-Cypriot auxiliary police forces and sparked off inter-communal fighting. Rampant killings by both communities followed, although undoubtedly it was the Greek-Cypriots that led the rampage. The violence that ensued led to the total or partial destruction of 103 mixed villages and a displacement of about a quarter (nearly 30,000) of the total Turkish-Cypriot community. After their departure Greek-Cypriots burned and demolished their houses and a complete blockade was imposed on the remaining Turkish enclaves.329 Cyprus descended into civil war and from that date the bi-communal republic established in 1960 ceased to exist.

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The role of external players On Malta the government’s success with the abrogation of the treaty of defence, and constitutional revision, allowed the island to evolve into an independent sovereign domain, underpinned by consensual and strong local institutions. In legal terms Cyprus remained under the remit of Britain, Greece and Turkey, limiting her ability to develop the institutions necessary to support independence. Fear of Turkish and/or Greek invasion remained a constant and impinged on the policy process. Cyprus remained a penetrated system and a client state. Its ethnic cleavage encouraged close linkages with other external domains and made difficult the development both of the notion of a separate territory and a national psyche. In turn, external actors identified too closely with a domain that harboured individuals with the same ethnic mix, developing relations on a cultural and social level, rather than at the level of the state, undermining the state and exacerbating the cleavage base. Differences in the limits of sovereignty and jurisdiction on the two islands impacted on their ability to solve problems through normal legal recourse in national and international courts. In Malta, the opposition appealed to foreign players to ensure a just outcome,330 but the local legal system remained sovereign. Appeals to the constitutional court remained a constant in the period under study.331 The government made several attempts to curtail the powers of the court including suspending it, restricting the discretionary power of the judges and moving judges around.332 However, the court continued to cut cases against the government,333 and, though the powers of the courts were challenged, their legitimacy and powers of enforcement persisted. In Cyprus, external players dictated the parameters of jurisdiction and sovereignty. The constitutional court, the highest court of appeal, was chaired by a foreigner. However, the court had less legitimacy and powers of enforcement than on Malta, and its mandate was not respected, and its ruling on the municipal issue was not enforced. The differences in their sovereign status also affected their status externally. As conditions on both islands worsened, Makarios and Mintoff attempted to insulate their governments from Western criticism. They increased efforts to gain support outside the Western camp. Malta signed agreements with Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, China and Russia,334 Cyprus with the United Arab Emirates. Both sought support from the non-aligned movement and AASPO.335 Increasingly, aid was obtained from non-democratic states. With the help of the Libyan government, the Maltese government set up Radio Mediterranean which broadcast first from Libya and then from Malta.336 In its dispute with the doctors, the government obtained new recruits from Eastern Europe and elsewhere who acted as strike breakers.337 These policies alienated the West further, and both islands became part of a superpower politics of containment. The opposition, in Malta the Nationalists, and in Cyprus the Turkish-Cypriots, however, were staunch supporters of the Western alliance. They drew on Western aid and kept the West briefed on developments.338 Makarios and Mintoff, alerted to the dangers of foreign intrusion, sought to secure their defence interests in the

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context of non-alignment. However, Mintoff came to realize the inadvisability of such a policy and sought to secure Malta’s neutrality by appealing to a number of Mediterranean countries; he finally settled for an Italian commitment to defend the island if under attack.339 Makarios, however, made no such provision and created a breach with Greece, leaving Cyprus open to attack from any quarter. On Malta, the behaviour of external players resembled that exercised in Greece, Spain and Portugal in the 1970s and tended to be conciliatory and encourage compromise; however, as the situation worsened, their role altered. Though the Vatican attempted to bring the parties together, it was not prepared to countenance the changes demanded by the Labour government. The result was that the Vatican shifted its position from one of broker and intermediary to one of firm opposition to the government.340 Criticism from the foreign community also escalated. The British medical association removed its recognition of Maltese medical degrees,341 and the world medical association was critical of government action in its dealings with the medical profession.342 The ILO censured government methods towards trade union action.343 The international body of jurists censured the enactment of certain laws that impinged on fundamental freedoms.344 By the end of the 1970s, relations with Britain and Italy had reached an all-time low, as had relations with European multilateral organizations including the EC.345 A  number of Western governments offered their services to the Nationalist Party, including Italy and Britain.346 External players from the Western camp, however, still attempted to play a reconciliatory and mediating role on the island. In 1980, the Maltese government indicated a preference for the West and turned to Italy to provide for its security and defence. The Italian government, despite rather rocky relations with the Maltese government, immediately responded in the affirmative.347 When no compromise seemed possible in the context of the Church-run schools and hospitals, the Vatican was called in to help broker a deal.348 Their predominant aim was that of prodding the elites to settle their differences within the context of the democratic game. Those states that had the greatest impact on Malta  – Britain, Italy and Germany  – were all consolidated democracies and attempted to replicate their methods of play on the external domain. On Malta, most external aid was procured from democratic and stable states. Britain, Italy and Germany provided Malta with substantial aid – economic, diplomatic, educational, cultural and in trade. Though aid was forthcoming from other areas, it never matched that received from the West. Russia, China and North Korea provided Malta with economic and military aid and Russia extended certain security guarantees. None of these relationships, however, were coercive. The closest Malta came to external intrusions reminiscent of those in Cyprus was in its relationship with non-democratic Libya, but the threat remained just that.349 The international climate also facilitated a politics of democratization. The late 1970s and early 1980s were characterized by the demise of Kissinger, the rise of Gorbachev and the politics of détente. Malta had become an associated member of the EC in 1970, and the strengthening of European Political Cooperation (EPC) and the successful democratization of Southern Europe were far more conducive to external actors playing out a centrist dove

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position reconciliatory towards the left wing and furthering democratic practice through consent and contagion. In Cyprus, the opposite was true. Greece and Turkey in the early 1960s maintained governments that were neither stable nor fully democratic. They were often referred to as feeble and ineffective and not in control of numerous forces at home.350 Neither sustained consensual elites replicating democratic games. It was this method of play that was practised on Cyprus. Britain, though a consolidated democracy, also exhibited unstable behaviour in Cyprus. Its high commissioner to Cyprus encouraged Makarios to put forward his constitutional revisions without first ascertaining whether he had the support of London. The role of these players on Cyprus was characterized by a high level of disorganization and lack of communication. Both Greece and Turkey claimed that their room for manoeuvre at home vis-à-vis Cyprus was limited and that if they took certain actions it could lead to a rebellion or the fall of the government. Nor could they claim to be in control of their respective spheres of influence on the island. By 1963, it was clear that the Greek government had lost control over the Greek-Cypriot government.351 Their behaviour was also coercive. In 1962 the Turkish government came out against any compromise on the issue of the municipalities, seeing separate rather than unified communities as the key to continued influence on Cyprus. Turkey encouraged the right-wing extremists who supported separatism, and attempted to silence Kutchuk, and the more conciliatory left. When the Greek government realized that Makarios intended to take an independent stance following the crisis of December 1963, it shored up its control by encouraging the Greek auxiliaries to infiltrate the Cypriot National Guard, by furthering the extreme right wing and putting pressure on Makarios to realign his government to the right. When the Greek government failed to shift Makarios in the right direction, it started to plan his demise, which culminated in a series of attempted assassinations. The external environment was also not conducive to consolidating democracy on the island. In 1963, both the Soviet Union and the United States applied coercive action to ensure continued control of allied and satellite states – the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the USSR and the illegitimate support for the right wing in both Greece and Italy by the United States were cases in point. The Cuban missile crisis had reversed the thaw in the Cold War, exacerbating the left/right cleavage internationally. Reflecting this environment, the role of external players on Cyprus was coercive, disruptive and negative, undermining democratic practice. All parties – Greek, Turkish, Russian, British and American – worked best with the extremist and violent fringes. Methods of play that encouraged reconciliation were scuppered. All external parties paid lip service to reconciliation, aware of the security and defence implications associated with breakdown, but in reality they contributed to the slow assassination of government. American action clearly illustrated this method of play. The United States regarded the island as central to the maintenance of Western power in the region.352 It also feared disagreement between Greece and Turkey over the island’s status as this would jeopardize the stability of NATO in Europe. Thus, when it observed in 1964 that Cyprus was increasingly exhibiting communist tendencies, was veering

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towards civil war and it became likely that Greece and Turkey would go to war, the United States advocated partition.353 The sovereignty and unity of the state of Cyprus came second to the security and defence of NATO. Increasingly, Turkey, Greece and even Britain came to support this view.

Conclusion The post-transition phase in Malta and Cyprus was complicated by issues of nation and statehood. Only an independent and sovereign state can proceed on the road to democratization. The process is an integral, though not always inevitable, part of the process of state building. For democracy to work, the inhabitants must fully identify with the state. If its legitimacy is questioned by certain national groups, democratization cannot succeed. In democratization through decolonization the transition phase is often extended, since in this case the period that marks the end of the procedural phase, that is the establishment of a democratic constitution, is not always marked by compromise between the national elites as the document may to some extent be enforced by external players. A second phase of this transition is therefore inevitable to allow domestic elites to format their own version of the state, and in doing so make the transition to consensually unified elites. This process is further complicated by the process of nation and state building, inevitable in a newly decolonized state seeking to defend and extend its legitimacy, exercise its rights of jurisdiction and sovereignty and build up the required mechanisms and resources of governance. This process also occurs under conditions where previous foreign overlords have not completely withdrawn their remit from their ex-colonies, and dependence may still exist in socio-economic, cultural, political and legal terms. These states therefore are also struggling to make the shift along the dependence– independence continuum and exercise and defend their rights of jurisdiction and sovereignty on the international circuit, shoring up borders which are still highly permeable. The role of international actors is therefore crucial in ensuring successful regime transition. Rosenau’s354 inner/outer linkage model expresses state attempts to access international contacts and resources, and external actors’ attempts to impact on the state to ensure compliance with regional norms. The format the relationship takes is crucial. Relationships with democratic players that are prepared to replicate this method of behaviour externally and through methods of consent and contagion promote democracy. Those based on coercive methods retard the process. An external environment that promotes democracy in the early years of consolidation but allows domestic actors the space to play out a four-player game is the most beneficial. In the case of Malta, this four-and-a-half-player model was in operation most of the time. Post independence the domestic players shifted closer towards the consensually unified elite model evinced by the agreements of 1969 and 1974. However, after 1976 we saw the rise of the extremes and a shift towards dis-unified elite behaviour. External actors, however, throughout the

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period shifted towards a more consensually unified approach in dealing with Malta. Methods of engagement in the early post-independence period were reminiscent of the politics of coercion exhibited on Cyprus. However, as Malta shifted towards a more consolidated regime, developed further notions of state and nation and strengthened its position on the international circuit, external actors increasingly intervened on a voluntary basis and at the request of the internal elites. This was mirrored in a behaviour that promoted democratization through consent and contagion and contributed to the ability of the island elites to pull back from the verge, strengthen the political centre, and negotiate a second transition in 1987 that resulted in the consolidation of democracy. In Cyprus, the five-player model remained operative. Domestic elite relations post independence continued to be dis-unified, and the extremes increasingly set the agenda, fracturing the state and increasing its vulnerability on the global circuit. This pattern of behaviour was reinforced by the continued presence of dis-unified external actors whose first consideration remained external security needs that could be ensured by promoting ethnic rather than national demands. This phenomenon encouraged the growth of cross-border links with ethnic majorities in Greece and Turkey undermining notions of state and nation further. Democratization here was of secondary importance to the external players who used coercive tactics to undermine Cypriot sovereignty and ensure that the birth of the Cypriot nation was stillborn. In doing so, external actors facilitated regime breakdown and contributed to the inability of the island to pull back from the verge and negotiate a second successful transition in 1974. Chapter 5 illustrates the consequences of regime breakdown and the attempts by both islands’ elites to negotiate a second transition.

Chapter 5 M A LTA A N D C Y P RU S :   C O N S O L I DAT I N G T H E N AT IO N S TAT E   – N E G O T IAT I N G A C OM P R OM I SE :   T H E S E C O N D T R A N SI T IO N

Compromise is a basic negotiation process in which both parties give up something that they want in order to get something else they want more. Compromises usually occur in win–lose situations when there is a fixed pie to be divided up, and whatever one side gets, the other side loses. In compromise situations, neither side gets all of what they really want, but they each make concessions in order to reach an agreement that is acceptable to both. However, some things cannot be compromised because they cut to the core of an individual’s or group’s identity or survival.1

Introduction In this chapter, Malta and Cyprus attempt to utilize methods of conflict resolution to overcome crisis, re-establish the democratic credentials of the state and consolidate the nation. In 1981 in Malta, and in 1964 in Cyprus, democracy was under threat and the legitimacy of the state called into question. For the next five years on Malta, and the next ten on Cyprus, numerous endeavours were made to ameliorate the situation, and create institutions that would provide consensus, and consolidate the democratic sovereign state. On Malta, these endeavours succeeded and by 1987 conflict resolution was achieved, democratic governance strengthened and national solidarity heightened. On Cyprus between 1972 and 1974 conflict resolution seemed possible, and an agreed formula was in the pipeline. This may well have made a unified Cypriot nation a viable enterprise. However, conflict resolution was forestalled, and in 1974 Greece invaded the island, initiating a coup that overthrew the government of Makarios. Within days Turkey responded by invading the island and appropriating 34 per cent of the land. In 1975, Denktash declared the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. The result was a division of Cyprus that is still in place today.

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Different points of departure Events during this second transition unfolded very differently on the two islands. This was in large part due to the different conditions on the two islands at the point of breakdown, the continuing divergence of these conditions during the period of attempted conflict resolution and the behaviour of the domestic and external elites in dealing with the crisis. The goals of the domestic elites on both islands proved similar. There were endeavours to push through package deals to ameliorate the rules of the game, improve governability, create a consensual constitution and strengthen the sovereign domain. However, the conditions under which these elites functioned differed radically. This was in part due to the external elites, who contributed to transition failure on Cyprus, and successful transition on Malta.

Cyprus in 1964 and Malta in 1981: The extent of regime breakdown Cyprus in 1964 was under siege and civil war conditions prevailed. A  British report commenting on the situation stated that the Turkish Community was without food, water and medical supplies . . . the Archbishop seemed to be unnerved by the degeneration of law and order . . . the extremist Greeks . . . feel that with a little more time they would have solved the racial problem by largely exterminating the Turkish minority.2

On the outbreak of violence3 a blockade was imposed on the Turkish enclaves,4 and the Turkish vice president, the Turkish ministers and MPs found it impossible to attend their ministries, and meetings of the council of ministers or Parliament which were held on the Greek side.5 Consequently, the Turkish-Cypriot members of the government absented themselves from Parliament.6 Following this impasse, the Turkish-Cypriot members were stripped of any legal standing in the House, and the Turkish-Cypriots were ousted from the executive and legislative branches, as well as from other services of the Republic. Kutchuk suggested that the entire council of ministers meet at the Green Line,7 but Makarios refused, stating that Kutchuk had abandoned the position of vice president and had led an insurrection against the state.8 Both the British and the Turks protested, but Makarios informed them that they had no remit on the island, as the treaty of guarantee was not valid since it conflicted with UN principles. Greece and Britain strengthened his hand by refusing Turkey consultation under Article 4 of the treaty.9 Makarios in May 1964 also declared that the constitution of the Republic was no longer in force10 and the now wholly Greek-Cypriot House of Representatives amended several fundamental articles of the constitution by ordinary legislation.11 Despite the exclusion of the Turkish-Cypriots from the mechanisms of the state, the international community including Britain signalled its preparedness to

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recognize the continued legitimacy of the Cypriot government.12 In December 1965, the General Assembly passed Resolution No 2077 confirming the Republic of Cyprus as an equal member of the UN, so it was, in accordance with the UN charter, entitled to enjoy full sovereignty and complete independence without any foreign intervention or interference.13 Thus from 1964 the powers and functions of the bi-communal Republic ceased to be exercised by organs and authorities set up by the 1960 constitution but came to be exercised instead by two exclusive administrations.14 Christian Heinze argues that if the Republic of Cyprus was never a sovereign state as alleged by the GreekCypriots, and its constitution at this point has been abrogated, then we arrive at a very important result, namely that the first true state having come to exist in Cyprus, was the Greek state of Cyprus, which was created by force in 1963, and has claimed a sovereignty unlimited by any Turkish rights of co-determination.15

The Turkish-Cypriots therefore refused to recognize the Cyprus government,16 and Necatigil argues that the Turkish-Cypriot community having been completely disenfranchised had to form its own administration, under the Vice President of the Republic, for though the Greek-Cypriot Administration claimed to be the government of the whole island, its writ had not run in the Turkish areas since December 1963.17

In its stead the Turkish communal chamber continued to function after 1963, passing laws and taking decisions under Article 87. The Turkish Members of the House of Representatives continued to meet, and elections of the Turkish Communal Chamber and of the House of Representatives were held. They also started to build up their own infrastructure.18 A state within a state was in progress. Any solution to this impasse was complicated by the Turkish-Cypriot view that no interim measures for restoration of normal life could be agreed until the constitution was fully restored.19 However when conditions on the island were on the mend, the Turkish MPs did put in a request to return to Parliament, conveyed by United Nations Peacekeeping Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Clerides, president of the House, however, put forward conditions that if accepted would have meant the elimination of the constitutional rights of the Turkish-Cypriot members, and the community they represented, including the abrogation of Article 78. On Malta, calm prevailed after the elections and the implications of the results were not immediately realized. When the Nationalist opposition realized they had the majority they declared that the result was inconsistent with the principle of majority rule, and Edoardo Fenech Adami, head of the opposition, insisted that the MLP should not form a government. When a Labour government was formed, he then insisted that they should stand down and hold new elections. Mintoff indicated that he would resign,20 but the MLP argued that they could not be held responsible for the system under which they were elected since it had been drafted

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by the Nationalist Party (PN) in 1964, that no one had suggested changes to the electoral process in the 1974 constitutional revisions and that the constitution therefore had to continue being respected, and the rules of the game altered before another election took place. The opposition countered these arguments by calling for the setting up of a national government, for constitutional reform, and an overhaul of the electoral system. When these demands were not met, the Nationalist MPs boycotted Parliament. However, the business of government proceeded as usual. The government was recognized on the international circuit, and Mintoff refused to consider any of the PN recommendations before their MPs attended Parliament, and accepted the legitimacy of government. Their continued absence led to their suspension from the House. In February 1982, the Nationalist Party started a campaign of passive resistance and called on the public to boycott all products advertised on Xandir Malta, the government-owned television network. There was also a de facto boycott against producers who supported the Labour government. Fenech Adami also directed all workers as a form of protest to observe the feast of St Peter and St Paul on 29 June as a public holiday. The call was a success and absenteeism was extensive. The government reacted by resorting to the mass suspension of these employees. However, on 8 August Mintoff abandoned this policy and stated that all workers could return to work on condition that they declare that they would promise to never again obey directives that would bring down the democratically elected government.21 Despite this negative environment, mediation between the government and the opposition commenced immediately after the election. Though with the unseating of the Nationalist MPs Mintoff ceased to recognize any constitutional opposition, and broke off negotiations with Fenech Adami, mediation continued at an unofficial level.22 On 22 December 1982, Mintoff in a speech in Parliament stated that electoral changes should take place in order that democracy should prevail.23 Following Mintoff ’s statement, the National Party MPs indicated that they would take their seats in Parliament.24 This was a de facto recognition of the legitimacy of the Labour government, and it paved the way for the resumption of talks on an official level in early 1983. On Malta the 1981 crisis did not result in state conflict, or breakdown. The opposition’s withdrawal from the mechanisms of the state was short term, and their return to Parliament occurred without a hitch. Despite bouts of protest, the opposition continued to recognize the legitimacy of the state. Mediation also commenced immediately and was never completely terminated. On Cyprus the crisis of 1963 was followed by state conflict and breakdown, and the Turkish-Cypriot withdrawal from state mechanisms which proved irreversible. The administration in the hands of the Greek-Cypriots became very biased.25 On the other hand, the Turkish leadership would not shift from the view that they were entitled to all the rights and privileges as a community which the constitution guaranteed them. The titular leaders were not in control of their extremists, and the small moderate element was too frightened to come out openly. On Malta a positive-sum game came into operation, on Cyprus a zero-sum game was immediately pursued.

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Enter external actors On Cyprus state breakdown and civil strife threatened both the internal and external domain, and external players entered in full force. A  tripartite force of Greek, Turkish and British soldiers was established,26 and by 25 December 1963, Turkish jets were flying over Cyprus, and on 27 December a Turkish naval contingent entered Cypriot waters.27 The Western allies pushed for a NATO force to monitor a truce but Makarios feared that this would be used to force his hand and refused.28 A  mixed UN force was therefore established, primarily controlled however by the British and the Americans.29 The three guaranteeing powers then persuaded Makarios to agree to the London conference to broker a solution. However, the conference did not focus on finding a political solution but developed into outside negotiations for an international force.30 Makarios, sensitive to the claims of Cypriot sovereignty, informed Britain, Greece and Turkey that they had no remit on the island, as the treaty of guarantee was not valid since it conflicted with UN principles. He demanded that British forces leave the UN force31 and made it clear that he did not wish the United States to intervene. Both powers were blamed for instigating the Turkish air attacks,32 and in June 1964 anti-British demonstrations were taking place in the main towns.33 Makarios attempted to use the UN, to abrogate the treaties and denounce certain aspects of the constitution, but the Western allies did their utmost to deny this route to Makarios.34 Britain feared that the UN would suggest that their occupation of the sovereign base areas was undesirable, and that the Afro/Asian element in the UN would seize this opportunity to oust them.35 Makarios, however, succeeded in eliciting the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964, which refers to the island as the Sovereign Republic of Cyprus, implicitly recognizing its independence, and the Makarios government as the legitimate government of Cyprus. Makarios then declared that he would abrogate the treaties of defence,36 and Clerides at the London conference stated that ‘true independence shall emerge from this conference . . . without the limitations by treaties of guarantee . . . we are not prepared to accept any system whereby rights are conferred on each community separately’.37 However, the interested Western parties made it clear that this was not possible.38 Kutchuk also made it clear that any solution would take place within the construct of international power politics, and that he was not prepared to negotiate except on a basis of the geographical separation of the two communities.39 In June 1964, the Turkish communal chamber published a pamphlet entitled ‘Federation and the Cyprus Economy’ which set out a claim to a state in North Cyprus covering 37 per cent of the total area,40 and rumours abounded of an impending declaration of an independent Turkish-Cypriot state supported by Turkish intervention.41 A fragile and disputed sovereignty, undermined by civil war, created the conditions for outside intervention, which henceforth became normal practice. In 1964 Grivas was sent by the Greek government to organize a national guard, despite the fact that Makarios called on all Greek-Cypriots to fall in for conscription.42 Turkish volunteers were also landed to enlarge the Turkish force on the island.

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Turkish planes and ships circled the island, and the possibility of a Turkish invasion remained imminent. Greek irregulars infiltrated the army, and more Greek troops were landed,43 many of whom committed acts of arson, including attacks on Turkish villages.44 The Turkish forces also established permanent positions on the island.45 1964 also signalled the replacement of Britain by the United States as the main arbiter on the island,46 though Britain continued to regard the island as central to its security network.47 The United States became intent on maintaining control of the island,48 and was to control key events throughout the decade. In 1964, it stepped in to stop a Turkish invasion and mediate between Greek extremism and Turkish intransigence. However, lack of success, coupled with the continued popularity of AKEL, and the open support of the Soviet Union for Makarios,49 prompted Western fears of growing Soviet infiltration of the island,50 persuading the United States and Britain of the inadvisability of an independent Cyprus. On Malta, though neither the internal nor the external domain were perceived as under immediate threat, external players commented on the deterioration in democratic practice on the island. The Council of Europe, due to the absence of Nationalist MPs, was faced with a lack of plurality in the Maltese delegation. However, on 22 September 1982, the Council of Europe refused to discuss a resolution concerning the elections of 1981. Both the legal and political committees said that it would not be legitimate, or within their competence, to examine these elections.51 Nonetheless, the perverse election results did become a topic of international criticism.52 Benjamin A. Gilman, a Republican, speaking in the US House of Representatives, stated, ‘The Malta government’s current foreign and domestic policies were under close and continuing scrutiny . . . that the Socialists won the majority of seats in 1981 is widely ascribed to gerrymandering and other irregularities.’53 Flaminio Piccoli, secretary general of the Italian DC (Christian Democrats), stated, ‘The PN gained 51% of the electorate. The fact that this majority did not obtain a parliamentary majority is the result of the distribution of electoral divisions.’54 In early 1983 the European Parliament also passed a resolution which called on the EC Commission to withdraw its proposal to the Council, recommending aid to Malta to the tune of 45 million ECUs,55 until all political liberties in Malta were guaranteed.56 The Labour government, however, also made it clear that external players had no remit on the island. Mintoff accused the Nationalists of winning a majority in the 1981 elections by drawing on external support and therefore winning through foreign interference.57 He lambasted the party for appealing to foreign players post elections and encouraging them to breach Maltese sovereignty.58 To limit external players’ room for manoeuvre on the island, and stem foreign aid to the opposition, the government enacted the Foreign Interference Act in 1982. This Act prohibited any statement, or any visit by foreigners to Malta, unless expressly agreed to by the government. It also prohibited the Maltese from participating in foreign fora without the express permission of the government.59 The Act was widely condemned in Malta and abroad and led to numerous skirmishes between the government and foreign organizations, including the press and numerous political parties. It also led to the anomaly of the official Maltese

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opposition not being represented on certain organizations, including the Council of Europe,60 and ambassadorial representatives posted in Malta being asked not to receive official members of the opposition.61 The International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights had this to say on the Act: It violates the rights of freedom of expression and freedom of communication, it restricts the activities in Malta of foreign politicians, journalists and others involved in public affairs and therefore circumscribes the contacts of Maltese persons with foreigners, and it prohibits the monitoring by foreign individuals and organisations of human rights practices within Malta.62

In an attempt to reinforce the legitimacy of the government on the international circuit, the Maltese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on 10 January 1983, sent a note to all resident foreign ministers in Malta stating that the PN MPs had not taken their oath of allegiance to Parliament, and for this reason the ministry objected to any contact by foreign ministers with these extra-parliamentarians.63 The foreign diplomatic community in Malta including the Australian, French and British embassies protested, and the US embassy stated that this line of action went against the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act.64 Consequently, the government, on 1 February 1983, retracted this demand. The resumption of talks the following month and the return to normal parliamentary activity also altered the stand of the Nationalists on the international circuit. The leader of the opposition went as far as flying to Brussels to remedy the situation vis-à-vis the granting of EC aid and informed the Commissioner of External Affairs that an ongoing process had commenced in Malta that could lead to full democracy and that under these circumstances he no longer recommended the withholding of aid. As a result, the aid was duly dispensed.65

Background to mediation Internal and external conditions on Malta and Cyprus prior to and during mediation therefore differed radically. On Cyprus, the result was that no in-depth negotiations took place between the internal elites for five years post 1964, and mediation took place largely under the auspices of external players. Consequently, both communities were determined not to compromise, persuaded that foreign backing gave them the power to eventually get their own way.66 Between 1964 and 1967, external players tried several routes to encourage reconciliation on Cyprus; however, Western external players ultimately did not support a democratic unified Cyprus but viewed partition as the favoured option.67 In 1964 the Acheson plan was put forward whereby most of Cyprus would be united with Greece, and an area on the north coast would be awarded to the Turks as a military base and as a political canton. Though unacceptable to Makarios and Greece, and only hesitantly contemplated by Turkey,68 the United States put considerable pressure on Greece to accept the plan. When this course of action failed, the United States

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supported a move to remove the incumbent prime minister of Greece, Georgios Papandreou, and from 1967 supported the authoritarian rule of the colonels who saw eye to eye with the United States on Cyprus. The UN secretary general did endeavour to get an unbiased view of the problem and chose a new mediator for Cyprus from a non-aligned state, Gazo Plaza, who drew up the Gazo Plaza plan. This plan advocated that a return to the Zurich and London agreements was not desirable and recommended unfettered independence and majority rule as the best solution for Cyprus. However, the plan was lambasted by both Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot community, and though Makarios advocated the continued use of Plaza as a mediator he was immediately removed for having exceeded his remit.69 The non-aligned, Third World and communist blocs also supported unqualified independence for the island, though these views were given short shrift by NATO players. Between 1964 and 1967, however, there was evidence of a growing rapport between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots, and a blossoming of some notion of Cypriot identity. Martin Packard, who headed the tripartite truce force patrols, in 1964 succeeded through secret meetings, and reconciliation endeavours at the local level, to encourage the Turkish-Cypriots to return to their villages. However, on 11 June, twelve hours before the Turkish-Cypriots were to be escorted back to their villages, Packard was removed.70 Packard in a secret report concluded that the route to a negotiated reconciliation was blocked because of a British decision based on narrow British and American strategic interests.71 Notwithstanding, by the end of 1964, evidence showed that many TurkishCypriots were returning to their villages, and many more would have done so if they had not been restrained by the TMT. Many Turkish civil servants also sought a return to work and outside Nicosia free movement between communities was resumed, though the Turkish-Cypriots continued to be deprived of goods and purchasing power.72 By the end of 1964, Makarios spoke of lifting the blockade, offering assistance to those who wished to return to their homes and providing a general amnesty. The Turks were reluctant to accept these concessions,73 but by the end of 1965 Turkey was considering their reintegration and accepting minority rights for the Turkish-Cypriot community.74 As support for a Cypriot state grew, support for enosis and taksim declined,75 and independence underpinned by a thriving economy became the preferred option. Makarios’s policy of a feasible solution emerged, ruling out enosis and supporting independence.76 Makarios became increasingly suspicious of all external forces, not just those who favoured the Turks.77 He began to doubt Greek motives, and by 1967 he was convinced that they would never allow Cyprus full independence. He therefore sought the support of the communist and the non-aligned bloc to accomplish this.78 The USSR was happy to provide aid to derail enosis since this would have meant a further eastward expansion of NATO.79 By 1966, the Russians openly denounced the London and Zurich agreements80 and made it clear that they would not countenance a Turkish invasion.81 Consequently, Western external players began to advocate the removal of Makarios to facilitate their own plans for Cyprus. On 9 March 1966, the prime

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minister of Greece appointed Grivas as head of all armed forces of Cyprus, against Makarios’s wishes.82 Hitchens states that Grivas made it known that he was under orders from Athens and called for enosis, though this ultimately meant partition. Grivas’s attack on two Turkish villages, Avios Theodoros and Kofinou, in November 1967 was meant to facilitate enosis through partition.83 The attack precipitated a threatened air strike and invasion from Turkey. A crisis was only averted by the removal of Grivas, and the Greek forces from Cyprus, depriving the Greek-Cypriots of any defence cover. This act was immediately followed by the declaration of the Turkish-Cypriots, of a temporary separate Turkish administration on 29 December 1967.84 The favoured policy of the allies, partition, now seemed feasible; only Makarios stood in their way. The Greek government contemplated a coup to replace Makarios. The British Foreign Office debated whether they should support a coup but concluded that the outcome would be increased conflict and prejudicial to their position.85 However, they were not opposed to forcing a solution on the GreekCypriots as long as it was backed by a credible threat of force, did not provoke violent resistance and the regimes in Greece and Turkey would be durable enough not to be overthrown before the new arrangements became well established. ‘In this settlement,’ the British report concludes, ‘we should try to rid ourselves of all formal involvement . . . we should not be expected to underwrite the settlement by massive economic aid . . . but [ensure] full provisions for our continued unfettered use of our base.’86 On 5 July 1967, Pravda carried an article outlining the danger of a coup in Cyprus by Greek forces supported by the United States and other NATO allies to enforce partition.87 After the debacle at Kokkina, relations between the two communities proceeded on a different basis. The provisional Cyprus Turkish administration remained suspicious of the archbishop and pushed for a separate administration under the 1960 constitution, talking of functional federalism, while pointing to the illegality of the Cypriot government. Turkey also declared that it was determined to safeguard the Turkish community’s separate character and existence within the framework of the Cyprus Republic.88 However, the community remained impoverished and dependent on mainland Turkey and by 1968 was keen to initiate negotiations. They were also slowly accepting that whatever the constitutional provisions, they would have to live within a Greek-dominated state. Economic factors alone dictated this reality.89 Consensus on foreign policy was also in the offing and Denktash supported a non-aligned policy.90 By 1968, the Greek-Cypriot regime was consolidated around Makarios who had enormous patronage at his disposal. He controlled all the appointments within the civil service and the police force, and the only part of the state machine that remained outside of his control was the National Guard whose officers were nearly all mainland Greeks or ex-EOKA men. Since the loyalty of the Cyprus police was mixed, Makarios started to build up his presidential guard and intelligence network to circumvent the Central Intelligence Service (CIS). The public information office and the Cyprus broadcasting corporation were also heavily influenced by him. Though many were disappointed in his rule because of the corruption

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of his government, the deterioration of his executive arm and his personal and medieval way of conducting state business, open opposition was feared. His hold on the parties also allowed his executive to remain relatively unhampered by the legislature. The main party that opposed enosis, the DEK, could not rally more than 5 per cent of the vote. EASA, the political arm of EOKA B,91 remained unconvincing. The only person who could match Makarios was Grivas, but his pro-enosis views and terrorist tactics boded ill for Cyprus.92 On Malta, negotiations took place in a mixed environment. The Labour government in 1980 had signed a defence agreement with Italy and in economic terms was dependent on European players. The EC, despite criticism of the government’s democratic credentials, had shown a preparedness to release funding, albeit on the advice of the opposition. The government’s relations with the continent, however, remained negative. Relations with the EC, Britain, Italy and the Vatican were still poor, and the government continued to be castigated by key multilateral forums including the Council of Europe and the ILO. Malta’s foreign policy raised heckles in the West, which only increased when the government in the early 1980s signed security and economic treaties with Russia, Libya and North Korea.93 Gilman spoke again on Malta in the US House of Representatives on 17 October 1986, stated that the Malta government’s current foreign policies were under close and continuing scrutiny . . . Malta’s relationship with Libya . . . and the island’s 1984 friendship treaty with Libya had serious security implications for the Mediterranean. Ghaddafi had been openly recruiting terrorists through the Maltese press . . . and Malta for years had had an active office for the PLO, and as a result Israel withdrew its representative in 1985.94

Western political analysts spoke of the Maltese government implementing increasingly anti-Western policies, and viewing the whole panoply of Malta’s relations with communist states, including China, concluded that the government, by allowing Soviet and North Korean air force and merchant marines to use the island as a staging post,95 was attempting to create a communist dynamic in the Mediterranean.96 The government’s economic policies were also under review. The 1970s had been characterized by a healthy national surplus, an increase in financial resources and a sharp rise in total external reserves.97 By the early 1980s, however, these figures were on a downward trend. Starting in 1980 the rate of GNP growth slowed, and it turned negative in 1983. The movement in GNP seems to have been driven by two exogenous components:  the export of goods and services on the one hand and gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) on the other. Exports rose sharply during the phase of rapid GNP growth from 1978 to 1980, whereas GFCF rose only slowly. Exports declined from 1981 to 1983, pulling GNP down despite a spurt in GFCF. The decline in exports was certainly due in part to the European slump as was the downturn in the Maltese economy.

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However, Malta remained highly dependent on donor aid and economic contracts granted for political reasons and its restricted trade policy remained a serious obstacle to increased prosperity.98 Post 1981, a further deterioration of democratic practice was also observed. The US State Department Reports on Human Rights in Malta in 1984 and 1985 emphasized the erosion of human rights on the island.99 The London-based Institute for the Study of Conflict also expressed its concern about the erosion of democracy in Malta.100 ‘Since 1981,’ stated A.  Smith, an expert on Southern Europe, ‘the divisive policies of the Socialist government have created a great deal of political instability and aggravated the island’s economic crisis.’101 Accusations of corruption were also made against members of Mintoff ’s government from the late 1970s.102 It also came to light that breaches of the constitution had taken place. The cases of the Broadcasting Commission and the Employment Commission were two such instances cited.103 There could be no progress in the talks, it was argued, until the organs of the state were properly constituted and had earned the public trust.104 A US government Report on Human Rights in Malta published in 1986 also noted that post 1981 the judicial system continued to be subject to political pressure, and that a number of constitutional and political cases that went before the court in the early 1980s were still not resolved by 1986; these included several cases brought against the government by the Church and other organizations.105 In November 1985, a judge resigned from one of the church school cases and two other judges abstained from the same case. When the constitutional court started to hear government appeals, the government challenged the legality of the composition of the court; however, the constitutional court declared itself validly constituted. Within days both cases were adjourned indefinitely.106 It was also pointed out that Maltese citizens still did not have the right of individual petition to the European Court of Human Rights and therefore had no final redress in such situations. Acts of political discrimination continued, and dissemination of information remained limited, since television and radio continued to be state-owned. Employees who went on strike continued to be suspended or transferred. There were also continued allegations of detainees who were ill-treated while under police detention. Freedom House in 1985/6 classified Malta as partly free and described the ruling party as increasingly anti-democratic.107 The US Report on Human Rights in Malta made references to police torture, telephone tapping and breaches in broadcasting and trade union rights.108 The International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights sent a fact-finding mission to the island, though it was careful to choose individuals from socialist parties and neutral countries amenable to the socialist government in Malta. The report stressed the responsibility of both government and opposition on the island in steering the country on to a democratic course; however, it highlighted the increase in political strife and polarization since 1981, and international concern over issues related to human rights.109 In 1984, the church schools issue reached crisis proportions. In 1983, a law was introduced to nationalize without compensation over 80 per cent of the

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Church’s property. The Church challenged the law before the courts which declared it unconstitutional. In 1984, another law was passed to bring the church schools under direct government control.110 In response to government action, and in support of the Church stand, the MUT, the teachers’ union, organized a massive strike. The government responded by threatening the teachers, and 1,400 teachers were transferred. There were also allegations made of acts of violence against the MUT. The ILO publicly condemned these acts and declared that the Maltese government had infringed ILO Regulation 98,111 as did the ICFTU survey on the violation of trade union rights.112 The ILO also upheld a complaint against the Maltese government that concerned thirty-one worker students, who had participated in the CMTU strike on 10 October 1984.113 The socialists in the Council of Europe and the Socialist International also censured the government.114 This period continued to be characterized by political violence. On 2 November 1981, MLP supporters, some carrying firearms, attacked a PN club in Zebbug. PN supporters retaliated by throwing large stones on their adversaries.115 On 29 June 1983, a bomb exploded outside the house of Albert Mizzi, a prominent Labour affiliate and chairman of several government corporations. Mintoff consequently suspended talks for three months.116 Just as they were about to recommence on 26 November 1983, the Nationalist Party headquarters were raided and a number of arms were unearthed. The following day a search was carried out at a storage facility in Qormi that belonged to a Nationalist Party member and a large cache of weapons was found. Once again talks were postponed. In December 1983, Wistin Cardona, a PN supporter, was arrested in connection with an unearthed cache of arms. In May 1984, he was discovered dead under mysterious circumstances.117 Throughout this period, however, there were also numerous endeavours to facilitate compromise and consensus. By 1984, the climate for the resumption of talks was more propitious. The Nationalist Party had regained control of its extremes. Early in 1983, Josie Muscat, a parliamentary member of the party, had disagreed with the party’s stance towards the crisis and believed that more forceful measures should be adopted. He castigated the party for accepting the constitutional changes of 1974,118 for re-entering Parliament in 1983, for entering into discussions with the president who had been chosen without their approval, for abandoning their campaign of passive resistance and for lifting the boycott on Malta Television.119 In 1983, he founded the Front Freedom Fighters (FFF) and started publishing a newspaper, Ir-Rieda (loosely translated as ‘The Will of the People’). The newspaper advocated assertive action to drop the government. The Nationalist Party, however, denounced the movement,120 and by summer of 1983 the movement was wound up. By early 1984, the Nationalists also lifted their ban on advertising on Malta Television. The Labour Party also viewed with consternation the growth of the extremes. Mintoff, who had considered Lorry Sant as a possible successor in 1983, opted instead for Karmenu Mifsud Bonnici, a moderate, aware that Sant’s tactics were becoming increasingly corrupt and anti-democratic. In 1984, Mifsud Bonnici became head of the party, and Malta’s new prime minister, replacing Mintoff. A  solution also seemed in sight on the church schools issue and in April 1985

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an accord was signed between the government and the Holy See regulating the position of church schools, and setting up a commission to determine the better use of Church property and the amount of government funding for church schools.121

The talks begin The talks in both communities therefore began in a mixed climate, closely monitored by external actors, who at times stood on the sidelines, and at other times became involved in the politically charged activities of these states. On Cyprus, between 1964 and 1967, a number of different approaches to conflict resolution were suggested including (i) legalization of the status quo followed by a declaration that this was temporary, (ii) a mutually satisfactory modus vivendi between the two communities enabling them to resume normal relations and ensure freedom of movement and security, (iii) a partial constitutional settlement, and piecemeal agreement on the rest or (iv) negotiating and arriving at a complete constitutional and political agreement, that is, the package deal concept favoured by the Turks.122 By 1968, internal players seemed determined to reach a compromise123 and the package deal approach favoured by the Turks was adopted. Between 1968 and 1974, there were a series of communal talks. The first set took place between June 1968 and April 1971. These were inter-communal talks between the Greek and Turkish-Cypriot communities, represented by Denktash and Clerides. The talks centred on constitutional revision, and the starting point was Makarios’s fourteen points. The major constitutional issue was the reintegration of the two communities within a restructured constitution. The Turkish-Cypriots agreed that the 1960 constitution had been unjust to both communities and that over-representation, and separate municipalities, had deprived the Turkish private sector of its young, educated and most capable people, and had also placed a huge economic burden on them.124 Both parties moved considerably from their original theoretical stance.125 The GreekCypriots came to accept bi-communal participation and a generous measure of local autonomy, and the Turkish-Cypriots abandoned the notion of functional federalism for a bi-communal state.126 By the end of the first phase, which only lasted two months, the TurkishCypriots had accepted substantial revisions of the constitution including the abolition of the veto powers of the vice president; reduction of representation in the House of Representatives, in the public service commission, in the civil service and in the police from 30 per cent to 20 per cent; abolition of separate majorities of the House required to enact taxation legislation on condition that the state undertook the cost of Turkish education; the president and vice president to be elected by both Greek and Turkish members; amalgamation of supreme and constitutional court; abolition of offices of the neutral presidents of the supreme and constitutional court on understanding that there would be the right of appeal to the European court of human rights; unification of lower courts and removal of

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the provision that Greek had to be tried by a Greek judge and Turkish by a Turkish judge; and the abolition of the army of the Republic.127 The above constitutional amendments were accepted by the Turkish-Cypriots on condition that the Greeks would accept local government on the following principles: that local government authorities be elected, that Greek and Turkish villages be grouped together under the existing Improvement Area Law for the purpose of local administration and that local authorities would have the following powers and functions – public health, sanitary services, construction/maintenance of streets/public markets, local welfare services and enactment of regulation for collection of local taxes. These functions were accepted by both sides. The Turkish-Cypriot side also demanded the following additional powers for local government: issuing of permits for taverns and hotels, an auxiliary fire service, permits for drilling, the operation of public transport, the right to borrow money for purposes of local government, the right to prosecute offenders against local authority regulations and impose fines, the right to issue permits for bakeries and factories, the right to create and operate libraries and the right to compulsory acquired property for public purposes. Clerides states that these powers and functions were well within what is accepted generally as normal local government functions. Certainly such functions were not much wider than those provided by articles 21/22, of ­chapter 243, of the laws of Cyprus, enacted by the British colonial administration. Equally the objection of the Greek-Cypriot side to the grouping of villages for local government purposes, which could be done under the already existing legislation, was unreasonable.128

The Turkish-Cypriots were keen to close the deal, and Denktash made it clear that he was under pressure due to economic and political problems in his community. There were certainly differences of opinion in the Turkish leadership,129 compounded by the incompetence of the Turkish-Cypriot administration and interference from the military. Despite disagreement from the hardliners, the Turkish-Cypriot side accepted all the constitutional revisions outlined at the end of the first phase, with the condition that there was agreement on local government. In this regard, the demands were the following: that the powers and functions of local government be clearly defined in the constitution, the creation of a central local authority exercising legislative and executive powers on matters of local government and the grouping of Turkish villages for the purpose of local government.130 Compromise on local government, however, remained unobtainable. Clerides attempted to persuade Makarios to give way on the issue of local government, even offering his resignation if it did not happen, but he failed. Makarios compounded this mistake by refusing a Turkish request for the Turkish-Cypriots to be resettled in their homes on the advice of the hawks in his cabinet.131 He therefore lost the opportunity to reach agreement on the constitutional level and have it mirrored on the ground. What befuddled the negotiations ultimately was lack of trust. The

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Greek-Cypriots saw the demand for local governance as a step towards separatism. The Turkish-Cypriots on the other hand wanted to assure themselves that another December 1963 would not be possible. On Malta, mediation also commenced through several routes both official and unofficial. Negotiations took place between the prime minister and the head of the opposition, between different party members, through intermediaries including the president of the Republic and finally through Parliament.132 Different options were touted, however, as on Cyprus, the package deal approach was adopted. In the early stages, the president of the Republic acted as a mediator, and a number of issues were discussed and agreed upon by the two parties. These discussions received the approval of the General Council of the MLP in March 1983 by 489 votes out of 535.133 This vote of confidence paved the way for the initiation of discussions on constitutional change from April 1983. The Nationalists were primarily concerned with rectifying the 1981 anomaly and therefore demanded alterations in the electoral law, and more access and impartiality in broadcasting, an institution which was regarded as having an important influence on voter behaviour.134 The MLP suggested changes: in the method of appointment of the president and of members of various commissions, in the powers of the president, further regulation of foreign interference and the entrenchment in the constitution of neutrality and non-alignment.135 In April 1984, Fenech Adami presented a motion to the House proposing the setting up of a select committee to discuss changes to the law on elections. Mintoff suggested that the committee should have a wider remit and focus on all suggested constitutional changes. However, this committee never really got off the ground.136 In 1984, Mintoff was also approached by Muscat and talks between the two commenced. The issues discussed included the following: a president elected by popular vote or two-thirds of the House; a Speaker of the House elected on a national basis; fine-tuning of the judiciary, statutory and electoral commissions; and that the majority of votes at general elections reflect a corresponding number of seats in Parliament.137 The Nationalist Party, however, protested on the grounds that Muscat had no remit from the party to participate in these negotiations.138 From then on, most of the talks took place between Mintoff and Guido Demarco, deputy head of the Nationalist Party. These meetings were supplemented by meetings with Fenech Adami, party head, and other members of the party. In October 1985, the Nationalist Party put together a number of draft amendments. Some of the amendments were based on proposals made by the MLP during the 1963 independence conference. The years since independence, stated PN parliamentarian Dr Michael Frendo, had shown the need for the revision and the renewal of the human rights provisions in the constitution. These proposals included the provision for the holding of a referendum, the appointment of an ombudsman, the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the right to be assisted by a representative from the moment of arrest, the right of complaint to a magistrate, protection of family rights, protection of freedom of educational institutions, the right to operate a radio/TV station, the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex, deletion of Article 48(7) which

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placed the code of organization of civil procedure outside the human rights provisions139 and the introduction of the right of petition to the European Human Rights Commission in Strasbourg.140 According to Edgar Mizzi, the attorney general, the meetings were so successful that by early 1986 seven parliamentary bills were drafted, incorporating all the changes that had been agreed upon. The main changes involved were the incorporation of Malta’s neutrality in the constitution; the dilution of the position of the Church; the election of the president by agreement of government and opposition, or by popular vote; additional powers to the president which would include heading the armed forces and appointing members of boards in the absence of agreement between government and opposition; provisions to ensure majority rule; the inclusion of a foreign interference clause; new methods of appointment of the electoral commission and an extension of its functions; and the establishment of a body to take over the functions of the Broadcasting Authority. By March 1986, Mintoff believed that consensus was possible and that the time was right to push for a package deal. These talks were also reinforced by talks in Parliament, and in 1985 a second select committee was set up with the mandate to explore all issues relevant to constitutional change.141

The changing environment However, on both Malta and Cyprus, while negotiations were taking place, the political climate internally and externally was changing rapidly. On Malta, as elections neared, the government endeavoured to improve relations at home and on the international circuit. In 1986, efforts to improve relations with the West were evident. In February 1986 a new papal nuncio arrived, the island had been without one since 1978, and Malta restored its relations with the Holy See.142 The government also attempted to use its Libyan connections to act as mediator between Libya and the West, brokering several meetings between Libyan, European, Russian and American diplomats. It also attempted to set up meetings of Mediterranean countries to discuss the situation in the region.143 Malta also twice circulated a Security Council resolution calling on all parties to desist from any action that could lead to the use of force in the Mediterranean.144 Malta’s relationship with Libya, however, roused suspicion and consternation, and there was international speculation as to whether the 1984 treaty of mutual defence had been invoked as well as Libya’s exact involvement in Malta’s economy.145 The Maltese government now acknowledged that support for the regime threatened the island’s security.146 The international secretary of the MLP wrote to express his frustration at Libyan clumsiness and the damage it had done to Maltese interests on the international scene.147 Direct contacts between Malta and the European Economic Community were also restored. Cheysson from the European Commission, on a visit to Malta, pointed out that

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a member of the commission had not visited the island for ten years. The situation had been unpleasant and it was high time direct contacts had been restored. The two sides had finally agreed on a second financial protocol . . . the way was now clear for co-operation in financial and technical affairs . . . commercial relations should also be considered.148

The aim of both, it was stated, was to enrich and enlarge the association agreement, ensure better access for Maltese products and discover what projects the Maltese government wanted financed. Political linkages were also discussed since the European Parliament hoped to play a greater role and encouraged the Maltese Parliament to accept exchanges.149 The prime minister also stressed the importance of links with the EEC, and an EEC representative spoke of the amazing progress which had been made in Malta–EEC relations over the last eighteen months.150 In February, the assistant secretary of the US Department of Commerce also visited the island to discuss commercial and investment interests, as did the deputy undersecretary of state of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office who came to the island to encourage British investment.151 In March 1986, a visit from the German Minister of State also took place to encourage German investment promotion and to discuss security and several bilateral and multilateral issues. There were about thirty-one German firms employing some 4,000 workers, and Germany received 31 per cent of Maltese exports.152 The relationship therefore was important in economic terms. In November, Malta signed an aid agreement with Italy that gave her 48.6 million ECUs in grants and loans.153 In the same year, British recognition of Maltese medical degrees that had been withdrawn in 1977 was also restored.154 In July 1986, the Maltese courts, in a case brought before it by Massimo Gorla, declared Article 3 of the Foreign Interference Act unconstitutional, and declared Article 3 null and void.155 By the end of July, a bill was presented before Parliament by the government to amend the Foreign Interference Act156 that had been so reviled on the international circuit. Feighan, a US congressman addressing the House, noted this change of direction. He spoke of previous concern over the direction of political change in Malta and on the decline in the island’s commitments to human rights. However, he also noted that some progress seemed to be being made in Malta, and noted new efforts to introduce electoral safeguards to ensure the legitimacy of the future Maltese government.157 In March 1986, Lino Spiteri, a government minister, stated, ‘We should take the initiative immediately to rectify the situation so that the number of seats in parliament reflects better the number of votes obtained at the national election.’ He also stated that he was unhappy with the broadcasting situation and that people wanted real debate.158 The government in November 1986 also removed the highly controversial 1984 licensing conditions for Church schools159 and started discussions with the Vatican to resolve outstanding problems.160 The government as a sign of goodwill also reintroduced St Paul’s feast as a public holiday.161 On Cyprus, however, the climate increasingly was not supportive of conflict resolution. Though failure to finalize the 1968 package is often placed on Makarios’s

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head,162 numerous factors, many of them external, also militated against an agreement. The Turkish-Cypriots believed that Makarios was in no hurry to reach a solution, that he was in charge of the island and that the status quo was in his favour, and would eventually lead to unification.163 However, Makarios’s relations with the Turkish leadership in this period were minimal, and neither had a clear idea of the situation in the different communities. Makarios had to deal with a highly volatile situation in the Greek-Cypriot community.164 Cyprus externally was being seen as a base for those that opposed the junta in Greece, and there were rumours of attempts to set up a Greek government in exile in Cyprus.165 From 1970 the colonels in Greece began a sustained campaign against Makarios, and on 8 March 1970, the first of a series of assassination attempts against Makarios took place.166 When they failed, an ecclesiastical coup was attempted, the Greek government inciting the Cypriot bishops to demand the removal of Makarios on ecclesiastical grounds. However, this ploy also failed.167 The junta also proceeded to infiltrate the Cypriot security forces and sent Grivas once again to Cyprus, instructing him to build up EOKA B, a terrorist organization, whose target was Greek-Cypriots who would not condone enosis or partition. By 1972, the extreme right spoke openly of compensated enosis, and there were indications that if an agreement was reached leading Cyprus away from enosis, Grivas would act.168 Grivas and the Co-ordination Committee for the Enosis Struggle (ESEA)169 now became the greatest obstacles to concessions being made.170 Cyprus was booming economically and had nothing to gain by union with Greece under a junta police state,171 and the majority of Greek-Cypriots preferred independence. Lack of autonomy, however, existed in both the Turkish and Greek-Cypriot communities,172 and in Greece and Turkey the political situation remained uncertain.173 The Turkish-Cypriots were also allowed little independence in political terms. Rumour had it that the presidential elections of the communal chamber were fixed, the military at the crucial stage pressuring a member to switch votes.174 On 15 February 1973, the deputy leader and other members of the Republican Turkish party were put under arrest for daring to contest the vice presidential elections.175 The leader and secretary of the same party were also sentenced to fines or imprisonment for circulating anti-Denktash comments. Others were accused of being communist or extreme left-wing by the Turkish government.176 A greater focus on resolving the internal problems by both Greece and Turkey was needed, but was absent. Their public denouncement of enosis and taksim177 would have helped both communities with their extremists, and Makarios requested that the Greek government make such a statement; however, it refused. Greek action created confusion and was harmful. Indeed, the British felt that the single most helpful step the Greek government could take at this stage would be to get Grivas out of Cyprus.178 However, independence was not wished for by their ally, the United States, and a democratic Cyprus would have been a threat to the Greek military regime.179 Ultimately, only the UN favoured an independent Cyprus. The UN’s effectiveness and credibility, however, was seriously undermined by the United States.180 The British and Americans favoured the Turkish approach,

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which was that of a federal solution, and the British action ultimately was one of inaction.181 The Eastern bloc only provided high-sounding statements. In 1970, the external situation for Cyprus worsened. In this year, the Soviets overtook the United States in intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The only way the Americans could keep ahead in nuclear capability was by monitoring changes in Soviet technology and this could best be done from Cyprus. By 1972, Nixon had decided to home port the US Sixth Fleet in Greece. By 1973, the arms race had reached a critical phase. Conflict in the Middle East threatened a global nuclear war.182 As the negotiations were prolonged, entering second, third and fourth phases, the chances of a successful conclusion receded. The momentum was lost, a general pessimism pervaded the scene and conditions became increasingly negative. Once the Turkish-Cypriots realized that comparable compromises were not forthcoming from the other side, their own stance hardened, and their demands on local government became more wide-ranging. By 1971, with the conclusion of the fourth phase, the problem still remained local government, and external actors now pushed for a widening of the talks to include external players. At this point, it seems that a secret agreement was reached between Greece and Turkey:  acknowledging the validity of the London and Zurich agreements, the basic partnership principles in the constitutional reconstruction of Cyprus and the extension and recognition of substantial local autonomy to the TurkishCypriots.183 The agreement was brokered by NATO.184 A  repeat of London and Zurich seems to have occurred, and external players again attempted to pre-empt the talks and then legitimate them through Cypriot rubber stamping.

The breakdown of talks On Cyprus, the breakdown of the talks once more signalled the entry in full force of external players. Makarios refused to consider their formula for renewed mediation; however, he was finally persuaded to accept the extended talks, and they were reactivated in June 1972 and continued until June 1974. The talks were expanded to include the special representative of the secretary general of the UN for Cyprus and constitutional experts from Greece and Turkey.185 The Greek-Cypriots attempted to include the defence treaties on the agenda. The Turks, however, would not hear of it. Certain British parties believed that if the Cypriots had persuaded the Security Council to seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice not much would be left of the validity of the treaties, since there were so many Rebus Sic Stantibus186 elements in them.187 The talks took place within a political framework that was becoming increasingly polarized and fractured. The presence of EOKA B had led to a rising incidence in violence in the Greek-Cypriot community. The growth of its political arm EASA, and its continued attempts to marginalize AKEL, also eroded the political base. The Greek government’s failure to remove Makarios through a military or ecclesiastical coup led to demands for his resignation and a reshuffling of his

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cabinet to eliminate the left-wingers. Mass protests in Cyprus, however, rallied to Makarios and called for the removal of the junta.188 The call for Makarios’s resignation was rescinded but Makarios did remove a number of ministers at the Junta’s insistence. The Junta also insisted that henceforth Makarios should regard Athens as the national centre.189 Makarios attempted to limit the damage by building up a security cadre loyal to him. As early as 1964 he appealed to the Soviets and the Egyptians for arms, and Egypt trained the Cypriots in the use of Eastern bloc arms. Early in 1970, the government began preparing a draft law for the detention without trial of suspected terrorists for up to three months; some MPs, however, were against the law.190 Makarios also tried to weaken the National Guard controlled by Greek officers and began switching funds to the police and building up an auxiliary police force. However, he was accused of giving official status to parastatal groups that condoned violence.191 A  number of police suspected of supporting Grivas were dismissed.192 In 1974, Makarios called for the withdrawal of all Greek officers from the National Guard. However, once the Turkish-Cypriot community became aware of the rising levels of conflict within the Greek-Cypriot community, they doubted the ability of Makarios to push through a deal and to provide the security necessary to implement it.193 Consequently, they upped their demands and became more difficult to negotiate with. Increasingly, they saw partition as the most viable option. This attitude was reinforced by the marginalizing of those centrists who supported a unified Cyprus. In 1973, Erkin’s party in Turkey was replaced by a more hard-line government that encouraged the Turkish-Cypriots to up the stakes and demand a solution on federal lines.194 In September 1973, Denktash sent a mission to the Arab countries to drum up support before the meeting of the nonaligned countries for a federated Cyprus.195 In 1973, the community also issued a series of stamps bearing the legend ‘Turkish-Cypriot administration 50 years of the Republic 1923–73’.196 On Malta, the inability to conclude the talks also signalled a deteriorating political climate. However, this was restricted to the domestic front. A  number of MLP parliamentarians cognizant of the implications of the proposed changes attempted to forestall them and raised objections to certain clauses put forward. In May 1986, in his first speech in Parliament since his resignation as prime minister, Mintoff spoke on constitutional change and made an appeal to save the package agreement that seemed in the offing.197 On 21 May, Mintoff placed before Parliament, documents, one to eight of the agreements reached, and Fenech Adami said that the way to an agreement was open.198 Edgar Mizzi, the attorney general, substantiated in his memoirs that Fenech Adami had been prepared to accept Mintoff ’s package, with some minor changes, which the latter was amenable to.199 However, Fenech Adami did not feel that Mintoff had the backing necessary to push through this package deal, and he asked Mintoff to provide assurances of such backing from the cabinet, the prime minister and the MLP parliamentary group. Fenech Adami’s suspicions were reinforced by the behaviour of several cabinet ministers who spoke openly against Mintoff, including members of the

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select committee. In June 1986, the Nationalist Party boycotted Parliament over the lack of progress within the select committee, and they stated that they would not return until the report of the committee was completed. Fenech Adami added that what was on offer from government, within the remit of the select committee, was unacceptable to the party. To facilitate the proceedings, the Nationalist members of the select committee made public their own minority report. This prompted the government members to present their own report and on 26 November a copy was laid before the House. The report however set down the views of the government and the opposition separately, and it was clear that no agreement had been reached. It was therefore left to the House to find agreement.200 Once the findings of the select committee were made public, complaints from civil society poured in. ‘It now appears,’ stated The Times commentator, ‘that the politicians from the two main political parties consider it to be their prerogative to tinker and tamper with proposals for constitutional change that the electorate had not given them a specific mandate on . . . they have conducted talks on vital matters without consulting any of the national institutions of the country.’201 The MLP and the PN were accused of attempting to extend two-party rule, by making the election of a third party very difficult, and by extending the present confrontation into the organs of the state which should be apolitical, for instance the electoral commission and the broadcasting authority. Which parliament, it was asked, would set up a select committee and then allow its business to be conducted elsewhere?202 The Communist Party also complained that the electoral changes being proposed discriminated against the small parties: the Communist Party (CP) and the Democratic Party (PDM).203 In the meantime, government continued to function without the input of the opposition. The appointments to the electoral commission were made without the agreement of the Nationalist Party. The commission report on the electoral boundaries for the 1987 elections was duly submitted, though it was only signed by six of the nine members of the commission.204 Compromise seemed impossible as a rift developed between the government and Mintoff. The government proved unwilling to make changes on the most important issue – the electoral laws – and refused to support Mintoff ’s proposal ‘that guaranteed the right to govern to any Party that obtained a majority’.

Rising violence The situation reached crisis proportions when at the end of November the Nationalist Party held a meeting in Zejtun, a Labour Party stronghold, and twentytwo individuals were injured in clashes, four of them suffering from bullet wounds. Police used tear gas, and the Nationalist Party leader also accused them of using firearms205 and said that they gave no protection to Nationalist supporters.206 On 2 December, shots were fired at the Tarxien Nationalist Party club, and on the same day a police constable was charged with having injured three individuals during a women’s protest over the shortage of water.207 On 4 December, the police were put

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on high alert when information was received that dry dock workers were planning to hold demonstrations outside the law courts and the Times of Malta offices.208 On 5 December a Nationalist Party supporter, Raymond Caruana, was shot dead in the PN club in Gudja by a shot fired from a passing car late at night.209 On the same day a police officer was found guilty of the illegal arrest and inhuman treatment of Tonio Vella who had been taken into custody by the police.210 Joe Fenech, a Nationalist MP, spoke of how ‘Malta was witnessing a Communist threat, that communist cells were present in the dry docks, para-statal industries, and government institutions, and that the socialist party was ready to exploit the present situation and impose a Marxist-Leninist form of government’.211 The leader of the opposition accused the prime minister of abdicating responsibility for upholding law and order212 and said he had abdicated power in favour of a few delinquents and criminals intent on destroying democracy.213 Piccoli, on 2 December, demanded guarantees of democracy in Malta, and referring to Sunday’s incidents, said that they gave rise to grave concern regarding democracy in Malta, and that the Italian parliament and government should address the issue and receive guarantees of democratic governance here before ratifying the next protocol.214 On 5 December, Christian Democratic members questioned the Italian government on Malta, and drew its attention to the fact that a helicopter and arms given by the Italian government had been used by the Maltese government in this incident, and asked what steps it intended to take.215 In mid-December, Colombo, the president of the European Union Christian Democrats (EUCD) condemned the violence and threats to freedom of expression. He said that there were new signs of the undermining of the democratic culture of the island, and he called on the Socialist International to use their influence to end the dangerous developments of its member party. The political bureau of the CD International, meeting in the Philippines, also took a resolution ‘noting that the Maltese government had not yet shown concrete and tangible proof of taking those necessary initiatives aimed at achieving respect to full democratic principles . . . grave concern for the prevailing political situation in Malta . . . and on the grave acts of intolerance that culminated in the murder of Raymond Caruana’.216 On Cyprus, Makarios was also not able to halt the escalation of violence, nor did he effectively crack down on the leadership of the pro-enosis insurgents. By early 1973, the security situation in the Greek-Cypriot camp had worsened. In the first week of April a political murder was reported, four police stations were raided and thirty-three bombs were placed. However, the British Foreign Office did not believe that the community was on the verge of a civil war. Both the pro- and anti-Grivas camps were responsible,217 though the majority of incidents seemed to have been instigated by the pro-Grivas forces.218 Undoubtedly, an intensified attack was being launched against the Greek-Cypriot government. Nor could Makarios control those violent elements that supported him, and the regular police seemed unwilling or unable to act against fellow Cypriots. Turmoil in both camps contributed to the scuppering of the inter-communal talks.219 In the same year the internal situation also deteriorated in the Turkish-Cypriot camp. The unions demanded wage increases and threatened to strike. There was

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also growing opposition from Kutchuk who formed an alliance with the TurkishCypriot Party (CTP) to once again dominate the political scene. Denktash seemed to have lost considerable support, many of his supporters were disgruntled, and his credibility weakened, and many resented the interference from Turkey. Economic problems continued to plague the community. However, the Turkish community was far more integrated and more capable of closing ranks when confronted by external threat.220 Consequently, the Turkish community called on Greek and Turkish contingents to keep the peace221 but the Turkish Bairak radio spoke only of armed gangs that terrorized the Greek-Cypriot community, with the aim of sabotaging the local talks.222

Last-ditch attempts to save the talks In this climate, last-ditch attempts were made on both islands to find a solution. The moderates on Malta and Cyprus attempted to pull in the extremes, ignore unreasonable demands and continue to work on a feasible solution. On Cyprus, however, the Greek side continued to exhibit a failure to expound a concrete policy, and on the Turkish side intransigence and a tendency to move the goal posts prevailed.223 In 1972 Clerides stated that he had reached agreement on all issues except local government, and that in this regard the Turkish-Cypriots had scaled down their demands and he again advised Makarios to accept. However, Makarios once again refused on the basis that it was a form of concealed federalism. In February 1973, Clerides reported that there was a greater chance than ever of reaching a solution and that all that was left was the issue of local government.224 The Turkish demands to reconstruct local government on a federal pattern would have eradicated any chance of a solution.225 However, to facilitate agreement these demands were ignored by the negotiators and discussions continued, and by early 1974 a complete agreement was reached even on the thorny issue of local government.226 The situation also seemed to be ameliorated by the death of Grivas in January 1974. According to Clerides, the last chance to solve the Cyprus problem occurred between 18 June and 10 July 1974. The Greek and Turkish constitutional advisors produced for consideration joint formulae on the unresolved constitutional issues: the organic law regarding local government authority, the structure of local government authorities and their powers and functions and state supervision over them. These formulae, however, were never considered. Invasion swept over Cyprus and put an end to all negotiations.227 Clerides states that ‘the period between 1970 and 1974 [was] when we reached the nearest point to the solution of the Cyprus problem, yet the solution escaped us’.228 He explains, The negotiations during 1973 produced an agreement by which the constitution would have been considerably improved and its workability achieved . . . in failing to finalise an agreement on the basis of the results of the 1967–74 negotiations, which to a great extent would have solved the constitutional differences and

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would have averted the catastrophic events of the criminal coup of the Greek junta . . . and the Turkish invasion which followed, we were our worst enemies.229

On Malta, Maltese across the political spectrum, aware of the severity of the situation, called for tolerance and reconciliation. The bishop called for tolerance, respect for justice and reconciliation,230 as did the CMTU, the largest right-wing trade union confederation.231 The murder of Raymond Caruana was condemned by the cabinet, the MLP and the GWU232, and a large delegation from the MLP called at the Gudja Nationalist Party club to lay a wreath of flowers.233 Youth organizations from both the left and the right organized a silent march against violence at which they condemned the shooting of Raymond Caruana and said that his killing was a result of political violence left unchecked in the past and called on the authorities to ensure that justice was done.234 Dr Fenech, from the PN, spoke of the time as Malta’s gravest hour and censured the recently published report of the electoral commission as outrageously biased, anti-constitutional and as having adopted the 1981 divisions with only minor revisions.235 The deputy PN leader added that the select committee had not concluded anything and that every time it neared agreement it met a reef, and that there were elements within the other party that did not accept the will of the majority.236 The PDM spoke of serious consequences and the non-acceptance of a government that usurped power through fraudulent elections.237 On 10 December in Parliament, Fenech Adami pleaded for an agreement before the next election.238 At this critical juncture, external players including the Italian ambassador offered their services as mediators. However, Mintoff was determined to finalize a deal, and he set out to fight his former ministers. To obtain agreement, he dropped practically all the changes contained in the package deal he had offered in March and August and retained only three issues. These were majority rule, the neutrality of Malta and a ban on foreign interference during election time. He adopted the cabinet’s views that the declaration on neutrality should be adopted almost in toto in Article 1 of the constitution. On foreign interference, he and the cabinet’s views coincided. On majority rule, he was adamant. In turn Fenech Adami and his party accepted including the principle of neutrality in the constitution, though up to the last they remained adamant on the deficiencies of such an inclusion, arguing that it unnecessarily limited Malta’s sovereignty. On 11 December, Mintoff addressed Parliament and said that they had reached a moment of truth and that the country was moving towards a precipice, and that this was the last chance for an agreement. With or without an agreement from the opposition the government was prepared to legislate on those points agreed, including electoral changes to ensure majority rule. The PN thus received an offer in the name of the MLP, in the presence of all the Labour deputies, at a sitting of Parliament broadcast to the whole nation. Fenech Adami then stated that the Nationalists were prepared to sign an agreement on the lines reached last August. At the end of the debate, Fenech Adami confirmed that an agreement could be signed that day.239 On 20 December 1986, the General Conference of the MLP and the GWU approved a resolution moved by Mintoff including the inalienable

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right to majority rule. In January 1987, these revisions to the constitution were successfully passed through Parliament.240 A few months later a general election took place under the new electoral laws which enabled the Nationalists, who obtained an absolute majority of the vote, to take their place in government.

Conclusion Malta and Cyprus attempted second transitions under very different circumstances. On both islands, democracy reached its lowest point when recourse to legal methods seemed impossible – December 1981 in Malta and December 1963 in Cyprus. However, Malta had been an independent state for more than sixteen years and had attained a certain political maturity, reflected in its functioning institutions and party system. Previous agreement on constitutional revision signalled that compromise among national elites was possible. The island had also been able to assert its sovereignty and jurisdiction on the international circuit by pursing economic and security policies that proved optimal for the island, and by 1987 there was a consensus, albeit somewhat strained, on foreign policy. These factors provided the conditions necessary for mediation:  a politically mature domestic elite who by 1987 were once more consensually unified, functioning and credible institutions that provided the rules of the game and the insulation from domestic and eternal players necessary to allow controversial and delicate decisions to be taken. Under these conditions the political centre, though threatened, survived, fought back and triumphed. Opposition groups continued to attempt to forward their agenda and protect their interests primarily by taking recourse to the law. The battles of the late 1970s and early 1980s were played out on the legal stage, the tools of state never being abandoned. Numerous efforts at mediation took place on Malta between government and opposition both at formal and informal level which did not restrict discussions solely to Parliament. The discussions involved constitutional changes that, though crucial, did not involve non-reconcilable core values over the construct of the state; these had already been resolved in the 1974 revisions. This facilitated what was crucial to mediation, that the leaders of the establishment and opposition had the ability to set an agenda that reflected the views at the centre of the political spectrum, control and neuter their extremes, and make and push through the compromises necessary for conflict resolution. Malta was aided in this agenda by the behaviour of the external elites. In the mid-1980s, the island was perceived by Europe and the United States as an unstable democracy, bordering on authoritarian rule, and classified as ‘only Partly Free’. It was also viewed as a possible threat to Western interests on the international circuit, and especially in ensuring their security in the Mediterranean. However, its sovereign status, its relatively stable political climate, its defence agreement with Italy, a NATO member, and its efforts to mend fences with a West that was undergoing a process of détente meant that the external players were prepared, through the tools of consent and contagion, to provide support for the island

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to undergo a second transition according to a four-and-a-half-player game that facilitated democratic consolidation. On Cyprus, after only three years of a truncated independence, the island split into two along ethnic lines, bringing into doubt its ability to survive as a sovereign state. Its institutions and political system remained weak and fragmented. What political evolution took place did so under the construct of two separate units. A previous tradition of compromise was absent, and the institutions of the state had as yet not gained the credibility that comes when rules are tried, tested and found to be adequate. The elites were not able to control and neuter their extremes and were hard pressed to construct an agenda that reflected the demands of the moderates. This was made more difficult by the fact that since no constitutional revision had as yet taken place, discussions were still focused on issues that reflected non-reconcilable core values that determined the final construct of the state. Discussions tended to be limited to formal arenas and yet did not include the legislative forum since Parliament could not provide a platform for both ethnic groups. Nor did the leaders/negotiators have the power in their communities to follow through on decisions reached in discussion forums, since the final say lay outside their remit, and was often conditioned by external players. However, despite these shortcomings, there were several instances when it seemed that compromise was possible and conflict resolution was in the offing. There was a sustained effort by the negotiating elites to move towards a pattern of consensually unified behaviour. In the final phase the external negotiators also endeavoured to reinforce this pattern of play. However, in the final analysis Cyprus remained weak on the international circuit. Its constitution continued to limit its claims to sovereignty, and in terms of security and defence it was more than powerless since it harboured numerous armies of external players. At the same time Makarios’s policy of non-alignment, coupled with the deteriorating relations of the Greek-Cypriot state with Greece left the island majority without a defence cover. In terms of international politics, Cyprus was seen as not only belonging to the Western sphere but crucial to its security interests. Consequently, external players were not prepared to contemplate its loss either to the Soviet camp or to civil war conditions that would have reduced its value as a base and might have threatened NATO efficiency. The invasion of 1974 secured these interests. On Malta, despite a still manifest class cleavage, the politics of détente ensured the presence of consensually unified elites internally and externally, during the second transition of 1987. On Cyprus in 1974, though coexistence was in progress, elites both internally and externally remained dis-unified. The attempts of the internal elites to move towards a more consensually unified model were forestalled by the coercive behaviour of the external elites, who played out a five-player game and tapped into the class and ethnic cleavages to further fragment the state and render it inoperable. The final chapter focuses on the most recent endeavours to strengthen democracy on both islands in the new context of EU membership and argues that this forum finally provides the conditions for both islands to harmonize their policies internally and externally, enabling them to become consolidated democracies.

Chapter 6 C O N S O L I DAT I N G D E M O C R AC Y U N D E R A F E D E R A L M O D E L :   M A LTA , C Y P RU S A N D   T H E   E U

Cyprus’ anchorage to the EU is the most important event since independence. It gives us an unshakable political security that is of far greater value than any military alliance. Had we chosen to embrace the Annan plan, it would have given us de facto security guarantees, far stronger than any Security Council resolution, or constitutional amendments to the plan . . . the EU provides us with a model for overcoming our political problems within the European sphere, most probably delivering a solution of some sort to Cyprus within the next ten years.1

Introduction This chapter views recent attempts at solving the incumbent divisions on both islands and consolidating previous democratic gains through a constitutional settlement within the context of EU membership. By 1990 three micro nation states on the two islands had surfaced, dependent on a number of bilateral relations and adopting neutral and non-aligned stances. In a new world order characterized by multilateralism, globalization, regionalization, interdependency and unipolarity, this politics however was becoming increasingly ineffective and Cyprus and Malta chose to adopt membership of the European Union. The drive for membership on Cyprus and Malta initially reinforced division. This was, however, eventually replaced by consensus that the Union would provide the islands with the mechanisms necessary to resolve contentious issues and strengthen democratic governance, and the security needed to survive in a post-Cold War world that demanded regional and global, rather than national, responses.

History of EU relations Malta and Cyprus first considered membership of the European Economic Community (EEC) in the early 1960s, when Britain first made her own membership bid. Malta signed an association agreement in 19702 and Cyprus opted for a similar

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agreement in 1972, when Britain became a member. Both agreements envisaged two stages which over a ten- or fifteen-year period would lead to a customs union. In both cases, however, the second phase never really took off, and from the mid1970s the first phase continued to be extended indefinitely.3 On both islands, the conditions were not ripe for a more involved and committed participation in the multilateral and integrative forums of the community.4 The 1970s and early 1980s were years of discord and strife on both islands. In Cyprus, the ceasefire of 16 August 1974 confirmed the partition of the island.5 In 1977, and 1979, the two communities agreed that the island should become a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation;6 however, no agreement was forthcoming, and a continued inability to broker a compromise resulted in the occupied zone proclaiming itself the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in November 1983. Though not recognized by the international community, its de facto status meant that the island now consisted of two sovereign states.7 To date, no solution has been found, and the island continues to be divided. This division is reinforced by a number of unresolved issues: the presence of several foreign armies including 30,000 Turkish soldiers in the North; the disappearance of a number of civilians during the invasion, who still remain missing; restrictions on freedom of movement between the North and the South; claims by Greek-Cypriots on property rights in the North, which are still pending; and the continued transfer of settlers from Anatolia to the North, which has distorted the demographic ratio on the island.8 Numerous attempts have been made by external players including the UN, the United States and the EU to put an end to the status quo.9 The UN has been putting forward proposals since 1964 focused on the notion of a unified state, within the framework of an independent, bi-zonal, non-aligned federal republic, made up of two politically equal communities (UN Security Council Resolution 939 (1994)10 and 1179 (1998)).11 The gap between the two sides however was considerable, with the Greek-Cypriots insisting that an agreement could only be based on a bi-communal, bi-zonal federal structure, with main powers held by the federal government, while the Turkish-Cypriots insisted that they be granted some form of recognition before direct talks could take place, and that only the creation of a confederation between two equal states could be the basis for negotiations.12 Under these circumstances the European Community was loath to get too involved in Cyprus, prior to an agreement which it felt was the responsibility of the UN to broker.13 After signing the association agreement where both Greekand Turkish-Cypriots were consulted, the EEC attempted to take an even-handed stance and provide both communities with funding and trading incentives.14 A number of agreements that included four technical and financial cooperation protocols were signed in 1978.15 These defined the conditions and procedures necessary for the implementation of the second phase of the agreement. Little progress was made, though in 1977, when agreement between Makarios and Denktash seemed in the pipeline, the second phase of the agreement was initiated. It was not till 1987, however, with the conclusion of an additional protocol, that a closer relationship developed, though the full liberalization of trade, as provided

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for in the second phase, was still not complete when the pre-accession phase was initiated.16 Malta–EEC relations also floundered. As early as 1971 the Maltese government sought to widen the scope of the agreement, with the intention of the possibility of eventual membership. Malta demanded improved preferential terms of trade for the export of certain sensitive products in the agricultural and textile sectors and better loan and aid facilities to support its industrial and economic development. In 1975/6 four new protocols were added to the agreement, and in 1977 the community agreed to extend the first stage.17 However, by the late 1970s, the government expressed its disappointment at the lack of support it had received from the community. This situation occurred at a time when the government’s track record on democratic issues had deteriorated, which in turn further soured its relationship with the community. In November 1979 the European Parliament condemned the Maltese government for its anti-democratic stance, and in January 1980 its Political Affairs Committee drew up a report on the situation in Malta.18 In 1983, the European Parliament called on the Council of Ministers to suspend aid to Malta pending a resolution of political conflict on the island.19 It was not until December 1985, when conflict resolution on the island seemed to be in the offing, that the economic aspects were resolved, and a protocol on financial aid amounting to ECU 30 million was signed.20 The second stage of the association agreement, however, remained stalled.

Changing conditions In both cases, stalled democratization generated negative domestic conditions, which limited the ability of the two islands to strengthen their relations with the most important democratic forum in Europe. By the late 1980s, Malta and Cyprus were the only two Southern European states that had not become members, and they both felt that membership had become an imperative if they were not to be marginalized in the region.21 The end of the Cold War and the bipolar world had reduced the effectiveness of policies of neutrality and non-alignment.22 Security on both islands had been provided by a series of bilateral relations: with Italy in the case of Malta, and Greece and Turkey in the case of Cyprus. However, these states were now increasingly interacting on the international circuit through multilateral forums, the most important being the EU,23 and both islands realized that their own security could be much better provided for under this multilateral framework.24 Democratic governance, it was also believed, would be safeguarded on both islands once they were members, and the Union would also provide the economic resources and expertise desperately needed along with the advantages of a much enlarged hinterland. In Malta, by the mid-1980s, the Labour government was endeavouring to improve relations with the West and saw the EU as crucial to the development of the island.25 In 1987 the Nationalist Party, which had made EU membership a focal part of its manifesto, was elected to government.26 On Cyprus,

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both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots agreed that EU membership was the optimal choice.27 Initially, however, membership for Malta and Cyprus was problematic for the Union. The EU continued to be reluctant to contemplate immediate membership for Cyprus as a divided island.28 Membership of two such small states also presented problems for the Union in terms of institutional factors. The institutional and voting arrangements favoured small states, and after the 2004 enlargement, the suppression of the will of the majority of peoples inhabiting the larger states by a medley of smaller states would be possible. Malta and Cyprus were viewed as extreme examples of the above scenario, and their membership could not be contemplated prior to institutional change.29 On both islands, there were also sizeable groups that rejected EU membership in its current format. The TurkishCypriots were emphatic that membership should follow conflict resolution, should involve the equal participation of two internationally recognized communities on the island and should occur in tandem with Turkish membership of the EU.30 On Malta, the MLP argued that immediate membership of the Union would militate against the islands’ interests, and that for the time being a special partnership package with the EU would be a better alternative.31 However, both Italy and Greece viewed Malta and Cyprus, respectively, as crucial for the defence of their southern flank and supported their membership. By the early 1990s, both states had more clout within the Union. Italy by the late 1980s was a G7 member, politically more mature, and the constitutional reforms from 1992 further consolidated democracy, enabling it to focus more on international and EU issues.32 Greece had performed poorly in economic terms post membership and did not exhibit enduring political stability till the early 1990s. However, after 1993, more stable conditions at home and a more pro-European government and opposition allowed it to focus its energies on expanding its external remit, in particular developing an expanded role in the EU. This was facilitated by a rapprochement with Turkey in the late 1990s.33 Both islands submitted requests for membership in 1990, Cyprus with the support of the Greek government, and Malta with the support of the Italian government which was holding the presidency of the Union at the time.34 Italy and Greece used the prospective eastern enlargement to push the claims of Cyprus and Malta, arguing that enlargement to the east should be balanced by enlargement to the south.35 This argument was further reinforced when it became evident that the new fault lines in security terms now lay between the North and South of the Mediterranean.36 In 2000, the problems related to the institutional arrangements were also eliminated, when an overhaul took place at Nice.37

The long haul The road to membership, however, was a lengthy process for both islands. The Commission did not issue its opinion until 1993.38 Though its analysis was positive, Malta and Cyprus were not included in the 1995 enlargement.39 The continued

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division of Cyprus militated against membership, and the 1993 Commission opinion made it clear that its resolution was a sine qua non of membership.40 Malta’s and Cyprus’s applications also seem to have been treated in tandem, and the Maltese believed that consequently the Commission approach to their application had been sluggish.41 However, on 6 March 1995, the French presidency secured a package deal which transformed the prospects of Cypriot accession to the EU, and committed the Union to opening negotiations with Cyprus, dropping the condition that the division of the island be ended before accession negotiations.42 The European Council meetings of March and April 1995 confirmed that accession negotiations with Cyprus and Malta would begin six months after the end of the intergovernmental conference.43 However, in October 1996, the new Malta Labour government froze Malta’s membership application.44 Consequently, the Luxembourg European Council only drew up a pre-accession strategy for Cyprus45 and opened negotiations with the island in March 1998.46 Malta’s application was not reactivated until September 1998, when the Nationalist Party was re-elected to government, and reapproved by the European Parliament in November.47 In March 1999 the Council called on the Commission to define a pre-accession strategy for Malta, and bilateral screening started in May of 1999, though the official launching of the negotiations did not take place until February 2000. In 1999 the Commission updated its opinion on both Malta and Cyprus, and finally in March 2000, more than ten years after the islands had launched their applications, Council Regulation (EC) No 555/2000 created an official framework for a pre-accession strategy for Cyprus and Malta.48

The suitability of Malta and Cyprus for EU membership The accession of Malta and Cyprus to the EU, in terms of the Copenhagen criteria, did not pose any great problems.49 The Commission reports of 1993 made it clear that though their membership would raise a number of economic, political and institutional difficulties, which would have to be dealt with prior to membership, their integration into the community system would not pose insurmountable problems of an economic or political nature.50 Both islands were seen as democracies supporting market economies, the rule of law and human rights, and therefore capable of aligning themselves and taking on the obligations of the Acquis Communautaire.51 Both islands were also considered as the most advanced candidates from the 2004 enlargement, and the political and economic transitions, deemed necessary in the Eastern European states before accession, were viewed as already having been successfully completed on the islands.52 In the social sphere, Malta and Cyprus were on a par with EU members. In terms of political criteria, it was noted that Malta’s institutions operated in a proper and satisfactory manner, and that there were no problems regarding the observation of fundamental rights and freedoms. The judicial system was viewed as independent and highly professional, if rather slow to work.53 On Cyprus, governmental institutions were said to function smoothly, the public administration was well

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structured and an ombudsman had been put in place as early as 1991. The office had functioned efficiently, and government had responded positively to the frequent allegations of corruption and patronage in the civil service. Freedom of expression, association, economic and social rights and protection of minorities was fully guaranteed and respected. Cyprus also had the judicial and administrative capacity to apply the acquis with relatively few problems.54 In economic terms, Cyprus was more prepared for accession than Malta,55 and though the economy in the North lagged far behind the South, the smallness of the area, EU aid and opportunities, it was believed, would quickly eradicate the problem. The Cypriot economy seemed ready to face integration; its buoyancy and performance was praised.56 A large number of instruments required for adaptation to the single market were already contained in the 1987 protocol and had been adopted. As a result, Cyprus had entered a customs union with the community in 1998. In the same year, the screening of Cypriot legislation had begun,57 and by 1999 sixteen chapters had already been screened.58 A  pre-accession strategy for Cyprus was already in place and included participation in certain target projects, aimed at boosting its judicial and administrative capacity. Participation in certain community programmes and agencies was also in progress.59 Overall, the Union believed that accession would reinforce both islands’ European identity, increase their security60 and prosperity, and further democratization. Malta’s accession would further secure the democratic gains made by the island in the 1987 constitutional settlement.61 Cyprus’s accession was seen as a way of bringing the two communities closer together, encouraging the re-establishment of fundamental liberties across the board and furthering the possibility of a lasting political settlement.62 As members, both would also help reinforce the Union’s external borders to the south63 and provide models for the ongoing attempts by the EU to foster democratization in the south of the Mediterranean.64 However, the international implications of the islands’ membership continued to preoccupy the Union. A divided Cyprus would pose problems in the context of the community’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP),65 as would Malta’s entrenchment of its neutral and non-aligned status in the constitution.66 With the accession of three neutral states in 1995, and institutional changes to CFSP under Amsterdam in 1997, Malta’s international status appeared to pose less of a problem,67 though its role in CFSP was still in doubt in the 1999 Commission opinion.68 A divided Cyprus remained a suboptimal solution for the Union, though from the late 1990s Greece and Cyprus became the staunchest advocates of Turkish accession, reducing somewhat the adverse effects of the division internationally.69 The 1999 Commission Reports on Malta and Cyprus also highlighted the different problems that the two islands would encounter in negotiating accession. In Malta the first stage of the association agreement had never been completed; the second stage had therefore not been initiated, and no shift to a customs union had been made. Therefore, the association agreement had not had the intended effects of opening the Maltese economy to European competition and aligning the country’s legislation, practices and competitive performance with those of the community. Therefore, the adoption of the Acquis Communautaire, in trade,

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economic, financial and competitive issues, depended on a root-and-branch overhaul of the Maltese economy’s regulatory and operational systems. The protective nature of the economy fell under scrutiny, and the ability of the Maltese economy to cope with the competitive pressures within the Union remained in doubt, particularly in the case of small enterprises in the agricultural, services and handicraft industries. Unlike other candidate countries there was as yet no programme for the systematic alignment of Malta’s legislation with the Acquis. In adapting Maltese law to community legislation not much progress had been made, beyond setting up the administrative machinery. Numerous restrictions still remained, inhibiting the functioning of the four freedoms. The public administration was seen as lacking in efficiency and effectiveness, and the island’s administrative capacity had to be improved and increased, especially in the fields of customs, competition, maritime transport and justice and home affairs. Due to the freezing of Malta’s application, the island’s exposure to the Acquis had also been reduced, and screening commenced late.70 Cyprus also needed to strengthen its administrative capacity in areas of the internal market including maritime transport and telecommunications, update its regulations and increase its efficiency primarily in the areas of environment and justice and home affairs. However, the Commission Report of 1999 emphasized primarily the negative implications of the status quo. The division of the island was not acceptable and was causing suffering to the population. It militated against the enjoyment of human rights, in particular the freedom of movement of people in their own country, as well as the movement of goods, services and capital, and the right of establishment which could not be exercised over the entire territory. Regional disparities between the North and South continued to grow. GDP in the North constituted only 30 per cent of that in the South. The human rights situation in the North of the island was also said to be worrying, especially the treatment of Greek-Cypriots and Maronites. There were also reports of disappearances and extrajudicial killings. A journalist was killed in 1996, allegedly for speaking out against Turkish policy. Finally, as a result of the political situation the process of accession could not cover Cyprus as a whole, but was restricted to the South.71

Divergent views on membership The shortcomings that the EU Commission identified in Cyprus and Malta were a consequence of long-standing cleavages on the island and now overlapped, and were reinforced by, the issue of EU membership. On Cyprus, the EU was increasingly viewed as pro Greek-Cypriot.72 The even-handed approach that the Union had adopted in the 1970s and early 1980s seemed to have been whittled away.73 When the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) applied for membership in 1990, the TRNC protested, stating that the ROC could not apply for membership of the whole island, when the Republic’s remit did not extend to the North. The TRNC demanded that the application be withdrawn, and that before any further negotiations take place it be consulted as an equal partner,74 but these demands

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were ignored. In economic terms, the North was also increasingly disadvantaged by the Union. From the early 1980s, it received proportionately less and less of the funds available to the island.75 Its terms of trade also deteriorated. The community, despite the fact that it had not officially recognized the TRNC, had continued to trade with the North after 1974. However, at the insistence of Greece, this practice was also stopped in 1994. This non-recognition of the TRNC in legal terms was also reinforced, when the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled against the North in the context of a number of cases dealing with land that had belonged to southerners.76 Greek membership of the Union and increased relations of Greek-Cypriots with the European Parliament, and the Commission, meant that the EU was increasingly exposed to, and as a result expressed, a Greek-Cypriot view.77 In 1997 when membership of the Republic of Cyprus seemed inevitable, the TRNC refused further contacts with the Community, stopped all attempts at reaching a solution with the South and proposed the setting up of a customs union with Turkey.78 When the accession process began, the Commission insisted that the Turkish-Cypriots be represented,79 but the North refused to participate, arguing that they would only take part as a separate delegation representing the TRNC.80 Indeed it was argued by numerous scholars that the prospect of EU membership had reduced rather than increased the chances of conflict resolution.81 On Malta the Labour Party came out against accession, arguing that membership would undermine the micro state’s sovereignty and jurisdiction. The island’s neutral stance would also be compromised, and this would negatively affect the island’s relations with its southern neighbours. A customs union was also seen as a threat to Malta’s local industries, leading to redundancies and undermining its social base. Membership, it was argued, favoured the elites, and not the workers.82 The prospect of EU membership became the main issue in both states and exacerbated the ethnic and left/right cleavages on Cyprus and Malta, impacting on party politics and causing alterations in the relations between parties, and within parties, and between parties and their electorates.

Impact on the party systems On Malta, the issue divided the left and right and caused divisions within both camps, though primarily within the ranks of the left.83 The official Labour Party stance was anti-EU membership; however, powerful forces within the party supported entry.84 Many in the General Workers Union (GWU), the main union of the left, also favoured membership;85 this was reflected in the impact assessment reports that the GWU commissioned.86 Though ultimately both the party and the GWU officially supported the ‘no’ vote during the referendum campaign, elements in the party and the GWU continued to support the ‘yes’ campaign.87 This division was reflected at the level of civil society, where a core left-wing group voted ‘yes’ in the EU referendum,88 and supported the Nationalists as the pro-EU party in the

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election that followed.89 This group swung the vote in favour of entry, ensured the return of the Nationalist Party to power and left the Labour Party in disarray.90 The issue also helped raise the status of the small environmental party on the island. Environmental politics had a far higher profile at the EU level, and Alternattiva Demokratika (AD) appealed to this level of governance, to deal with environmental issues, ignored by government and opposition.91 AD was affiliated and had the support of the environmental group in the European Parliament, and Arnold Cassola, a founding member of AD, was made secretary general of the European Federation of Green Parties. AD saw its interests furthered by EU membership, supported the ‘yes’ vote92 and offered to enter an alliance with the Nationalists in the upcoming elections.93 Coupled with their informed and efficient stance towards the issue, and their superior knowledge of an insider’s view of the workings of the EU system, their popularity soared and was reflected in the June 2004 European Parliament elections, where Arnold Cassola obtained 10 per cent of the votes.94 On Cyprus, the issue also caused divisions, which also occurred primarily within the ranks of those that opposed membership. In the TRNC, a number of political parties on the left favoured immediate membership believing that it would foster economic growth and provide Turkish-Cypriots with the benefits of the single market and the four freedoms.95 This group feared the growing dependence of the TRNC on Turkey,96 and the continuous inflow of Turks into the island, who threatened the indigenous culture of northern Cyprus.97 They advocated early agreement with the South based on a federal rather than a confederal solution sought by the government of the TRNC. They also made it clear that though they considered it optimal for membership of the TRNC to take place in tandem with Turkish membership, they were prepared to support immediate entry without the latter.98 This group was supported by a large percentage of the populace, who by the end of 2002 took to the streets to protest against the government stance, and called for an immediate solution to the continued division of the island, followed by EU membership.99 These protests led to the collapse of the government in December 2003, and the opposition parties won the same number of seats as the parties supporting Denktash.100 These parties were pro-EU, and though not fully supportive of the latest UN peace plan, ‘Annan V’, were prepared to adopt it, if a referendum in the TRNC endorsed it. Subsequently, the ‘Annan V’ proposal was endorsed by 65 per cent of the voters in the TRNC.101 In the ROC, however, conservative elements informed the public that ‘Annan V’ favoured the North. Consequently, the government called for a ‘no’ vote in the referendum. AKEL, the largest left-wing movement, with representatives in government, hesitated to take a stand and did not direct its voters. At the very last moment, it came out against.102 Despite the official support of a number of important political personalities including Clerides, the ex-president, 76 per cent of the Greek-Cypriots voted against.103 This put an end to the entry of a unified Cyprus into the EU, and only the South climbed on board after delivering a ‘yes’ vote in the EU referendum.

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Successfully co-opting the opposition Ultimately, the EU was extremely successful in co-opting the opposition in both states and persuading them to acquiesce to EU membership in its current format. This success was due in part to the use of certain methods of consent, conditionality, contagion and the carrot-and-stick formula.104 Membership was a voluntary decision of the candidates; the relationship was initiated at the demand of the two islands and progressed purely with their consent. Once this decision was made, however, conditionality kicked in, and both islands had to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria.105 Democratic behaviour was also adopted by opposition groups who accepted that whatever the formula agreed upon, interacting with the Union was a sine qua non for their survival, and therefore adopting Union rules was imperative.106 This behaviour was reinforced by the process of contagion, as local elites increasingly functioned under rules and structures that were derivative of the EU formula.107 Finally, the Commission aided the process through a carrotand-stick formula, offering the islands resources, attempting to accommodate their views and at the same time insisting that the Acquis be efficiently and immediately applied.108 The EU thus slowly incorporated the local elites into community structures and set up inter-parliamentary committees and facilities to observe council meetings. The Commission also facilitated the process through a range of dedicated instruments including technical assistance and investment in infrastructure needed for applying the Acquis, the twinning of administrations of member states with counterpart institutions in acceding countries, peer reviews and the joint elaboration by Commission and acceding country experts of concrete action plans.109 Finally, the EU’s pre-accession strategy defined in the Essen Summit in 1994 was adopted as the pre-accession format.110

Preparing for accession and adopting the Acquis Malta and Cyprus did not undergo the same radical transformation of their institutional structures, as did the Eastern European applicants. None of the three elements defined at the Essen summit strictly applied to them. Both had association rather than partnership agreements. PHARE111 agreements financed the provision of advice on transition to political pluralism and capitalism by Western experts; this service was not required by either Cyprus or Malta. However, it was decided that both states must take part with the Central and Eastern European countries in the following aspects of the pre-accession strategy:  familiarization with the running of the EU and its institutions, community programmes and technical assistance with adopting the Acquis. In other words, both islands were supported in a two-pronged process. The first was the transformation into modern, efficient, transparent, corporate governments underpinned by efficient market economies. The second was the transition from sovereign unitary states to more fluid units operating within the format of shared multilevel governance.112

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Pre-accession funds were given to both islands under Council Regulation (EC) 555/2000 to support projects designed to facilitate transposition, application and enforcement of the Acquis.113 On 6 June 2003 a special package for the northern part of Cyprus was adopted to promote economic development and to bring the Turkish community closer to the EU.114 After accession, further targeted assistance was envisaged to improve implementation and enforcement of the Acquis and would be made available to the public administrations of the two states through the transition facility. This was a new temporary instrument to assist new member states to develop and strengthen their administrative capacity, to implement and enforce community legislation and to foster exchange of best practices among peers. A Schengen facility was also created for the purpose of addressing shortcomings identified in the preparation for participating in Schengen.115

Structured dialogue and the transformation of the state The opening of a structured dialogue and the concomitant transformation of the state began earlier in Cyprus. In May 1990, the Commission established a permanent delegation in Cyprus.116 In March 1992, the EP set up a new EC– Cyprus Parliamentary Committee.117 From 1995, ministers and officials were invited to attend meetings under the three Maastricht pillars. In CFSP Cyprus began to regularly align its position with those of the Union, including sanctions and restrictive measures, statements, declarations and demarches.118 Cyprus nominated its former president George Vassiliou to head its negotiating team. It established a task force chaired by the Foreign Ministry which consisted of working groups that examined the implementation of the Acquis in different areas. A special committee for EU and External Affairs was set up to assist the harmonization process, consisting of nineteen members, who examined all legislative instruments that were required for the approximation of national legislation to the Acquis, and which included the facility of a fast-track procedure.119 Cyprus began a period of restructuring in both the economic and political fields early to comply with the Acquis. In 1991, the post of ombudsman was created to bring transparency to public administration. VAT was introduced in 1992. Between November 1993 and February 1995, the Commission held discussions with twenty-three sectoral committees in Cyprus set up to discuss the alignment of Cypriot law with EU law. Between 1995 and 2000, Cyprus harmonized Cypriot law and institutions in line with the Acquis. From 1994, expenditure in Science and Technology was increased. From 1996, steps were taken to liberalize certain transactions in foreign investments, and by 1999 foreign participation in most sectors of the economy had reached 100 per cent. In 1997, Cyprus reformed its legislation in public procurement and product liability. Its banking bill was also updated, as was its audio-visual law in 1998. In the same year, its laws on foreigners and immigration were also amended. In January 1998, Cyprus also adopted the EU common customs tariff and made plans to liberalize its telecommunications, energy, air transport and postal services sector.120

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The Cypriot public administration underwent reform to deal with the accession process, comply with demands of the Acquis and prepare itself for membership. The processes accelerated the establishment of new structures, led to the strengthening of its administrative capacity and hastened the recruitment of additional staff in key areas. A large recruitment package of 344 posts in view of EU accession was approved in 2003. A marked improvement was noted in the appointment of female candidates to the civil service and by 2004 women accounted for more than 50 per cent of new appointees. An internal code of conduct for the administration was also introduced. Special training on EU issues was also offered to civil servants by the Cyprus Academy of Public Administration. Training programmes were also organized in different sectors, such as the coordination of social security systems, maritime safety and justice and home affairs. Additional staff was also recruited in key areas, such as financial services, company law, fisheries and transport. This allowed Cyprus to reinforce market surveillance systems, improve supervision of financial services and upgrade inspection arrangements. After 1998, Cyprus along with Malta was finally included in the TAIEX and PHARE programmes, targeted at training judges and officials.121 New administrative structures were also set up to deal with new requirements that were offshoots of the Acquis: an authority to settle disputes resulting from the process of credit transfers, a state aid monitoring authority, a statistical council, a special group of officials to examine new structures of government and a Refugee Authority. Existing enforcement bodies were also increased, to include a Securities and Stock Exchange Commission, and a Unit for Combating Money Laundering. In important areas such as capital movement, competition, agriculture, taxation, customs, environment and justice and home affairs, enforcement structures were reinforced. The government also updated its IT system to allow the exchange of data with European institutions.122 The notion of transparent government was further reinforced by a citizens’ charter that detailed citizens’ rights vis-à-vis the administration. The Cyprus administration also introduced in some ministries an automation system that accelerated access to documentation. A comprehensive legal framework against fraud and corruption was introduced, and a coordinating body on corruption, which included representatives of both the public and private sectors, was set up to advise the Council of Ministers on issues of corruption. A specialized complaints unit within the police to examine complaints against police officers was also set up. All the human rights legal instruments which fell under the Justice and Home Affairs Acquis were also ratified by Cyprus.123 On Malta a slower process was discerned. In the late 1980s, government started to plan the restructuring of the administration in the light of membership and established certain structures including a cabinet standing committee on the EC, an inter-ministerial committee on EC–Malta relations and EC desk officers allocated to every ministry.124 However, the process did not take off until the mid-1990s, was stalled after 1996 and only really took off after 1999.125 Here the position of ombudsman whose role was to receive complaints against government organizations was set up in 1995. The post, however, was appointed by two-thirds

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of the House of Parliament, a fairly radical procedure by Maltese practice. A tribunal for the investigation of injustices was also set up in 1995 to investigate allegations before 1995, along with a Permanent Commission against Corruption. A national audit office, an office of the telecommunication regulator and the Malta Communication Authority were established in 1997. The project of adopting the European System of Accounts (1995) for GNP compilation purposes was started in 1998. In 2000, the Inland Revenue department introduced new legislative and administrative measures for better enforcement and higher compliance. Also in 2000 the Malta Statistics Authority was established. The legislative framework was prepared with the assistance of Eurostat’s legal advisor. A new Environmental Statistics Programme was also introduced, since statistics in this area were incomplete.126 One of the earlier developments was the establishment of a local government framework in 1993.127 Though its tasks were purely administrative, and the small size of the island raised questions as to the advisability of such a structure,128 it was in part intended to meet the demands of the EU institutional framework and funding procedures.129 Regional policy continued to be determined by central government, the cabinet committee on policy and priorities providing strategy and coordination and in 2001 a Regional Policy directorate was set up within the Office of the Prime Minister. Overall monitoring and reporting of the programmes co-funded by the structural and cohesion fund were to become the responsibility of the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Regional Policy, with the Regional Policy directorate acting as secretariat.130 Local councils, however, have over the years accrued more powers and now have consultation rights in a number of specific areas, and generally also on matters that impinge on their localities. Ministries and public authorities can also now delegate any of their functions to local councils.131 Malta’s public administration also underwent change in the light of membership. In 2001, an Office of Review headed by a director was set up in each ministry which was accountable to the permanent secretary. It dealt with EU-related initiatives, projects to improve service delivery, ministry-specific initiatives, all documents needed in the process of negotiations, the release of position papers and the drafts of laws related to alignment with the Acquis. Answerable to this office in each ministry was an EU Co-ordinator and a Customer Care Co-ordinator who were assisted by other staff. The lead ministry was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which housed the EU directorate that was the lead unit throughout the negotiations. This directorate had an officer for every chapter. The EU directorate, however, was accountable to the EU secretariat housed in the Office of the Prime Minister. To aid the process, in January 2002, a reform was initiated giving more responsibility to the heads of department. A  performance management programme and an efficiency review aimed at government employees were also set up. Coordination between different sectors was also targeted for improvement. The staff complement of the pertinent ministries and authorities was also increased, so they could carry out new functions and ensure effective separation of roles. Privatization of certain key public institutions took place. A  one-stop-shop system was also introduced whereby local councils served as a calling place for

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receipt of applications for licences and other menial tasks, relieving the load of central government. An E-Government strategy was also initiated. The Malta EU Steering and Action Committee (MEUSAC), under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was established, to involve the different groups of civil society in the accession process.132 Consultation with economic and social partners also took place through the Malta Council for Economic Development (MCED) and the Euro Assistance Co-ordination Task Force (ACT).133 Greater investment in equipment training and technical assistance was also provided. The Minister of Justice organized introductory courses on the nature of EU legislation and legal structures, and the application of such legislation at the national level. Malta also made representation to EUROPOL for possible cooperation through a bilateral agreement prior to membership. The educational sector was also targeted in the light of the need for greater human resources to cope with membership. In January 2000, the European Union Programme Unit was set up in the Ministry of Education. Malta started participating in the Leonardo and Socrates programmes and in the Fifth Framework Research Programmes. In 2001, the Education Act was amended to ensure there was no discrimination in the provision of education, and that children of migrant workers were provided with educational facilities. The Employment Training Corporation (ETC) began to implement the principles of European Pathways including issuing of European training documents. Joint public–private sector research and development ventures were also promoted, and Malta began to participate in a number of EU science and technology programmes including AVICENNE An updated strategy for research and development was also established and efforts were made to start up a national science and technology information databank.134

Commission feedback The Commission during restructuring provided both countries with advice, expertise and incentives. Yearly monitoring reports drew the countries’ attention to shortcomings, difficulties and un-dealt with issues. The Malta reports emphasized economic issues: Progress in the structural reform of the economy has been mixed . . . very substantial efforts need to be made to guarantee sustainability of public finances . . . still need of major restructuring of public enterprises and . . . level of nonperforming loans in the banking sector was high. In the field of public administration [there was a] . . . need for more efficiency and accountability across public services, [a]‌need of reform in the judiciary to decrease backlog of pending cases, and [a need to] improve the functioning of the small claims tribunal. Malta needed a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy taking on board the recommendations of the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption.

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Reports also indicated that the islands’ external borders drastically needed to be more effectively secured.135 In Cyprus the emphasis was on political and administrative issues. The September 2003 report stated, In the field of public administration the impartial character of the civil service needs to be strengthened, and [there are] weaknesses as regard training and staffing. There is also concern over the efficiency of a number of bodies implementing the acquis [and this] needs to be addressed. In the field of the judiciary the length of court proceeding should be reduced. The island needs to continue fighting corruption on the basis of a comprehensive anti-corruption policy including regulations on the funding of political parties. Visa policies were still not in place and problems remained with audio visual material, investment services and security markets.136

On both islands EU rural funding development measures were still not in place, and payment agencies had not yet been set up. Shortcomings were also still evident in the areas of maritime safety, nature protection, and the liberalization of telecommunications, and external trade in agriculture.137

Accommodating the opposition During accession, the Commission also attempted to act as honest broker and accommodate the demands of the opposition. The Commission reports on Cyprus stressed that the status quo was at odds with international law, threatened the stability of the island and the region, and had implications for security. The Union was determined to play a positive role to bring about a just and lasting settlement between North and South, ensuring that the accession negotiations would contribute positively to a political solution.138 Accession was viewed by the Commission as a means of narrowing the development gap between North and South, and a percentage of economic aid was set aside for the Turkish community.139 The European Council insisted that representatives of the Turkish-Cypriot community be included in the accession negotiating delegation, and in March 1998, President Clerides tabled a motion inviting them to participate.140 The Commission also proposed setting up an EU information unit in northern Cyprus to inform the Turkish-Cypriots of the advantages of membership. When this failed, it tried to channel information through the European Institute of Cyprus in the South. It also organized Acquis-related seminars in the North, the training of legal experts, meetings with the chamber of commerce and with the Pan-Cypriot Trade Union Forum, and started on the translation of the Acquis into Turkish.141 The North, however, refused to participate in the negotiations until their separate sovereignty was recognized and barred the setting up of an information unit and the collection of any data. Aid allocated was not used, since the Turkish-Cypriots were not prepared to accept aid made available through the government of the

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Republic of Cyprus. Implementing the bi-communal projects funded by the Commission and intended to bring the two communities together also proved impossible.142 Throughout the accession process, the Commission constantly expressed its concern at the impasse in negotiations, noting that because of the situation, the Acquis screening could not cover Cyprus as a whole.143 The EU, however, did not involve itself directly in negotiations between the two communities, reiterating that this was the role of the UN.144 The accession negotiations did not touch on the problem but dealt only with the economic, administrative and technical aspects of membership.145 Indirectly, however, the EU attempted to promote UN negotiations. The G8 Summit of heads of state, many of whom were EU members, in 1999 urged the UN secretary general to invite the leaders of the two communities to negotiate based on the premise of no set preconditions, putting all the issues on the table, and negotiating in good faith until a settlement was reached. Proximity talks under the aegis of the secretary general were in fact opened in December 1999, and in November 2000 the UN secretary general presented a paper outlining the future process of negotiations. The UN also tried to upgrade the talks to direct negotiations, because until then the secretary general had always met Denktash and Clerides separately. However, at the end of the fifth round Denktash withdrew from the talks, again reiterating that he would not return until the TRNC was officially recognized.146 The accession negotiations were also viewed by the Commission as reinforcing the talks under the aegis of the UN. Accession negotiations therefore took place with EU membership of the entire island in mind. Accession structures were formatted to cater to, and reinforce, a political system based on a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation.147 In turn, the UN also viewed settlement within the context of eventual EU membership. Therefore, the Annan plans, that focused on constitutional settlement, endeavoured to ensure that the final constitution would be in line with EU requirements.148 It was also believed that the federal aspect of the constitution would work better and be reinforced by EU membership. A number of areas of high politics included macroeconomic policy, and security and defence, which were still highly contentious issues between the two communities, could now be formulated within the context and remit of EU decision making, resolving the problem of which level of governance these issues should fall under.149 The Commission also accepted that the deal brokered under the UN would not be fully in line with the Acquis. The Turkish-Cypriots insisted that limitations on free movement within the state should be imposed, particularly vis-à-vis residency and the purchase of property, since they feared that the North would be overwhelmed by southern settlers. These requests contravened the principles of the four freedoms; however, the EU was prepared to accept their inclusion as part of the final settlement on accession.150 At the insistence of the EU Commission, new talks between Denktash and Clerides opened in January 2002. Kofi Annan presented a comprehensive draft for a settlement which was subsequently revised. Denktash refused to accept the plan, and the talks broke down in March 2003.151 The EU behind the scenes had also been trying to further agreement by encouraging cooperation of the two

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communities at the level of civil society, promoting inter-communal trade, and pushing for the slow dismantling of the Green Line by increasing checkpoints, and making the flow of trade and people across the line easier.152 As a result in April 2003 the TRNC announced a series of confidence-building measures including the partial opening of the Green Line.153 Renewed talks between the two sides began in February 2004; by March little progress had been made. When no agreement appeared to be in sight, the EU reiterated its regret that a political solution had not been reached prior to accession, and both communities under pressure agreed that separate referenda would be held in April 2004 on a plan that would unite Cyprus prior to membership.154 This was Annan V, revised on 26 February 2004.155 On Malta the demands of the opposition were also considered; however, the island was a unified sovereign state, with a legitimate government recognized by all Maltese. The process here was therefore much simpler than on Cyprus. The EU dealt primarily with the government, which channelled through official sources both the different viewpoints of contesting groups, and the commensurate aid needed for these groups to access EU institutions. All requests for aid, and contacts with the Commission, came from officially recognized organizations on the island that forged links with their parent bodies at the community level.156 When in 1996 the recently elected Labour government froze Malta’s application, and demanded a new and unique relationship with the EU, the Commission attempted to comply with the request, and the indicative programme was amended in July 1998. The focus now became the supporting of Malta’s industrial restructuring programme, the improvement of the Maltese education system and the continuation of the European Community Scholarship and Fellowship Fund.157 Once Malta was back on track towards membership, with the re-election of the Nationalists, attempts were made to accommodate opposition views. Indeed, Malta obtained the largest number of exemptions (transitional arrangements), more than seventy-five, from all the accession states, in thirteen sectors, and the only permanent derogation. The island won the right to bar foreign labour for up to seven years, and after this date for its influx to be reassessed in agreement with the Commission. It was also given the right to block non-residents indefinitely from buying second homes on the Maltese islands. A transitional period up to 2008 was given for Malta to implement its seven-year restructuring plan at the shipyards, and up to 2011 for small firms to continue benefiting from incentive packages given under the old industrial development plan, and up to 2008 to continue benefiting from operating aid under the Business Promotion Act. A 25-mile fisheries conservation zone was also obtained in addition to a limit on the number of boats allowed to operate in Maltese waters. In agriculture the entire territory of Malta and Gozo was to be considered as a less favoured area and would get additional EU funding for rural development. The accession agreement includes a protocol on abortion, a declaration on neutrality and a declaration on Gozo as a separate region, and an arrangement with the Vatican on matrimonial matters and parental responsibility.158 Many of these arrangements were made to accommodate groups that had reservations towards membership including

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the Church, the agricultural and fisheries sector, the hunting lobby, small-scale entrepreneurs and the unions.

Membership and the state transformed In 2003, both islands signed accession documents and formed part of the 2004 enlargement,159 though on Cyprus a special accord was signed that suspended the application of the Acquis in the North.160 Membership in Cyprus and Malta was supported by the majority of the populace.161 The EU issue that had for many years reinforced the main cleavage of dissent on both islands was now creating a consensus and the possibility of reconciliation across cleavage lines. The realization of the added value derived from membership, and the creation of a new political, social and economic environment on both islands resulting from the pre-accession process, was largely responsible for this change of heart. The pre-accession process initiated a learning curve and promoted new views, new alignments, new considerations and new methods of conducting business.162 In both states sections of those that belonged to the anti-EU camp rebelled against the status quo. The result was the growth of the centre, and a shift in electoral terms from a party-identification model to an issue-voting model, as the EU cut across the left/right and ethnic cleavage in Malta and Cyprus, helping to build a model of cross-cutting cleavages. This tendency can be observed, as new levels of governance at the federal and regional level have necessitated the transfer of many contentious issues out of the hands of national government. On Malta many issues around which the left-right cleavage coalesced, including the struggle between public and private, are increasingly determined at the EU level.163 On Cyprus the eventual membership of the whole island, and of Turkey, will ease the present centrifugal tendencies that encourage the South to look to Greece, and the North to depend on Turkey,164 and finally allow the growth of a Cypriot conscience.165 Access to new levels of governance, and easier access to international organizations, has loosened the link between civil society, party and government locally. This has reduced the interdependence between these organizations, and raised the status of civil society organizations, and small parties, that can now draw on resources from parent groups abroad. Party dissenters on both islands in the past had nowhere to turn to; alliances with national oppositions had been taboo. Elites now have a new level of governance to appeal to and lobby, and new political units to link up with, and create alliances.166 During accession the process had already begun, and new links were created with political parties, trade unions and different civil society forums at the EU level.167 Unofficially, the TRNC also opened discussions with EU members and increasingly approached EU institutions.168 These new relationships have also transformed the government–party–civil society triad once dependent on vertical linkages, underpinned by patronage, clientelism and graft to a horizontal relationship, where individuals access the resources of the state through institutional formulae, underpinned by the rule of law and the philosophy of a rights-based system.169 This process should also be

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affected by the transformation that is taking place in the public administration. The accession process required a fast and highly technical decision-making apparatus, which meant that often civil servants were dealing with issues of a highly technical nature, in a crisis management situation. Expert technocrats now took decisions that had previously been the prerogative of the political class. A new relationship developed between local civil servants, and their counterparts within the Commission, a relationship which may in the long term reduce the power of the local political class. This process should also ensure that policies will be led less by the contingencies of the moment and be answerable to more longterm factors.170 A new method of coalition building between government and opposition also seems to have developed on both islands. On accession, Malta and Cyprus as micro states found themselves with very limited resources to deal with the contingencies of governance at a federal level. With only six seats in Parliament, both islands did not even have the human resources to fill all the different parliamentary positions open to them, and to attend all the different sessional meetings. It was therefore decided that the Nationalist and Labour MPs on Malta would cooperate and decide between them not to take on a duplication of posts.171 Increasingly, MEPs from different parties cooperate, to support issues that affect the island, as ideology became secondary to national interests. Locally, both parties have also come together to represent certain interests at the EU level. This has been most evident in the context of illegal immigration.172 On Cyprus coalitions between different Greek-Cypriot parties have also been observed, however, as yet the Greek-Cypriots hold all six seats in the European Parliament. However, the TRNC has made it clear that two of these seats should be allocated to Turkish-Cypriots.173 Once this occurs,174 a new pattern of coalition building across ethnic lines, at the level of the European Parliament, should be observed, as Cypriots similar to the Maltese case attempt to defend national interests in a forum where they are greatly outnumbered. On Cyprus, a new pattern of coalition building, however, has been observed vis-à-vis the Greek-TurkishCyprus triangle. For though the Republic of Cyprus has been very insistent that Turkish recognition of the Republic should be a sine qua non of membership, in alliance with Greece, it is a supporter of Turkish membership, cognizant of the fact that they have shared interests including the resolution of a divided Cyprus.175 This democratization of procedures has also impacted on opposition groups, whose desire to access the EU forum has necessitated a respect for EU norms and rules. Though the Labour Party on Malta refused to recognize the results of the referendum on EU membership, it immediately bowed to majority wishes for EU membership reflected in the electoral results of April 2003. The necessity of seeking allies at the European level also meant that it sought full membership of the socialist alliance (PES), which was not forthcoming until it was committed to abide by the alliance rules and its ideological stance. Within the TRNC, Turkey’s desire for EU membership pushed the latter towards greater respect for democratic norms here. By 2003, the government of the TRNC started to cooperate with the Union to initiate an opening up of the North and set the ball rolling for eventual

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membership. Post accession the TRNC has developed a closer relationship with the Union, bent on ensuring that the Union stays true to its promise that the TRNC will not be disadvantaged by ROC membership, and that Turkish-Cypriot views reach the ear of Brussels.176 Growing support for EU membership, by the opposition on both islands, has also helped alter the relationship between these groups and the Union. The overwhelming support of the Turkish-Cypriots at the referendum for the Annan V plan, which would have enabled a unified Cyprus to enter the union, and its overwhelming rejection by the Greek-Cypriots, altered the Union’s perception of the status quo. The Greek-Cypriot ‘no’ was greeted with derision in EU circles,177 and they were viewed as selfishly holding up unification to the detriment of the Turkish-Cypriots, who had exhibited both political maturity and support of the Union in their vote. The Union became determined to implement measures to encourage union and to ensure that the Turkish-Cypriots would not be deprived of the benefits of EU membership.178 In April 2004, the General Affairs Council of the EU expressed its determination to ensure that the people of Cyprus will soon achieve their shared destiny as citizens of a united Cyprus in the EU. The Council adopted Regulation (EC) No 866/2004 which entered into force on 1 May 2004 and, combined with the Commission implementing rules adopted on 7 July 2004, provides the legal machinery for the crossing of persons, goods and services across the line.179 In addition, new confidence-building measures were announced on 16 July 2004 and trade and transport measures on 30 July 2004. New crossing points across the ceasefire line had first been opened in April and May 2003, and in line with new EU recommendations in 2004 the ROC suggested the opening of eight new crossing points in other areas. In 2004, the Cypriot government also proposed the withdrawal of forces along the ceasefire line. This would help towards the area’s revitalization, economic strengthening and better relations between the two communities.180 The Union insisted with the ROC that they facilitate the process, and the president of Cyprus in a meeting with Gunter Verheugen, Commissioner for Enlargement, in June 2004, proposed two measures to facilitate movement of goods and persons across the line. He was also prepared to make special arrangements to render Larnaca Port a hub for goods across the line and suggested hiring the services of Turkish-Cypriots to do the work.181 The government also suggested measures under Council Directive 77/388/EEC aimed at applying simplified procedures in the field of VAT and exempting products from the North, and measures amending Regulation (EC) 866/2004 so as to introduce more liberal provisions that would facilitate trade, and exempt goods crossing the line from customs duties. Under this regulation the Council of Ministers also allowed the crossing of public service vehicles owned by Turkish-Cypriots, including tourist buses and taxis. This process has ensured that products produced in the North are exported through the legal ports and airports of the Republic.182 Support for these measures was largely forthcoming since the ROC feared the introduction of direct trade between the Union and the TRNC which has been on

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the cards since 2004. Support for the TRNC post referendum was also shown on the bilateral front as Britain indicated its intentions to increase direct contacts with the community.183 The Strategic Partnership Document signed between the prime minister of Britain and prime minister Erdogan of Turkey in 2004 stated that it aimed ‘to end the isolation of the Turkish-Cypriots following their strong support for the comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem . . . to promote greater direct commercial economic political and cultural contacts between the UK the EU and Turkish-Cypriot side’.184 Both Britain and the United States were seen by the ROC as staunch supporters of the recognition of the TRNC, and Turkey’s membership of the EU, though it is the United States that is viewed as the greatest threat since it supports a policy of two states in Cyprus.185 These measures have encouraged unification on the ground, and at the level of civil society, ensuring that the opportunities emanating from membership acted as a gravitational pull.186 From April 2003, once freedom of movement on the island was eased, more than 4 million crossings were registered between the North and the South, and ROC figures indicated that more than 10,000 TurkishCypriots arrived in the South every day (a figure representing more than 12 per cent of the population of the Turkish-Cypriots living in the occupied area) earning about $150 million a year. There were equally a significant number of daily visits of Turkish-Cypriots at the competent authorities of the Republic dealing with issues such as birth certificates, identity cards and passports. Many thousands of TurkishCypriots also visited medical institutions. Compared to April 2003, the monthly number treated in these institutions had increased by 506 per cent.187 Within a few months of membership, over 30,000 Turkish-Cypriots had applied and received passports from the Republic of Cyprus and thousands more were in the process of applying. Many wanted to use the passport to travel and work in the Union.188 On Malta the relationship between the Union and the opposition was facilitated by the European Parliament election results of 2004 which gave the majority of seats to the Labour Party,189 effectively giving the party the opportunity and responsibility of representing the island in this forum. The Labour Party post accession has consistently followed a pro-European programme making it clear that if elected to government it would fully support Malta’s role in the EU. This stance was further confirmed by the huge support shown by the Labour Party for the ratifying of the EU constitution.190 Post membership, Maltese across the board immediately applied for work, both within the institutions of the Union and within a number of member states. Student mobility has increased. Research and development is formatted primarily within the EU research and development sphere. Local businesses are slowly developing European subsidiaries. A transformation in the way both islands conducted business on the international circuit could also be observed. Both Malta and the ROC showed a preparedness to align with majority opinion within the forum of CFSP. Both started participating in meetings between the Union and NATO,191 and though not members of the latter forum, certain sympathies reminiscent of a non-aligned stance may slowly be eroded. Both states are also learning to adopt stances towards the global circuit that reflect Union rather than solely national requirements. Both

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soon learnt that though in theory each country still retains the right of veto in the Council of Ministers, few if any today, even among the most powerful states, dare wield it. Thus, Cyprus did not invoke it in December 2004192 when the Union agreed to open accession negotiations with Turkey, even though the latter had not yet recognized the legitimacy of the ROC.193 Both islands began finally slowly learning the most important lesson for the survival of any democracy, that only a politics of coalition will yield results. Malta and Cyprus seemed to finally be playing out a positive-sum game.

A decade post accession: Democratization progression or regression? Accession having taken place more than a decade ago, the impact of Europeanization and national identity reconstruction194 on democratization on the islands can start to be assessed. A  common value system based on the politics of contract, underpinned by the Acquis, and stringent implementing and monitoring bodies, has ushered in a new age in democratic politics on the islands. There are a number of infringement proceedings, with regard to both islands, though the number seems to be comparatively low, indicating that implementation and monitoring bodies need to be brought up to scratch.195 Data on the take-up of the structural funds, and the percentages accessed, show deficiencies in this area; however, by 2017 Malta had an absorption rate of 100 per cent.196 In both states, complaints are rampant on the lack of transparency and the lack of consultation. A new politics of graft seems to be surfacing, as many young graduates now wield the power of the technocrat, which is not legitimized by electoral consent.197 Open borders as elsewhere in the Union have facilitated corruption as circumspect capital flees legitimate jurisdictions.198 Statistics have indicated a certain disquiet with the Union among the populace on both islands post accession.199 As elsewhere in Southern Europe, EU policy outcomes were not always viewed as optimal; it was believed that the EU would solve the Cypriot crisis. This optimism evaporated with the failure of the Annan plan, a trauma for the Turkish-Cypriots. The Annan plan allegedly favoured the North; however, once abandoned the EU allowed the ROC to enter the Union prior to conflict resolution, which is seen as having militated against the interests of the TRNC, and made conflict resolution more difficult. The ROC has been accused of using EU membership as a tool to broker an agreement with the TRNC to their liking. The Commission has also been stigmatized for having forgotten its commitment to the North since accession, and allowing the ROC to hold up reforms, one such case being that of introducing direct trade.200 The TRNC remains excluded from EU governance and many of the benefits of membership. Analysts have commented that the Cypriots seem no closer to conflict resolution, and that the EU does not play its part but leaves it to the UN to steer the process. However, all Cypriots became members of the EU on accession,201 and over the last decade the EU Commission has worked to ensure that the North is prepared for full membership, and given access to resources. In 2006, Aid Regulation 389/2006

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was approved to help the North prepare for unification, and 259  million euros were allocated under a five-year programme. From 2011, an annual assistance of 30 million euros was allocated. In the same year an EU support office was set up in the North, and funds started to be allocated to projects here.202 Turkish-Cypriots were also assisted in accessing European resources, education being a case in point. Though the universities in the TRNC are not part of Erasmus, from 2007 they have been allocated funds for scholarships to EU universities.203 Under Commission guidance, the law in the TRNC is slowly being brought in line with the chapters of the Acquis. By 2008, eight chapters204 had been opened.205 The reform of the civil service has also been taking place.206 The Green Line regulation since 2004 has facilitated and increased trade yearly across the line. In 2008 circa 500,000 euros monthly in goods were crossing the line. As the number of products grows, community regulations and standards are implemented, and health and safety procedures enforced.207 Upgrading of infrastructure, electricity, water and historical building has also taken place. Financial aid given for electricity upgrade was challenged by the ROC; however, the objections of the Republic were withdrawn. It was not advantageous for the South to stop aid to the North. Upgrading of technical certificates and vocational education is also taking place. A survey showed that people crossing the line had increased and these were spending between 5 and 25  million dollars a month. An increasing number of Turkish-Cypriots are today working in the South. With membership, foreigners could no longer be prosecuted for using Turkish-Cypriot airports and ports. Anyone today who is an EU citizen and has valid documents of ROC can cross the border at any time.208 The object of these reforms was that of unifying the economy, which in the Republic after the crash of 2011 is on the mend, with a projected GDP annual growth of 3.9 per cent in 2018.209 These projections may be further assisted by the recent availability of natural gas fields. The economy in the North is still dependent on Turkey, and per capita income remains below that of ROC.210 New crossing points, primarily the one located on the main street of the capital, Nicosia, Ledra Street, give you the illusion of a unified city. Shops and restaurants have opened, businesses are booming and the area is changing, physically, economically and socially. The buffer zone dividing the North and South is undoubtedly shrinking and becoming an area of activity. More than a third of the area has been opened up to civilians, and many groves and farming lands have been revived. Much of the island’s pork is produced here and since 2008, the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy applies to these lands, making them entitled to subsidies.211 Urbanization is also reducing this area and Cypriots are returning to their villages inside or adjacent to these zones, the village of Mammari being a case in point. The University of Central Lancashire has opened up a Cypriot campus in the buffer zone, as have the Goethe Institute and the US Fulbright Foundation. In line with conflict theory, as the buffer zone shrinks and becomes a zone of peace, it reflects the improved relations between the conflicting parties.212 Since membership, the climate of fear between the two parties has lessened and though the situation is not always auspicious, leaders from the North and

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the South continue to talk of brokering a deal.213 One of the most contentious issues to be resolved is that of property lost in 1974. To tackle the issue a property commission was set up in the TRNC on the advice of the human rights court.214 Greek-Cypriots can apply for property to be reinstated or for compensation. The commission, which is funded by Turkey, is presently out of funds, and its use, which implies ipso facto recognition, is also heavily discouraged by the Republic. Imperative for unification to succeed, however, is the right environment and here the EU can play a key role. It can project a positive presence on the island and the region, and provide a common value system that will bring all parties together and engender trust. The EU has the support of the left wing in both communities. The new Cypriot leaders are not part of the past and are both prepared to push for a federal solution. In the present world order, all parties are aware that there is no paradigm outside of the interests of the United States, the UK and the EU, thus the only solution presently is a unified Cyprus. This solution continues to be a hard sell; however, the Greek-Cypriots are aware that the solution lies in a modified Annan plan, though some see the plan as ceding too much. External players also need to be on board, and many view Turkish acquiescence as only possible if membership remains on track.215 Some autonomy in the TRNC exists, and legislation and institutions do differ from Turkey but the North remains very dependent. There is twenty-four-hour-aday contact between the two states, and anything implemented against the wishes of Turkey would not succeed. In terms of the economy, only direct trade would break this dependency. Increased levels of trust would also facilitate the removal of troops, another key issue that needs to be resolved. To foster this trust, people need to mingle, to understand that a united Cyprus is a logical flexible business partnership, where the two sides need to be in a civilized cooperative relationship. A  propitious move to foster this, many argue, would be the removal from the ROC of all symbols reminiscent of Greek power, which would put pressure on the TRNC to follow suit. This would help cultivate belief in a multicultural Cyprus, with its own symbols, where EU membership would provide security, rather than the current treaty of guarantee. The outcome would be Cypriots inculcated in a European Cypriot identity, rather than socialized by Greek and Turkish discourses.216 In theory, conflict resolution and consensus building on Cyprus, and Malta, should be facilitated by Europeanization, regarded as supporting the democratization and liberalization of institutional and legislative instruments in new member states. The setting up and operation of institutional review mechanisms, the ombudsman and the audit office has improved transparency and allowed corrupt practices to surface. In Malta the ombudsman is elected by a twothirds majority,217 and the audit office is headed by an MP from the opposition.218 Both institutions have a sterling reputation, and though at times constrained in their operations, constantly call the government to account. In Cyprus both offices fall under legislation developed in the context of power sharing among ethnic groups, which under the current division of Cyprus is not operational. The remit of the office of the Commissioner for Administration and Human Rights

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(ombudsman) has been extended since 2004, its director is elected through a simple majority and annual reports are available online. In the case of the audit office the last reports available online are from 2014, though a performance audit on the management of water resources was issued in 2016.219 Since 2004 on both islands a number of laws to facilitate governance have been passed. On Malta these include the Whistleblower Act, Freedom of Information Act, Party Financing Act and the introduction of a special investigator to work with the Commission against Corruption. A new bill on standards in public life is in the offing. In Cyprus, in 2015, there was the introduction of a Whistleblower Act and the Party Financing Act; a Freedom of Information Act is in the offing. However, in both states, these Acts have been criticized for falling far short of what is required for adequate governance. In both states, improving government structures, and their better synergy with EU institutions and organizations, has also been facilitated by the exigencies of holding the EU presidency. This exercise normally results in upgrading local skills and encourages capacity-building exercises. It also helps foster the founding principles of the Union, by requiring the host state to focus on targeted realistic integrative policies. In Cyprus, in 2008, the civil service increased its staff dedicated to EU affairs, and set up the Secretariat of the Presidency of the EU, which coordinated the position of the ministries, provided information and coordinated the work of the thirteen new interdepartmental working groups. The cabinet  also set up a ministerial committee and a deputy minister for EU affairs.220 Malta hosted the presidency in January 2017. In 2013, within days of the formation of a new government, preparations for this event were in full swing. An EU affairs ministry and a planning and priorities coordination division were set up. The civil service took on more experts in EU policy − over a hundred were allocated to Brussels alone. Additional staff were posted to offices in Vienna, The Hague, New York, Rome and London. A new operating system was introduced and policy planning, education, training, communication and logistical support fine-tuned. Malta prepared its own presidency handbook determining protocols, priorities and practices.221 Europeanization is said to have encouraged the liberalization of social norms in Malta, the TRNC and ROC, which has been reflected in new legislation. In Malta, in 2011, the first divorce laws were introduced, and in 2014 in Malta, and in 2015 in Cyprus, an act to enable civil union. In the TRNC, in 2014, a law was implemented to legalize gay sex.222 On 5 June 2014, the national assembly of the TRNC proposed twenty-three constitutional amendments, the first since the 1985 constitution. These were designed in part to bring the laws of the TRNC into greater harmony with EU standards and to combat corruption. These included proposals by the centre-left parties to expand minority rights, remove Turkish military control over the police, establish conscientious objection to the military service and instruct courts to use the opinion of the European Court of Human Rights. However, this package was rejected by referendum, though the reforms were supported by all parties in the national assembly.223 In the Freedom in the

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World 2017 report Malta and the ROC achieved the highest score, and the TRNC the second highest, in terms of freedom, civil liberties and political rights. In the area of human rights, the EU’s asylum policy has impacted positively on both islands. Irregular migration has been a key issue for both states224 as membership has accelerated the inflows of illegal immigrants, cognizant that here now lie the new external borders of the Union. In 2014, relative to the size of the resident population, Malta recorded the second highest rates of immigration: 21 per cent per thousand. The highest rate of emigration was in Cyprus: 28 per cent per thousand. Both islands have encouraged the criminalization and imprisonment of migrants, and racism and xenophobia have been on the increase, in tandem with the emergence of identity politics. The result is that on Malta, the old left/ right cleavage is slowly being replaced by a politics of race and fringe parties extolling nationalist formulae.225 However, EU asylum policy, coupled by positive economic indexes which have resulted in the quick absorption of foreign labour, has fuelled discourses on the need for a politics of integration. These policies have been encouraged by EU recommendations and the judgements of the ECHR and the ECJ. Indeed for the first time in their history, both islands, as a result of rapid economic growth, have experienced the need for replacement population stocks in their labour markets.226 The economy on both islands has done well and has been stimulated by membership of the euro in 2008. Malta’s economic performance, which was well below par227 on membership, is presently one of the highest performing in the union. Like elsewhere in Southern Europe, Cyprus had to deal with economic crisis, which worsened in 2011 with the election of the communists and spiralled out of control with the Greek economic crisis. Unlike its patron state, the economy of the ROC is on the mend, stimulated by IMF-approved loans. Though in the TRNC the economy is one of dependency, from October 2015 preparations for transfer to the euro in the North of Cyprus were underway, once settlement is reached.228 One can already pay for goods and services in euros and receive change in euros here. Unification should stimulate the economy, eliminate dependency and reduce inequalities across the island. The role of civil society, which acts to bridge the gap between EU institutions and its citizens, has also helped alter the political systems of the three micro states since membership. Civil society in Malta and Cyprus has expanded, is better organized, has its EU counterparts to assist it and has access to EU funding. In Malta, the Voluntary Organisation Act of 2007 created a legal framework to regulate these organizations and their administration. In the ROC, an institutional framework has not yet been established, within which civil society and citizens can effectively influence the policies of the EU at the local or EU level. However, though civil society lacks the power that lobbies have in Brussels,229in Cyprus it has helped to build trust and reconciliation across the communities. In the North, civil society has been the beneficiary of various programmes under the 2006 financial aid regulation. These programmes have encouraged the diversification of civil society, by funding new organizations, and widening their remit beyond the Cyprus question, to include human rights and the environment.230

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Conclusion Malta and Cyprus were among the first EU members to ratify the European constitution, among the first new members to join ERM2,231 and the euro in 2008. One cannot but acknowledge that EU membership has acted as a catalyst here. The slow transformation of both islands within the context of new supranational structures has altered the pattern of play domestically and internationally. EU membership has provided both islands with the security they have long sought, both in the context of traditional security concerns exemplified by the ROC’s belief that previous threats are largely reduced and new security concerns reflected in Malta demanding that the problem of illegal immigration inflows should be the responsibility of the Council and the Commission. Internally, both islands believe that democratic structures will be safeguarded and reinforced by EU membership and the application of the Acquis. The elites on both islands are now operating within a new framework of multilevel governance. This shift in Malta has contributed to an abatement of the left/right cleavage as many socio-economic issues are now played out at the supranational level, and new contingencies now require local elites to align on a national agenda, creating a new need and ability for the politics of consensus. On Cyprus, the Union is being looked to, to provide sufficient incentives to contain nationalism’s destabilizing tendencies. Commission measures that have attempted to apply the single market across the whole island, thereby introducing the spirit of the Acquis to encourage unity at grass-roots level, have already gone some way towards this goal.232 The prospect for ethnic stability, it is hoped, will now result from an EU philosophy that ‘avoids the romantic version of the nation as a seamless, organic, cultural unit, and instead promotes civic nationalism, and a more voluntaristic and pluralist conception of the nation, as a rational association of common laws and culture within a defined territory’.233 This will finally allow Cyprus to fulfil the first basic precondition for democratization, that is the existence of a territorial state, whether as a federation or confederation, and as on Malta, make possible a politics of consensus and compromise that will complete the process of democratization. To conclude, a new constitutional settlement on both islands, reformatted within the context of Europeanization, is taking place. In line with other Southern European cases, it may well finally eradicate the five-player model, by ensuring the presence of consensually unified internal and external elites, though recent tensions between Turkey and the EU have stalled this process. If accomplished, these players will provide the mechanisms for reconciliation between the internal and the external, and make possible the playing out of a four-and-a-half-player game that will underpin further democratic consolidation here.

C O N C LU SIO N : F R OM D E M O C R AT IC C O N S O L I DAT IO N T O E U R O P E A N I Z AT IO N

Truth is stranger than fiction, but it is because fiction is obliged to stick to possibilities; truth isn’t.1

Assessing the model This research has attempted to provide a methodology through which one can reach a better understanding of the role of external players in democratization in Southern Europe, and more specifically in Malta and Cyprus. To do this a model was constructed from the material available on Southern Europe, and it was then used to analyse the patterns of play of external elites in the various attempts at democratic transition in Cyprus and Malta. The first two chapters of this work overhauled the literature on democratization, which provided a thorough understanding of the domestic conditions necessary to facilitate democratization, though Malta and Cyprus were excluded from this body of literature. Data on Malta and Cyprus was therefore imputed, and their socio-economic structures and political developments compared to those in the authoritarian regimes. These proved to be sufficiently similar to allow the data and models to throw light on the domestic conditions that promoted democratization in the colonial transitions. It therefore became possible to construct a model of democratization for the region which focused on domestic factors. The model was structured around the two main approaches to the study of democratization  – the functionalists and the elitists. In line with these schools, the model adopted a longitudinal approach that incorporated long-, medium- and short-term factors operating within both macro and micro climates. These were illustrated in the inclusion of the socio-economic and political conditions present at the point of transition, and the behaviour patterns of the elites in negotiating transition. These factors, however, were also influenced and altered by historical conditions, reflected in the imputing of a time continuum from premodern to modern and postmodern, the assumption being that modern and postmodern conditions facilitated democratization. The model was therefore cumulative and progressive rather than cyclical. For the model to give a true rendering of democratic transition in Malta and Cyprus, it also had to include variables that would illustrate the role of external

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factors, since these were overriding in the colonial transitions. The literature available, however, proved limited. Therefore, the focus shifted to those works that surfaced from the late 1980s and were influenced by the end of the Cold War. These works reassessed the data on Southern Europe and posited a role for external players in democratization in the region, allowing a more accurate rendering of the pre-transition/transition phase in the region. The earlier data in the first two chapters was also reassessed in the light of recent international relations data and theories. This made possible a better rendering of outer/inner linkages, for the material on the external influences on democratization lacked the sophistication and methodology of the literature on domestic influences. International relations material gave a new resonance to the process and showed that democratization took place against a changing external environment. In the pre-transition phase, it was characterized by bi-polarity and a nuclear politics coercive in intent, and under constant threat – an international relations based on a zero-sum game of ‘for or against’, which fuelled a superpower race in search of allies. This pattern of play was devastating in the Southern European states, weak on the international circuit,2 and co-opted on a basis of dependency, and as client states. However, by the 1970s, the external environment became characterized by the politics of coexistence and détente, the growth of pacifist politics, green politics and Euro-communism, culminating in the assuaging of the left/right cleavage and the victory of the politics of liberal democracy. The trend was also towards globalization, and the internationalization of politics and economics, making notions of unfettered sovereignty and sealed national borders redundant. This trend was mirrored by a shift to a multilateral foreign policy and the bourgeoning of multilateral institutions. Global politics also elicited regional responses as more effective than national ones. The nation state under challenge was being reformatted in the context of regional and supranational governance, and the second half of the twentieth century saw the rise of the power of the federation. The nations of Europe pooled their resources including sovereignty and jurisdiction, side-stepping the protests of engrained nationalism by adopting the unique formula of functionalism. The outcome was a new regional order based on multilateral institutions, the European Economic Community. This organization, underpinned by democratic governance, created economic wealth culminating in the Single European Market, one of the richest markets in the world, built a social model which transferred resources from the rich to the poor, financed programmes to rectify the inequality of regions and endeavoured to support smalland medium-sized industries in the global market. The community also attempted to develop an international profile and provide a response to global contingencies. It thus created a new prototype of democratic governance, formatted to deal with the demands and contingencies of the postmodern, and more recently of the postCold War global system. By the 1970s, the EC had replaced the United States as the most influential external actor in the region and offered Southern European states incorporation into the European club, not on a core–periphery model, but as equal members of

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a regional alliance. The EC used methods of consent, conditionality and contagion to coax the states of Southern Europe into adopting the EU blueprint of democracy, and make the transition to modern, corporate, efficient, open and transparent governance, underpinned by a rational-legal system and supported by an open, structured market economy. Thus, while methods reminiscent of the Cold War years – coercive and conflictual – had hindered the process of democratization, EC/EU methods based on consent, conditionality and contagion facilitated the process. Drawing on this material, Chapter 2 developed a model that also included the role of external players in democratization. The model illustrated their behaviour by adopting the methodology used in assessing the role of domestic players in democratization. Thus, the model adopted a ‘four-and-a-half ’ and a ‘five-player’ scenario which altered the classic elitist ‘four-player’ scenario to incorporate the role of external players. True to the ‘four-player’ model, it posited that consensually unified internal and external elites were necessary for democratization, and that both dis-unified internal and external elites delayed democratization in the region. The model also included the changing international scenario by incorporating a time frame that illustrated that a democratic external environment promoted a democratic environment internally, and vice versa. The model also posited that a state’s position on this international circuit affected the role of external players internally. Thus, weak dependent states are more liable to be ‘influenced’ by external players, than are stronger independent sovereign states. Though as Pridham illustrates,3 this relationship is transformed under the new interdependent scenario that develops with membership of the federal EU. The model is tested in the second half of the text which focused on explaining democratization in Cyprus and Malta by drawing primarily on original sources. True to the model, Malta and Cyprus, attempting democratization through decolonization, played out a five-player game as weak and dependent states, where the role of external players was coercive, intrusive and divisive. As was the case for all the Southern European states, though to different degrees, the two islands were in the throes of making the transition from dependence to independence, and concurrently from premodernity to modernity. This involved the liberalizing and democratizing of their regimes to provide sovereignty with adequate governance. In line with the Lipset/Rokkan model, radical change fuelled crises and created division. The result was a centrifugal cleavage base, underpinned by dis-unified elites, which was tapped into, and reinforced by dis-unified external elites, who replicated external divisions locally. A  transition is thus formatted under disunified internal and external elites that further exacerbated the cleavages and resulted in breakdown. In Cyprus, numerous external players ensured that the resources of sovereignty and jurisdiction were unobtainable, and that Cypriot independence was a charade. Consequently, Greek and Turkish Cypriots continued to identify with Greece and Turkey, further exacerbating the ethnic cleavage and making impossible the transition to consensually unified elites essential for successful democratization. However, conditions on Malta were far superior to those on Cyprus since here

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the impact of the external players was less devastating, and the transition, though flawed, did result in Malta acquiring full sovereignty, and the tools for domestic actors to play out a positive-sum game. Thus the five-player model was less injurious and transition failure here less devastating. This is illustrated in Chapter  4 that detailed transition breakdown in both states. On Cyprus, state breakdown occurred after only three years, in which time the five-player model continued to operate. The breakdown of the state was devastating and resulted in civil war. In Malta, however, post-independence echoes of the four-and-a-half-player game were already in evidence as internal elites slowly mutated towards the consensual model. Party government alternated according to the electoral process, and successful constitutional revision took place. External players also started to practise a more consensual politics on the island. These practices were never fully abandoned and account for the less devastating breakdown of the state in the late 1970s. This is illustrated in Chapter 5 where Malta, now a cohesive mature sovereign state, with some ‘clout’ on the international circuit, was able to format a second successful transition according to a four-and-a-half-player model. Here consensually unified domestic and external elites were able to play out a positivesum game. This pattern of behaviour is reinforced by an external climate of détente where consensual politics increasingly becomes the norm. This was in stark contrast to Cyprus, still weak, dependent and fragmented. Here a second failed transition, under a ‘five-player’ game, characterized by dis-unified internal and external elites interacting in an external domain still influenced by Cold War conditions, led to a zero-sum game, and the division of Cyprus. However, the work is concluded by positing that new conditions, provided by the more democratic global post-Cold War environment, are offering new opportunities for both islands to reformat their state structures, in line with the requirements of consolidated democracies. Chapter  6, in line with the model, illustrates the possibility of successful democratization in both states. Here a new interdependent relationship between the internal and external regimes under EU membership may allow the playing out of a four-and-a-half-player game, under consensually unified internal and external elites within the context of federal politics. The case studies on Malta and Cyprus therefore bear out the assertions made in the model and emphasize that though the model draws on universally applicable theories, it only attempts a middle-range approach, addressing itself to conditions in Southern Europe. It illustrates how different external conditions in the authoritarian and colonial states in the region accounted for the different pace of democratization in the different states. However, the model also illustrates that Southern Europe as a region has become increasingly homogeneous.4 In 2005 internal and external factors throughout the region bore a marked similarity, for in terms of governance and foreign policy the region now displays a newfound unity, characterized by aspiring or current EU membership. This drive towards Europeanization5 has influenced the political process in all the countries of Southern Europe, whether of a colonial, authoritarian, or totalitarian stamp, and has aided and abetted political transitions here towards democracy.6

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The model’s trajectory: From dependency to Europeanization Many, however, would be critical of the model’s focus on democratic consolidation, arguing that the shift here has been simply to procedural democracies. Governance in Southern Europe continues to be characterized by clientelism, patronage and the politics of status. Governments in the region remain inaccessible and lack transparency. Accusations of corruption remain rife. Political parties continue to dominate the forum, civil society remains weak and the transitions to market economies are far from complete.7 This is certainly borne out by the Maltese and Cypriot cases in Chapter 6. EU sponsorship of democratization in the area has also come under fire. Though democratic government was always a precondition for membership, until recently there was no systematic approach to ascertaining the democratic credential of potential members. The Copenhagen criteria8 have been criticized for being too vague and not providing the road map promised to guide new members.9 Commission reports indicate that new members had to satisfy procedural requirements of democracy, rather than substantive ones, falling far short of the original requirements specified in the Commission documentation. This also proved to be the case with the earlier enlargement of Greece, Spain and Portugal. All the states of Southern Europe, with the exceptions of Turkey, Albania and Serbia, are now classified as consolidated democracies,10 though recent studies also emphasize the flawed character of these democracies.11 Nevertheless, EU membership, or prospects thereof, has undoubtedly facilitated democratization in the region. All of Southern Europe has now been absorbed into the Union,12 and recent data illustrates that membership has impacted positively on all the states.13 Data as yet, however, is primarily available on its older members – Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal – where a time trajectory of between thirty and sixty years has made them the perfect laboratory to test this equation.14 However, undoubtedly, in the south-eastern variants after 1989, the prospect of EU membership hastened the process of democratization. In Malta and Cyprus15 it has acted as a catalyst, encouraging governance on both islands to be reformatted within the context of postmodern structures, and furthering the practice of consensual politics albeit with setbacks. Europeanization and the role played by EU elites indeed helped create conditions in the region that were crucial for successful democratization from the 1970s. These conditions facilitated a politics of consensus and compromise, encouraged a politics of moderation and neutralized, or reconciled, extremist tendencies. This was accomplished using the tools of consent, contagion and conditionality.16 Indeed the EU and the politics of interdependency that it cultivates is the example par excellence of the four-and-a-half-player game and in the model is the trajectory towards which all the states complete their evolution as consolidated democracies.17 This is because, within the region, the EC/EU ultimately represented the advanced core to the peripheral Southern European states. It also provided them with a model of democratization, and the means for them to take it on board,

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by adopting the Acquis Communautaire, the Copenhagen criteria and the advice listed in the EU Commission monitoring and progress reports. The Union also aided the process by providing the region with financial aid, expertise, twinning facilities, educational opportunities and early access to its institutions in Brussels. This process for the Southern European states often entailed a shift, from premodern to postmodern structures, in some cases in a very short time frame. In some cases it also necessitated a truncation of the process of modernization that fostered consolidated nation states, characterized by sovereignty and homogeneity. This was despite the fact that this process had previously been considered as a precondition for successful democratization, for in the south-eastern variants, sovereignty and independence were a recent phenomenon. In Cyprus it is still an absent ingredient. In nearly all the states, problems of state-ness linked to ethnicity and regionality remain to some extent unresolved. Recent studies on democratization in Southern Europe indicate that the EU has provided the tools and the resources to help Southern European states deal with problems of state-ness, which continue to plague the entire continent, including Southern Europe.18 Europe is presently in the throes of change due to the fragmentation of national units under the impetus of ethnic demands, the consequent multiplication and recasting of new national units and the surfacing of new regional demands for autonomy. The continent is also presently awash in a flood of migrants from its Asiatic and African borders seeking a better existence in the Union. Finally, in recent years, we have witnessed the replacement of the left/right cleavage which has characterized politics in the region since the French Revolution, with a conflict over notions of national, regional, ethnic and religious identities, symbiotic of the new clashes of cultures and civilizations. The EU as a supranational/quasi-federal system of multilevel governance, that defines sovereignty and jurisdiction in accordance with subsidiarity, underpinned by a secular and civic consciousness that draws on values such as liberty, equality and solidarity, may well prove to be the best framework to deal with the new cleavages that have surfaced on the continent. There is an indication of this in the links the Spanish and Italian regions have fostered with EU institutions, which they feel are more understanding of their needs, than are the Italian and Spanish governments. It is also evident in Cyprus where membership has created a new dialectic between the North and the South. In Malta, membership brought a new unity between the left and the right, as they joined forces to more effectively access the federal level, though this unity at times has been frayed by local conflict. Ultimately, all the states of Southern Europe have chosen to make the journey illustrated in the model. All have successfully navigated the space/time continuum from the modern to postmodern, from nation state to supranational governance, in the belief that this model would safeguard their independence and strengthen their democratic political systems. The result has been the transformation of a region that consists of small, newly independent or relatively weak states on the international circuit and had, until recently, been defeated or penetrated systems. The EU has now made available to them a security and defence network that is accessible on a basis of relative equality,

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structured around a politics of consensus and compromise, which allows even the smallest states to extend their reach beyond what was previously possible.19 This transformation of the region has helped to extend the borders of a free and unified Europe, and created a pool of interlinked democracies that seem set on supporting peaceful coexistence in the region, and the adjacent regions. This objective has become increasingly important post 1989, in a new unipolar world, where new security issues that have surfaced both on the eastern and southern borders of the Union demand a regional response.

Whither the model? The way forward This Southern Europe model, which has culminated in democratic consolidation and EU membership, has long been admired by other states undergoing democratization. Indeed, Southern Europe has been at the forefront of research in studies on transitology. It was here that the third wave was initiated. Within a year, three states successfully negotiated peaceful democratic transitions, followed by successful consolidation. Southern Europe was the first region to join the community while still consolidating democracy, and making the transition to modernity and postmodernity. The region has also illustrated the path to democracy of three different political systems – the authoritarian, the colonial and the totalitarian models. Many of the new theoretical models that have surfaced in the study of democratization were based on empirical findings in the region. It is also in this region, however, that the negative international environment that surfaced post 2001 has impacted with such ill effect, and exposed the shortcomings of EU membership. The global financial crisis of 2007/8, followed by recession and in Europe a politics of austerity, has undermined the previous consensus on globalization, regionalization and their offshoot neo-liberalism. The Southern European states, with the exception of Malta, were hit hard by the recession and its follow-up response, austerity programmes. The fallout has been an increase in tensions between the two main cleavages of the EU, territorial and economic, as resources are seen to increasingly fall to the powerful. Core– periphery relations have been strained to their limits at the regional level as a powerful Brussels, symbolizing German and French power, is seen as imposing austerity programmes on a poorer peripheral Southern Europe, and at a national level, as the single market and neo-liberal economics are viewed as increasing the wealth of the privileged, impoverishing the proletariat and increasing the gap between rich and poor. The situation has been further exacerbated by the large number of migrants and refugees reaching Europe frequently through its southern shores, placing a huge economic burden on these states, required to provide for another impoverished group. This has resulted in the further fraying of the social contract and the resurrection of racial and religious cleavages as the migrants are identified as inimical to the unity of the sovereign state. The outcome has been increasing calls for the sovereign, dirigiste, social state, and less Europe, reminiscent of the

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demands made by the Brexiteers. For Southern Europe, it is therefore imperative that a restructuring of the model of EU governance quickly takes place, in order that union remains a core ingredient in sustaining good governance and democratization in the region. Southern Europe will continue to be at the forefront of research for some years to come. Many of the key questions preoccupying political scientists and international relations experts today can gain in resonance by tapping into data from the region. The key theme of this book, the impact of external players on democratization, is one such case, and indeed has led to a recent reassessment of the literature on democratization in Southern Europe. This new school is presently dealing with one of the main areas of current research in the field: the interaction, and increasing integration, of the national and the international domains. The debate has contributed to the radical transformation of both the fields of political science and international relations and today many academics are thinking in terms of a new hybrid,20 indicating a reluctance to view the two areas of study separately. ‘Truth is stranger than fiction, but it is because fiction is obliged to stick to possibilities; truth isn’t,’ said Mark Twain, and perhaps this phrase expresses best the inability today of theoreticians to keep up with changes on the ground. For, as Cooper21 indicated some years ago, the distinction between the national and the international has become increasingly redundant today. The rise of international economics, and global politics, has created the need for a new political animal that both incorporates, and transcends, the sovereign state. Europe responded by creating the supranational model, which has not done away with the national borders of sovereignty, but has attempted to overcome their deficiencies, and work beyond them, by incorporating both the national and the international within its remit. For many years, academics were undecided as to how to regard this new hybrid. On inception it was largely viewed as an international organization, and therefore falling within the field of international relations. However, debates surfaced on whether in fact it should be viewed as a political system and Hix22 used the tools of political science to bring new clarity and understanding to the model. Today, a new methodology is needed to fully assess what is happening in the field of democratization studies: a new type of international politics, drawing on an interdisciplinary approach, which involves the removal of barriers between the two fields of international relations and political science, mirroring what has already occurred on the ground. This book has attempted to do just this, and by tapping into theoretical formulae from both the international relations and political science schools, the author has been able to construct an interactive model that attempts to explain the role of the external on the internal, and more specifically the role of external players on democratization in Southern Europe. The model in this work adopts an interactive and interdisciplinary approach, and extends political science formulae to comment on the behaviour of political actors on the international scene, and at the same time views domestic patterns of political behaviour within the framework of international relations methodology. The resultant model makes clear that certain key requirements for democratization, at the domestic level, must also exist at the level of the international society that

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is impacting on that state, during, and after, the period of transition. Findings in Southern Europe have made clear that in a successful transition to democracy the role of domestic elites is crucial, that these elites should be consensually unified, that the art of consensus and compromise must be practised in the political forum, and this is normally exemplified by the playing out of a four-player game. The model in this work therefore posits that the same conditions must be present on the external circuit, and that consensually unified external elite interaction with domestic elites reinforces this positive-sum game,23 since international politics often replicates its pattern of behaviour on the domestic scene. An absence of consensually unified elites externally would on the other hand encourage the playing out of a zero-sum game internally.24 The model, tapping into international relations theory, also posits that the position of a state on the international circuit will to a great extent determine the role that external actors play on the domestic scene, and the type of influence they will have on the democratization process locally. The model posits two journeys towards democratization in Southern Europe – that from authoritarian rule and that from colonial rule. The different systems, in which the role of external actors vary, account in part for the different pace and substance of democratization, on the one hand in Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal, and on the other in Malta and Cyprus, though it must also be emphasized that variations within each system also exist. However, the model shifts from an emphasis on variety to that of uniformity, as all Southern Europe eventually falls under the influence of the EU, and a new homogeneity characterizes the region as it mutates to meet the conditions of membership. Though the model is used to explain a very specific phenomenon, it is hoped that this methodology will be applied to other cases, and will encourage the growth of other models, to explain the growing interaction and interdependency of the national and international sphere. Such key models of political science, such as that of the ‘polity–politics–policy triad’, and of international relations, such as the ‘balance of power theory’ or the ‘interdependence theory’ may usefully be adapted to comment on the new international/national dialectic. Presently, theoreticians in the field are reconsidering many widely held assumptions, and having to deal with phenomena of which at present there is no proper conceptualization. The marginal importance of external players in democratization is one such case, in the light of changing structures of international law, and international economic bodies such as the IMF and the World Bank that may dictate policies domestically, the first in the name of human rights, the second in the role of loan creditor and auditor. A  second case is that of the necessity of sovereignty prior to democratization. The studies of Malta and Cyprus certainly bear this out, though the unresolved situation in the latter and the possibility of consolidating democracy under a new supranational formula is food for thought. As a result of this new national/international interface, many areas crucial to the study of democratization are today under the microscope. These include such questions as:  What type of democratic system is the EU? Does it fulfil Dahl’s requirements for a democracy?25 Is the format of democratic governance changing? If so, how? What type of democracy do we need today? What is the

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role of the nation state in creating and ensuring democratic governance? How has its role changed? To what extent has it been replaced by notions of local, regional and global governance and democracy? How does the shift from bilateral to multilateral relations, the role of new governmental and non-governmental bodies and the decline of parties on the domestic and international scene affect democratic governance? How do ethnic, regional and religious cleavages – once again manifest, and with more saliency than the old left/right cleavage that underpinned the four-player model  – affect democratization? To explore these new issues we must, however, first answer the most important question of all: What format should this new hybrid take, to assess correctly these phenomena which are evolving in a global climate, where the slow erosion of the distinction between the national and the international continues apace? This work is an attempt to make a contribution to this journey.

NOTES Chapter 1 1 Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: www.iep.utm.edu/objectiv/#SH2a. 2 In the 1980s and 1990s, a large literature on democratization in Southern Europe emerged. 3 There is a detailed literature on the history of Malta and Cyprus but little in the way of political theory. On Malta, there is E. Warrington’s unpublished doctoral dissertation, ‘Administering Lilliput: The Higher Civil Services of Malta’, Barbados and Fiji, University of Oxford, 1997, and a recent publication by D. Fenech, Responsibility and Power in Inter-War Malta: Book One: Endemic Democracy (1919–1930), Malta: PEG, 2005. On Cyprus, there is a literature tied up to theories of ethnicity, peace and conflict studies, and international relations. For both, there is a body of work tied to the literature of small states and a growing literature on EU studies. 4 See G. O’Donnell, P. Schmitter and L. Whitehead (eds), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, especially Chapter 2: S. Giner, ‘Political Economy, Legitimation, and the State in Southern Europe’. 5 See J. Kurth and J. Petras, Mediterranean Paradoxes: The Political and Social Structure of Southern Europe, Providence, RI: Berg, 1993, p. 7, on the opinion in the 1970s and early 1980s being sceptical on the prospects of democracy in Southern Europe and the changing consensus after 1983. 6 See ibid., p. 2, on backwardness of the region; on corruption, see P. Heywood (ed.), Political Corruption, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997, pp. 2–5; and P. Heywood (ed.), Distorting Democracy: Political Corruption in Spain, Italy & Malta, Bristol: University of Bristol, 1994. On Malta, see J. Borg, Omerta f 'tal-linja u l-awżiljarji, Valletta, L-Isla: Dipt. tatTagħrif, Partit Laburista, 1996. 7 For Southern Europe in general, see G. Sapelli, Southern Europe since 1945, London: Longman, 1995, pp. 5–18. For Malta, see M. Vella, ‘That Favourite Dream of the Colonies: Industrialisation, Dependence and the Limits of Developments Discourse in Malta’; and R. Sultana, ‘Perspectives on Class in Malta’, in R. G. Sultana and G. Baldacchino (eds), Maltese Society: A Sociological Inquiry, Msida: Mireva, 1994. For Cyprus, see C. H. Dodd, The Political, Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus, Cambridgeshire: Eothen Press, 1993, pp. 252, 270. 8 Sapelli, Southern Europe, p. 7. 9 Sapelli, Southern Europe, p. 13; and P. Schneider, Y. Schneider and E. Hansen, ‘Modernisation and Development: The Role of Regional Elites and Non-Corporate Groups in the European Mediterranean’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 14, 1972, pp. 320–50.

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10 L. Leontidou, The Mediterranean City in Transition: Social Change and Urban Development, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 29. 11 Read Kurth and Petras, Mediterranean Paradoxes, p. 60, on the corporatist nature of the Southern European states. 12 On the atomization of society in Southern Europe, see D. Ethier, ‘Introduction: Processes of Transition and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical Indicators’, in D. Ethier (ed.), Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, Latin America and South East Asia, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990. 13 J. Keane (ed.), Contradictions of the Welfare State/Claus Offe, London: Hutchinson, 1984. 14 Ibid. 15 ‘These have a prevalence of middle classes, under classes and mobile workers who cannot be directly defined by a permanent productive role like the classic industrial workers’ (Sapelli, Southern Europe, p. 15). 16 Sapelli, Southern Europe, p. 17. 17 On Italy being a difficult democracy, refer to J. La Palombara, Democracy Italian Style, London: York University Press, 1987, p. 1. On Malta’s democratic credentials, refer to CSCE report on Malta and the Security of the Mediterranean Region, Milan, Italy, 1986. On Cyprus, see T. Vanhanen, The Process of Democratization; A Comparative Study of 147 States: 1980–1988, New York: Crane Russak, 1990, p. 76. 18 See J. Podolny, ‘The Role of Juan Carlos in the Consolidation of the Parliamentary Monarchy’, in R. Gunther (ed.), Politics, Society and Democracy: The Case of Spain, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993. 19 T. C. Bruneau and A. Macleod, Politics in Contemporary Portugal: Parties and the Consolidation of Democracy, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1986, p. 16. 20 See K. Vergopoulos, ‘The Political Economy of Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe’, p. 139, in Ethier, Democratic Transition, on the growing number of malfunctions and deficiencies of the Southern European economy. 21 R. D. Putman and R. Leonardi, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993; M. Bull and M. Rhodes, Crisis and Transition in Italian Politics, London: Frank Cass, 1997; R. Leonardi and R. Y. Nanetti (eds), Italy: Politics and Policy, vol. 1, Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996. 22 The term ‘third wave’ was first coined by Samuel Huntington and expounded on in his book The Third Wave (1991) where he details three waves of democratization: the first wave beginning in the early nineteenth century, the second wave commencing after 1945 and the third wave starting in the 1970s with Southern Europe. 23 See R. Gunther, P. N. Diamandouros and H. J. Puhle, The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, p. ix, on democratic consolidation in the area. 24 See J. Linz and A. Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post Communist Europe, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, p. 150, on the unconsolidated democracies of South America and pp. 454–7 on Eastern Europe where democracy was slowly becoming the only game in town, but one cannot yet talk of consolidated democracies. 25 See ibid., p. 139, on Southern Europe’s consolidated democracies. 26 R. Luckham, A. M. Goetz and M. Kaldor, ‘Democratic Institutions and Democratic Politics’, p. 28 in S. Bastian and R. Luckham (eds), Can Democracy Be Designed: The Politics of Institutional Choice in Conflict Torn Societies, London: Zed Books, 2003.

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27 See S. Giner, ‘South European Socialism in Transition’, in G. Pridham (ed.), The New Mediterranean Democracies: Regime Transition in Spain, Portugal and Greece, London: Frank Cass, 1984, p. 139, where he talks of the semi-peripheral status of Southern Europe in the context of European economic development. 28 For economic development of the region in the late 1980s and 1990s, see the special surveys on Spain and Portugal in the Economist of 25 November and 2 December 2000. 29 Today referred to as semi-peripheral, but this status is also becoming increasingly questionable. 30 Finfacts Ireland 12/01/05 OECD Comparative GDP Figures. 31 See Kurth and Petras, Mediterranean Paradoxes, pp. 18–19, on the great legacies of the Mediterranean past: ‘almost all our religions, almost all our law, almost all the arts, almost all that sets us above savages, has come to us from the Mediterranean’, and E. Malefakis, ‘The Political and Socioeconomic Contours of South European History’, in Gunther et al., The Politics of Democratic Consolidation, p. 42: ‘The main features of Southern history were more like those of Western Europe.’ 32 Ibid. See also O. Donnell et al., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. 33 Spain, Greece and Portugal supported a strong liberal tradition of government in the nineteenth century and the Spanish constitution of Cadiz of 1812 was one of the earliest liberal and republican constitutions of Europe. See Giner, p. 29, in Pridham, The New Mediterranean Democracies. 34 H. Pirenne, Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe, London: Routledge, 1936. 35 Ibid.; see also Giner in Pridham, The New Mediterranean Democracies. 36 R. Dahl, On Democracy, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998. See pp. 145– 72: ‘What underlying conditions favour democracy’. 37 Pirenne, Economic and Social History and see F. Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, vol. 1, London: Collins, 1972. 38 See Gunther et al., The Politics of Democratic Consolidation, p. 1, on ‘Democratisation in Southern Europe being regarded as a harbinger of things to come and of providing a unique laboratory for the testing of theories on democratisation’. 39 See L. Whitehead, ‘Comparative Politics: Democratisation Studies’, in R. E. Goodin and H. D. Klingemann (eds), A New Handbook of Political Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 353. 40 S. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, pp. 13–26. 41 Ibid. Also see L. Macpherson, The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977, pp. 9–12, on democratization in the nineteenth century. 42 Huntington, The Third Wave, pp. 18–21. 43 Ibid., pp. 21–4. 44 P. N. Diamandouros, ‘Southern Europe: A Third Wave Success Story’, in L. Diamond, M. Plattner, Yun-han Chu and Hung-mao Tien (eds), Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Regional Challenges, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997, p. 7. 45 See L. H. Legters, Eastern Europe: Transformation and Revolution 1945–1991, Lexington, MA: Toronto, 1992, p. 583, on the rapidity of political change in the area. 46 See P. Schmitter, ‘An Introduction to South European Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Turkey’, in O’Donnell et al., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, p. 5.

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47 A. Agh, ‘The International Context of the Emergence of Constitutional State in ECE: The Case of Hungary’, pp. 1–5, paper presented at a conference in Vienna, September 1998, Democratic Consolidation: The International Dimension. Hungary, Poland, Spain. 48 C. Cohen, Democracy, New York: Free Press, 1973, especially Part Three: Democracy and Its Instruments. 49 J. O. Field, Consolidating Democracy: Politicisation and Partisanship in India, New Delhi: Manohar, 1980. 50 Vanhanen, The Process of Democratization, Chapter 3: ‘Theoretical Explanations of Democratisation’. 51 Schmitter, ‘An Introduction to South European Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Turkey’ and Giner, ‘Political Economy, Legitimation, and the State in Southern Europe’ in O’Donnell et al., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. 52 Read Maravall and Santamaria, ‘Political Change in Spain and Prospects for Democracy’; Maxwell, ‘Regime Overthrow and the Prospects for Democratic Transition in Portugal’; Diamandouros, ‘Regime Change and Prospects for Democracy in Greece’, in O’Donnell et al., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule; and Putman and Leonardi, Making Democracy Work. 53 On Malta see G. Pirotta, The Maltese Public Service 1800–1940: The Administrative Politics of a Micro-State, Malta: Mireva, 1996; E. Zammit, A Colonial Inheritance, Malta: Malta University Press, 1984; and Sultana and Baldacchino, Maltese Society. On Cyprus read S. Panteli, The Making of Modern Cyprus: From Obscurity to Statehood, New Barnet: Interworld, 1990; and D. Christodoulous, Inside the Cyprus Miracle: The Labours of an Embattled Mini Economy, vol. 2, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1992. 54 For economic development of the region in the late 1980s and 1990s, see the special surveys on Spain and Portugal in the Economist of 25 November and 2 December 2000. For Italy read P. Ginsborg, Italy and Its Discontents 1980–2001, London: Allen Lane, 2003, especially Chapter 1. 55 See The Economic Intelligence Unit of 1993 – Summary for Cyprus/Malta No 1 1993. 56 Rustow (1970) posits a four-phase model of democratization: one – national unity; two – political struggle; three – the decision phase; four – the habitation phase, where the rules of democracy become the norm. 57 J. Pridham, ‘Comparative Perspectives on the New Mediterranean Democracies: A Model of Regime Transition?’, in Pridham, The New Mediterranean Democracies. 58 This area of research was dominated by political anthropologists. Read P. Cesarini and K. Hite, ‘Introducing the Concept of Authoritarian Legacies’, p. 13 in K. Hite and P. Cesarini (eds), Authoritarian Legacies and Democracy in Latin America. Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004. 59 A. Friedman, Agnelli and the Network of Italian Power, London: Harrap, 1989, especially Chapter 1: ‘The Mafia and Other Mafias’. 60 Party government. 61 Division of spoils. 62 Parallel government or a second government. 63 Refer to La Palombara, Democracy Italian Style; and F. Spotts and T. Wieser, Italy: A Difficult Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. 64 M. Burton, R. Gunther and J. Higley (eds), Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991,

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66

67 68 69

70 71 72

73 74 75

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pp. 10–12, talks of three ideal types of elite groupings in existence: (1) Dis-unified elites: where structural integration and value consensus between them is minimal. (2) Consensually unified elites: where structural integration and value consensus between them is relatively inclusive. (3) Ideologically unified elites: where structural integration and value consensus between them is seemingly monolithic. On Portugal and Spain, refer to H. J. Wiarda, The Transition to Democracy in Spain and Portugal, Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1989, p. 3. For Greece, see K. L. S. Koutsoukis, Political Leadership in Modern Greece, Athens: Athena, 1982; and for Italy, read C. Cattaneo, Stati Uniti D’Italia: Il Federalismo, Le Leghe, Milano: SugarCo, 1991, and see V. Mallia-Milanes, ‘The Genesis of Maltese Nationalism’, pp. 1–2 in V. Mallia-Milanes (ed.), The British Colonial Experience 1800–1964: The Impact on Maltese Society, Malta: Mireva, 1988. See R. R Denktash, The Cyprus Triangle, London: Allen & Unwin, 1982, p. 13: ‘There is not, and there never has been a Cypriot nation.’ For Portugal, see M. Kayman, Revolution and Counter Revolution in Portugal, London: Merlin Press, 1987, and D. L. Raby, Fascism and Resistance in Portugal, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988; on Spain, see P. Preston, The Triumph of Democracy in Spain, London: Routledge, 1990, Chapters 1 and 2; on Greece, see R. C. Macrides, Greek Politics at the Crossroads: What Kind of Socialism, California, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1984, pp. 18–25. La Palombara, Democracy Italian Style, Chapter 6. For Malta refer to Mallia-Milanes, The British Colonial Experience; and J. Reddaway, Burdened with Cyprus, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1986. Raby, Fascism and Resistance, Chapter 1: ‘Fascism and Resistance in Portugal and Elsewhere’; J. Trumphour, ‘Southern Europe Past and Present’, in Kurth and Petras, Mediterranean Paradoxes; and Blinkhorn, ‘The Iberian States’, in D. Muhlberger (ed.), The Social Basis of European Fascist Movements, London: Croom Helm, 1987. For Malta refer to R. Spiteri and D. Massa, Twelid Ta’ Stat Indipendenti, Valletta: Guga House, 1989, pp. 24–34, and for Cyprus see T. C. Adams, AKEL: The Communist Party of Cyprus, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1972, p. 17. M. Gomez-Reino, F. A. Orisa and D. Vila Carro, ‘Spain: A Recurrent Theme for Juan Linz’, in R. Gunther (ed.), Politics, Society and Democracy: The Case of Spain, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993, p. 13. Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, p. 44; and K. Hite and L. Morlino, ‘Problematizing the Links between Authoritarian Legacies and Good Governance’, in Hite and Cesarini, Authoritarian Legacies, pp. 38–9, on the creation of new political collective identities. R. Pinkney, Democracy in the Third World, Buckingham: Open University Press, 1993, Chapter 3: ‘Democracy and the End of Empire’. K. Vergopoulos, p. 149, in Ethier, Democratic Transition. P. N. Diamandouros, ‘Southern Europe: A Third Wave Success Story’, p. 7, in Diamond et al., Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies; and Sapelli, Southern Europe, Chapter 1: ‘Many Europes’; also read J. Kurth, ‘A Tale of Four Countries: Parallel Politics in Southern Europe, 1815–1990’, in Kurth and Petras, Mediterranean Paradoxes. S. Giner, ‘Political Economy, Legitimation and the State in Southern Europe’, in O’Donnell et al., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. In the context of Malta and Cyprus, however, there is little material though it is treated in detail in later chapters in the case study material on Cyprus and Malta taken from original sources. For

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89

90 91 92

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Notes Cyprus, however, refer to Adams, AKEL, pp. 6, 16, 26, 36, on the Greek-Cypriot left and right uniting against British rule. On Malta, refer to J. Alexander, Mabel Strickland, Malta: Progress Press, 1996, p. 260, on all parties uniting in January 1959 against attempts of the British to set up an interim council and put back the clock in constitutional matters. Burton et al., Elites and Democratic Consolidation, pp. 10–12: consensually unified elites, where structural integration and value consensus between them is relatively inclusive. A. Lijphart, ‘Democratic Political Systems, Types, Cases, Causes and Consequences’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1 (1), 1989, pp. 33–48. Dahl, On Democracy, especially from p. 149 – cultural conflict weak or absent. S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan, ‘Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: An Introduction’, in S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan (eds), Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives. New York: Free Press, 1967. In line with Pridham’s theory, pp. 12–26, in J. Pridham, ‘Comparative perspectives on the New Mediterranean Democracies: A Model of Regime Transition?’, in Pridham, The New Mediterranean Democracies. Read Vergopoulos, p. 141, on the backwardness of the economy right up to the 1980s in Ethier, Democratic Transition. P. C. Manuel, Uncertain Outcomes: The Politics of the Portuguese Transition to Democracy, Landover: University Press of America, 1995, p. 3. J. M. Colomer, Game Theory and the Transition to Democracy: The Spanish Model, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1995, p. 3. Koutsoukis, Political Leadership, p. 1. T. S. Pappas, Making Party Democracy in Greece, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999, p. 28. Influenced by the functionalist and structuralist schools. Manuel, writing on Portugal, draws on the radical approach and identifies the successful neutralization of the cleavages, especially that of class, as central to transition and quotes Poulantzas stating that ‘class relations ascertain the probabilities of the political outcomes whether positive or negative’ (Manuel, Uncertain Outcomes, p. 7). He portrayed this elite action as being defined in terms of class position and classbased groups, and of being positive or negative depending on whether the groups ally or oppose one another. The alliance or opposition of these groups, he argued, depended largely on the material incentives on offer from the elites. In Schmitter in O’Donnell et al., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, pp. 6–9; also refer to Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, Parts 1 and 2. L. Morlino, Democracy between Consolidation and Crisis: Parties, Groups and Citizens in Southern Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 52. Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, pp. 87–115: ‘The Paradigmatic Case of Reforma Pactada – Raptura Pactada: Spain’. From the Pact school where the presupposition is that of rationality and the desire of the actors to maximize utility: L. D. Edles, Symbol and Ritual in the New Spain: The Transition to Democracy after Franco, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 13. Also refer to K. Medhurst, ‘Spain’s Evolutionary Pathway from Dictatorship to Democracy’, in Pridham, The New Mediterranean Democracies; and E. A. Baloyra, Comparing New Democracies: Transition and Consolidation in Mediterranean Europe

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95 96

97

98 99 100 101

102

103 104

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and The Southern Cone, Boulder: Westview Press, 1987; and Burton et al., Elites and Democratic Consolidation. In Burton et al., Elites and Democratic Consolidation, p. 8, elites are persons with power and authority, who are able, by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful organizations, to affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially. Elites are the principle decision makers in the largest or most resource-rich political, governmental, economic, military, professional, communications and cultural organizations and movements in a society. They affect policy outcomes regularly and substantially and without them you cannot formulate policies or strategies. In other words, elites are those individuals who possess power and acknowledged authority and therefore can act. In Italy and Spain, we are told they number between 1,000 and 5,000 individuals. In Portugal and Greece, there are fewer than a thousand of them. In Malta and Cyprus, they are rarer still. L. D. Edles, Symbol and Ritual in the New Spain: The Transition to Democracy after Franco, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Methods of play: the use of Game Theory: (1) Agents are instrumentally rational; they act in their own self-interest. (2) They have common knowledge of their rationality. (3) They know the rules of the game. M. Shubik, Game Theory in the Social Sciences, Vol. 1: Concepts and Solutions, Massachusetts: MIT Press; reprint edition 1985 – Chapter 1. Colomer, in Game Theory, directly applies this theory to his research. By applying the primary assumption of game theory that decisions of actors can be explained as being derived from rational calculations, he gives us a blow-by-blow account of elite behaviour in the Spanish transition. Burton et al., Elites and Democratic Consolidation, p. 22. G. Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transition, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990. Refer to ‘Pact Men, the Actor School and the Voluntarist Approach’, see Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, pp. 61–2. Manuel, Uncertain Outcomes, Chapter 1 on Portugal states that the political battles fought during transition were not directed and determined by ideology but rather by those who represented these cleavages, in other words the players in the field and the conditions under which they had to operate. T. C. Bruneau, Politics and Nationhood: Post Revolutionary Portugal, New York: Praeger, 1984, p. 8, states ‘that politics is conflict over scarce resources . . . that regimes can be analysed according to which groups, and thus conflicts, are included in or excluded from decision making and that elites have a role in superseding conflicts and thus formulating stable regimes’. T. C. Bruneau and A. Macleod, Politics in Contemporary Portugal: Parties and the Consolidation of Democracy, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1986, pp. 1–11. The role of Cybernetic Elites – Koutsoukis, Political Leadership, pp. 3–16, analyses this transition within the same framework maintaining that it is government dominated by elites that takes a central role and has power in the political system, but that the context of power and its application are a matter of communication and that in this regard elites function as message receivers and senders and he refers to these as cybernetic elites. He contends that through content analysis, elite recruitment patterns, factor analysis and mobility through regression analysis, we can study these elite attitudes in order to understand their behaviour in successful transitions.

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105 A. Przeworski et al., Sustainable Democracy, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 61. 106 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, p. 61. 107 Schmitter and Karl’s four paths: by imposition, by pact, by reform, by revolution; P. C. Schmitter and T. Karl, ‘The Types of Democracy Emerging in Southern and Eastern Europe and South and Central America’, p. 59 in P. M. E. Volten (ed.), Bound to Change: Consolidating Democracy in East Central Europe, New York: Westview Press, 1992. 108 The Spanish terms ‘Ruptura Pactada’ and ‘Reforma Pactada’ characterize this process, the former underlying the lack of political continuity and the latter emphasizing the element of legal continuity; Maravall and Santamaria, in O’Donnell et al., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. 109 Deterioration and breakdown of the regime in Spain is brought on by the death of Franco. 110 A crucial role played by an individual in authority who is able to build and maintain coalitions. Pridham, The New Mediterranean Democracies, p. 18. 111 Change in Spain would be carried out through a legal process respecting the demands and conditions set by the existing institutions. 112 In Spain today, only one major group, the Basques, does not accept the legitimacy of the Spanish state and the constitution it upholds. This same group was excluded from the negotiations, thus not participating in the game they were not prepared to uphold its rules and final resolutions. 113 Concessions came mainly in the form of the legalization or shoring up of certain political mechanisms, including union and party structures, and electoral participation, though all highly circumscribed, since they must meet the requirements of the para-constitutions of the region. 114 ‘The root hypothesis is that for an effective and enduring challenge to authoritarian rule to be mounted, and for political democracy to become and remain an alternative mode of political domination, a country must possess a civil society in which certain community and group identities exist independent of the state, and in which certain types of self-constituted units are capable of acting autonomously in defence of their own interests and ideals.’ Schmitter, p. 6 in O’Donnell et al., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. 115 In Greece and Malta in 1967, it was clear that despite the biased character of the electoral process the left would probably become the next legal party of government. 116 See chapters on Spain, Portugal and Greece in O’Donnell et al., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. 117 Spotts and Wieser, Italy, p. 46. 118 See chapters on Spain, Portugal and Greece in O’Donnell et al., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. 119 A. Koster, Prelates and Politicians: Changing Power Balances between Church and State in a Mediterranean Island Fortress, 1800–1976, Holland: Van Gorcum, 1984, p. 102. 120 On changing attitudes see Morlino and J. H. Montero, ‘Legitimacy and Democracy in Southern Europe’ in Gunther et al., The Politics of Democratic Consolidation. 121 Burton et al., Elites and Democratic Consolidation, pp. 6–10. 122 S. Tarrow, ‘Mass Mobilisation and Regime Change; Pacts, Reform and Popular Power in Italy and Spain’, in Gunther et al., The Politics of Democratic Consolidation.

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123 Even here, promises to fully incorporate the communists were not kept; Spotts and Wieser, Italy, p. 46. 124 ETA in Spain – Brigate Rosse in Italy – the Lorry Sant faction in Malta. In most cases, real threats to the transition emanated from the right wing, Spain in 1981, Cyprus in 1963 and 1974, Greece in 1974. However, the extreme left also at times posed a threat. 125 In Portugal carried out by the left wing and in Malta the first transition took pace under the right wing and the second under the left wing. 126 In the case of Cyprus, this assertion remains true for the separate Greek and Turkish communities. 127 ‘In pacted transitions the domestic forces should keep a distance from external backers who might taint the transition’: L. Whitehead, ‘Democracy by Convergence: Southern Europe’, p. 277 in L. Whitehead (ed.), The International Dimension of Democratisation: Europe and the Americas, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. Maravall and Santamaria speaking of Spain in O’Donnell et al., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, p. 91: ‘The initiation of the transition was entirely unconnected with any external stimulus.’ 128 Gunther, Puhle and Diamandouros in R. Gunter, P. N. Diamandouros and H. J. Puhle (eds), The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, p. 5. 129 Schmitter in O’Donnell et al., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, p. 5. 130 J. Pridham, Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991, p. 243. 131 S. Giner in O’Donnell et al., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, p. 39: ‘The international military, political and economic order of the west would have made any serious attempts to derail the process not only highly costly but ultimately unlikely to succeed.’ 132 Ibid., p. 39, in the case of Italy sustains that ‘the transition was initiated by domestic actors though precipitated and made effective by foreign invasion’. 133 In keeping with the modernization, structuralist and developmental schools. 134 C. C. Menges, Spain: The Struggle for Democracy Today. London: Sage, 1978, pp. 12–18. 135 Maravall and Santamaria, p. 74 in O’Donnell et al., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. 136 P. N. Diamandouros, p. 144 in O’Donnell et al., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: ‘Greece . . . opted for a policy of full integration into the international market . . . rapid change brought social disintegration and disintegration [which] were bound to affect some of the main institutional pillars of the political system.’ 137 B. Kohler, Political Forces in Spain, Greece and Portugal, London: Buttersworth, 1982, p. 175. 138 Pinkney, Democracy in the Third World. 139 Linkage Model 1969 in G. Pridham, ‘International Influences and Democratic Transition: Problems of Theory and Practice in Linkage Politics,’ in G. Pridham, Encouraging Democracy, p. 3. 140 Ibid., p. 16. 141 Ibid., p. 10: Model based on dependency theory 1978. 142 Ibid., p. 12. Brecher’s 1972 Input Model of Crucial Variables outlined a complex external operational environment that touches on the role of the individual, including the media and the psychological environment, and shows that elite image

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146 147 148

149 150 151

152 153 154 155 156 157

158 159

Notes is a decisive input of a foreign policy system. His model gives us an attitudinal prism, which shows that decision makers act in accordance with the perception of reality, not in response to reality itself and that ‘elites image the process into form and implementation and then outputs are simply defined as the substance of the decisions’. Pasquino in O’Donnell et al., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, p. 70. Pridham, Encouraging Democracy. E. A. Baloyra, ‘Democratic Transition in Comparative Perspective’, p. 11, and L. Morlino, ‘Democratic Establishments: A Dimensional Analysis’, p. 57, in E. A. Baloyra (ed.), Comparing New Democracies: Transition and Consolidation in Mediterranean Europe and the Southern Cone, Boulder: Westview Press, 1987. Ibid., p. 59. W. C. Opello, ‘Portugal: A Case Study on International Determinants of Regime Transition’, in Pridham, Encouraging Democracy, pp. 100–1. Pridham, Encouraging Democracy, pp. 131–2. Story tells us that in 1969 the United States intervened against the Spanish foreign minister, Castiella, who was furthering a policy of neutrality and at the same time openly favoured the party the Opus Dei, which was known to be pro-American. It is from the late 1960s that we start seeing a revisionist school of history emerging in both the USA and Russia that gave a more objective account. G. Lundestad, International Relations Since 1945, London: Sage, 2018. E. J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914–1991, London: Michael Joseph, 1994, pp. 1–17. The school portrayed a world that was then dominated by two superpowers, locked in a timeless present characterized by aggression and self-interest practising a zero-sum game where the winnings of one side would mean losses on the other. Verney and Couloumbis on Greece, p. 106, and Leonardi throughout makes the same observation for Italy, in Pridham, Encouraging Democracy. Diamandouros in Diamond et al., Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies, p. 5. Many scholars have stressed the failure of Southern Europe to democratize prior to the Cold War due to the external environment: depression and rise of fascism. Also read Tovias, in Pridham, Encouraging Democracy. Verney and Couloumbis on Greece and Leonardi on Italy in Pridham, Encouraging Democracy. Makarios III was a Greek Cypriot clergyman and politician, who served as the archbishop and primate of the autocephalous Church of Cyprus and as the first president of Cyprus. Refer to A. Pollis, ‘International Factors and the Failure of Political Integration in Cyprus’, p. 45 in S. G. Neuman (ed.), Small States and Segmented Societies: National Political Integration in a Global Environment, New York: Praeger, 1976. The study intends to investigate the case of Cyprus and that political integration may have been precluded not primarily by internal factors but because of the policies and actions of foreign powers. A. Theophylacton, Security, Identity and Nation Building: Cyprus and the EU in Comparative Perspective, Ashgate: Aldershot, 1995, p. 14. Conflict in Cyprus is best explained by external factors which in conjunction with internal dynamics have had a lasting and traumatic impact on Cypriot society and politics. FCO27/311 from Crawley 09/06/67. Giner, p. 36 in O’Donnell et al., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule.

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160 B. Kohler, Political Forces in Spain, Greece and Portugal, London: Butterworths European Studies, 1982. 161 D. Corkill, ‘Party Factionalism and Democratisation in Portugal’, p. 72, in ‘Special issue: Factional Politics and Democratisation’ Democratisation, Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring 1995. 162 The US government and the EEC granted Portugal $272 million in emergency aid in 1975, and it was reported that the CIA had sent between $2 and $10 million to the socialists in this period. The Soviet Union provided the PCP with nearly $50 million. Also there was little doubt that foreign intelligence operatives from the NATO countries were active in Portugal between June and November 1975. K. Maxwell, ‘Regime Overthrow and the Prospects of Democratic Transition in Portugal’, p. 130 in O’Donnell et al., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. 163 Ibid., p. 31. 164 Pridham, Encouraging Democracy, p. 20. 165 Recent material claimed that in the 1950s the SIFAR (Italian military intelligence) believed that a secret communist army was being formed by civilians called the L’Apparato to take over the state. As a countermeasure, it is said that the United States along with NATO organized a counter-guerrilla structure that was meant to lurk behind enemy lines. In tandem with this, the ‘solo piano’ surfaced. This was said to be an Allied plan to ensure that the communists never came to power by destabilizing the state. Such material remains largely unobtainable and when obtainable its sources are often unclear, making it highly circumspect. 166 L. Diamond, ‘Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors, Instruments and Issues’, in Göran Hydén and Axel Hadenius (eds), Democracy’s Victory and Crisis: Nobel Symposium No 93, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 313. 167 A subcommittee report from Congress in early 1974 urged the United States to make the promotion of human rights a major foreign policy goal, and in 1974 Congress added human rights amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act, the Mutual Assist Act, and the Trade Reform Act. A second phase in US policy came with the Carter administration in 1977. Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 91. 168 J. Rupnic. ‘Eastern Europe: The International Context’, in M. F. Plattner and A. Smolar (eds), Globalisation, Power and Democracy, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000, p. 58. 169 Valenzuela, ‘Through Defeat, Through Transition, Through Extrication’ quotes Mainwaring’s typology: J. S. Valenzuela, ‘Democratic Consolidation in Post Transitional Settings: Notion, Process and Facilitating Conditions’, pp. 74–7 in S. Mainwaring, G. O’Donnell and J. S. Valenzuela (eds), Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992. 170 ‘Transition driven by external forces, transition resulting from violent intervention, and transition through evolution’, p. 5, D. Ethier, ‘Introduction: Processes of Transition and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical Indicators,’ in Ethier, Democratic Transition. 171 Baloyra, Comparing New Democracies, p. 17 – the other two are early internal and delayed internal. 172 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, p. 73. 173 Pinkney, Democracy in the Third World, p. 32. 174 Ibid., especially Chapter 3: ‘Democracy and the End of Empire’.

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175 D. Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995, pp. 20–21. 176 J. Anderson, ‘Questions of Democracy, Territoriality and Globalisation’, in J. Anderson (ed.), Transnational Democracy, Political Space and Border Crossings, London: Routledge, 2002. 177 Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 15. 178 Ibid., p. 16. 179 Ibid., contributions to democratization – occupation by a pro-democratic foreign power, p. 37. 180 Ibid., p. 18 – contributions to democratization – experience of a British colony, p. 37. 181 Ibid., p. 25 – contributions to democratization: (1) influence by a pro-democratic foreign power; (2) elite desire to emulate democratic nations, p. 37. 182 Ibid., p. 9. 183 Ibid., p. 33. 184 Ibid., p. 45. 185 The least clear-cut case is Portugal which received a lot of foreign funding. 186 Whitehead, The International Dimension, pp. 3–24. 187 Advanced democratic regional or global powers. 188 He argues that ‘new democracies are the result of historical busts and booms, global opinion climates, shifting opportunities and contingent preferences’: Di Palma, To Craft Democracies, p. 15. 189 Ibid., p. 18. 190 Political actors if offered external incentives to move toward democratization or disincentives to resist, it can respond to them by conveniently modifying their behaviour. Ibid., p. 189. 191 The most recent case being the USSR with dramatic effect: ibid., p. 184. 192 Ibid., p. 191. 193 Verney and Couloumbis on Greece, p. 103 in Pridham, Encouraging Democracy. 194 The five hegemonic myths in international negotiations: (1) the myth of global vulnerability, (2) the myth of per capita equality, (3) the myth of historical obligation, (4) the myth of voluntary frugality and (5) the myth of the market solution. S. Rayner. ‘Governance and Global Commons’, pp. 76–82 in M. Desai and P. Kedfern (eds), Global Governance: Ethics and Economics of the World Order, New York: Pinter, 1995. 195 S. Gill, ‘Global Structural Change and Multilateralism’, in S. Gill (ed.), Globalisation, Democratisation and Multilateralism, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997. 196 M. Pinto-Duschinsky, ‘The Rise of Political Aid’ in Diamond et al., Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies. 197 Whitehead, The International Dimension, p. 280. 198 Diamandouros in O’Donnell et al., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, p. 146. 199 Diamandouros in Diamond et al., Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies, p. 6. 200 Leonardi and Tovias in Pridham, Encouraging Democracy. 201 Kohler, Political Forces, p. 191 and see D. Sidjanski in Pridham, Encouraging Democracy. 202 . Ibid. 203 NATO was seen as the most value-infused institution; the EU was seen mostly as an economic institution. 204 The US government used a variety of means: political, economic, diplomatic and military to promote democracy. These included the following: (1) statements

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206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213

214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221

222

223

185

by presidents and secretaries of state, (2) economic pressure and sanctions, (3) diplomatic action, (4) material support for democratic forces, (5) military action and (6) multilateral diplomacy. Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 94. EU funding was especially positive on all the Southern European states’ process towards consolidation, albeit in varying degrees. It is said to have had the least impact on Greece. Read, EC Regional Policies Europe 2000 and Cooperation for European Territorial Development, Luxembourg: European Commission, 1994; and F. Bollen, I. Hartwig and P. Nicolaides, EU Structural Funds beyond Agenda 2000: Reform and Implications for Current and Future Member States, Maastricht: European Institute of Public Administration, 2000. Segal in Pridham, Encouraging Democracy. Whitehead, The International Dimension, p. 1. L. Goetschel, ‘The Foreign and Security Policy Interests of Small States in Today’s Europe’, p. 25 in L. Goetschel (ed.), Small States Inside and Outside the European Union: Interests and Policies, Boston, MA: Kluwer, 1998. Ibid., p. 30. R. A. Dahl and E. R. Tufte, Size and Democracy, California: Stanford University Press, 1973, p. 24. B. Thorhallsson, The Role of Small States in the EU, Hants: Ashgate, 2000, p. 12. Ibid., p. 14. J. J. Linz and A. Valenzuela (eds), The Failure of Presidential Democracy, vol. 1, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994; L. J. Diamond, M. F. Plattner and D. A. Brun, Latin America’s Struggle for Democracy, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008. J. Pridham and P. G. Lewis, Stabilising Fragile Democracies, London: Routledge, 1996. S. Milne, The Revenge of History: The Battle for the 21st Century, London: Verso, 2012. M. Buckley and R. Singh, The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism, London: Routledge, 2009; Hamed Abdel-Samad, Islamic Fascism, New York: Prometheus, 2016. D. Berg-Schlosser, ‘Neighbourhood Effects of Democratisation in Europe’, Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 29–45. C. Panara and G. Wilson (eds), The Arab Spring: New Patterns for Democracy and International Law, Leiden; Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff, 2013. J. Brownlee, T. E. Masoud and A. Reynolds, The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression and Reform, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. A. Roberts, M. J. Willis, R. McCarty and T. C. Ash (eds), Civil Resistance in the Arab Spring: Triumphs and Disasters, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016; V. Prashad, Arab Spring Libyan Winter, Oakland: AK Press, 2012. D. Corstange, The Price of a Vote in the Middle East: Clientelism and Communal Politics in Lebanon and Yemen, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016; M. Lynch, The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions on the New Middle East, New York: Public Affairs, 2013. A. Lazaroaia, ‘Current Risks and Threats Identified at the EU External Borders European Union Response – Organisational and Legislative Aspects’, in International Scientific Conference Strategies, XXI, Bucharest: pp. 46–52, Carol National Defence University, 2016. R. Legvold, Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century, New York: Columbia University Press, 2012.

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224 B. Gebrewold (ed.), Africa and Fortress Europe: Threats and Opportunities. London: Routledge, 2016; K. S. Follis, Building Fortress Europe: The Polish-Ukrainian Frontier, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012. 225 K. Barysch, East versus West? The EU Economy after Enlargement, London: Centre for European Reform Essays, 2006. 226 D. Muro and G. Vidal, ‘Political Mistrust in Southern Europe Since the Great Recession’, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 22, Issue 2, 2017; S. Verney, A. Bosco and M. Costa Lobo (eds), Southern Europe and the Financial Crisis, London: Routledge, 2014. 227 ‘Southern Europe Was Never Meant to Join the Euro’, Economist, 19 March 2010. 228 S. Milio, ‘Twenty Years of European Funding: Italy Is Still Struggling with Implementation’, in A. Mammone and G. A. Veltri, Italy Today: The Sick Man of Europe, London: Routledge, 2010. 229 D. Steinbock, ‘The Erosion of Southern Europe’, EU Observer, 28 August 2013. 230 . Ibid. 231 M. Baumeister and R. Sala, Southern Europe? Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece from the 1950s until the Present Day, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2015. 232 ‘Did a Dutch Bureaucrat Call Southern Europeans Drunken Womanisers?’, Economist, 24 March 2017. 233 E. Pedaliu, ‘The Making of Southern Europe: An Historical Overview’, in E. Karamouzi, E. G. H. Pedaliu and E. De Angelis (eds), A Strategy for Southern Europe? LSE REPORT, 2013. 234 A. Mammone and G. A. Veltri, Italy Today: The Sick Man of Europe, London: Routledge, 2010. 235 K. Botsiou and A. Klapsis (eds), The Konstantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy Yearbook 2011: The Global Economic Crisis and the Case of Greece, Berlin: Springer, 2011. 236 K. Cinar, ‘A Comparative Analysis of Clientelism in Greece, Spain and Turkey: The Rural-Urban Divide’, Contemporary Politics, Vol. 22, Issue 1, 2016. 237 D. A. Sotiropoulos, ‘Southern European Bureaucracies in Comparative Perspective’, West European Politics, Vol. 27, Issue 3, 2004; D. A. Sotiropoulos, ‘Southern European Governments and Public Bureaucracies in the Context of Economic Crisis’, European Journal of Social Security, Vol. 17, Issue 2, 2015. 238 J. M. Magone, ‘Introduction: The Great Transformation of European Politics, A Holistic View’, in J. M. Magone (ed.), Routledge Handbook of European Politics, London: Routledge, 2015, p. 23. 239 J. Vaquer, ‘Party Systems in Disarray, and the Emergence and Consolidation of New Actors in Southern Europe’, Geographical Overview: Mediterranean Yearbook, 2015; E. Kulahci, Europeanisation and Party Politics: How the EU Affects Domestic Actors’ Patterns and Systems, Colchester: ECPR Press, 2012. 240 T. Aalberg et al. (eds), Populist Political Communication in Europe, London: Routledge, 2017, Part IV, Populist Political Communication in Southern Europe. 241 ‘Greeks defy Europe with Overwhelming Referendum No’, Reuters, 4 July 2015. 242 M. La Barbera, Identity and Migration in Europe; Multidisciplinary Perspectives, Geneve: Springer, 2015; K. Calavita, Immigrants at the Margins: Law, Race and Exclusion in Southern Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 243 ‘Merkel Says Migration Crisis Biggest Challenge of Tenure’, Sputnik News, 29 February 2016.

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244 The Dublin Regulation establishes the member state responsible for the examination of an asylum application. 245 ‘Enthusiasm for EU in Sharp Decline throughout Europe, Not Just UK’, Financial Times, 8 June 2016. 246 N. Vuckovic, Transparency and Openness in European Institutions, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Council of Europe, 2016. 247 ‘Southern Europe Was Never Meant to Join the Euro’, Economist, 19 March 2010. 248 F. Tassinari, ‘What Really Divides Northern and Southern Europe’, The World Post, 5 August 2014. 249 Pridham, Encouraging Democracy, p. 1. 250 Sidjanski in Pridham, Encouraging Democracy.

Chapter 2 1 Anonymous, ‘Reflections on the Game of Chess’. 2 Malefakis refuses to include Malta and Cyprus in his analysis of democratic consolidation on grounds of their tiny size and the limited duration of their political sovereignty: E. Malefakis, ‘Contours of South European History’, p. 35 in R. Gunther, P. N. Diamandouros and H. J. Puhle (eds), The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995. 3 R. Cooper, The Post-Modern State and the World Order, London: Demos, 1996. 4 The study includes the Southern European states of Spain, Portugal, Greece, Italy, Malta and Cyprus. 5 On integrating both approaches, see Collier et al., ‘Shaping the Political Arena’ and R. Snyder and J. Mahoney, ‘Integrative Strategies for the Study of Regime Change’, pp. 186–90 in S. U. Larsen (ed.), The Challenges of Theories on Democracy: Elaborations on New Trends in Transitology, New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. 6 Mahoney et al., ‘Students of Regime Change Have Increasingly Advocated Integrative Research but Offer Few Guidelines’, p. 180 in Larsen, The Challenges of Theories on Democracy. 7 These also, however, reveal the very real differences that existed in the way numerous domestic elites operated in the different states of Southern Europe. In Spain and in Cyprus, the presence of explosive ethnic cleavages; in Malta, an undeveloped economy that could not support an entrepreneurial elite; in Portugal, the presence of a dominant military; and in Greece, Spain, Italy and Malta, a non-reconcilable left/ right cleavage. 8 For extremely innovative attempts refer to J. Pridham, Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991, Chapter 1; and Larsen, ‘The Transition Funnel of Causality’, p. 466 in Larsen, The Challenges of Theories on Democracy. 9 Refer to Chapter 1. 10 P. Schmitz and K. Sell begin, ‘The recent global trend towards global governance has left the academic debate in considerable confusion . . . research should be carried out to identify more precisely the linkages between inside and outside political change . . . we suggest that the agency based literature offers a more promising start.’ P. Schmitz and K. Sell, ‘Towards a Theoretical Integration, in J. Grugel (ed.), Democracy

188

11 12

13 14

15 16 17

18

19 20

21 22

Notes without Borders: Transnationalisation and Conditionality in New Democracies, London: Routledge, 1999. T. Vanhanen, The Process of Democratization: A Comparative Study of 147 States, 1980–1988, New York: Crane Russak, 1990. The first three chapters deal with this theme. For socio-economic indicators, ibid., Chapter 3; for the impact of previous regime types, refer to H. Waldrauch, ‘Incommensurability?’, pp. 124–38 in Larsen, The Challenges of Theories on Democracy; S. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, Chapter 3; R. Pinkney, Democracy in the Third World: Issues in Third World Politics, Buckingham: Open University Press, 1993, p. 42 on variations on colonial rule. This is a general evaluation. Huntington, in The Third Wave for instance, refers to Greece as a Bureaucratic-Authoritarian model (p. 110) and to Spain and Portugal also as personal dictatorships (p. 111). See Pinkney, Democracy in the Third World, Chapter 3, on the colonial inheritance; and Guillaimer, Chapter 1, on the advantageous characteristics of Southern European authoritarianism, in G. O’Donnell, P. Schmitter and L. Whitehead (eds), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. Ibid. – on the positive characteristics of authoritarian regimes. Read R. E. Holland, European Decolonisation 1918–1981: An Introductory Survey, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1985, p. 191, on colonial rule becoming unpopular even at the metropolis. J. Linz and A. Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post Communist Europe, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, pp. 55–65, states that of all the non-democratic regimes authoritarianism is the most likely to enhance democratization. On the authoritarian regimes, read J. Pridham, p. 9, in G. Pridham (ed.), The New Mediterranean Democracies: Regime Transition in Spain, Portugal and Greece, London: Frank Cass, 1984. On Malta, read Henry Frendo, The Origins of Maltese Statehood: A Case Study of Decolonisation in the Mediterranean, Malta: PEG, 1999. On Cyprus, read S. Panteli, The Making of Modern Cyprus: From Obscurity to Statehood, New Barnet: Interworld, 1990. Refer to H. Frendo, Party Politics in a Fortress Colony: The Maltese Experience, Malta: Midsea, 1979; and Panteli, The Making of Modern Cyprus – Malta and Cyprus were European states, and both had sported liberal and democratic tendencies prior to colonization by the British. On totalitarian and Sultanite regimes, refer to Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, pp. 57–64. P. N. Diamandouros, ‘Southern Europe: A Third Wave Success Story’: ‘by the 1970s, the appeal of non-democratic models of political organization had declined significantly’, p. 5 in L. Diamond, M. F. Plattner, Y. H. Chu and H. M. Tien (eds), Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Regional Challenges, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997. Ibid. Maravall and Santamaria, ‘Political Change in Spain’, p. 80: ‘large sectors of the newly industrialized bourgeoisie saw the dictatorship … as an impediment to Spanish integration into the EEC’, in G. O’Donnell, P. Schmitter and L. Whitehead (eds),

Notes

23 24 25 26 27

28 29 30 31 32

33

34 35

36 37

189

Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. P. Schmitter, p. 9: ‘South European countries benefited from their distance from the American system [and nearness] to Western Europe.’ In O’Donnell et al., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. On different developments of state-ness in Southern Europe, read J. Kurth, p. 225, in J. Kurth and J. Petras, Mediterranean Paradoxes: The Political and Social Structure of Southern Europe, Providence: Berg, 1993. Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, pp. 17–19: ‘without a sovereign state there can be no secure democracy’. J. Hutchison and A. D. Smith, Nationalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 5. Ibid., p. 15. There is no agreement among scholars on the definition of nation – for Renan it is a solidarity sustained by a distinctive historical consciousness; Weber affiliates nations to ethnic communities; Giddens describes the nation as a bordered power container. The challenge of competing nationalism within one territorial state, or the question of who was a citizen of the new democratic polity, was not on the whole a salient issue. Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, p. 16. P. Loizos, ‘How Might Turkish and Greek Cypriots See Each Other More clearly’, pp. 37–8 in V. Calotychos (ed.), Cyprus and Its People: Nation, Identity and Experience in an Unimaginable Community, Colombia: Westview Press, 1998. Read Kurth in Kurth and Petras, Mediterranean Paradoxes, pp. 225–8, on the delayed development of Southern European statehood. Must possess a monopoly on force, coercion and security. Although Pridham is critical of the term ‘penetrated system’ as too loose a working definition (p. 11), he agrees that ‘South European states as semi peripheral states would presumably count as in some respects candidates for consideration’, in Pridham, Encouraging Democracy, p. 10. Spain and Portugal lay claims to early statehood; however, they lacked the resources in the nineteenth century to make the shift to the modern rationalized bureaucratic Weberian state model. Read T. Bruneau, Politics and Nationhood: Post Revolutionary Portugal, New York: Praeger, 1984, p. 64, on Portugal being small, weak and economically undeveloped and H. J. Wiarda, The Transition to Democracy in Spain and Portugal, Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1989, p. 10, on the same situation in Spain. Ibid. On Greece read T. S. Pappas, Making Party Democracy in Greece, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999, p. 44: ‘with the Greek state unable to sponsor robust productive undertakings to give itself an adequate industrial base, the fear of marginalisation in the international markets . . . and threatened national independence.’ And on Italy read Leonardi, pp. 66–7, on limited political options due to external imposition, in Pridham, Encouraging Democracy. A good account of Malta’s process of decolonization is J. Pirotta’s three-volume work, Fortress Colony: The Final Act 1945–1964, Malta 1987/91/2001, and for Cyprus J. L. Scherer, Blocking the Sun, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1997. On unresolved cleavages in Southern Europe, read Malefakis, pp. 47–52, in Gunther et al., The Politics of Democratic Consolidation; on Malta read R. G. Sultana and G. Baldacchino (eds), Maltese Society: A Sociological Inquiry, Msida: Mireva, 1994,

190

38 39

40 41 42 43

44

45 46

47

48

Notes especially Sultana’s article on class in Malta; on Cyprus read S. Joseph, Ethnic Conflict and International Concern, New York: Peter Lang, 1985, especially p. 53 on the fragmented society. Read Giner on the sharpness of the class cleavage in Southern Europe and the long tradition of radicalism in S. Giner, ‘Southern European Socialism in Transition’ in G. Pridham, New Mediterranean Democracies. Wiarda, Transition to Democracy, p. 3, talks of how from the eighteenth century there were two rival and competing forms of socio-political organizations: two Spains and two Portugals. K. L. S. Koutsoukis, Political Leadership in Modern Greece, Athens: Athena, 1982, Chapter 4, talks of a collective identity crisis and two notions of nation in Greece. For Italy read J. La Palombara, Democracy Italian Style, London: York University Press, 1987, p. 10: ‘since the Italian nation was an unlikely prospect to begin with.’ Read G. Sapelli, Southern Europe since 1945, London: Longman, 1995, especially Chapters 1 and 2. Read J. Lively and A. Lively (eds), Democracy in Britain, Oxford: Blackwell, 1994, Chapter 8: on the growth of the welfare state and the inclusion of the left as a model for Europe. Wiarda, Transition to Democracy, p. 3. Refer to note 37 and see Mallia-Milanes, ‘The Genesis of Maltese Nationalism’, pp. 1–2 in V. Mallia-Milanes (ed.), The British Colonial Experience, 1800–1964: The Impact on Maltese Society, Malta: Mireva, 1988; and R. R Denktash, The Cyprus Triangle, London: Allen & Unwin, 1982, p. 13: ‘There is not, and there never has been a Cypriot nation.’ Refer to Burton et al., p. 325: the diagram shows the lateness of elite consensus in Italy, Spain and Portugal, in M. Burton, R. Gunther and J. Higley (eds), Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. For Greece, refer to K. Katsoudas, ‘The Constitutional Framework’, pp. 14–18, on how the national schism delayed constitutional consensus, in K. Featherstone and D. K. Katsoudas, Political Change in Greece before and after the Colonels, London: Croom Helm, 1987. On Malta refer to P. Nazzjonalista, Is Malta Burning? A Nationalist Party Publication, Malta: NP Publication, 1981. On Cyprus read Tzermias, ‘A United Cyprus as a Factor of Stability in the Eastern Mediterranean’, Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1997. For a reading of fascist politics in Southern Europe, read the chapters on Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal in O’Donnell et al., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Panteli, The Making of Modern Cyprus; M. A. Attalides, Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics, Edinburgh: Q Press, 1979, pp. 101–276; B. Blouet, The Story of Malta, London: Faber & Faber, 1967; A. Williams, ‘Britain and the Mediterranean’, p. 43 in Mallia-Milanes, The British Colonial Experience; and W. Hardmann, A History of Malta: During the Period of the French and British Occupations 1798–1815, Malta: Midsea, 1994. On this issue refer to Frendo, Party Politics in a Fortress Colony; the whole book details the impact of language on party politics, and English and Italian as reinforcing different cleavages and O. Friggiri, ‘The Search for a National Identity in Maltese Literature’, in Mallia-Milanes, The British Colonial Experience. A. Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, ‘Cyprus and Lebanon: A Historical Comparative Study in Ethnic Conflict and Outside Interference’, The Cyprus Review, Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring, 1990, pp. 97–129.

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49 For Malta read E. L. Zammit, A Colonial Inheritance: Maltese Perceptions of Work, Power and Class Structure with Reference to the Labour Movement, Malta: Malta University Press, 1984, p. 14: ‘eventually two camps emerged which manifested far deeper divisions than implied by the original issues’; and J. Hull, The Maltese Language Question: A Case Study in Cultural Imperialism, Malta: Said, 1993, Chapter 2. For Cyprus read Attalides, Cyprus, p. 40: ‘by the end of the Ottoman period economic power was concentrated in the hands of the Greek merchants and the Orthodox church’ and p. 41: ‘The British Government regarded the Turkish Cypriots as loyal.’ 50 On Malta read A. Koster, Prelates and Politicians: Changing Power Balances between Church and State in a Mediterranean Island Fortress, 1800–1976, Holland: Van Gorcum, 1984, Chapter 3, on increasing interdependence between church and state and p. 62 on the politicization of the upper classes. On Cyprus: S. Joseph, Ethnic Conflict and International Politics, London: Macmillan, 1997, p. 18: ‘the maintenance of a psychological and administrative gap between the two ethnic groups was instrumental in securing British control over Cyprus.’ 51 N. Kizilyurek, ‘From Traditionalism to Nationalism and Beyond’, The Cyprus Review Vol. 5, No. 2, 1993, pp. 60–4. 52 A. Koster, Prelates and Politicians, p. 104; and J. Pirotta, Fortress Colony: The Final Act Vol. II 1955–58, Malta: Studja Editions, 1991, Chapter 2: ‘Malta Requests Integration with Britain’. 53 L. Whitehead, ‘Democracy by Convergence’, in L. Whitehead (ed.), The International Dimension of Democratisation: Europe and the Americas, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 278–9: democratisation in Southern Europe is also about the definition of a modern national identity and the creation of a consensus about where these nations belong in the international system. 54 J. Kurth. ‘A Tale of Two Peripheries: Southern Europe and Eastern Europe’, in Kurth and Petras, Mediterranean Paradoxes. 55 On the economic backwardness of the Southern European states, see K. Vergopoulos, ‘The Political Economy of Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe’, p. 139 in D. Ethier (ed.), Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, Latin America and South East Asia, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990. On Malta see E. J. Spiteri, Malta: An Island in Transition; Maltese Economic History 1954–74, Malta: Progress Press, 1997. On Cyprus, D. Christodoulous, Inside the Cyprus Miracle: The Labours of an Embattled Mini Economy, vol. 2, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1992. 56 O. Elgstrom, ‘Active Foreign Policy as a Preventive Strategy against Independence’, in O. Holl (ed.), Small States in Europe and Dependence, Luxembourg: Wien Braumuller, 1983. 57 H. Vogel, ‘Small States Effort in International Relations: Enlarging the Scope’ and R. Vayrynen ‘Small States in Different Theoretical Traditions of International Relations Research’ state that small states are more interdependent than bigger ones, in O. Holl, Small States in Europe. 58 Read D. Ott, Small Is Democratic: An Examination of State Size and Democratic Development, New York; London: Garland, 2000; and L. Goetschel, ‘The Foreign and Security Interests of Small States in Today’s Europe’, in L. Goetschel (ed.), Small States Inside and Outside the European Union, Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic, 1998. 59 In this case, Malta and Cyprus. 60 Segal, pp. 36–7, ‘more subject to external economic pressures . . . more subject to international manipulation’, in Pridham, Encouraging Democracy.

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61 R. Vayryen and H. A. Mouritzen, ‘Defensive Acquiescence Making the Best out of Dependence’, in O. Holl, Small States in Europe. 62 Almond takes the argument a step further and asserts that ‘the penetration of domestic politics by the international environment . . . is a constant process’; A. Almond, ‘The International–National Connection’, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 19, No. 2, April 1989, p. 254. 63 Huntington, The Third Wave; Vanhanen, The Process of Democratization. 64 See K. Maxwell and S. Spiegel, The New Spain: From Isolation to Influence, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994, p. 1, on the isolation of Spain from the international community. 65 On the extremities of interference in Cypriot affairs, read B. O’Malley and I. Craig, The Cyprus Conspiracy: American Espionage and the Turkish Invasion, London: I.B.Tauris, 2001. 66 Spain’s constitution of Cadiz 1812 was one of the earliest and most democratic in Europe, Portugal, Greece, Spain and Italy all experimented with forms of liberal democratic government prior to the Second World War; read U. Liebert and M. Cotta (eds), Parliament and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe, London: Pinter, 1990, p. 8: ‘parliamentary systems were introduced throughout southern Europe as early as in the first half of the 19th century.’ On Malta and Cyprus, read J. J. Cremona, The Maltese Constitution and Constitutional History since 1813, Malta: PEG, 1997, and J. Reddaway, Burdened with Cyprus: The British Connection, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986, Chapter 4: ‘Constitutional Offers 1947–1956’. 67 J. Trumpbour, ‘Preface: Southern Europe – Past and Present’, pp. 3–5 in Kurth and Petras, Mediterranean Paradoxes. 68 This is not to say that external influences did not intrude; British influence in Portugal and American influence in Spain was evident throughout the century, but that sovereignty despite these influences remained relatively intact. Whitehead, ‘Democracy by Convergence: Southern Europe’, p. 274 in Whitehead, The International Dimension. 69 Ibid., p. 273, refers to Spanish and Portuguese isolationism; this inverts Whitehead’s argument of contagion in Whitehead, The International Dimension, and Huntington’s of diffusion in Huntington, The Third Wave. 70 Greece 1829, Italy 1860. 71 See La Palombara, Democracy Italian Style, pp. 8–12, on the failed Italian Risorgimentos; and P. Mackridge and E. Yannakakis, Ourselves and Others: The Development of a Greek Macedonian Culture Identity since 1912, Oxford; New York: Berg, 1997, pp. 1–19. 72 S. Verney and T. Couloumbis, ‘State–International Systems Interaction and the Greek Transition to Democracy in the mid 1970s’; and R. Leonardi, ‘The International Context of Democratic Transition in Post War Italy: A Case of Penetration’, in Pridham, Encouraging Democracy. 73 See J. Pridham, ‘The International Context’, p. 171 in Gunther et al., The Politics of Democratic Consolidation, on the unhealthily high degree of international penetration in Greece and Italy and how this factor delayed democratic consolidation; and Verney and Couloumbis and Leonardi, in Pridham, Encouraging Democracy. 74 R. D. Putman and R. Leonardi, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993. 75 See La Palombara, Democracy Italian Style, p. 15, and J. Pasquino, ‘The Demise of the First Fascist Regime and Italy’s Transition to Democracy: 1943–48’, p. 45, on the

Notes

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79 80 81 82 83 84

85

86 87 88 89 90

91 92

193

tripartite ruling coalition composed of Christian Democrats, the Italian Socialists and Communists, in O’Donnell et al., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Pasquino, p. 50, in O’Donnell et al., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. P. Ginsborg, Italy and Its Discontents 1980–2001, London: Allen Lane, 2003, p. 218. Altiero Spinelli was one of the strongest voices in favour of a Europe conceived as a true federation of nations. See Ginsborg, Italy, pp. 242–3, on the link between the development of the Italian regions and European integration. Also read, R. Leonardi and R. Y. Nanetti, Regions and European Integration: The Case of Emilia Romagna, London: Pinter, 1991; R. Leonardi (ed.), Regions and the European Community: The Regional Responses to the Single Market in the Underdeveloped Areas, London: Frank Cass, 1993; R. Leonardi and R. Nanetti (eds), Regional Development in a Modern European Economy: The Case of Tuscany, London: Pinter, 1994. Cyprus 1960, Malta 1964, from British rule. P. Lyon and J. Manor (eds), Transfer and Transformation: Political Institutions in the New Commonwealth: Essays in Honour of W.H. Morris Jones, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1983, p. 1, refers to the process as the transfer of power. Huntington, in The Third Wave, states that in many ex-colonies democratic institutions are imposed (p. 43); democracy was tenuous and in many it failed (p. 19). Lyon and Manor, Transfer and Transformation, p. 2; this can include the transfer of power, authority, institutions, types or whole systems of governance and bureaucratic habits. P. Childes and R. J. Patrick Williams, An Introduction to Post Colonial Theory, Hertfordshire: Prentice, 1997, p. 5. In both Cyprus and Malta, security and defence still remained the remit of the British; for Malta read R. Spiteri and A. Massa, Twelid Ta’ Stat Indipendenti, Valletta: Guga, 1989, p. 140; and for Cyprus read S. Joseph, ‘International Dimensions of the Cyprus Problem’, The Cyprus Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, Fall 1990, p. 24. S. R. Sonyel, ‘New Light on the Genesis of the Conflict’, p. 17, lists a number of unresolved issues in Cyprus, in C. H. Dodd (ed.), Cyprus: The Need for New Perspectives. Huntington: Eothen, 1999; for Malta, refer to Il-Ġlieda Għall-Ħelsien, Malta, 1981, p. 63. See Childes and Williams, An Introduction, p. 8, on the recovery of indigenous histories. Often conflicting demands of multiple identities to resolve, read A. D. Smith, National Identity, London: Penguin, 1991, Chapter 1, on national and other identities. S. Telhami and M. Barnett, p. 3, in S. Telhami and M. Barnett (eds), Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002. This relationship emerges clearly, for instance, in Frendo, Party Politics in a Fortress Colony. Positive-sum game: in game theory, a term that refers to situations in which the total of gains and losses is greater than zero. A positive sum occurs when resources are somehow increased and an approach is formulated in which the desires and needs of all concerned are satisfied (Encyclopaedia Britannica: www.britannica.com/topic/ positive-sum-game). The Greek-Cypriots felt diminished responsibility for a constitution which they felt had been imposed; read K. C. Markides, The Rise and Fall of Cyprus, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977, p. 23. E. Warrington, ‘Administering Lilliput: The Higher Civil Services of Malta, Barbados and Fiji’, University of Oxford, D.Phil. thesis, 1997; and Chapter 11, ‘Political Superstructures in Post-Colonial States’, in D. A. Low, Eclipse of Empire, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

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93 Read Lo Shiu-Hing, The Politics of Democratisation in Hong Kong, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997. 94 For Malta read H. Frendo, The Origins of Maltese Statehood. For Cyprus read C. Hitchens, Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger. London: Verso, 1998, Chapter 2. 95 Lyon and Manor, Transfer and Transformation, p. 4. 96 See O’Malley and Craig, Cyprus Conspiracy, Chapter 1, on the importance of Cyprus. 97 R. E. Holland, European Decolonisation 1918–1981: An Introductory Survey, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1985, Chapter 7: ‘Britain: The End of Imperial Statehood’. 98 Ibid., p. 248, ‘Cyprus and Malta remained of critical importance to imperial interest’ and O’Malley and Craig, Cyprus Conspiracy, Chapter 1: ‘Strategic Prize’ and Chapter 5: ‘Hamstrung at Suez’. 99 On Cyprus read M. Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, ‘Cyprus and Lebanon: A Historical Comparative Study in Ethnic Conflict and Outside Interference’, The Cyprus Review, Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring 1990. On Malta, Frendo, The Origins of Maltese Statehood, Chapter 14: ‘The Mintoff Factor; A Coup D’État in the Offing?’ 100 On Cyprus read M. A. Attalides (ed.), Cyprus Reviewed: The Result of a Seminar on the Cyprus problem, Nicosia: The Association, 1977, p. 49; and on Malta read Frendo, The Origins of Maltese Statehood, Chapter 7: ‘A Constitution in the Forge’. 101 There have been a small number of cases where decolonization and democratization led by local elites have resulted in the creation of elite consensual unity on independence – United States, Canada, Australia: p. 13 in J. Higley and R. Gunther (eds), Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 102 E. Mizzi, Malta in the Making 1962–1987: An Eyewitness Account, Malta: Beck Graphics, 1995, Chapter 4: ‘The Last Lap: Then Independence’; and Frendo, The Origins of Maltese Statehood, p. 185: ‘Labour party said that HMG should shoulder its responsibilities and decide all the outstanding issues’. 103 The British government endeavoured to include the left wing, but the primacy of security and defence conditions resulted in her ceding to the wishes of the Nationalist Party especially in the context of the Corrupt Practices Act. FCO27/311 From Crawley 09/06/67. 104 P. G. Polyviou, Cyprus in Search of a Constitution: Constitutional Negotiations and Proposals, 1960–1975, Nicosia: Chr. Nicolaou and Sons, 1976, p. 13. 105 Ibid., p. 17. 106 Markides, The Rise and Fall of Cyprus, p. 25. 107 Cyprus Cmnd 1093, July 1960 Cyprus Appendix A Draft Treaty Concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. 108 Cremona, The Maltese Constitution, Chapter 9: ‘The Independence Constitution’. 109 See Polyviou, Cyprus in Search of a Constitution, p. 25, on the many sui generis provisions of the constitution. 110 Discussions could not take place without the involvement of Britain, Greece and Turkey. 111 Joseph, ‘International Dimensions’, pp. 17–18. 112 Ibid., p. 24. 113 See J. L. Scherer, Blocking the Sun: The Cyprus Conflict, Minnesota: University of Minnesota, 1997, p. 25, on US efforts to forestall a Turkish invasion. 114 J. Ethier, ‘Processes of Transition and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical Indicators’, in Ethier, Democratic Transition.

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115 On Malta read A. Koster, Prelates and Politicians, p. 202, on the results of the independence referendum; and on Cyprus read Scherer, Blocking the Sun, p. 18. 116 On Cyprus read H. Scott Gibbons, The Genocide Files, London: Charles Bravos, 1997; and on Malta read Nazzjonalista, Is Malta Burning, 1991, and L. Briguglio, L-Elementi Kriminali u Vjolenti Fi Ħdan Il-Partit Laburista, Valletta: Partit Demokratiku, 1986. 117 E. Warrington, ‘The Other Face of Sovereignty – Reflections on the Genesis of Malta’s Foreign Policy’, p. 2 in V. J. Gauci, The Genesis of Malta’s Foreign Policy, Malta: Agenda, 2005. 118 ‘Democracy as a culture and civilisation which subsumes and overrides the sovereignty of the nation-state’; see S. J. Rosow, ‘Globalisation as Democratic Theory’, Millennium Journal of International Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2000, p. 36, and Pridham, Encouraging Democracy, p. 14, on Spanish, Greek and Portuguese consensus on EC membership. 119 On Malta read A. Smith, ‘From NATO Base to Libyan Outpost’, in International Security Council: Malta and the Security of the Mediterranean Region, Milan, Italy, 23–25 November 1986; and on Cyprus read S. Joseph, ‘The UN as an Instrument of National Policy; The Case of Cyprus’,The Cyprus Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, Fall 1989, p. 52: ‘The Western Powers were afraid . . . the Cypriot president would bring about changes in the external affairs of Cyprus . . . harming Western interests.’ 120 A. Theophylacton, Security, Identity and Nation Building: Cyprus and the EU in Comparative Perspective, Ashgate: Aldershot, 1995, p. 30: ‘Makarios firmly anchored Cyprus in the non aligned camp . . . these connections had not proved helpful for the island’s state of security.’ 121 Scott Gibbons, Genocide Files. 122 Polyviou, Cyprus in Search of a Constitution, Part One: ‘The Constitution: Strain and Deadlock’. 123 Markides, Rise and Fall of Cyprus, p. 39; and Theophylacton, Security, Identity and Nation Building, p. 15. 124 For a detailed account read G. Clerides, Cyprus: My Deposition, vol. 3, Nicosia: Alithia, 1990. 125 This is reflected above all in the large and numerous foreign and military contingents still present on the island. Read Lindley, ‘The Military Factor in the Eastern Mediterranean’, in Dodd, Cyprus: The Need for New Perspectives. 126 N. M. Ertekun (ed.), The Status of the Two Peoples of Cyprus – Legal Opinions/E Lauterpacht [et al]., Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence, Public Relations Department, 1997. 127 The term ‘zero-sum game’ refers to situations in which the total of wins and losses adds up to zero, and thus one party benefits at the direct expense of another (Encyclopaedia Britannica: www.britannica.com/topic/positive-sum-game). 128 This statement needs to be qualified in the case of Cyprus. 129 H. Frendo, Malta’s Quest for Independence, Valletta: Valletta, 1989, Chapter 1: ‘The Machismo Cult: Malta’s Independence in Contemporary Politics’. 130 Gauci, The Genesis of Malta’s Foreign Policy, Chapter 3: ‘Establishing a Diplomatic Service and a Foreign Policy 1964–66’; and H. Frendo, Censu Tabone: The Man and His Century, Malta: Maltese Studies, 2000, p. 198: ‘Malta was an independent state: There were no colonial brakes . . . Mintoff ’s [foreign policy] was more experimental.’ 131 Mizzi, Malta in the Making, pp. 113–38, 183–96.

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132 Ibid., pp. 75–86, 197–202; and Gauci, The Genesis of Malta’s Foreign Policy, Chapters 4, 7, 9, 10, 11. 133 In line with Whithead’s model of international dimensions of democratization, case 4: Consent, p. 15, in Whitehead, The International Dimension. 134 Read U. Mifsud Bonnici, Kif Sirna Repubblika, Malta: P.I.N., 1999. 135 Nazzjonalista, Is Malta Burning 1981; A. J. Bencini, Nothing but the Truth, Malta: Penprint; D. Borg, Libertà Mhedda. Ksur ta’ Drittijiet Fundamentali talBniedem Fi Stat Polizjesk 1980–87, Malta: P.I.N., 2002; and A Report from the Helsinki Federation for Human Rights: Human Rights in Malta, May 1988, International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights Rummelhadtgasse 2–18 A – 1090 Vienna. 136 Mizzi, Malta in the Making, pp. 457–71. 137 C. Coleiro, A Propitious Partner, Malta: PEG, 1997, Chapter 4 and Neutrality Agreement, Malta–Italy 1980, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malta 1980. 138 Read Proposals for Updating the Foreign Policy of the Malta Labour Party in the Sectors Concerning National Security. Document prepared by an informal working group for the consideration of the National Executive and the General Conference of the Malta Labour Party, Malta, 1994. Despite differing from the Nationalist Party on a number of issues, substantially there is agreement on Malta’s foreign policy direction being West-oriented, especially in the context of security and defence. 139 Malefakis, ‘a notable phenomenon in all three countries was the consistency with which the population rejected electorally and in every other way extremist solutions’, p. 75 in Gunther et al., Politics of Democratic Consolidation. 140 Pridham, ‘South European Democracies on the Road to Consolidation: A Comparative Assessment of the Role of Political Parties’, in G. Pridham (ed.), Securing Democracy: Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe, London: Frank Cass, 1990. For Italy on the inclusion of the left, read R. Leonardi and D. A. Wertman, Italian Christian Democracy: The Politics of Dominance, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989. 141 On the strengthening of Italian democracy, read Putman and Leonardi, Making Democracy Work; and Ginsborg, Italy. 142 Diamandouros, p. 139, in O’Donnell et al., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. 143 Ibid., p. 140. 144 In Greece, there was controversy from the beginning over the constitution; in Portugal, the military played a key role in its formulation and this necessitated extensive constitutional revision later; and in Italy constitutional settlement was consensus-based but a rupture between the left and right soon followed. Pridham, p. 31, in G. Pridham (ed.), Securing Democracy: Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe. London: Frank Cass, 1990. 145 Portugal relied on Britain (Giner, p. 18) and Greece on the United States; (Diamandouros, p. 146) in O’Donnell et al., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. 146 C. P. Danopoulos, ‘Democratizing the Military: Lessons from Mediterranean Europe’, West European Politics, Vol. 14, No. 4, Oct. 1991, pp. 26–7. 147 Huntington, Third Wave, p. 33. 148 Whitehead, International Dimension, pp. 5, 15. 149 P. J. Schraeder, ‘Promoting an International Community of Democracies’, p. 2 in P. J. Schraeder (ed.), Exporting Democracy: Rhetoric versus Reality, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2002. 150 C. W. Kegley and M. G. Hermann, ‘In Pursuit of a Peaceful International System’, p. 16, outlines the characteristic of democracies peaceful external interaction, and

Notes

151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164

165 166 167 168

169

170

197

S. W. Hook, ‘Inconsistent U.S. Efforts to Promote Democracy Abroad’, p. 117, gives concrete examples in Schraeder, Exporting Democracy. Read A. J. P. Taylor, From the Boer to the Cold War: Essays on Twentieth Century Europe, London: Penguin, 1996. Ibid. E. J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914–1991, London: Michael Joseph, 1994. Ibid.; and Huntington, Third Wave, pp. 15–45. L. Diamond, ‘Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors, Instruments and Issues’, in Göran Hydén and Axel Hadenius (eds), Democracy’s Victory and Crisis: Nobel Symposium No 93, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. R. Youngs, The European Union and the Promotion of Democracy: Europe’s Mediterranean and Asian Policies, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, especially Chapter 2: ‘EU Democracy Promotion Instruments: Evolution and Shortcomings’. F. Cameron, The Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union: Past, Present, and Future, Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1990. J. Pinder, ‘Interdependence, Democracy and Federalism’, in G. Parry (ed.), Politics in an Interdependent World: Essays Presented by Ghite Ionescu. Aldershot; Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar, 1994. Ibid., pp. 112–13; and Whitehead, pp. 257–60 in Whitehead, The International Dimension. G. Pridham, ‘Political Actors, Linkages and Interactions: Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe’, West European Politics, Vol. 13, No. 4, October 1990. Read Opello and Verney, and Couloumbis, in Pridham, Encouraging Democracy. Ginsborg, Italy, pp. 235–48. Whitehead, ‘Democracy by Convergence: Southern Europe’, in Whitehead, The International Dimension. A. Kuosmanen, ‘Decision-Making in the Council of the European Union’, in L. Goerschel (ed.), Small States Inside and Outside the European Union: Interests and Policies, Boston, MA: Kluwer, 1998, p. 77: ‘The construction of the community/union greatly benefits small states.’ G. Stoker, ‘Introduction: Trends in European Local Government’, in R. Batley and G. Stoker (eds), Local Government in Europe: Trends and Developments, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991, pp. 1–4. F. Spotts and T. Wieser, Italy: A Difficult Democracy, Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1986, pp. 223. J. Colomer. ‘The Spanish State of Autonomies: Non-Institutional Federalism’, in P. Heywood (ed.), Politics and Policy in Democratic Spain: No Longer Different, London: Frank Cass, 1999, p. 41. Reflected in the term ‘pluralist democracy’ – read C. Spretnak and F. Capra, Green Politics: The Global Promise, London: Hutchinson, 1984, p. 3: ‘the Greens consider themselves the political voice of the citizens’ movements, that is, ecology, antinuclear-power, peace, feminist and others.’ Philosophy of self-determination was extended to sub-national groupings; read E. Kedourie, ‘Nationalism and Self-determination’, in J. Hutchison and A. D. Smith, Nationalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994; and B. R. Barber, ‘Democracy and the New Ethnicity’, in Parry, Politics in an Interdependent World. P. Blair, ‘Trends in Local Autonomy and Democracy: Reflections from a European Perspective’, in Batley and Stoker, Local Government in Europe.

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171 Pinder in Parry, Politics in an Interdependent World. 172 See C. Rumford, The European Union: A Political Sociology, Oxford: Blackwell, 2002, p. 159, on multi-level governance. 173 This pattern of growth in regional and local governance in the 1970s could be observed in numerous European states. See E. T. Nevin, ‘Regional Policy’, pp. 325–44 in A. M. EL-Agraa (ed.), Economics of the European Community, Hertfordshire, 1990, on the link between the development of the Italian regions and European integration; also read R. Leonardi and R. Y. Nanetti (eds), Regional Development in a Modern European Economy: The Case of Tuscany, London: Pinter, 1998; R. Leonardi (ed.), Regions and the European Community: The Regional Responses to the Single Market in the Underdeveloped Areas, London: Frank Cass, 1993. 174 Rumford, The European Union, p. 160. 175 Ginsborg, Italy, pp. 235–48; Leonardi, Regions and the European Community; Leonardi and Nanetti, Regional Development. 176 Read B. Thorhallsson, The Role of Small States in the European Union, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000. However, a number of academics including Gill argue that ‘global structural change has tended to reinforce the position of global elites and ruling classes, widespread social inequality within and between nations, and exacerbated disparities in inter state power relations’. S. Gill, ‘Global Structural Change and Multilateralism’, p. 2 in S. Gill (ed.), Globalisation, Democratisation and Multilateralism, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997. 177 Mizzi, Malta in the Making, pp. 113, 138, 183, 202, 295, 336; and Coleiro, A Propitious Partner, pp. 69, 102. 178 Read Gauci, The Genesis of Malta’s Foreign Policy, Chapters 10, 11, 12, 13, 14; and R. Pace, Micro-State Security in the Global System: EU–Malta Relations, Malta: Midsea, 2001, Chapter 4: ‘Relations in the Period 1987–2000’. 179 Covers all treaties, EU legislation, international agreements, standards, court verdicts, fundamental rights provisions and horizontal principles in the treaties such as equality and non-discrimination. In short, EU law. See http://en.euabc.com/ word/12 (accessed on 3 September 2018). 180 Established the criteria for countries applying for EU membership: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. See http://en.euabc.com/word/230 (accessed on 3 September 2018). 181 Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Malta’s Preparations for Membership. {COM(2003) 675 Final}. 182 D. A. Theophylactou, Security, Identity and Nation Building: Cyprus and the European Union in Comparative Perspective, Aldershot: Avebury/Ashgate, 1995, p. 117. 183 Ibid., p. 126. 184 D. Dehm, The EU Must Be Democratized, DiEM25 2016; A. E. Stie, Democratic Decision Making in the EU: Technocracy in Disguise? London: Routledge, 2013. 185 J. J. Dethier, H. Ghanem and E. Zoli, An Empirical Study of Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, Policy Research Working Paper 2194, The World Bank, October 1999. 186 I. Ciurea, ‘Economic Disparities between EU States and Regions’, Scientific Bulletin – Economic Sciences, Vol. 9, No. 15, 2009. 187 Fundamental Social Rights in Europe Working Paper, European Parliament Director General for Research PE 168.629, 1999, p. 34.

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188 R. Vilpisauskas, ‘Eurozone Crisis and European Integration: Functional Spillover, Political Spillback?’ Journal of European Integration, Vol. 35, No. 3, pp. 361–73, Routledge, 2013. 189 S. Verney, ‘Euroscepticism in Southern Europe: A Diachronic Perspective’, South European Society and Politics, Vol. 16, Issue 1, 2011; A. Sierp and C. Karner, ‘National Stereotypes in the Context of the European Crisis’, National Identities, Vol. 19, Issue 1, 2017. 190 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. 191 A. Zamora-Kapoor and X. Collier, ‘The Effects of the Crisis: Why Southern Europe?’ The American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 58, No. 12, pp. 1511–6, 2014; C. Y. Lin, L. Edvinsson, J. Chen and T. Beding, National Intellectual Capital and the Financial Crisis in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, New York: Springer-Verlag, Spring 2013, Chapter 2. 192 T. Fazi, ‘How Austerity Has Crippled the European Economy – In Numbers’, Social Europe, March 2016; H. W. Sinn, The Euro Trap: On Bursting Bubbles, Budgets and Beliefs, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014; S. Lehndorff (ed.), A Triumph of Failed Ideas: European Models of Capitalism in the Crisis, Brussels: ETUI, 2012. 193 ‘Can Greece Leave the Euro and Stay in the EU?’, Open Europe, 9 July 2015. 194 ‘Threat of Schengen Expulsion a New EU Humiliation for Greeks’, Financial Times, 29 January 2016. 195 ‘Greece Looks to Russia as Deal With Europe Stumbles’, New York Times, 30 March 2015. 196 J. M. Magone, B. Laffan and C. Schweiger (eds), Core–Periphery Relations in the European Union: Power and Conflict in a Dualist Political Economy, London: Routledge, 2016. 197 T. Behr and T. Tilikainen (eds), Northern Europe and the Making of the EU’s Mediterranean and Middle Eastern Policies, London: Routledge, 2016. 198 Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). 199 H. P. Schmitz and K. Sell, ‘International Factors in Processes of Political Democratisation: Towards a Theoretical Integration’, in J. Grugel (ed.), Democracy without Borders: Trans-Nationalisation and Conditionality in New Democracies, New York: Routledge, 1999. 200 M. Roccas and T. Padoa-Schioppa, ‘Economic Change and the Process of Democratisation in Southern Europe’, pp. 47–51 in H. D. Gibson (ed.), Economic Transformation, Democratisation and Integration into the EU: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001. 201 Huntington, The Third Wave, Chapter 1. 202 B. J. Olafsson, Small States in the Global System: Analysis and Illustrations from the Case of Iceland, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998, pp. 52–7. 203 Higley and Gunther, Elites and Democratic Consolidation, pp. 22–3. 204 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, p. 61.

Chapter 3 1 Kathy Zamostny, staff psychologist, University of Maryland College Park. 2 This was not always the case in many of its North African colonies; in Iraq and Egypt, Britain left monarchies in place. R. Pinkney, Democracy in the Third World: Issues in Third World Politics, Buckingham: Open University Press, 1993.

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3 The elites in their majority in Cyprus and Malta unlike the North African colonies were in agreement over democracy being the superior form of government. 4 Certain common policies of the two islands, however, have been explored especially in the context of EU membership. 5 J. S. Joseph, Ethnic Conflict and International Politics, London: Macmillan, 1997; M. Attalides, Cyprus Reviewed. Nicosia: Jus Cypri Association, 1977. 6 Refer to such works as E. Warrington, Administering Lilliput: The Higher Civil Services of Malta, Barbados and Fiji. University of Oxford: DPhil thesis, 1997; G. Baldacchino, Global Tourism and Informal Labour Relations: The Small Scale Syndrome at Work, London: Mansell, 1997; R. Pace, Microstate Security in the Global System: EU–Malta Relations, Malta: Midsea, 2001. 7 For Malta refer to B. Blouet, The Story of Malta, London: Faber & Faber, 1967. For Cyprus refer to S. Panteli, The Making of Modern Cyprus: From Obscurity to Statehood, New Barnet: Interworld, 1990. 8 For Malta refer to G. Wettinger, ‘The Arabs in Malta’, in Malta: Studies of Its Heritage and History, Malta: Mid-Med Bank, 1986, p. 88, on the contentious issue of the origins of the Maltese language whether Punic or Arabic; for Cyprus, Panteli, The Making of Modern Cyprus, p. 52, claims that some of the Turkish population were Greek but converted to Islam. 9 M. Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, ‘Cyprus and Lebanon: A Historical Comparative Study in Ethnic Conflict and Outside Interference,’ The Cyprus Review, Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring 1990, p. 98. 10 S. A. Royle, A Geography of Islands: Small Island Insularity, London: Routledge, 2001, p. 58. 11 P. Serrincino Inglott, ‘Was Malta a Nation in 1964?’, in V. Mallia-Milanes (ed.), The British Colonial Experience 1800–1964: The Impact on Maltese Society, Malta: Mireva, 1988. 12 G. Baldacchino, ‘The Nationless State? Malta, National Identity and the European Union’, West European Politics, Vol. 25, No. 2, October 2002, pp. 191–206. 13 Though it is argued that a real cleavage did not emerge until the twentieth century in Panteli, The Making of Modern Cyprus, p. 119, and R. Bryant, ‘Justice or Respect – A Comparative Perspective on Politics in Cyprus,’ Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 24, No. 6, November 2001, pp. 892–924 and 893, argues that the development of a Cypriot consciousness and identity is possible, as does Theophylactou, Security, Identity and Nation Building, p. 33. 14 Scherer, Blocking the Sun, p. 8. 15 Numerous works on the role of external players in Cyprus include Theophylactou, Security, Identity and Nation Building; and C. Hitchens, Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger, London: Verso, 1997. This is less so for Malta where the focus is on the British presence, but one can refer to S. Howe, ‘British Decolonisation and Malta’s Imperial Role,’ in Mallia-Milanes (ed.), The British Colonial Experience, pp. 351–60. 16 Frendo, Party Politics in a Fortress Colony, p. 3. 17 Though the first optional council was put in place in 1813; J. J. Cremona, Malta and Britain: The Early Constitutions. Malta: PEG, 1996, Chapter 1. 18 For Cyprus see Hitchens, Hostage to History, p. 44, and T. W. Adams, AKEL: The Communist Party of Cyprus, California: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1972, p. 10: ‘Britain did little for the island economically.’ For Malta see E. L. Zammit, A Colonial Inheritance, Malta: Malta University Press, 1984, p. 12, on the dependency

Notes

19

20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39

201

of the economy and the powerlessness of the Maltese; and C. A. Price, Malta and the Maltese: A Study in Nineteenth Century Migration, Malta; Melbourne: Georgian House, 1954, pp. 1–34. For Cyprus see D. Christodoulous, Inside the Cyprus Miracle: The Labours of an Embattled Mini Economy, Vol. 2, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992, pp. xxix, 17, 18, 79; Adams, AKEL, p. 21; for Malta see Zammit, A Colonial Inheritance and E. J. Spiteri, Malta: An Island in Transition. Maltese Economic History 1954–1974, Malta: Progress Press, 1997, Chapter 1. Adams, AKEL, p. 21; Frendo, Party Politics in a Fortress Colony, Chapters 6–7; and J. Chircop, The Left within the Maltese Labour Movement, Msida: Mireva, 1991. Mallia-Milanes, The British Colonial Experience. K. C. Markides, The Rise and Fall of Cyprus, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977, p. 23: ‘had the Cypriots accepted the liberal constitutions in the 1940s the polarisation of the two ethnic communities would probably not have occurred.’ Mallia-Milanes, The British Colonial Experience, pp. 4–15. I. Calleja, British Interest in Malta 1798–1803, unpublished BA Honours Dissertation, University of Malta, 1991, p. 30. E. Mizzi – promoted a politics of irredentism focusing on Malta’s union with Italy; read Koster, Prelates and Politicians, pp. 67–8. V. Mallia-Milanes, ‘The Genesis of Maltese Nationalism’, in Mallia-Milanes, The British Colonial Experience. AKEL, the Progressive Party of the Working People, successor to the Communist Party of Cyprus (CPC) established in 1926, held its founding Congress on 14 April 1941. It has aimed to unite all the Cypriot working class, Greek-Cypriots, TurkishCypriots, Maronites, Armenians and Latins. See www.akel.org.cy/en/wp-content/ uploads/2016/09/AKEL-in-brief-en.pdf. R. R. Dentash, A Short Discourse on Cyprus, Nicosia: Lefkosa, 1972, p. 41 and P. Loizos in V. Calotychos, Cyprus and Its People, Oxford: Westview Press, 1998, pp. 36–7. Though technically the first advisory council was introduced in 1813; see J. J. Cremona, The Maltese Constitution and Constitutional History since 1813, Malta: P.E.G., 1997. J. Reddaway, Burdened with Cyprus: The British Connection, London: Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1986, Chapters 2, 4. For a constitutional history of Malta read J. J. Cremona, The Maltese Constitution and J. M. Pirotta, L-Istorja Kostituzzjonali U L-Isfond Storiku (1800–1942), Vol. 1, Malta: P.E.G., 2005. M. Lyssiotis, ‘An Analysis of the Cyprus Legislative Council’, The Cyprus Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, Fall 1990. PantelI, The Making of Modern Cyprus, Chapter 3; Markides, The Rise and Fall of Cyprus, pp. 7, 8, 9. R. Hyman (ed.), British Documents on the End of Empire: The Labour Government and the End of Empire 1945–51, Part 3, London: HMSO, 1992 pp. 92–105. Adams, AKEL, p. 148. Panteli, The Making of Modern Cyprus, p. 48. B. Lapping, End of Empire, London: Granada, 1985, p. 321. CO926/641 From Higham 27/3/58. Interview with Barbara Castle 1957, Brief of Sir H Foot no 11 Attitude of the Opposition. Hyman, British Documents on the End of Empire, pp. 92–105.

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40 Lapping, End of Empire, pp. 316–21. 41 R. R. Denktash, The Cyprus Triangle, London: Allen & Unwin, 1982, pp. 19–21. 42 Ibid.; and E. Seraphim-Loizou, The Cyprus Liberation Struggle 1955–1959: Through the Eyes of a Woman E.O.K.A Area Commander, Nicosia: Epiphaniou, p. 18. 43 Panteli, The Making of Modern Cyprus, p. 146. 44 Ibid., pp. 173–8; and B. O. Malley and I. Craig, The Cyprus Conspiracy, London: I.B. Tauris, 2001, Chapter 6; CO926/716 Talks with Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers on the Macmillan Plan. 45 S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan (eds), Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives. New York: The Free Press, 1967. 46 Frendo, Party Politics in a Fortress Colony, Chapter 7: ‘The Transformation of a National Culture: Towards a Two-Party System’. 47 Koster, Prelates and Politicians (the entire text deals with the religious conflict). 48 H. Frendo, ‘Maltese Colonial Identity: Latin Mediterranean or British Empire’; and O. Friggieri, in Mallia-Milanes, The British Colonial Experience. 49 K.Ellul Galea, It-Trejdunjonismu F’Malta, Vol. 2, Malta: P.I.N, 1993. 50 U. Mifsud Bonnici, Kif Sirna Repubblika, Malta: P.I.N., 1999 (the text outlines the cross-party compromises that led to the constitutional revision in 1974). 51 Markides, The Rise and Fall of Cyprus, p. 21: ‘Had the Greek Cypriot elite accepted the various liberal constitutions offered by the British in the 1940s the polarisation of the two ethnic communities would probably not have occurred’; and N. C. Lanitis, Our Destiny: A Consideration of Some Crucial Problems Pertaining to Cyprus (based on a series of articles published in the Cyprus Mail 3/7 March 1963); The Importance of Unity: ‘for three years we tried to bring home to the leaders and the public at large the importance of acquiring constitutional liberties and developing closer co-operation between Greeks and Turks.’ Also see E. Averoff-Tozzizza, Lost Opportunities, The Cyprus Question 1950–1963, New York: Aristides D. Caratzas, 1986. 52 See Adams, AKEL, p. xxvii, for a list of political parties in Cyprus and Chapter 1; also see CO926/1113 From Labour Attache Tel Aviv to Parker 09/07/59 for a picture of the political situation in the late 1950s. 53 Ibid., and refer to CO926/942 Valiant youth of EOKA 07/01/59, CO926/1088 Who Are They Deceiving or Why I Left EOKA?, Note by the Administrative Secretary 20/09/58. 54 CO926/1112 International Confederation of Free Trade Unions Fifth World Congress, CO 926/942 Leaflet of the Communist Student Organisation PEOM, CO926/1088 Who Are They Deceiving or Why I Left EOKA? 55 CO926/598 Tel 155 2/2/58 and CO926/928 June 1959 from Higham. 56 Christodoulou, Inside the Cyprus Miracle, p. xxvii; and J. Pirotta, Fortress Colony: The Final Act 1945–1964, Malta: Studia Editions, 2001, Chapters 5, 12. 57 In 1954, Greece came out openly in favour of enosis. 58 Seraphim-Loizoù, The Cyprus Liberation Struggle; C. Foley, Legacy of Strife: Cyprus from Rebellion to Civil War, Middlesex: Penguin, 1964. 59 CO926/932 Documents Captured from Cypriot Terrorists, from Harding 15/02/57. 60 CO926/597 Tel 237-11/57. 61 CO926/932 P.E.K.A. Distributed in Nicosia 16/12/56. 62 Ibid.: ‘if any leftist leader acts against us he will be stigmatized’ CO926/1113 From Sir H Foot 2/11/58. 63 Foley, Legacy of Strife, p. 40. 64 CO926/641 Summary of World Broadcasts 2/12/57; Foley, Legacy of Strife, p. 30.

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65 Koster, Prelates and Politicians, Chapters 7, 8; and J. Pirotta, Fortress Colony: The Final Act 1945–1964, Malta: Studia Editions, 1987, Chapter 15. 66 Universal suffrage in Malta was introduced in 1947. 67 D. Mintoff, Ix-Xandira Ipprojbita: Taħdita Ta’ Dom Mintoff Iċċensurata MillAwtorità Tax-Xandir, Valletta: Union Press, 1963. For an understanding of Mintoff ’s philosophy refer to M. C. Cremona, Il-Bidu tal-Ġlieda Għall-Ħelsien: Kitbet Mintoff Fis-Snin Erbgħin, Valletta: Union Press, 1984. 68 J. Pirotta, Fortress Colony: The Final Act 1945–1964, 2001, Chapter 15; Koster, Prelates and Politicians, pp. 191–201. 69 CO926/1088 From Foot 20/010/59 and Med30/08/05 Memo on the Rundown of the Naval Base in Malta CO926/1872 COS 4th Meeting/63. 70 CO926/1119 Record of Meeting Held at Government House 29/12/59 CO926/1883 Overseas Policy Committee Malta: ‘Malta cannot be economically viable for many years. The rundown is hitting it hard.’ 71 A. James, ‘The Making of the Cyprus settlement’, The Cyprus Review, Vol. 10, No. 2, Fall 1998, pp. 24–5; CO926/1471 Record of Meeting Held at Government House Nicosia 08/02/60 Med30/08/05 To UK Commissioner Malta 22/03/63. 72 CO926/1113 and 1112 – these files deal primarily with trade union affairs CO926/1815 Union Letters 24/03/64. 73 Adams, AKEL, p. 40. 74 Pirotta, Fortress Colony: The Final Act 1945–1964, 2001, Chapter 12. 75 M. Michaelides, ‘The Turkish Cypriot Working Class and the Cyprus Labour Movement 1920–1963’, The Cyprus Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 41; CO926/1883 Kirsch to Hunt 09/01/63. 76 CO926/1883 From Zahra Gen Sec CMTU 1963. 77 CO926/1113 and 1112 – these files deal primarily with trade union affairs in Cyprus. 78 Koster, Prelates and Politicians, pp. 187–8; Pirotta, Fortress Colony: The Final Act 1945–1964 2001, pp. 75–80. 79 CO926/1125 Interview with Makarios, CO926/1021 From Sir H Foot 3/12/59. 80 Ibid.; and Adams, AKEL, p. 5. 81 CO926/992 Unsigned Report on Makarios’s Statements. 82 CO926/928 Meeting between Governor and Makarios 19/08/59. 83 Koster, Prelates and Politicians, pp. 119–12; and Pirotta, L-Istorja Kostituzzjonali U L-Isfond Storiku (1800–1942), Vol. 1, pp. 234–5. 84 J. Alexander, Mabel Strickland, Malta: Progress Press, 1996, p. 161. 85 Pirotta, L-Istorja Kostituzzjonali U L-Isfond Storiku, Vol. 2, Chapter 3. 86 Ibid. 87 The Nationalist Party as early as 1932 had requested independence. 88 For an understanding of that chaotic period, read A. Sant, 28 Ta’ April 1958: Il-Ħobż U L-Ħelsien, Malta: SKS Marsa Press, 1988. 89 CO926/1876 From Wakefield 26/01/03. 90 Ibid. Ward to Cheetham 04/01/63. 91 Based on the Singapore Constitution of 1958, the 1961 Maltese Constitution is also known as the ‘Blood Constitution’. This constitution gave full legislative and executive powers to the government of Malta subject to defence and external affairs being referred to the British government (www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/ handle/123456789/13483). 92 Cremona, The Maltese Constitution, Chapter 8; and Pirotta, L-Istorja Kostituzzjonali U L-Isfond Storiku, Vol. 2, pp. 117–22.

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93 Frendo, The Origins of Maltese Statehood, Chapter 4. 94 CO926/1885 Strickland to Alec 24/11/63, CO926/1886 Note of the Legislative Assembly 20/01/64, and From Minister of Defence 27/01/64. 95 CO926/1886 First Draft on Cabinet Paper on Malta. 96 CO926/1887 From Acting UK Commissioner 09/03/64. 97 CO926/1888 Reuter Press Cutting 22/07/64, Minogue to Eastwood 17/07/64, From Acting UK Commissioner 10/07/64: ‘he believed that Borg Olivier had told Maltese ministers virtually nothing of what was going on.’ 98 CO926/995 Meeting between Governor and Makarios 2/11/59, CO926/992 The Times 1/06/59 Militant Hellenism in Cyprus. 99 CO 926/952 Statement by TNT. 100 CO926/1537 From Sir H Foot 10/07/60. 101 Adams, AKEL, p. 5, states that the issue was further complicated because for most Greek-Cypriots, including communists, self-determination and enosis were synonymous. 102 Panteli, The Making of Modern Cyprus, p. 181. 103 Ibid., p. 182. 104 CO926/992 From Chancery to British Embassy Ankara 14/08/59 and The Times, 01/06/59 Militant Hellenism. 105 CO926/1471 Meeting between Governor and Makarios 03/04/60. 106 CO926/1125 Interview with Makarios: ‘Cyprus remains part of the sterling area and the commonwealth’. 107 CO926/1113 From Labour Attaché Tel Aviv. 108 CO926/1112 Parker to Wallis 08/07/58, CO926/641 Summary of World Broadcast 02/12/57, CO926/932 P.E.K.A. Distributed in Nicosia 16/12/56, CO926/598 From A.D.M. Rose 02/58. 109 CO926/649 Statement Issued by Denktash 10/59. 110 CO926/592 Guardian 19/01/59. 111 One can draw on interesting parallels here with British policy in (a) Palestine and (b) southern Rhodesia, which respectively predated and succeeded the Cyprus question. 112 CO926/1070 From Addis 12/58. 113 CO926/1070 Discussions with Greece and Turkey 12/58: ‘Zorlu said that the status he had discussed with Averoff was not really a form of independence. It would be necessary to write into the constitutions the alliances, and also the right of veto on both sides with regard to the 2 communities. The island must be Turkish-Greek, and the sovereignty outside the British bases must be shared between Turkey and Greece.’ 114 CO926/1471 Governor to Rossides 11/59. 115 CO926/1873 From Hamilton 18/03/64. 116 CO926/1872 From Crawley 25/06/63. 117 CO926/1888 From Acting UK Commissioner 03/06/64. 118 CO926/592 Med86/08/73 From Wakefield 26/01/63. 119 CO926/1990 To the Archbishop of Canterbury 08/08/64. 120 CO926/1888 To Trevaskis 12/05/64. 121 CO926/1887 Questions in the English Parliament 17/03/64. 122 CO926/1888 From Minogue 17/07/64: ‘on the electoral law he said it was his intention to concede what Borg Olivier wanted in return for Borg Olivier’s acceptance of the defence agreement. He emphasized that he would have very much liked to have changed the existing electoral law but Borg Olivier refused to budge.’

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123 CO926/1885 From Mintoff to the Secretary of State 26/12/63. 124 Theoreticians on democratic transition do not recommend direct participation of the popular level in the process but are emphatic about the importance of the main elite groups being involved. The non-participation of the Basques in the Spanish transition is said to account for future failure to properly integrate them. 125 CO926/1886 From Secretary of State to Borg Olivier 11/02/64: ‘The new constitution shall come into effect only after it has been endorsed by the people of Malta.’ 126 Refer to the Malta constitution of 1964 and Defence Agreement of 1964. 127 CO 926/592 Med30/01 From Foot 07/12/58, CO926/595 Tel 211. 128 CO 926/592 Med30/01 From Foot 11/11/58. 129 The Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) came into being on 16 April 1948. It emerged from the Marshall Plan and the Conference of Sixteen (Conference for European Economic Co-operation), which sought to establish a permanent organization to continue work on a joint recovery programme and in particular to supervise the distribution of aid. In September 1961, the OEEC was superseded by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), a worldwide body (www.oecd.org/general/organisationforeuropeanecono micco-operation.htm). 130 Scherer, Blocking the Sun, p. 18. 131 CO926/1133 From A.D.M. Rose. 132 Hitchens, Hostage to History, p. 49; Markides, The Rise and Fall of Cyprus, p. 24; Panteli, The Making of Modern Cyprus, p. 183; CO926/1070 From Addis 12/58: ‘Zorlu’s idea is a Turkish/Greek diarchy . . . Averoff thinks of the scheme as a form of qualified independence.’ 133 Malta Constitution of 1964. 134 Malta/UK defence treaty 1964. 135 CO926/1816 From UK Commissioner Malta 18/08/64. 136 CO926/1135 From Foot 05/08/60: ‘Makarios has been working well with Kutchuk and I understand they have reached agreement on nearly all outstanding issues.’ 137 CO926/1816 From Crawley 29/03/63. 138 A Turkish-Cypriot politician, barrister and jurist who served as the founding president of Northern Cyprus (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Rauf_Denkta%C5%9F). 139 CO926/592 Med30/01 From Foot 16/01/59: ‘Both Greek and Turkish Cypriots are bitter over British claims vis-a-vis the base and over her refusal to threat Cyprus as a genuinely independent state.’ 140 CO926/592 Med30/01 Talks Reach Deadlock over Base Issue 19/03/59: ‘Makarios and Kutchuk stand firm over base agreements . . . has brought unity between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.’ 141 Cyprus-born general in the Greek Army, leader of the EOKA. (See www.britannica. com/biography/Georgios-Grivas.) 142 CO926/928 From Higham 06/59. 143 CO926/952 Turkish Resistance Organisation, CO926/644 Discussion with Governor and Kutchuk, CO926/928 Meeting between Governor and Archbishop. 144 CO926/1537 Policy Statement by the Democratic Union May 1960. 145 Hitchens, Hostage to History, p. 41. 146 CO926/716 To the British Prime Minister 08/58. 147 CO926/593 From Foot 09/59. 148 CO926/716 To the British Prime Minister 08/58.

206 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189

Notes CO926/1126 From British Embassy Athens to Addis 10/59. CO 926/1070 Discussion between Turkish and British Government 12/58. Cyprus Mail 22/05/60 Denktash Intervenes. CO926/1119 Meeting at Government House Cyprus 29/01/59. CO926/644 Cyprus Press 10/3/59. CO926/1119 Meeting at Government House Cyprus 29/01/59. CO926/992 Political Programme EDMA. CO926/1884 Statement by CWP, DNP and PCP. CO926/1884 From and Strickland 11/63 Pelligrini, Ganado. CO926/1884 Address Delivered by the Governor 28/10/63. CO926/1990 From Foreign Office 27/07/64: ‘The constitution follows in general the draft prepared by the Malta Government.’ Koster, Prelates and Politicians, p. 197. CO926/1882 The Three Changes Proposed by the British. CO926/1885 Pelligrini to Borg Olivier 28/12/63. CO926/1885 Differences in the Draft Constitution between the Nationalist and the Labour Party. Ibid.; and CO926/1884 More Serious Points of Difference between the Nationalist and Labour Parties. CO926/1884 Ibid. CO926/1887 Questions in the English Parliament 17/03/64; and CO926/1888 From the Secretary of State on Parliamentary Questions 21/07/64 and Note of Meeting at Commonwealth Relations Office 20/05/64. FCO27/311 From Crawley 09/06/67. CO926/641 From Ankara to F.O Britain 30/11/57, Brief to Foot on attitude of the opposition. CO926/641 To Higham 27/3/58. CO926/641 Interview with Barbara Castle. Ibid. Interview with Major Wall Labour Party 05/10/57. CO926/1816 From Wakefield 29/04/64. United Nations Debate: Independence for Malta. Printed at Freedom Press, Malta, 1964, pp. 12–13. Ibid., p. 33. Ibid., p. 38. Ibid., p. 41. Ibid., p. 61. O. P. Richmond, Mediating in Cyprus, London: Frank Cass, 1998, p. 89. CO926/1884 Discussion between Secretary of State and Borg Olivier 23/09/63. CO 926 /716 Letter Dated 9/8/58. CO926/592 Med 30/01 From Foot 11/12/58. CO926/1923 From Acting UK Commissioner 06/04/64. CO926/592 Med 30/01 From Foot 09/01/59. CO926/592 Med 30/01 Pressure and Blackmail 10/01/59. CO926/1822 Monthly Intelligence Report 05/06-03/07/64. CO926/1070 01/59. CO926/592 Med 30/01 From Foot 12/58. CO926/1816 From Secretary of State to Wakefield. CO926/995 Meeting between Governor and Makarios 02/11/59 Makarios Feared That It Would Affect General Public Confidence.

Notes 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235

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CO926/1886 First Draft on Cabinet Paper on Malta. Cyprus Mail 03/01/63. CO926/1885 From Mintoff 26/12/63. CO926/1816 From Secretary of State to E. Wakefield. CO926/1070 Cyprus Times 24/01/59. CO926/961 A.N.E Valiant youth of EOKA 07/01/59. CO926/1886 From Mintoff 10/02/64. CO 926/1070 Letter of 12/58. Evening Standard, 9 July 1964. Kruschev’s offer to support Makarios in his demands for constitutional change in 1964 and the Soviet readiness to supply him with arms. CO926/1871 From Pelligrini, Ganado and Strickland 09/02/64. O’Malley and Craig, The Cyprus Conspiracy, p. 12. Ibid., p. 13. Ibid., p. 1. Ibid., p. 2. Ibid., p. 6. CO926/1873 Strategic Importance of Malta COS 17 64/4. CO926/1873 Extract of Conclusions of a Cabinet Meeting CM64 24th March 1964. CO 926/1872 Extract from Prime Minister’s Speech 07/04/64. CO926/1873 Annex to COS 187/64. CO926/928 Meeting between Governor and Archbishop. CO926/644 Meeting between Governor and Kutchuk 21/12/59. CO926/1133 Rose to Secretary of State 19/06/60. CO926/1472 F.O. London to British Embassy Athens 09/04/60. CO926/1817 Watt to Strickland 13/01/64. CO926/1923 Local Intelligence Committee 12/63-01/64. CO926/1884 From Dorman 09/63. CO926/1923 Local Intelligence Committee 12/63-01/64. CO926/1884 From Dorman 09/63. D. Sammut, Too Early for Freedom: The Background to the Independence of Malta – 1964, Malta: Union Press, 1984, p. 52. CO926/1133. Cyprus Mail 29/01/60. Cyprus Mail 02/04/60 Makarios Prepared to Proclaim a Republic. Cyprus Mail 04/04/60 Growing Opposition over Base. Cyprus Mail 03/05/60 Makarios Must Resign. Cyprus Mail 15/05/50 Archbishop Boycotting Talks. Cyprus Mail 02/04/60 Action Will Lead to Civil War. CO926/1135 Ankara to F.O. 06/60. CO926/1135 Foot to Secretary of State 08/60. CO926/1471 Meeting between Makarios and Governor 03/04/60. CO926/1442 From Allen to the Governor 03/05/60. CO926/1113 From Labour Attaché Tel Aviv. CO926/1884 From Dorman 09/63. CO926/1884 Governor Addressing the Second Session of the First Legislature 28/10/63. E. Warrington, Administering Lilliput: The Higher Civil Services of Malta, Barbados and Fiji. University of Oxford: DPhil thesis, 1997, p. 142. Ibid., p. 143.

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236 CO926/721 Administrative Secretary. 237 J. Linz and A. Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post Communist Europe, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, p. 61. 238 Consensually unified elites: where structural integration and value consensus between them is relatively inclusive. According to the Burton typology, democratization requires the existence of a consensually unified elite. 239 Koster, Prelates and Politicians, p. 199. 240 FCO27/311 Crawley to Diggens 09/06/67.

Chapter 4 1 Aristotle, The Politics, translated by T. A. Sinclair, revised and represented by Trevor J. Saunders. London: Penguin, 1962, second book, ninth chapter. 2 U. Mifsud Bonnici, Kif Sirna Repubblika, Malta: P.I.N., 1999, p. 1. Translated from the Maltese: ‘Il-Kostituzzjoni tagħna ssawret f ’ċirkostanzi diffiċili. Ma kinitx il-frott ta’ elaborazzjoni minn Assemblea Kostitwenti . . . u għalhekk kien jonqosha dak l-element ta’ kompromess li jġib . . . il-kunsens.’ 3 P. G. Polyviou, Cyprus in Search of a Constitution, Constitutional Negotiations and Proposals, 1960–1975, Nicosia: Chr. Nicoaou and Sons, 1976, pp. 44–53. 4 The Greek and Portuguese coups of 1974 and the Spanish coup of 1981. 5 J. Pridham, Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991. 6 Makarios as president – Borg Oliver as prime minister. 7 Malta – Malta Labour Party – MLP, Cyprus – Communist Party – AKEL. 8 Malta GWU – General Workers Union, Cyprus – PEO – Pan-Cyprian Labour Federation. 9 Malta – DO/202/19 Answer to Secretary General’s Questionnaire on NATO and Malta. 10 FO371/186965 Telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office 12/02/63 – ‘The archbishop reveals distinct dictatorial tendencies.’ Malta FCO9/1749 Morton 02/07/73. 11 DO204/5 From Sheridan 27/09/61: ‘The Cyprus Government is inclining towards a policy of moderate socialism.’ 12 FO371/168964 Cyprus Fortnightly Report 13–26 September 1963 on the heavy dependence of the Cypriot economy on British Military expenditure and DO220/47 D. Barrett The Republic derived 7/8 million a year from the base expenditure. 13 Results of Proposed Rundown of Services of Cyprus: ‘rundown contemplated over period of 18 months . . . some 1,500 Cypriots will be made redundant’; FO371/168965 Malta CO926/2080 CMTU Rundown of Naval Base ‘by 1967 11,000 Maltese may be made redundant’. 14 FCO27/262 Malta -EEC. 15 FO371/168966 The Republic of Cyprus: A Brief Survey and Malta FCO 27/262 From Foreign Office to Jackling 19/07/68 and FCO/9/1433 Watson to Douglas-Home 08/06/71. 16 FO371/168964 Cyprus Fortnightly Report 30 August–12 September 1963 – Clerides was seeking advice on the extent to which the guarantor powers could intervene under A4 of the treaty of guarantee; Malta FCO/27/205 Statement of the Maltese Prime Minister 06/06/67 and to Commonwealth Relations Office 02/06/67.

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17 FO371/168988 Interview with Makarios from Athens News Agency Weekly Bulletin 28/08/63: ‘The Treaty of guarantee should cease to exist’, Malta FCO9/1417 Mintoff ’s Address to the Nation 4/9/71. 18 DO220/11 Peters to Lennard 21/09/64: ‘Many businessmen and several of the GreekCypriot ministers are clearly concerned about the economic future after enosis . . . do not want to lose the benefits of belonging to the sterling area; Malta FCO9/919 MLP Policy on Neutralism 09/10/69: ‘Mintoff made clear he would not expel the British GWU members dependent on jobs here.’ 19 DO161/3 Clark to UK Representative in Cyprus 27/01/61. 20 FO371/168988 ‘the government (Cyprus) has developed trade relations with all neighbouring countries’, Malta FCO/27/215 From Tory 04/05/68. 21 FO371/168965 Cyprus Fortnightly Report 21/06 04/07-63 Malta DO 202/19 Answer to Secretary General’s Questionnaire on NATO and Malta. 22 DO161/3 Clark to UK Representative in Cyprus 27/01/61 on Malta. Ibid. 23 FO371/168966 Cyprus Economic Dependence and Security, on Malta. Ibid. 24 FO371/168988 Interview with Makarios from Athens News Agency Weekly Bulletin 28/08/63. 25 DO220/47 Makarios 14/05/64: ‘We shall not permit the use of the bases against Arab countries’, FCO/27/205 Parliamentary Reports Malta 31/05/67. 26 FO371/168988 Interview with Makarios from Athens News Agency Weekly Bulletin 28/08/63: ‘We support the rights of Palestinian Refugees.’ 27 DO161/3 Clark to UK Representative in Cyprus 27/01/61 Malta FCO/27/205 To Commonwealth Relations Office 29/5/67. 28 FO371/168964 Cyprus Fortnightly Summary – resolution of AAPSO on treaties signed before the departure of the rulers as not binding on the people concerned. 29 DO204/5 Sheridan 27/9/61 Malta. 30 FO371/174748 Secret. 31 DO161/6 British Brief on Cyprus 1963 and Wakely to Jameson. 32 DO161/6 Telegram 1380 16/12/61: ‘The USA has decided to expand its role in Cyprus to counter growing Communist infiltration’; and Malta FCO/27/215 Foreign Office Britain 7/5/68. 33 DO161/6 Foreign Affairs 26/08/63. 34 In both cases a number of constitutional issues had been unresolved during the independence debates. 35 DEFE11/254 Clark 23/11/62: ‘The present Greek-Turkish hostility in the island is I fear partly our fault under our colonial rule they got along quite happily together until the last few years of it.’ 36 FO371/174747 Khruschev to British PM 07/02/64: ‘The internal problems in Cyprus are being used as a pretext for unconcealed intervention in the affairs of Cyprus.’ 37 Scott Gibbons, The Genocide Files. 38 G. Clerides, Cyprus: My Deposition, Vol. 3, Nicosia: Alithia, 1990, p. 338. 39 DO202/25 Independence Celebrations 06/11/64. 40 FO371/168964 Cyprus Fortnightly Summary25/10-07/11/63: ‘Makarios said that Enosis was a national aspiration’; and FO 371/168965 Athens to FO 22/3/63: ‘The Turks were envisaging a move towards partition.’ 41 DO161/3 Clark to UK Representative in Cyprus 27/01/63: ‘no sign yet of a Cypriot National consciousness . . . anyone who refers to the Cyprus people are bitterly attacked.’ 42 Serracino Inglott in Mallia-Milanes, The British Colonial Experience.

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43 E. Mizzi, Malta in the Making 1962–1987, Malta: Beck Graphics, 1995, pp. 43–4. 44 DO161/6 British Brief on Cyprus 1963: ‘there is no effective right-wing organisation’ and British Government Report on Cyprus 1961: ‘Government’s lack of success in establishing a stable democratic life.’ 45 1964 Constitution of Malta, however, also refer to FCO9/1431 Discussions with the Malta Government 15/07/71 ‘though we do not accept that the Malta Government can legally abrogate the defence agreement’. 46 FO371/168988 Telegram 602 06/08/63 – Turkey makes it clear that abrogation of treaties is not possible. 47 Intelligence Report No. 8047: ‘Analysis of Cyprus Agreements,’ July 1959, Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research USA. 48 1964 Constitution of Malta. 49 FO371/168969 Comments by Clerides on the Cyprus Constitution: ‘our constitution in many respects is completely sui generic’ and Polyviou, Cyprus in Search of a Constitution, p. 3. However J. Reddaway, in Burdened with Cyprus: The British Connection, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986, argues that the Greek-Cypriot objections were political rather than practical, pp. 129–30. 50 1960 Constitution of Cyprus. 51 Lauterpacht stresses the bi-communal character of the 1960 constitution in N. M. Ertekun (ed.), The Status of Two People in Cyprus – Legal Opinion, Lefkosa: Public Relations Department, 1997, p. 22, and O’Malley and Craig, The Cyprus Conspiracy: ‘the structures of power solidified the divisions’, p. 87. 52 A. Borowiec, Cyprus: A Troubled Island, West Port: Praeger, 2000, p. 44, ‘most of the voting at cabinet sessions was along cabinet lines’. 53 FO/371/168964.Kutchuk 09/5/63: ‘I agreed to the appointment of a Greek as our delegate to the UN and as our ambassador in Washington on the assurance that when the ambassador would be attending the UNO a Turkish chargé d’affaires would be appointed in Washington. No such appointment has yet been made.’ 54 For details refer to Chapter 3. Here Malta was in line with Spain, Greece and Portugal where the elites who steered the constitutions through Parliament were also the first parties of government. 55 FCO9/1417 Mintoff ’s Address to the Nation 04/09/71. 56 DEFE11/254 Ankara to FO 8/11/62: ‘in the constitution the Turks got away with safeguards beyond the normal measure for any minority anywhere in the world . . . the Turks came out of the business better than anyone else.’ 57 Ibid. ‘The Zurich agreements are disliked and criticized by the Greek community.’ 58 FO371/168988 Makarios 28/8/63. 59 DO161/3 Dispatch No. 1 27/1/61. 60 FO371/168969 Clerides Comments on the Constitution: ‘on separate municipalities . . . impossibility of defining geographical areas . . . the constitutional commission spent a whole year doing this prior to independence but did not succeed.’ 61 FO371/168964 Denktash 02/01/63. 62 Ibid. Telegram from Foreign office 09/01/63 Quoting Makarios. 63 FO371/168964 10/5/63 Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office: ‘All Greek proposals smacked to Turks of unification and all Turkish proposals spelt separation.’ 64 DEFE/11/254 Ankara to Foreign Office London 09/01/63. 65 In accordance with A 177. 66 DEFE11/254 Telegram from Foreign Office London 17/01/63. 67 DO161/6 Nicholas to Scott 19/03/62.

Notes

211

68 FO371/168964 Cyprus Fortnightly Summary 8–15/02/63: ‘The local Greek and Turkish press have continued to publish highly provocative and irresponsible articles.’ 69 DO161/6 British Brief on Cyprus 1963. 70 DEFE/11/254 A Clark 08/11/62. 71 FO371/168964 Cyprus Fortnightly Report 19/02-04/03/63: ‘more extreme Turks however cling to separate municipalities.’ 72 FO371/168964 Cyprus Fortnightly Report 26/06-04/07/63. 73 DEFE/11/254 A Clark 08/11/62. 74 Outlined separatist concerns at the possibility of the assimilation of the Turkish community if the discussions succeeded – in D. Weston Markides, Cyprus 1957– 1963: From Colonial Conflict to Constitutional Crisis, the Key Role of the Municipal Issue, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2001, p. 107, and DEFE/11/254 A Clark 08/11/62 DEFE/11/398 From Athens to Ankara 24/01/64: ‘All evidence suggests that the power and influence in Nicosia of underground leader Chakal grows continuously and that the process of transfer of executive control from Kutchuk and his colleagues to Chakal is virtually complete . . . clear risk that any compromise solution reached at London will be unworkable because moderate leaders no longer have power.’ 75 DEFE/11/254 A Clark 8/11/62: ‘ex-EOKA men who went unrewarded were disgruntled and bitter.’ 76 DO161/6 British Government Report on Cyprus 1961. 77 Greek-Cypriot journalist and militant nationalist, member of EOKA and president of Cyprus for eight days. He was sentenced to death in 1957. See www.britannica.com/ biography/Nikos-Sampson. 78 DEFE/11/398 Report on situation in Cyprus: ‘The main danger lies in Sampson and his irregulars acting on their own initiative.’ 79 DO161/6 Tel 1019 18/12/61. 80 DO161/6 Tel 1380 16/12/63. 81 Weston Markides, Cyprus 1957–1963, p. 83. 82 FO371/168964 Cyprus Fortnightly Summary 13–26/09/63. 83 FO371/168965 Tel 14 12/02/63. 84 FCO371/168965 Tel 19 12/02/63. 85 FO371/168964 Cyprus Fortnightly Summary 13–26/09/63. 86 Weston Markides, Cyprus 1957–1963, p. 75. 87 FO371/168965 Tel 9 26/02/63. 88 FO371/ 168965 Tel 156 28/02/63. 89 FO371/168968 Tel 364 10/05/63. 90 FO371/168964 Tel Foreign Office London 09/01/63 and Cyprus Municipalities Background Note. 91 Ibid. 92 FO371/168964 Cyprus Municipalities Background Note. 93 FO371/168964 Cyprus Fortnightly Summary 19/02-04/03/63 & Telegram 81 29/01/63& 156 28/02/63: ‘from Clerides-Denktash talks an eminently sensible compromise is emerging.’ 94 FO371/168968 Telegram 364 10/05/63. 95 FO371/168964 Cyprus Fortnightly Summary 19/02-04/03/63: ‘The more extreme Turks cling to separate municipalities.’ 96 FO371/168965 Telegram No. 143 22/02/63: ‘need to persuade Turkish government to be more flexible or at least to give local Turks a free hand in negotiating a settlement’.

212

97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105

106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119

120 121 122 123 124

Notes FO371/168964 Telegram 10/05/63: ‘key to solution does not really lie here, but in Ankara whence local Turks clearly get instructions.’ That had given the Turkish-Cypriots the right to veto any financial legislation. Weston Markides, Cyprus 1957–1963, p. 75. FO371/168964 Moothan 15/01/63. This legislation dissolved the Turkish-Cypriot municipalities. FO371/168964 Cyprus Municipalities Background Notes. FO371/168964 Cyprus Fortnightly Summary 22/01-04/02/63 & Denktash 02/01/63: ‘We shall report all Turks who contravene Turkish municipal laws.’ FO371/168964 Cyprus Fortnightly Summary 02-15/08/63. FO371/168964 Cyprus Fortnightly Summary 21/06-04/07/63: ‘if the TurkishCypriots refuse to budge Greek-Cypriots would have no alternative . . . but to secure amendment of constitution.’ FCO9/932 Trade Unions in Malta. A. Koster, Prelates and Politicians: Changing Power Balances between Church and State in a Mediterranean Island Fortress, 1800–1976, Holland: Van Gorcum, 1984, pp. 185–191; and D. Mintoff (ed.), Dokumenti dwar in-negozjati bejn il-Vatikan u il-Partit tal-Ħaddiema 1964–66, Malta: Freedom Press, 1966; and DO 202/19 Secretary Generals Questionnaire on NATO and Malta: ‘in the past the Archbishop has used all his authority and force against the MLP.’ Koster, Prelates and Politicians, Chapter 9. DO202/42 Crawly 30/12/64 The Quarrel of the Malta Labour Party with the Church in Malta, edited by a Special Diocesan Commission Malta, Malta: Empire Press, 1966, p. 14. Koster, Prelates and Politicians, p. 217 and DO 202/42 Crawly 30/12/64: ‘Rome has always been more sympathetic to the MLP than the church here.’ DO202/42 Spenser 21/12/65. Koster, Prelates and Politicians, p. 218. Koster, Prelates and Politicians, p. 220. Mintoff, Dokumenti dwar in-negozjati, p. 103. FCO27/311 Crawley to Diggens 09/01/67. Koster, Prelates and Politicians, p. 226. Mizzi, Malta in the Making, p. 161. Koster, Prelates and Politicians, p. 228 and FCO9/1418 Rome July 1971. FCO9/1418 From Rome July 71: ‘Corruption and lack of dynamism of former government’. FCO 9/1418 Malta General Elections 1971. See W. H. de Mino and J. C. Lane, ‘Malta: STV in a Two-Party System’, in S. Bowler and B. Grafman (eds), Elections in Australia, Ireland and Malta Under the STV: Reflections on an Embedded Institution. Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2000, p. 70, on the large disparities in district size before 1976. Mizzi, Malta in the Making, p. 91. F. Zammit Dimech, The Untruth Game: Broadcasting Under Labour, Malta: Progress Press, 1986, p. 185. Mizzi, Malta in the Making, p. 92, and De Mino and Lane, ‘Malta: STV in a TwoParty System’, p. 85. Inherited institutions, legal restrictions and economic dependence. FO371/168964 Cyprus Fortnightly Summary 13/09-26/09/63 Malta DO202/42 Crawley 30/12/64.

Notes

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125 FO371/168966 The Republic of Cyprus: A Brief Survey, For Malta FCO27/265 To Commonwealth Relations Office 09/10/68 & FCO 27/262 Jackling 19/07/68. 126 DO 220/48 Peters to Lennard 21/9/64. 127 DO224/48 Telegram 13/10/64 Teleftea Ora 10/10/64 ‘claimed Britain had refused to pay last instalment of 1½ m pounds due against our use of the base’. 128 DEFE/11/398/ 21/1/64 From Nicosia to Foreign Office. 129 FCO27/205 From Pritchard 23/06/67. 130 DO204/5 Sheridan 27/9/61 – Malta FCO 27/215 Monro 29/07/67. 131 DO204/5 From Fletcher 20/09/61 DO 205/5 From Sheridan 27/09/61 – Malta FCO27/215 Malta – Russia Relations. 132 DO161/6 Telegram 1380 16/12/61& Tel 1019 18/12/61& From British High Commission to Commonwealth Relations Office 02/08/62 – Malta FCO 27/215 Foreign Office 07/05/68. 133 FCO9/924 – British Confidential Report on Malta. 134 FCO9/1241 – US Interest in Malta & Bendall to Washington 23/11/70. 135 DO 161/6 Telegram 1019 18/12/61. 136 FO 371/168964 Cyprus Fortnightly Summary 22/01/-04/02/63. 137 DO161/6 Nicholas to Scott 19/03/62. 138 DO161/6 Telegram 1380 16/12/61 & British High Commission to Commonwealth Relations Office 02/08/62: ‘if the three powers feared a communist electoral victory they might intervene to defer the vote.’ 139 FO371/174746 – Cyprus and NATO. 140 DO204/5 Fletcher 20/9/61, DO161/6 Wakely to Jameson, & British Brief on Cyprus 1963. 141 FO371/168988 Interview with Makarios 28/08/63 – DO204/5 Sheridan 27/09/61. 142 DO204/5 Sheridan 27/09/61 & Cold War Manifesto 06/12/60 Moscow Meeting of 81 Communist Parties: Advice to Communist Parties Operating in Ex-Colonies. 143 DO161/6 British Brief on Cyprus 1963. 144 FCO9/919 To Commonwealth Relations Office 09/04/69 & – FCO 41/622 Malta – NATO. 145 FCO27/265 NATO Assistance. 146 FCO27 /217 Edmonds 18/07/68. 147 FCO27/211 Malta’s Relations with Italy. 148 DO202/25 Translated from La Domenica Del Corrieri 31/07/66 & Martin to Morton 03/06/66. 149 Ibid. 150 DO202/25 Italy’s help to Malta – Malta News 09/10/66. 151 FCO27/265 NATO Assistance. 152 FCO41/622 Malta and NATO. 153 FCO27/265 From Washington 09/10/68 & From Morgan 02/09/68; J. Farrugia, Malta – A Foreign Policy of Dependency? A Case Study in German-Maltese Relations 1964–1979, BA Hons Dissertation, University of Malta, 2004, Chapter 4. 154 FCO9/1241 From Watson 03/12/70 US Interest in Malta. 155 FCO 27/281 To Foreign Office 31/01/67. 156 FCO 41/622 Malta and NATO. 157 FCO41/622 From Davidson 02/10/70 & Malta and NATO. 158 FCO41/622 Draft Paper Malta and NATO. 159 FCO9/919 From Tory 09/04/69. 160 Pirotta, L-Istorja Kostituzzjonali U L-Isfond Storiku, Vol. 2, p. 211.

214

Notes

161 FCO9/919 From Tory 09/04/69; increasingly the Maltese were seen as favouring Mintoff ’s policy of neutrality and the removal of all bases. 162 M. Kayman, Revolution and Counter Revolution in Portugal, London: Merlin Press, 1987, pp. 219–24. 163 Paul Heywood, The Government and Politics of Spain, London: Macmillan, 1995, p. 45. 164 F. Spotts and T. Wieser, Italy: A Difficult Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, pp. 222–3. 165 J. La Palombara, Democracy Italian Style, London: York University Press, 1987, p. 280. 166 DEFE/11/399 03/02/64 Peace Keeping Forces: ‘The Greek-Cypriots have much in mind the settlement forced on them at Zurich against their better judgment and refuse at all costs to let it happen again.’ Malta CO926/2076 – Preparations for a coup d’état – ‘difficult to foresee a constitution that will not offend a large section of the population’. 167 J. Reddaway, Burdened with Cyprus: The British Connection, Oxford: University Printing House, 1986, p. 122; Malta DO202/25 Independence Celebrations 06/11/64 and FCO 09/1417 Mintoff ’s Address to the Nation 04/09/71. 168 CO926/1888 Meeting of Secretary of State 20/05/64. 169 The Maltese constitution in 1964 was passed through Parliament through a simple majority. 170 FCO9/1749 Buttigieg to Borg Olivier 20/03/73 & Morton to Lewis 26/03/73. 171 Polyviou, Cyprus in Search of a Constitution, p. 53. 172 FO 371/168969 Comments on the Cyprus Constitution by Clerides. 173 In Cyprus constituted nearly 80 per cent and in Malta up to and at times over 50 per cent; CO926/2076 Secret 30/04/64. 174 CO926/1888 – Meeting of the Secretary of State 20/05/64 & – Watt 14/05/64. 175 FO371/168964 – Tel 67 Ankara to Foreign Office. 176 Intelligence Report No. 8047 Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research. ‘It endeavours to codify in detail the position and rights of the two communities instead of relying on constitutional custom as other countries have done in similar situations. There are dangers inherent not only in the comparative rigidity of the structure of the new state but also in the detailed codification of community rights which will tend to perpetuate rather than eliminate the communal cleavages.’ Malta CO926/2076 – Summary of Commander in Chief ’s Mediterranean Paper. 177 FCO9/1749 Fort 19/10/73. 178 A. J. Bencini, Nothing but the Truth, Malta: Penprint, p. 218. 179 FCO9/1749, 26/3/73. 180 Ibid. 181 Led by Dr Ugo Mifsud Bonnici. 182 FCO9/1749 Conversation with Dr Edgar Mizzi 01/08/73. 183 FCO9/1749 Shaw 26/03/73. 184 This is identical to the Spanish case of 1975 where the fallange insisted on legal continuity of the political system though prepared to support reform. 185 Mizzi, Malta in the Making, pp. 160–1; Mifsud Bonnici, Kif Sirna Repubblika, p. 20; Pirotta, L-Istorja Kostituzzjonali U L-Isfond Storiku (1800–1942), pp. 231–2. 186 Ibid. 187 The Vatican representative. 188 The Malta government representative.

Notes

215

189 Mifsud Bonnici, Kif Sirna Repubblika, p. 37. 190 Mizzi, Malta in the Making, p. 161; Pirotta, L-Istorja Kostituzzjonali U L-Isfond Storiku (1800–1942), pp. 231–2. 191 Ibid., p. 163. 192 Mifsud Bonnici, Kif Sirna Repubblika, p. 37. 193 Ibid., pp. 35–6. 194 Mifsud Bonnici, Kif Sirna Repubblika, p. 41; Mizzi, Malta in the Making, p. 171. 195 Mifsud Bonnici, Kif Sirna Repubblika, pp. 34–5. 196 Ibid., p. 27. 197 Ibid., p. 25. 198 Ibid. 199 Mizzi, Malta in the Making, pp. 168–9. 200 Mizzi, Malta in the Making, p. 172; and Mifsud Bonnici, Kif Sirna Repubblika, p. 53. 201 Mifsud Bonnici, Kif Sirna Repubblika, pp. 44–5. 202 Koster, Prelates and Politicians, p. 250. 203 Mifsud Bonnici, Kif Sirna Repubblika, p. 54. 204 Koster, Prelates and Politicians, p. 246; and Mifsud Bonnici, Kif Sirna Repubblika, p. 51. 205 Mizzi, Malta in the Making, p. 172. 206 Mifsud Bonnici, Kif Sirna Repubblika, p. 40. 207 Ibid., p. 54. 208 M. Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, ‘Cyprus and Lebanon: A Historical Comparative Study in Ethnic Conflict and outside interference’, The Cyprus Review, Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring 1990, p. 120. 209 FO371/168965 Telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office no. 14 12/02/63 Including the 70/30 per cent quota in the civil service, army and police. 210 FO371/168988 Interview with Makarios 28/08/63: ‘nearly 3 years after it was drafted it is still impossible to implement some of its major provisions.’ 211 FO371/168964 Moothan 15/01/63: ‘action now taken by Republican Government is to bypass the constitution requirement’; FO371/168968 Statement by Kutchuk 09/5/63: ‘no real effort has been made to prepare appropriate legislation.’ 212 FO371/168964 Denktash 02/01/63: ‘part of their policy is to overrun all Turkish rights contained in the constitution.’ 213 FO371/168965 Cyprus Fortnightly Summary 13–26/9/63. 214 FO 371/168965 Cyprus Fortnightly Summary 25/10-07/11/63. 215 FO 371/168965 Cyprus Fortnightly Summary 02-15/08/63. 216 FO 371/168965 Cyprus Fortnightly Summary 02-15/08/63. 217 FO 371/168965 Cyprus Fortnightly Summary 25/10-07/11/63. 218 In Malta this also worried the opposition; Mifsud Bonnici, Kif Sirna Repubblika, p. 16. 219 FO371/168965 Cyprus Fortnightly Summary 30/08-12/09/63: ‘Clerides has asked for advice on how to achieve unified municipalities without a breach of the constitution.’ 220 There was a readiness to consider amendments to the tax legislation but the new arrangements would have to be defined by a special bi-lateral protocol which would bypass the need to amend the constitution; Weston Markides, Cyprus 1957–1963, p. 89. 221 FO371/168968 Kutchuk 09/05/63. 222 FO371/168964 Cyprus Fortnightly Summary 02-15/08/63 – for a theoretical explanation read D. Carment and P. James, ‘Explaining Third Party Intervention in

216

223 224 225 226 227

228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253

Notes Ethnic Conflict: Theory and Evidence’, Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2000, pp. 173–202. FO371/168965 – Cyprus Fortnightly Summary 02-15/08/63. Weston Markides, Cyprus 1957–1963, p. 145. Ibid., p. 149. E. Averoff-Tozzizza, Lost Opportunities: The Cyprus Question 1950–1963, New Rochelle, NY: Caratzas, 1986, p. 246. Ibid.; and D. A. Theophylactou, Security, Identity and Nation Building: Cyprus and the European Union in Comparative Perspective, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1995, p. 80: ‘Makarios’ insistence to proceed with the amendments were seen by the Turkish-Cypriots as a political coup.’ DO220/39 The build-Up of Violence. Ibid. Ibid. Telephone Interview with Dr Alex Xiberras Trigona 05/03/05 (foreign minister under the Labour government). FCO9/1432 D. Marchant, Britain’s Coup d’état. FCO9/1430 Defence and Overseas Policy Committee 07/07/71: ‘it is conceivable that we could bring about his fall.’ FO371/168965 Athens to Foreign Office 22/3/63 – DO 204/5 Fletcher 21/12/61 – FO371/174748 From British Embassy Washington 24/01/64: ‘Americans critical of Makarios suggested might be advantageous to dump him.’ Clerides, Cyprus: My Deposition, p. 338. FCO9/1417 Mintoff ’s Address to the Nation 04/09/71. FCO9/1424 Telegram 823 21/09/71. FCO9/1431 from Seconde 14/07/71 – FCO9/1432 Wilberforce to Wiggens 28/07/71. FCO9/1424 Malta–Libya Relations Telegram 138 18/08/71. FCO9/1543 Telegram 106 11/01/72. Malta–UK Military Facilities Agreement 1972; Mizzi, Malta in the Making, pp. 117–52. FCO9/919 MLP Policy on Neutralism 09/10/69. Weston Markides, Cyprus 1957–1963, p. 101 FO371/168964 Cyprus Fortnightly Summary 13–26/09/63. Weston Markides, Cyprus 1957–1963, p. 117. Weston Markides, Cyprus 1957–1963, p. 131 FO371/168964 Cyprus Fortnightly Summary 02-15/08/63 & 03/08-12/09/63. For British view DEFE/11/396 Draft Directive for CBF Cyprus. FO371/168988 – Visit of Cyprus Foreign Minister 15/05/63. FO371/174748 – Dodson 22/01/64 & Record of Private Meeting of Security Council 15/02/64. FO371/168964 – Cyprus Fortnightly Summary 25/19-07/11/63 & DEFE/11/396 Telegram 13 02/01/64. FO371/174746 Cyprus and NATO. DO161/6 British Government Report on Cyprus 1961. FO371/174747 UK Delegation to NATO Paris 02/02/64: ‘no one here wants a NATO force.’ Refer to AAPSO Document in FO371/168964 Cyprus Fortnightly Summary 30/08-12/09/63.

Notes

217

254 S. R. Sonyel, Cyprus: The Destruction of a Republic. British Documents 1960–1965, Cambridgeshire: Eothen Press, 1997, pp. 40–1. 255 Weston Markides, Cyprus 1957–1963, p. 147; Sonyel, Cyprus: The Destruction of a Republic, p. 39. 256 Ibid. 257 FO371/168964 Cyprus Fortnightly Report 08-15/02/63 and Inward Telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office 29/1/63. 258 FO371/168964 Cyprus Fortnightly Summary 05-18/07/63. 259 DEFE/11/397 From Commander British Forces Cyprus 13/01/64. 260 Sonyel, Cyprus: The Destruction of a Republic, p. 40. However, the British did advocate a slower pace and more concession. 261 FCO9/1749 Malta and the Constitution. 262 FCO9/1749 From Goodison 08/11/73, From Moreton 02/07/73, From Buttigieg 20/03/73, From Moreton 26/03/73; Mizzi, Malta in the Making, pp. 170–1. 263 FCO9/1749 Fort 19/10/73. 264 Ibid. Goodison 1973. 265 Mizzi, Malta in the Making, pp. 160–3; Mifsud Bonnici, Kif Sirna Repubblika, pp. 37–9. 266 FCO9/1418 Telegram 325–17/06/71; R. Findlay and S. Wellisz, ‘Malta’, pp. 256–92 in R. Findlay and S. Wellisz (eds), The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity and Growth: Five Small Open Economies, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. 267 E. J. Spiteri, Malta: An Island in Transition. Maltese Economic History 1954–1974, Malta: Progress Press, 1997, Chapter 5. 268 Zammit, A Colonial Inheritance, Chapter 4; and R. G. Sultana, ‘Perspectives on Class in Malta’, in R. G. Sultana and G. Baldacchino (eds), Maltese Society: A Sociological Inquiry, Msida: Mireva, 1994, p. 47. 269 Mizzi, Malta in the Making, pp. 153–6, 173–83, 203–38. 270 V. J. Gauci, The Genesis of Malta’s Foreign Policy, Malta: Agenda, 2005, p. 97. 271 Spiteri, Malta: An Island in Transition, Chapter 5; and Findlay and Wellisz, The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity, and Growth, pp. 256–92. 272 Ibid.; and Mizzi, Malta in the Making, pp. 251–84, 337–48. 273 G. Baldacchino, ‘A Review of Maltese Trade Unionism’, Economic and Social Studies, Vol. 5, 1990. 274 M. J. Schiavone, X’Fissret l-Għaqda tal-GWU mal-MLP għall-ħaddiem, Malta: P.I.N, 1990, p. 48. 275 A Report from the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights: Human Rights in Malta, Vienna, 1985, pp. 28–9. 276 Memorandum on Dispute with M.A.M. 1977, A Department of Information Publication, 1977. 277 Baldacchino, ‘A Review of Maltese Trade Unionism’, pp. 68, 79. 278 International Helsinki Federation, Human Rights in Malta, 1985, p. 11. 279 P. Nazzjonalista, Is Malta Burning?, Malta: NP Publication, 1981, p. 9. 280 International Helsinki Federation, Human Rights in Malta 1985, Chapter 7. 281 F. Zammit Dimech, The Untruth Game: Broadcasting under Labour, Malta: Progress Press, 1986. 282 Ibid., p. 160. 283 D. M. Boswell, ‘Clientelism, Patronage and Accusations of Corruption in Malta in the 1970s and 1980s’, in P. Heywood (ed.), Distorting Democracy: Political Corruption in Spain, Italy and Malta, Bristol: Centre for Mediterranean Studies, 1994.

218

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284 Nazzjonalista, Is Malta Burning, 1981, p. 11; also see Deċiżjonijiet Kostituzzjonali 1964–1978, Vol. 2, Malta: Lux Printing Press, 1979. 285 The two landmark cases were the government dispute with the medical profession in 1977 and with the Blue Sisters Hospital in 1980–1. 286 International Helsinki Federation, Human Rights in Malta, 1985, Chapter 5 and The Constitutional Court Issue in Malta published by Camera degli Avvocati, Malta, 1974. 287 International Helsinki Federation, Human Rights in Malta, 1985, Chapter 2. 288 D. Borg, Libertà Mhedda: Ksur ta’ Drittijiet Fundamentali tal-Bniedem fi Stat Polizjesk 1980–1987, Malta: P.I.N., 2002, pp. 7–28. 289 MaltaToday 04/01/04 Man of the Year Should He Stay or Should He Go? and J. Mifsud, Minn Taħt L-Inċira, Malta: PEG, 1996, pp. 301–50. 290 L. Brigulio, L-Elementi Kriminali U Vjolenti Fi Ħdan il-Partit Laburista, Malta: Partit Demokratiku, 1986. 291 Ibid. 292 The introduction of the law limiting the use of the words ‘Malta’ and ‘Nation’ to government institutions in 1978; see Human Rights in Malta, 1985, p. 23. 293 Interview with Joe Saliba, PN General Secretary 10/04/04. 294 R. Muscat, Għandi Missjoni Għalik, Malta: P.I.N., 1996. 295 Interview with Dr M. Frendo 10/04/04 (at the time Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs). 296 These are unsubstantiated, though in 1983 a number of arms were unearthed at the PN HQ, and at a storage facility said to belong to a PN supporter – TOM 16/03/86 Let’s Be Prepared; and D. Borg, Libertà Mhedda, Malta: P.I.N., 2002, Chapter 4. 297 De Mino and Lane in Bowler and Grafman, Elections in Australia, Ireland and Malta Under the STV, p. 85. 298 Mizzi, Malta in the Making, pp. 429–56. 299 D. Christodoulous, Inside the Cyprus Miracle: The Labours of an Embattled Mini Economy, Vol. 2, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1992, p. xxvii. 300 Established in 1961. 301 Christodoulou, Inside the Cyprus Miracle, p. xxxii. 302 Can compare to the SGI in Malta, a German firm, the largest employer. 303 DO204/5 Sheridan 27/9/61: ‘in the countryside the main battle will be between the church and the communists.’ 304 DO161/3 Dispatch no. 1 12/01/61: ‘Makarios tries to do everything himself.’ 305 Ibid. 306 Ibid. 307 DO161/6 British Brief on Cyprus 1963. 308 DO204/5 Sheridan 27/09/61. 309 Ibid. 310 DO161/6 British Brief on Cyprus 1961. 311 DO161/6 From British High Commission Nicosia 26/08/63: ‘The communists have the only efficient party here.’ 312 DO204/5 Sheridan 27/09/61. 313 FO371/168946 Cyprus Fortnightly Summary 19/02-04/03/63. 314 DO161/3 Dispatch 1 27/01/61. 315 FO371/168964 Denktash’s Statement Regarding the Turkish Municipalities 02/01/63. 316 Delivered on 25 April 1963, declared both community actions null and void. 317 FO371/168964 Cyprus Fortnightly Summary 22/01-04/02/63 & 08-15/02/63. 318 Weston Markides, Cyprus 1957–1963, p. 113.

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319 FO371/168964 Cyprus Fortnightly Summary 22/01-04/02/63. 320 FO371/168964 Cyprus Fortnightly Summary 13–26/09/6. 321 DEFE/11/254 British Summary 08/11/63: ‘The Turks would ruthlessly eliminate their own moderates.’ 322 DEFE/11/398 Athens to Ankara 24/01/64 & Athens to Foreign Office 23/01/64. 323 Weston Markides, Cyprus 1957–1963, p. 132. 324 FO371/168964 Cyprus Fortnightly Summary 13–26/09/63. 325 Weston Markides, Cyprus 1957–1963, p. 87. 326 Weston Markides, Cyprus 1957–1963, Chapter 4. Kutchuk also makes this charge; FO371/168964 Cyprus Fortnightly Summary 27/09/-10/10/63. 327 FO 371/168964 Denktash Statement on Municipalities 02/01/63. 328 Ibid.; and DEFE/11/397 12/1/64 & 21/01/64. 329 Sonyel, Cyprus: The Destruction of a Republic, pp. 60–1. 330 One such case was the Church schools issue where an appeal was made to the European Parliament. D. V. Scerri, The Saga of the Church Schools in Malta 1970– 1986: A Historical Portrayal of Events, Malta: M.U.T., 2000. 331 Deċiżjonijiet Kostituzzjonali 1964–1978, Vol. 2, Malta: Lux Printing Press, 1979; and Scerri, The Saga of the Church Schools in Malta, p. 147. 332 International Helsinki Federation, Human Rights in Malta, 1985, p. 34. 333 M. Montebello and R. Borg, The Case of Church Schools in Malta, B.Ed. Hons, 1989, University of Malta, pp. 23–6 – government challenged certain rights of donation to the Church and lost. 334 E. Rossi, Malta on the Brink: From Western Democracy to Libyan Satellite, London: Alliance Publications, for the Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, 1986; and R. F. Sola, ‘Malta in the Moscow-Beijing-Pyongyang Triangle’, in International Security Council Malta and the Security of the Mediterranean Region, Milan, 1986. 335 C. Kamaledevi, ‘Malta Joins the Non Aligned Movement’, Indian Review V67/8 1971, pp. 25–31; and Y. Mintoff, ‘Malta: More Ties with Arabs Sought’, Middle East Economics Digest, Vol. 18, June 1974, pp. 691–4. 336 H. Frendo, Messages from Mintoff ’s Malta: The Grenada of the Mediterranean, Quadrant, 1986; and Iż-Żjara F’Malta Tal-Kurunell Muammar El Gaddafi, published by the Libyan Embassy in Malta. 337 Memorandum on Dispute with M.A.M., A Department of Information Publication, Malta, 1977, p. xxxi. 338 Nazzjonalista, Is Malta Burning, 1981; and Frendo, Messages from Mintoff ’s Malta. 339 D. Kappeler, ‘The Swiss Experience with Neutrality and Its Relevance for Malta’, Id-Dritt: Law Journal, Vol. xvi, University of Malta, 1991; and P. Serracino Inglott, ‘Maltese Neutrality and the Italian Parliament’, in AZAD PERSPEKTIV, No. 15, June 1981, Malta. 340 Montebello and Borg, The Case of Church Schools in Malta, p. 13. 341 TOM (Times of Malta) 04/05/86 Medical Recognition Regained. 342 M.A.M. 1977, p. viii. 343 International Helsinki Federation, Human Rights in Malta, 1985, pp. 26–7. 344 TOM 27/02/81. 345 In-Nazzjon Tagħna 06/11/79, p. 1. 346 Interview with Dr M. Frendo. 347 C. Coliero, A Propitious Partner, Malta: PEG, 1997, pp. 96–9. 348 Scerri, The Saga of the Church Schools in Malta, pp. 166–77.

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349 A. Smith, ‘Malta: From NATO Base to Libyan Outpost’, in Malta and the Security of the Mediterranean Region, 1986. 350 R. C. Macrides, Greek Politics at the Crossroad: What Kind of Socialism?, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1984, pp. 1–2; and I. Sunar and S. Sayari, in G. O’Donnell, P. Schmitter and L. Whitehead (eds), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, p. 165. 351 DO 220/47 Sikes to Dodson 23/06/64. 352 O’Malley and Craig, The Cyprus Conspiracy, p. xi. 353 Ibid., p. 97. 354 J. N. Rosenau (ed.), Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems, American Political Science Review, New York:Free Press, 1969.

Chapter 5 1 M. S. Eagle, ‘Cultural Aspects of Disputing’, PCR Paper Series: 1987–2. Program on Conflict Resolution, University of Hawaii, 1987, pp. 1–20. 2 DO220/39 Incidents from 21st–31st December 1963 – DO220/47 Cyprus Situation 12–18/05/64 List of Turkish missing since 11 May. 3 The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Houses of Commons in their report on Cyprus published in 1987 in Necatigil, ‘The Cyprus Conflict in International Law’, in C. H. Dodd (ed.), The Political Economic and Social Development of Northern Cyprus, Cambridgeshire: Eothen Press, 1993, p. 51. 4 S. R. Sonyel, Cyprus: The Destruction of a Republic. British Documents 1960–1965, Cambridgeshire: Eothen Press, 1997, p. 61. 5 DEFE/11/397 To Commonwealth Relations Office 13/01/64. 6 Ibid. 7 The Buffer Zone – also called ‘the Green Line’ – extends approximately 180 km across the island. In some parts of old Nicosia it is only a few metres wide, while in other areas it is a few kilometres wide. Its northern and southern limits are the lines where the belligerents stood following the ceasefire of 16 August 1974, as recorded by UNFICYP. https://unficyp.unmissions.org/about-buffer-zone. 8 DO220/47 Copy of Kutchik’s letter to Makarios and Makarios’s reply. 9 C. H. Dodd, ‘Cyprus in Turkish Politics and Foreign Policy’, in C. D. Dodd (ed.), Cyprus: The Need for New Perspectives, Cambridgeshire: Eothen Press, 1999, p. 113. 10 DO220/47 Copy of Kutchik’s letter to Makarios. 11 Applying the doctrine of necessity, Necatigil, ‘The Cyprus Conflict in International Law’, p. 59; and DO220/48 CW Relations Office Tel 21/10/64. 12 DO220/9 Denktash to Sandys 06/02/64 and UN Security council resolution of 1964 in Dodd, Cyprus: The Need for New Perspectives, p. 131; and DEFE 11/398. 13 S. R. Sonyel, ‘New Light on the Genesis of the Conflict: British Documents 1960–67’, in Dodd, Cyprus: The Need for New Perspectives, p. 37. 14 As was acknowledged in the Geneva declaration of 30 July 1974, in Necatigil, ‘The Cyprus Conflict in International Law’, p. 61. 15 Ibid., p. 53. 16 DEFE11/398 Tel 249 to CW Relations Office 20/01/64. 17 Necatigil, ‘The Cyprus Conflict in International Law’, pp. 51–2. 18 DEFE11/398 From Nicosia to Athens 20 and 21/01/64.

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19 DO220/47 CW Relations Office Tel 26/05/64. 20 Mizzi, Malta in the Making, p. 436. 21 Ibid. p. 429, 455; Pirotta, L-Istorja Kostituzzjonali U L-Isfond Storiku, Vol. 2, pp. 290– 307; E. Fenech Adami, Nagħtik Kelmti, P.I.N. 1989/90/91, Vols 2, 3, 4. 22 Mizzi, Malta in the Making, p. 447; Fenech Adami, Nagħtik Kelmti, P.I.N. 1991, p. 45. 23 Mizzi, Malta in the Making, p. 447; Pirotta, L-Istorja Kostituzzjonali U L-Isfond Storiku, Vol. 2, p. 301. 24 Ibid. 25 DO220/45 COS Meeting 19/06/64. 26 D220/39 Consultation between the Guarantor Powers and DO220/45 The Origin of the Present Tripartite Force 30/01/64. 27 D220/39 Incidents from 21st –31st December. 28 FO371/174747 From UK to NATO 06/02/64. 29 O’Malley and Craig, The Cyprus Conspiracy, p. 104. 30 DO220/9 Telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office 09/02/64. 31 DO220/47 CW Relations Office Tel 04/06/6/4. 32 DO220/45 Cyprus Update 12/09/64. 33 DO220/47 CW Relations Office Tel 03/06/6/4. 34 FO371/174747 Dodson to Rennie 03/02/64. The United States stated that if the archbishop went to the UN the United States would (1) state that it was not a question of independence but dispute between two groups in a state, (2) insist that the dispute be heard by the Security Council, (3) place the full blame on Makarios, (4) oppose any peacekeeping operation and (5) do nothing if Turkey intervened. 35 DO220/45 The Origin of the Present Tripartite Force 30/01/64. 36 Clerides, Cyprus: My Deposition, Vol. 2, p. 95. 37 DO220/9 Cyprus Conference 16/01/64. 38 Clerides, Cyprus: My Deposition, Vol. 2, pp. 107–12. 39 Ibid.; and DO220/9 Meeting with Turkish Government 24/01/64. 40 DO220/47 CW Relations Office Tel 15/06/64. 41 DO220/47 To JIC from JIG 09/06/64. 42 DO220/47 CW Relations Office Tel 08/06/64. 43 DO220/47 S.I.G. CY 649/28 28/07/74. 44 DEFE11/397 To CW Relations Office 12/01/64. 45 DEFE11/398 Athens to Ankara secret 24/01/64. 46 Hitchens, Hostage to History, Chapters 2–3. 47 DEFE11/397 Importance of the Cyprus Base. 48 DO220/9 Commonwealth Secretary’s Talks with Senator Fulbright 05/05/64 ‘of the danger of Cyprus becoming another Cuba . . . attraction of enosis which would be much better than an independent communist Cyprus’. 49 FO371/174747 Khrushchev to the British PM 7/2/64. Complaining about the unconcealed intervention in the internal affairs of Cyprus and the denial of its sovereign rights and breaching of its independence and DO220/47 CW Relations Office Tel 22/06/64 ‘Russia is ready to give Cyprus 30 million in aid’. 50 DO220/45 Sir Bishop on the Situation in Cyprus. 51 Mizzi, Malta in the Making, p. 444. 52 TOM 09/03/86 Libreri, Dr Cassar on Reform. 53 TOM 09/11/86 Malta–US Relations. 54 Foreign Interference in Malta Issued by the Socialist Parliamentary Delegation to the Council of Europe. Interprint, Malta, 1982.

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55 The European currency unit, abbreviated as ECU, was the former currency unit of the European Communities, from its adoption on 13 March 1979 (replacing the ‘European Unit of Account’) to its own replacement by the euro on 1 January 1999, at a ratio of 1:1. The ECU was composed of a basket of currencies of the European Communities Member States and it served as the standard monetary unit of measurement of the market value/cost of goods, services or assets in the European Communities, thus constituting the cornerstone of the European Monetary System (EMS). https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/ Glossary:European_currency_unit_%28ECU%29. 56 R. Pace, Microstate Security in the Global System: EU–Malta Relations, Malta: Midsea, 2001. p. 172. 57 TOM 16/03/86 J. Fenech, Let’s Be Prepared & 12/12/86 D Mintoff Government Prepared to Enact Necessary Legislation before the End of the Year. 58 TOM 12/12/86 Opposition Ready to Sign Agreement. 59 B. Cartier, ‘Violation of Human Rights in Malta’, in International Security Council, Malta and the Security of the Mediterranean Region, 1986, pp. 58–59; and International Helsinki Federation, Human Rights in Malta, 1988, pp. 19–25. 60 International Helsinki Federation, Human Rights in Malta, 1988, pp. 18–25. 61 Mizzi, Malta in the Making, p. 445. 62 TOM 06/07/86, p. 16. 63 TOM 11/01/83 and Mizzi, Malta in the Making, pp. 445–51. 64 Ibid. 65 Mizzi, Malta in the Making, pp. 445–51. 66 DO220/45 Sir Barrett on the Situation in Cyprus. 67 Sonyel, Cyprus: The Destruction of a Republic, p. 81. Both the British and the Americans were encouraging Turkey and Greece to start direct negotiations with a view to getting rid of Makarios and solving the Cyprus problem through double enosis; O’Malley and Craig, The Cyprus Conspiracy, pp. 113–19. The British and the Americans began colluding to support Turkish attempts to separate the two communities and create partition. 68 Clerides, Cyprus: My Deposition, Vol. 2, p. 138; Hitchens, Hostage to History, p. 61. 69 For details of the plan and reactions to it read Clerides, Cyprus: My Deposition, pp. 152–78; Hitchens, Hostage to History, pp. 66–8. 70 O’Malley and Craig, The Cyprus Conspiracy, p. 110. 71 Ibid. 72 DO220/48 CW Relations Office Tel 21/10/64. 73 DO220/48 CW Relations Office Tel 29/09/64. 74 DO220/11 Diggens 15/10/65. 75 FCO27/68 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Memo 67. 76 Declared formally 12 January 1968. 77 DEFE11/397 From Athens to FO 15/01/64. 78 DO220/47 Makarios Interviewed by TASS 14/05/64. 79 DO220/11 P.B. Lewis 31/01/66. 80 Ibid. 81 DO220/11 Declaration of the AKEL congress 6/3/66. 82 Clerides, Cyprus: My Deposition, Vol. 2, p. 179. 83 Hitchens, Hostage to History, p. 65. 84 Dodd, p. 103 in Dodd, The Political Economic and Social Development of Northern Cyprus.

Notes 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121

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FCO27/68 MOD 26/07/67. FCO27/68 Top Secret. FCO27/68 Moscow to Foreign Office 05/07/67. FCO9/1671 From M.G. Mac Donald 01/11/73. FCO9/1363 Cyprus A Summary 25/03/71. FCO9/1664 British High Commission to S. European Depart 06/03/73. EOKA-B was a Greek-Cypriot paramilitary organization formed in 1971 by General Georgios Grivas. See www.hellenicaworld.com/Cyprus/History/en/EOKA. html. FCO9/1495 Diplomatic Report 06/12/71. A. Smith, ‘Malta: From NATO Base to Libyan Outpost’, in International Security Council, Malta and the Security of the Mediterranean Region, Milan, 1986, p. 27. TOM 09/11/86 Two Obstacles in Malta–US Relations; Security Ties with Libya and Problems of Democracy. R. F. Sola, ‘Malta in the Moscow–Beijing–Pyongyang Triangle’, in International Security Council, Malta and the Security of the Mediterranean Region, Milan, 1986, p. 50. Ibid., p. 47. E. J. Spiteri, Malta: An Island in Transition. Maltese Economic History 1954–1974, Malta: Progress Press, 1997, p. 283. R. Findlay and S. Wellisz (eds), The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity and Growth: Five Small Open Economies, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 256–92. TOM 09/11/86 Two Obstacles in Malta–US Relations; Security Ties with Libya and Problems of Democracy. Foreign Interference in Malta 1982, p. 15. Smith, ‘Malta: From NATO Base to Libyan Outpost’, p. 25. Boswell, in P. Heywood (ed.), Distorting Democracy: Political Corruption in Spain, Italy and Malta, Bristol: Centre of Mediterranean Studies, 1994, pp. 27–39. TOM 24/05/86 The Democratic Process. TOM 01/06/86 Confrontation Seeds. TOM 15/02/86 U.S. Government’s Report on Human Rights in Malta. M. Montebello and R. Borg, The Case of Church Schools in Malta, B.Ed. Hons, 1989, University of Malta, pp. 23–6. TOM 15/02/86 U.S. Government’s Report on Human Rights in Malta. TOM 23/6/86 M. Frendo Third Report on Human Rights in Malta. International Helsinki Federation, Human Rights in Malta, 1988. Ibid., p. 8; and STOM 15/06/86 Roamer’s Column. TOM 18/04/86 ILO Report Criticises Government Attitude towards MUT Members. TOM 10/12/86 Malta in ICFTU Survey on Violation of TU Rights. TOM 25/04/86 ILO Trade Union Rights of Worker Students. TOM 04/05/86 A Double Beating from the ILO. D. Borg, Libertà Mhedda, Malta: P.I.N., 2002, p. 29. Mizzi, Malta in the Making, p. 451. Borg, Libertà Mhedda, p. 67. TOM 27/04/86 Dr J. Muscat’s Decision on the Next Election. TOM 13/04/86 Letter from Josie Muscat’s Wife. TOM 04/05/86 The Josie Affair. STOM 15/06/86 Roamer’s Column.

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122 P. G. Polyviou, Cyprus in Search of a Constitution: Negotiations and Proposals 1960– 1975. Nicosia: Chr. Nicolaou and Sons, 1976, pp. 243–6. 123 FCO9/1679 British Embassy to S. European Depart 12/01/72: ‘the majority in both communities want a solution quickly.’ 124 F. Mirbagher. Cyprus and International Peacekeeping, London: C. Hurst, 1998, p. 58. 125 Ibid., p. 256. 126 Polyviou, Cyprus in Search of a Constitution, p. 249. 127 Clerides, Cyprus: My Deposition, Vol. 2, p. 235. 128 Ibid., p. 237. 129 F. Mirbagheri, Cyprus and International Peacemaking, London: C. Hurst, 1998, p. 59. 130 Clerides, Cyprus: My Deposition, Vol. 2, p. 264. 131 Ibid., p. 272. 132 TOM 16/03/86 Let’s Be Prepared. TOM 24/05/86 Democratic Process. 133 Mizzi, Malta in the Making, p. 447. 134 TOM 13/01/86 PN Leader Warns of Consequences. 135 TOM 29/04/86 PN MP Reveals Main Points of Draft Agreement. 136 Mizzi, Malta in the Making, p. 454. 137 TOM 29/04/86 Nationalist MP Reveals Main Points of Draft Agreement. 138 TOM 04/05/86 J Fenech Dr Josie Muscat’s Initiative on Constitutional Changes. 139 TOM 12/01/86 Frendo M. Protecting the Individual – Hielsa Proposals on Human Rights. 140 TOM 07/04/86 Azzopardi, The Protection of Human Rights in Malta Today. 141 Mizzi, Malta in the Making, pp. 459–60. 142 TOM 06/02/86 Dialogue with the Vatican. 143 TOM 09/02/86 PM Three-Hour Meeting with Dr Kriesky and Major Jalloud; TOM 22/01/86 PM Flies to Palermo to Give Gaddafi’s Message to Craxi. 144 TOM 15/04/86 Gaddafi Calls for Med Conference & Malta Appeals for Restraint and Prudence at the UN. 145 STOM 19/01/86 Roamer’s Column. 146 TOM 20/01/86 Terrorist Attacks on Rome and Vienna Airport. 147 TOM 31/05/86 Saturday Commentary. 148 TOM 14/02/86 Way Now Clear for EEC – Malta Preparation. 149 TOM 15/02/86 EEC Funds to Help Malta. 150 TOM 05/05/86 Amazing Progress in Malta–EEC Relations. 151 TOM 19/03/85 More Fence Mending. 152 TOM 18/03/86 Maltese-German Relations. 153 TOM 21/11/86 Malta–Italy Sign Aid Pact. 154 TOM 11/05/86 Only Limited Recognition Granted for Malta’s MDs. 155 TOM 17/07/86 Case against Massimo Gorla. 156 TOM 24/07/86 Bill Amending Foreign Interference Act. 157 TOM 29/06/86 US Congressman on Fate of Democracy in Malta. 158 TOM 26/03/86 Report on Lino Spiteri’s Speech. 159 TOM 02/11/86 Government to Remove 1984 Licensing Conditions. 160 TOM 14/11/86 Vatican and Malta Start Study of Problem. 161 Ibid., Government reintroduces St Paul’s Feast. 162 Clerides, Cyprus: My Deposition, Vol. 3, Chapter 7. 163 FCO9/1370 High Commissioner Meets Kutchuk 07/01/71. 164 FCO 9/1369 Hooper to Seconde 8/9/71 and FCO Tel 620 13/08/71. 165 FCO9/1369 Miles to Wilberforce 03/03/71.

Notes 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186

187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208

225

Clerides, Cyprus: My Deposition, Vol. 2, p. 361. Clerides, Cyprus: My Deposition, Vol. 3, p. 131. FCO9/1495 Mac Donald to Fearn 16/06/72. Funded by Athens Ibid. FCO9/1495 The Observer 02/10/72. FCO9/1369 Hooper to Seconde 8/9/71 & FCO Tel 620 13/8/71. Ibid. FCO9/1664 Mac Donald to Davis 01/11/73. FCO9/1664 Vice-Presidential Elections 22/02/73. FCO9/1671 Turkish-Cypriot Political Parties 12/09/73. Polyviou, Cyprus in Search of a Constitution, p. 256. FCO9/1495 To FCO Tel 899 06/12/72. Mirbagheri, Cyprus and International Peacemaking, p. 70. Ibid., p. 81. Ibid., p. 68. O’Malley and Craig, The Cyprus Conspiracy, p. 141; and FCO9/1366 Secret 16/02/71. Polyviou, Cyprus in Search of a Constitution, p. 194. Ibid., p. 195. Clerides, Cyprus: My Deposition, Vol. 3, Chapter 5. Rebus Sic Stantibus: According to this principle (understood in a broad sense), extraordinary circumstances can lead to the termination of a treaty. These circumstances can consist either in a material breach of a given treaty by one of the state’s parties (Article 60), in a permanent disappearance of an object indispensable for the execution of the treaty (Article 61) or in a fundamental change of circumstances (Article 62, clausula rebus sic stantibus understood in a narrow sense). The Principles of International Treaty Law: www.walter.gehr.net/rebusstantibus.html. FCO9/1495 Jameson to Wilberforce 26/01/72. FCO9/1495 The Observer 02/10/72. Clerides, Cyprus: My Deposition, Vol. 3, p. 163. Cyprus Times 11/1/70 Drastic Law to Curb Terror. FCO9/1668 Cyprus Internal Situation 02/04/73. FCO9/1681 Cyprus Internal Situation. FCO9/1681 F.O. Tel 403 07/10/73. FCO9/1680 Cyprus WSC 01/11/73. FCO9/1664 Turkish-Cypriot Mission to Arab Countries 13/09/73. FCO9/1671 From M.G .Mac Donald 05/12/73. TOM 21/05/86 Mintoff on Talks on Constitutional Change. TOM 22/05/86 Way to an Agreement Is Open. Mizzi, Malta in the Making, pp. 462–4. TOM 29/05/86 Direct Consultations. TOM 31/05/86 Argus: Saturday Commentary. TOM 01/06/86 M. Vella Confrontations Seeds. TOM 06/06/86 Communist Party Election Proposals. TOM 02/10/86 PM Winds Up Debate on Electoral Commission’s Report TOM 01/12/86 22 Injured in Clashes. TOM Ibid. PN Leader Lays Responsibility on PM. TOM 03/12/86 Shots Fired at Tarxien Club & Police Constable Charged. TOM 05/12/86 Yard Workers Demonstrations.

226 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240

Notes TOM 06/12/86 Man Shot Dead in Gudja. Ibid. Police officer found guilty of illegal arrest. TOM 07/12/86 Joe Fenech. TOM 10/12/86 Fenech Adami Accuses PM of Abdicating Responsibility. Ibid. PM Leader on Zejtun Incidents. TOM 02/12/86 Piccoli Wants Guarantees of Democracy in Malta. TOM 05/12/86 DC Members Question Italian Government on Malta. TOM 16/12/86 CD Concern over Violence in Malta. FCO9/1668 F.O. Tel 164 9/4/73 and Cyprus The Internal Situation April 73. FCO9/1668 The Internal Situation in the Pre-Election Period 12/2/73. FOC9/1665 Interview with Makarios 31/07/73. FCO9/1671 The Turkish-Cypriot Scene 06/06/73. FCO9/1665 Interview with Denktash 03/08/73. Cyprus Times 10/01/70 Drive against Illegal Arms. Polyviou, Cyprus in Search of a Constitution, pp. 254–6. Guardian 02/02/73; Polyviou, Cyprus in Search of a Constitution, p. 200. Polyviou, Cyprus in Search of a Constitution, p. 200. In December 1973, the Turkish proposals on regional autonomy were submitted which could not but be regarded as an effort to undermine the talks. Polyviou, Cyprus in Search of a Constitution, p. 201. Ibid., Chapter vi. Clerides, Cyprus: My Deposition, Vol. 3, p. 15. Clerides, Cyprus: My Deposition, Vol. 2, p. 19. TOM 02/12/86 Bishop Calls for Tolerance; and TOM 8/12/86 Massive Crowd Pay Last Respects. TOM 08/12/86 All Round Condemnation of Gudja Killing. TOM 07/12/86 Murder at PN Gudja Club. TOM 08/12/86 All Round Condemnation of Gudja Killing. TOM 10/12/86 Youths in Silent March against Violence. TOM 09/11/86 Malta’s Gravest Hour. TOM 24/12/86 Select Committee Agreement. TOM 10/11/86 PN Deadline to Select Committee. TOM 11/12/86 Fenech Adami Pleas for Agreement and Maltese Parliamentary Debates 10/12/86. Maltese Parliamentary Debates 11/12/86. Maltese Parliamentary Debates January 1987.

Chapter 6 1 Cyprus Mail 01/05/04 K. Pavlowitch, ‘Comment – The first Day of the Future’. 2 R. Pace, Microstate Security in the Global System: EU–Malta Relations, Malta: Midsea, 2001, p. 144. 3 P. Christou, The EU and Enlargement: The Case of Cyprus, New York: Macmillan, 2004, p. 64. 4 N. Tocci, EU Accession Dynamics and Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace or Consolidating Partition in Cyprus, Hampshire: Ashgate, 2004, p. 37. 5 J. S. Joseph, Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics, Macmillan: London, 1997, p. 53.

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6 J. S. Joseph, ‘Learning from the Past to Build a Better Future’, in S. Baier-Allen (ed.), Looking into the Future of Cyprus–EU Relations, Germany: Centre for European Integration Studies, 1999, pp. 135–6. 7 C. H. Dodd, ‘From Federated State to Republic 1975–1984’, in Dodd, The Political Economic and Social Development of Northern Cyprus. 8 A. Marco Turk, ‘Rethinking the Cyprus Problem: Are FrameBreaking Changes Still Possible through Application of Intractable Conflict Intervention Approaches to This Hurting Stalemate’, Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review, Vol. 29, 2007, 463. Available at: http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol29/iss3/. 9 H. Anastasiou, ‘Negotiating the Solution to the Cyprus Problem: From Impasse to Post Helsinki Hope’, The Cyprus Review, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2000; N. Salem (ed.), Cyprus: A Regional Conflict and Its Resolution, Ottawa: St Martin’s Press, 1992; C. H. Dodd, The Cyprus Imbroglio, Cambridge: Eothen Press, 1998. 10 Dodd, The Cyprus Imbroglio, p. 162. 11 O. P. Richmond and J. Kerlindsay (eds), The Work of the UN in Cyprus, London: Palgrave, 2001. 12 Dodd, The Cyprus Imbroglio, pp. 34–41; N. Peristianis, ‘A Federal Cyprus in a Federal Europe’, in A. Theophanous et al. (eds), Cyprus and the European Union, Nicosia: Intercollege, 1999; Two People and Two States in Cyprus at the Eleventh Hour. Proceedings of a seminar held at the Turkish Embassy in London, 16 February 2001. 13 This view is expressed in The Commission Opinion on the Application by the Republic of Cyprus for Membership doc/93/5–30 June 1993. 14 C. Brewin, The EU and Cyprus, Cambridgeshire: Eothen, 2000, pp. 30–56. 15 Ibid., pp. 56–60; and C. Brewin, ‘Reluctant Commitment: Past Aloofness and Present Problems in European Attitudes to Cyprus’, in A. Theophanous, A. N. Peristianis and A. Ioannou (eds), Cyprus and the European Union. Nicosia: Intercollege, 1999. 16 Brewin, EU and Cyprus, pp. 60–89. 17 C. Pollacco, Malta–EEC Relations, Msida: Mireva, 1992, pp. 36–45; and MISCO, The EC at the Crossroads, Malta: FOI, 1988, pp. 34–6. 18 Pace, Microstate Security in the Global System, p. 171. 19 Pollacco, Malta–EEC Relations, pp. 57–8. 20 MISCO, EC at the Crossroads, p. 36. 21 M. Frendo, Europe: The Case for Membership, Malta: Offset Press, 1996, p. 43; G. S. Yiangou, ‘The Accession of Cyprus to the EU: Challenges and Opportunities for the New European Regional Order’, Journal of Ethno-politics and Minority Issues in Europe, Issue 2, 2002, p. 2. 22 M. A. Tanti, ‘A Brief Report on the International Colloquium on Neutrality and Non-Alignment in the Post-Cold War Era – Malta 4–8 November 1991’, Id-Dritt Law Journal, Vol. xvi, 1991. 23 K. A. Eliassen (ed.), Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union, London: Sage, 1998. 24 Theophylactou, Security, Identity and Nation Building, p. 126; P. Tank, ‘Resolving the Cyprus Problem: Changing Perceptions of State and Societal Security’, European Security, Vol. 11, No. 3, Autumn 2002; S. C. Calleja, Looking Ahead: Malta’s Foreign Policy Agenda, Malta: Agenda, 2002, Chapter 2. 25 Pace, Microstate Security in the Global System, p. 159. 26 Frendo, Europe: The Case for Membership, p. 20; A. Sant, Malta’s European Challenge, Malta: SKS, 1995, p. 9.

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27 H. Kabaalioglu, ‘The Cyprus Situation and Dilemmas Created by the EU Approach’, in Two People and Two States in Cyprus at the Eleventh Hour, 2001. 28 Ibid., pp. 70, 82, 83; G. Christou, The EU and Enlargement: The Case of Cyprus, New York: Palgrave, Macmillan, 2004, p. 71. 29 Pace, Microstate Security in the Global System, p. 223. 30 Cyprus and the EU: The Turkish Cypriot View and Some Selected Articles. UN Association of North Cyprus, Lefkosa, 1996. 31 Sant, Malta’s European Challenge, Chapter 4. 32 Ginsborg, Italy, p. 239. 33 Tocci, EU Accession Dynamics and Conflict Resolution, p. 34; Van Coufoudakis, however, argues that Greece remained weak on the international circuit, and that she was the only NATO member whose sovereignty was threatened by irredentist claims in the post-Cold War period: V. Coufoudakis, ‘Greece, the Balkans and Issues of Security and Co-operation in the East Mediterranean’, in Theophanous and Coufoudakis (eds), Security and Co-operation in the Eastern Mediterranean, Nicosia: Intercollege, 1997. 34 Tocci, EU Accession Dynamics and Conflict Resolution, p. 65; Pace, Microstate Security in the Global System, p. 202. 35 Cyprus: A Special Case, Sheffield: 3C Initiative, 1997, pp. 30–40; and Pace, Microstate Security in the Global System, pp. 202, 210, 229. 36 S. P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of the World Order, New York: Touchstone Edition, 1997. 37 J. Shaw, ‘Enhancing Co-operation after Nice: Will the Treaty Do the Trick’, in P. G. Xuereb, The Future of the European Union: Unity in Diversity, Malta: PEG, 2002, pp. 97–113. 38 Commission Opinion on the Application by the Republic of/Cyprus Com (93) 313/Malta Com (93) 312 both published in June 1993. 39 Community Awareness and the European Union: Informing the Public about the EU, Accession and the Implications for Cyprus. A paper delivered by Patrick Brooks at a seminar organized by the Cyprus Association of Public Relations Professionals 09/12/98. 40 Ibid. 41 Pace, Microstate Security in the Global System, pp. 220–40. 42 Brewin, EU and Cyprus, p. 17; EP Secretariat Working Party Task Force Enlargement, Luxembourg 01/07/99 Briefing No 4 Malta and Relations with the EU, p. 7. 43 H. J. Axt, ‘The Island of Cyprus and the European Union’, in Dodd, Cyprus: The Need for New Perspectives, p. 178. 44 EP Secretariat, 01/07/99 Briefing No. 4 Malta and Relations with the EU, p. 7. 45 Council Regulation, (EC) No 555/2000. 46 Christou, EU and Enlargement, p. 77. 47 EP Secretariat 01/07/99 Briefing No. 4 Malta and Relations with the EU, p. 14. 48 Council Regulation (EC) No 555/2000 in accordance with procedures set out in regulation (EC) No 622/98 for the applicant states of East and Central Europe. 49 OFF Pub EC 2454/98/6 Report of the Working Group on the Eastward enlargement of the EU: Preparing for the Acquis Communautaire, EUI Italy, 1998, pp. 3–4. 50 Commission Opinion on the Application by the Republic of/Cyprus Com (93) 313/Malta Com (93) 312 both published in June 1993. 51 Commission Report COM (1999) 502 Final – Cyprus – COM (1999) 69 Final – Malta.

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52 F. Cameron, ‘Cyprus and the EU: The Next Steps’, in Baier-Allen, Looking into the Future of Cyprus–EU Relations, p. 21. 53 Commission Report COM (1999) 69 Final – Malta. 54 Commission Report COM (1999) 502 Final – Cyprus. 55 For economic indicators refer to the Eurochambers National Report on Cyprus. EES 2005. For economic outlook, pre-accession refers to ‘The Challenges of the Cypriot Economy in the Process of Accession to the EU’, presentation by Mr Antonio Malaos, director of the EIC, at the summer school on ‘The Future of Europe’, September 2002. 56 Commission Report COM (1999) 502 Final. 57 Tocci, EU Accession Dynamics and Conflict Resolution, p. 72. 58 Commission Report COM (1999) 502 Final. 59 EP (113/1/4) Briefing nos 1 update nos 4, p. 15. 60 EP 167.350/rev3 01/07/99 Briefing nos 4, p. 8. 61 M. Jerch, ‘Reforming Mediterranean and Middle Eastern Countries: Wider Europe, Greater Middle East or the Alexandria Settlement? A Critical Assessment’, in P. G. Xuereb, The European Union and the Mediterranean: The Mediterranean’s European Challenge, Vol. V, Malta: EDRC, 2004, pp. 149, 162. 62 EP resolution on the progress made by each of the candidate countries towards accession COM (2002) 700. 63 EU Business 15/03/2004 Malta, Italy, agree enhanced defence pact; and A. Theophanous, ‘Necessary Conditions for Stability in the East Mediterranean: The Case of Cyprus’; and P. Tzermias, ‘A United Cyprus as a Factor of Stability in the Mediterranean’, in Theophanous and Coudoudakis, Security and Co-operation. 64 S. Calleja, Navigating Regional Dynamics in the Post Cold War World: Patterns of Relations in the Mediterranean Area, Hants: Dartmouth, 1997, pp. 147, 194, 200; and R. Pace, ‘Enlargement and the Mediterranean Dimension of the European Union: The Role of Cyprus’, in Theophanous et al., Cyprus and the European Union, pp. 29–34. 65 Tank, ‘Resolving the Cyprus Problem’; H. T. Oguzlu, ‘Is the Latest Turkish-Greek Détente Promising for the Future?’ European Security, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2003. 66 Pace, Microstate Security in the Global System, pp. 214–20. 67 S. C. Calleja, ‘Malta’s Foreign Policy in an Enlarged European Union’, in P. G. Xuereb (ed.), The Future of the European Union: Unity in Diversity, Malta: P.E.G., 2002, p. 212. 68 The 1999 Commission Report indicated a preoccupation with Malta’s neutral status. 69 However, both Oguzlu, ‘Is the Latest Turkish-Greek Détente Promising for the Future?’; and N. G. Loizides, ‘Greek-Turkish Dilemmas and the Cyprus EU Accession Process’, Vol. 33, No. 4, 2002, argue that this is not sufficient. 70 Commission Report COM (1999) 69 Final – Malta. 71 Commission Report COM (1999) 502 Final – Cyprus. 72 Tocci, EU Accession Dynamics and Conflict Resolution, pp. 70–1. 73 Brewin, EU and Cyprus, Chapter 2. 74 ‘Turkish Cypriot Memorandum Addressed to the Council of Ministers of the European Communities in Respect to an Application for Membership by the Republic of Cyprus’, in Cyprus and the EU: The Turkish Cypriot View and Some selected Articles; Lefkosa, 1996; and ‘Resolution by the Parliament of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 29/08/94’, in Historic Resolutions on the Cyprus Question, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. 75 Brewin, EU and Cyprus, pp. 56–60. 76 Tocci, EU Accession Dynamics and Conflict Resolution, pp. 70–1.

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77 See C. Dodd, Storm Clouds over Cyprus: A Briefing, Cambridgeshire: Eothen Press, 2001, p. 58, on the EP lack of sympathy for the Turkish Cypriot view; and H. Unal, ‘Implications on the EU-Turkish Relationship’, in Baier-Allen, Looking into the Future of Cyprus–EU Relations, p. 86: ‘The EU sounds like the mouthpiece of Athens.’ 78 H. Bagci, ‘Turkish Reactions to the EU Approach’, in Baier-Allen, Looking into the Future of Cyprus–EU Relations. 79 Cameron in Baier-Allen, Looking into the Future of Cyprus–EU Relations, p. 4. 80 T. Diez, ‘Cyprus and the EU as a Political and Theoretical Problem’, in T. Diez (ed.), The EU and the Cyprus Conflict, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000, p. 4. 81 Unal in Baier-Allen, Looking into the Future of Cyprus–EU Relations, p. 85: ‘The EU has not been an honest broker’; O. Richmond, ‘Ethno-Nationalist Debate and International Peacekeeping: The Case of Cyprus’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1999, argues that the EU has complicated the situation but it may also lead to a solution. 82 Malta Labour Party, Malta and the E.E.C: Labour’s Policy 1990; Sant, Malta’s European Challenge, Chapters 4, 5, 6, 7, 9. 83 M. Cini, ‘Malta and the European Union’, Department of European Studies, University of Loughborough, 14 November 2001; M. Cini, ‘Party Politics and Europe: The Case of Malta’, Department of Politics, University of Bristol, 15 May 2002. 84 MaltaToday 23/06/02 The Labourite Who Favours EU Membership and 06/05/01 Karmenu, the Euro-Sceptic Former Premier. 85 MaltaToday 26/01/01 EU Report Was a Quick Fix Says GWU Official. 86 These were available online on the GWU website (www.gwu.org.mt) but have now been removed; however, view ‘A Proposed Position Paper for the GWU: The Effects of the EU’s Common and Security Policy on the Maltese Worker’. www.maltatoday. com.mt/2002/0728/GWU%20%20EU%20CHPT%201.pdf. 87 MaltaToday 23/06/02 The Labourite Who Favours EU Membership and 06/05/01 Karmenu, the Euro-Sceptic Former Premier: ‘some 5% of labour voter support EU membership.’ 88 M. Cini, ‘The Maltese Referendum’, paper presented at the Political Studies Association (PSA) Annual Conference, 15–17 April 2003 [PSAMalta03.doc]. 89 D. Fenech, ‘The 2003 Maltese EU Referendum and General Election’, West European Politics, Vol. 26, Issue 3, July 2003, pp. 163–70. 90 TOM 12/11/05 Unconvincing Argument. 91 MaltaToday 21/03/04 When It Comes to Green Matters Malta Remains Unprepared; and 13/10/02 Lm40 Million Environmental Costs for 2004–2006 and 06/05/01 All Talk and No Action. 92 MaltaToday 05/08/61 The Historic Choice Ahead. 93 MaltaToday 26/05/02 PN and AD in Agreement on Broad Pro-EU Alliance. 94 MaltaToday 02/01/05 A Case of Shifting Sands – AD Got Nearly 10%; and EU Business 13/06/04 Voter in Malta Find Euro Vote to Their Liking. 95 Christou, The EU and Enlargement, pp. 108–21. 96 See ‘Joint Declarations between the Republic of Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ signed 28/12/95 and 20/01/97 in Historic Resolutions on the Cyprus Question, TRNC. 97 B. A. Yesilada, ‘Social Progress and Political Development in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ The Cyprus Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, Fall 1989; C. P. Ioannides, ‘Changing the Demography of Cyprus; Anatolian Settlers in the Turkish Occupied

Notes

98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105

106

107

108 109 110

111 112 113 114 115 116

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North’, in C. P. Ioannides (ed.), Cyprus: Domestic Dynamics, External Constraints, New York: Caratzas, 1992. Christou, The EU and Enlargement, pp. 108–21. Socialist world.net 23/01/03 Mass Protest Rocks Ruling Class www.socialistworld.net/ eng/2003/01/24cyprus.html. The Economist 18/12/03 A Glimmer of Hope. The Economist 29/04/04 An Ominous European Debut. Cyprus Mail 09/05/04 Why Cyprus Lost Its Referenda. The Economist 29/04/04 An Ominous European Debut. L. Whitehead (ed.), The International Dimension of Democratisation: Europe and the Americas, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 3–24. C. Lord, ‘Legitimacy, Democracy and the EU: When Abstract Questions Become Practical Policy Problems’, Policy paper 03/00 found at www.one-europe.ac.uk; D. Kochenov, ‘Behind the Copenhagen Façade: The Meaning and Structure of the Copenhagen Political Criteria of Democracy and the Rule of Law’, European Integration Online Paper, Vol. 8, No. 10, 2004, http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-010a. htm. N. Tocci, ‘EU Intervention in Ethno-Political Conflicts: The Case of Cyprus and Serbia-Montenegro’, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 9, 2004 – on the impact of accession and EU regulations on the Annan Plan and the behaviour of opposition elites. D. Kappeler, ‘Malta & the European Union: Experience in Maximizing Negotiating Capacity for Possible Entry into the Union’, presented for a colloquium on Diplomacy after 2000: Small States and Negotiating Space in the New International Trading Environment 08/10/96; and R. Pace, ‘The Experience of a Micro-State Negotiating with the EU: The Case of Malta’, Malta: EDRC, 2003. A. Weirer, ‘The Embedded Acquis Communautaire: Transmission Belt and Prism of New Governance’, Off Pub EC 1996/98/35; and ‘Preparing for the Acquis Communautaire’, Off Pub EC 2454/98/6. Refer to 2002 Regular Report on Malta/Cyprus Progress towards Accession {COM(2002)700/1407 Final}. (EC) No 555/2000 Pre-accession strategy for Malta and Cyprus and ‘Proposal for a Council Decision on the Principles, Priorities, Intermediate Objectives and Conditions Contained in the Accession Partnership with Malta/Cyprus’ (OJL68.16.3.2000). Phare was one of the main pre-accession assistance instruments for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (see https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/ policy/glossary/terms/phare_en). Malta/Cyprus – National Programmes for the Adoption of the Acquis 2001/2000. COM (2005) 64 Final – 2003 Report on Phare and Pre-Accession Instruments for Cyprus, Malta and Turkey. IP/03/786 03/06/03 The Commission Proposes a Goodwill Package to Bring Northern Part of Cyprus Closer to the EU: www.europa.eu.int/rapid/ pressReleasesAction.do. ‘Comprehensive Monitoring Report of the European Commission on the State of Preparedness for EU Membership of Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia’, 2003, pp. 20–3. C. Brewin, EU and Cyprus, p. 69.

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117 EP Working Party Task Force ‘Enlargement’ Luxembourg 18/03/99 EP (113/1/4) Briefing No 1. Cyprus and Membership of the EU, Update No. 4, p. 11 and the EU– Cyprus Joint Parliamentary Committee: www.parliament.cy/parliamenteng. 118 Prepared for the EP by DG for External Policies of the EU 03/03/04 Note on the Political and Economic Situation in Cyprus and Its Accession to the EU, p. 14. 119 EP (113/1/4) Briefing No 1, p. 11 and Europa – Enlargement: Candidate Country: Cyprus Country Profile, archived on 1 May 2004: www.europa.eu.int/ nlargement/cyprus. 120 1999 Regular Report from the Commission on Cyprus’ Progress towards Accession. 2003 – Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Cyprus’ Preparation for Membership. 121 1999 Regular Report from the Commission on Cyprus’ Progress towards Accession 2003 – Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Cyprus’ Preparation for Membership Administrative Reform in the Mediterranean Regions: Summary of Cyprus: http:// unpan.1.un.org/intradoc/groups 26/08/05. Report on Structural Reforms in Cyprus in the Context of the Cardiff Exercise, October 2004: www.mof.gov.cy. 122 2001/2 Regular Reports on Cyprus’ Preparation for Membership 2000 – Cyprus National Plan for the Adoption of the Acquis. 123 Ibid. 124 Pace, Microstate Security in the Global System, pp. 207–9. 125 E. Warrington, ‘The Europeanisation of Maltese Public Administration: Mirror Image, Laboratory or Paradigm?’ (unpublished draft), p. 5. 126 Malta National Plan for the Adoption of the Acquis – 2001, 2003 –Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Malta’s Preparation for Membership, and 2001/2 Regular Reports on Malta’s Progress towards Accession. 127 Local government was established in 1993 following the Maltese Parliament’s approval, on 30 June 1993, of the Local Councils Act, 1993 (Act No. XV of 1993). This law made it possible for local councils to be set up. Furthermore, it presently serves as a regulatory mechanism for Councils’ operation. The Local Councils Act was modelled on the European Charter of Local Self-Government, which the Maltese government had signed and ratified. 128 The MLP started off by being against local government and refused to field candidates for local elections. 129 R. Batley and G. Stoker (eds), Local Government in Europe: Trends and Developments. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991. 130 Malta COM (2002) 700 Final, Chapter 21 and Malta: Single Programming Document 2004–2006 pp. 152, 170. 131 Malta: Single Programming Document 2004–2006, Chapter 10. 132 Though the MLP refused to participate. 133 Malta: Single Programming Document 2004–2006, Chapter 10. Malta: National Plan for the Adoption of the Acquis 2001, Chapter 4. Malta COM (2002) 700 p15/16 and Refer to the Malta EU Information Centre for details of administrative setup of the negotiating process: www.mic.org.mt/Malta-EU/mlteu.htm. 134 Malta: National Plan for the Adoption of the Acquis, 2001, pp. 80–85. 135 Malta COM (2002) 700 Final and Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Malta’s Preparations for Membership. 136 Cyprus COM (2003) Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Cyprus’ Preparations for Membership. 137 ‘Comprehensive Monitoring Report of the European Commission on the State of Preparedness for EU Membership of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia,

Notes

138 139 140 141 142

143 144 145 146

147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161

233

Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia’, pp. 29–31 – Cyprus, pp. 37–9 – Malta. Commission Reports Cyprus 1993/1999. Cyprus COM (2002)/700 Final. Relations with Cyprus, archived 1 May 2004: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargment/ cyprus/index. Relations with Northern Cyprus, updated 29/07/03: www.europa.eu.int/scanplus/ leg/en. Office of the Coordinator for Harmonisation: www.eu-coordinator.gov.cy/ harmonisation (06/30/05). Denktash suspended bi-communal contacts on 26 December 1997 in response to the Luxembourg European Council conclusions. Refer to Brewin, EU and Cyprus, pp. 120–9. Commission Report Cyprus, 1999, pp. 4–5. Communication from the Commission: Ways of Promoting Economic Development in the Northern Part of Cyprus: http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex. Brewin, EU and Cyprus, pp. 119–21. Relations with Cyprus, archived 1 May 2004: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargment/ cyprus/index, pp. 7, 8; EU reactions to UN decisions, and on UN decision; C. H. Dodd, Storm Clouds over Cyprus: A Briefing, Cambridgeshire: Eothen, 2001, Chapter 3; and EP Note on the Political and Economic Situation in Cyprus and Its Accession to the EU 03/03/04, pp. 7–9. EP Note on the Political and Economic Situation in Cyprus and Its Accession to the EU 03/03/04, p. 8; and Report of the UN Secretary General on ‘his Mission of good offices in Cyprus 02/06/04’ and for Annan V: www.cyprus-un-plan.org. Report of the UN Secretary General on ‘his Mission of good offices in Cyprus 02/06/04’. Tocci, EU Accession Dynamics and Conflict Resolution, Chapter 7. Report of the UN Secretary General on ‘his Mission of good offices in Cyprus 02/06/04’ and Letter by the President of the Republic, Mr Tassos Papadopoulos to the UN Secretary General 07/06/04. EP – The Political and Economic Situation in Cyprus and Its Accession to the EU 03/03/04, p. 8. Commission Proposes Goodwill Package to Bring Northern Part of Cyprus Closer to the EU IP/03/786 03/06/03. Confidence Building Measures Announced by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus in the Commercial and Military Fields, Summer 2004, p. 2. EP – The Political and Economic Situation in Cyprus and Its Accession to the EU, 03/03/04, p. 8. www.cyprus-un-plan.org. Government allocated funds to different groups who used it to access or gain information on Brussels. EP Briefing No. 4 Malta and Relations with the EU, p. 13; and COMM 1999 (69), p. 5. Malta–EU Information Centre: The Results of Negotiations: www.mic.org.mt/ Malta-EU/results/results.htm. Council Decision on the Principles, Priorities, Intermediate Objectives and Conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with Malta/Cyprus. Treaty of Accession 2003 Protocol No. 10. EU Referenda results Malta: www.electionguide.org/resultsum/malta_EU_ref2003. htm.

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162 R. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier, ‘Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe’, Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2004. 163 S. Hix, The Political System of the European Union, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999, pp. 144–8 – EU impact on the class cleavage. 164 Theophylactou, Security, Identity and Nation Building, p. 126; Axelrod’s Logic: D. Carment and P. James, ‘Explaining Third Party Intervention in Ethnic Conflict: Theory and Evidence’, Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2000. 165 O. Richmond, ‘Ethno-Nationalist Debates and International Peacemaking: The Case of Cyprus’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1999. 166 F. Schimmelfennig and W. Wagner, ‘Preface: External Governance in the European Union’, Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2004. 167 In Malta the two most important union organizations, the GWU and the CMTU, are members of the ETUC. 168 Relations with Northern Cyprus: www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en. 169 Cyprus Mail 30/04/05 We Are Europeans Now! 170 Administrative Reform in the Mediterranean Region: Summary of Cyprus: http:// unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents. Report On Structural Reforms in Cyprus in the Context of the Cardiff Exercise: www.mof.gov.cy/mof. Improve Public Administration: Malta: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprises. 171 MaltaToday 20/06/04 Jubilation and Bitter Realism First Reactions from MEPs Elect. 172 MaltaToday 12/09/04 A Desperate Situation. 173 PM Talat’s Letter to EP President: Turkish Cypriots Should Be Represented at EP 31/05/04: www.trncinfo.com. 174 EU–Cyprus Joint Parliamentary Committee 29/09/03: Cyprus Preparation for the European elections in 2004. 175 Cyprus Mail 03/07/05 A Bad Week for Turkey Means a Bad Week for Cyprus. 176 PM Talat’s Letter to 24 EU Member Countries 01/06/04: www.trncinfo.com. 177 Cyprus Mail 16/05/04 Just What Kind of Solution Are We Looking For? 178 Commission Proposes Comprehensive Measures to End Isolation of Turkish Cypriot Community 07/07/04 IP/04/857. 179 Green Line Regulation for Cyprus (EC) No 866/2004. 180 Confidence Building Measures Announced by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus in the Commercial and Military Field, 2004. 181 Commission Decision of 07/07/04 on the Authorisation of the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of commerce (2004/604/EC). 182 Council Resolution (EC) No 293/2005. 183 Cyprus Mail 09/04/05 Turkey Welcomes Straw Comments on Trade and Direct Flights. 184 Foreign Affairs Committee of the United Kingdom Parliament Inquiry into UK policy towards Cyprus 15/03/2005. Memorandum by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus Regarding the Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the UK Parliament 22/02/05. 185 Cyprus Mail 20/02/05 Britain May Be Misbehaving but Why Call in the Demons? 186 Cyprus Mail 01/05/04 What Will Change for the Turkish Cypriots. 187 Memo by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus 22/02/05. 188 The Economist 24/02/05 Shadowed Northern Lights. 189 Site of the European Parliament – European Elections: www.elections2004.eu.int/ ep-election/sites/en/results1306/countries/mt/results/index.html.

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190 Di-ve News 06/07/05 – P. Cachia., Malta Ratifies Unanimously EU Constitution: www.di-ve.com/dive/portal/portal.jhtml?id=190152&pid=23. 191 Cyprus Mail 070/07/05 Small Step in EU-NATO Conundrum over Cyprus. 192 Cyprus Mail 09/12/04 Europe on Collision Course over Cyprus. 193 The ROC also threatened to block Turkish accession talks starting 3 October 2005; however, a compromise was reached. Cyprus Mail 02/09/05 EU Ponders Reply to Ankara. 194 N. Nancheva, Between Nationalism and Europeanisation: Narratives of National Identity in Bulgaria and Macedonia, Colchester: ECPR Press, 2016. 195 European Commission, Taxation and Customs Union; Infringement Cases by Country 2010–2013. ‘Decrease of Infringement Proceedings: Malta among the Three Best Performing European Union Member States’, The Malta Independent 02/10/2014. 196 ‘Malta’s Absorption Rate of EU Funds at a 100%’, MaltaToday 03/03/2017. ‘Over €800 Million Coming Through EU Structural Funds by 2020’, Cyprus Mail 24/10/2013. 197 D. Schembri, ‘Technocrats Time May Have Come’, Times of Malta 05/11/2011. 198 ‘Cyprus in Spotlight on Russian Money Laundering’, EU Observer 02/02/2016. 199 ‘Report Outlines EU Effects on Malta since Accession’, MaltaToday 27/06/2014. 200 G. Kyris, ‘The European Union and the Cyprus Problem: A Story of Limited Impetus’, European Journal of European Studies, Vol. 3, Issue 1, June 2012. 201 European Union Cyprus, Overview: https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/ countries/member-countries/cyprus_en. 202 European Union Assistance to the Turkish Cypriot Community, European Court of Auditors Special Report No 6, 2012. 203 Annex 2013 Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot Community: https://ec.europa. eu/info/sites/info/files/annex_c_2013_7969_tcc_2013_programme_en.pdf. 204 The eight chapters are the following: enterprise and industry, statistics, financial control, trans-European networks, consumer health protection, intellectual property law, science and research and company law. 205 Interviews in July 2008 with Academics and members of the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce. 206 G. Kyris, The Europeanisation of Contested Statehood: The EU in North Cyprus, London: Routledge, 2015. 207 Interviews in July 2008 with academics and members of the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce. 208 O. Gokcekus and J. Whitehead, Green-Line Regulation and Its Economic Implications in Cyprus, 2017. 209 See https://tradingeconomics.com/cyprus/gdp-growth. 210 A. C. Tasiran and B. Ozoglu, Northern Cyprus Economy Competitiveness Report, 2016–2017, Ktto, 2017. 211 France 24 Farmers Returning to the Cyprus Buffer Zone: www.24.com/ en/20121214-farmers-returning-cyprus-buffer-zone. 212 D. Jacobson et al., The Opening of Ledra Street/Locmaci Crossing in April 2008: Reactions from Citizens and Shopkeepers, PRIO Cyprus Centre Paper 2. 213 Will Cyprus Be Reunified? The Economist 01/16/2017. 214 The Human Rights Court ruled that the Commission is an effective system. 215 Interviews in July 2008 with academics and members of the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce. 216 Ibid.

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217 For further information on the office of the Ombudsman, refer to www.ombudsman. org.mt. 218 For further information on the National Audit office, refer to http://nao.gov.mt. 219 www.ombudsman.gov.cy/ombudsman/ombudsman.nsf/page05_en/page05_ en?OpenDocument#; www.audit.gov.cy/audit/audit.nsf/All/32A8663CE3FABC5CC2 258132003F952B/$file/ANNUAL%20REPORT%202014.pdf?OpenElement. 220 A. G. Passas and E. I. Katakalou, ‘The Cyprus EU Presidency “Riders on the Storm” ’, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 2012. 221 Interview with Ambassador Victor Camilleri from the Ministry for European Affairs Malta. 222 ‘Northern Cyprus Votes to Legalise Gay Sex’, The Guardian, 27 January 2014. 223 Freedom in the World 2015, North Cyprus. 224 Eurostat Statistics, May 2016. 225 TOM 04/11/05 Jesuits Warn against Calling Racism by Another Name. 226 Cyprus 2007 showed that foreign workers made up 17 per cent of the labour market. Figures fell after the crisis of 2011 but have started to increase again with a projected growth of 1.6 per cent for 2016. 227 European Economy – European Commission, No. 5, 2005 Economic Forecast, Autumn 2005. 228 ‘Steps Taken to Prepare North Cyprus for the Euro Currency’, Famagusta Gazette, 15 October 2015. 229 See joinup.ec.europa.eu. 230 Building Trust and Reconciliation in Cyprus: A Civil Society Toolkit, International NGO and Training Centre, 2011. The NGO Created an EU support team 2008–2011 to assist CSOs with applications; Kyris, The Europeanisation of Contested Statehood. 231 Building Trust and Reconciliation in Cyprus: A Civil Society Toolkit, International NGO and Training Centre, 2011. The NGO Created an EU support team 2008–2011 to assist CSOs with applications; Kyris, The Europeanisation of Contested Statehood. 232 Cyprus Mail 04/05/04 Real Reconciliation Begins through Business. 233 M. Blunden, ‘Managing Variety Issues in the Integration and Disintegration of States’, Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster, Spring 1997, Research Papers, No. 12.

Conclusion 1 Mark Twain, Following the Equator, Pudd’nhead Wilson’s New Calendar. 2 All were defeated or penetrated states; Huntington in The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. 3 J. Pridham, Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991, p. 212. 4 There is no precise definition of Southern Europe, but it is normally taken to consist of Spain, Portugal, Andorra, France, Monaco, Italy, San Marino, Malta, Cyprus, Croatia, Serbia, Albania, Montenegro, Greece and Turkey. 5 Europeanization ‘is a contested and often rather ill-used concept. In the broadest of senses, Europeanisation refers to the impact of EU membership (and more concretely EU policies and decisions) on its member states (and, for that matter,

Notes

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7

8 9 10 11 12 13

14

15 16 17 18 19 20

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Note on internet sources The internet sources quoted here were primarily accessed in May and June 2005 and May and June 2016 and were correct when quoted. Most of the internet links quoted remain valid. However, a few may have expired. In the case of some EU documentation, these may have been moved to archived sites. However, the majority of these sources can also be obtained in hard-copy format and the required location details to do so are given.

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283

Times of Malta (TOM) www.timesofmalta.com/core/index.php The World Post, 2014. www.di-ve.com/dive/portal/portal.jhtml?id=190152&pid=23 Interviews Interviews with academics and members of the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce, July 2008. Interview with Ambassador Victor Camilleri from the Ministry for European Affairs, Malta, 2013.

INDEX AAPSO see Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) accession 44, 139–42, 144–5, 149–56 Acquis Communautaire 46, 139–41, 144–5, 147, 149, 168 ACT see Euro Assistance Co-ordination Task Force (ACT) AD see Alternattiva Demokratika (AD) Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) 82, 94, 103 Aid Regulation 389/2006 156 AKEL movement 54, 57–8, 60–1, 79, 86, 89, 101, 114, 143 Allen, Dennis 95 Alternattiva Demokratika (AD) 143 American Revolution 18 Anglicization 54 Annan plans 143, 150–1, 154 anti-clerical sentiment 32 anti-communism 86 Atlantic Alliance (NATO) 37 authoritarian model and four-and-a-half-player model 41–2 home-grown 32–3 imported 33–4 international climate 42–4 and island micro states 34 overview 29 post-authoritarian model 44–5 postcolonial model 46 post-truth phase 46–8 premodern phase 31–2 regime types 30–1 Averoff, Evangelos 63, 72 AVICENNE 148 Berlin Wall 14 bi-communal projects 150 Blanco, Carrero 11 Boffa, Paul 59 Bonnici, Mifsud 94

Borg Olivier government 68 Bouzayen, Sadok 69 Brexiteers 170 ‘Britain’s Coup D’État’ 96 British Foreign and Commonwealth Office 125 British Labour Party 69 British 1956 White Paper 56 Broadcasting Commission 119 Bruneau, T. C. 9 Business Promotion Act 151 Buttigieg, Anton 69 Cardona, Wistin 120 carrot-and-stick formula 144 Caruana, Raymond 130, 132 Cassola, Arnold 143 Central Intelligence Service (CIS) 117 CFSP see Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Christian Workers Party 59–60 Church–State conflict 87–8 CIS see Central Intelligence Service (CIS) CITA see Cyprus Inland Telecommunications Authority (CITA) Clark, Arthur 97 Clerides, G. 72, 86, 111, 122, 131, 143, 149 CMTU strike 99, 120 Cold War 12, 14–15, 17, 35–7, 43–4, 105, 135, 137, 164–6 Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865 55 colonial model and four-and-a-half-player model 40–1 international climate 42–4 and island micro states 34 overview 29 post-authoritarian model 44–5 postcolonial model 46 post-truth phase 46–8 premodern phase 31–2 regime types 30–1

286

Index

Commission Report of 1999 140–1 Common Agricultural Policy 157 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 140, 145 Communist Party (CP) 129 conflict resolution breakdown of talks 127–9 communal talks 121–4 Cyprus in 1964 and Malta in 1981 110–12 external actors 113–15 last-ditch attempts 131–3 during mediation 115–21 overview 109 rising violence 129–31 constitutional revision in Cyprus 94–6 in Malta 92–4 constitutional settlement in Cyprus 85–7 in Malta 87–8 Constraints of International Negotiations 19 Cooper, R. 170 Co-ordination Committee for the Enosis Struggle (ESEA) 126 Copenhagen criteria 46, 144, 167–8 Council of Europe 40, 114 Council of Ministers 137 Council Regulation 866/2004 154 Aid Regulation 389/2006 156 77/388/EEC 154 No 555/2000 139, 145 No 866/2004 154 CP see Communist Party (CP) CTP see Turkish-Cypriot Party (CTP) Cypriot Confederation of Labour (SEK) 101 Cypriot National Guard 105 Cyprus in 1964 110–12 collapse of democratic government in 83 constitutional revision in 94–6 constitutional settlement in 85–7 and EU membership suitability 139–41 failure to compromise, coercive action and counter state 100–2 lack of consensus 64–7 negotiation process (see conflict resolution) in postcolonial phase 82–3

role of external players in 88–90, 96–8, 103–6, 113–15 transition to independent government (see independent government transitions, in Cyprus and Malta) working and living with constitution 83–5 Cyprus Academy of Public Administration 146 Cyprus Inland Telecommunications Authority (CITA) 66 Cyprus is Turkish Party (CTP) 57 Dahl, R. A. 21 Dahl’s hypothesis 4–5 Debono, Nardu 99 Delayed External scenario 16 Democratic Nationalist Party (DNP) 59 Democratic Party (PDM) 129 Democratic Union 65, 72 democratization 1–26, 29–50, 79, 83, 140, 153, 163–72 progression/regression 156–61 Diamandouros, N. 13, 20 Di Palma 9, 18–19 DNP see Democratic Nationalist Party (DNP) EAC see Electricity Authority of Cyprus (EAC) Eastern Bloc 73 EC see European Economic Community EC–Cyprus Parliamentary Committee 145 ECHR see European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) ECJ see European Court of Justice (ECJ) Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 3 Economist 23 EDEK see Movement for Social Democracy (EDEK) Edles, L. D. 9 EDMA see National Democratic Front of Fighters (EDMA) Education Act (2001) 148 EEC see European Economic Community (EEC) EFTA see European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Electricity Authority of Cyprus (EAC) 66

Index 11 February Zurich Declaration 63 elitist approach 5–6, 14–15 elitist school 7–9 Employment Commission 119 Employment Training Corporation (ETC) 148 EMU see Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe (Pridham) 14 Environmental Statistics Programme 147 EOKA see National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) EPC see European Political Cooperation (EPC) Erkin, Feridun Cemal 96 ESEA see Co-ordination Committee for the Enosis Struggle (ESEA) Essen Summit 144 ETC see Employment Training Corporation (ETC) Ethier, D. 16 EUCD see European Union Christian Democrats (EUCD) EU membership and Acquis 144–5 changing conditions 137–8 commission feedback 148–9 democratization progression/regression 156–61 divergent views on 141–2 history of 135–7 impact on party systems 142–4 Malta and Cyprus suitability 139–41 process of 138–9 and state transformation 145–8, 152–6 structured dialogue 145–8 Euro Assistance Co-ordination Task Force (ACT) 148 European Community Scholarship 151 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 123–4 European Court of Human Rights 119, 159 European Court of Justice (ECJ) 142 European Economic Community (EEC) 36, 135, 164–5 Malta-EEC relations 125, 137, 146 European Federation of Green Parties 143

287

European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 13 European Institute of Cyprus 149 European Parliament 114, 137, 139, 143, 153, 155 European Political Cooperation (EPC) 104 European System of Accounts 147 European Union Christian Democrats (EUCD) 130 European Union Programme Unit 148 EUROPOL 148 Eurozone 24 external players, in Cyprus compromise, coercive action and counter state 103–6 and conflict resolution 113–15 and constitutional revision 96–8 and constitutional settlement 88–90 micro climate and elitist approach 14–17 and UN 69–70 external players, in Malta compromise, coercive action and counter state 98–100 and conflict resolution 113–15 and constitutional revision 92–4 and constitutional settlement 87–8 micro climate and elitist approach 14–17 and UN 69–70 fascist and colonial models 6–7 Fellowship Fund 151 Fenech, Joe 130 Fenech Adami, Edoardo 111–12, 128–9, 132 FFF see Front Freedom Fighters (FFF) Fifth Framework Research Programmes 148 First World War 4, 35, 55, 73 ‘five-player’ game model 82, 107, 166 Foot, Hugh 66 Foot, Michael 75 Foot–Macmillan partnership plan 56 Foreign Interference Act (1982) 114, 125 four-and-a-half-player model 106, 134, 161, 166–7, 170 and authoritarian model 41–2 and colonial model 40–1

288

Index

four-player model 10 Fourteen Points 42 Freedom House 119 Freedom of Information Act 159 French Revolution 18 Frendo, Michael 123 Front Freedom Fighters (FFF) 120 functionalist approach 1–2, 53–4 game theory 10 Ganado, Herbert 59 Gazo Plaza plan 116 GDPs see gross domestic products (GDPs) General Affairs Council 154 General Assembly 69–70 Resolution No 2077 111 General Workers Union (GWU) 59, 71, 75, 78, 90, 142 GFCF see gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) Gill, S. 19 Gilman, Benjamin A. 114, 118 Goethe Institute 157 Gorla, Massimo 125 Grech, Edwin 100 Grech, Karen 100 Greek-Cypriots 54, 62, 63, 65, 66, 72 Greek-Turkish-Cyprus triangle 153 Green Line regulation 110, 151, 157 Grexit 23, 47 Grivas, Georgios 65 gross domestic products (GDPs) 3 gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) 118 Gudja Nationalist Party 132 Gunter, R. 12 Gurkan, Ahmet Muzaffer 85 GWU see General Workers Union (GWU) Heinze, Christian 111 Helsinki Final Act 115 Hikmet, Ayhan 85 Hix, S. 170 Holy See 121 Hopkinson, Henry 73 House of Commons 73 House of Parliament 68, 71, 147 House of Representatives 60, 94–5, 101, 110–11, 114, 118 Huntington, S. P. 17–18

ICBMs see intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) ICFTU survey 120 Il-Hajja (newspaper) 99 ILO see International Labour Organisation (ILO) ILO Regulation 98 120 IMF see International Monetary Fund (IMF) Improvement Area Law 122 independent government transitions, in Cyprus and Malta constitutional developments 54–6 and continued hegemony 74–5 and economic environment 59–60 elitist approach 58–9 and extreme elements 75–6 functionalist approach 53–4 and independence constitutions 63–4 and international politics 61–3 lack of consensus 64–9 negotiating constitutions 64 overview 51 party system emergence 56–8 points of commonality 51–2 points of divergence 52–3 politics of collusion 70–4 and public opinion 60–1 and UN 69–70 uncertainty and unpreparedness 76–8 Inland Revenue department 147 Institute for the Study of Conflict 119 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) 127 Inter-Ministerial Committee 147 International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights 115 International Labour Organisation (ILO) 99 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 19 Ir-Rieda (newspaper) 120 Islamic State (IS) 22 John XXIII (Pope) 87 Karmenu Mifsud Bonnici 120 Kingswell, Attard 99 Kohler, B. 13, 16 Koster, A. 78

Index Kutchuk, Fazil 63, 65, 66, 74, 76, 79, 85, 86, 95, 110, 113, 131 Labour Party 55, 58, 60, 67–9, 87–90, 93, 96, 120, 142, 153, 155 Late External scenario 17 Leonardo programme 148 Linz, J. 7, 9, 17, 31 Lipset, S. M. 56 Lipset/Rokkan model 165 Lipset’s hypothesis 4 Luxembourg European Council 139 MAD see mutual assured destruction (MAD) Magone, J. M 24 Malta in 1981 110–12 collapse of democratic government in 83 constitutional revision in 92–4 constitutional settlement in 87–8 –EEC relations 125, 137, 146 and EU membership suitability 139–41 failure to compromise, coercive action and counter state 98–100 lack of consensus 67–9 negotiation process (see conflict resolution); in postcolonial phase 82–3 role of external players in 88–90, 96–8, 103–6, 113–15 transition to independent government (see independent government transitions, in Cyprus and Malta) working and living with constitution 83–5 Malta Council for Economic Development (MCED) 148 Malta EU Steering and Action Committee (MEUSAC) 148 Malta Labour Party (MLP) 59–60, 69, 75, 78 Malta Statistics Authority 147 Marchant, Douglas 96 Mark Twain 170 Mater et Magistra and Pacem in Terris 87 MCED see Malta Council for Economic Development (MCED) Menges, C. C. 13

289

Merkel, Angela 25 MEUSAC see Malta EU Steering and Action Committee (MEUSAC) Mintoff, Dominic 58, 59, 62, 70, 75, 82, 87, 91, 92, 96, 97, 100, 103, 104, 111, 112, 114, 120, 123, 124, 128–9, 132 Mizzi, Albert 120 Mizzi, Edgar 92, 124, 128 Mizzi, Enrico 60 MLP see Malta Labour Party (MLP) Morlino, L. 9, 14 Moro, Aldo 11 Movement for Social Democracy (EDEK) 57 Muscat, Josie 120 mutual assured destruction (MAD) 43 National Democratic Front of Fighters (EDMA) 60 National Guard 128 National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) 58, 60–1, 66, 72, 79 Nationalist Party 60, 75, 78, 87, 88, 90, 92, 93, 94, 100, 112, 120, 123, 129–30, 137, 139, 143 NATO 16, 20, 37–8, 46, 63, 73, 89–90, 97, 105 ‘no’ vote 142–3 OECD see Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) OEEC see Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) Opello, W. C. 14 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 20 Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) 63 Orthodox Church 57–8, 61 Packard, Martin 116 Pan-Cyprian Federation of Labour 58–9 Pan-Cypriot Trade Union Forum 149 Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) 42 Papandreou, Georgios 116 Party Financing Act 159

290

Index

PASOK see Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) PDM see Democratic Party (PDM) Pellegrini, Toni 59 Permanent Commission against Corruption 147 PHARE programme 144, 146 Piccoli, Flaminio 114 Pinkney, R. 17 Political Affairs Committee 137 Political Programme of the United Democratic Front of Reconstruction 67 Portuguese Communist party 16 positive-sum game 171 post-authoritarian model 44–5 postcolonial model 46 post-truth phase 46–8 PR see proportional representation (PR) pre-accession funds 145 premodern phase 31–2 Press Act X 1974 99 Pridham, J. 12, 14, 19, 26 proportional representation (PR) 15

Securities and Stock Exchange Commission 146 Security Council 113 SEK see Cypriot Confederation of Labour (SEK) ‘Sette Giugno’ riots 55 Shakhov, Pavel 69 Sidjanski, D. 26 Single European Act (1986) 24 Single European Market 164 Socrates programme 148 Southern Europe 1–2 passim Soviet Bloc 72 Soviet Diplomatic Mission 89 Spiteri, Lino 125 state transformation, and EU membership 145–8, 152–6 Stepan, A. 17, 31 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) 43 Strategic Partnership Document 155 Strickland, Mabel 75 Symbol and Ritual in the New Spain (Edles) 9

QMV see qualified majority voting (QMV) qualified majority voting (QMV) 25

TAIEX programme 146 taksim 85 Tarxien Nationalist Party club 129 Third World 89 Thorhallsson, B. 21 Times of Malta 130 Times of Malta (TOM) 99 TMT see Turk Mukavemet Teskilati (TMT) TOM see Times of Malta (TOM) Treaty of Amiens 54 TRNC see Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) Tunisian model 22 Turk Mukavemet Teskilati (TMT) 58, 61–2 Turkish Communal Chamber 111 Turkish-Cypriot Party (CTP) 131 Turkish-Cypriots 58, 59, 61–7, 74, 79, 85, 86–7, 94–5, 101–3, 110–12, 116–17, 121–3, 126, 128, 130–1, 136, 138, 149, 150 Turkish Federated State of Cyprus 109

Rayner, S. 19 Reformist and Anti-Reformist parties 56 Regional Policy 147 Republic of Cyprus (ROC) 111, 141–2, 150, 153–6, 160 retarded development model 2–3 ROC see Republic of Cyprus (ROC) Rokkan, S. 56 Rose, A. D. M. 74 Rosenau, J. N. 13, 106 Rossides, Zenon 94 SALT see Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) Sampson, Grivas 86 Sampson, Nikos 86 Schengen treaty 24 Schmitter, P. 8, 12 Second World War 6, 18, 35–6, 47, 73

Index Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) 136, 142–3, 151–4, 157–9 UNFICYP see United Nations Peacekeeping Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP) Unit for Combating Money Laundering 146 United Nations Peacekeeping Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 111 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 42 University of Central Lancashire 157 US Fulbright Foundation 157 US Sixth Fleet 127 Vassiliou, George 145

291

Vella, Tonio 130 Visegrad Group 16 Voluntary Organisation Act of 2007 160 Western Bloc 14 Whistleblower Act 159 Whitehead, A. 18–19 Wilson, G. 42 Xandir Malta 99 Yalta Conference 15 ‘yes’ campaign 142–3 Zorlu, Fatin Rustu 63