Democracy in Post-War Japan: Maruyama Masao and the Search for Autonomy 9781315004099, 9780415869577, 9780415117531

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Democracy in Postwar Japan

The Nissan Institute/Routledge Japanese Studies Series Editorial Board

J. A. A. Stockwin, Nissan Professor of Modem Japanese Studies, University of Oxford and Director, Nissan Institute of Japanese Studies Teigo Yoshida, formerly Professor of the University of Tokyo, and now Professor, Obirin University, Tokyo Frank Langdon, Professor, Institute of International Relations, University of British Columbia, Canada Alan Rix, Professor of Japanese, The University of Queensland Junji Banno, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo Leonard Schoppa, University of Virginia

Other titles in the series:

The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness, Peter Dale The Emperor's Adviser: Saionji Kinmorcbi and Pre-war Japanese Politics, Lesley

Connors

A History of Japanese Economic Thought, Tessa Morris Suzuki The Establishment of the Japanese Constitutional System, Junji Banno, translated by

J. A. A. Stockwin

Industrial Relations in Japan: the Peripheral Workforce, Norma Chalmers Banidng PoHcy in Japan: American Efforts at Reform During the Occupation, William

M Tsutsui

Education Reform in Japan, Leonard Schoppa How the Japanese Learn to Work, Ronald P. Dore and Mari Sako Japanese Economic Development: Theory and Practice, Penelope Francks Japan and Protection: The Growth of Protectionist Sentiment and the Japanese Re-

sponse, Syed Javed Mas\llood

The Soil, by Nagatsuka Takashi: a Portrait of Rural Life in Meiji Japan, translated and

with an introduction by Ann Waswo

Biotechnology in Japan, Malcolm Brock Britain's Educational Reform: a Comparison with Japan, Mike Howarth Language and the Modern State: the Reform of Written Japanese, Nanette Twine Industrial Harmony in Modern Japan: the Invention of a Tradition, W Dean Kin=ley Japanese Science Fiction: a View of a Changing Society, Robert Matthew The Japanese Numbers Game: the Use and Understanding of Numbers in Modern Japan, Thomas Crump Ideology and Practice in Modern Japan, Roger Goodman and Kirsten Reising Technology and Industrial Development in Pre-War Japan, Yukiko Fukasaku Japan's Early Parliaments 1890-1905, Andrew Fraser, R. H. P. Mason and Philip

Mitchell

Japan's Foreign Aid Challenge, Alan Rix Emperor Hirohito and Showa Japan, Stephen S. Large Japan: Beyond the End of History, David Williams Ceremony and Ritual in Japan: Religious Practices in an Industrialized Society, Jan van

Bremen and D. P. Martinez.

Understanding Japanese Society: Second Edition, Jay Hendry The Fantastic in Modern Japanese Literature: The Subversion of Modernity, Susan J.

Napier

Democracy in Postwar Japan Maruyama Masao and the Search for Autonomy

Rikki Kersten

I~ ~~~1!;n~~~up LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 1996 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Reprinted 1999, 2000

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York NY 10016 Transferred to Digital Printing 2005 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group

© 1996 Rikki Kersten Typeset in Times by Datix International, Broad Street, Bungay, Suffolk

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book has been requested. ISBN~I5-1l753-4

In memory of

Lew Jarratt

Contents

Series editor's preface Acknowledgements

xi xii

Introduction Notes

II

1

2

3

4

Defeat and democracy in postwar Japan: The war responsibility debate 8.15: the event The Occupation: war guilt as democratic prerequisite Maruyama Masao and war responsibility War responsibility as war guilt The ongoing debate Notes The search for autonomy: Maruyama Masao and the

1

13 16 21 31 36 43 44

Japanese past Images of the Japanese past Maruyama's studies: feudalism, dynamism and contradiction The dynamics of the dialectic: Sorai and Norinaga Meiji modernity: feudal dynamism in a hostile environment Protest as an expression of social autonomy: the People's Rights Movement Fukuzawa Yukichi: the logic of nationalism and individualism Autonomy: some observations Notes

49 50 53 57 60

Maruyama, Marx and the shutaisei debate Marxism in Japan Maruyama and the young Marx Maruyama, Mannheim and the primacy of the subject The philosophy of autonomy

78 79 81 86 88

65 71 73 75

viii

Contents The shutaisei debate Umemoto Katsumi: the plea for a world view Maruyama Masao: the reinterpretation of Marxism Autonomy as a universal value Notes

90 93 96 101 106

5

Modernisation: the acquisition of autonomy Modernisation: the Japanese interpretation Maruyama Masao and the East-West paradigm Modernisation and the open society Notes

109 110 117 123 133

6

Fascism: the antithesis of democracy Theories offascism Theories of wartime Japanese fascism Maruyama Masao and Japanese fascism The dynamics of fascism Fascism in postwar Japan Notes

137 139 142 146 150 153 161

7

Pacifism, autonomy and the logic of democracy Pacifism and the Cold War Peace and democracy: the logic of Japanese pacifism The Heiwa Mondai Danwakai Pacifism as realism Pacifism as peaceful coexistence Notes

164 166 168 175 186 190 195

8

Democracy in crisis: the security treaty crisis of 1960 The treaty issue: the excuse for a crisis Security or democracy? The political crisis The democratic crisis 5.19 and the protect democracy campaign 5.19 and 8.15 After the shouting: assessments and recriminations Notes

199 201 203 206 211 217 220 222 227

9

Conclusion Note

231 233

Bibliographies Interviews Maruyama Masao: Secondary Sources (English) Maruyama Masao: Secondary Sources (Japanese)

234 234 234 235

Contents ix Primary Sources: English Primary Sources: Japanese Secondary Sources: English Secondary Sources: Japanese

237 239 248

255

Maruyama Masao: critical bibliography

260

Index

287

Series editor's preface

It remains unfortunately true, as the new century approaches, that

Japan is an underreported country. Despite significant increases in the amount of information available, it is still the case that few aspects of Japan and its people are discussed in comparable depth, or with similar assumptions about familiarity, to discussion of the United States, Britain or other major countries. Differences of language and culture of course constitute a barrier, though less so than in the past. As the patterns of our post-Cold War world gradually consolidate, it is more clear than ever that the regional and global importance of Japan is increasing, often in ways more subtle than blatant. To borrow a phrase from Ronald Dore, we really should start 'taking Japan seriously'. The Nissan Institute/Routledge Japanese Studies Series seeks to foster an informed and balanced, but not uncritical, understanding of Japan. One aim of the series is to show the depth and variety of Japanese institutions, practices and ideas. Another is, by using comparisons, to see what lessons, positive and negative, can be drawn for other countries. The tendency in commentary on Japan to resort to outdated, ill-informed or sensational stereotypes still remains extraordinarily strong, and needs to be combated. One particularly entrenched perception about Japan is that what is significant about it is the effectiveness of its economic institutions and practices, that the Japanese are essentially 'economic animals', and that politics functions merely to serve the purposes of the economic superstate. Recently, this approach has come to be subsumed under the so-called 'Asian model of democracy', the proponents of which may be found in south-east as well as north-east Asia, but whose basic premises are those of authoritarian rather than democratic government. So far as Japan is concerned, this ignores or distorts a vital subtext in her postwar history, namely the persistent efforts of courageous and far-sighted men and women to foster and strengthen the

xii

Series editor's preface

fragile plant of democracy in its universal and genuine set of meanings. The role in this movement of Professor Maruyama Masao is of gigantic importance. In a real sense he formed the minds of a whole generation of political thinkers in postwar Japan, even though there were those who later reacted against his influence. He is a man of immense historical erudition and insight, who was able to pinpoint and challenge the unhealthy traditions of Japanese authoritarianism with arguments that were impossible to ignore. His writings deserve to be far better known outside Japan. In writing this book, Dr Rikki Kersten focused on Maruyama's concept of shutaisei (here translated as 'autonomy') as a key to understanding his approach to the democratisation of Japan over the decade and a half following the end of the War. She teases out with great subtlety the variety of intellectual influences, Western and Japanese, that helped shape Maruyama's critique of Japanese political practice and his vision of a truly democratised Japan.

J. A. A. Stockwin

Acknowledgements

I should like to express my sincere gratitude to Professor Maruyama, not only for granting extensive interviews to a precocious and anonymous graduate student, but for providing us with such rich material to explore. Maruyama's work has retained its power to stimulate and frustrate this reader long after the panic of producing a thesis died. While I recorded a total of six hours of interviews with Professor Maruyama, he asked not to be quoted directly. I have therefore used the taped interviews as reference points, and referred to the interviews where appropriate. An invaluable context for my interviews with Professor Maruyama was provided by discussions with Mr Midorikawa Toru of Iwanami Shoten, and Professor Sakamoto Yoshikazu. On a practical level, I should like to thank the Shell Company of Australia, whose generous support enabled me to savour the experience of research at Oxford. Research in the field was undertaken through a fellowship from the Japanese Ministry of Education under the auspices of the Oxford-Tokyo University Exchange Scheme. The kind understanding of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade granted the initial time to make the most of these opportunities. In Japan the research trail was smoothed and given renewed purpose through the selfless interest and expertise of Professor Ishida Takeshi, who has encouraged and commented on the work in progress in three countries. Invaluable advice was also given by Professor Inoguchi Takashi, Professor Watanabe Hiroshi, Professor Glen Hook and Dr Siegfried Kohlhammer. St. Antony's College Oxford and the Nissan Institute of Japanese Studies welcomed a former diplomat back into the academic fold, and offered a range of erudite colleagues who prodded me on to ever greater efforts. Special thanks are due to Professor Geoffrey Best, Mrs Dorothie Storry and to Dr David Williams for their incisive comments and their friendship. The writing would not

xiv Acknowledgements have been completed without the warm welcome, understanding and time provided by the members of the History Department at Sydney University. In particular Professor Stephen Garton, Dr John Wong, Dr John Ward, Professors Barbara Caine, Ros Pesman, Ian Jack and Deryck Schreuder were supportive and tolerant of a preoccupied colleague. The talented students who took my course Protest, Dissent and the State in Modern Japan reminded me of the importance of questioning and debate, and I thank them for their stimulating presence. Many friends have rallied to help with comments and gathering research materials. Professors Nobuko and Masamichi Komuro, and Professors Takako and Atsushi Shirai of Keio University have performed superhuman feats of academic work and friendship in Tokyo and Oxford. Drs Ishida Ken and Takeuchi Kenzo found time to help a struggling researcher on countless occasions, for which I thank them. Richard Wong in Fisher Library at Sydney University has been a miracle-worker in locating materials. Robert and Jenny Weimann offered the support and champagne necessary to a tiring scholar. lowe all of the members of 'Teppei' in Nezu, downtown Tokyo, special thanks for welcoming a wagamama gaijin into their midst. Special thanks go to Professor Arthur Stockwin, whose interest, encouragement and friendship have been invaluable. It is surely the opportunity to know people such as this wherein lies the greatest reward of academic work. My ongoing thanks to my parents, who offered encouragement for this project for a decade. Thanks also to Peter Martin, for keeping body and soul more or less together. Final thanks to the late Lew Jarratt, an extraordinary humanitarian who knew I had something to say well before I did.

1 Introduction

Can Japan teach the world anything about democracy? To many people, the thought that Japan could resolve some of democracy's inconsistencies and even add to the body of universal democratic thought is ludicrous. Surely, Japan is an authoritarian society, a 'how not to' example of a country that was a passive recipient of democracy after defeat in 1945. The reality is very different. Postwar Japanese society, especially in the period between 1945 and 1960, was obsessed with the democratic idea. Far from reluctant converts of necessity or convenience, the opinion leaders of the day defined democracy with the full force of the self-consciousness, self-criticism and defiant idealism inherent in their historical circumstances. One of the most inspiring and creative of these definers of democracy was Maruyama Masao (1914). The first philosophical touchstone for postwar Japanese democracy was the war itself. The transwar generation of intellectuals such as Maruyama began by rationalising that the war had been a consequence of society's lack of autonomy from the state. Intellectuals accordingly targeted the relationship between citizens and the state as the locus of postwar democratic reform. Distance between society and the state became a key criterion for Japanese democracy, and implied an inversion of political power from the state to society. The Occupationinitiated institutional reforms were merely the framework within which this democratic reform would take place. But as the postwar era progressed from Occupation to independence after 1952, Maruyama's concern switched to identifying obstacles to the development of autonomy in society. Through analysing postwar Japan and the history of Japanese political thought, Maruyama endeavoured to discover why autonomy was absent as a force in Japan's political culture. By 1960 Maruyama and his peers felt that democracy was in crisis. Instead of autonomy, they found that the bogies from the past

2 Democracy in postwar Japan

had assumed a democratic guise. According to their own criteria, intellectuals judged that democracy had failed in postwar Japan. The most important questions to be answered are: what were Japanese thinkers looking for in their search for autonomy? To what extent was their disillusionment with postwar democracy due to their understanding of autonomy? An equally important consideration is how this has affected Japanese attitudes to their political system and its interaction with society today. In postwar Japan between 1945 and 1960 we find democracy in the process of self-definition, not assimilation or distortion. It is through placing autonomy at the heart of democratic legitimacy that postwar Japan came to grips with democracy. The way they did this represents a significant contribution to universal democratic thinking. The notion of autonomy is fundamental to democratic philosophy. In this sense the substance of postwar Japanese debates on democracy has much in common with intellectual discourse in late eighteenth century Europe. In the 1890s European attempts to locate the subject in history led to tension between idealist and materialist interpretations of the historical process. At issue was the extent to which man had the power to control human history, and to identify the forces influencing man's actions. Social Darwinism, liberalism, Marxism and revisionism were the parameters of that European discourse. Liberal thinkers turned to individualism in order theoretically to reconcile man and his politicaVhistorical world. Marxists on the other hand used materialism to mediate between theory and humanism. Both approaches claimed a moral impetus behind their ideas about man and history that could be traced back to Kant. The European liberal version of autonomy featured a number of complementary criteria: responsibility, self.;determination, rationality, and value creation. Connecting the self with responsibility for his/her actions, plus the prerequisite that individuals be entirely free to determine the values which inform those actions, was intrinsic to the ability of the developed self to formulate a world view: 'the individual subjects the norms with which he is confronted to critical evaluation and reaches practical decisions as the result of independent and rational reflection.'1 Isaiah Berlin conveyed the essence of liberal autonomy as a special type of individualism:

J wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of what ever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men's, acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to

Introduction

3

be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affect me ... from outside. 2 In post-World War II Japan, idealist-materialist tensions also emerged when intellectuals debated the role of the subject in history. For the survivors of war, determining the extent to which man could direct history - and assume responsibility for it - were elementary concerns. In Japan's case it was Marxism which enabled some Japanese intellectuals to ease the idealist-materialist conundrum. They posited the humanism of the 'young Marx' as a theoretical bridge between idealism and materialism, much in the way that the revisionist Bernstein did in Europe. In a sense, the Japanese postwar experience was a struggle to reconcile these two opposed interpretations of society. The negative evaluation of Japanese democracy by the transwar generation of intellectuals can also be traced back to this philosophical sparring ground. At the same time, Japanese ideas on autonomy in the postwar period incorporated much that was empathetic to European individualism. Koschmann has described the Japanese understanding of a kindred idea - subjectivity - as 'an active force, or energy, that originated internally but was inevitably expressed in practice ... it suggested firm commitment and a stance of independence in relation to potentially deterministic, external forces'.3 Koschmann's definition only referred to the concept of subjectivity (shutaiset) which was debated in the late 1940s.4 I argue that the conceptual significance of subjectivity to Japanese democratic thought extended well beyond those confines. Shutaisei was the catalyst for an exploration of democracy in postwar Japan, and the conceptional well-spring of Japanese ideas about autonomy. Japanese concepts of autonomy incorporated aspects of idealist individualism and Marxist materialism. Beneath the 'isms' of this discourse was a familiar and unresolved dilemma peculiar to democracy. As Maruyama often pointed out, democracy is a system founded on paradox. On the one hand, it extols the virtues of individualism. On the other hand, it employs institutional procedures which subjugate the individual to the rule of the majority. The dichotomy between democratic theory and democratic practice has dramatised the difficulties involved in reconciling the individual and the collective. This was especially true of postwar Japan, and as such the tussle Japanese intellectuals had with the ideals and reality of democracy adds an important dimension to an ongoing philosophical dilemma. In addressing this problem, I will distinguish between two types of autonomy which crystalised gradually as the postwar era progressed:

4 Democracy in postwar Japan personal autonomy, and social autonomy. Maruyama insisted on personal autonomy as the cornerstone of genuine democracy. This was explored through the debates on modernism in the 19508, where discussants identified the traits expected of 'modern' and by implication 'democratic' men. At the same time, Maruyama preserved a vision of democracy which featured social autonomy, meaning a pluralistic society in which multi-dimensional individuals preserved their mobility in society and used alternative collectives to criticise the public political realm. Personal autonomy featured a sharp distinction between the public and private realms. Social autonomy on the other hand facilitated the political engagement of society with the state. Essentially, successful social autonomy was not possible unless it was premised on personal autonomy. However the affinity between social autonomy and the collective threatened to violate personal autonomy. Conversely, personal autonomy only fulfilled a democratic role when it connected with the public realm via active social autonomy. How these tensions were played out in postwar Japan up to 1960 is the key to understanding the philosophical questions shaping Japanese democracy. To date the study of Japanese democracy has been hostage to historical context and ideology, denying its contribution to universal democratic thinking. It is essential that Japanese democratic thought be accorded this recognition, and not regarded as an intellectual tradition that is either 'unique', or derivative. Japanese democracy has been judged according to the success of the Occupation (1945-52), or treated as part of a larger debate on interpretations of the Japanese prewar past. American Occupation policy had a dual focus: institutional democratisation, and social democratisation. As Occupation documents reveal, often the Occupation stewards judged the success or failure of institutional reform according to the perceived penetration of 'democratic values' in society at large.' And yet, historians who have praised the institutional dimension of Occupation democratisation have refrained from connecting this with the democratisation of the spiritual dimension. 6 In either case, an appreciation of Japanese democracy is piecemeal at best. Other historians who have judged that institutional democratisation was hampered or nullified by social factors have phrased their argument in terms of continuity from an 'undemocratic' past. Historians have asked: were the 1930s an aberration in what was otherwise a course of development headed in a democratic direction?' If not, and the 1930s were the outcome of an authoritarian tradition dating from

Introduction

5

the Meiji era (1868-1912), then is postwar democracy the aberration?B Maruyama has been identified with the school of thought that regarded authoritarianism instead of democratic potential as the substance of historical continuity. But this is far too simplistic. A layer of complexity is added by the confluence of these debates on historical continuity, and the advent of the Cold War in Asia. American historiography on Japan has until very recently been split between what has become known as the Modernisation School, and a younger generation of scholars following in the footsteps of the leftist historian E. H. Norman. The former grouping promoted the idea of a value-free process of industrialisation and implied that Japanese democracy was a by-product of this process.' The latter group identified industrialisation as the companion to authoritarianism in Japan, denying any linkage between Japan's capitalistic advances and democracy.'o The '1930s aberration' thesis was usually put forward by the Modernisationists, while the 'authoritarian' thesis was the argument typical of the second group. In the early 1960s when the Modernisation studies began, the debate between the Koza and Rono schools" of Marxism on the nature of Japanese capitalistic development had reappeared in Japan. Combined with the Cold War atmosphere of the 1950s, this prompted the American Modernisationists to phrase their theories in anti-Marxist terms. It will be seen that the Japanese version of the modernisation debate differed greatly from that of the American scholars. It is time for the Japanese voice to be given due consideration when evaluating ideas on democracy in postwar Japan. This study of Japanese democratic thought relies heavily on Japanese writings and stresses the context in which they were written. From a contemporary perspective, many of the issues covered in those writings may seem dated. But as the vagaries of Japanese democracy continue to demonstrate, they are far from irrelevant to contemporary concerns. This study provides a better-informed foundation for us to understand the disputes in Japanese politics which are only peripherally treated by the English-speaking media. It is above all an attempt to communicate the Japanese voice. The Japanese voice of the early postwar years burst out as a cacophony of commentary and analysis. Subjective engagement with politics and society was the order of the day. The debate culture (rondan bunka) of the postwar period featured intellectuals who had formerly isolated themselves from popular fora and who emerged postwar to set the agenda for public debate on the issues of the moment. This appeared to many to be the very stuff of democracy. Though the

6 Democracy in postwar Japan

restraints of Occupation censorship were in evidence during the first half of the period under consideration (notably with issues such as the atomic bombings and the American initiative behind institutional democratisation) the sense of freedom amongst postwar scholars was self-evident. Postwar Japanese democratic thought has other features which have prevented a straightforward analysis by outside observers. The 'round table discussions' (zadankai) used in Japanese academic-populist writing has discouraged serious scholarship. Zadankai involve a group of hand-picked participants sitting around a table discussing the designated topic, which is recorded. The participants then have the opportunity to edit their own remarks, and the transcribed discussions are usually edited by the publisher as well. The style of debate is also 'unacademic' in Western terms, with vague terminology, a sense of academic hierarchy amongst the participants and the artificial structure of discussions frustrating the in medias res value of the exercise. This is partly due also to the nature of the Japanese language, which relies on connotation rather than more explicit analytical discourse. When one adds to this the complicated sentence construction and multi-layered suggestion typical of Maruyama's writing, one has felt frustrated rather than enlightened about Japanese democratic thinking. But this attitude fails to appreciate the value of postwar academic discourse, value which begins with the fact that it was a deliberate attempt to integrate the wider community into the discussion. It is through coming to terms with the nature of this discourse that one can understand the significance of the concepts and ideas being discussed. The style of discourse is the first clue to the substance of the discourse itself. This is exemplified in the debates on democracy in postwar Japan. The problem-consciousness (mondai ishikl) behind these debates made it plain that when discussing democracy it was not institutions that were at issue, but political culture. Like some Occupation administrators, Japanese intellectuals who wrote on democracy postwar were concerned with a democratic tradition, defining a democratic spirit, and establishing a democratic value system to give substance to the cosmetic institutional reforms implemented around this human dimension. In R. H. Tawney's words, Maruyama and his peers wanted to avoid the denigration of democracy into 'a political theory which replaced the conception of purpose by that of mechanism' .12 What was the 'conception of purpose' in postwar Japanese thought on democracy? In the early postwar years, Japanese writers on democracy sought out Japan's historical credentials for democracy. Discus-

Introduction

7

sion tip-toed around the question of whether democracy was a compatible socio-political identity for postwar Japan, given her authoritarian disposition in the past. As Yanaihara Tadao wrote in 1959: 'there is a question whether racial characteristics and the historical background of the Japanese provide the foundation on which democracy can be developed or not.'13 Even the Education Department textbook on democracy published under Occupation censorship pointed to Japan's lack of a democratic tradition. This was supposed to explain the continuation postwar of Japan's undemocratic inclinations: 'In Japan, we don't have a strong democratic tradition. Somehow in the depths of our hearts when we hear the word democracy we still think of something brought in from the outside.'14 The change in American democratisation policies which became evident in 1947 (when MacArthur banned the general strike planned for 1 February 1947) shocked Japanese intellectuals into developing indigenous criteria for their democracy. The rehabilitation of particularistic factors, while by no means unanimously agreed upon, marked the coming of age of Japanese thinking on democracy. Instead of particularistic obstacles to democracy, writers began to identify particularistic contributions that Japan could offer to democratic philosophy. It was the first step towards embracing the universalism of democracy. By 1955 this had matured to the point where Maeda Tamon could write: After the war democracy appeared to have been assigned from the outside, however as far as the ideal itself is concerned, it possessed the characteristics of natural law, irrespective of East and West, and was an independent concept '" changes would naturally occur through differences in national character, but the principles at its base would be in common with other countries ... 15 This is one important reason to focus more specifically on Japanese ideas of democracy. The attempt to connect with universality meant that the impulse behind attempts to reconcile tradition with democratic theory could be acknowledged without disqualifying Japan's democratic credentials. This attitude has not been forthcoming in Western history writing on Japan. The paradoxical appearance of democracy to intellectuals of Maruyama's generation was revealed vividly through their appraisals of fascism. As the postwar debates on Japanese fascism swung from the past to the present, the dichotomy between the individual and the collective hardened. Instead of two entities which ideally (in democratic terms) should interact in a dynamic relationship, defensive distance became the dominant feature of that relationship. Maruyama's prominence in

8 Democracy in postwar Japan early postwar writing on Japanese fascism provides us with the ideal medium through which to follow this shift. By examining the tension in Maruyama's thOUght between personal autonomy and social autonomy, we will gain insights into why debates on democracy in postwar Japan developed as a discourse of failure. Maruyama Masao has been a formidable presence in the intellectual life of his country. He has been credited with launching political science as a discipline postwar, and with spawning a school of political and social scientists comprising the brightest and best-known intellectuals of modern times. 16 While autonomy in Japanese democracy is the focus of this study, in the process I hope to enhance understanding of one of the most brilliant men to emerge in postwar Japan. Maruyama's intellectual output, and the focus of his research, has profoundly affected the way his peers have assessed Japanese democracy. A broader appreciation of his work, which has been made only partially available in English, is an important undertaking that is overdue. 17 Maruyama was born on 22 March 1914 in Nagano prefecture. The second son of the liberal journalist of the TaishO era, Maruyama Kanji, Maruyama was exposed early in life to the predicament of being a liberal in an age where liberalism was radical. Key stages in his life have corresponded with cataclysmic events in Japan and abroad, a circumstance which significantly influenced his intellectual disposition. One of his earliest childhood memories was the aftermath of the 1923 earthquake, when Koreans and anarchists were arrested and murdered. IS The Manchurian Incident happened during Maruyama's first year at high school; in his second year, political party cabinets effectively came to an end with the assassination of Prime Minister Inukai; in his third year, the Nazis came to power in Germany; and in his first year at university, professor Minobe Tatsukichi was prosecuted for insulting the Emperor with his 'organ theory', as throughout Japan right wing civilian movements gathered steam. Conscripted into the army in 1944, he was eventually sent to Hiroshima. He experienced the atomic bombing and witnessed its aftermath, eventually returning to the bastion of elite scholarship, Tokyo University, to resume his career as a pioneer political scientist and historian of Japanese political thought under the tutelage of Nanbara Shigeru (1889-1974). Maruyama has described in some detail the repression of intellectuals, in particular those who were based at Tokyo Imperial University, in the late 1930s. Maruyama, who at the time was not important

Introduction

9

enough to attract the attention of the right-wing squads of self-appointed patriots, was nonetheless advised by Nanbara to exercise prudent self-censorship on several occasions. 19 He did not escape persecution altogether, however. At university, his relative anonymity and privilege as a member of the intellectual elite largely shielded him from this repression. But while still at high school, Maruyama attended a gathering of an academic group founded by a liberal colleague of his father, Hasegawa Nyozekan (1875-1969), whose purpose was the study of historical materialism. This group hardly qualified as an assembly of revolutionary activists, but their subject matter fell into the category of 'dangerous thought'. Furthermore, it was illegal at the time, according to the Ministry of Education, for high school students to study Marxism. Maruyama's presence at this gathering led him to be arrested, interrogated and blacklisted by the Special Police (tokko). He continued to be harassed by them until he was conscripted in 1944, but their vigilance could not have been overly professional. Once at university, Maruyama frequented a back-room bookshop which sold Western books, including the Communist Manifesto, which Maruyama bought on the sly. Maruyama professed later to have been greatly affected by the experience of being interrogated by the Special Police, saying that it felt as though 'the state had entered one's inner soul with boots on'. 20 It must be said that Maruyama did not engage in any activities which would have drawn the disapproving attention of the authorities. Purchasing the odd Marxist tract was cheeky, but for a university student conducting private study, no longer illegal. The few works available to us today which were written by Maruyama at this time implied passive resistance, but the message was so extraordinarily subtle as to be almost obscure to all but the most educated reader.21 At the very least, Maruyama's experience of academic life during the days preceding the outbreak of the Pacific War dramatised the difficulties of engaging in effective resistance against a repressive regime. Acknowledging the failure to resist in wartime ensured that individual accountability would assume central importance for Maruyama's generation in defining their postwar democracy. Postwar, Maruyama was plagued by pulmonary tuberculosis, and his writing was interspersed with prolonged stays in hospital. Between 1945 and 1960, Maruyama turned his analytical eye to his immediate political environment, mobilising studies of prewar political thought to illustrate his points. In the debate culture after the war, Maruyama played a dominant role as provocateur in his think-pieces on democracy and autonomy. When independence precipitated Japan into a

10 Democracy in postwar Japan Cold War world in the company of a security alliance with the United States in 1952, Maruyama was on the frontline of activists who regarded democracy and autonomy as essential to the survival and integrity of postwar Japan's democracy. After the tumult of the 1960 Security Treaty Crisis, which saw Maruyama adopt an unprecedentedly high public profile, he turned away from the maelstrom of contemporary issues and once more directed his attention to the study of prewar Japanese thought. His presence is still felt as successive generations of scholars have attempted to make their mark by attacking this master of political theory. No-one can deny that his ideas still resonate in Japan. The continued compulsion on the part of Japanese scholars either to invoke his ideas or denounce them compounds the necessity to uncover just what it is about this man's work that provokes these reactions. In the 1990s, it is still impossible to discuss Japanese democracy without coming to terms with Maruyama Masao's ideas. The philosophical discourse which Maruyama created and operated in was phrased in terms of 'war responsibility' and war guilt, modernism, shutaisei, fascism, pacifism and nationalism. I begin by locating the postwar debates on Japanese democracy in their historical context. Defeat in 1945 was the launch-pad for this discourse, when democratic debate was wrapped around tortured assessments of war guilt. Maruyama's generation also had to come to terms with the prewar past, and in Maruyama's case this meant the intellectual legacy of the feudal era. I then examine the philosophical foundations of the concept of autonomy as it emerged through the debates on modernism and shutaisei. Maruyama's writings on fascism in pre- and postwar Japan illustrate how tension developed between personal and social autonomy, and between state and society, after 1945. How these tensions were expressed when confronted with political crisis during the peace and neutralist movements of the 1950s and the security treaty crisis of 1960 will highlight the centrality of autonomy to democratic legitimacy in postwar Japan. Maruyama's writing on democracy centred on a search for autonomy. The results of that search had implications for postwar Japanese democracy, as did the way the search was conducted. If democracy in Japan is a concept of postwar origins, then it is vital to understand the political dynamics of this democratic ideal. If postwar democracy is another example of frustrated democratic potential, it is equally important to relate this ideal to its hostile environment and ask whether the ideal has a constituency, or a future, in Japan. The answer rests with

Introduction

11

the role of autonomy in postwar Japanese political culture. For this purpose Maruyama is the ideal medium, as he embodied and formulated the concerns of his age. In order to come to grips with the importance of autonomy to Japanese thinking on democracy, one must also come to grips with Maruyama Masao. Through examining Japanese democratic thought in the process of self-definition, we can gain a fuller understanding of contemporary Japanese politics. Issues such as distrust of the tyranny of the majority, insistence on minority rights, and debate over what constitutes democratic legitimacy continue to manifest themselves in Japan today. Japanese perceptions of the ideal relationship between the individual and the community, and society and state, explain much about pervasive Japanese dissatisfaction and disillusionment with democracy. A reappraisal of Japanese democratic thought is both timely and necessary, as in the 1990s we witness Japan's venture away from one-party dominance towards a new stage in their democratic history. NOTES

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Steven Lukes, 'Types of Individualism', Dictionary of the History of Ideas. vol. III, New York, Charles Scribner and Sons, 1973, p. 598. Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 131. J. Victor Koschmann, 'Debate on Subjectivity: Foundations of Modernism as a Political Critique', Pacific Affairs, vol. 54, no. 4, Winter 19811982, p. 610. The shutaisei debate (see Chapter 4). See for example Government Section, Supreme Commander ,For The Allied Powers, Political Reorientation of Japan, Westport, Greenwood Press, 1949, vol. I, p. xx, pp. xxvi-xxviii, p. 92, p. 112. Robert Ward, 'Reflections on the Allied Occupation and Planned Political Change in Japan', in Ward, ed., Political Development in Modern Japan, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1968, p. 486, p. 478. See for example E. Reischauer, 'What Went Wrong', in James W Morley, ed., Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1971, pp. 489-510. See for example R. Scalapino, Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan, California, University of California Press, 1953. See M. Jansen, ed., Studies in the Modernisation of Japan by Western Scholars, I.Cu., 1962. For example John Dower, Jon Halliday, Thomas Huber, Gavan McCormack, Michael Schaller. These schools of Japanese Marxism differ according to their evaluations of Japanese historical experience. The Koza school argues that Japan remains semi-feudal and therefore not ready to progress to the next stage

12 Democracy in postwar Japan

12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

21

of socialist revolution; the Rono school argues that the Meiji Restoration represented a bourgeios revolution which combined with Japan's development as an imperialist power meant that Japan was ready for socialist revolution. Quoted in E. H. Carr, Conditions of Peace, London, Macmillan, 1944, p. 103. 'Democracy in Japan', Democracy in Japanese Culture, World University Service of Japan, 1959, p. 1. MombushO, Minshushugi, vol. II, 1948, p. 352. 'Nihon de minshushugi wa mono ni naru no ka' (Will Democracy Work in Japan?), Chilo Koron, February 1955, p. 29. Ishida Takeshi, Fujita ShOzo, Matsumoto Sannosuke, Kamishima Jiro. The most comprehensive (and positive) analysis of Maruyama to date has been that of Sasakura Hideo, Maruyama Masao ron nolo (Notes on Maruyama Masao), Misuzu ShoM, 1988. Interview with Maruyama Masao, 17 April 1987. See Maruyama Masao, 'Nanbara Shigeru 0 shi toshite' (My Teacher Nanbara Shigeru), in Nihon Kokka Gakkai Zasshi, July-August 1975, pp. 395-416. Maruyama Masao, 'Nihon shiso shi ni okeru "koso" no mondai: Maruyama Masao sensei 0 maneki shite' (Problem of ''Ancient Layers" in Japanese Intellectual History: An Invitation to Professor Maruyama Masao), Uchiyama Hideo kenkyilkai, 1979, p. 35. See also Maruyama, 'Nanbara sensei 0 shi toshite', pp.401--402. Maruyama Masao, 'Jinno ShOtoki ni arawaretaru seiji kan' (Political Perspective Revealed in the Jinno ShOtoki), in Senchil to sengo no aida, pp. 76-91; and 'Fukuzawa ni okeru chitsujo to ningen' (Order and Man in Fukuzawa), in Senchil to sengo no aida, pp. 143-146.

2 Defeat and democracy in postwar Japan The war responsibility debate

That particular date, 15 August 1945, or 8.15, has been described as 'the most important turning point in modern Japanese history', I the day upon which 'the whole future of the Japanese people and of Japan itself hinges'.2 But it became more than a date signifying the defeat of Japan and the end of World War II in Asia and the Pacific. In the eyes of many in postwar Japan, 8.15 became a metaphor for Japan's postwar democracy. The implications of defeat and Occupation for Japan likewise went well beyond the institutional reforms and economic reorganisations planned by the victors. Japanese were forced and encouraged by the mainly American Occupation (1945-1952) critically to reassess their very identity, with democracy as the primary gauge of value. A concerted propaganda and censorship campaign by the Occupation authorities projected an idealised version of the democracy which they hoped to inculcate into the Japanese nation. The ensuing policy reversals associated with the advent of the Cold War in Asia meant a substantial redefinition of this democratic model. But far from damaging the democratisation process, these policy shifts gave momentum to indigenous efforts to give meaning to democracy in Japan. For the Allied victors, war guilt became the single most important indicator of democratic legitimacy in Japan. But for the Japanese intellectuals who debated the war-democracy paradigm, it was not guilt but responsibility which became the principle democratising instrument after 1945. The war responsibility debate was the first self-defining step in Japan's postwar democracy, and that debate placed personal autonomy at the heart of democratic discourse. Paradoxically, the idea of 'war responsibility' (senso sekinin) was future-focused in orientation, not retrospective. It was not a case of asking 'who was responsible for the war', but rather it meant identifying the roles of various players - institutions, groups, individuals who failed to prevent the war. The 'responsibility' was to acknowledge

14

Democracy in postwar Japan

this, and to use this knowledge to prevent the reoccurrence of war. It is significant that over time responsibility became a prescription for resistance on the part of society against the state. The war responsibility debate has continued to highlight the sensitive relationship between war and democracy in contemporary Japan. Peace and independence in 1952, and even the death of Hirohito in 1989, have failed to stem the debate. If anything, the mid-1990s saw an acceleration in the debate, as the 'comfort women' issue belatedly gained prominence, and former POWs of the Japanese demanded compensation and, inevitably, an apology. The domestic debate first acquired a sense of purpose in responding to the Tokyo War Crimes Trial of May 1946-November 1948, and subsequently provided the conceptual underpinning for the peace and neutralist movements of the early 1950s. The second peak of the debate occurred in 1956 when the intellectual community, led by the philosopher Tsurumi Shunsuke, responded with fierce condemnation to the claim that 'the postwar (sengo) is over'. 3 More recently, the issue of war responsibility re-emerged with great intensity in the form of the textbook revision controversy of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the reactions to the illness and death of Emperor Showa (as he is posthumously known) in 1988-1989, and the acknowledgement of 'comfort women' in 1993. The persistence of this debate within the defeat and democracy paradigm suggests two contradictory movements in Japanese historical sensibility: first, that democracy has retained paramount value in Japan's political culture; second, that Japan remains insecure in its identity as a democratic state in a postwar world. In the aftermath of defeat in 1945, Maruyama believed that the implications of the war responsibility debate were vital for postwar democracy His priorities were demonstrated in what became the sub-theme of the debate: the notion of individual responsibility, where the individual in a democracy has the power and the duty to control the political system and its decision-making processes. In his view, redefining the relationship between the individual and the state was an essential prerequisite for war responsibility. In his postwar work Maruyama attempted to identify core values which could promote this genuine democratic transformation. As intellectuals encountered the emotive issue of 'war responsibility' it became clear that 8.15 democracy was profoundly affected by its generation in the counter-example of war. The idea of each individual citizen acknowledging responsibility for failing to prevent the rise of the wartime state epitomised personal autonomy, yet frequently what postwar

Defeat and democracy in postwar Japan

15

intellectuals did was target the state and its insidious ideology as the bearer of substantial war guilt. In effect from its inception personal autonomy was compromised by a pervasive sense of victimconsciousness. As a result the essence of personal autonomy - political responsibility - was cast into a void between war and defeat. Intellectuals sought redemption through focusing on a future where personal autonomy would prevent the reoccurrence of authoritarianism, but this founding value of Japan's postwar democratic culture was itself founded on a normative void. Intellectuals trumpeted the virtues of personal autonomy, but were initially unable to see either themselves or the citizens of Japan retrospectively as active subjects. They undermined their own democratic criterion of personal autonomy in the process. Interestingly, the day which represented a complex mixture of relief, shame and dismay for many Japanese was also built around a factual void. In his pre-recorded surrender speech to the nation, the Emperor had not used the word 'defeat': instead, he had used euphemisms such as 'the war has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage' and 'we have decided to effect a settlement of the present situation by resorting to an extraordinary measure'. Thus began the symbolic confusion which has surrounded the rationalisation of that moment and its significance for postwar Japan to this day. Instead of a decisive moment of reorientation, it was what Hidaka Rokuro described as 'the vortex of a nebula', a vague understanding of being caught in a time of ill-defined ends and beginnings.4 The question was: ends and beginnings of what? The tendency to assess postwar democracy as a function of war and defeat was also evident in the attitudes and policies of the Occupation authorities. Both occupiers and occupied felt compelled to disprove continuity from a discredited past, in the assumption that such continuity would undermine postwar democratisation. For the stewards of the Occupation, the interpretation of Japanese reactions to defeat became linked to their evaluation of the success of democratisation objectives. For intellectuals such as Maruyama Masao, ensuring discontinuity of prewar socio-political distortions was crucial to the development of a democratic ethos in postwar Japan. War responsibility became the yardstick with which to gauge the integrity of democracy in postwar Japan. Maruyama first sought to define democratic values through questioning received views of war guilt in the war responsibility debate.

16 Democracy in postwar Japan 8.1S: THE EVENT 8.15 as an event was dramatic. For the first time in history, the voice of a living god was broadcast throughout Japan and to the troops serving overseas. After years of sacrifice, the people and soldiers of Greater Imperial Japan were told that they had failed. The atmosphere of the time is conveyed simply and powerfully by the Reverend Tanimoto Kiyoshi: At the time of the Post-War, the marvellous thing in our history happened. Our Emperor broadcasted his own voice through radio directly to us, common people of Japan. August 15th we were told that some news of great importance could be heard and all of us should hear it. So I went to Hiroshima railway station. There set a loud-speaker in the ruins of the station. Many civilians, all of them were in boundage, some being helped by shoulder of their daughters, some sustaining their injured feet by sticks, they listened to the broadcast ... When they came to know the war was ended - that is, Japan was defeated, they, of course, were deeply disappointed, but followed after their Emperor's commandment in calm spirit, making whole-hearted sacrifice for the everlasting peace of the world - and Japan started on her new way. 5 The poignant symbol of the loudspeaker in the ruins evokes the devastation which marked 8.15 for many Japanese when they realised that not only was the war over, but Japan had been defeated. Surrounded by rubble, facing hardship and food shortages, the people had little to guide them as to what the future might hold. While defeat encouraged a desperate future-focus and an acceptance of the 'new', the reality of defeat gradually engendered troubled reflection on the past and its relationship to the future. The idea of continuity was caught between a discredited past and an unknown future. The dilemma was symbolised in the person of the Emperor. President Truman and Secretary of State Byrnes had resisted the urging of their Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew to include a reference to the fate of the Emperor in the Potsdam Declaration. Consequently the only mention of the nature of a post-surrender Japanese government was contained in Article 12: the Occupation forces would withdraw after 'there has been established in accordance with the freely-expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government'.6 Mindful of the other Potsdam provision concerning the certainty of war crimes trials, the Japanese Government on 10 August sent a qualified acceptance of the Potsdam terms in which

Defoat and democracy in postwar Japan

17

they sought an explicit statement from the Allies concerning the fate of the Emperor. The Allied response of II August under the signature of Byrnes repeated the Potsdam formula of Article 12, and stated that not only would the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, but the Emperor would be required to oversee the surrender and demobilisation from a position of authority. The gist of the Byrnes Note was interpreted correctly by the Japanese Foreign Ministry, which made a shrewd assessment of the relative strengths of their position: the sovereignty (t6jiken) of the Emperor would be restricted by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, but not transferred; the provision concerning the ultimate form of the Japanese government pertained only to the political structure (seitm), not the spiritual structure (kokutai) which had the Emperor at its apex, therefore, 'if it is freely to be decided by the people of Japan, there is absolutely no danger that the kokuta; will be altered'. 7 The Japanese Foreign Ministry realised that compared to Nazi Germany's fate, the fact that the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers was planning to govern through the existing Japanese authorities (namely the Emperor, the government and the bureaucracy) was in Japan's favour. It was in fact a recognition of the Emperor's authority. The Foreign Ministry also regarded it as significant that the Allies had used specifically Article 12 to answer their enquiry regarding the Emperor, and took it as a sign that the Allies appreciated and were willing to make allowances for Japan's kokutai. 8 But for those who witnessed the total devastation of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs, continuity was obliterated. Maruyama's personal experience of the beginning of postwar Japan occurred in the ashes of Hiroshima. Posted as a Private First Class to Hiroshima in March 1945, he was separated from the blast of 6 August by four kilometres and a high stone wall. His response to what must have been a shocking experience has been restrained. While he became a leading figure in the intellectuals' pacifist and treaty movements of the 1950s, he confessed many years later that he considered the greatest deficiency in his thought to be his failure to use his personal experience in Hiroshima to add moral force to his work on peace. 9 Indeed, Maruyama did not describe his experiences publicly until 1969. He did this on the twenty-fourth anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing. Speaking from his hospital bed to a reporter from the Chilgoku Shinbun, Maruyama described the scene in the aftermath of the blast.

18

Democracy in postwar Japan

Maruyama reportedly said he would 'never forget the moans' of the injured, or the sight of the dead who were 'piled by the sides of the roads like tuna' at the fishmarket. Replete with photographs of the scene which Maruyama took three days after the bombing, the two-part article was indeed a dramatic gesture by Maruyama. lo Maruyama's duties in Hiroshima prior to 6 August had involved analysing foreign news; he thus had had access to the Potsdam Declaration soon after its release. His response was rapturous: 'the instant I saw the text, my entire body was suffused with warmth'.ll His reaction to the Emperor's broadcast was one of secret relief, and a feeling of emancipation. The personal significance of that time for Maruyama was intensified when he heard on 18 August that his mother had died three days earlier. In the uncertain days after the Emperor's broadcast, Maruyama was ordered by his staff officer to lecture on Japanese political history dating from the Manchurian Incident. For this he was given 'complete freedom of thought' by the officer, who told him 'you may even use the words "military clique"'. 12 Maruyama at that time told his officer that he did not believe the Emperor would necessarily have to be removed, since idthough democracy was incompatible with dictatorship, it could incorporate monarchy. 13 In 1958 Maruyama claimed that his feeling of emancipation after 8.15 had not lasted long. Although pleasantly shocked by the radical policies of the early Occupation, he had already begun to feel cynical about the political atmosphere in Japan, and had felt 'against the times for the rest of 1945' .14 He noticed a radical swing on the part of intellectuals away from the extreme right to the extreme left. This was not only the result of Occupation directives to release all political prisoners (including many communists) and to encourage unions. It was a spontaneous show of respect for those communists who had been comparatively outspoken in refusing to cooperate with the fascist war effort. Maruyama noted the guilt-motivated rush by many of his peers to embrace communism, and nurtured his disquiet. His own intellectual relationship with Marxist thought was complex, and his reluctance to ride the pro-communist wave cannot be tidied away as simple ideological incompatibility. It was rather Maruyama's deep antipathy towards any ideological orthodoxy which set him instinctively against this trend. In a postscript to the 1964 expanded Japanese edition of his essays, Maruyama admitted that he decided to make the spiritual structure of ultranationalism his theme so as to offer an alternative to the Marxist-inspired approach, which only selected political and economic explanations for Japan's historical development. 15 With hindsight, we

Defeat and democracy in postwar Japan

19

can also say that it was an early glimpse of Maruyama's conviction, later to be declared forcefully in the shutaisei debate, that individuals and ideas are the prime movers of history. Maruyama was also sceptical about the way democracy was being interpreted by society at large. Upon returning to Tokyo University in October 1945, Maruyama joined with his peers (including Uryii Tadao and Nakamura Tetsu) in forming a discussion group called The Young Persons Culture Conference, which he described as 'a gathering of intellectuals who shared a victim-consciousness and a sense of generation'.'6 His notes for their first meeting mentioned a number of reservations about 'received' democracy: 'there is a danger that democracy from above will be canonised. This will incite a frightening reaction'; 'the fight ... is not that of thought versus external violence. Must wage serious fight against internal violence (violence inherent in thought)'; 'Will degenerate to straight majority rule, no respect for minority rights."? Even at this early stage, Maruyama knew where the focus of his concerns lay. For him, true democratisation would involve nothing less than a revolution in thought, a restructuring of values. Thought was the medium through which the deceptions of the 1930s and onwards had been practised, and the instrument which could forge a strong postwar democratic ethos in Japan. Paradoxically Maruyama believed that democracy was needed to drive this change in thought orientation. 'Democracy must work harder as the energy for self-renovation. In this way, it will become a renovative energy in the true sense.'18 In 1947 Maruyama described his view of the vital difference between the war and the postwar like this: 'now for the first time it is possible rationally to criticise the very hub of state power', and 'the complicated process of forming the national will ... has been opened to the public' .19 The significance of 8.15 was that power and responsibility had the opportunity to be co-located in the citizenry of a democratic Japan. But first the power dynamics of the past had to be identified and understood. The Emperor's surrender message had assumed that there would be continuity through the retention of the Imperial state. In a high, tremulous voice, the Emperor had in his 8.15 broadcast exhorted the populace to 'let the nation continue as one family', a goal made possible by 'having been able to safeguard and maintain the structure of the Imperial state'. Indeed surrender was rationalised as the only way to guarantee continuity, in the face of the 'new and most cruel bomb' that had twice been deployed against Japan.20

20

Democracy in postwar Japan

The curious association of the Emperor, the very symbol of continuity, with ends and beginnings of historical experience suggests that notions of genuine discontinuity were but a delusion. Disillusioned liberal opinion was quick to criticise the Emperor's formal denial of his divine status on 1 January 1946 as a sinister move: he had been transformed froin a divinity to a fellow-sufferer in order to lend credibility to his postwar incarnation. Even the fact that it had been the Emperor who had delivered the news of defeat, albeit in a roundabout way, was viewed with scepticism, as it 'made the Emperor appear as the benefactor of the end of the war'. 21 The failure to indict the Emperor as a war criminal would eventually act as a powerful negative stimulus to the war responsibility debate, and provide ready ammunition for those who looked to discredit the Tokyo War Crimes Trial. Continuity of historical experience in the context of defeat and Occupation was easily viewed as a liability. Yet in the intellectual culture of the immediate postwar period there was tension between the desire to see 15 August, or 8.15, as an historic break, and the impulse to connect with an indigenous past. For Kato Shiiichi, the price of his feeling of emancipation at the end of the war was his identity. It was 'not a feeling of being glad to be Japanese. The emancipation was rather based on everything Japan had being denied.'22 For others, 8.15 was a signal to seek the return of an idealised past. Maruyama later described the mood of the immediate postwar period as follows: I once wrote that Japanese thought is 'the philosophy of memory'. This refers to those people who felt nostalgic. They went back to the age of TaishO democracy, and understood that those days would return. Others thought that the days of early Showa would return. In other words, they saw everything after the idealised period as a minus, a 'dark valley'. They were unable, myself included, fully to appreciate the difference between former times and the postwar.23 Coming to terms with continuity and discontinuity not only had implications for Japan's postwar identity, but also for Japan's new postwar democracy. When assessments of postwar democracy became tangled up in questions of ends and beginnings of historical experience, the dilemma which attached to personal identity threatened to discredit postwar democracy while it was still in its fledgling state. The democracy of 8.15 was vulnerable for its association with defeat, and because it seemed not to have any connection with the past. Some intellectuals despaired at the foreign cast of 8.15 democracy, and dismissed it as

Defeat and democracy in postwar Japan

21

democracy born of defeat, imposed under foreign military occupation, and therefore only an 'illusion'. 24 Others, including Kato and Hidaka, believed that 8.15 offered a new beginning after the fascist 'dark valley', and it was precisely this break with the past that endowed 8.15 democracy with 'the vitality and idealistic fervour not found in old democratic countries'.15 Maruyama saw that in both the attempts to regain an ideal past and to cut otT past and present experience, there lurked the danger that postwar democracy could be discredited. He chose to address this issue in the context of the debate on war responsibility, as it was here that assumptions concerning historical continuity and legitimacy threatened to compromise the integrity of postwar democracy. But first he had to overcome the mindset encouraged by the Occupation administration in Japan. THE OCCUPATION: WAR GUILT AS DEMOCRATIC PREREQUISITE In the early postwar period, judgements made by the Occupation authorities about historical continuity were not plagued by any sentimental concerns regarding identity. The approach was plain and simple: there was to be change, and this change was to be led and inspired by the Occupation. The whiff of democratic evangelism in the early statements emanating from Occupation headquarters was qualified by an obliquely stated distrust. On the first anniversary of Japan's surrender, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, General Douglas MacArthur, made this assessment of the impact of defeat on the Japanese people: Their whole world crumbled. It was not merely an overthrow of their military might, not merely a great defeat for their nation, it was the collapse of a faith, it was the disintegration of everything they had believed in and lived by and fought for. It left a complete vacuum morally, mentally and physically. And into this vacuum flowed the democratic way of life.26 This statement reflected accurately MacArthur's belief that the 'spiritual' system of American democracy would replace the spiritual disease of kokutai. It soon became clear that evidence of 'the democratic way of life' included acknowledging the reality of Japan's defeat in terms which neatly juxtaposed militarism and ultranationalism with the democratic ideology of the West (as defined by the United States). The linchpin of this rationale was the propagation of a sense of guilt

22

Democracy in postwar Japan

for the war, suitably expressed as contempt for designated war criminals and rejection of the fascist order. Through the Occupation's public information campaigns, the purges, and the Tokyo War Crimes Trials, the Allied Powers displayed an implicit logic which linked their concept of war guilt with democratic integrity. The Occupation authorities were disturbed to find that in the latter months of 1945, there was little evidence that the majority of Japanese had even acknowledged defeat. Although the fact of defeat was self-evident through the presence of an Occupation force, it had not escaped the notice of General Headquarters (GHQ) that the Emperor's speeches had scrupulously avoided using the words 'defeat' and 'surrender', either in the 8.15 broadcast or in the address to the Diet on 24 August 1945. 27 This meant that quick realisation of the truth rested upon familiarity with the terms of the Potsdam Declaration (not to mention comprehension of imperial language). Much has been made of this omission, both by contemporary observers and by historians, who have interpreted it as part of early manoeuvres by Japanese bureaucrats deliberately to subvert Occupation policy via the tactic 'complete outward compliance with the orders of the conquerors, combined with lasting spiritual resistance to the conqueror's will'.28 The absence of the word 'defeat' was also noticeable in official pronouncements made in the immediate aftermath of 8.15, and there was good cause for suspecting duplicity on the part of Japanese government officials in what amounted to efforts to deflect war guilt away from the state. 29 For the authorities in the early days of the Occupation, war guilt soon assumed high priority. An assessment of the Japanese sense of war guilt in September and October 1945 found that it was non-existent, that it was widely believed defeat was due to the United States' scientific superiority (instead of the inherent evils of fascism and ultranationalism), and that the Japanese media had shown no interest in covering war crimes news for six weeks. 30 The Civil Information and Education (CIE) section of General Headquarters soon distributed a series of twenty articles on the war, ensured that other public information campaigns addressed this issue, and held regular press briefings where journalists were instructed in the duties of a democratic press. 31 While it is true that the Japanese press in the weeks following 8.15 did not indulge in an orgy of self-recrimination and soul-searching about their guilt for the war, there were however some tentative explorations of defeat and responsibility for the war to be found. In the month between surrender and the imposition of censorship by GHQ

Defeat and democracy in postwar Japan

23

on 15 September, the Asahi newspaper ran an editorial in which the word 'defeat' featured prominently. Entitled 'Building a New Japan', the opening paragraph employed a no-nonsense tone: Japan has lost the fight. This is a reality that is hard to ignore, but Japan must make a fresh start from its position as a defeated country, and look forward to the great successes of tomorrow. However, the way that Japan acknowledges the fact of defeat is a great problem that will affect the path which Japan takes in the futureY The editorial went on to point out that Japan must guard against falling into the same error as Germany after World War I. The first step in this process was to implement the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration which guaranteed political freedom. Japan should not dwell on the hardships which were the price of defeat. The Japanese should be aware, however, of the different approaches being taken by the Soviet Union and the United States to the reorganisation of the postwar world's political and economic institutions. The idea was to look for a compatible way to promote world peace, and achieve true renovation: 'The rebirth of Japan is not the revival of our old selves, but the construction of new selves, the building of a Japan that can live with the world.'33 In general, when defeat and responsibility were discussed in print in the early postwar days, awareness of responsibility tended to be restricted to the leadership's responsibility for defeat, or for starting a war that was obviously a lost cause in the first place, rather than an awareness of a more pervasive problem such as ultranationalism, or compliance. GHQ's initial tactic was to favour brutal truth over subtle information campaigns. The first example of this was a three part report, carried on GHQ's orders in all papers in the middle of September, detailing Japanese atrocities in the Philippines. It was only after the establishment of CIE on 22 September that press articles, under CIE's 'guidance', began to draw a more explicit link between war, defeat, and war guilt. The nature of GHQ's concern regarding war guilt was symptomatic of various inconsistencies and tensions which existed within the policy guidelines for the Occupation, and between these policies and GHQ's assessment of Japan's democratic potential. A number of senior figures in the Occupation administration nurtured misgivings about the democratic proclivity of the Japanese, and considered that democracy might be culturally incompatible with Japan. 34 This made the issue of remorse for the past actions of the militarists and acknowledgement of

24

Democracy in postwar Japan

war gUilt assume the importance of a prerequisite for true democratisation. At the same time it was recognised that mere institutional reform would not guarantee the survival of democracy in Japan after Japan had regained her independence. At the very least, democratisation would have to appear to be the product of Japanese effort, achieved under the guidance of a benevolent Occupation. Though engaged in institutional reform, the Occupation authorities believed spiritual reform to be paramount; though sceptical of Japanese democratic aptitude, they looked for evidence of a genuine spiritual transformation. War guilt was regarded as a reassurance that spiritual affinity with democracy existed. The association of democratisation objectives and war guilt was conspicuous in the purge documents. Between 1946 and 1950, various strata of Japanese society were targeted in a four stage operation known as Japan's 'moral disarmament'. In theory, the purpose of the purges was encapsulated in Article 6 of the Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945: There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world. 3s Yet as political priorities shifted in response to an uneasy international climate in the late 194Os, and the purge targets changed from the national level (1946), to the local, then economic and media levels (1947), and finally the Red Purge (1950), it became clear that the purges were inspired more by an ideologically-loaded reading of Article 10. 'The Japanese government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people.'36 Baerwald has concluded that the consecutive purging of the right (on the basis of Article 6) and the left (on the tenuous basis of Article 10), by confusing the objectives of establishing war guilt and a democratically-inclined leadership, exemplified the contradictory goals of the Occupation. 37 This may be the case, but as far as the rationale motivating democratisation was concerned, these objectives were complementary and even necessarily related. Even given the Cold War exigencies which prevailed in 1950, the targeting of the left was as much a sign of prevailing insecurity regarding the penetration of democracy in Japanese society in general as it was a response to the ideological climate of the time.

Defeat and democracy in postwar Japan 25 A reading of the text of the Potsdam Declaration and the Indictment drafted on behalf of the International Military Tribunal For The Far East (IMTFE) belied this insecurity. Here guilt was attributed to the military and civilian leaders, and not to the mass of Japanese society. Japan had been 'controlled by self-willed militaristic advisors', the people had been 'deceived and misled'. According to the Indictment, guilt lay squarely at the feet of a 'criminal militaristic clique' who had 'poisoned' the minds of the people. Article 10 of the Potsdam Declaration implied that if only these obstacles were removed, it was believed that there were democratic tendencies in Japan that could be revived. Nevertheless, a closer reading of the documentation relating to the purges points to an undercurrent of doubt regarding these 'tendencies'. In a Government Section Draft Directive, it was noted that the Japanese seemed unwilling to do their own house-cleaning, consequently there was a need to deal with the private as well as the public sector. In this instance, the scope of the purges was finally narrowed to include those persons who had held certain positions since 7 July 1937. 38 In the purge directive SCAPIN 550, Category G contained a more explicit widening of the purge to include 'any person who has denounced opponents of the militaristic regime', 'any person who has instigated ... violence against opponents of the militaristic regime', any intellectual 'who by speech, writing or action has shown himself to be an active exponent of militant nationalism and aggression'.39 Press conferences were held at the close of each major stage because 'the people of Japan must learn that upon the individual citizen rests responsibility for ensuring that the old leaders ... do not re-occupy the seats of power'.40 And in the United States Initial Post Surrender Policy For Japan, another directive which covered the purges as well as administration of the Occupation as a whole, the Supreme Commander was instructed to encourage the Japanese to 'develop a desire for individual liberties and respect for fundamental human rights'.41 In the implementation of the purges and in the war crimes trials war guilt may have been attributed to those persons who held positions of leadership in military and bureaucratic spheres, but the success of democratisation was judged according to whether or not this guilt was recognised and understood by society at large. The Tokyo War Crimes Trial was intended to be the showcase of democracy in action, where justice and accountability were to be raised up as the icons of Japan's postwar political culture. Between 3 May 1946 and

26

Democracy in postwar Japan

4 November 1948, representatives of the military and bureaucratic leadership of wartime Japan, plus some ultranationalist ideologues, were arraigned before the International Military Tribunal For The Far East. During the course of the proceedings, the Japanese people and the international community were acquainted with the unsavoury details of Japanese atrocities, and watched as individuals were judged guilty of Crimes Against Peace, Conventional War Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanity. The idea of senior officials being held responsible for their actions in war was demonstrated powerfully through the Trial and its verdict, but in the long term this was not the Trial's legacy. Rather, it was the many perceived defects of the Trial which acted as a catalyst for intellectual debate on the conceptual link between war guilt and democracy in postwar Japan. Japanese thinkers did assimilate the Trial's hidden logic, but they radically recast its conceptual frame. In doing so, intellectuals such as Maruyama took the first decisive step in defining democratic integrity in their own terms. The Tokyo Trial was criticised for a number of reasons. As the defence counsel for the accused pointed out, there were no precedents in international law for the charges of Crimes Against Peace and Crimes Against Humanity prior to World War 11.42 This laid the Trial open to the criticism that defendants were being charged with crimes ex post facto, and that it was illegitimate to hold individuals responsible for acts of state. Furthermore, the Tokyo Trial departed from its Nuremburg Charter precedent in that it exempted the Emperor. This was despite the fact that even the President of the Tribunal regarded Hirohito as 'the leader in the crime'.43 Detractors have also pointed out that the Trial admitted no concept of reciprocal guilt, and represented mere 'victor's justice', where Western civilisation sat in judgement on the culture and society of Japan. The dissenting judgement of Justice Pal, and the separate opinions of other members of the bench, confirmed the dubious reputation of the Trial. The concern over the lack of a precedent for certain war crimes troubled both victor and vanquished, and was in itself a substantial and reasonable complaint. As far as the problem of war gUilt and democracy is concerned, as a consequence of the charge of Crimes Against Peace the individual acquired a new status in international law. This was raised by Takano Yiiichi in a 1949 discussion (zadankat) which included Maruyama Masao, Ukai Nobushige and Tsuji Kiyoaki on the theme 'The Truth and Legality of the Tokyo Trial'.44 Takano pointed out that the labelling of the war as one of aggression, thus making it a crime, isolated not the state which committed the aggres-

Defeat and democracy in postwar Japan

27

sion but those servants of the state who planned and prosecuted it. Takano's aim was ostensibly to discredit the Trial, yet his fellow discussants, notably Tsuji and Maruyama, preferred instead to emphasise that through the logic of Crimes Against Peace, the individual in authority had become the direct object of international law and could no longer hide behind the anonymity of a collective entity. The question of the exemption of the Emperor from indictment as a war criminal, or even a tacit recognition of this in the form of abdication, continues to be the most perplexing issue of the debate on democratic legitimacy in postwar Japan. Not only has this matter persisted as the predominant concern for half a century, but as the reactions to Emperor Showa's death in 1989 showed, not even his death resolved the accompanying ambiguities of his postwar status. The spectacle which surrounded the death of Emperor Showa demonstrated much about the insecurities of modern Japanese democracy. The Takeshita cabinet determined early on that events had to be managed, as did the Emperor's image. The purpose of this was to disassociate him from any war guilt. Prime Minister Takeshita's eulogy laid out the script for posterity. Delivered on 7 January 1989 on the day of the Emperor's death, it read in part (referring to the China and Pacific wars) 'throughout these developments, the late Emperor ardently wished for world peace', and he resolutely brought to an end the war that had broken out against his wishes, out of a determination to prevent further suffering of the people, regardless of the consequences to his own person. 4S A similar sanitation exercise was also meticulously implemented during the funeral. Articles 20 and 89 of the 1947 constitution stipulate the separation of religion and state and lay down guidelines for expenditure of state funds for religious (read Shinto) events respectively. After politically charged debates over the funeral arrangements in parliament, a compromise was struck. The event started with a state ceremony at 9.30 am, switched to a private Shinto ceremony for an hour, then reverted to a state ceremony before returning to a Shinto ritual at the graveside. Democracy was protected by the raising of a curtain, which was supposed to indicate separation of the Shinto and state ceremonies. Takeshita later suggested that the inclusion of the Shinto rituals in the midst of the state ceremonies was a result of logistical problems, and implied that the use of the Shintoist symbols, the torii and the omasakaki, were purely to placate the LDP right. Placing the symbols behind the curtain before the recommencement of the state funeral supposedly made it legitimate. It was unfortunate that

28 Democracy in postwar Japan the Shinto priests led the cortege to the ceremonial site, but the presence of a police escort between the cars carrying the priests and the casket supposedly preserved the distinction between religion and state. Semantics and fancy footwork evaded the constitutional limitations on the association of state and religion. Williams claims that this in itself represented the greatest threat to the credibility of the postwar constitution that had yet occurred. 46 These and other controversies which attended Emperor Showa's death demonstrated the failure of the Occupation's strategy concerning the Emperor. The state's interference and manipulation of society's understanding of this event revealed a lack of conviction that Hirohito represented Japanese acceptance and assimilation of borrowed democratic values. The government of the day chose to manufacture history rather than let it take an uncharted course towards war responsibility. Another criticism of the Tokyo Trial, that of 'reciprocal gUilt' or 'victor's justice', has facilitated subsequent rightist attacks against the alleged foreign-tutored, hypocritical nature of postwar democracy. The 'reciprocal guilt' line has functioned as a distorted type of pacifist philosophy, and usually accompanies the facile argument that 'all wars are bad' and therefore 'Japan's acts were no worse than any other country's'.47 These distortions were expanded upon by following the dissenting judgement of the Indianjudge on the tribunal, Judge Rabhabinod Pal, who used the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as an example of why the West should also shoulder guilt for the war. Whatever the arguments for and against the necessity to use the atomic bombs against Japan in 1945, entangling the power and value hierarchy of the East-West paradigm with the atomic bombings has had the effect of entrenching a culture-based victim-consciousness in postwar Japan. This has been strengthened further through recent critical studies by Japanese scholars on the Band C class war crimes trials.48 The character of the Tokyo Trial as the last gasp of a legal system which supported prewar Western colonial regimes was in Arai Shinichi's view even more pronounced in the Band C trials. The fact that the victorious Western countries conducted these trials on behalf of their colonial clients effectively removed the Asians themselves from the process of bringing criminals to justice. As Arai Shinichi said: war crimes trials performed the role of showcase for the correctness of the colonial rulers, and to discredit independence movements ...

Defeat and democracy in postwar Japan

29

The postwar settlement was one pillar of the effort to revive the prewar structure of the world colonial order, and is one historical reason why Japan's war responsibility in Asia is being questioned again. 49 The damage this rationale infticted on the credibility of a postwar democratic order was plain. The retrospective cleansing of the true nature of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere was thinly disguised in this argument, and clearly undermined contemporary Japan's democratic credentials not least in the eyes of Japan's near neighbours in the region. The pretence of the Co-Prosperity Sphere ideology that Japan would deliver fellow Asians from the yoke of Western imperialism seemed undimmed by defeat. The same rationale was revealed by the textbook controversy, when the Ministry of Education sought to soften the language used in secondary school history textbooks to describe Japan's actions in the China and Asia-Pacific theatres of war. Indeed, Prime Minister Takeshita was called to account by the socialist opposition in February 1990 for asserting that Japan had not been aggressive in China in the 1930s. In terms of the war responsibility debate, the continuing controversy over versions of history has served to counterbalance the victim-consciousness of some sectors of opinion with a firm reminder that Japanese had appeared as aggressors in Asia. The question of key omissions from the Tokyo Trial indictment has similarly been used to discredit the Trial and through it to discredit the democratic regime it represented. Not only had the Emperor been passed over, but also the kenpeitai (Japanese military police), the zaibatsu (industrial conglomerates), the manufacturers of biological weapons, and most importantly, the mass of the Japanese population. It was here that the postwar debate on war responsibility came into its own. Underlying the calls for all Japanese to acknowledge their own war guilt was a fundamental concern about the nature of the relationship between the individual and the state in Japan, and a tacit recognition that this relationship had to be altered radically if postwar democracy was to survive. This is the spirit in which we should appreciate the importance of the debate on 'comfort women' in the 1990s. Seen from a democratic perspective, it is one step further down the road away from victim consciousness towards responsibility. Through Prime Minister Miyazawa's long-awaited acknowledgement on 4 August 1993 that women of Asia had been forced to work in Japan's military brothels, the way was opened for a rapprochement between state and society in Japan

30

Democracy in postwar Japan

through the assumption of responsibility for that war crime. so The Japanese bureaucracy quickly mobilised to contain the legal fallout after newly-installed Prime Minister Hosokawa pledged to follow-up Miyazawa's admission, and the issue remains far from resolved. 51 Nonetheless, war responsibility in this case showed its clearest affinity with democratic legitimacy in Japanese political culture. In the 1940s, this process had only just begun. The exclusion of the Japanese from the process of allocating war guilt was the fulcrum of the arguments about the Trial. Postwar democracy had to be reprieved by associating it with an indigenous process. Genesis was to become the most important proof and defence of the legitimacy of Japan's postwar democracy. Here lay the motivation to redefine 8.15 as the origin of a new tradition, one that was divorced from change externaHydefined and imposed from above. And here began the indigenous creation of 8.15 democracy. In the late 1940s, the need for Japanese to engage in their own analysis of war responsibility was widely regarded by intellectuals as self-evident. As Royama Masamichi stated: 'the mental attitude of a defeated people is not enough to ensure the acceptability of new ideas of democracy.'s2 Intellectuals displayed a logic which connected the origins of a concept or system, and its legitimacy. This theme, which has persisted through to the 1990s, saw the assumption of war responsibility by Japanese on their own initiative as a means of indigenising, and thereby legitimising, postwar Japanese democracy. Without this, the postwar democratic revolution would have no substance. 53 The economist Otsuka Hisao spoke for many when he said: both the energy and initiative for democratic reconstruction ... must be voluntary, coming from within the defeated nation. Democratisation in any sphere of life if carried out simply on account of pressure and coercion by foreign military forces will inevitably produce nothing more than a 'paper' democracy, a 'dead mechanism' of democracy. 54 Genesis was indispensable as far as the survival and acceptance of postwar democracy was concerned. Yet harking back to an indigenous democratic tradition was difficult. For many intellectuals postwar, Japan's involvement in World War II was seen to be the result of failed or flawed democratisation in the Meiji and Taisho eras. Redefining 8.15 as the foundation of a new tradition, a tradition forged in defeat, was the only option.

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MARUYAMA MASAO AND WAR RESPONSIBILITY It was in addressing war responsibility that Maruyama Masao first explored the intellectual terrain that was to guide his analysis of democracy in the postwar period. In addition to searching for the locus of responsibility, Maruyama sought to expose the psychological impetus behind a system where responsibility and power were unable to coexist. Maruyama embarked on this journey in the aftermath of defeat, as wartime Japan moved into the value vortex of the postwar world. In his landmark 1946 essay Logic and Psychology of Ultranationalism, Maruyama set out to analyse the intellectual structure and psychological basis of ultranationalism. 55 He chose this approach in the belief that more than anything, the phenomenon of the last war had manifested itself in Japan as an assault on the mind: 'the key factor is the all-pervasive psychological coercion, which has forced the behaviour of our people into a particular channel. '56 In the heady atmosphere of the early days of the Occupation and faced with the spectacle of the war crimes trial, Maruyama realised that his aim was nothing less than 'securing the internal freedom of the individual' from the manipulative psychological intrusion of the state. 57 Maruyama unravelled the issue of war responsibility by investigating the psychology of various groups within Japanese society, and relating this to their respective relationships with power. In Ultranationalism, Maruyama claimed that the dominant characteristic of prewar and wartime society was a lack of perceived distinction between the individual and the state. The state maintained this by employing the kokutai ideology as a psycho-cultural tool which defined morality in terms of power. Rather than a preserve of the individual, morality was defined by the state, and all values were national values: 'the real locus of Japanese morality was not in the conscience of the individual but in the affairs of the nation. '58 The cohabitation of morality with the state was in turn justified by what Maruyama called 'proximity to the ultimate value', personified by the Emperor. This idea was a vital factor as far as war responsibility was concerned. The importance lay, in Maruyama's view, in the vertical nature of power relationships built into the concept of proximity. The position of an individual or group was a relative position, one of comparative proximity to the Emperor, and therefore, a position whose power was defined relatively. Power was not inherent in any position, instead it was transferred downwards from positions of greater proximity. Therefore, those in a position of leadership felt superior due to their evident proximity; however, power did not emanate from their

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Democracy in postwar Japan

nominal status, neither were decisions justified by their status as leaders. Maruyama described this as a sort of 'unconscious despotism', which led to the complete absence of any feeling of responsibility for the conduct of the war. The country merely slithered into war. In this scenario Maruyama saw power and morality acquire characteristics that were functionally interchangeable. The result was 'the interfusion of ethics and power' in such a way that each phenomenon could masquerade as the other. 59 Here Maruyama discerned the 'logic' of atrocities committed in war by the Japanese. As the Emperor was the ultimate value, acts committed in his name acquired the aura of sanctity. The greater the proximity to the ultimate value, the more the act was morally justified. Atrocities, then, were acts of psychological compensation on the part of those in low and distant positions, who were finally given an opportunity to 'transfer oppression' on to those in even lower and more distant positions from the ultimate value. What takes the place of despotism in such a situation is a phenomenon that may be described as the maintenance of equilibrium by the transference of oppression. 60 In theory even the Emperor carried such a burden, in the form of the wishes of his ancestors which had to be 'transferred' down the line. This completes an appalling picture of utter irresponsibility, where the dynamics were invisible psychological pressures, and men moved in destructive ways wielding anonymous power. When power was expressed as morality, it was not recognised as violence or compulsion, similarly morality was inevitably expressed as power. This was what Maruyama saw to be the feature of Japanese ultranationalism. Having adopted this configuration, it was unavoidable that ultranationalism be expressed as imperialism and expansionism. In this essay, Maruyama identified an indispensable criterion for democracy: the ability of the individual to define freedom in a subjective sense, instead of through obedience to an external superior entity such as the state. We can also identify the value orientation of Maruyama's model: he perceived the prewar problem to be one of thwarted development and low political consciousness on the part of the people, pitted against the moral totalitarianism of political authority. Although his argument was cast in terms of deficiency both on the part of the average citizen and their leaders, the object of his sympathies as an intellectual, and the locus of active reform, was the popular mind. Changed perception and heightened awareness on the part of society would force the structure of authority itself to change. But in retrospect it could be argued that Maruyama's idea of responsibility was ambiguous and even contradictory to the logic behind the

Defeat and democracy in postwar Japan 33 war responsibility debate itself. Maruyama attributed blame to the nature of the system rather than to specific individuals for specific acts. Statements such as 'psychological coercion' attributed a passive, victim status to the Japanese people. How could the notion of 'responsibility' be applied to innocent victims? At this stage, Maruyama avoided this question and chose instead to create an awareness of the structure of thought which supported the wartime regime. Maruyama was reaching beyond specific responsibility for the war, and encouraging a greater awareness of the individual's potentially active part in determining the political system. It was a somewhat circuitous path to war responsibility. The net result though was to direct war responsibility towards the future, avoiding confrontation with the past. In this way the postwar debate on war responsibility failed to demand of the individual what was expected from the state: the cohabitation of power and responsibility. The active, involved citizen was a future-focused subject as far as ideas on war responsibility were concerned. Maruyama developed his ideas concerning the incoherence of authority's relationship with power in a study of the psychology of Japan's wartime leadership. Written in 1949 and entitled Thought and Behaviour Patterns of Japan's Wartime Leaders, this piece drew extensively on the transcripts of the Tokyo Trial, particularly the testimonies of the accused. As one commentator has pointed out, the net impact of Maruyama's arguments served not only to denounce the leaders, but to make the contemporary reader feel directly attacked. 61 Maruyama dismissed the Tokyo War Crimes Trial's charge of conspiracy on the part of the wartime Japanese leadership, and reiterated his theory of essentially irresponsible leadership, calling it 'a system of irresponsibility'. War was neither historically inevitable, nor a product of systematic intent: it was 'the result of a vast accumulation of illogical decisions'.62 For Maruyama, the study of wartime leaders was the study of the ethos of irrationality. Later Maruyama used this metaphor to describe the farce of the wartime leadership's 'decision making': It was as though one group had brought out the portable shrine, and then dropped it; it could not be returned, so a different group came along and carried the shrine, and so on until it fell to the bottom of a ravine. Then you ask, 'but who dropped it into the ravine?'63 Beckoning controversy, Maruyama presented this pervasive irresponsibility as a function of the nature of Japanese fascism which, when compared to the bold, purposeful Nazi variant, was exposed as

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Democracy in postwar Japan

'dwarfish' and pathetic. Juxtaposing the cross-examinations of Japanese and Nazi leaders at their respective war crimes trials, Maruyama plotted the differences between the two political cultures. Not surprisingly, holding the infamous Nazi leadership up as models with which to shame Japan's militarists caused great controversy. According to Maruyama, in order to comprehend Japanese fascism, we must first understand 'The Outlaw'. With the premise that fascism in all its manifestations is based on an abnormal psychology, Maruyama argued that in both Nazi Germany and wartime Japan, actual power was wielded by Outlaw personalities. The Nazi Outlaws were poorly educated and socially outcast, yet they not only wielded actual power but acknowledged themselves as responsible decision makers. By contrast, Japan's formal leaders were drawn from the elite of society, with prestigious educational qualifications; however, they neither held actual power nor acknowledged the hollowness of their formal role as policy makers. Instead, they were prey to influence from Outlaws, whose very illegitimacy endowed their power with dangerous anonymity. Nazi leaders such as Goering were brazen and defiant in admitting their responsibility and intentions to the Nuremburg tribunal, but the Japanese leaders were 'slippery as eels, hazy as the mist'.M In short, the Nazi leaders had a sense of self (shutaisel), whereas the Japanese had 'an under-developed sense of responsibility' that was 'a reflection of the ethos inherent in the environment in which these men lived and acted'.6s Almost as an afterthought, Maruyama completed the model of the Japanese fascist power structure in a footnote. The Outlaw (ronin) was at the bottom of a hierarchy below the Official (yakunin) and the Shrine (omikoshi). Value attached to the Shrine and filtered downwards, despite the fact that actual power was exercised by Outlaws on the lowest level. While combinations of these personalities could manifest themselves in one person, actual power and responsibility never coexisted. 66 Maruyama declared that this collection of personalities was not a product of unusual events or an aberration, but rather represented the established configuration of power in Japan: 'the three types of political personality and their structural relationship serve to formulate not only the fascist period but the entire political world of Imperial Japan. '67 This reading of history, in imposing a slur on the indigenous Japanese democratic tradition, would provoke further outrage from those who sought to rehabilitate postwar democracy by appealing to a prewar Japanese democratic tradition. In highlighting deficiency on the part of the Japanese liberaldemocratic tradition, Maruyama was denying the tendency already

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apparent in 1949 to regard those democratic elements as victims of a fascist aberration. In positing the thesis that the rise of fascism in Japan had been a logical outcome of the nature of the political power structure in the Meiji and TaishO eras, Maruyama made clear that it was not that a good system had been abused, but that it was an inherently bad system. 68 This was a continuous theme in Maruyama's work, and displayed his conviction that rather than harking back to a flawed past, it was better to discover legitimacy for postwar democracy through genuine self-renovation in the present. Maruyama's Wartime Leaders essay was remarkable for its unrestrained scathing tone vis a vis the leadership which faced interrogation at the Tokyo Trial. Citing copious examples from the Trials transcripts, Maruyama ascertained that the 'dwarfishness' of Japanese fascism had two distinguishing characteristics. First, there was the proclivity to attribute decisions during the war to faits accomplis. Instead of setting out with a definite objective in mind, and connecting intention with outcome, the Japanese leaders 'were always being dragged along by the "objective situation" and by the "force of circumstances" until they finally slithered into the depths of defeat' .69 Thus the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Marquis Kido K6ichi, said of the Tripartite Pact 'it was difficult to oppose this proposed measure since it had now entered the realm of actuality'.70 Maruyama noted with disdain that for men such as this, 'reality . . . is a blind inevitability flowing from a determined past'.7! Maruyama's model of the fascist power structure showed that fundamental irresponsibility was entrenched in a system where power and value were fixed in permanent distance from each other. It was this state of affairs which enabled Outlaws such as the Young Officers to exert great influence on events. The gekokujo syndrome, or rule of the higher by the lower, was according to Maruyama the pathological manifestation of the transference of oppression. When power runs rampant outside the confines of an immobile hierarchy of value, what emerges is 'an inverted form of democracy'. 72 Secondly, Maruyama noted that almost without exception, Japanese leaders felt that matters were beyond their official jurisdiction. Maruyama saw the same dynamic, the transference of oppression, at work here, in that power obeyed an external impulse and thus carried no burden of responsibility. Therefore the Emperor could not go against the advice of the cabinet to declare war against the United States, neither could General Mut6 acknowledge that he had been in charge when his troops perpetrated the Rape of Nanking.73 Maruyama traced this rationale back to the Meiji Period, where

36 Democracy in postwar Japan

pluralism and irresponsibility had been features of the political structure. Dressing up the Emperor as a constitutional monarch enabled the Emperor to avoid responsibility by referring to the external constraint of the constitution, while bureaucrats could behave as though they served an absolute monarch in order to shield their own manipulations of power. Absolute monarchy became a screen for political irresponsibility. Postwar, Maruyama saw that unless power was based in a free, responsible citizenry, in a system which assigned value to power from below, democracy would be stood on its head. WAR RESPONSIBILITY AS WAR GUILT

In the early postwar years, Maruyama was more concerned with the power structure of the fascist state, and the pervasive psychology which supported this structure, than with joining the communists in their search for specific, individual war responsibility. Obviously emotionally involved with his work on the fascist leadership, Maruyama did not at this stage feel compelled to scrutinise his own role or that of his fellow intellectuals. But as the communists burst forth out of their time capsule after 1945, it was inevitable that people began to ask why no significant resistance movement had arisen amongst the so-called 'progressive' intellectuals such as Maruyama, who were at the forefront of the postwar democratic movement. While the left were drawing up lists of collaborators (through journals such as Shin Nihon Bungaku and Kindai Bungaku), and the press were enthusiastically purging their organisations of 'collaborators' for the sake of democratisation, the 'progressive' intellectuals were strangely silent. In 1946 the maverick intellectual Fukuda Tsuneari challenged the leftists, accusing them of hypocrisy because of their apparent belief that self-criticism qualified them for democratic revolution, and enabled them to criticise others. He also suggested that for some writers, collaboration was unavoidable: 'It is impossible to expect ordinary people to be heroes; I do not have the courage to face that sort of state authority and continue a fruitless existence. '74 Fukuda taunted the righteous left with an argument which had some relevance to all intellectuals. This was that the repentant thinkers seemed to imply by their self-criticism that they were somehow free of the failings which had prevented the organisation of a resistance. The idea that intellectuals, and not just the masses, were imbued with the same flaws as the state was a shocking suggestion not entertained by other thinkers of the day. It was not until 1956 that the problem was tackled head-on in Tsurumi

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Shunsuke's article Intellectuals' War Responsibility.7s Tsurumi's piece sparked off a round of fierce condemnation amongst the intellectual community, and revealed that doubts concerning the legitimacy of postwar democracy persisted after Japan regained her independence. Through struggling to define how intellectuals could best assume war responsibility, intellectuals were at the same time grasping for a way to legitimise postwar democracy. It is highly significant that intellectuals sought rehabilitation for themselves and for postwar democracy through identifying with a pacifist philosophy. According to Tsurumi, it was time for intellectuals to: confess that in the past they did not personally resist, consider the state of affairs that intellectuals have been heroically lording over the people while continuing to paint over their own cowardice with superficial arguments, and, from now on, instead of menacing the people with words, intellectuals should actually try to acquire true intellectual courage when it is needed, when the people participate in the peace movement. 76 This was much more than an intellectual debate. The peace movement had come of age by 1955, having struggled for a comprehensive peace with all belligerents in 1952 and against the security alliance with the United States which was signed on the same day. A cross-section of intellectuals gathered together in the The Peace Problems Discussion Group placed the integrity of the postwar constitution on top of their agenda. When in 1954 Japan signed a Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with the United States, it seemed that the ethos of postwar democracy - peace - was in jeopardy. This Agreement sought to enforce the intention stated in the security agreement that Japan would increasingly assume more responsibility for her own defence. The peace clause, already under threat through similar terms contained in the 1952 security treaty, demanded more than words from opinion leaders. Democratic activism for the purpose of protecting the integrity of Article 9 of the postwar constitution clarified the peace-democracy connection. This was the push needed to force the proponents of democracy to face war responsibility themselves. When in 1955 there emerged a bid to declare the postwar era 'over', the time had come to invest democratic faith in pacifist activism. But first, intellectuals had to show through addressing war responsibility that in significant senses, neither the war nor the postwar were truly over yet. Participants in the ensuing debate did not question Tsurumi's premise that the Occupation's efforts to chase war guilt had been artificial, and demonstrated anew the strength of the conceptual link

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between the assumption of war guilt by Japanese themselves and the integrity of postwar democracy. The 1956 debate can be seen as the point where considerations of war responsibility switched from a vague angst to an active, future-focused pacifism. Maruyama's first contribution to the debate embraced this change in emphasis whole-heartedly, in what was by then regarded as his typically provocative style. His essay Blind Spots of War Responsibility repeatedly drew a connection between interpreting correctly war responsibility, and the success of postwar democratic movements: How we Japanese acknowledge war responsibility, and how we assume responsibility in the future is of course a problem which we must confront in a fundamental way, and I think that we have corne to the stage where if we avoid or conceal it the peace movement and the movement to protect the constitution will make no real progress. 77 It was wrong, cautioned Maruyama, to concentrate only on intellectuals' war responsibility. First, there were other types of war responsibility to be confronted which, if ignored, could lead to the reappearance of dangerous prewar and wartime configurations of power. The focus should not be narrowed, but broadened: It is not a matter of black or white, but rather how individuals within each group/level/profession aided Japan's actions from 1931 to 1945, either by acting or failing to act and, from this perspective, determining the nature and extent of each person's errors, mistakes, blunders.78 The individual focus in this statement was a distinct shift in Maruyama's problem consciousness, as it linked the individual with responsibility during as well as after the war. In Blindspots of War Responsibility he went further and identified three types of war responsibility that had hitherto been overlooked. In identifying these groups, Maruyama also made a distinction between different kinds of war responsibility. The first sally was made against the citizens of Japan. It was proper, conceded Maruyama, that a distinction be made between those who had occupied political office, and those who had not. However, the fact that the latter group was outside of the formal political structure did not exonerate them from responsibility for the war. To the contrary, the people of Japan carried the burden of moral responsibility for the wartime actions of the Japanese state, in that they had silently followed in its wake. For the first time Maruyama drew an explicit causal connection between the people's acknowledgement of

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war responsibility and the future of Japanese democracy: 'a sense of active opposition to the evil authorities of tomorrow cannot be expected from a people who were easily exempted from responsibility for greeting the evil authorities of yesterday.'79 Maruyama considered moral responsibility an important aspect of 'war responsibility', particularly the consequences flowing from its passive aspect. But his primary concern in this essay was to challenge the parameters of the reconstituted war responsibility debate, and to do it in such a way that readers would be made aware of the causal connection between political power and political responsibility. It was in essence a call to recognise a fundamental criterion for a democratic political system. In this spirit, Maruyama set his sights on the Emperor. The left had pursued the Emperor's war responsibility, it is true, but they were lone voices. The most that any other group had been able to do was mutter darkly about a vague kind of moral responsibility. Given that the Emperor had been the bearer of sovereignty, had had the power to name ministers, exercise direct command powers and even by personal fiat end the war, this was 'totally unforgivable from the perspective of political ethics'.80 putting international political factors aside, the fact that the Emperor's responsibility as Head of State has not been taken up is related to the fact that amongst the people the Emperor himself has been made into something like an apolitical or supra-political symbol. 81 Maruyama pointed out that it was precisely through exercising power in the irresponsible bureaucratic void beneath a supposedly supra-political position that both ruler and ruled had been able to blunder their way from outrage to outrage during the war. The continuation of this perception into the postwar era represented a lethal threat to democracy: Determining and pursuing the Emperor's personal political responsibility is an urgent issue, in that it involves over-turning the spiritual basis of structural bureaucratic domination which has always been the greatest cancer of democratisation. 82 Clearly, Maruyama argued, the Emperor should abdicate, as his presence was evidence of undesirable continuity into the postwar period. Taking his cue from Fukuda Tsuneari, but in a much more provocative manner, Maruyama next targeted the opposite ideological flank the communists. Unlike Fukuda, Maruyama concentrated on the political nature of this group's war responsibility. Although the communists

40 Democracy in postwar Japan had undergone further trials postwar as victims of the Red Purge during the Occupation, they had retained and arguably enhanced their positive image as the Korean War and the entrenchment of the Cold War pushed pacifism to the forefront of the postwar intellectual agenda. It was therefore extremely controversial to attack their credentials as representatives of anti-imperialism, and suggest that they too bore guilt for the fascist imperialist war. Undaunted, Maruyama went straight to the point: 'the question is, did the communist party win the fight against fascism or lose it?"] Clearly, the communists had failed as a vanguard party, failed to mount an effective resistance, and failed to prevent neighbouring countries from suffering an imperialist onslaught. One suspects that Maruyama was baiting his communist peers with this argument, but there was also a more serious motive. Reflecting the tortured efforts of intellectuals in the 1950s to join together in the name of promoting the pacifist neutralist cause, Maruyama commented: If communists acknowledge war responsibility from their unique position, it will dissipate the liberals' and social democrats' complex vis vis communists, and will substantially contribute to the strengthening of the foundation of the United Front.'"

a

Maruyama's message was that unless the war responsibility of the Emperor and the communists was ascertained, it would not be possible to determine the intermediate degrees of responsibility for the rest of society. And if Japan's involvement in World War II was dismissed as merely the inevitable outcome of the growth of capitalism, the dynamics of irresponsible power would remain unrecognised and would linger on into the postwar era using democracy as a cloak, fatally eroding postwar democracy from within. Maruyama was given a number of opportunities to restate his views, but he found few kindred spirits. Maruyama's interlocutors were mainly interested in pursuing intellectuals' war guilt, and agonised over the best way to purge this burden. In general the tone of the intellectuals' 1956 debate on war responsibility was based on the premise that intellectuals were a distinct entity. Non-resistance was not a result of a lack of awareness or ability to understand the situation, but simply a failure to decide to act. The problem was phrased in terms of the duty of intellectuals to lead others to awareness; their 'war responsibility' was the failure to do this. Maruyama's first attempt to deal with this issue was in a 1947 essay entitled Ideology and Dynamics of Japanese Fascism. It was inadequate, and laid him open to virulent criticism from other thinkers who

Defeat and democracy in postwar Japan

41

objected to his apparent pro-Western elitism. Maruyama admitted in this work that some intellectuals had promoted fascism, yet he was careful to distinguish between 'sub-intellectuals' who had manufactured fascist ideology, and 'true intellectuals', whose European culture would never permit them to respond to the low tone of the fascist movement and to its shallow intelligentsia. 85 It was because the penetration of this European culture had been superficial, not that it was intrinsically tainted, that the 'true intellectuals' had been unable to make a resolute defence of their inner individuality against fascism. 86 Maruyama's remarks about the European intelligentsia's superiority would lay him open to attack in later debates on modernism, and cause him to be branded negatively as a 'modernist' to this day. Along with his disparaging remarks, however, was a call to intellectuals to recognise their responsibility to society, and to avoid the elitist isolationism which had made them follow a 'hesitant and impotent existence'.87 Looking back from 1983 to the immediate postwar years, Maruyama acknowledged that the intellectuals' image at that time had provided sceptics of 'imposed democracy' with more ammunition." He has since been at pains to make a clear distinction between the 'passive' wartime intellectual culture and the constructive postwar one, in order to enhance the credibility of the democracy which these intellectuals promoted. Maruyama coined the phrase kaikon kyOdotai, or 'community of regret', to describe the intellectual mood after the war, when intellectuals were 'making an indistinguishable blend of emancipation and self-condemnation; joy in hope for the future, and remorse for the past'.89 Maruyama had been keenly aware of the nature of criticism directed against intellectuals such as himself in the 1950s. His own paraphrase of this criticism was damning: [progressive intellectuals] did not face squarely the harsh reality of military occupation at the hands of the Allied countries, but became ecstatic at the 'liberation from outside' of the Potsdam Declaration, became drunk on rose-coloured enlightenment, and preached posing as enlighteners to the masses who, in blank amazement, were demanding food and shelter, roaming on a scorched earth. 90 Maruyama tried to soften, if not improve, the postwar intellectuals' image. He did not deny the intellectuals' elitism, but sought recognition for their genuine concern for the future of postwar democracy. Their war responsibility debate in the first postwar decade was motivated by the feeling that significant change could only be achieved via fundamental reconstruction of the past. This had expressed itself

42

Democracy in postwar Japan

amongst intellectuals as an introspective impulse to purge shared regrets: Those who were imprisoned and committed apostasy regretted their lack of strength of conviction and fortitude. Liberal intellectuals regretted the fact that while harbouring doubts about and unease towards the militarists and the right wing in Japan, in the end they were pushed by established reality to go so far as to cheer the 'New Order' and conform. All intellectuals regretted the fact that no matter what their field of specialisation, they were quite ignorant of the socio-political situation, and while like the uneducated masses trusting the pronouncements of the government, they carried on with their own work. 91 Maruyama's feeling that for intellectuals such as himself war responsibility meant failing to perform a socially responsible role paralleled his wish to prevent the association of postwar democracy with intellectual opportunism. He believed that the promotion of postwar democracy had been an expression of sincere and active commitment on the part of a repentant intelligentsia. One clue to Maruyama's reluctance to address wartime compliance with the state on the part of himself and his peers can be found in his 1969 newspaper interview about his days in Hiroshima after the bombing. Maruyama had hitherto not referred to himself as an atomic bomb victim (hibakusha), although he had been there. He explains that he felt it presumptuous to refer to himself in this way, as he had been there as a soldier, as a witness and not as a fellow-sufferer. But in 1969 he appeared ready at last to don this label. The reason was expressed obliquely, as is his way. Maruyama likened himself to the character in a novel who was against the state. In the sense of joining the other pebbles by the roadside, Maruyama declared himself to be a hibakusha. There is another clue in this interviewto Maruyama's changing perception of those days and its significance to the postwar era. In a plea for understanding, Maruyama reportedly stated that soldiers had been victims, too, and that indeed they were the victims who had been most overlooked by history. This is the closest we can come to Maruyama's personal interpretation of his wartime experience. Through the war responsibility debate, defeat was transformed from a stigma into an opportunity for self-definition. Two decades after 8.15, Maruyama commemorated the event with the words: 'Japan, through defeat as the last advanced Imperialist country, became the first advanced pacifist country.'92 More than a simple reflex formulation which

Defeat and democracy in postwar Japan

43

juxtaposed militarism and pacifism, this represented an attempt to indigenise and legitimise Japan's postwar democracy. In the volatile context of postwar Japan, positive self-definition was essential for the survival of 8.15 democracy. For Maruyama, this entailed the right to define morality subjectively, with the corollary that individual decisions and actions were necessarily associated with responsibility. It was in effect the first expression of Maruyama's vision of a democratic ethos for postwar Japan. However, the search for war guilt did not truly connect with its cleansed postwar incarnation as 'war responsibility' . Given that the individual citizens of postwar Japan would have to team power with responsibility as the bearers of sovereignty, it was odd that Maruyama did not seek to establish how this broke down prewar. Maruyama saw only the insidiousness of the state's ideology, and judged that the lack of opportunity for the individual subjectively to determine values pre-empted meaningful engagement with the state's agenda. The democracy of 8.15 was premised on personal autonomy and presented as an antithesis. But the thesis was neither acknowledged nor explored in the same terms of responsibility upon which rested the integrity of its democratic antithesis. THE ONGOING DEBATE In 1993 the war responsibility debate acquired a new dimension. In an informal press conference, the leader of Japan's new coalition government, Hosokawa Morihiro, referred to the last war using a phrase which is replete with acceptance of war guilt: he said it was 'a war of aggression'.93 The international media responded with effusive praise for this unprecedentedly straightforward admission of war guilt by a Japanese leader, despite the fact that he significantly toned down his language in several subsequent statements on this question. 94 It is irresistable to link these developments with the decline of one party dominance under the Liberal Democratic Party and the advent of a reformist coalition government. Certainly in terms of the war responsibility debate Hosokawa's statements seemed to epitomise the qualities of moral responsibility required of a legitimate democracy. There appeared to be a universal desire at home and abroad finally to ring in a democratic revolution in Japan. We wanted to draw a correlation between Hosokawa's position, his public opinion rating, and his statements about the war. But a series of political backdowns soon revealed the same old power configurations and constraints behind the fa~ade of representative government. The war responsibility debate

44

Democracy in postwar Japan

has become a political football rather than the foundation of a nation's postwar identity. The fiftieth anniversary of 8.15 finds Japan still unreconciled with fundamental questions of accountability, which its own political culture deems essential to democratic integrity. We need to look to ourselves also when evaluating the war responsibility debate. It was the Allies who omitted a number of crimes, including the enslavement of 'comfort women', from the war crimes process. We allowed Japan to regard reparations as sufficient accounting for her wartime actions, and many nations continue to accept this largesse in a different form, through foreign aid. Japan's democratic tutors also looked to enforce a sense of responsibility amongst Japanese in undemocratic ways, through censorship, propaganda and ideological discrimination. In the case of 'comfort women', the failure of their respective governments to support their cause until recently suggests an unwillingness to exorcise these war ghosts in their own societies as well. For Japan's part, it is difficult to expect symbolic moral responsibility from a postwar generation when there is pervasive ignorance of the history of the war beyond that of being the world's first nuclear victim. Ienaga Saburo's fight to depict the war in secondary school textbooks exposes ongoing official resistance against confronting the issue.9s Japan's democracy remains trapped in an historical debate on democratic legitimacy. In many ways, when analysing Japanese democracy we continue to be confronted by the unresolved dilemmas of 8.15.

NOTES

2 3 4 5 6 7 8

9

Hidaka Rokuro ed., Sengo shiso no shuppatsu (The Beginning of Postwar Thought), Chikuma ShobO, 1968, p. 3. Pacific War Research Society, Japan's Longest Day, Kooansha, 1968, p. 7. Nakano Yoshio, 'Mohaya sengo de wa nai' (It Is No Longer Postwar), Bungei Shunjl1, February 1956, pp. 56--66. Hidaka Rokl1, Kindaishugi (Modernism), Chikuma ShobO, 1964, p. 14. Quoted in John Hersey, Hiroshima, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1986, pp. 85-86. Government Section, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Political Reorientation of Japan (PROJ) Appendix A3, p.413. GaimushO, ShUsen shiroku (Record of the End of the War), 1952, p. 647. See ibid, pp. 645-646. It was not surprising that the Foreign Ministry made a positive appraisal of the Byrnes Note at this stage, as they were firmly in favour of ending hostilities, and knew that the Army in particular would seize on any half-hearted or negative assessment of Allied intentions as an excuse to wage a final battle on home territory. Maruyama Masao, 'Fuhen teki genri no tachiba', (From the perspective of universal principles) in Tsurumi Shunsuke, Katari tsugu sengo shi, vol. 1, Shiso no kagaku sha, 1969, pp. 85-88.

Defoat and democracy in postwar Japan Hi

11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39

40

45

'Nijii yonenme ni kataru hibaku taiken' (Speaking about the experience of being an atomic bomb victim twenty four years afterwards), Chiigoku Shinbun, Parts I and II, 5 and 6 August 1969. Maruyama Masao et at.. 'Senso to dojidai' (War and its Era), Dojidai, No.8, September 1958, p. 25. ibid., p. 24. ibid, p. 25. ibid. Maruyama Masao, Gendai seiji no shiso to kodo (Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics), Miraisha, 1964, p.495. Maruyama Masao, Senchii to sengo no aida (From War to Postwar), Misuzu ShobO, 1976, p. 190. Maruyama Masao et at., 'Sensa to dajidai', p. 30. Maruyama Masao et al., 'Gendai wa ikanaru jidai ka', (What Kind of Age is This?), Asahi Janaru, vol. 1, No.21, August 1959, p. 17. Maruyama Masao, 'Politics as a Science in Japan', in Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1969, p.233. Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Shiiwa, London, Athlone, 1985, p. 185. Arase Yutaka, 'Sengo shisa to sono tenkai' (Postwar Thought and Its Development), Kindai Nihon shiso shi koza, Chikuma ShobO, 1959, pp. 346-347. Kato Shiiichi, Kuno Osamu, '5.19 to 8.15' (19 May and 15 August), Shiso no Kagaku, August 1960, p. 13. Maruyama Masao et at., 'Gendai wa ikanarujidai ka', pp. 9-10. For instance Yoshimoto Takaaki and Okuma Nobuyuki used this expression. Kata, Kuno, op cit., p. 13. Hidaka, 'Sensa taiken to sengo taiken' (War Experience and Postwar Experience), Sekai, August 1956, p. 52. PROJ, Appendix: F21, p. 756. General Headquarters, Supreme Commander For The Allied Powers. Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan and Korea, (NMH), Tokyo, Microfilm, reel 1, p. 26. William MacMahon Ball, Japan . .. Enemy or Ally? Melbourne, Cassell and Co., 1948, p. 59; see also Arase, op. cit., and James W. Morley, 'First Seven Weeks', Japan Interpreter, vol. 6, no. 2,1970, pp. 151-164. Arase,op. cit., pp. 345-349. NMH, Reel I, p. 162. See William J. Coughlin, Conquered Press, California, Pacific Books, 1952. Asahi Shinbun, 28 August 1945, p. 1. ibid See for example Kades and Hussey in PROJ, vol. 1. PROJ, Appendix: A3, p.413. ibid Hans Baerwald, Purge of Japanese Leaders Under the Occupation, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1959, pp. 2-6, 99-106. PROJ, vol. I, pp. 11-13. ibid., pp. 21-22. ibid., p. 39.

46

Democracy in postwar Japan

41 42

PROJ, Appendix: All, p. 423. Part of the Prosecution's argument in favour of the legitimacy of the Crimes Against Humanity charge was the precedent of the report prepared by the 1919 Commission on Responsibilities, which referred to Crimes Against Humanity in connection with Turkish atrocities against the Armenian population during World War I. Ironically, the United States signed with a dissenting reservation, in which they argued that Crimes Against Humanity were not legitimate war crimes, as 'there is no fixed and universal standard of humanity'. The Treaty of Versailles followed the United States' line and excluded references to Crimes Against Humanity. It is interesting that it was subsequently the United States that introduced this concept into the United Nations War Crimes Commission's deliberations on war crimes during World War II. In the documents appendix for the Tokyo Trial, there is a record of a request made by Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson for a copy of the 1919 Commission's report. The report was copied without the annex listing the United States' reservations. See The United Nations War Crimes Commission, History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and the Development of the Laws of War, London, His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1948, pp. 32-41, and International Military Tribunal For The Far East, Various Documents, p. 8. Richard Minear, Victor's Justice, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1971, p. 162. 'Tokyo saiban no jijitsu to hori', H6ritsu JiM, February 1949, pp. 13-28. Author's translation. David Williams, 'Reporting the Death of the Emperor ShOwa', Nissan Occasional Paper Series No.l4, 1990, p. 2. Tsurumi Shunsuke refers to this in Hosoya et al., Tokyo War Crimes Trial: An International Symposium, Kooansha, 1986, pp. 140-142. 8 and C class war crimes refer to conventional war crimes as opposed to those specific crimes identified in the Nuremburg and Tokyo charters. They were held throughout the Asian war theatre. Fujiwara Akira and Arai Shinichi, eds, Gendai shi ni okeru sens6 sekinin (War Responsibility in Modem History), Aoki Shoten, 1990, pp. 40-41. Miyazawa made this statement on 4 August 1993 after he had lost the 18 July election. He was acting as a caretaker leader until the coalition government was formed. The Japanese Government has since 1992 interviewed women (especially South Korean women) who claimed to have been comfort women. The issue of compensation remains unclear, though during his August 1994 Asian tour Prime Minister Murayama has mentioned the comfort women issue. Meanwhile, academics continue to amass documentary evidence to prove the comfort women's case. The UN has established the Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities under Human Rights Commission auspices to investigate the comfort women issue. Royama Masamichi, 'Prospects of Constitutional Government in J.!lpan', Japan Quarterly, vol. I, No.1, 1954, p. 7. Onuma Yasuaki, Tokyo saiban kara sens6 sekinin no shis6 e, (From the Tokyo Trial to War Responsibility), Yiishindo Kobunsha, 1985, p. 95.

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51

52 53

Defeat and democracy in postwar Japan 47 54 55

56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64

65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88

Otsuka Hisao, 'Formation of Modern Man', Japan Interpreter, vol. 6, No.1, Spring 1970, p. 1. In Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics the title of this essay has been translated as 'Theory and Psychology of Ultranationalism'. As the original Japanese version is 'Chokokka shugi no ronri to shinri', I prefer to use the word 'logic' in the title. ibid., pp. 1-2. ibid., p. 5. ibid., p. 10. ibid., p. 9. ibid., pp. 16-19. 6take Hideo, 'Maruyama seiji gaku to hoho ron', UP, No. 179, September 1987, p. 26. Maruyama Masao, 'Thought and Behaviour Patterns of Japan's Wartime Leaders', in Thought and Behaviour, p. 87. Maruyama Masao et al., 'Senso sekinin ni tsuite' (On War Responsibility), Shiso no Kagaku, No. 16, November 1956, p. 3. Maruyama Masao, 'Wartime Leaders', Thought and Behaviour, pp. 100101. ibid., p. 103. ibid., pp. 128-129. ibid., p. 130. Maruyama Masao, 'Ultranationalism', Thought and Behaviour, p. 23. Maruyama Masao, 'Wartime Leaders', Thought and Behaviour, p. 107. ibid., p. 104. ibid., p. 106. ibid., p. 113. ibid., pp. 116-117. Fukuda Tsuneari, 'Bungaku to senso sekinin' (Literature and War Responsibility), in Hidaka, Sengo shiso no shuppatsu, pp. 228-231. Tsurumi Shunsuke, 'Chishikijin no senso sekinin', Chilo Koron, January 1956, pp. 57-63. ibid., p. 60. Maruyama Masao, 'Senso sekinin no moten' (Blind Spots of War Responsibility), Senchil to sengo no aida, p. 596. ibid., pp. 597-598. ibid. ibid., p. 600. ibid. ibid., p. 60 I. ibid. ibid., p. 602. Maruyama Masao, 'Ideology and Dynamics of Japanese Fascism', in Thought and Behaviour, p. 59. ibid., pp. 59-60. ibid., p. 60. Yoshimoto Takaaki was particularly scathing of Maruyama on this point See Yoshimoto, 'Maruyama Masao ron' (On Maruyama Masao), Shiso ka ron, vol. 12, Yoshimoto Takaaki zenchosaku shu, Keio Shobo, 1969, pp. 14--23.

48

Democracy in postwar Japan

89

Maruyama Masao. Koei no ichi kara (From the Rearguard), Miraisha, 1982, p. 114. ibid., pp. 113-114. ibid., p. 115. Maruyama Masao, 'Niju seiki saidai no paradokusu' (Greatest Paradox of the Twentieth Century), Sekai, October 1965, p. 202. 10 August 1993. Prime Minister Kaifu also made blunt statements concerning Japan's war guilt in 1990 during a State Visit by South Korean Prime Minister Roh Tae Woo, but this did not have the same impact. It was instead seen as an attempt to draw attention to himself and away from the powerbrokers behind his cabinet. Hosokawa made successively weaker statements during the state ceremonies commemorating 8.15, and again in his inaugural policy speech to parliament on 23 August. Professor Ienaga Saburo has been involved in legal action with the Ministry of Education since 1965 over censorship of his history textbooks. Ienaga scored a minor victory in October 1993, though in March of that year the Supreme Court refused to regard the censorship of textbooks as unconstitutional.

90 91 92 93 94

95

3 The search for autonomy Maruyama Masao and the Japanese past

The poverty of personal autonomy in wartime established it as a key criterion for democracy postwar. Even before the war's end, Maruyama turned to history to ascertain how Japan's political culture had developed this weakness over time. Through searching Japan's past for examples of personal autonomy, Maruyama came to realise that personal autonomy alone could not impact on politics. Society needed to be proactive in its dealings with authority. The pockets of personal autonomy that Maruyama found in Japanese history had failed because they did not have an appropriate vehicle of political expression. There had to be a bridge between society and state that did not compromise personal autonomy. Through analysing the frustrated attempts at combating authoritarianism in the past, Maruyama gradually expanded his understanding of autonomy. The interaction of society and state demanded a medium that we shall refer to as 'social autonomy'. Protest and resistance were evidence that social autonomy existed. Yet when Maruyama explored past instances of protest, he found that their failures were often due to the flawed interaction of personal and social autonomy. The conclusions he drew from this affected his appraisal of how democracy should be established in postwar Japan. Maruyama's conclusions were moulded by his methodology. Behind the collapse of the Tokugawa regime (1600-1868) he discerned a dichotomy in Confucian thought between the ideas of Nature and Invention. 'Nature' evoked the Confucian acceptance of the natural world as the model for social organisation to be accepted as beyond the realm of man's control. 'Invention' meant the opposite - man appearing as the creator of socio-political order. When Maruyama analysed the Meiji era of enlightenment (1868-1912), he noted the tension between Eastern versus Western identity which accompanied the collapse of the Tokugawa dynasty and the push for Western-inspired modernity. Next

50

Democracy in postwar Japan

he turned to the much-vaunted democratic movement known as the People's Rights Movement of the late Meiji era. There he identified the struggle between National and Popular Sovereignty as the moment when autonomy, in both personal and popular forms. fell victim to hostile ideas. As we follow Maruyama's consideration of Japanese history, we find a growing realisation on his part that these dualities were driven by their interaction with each other. Further, their interaction was dialectically driven. In each historical instance, he determined that the dialectic had the opportunity to work through autonomy, or against it. This adds a new dynamic dimension to conventional democratic thinking. In effect, through his work on Japanese political history, Maruyama realised that he was examining how society lost control of its political self-definition. The next consideration was. what implications did this have for the postwar era? IMAGES OF THE JAPANESE PAST

In Japan's prewar history Maruyama confronted a number of assumptions, mostly negative, about the relationship between the 'democratic' and the 'feudal'. The notion of a dynamic feudal entity is a relatively recent phenomenon in history writing in general, and is particularly true of Western scholarship of the Tokugawa-Meiji periods. Until the appearance of this idea, the Meiji era represented modernity, while the Tokugawa era embodied premodernity and feudalism almost by default. This shift in perspective on the Tokugawa period has paralleled changing interests in the contemporary world. In particular, scholars. pundits and 'theories about the Japanese' (Nihonjinron) theorists have been at pains to isolate the reasons for Japan's phenomenal industrial success. Inasmuch as they have dwelt on social aspects, they have avoided an assessment of the relationship between 'traditional' or 'feudal' attitudes and authoritarianism. It has apparently been enough to show compatibility between 'traditional' attitudes and productivity. I When we examine the positive reappraisal of Tokugawa feudalism, it is clear that Maruyama deserves pride of place amongst the defenders of a qualitative essence in the midst of the essentially 'feudal' state and society. As early as 1946 Maruyama exhorted his peers to return to the Tokugawa past for inspiration on how to recapture the essence of modern consciousness. The important point to make, and one that will be developed in Chapter 5, is that in postwar Japan modernity was synonymous with democracy. However in wartime Japan, equating modernity with Western influence was the predominant interpretation,

The search for autonomy 51

thanks to the 'overcome modernity' propaganda campaign which sought to demonise the West and idealise the pure Japanese spirit. In the early postwar period remnants of the 'overcome modernity' debate still lingered in the ruins of defeat. Maruyama found it unacceptable to associate modernisation exclusively with Westernisation because it encouraged the belief that Japanese thought was naturally inclined towards the kind of mentality that had facilitated the rise of the militarist state. It was vital in postwar to 'restore people's faith in the power of their own thought'.2 Maruyama's writings on the political thought of the Tokugawa era, collected under the title Nihon seiji shiso shi kenkyu (Studies in the History of Political Thought in Japan)3, brought the search for modernity within the field of Tokugawa Confucianism, the bastion of feudal ideology. If the 'overcome modernity' idea was irksome postwar, it was virulent and in the ascendant when Maruyama wrote these essays between 1940 and 1944. Maruyama later acknowledged that this was a major incentive in choosing his approach. This led Maruyama to pursue his theme: 'even Tokugawa ideas, if one looked at the "deep currents", could be seen as developing unceasingly toward modernity.'4 Maruyama also had to overcome a personal aversion towards Japanese intellectual history. Maruyama has made it plain that Japanese intellectual history was not his preferred subject of study. In fact, he initially thought it 'boring'. S Further, he had regarded the Tokugawa era as 'barren and impoverished' in terms of political thought. 6 It was only through the prompting of his Professor, Nanbara Shigeru, that Maruyama even began to entertain the idea. It was his readings in Western European intellectual methodology, notably Mannheim and Borkenau, which aroused his interest in the history of ideas in his own country. Maruyama's attraction to those European thinkers did much more than this. It provided him with an idealist methodology with which to challenge, but not totally dismantle, the historical methodology of Marxism. Here we confront a persistent theme in Maruyama's volatile relationship with Marxist thought. In the introduction to the English translation of Studies, Maruyama explains at length his complex feelings towards Marxism. Ultimately Maruyama was deeply dissatisfied with the methodological inability of Marxists to reconcile what had been highlighted by Mannheim and Borkenau. 'It [Marxism] had still not shown how, concretely, one could relate, on the one hand, those developments and ideas that can be attributed to the autonomous working out of their own internal logic to, on the other hand, changes in the social base and in class relations.'7

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Democracy in postwar Japan

Maruyama has confessed that he was inspired by Weber's Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism in this regard. While Maruyama's interpretation would have surprised Weber, Maruyama in later years revealed that it was Weber's book, dedicated as it was to rebutting the materialist perspective, which inspired him to look at the Tokugawa period with new eyes. He had been inspired, he said, to discover whether or not there was a connection between the nature of capitalism prevalent in Tokugawa, and the development of thought in society.s This opened the door for Maruyama to use dialectics to analyse the history of political thought. It is evident from the finished product that Maruyama became completely engrossed in investigating the development of modem thought through the workings of the 'internal logic' of its antithesis, Chu Hsi Confucianism. However the materialist inspiration behind his work should not be dismissed. Maruyama in fact used a Hegelian dialectic to inspire his pathfinding work on the modernist spark within the Tokugawa feudal stronghold. It was this methodology which led Maruyama first to discover, then condemn, this spark of ill-fated modernity. Maruyama's subsequent work on modernism cast the Tokugawa era in such a negative light that it is difficult to imagine how he ever could have retrieved anything positive from it. In the 1950s Maruyama focused on the Tokugawa era as the antithesis of modernity. Its analytical function was not as a model, but as a negative contrast for the 'open society' which embodied the democratic idea. In his 1959 essay Kaikoku he portrayed the society of Tokugawa Japan as follows. 9 Tokugawa Japan was a 'frozen' society which was based on paradox. In 1603 Tokugawa Ieyasu froze a military administration formulated in the preceding Warring States (Sengoku) period, and thereby induced over two and a half centuries of peace. Soldiers became educators, while martial values underpinned the limited cosmos of Pax Tokugawa. Authority was centralised in the Shogunate, yet grounded on the dispersal of power in self-contained units (fiefs). In freezing the dynamism and chaos of Sengoku Japan, Ieyasu froze the social structure as well as the administrative structure. In doing so, he also allocated specific value to each level of this hierarchy through the application of Confucian ethics. Originally designed to maintain the power structure only, it was subsequently made into an academic orthodoxy under the third Shogun, Iemitsu. The distinction between the different classes or levels of society was therefore one of status AND value, which reduced each level to social isolation. Thus through the administrative and social structures, the national policy of Sakoku (national isolation) was reproduced internally throughout the country.

The search for autonomy 53 Social immobilism, the identification of authority with (Confucian) norms, and a hierarchy of value were the antithesis of modem society. How then could modernity ever come from there? Through first identifying the intellectual axis of Tokugawa Japan, then placing key ideas in dialectical tension with each other, Maruyama began his search for the development and frustration of autonomy in Japanese history. MARUYAMA'S STUDIES: FEUDALISM, DYNAMISM AND CONTRADICTION Maruyama's essays in Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan can be described as an attempt academically to stand the theory of Western penetration as a catalyst for modernisation on its head. True to his idealist leanings, Maruyama explored in these essays how the ideology of what he would later call a 'closed society' contained within it the kernels of its own negation. Crucially, the cause of that negation was an alternative idea that was invented and implemented by man. Treating Chu Hsi Confucianism as the ideology of the closed Tokugawa society, Maruyama traced the intellectual disintegration of the Chu Hsi ideology through the scholars loosely grouped in the Ancient Studies School: Yamaga Soko, Ito Jinsai and most significantly, Ogyii Sorai. Sorai's reformulation of Confucianism set off a chain of 'logic' which, according to Maruyama, eventually culminated in the questioning of the feudal system which it was designed to uphold. Chu Hsi Confucianism, or neo-Confucianism, was a philosophical system of Chinese origin. It had a profound impact on Japan, but not in its Chinese form. In employing Chu Hsi Confucianism as the philosophical foundation of the regime, the Tokugawa dynasty was selective. It discarded those elements such as the Mandate of Heaven which did not serve to maintain their power, and creatively applied the precepts of Chu Hsi not just to the political system but to the entire fabric of society. It was precisely this creative act by the Tokugawa rulers that gave Maruyama insight into the philosophical fragility of the Tokugawa edifice. 10 This link between personal autonomy and creativity was central to the positive reappraisal of Tokugawa society. Chu Hsi Confucianism comprised universal norms linked to human relationships, social order and political legitimacy. 'Chu Hsi philosophy is so systematic that the whole structure collapses if a single element is disturbed.'11 The disturbance caused by creativity would inevitably alter the foundations of this system. Maruyama implied that the window of creativity immanent in its enforcement from above

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Democracy in postwar Japan

precipitated just such a breakdown. Chu Hsi philosophy was based on dualism. The dual elements had to function not as counterbalancing equals but within an hierarchical structure. This meant that destabilisation could take two forms: that of inversion, where the 'low' element rose above its designated value and vice versa; or that of over-emphasis, where one element was stressed to the near-exclusion of the other. When Maruyama examined the dualistic structure of Chu Hsi Confucianism, he isolated the weak points by highlighting these dualities. The primary imbalance was between Principle (Lz) and Ether (Kz). Principle was supreme in Chu Hsi Confucianism because it was identified with morality. The dualism inherent in Principle was the universal joint linking heaven with man. Maruyama described its properties like this: Principle had a transcendent character, unifying everything, but was at the same time immanent in each individual thing. This Principle, when endowed upon man, constitutes his Original Nature. Hence by investigating the Principle in each individual object, we should be able to understand our own Original Nature better.12 In other words, subjectivity was located outside the self, and moral status depended on external, material things. This link between nature and norms was the crux of the Chu Hsi system. By default human nature was also plagued by dualism: man had to struggle against his Ether (or his inner nature) to reach unity with the Principle. Ether, the essence inherent in each individual, was condemned to a low-value status because it was paired with the supreme normative agent, Principle. The result was the development of a dual philosophical function within Chu Hsi Confucianism which Maruyama called 'naturalistic optimism' and 'moral rigorism'. Because Principle was a physical law (linked with nature), the 'perfectibility' potential was high. Because Ether was a corrupting influence, it required normative discipline. Principle and Ether, Norms and Nature, Natural Optimism and Moral Rigorism, were all inextricably inter-related. The extent of integration between them illustrates well Maruyama's premise that the disturbance of a single element would bring down the normative edifice of Tokugawa Chu Hsi Confucianism. It was clearly Maruyama's assumption that instability was inherent in this plethora of dualities. It was Maruyama's contention that these components developed 'lives of their own' at the hands of thinkers in the Ancient Studies School who subjectively redefined the philosophical priorities of Confucianism. Thus Yamaga Soko (1622-1685) was portrayed as rejecting

The search for autonomy

55

'moral rigorism' when he suggested that morality could best be expressed and obtained through subjective action in accordance with one's own moral goal, rather than through contemplation of the material. According to Maruyama, this meant that Soke) 'was cutting the link between the normative and naturalistic characteristics of the Chu Hsi theory of human nature and attempting to isolate the normative aspect'.13 Soko was also credited with rehabilitating Ether if it was expressed for the 'right' reasons. Similarly Ito Jinsai (1627-1705) cut the ties between human nature and heaven by restricting Principle to the material realm. In either case, Maruyama judged that the disintegration of Chu Hsi Confucianism began with the alienation of concepts which were considered to be mutually reinforcing in the orthodox view. The fact that these scholars sought to strengthen the feudal order and its ideology was of no consequence. Their chain of logic facilitated the radical philosophical intervention of Ogyii Sorai. Maruyama has been credited with (or even accused of) having 'discovered' Ogyu Sorai.14 It is undeniable that Maruyama's study has had a decisive influence on scholars of Tokugawa Japan. In Sorai Maruyama saw the culmination of earlier tendencies to separate fundamental Confucian concepts. Through Sorai's 'politicisation' of Confucianism, the concepts linking Heaven and Man, and Norms and Nature, were split along a new rational divide under the rubric of Public and Private. Ogyii Sorai (1666-1728) returned to Edo (Tokyo) from sharing his father's exile in the provinces at the age of 24 and eventually became an advisor to the Tokugawa Shogunate. As Sorai's association with the Shogunate suggests, he was completely committed to upholding the feudal order and did not entertain the idea of an alternative to the shogunate, certainly not the Imperial House, as a government for Japan. Nonetheless as Maruyama pointed out, Sorai's introduction of utility in place of morality as the raison d'etre of government necessarily imposed conditionality on that government. Moreover, the government's legitimacy was to be judged according to subjective criteria by those who were ruled, not according to a 'Way' defined by Heaven and assumed to be embodied by the government of the day. What Sorai effectively did was to prise creativity from the hands of authority, and set it loose amongst those who should merely obey. 'The Way of the Early Kings is that which the Early Kings created. It is not the natural Way of Heaven and Earth.'15 Maruyama paraphrased Sorai to illustrate the political reasoning behind this shattering devaluation of Principle: 'The ruler may act against just principles so long as he pursues the political goal of maintaining peace among the people.'16

56 Democracy in postwar Japan

With this exposure of the practical uses of Confucianism, Sorai acknowledged the creative subject. As Harootunian has noted, 'Ogyii ... transformed a moral ruler-teacher with innate political authority into a politician liberated from an impossible moral code to create norms and institutions suitable for his own times.'17 The second manifestation of personal autonomy was revealed in Sorai's dismantling of another fundamental (orthodox) Confucian precept, the continuity of norms and nature. The political moment was decisive here too. Sorai regarded norms, like the Confucian Way, as a political instrument. ls Instead of an essence which contained the Principle, it was just another means to ensure peace and stability, the political end-goals of Confucianism. In this instance, the creative subject appeared in the guise of a peacemaker. 'The succession of periods of peace and civil war is a part of the cyclical movements of the natural order but is implemented entirely through the medium of human action.'19 In short, peace was made by man, not by heaven. The third entry of the autonomous subject was the most vital as far as Maruyama was concerned. In Sorai's sharp distinction between the Public and Private realms, Maruyama saw tangible evidence of modem thought. 'The independence of the public domain in every sphere of human activity, which implies the liberation of the private domain, is surely the crucial hallmark of "the modern".'20 In divorcing the internal and the private from any ethical connection with the political sphere, Maruyama saw that this time the window of creativity had come from 'below'. Sorai's distinction between Public and Private did not exclude the individual from the political sphere. Part of his rehabilitation of the Private involved the liberation of Ether. Maruyama stressed Sorai's conviction that the development of each individual's inherent abilities was 'the method by which each individual can participate in the Way'.21 Sorai's new rational, political Way would not confine the individual in an intangible ethical restraint. The 'natural' abilities of each person would serve a benevolent ruler best. Maruyama called Sorai's philosophy 'Invention', but we may think of it as the central notion of personal autonomy. Specifically, this means that man creates ethics, and these ethics can serve either the individual or the state. When the state sought to disguise power as ethics by calling it part of the natural order, then personal autonomy was denied in the process. But in Maruyama's work it was not merely the act of Invention that mattered, but the creative subject behind it. Maruyama's second essay in Studies would be dedicated to the exploration of Invention (or Artifice). But first Maruyama had to complete

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the dialectic. Sorai was for Maruyama the negation of Chu Hsi philosophy, as represented conclusively by his denial of ethical continuity between Nature and Norms in society. In smashing the cornerstone of the Confucian ideology, Sorai had presented another set of dual concepts, Public and Private. For Maruyama the momentum of the dialectic would inexorably move on. The consequences for the political and the modem would be considerable. THE DYNAMICS OF THE DIALECTIC: SORAI AND NORINAGA

Selective uses of Confucianism by the Tokugawa regime was the forerunner for a nationalistic push within the scholarly community of Confucian philosophers. Momentum had been building up through the philosophies of Wang Yang-Ming (Oyomei) scholars and others who discredited the Chinese Confucian model with the tenets of Confucianism itself: surely the Mandate of Heaven was an inherently unstable, therefore un-Confucian, philosophy? Was not Japan actually a 'better' Confucian state than China, in that she had enjoyed rule under 'an unbroken line of Emperors for ages eternal' whereas the Chinese had suffered a series of dynastic upheavals? But it was the National Studies School that articulated the most overt nationalistic position. It attempted to weave a Confucian logic around the Emperor. The contrast between the National Studies School and the Ancient Studies School could not have been stronger. Whereas the former looked only to a Japanese tradition, the latter advocated a return to the wisdom of the ancient Chinese sages. Yet Maruyama saw an unmistakable 'objective' link between the two schools. Born of a contradiction, the connection between the two schools was based on logic. Maruyama's interest in looking at this dialectical link was 'to ascertain how the process of disintegration of the Chu Hsi mode of thought made way inwardly for the formation of a uniform mode of thought known as National Learning, and as a result to examine the kind of structural relationship that developed between the twO'.22 Maruyama presented the structural connections between the two schools in the form of 'negative mediations', or 'negative tension which acted as a bridge between antipathetic views?3 Invention was one such 'bridge'. Sorai used Invention - the fact that Confucianism was designed by men, not endowed by Nature - to shore up the Confucian basis of Tokugawa government, but National Studies scholar Motoori Norinaga (1730-180 I) used it as evidence to dismiss Confucianism as merely an artificial philosophy.

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For Sorai it was a simple matter of Invention being the exclusive preserve of the Early Kings. The organised religion of Shinto was essentially heretical because it was an opportunistic creation of modern origin. But for Norinaga, it was precisely the artificiality of Chinese Confucianism that demanded the Invention of a 'pure Shinto'. He achieved this by personalising the origins of this 'pure Shinto' Way by linking Heaven with the Emperor. 'When we inquire into the nature of this Way, we find that it is not the natural way of heaven and earth, not a way established by man. This sacred Way was initiated by our ancestral Gods.'24 The Shinto Way had still been 'invented', but not by man. By nominating the Gods as the forebears of the Emperor, Norinaga restored the link between heaven and earth that Sorai had eliminated through his pragmatism. Having restored this link, it was logical and ethically correct for Norinaga to assert that there was natural accord between human desire (in Japan) and serving the Emperor. Maruyama believed that Norinaga had thereby not only inverted Sorai's Public-Private duality, but had politicised the Private in the process. In this was revealed what Maruyama called 'the negation of the negation' of Chu Hsi Confucianism. Norinaga, in true dialectical fashion, had in Maruyama's view 'first adopted and then transcended Sorai's mode of thought'.2S In the process, Norinaga had moved the ethical nexus only a whisker away from the rationale of the Emperor System of the 1930s and 1940s. The dangers inherent in a dualistic philosophical or ethical structure were very apparent to Maruyama in 1959 when he wrote in his Kaikoku essay: The secret of the formation of the Imperial Japanese State without parallel in the world lies in the moment when the dynamic elements born when countless closed society walls were lifted became transformed into the concentrated energy typical of a closed society called the Emperor System State. 26 The desire to label Maruyama's work on Tokugawa political thought 'Marxist' is automatic. Are we not talking about a dialectic, which after all is the hallmark of historical materialism? Even though Maruyama admits that Marxism had a profound influence on his intellectual work, particularly in these early university years of the 1940s, it is plain from his essays in Studies at least that it is inappropriate to label him a K6za Marxist, as a growing band of critics continue to do. 27 While it is true that in Studies Maruyama included references to the collapse of the Tokugawa system and social discipline in terms of economic changes, and stated that Sorai's reformulation of Confucianism

The search for autonomy 59 was purposely directed at shoring up the feudal system that was collapsing about him, Maruyama never left any doubt that the dialectic referred to the 'mode of thought'. Maruyama at no stage attempted to include the materialistic base in the dialectical mechanism. Maruyama's dialectic was at this stage an Hegelian animal, not Marxist as in the theory of historical materialism. Maruyama was indeed inspired by the contradictions prevalent in premodern economies. However, when he stated he had been prompted by reading Weber to look at whether there was a connection between the nature of capitalism in premodern society and the nature of thought, he was talking about a structural similarity, not a causal connection. Just as the premodern economy was riddled with contradictions, so was Tokugawa thought riddled with contradictions. The pervasive dualism was a sign that just as premodern and then capitalist societies were propelled forward through the force of internal contradictions, so was thought propelled towards a modern manifestation. When Maruyama wrote in Studies that 'the dual character inherent in "modem" Japan ... has determined my methodology',28 he was indicating the potential for creative intervention which arises whenever opposites have room to grate. The autonomous opportunity depends on it. 'Just as the citizen cannot revert to serfdom, the internally divided consciousness can no longer accept the innocent premodern continuative consciousness.'29 The concentration on the dynamics of indigenous thought was a powerful statement of Maruyama's conviction that ultimately the political destiny of a society rests with its value systems and their creation by the members of that society. A catalyst could only ever be a trigger for a logic that was already in place: The direct intellectual genealogy of so-called enlightened thinking may have been its foreign derivation, but foreign ideas could only enter because the existing factors 'within' had changed sufficiently in nature to admit them without serious opposition. 30 Maruyama's structuring of the issue as one of conflict between orthodox Confucian notions of Nature such as Norinaga's and Sorai's notion of Invention paralleled the realisation that ideas were directly relevant to the creation and maintenance of the political system. In other words, Invention was the philosophical foundation of autonomy itself. Norinaga had in a sense been ideologically opposed to Confucianism,

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but he effectively shared the logic of Chu Hsi Confucianism by clinging to the notion of Nature as an entity both transcendental and immanent. Norinaga's philosophy was not a mere negation of Sorai's philosophy. It was a creative reformulation of the logic of its antithesis, a new beast. It was clear to Maruyama, especially in the months preceding his conscription into the Imperial Japanese army in 1944, that the dialectical mechanism was not harnessed in any way to a positivistic historical track. The question Maruyama addressed to the Meiji era was this: what had become of the modern mode of thought? The Meiji Restoration of 1868 featured the overthrow of the Tokugawa dynasty, and the creation of a 'modern' state led by an oligarchy of former middle-ranking samurai. These new rulers pushed aside a centuries-old power structure, and eventually emerged with the promise of elections and a constitution. They also emerged with a transcendental power structure interleaved between the 'modern' governmental structure and the Emperor. Rather than a restoration of the Emperor, it was in fact a restoration of the logic of Confucian Nature masquerading as the Invention of a modern Japanese state. The Restoration posited a higher, more tangible entity as a focus of loyalty: the nation, personified by the Emperor. In some respects the Restoration was for Maruyama 'the overwhelming success of the theory of autonomous invention',31 And yet, as the term 'Restoration' suggests, it was not 'revolutionary'. Maruyama was still waiting for the 'revolution' in 1947: 'we have now been confronted with the task of completing the democratic revolution which the Meiji Restoration should have but could not carry out. We are now on the verge of confronting the problem of human freedom.'32 It was in this spirit that Maruyama traced the mode of thought behind Nature and Invention into the 'modern' era. MEIJI MODERNITY: FEUDAL DYNAMISM IN A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT In the debates on Shutaisei (subjectivity) in the late 1940s Maruyama would rail against the determinism of his orthodox Marxist peers, arguing for the predominance of ideas in history. He tried to assert that the historical moment is replete with potential outcomes, and that no one course is ever the only possible result of any given situation. What we learn from Maruyama's work on the Japanese past is that the paths not followed are as important as those that are. This is a direct result of his dialectical methodology, which greeted the 'modern' era with enhanced sophistication and added complexity.

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The dialectical dualities of Nature and Invention continued beneath the surface, within new rubrics of National and Popular Sovereignty. The most important point though is that Maruyama saw that the path not taken was not a mere 'lost opportunity', but was subsumed within the chosen path in a dialectical relationship. It was in Maruyama's work on the Meiji era that the full implications of the dialectic became evident. In effect, it added a whole new dimension to historical potential. Because the dynamics of history were dialectical, there was always a chance for the logic inherent in the path not taken both to influence history as an 'antithesis'. and for it to become the dominant element in the future. The implicit promise, and menace, of this theory remained tantalising for Maruyama in the post-World War II world as he struggled to realise the modernist, democratic potential of history in his own time. It becomes clear when reading Maruyama's works on the Meiji era that the positive (from his point of view) outcome of the Nature-InventionlNational Sovereignty-Popular Sovereignty dialectic depended on the presence of an interactive subject. Thus Meiji Japan, the model for social and political reconstruction chosen by many intellectuals after 1945, was judged in retrospect according to the fate of personal autonomy. Many postwar scholars of the Meiji era identified a dichotomy between spirit and matter as the catalyst for the rise of the ultranationalist and militarist state of the 1930s. In other words, Meiji Japan had failed to borrow the spirit as well as the industrial trappings of the modern West. This was in stark contrast to the 'national purist' (kokusuishugisha) thinkers who regarded the realm of the spirit as one of indigenous identity to be defended from external (material) influences. For them, Meiji had been an unwelcome exposure to Western ideas. It was a battle by proxy for the legitimacy of the Western-origin democracy of the postwar period. When Maruyama looked at Meiji Japan from the 1868 Restoration onwards, he saw double. This was not merely the 'double-image' tying the Restoration and post-World War II experiences, which he professed affected him greatly. Rather, it was the re-emergence of dualism. In late Tokugawa and Meiji Japan the interaction between opposites occurred between Restoration versus Renovation, and National Sovereignty versus Popular Sovereignty. In both cases, Maruyama described the relationship between the separate elements as 'confrontational unity' (tairitsu teki t{jitsu). The context of the Restoration, when the collapse of a dynasty that had lasted over two hundred years was accompanied by the opening of the country to the Western trading powers, meant that this historical moment was born of dualism. In a

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sense this was quite natural. It was to be expected that the collapse of the major policy of the Tokugawa dynasty, sakoku (isolationism), should accompany their demise (and vice versa). But it was also fraught with contradiction, as the slogans of rival domestic forces revealed. For Maruyama the conflict between sonno joi (revere the Emperor, expel the barbarians) and bummei kaika (civilisation and enlightenment) established a false discourse. Despite the irony of the 'restoration' of the Emperor being accompanied by the opening of the country, scholars were ranged against each other not just on ideological grounds, but also under the banner of Eastern versus Western identities. This East-West divide accentuated antipathy between positions which Maruyama believed were opposed to each other for quite a different reason. In effect, the East-West division camouflaged a dichotomy of much greater importance: that of subjectivity and objectivity. In the sensitive environment of 1942, Maruyama addressed the issue of Meiji Europeanisation in terms which were to dominate the modernism debate in postwar Japan. Already he saw the need to distance modernity from the irreconcilable East-West paradigm. His extension of the argument from spirit-matter to subject-object enabled modernity to acquire different attributes. The essential attribute in Maruyama's view was universalism. In his 1942 review essay of Aso Yoshiteru's History of Modern Japanese Philosophy Maruyama introduced the spirit-matter paradigm in terms that would have been acceptable to the censors, describing the European influence in Meiji as one that was wholly based on material culture. This struck a responsive chord in Confucianists and Japanists who despised materialism, but it also pursued the 'insufficient modernisation' theme. He made it plain that Japan was still not modern because of insufficient permeation of the spirit of European modernity. The crux of the matter was not that Japan should spiritually 'Europeanise', but that Japan needed an interactive subject to carry out modernisation beyond a superficial level. If the dynamics were subjective, the very act of 'permeation' would indigenise the process. 'This type of modernisation would not be incompatible with tradition. . . . in my view, it is rather the process of permeation of European aspects in the spiritual sphere that acts as a barometer measuring the modernisation phenomenon as a whole. '33 Maruyama regarded the first ten years after the Restoration as the time when pluralism reigned. The abolition of social and economic constraints, burgeoning intellectual activity and publishing and the development of a political agenda open to public discussion was truly in the spirit of the Enlightenment. Maruyama attributed the freeing of

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intellectual life at this time to the advent of capitalism in place of feudalism, which he said led to a 'multiplication of world views'. Intellectual freedom was marked by its independence from the political and bureaucratic world, although in time scholars became attached to bureaucracy and government, the autonomy of their thought was lost and they were transformed into an 'entrenched elite'.34 The separation of intellectuals from politics was a major issue in the early Meiji era, and was debated with gusto by the leading public thinker Fukuzawa Yukichi and his peers in the Meirokusha (Meiji Six Society). When interaction between the two spheres began to take place, Maruyama took it as a sign that the old problem of value hierarchy was immanent: where there is no tradition of free association and organisation in a dimension different to that of politics, there is a tendency to use political groups as a model both structurally and functionally and become a smaller manifestation of the most powerful and largest group, the government. 3S Once intellectual autonomy was lost, the autonomy of society from the state was impossible. Instead men and their ideas would be trapped within an orthodoxy, and relegated to a rank which reflected their utilitarian value according to a political agenda. This was the fate which Maruyama said befell the renovative impulse in Meiji society after Meiji 10 (1877). The suppression of the Satsuma rebellion in 1877 was followed two years later by the promise of an elected parliament, a promise that was fulfilled in 1890. Yet Maruyama detected after Meiji 10 the absorption of individuals into a political, and increasingly a socio-political orthodoxy. By Meiji 40 freedom of expression, assembly and association were akin to Nazi Germany's 'freedom of the totalitarian state'.36 The impetus behind this process as Maruyama saw it was not the interactive subject, but the re-emergence of the logic of Nature in the form of the Emperor System (tennosel) and Family State (kazoku kokka) ideologies. The battle-lines had been drawn in the Restoration itself. According to Maruyama, from the beginning tension existed between external and internal impulses, in the form of National Sovereignty towards the Western nations, and Popular Sovereignty towards the government itself. For Maruyama it was particularly crucial that instead of coexisting as dual facets of a subjective identity, these two impulses were regarded as incongruous, even antithetical. It was not possible to defend the nation and be democratic at the same time. In other words, the subject greeted the modern era as a divided self, a dichotomous

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subjectivity in hostile cohabitation within the state and the citizen. In Maruyama's view this made the state and the citizen appear incongruous unless one was absorbed by the other. To achieve National Sovereignty, centralisation and unity were required; to achieve Popular Sovereignty, decentralisation of political discourse was required. 37 The reasons for the triumph of antipathy over coexistence between them were again to be found in the nature of the Restoration. It is here that Maruyama drew closer to a historical materialistic interpretation of the dialectic. In Meiji kokka no shiso, Maruyama stated that the Restoration had been propelled by the discontented elements of feudal society, the merchants and the samurai. Because of the feudal nature of the economy, popular opinion was incapable of guiding the modernisation of society. In the end, the restoration was a revolutionary change consolidated from above, but it was not a revolution. It did not feature an autonomous, popular push for a new state and society. At the time of transition, the authoritarian aspects of feudal government (centralisation) prevailed over the dynamic elements of feudal society (decentralisation), those that had pushed the confines of the feudal economy itself.38 Feudal dynamism was trapped within the confines of feudal stasis. This version of the dialectic sounds much more in tune with the classic Marxist theory of historical materialism. But instead Maruyama used this to differentiate between healthy and unhealthy nationalism. 39 Maruyama acknowledged nationalism as an attribute of a modern state; however, if this nationalism regarded popular sovereignty and the citizen as the embodiment of a hostile essenceautonomy then it was merely masquerading as a modern entity. Seen from this perspective, the triumph of imperialism was not just the inevitable working out of historical materialism. It was rather an extension of the loss of self, with imperialism acting as the integrative mechanism in place of autonomy. But was the dialectic between National and Popular Sovereignty fated to be resolved through the primacy of the nation? Was there never to be a potential place for the autonomous self in a modern Japanese state? Maruyama looked for positive synthesis in early Meiji in two places: in the People's Rights Movement; and in the enlightenment thinker and educationalist. Fukuzawa Yukichi.

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PROTEST AS AN EXPRESSION OF SOCIAL AUTONOMY: THE PEOPLE'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT The People's Rights Movement, which spanned the period between 1874 and the advent of an elected national assembly in 1890, has been touted as the first example of popular democratic activism in modern Japanese history. Along with the period of so-called 'Taisho Democracy'in 1912-1926, it has been cited as proof that Japan has an indigenous democratic tradition. 40 This appraisal has not been unanimous. Scholars who regard the rise of the militaristic state of the 1930s as a logical outcome of Meiji Japan have looked instead at the failure of those popular forces to triumph over authoritarian government. The only common ground between these positions is that they both regard protest from below as a positive sign that resistance to authoritarianism has existed. Maruyama's writings on the People's Rights Movement have, along with his famous critique of the structure of Japanese thought in Nihon no shiso, incited the ongoing wrath and indignation of a number of his peers. The accusation most commonly hurled in Maruyama's direction is that he despises and under-estimates Japanese tradition. This complaint is usually linked to an alleged Eurocentric attitude on Maruyama's part, meaning that he finds Japan wanting through comparison with Western European historical experience instead of evaluating Japan's history on its own merits. Maruyama lamented the failure of democratic and individualistic forces rather than their Japanese identity. He saw this failure to be the result of a structure of thought that was characteristic of Japan's historical experience rather than inherently Japanese. The futility of continuing to address the crisis of autonomy and democracy in a society that is naturally condemned to follow an authoritarian path is self-evident when one considers the basic premise of autonomy itself. Maruyama never acquiesced to the primacy of Nature in Japanese society, and certainly did not regard its predominance as an inevitable outcome. Maruyama's analysis of the People's Rights Movement (PRM) highlighted its dynamism, which he attributed to dialectical tensions between national and popular sovereignty, restoration and renovation, and subjectivity and objectivity. This tension was an ironic consequence of the success of Invention. On the one hand, the Restoration had dramatised the fact that government was man-made, and that political debate and activism were legitimate activities for the ordinary person. But the philosophical basis of the PRM was also compromised by the Restorational legacy. Maruyama wrote that, in effect,

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democratic rights in Japan were not natural rights as understood in Western Europe, but instead man-made products. 41 Therefore rights were tainted by artificiality, and seen to be beneath the universality that attaches to an inalienable concept. The ability correctly to grasp the concept of democratic rights seemed to Maruyama to hinge on a correct understanding of the right to protest. Protest, if politically informed, could be described as the modem manifestation of Invention. It conveyed a belief that man was the creator of political reality, not the victim of it. But protest demanded interaction between the public and private spheres. Modem autonomy was not mere ethical autonomy, but political autonomy. It meant maintaining the integrity of the private, individual sphere and using the ethical distance between the public and private spheres to criticise and creatively intervene in the running of the state. In short, Maruyama saw that in order to have political impact, personal autonomy needed its public complement social autonomy. Invariably, the creative space from which protest is born is measured in the distance between object and subject, power and value, state and society. What is it that can make this space appear? Maruyama was in no doubt that only something that was universal could achieve this. 'From a way of thinking which makes absolute that which is particular, there will never emerge from within oneself the way of thinking which is able totally to transform the self.'42 This underlines how inappropriate it is to categorise him as a Eurocentric thinker, or equally, as a thinker who despised his own cultural tradition. Maruyama's aim was not to denigrate the particular, but to emancipate it. Action is intrinsic to Invention, but its dynamism is valuable only when directed by political awareness. In Studies Maruyama cited the example of Ando Sh6eki, a Confucian scholar who like Norinaga had rejected Invention for its artificiality. Although Maruyama praised Ando for his clear ideological opposition to feudalism, this awareness alone was useless because Ando rejected action along with Invention. 'He [Ando] was so opposed to any dogma of "human invention" that his theory lacked the active element necessary to bring about the transformation from the world of law to the world of nature.'43 Likewise Norinaga may have inadvertently developed a revolutionary logic, but its existence on the apolitical edge neutralised its revolutionary potential. Social awareness, action, and political engagement were the components of autonomous protest. As Maruyama put it, what mattered was not opposition to the state but a sense of social autonomy from the state. 44 The yardstick was a sense of interested distance between state

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and society. This in turn rested entirely on one's perspective of authority. Authority cannot exist as a unilateral concept. It must be acknowledged by those in authority, and by those who are not. It is both a concept and a mechanism, in that principle and compliance must be mutually reinforcing. Maruyama argued that it was through the identification of norms and politics that the creative space for autonomous protest was denied. He tackled the issue in two ways: through studying the relationship between dominance and submission; and that between loyalty and rebellion. Willing submission to authority can only exist where there is a recognised identity of interests between those who are in authority and those who are not. Maruyama saw that once the perception of shared interests was lost or disputed, force became a necessity in ensuring dominance. It was in this circumstance that authority turned to spiritual means to perpetuate its position. The devastating effect of this in Maruyama's view was that those in positions of dominance concealed the rationale for subordination, making compliance appear to be 'spontaneous' on the part of those who were ruled. In other words, Maruyama alleged that through monopolising values, authority disguised the mechanism of dominance itself. It can be said that history in reality has seen this type of 'irrational' democracy progressively acknowledged rationally by rulers and ruled from their respective positions in a process that has consciously been constructed. 4s

In Shihai to fukuju (Dominance and Submission) Maruyama wrote that it was only by exposing the clashes of interest between ruler and ruled that the structure of dominance would reveal itself. The identification of norms with politics, or authority, developed an entirely new twist when Maruyama applied a dialectical mechanism to it. In his essay Kenryoku to dotoku (Authority and Morality), he pointed out that when the mechanism of dominance worked through the internalisation of its own rationale, it worked through the subject. Authority and morality were separate concepts until mediated through the individual. The individual was the locus of synthesis between morality and authority. The logical assumption flowing from this was that the subject is ultimately in control of this process. It also meant that social autonomy could be subverted by personal autonomy. Maruyama's stated aim in Kenryoku to diJtoku was to see how political authority related to morality in the following ways: in terms of unity, separation, and contrast. He chose as his model the relationship between church and state in Western Europe. In Japan even in the

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post-World War II era 'morality is only realised through an authoritative system'.46 In Japan's recent past, the concepts of authority and morality had been virtually indistinguishable. 'Rather than just an external force, political authority has been thOUght of as a spiritual constraint, and morality has not just been an internal norm but has been regarded as a norm with a tangible emotional reality. '47 The identification of moral and political authority was a feature of the ancient world, wrote Maruyama. Once unified in authority, the two could only be separated by forging a link between the personal, ethical world and the universal. This was the function of the church in Western Europe from the Reformation onwards. According to Maruyama, the church succeeded in rekindling the tension between authority and morality, first by positing the Vatican as an alternative external authority, and then during the Renaissance by reclaiming religion for the individual. External authority was always conditional on its affirmation by internal morality, and any discrepancy was just cause for rebellion. Tension between the internal and the external was resolved through the primacy of the internal and its link with a transcendental ethic.48 In short, a link with universal values would be the saviour of personal and social autonomy. In Nihon no shiso Maruyama referred to the Christian church as an 'axis'. Rather than an ethical yardstick, the 'axis' of the Christian church was merely another term for the creative subject. The ethical space created by the church made resistance against authority under certain circumstances a natural right. The logic of natural law was a product of this ethical space. Popular autonomy could deliver successful protest only if there was ethical distance between society and state, tension between rival objects of loyalty within autonomous individuals and linkage between personal and universal values. How did the PRM stand up to these criteria? Maruyama found the answer in the failure of the People's Rights Movement to distinguish between objects of loyalty, to the extent that they lost critical and ethical distance between society and state. This is usually referred to as the triumph of state's rights over people's rights. For Maruyama the Meiji Restoration of 1868 represented a crisis of loyalties. Suddenly those dynamic elements of feudal society, particularly the lower level samurai, found that the order they had fought for was betrayed by those newly-installed in power. Instead of sonno joi (including the expulsion of the barbarians), they got kaika (the opening of the country). The PRM was propelled forwards in its initial phase by misdirected revolutionary zeal. Put simply, the energy of activism was reactionary, coming from the disaffected and displaced losers in

The search for autonomy 69 the Restoration process. 'Rather than a modem liberal movement the movement in this first period instead conformed with "modernisation from above", and was a resistance movement on the part of the samurai who had refused to abandon the old privileges, who had failed to conform.'049 The wealthy farmers who were co-opted into the cause had their own agenda, and were interested in avoiding paying for the establishment of the new order. The calls for 'people's rights' in these early years (1874-1877) were divorced from the people themselves. Does this matter? The conventional interpretation of the democratic importance of the PRM concentrates on its second phase prior to the Sino-Japanese War, using popular participation as a gauge of its democratic integrity. Maruyama bucked this view, and stuck to his enthusiasm for the liberal environment that pervaded the first ten years of the Meiji era. Despite the elitist leadership of the movement at this time and the reactionary agenda of its initiators, Maruyama believed that this leadership was representative of the people in that it had a strong sense of its independence from the government. 'In modem Japanese history there was no time when the concept of the right to resist was more widespread than in Meiji 10.'50 The second phase of the PRM featured spectacular successes, including the promise and fulfilment of a constitution and an elected national assembly in 1889 and 1890 respectively. It also featured the formulation of the kokutai (national polity) ideology, and legal restrictions on protest and freedoms of speech and the press. Maruyama regarded the strengthening of an ideology which demanded absolute loyalty such as kokutai as the death knell of the democratic promise of the Movement. This was not because kokutai, and more specifically the Emperor, was at this stage a repressive ideology. It was rather because the growing popular base of the Movement saw no conflict of interest, no tension, between kokutai and the concept of people's rights. Loyalty to the person of the Emperor was a question of consistency for many of the Movement's activists, and represented an extension of their motives in backing the Restoration. It was equally logical for them to resist a government which in their view had failed to deliver the promises made when overthrowing the Tokugawa: until [Meiji 20), there were great disparities of interpretations regarding what sort of political structure was the legitimate expression of the spirit of the restoration, and what constituted loyalty to the state, and by invoking the Charter Oath and the Imperial Rescript on parliamentary government the People's Rights Movement had a

70 Democracy in postwar Japan

strong foundation for arguing that it was rather the Meiji Government that was turning its back on the Imperial Will and subverting the restoration. 51 But in confirming their loyalty to the Emperor, the Movement condemned itself to ideological absorption into the Emperor System when the Imperial constitution was promulgated under imperial sovereignty. Gone was the distance between the people and the state, for through the kokutai the Emperor was the embodiment of state and society. When after the Triple Intervention following the Sino-Japanese war the People's Rights advocates placed Japan's imperial adventures ahead of popular rights, they undermined the democratic integrity of their own raison d'etre. 'As the Meiji era progressed, Fukuzawa's dictum "state independence through individual emancipation" was turned into "state power through suppression of individual freedom".'s2 When the Emperor System ideology incorporated the family state ethic (kazoku kokka) into its armoury, the state entered the last bastion of privacy. The Emperor was no longer merely the ultimate object of loyalty, he was the father of the nation, and of every Japanese. In this way critical distance was subsumed by ethical proximity. The Emperor System ideology represented for Maruyama the concentration of loyalty around the imperial symbol. The only rival loyalties were 'dangerous thoughts' such as socialism, which was already teetering on the brink of social and political isolation. The loyalty concentrated around the Emperor in the late Meiji era served to disguise the repressive nature of the kokutai ideology, because it turned out that the only way effectively to demonstrate loyalty was to repress autonomy. in this way their [the People's Rights' Movement's] concept of freedom was confused, and because they could not distinguish between the concept of freedom whereby it was the spirit which upholds subjectively a certain order, and the concept of freedom whereby it was an emotional demand for freedom from external constraints, they could do nothing but be receptive to the patriotism and kokutai theories of the fief-dominated government. S3 In its failure to maintain ethical and critical distance between the concepts of people's rights and state's rights, the followers of the PRM, especially after 1877, failed conclusively to comprehend the concept of social autonomy. The PRM advocates, spanning its elite and popular phases, were disadvantaged equally by the imbalanced modernity of the economy and the poverty of social autonomy in their ideas. With the kokutai

The search for autonomy

71

ideology's presentation of the bonds between the individual and the state as 'natural' and 'historic', the old bogey had returned. Was it possible to find a synthesis between the popular and national ideas which still allowed room for autonomy? In the last lines of Chfisei to hangyaku Maruyama made a plea for the reader to 'leap above the constraints of history and find a voice that speaks to us for all time'.54 Maruyama found such a voice in Fukuzawa Yukichi. FUKUZAWA YUKICHI: THE LOGIC OF NATIONALISM AND INDIVIDUALISM

Maruyama cannot be accused of having 'discovered' Fukuzawa Yukichi (1834--190 I) in the same manner that is said of his writing on Ogyu Sorai, yet Fukuzawa is the person with whom Maruyama is most frequently associated. The associations are not always flattering. Irokawa Daikichi sees much in common between Fukuzawa and Maruyama, especially in terms of their supposed desire to 'escape from Asia'.55 Both Bannu Junji and lrokawa have argued that Maruyama's poor regard for the indigenous democratic tradition of Japan is due to his choice of Fukuzawa as a yardstick. Both scholars believe that Maruyama chose the wrong base and the most regressive episodes in the modern era on which to judge the failure of prewar democracy. Banno even lays this failure at Fukuzawa's feet, saying that his logic continues to undermine democratic integrity in Japan today. 56 A full account of Maruyama's intellectual relationship with the thought and person of Fukuzawa would justify a separate study in its own right. Here I address only one aspect of Maruyama's writings about Fukuzawa's thought, the relationship between national and popular sovereignty. The fascinating thing is that Maruyama saw no dilemma of this kind in Fukuzawa's thought. But when we also recall Maruyama's insistence on creative tension between state and society, subject and object, how can popular and national sovereignty positively be synthesised? Maruyama's positive evaluation of Fukuzawa's ideas on national and popular sovereignty rested on one key element: Fukuzawa's insistence on distance between the individual and the state. Perhaps the most well known example of this is Fukuzawa's advocacy of the independence of intellectuals from government, which he promoted vigorously within the Meirokusha. What appealed to Maruyama was that Fukuzawa's position reflected an intense aversion towards Confucianism, including the merging of ethics and politics, and the fixed nature of feudal social relations. Accordingly, Maruyama highlighted

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Fukuzawa's promotion of pluralism, the strict private character of ethics, and political pragmatism. Maruyama discerned that the pluralism promoted by Fukuzawa was not an unstructured pluralism, but instead values and perspectives which served to counterbalance and relativise each other. Furthermore, this relativity functioned dialectically. The idea is best conveyed through what Maruyama called Fukuzawa's 'dialectic of freedom'. Freedom was born not in the triumphant struggle between two absolute ideas such as absolute freedom and dictatorship, but in the tension produced between these two concepts in a pluralistic intellectual arena. In short, 'freedom is born where there is no freedom' ... It is within the confrontational struggle between freedom and dictatorship that freedom can be found, the lone dominance of freedom is not freedom at all.'s7 Fukuzawa emphasised the ability of people subjectively to choose freedom. This type of subjective choice was impossible without ethical distance between the public and private spheres. In Fukuzawa's view, this could be achieved if ethics were divorced from the political sphere. This meant in turn that the autonomous self had to be the creator of value. Fukuzawa believed that autonomy could be forthcoming in a pluralistic society, as pluralism would encourage mobility in social relations. Social mobility was intrinsic to pluralism, and pluralism was essential to value creation: If it is the case that political absolutism is accompanied by value absolutism, then where the monopoly of value standards by authority can be broken and the origins of value determination are many, is where freedom will always develop. 58 Pluralism was also important because it provided an abundance of perspectives on any given issue and in any context which could keep absolutism at bay. The idea that values ought to be newly invented to suit a changing reality enhanced the importance of autonomous individuals capable of this contextual reinvention. Values could not become concentrated, and social relations could not become fixed, if change was incorporated into the world view of those who created value. 'In these circumstances instead of tradition and custom the role of the intellect increases. Man's ability to judge gradually progresses through demanding constant activity and tension.'S9 Maruyama used what he called Fukuzawa's 'floating situational consciousness' to explain why Fukuzawa denigrated the PRM. Fukuzawa's most reviled stance concerned that of 'kanmin chiiwa', where he advocated a 'coming to terms' between the People's Rights activists

The search for autonomy 73 and the government. Maruyama argued that Fukuzawa was opposed to absolutism of any kind. The fact that both the government of late Meiji and the PRM in its most populist phase sought to achieve absolutist positions made them both intolerable to Fukuzawa (or so Maruyama claims). Absolutism undermined the creative nature of tension between opposing ideas, and threatened to make value generation and possession concentrated in one absolutist place. 60 This is persuasive, but not the full story. If we recall Fukuzawa's famous dictum 'one man free, one country free', and recall Maruyama's acknowledgement of Fukuzawa as an individualist and nationalist in equal measure, we must also recall the dilemma experienced by the PRM between national and popular sovereignty. Maruyama had criticised the Movement for being unable to see the contradiction between loyalty to the Emperor and popular sovereignty. It appears from Maruyama's writings that Fukuzawa was praised rather than denigrated for making a similar association. In Fukuzawa's case, the lack of contradiction between national and popular sovereignty, both personally and philosophically, stemmed from a recognition of the ultimate priority of the nation. Maruyama had pointed out that Fukuzawa's distinction between the private and public spheres was, in the context of the Meiji period, ultimately directed at ensuring Japan's national independence in the face of Western pressure. Blacker attributed Fukuzawa's criticism of the PRM to the fact that in his opinion 'they were still unable to grasp that the relation between the government and the people was one of equality and reciprocity' .61 Maruyama also noted that Fukuzawa aimed to separate the public and private spheres by switching from personalistic feudal loyalty to loyalty to the nation, in an attempt to make rational and external what had formerly been irrational and internal. 62 But if the dialectical relationship between the public and private, the nation and the individual achieved synthesis in the a priori entity of the nation, then autonomy would again be stifled. Maruyama did not share Banno Junji's condemnation of Fukuzawa's conciliatory attitude to the Meiji government; why he did not do so is not easily explained away. If the only manifestation of the individual is the nationalist, then Fukuzawa must be said to have taken the same misguided path as did the PRM. AUTONOMY: SOME OBSERVATIONS

Without a measure by which to judge, accept or reject new ideas Japanese thought has according to Maruyama been predisposed towards

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chaos rather than pluralism. Chaos manifested itself through the coexistence of premodern and modern thought, where premodern attributes included fixed social relations and the monopoly of value creation by authority. The casualty of this situation was social autonomy, and in the political sphere this opened the door to an ideology which assumed the status of nature rather than law or Invention: state authority rides over the two-dimensional premise of modern liberalism, the internal and the external, self-regulation and state institutions, and begins actively to demand 'loyalty' to a legitimating ideology ... 63 In modern Japan, the kokutai ideology performed this function. Invention and nature could not coexist because nature negated the role of human agency. In effect, nature was itself dehumanising. The significance of defeat in 1945 was that society had the opportunity once more to realise its role as the creator of value and the legitimiser of the political system. Maruyama's analysis of Japan's history assumed that human agency had been supplanted by a structure of change which precluded a sense that human history was in human hands. This was surely the basis of Maruyama's pleas for social autonomy in Japan's political culture. Democracy must be the product of autonomous value creation and action, and cannot function without human agency. The search for social autonomy was nothing less than a quest to regain control over Japan's historical destiny. This threw into question the validity of a 'guided' revolution such as the Occupation, and made those who debated democracy such as Maruyama central figures in the democratisation process. Popular autonomy was absolutely essential to the success of postwar democracy, as it provided the link between personal autonomy and political change. In a sense social autonomy represented the 'freedom for' version of liberal-democratic autonomy. Yet its ethical basis was personal autonomy, born in reaction against the usurpation of value creation by the state in wartime Japan. The incongruity between the 'freedom from' nature of personal autonomy and the 'freedom for' nature of social autonomy would be further enhanced during the course of the debate on shutaisei (subjectivity). Though Maruyama was deeply involved in this debate, he was too intent on fighting determinism at the time to examine the contradictions growing within his own version of autonomy. The notion of nature offers an interesting perspective on more recent

The searchfor autonomy 75 debates about the 'secret' of Japanese economic success. The 'theories about the Japanese' (Nihonjinron) genre of literature has tended to reinforce the primacy of the nation at the expense of individual and social autonomy. The racial or cultural explanations for Japanese success often sound as though nature extended to a 'natural' proclivity on the part of the Japanese to serve the nation, the company, or the group. Phenomenal economic success has made these self-sacrificing attributes appear noble and positive, with few voices raised in concern for the impact on personal autonomy. Now in the mid-1990s as Japan too succumbs to recession, it will be interesting to observe whether the nation will be employed to urge further self-sacrifice from the individuals who performed the economic miracle. Outside evaluations of the Japanese model may well isolate the lack of personal autonomy as the reason why Japan is unable to develop creative policy responses to the economic malaise.

NOTES

2

3 4

5

6

7 8 9 10 II 12

One of the earliest Western works on the re-interpretation of Tokugawa feudalism was John Whitney Hall, 'New Look of Tokugawa History', in Hall and Jansen, eds, Studies in the Institutional History of Early Modern Japan, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1968, pp. 55-64. This has since burgeoned into a new interpretive trend, which identifies Confucianism as the traditional element which explains the success of Japan and the Asian tigers. See for instance Ronald Dore, Taking Japan Seriously, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1987. Maruyama Maso, 'Kindai teki shii' (Modem Thinking), SenchO to sengo no aida, Misuzo Shubo, 1976, p. 189. Translated into English by Mikiso Hane as Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan, Tokyo University Press, 1974. Hereafter referred to as Studies. ibid., p. xxxii. 'Fuhen teki ishiki 0 kaku Nihon no shiso - Maruyama Masao 0 kakonde' (Japanese Thought Lacks a Universal Consciousness - Speaking With Maruyama Masao), in Hitotsubashi Shinbun IS July 1964, p. 2. Maruyama Masao, Studies, p. xxix. ibid, pp. xxvi-xxvii. Maruyama Masao, 'Fuhen teki ishiki', p. 2. Maruyama Masao, 'Kaikoku' (Opening the Country), in Hidaka Rokuro, ed., Kindaishugi, vol. 34, Gendai Nihon shiso taikei, Chikuma ShoM, 1964. See Part II, pp. 285-290. Maruyama made this point in Studies, p. 12. The subjective modifications included the rejection of the Mandate of Heaven concept, and the rejection of the Chinese examination system. Maruyama Masao, Studies. p. 20. ibid.. pp. 24-25.

76 Democracy in postwar Japan 13 14

15 16 17

18 19

20 21 22 23 24 25

26 27 28 29 30 31

32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39

ibid, p. 45. See for instance Tetsuo Najita, 'Reconsidering Maruyama Masao's Studies', Japan Interpreter, voUl, no. I, 1976, pp. 97-108; and Herbert Ooms, Tokugawa Ideology, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1985, pp.4-6. Ogyii Sorai, Bendo (Discrimination of Names), Olof Lidin trans., Tokyo, Sophia University, 1970, p. 24. Maruyama Masao, Studies, p. 82. H. D. Harootunian, Toward Restoration: The Growth of Political Consciousness in Tokugawa Japan, Berkeley, California University Press, 1970, p. 23. See also Tetsuo Najita, Japan: The Intellectual Foundations of Modern Japanese Politics, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1974, p.36. See Najita, Japan, p.35. John R. McEwan, Political Writings of Ogyil Sorai, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1969, p. 30. See also Robert Bellah, 'Baigan and Sorai', in Tetsuo Najita and Irwin Scheiner, eds, Japanese Thought in the Tokugawa Period 1600-1868, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1978, p.I44. Maruyama Masao, Studies, p. 103. ibid, p. 91. ibid, p. 144. ibid., p. 154. ibid, p. 156. ibid, p. 167. Maruyama Masao, Kaikoku, p. 312. See for instance Najita, 'Reconsidering Maruyama Masao's Studies', p. 99; Germaine A. Hoston, Marxism and the Crisis of Development in Prewar Japan, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1986. Maruyama Masao, Studies, p. 179. ibid., p. 184. ibid, p. 191. ibid., p. 316. Maruyama Masao, 'Nihon ni okeru jiyii ishiki no keisei to tokushitsu' (Formation and Characteristics of Liberal Consciousness in Japan), in Senchil to sengo no aida, p. 305. Maruyama Masao, 'Aso Yoshiteru "kindai Nihon tetsugaku shi" 0 yomu' (Reading Aso Yoshiteru's "History of Modern Japanese Philosophy"), in Senchil to sengo no aida, p. 119. Maruyama Masao, 'Meiji jidai no shiso' (Thought of the Meiji Era), in Senchil to sengo no aida, p. 567. Maruyama Masao, 'Kaikoku', p. 311. Maruyama Masao, 'Chiisei to hangyaku' (Loyalty and Rebellion), Jiga to kankyo, vol. 6, Kindai Nihon shiso shi koza, Chikuma Shobo, 1960, p. 446. Maruyama Masao, 'Meiji kokka no shiso' (Thought of the Meiji State), in Senchil to sengo no aida, pp. 203-205. ibid, p. 207. See Maruyama Masao, 'Nationalism in Japan: its Theoretical Background and Prospects', Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1969, pp. 135-156; and Maruyama

The search for autonomy 77 40

41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48

49 50 51

52 53 54 55 56

57

58 59 60 61 62 63

Masao, 'Nationalism in Postwar Japan', Preparatory Paper, lIth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Lucknow, India, October 1950. Irokawa Daikichi, Jiyu minken (People's Rights Movement). Iwanami Shinsho, 1981; and Roger Bowen, Rebellion and Democracy in Meiji Japan, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1980, are representative of this position. Maruyama Masao, Studies. p. 313. Maruyama Masao 'Fuhen teki ishiki', p. 3. Maruyama Masao, Studies, p. 263. Maruyama Masao et al., 'Shakai ishiki ni okeru Seiyo - Toyo Nihon' (West - the East - Japan in Social Consciousness), Sekai Hyoron, March 1948, p. 42. Maruyama Masao, 'Shihai to fukujii' (Dominance and Submission), in Gendai seiji no shiso to kodo. 1964, p. 418. Maruyama Masao, 'Kenryoku to dotoku' (Authority and Morality), Gendai Seiji. 1964, p. 396. ibid., p. 396. ibid. pp. 401-403. Maruyama Masao, 'Jiyii minken undo shi (History of the People's Rights Movement), Senchii to sengo no aida. p. 311. Maruyama Masao, 'Chiisei to hangyaku', p. 417. ibid. p. 428. Maruyama Masao, 'Jiyii minken undo shi', p. 332. Maruyama Masao, 'Jiyii minken undo shi', pp. 332-333. Maruyama Masao, 'Chiisei to hangyaku', p. 467. Irokawa Daikichi, Jiyu minken. Iwanami Shinsho, 1981, pp. 84-87. Banno Junji, 'Nihon kindaishi to kyo no Nihon: "bummei kaika" to "jiyii minken" , (Modem Japanese History and the Japan of Today: "Civilization and Enlightenment" and "People's Rights"), Shakai Kagaku Kenkyu, vol. 38, No.4, December 1986, p. 242. Maruyama Masao, 'Fukuzawa Yukichi no tetsugaku: toku ni sono jiji hihan to no kanren' (Fukuzawa Yukichi's Philosophy: Particularly its Relationship to His Critique of the Times), in Hidaka Rokuro, ed., Kindaishugi. vol. 34, Gendai Nihon shiso taikei, Chikuma ShoM, 1964, p.75. ibid, p. 74. ibid, p. 72. ibid., pp. 77-79. Carmen Blacker, Japanese Enlightenment: A Study of the Writings of Fukuzawa Yukichi, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1969, p.114. Maruyama Masao, Chusei to hangyaku. p.412. Maruyama Masao, 'Nihon no shiso' (Japanese Thought), in Nihon no shiso, p. 33.

4 Maruyama, Marx and the shutaisei debate

History had shown Maruyama the central importance of both personal and social autonomy in a democracy. The dynamics of history were dialectical, and it was autonomy that would push the resolution of the dialectic in favour of democracy. But it would be misleading to call Maruyama a 'Marxist' merely because he was inspired by Marxian methodology. His was far from an orthodox Marxist view, and was firmly on the side of man as the maker of his fate. In fact it was in battling orthodox Marxism that Maruyama was able to clarify his philosophy of autonomy, and establish a positive agenda for its establishment in the new postwar world. On the other hand, any understanding of postwar Japanese intellectual discourse needs to come to terms with Marxism. This is especially true of democratic thought. Buffeted between idealism and ideology, democracy was defined through its association and disassociation with a Marxist world view. Although the ideological hue of that democracy was in dispute, Marxist terminology was the common currency of those times. Those who promoted social democracy insisted that this would inevitably occur through the forces of historical change. Those who promoted liberal democracy on the other hand identified the individual as the creative force. The battleground between these views was the shutaisei debate of 1947 and 1948, though for Maruyama the question of the role of the subject in history predated and continued after that specific debate. Shutaisei (subjectivity) was a complex concept which connoted 'a sense of self', and which presumed that man directed his historical destiny. The subject as maker of history had to be someone who was conscious of his creative role, and who incorporated within his humanity the freedom to determine the values that would inform change. Shutaisei has often been treated as an interchangeable concept with autonomy, and indeed it was the connection between his concept of

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personal autonomy and shutaisei which drove Maruyama tenaciously to defend the primacy of idealism in the historical process. The shutaisei debate in which Maruyama featured peaked in a 1948 round table discussion recorded by the journal Sekai, and ended in acrimonious disarray. In this debate we find Maruyama forced to confront the disharmony inherent in his Marxian interpretations of historical change, and his conviction that man was a value-conscious actor in control of this change. He left no doubt that idealism triumphed, yet this by no means implied that he had totally disavowed Marxist theory. His intellectual affinity with the Marxist thinker Umemoto Katsumi during the debate was no ideological aberration on Maruyama's part. To the contrary, in examining the influence on Maruyama of the writings of the young Marx, it becomes clear that Maruyama felt he was defending the true intentions of Marx rather than attacking the central premises of his theories. It was rather the inflexible, narrow interpretations on the part of orthodox Japanese Marxists that drew Maruyama's ire. The shutaisei debate was instrumental in turning Maruyama towards a 'freedom from' version of personal autonomy. MARXISM IN JAPAN The impact of Marxist thought on Japanese intellectuals has been described by Maruyama as resembling a whirlwind. Much more than merely a pristine theory or a credo for radical action, Marxism was regarded as an intellectual movement which reached far beyond narrow categories of thinkers and activists. Maruyama was greatly impressed by the totalistic embrace of Marxist philosophy, and saw that not only was the focus broad, it was systematically integrated: it was possible for the first time to learn a methodology which could take up politics, law, philosophy, and economics, not as separate disciplines, but to relate them to each other and examine them in a comprehensive manner; furthermore, in history, rather than ascertaining isolated facts through documents or just extracting information on the changing fortunes of leading figures, Marxism taught intellectuals to pursue the fundamental motivations which move and exist behind various historical phenomena. I By the 1930s, Marxism was well established in academic circles in Japan. One illustration of this was the establishment of new economics departments in universities throughout the country, which in turn led to the presentation of Marxism as a purely economic theory_ This type of academic orthodoxy was to re-emerge in the immediate postwar

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period, and was responsible for the intractability of thinkers such as Kozai Yoshishige tn the shutaisei debate. Even so, the Japanese academic world of the 1930s was extremely well versed in the works of Marx and Engels. The first complete edition of the collected works of Marx and Engels to appear anywhere in the world appeared in Japan in 1933.2 The tradition of socialism and Marxism in Japan was not exclusively dominated by economic determinism. In the Meiji period it was the humanistic aspects of Marxism which constituted its appeal. Proponents of Marxism such as the Christian socialists saw it as a moral corrective to the perceived inhumanity of capitalism. In this they exemplified a strong indigenous variant of humanist-Marxism which persisted through times of trial to the postwar period. Japanese humanist-Marxists were also notable for their benign view of the state, and their willingness to explore parliamentary options instead of engaging in direct confrontation for the sake of a more just social order. Kawakami Hajime's thought is representative of the idealist view which saw Marxism as an ethical philosophy. He persisted in trying to achieve recognition for human consciousness in the theory of historical materialism despite attacks from his peers and followers, who were compelled by the political realities of the domestic and international arenas in the late 1920s and 1930s to seek solace in determinism. Pre-empting Umemoto's rationale, Kawakami insisted on drawing a logical connection between Marx's notion of praxis and human will, which was essential to an ethical end-goal. Interestingly, Bernstein attributed Kawakami's position to an affinity with the spirit of 'the young Marx'.3 Added to the essential passivity of these ethical Marxists, the combination of domestic repression and ideological acrimony between organised Japanese Marxists consigned all Marxists to obscurity. The surge of optimism in the wake of the Russian Revolutions of 1917 and the jolt of the Rice Riots of 1918 were unable ultimately to surmount the crescendo of nationalism and imperialism which ushered in the 1930s. Indeed, many leftists such as Aso Hisashi (1891-1940) engaged in ideological gymnastics to reconcile communist goals with imperialism. The destructive debate between the Koza and Rono factions of the communist party in the 1920s over the role of a vanguard, and the disagreement over what stage of historical development Japan had achieved - exacerbated by the vacillations of the Comintern on this question - ensured that any windows of liberalism that existed in the TaishO period (1912-1926) were closed. The Japan Communist Party finally came down in 1932 in favour of the Koza position, which determined that Japan had yet to surmount its feudalistic phase and

Maruyama. Marx and the shutaisei debate 81 undergo a bourgeois revolution before moving ahead to socialism. But by then the 1925 Peace Preservation Law had shown its teeth, and repression of 'dangerous thought' intensified as Japan embarked on her adventure in China. It was in this environment of repression and intellectual challenge that Maruyama assimilated Marxist theories. He has acknowledged that this atmosphere did have ramifications for his appreciation of Marxism, and points out that by the time he entered the Tokyo Imperial University in 1934, 'in practical terms Marxism already existed in a watchful environment as an intellectual system cut off from practice'.4

MARUYAMA AND THE YOUNG MARX It is significant that Maruyama first encountered Marx's writings via the works of neo-Kantians of the Heidelberg school. While Maruyama stresses that this was purely accidental, it nonetheless established in Maruyama's thought the primacy of consciousness and the will as important aspects of any consideration of the philosophy of history. 5 Through his foreign language classes at the First Imperial High School, Maruyama became familiar with the thought of two leading philosophers of the Heidelberg School, Wilhelm Windelband (18481915) and Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936). This school was distinguished by its efforts to reconcile the disciplines of natural science and history through attempting to acquire scientific legitimacy for knowledge other than that specified by Kant (natural science), and conversely, to find a legitimate place for consciousness, ethics and value in scientific knowledge. Windelband argued that it was inappropriate to distinguish between sciences according to their object. Rather, science and history were merely different methods for establishing different kinds of knowledge. Science was concerned with general principles (laws), while history was concerned with individual facts. In other words, 'no single event can be deduced from general laws, and no law can be framed out of the contemplation of a single event'.6 Windelband's insistence on addressing this philosophical dilemma from the perspective of the subject, namely as a question of consciousness, is of chief interest here. We should also note that Windelband continued to associate history with norms which defined the significance of events for individuals, despite his ostensive objective of establishing history as a science (in the Kantian sense of the word), and not as mere ethics. 7 For his part, Rickert transposed the realms of the universal and the

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particular away from separate scientific disciplines to the simple, rational appraisal of reality. 'Reality ... becomes nature if we consider it in regard to what is general; it becomes history if we consider it in regard to the particular or individual.'8 Rickert nonetheless made a de facto distinction between the natural sciences and history by incorporating into his 'science of culture' a distinction between 'valuing thought' and 'non-valuing thought'. History epitomised the former, natural science the latter. Of relevance to our analysis is Rickert's notion that history necessarily involved value jUdgement, and achieved objectivity through the application of values that were universal. It was with the intellectual orientation of 'scientific idealism' provided by Windelband and Rickert that Maruyama began his study of Marx's writings during his high school years and then in university. This mindset was complemented by the writings of 'the young Marx', which featured humanism and the affirmation of personal autonomy. Maruyama also highlighted two other aspects of Marxism which caused him fundamentally to reappraise his view of knowledge and history. One was the realisation that theory had the power not only to interpret the world (to paraphrase Marx), but to change it. The other maxim highlighted by Maruyama was one which identified the scientific pursuit of fact with value: Marxists made it clear that no matter what kind of scientific research, it cannot be undertaken totally without premises, and that without asking whether or not one is conscious of it, scientists promote intellectual activities on the basis of a selection of values. 9 It is interesting to note the emphasis that Maruyama chose in his interpretation of the significance of Marxism for Japanese intellectuals, including himself. Here we see that he isolated those aspects involving interpretation, value and motivation. In this he was reaffirming the stresses and priorities of the Heidelberg School. Furthermore, this reading was clearly not the deterministic reading of capitalistic development and surplus value which characterised the works of Marx and Engels after 1845. Rather, it suggested the more humanistic focus of 'the young Marx'. McLellan argues that it is misleading to make a sharp distinction between the early versus the mature works of Marx using the vague criterion of humanism. In his view, humanism expressed through the theory of alienation is the unifying element of Marx's complete output. 10 The tendency to associate only the early works of Marx with

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a humanistic imperative was largely a product of the particular circumstances of the 1930s, which saw the belated publication of The Paris Manuscripts (1932) in a chaotic intellectual atmosphere. With fascism, Stalinism and existentialism in the air, the 'critical and yet undogmatic' humanism exhibited in The Paris Manuscripts was a revelation. II This was the aura surrounding those publications when Maruyama first encountered them. McLellan suggests that The Paris Manuscripts was remarkable because the human focus was presented independently from materialism, and it is this which makes this work representative of 'the young Marx'. Intrinsic to the notion of alienation which Marx outlined in this work was the logic behind the Hegelian dialectic that man was 'a being who creates himself and the conditions of life' .12 When considered from the perspective of humanism in this way, Alienation represented the sacrifice of autonomy: In all fields the common idea was that man had forfeited to someone or something what was essential to his nature - principally, to be in control of his own activities, to be the initiator of the historical process. In the different forms of alienation some other entity had obtained what was proper to man: in religion it was God, in politics the state, in economics the market process. \3 Marx's depiction of humanism as autonomy in his early works has been noted by a number of scholars. Tucker asserted that Marx was in fact an ethical individualist, in that he consistently gave priority to the achievement of personal autonomy. He argued that personal autonomy, defined as 'the capacity to be self-directing and not simply a pawn of other people's manipUlations, or subject entirely to the forces of nature and society' also represented the logic behind materialism, which featured in Marx's later writings. 14 The theme of the primacy of man was also a feature of Marx's works on Hegel's Philosophy of Right. In the 1843 Critique, this theme assumed the form of an attack on Hegel's concept of the state: 'Hegel starts from the state and makes man into the subjective aspect of the state; democracy starts from man and makes the state into objectified man.'ls In the Introduction (1843-1844) the humanistic theme appeared as an argument for the importance of consciousness, in its weak manifestation as self-awareness. According to Kolakowski this aspect continued to feature in works written by Marx and Engels after 1845, including works which Maruyama read at high school and at university. One such work, which Maruyama mentions as having interested him greatly, was The Holy Family (1845). In this work we see the interplay

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of the determinism inherent in the theory of historical materialism, and the role of consciousness in the historical process. Kolakowski maintains that while communism is presented in this piece as an historical inevitability, Marx nevertheless accorded great importance to the self-consciousness of the proletariat as an integral part of their historical role. 16 As we explore further beyond the line suggested by McLellan as dividing the works of the 'young' Marx from those of the 'mature' Marx, we see that autonomy was not so much subsumed in the analysis of economic determinism as it was accorded a social locus. In The German Ideology (1846), another work which Maruyama read, it is argued that man recovers his humanity via the transformation of material ties into personal ones. Autonomy is lost when 'the conditions of existence have become something accidental, something over which they (the proletariat), have no control, and over which no socialorganisation can give them control' .17 It was only in recognising and realising individuality through community that man could regain his autonomy: 'In a real community the individuals obtain their freedom in and through their association.'18 These Marxist works stressed a type of humanism which incorporated personal autonomy and community in a scientific theory. It is significant that Maruyama defended this interpretation of Marx even in the midst of the repressive political atmosphere of 1930s Japan. When he admitted reservations about Marxist theories of historical development and the state, it was not a retreat in the face of ideological (and physical) pressure. Rather it was a stand against fatalistic and deterministic readings of Marx by Japanese and European thinkers who denied recognition of the essential role of ideas in the historical process. Instead of turning away from Marx, Maruyama qualified his views of Marxism. He did this by turning to empathetic Marxist thinkers such as Karl Mannheim. His understanding of Mannheim was conditioned by the environment in which he assimilated Marxist thought, and by the nature of Japanese Marxism itself. At university, Maruyama engaged in the study of Marx and Engels, as well as Marxist writers such as Bukharin and Borkenau, more seriously and systematically. As he became more aware of the implications of historical materialism and its deterministic aspects, Maruyama felt uneasy about foresaking the role of consciousness when appraising socio-historical change. This disillusionment took the form of a disillusionment with interpretations of Marx. As we have seen (in Chapter 3), Maruyama was influenced greatly by the dialectical aspects of Marxist theory, which he employed

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creatively in his historical methodology. He was also impressed by the notion of stages of historical development which this theory implied, and likewise with the attendant theory of ideology as a socio-economic instrument. However, Maruyama observed that Marxist thinkers tended to be uncritical about their own uses of ideology. He saw that in the process, the relationship between historical events and meaning tended to become lost. Maruyama complained that Marxists employed a methodology which selected various criteria within the historical process, but then did not regard these selected criteria with the same critical vision. Instead, these criteria were dissolved within positivistic history. This meant, according to Maruyama, that the meaning of the observed historical processes was compromised. The consequences of this were considerable. Maruyama believed that it was because of this lop-sided criticism, which was in tum due to an excessive (and irresponsible) trust in science, that Marxist theory came to be used to legitimise systems that were far removed from the true objective of those theories. Here we see an ironic twist of the 'inversion' principle inherent in Marx's early negative formulation of ideology: In general, even if a certain system, or certain ideas (for example, natural law), performs a necessary ideological function under certain historical conditions, historically speaking it is not exactly rare that the 'tool' goes against the intentions of the master, that a 'change in objective' is accomplished, and becomes a two-edged sword aimed at the master. To the contrary, history is full of such ironies. 19 Maruyama's use of the Hegelian categories of 'essence' and 'science' shows that Maruyama was actually seeking a Marxist explanation which could relate these opposites in a meaningful way. Maruyama judged that Marxists had proved unable to explain how the process of 'genesis' (hassei ron) implied in the historical process related to the 'essence' (honshitsu ron) underlying and accompanying this process in its entirety. Not only Marxists but also the works of the originators themselves obscured this element. Maruyama cited Engels' The Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State as an example of this. Significantly, Maruyama stated that he did not think that Marxism was fundamentally incapable of achieving synthesis between these elements.20

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MARUYAMA, MANNHEIM AND THE PRIMACY OF THE SUBJECT It was at this stage of his intellectual development that Maruyama came across the work of Karl Mannheim. Mannheim appeared to Maruyama to achieve the formulation of Marxist thought that he had been seeking. The fact that Maruyama saw no contradiction between the intent of Marx and the thought of Mannheim shows that Maruyama was not looking to transcend Marxism, but instead to find a formulation that he could live with. This required a theory of society that accorded value to pluralism. It was Maruyama's interest in Marxist ideology that attracted him to Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia in his third year at university. In his theory of the sociology of knowledge Mannheim gave due emphasis to the Marxist concepts of the importance of the base, the social definition of the individual, and the vitality of the historical process: 'it is precisely the interconnection and intertwining of this threefold formulation of the problem, the economic, the social, and the ideological, that gives to Marxist ideas their singularly penetrating quality. '21 However, Mannheim went further. In his reformulation of the concept of ideology, Mannheim discerned different dimensions of ideology which were representative of different locations in the socio-historical context. Mannheim sought not only to find a valid place for value and meaning in the historical process, but to assign to value the same dynamic structure as had hitherto been the exclusive preserve of the base. In short, while ideology may well be designated as 'superstructure', it had properties of development which were, like the base, socio-historically defined. In one stroke, Mannheim had answered Maruyama's misgivings concerning the limitations of neo-Kantian epistemology, and the reactive role attributed to consciousness by Marxist theory. By making it theoretically possible to speak of a 'structure of thought' or a 'mode of thought', Mannheim was in effect raising up the subject as an important actor in history. political thought cannot be carried on by speculating about it from the outside. Rather thought becomes illuminated when a concrete situation is penetrated, not merely through acting and doing, but also through the thinking which must go with them. 22 This subjective factor included considerations of meaning and value in history:

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It may be true or false that a group struggles only to realise a fascist or a communist society, but it is only by means of this meaninggiving, evaluating definition that events produce a situation where activity and counteractivity are distinguishable, and the totality of events are articulated into a process. 23 By associating meaning with an historical, developmental dynamic, Mannheim created an indirect means of marrying positivism and idealism. He achieved this not through tortuous theoretical reclassifications such as those attempted by Windelband and Rickert, but simply by allowing both facts and meaning to share the characteristic of dynamism. Thus Maruyama concluded on the basis of Mannheim's theory that when analysing the development of the state, it was necessary to distinguish between the historical development of the state (facts), and the historical development of theories and concepts of the state (meaning). The latter had to take into account the value-consciousness of the subject, via the subject's socio-historical shU shuta; (context of thought).24 This accorded well with Mannheim's elaboration of Marx's theory of ideology. Mannheim lauded Marx for developing the concept of ideology into a totalistic concept, instead of just a particularistic one. Mannheim noted however, as did Maruyama, that Marxists tended to engage in 'functional reductionism' by always relating philosophers and their ideas to a particularistic (class) situation, thus undermining the potential of Marx's original conception. Mannheim's reformulation of ideology incorporated both interpretations of the concept, but made it clear that there was historically an inexorable movement from the particular towards the universal. In his categories of 'the particular' and 'the universal', Mannheim combined differing Marxist interpretations of ideology. 'The particular' represented the version put forward by Marx in The German Ideology, which was a negative assessment of ideology. This version was based on the inverted logic of the concealment of reality by a particular class (notably the bourgeoisie) for its own ends. 'The universal', on the other hand, was an ideology that represented a socio-historical group or era. This version comes closer to the more positive meaning used by Bernstein, Lenin, Lukacs and Gramsci following the death of Marx. This view presented ideology as a positive force representing the historical struggle of the proletariat, where the proletariat was aware of its real interests and motivated by this ideology to fight for them. 25 Mannheim's association of consciousness with progress towards 'the universal' was another significant factor in Maruyama's eyes. Starting

88 Democracy in postwar Japan with Kant's philosophy of consciousness, Mannheim tracked the progression of consciousness through history to its attachment to a class.26 As ideology was in Mannheim's view essentially geared towards maintaining the status quo, it was necessary to move beyond ideology towards 'utopia'. Utopias were created by the socially oppressed, whose drive to attain a better future likewise blinded its propagators to the social realities underlying their vision. Herein lay another aspect of Mannheim's thought which impressed Maruyama. This was that intellectuals were the only group capable of the 'dynamic intellectual mediation' between ideologies and utopias necessary to achieve the 'unmasking' of social reality. This elitist vision of an objective but interested intelligentsia appealed greatly to Maruyama, and structured his intellectual activity throughout the postwar period. Despite his plea for the admission of consciousness and motivation into the inner sanctum of legitimate Marxist theory, Mannheim was ultimately unable to relinquish his stress on the base in favour of the autonomy of thought. For this, he was criticised by Hughes for being 'obsessed with Marxist memories'.27 Yet for Maruyama, this adherence to the essentials of Marx constituted Mannheim's chief appeal. Maruyama later protested that he himself was not a Marxist, and that he was in fact a 'non-communist'. But he did not deny the deep and lasting impact that Marxism had on his thought and methodology. For Maruyama, 'Marxism ... was not just a way station'. 28 THE PHILOSOPHY OF AUTONOMY The struggle between idealism and determinism was at the heart of major disputes, particularly in Germany, over the interpretation of Marxist theories after the death of Marx. Through examining Maruyama's intellectual development in the prewar years, we soon appreciate the extent to which Maruyama and his peers were well versed in German philosophy. Given that Japanese intellectuals used this debate to rationalise and transcend the war experience, it is important to examine more closely the philosophical antecedents of the concept of autonomy which transposed itself to postwar Japan. This is even more vital when we consider that autonomy became the fulcrum of Maruyama's problem consciousness about Japan's postwar democracy. Autonomy as an idea was defined via this perceived conflict between idealism and determinism and, under a more systemic guise, between liberal and social democracy. While such a debate implies retrospectively an antipathy between Marxist and liberal democratic theories, this antipathy was not born of separate entities. Levin argued that

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Marxism and liberal democracy shared a conceptualisation of democracy as the fulfilment of man's humanity.29 He has even said that Marxism was in effect a product of liberal democracy. It was such a perception that enabled thinkers like Mannheim and Bernstein to consider themselves faithful interpreters of Marx and Engels, particularly of the pre-German Ideology 'young Marx'. In Europe, the predominance of the narrower view which saw irretrievable incompatibility between idealism and materialism (and, by extension, deduced this to be the keynote of Marxist theory), forced Bernstein to be branded a revisionist. Support for this interpretation came from the now notorious phrase from The German Ideology, 'consciousness does not determine life, but life determines consciousness'.3D This particular work was taken by adherents to the materialist conception to mean that the authors insisted on the primacy of the material over the ideal. Engels subsequently gave greater acknowledgement to human consciousness, but consciousness was still relegated to the confines of dialectical materialism: In the history of society . . . the actors are all endowed with consciousness, are men acting with deliberation or passion, working towards definite goals; nothing happens without a conscious purpose, without an intended aim. But this distinction (between unconscious nature and conscious men) ... cannot alter the fact that the course of history is governed by inner generallaws. 31 The advent of Darwinism had far-reaching ramifications in the world of European philosophy. Both the tendency to associate social history with a scientific progression (determinism) and the urge to resist the negation of the role of consciousness were reactions to the extension of Darwinism to the social sciences. Lichtheim accused Engels of following Darwin by attempting to synthesize speCUlative philosophy and positive science - idealism and materialism - through his theory of dialectical materialism. According to Lichtheim not only did Engels fail, but his intention was alien to that of Marx, who had never envisioned a correlation between nature and history.32 Eduard Bernstein (1850-1932) represented the stream of thought that harked back to a more subject-centred perception of social history. In this he exemplified the idealist impulse on the part of Marxists towards allowing 'the ideological, and especially the ethical, factors greater space for independent activity than was formerly the case',33 Bernstein's resistance to ideas of determinism and positivism was partly an attempt to reconcile the European political environment of

90 Democracy in postwar Japan the 1890s and the early 1900s with a Marxist perspective. Bernstein saw that rather than class tension and conflict, the trend of the times indicated that socialism could be achieved by adapting itself to consensus tactics that were more compatible with individualism and democracy. Even his pro-determinist contemporary, Karl Kautsky (18541938), had advocated parliamentary tactics. At the same time, Bernstein's view incorporated a type of humanism which necessarily involved a moral imperative. In other words, socialism was not just something that would happen, but something that 'ought to be'.34 His insistence that goals are approached through human agency based on conscious commitment to that goal, or alternatively, to the realisation of certain values, was a notion of Kantian origin. Not surprisingly, McLellan attributed Bernstein's conception to the neo-Kantian revival of the post-1860s. Intrinsic to the logic that man was the supreme value and an end in himself, Kant himself had perceived an essential connection between consciousness and morality: 'to the idea of freedom there is inseparably attached the concept of autonomy, and to this in tum the universal principle of morality.'3s This association was fundamental not only to the concept of personal autonomy, but to liberal conceptions of man. Regarded as a core value of liberal democracy, it became the measure of the legitimacy of liberal democratic society. 36 Here our encounter with the concept of autonomy comes full circle. In the liberal-democratic definition, we find reproduced the very values and attributes which Maruyama judged to have been critically lacking in the polity of prewar and wartime Japan: individuality, value acquisition and creation, action, and responsibility. Maruyama was mindful of the fact that, in postwar Japan, the abuse or frustration of personal autonomy implicitly threw doubts on the existence of genuine liberal democracy. To Maruyama's mind, the concept of autonomy was not necessarily the exclusive preserve of liberal democracy (in the sense that this implied antipathy with Marxist theory). However, the harried Marxists who emerged from prison in 1945 were eventually driven by a renewal of persecution in 1950 to believe that theoretical orthodoxy was ultimately the only option.

THE SHUTAISEIDEBATE The shutaisei debate, which occurred mainly in 1947-1948, reflected the mood of troubled introspection and preoccupation with the self characteristic of Japanese intellectual culture in the immediate postwar period. The rush to embrace humanism and laud the dignity of man

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was an understandable reaction to war, and Japan was no exception to this trend of the postwar world. In post-1945 Japan, the added reality of defeat and Occupation was a catalyst for critical retrospection and self-conscious analysis on the part of intellectuals. This was expressed negatively through the war responsibility debate, and more positively, with an implicit future focus, through the debate on shutaisei. As well as establishing the overriding issue of postwar thought, the idea of shutaisei refocused the debate on to contemporary political issues. Maruyama was not alone in viewing the debacle of war in terms of the violation and deception of the individual. It was in response to this widely-held perception of wartime psychology that the literary world launched its version of the shutaisei debate in 1946. Centred on Ara Masato, this segment of the postwar intelligentsia equated the wartime obliteration of the individual with the obliteration of the ego. The failure of writers to engage in protest, the phenomenon of tenka (apostasy), and active efforts to assist in the propagation throughout society of the state's war psychology (despite the fact that this supposedly did not accord with the writers' will) was likewise explained as the product of a weak, submissive ego. In contrast to this narrow, introspective focus, the debate amongst philosophers and political scientists explored the vast intellectual terrain that had already seen the likes of Hegel, Marx and the Marxist revisionists in Europe. The shutaisei debate in Japan should be seen as an extension of the European debate, as it is concerned with the same philosophical issues of idealism and determinism. It was also entangled with a crisis of interpretation in Marxist theory. However, the Japanese debate can be distinguished from its European precedent in a number of important respects. The circumstances in Japan added a dimension of immediacy and practical consequence to the Japanese debate that did not attend the debate in Europe. Much more than purely a theoretical debate concerned more with the realm of philosophy than with politics, the debate in Japan was permeated with urgency. The intellectuals who were ranged on the side of idealism believed that the rise of the fascist state had been facilitated by the manipulation of ideas on the one hand, and the failure of individual and social autonomy on the other. If ideas were not given due recognition postwar, then democracy - of whatever hue - would be doomed. Viewed from this perspective, determinists were not only irresponsible, but dangerous. It was trust in the fatalistic aspects of fascism, namely that it was an inevitable transitory phase on the road to socialism, that had sanctioned the repression and violence of the wartime state.

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Events soon conspired in the early postwar years to smash the euphoria of the pro-determinists as well. Following their release from prison, the martyred communists enjoyed widespread respect and freedom such as they had not known for decades. For a period there was common ground between so-called 'progressive liberals' and communists over the need to eradicate the remnants of feudalism and modernise Japanese society. This 'united front' disappeared in the wake of MacArthur's decision to ban the general strike of February 1947. For many communists, it was automatic at the time to cling to the iron theory of inevitable victory which had sustained them through the persecutions of the past. Eventually, these communists would find reinforcement for their view in the economic recovery that accompanied Japan's support role for the United States during the Korean War. In the meantime, shutaisei became a means of measuring the degree of ideological cleavage between 'progressive liberals' and orthodox Marxists, as around them the Reverse Course of the United States' Occupation policy reflected domestically the Cold War mood of the international arena. SignificiantIy, shutaisei was also a potential means of philosophical accommodation between them. The intellectual opponents embroiled in the shutaisei debate did not use terminology in quite the same way as those involved in the European debate. The historical and intellectual context of the late 1940s required a special language with which to joust over these concepts. Instead of 'determinism', we find the strictly objective entity of 'science'. Instead of 'revisionism' and any stance that defended 'idealism', we encounter the embodiment of consciousness and value, the 'world view'. Thus according to the orthodox Marxist view, historical materialism, being 'scientific', could not admit an irrational, subjective element such as consciousness or motivation. Yet for social scientists such as Maruyama, it was dangerous to contemplate a world which was not created and regulated by the value-conscious individual acting to realise his 'world view'. The main interest in the shutaisei debate was not in the consolidation of irreconcilable positions. Rather, it was in the attempts by Maruyama Masao and Umemoto Katsumi, who were widely regarded as ideological opponents, to transcend the antipathy. Neither intellectual succeeded in extracting concessions from their fellow discussants. Yet in mutually affirming the belief that man was to be regarded as an active agent of social change and that the impulse behind this action was the value consciousness of the actor, Maruyama and Umemoto discovered common ground between ideological foes. While Umemoto

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would eventually succumb to the pressures of Marxist orthodoxy, Maruyama continued to embody the spirit and intent of this common ground. For Maruyama, the pursuit of shutaisei became synonymous with the pursuit of a democratic ethos in postwar Japan.

UMEMOTO KATSUMI: THE PLEA FOR A WORLD VIEW Umemoto Katsumi (1912-1974) was a member of the communist party from the early postwar years until 1960. His credentials as a Marxist were underlined by his inclusion in the Red Purge of 1950. Yet he remains best known for his definition of shutaisei as a philosophical issue which, in his view, was entirely consistent with the Marxist theory of historical materialism. Umemoto's argument was that there had to be a connection between the individual and political reality, even a reality as construed by an ideology. Ignoring the theoretical incompatibility of human will and social change inherent in historical materialism, Umemoto declared his heresy by relabelling Marxism as a 'world view' instead of a science, and isolating the individual from his class by calling him 'autonomous'. Umemoto wrote that he felt compelled to 'make an issue out of the internal connection between Marxism as a world view, and one's own self'.37 Umemoto was looking for 'the connection between the internal self and Marxism as a world view'.38 Umemoto also framed his idea in more familiar Marxist terminology: 'how is the mutual relationship between superstructure and base expressed within the autonomous individual?'39 We receive the strongest echo of Eduard Bernstein, and recognise the similarity of Umemoto's ideological dilemma, in his question: 'why should the individual die for a future he cannot experience himself, for the sake of an entire class?,40 Here lies the crux of what orthodox Marxist intellectuals such as Kozai Yoshishige and Matsumura Kazuto saw as heresy. Umemoto was introducing the notion of subjectivity, or human motivation, into the law of historical materialism. In short, Umemoto believed that subjectivity was the missing link of Marxist theory. He saw that autonomous action on the part of individuals who were motivated to act through their commitment to a goal was consistent with Marxism's humanistic orientation, and should be incorporated into Marxist theory. After all, Marxism tacitly held a moralistic idea, the emancipation of mankind, as a premise. 41 When we examine Umemoto's writings, we find a striking compatibility with Maruyama's ideas on the connections between value, the

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autonomous individual and action, which are in turn the fundamental premises of shutaisei. Umemoto first outlined his philosophy in terms of the link between freedom and modern man. In The Limits of Humanistic Freedom, Umemoto asserted that an ethical personality was essential if humanity was to be restored to modern man, thus making him truly free. 42 In other words: 'what were the ultimate values regulating humanity, and what were their rootS?'43 Umemoto developed his ideas about motivation in the conceptual framework of 'the individual' and 'the whole'. His essay Materialism and Man noted that history had always featured tension between the individual's isolation from the social whole, and the demand for the synthesis of individual and social identities. The struggle between the social and individual aspects of the self had been expressed as class struggle. The individual had to resolve this dualism: 'modernity demands that new individuals should discover within themselves as individuals the principle for unity.'44 The Marxist perspective of the dualism of man's existence, wrote Umemoto, was explained in terms of the inevitable consequences which flowed from the contradictions inherent in the relations of production. Thus far he kept to a standard Marxist view. However, unlike this Marxist formulation, he thought that relations of production were also human relations: 'consciousness and language are products of these relations, . . . but they are also where relations truly and consciously recognise themselves as human relations.'4s The self was realised in contradicting the whole, and in true dialectical fashion, realised unity with the whole through this contradiction. But why should the individual consciously decide to contradict the whole? Science was not enough to make people fight selflessly for emancipation. 'If Marxism is simply positivistic social science then it is unrelated to the people who will change the world.'46 The historical consciousness of materialism is not just consciousness, but consciousness which incorporates judgement and is led by practical determination, and in this regard the self is clearly distinguished from all neutral consciousness. 47 So what was the value which would mobilise the individual? it is devotion to the emancipation of the specific class which occupies the historical position which must emancipate mankind. It is the devotion to the whole. Furthermore, it is an expression of the acknowledgement that that devotion to the whole is at the same time devotion to the emancipation of the whole of humanity.48

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Umemoto's philosophy of shutaisei borrowed inspiration from the philosophy of Nishida Kitaro. Nishida sought to go beyond the ideas of Kant and the neo-Kantians by devising a theory which could transcend the perceived opposition between subject and object. He achieved this through his 'system of absolute nothingness', which identified the transcendental 'place' where subject and object were yet to be distinguished. In developing his theory, Nishida gave heavy emphasis to sUbjectivity and the role of consciousness and the will. His formulation of 'mu' (nothingness) was meant to be free of the taint of subjectivity, but in proceeding to locate 'place' in the actual world (which he called 'the historical world'), Nishida returned to a de facto stress on the self as a creative determinant of the world as well as of the self. 49 Umemoto reworked the notion of mu to fit into the theory of historical materialism. Instead of a realm from which subject and object (alternatively spirit and matter) were yet to be extracted, and therefore a place where these opposites were retroactively synthesized, Umemoto fixed mu as the ultimate conceptual locus of historical materialism. The material in turn influenced consciousness, which aspired to the state of mu. In simple terms, mu was the realm where the restrictions placed on the self by circumstance (the material) and those imposed on the self by the self (consciousness) were dialectically transcended. 50 Koschmann has also attributed Umemoto's formulation of shutaisei to the fledgling tradition of existential Marxism. According to Koschmann, Umemoto 'sought to synthesize an understanding of the existential moment of commitment with the Marxist conception of history and the social whole',st It is true that Umemoto was concerned mainly with the question of commitment, but his overall thrust on conscious identification with the whole, and the space he consistently allowed for value and active subjectivity, suggested a greater affinity with the non-regulated aspects of existentialism than with the scientific Marxist theory of determinism (though this could easily be applied to all so-called existential Marxists, who in Bernstein's day would have been acknowledged only as revisionists). Nonetheless, we can slot Umemoto into the definition of existential Marxism proposed by Poster with few qualms: a non-Leninist Marxism that conceptualises advanced industrial society in a way that points toward the possible elimination of its alienating structures; that looks to all the relations of daily life, not simply to the relations of production, to make society intelligible; that picks up from existentialism the effort to capture human beings in the

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It was the aspect of 'human beings in the moment of their active creation of their environment' that was rejected absolutely by the majority of orthodox Marxists. Eventually, Umemoto modified his rhetoric, altered his terminology, and professed adherence to that orthodoxy.

MARUYAMA MASAO: THE REINTERPRETATION OF MARXISM Maruyama agreed with Umemoto that value-based action did belong in Marxist theory. In discovering common ground with Umemoto, Maruyama was not so much crossing over to hostile territory as he was discovering a kindred spirit. He was staking his claim to his idea of the correct interpretation of Marxist theory, and chastising those Marxists who had erred. Given that he failed to convince the self-appointed guardians of Marxist orthodoxy in Japan, we could put it another way and say that Maruyama was actually trying to reinterpret Marxism. Maruyama's antipathy towards Marxism in the context of the debate on shutaisei was based on the stubborn refusal of orthodox Marxist theorists to acknowledge that Marxism was in fact an idealist theory. His chagrin was revealed not just in the context of the 1948 debate, but regularly in his writings during the fifteen years after defeat in 1945. The most striking examples are revealed in Maruyama's writings on Harold Laski. Maruyama first read Laski while in his third year at university. Laski's personal example added warmth and popular responsibility to the elitist intelligentsia described by Mannheim. Maruyama modelled himself on Laski as an intellectual for a number of reasons. First, Laski seemed to be in tune with the problem consciousness of his era, and did not flinch from discussing difficult and dangerous issues. One sign of this was Laski's propensity to publish essays rather than scholarly treatises, a practice which Maruyama copied. Second, Maruyama was impressed with Laski's open-mindedness, and his ability to rise above particularistic ideological positions. In the midst of a flood of scholars who rationalise and comment upon apparent reality, who when confronted with a most critical period in the world situation formulate precise theories in a safe place, avoiding politically delicate problems and 'dangerous' themes, and who always follow the natural legitimacy of established systems

Maruyama. Marx and the shutaisei debate 97 or factions, Laski in particular ... is one of the few scholars who presents both sides: academic pursuits and practical topics; science and ideology; the preservation of intellectual standards and popular understanding, and does not avoid the fundamental problems of the times, but meets them head on.53 Third, Maruyama was struck by Laski's stress on value, and his insistence that value and meaningful socio-political change were linked. This was revealed in Laski's appraisal of the Russian Revolution and Bolshevism as expressions of a faith. For Laski, historical regeneration was contingent on the motive power of value. In Maruyama's view: Laski always interprets communism as a faith, from the perspective of 'ethos'. Here we find not a word about something like the 'iron inevitability' of a materialistic process that is independent of human will. 54 Maruyama concurred fully with Laski's interpretation of communism as something that developed not through its realism or materialism, but through its idealism and spiritual bonding. 55 The aim of this value pursuit was unquestionably that of individual self-realisation. Laski believed that 'the guarantee of the masses' material welfare is only seen as significant in that it is a premise of the realisation of their internal personality'. 56 Individual autonomy was to be the measure of the legitimacy of the state. According to Laski, the state was to be judged by the extent to which it guaranteed the right to realise 'my best self'.s7 Fourth, Maruyama reported that he would 'never forget the inspiration' of witnessing Laski, a Western European liberal democrat, drawing closer to Marxism while all around him Japanese intellectuals were renouncing it. 58 Maruyama credited Laski with clarity of vision under duress, in seeing that Western European democracy had actually nurtured fascism, and could hardly shame the Soviet Union into renouncing a creed which promised spiritually to revitalise the people. In this Maruyama compared Laski to Gide, whom Maruyama quotes as having said: 'I do not think that communism and individualism properly understood are essentially incompatible. '59 Finally, it must be said that Maruyama felt empathy with Laski's view that the decay of culture in the interwar years, and by implication the rise of fascism in Europe, was due in large measure to the irresponsibility of intellectuals. Laski's belief that fascism could be attributed to the aloofness of great minds at a time when values were in transition fitted with Maruyama's reading of the failings of Japanese intellectuals in the 1930s. Maruyama conveys deep admiration for Laski's adher-

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ence to humanism above all else, including in times of upheaval and repression. To this end, Maruyama noted that Laski had the courage to remain true to an ideal which was in every sense universal: Laski gave up on neither revolution, nor peace. 60 Maruyama elaborated on his ideas about the perceived opposition between the material and the ideal in an essay written in 1948 called Random Thoughts. In this piece we get the first indication of Maruyama's perception of idealism. This was that the ideal did not necessarily imply a lack of realism, and in fact, that it was because of such a perception that fascism and state repression had been triumphant in the past. In Random Thoughts, Maruyama wrote that Japan had a stunted appreciation of idealism. This manifested itself in the form of what amounted to a faith in materialism, a type of idealistic materialism, which was ahistorical and alien to the dialectical process. For a correct understanding of the dialectic, one had to understand the German philosophical tradition. This was important not because the German context was important in itself. Rather, it was important to understand the genesis of the idea of the dialectic in order to understand its application to any specific context. The fact that up until now in our country this type of understanding ... has been very poor has a number of causes, but amongst them is that always when it comes to ideas or philosophy, it is as though there is a meal, and all we do is eat what is on the plate, without attempting to enquire how it was cooked or where, and it is undeniable that here there is the basic tendency of a safe, lazy, backward country at work. 61 Maruyama advocated familiarity with the young Marx in order to rectify this ignorance of the genesis of ideas. Maruyama's tendency to blame the impasse between idealism and materialism on the inadequacies of Japanese Marxism was a theme that he repeated several times both during and after the shutaisei debate. Maruyama echoed Umemoto, saying that man does not live simply in order to prove a scientific issue, and employed Engels to prove his point. 'Engels said that true freedom comes from a classless society', wrote Maruyama, but: is it not precisely because the concept of value called 'true freedom' does not come from existing reality that, relying on 'true freedom', it is possible to oppose the bourgeois freedom of present existence'!62

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The importance of deriving motivation and direction from values had been amply demonstrated by the war: Unless you commit yourself to values which surpass present reality and which cannot be seen, you will be dragged along by the reality you can see and your way of thinking will be changed. In the end you will become an appendage of circumstance. 6l Maruyama attempted to bridge the perception gap between progressive liberals and orthodox Marxists during the round table discussion convened by Sekai, which was published in February 1948. In a sense, Maruyama was doomed in his endeavour from the start. Judging from the array of intellectuals assembled for this debate, Maruyama was supposed to represent the 'progressive liberal' view. The other people were likewise slotted into set categories ranging from 'orthodox Marxist' to 'psychologist' to 'social scientist'. The stage was set for an exposition of set positions, not for a creative exchange of views. Ranged beside Maruyama were some noted academics. Flying the flag for orthodox Marxism was Kozai Yoshishige, a member of the Japan Communist Party who had approached Marxism through neo-Kantianism. He received qualified support from Matsumura Kazuto, a philosopher sympathetic to orthodox Marxist views, who stressed an Hegelian approach to historical materialism. The rebel Umemoto was not a participant in this particular forum, but his views were well represented by Mashita Shinichi, an anti-determinist who championed autonomy and rationalism as essential considerations of social theory. Moving further towards the idealist position, there was Miyagi Otoya, a social scientist who placed great emphasis on the psychological aspects of man's involvement in social change. The person who had the most affinity with Maruyama's position was the social scientist and critic Shimizu Ikutaro. Finally there was Hayashi Kentaro, an expert in the theory of historical materialism who, having opposed fascism before the war from a leftist position, was drawing closer to a staunch conservative position postwar. All of these academics shared a solid grounding in Marxist theory, as well as the environment in which they encountered and assimilated these theories. Their differences were therefore not so much an expression of different experiences or even antipathetic ideological orientation, but instead expressions of different interpretations of Japan's war experience. In particular, their respective formulations of shutaisei and their analysis of the dynamics of socio-political change reflected their differing views on how Japan was to avoid a reoccurrence of the mistakes of the past. Appropriately, the Sekai discussion on 'Historical

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Materialism and Shutaisei' took as its starting point the causes of war. War was the medium through which the proponents of materialism and of idealism restated their antipathy. The UNESCO conference of 1946 had provoked a flow-on debate in Japan about whether or not war was caused by perceptions (namely by man as a conscious actor creating his fate), or by capitalist greed expressed as imperialism (namely the inevitable consequences of capitalism). Maruyama argued that ideals had the ability to transcend all such disputes. Even material issues were ultimately arbitrated through the mind and spirit: 'even if [the causes of war] are materialistic, after all it first becomes a problem through being arbitrated via the spirit, and thus builds the opportunity for war .. .'64 The discussants focused on an article which had appeared in Sekai the previous month written by James Marshall, entitled 'Freud and Marx in UNESCO'. Maruyama was backing Marshall's main conclusion that philosophers needed to be more aware of economic forces, while economic theory needed to take into account the spiritual aspects of life. But the crux of the issue was not long in coming forth: was there legitimate room for the creative subject in the law of historical materialism? In this debate, the question was of course phrased slightly differently: was it possible to regard subjectivity (shutaisel) as a scientific entity, or one which could be treated in a scientific way? Not surprisingly, the participants divided along ideological lines. Mashita argued that Marxism incorporated a world view and therefore it was legitimate to attach meaning t.o the process of historical materialism, especially if that meaning stems from a class locus. He was implacably opposed by Miyagi and Kozai, for whom the words 'meaning', 'value', 'psychology' and 'world view' had unacceptable associations with the superstructure. Believing that existence must coincide with value, Maruyama accused the Marxist scholars of 'coldness' in refusing to recognise value, even though socialism clearly had a strong humanistic value orientation: Not just simply eating and existing like animals, but the comprehensive emancipation of mankind - freely to develop man's ability, to create a society where this is possible - this is where the final goal lies, where the problem lies.65 Value was, in Maruyama's mind, the yardstick by which Marxists judged whether or not the proletariat's consciousness was high or low. Was not consciousness itself treated by Marxists as a value, in that there was clearly a consciousness which the proletariat ought to have?

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Encountering inflexible rhetoric from his fellow discussants, Maruyama made a last plea for the recognition of the value-conscious actor: 'this is a problem of how far you trust humanity, how far you trust the universality of human logic. '66 Towards the end of the round table discussion, Maruyama again showed how much importance he placed on subjectivity in the sense of a direct link between action and responsibility. Rebutting Shimizu Ikutaro's call for objectivity, Maruyama noted that great danger lurked in historical materialism's claim to objectivity. In his view, objectivity meant that 'responsibility for one's actions is shut out, as though history was screened off from you, working all on its own'.67 Not surprisingly, Maruyama was isolated in this particular forum. AUTONOMY AS A UNIVERSAL VALUE

Maruyama was dissatisfied on two counts: Japanese Marxists regarded materialism as an ideal, but did not recognise that Marxism was in itself, through its intrinsic value orientation and the dialectic of history, ban idealistic theory. In musing about the reasons for this state of affairs, Maruyama added new depth to the whole issue of change and legitimacy in Japan. In doing so, the frame of reference moved from the nature of Japanese Marxism to the nature of historical change in Japan. His aim remained the fulfilment of the promise he perceived in Marx's original vision, but he developed a new focus. Maruyama attributed the inability of Japanese Marxists to acknowledge value to their preference for a unidimensional theory. Whereas the neo-Kantians or even Weber had perceived coexisting dimensions of existence and value, Marxists insisted on compressing the two into a hierarchy, where existence, narrowly defined as materialism, had precedence. This was in tum seen by Maruyama as characteristic of the weaknesses of the Japanese structure of thought, weaknesses which made Japanese intellectuals especially susceptible to Marxism. This meant that the claim to 'science' encouraged dogmatism, and the totalistic embrace of Marxism made it take the form of a totalitarian creed which admitted no alternative and claimed to be the sole possessor of truth. All of these responses were the result of the lack of what Maruyama called 'a spiritual axis'. Ultimately, Maruyama was accusing the Japanese intellectual structure itself of lacking autonomy. What had been a problem for the individual versus the state had now become one for Japan as a whole. Without a 'sense of self', Japan could not integrate ideas, philosophies or technologies without sacrificing her integrity.

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Marxism was not at fault. Neither were Japanese orthodox Marxists, for even they were merely obeying the pulse of a chaotic spiritual and psychological environment: The sort of energy that can raise what is coexistent to something that is hybrid, whether it be knowledge or practice, will not emerge without a subject that has acquired a tough self-mastery. The production of such a subject is nothing less than the matter of our destiny.68 Autonomy not only had to transcend politics, it must represent a universal entity. The acquisition of autonomy was now infinitely more complex. It required not only a revolution of awareness, but the acquisition of a new consciousness. It meant eradicating the feudal aspects of social life - represented by fixed social relations, and the identification of morality with power - and indigenising not only personal autonomy, but social autonomy. It did not mean wholesale acceptance of the new and the Western, but rather the formation of a new mode of thought (shiza k6z6). Maruyama called this 'modern', but this was also entirely consistent with the fundamentals of humanist Marxism. In his search for autonomy Maruyama next turned to John Locke and to Fukuzawa Yukichi. In his view, each intellectual epitomised different aspects of autonomy. In the case of Locke, it was a positive theory of autonomy which incorporated action. In the case of Fukuzawa, it was a type of negative autonomy which would have the power to restrict the activities and power of the state. It was Locke's concept of freedom which Maruyama employed to illustrate the complementarity of freedom and action on the part of autonomous individuals. It is difficult to accept without reservation the idea that the populace of wartime Japan was totally passive, brain-washed or unaware of its plight. Maruyama and his peers implicitly acknowledged this byemphasizing the need for action on the part of value-consistent individuals and in insisting that action be linked with responsibility. In contrast to Hobbes' 'passive' version of freedom, or what Berlin called 'negative freedom' or 'freedom from', Maruyama saw that Locke expressed active or 'positive' freedom. Maruyama thought it necessary to pursue the genesis of the idea of freedom behind Locke's theory. Locke, decided Maruyama, had derived his concept of freedom from the Puritan Revolution in seventeenth-century England, where absolutism had clashed with a new citizen's consciousness. The fact that Locke emerged with a definition

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of freedom which centred on personal autonomy, namely 'the ability of logical self-definition', showed that Locke was primarily concerned with man rather than man's environmental constraints. Locke's interpretation of freedom stressed the rational, active individual as its vehicle. It was not enough that consciousness be freed; there had to be a new normative consciousness which could push people to fight for a new social and political order. Maruyama concluded sadly that the Meiji Restoration had achieved only a decadent version of Berlin's 'freedom from'. Human desire for freedom had been released, but no autonomous movement for freedom was forthcoming. Even though Maruyama had singled out Locke for his idea of active autonomy, Maruyama made his personal affiliation very clear. In the politically-charged atmosphere of August 1947, Maruyama declared that the bearers of freedom were no longer the 'citizens' of post-Lockean liberalism. In a pointed message to the disillusioned postwar labour movement, Maruyama said that it was now up to the labouring masses of workers and farmers to carry on the fight for freedom.69 In part Maruyama paired action and freedom because the wartime intellectual and social structure featured the tendency of people to take reality as a 'given' rather than something that was man-made. Before social change could occur, there has to be an awareness that the public order, institutions, mores, in short the whole social environment that encompasses mankind, is man-made, and can be changed by the force of man's intellect. 70 The second element influencing Maruyama's attention to action was the belief that it was only through action that new norms, ideas or values genuinely permeated the individual psyche and became intellectually indigenised. Indeed, if we look at the themes which surfaced in debates on democracy in the first fifteen postwar years at least we see a repeated concern that the origin of change (genesis) was crucial to its legitimacy and durability. Postwar democracy was accused of being imposed, a product of defeat rather than of indigenous creation and therefore illegitimate, even illusory. Crudely put, freedom (or any reform, including democracy) was only genuine or valuable if it was fought for. In his essay To Do and To Be, Maruyama described this as the bloody lesson of European history: Freedom is not something that is, like an object, but rather something that can only be protected by action in the present; in other

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words, something is free for the first time through trying day by day to become free. 11 The individual of postwar Japan had not only to realise his status as an individual, but also formulate values which would propel him to act, as a subjective, motivated entity, to realise and legitimise reform. Maruyama did not leave action unqualified and unrestrained. Intrinsic to the individual's action was the principle of self-regulation, or responsibility as the corollary of action. What swept through the early postwar days as retrospective wisdom was the recognition that neither the fascist leadership nor the bulk of the populace had previously acknowledged this basic connection between action and responsibility. Nonetheless Maruyama did not abandon his concern with the passive 'freedom from' version of autonomy. Turning again to Locke, Maruyama sought to underline in yet another way the perils of trusting the state with an incomplete, compromised version of personal and social autonomy. Maruyama extracted seven principles from Locke's political writings for analysis: the concept of self-regulation as the nucleus of modem freedom; political authority legitimised by the peoples' consent; no automatic correlation between power and rights; the need for the separation of powers; the rule of law; the right of a sovereign people to engage in revolution; and the principle of the freedom of thought. 12 Maruyama wrote his essay on Locke mainly to spread his theories in Japan in the absence of a Japanese translation of Tho Treatises of Government. Yet Maruyama's exegesis was as revealing about Maruyama's view of the state as it was of the works of Locke. The shadow of the value-totalitarian state which loomed behind Maruyama's reading of Locke was often present in his own intellectual work. Maruyama's treatment of Fukuzawa Yukichi exemplified this tendency to define autonomy as something which also guaranteed 'freedom from' the absolutism of the state. Maruyama saw in Fukuzawa the epitome of the autonomous, modem consciousness. This became very clear in his writings on modernism. But Maruyama also portrayed Fukuzawa's version of social autonomy as a successful muz. zling of the state by society. Fukuzawa's thought, in Maruyama's view, featured the attributes of autonomy: value fluidity and flexibility; rational judgement; and responsibility. For Fukuzawa, 'even though civilization surpasses the state, it becomes the tool of the state; even though the state uses civilization as an instrument, it has already been surpassed by civilization'.13 This was supposedly Fukuzawa's justification for welcoming the influence of the West (referred to as 'civilization'), but for Maruyama it was without

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doubt a plea for autonomy. Autonomy of this kind, the kind personified by Fukuzawa, was the only way to prevent political authority from becoming an end in itself. Maruyama's admiration for Fukuzawa was based in part on the fact that Fukuzawa aimed to instil this type of social autonomy into Japanese society: Not by forcing some kind of absolute value onto the people, but making them stand before multifaceted values and think about them, choose from amongst them, and walk a path to freedom independently, this was the ultimate aim of his [Fukuzawa's] Iife. 74 The contrast with Fukuzawa's nationalistic (or should we say 'patriotic') impulse is striking, though Maruyama seems to have regarded this aspect of Fukuzawa's thought as relevant only to the specific historical circumstances of Japan under the unequal treaties regime of the late 1800s. Maruyama was more receptive to Fukuzawa's ideas on the relationship between society and the state (social autonomy) than to his ideas on the relationship between the people and the nation (nationalism). These were the complex issues and concepts which Maruyama gave voice to in the shutaisei debate. Shutaisei became the ethic which would help realise the democratic ideal of which it was the conceptual core. His logic drove him to go well beyond a situational debate on correct interpretations of Marxist theory. It is true that Maruyama's version of democracy incorporated the premises of the 'young Marx'. But as Japan moved from Occupation to independence, the concept of autonomy superseded the narrow confines of mere philosophical musing. Autonomy became a rearguard action against the challenges posed to postwar democracy as the Occupation drew to a close. In terms of his thinking on autonomy, through discussing the concept of shutaisei Maruyama moved closer to defending personal autonomy from engagement with the state. The shutaisei debate forced him to declare his adherence to idealism, but it also brought home the need for ideals to be universal. In the late 1940s as the Cold War curtain was descending on the intellectual world in Japan, the immediate enemy remained theoretical orthodoxy: communism versus capitalism. A few years later when the Korean War announced the Cold War turned Hot in Asia, Maruyama realised that individualism had to pair with social autonomy and impact on politics, and connect with a universal ethic that could rise above ideology, to have any influence on Japan's future. The fate of autonomy as the linchpin of postwar democracy hung in the balance.

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NOTES

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

II 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

Maruyama Masao, Nihon no shiso (Japanese Thought), Iwanami Shinsho, 1961, pp. 55-56. Tom Bottomore ed., Dictionary of Marxist Thought, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1983, p. 321. Gail Lee Bernstein, Japanese Marxist. A Portrait of Kawakami Hajime, Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press, 1976, p. 121. Maruyama Masao, 'Shiso shi no bObO 0 mosaku shite' (Forming a Methodology for Intellectual History), Nagoya Daigaku hOsei ronsha, No 77, September 1978, p.4. Maruyama Masao, 'Shiso shi no hobO', p. 6. Hayden V. White, entry on Windelband, in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 8, p. 322. Windelband did not convince Collingwood on this score. See R. G. Collingwood, Idea of History, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1946, p. 168. H. Rickert, Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft, quoted in Robert Anchor, entry on Rickert, in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, London, Macmillan, 1967, vol. 7, p. 193. Maruyama Masao, Nihon no shiso, p. 56. David McLellan, Karl Marx Early Texts, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1971, pp. xxxvi-xxxix. There are various views on exactly what period constitutes the end -of 'the Young Marx'. McLellan suggests 1845, Kolakowski draws the distinction at 1843, Levin at 1849, while Tucker prefers to see no break at all. ibid, p. xxxi. Mclellan, Early Texts, p. xxxvi. ibid., p. xl. D. F. B. Tucker, Marxism and Individualism, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1980, pp.lI-12, 59, 65. K. Marx, Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, in McLellan, Early Texts, p. 65. Leszek Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1978, vol. I, p. 148. K. Marx and F. Engels, German Ideology, C. J. Arthur ed., London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1970, p. 85. ibid, p. 83. Maruyama Masao, Shiso shi no hOhO, p. 9. ibid, p. 9. Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1936, p. 116. ibid,pp.I13-114. ibid., p. 19. Maruyama Masao, 'Shiso shi no hoho', p. 17. See Bottomore, Dictionary of Marxist Thought, pp. 219-223, for an account of the historical progression of Marxist interpretations of ideology. Karl Mannheim, op. cit., pp. 49-60. H. Stuart Hughes, Consciousness and Society, Brighton, Harvester Press, 1979, pp. 420--421.

Maruyama, Marx and the shutaisei debate 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46

47 48 49

50

51 52 53 54

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Maruyama Masao, 'Shiso shi no hOhO', p. 28. Michael Levin, Marx. Engels. and Liberal Democracy, London, Macmillan, 1989, p. 18. David Mclellan, Karl Marx: His Life and Thought, St. Albans, Paladin, 1976, p. 146. George Lichtheim, Marxism, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961, p.249. ibid., pp. 244-252. David Mclellan, Marxism After Marx, London, Macmillan, 1979, p.34. George Lichtheim, op cit, p. 296. Quoted in Steven Lukes, 'Types of Individualism', in Dictionary of the History of Ideas, New York, Charles Scribner and Sons, vol. III, 1973, p. 598. See Richard Lindley, Autonomy, London, Macmillan, 1986, pp. 4-9. Furuta Hikaru et al., 'Shutaisei ronso' (Shutaisei Debate), in Kindai Nihon shiso ronso, Aoki Shoten, 1963. p. 319. ibid., p. 319. ibid, p. 340. ibid. p. 323. Umemoto Katsumi, 'Yuibutsu shikan to dotoku' (Historical Materialism and Morality), Tenbii, August 1948, p. 5. Umemoto Katsumi, 'Ningen teki jiyii no genkai' (Limits of Human Freedom), Tenbii, February 1947. Furuta et al., op. cit., p. 324. Umemoto Katsumi, 'Yuibutsuron to ningen' (Materialism and Man), in Takeuchi Yoshimi, ed., Gendai Nihon shiso taikei, no. 21. Chikuma Shobo,1965.p.293. ibid, p. 293. Umemoto Katsumi, 'Yuibutsu shikan to dotoku', Tenbii, August 1948, p.8. ibid., p. 5. Umemoto Katsumi, 'Yuibutsuron to ningen', in Takeuchi Yoshimoto op.cit., p. 291. See Shimomura Torataro, 'Nishida Kitaro and Some Aspects of his Philosophical Thought', in Nishida Kitaro, A Study of Good, 1960, pp. 191-217, for a description of the emphasis on subjectivity in Nishida's philosophical development. For a fuller explanation, see Umemoto Katsumi, 'Mu no ronri sei to toha sei' (Logicality and Partisanship of Nothingness), Tenbii, March 1948, pp. 2-13. A brief analysis is available in Furuta et. al., op. cit., pp. 324-325. 1. Victor Koschmann, 'Debate on Subjectivity in Postwar Japan: Foundations of Modernism as a Political Critique', Pacific Affairs. vol. 54, no. 4, Winter 1981, p. 618. Mark Poster, Existential Marxism in Postwar France, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1975, p. ix. Maruyama Masao, postscript, Gendai seiji no shiso to kOdo, p. 534. Maruyama Masao, 'Seio bunka to kyosanshugi no taiketsu' (Conflict Between Western European Culture and Communism), Gendai seiji no shiso to kOdo, Miraisha. 1964. p. 220.

108 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67

68 69

70 71 72 73 74

Democracy in postwar Japan Maruyama Masao, 'Rasuki no Roshiya kakumei kan to sono suiT (Laski's Perspective on the Russian Revolutions and its Development), Gendai seiji no shiso to kOdo, p. 238. Maruyama Masao, 'Seio bunka to kyOsanshugi no taiketsu', p. 220. Maruyama Masao, 'Rasuki no Roshiya kakumei kan', p. 243. Maruyama Masao, postscript, Gendai seiji, p. 533. Maruyama Masao, 'Seio bunka to kyosanshugi no taiketsu', p. 222. Maruyama Masao, postscript, Gendai seiji, p. 557. Maruyama Masao, 'Giikan' (Random Thoughts), in Sencha to sengo no aida, p. 351. Maruyama Masao et at., 'Shutaisei ron' (Theory of Shutaiset), in Sengo Nihon no kakushin shiso, 1983, p. 387. Maruyama Masao, 'Shutaisei ron', in Sengo Nihon no kakushin shiso, p. 391. 'Yuibutsuron to shutaisei' (Historical Materialism and Shutaisel), Sekai, February 1948, p. 125. ibid., p. 148. ibid., p. 153. ibid, p. 155. Maruyama Masao, Nihon no shiso, 1961, p. 66. Maruyama Masao, 'Nihon ni okeru jiyii ishiki no keisei to tokushitsu' (The Formation and Characteristics of Liberal Consciousness in Japan), Sencha to sengo no aida, p. 305. Maruyama Masao 'From Carnal Literature to Carnal Politics', Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 255. Maruyama Masao, 'De aru koto to suru koto' (To Be and To Do), Nihon no shiso, Iwanami Shoten, 1961, p. 156. Maruyama Masao, 'Jon Rokku to kindai seiji genri' (John Locke and Modem Political Philosophy), 1949, in Sencha to sengo no aida, pp. 404417. Maruyama Masao, 'Fukuzawa Yukichi no tetsugaku: toku ni sono jiji hihan to no kanren' (Philosophy of Fukuzawa Yukichi: Especially its Relationship to his Critique of the Times), in Hidaka, Kindaishugi, p. 66. ibid, p. 76.

5 Modernisation The acquisition of autonomy

Embarking on a discussion of modernisation in postwar Japan means entering a minefield of value-laden terminology. Modernisation was buried in a tangle of paradigms: tradition versus modernity, East versus West, internally-generated versus externally-generated change, and modem versus feudal. The problem was complicated further because all of these paradigms involved identity. If identity had its locus in tradition, then it was compromised by the rejection of the feudal character of this tradition. If the 'modem' could only be associated with the West, then modernisation meant rejection of Japanese identity. Intellectuals wondered whether the realignment of value dssociations in the wake of defeat in occupied Japan inevitably meant the rejection of Japaneseness. The crux of the issue was postwar democracy. The juxtaposition of a victorious, democratising Occupation force with the discredited wartime order of Imperial Fascism imposed an iron incongruity between what was 'Japanese', and what was 'democratic'. In order to avoid such a clash, modernisation had to transcend its Western image. Maruyama resolved this in part by associating the modem with the universal. The measure of his success was that modernisation and democratisation were eventually seen to be interchangeable processes. The modernisation debate thus carried great ramifications for postwar democracy. A challenge against the positive value assigned to modernisation threatened acceptance of the new democratic order; perceived obstacles to modernisation could prevent genuine democratic transformation. Confronting the modem was the familiar Meiji era dilemma - to what extent did modernisation mean Westernisation? This dilemma was a direct consequence of the problems inherent in the context of defeat and occupation. The idea of modernisation, and therefore democratisation, was condemned by defenders of tradition because of its

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apparent character as a Western, external-origin, imposed 'from above' concept. It was the belief that change of this kind was destined to fail, was undesirable and even unworkable that prompted an energetic, soul-searching debate on modernisation in postwar Japan. On the other hand, the acceptance of democracy seemed to condemn Japanese tradition and identity to the abyss of illegitimacy. The hope of harking back to a Japanese prewar democratic tradition seemed stillborn in the light of Japan's disastrous war against the nations which had created and nurtured the democratic idea. Maruyama realised that the fate of postwar democracy lay in the balance. He saw that behind these misgivings lurked the assumption that democracy may be culturally incompatible with Japan. To avoid having democracy regarded permanently as an alien ideology, Maruyama confronted the essential dilemma. How could democracy and democratisation be dissociated from the tangled paradigms of modernity, tradition and the West and retain its legitimacy? In solving this dilemma Maruyama effectively transcended the implicit East-West divide and in the process shattered those paradigms. He did this through expanding the notion of kaikoku, meaning 'opening the country'. 'Opening the country' usually refers to the arrival of Commodore Perry in Uraga Bay in 1853, an event which led to Japan opening her markets to foreign trade and admitting foreign diplomatic missions on Japanese soil. In postwar Japan Maruyama came to regard modernisation as the process of moving from a 'closed' to an 'open'society. Maruyama recognised that the real problem facing Japan's postwar democracy was not one of Eastern antipathy to Western democracy. Instead it was the more basic problem of institutions supplanting the role of value-conscious individuals in the formation of a democratic society. For Maruyama, the creation of 'modern' men capable of democratic invention was the goal of modernisation. MODERNISATION: THE JAPANESE INTERPRETATION The term 'modernisation' usually refers to the process of industrialisation in late-developing countries. In Japanese studies the concept is frequently identified with the conferences on The Modernisation of Japan which subsequently appeared as the Studies in the Modernisation of Japan series published by Princeton University Press. I Unlike the concept which took shape at the first conference in Hakone in 1960 - kindaika - , the concept referred to in the early postwar years in Japan (kindaishugz) had a socio-cultural rather than an industrial

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focus. 2 In other words, it was concerned with the modernisation of the Japanese people and the character of this modernisation process: 'not just institutional reform, but a strong interest in the establishment of a modem people who would carry out those reforms'.3 Although the Hakone concept did not totally ignore the human element, it was far from granting the weight that the Japanese scholars did to attitudes (with the exception of 'a belief in progress') or to the character of a people. 4 The social focus of the Japanese interpretation was present in Western modernisation theory, but it was very much a minority view. s The second more crucial difference between the Hakone view and that of postwar Japanese intellectuals involved the question of ideological association with the end goal of modernisation. Though they disagreed about its ideological hue, there was agreement across the board amongst the Japanese scholars of the immediate postwar period that a necessary connection existed between modernisation and democracy. Their total identification of these two processes is underscored by their view that in order to achieve modernisation 'above all the democratisation of all systems, human social relationships and the individual's thought and behaviour was necessary'.6 At Hakone disagreement between the American and Japanese scholars proved irreconcilable.1 Leftist intellectuals such as Ouchi Hyae and Toyama Shigeki scoffed at the Americans' pretensions to a value-free definition of modernisation (a process which they saw as inevitably involving capitalist development).8 Ironically through their de facto recognition of modernisation as an industrial process the leftists were closer to their American colleagues than were their more liberal Japanese counterparts. The liberals insisted on the importance of identifying the modernisation process with a liberal democratic political culture. For his part, Maruyama defended himself against the charge of using value-laden words like 'democracy' with the characteristic objection that the discussion was 'too heavily weighted against the world of ideas', recommending that 'the value systems of the individual be given more consideration'.9 The considerable differences between the American and Japanese positions is illustrated by Robert Ward's conclusion that strong authoritarian leadership in the early chaotic stages of modernisation may be desirable if (his idea 00 modernisation was to succeed. His idea echoed Sinai's depiction of modernisation as 'a forced march led by hedgehogs', a procedure made necessary in order to 'clear the ground of the accumulated debris of centuries and to impose unwelcome but necessary changes upon the "unenlightened" people'.'o Ward favoured the dominant role of government as a forceful synthesizer of values,

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believing that in Japan's case 'more democratic decision-making at this early stage would have been detrimental'. He also argued that this pattern need not preclude a democratic outcome. I I It would be difficult to formulate a view more antipathetic to that of the Japanese modernists than this. For the Japanese intellectuals in the late 1940s and 1950s, the debacle of war clearly showed the Meiji experiment to have been an unqualified disaster in terms of this type of modernisation leading to democracy. If forced modernisation was to reappear in the postwar era, be it under the heel of a foreign Occupation or a rehabilitated authoritarian elite, then democracy would surely be doomed. The best conceptual expression of the spirit embodied in the Japanese modernists' position can be found in David Apter's theory of modernisation. Apter included institutional concerns in his theoretical framework, but emphasised the human relations aspect of the modernisation process through three main criteria. First, he stressed the human resources side of the modernisation process. Second, while acknowledging the tendency for power to gain emphasis in the early stages of modernisation, he avoided Ward's affirmation of a legitimate role for authoritarian forces. Apter suggested that more attention be paid to what he calls the 'pre-democratic' institutions caught up in the modernising process. Third, Apter implied linkage between modernity and democracy by defining modernisation as a process which creates a relationship between freedom and choice: 'modernisation as a non-economic process originates when a culture embodies an attitude of enquiry and questioning about how men make choices moral, social and personal'. Modernisation involved creating the best conditions and selecting the best mechanisms for making these choices. 12 Another area of disparity highlighted at Hakone concerned attitudes towards tradition. Benjamin Schwartz was one American scholar who was motivated to correct what he perceived to be the mistaken but common view that tradition was incongruous with modernisation. Ward, Schwartz and Reischauer agreed that 'traditional' cultural and religious mores may in some cases actually assist the modernisation process.13 This line of argument subsequently found its most extreme expression in Fosco Maraini, who stated that Japan's religious traditions had made Japan a better moderniser than the West. 14 The notion that cultural particularity on the part of a non-Western nation represents not only a credible formula for modernisation but actually achieves superiority over the Western model has since become a major theme, both in the Western world (which strives to duplicate the 'secrets' of Japanese management techniques) and in Japan (in the

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shape of Nihonjinron, featuring varying degrees of chauvinism and racial explanations for Japan's success). It is important to step back from these explanations of the modernisation process and acquire a sense of context before analysing the modernist debates of the immediate postwar period. As the ensuing discussion of the Japanese modernists shows, most Japanese scholars who participated in these debates at that time found that the idea of a positive or dynamic tradition was quite divorced from the message surrounding them in the oppressive reality of postwar. The exhortations from above to 'preserve the national polity' (kokutaz) and centre the new postwar polity on the Emperor were but pitiful bleats compared to the surge of 'progressive' opinion demanding a spiritual and social revolution (namely, democracy). As the Tokyo War Crimes Trial reminded them daily, 'tradition' was relegated to a negative, shamed past. The challenge posed to intellectuals such as Maruyama by the complexities of tradition in postwar Japan involved tackling the apparently self-evident fact that 'tradition' and 'modernity', through their association with the antipathetic entities of East and West, occupied opposite poles of identity and value. Passin's definition of modernisation as the attempt to combine the disparate elements of 'new' and 'Japanese' evokes accurately the nature of the challenge as it appeared to the early Japanese modernists of postwar: namely, legitimately to acquire the 'modern' without acquiring 'the West'. We come closer to the difficulties surrounding the idea of tradition in postwar Japan by pursuing Passin's theme. Those difficulties were twofold. The nexus of the relationship between identity and tradition involved meaning, therefore the task at hand was to remove meaning from the exclusive preserve of tradition. In Kolakowski's words: We try to assert our modernity but escape from its effects by various intellectual devices, in order to convince ourselves that meaning can be restored or recovered apart from the traditional religious legacy of mankind and in spite of the destruction brought about by modernity. IS The second difficulty involved restructuring the paradigms of identity and value. In order to achieve this, the historical foundations of these associations had to be identified and re-evaluated. Since Meiji, the distinction between self and other had been defined in terms of cultural particularity vis a vis the West. Because culture and value were placed in the confines of an hierarchical world view, the affirmation of the self was expressed as cultural superiority. This was the ideology of the New Order which took shape as the Greater East Asia

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Co-Prosperity Sphere of the 194Os. 16 The establishment of identity on the part of the Meiji State had also fixed the self and the other as fundamentally opposite essences, adding an extra layer of alienation by describing first difference then superiority in terms of the difference between (Eastern) spirit and (Western) matter: Liberating Japanese cultural idealism from Western materialism and separating Asia from Western hegemony were thus closely related sentiments, so much so that the attack on modernity provided the underlying intellectual justifications for the ideology enunciated by Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro ... 17 To retain meaning which did not negate culture or compromise identity: this was the objective of the 'progressive' intellectuals postwar. Their opportunity was delivered by defeat in war. The old frames of reference were discredited - something had to go in their place. To borrow Maruyama's terminology, what was needed was a new referential axis, a sense of self which was not expressed as culture but concurrent with it, a supra-traditional, supra-cultural mechanism. Maruyama and his peers, the so-called modernists, realised that autonomy could function as this new referential axis. The whole question of modernisation in the fifteen years of the postwar era was inextricably tied to this search for a new world view called democracy, and informed by a problem consciousness influenced by historical experience. One illustration of this was the tendency to regard democracy as a 'filter' for outside influences on a spiritually disorientated nation. Hidaka Rokuro, one of Maruyama's contemporaries and a 'modernist', believed that something was needed to take the place of the old imposed filter, the kokutai (national polity). Hidaka described this 'something' as 'a spirit of independence'. 18 Another 'modernist', Otsuka Hisao, took this idea further, and stated that not only was a new subjectivity (shutat) needed, but this subjectivity had to be self-defined. It was this type of process alone which would produce the desired outcome - the establishment (indigenisation) of democracy: both the energy and initiative for democratic reconstruction ... must be voluntary, coming from within the defeated nation. Democratisation in any sphere of life if carried out simply on account of .pressure and coercion by foreign military forces will inevitably produce nothing more than a 'paper' democracy, a 'dead mechanism' of democracy. 19 The idea that the self must be self-defined, and that it is only this kind

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of self which can unify the unfamiliar aspects of the 'modern', underlines the conceptual linkage that existed between modernisation and democratisation. The substance of this linkage, autonomy, was the force which could also unify meaning and modernity, democracy and tradition. Modernisation theorists recognized that autonomy had the power to create a 'new tradition': the uniqueness of the process of modernisation ... lies in the fact that it was based on the assumption of the possibility of the active creation by man of a new socio-political order, an order based on the premises of universalism and equality, and the spread of these assumptions was combined with the development of far-reaching structural-organisational changes ... 20 Maruyama was closely identified with this association of modernisation and autonomy, and as we shall see, contributed greatly to the conceptualisation of a new world view. Some scholars have attributed Maruyama's inspiration to a reaction against feudalism, which led him to define modernity according to this negative stereotype.21 This will be addressed later, but pertinent to an improved understanding of the modernisation debate of the 1940s and 1950s is the presence of another historical shadow, the Meiji Restoration. The modernisation debates of the early postwar years were replete with Meiji echoes which both influenced the nature of the debate and affected retrospective judgements of it. What is of interest is the perceived relevance of the Meiji experience to that of the postwar era, and what it tells us about the latter. One lingering association that has skewed subsequent views of postwar modernisation has been the application of the term 'enlightenment' to describe the process of democratisation and modernisation after 1945. In Meiji Japan, intellectuals such as Fukuzawa Yukichi saw Western Learning as an 'enlightening' enterprise for a society entering post-feudalism. Postwar Enlightenment (Sengo keimo) implies many superficial parallels. It highlights the Western origin of change, and places intellectuals firmly in a leadership role. Certainly, postwar did feature flourishing publishing activity, providing many platforms for 'enlightenment' opinion-leaders. But the appearance of many new journals - Sekai, KineJai Bungaku, TenbO and the reappearance of Chuo Koran and Kaizo - also signified the emancipation of discussion on current events which no longer drew a sharp distinction between academia and journalism. This intellectual buoyancy was reflected also in the formation of many new discussion groups at universities which in the beginning featured an unprecedentedly broad ideological membership.

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Another perceived parallel between the Meiji and postwar periods appeared as a lesson. Quite simply, the war had been the consequence of either insufficient, inconclusive or distorted modernisation in Meiji. Therefore, the task postwar was to complete this hitherto incompleted process, or alternatively, to 'get it right this time'. Yet when we separate the various strands of this argument, we see that in reality the advocates of postwar enlightenment were not seeking to finish the same process of modernisation, but rather were trying to redirect the enterprise towards the propagation of autonomy. One strand of the 'incomplete modernisation' theme was that modernisation in Meiji had been merely superficial, following the dictates of the official slogan 'Eastern morality, Western technology' (Tiiyii diitoku, Seiyii gijutsu). This seems to suggest that democracy was regarded as the instrument with which to complete postwar the Westernisation process of Meiji on a psychological, cultural plane. But as Matsumoto Sannosuke observed, given that fascism had been the result of insufficient modernisation since the Restoration, surely the lesson of defeat was to democratise thought. Here we see an implicit assumption on Matsumoto's part that modernisation did not mean Westernisation, but democratisation. Maruyama pursued the same theme in his studies of Japanese nationalism, which we shall turn to below. The association of postwar modernisation with democratisation was further enhanced by the creative reconceptualisation of the spirit/matter paradigm. In Meiji, the divide had mirrored the cultural and value alienation of East and West. Postwar, the 'modernists' interpreted democracy not merely as a political system but as a life philosophy incorporating certain essential spiritual traits. Another strand of the postwar identification with the Meiji experience concentrated on locating the flaws of Meiji attempts at modernisation. The tendency in Meiji to absorb only the results of processes enacted elsewhere was blamed for the ensuing 'distortions' of fascism and ultranationalism. This theme was picked up and developed by Maruyama throughout his postwar work, appearing either as the Hegelian idea of genesis, or in Maruyama's own words as the phenomenon of 'emanation'. This idea proved crucial to the whole question of the legitimacy of postwar democracy. The reason it assumed such importance was that postwar, flawed Meiji modernisation was blamed on the absence of autonomy accompanying modernisation and change. Therefore the lesson for the postwar period was to lend meaning and credibility to the modernisation/democratisation process by ensuring that it was the product of autonomous effort.

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This was the message of Otsuka Hisao's criticism of the Meiji modernisation process, which he delivered in the form of a list of premodern mental characteristics that had to be eliminated postwar. Japan's modernisation to date had been unnatural, he argued, because there had been no inner spontaneity, no sense of fairness and equality, only fleeting respect for the concept of rationality, and no love or respect for the masses. 22 It was in effect an agenda for the establishment of an autonomous personality postwar, without which the democratisation process would be rendered illegitimate. Many Japanese scholars have remarked on the intellectual culture of postwar enlightenment, highlighting the characteristics outlined above. But as the era of war and defeat recede in time and mind into the past, the predominant tendency has been to liken the proponents of postwar enlightenment to their Meiji predecessors. Leftist writers such as Yoshida Masutoshi have been scathingly critical of the elitism of the 'modernists', pointing to their hypocrisy in setting themselves before the people as enlighteners when they had failed to resist the fascist, imperialist warY It is true that elitism was a feature of postwar Japan's intellectual culture, and we have already noted Maruyama's positive view of Mannheim's intellectual elite. But this neither negates the fact that the concerns addressed by 'modernists' were legitimate and relevant, nor discounts the reality that this elitism was informed by a sense of responsibility on the part of intellectuals precisely because they had failed conclusively to resist the wartime state. Intellectual leadership was the order of the day in a time when what was at question was the spiritual, cultural and socio-political identity of a defeated nation. It should be noted that the term 'modernist' was a label retrospectively applied to a group of individuals who shared an identifiable intellectual orientation. It was not used at the time by these individuals in reference to themselves. Rather, it was first invoked by critics of the modernisation phenomenon and its proponents (notably by orthodox Marxists), and is often used as a pejorative term. This became increasingly strident as the fragile 'united front' between progressives and Marxists crumbled (revealed most strikingly during the shutaisei debate of 1948), and the Cold War abroad and the Red Purge at home set the Marxist left on a hostile path. MARUYAMA MASAO AND mE EAST-WEST PARADIGM If enlightenment thought in the shape of modernisation and democratisation was dedicated to the formation of an independent, autonomous citizenry whose energy source was 'modern' without being Western,

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then Maruyama can be described as truly representative of his era. Yet while he defined the problem consciousness of the times he also struggled with purpose and creativity to redefine the problem itself. In order fully to appreciate the evolution of his thought, it is necessary to widen the perspective beyond the immediate postwar period. Maruyama's prominence in promoting democracy through modernisation is amply demonstrated by the fact that criticism of Maruyama was (and is) considered to be synonymous with criticism of postwar democracy.24 The criticism which disturbed Maruyama most, that of dismissing the entire substance of postwar democracy as 'illusion' (kyomo), was one which he could not allow to go unchallenged. He did so most notably in a brief statement in the postscript to the 1964 (Japanese) expanded edition of Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics, and thereby sparked otT a whole new debate amongst the younger postwar generation as they struggled with disillusionment in the wake of the 1960 Security Treaty Crisis. His oft-quoted statement'If I were to state my preference, rather than the "reality" of Greater Imperial Japan, I would prefer to stake my hopes on the "illusion" of postwar democracy'2S - should be kept in mind as we follow the logic of his theory of modernisation. For Maruyama, the fight against kyomo was the fight against associating democracy with Westernisation, and against regarding externally-generated change as incompatible or superficial. Maruyama's ideas on this issue first began to gather tangibly around what he termed the phenomenon of 'kaikoku'. The word itself, meaning 'opening the country', is replete with imagery which when applied to 15 August 1945 achieved a positive transformation of defeat typical of enlightenment thought. It originates of course from the time of the Meiji Restoration (1868), when kaikoku represented the collapse of both the Tokugawa shogunate and their policy of international isolation (sakoku). Maruyama did not publish his famous essay Kaikoku until 1959, but he later recalled that the 'double-image' of the Meiji and postwar periods had struck him almost immediately upon returning to academic life in late 1945: I would be desultorily reading newspapers and journals of the immediate post-Restoration period, and the atmosphere of the immediate postwar period which I experienced with these eyes and these ears bore a surprising resemblance in a number of ways to those materials. 26 Before he intellectualised it, the identification of the Meiji and postwar periods was for Maruyama a direct, personal sensation.

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In terms of chronology, Maruyama identified three periods of kaikoku: contact with the Portuguese and the Dutch in the late Ashikaga period (1338-1573), the Bakumatsu period of 1853-1868, and the period after 1945. Implicit in this chronological sequence were the dictates of failure. This was no mere historical exercise, but a clear warning about the fate of the third kaikoku. Yet as Matsumoto Sannosuke had indicated, the issue was not to complete the Westernisation process, but to redirect the entire enterprise towards democratisation. As Maruyama wrote in 1947, 'we have now been confronted with the task of completing the democratic revolution'.27 The Meiji experience was the metaphorical mechanism with which to dissect, criticise and direct the postwar attempt. Like the war responsibility debate, the aim of analysing the failure of Meiji was not simply to condemn the past and lay blame for the rise of the ultranationalist state. It was also future-focused. In looking for failure, Maruyama was looking for the internal obstacles to the growth and establishment of a democratic polity after 1945. Maruyama invited a barrage of criticism in the uneasy times of the late 1940s when he first introduced his concept of kaikoku. In The Problem of Raison d'Etat in the History of Ideas in Modern Japan, Maruyama described kaikoku as the attainment of an awareness of one's relative position in the world through contact with Europeans: 'Kaikoku ... while meaning facing the European world and opening the country, also meant becoming aware of one's "closed" homogeneity in relation to this international society.'28 Maruyama's main interest here was to provide a grounding for the development of a modern state in Japan. Maruyama first used China to illustrate how not to regard kaikoku, that is, as merely a threat from a foreign foe. Maruyama used an analogy of Chinese origin to illuminate the kaikoku-induced collapse of isolationism in Japan. Ka-i shiso referred to an ancient Chinese world view which placed China at the centre of the civilized world (ka), and all other countries on the barbaric periphery (i). Maruyama argued that both the neo-Confucianists and the National Studies scholars (Kokugakusha) possessed the notion of ka: for the former this was China, for the latter Japan. Although their philosophies were antagonistic, both schools shared a logical ability to acknowledge an international environment. 29 While China did descend into a semi-colonial state due to her ineffectual resistance against foreign penetration, her significance for the scholars of post-World War II went beyond a 'how not to' case of kaikoku. In the 1952 postscript to Nihon seiji shiso shi kenkyu, Maruyama admit-

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ted that in the past he had been rather dismissive of China, regarding it as a fundamentally stagnant society. His explanation was that he had been more interested in explaining why Japan had become the first modern state in Asia than in weighing up China's attributes. lO He also redeemed himself to a degree in his assessment of Chinese nationalism in his 1951 essay Nationalism in Japan, pointing out that China had managed to reconcile social revolution with nationalism, unlike Japan which had made popular and national aims identical. 31 But his propensity to focus on Western contact as a modernising influence, combined with his vehement and provocative articles on the ultranationalist state, was interpreted by those trapped within the fixed frames of the East-West and Modernity-Tradition paradigms as a gauntlet duly thrown down. When Mao's forces triumphed in 1949, there arose in Japan a wave of self-denigration amongst Japanese intellectuals. Mao's success represented the victory of indigenous, internally-generated change, which made postwar Japan's foreign-tutored democratic 'revolution' seem like a sacrifice of identity and cultural integrity. Takeuchi Yoshimi, a scholar of Chinese history and literature, was one intellectual who was greatly inspired by the Chinese postwar experience. He had already greeted with dismay the postwar interlinkage of modernisation and Westernisation, which was evident both in the nature of Occupation policy and the assumptions behind the modernisation debate amongst his peers. Takeuchi was obviously driven by his respect for the Chinese Communist movement, and this bias made his view unequivocal. He was not alone though in insisting that modernisation need not necessarily stem from or be congruent with Westernisation. Kato Shiiichi was another scholar who saw no reason why modernisation should not be perceived as an autonomous process, and why discontinuity had to be an unavoidable consequence of modernisation. Indeed, Kato went further than most like-minded people by declaring that Japan's postwar modernisation was generated by the Japanese themselves, and not by the Occupation. In Kato's opinion, the motive power behind spiritual and social democratisation was a reaction against the meaningless sacrifices and disillusionment of the war. In fact, the Western model of modernity, where the core value was individualism, was incompatible with Japan's value system, which prized the submersion of the self.32 Kato hereby otTers an early glimpse of the Japanese answer to Western paramountcy in the modernisation process. He also gives us an insight into the difficulties of having autonomy accepted as the core value of Japan's postwar democracy. We have now encountered two alternative ways to surmount or circum-

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vent the East-West paradigm. One way was to draw away from the East-West comparison and transpose the gauge of inferiority to the Asian context. This presents us with a 'dynamic' Japan versus a 'static' China. There have been many formulations of this, including Reischauer's observation that Japan's feudalism, being goal-oriented, was more open to (industrial) modernisation than China's, the latter being status-oriented. 33 The other way was to retain the East-West gauge, and claim superiority for the Eastern element. It is significant that Kato attempted to do this by pointing to indigenous motivation and internally-generated change. However, the retention of the East-West frame carries with it the inherent implication of Western generation, Eastern reaction. The circumstances postwar demanded a third way: that the fruits of modernisation be seen as the product of autonomous, indigenous effort. Takeuchi Yoshimi was driven by his ecstatic response to the Chinese Revolution, and by what he perceived to be the slavish pro-Western sentiments of Maruyama, to attempt an autonomous definition of modernisation. It is important to note that Takeuchi was not an anti-modernist, rather he was an anti-European modernist. He was not attacking modernisation, but the slur on the value of tradition which was implied through the Western cultural monopoly of modernity. His article What is Modernity? revealed his concern that the 'escape from Asia into Europe' (datsu-a nyu-iJ) character of the modernisation debate threatened to deprive Japan of her identity. Identity for Takeuchi meant an Eastern identity and, without excessive simplification, this meant an Eastern identity as exemplified by China. 'Eastern' identity, according to Takeuchi, was formed and strengthened through a process of resistance: 'for as long as Eastern modernity is a result of invasion and pressure from Europe, "resistance" has existed in Eastern modernity.' Therefore, 'in the East the history of resistance is the history of modernisation'. 34 Takeuchi then proceeded to compare Japan unfavourably with this pattern, and found that Japan had exhibited a 'tenkiJ bunko' (a fickle or turncoat culture). His condemnation was unequivocal: The fact that there was no resistance means that Japan is not Eastern, and at the same time, the fact that Japan made no demand for self-preservation (has no selO, means that Japan is not European. In other words Japan is nothing.35 Takeuchi felt that it was vital for Japan to reach out decisively for a particularistic type of modernisation, based on the Eastern values of resistance and a spirit of independence. Yet we see that he did not

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really transcend the East-West paradigm. Instead he asked that the incidence be transferred from the West to the East. More than any of his contemporaries, Takeuchi embodied the call for indigenous energy in the modernisation process. In 1949, Takeuchi again criticised Maruyama in obvious distress at the latter's unsatisfactory reaction to the Chinese Revolution. Interestingly, Maruyama was attacked for the same reason that the Marxists were attacked: for failing to value the nationalistic element in the revolution. In his essay Raison d'Etat, Maruyama had according to Takeuchi totally overlooked the qualitative difference between Japan and China's situations. Japan may have 'modernised' superficially and painlessly, but at the cost of her identity. China, though slowly and with enormous difficulty, had retained her shutat (sense of self). Modernity had, in Takeuchi's view, permeated to the very core of the Chinese psyche. Contact with the 'foreign' had merely enhanced the Chinese essence; in Japan the foreign swallowed an already schizophrenic identity.36 In this Takeuchi presents the clearest insistence on affinity between modernisation and identity. Maruyama's response many years later conveyed empathy with Takeuchi's position. Takeuchi had a simplistic view of democracy, thought Maruyama, and did not appreciate that democracy was not just a movement but a struggle to combine disparities between systems and movements. In any case (and Maruyama made it clear that he was not accusing Takeuchi of this), one must beware of seeing too much of universal significance in China's experience, because particularity is always particularity . . . universality does not come from there. . . . unless the particular is preceded by and is a premise of the universal, there is no penetration from the particular to the universal. 37 Maruyama realised that the dichotomous approach to modernisation could subsume its universalist message. The recourse to universal values was an increasingly obvious means to transcend the East-West paradigm, but unless this could be allied with autonomous energy it would serve merely to invert the paradigm as Takeuchi had done. Maruyama did not break away from this dichotomous thought structure, but instead defused the cultural absolutes of the paradigm and put in its place the broader, more flexible categories of 'the internal' and 'the external'. As he drew on the metaphorical richness of kaikoku, it became clear that he was not so much talking symbolically about East-West, but about the citizen and the state. Once more autonomy was called upon to legitimise the modernisation process.

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MODERNISATION AND THE OPEN SOCIETY From the outset, kaikoku was for Maruyama much more than enforced congress with international society at the insistence of a powerful foreign intruder. Kaikoku had enabled the inhabitants of Meiji Japan to define their national identity. But what of the individual? Writing in the maelstrom of the third kaikoku, Maruyama found the enlightened pursuit of an identity freely defined by the individual (versus an imposed world-view externally-defined by authority) a far more pertinent question. The folly of uncritically allowing one's identity to be merged with that of the state (and proscribed by its myths) had been clearly demonstrated in 1945. The modern, democratic individual of the postwar period would have to redefine his view of the world and his place in it. Thus in line with the priority of the postwar enlightenment, Maruyama concentrated on the individual, social impact of the third kaikoku. Without a genuine social transformation, the future of postwar democracy looked bleak. Confronted by the negative example of the second kaikoku, Maruyama felt even more strongly the necessity to isolate the social aspects of this failure, for the sake of the third opportunity afforded by defeat. He did this by adding a second dimension to kaikoku, that of the symbolic move from a 'closed' to an 'open' society. Rather than a finite event occurring at a set time, this was an open-ended, qualitative progression towards what was for Maruyama a modern, democratic society. Maruyama's identification of an 'open' society with a democratic one gives us a valuable insight into his philosophy of democracy. Maruyama drew inspiration for this perspective from Bergson (Two Sources .0/ Morality and Religion) and Popper (The Open Society and its Enemies). Ignoring the philosophical and theoretical differences between the two, Maruyama concentrated on an area of fundamental accord which he believed overrode those differences. The basis of his confident appraisal was that both of these thinkers' concepts of an 'open' society conveyed the essential characteristics of a democratic mentality. In Kaikoku, Maruyama paraphrased Zevedei Barbu in order to outline this empathetic common ground. The attributes of an open society were: a perception of change where change and readjustment are regarded as normal and considered to represent an open social structure. 2 a conviction that those changes are a direct result of

124 Democracy in postwar Japan individuals' single or joint efforts, and the general belief that you are the creators of society. 3 a consciousness that authority and power are unstable and relative - a way of thinking that sees that power is entrusted, not transferred. Even by democratic means, such transference is undemocratic. 4 the authority of internal reason over foreign authority - thus the belief in internal values that can structure bewildering change will be born. Basic human rights underscore this kind of universal value, and unity is not affixed but is a unity derived through plurality.38 Maruyama's open society was characterised by pluralism and dynamism, and paramount power emanated from an active, responsible collectivity of individuals. An open society was also the context for free discussion, with free assembly in diverse groups of varied structure, with competition between them. This was Maruyama's democratic ideal. Barbu's book Democracy and Dictatorship placed sociological factors at the heart of meaningful political renovation. Straight democratic decision making in itself was insufficient: 'the concept of the majority enters into the definition of democracy only to the extent to which the many possess, and know how to make use of, political power in their community'.39 True democracy was not made up of structures and institutions, but reflected the will of an autonomous citizenry which embodied the 'democratic frame of mind'. Without such a frame of mind, 'democratic institutions cannot grow; if they are introduced from outside they are likely to be mutilated or disappear altogether after a short time' .40 It was Barbu's emphasis on spirit and ideas that found deep accord with enlightenment thinking in postwar Japan. Essentially Maruyama, like Barbu, was concerned with humanity not systems, individuals not nation-states. However the regulation of power relations in an 'open' or democratic society involved two-way communication between authority and the sovereign people. Clearly the locus of responsibility for the control of power fell on the bearers of sovereignty. It was inevitable in the context of postwar Japan, when progress towards openness had again jolted forward, that Maruyama would endeavour to measure the ability of the people to fulfil this role. In addressing this problem, Maruyama analysed the structure and manipulative patterns of the 'closed' society. Maruyama was not dismissing the ability of Japanese citizens to achieve the positive transformation towards modernity and democracy. It was rather his growing realisation that he was actually searching for frustrated potential which imbued his work with increasing urgency. Whether the obstacles were

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imposed externally by authority via an official ideology, or frozen within a 'closed' unquestioning world view, it was the collective psyche of the people that was the locus of future initiative and change. Weakness in this regard was an invitation to abuse by an unscrupulous authority, even one that was operating within a democratic structure. Here Maruyama was in full accord with Popper.41 In Kaikoku Maruyama described how the East-West dichotomy was intrinsic to the power structure devised by the creators of the Meiji state. The impact on the individual of opening the country, in other words the manifestation of openness, was as follows: the individual was released from total identification with the old entity; he became more aware of his own individuality vis a vis other individuals; and he became more aware of belonging to a larger entity.42 The ultimate consequence of this was the emergence of popular rights movements. The state's response to this, and their management of kaikoku, ultimately displaced the popular element. But Maruyama was careful to note that until the tenth year of Meiji, this was not an inevitable outcome of Japan's kaikoku. 43 The nature of the state's response to kaikoku had deep and far-reaching ramifications. As Maruyama had stated earlier in Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan, the authorities comprising the Meiji state had only discarded joi on the international level. On the social and psychological level, the closed, exclusionist mentality persisted and was nurtured by a state under siege, a state that saw kaikoku as a viable option only if its opposite - sakoku - was embedded deeply into Japan's polity. This was revealed in the nationalist ethic formulated by the state. In Kaikoku, Maruyama argued that the level of self-identification had been restricted to the nation and had not been extended to the individual. This was a result of the world view propagated by the authorities of Bakumatsu Japan, who had embraced two conflicting world views. Maruyama described this in more detail in earlier essays on the Meiji State and Japanese nationalism. These two conflicting world views were: the traditional Japanese view which saw the world as comprising separate cultural spheres, and the modern which comprised an East-West hierarchy of superior and inferior force. But there was also an internal power dimension. Hierarchy and cultural particularity were the criteria projected into the international arena in the formulation of the modern state's world view, but it was projected by an elite which equated this new nationalism with the maintainence of their position in the internal hierarchy. This had two consequences. First, because the new state and its

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world view appeared as a 'revolution from above', nationalism and popular sovereignty were seen to be incompatible. In his 1946 essay Thought of the Meiji State, Maruyama traced the tension between the divergent coexisting tendencies of national and popular sovereignty, centralisation and decentralisation, and noted the triumph of the national over the popular for the proponents of democratic movements such as the People's Rights Movement. 44 The supremacy of the nation was compounded by the lop-sided nature of Japan's capitalistic development and aggravated by the predominance of imperialism internationally. In the end the popular impetus was consigned to the apolitical limbo of the introspective 'I-novel', and 'popular movements were suppressed in the name of national unity' .45 The crux of the matter was, as Maruyama stated in Kaikoku, that the East-West dichotomy was the device employed by the Meiji authorities to legitimise their regime. The Meiji state was 'modern' in the sense that it replaced a decentralised system of feudal fiefdoms with a centralised state. Loyalty was likewise centralised around the figure of the Emperor, in place of the decentralised system of loyalty to the local lords in each fief. All of these changes, indeed the act of restoration itself, was packaged by the rebel samurai as an act of anti-foreignism or more specifically, anti-Westernism. The modernity of Meiji was an irrational proof that asserting Eastern (Japanese) values paid ofT. Thus the second consequence was that the state defined difference between Japan and the outside world in terms of culture and essence. It was not just an East-West divide, but a spiritual-material divide. Partial openness was therefore both an expression of nationalism and an internal control mechanism. Ironically, it was the proponents of exclusionism Uoi) who were against this type of selective Westernisation, and who saw spirit and matter as necessarily interrelated.46 They feared that admitting Western technology would invariably pollute the Japanese spirit. In this way the openness of kaikoku coexisted with the artificiality and paradox of Bergson's closed society, where society was maintained in a constant state of readiness against attack from an ever-present, non-specific external foe. It was in fact the mentality of a military society, which fitted Maruyama's reading of kaikoku as the reappearance of the mentality of the warring states period that had been frozen during the two hundred years of Pax Tokugawa. The 'melting' of the Tokugawa system in Meiji released the unruly forces typical of an unstable militaristic era, and evoked the spectre of gekokujo (rule by the lower over the higher). Just as the middle and lower ranking samurai had turned against their Tokugawa lords, so could other 'loyal' upstarts challenge the new oligarchy.

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This in turn justified authoritarian controls and transcendental bodies such as the oligarchs (genro). In the pattern of Popper's closed society, both the Tokugawa and the Meiji regimes were founded on the identification of authority and norms. These norms were based on a combination of Confucian ethics which espoused duty over profit, and rejection of the materialism of the West. It is a great historical irony that this association carried over into the Meiji period and was used to shore up the new regime, and one that must be understood in order successfully to unravel the East-West paradigm's stranglehold on acceptance and indigenisation of the modern in Japan. This was the motivation behind Maruyama's theory of kaikoku. An added irony is that the nature of European thought when Meiji Japan allowed greater access to the West was extremely disorientated and materialistic. In a 1942 review of Aso Yoshiteru's History of Modern Japanese Philosophy Maruyama described the state of European thought at the time as stagnant, a product of the collapse of Hegelianism and the rise of the industrial age: 'amongst the things first introduced from Europe into modern Japan the most spiritual and internal was actually that of the philosophy of material culture' .47 This ethos would have been a useful reinforcement for the 'strong army wealthy country' lfukoku kyohei) advocates of Meiji, but the state insisted that the spirit of enterprise be confined to the world of industry. Given this self-evident dichotomy of spirit and matter paralleling the East-West divide it was to be expected, thought Maruyama, that intellectuals such as Okakura Tenshin and Uchimura Kanzo found it natural to oppose the mechanistic modernity of the West with Asian idealism. 48 When value became the exclusive preserve of the Eastern Spirit, the stage was set for the rise of the pan-Asianist ideology which eventually led to war. When looking at the 'failure' of the Meiji kaikoku Maruyama saw the failure of invention, with all of the consequences and potential for power abuse which that implies. With the notable exception of the early People's Rights Movement, Maruyama saw that the nation and the Imperial myth had been substitutes for the natural taboos of neo-Confucianism. Elsewhere Maruyama referred to this as 'fiction', meaning that which is produced by a self-conscious, creative mind that 'sees mediated reality as being on a higher level than "immediate" reality'.49 If the individual of modern Japan failed to formulate his own world view based on his active participation in politics, then tragic deception would recur. 'It is our fate to live in a world where there are only various fictions and various designs. Unless we realise that fate, we are bound to lose the ability to select the

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better from among those fictions.'so The message was: devise one's own fiction according to one's own values, otherwise be at the mercy of a produced world view. The concept of kaikoku demonstrated to Maruyama the necessity of social autonomy, but it also demonstrated that this social autonomy had to be grounded in personal autonomy. Maruyama's demand for a modern consciousness is now revealed unmistakably as the demand for a popular autonomous ethos. There is no doubt about what was required in Maruyama's eyes in postwar Japan: an autonomous citizenry which was active, whose action was informed by values autonomously defined, and which was fully conscious of the responsibility to engage in this sort of active definition of po Ii tical life. The identification of modern consciousness with autonomy comes alive in Maruyama's writings about Fukuzawa Yukichi. A particularly enlightening example is a devious little article produced by Maruyama for a small newspaper in November 1943. Obviously Maruyama had to write with discretion, and his selection of Fukuzawa Yukichi as the subject appears judicious on the surface. The net effect however is a study of expertly-layered meaning, and in retrospect a study that is brim-full of blunt innuendo about the contemporary scene. Using Fukuzawa as a medium, Maruyama added the criterion of responsibility to the attributes of a citizenry operating on an awareness of 'invention'. The relationship of this formulation to a democratic polity is emphatically underlined. Maruyama began by lauding Fukuzawa as both an individualist and a nationalist, of which the latter had priority. His interpretation of Fukuzawa appeared to be aimed at recommending a closer identification between the citizen and the state: unless the citizen draws close to the state as something tangible that belongs to him, and is conscious that the state's activities are particularly relevant to his own destiny, how can firm independence be preserved in a savage international arena? ... If Japan is to develop normally as a modern state, the masses of citizens who until now did not know better than just passively to follow the political order must be made aware of themselves as members of the state in occupying an active constituent position within it ... 51 But in order to realise this, Fukuzawa had insisted that the road to true national independence could only be achieved by first attaining individual independence. The underlying logic was that an active regulatory

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interest in the activities of the state, based on a sense of responsibility for those activities, was proof of personal autonomy. Unfortunately, 'what Fukuzawa saw as lacking most in our country's traditional citizen consciousness was the spirit of independent personality'.52 Maruyama concluded somewhat tongue-in-cheek that Fukuzawa was basically optimistic about the ability of the Japanese people to develop the required talent of interference in affairs of state: Although Fukuzawa said that our citizens were meagrely endowed with a tradition of self-respect for independence, he thought that they had plenty of strength to endure the ethical severity of attaining it. In other words, he was optimistic about the Japanese people's ability to construct a modern state. 53 This furthers our understanding of Maruyama's expectations for postwar democracy. By insisting on a distinction between 'private' and 'public', Maruyama was responding defensively to the ideological intrusiveness of the wartime state. But there was also a positive aspect to the separation of state and citizenry. As indicated above, a citizenry that embodies autonomy can perform the invaluable function of criticising politics from an apolitical sphere. This was a recurrent theme in Maruyama's work, and again emphasises the enormous importance of developing an autonomous ethos. This was the substance of Maruyama's positive appraisal of the Meirokusha intellectuals, who debated this issue with gusto. Maruyama praised the Meirokusha thinkers for the same reason that he praised Sorai: they had both politicised the apolitical sphere without submerging the identity of the latter into the former, and in doing so had reconceptualised the parameters of morality itself. It was precisely this sort of activity that was the citizen's duty: When an independent society such as the Meirokusha with its apolitical aims actually establishes the tradition of criticising as a matter of course the major issues of a political age from its apolitical position, then for the first time the line of thought which makes a distinction between politics and culture is broken, and the dayto-day morality of a modern citizenry in which political statements originate from an apolitical sphere is nurtured. 54 Active intervention on the part of a responsible citizenry confident in its autonomy will guard the integrity of an open society: Through constant warnings by the people from the beginning about the system becoming an end in itself - being deified - through adopting

130 Democracy in postwar Japan

a critical posture, and ceaselessly inspecting the actual functioning of the system, democracy for the first time becomes a living thing. In a democracy, it is more important for the citizen to ask 'to do or not to do', rather than 'to be or not to be'.ss The essential factor was autonomy. Without personal and social autonomy, there could be no democracy. It was autonomy that could guarantee the independence of the individual, and preserve individual identity within a democratic system: where there is no tradition of free association and organization in a dimension different to that of politics, there is a tendency to use political groups as a model both structurally and functionally, and become smaller manifestations of the most powerful and largest political group, the government. 56 The rationale extended to Maruyama's view of his own role as an intellectual, and leaves us in no doubt that autonomy was the single most vital factor in a democratic, open society. In the spirit of Mannheim's intelligentsia, Maruyama advocated the life on the periphery between orthodoxy and criticism, the centre and the border. Even after the protest movement against the renewal of the Mutual Security Treaty with the United States had ended in disappointment for the opposition, Maruyama could write: The difficult yet glorious task of the present-day 'liberal' is, I believe, ... [to stand] on the brink between complete commitment and complete 'irresponsibility', to strive for a perspective that will go through and beyond the inside. 57 Following Maruyama's analysis, our vision of democracy ,assumes the shape of a value-impotent democratic mechanism serving as the state, responding to initiatives and regulatory concern from the repository of value and sovereignty, the citizenry. It is the reconstituted open society. In the symbolic approach to kaikoku Maruyama successfully achieved distance from the dictates of the East-West frame: This type of approach will not lead us to the stiff 'advanced country' theories of either the so-called deficiency argument, where what was in Europe was not in Japan, or alternatively the argument that from now on Japan will pass through the same historical stages as Western Europe. 58

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The West did not disappear completely from his analysis, but was relegated to the role of catalyst, the internal responses to which were Maruyama's real concern. Maruyama used this logic to restore faith in Japan's liberal democracy when in the thick of the Cold War democracy seemed to be in peril. He acknowledged that liberal democracy had not been generated within Japan, but this was of little consequence: In the end the problem can only be solved by the Japanese themselves, and the external restrictions will themselves also be modified to a certain extent by the nature of the internal response. 59 What mattered then was not indigenous genesis, but autonomous assimilation. Maruyama's juxtaposition of the West and the traditional reached a normative plane instead of a cultural one; norms were not the inherent products of culture but of autonomous individuals. The ethic of responsibility was an important component of this autonomy. With this in mind, Maruyama's controversial comparison of Japanese and German wartime leaders facing trial represented much more than a blind Eurocentric attitude - it was rather a stark contrast between responsibility and systemic irresponsibility. As with his Studies on Tokugawa and modern history, Maruyama's work on modernisation reinforced the critical influence upon him of dialectics. The coexistence of the premodern and the modern, the external and the internal, the public and the private, the system and the idea ... are dialectical couplings which achieve synthesis through the transcendentalism of autonomy. It is in the tension produced by coexistent antipathy of ideas and their restraints, and through the creative interaction between concurrent opposites, that we find the stimulus which generates change. The problem was not that opposites coexist, but that they grate, and in doing so, that ultimate value attaches to the internal, the private, the idea, and the modern. Maruyama's approach to modernity, through subjectivity, remained faithful to the tenets shared by Bergson and Popper in regarding modernisation as an infinite progression. In short, there is no open society, only societies in the process of becoming open. In this respect Maruyama also has much in common with Habermas, as Koschmann has noted. 60 Comparing the ideas of Habermas and Maruyama on modernisation reveals a great deal of empathy between them, especially with respect to viewing modernity as a potential bridge between universalism and the individual. For Habermas, promoting moral universalism represented 'the wedding of the best of Marxism and democratic theory' .61 Maruyama's philosophy of the subject

132 Democracy in postwar Japan

precludes too close an identification with Habermas' position, but the fundamental relationship between the dialectical mechanism of Maruyama's problem consciousness and the structure of the problem itself is a powerful demonstration of the interplay of Marxist and liberal influences in his thought. What was Maruyama's reading of the prospects for the third kaikoku? His thoughts on this issue betrayed indecision regarding whether the fault lay more with feeble modern consciousness on the part of the citizenry or with the feudal culture of political authority. He was greatly disillusioned in 1947, not so much by MacArthur's suppression of the General Strike, as by the failure of the workers themselves to recover and fight on.62 He also rejected the notion that a new democratic consciousness could emerge from institutions, a blunt rejection of the aims of the Occupation reforms. Neither could a modern consciousness be attained merely through retracing an 'orthodox' lineage of modern freedom.63 Maruyama eventually came down on the side of blaming different layers of authority for taking advantage and deliberately encouraging 'the swamp of pre-modern human relationships'. His view of postwar society was of individuals inhibited by immobilist social relations, which authority regarded as a useful instrument of social control. Maruyama's assessment is revealed most forcefully in his 1950 article A Letter to a Liberal. This article shows Maruyama in his element, chastising both the left and the right for failing correctly to read Japan's situation. Unable to endure the Cold War competition for the democratic label and the responses to the McCarthyist storms in the United States any longer, Maruyama attacked the pretenders to modernity. The real enemy was still within: Within the overwhelmingly strong premodern human relations, the silent pressure from higher authority, the essential brutality of authority has been hidden, and the submission resulting from internal fear of this authority can imitate well an accord with modernity.64 In other words, the real danger to democracy was not the existence of premodernity itself, but that authority actively used this as a tool of silent oppression. In the past, Maruyama continued, authority had been able to manufacture a facade of benevolent control and apparent acquiescence - 'this is how authority and its ideologues have rationalised control from the Meiji Restoration to the present day'.6s When Maruyama wrote that in Japan there was not yet the type of democracy worth defending, he was not discounting democratic potential, but instead pointing to the forces that inhibit that potential. What

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was needed therefore was more than the formation of a Leninist vanguard, or the blinkered annihilation of communism. The issue of the modernisation of Japanese society will not be achieved through memorising academic principles, instead it is my fundamental feeling that it is only through genuine recognition of the forces which in historically-specific circumstances qualitatively promote modernisation and which are relatively strong in each class. influence or social group; and by opposing those things which even slightly weaken those forces. and agreeing with those things which strengthen them, that modernisation can be achieved. 66 In Japan's version of mass society, Maruyama perceived a fundamental lack of coherence between each unit - the language of shared values was missing. Japan's third kaikoku was really only a move from one closed society (based on the fiefs of Tokugawa, then the nation of Meiji, TaishO and ShOwa) to another, that of the closed mind. To resolve this, Maruyama returned to the premise that in Japan there remained a key relationship between values and power. Power relations intervene decisively when . . . human relations are controlled with the object of pursuing, winning, maintaining, increasing, or distributing values, and when in exercising such control the power carrier in the last resort uses the sanction of depriving others of the basic values they possess or pursue.67 When Maruyama defended postwar democracy against the charge of consisting merely of 'illusion', he wrote that ultimately this depended not on experience, but on the values of the proponents of democracy. Clearly then, individual interaction with the state before autonomy was established lay society open to abuse at the hands of authority. As the enlightenment mood of postwar darkened and the Cold War threw democracy into ideological disarray, Maruyama felt the shadows of the past reappear in a new postwar incarnation. Once more, personal autonomy seemed set to resume its defensive guise.

NOTES 1 2 3 4

The Conference on Modem Japan took place between 1959 and 1969. In English the actual process can only be called 'modernisation'; no further distinction is possible. Hidaka Rokuro, Kindaishugi (Modernism), vol. 34, Gendai Nihon shiso taikei, Chikuma Shobo, 1964, p. 8. Marius B. Jansen, Studies in the Modernisation of Japan, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1962, pp. 3--4.

134 Democracy in postwar Japan 5

6 7 8

9 JO

II 12 13

14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

22 23 24 25 26

See for example John Brode, Process of Modernisation: An Annotated Bibliography on the Socio-Cultural Aspects of Development, p. vi, Cambridge Mass, Harvard University Press, 1969; David Apter, Politics of Modernisation, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1965. Hidaka, Kindaishugi, p. 22. See Hall in Jansen, Changing Japanese Attitudes Towards Modernisation, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1965, pp. 18-31. Rustow and Ward, Political Modernisation in Japan and Turkey, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1964, p. 5; R. Ward, 'Political Modernisation and Political Culture in Japan', World Politics, vol. XV, no. 4, July 1963, p. 579. Maruyama Masao, in Jansen, Changing Japanese Attitudes, p. 490. See also Hall in Jansen, ibid, p. 26. I. R. Sinai, Challenge of Modernisation: the West's Impact on the Non-Western World, London, Chatto and Windus, 1964, p. 218. Ward, 'Political Modernisation', pp. 580-588. Apter, Politics of Modernisation, pp. 9-11, 68-69. Ward, 'Political Modernisation', p. 579; Hall in Jansen, Changing Japanese Attitudes, p. 37; Edwin O. Reischauer, 'Modernisation in Nineteenth Century China and Japan', Japan Quarterly, vol. X, no. 3, July-Sept. 1963, p. 306. This view accords with the interpretation of Japanese history which regards the 1930s as an 'aberration' from the path of healthy modernisation set in the Meiji and Taisho periods. Fosco Maraini, in Henny and Lehmann, Themes and Theories in Modern Japanese History, London, Athlone, 1988, pp. 49-51. Leszek Kolakowski, Modernity on Endless Trial, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1990, p. 9. See John Dower, War Without Mercy, London, Faber and Faber, 1986, for a detailed study of the uses of race in the propaganda and ideological mobilisation during the Pacific War. T. Najita and, H. D. Harootunian, 'Japanese Revolt Against the West: Political and Cultural Criticism in the Twentieth Century', Cambridge History of Japan, vol. 6, 1988, p. 767. Hidaka, Kindaishugi, p. 37. Otsuka Hisao, 'Formation of Modem Man', Japan Interpreter, vol. 6, no. I, Spring 1970, p. I. S. N. Eisenstadt, Tradition, Change and Modernity, New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1973, p. 209. See also David Kolb, Critique of Pure Modernity, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1986, p. 6. Victor 1. Koschmann, 'Maruyama Masao and the Incomplete Project of Modernity', in M. Miyoshi and H. D. Harootunian, eds, Postmodernism and Japan, Durham and London, Duke University Press, 1989, pp. 123141. Otsuka, 'Formation of Modem Man', pp. 1-3. Yoshida Masutoshi, Sengo shiso ron (Postwar Thought), pp. 24-25. Matsumoto Sannosuke, 'Maruyama riron to genzai no shiso jokyo' (Maruyama's Theories and the Contemporary Intellectual Situation), Gendai no Riron. May 1975, p. 73. Maruyama Masao, Gendai seiji, 1964, p. 585. Maruyama Masao et aI., Nihon bunka no kakureta katachi (Hidden Structure of Japanese Culture>, 1984, p. 97.

Modernisation 27 28

29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41

42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52

135

Maruyama Masao, 'Nihon ni okeru jiyii ishiki no keisei to tokushitsu' (Formation and Characteristics of Liberal Consciousness in Japan), Senchii to sengo no aida, p. 305. Maruyama Masao, 'Kindai Nihon shiso shi ni okeru kokka risei no mondai' (Problem of Raison d'Etat in the History of Ideas in Modern Japan), TenbO, January 1949, p. 6. Maruyama, ibid., pp. 6-9. Maruyama Masao, Nihon seiji shiso shi kenkyii (Studies in the History of Japanese Political Thought), Tokyo University Press, 1952, p. 371. Maruyama Masao, 'Nationalism in Japan: its Theoretical Background and Prospects', Thought and Behaviour, pp. 141-142. Kato Shiiichi, 'Modern Japanese Civilization in History', Japan Interpreter, vol. VI, no. 1, Spring 1970, pp. 29-43. E. 0. Reischauer, 'Modernisation', pp. 301-308. In Yoshida Masutoshi, Sengo shiso ron (Postwar Thought), 1984, p. 68. In Yoshida, ibid, pp. 68-69. Takeuchi Yoshimi, 'Dento to kakumei' (Tradition and Revolution), TenbO, September 1949, p. II. Maruyama Masao et aI., Sengo Nihon no kakushin shiso (Renovative Thought in Postwar Japan), 1983, p. 40. Maruyama Masao, 'Kaikoku' (Opening the Country), p. 284. Zevedei Barbu, Democracy and Dictatorship: Their Psychology and Patterns of Life, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956, p. 13. ibid, p. 23. There is much disagreement over whether Popper recognized the necessity of introducing 'undemocratic' controls to guarantee the maximization of democracy throughout society. Bryan Magee argues that Popper did take this into account (see Popper, 1973, chapters 6 and 7); Kolakowski argued that Popper neglected the enemy within the open society (see Modernity on Endless Trial, 1990, pp. 162-165). Maruyama Masao, 'Kaikoku', p. 297. ibid, p. 304. Maruyama Masao, 'Meiji kokka no shiso' (Thought of the Meiji State), in Senchii to sengo no aida, pp. 202-250. Maruyama Masao, 'Nationalism in Japan: its Theoretical Background and Prospects', Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics. p.143. Maruyama Masao, 'Kaikoku', p. 297. Maruyama Masao, 'Aso Yoshiteru "Kindai Nihon tetsugakushi" 0 yomu' (Reading Aso Yoshiteru's "History of Modern Japanese Philosophy"), Senchii to sengo no aida, p. 128. Maruyama Masao, 'Fukuzawa, Uchimura, and Okakura-Meij, 'Intellectuals and Westernization', The Developing Economies, vol. IV, no. 4, December 1966 pp. 11-12. Maruyama Masao, 'From Carnal Literature to Carnal Politics', Thought and Behaviour, p. 254. ibid, p. 255. Maruyama Masao, 'Fukuzawa ni okeru chitsujo to ningen' (Order and Man in Fukuzawa), in Hidaka, Kindaishugi, p. 56. ibid, p. 56.

136 53

54 55

56 57 58 59

60 61 62 63

64

65 66

67

Democracy in postwar Japan ibid, p. 57.

Maruyama Masao, 'Kaikoku', p. 310. Maruyama Masao, 'De aru koto to suru koto' (To Be and To Do), Nihon no shiso, Iwanami Shinsho, 1961, pp. 156-157. Maruyama Masao, 'Kaikoku', p. 311. Maruyama Masao, 'Politics and Man in the Contemporary World', Thought and Behaviour, p. 348. Maruyama Masao, 'Kaikoku', p. 283. Maruyama Masao, 'Aru jiyushugi sha e no tegami' (Letter to a Liberal), Sekai, September 1950, p. 38. See Koschmann in Miyoshi and Harootunian, eds, Postmodernism and Japan, pp. 123-141. David Rasmussen, Reading Habermas, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1990, p. lB. See also J. Habermas, Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1987. Maruyama Masao, 'Nihon ni okeru jiyu ishiki no keisei to tokushitsu', p.306. ibid, p. 305. Maruyama Masao, 'Aru jiyushugi sha e no tegami', p. 33. ibid, p. 35. ibid, p. 37. Maruyama Masao, 'Some Problems of Political Power', Thought and Behaviour, p. 279.

6 Fascism The antithesis of democracy

It was perhaps inevitable that the postwar era in Japan would be preoccupied with the past. Discontinuity was supposed to be the measure of success in this postwar era, but when intellectuals discussed Japan's experience with fascism they were unable successfully to confine it to an historical context. The most compelling aspect of debates on fascism in postwar Japan was, and remains. the self-conscious application of fascism to the present. In some senses the postwar in Japan was 'over' in 1955, I but doubts necessarily remained when fascism and fascist political dynamics were seen to persist in new modern garb. The ongoing academic debates about whether or not Japan between 1930-1945 was fascist has masked the real dilemma concerning continuity from the wartime to the postwar period. In essence, this was that in a postwar democracy the state and the individual ought to be distinct entities, and any ideology which sought to reconcile the two was a priori unthinkable. Fascism was the ultimate example of an ideology which cemented state and individual, thus democracy must place distance between them. Through subsuming the individual into the collective of the state, and mobilising this collective under the banner of nationalism as an ideological front for totalitarianism, fascism had established enmity as the guiding relation between the individual and the collective postwar. This was the refrain informing debates in postwar Japan on the need for distance between the individual and the state, and the appearance of independent individuals (shutaiteki kojin) as preconditions for genuine democracy. Indeed, such distance came to be regarded by Japanese intellectuals and foreign analysts as the proof of democracy in Japan. In the less-sophisticated contemporary form of this debate, concerns are expressed about the Japanese penchant for group activity and identification, the close relationship between business. bureaucracy and government, and the preference for harmony and consensus as modus

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operandi throughout Japanese society. For liberal and leftist intellectuals in 1950s Japan, the discourse about individualism and political pluralism assumed an urgency and philosophical significance which the gentler contemporary version seems to have lost. In the context of the American 'reverse course' of the late 1940s onwards, the Cold War, the Red Purge, the subsequent conservative Japanese 'reverse course' after independence in 1952 and the spectacle of McCarthyism, personal autonomy emerged as the last bastion between postwar democracy and neo-fascism. It is in the debates on postwar fascism in Japan that we can discover the primary motivation for intellectuals' insistence on personal autonomy as the precondition for social autonomy in Japan's postwar democracy. Maruyama Masao was a prominent and creative theorist of Japanese fascism in the early postwar decades. His ideas on Japanese democracy were greatly influenced by his interpretation of fascist dynamics in Japan. The tension between personal and social autonomy in his thought was resolved in favour of the former principally by his understanding of fascism and, to his dismay, evidence that neo-fascist dynamics continued in postwar Japan. All of his writings showed in varying degrees his growing concern for his contemporary context. Maruyama was driven to the defence of personal autonomy as the indispensable criterion for democracy in Japan by his belief that the collective was the preserve of the state and, in terms of ideology, the fascist-type state. Like Yoshino Sakuzo (1878-1933) before him, Maruyama retreated to an apolitical realm to house his version of personal autonomy and thus in his eyes maintain the integrity of democracy. In other words, by insisting that democracy in Japan function through the political criticism of apolitical individuals, or alternatively within the space between the private and the public, Maruyama was laying the groundwork for the political isolation of what he regarded to be the life-force of democracy, the active citizenry. The political engagement characteristic of social autonomy fell victim to the defensive anticipation of a neo-fascist challenge to democracy in postwar Japan. Maruyama's writings on fascism reveal how he came to this theoretical impasse. More than any other topic on which he wrote, his articles on fascism provoked hot debate. In many ways, the critiques of his theory of Japanese fascism represented the coming together of other criticisms of his work, methodology and conclusions. His theory of Japanese fascism as 'fascism from above' saw him branded alternately as a Koza Marxist, a modernist, and as always, a 'Eurocentric' thinker. As with his ideas on Japanese democracy, his theory of Japanese fascism

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remains something which other analysts must consider whenever they address the problem of Japanese fascism. The fact that his ideas remain a feature of the intellectual landscape indicates that what he had to say still strikes a chord of recognition, be it one of discord or of harmony. Neo-fascism was the severest challenge to Maruyama's brave exposition of postwar democratic autonomy. The fact that he still had the strength of conviction to 'stake his hopes' on the 'illusion' of postwar democracy during the pacifist and anti-security treaty movements speaks of the enduring appeal of his democratic formula despite his misgivings.

THEORIES OF FASCISM As an ideology, fascism has been a phantom. Scholars who have sought to define it have done so largely in descriptive terms, treating the context in which it appeared and the trappings of fascist regimes as definitions in their own right. Mosse has come closest to a direct definition by referring to fascism as a 'scavenger ideology', which 'attempted to annex all that had appealed to people in the 19th and 20th century past.'2 The vagueness of its ideological content on the one hand, and the specificity of its context on the other, has made fascism an unruly and inconsistent subject for comparative historical study. Most definitions of fascism assume a European context focused on Germany and Italy. Those that base their definition of fascism on these contexts develop what are described as criteria - but are actually just attributes - for a fascist regime: a single mass party, a single (charismatic) leader, a militaristic state ethic, a national and/or racial myth. The contextual definition of fascism is the starting point for what passes as the definition of fascist ideology. According to Nolte, fascism was a phenomenon which arose in Europe between 1914 and 1945 in response to a crisis in liberal-democratic society. 3 This interpretation regards the inability of parliamentary democracy to cope with the upheavals of the post-World War I world as the context for the appearance of fascism. Such a view implies that fascism offered a positive alternative programme, and indeed fascism portrayed itself as a revolutionary force between the wars.4 However Nolte and others simultaneously highlight the nihilist nature of fascism, and in particular cite a reaction against Marxism as the negative force moulding the shape of fascism after 1917. Fascism thus is presented as the ultimate example of reaction, with anti-Marxism and anti-democracy manifested in the fascist agenda as anti-internationalism and anti-individualism. s

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If fascist ideology had a positive programme, it was the promotion of the nation. It has been implied that nationalism served as little more than the 'functional myth' of fascism, and that if anything it was merely another form of anti-Marxism. 6 If we accept that 'all fascisms were nationalisms',? we must take note of the particularism which necessarily accompanies a nationalist ideology. This aspect has bolstered the assumption that fascism was not a subject that would yield to comparative study, certainly not outside Europe. A powerful argument against this is the concept of nationalism itself, which is accepted as a universal force - or ideology - in its own right. The logic of nationalism suggests that fascism ought to be approached much in the way that Maruyama Masao has approached it, namely as a dynamic featuring certain patterns that are revealed in different forms according to the particularistic context. Maruyama refers to this as 'fascism as a movement', as opposed to 'fascism as a structure'. Based on the particularistic, context-specific version of fascism, Laqueur offers the following definition: a hypernationalist, often pan-nationalist, anti-parliamentary, anti-liberal, anti-communist, populist and therefore proletarian, partly anti-capitalist and anti-bourgeois, anti-clerical, ... movement with the aim of national social integration through a single party and a corporative representation not always equally emphasised; with a distinctive style and rhetoric, it relied on activist cadres ready for violent action combined with electoral participation to gain power with totalitarian goals by a combination of legal and violent tactics. 8 Herein is contained an elaborate description of how fascist states came about in Europe, and what they were opposed to. It is through the ideological version of fascism offered by Nolte (one of three definitions he offers) that we begin to understand the dynamics of fascist ideology. The significance of his definition is that it highlights the dialectical relationship of fascist ideology with that of its erstwhile enemy, Marxism: fascism is anti-Marxism which seeks to destroy the enemy by the evolvement of a radically opposed and yet related ideology and by the use of almost identical and yet typically modified methods, always, however, within the unyielding framework of national self-assertion and autonomy.' It is ironic that the manifestation of discord between fascism and Marx-

ism was the nationalism of the former and the internationalism of the

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latter. With the development through necessity of Stalin's 'socialism in one country' policy and China's own communism, the particular eventually triumphed over the universal. Eventually then we come down to questioning the nature of the relationship between the people of one nation and the ideology which purports to embrace them. It is this aspect of fascist ideology which was the focal point of postwar Japanese intellectuals' study of fascism within the rubric of nationalism. Contrary to purist fascist definitions, we find that particularism was the key to understanding the workings of fascism in society. The word 'totalitarian' is most often used to describe the nature of this relationship between fascist ideology and society. The dominance of nation over individual, and the latter being recognised only through virtual self-denial, was evident in the words of the founder of the first fascist party in 1919, Mussolini. The individual, in Mussolini's view, was of value only in that he belonged to the state: 'anti-individualistic, the fascist conception of life stresses the importance of the state and accepts individuals only in so far as his interests coincide with those of the state.'IO Self-realisation through the obliteration of the self was cheerfully acknowledged: 'liberalism denied the state in the name of the individual; fascism reasserts the rights of the state as expressing the real essence of the individual.'11 At the same time, the type of system whereby the individual is subsumed by the state was extolled as the means for individuals to gain fulfilment: it was 'a life ... in which the individual ... can achieve that purely spiritual existence in which his value as a man consists'}2 One of many ironies about the fascist concept of the individual is that while being opposed to parliamentary democracy, it purported to function as a more genuine and efficient democracy than its constitutional version. The catch was that this 'democracy' swung between two extremes, neither of which were democratic. On one side, the raw energy of the masses was ennobled in order to legitimate violence and disorder; on the other side the will of the people was identified with the leader of the state. The hated democratic oligarchy was simply replaced with a dictator. It was but a short hop of logic to justify authoritarian rule on behalf of the collective. The mediation of a vanguard and the revulsion against bourgeois forms of social order has prompted scholars to compare fascism and Marxism as like to like, both being different types of totalitarianism. The rationale of the vanguard was in both instances an authoritarian control ethic: the vanguard as the 'self-selected representatives' of the collective gave themselves 'moral priority and control privilege' over the rest of society. 13 Authoritarianism dressed as democracy was a major concern for

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intellectuals of Maruyama Masao's generation. The structural attributes of a mass party and a dictator were but the trappings of a power dynamic pretending to function as the vehicle for popular sovereignty. It was this aspect above all others that denoted fascism to Maruyama. In a sense Maruyama's ideas on democracy postwar can be seen as anti-fascism, much in the same way that fascism has been seen as anti-democracy. This leaves the question of the true essence of democracy: was the substance of postwar democracy in Japan determined principally by antipathy toward and contrast with fascism? THEORIES OF WARTIME JAPANESE FASCISM The definition of Japan's postwar democratic state was dependent on the definition of its fascist enemy. The distinguishing aspect of Maruyama's analysis was his determination to identify and strengthen the divide between the true democratic state and the fascist state masquerading as a democratic one. While he identified the particularistic aspects of fascism in Japan, he considered this democratic masquerade to be a universal attribute of fascism. The final word on whether Japan between 1930 and 1945 was fascist remains to be said. The debate still rages in the world of Japanese history both in Japan and abroad. The simplistic division of the postwar world into democratic and fascist states which was evident during the Tokyo War Crimes Trial did not hold enduring sway beyond the court-room. The legacy of the Trial manifested itself more in terms of the self-conscious expectation by the Occupation that Japanese would exhibit non-fascist traits and attitudes. This brings us once more to the dialectical relationship between concepts of democracy and concepts of fascism in postwar Japan. Most of the dissenting camp has been influenced by the absence of European fascist attributes, such as a mass party and a dictator, in deciding that wartime Japan was not fascist. They have had an easy retort for their opponents: the particularistic attributes of Japan's so-called fascism are merely examples of exceptionalism, or deviant case studies, which make Japan the exception that proves the rule. Those who argue that Japan was fascist point to fascist dynamics to prove their case, including the authoritarian, militaristic and nationalistic nature of the wartime state. All who consider the topic have felt compelled to do so on a comparative basis, establishing similarities and differences between the Japanese and European cases. But if there was no fascist enemy, the entire nature of postwar democratic discourse. and the conservative tradition within it, would be

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altered. Nakamura Kikuo argued on a number of fronts, including the deviant nature of the Japanese example on the one hand and the inappropriateness of applying European political concepts to Japan on the other, to show that Japan before 1945 was not fascist. 14 According to Nakamura, the attempt to apply the fascist label to Japan was partly the work of Eurocentric Japanese scholars, and partly the result of the inordinate influence of Marxist ideas in Japan's academic community. Scholars such as Ito Takashi have even disputed the term 'Emperor System Fascism', saying that it too was a product of Marxist ideology (the 1932 Theses).ls Nakamura argued that the dissimilarities between Japan and Europe (no anti-Jewish programme, no large-scale extermination of political criminals, no exiles, no mass party, no seizure of power, no overturning or smashing of the constitutional parliamentary system) 'far outweighed' the similarities (nationalism, anti-liberalism, anti-democracy, foreign expansion, anti-socialism, anti-communism) during the years in question. He noted that the few fascist-type smatterings that had existed in Japan in the form of fascist theorists (such as Okawa Shiimei) and attempted coups d'etat failed, finding no supporting voice in power or in the wider community. Furthermore, Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was self-styled as a pacifist ideology, not one that glorified war. As for the Emperor, Nakamura acknowledged that there had been changes in the function of the Emperor System since Meiji, but essentially the Sh6wa Emperor had 'been someone who had greatly respected the constitution, and it is said that he did not like supra-constitutional fascist domination' .16 The most that could be admitted was that Japan had been militaristic. In a provocative analysis, Duus and Okimoto stated that what some call fascism in 1930s and I 940s Japan was actually just cultural continuity. This manifested itself as 'natural' antipathy towards personal autonomy in favour of emphasis on the collective. The push by intellectuals for collective cohesion was not fascist authoritarianism, but instead an attempt at 'the formation of a new style of collectivism more or less in tune with industrialised society' .17 Equating the fate of fascism in Japan with that of the ShOwa Kenkyiikai, Duus and Okimoto suggested that the continuity within the Japanese ruling structure throughout the era in question not only disqualified Japan from the fascist camp, but represented credibility for Japan's pre-1945 democracy.'B They stated that rather than seek the causes for the failure of pre-1945 democracy in Japan, it would be more fruitful to enquire why fascism failed. 19 Shillony also emphasised the structural continuity of Japan's constitutional democracy during the so-called fascist era.20 He maintained that

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not only did parliament continue to function, but criticism both within and without the Diet continued throughout the period in question. The pluralistic decision-making structure (one could also call it chaotic), the antipathy between the military and big business, and the absence of other forms of repression such as an independent secret police force, disqualified Japan from being called either fascist or totalitarian. At best, Shillony wrote, these were 'nicknames for highlighting the repressive and aggressive character of the state'.21 While the case made by Shillony is empirically sound, it did not answer the fundamental concerns of the postwar intellectuals of Maruyama's generation. If anything, these arguments enhanced their disquiet. The mere fact of continuity of democratic structures and mechanisms did not in itself preclude the movement of fascist or authoritarian dynamics within those structures. 'There is no a priori reason for thinking that the existence of legal provisions for a constitution and for a parliamentary system is of itself proof of the absence of fascist forms of control. '22 Debates on democracy in Japan had often focused on the incongruity of form and content. If the wartime state could maintain the appearance of a functioning parliamentary democracy and still engage in military adventure abroad accompanied domestically by an insidious ideology, then this exposed the possibility that the same hollow exterior called democracy could remain a feature of the postwar political scene. It was the social dimension, the point where politics and their structures interacted with society, which determined for Maruyama whether or not Japan had been, and still was, fascist. Maruyama's influence on analysts of Japanese fascism has been significant. 23 The terminology used and the criteria examined are easily recognisable as originating from his pioneering postwar works (which will be examined below). Those who believe that Japan was fascist have accordingly presented the Emperor System, the authoritarian state and its Family State ideology (kazoku kokka) as phenomena through which fascist dynamics worked in Japan. Rather than the hallmarks of 'exceptionalism', it is argued that in functional terms these features corresponded with European fascisms. Furuya Tetsuo and Yamaguchi Yasushi have isolated ideological mechanisms on the Japanese side which they believe corresponded to the role performed by institutions in Europe.24 Instead of a mass party as in European fascisms, Furuya cited the Emperor System as the integrative instrument in Japan. Yamaguchi nominated the kokutai (national polity) ideology as Japan's integrative mechanism. For both of these scholars, it was the fact that whether it be an ideology or an

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institution, the fascist society allowed no distinction between the public and the private spheres. This recalls Nolte's third definition of fascism as an ideology which resisted transcendence.25 Whether it was framed as the natural rights of man, or as the rights of the proletariat anticipated by a bourgeois revolutionary vanguard, fascism could not allow any idea to rise above the value of the state. In the Japanese context, it was the denial of individualism which they stamped as archetypal fascism. The validity of considering ideology and institutions as corresponding phenomena was debatable in some respects, but the functional basis for comparison was compelling. One reason was that it highlighted another core issue of the postwar world, that of 'war responsibility'. The contrast between a mass party, where the people were subjectively and actively engaged with the political momentum of the state, and the kokutai ideology, with which the state sought to integrate each private psyche in ethical terms into its agenda, is a radical one from the perspective of the subject. Without seeking to be engaged, the Japanese subject was incorporated into the fascist state. Maruyama, Furuya and Yamaguchi called into question the apparent political passivity of the citizenry with their analysis. Only a few Japanese writers on the subject have stated that the Japanese people as a whole were willing fascists, and that the 1930s was a reaction on the part of the entire society against the bungles and disappointments of TaishO democracy.26 Maruyama has argued that as a whole prewar Japanese society had been inclined towards fascism.27 He has declined though to condemn society as a whole. Maruyama believed that the abolition of political parties in 1940 had closed off all routes for effective passive resistance, and that incorporation into the regime had been the only path left open.28 Noting the lack of private space and the incorporation of society into the ideology of the state, Maruyama followed the authoritarian dynamic and dubbed Japanese fascism 'fascism from above'. The crucial factor for Maruyama was the total lack of distinction between state and society. Scholars in Japan have subsequently applied this understanding of fascism to the postwar.29 Assuming that battle would have to be done with fascism on its own territory, they have urged that postwar democracy be made to establish a connection with the psyche of the Japanese citizen, thus providing psychological ammunition to resist neo-fascism. Strangely, they turned to democracy as a rival ideology to function in place of the fascist one. lO Postwar democracy can be described as a reaction against wartime fascism in that it sought to distinguish between state and society, and

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involve the citizens actively with their political environment. However, the advocated distance between private and public also contained the potential for authoritarian forces to continue operating within a reduced but still irresponsible sphere of power. If autonomy could be guaranteed only through keeping individuals separate from politics, democracy would be divorced from the demos. The absence of the autonomous citizenry in Japan's wartime fascism would be repeated under the banner of democracy. From this perspective, concepts of postwar democracy can be said to have flowed dialectically from the concept of wartime fascism. MARUYAMA MASAO AND JAPANESE FASCISM

Maruyama was a pioneer scholar of Japanese fascism after the war. Through his work he established nationalism and the tradition of authoritarianism as criteria that denoted Japan's distinctive type of fascism. As has been noted above, the debates on fascism postwar were tied up with the emotive, troubled debates of the postwar era. These included the issue of collaboration and war responsibility during the war on the part of society as a whole and intellectuals in particular, the political role of individuals (through the shutaisei debate), and the nature of Japan's modernisation. Maruyama's critics have attributed his interpretation of wartime Japanese fascism to his ideas on modernisation. It is argued that Maruyama followed the K6za Marxist view of Japanese development, where the Meiji Restoration was an incomplete bourgeois revolution. The persistence of feudal elements in modern society precluded the development of European-style fascism, for which democracy had been the prelude. With democracy emasculated in Japan by the absence of the mass as a force in the political transformations in society, Japan's fascism naturally evolved as 'fascism from above'. As Barrington Moore would have it, fascism was the price for Japan's non-revolutionary entry into the modern world. 31 For the purposes of this study, it is not Maruyama's assessment of the Japanese past in its own right which will be examined. Rather, as with most of his academic work in the first fifteen years of postwar, it is his overriding concern with the past as a medium through which the postwar could be understood, and how the future could be made, that will be the focal point. This concern with the postwar world comes through forcefully in his writings on fascism. His works betrayed at a very early stage a realisation that his analysis of fascist dynamics in Japan was not merely a subject of historical interest, but of con tempo-

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rary concern. His postwar works on fascism should be read as commentaries on the socio-political dynamics of postwar Japan. Maruyama looked at three factors when assessing the nature of Japan's wartime fascism: the state, nationalism, and the dynamics of fascism. In each case, his consideration of the human dimension led him to highlight the precarious position of the individual. He found that often the state and nationalism had been defined through the denial and subjugation of the individual, and that this was the essence of the fascist dynamic. In his 1950 essay Shihai to fukuju (Dominance and Submission) Maruyama had defined dominance as distance between the individual and his socio-political environment. He argued that the advent of modem society had featured more sophisticated expressions of the relations of dominance, where those who were dominant monopolised value production, and those who were dominated remained unaware of their relationship with authority as one of dominance and submission. It was the same type of analysis that he had applied to the specific case of Japan's wartime state in Logic and Psychology of Ultranationalism. In effect, value monopoly had rationalised and internalised the dynamic of dominance. It was a form of 'false consciousness' that produced a 'spontaneity of subordination' which, Maruyama wrote, functioned as an 'unconscious mechanism' even though the process of domination itself was deliberate and conscious on the part of the state. It produced a 'tragic dual dimension' of public opinion where authority was disguised and the will of the people was a fiction. In the tradition of classic Marxism, Maruyama argued that the true will of the people could only be evoked by them becoming aware of conflicting interests between themselves and the state. 32 The theme of 'false consciousness' and the emasculation of value production was a recurring one in Maruyama's postwar work. Marxist thinking was particularly evident in his early writings, and though Maruyama modified his language both during and after the Occupation it is clear that the notion of 'false consciousness' influenced considerably his ideas on the state. This was especially blatant in his 1936 prize-winning graduate essay on the concept of the state. 33 Here Maruyama did not attempt to conceal the Marxist nature of his analysis. In this essay he described the revolutionary progress of the bourgeoisie alongside changes in the economic foundations of society. Throughout his argument, it is plain that Maruyama was primarily interested in identifying the historical and conceptual moment

148 Democracy in postwar Japan when the fascist state emerged. For Maruyama, this occurred when the pressure from below forced the bourgeoisie into an alliance with the state. From the perspective of state theory, this signified the moment when individualist interpretations of the state were rejected in favour of the bourgeois conception. It represented the triumph of state sovereignty over natural rights as the legitimator of authority. Furthermore, the switch from individualism to collectivism was ushered in by a switch from a rational to an irrational state ideology. Maruyama traced the rise of the fascist state as part of a dialectical process which originated in individualism, but eventually became its antithesis: in this way, as the rationalism that was the structure of thinking of the individualistic conception of the state is cast off by merchants, the idea of state omnipotence emerges from the individualistic conception of the state, and transforms itself into a negation of its creator through adopting the guise of a middle ages, romantic type of conception of the state. This is the fascist view of the state. 34 Without referring specifically to Japan, Maruyama initially followed the Marxist interpretation of European fascism as a response to a crisis of monopoly capitalism. For him this crisis was the moment when the proletariat should have resisted the state. Historical momentum to date had been based on resistance to the state in the name of natural rights. As soon as resistance was lacking, the state utilised irrationality to disguise the irrational twist that history had taken. The stagnant, rational, modern structure of thought could find no bearer, neither in the unpropertied classes who stressed the historical transition of present society, nor in the spokesmen for the merchant level, who demanded the irrational beautification of contemporary society.3' Maruyama anticipated Nolte's idea of the fascist state as one which resists transcendence. He pointed out that the German and Italian fascist states had both lauded the people in ideological terms. This was irrational because the fascist state was dedicated to preventing the fulfilment of individualism. His conclusion was unequivocal: 'the individual can be established as a concrete entity only by using the state as an agent, and by tirelessly standing in a relation of negative independence from the state.'36 Maruyama's theoretical building blocks were made of Marxist stuff, but ultimately he identified fascist dynamics through its consequences for individualism.

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Maruyama's first work on nationalism was likewise written in the midst of the 'politics of assassination', attempted coups d'etat, and as he was preparing to leave his new bride for the boot camp in 1944. They are pieces which struggled to maintain academic brevity in spite of an acute sense of personal crisis. His 1944 essay on Japan's nationalism epitomised his predicament, and added a personal dimension to his plea for the nation to be the expression of its people's aspirations rather than a force compelling them outward for the sake of a de-personalised entity. In The Premodern Formation of Nationalism he defined nationalism as something produced by voluntarism and which facilitated the interaction of individuals within a particular society. He also depicted 'healthy' nationalism as something which 'seeks to eliminate the force or structure that intervenes between the nation and the state, preventing the direct union of the twO'.37 'Unhealthy' nationalism placed impediments between the people and the state. It was the de-personalised state which distorted nationalism. Maruyama's terminology underlined his sharp distinction between nation and state. He preferred to call 'healthy nationalism' kokuminshugi, stressing the citizen as the focal point and energy source. 'Unhealthy' nationalism was called kokkashugi, emphasising the empty institution devoid of a democratic foundation. The tragedy of the Meiji Restoration was not only its character of reaction rather than revolution, but that change was managed by the very elements which intervened between the people and the nation-state. Nationalism was hostage to a narrow group of feudal intermediaries. Identifying the course chosen by the nation with the course taken by the restorationists, Maruyama later argued that the irrational genesis of nationalism and revolution in Japan were concurrent and inter-related phenomena. Japan's defensive and partial openness (kaikoku) to the West from the 1860s onwards had divorced the technical and material imports from their Western spiritual context, thus distorting them. Similarly, Japan's modernisation had occurred without popular input. The spirit of nationalism, popular sovereignty, had been missing. The long term consequence of this was fascism from above. Maruyama used the metaphor of the nation to highlight the disregard for the individual that is characteristic of reactionary change. Contrasting China's experience with that of Japan, Maruyama remarked that social revolution had been the companion to nationalism in the former, whereas Japan had had no sense of self (shutaisel) either as a nation in the world or as a nation to its own people. This was so marked that popular sovereignty in Japan was made to appear incompatible with nationalism. 38

150 Democracy in postwar Japan We are left with a vision of authoritarianism and distorted nationalism that stems from the isolation of the people from the state, but which presents itself as a system based on the collective interest. Instead of representation, there was misrepresentation. Maruyama also provides us with a clear statement of what would constitute a non-fascist, non-authoritarian political arrangement. Democracy would need to be the spirit of postwar nationalism. Popular sovereignty would need to be associated directly with the nation, without the irrational intervention of the state. However, if the state assumed the role of intermediary, and pretended to both embody and express the popular will, then the only haven for a genuine popular will was in individualised and apolitical forms. An authoritarian state would embrace nationalism as an expression of the interests of the state, and drive social autonomy away from meaningful connection with the nation. THE DYNAMICS OF FASCISM Having come through the maelstrom of war and quietly rejoiced at defeat, Maruyama wasted little time in exploring the nature of the wartime state. He introduced sociological and psychological factors into Japan's political science which subsequently were commonly associated with the American school of political science led by Harold Lasswell. 39 His pathology of Japanese fascism became one of his intellectual trademarks. The analysis varied from extrapolations from the publicly-released transcripts of the Tokyo War Crimes Trial, to emotive statements on the 'mental puniness' and 'dwarfishness' of Japan's wartime leaders, to penetrating analysis of the dynamics of fascism. He would later acknowledge the shortcomings of some of his methodology.40 However, he steadfastly refused to regard his conclusions about the dynamics of Japanese fascism as a creature buried in the wartime past. His observations postwar detected fascist manoeuvres in new shapes and with new voices, but fascist nonetheless. 'What is called Japanese fascism, especially as a state structure, collapsed on 15 August 1945. But this by no means precludes the possibility that a fascist movement may arise in Japan in the future. '41 What did Maruyama understand by 'fascism'? In his first essay on fascism in 1947, The Ideology and Dynamics of Japanese Fascism, Maruyama refused to define it, apart from stating his intention to treat fascism as a movement and not as a structure. His first formal definition which appeared in 1954 did not take the Japanese context into account, and was in accord with general descriptions of the attributes

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of European fascisms: a single far Right political party; a system which rejects parliamentarism, liberalism, communism and internationalism; a leader who is deified; and rule that is totalitarian, militaristic and authoritarian. He also ventured some observations on fascist dynamics which did connect with his later work on Japanese fascism. He noted that the fascist vanguard tended to appear where democracy was weakest, in the lower and middle orders of the military and the bureaucracy. Paradoxically a fascist system sought to enforce social cohesion by making fascist rule appear as government by democratic consent. Its power lay in its ability spiritually to inspire, direct and control society. Fascism then was in Maruyama's view based on a spiritual dynamic. What mattered when studying fascism was not what political shape it took but the process of 'fascization' itself.42 Maruyama believed fascism to be a form of political reaction and in this he agreed with the nihilist definition of fascism. He noted that reaction against revolutionary ideas, or even ideas which merely challenged the status quo, was the most dangerous and enduring form of reaction because such reaction 'can lead to endless repression'. Revealing yet another dimension of its dialectical nature, reaction could snowball into an endless attempt at negative progress. Like revolution, counter-revolution was never finished. 43 This prompted Maruyama to portray fascism not as a new order, but 'a great leap to the old world'.44 In spite of this, Maruyama realised that fascism succeeded precisely because it presented itself as a pseudo-revolution. The greatest irony surrounding the advent of fascism in Japan was that it had arisen in reaction to threats which were more apparent than rea1. 45 There was neither a liberal-democratic nor a leftist threat substantially in evidence in the 1930s. Maruyama's account of the maturation process of fascism in Japan identified three stages between 1919 and 1945, where the first two stages featured fascist impulses from below. 46 He nominated the 26 February Incident (1936) as the point where fascist momentum was seized from above after having been carried in more diverse forms by forces below. The first period up to 1931 was purely reactionary in an anti-leftist mode; the second acquired added impetus as 'a positive social movement'; the third 'brought the movement of radical fascism from below to an end' as the state assumed contro1. 47 Maruyama was firm in rejecting any popular link with this third maturation stage of fascism, though the logic of his stages theory (and historical evidence) implied that the fascist-inclined popular groups and proletarian political parties, though disparate, did not oppose that trend. The decisive aspect which distinguished fascism from below and

152 Democracy in postwar Japan

fascism from above was not actually one of disconnection. Rather, it was one of popular versus authoritarian impetus behind the fascist movement. Maruyama outlined the distinguishing features of Japanese as opposed to European fascism in terms of three ideologies: the Family State (kazoku kokka), Agrarianism (Nohonshugl), and Asianism (Ajia shugl). All of these ideologies sought to integrate the masses from above, but the mere fact of integration did not in Maruyama's view qualify Japanese fascism as mass-based. Whether these ideologies had genuine constituencies in society was not as important for Maruyama as the fact that those ideologies were associated with the state structure. For him the moment these ideologies became state ideologies they were alienated from their objects. Maruyama did great harm to the credibility of his reading of Japanese fascism by attempting in his 1947 essay to distance what he called 'true' intellectuals from the 'pseudo-intellectuals' who supported fascism in the 1930s. He has since admitted that 'true' intellectuals did in fact support fascism actively in the 1930s and 194Os, though he continued to insist that the 'true' intellectuals such as himself did passively resist the fascist state.48 Two factors ought to be considered about this statement. First, what Maruyama meant by 'pseudo-intellectuals' was factory-owners, retailers, farmer-landowners and others of the petite bourgeoisie who were in positions of authority in the wider community. Though he did not document the nature of their influence, he asserted that they 'directly controlled the thought and sentiment of the masses'.49 In addition to a lack of supporting evidence, this is unsatisfactory because it attributes an inordinate passivity to civilian Japanese which his own theory of the development of fascism in Japan suggests was not the case. At least, the community leaders influenced the members of the community because their views accorded with views that were widely-held. Secondly, whether a feeling of 'vague antipathy' amongst the 'true intellectuals' qualified as passive resistance is a moot point. so The telling fact, which Maruyama acknowledged, was that these intellectuals had no connection with the community, and likewise no influence. Their existence merely compounded the alienation of the community from the circles of power and myth-making. This elitist isolation may have been due to their Western socialisation, or it may have reflected the position intellectuals had always held in the community at large. Whether an elite or not, intellectuals were ultimately just as alienated from the sources of power as the rest of the community. Maruyama supported his analysis of Japanese fascist dynamics by pointing out that it had not triumphed through the overthrow of the state structure or the ousting of the power elite. One could argue that

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the 'fascization' from within the existing power structure was just another example of Japanese fascist exceptionalism. For Maruyama it was proof that fascism in Japan was not an aberration: 'such a view fails to take into account the distinctive undercurrent in thought and social structure that had existed in Japanese political life since the Meiji restoration and that sanctioned the advance of Japanese fascism.'sl If Japanese fascism was a product of authoritarian continuity from the Meiji era, then the masses had never played a role in determining the political destiny of the nation and the state. They had neither driven the engine of fascism and installed it in power, nor opposed its consolidation with a popular rival agenda. They had featured as disembodied subjects, and served as the vortex of an empty ideology. Nationalism, democracy and fascism thus had shared the same fate. In each case, the masses had been overlooked, excluded or restrained from entering into the political equation. Fascism was not the ultimate indictment of the poverty of democracy in prewar Japan. Rather, Maruyama believed that the triumph of Japanese fascism as 'fascism from above' was the decisive indicator of the degree to which the people were alienated from the processes of government and from true identification with the nation. In a perverse sense, fascism from below such as had occurred in Germany and Italy had more integrity than the Japanese variant. This was one aspect of Maruyama's analysis which drew the ire of other intellectuals enraged at Maruyama's apparently blind preference for all things European. From Maruyama's perspective the lesson learned was not isolating Japan's historical experience for its own sake, but that Japan's democratic tradition existed mainly as the emasculation of democratic potential. FASCISM IN POSTWAR JAPAN Japan's defeat in 1945 ushered in radical changes to Japanese society, the political power structure and the frames of reference for socio-political activity. The mainly American Occupation of Japan of 1945-1952 can justly be described as a revolution. It presided over structural changes in the major spheres of public life, from parliament (votes for women) to the constitution (revised to make the people sovereign in place of the Emperor) to land ownership (creating a new class of owner-cultivators) to civil rights. The pace of change was so rapid as to invite comparisons with the Meiji era. While the impetus behind change was foreign and at the hands of an occupying power, there were significant sectors of Japanese society which grasped the revolutionary opportunity with alacrity. These included notably the

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labour movement, the communist party and public intellectuals of all kinds. When the international environment divided into ideological spheres in the late 1940s it precipitated a change in direction in Japan's democratic revolution. The context for reaction postwar was accordingly complex. Maruyama explored the terrain of reaction in the postwar era mindful of the dynamics of prewar Japanese fascism. The crucial difference postwar was that the flavour of revolution from without and within was that of democracy; counter-revolution had a specific and well-defined enemy that had existed previously only as potential. Looking retrospectively at the early postwar years, Maruyama described the momentum of reaction like this. As with the Meiji restoration, reaction had set in against the external impetus behind change postwar. The big difference between the Meiji and postwar eras was that in addition to the external factor pent-up pressure from below was also released after the war. Authority was sandwiched between internal and external forces pushing for democratic change. Reaction was infinitely more complicated under these circumstances. Maruyama explicitly rejected any suggestion that there was a coalition of popular feeling and conservative authority against the democratic revolution. Popular disenchantment was marked not when the constitution was 'imposed', but when authorities within and without the country attempted to undermine its provisions through rearmament and signing a security agreement with the United States in 1951. 52 In 1947 Maruyama warned of fascists posing as democrats. In February of that year the wind went out of the sails of the labour movement when MacArthur banned the general strike planned for I February. This date was subsequently acknowledged by many in Japan as the beginning of the 'reverse course'. Initiated by the Occupation authorities, it acquired momentum with the cooperation of successive conservative Japanese administrations. As Morris has documented, the landmarks of this Cold War-inspired reaction were: the denial of the right to strike to public servants; the Red Purge of 1950-1952 when over 11,000 public servants were dismissed and labour unions were disbanded; the formation of the National Police Reserve in July 1950; the reversal of the Anti-Trust legislation in the previous year; and other legislation enacted by a newly-independent Japan in the areas of education, defence, and attempts at constitutional revision. 53 The reactionary nature of the 'reverse course' was self-evident. It also changed dramatically the parameters of revolution and reaction. Maruyama pointed out that the Cold War context completely

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altered the nature of external pressure and democracy. Instead of forcing change on to a reluctant government, the American authorities began to restrict changes they themselves had inaugurated. They had ceased being the power behind revolution, and had redefined revolution in ideological terms to represent what amounted to heterodoxy. Meanwhile, the democracy that had been 'seething with multidimensional potential' in the aftermath of defeat was also constrained by an ideological frame. Democracy had become anti-communism. Liberal democracy had become the orthodoxy. In the process nationalism became the instrument through which rival forces of revolution and reaction tried to strengthen their respective positions. Maruyama believed that the peace and neutralist movements culminating in the anti-Security treaty movement in 1960 were an attempt by those out of power to marry democracy with these new forms of nationalism. In counter-attack, the forces of conservatism employed fascist dynamics to create their own version of neo-nationalism that excluded popular uprisings. The trappings had changed, but Maruyama was in no doubt that fascist dynamics were once more at work in postwar Japan. Maruyama's own life experience postwar confirmed his belief that above all, fascism was a dynamic. It was not something associated with specific institutional forms or particular personalities and political configurations. It was a vital counter-revolutionary force which could adapt chameleon-like to its circumstances. In postwar Japan, fascism was gearing up to adopt a democratic facade. Just as it had used dialectical tactics to subvert communism with its own logic after World War I, it was attempting in post-World War II to do the same with the mechanisms of democracy. Maruyama set about analysing the nature of the postwar fascist beast at around the time that Japan was acquiring her conditional independence in 1951-1952. The first task was to redefine the meaning of fascism to suit its changed appearance. Maruyama urged that a broad definition be adopted. The appearance of reaction in the form of extreme anti-communism in the United States itself, epitomised by McCarthyism, profoundly affected Maruyama and his view of neo-fascism flowed from his reading of McCarthyism. McCarthyism had turned democracy on itself by adopting a strict, narrow understanding of democratic freedom. Democratic freedom was denied to those who were judged to endanger that freedom, a state of affairs that was inimical to the true meaning of democratic freedom. Maruyama saw that 'instead of personal realisation, democracy will be used to destroy the enemies of democracy in its name ... people will think that discarding heresy is democratic freedom'.54

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Similarly, if one defined fascism in narrow terms, the transformed appearance of fascism would go unrecognised for what it was. if one uses such extreme constructs to define fascism, one can say 'that is not fascist', and fascism will seem like a thing of the past, or even if you do not go that far, it would be easy to fall into a com pia. cent attitude and say that as long as there is a parliament and competing political parties it is far-fetched to speak of fascism.55 Japan's own war experience and even that of the defender of democracy in the postwar world showed this to be a dangerous fallacy. Maruyama was quick to point out that if the distortion of democracy into an enforced orthodoxy could occur in a country such as the United States with its long democratic experience, then what chance for Japan, with its miserable record of repression of human rights?S6 A narrow definition was the opportunity for abuse. It was also, Maruyama noted, the indicator of fascist dynamics. With a tone that spoke of hard personal experience, Maruyama traced the origins of the 'silent subject consciousness' to this: even if there is no direct repression from state authority, if this type of thinking which distinguishes sharply between orthodox and heterodox ideas spreads throughout society people will out of fear that they will be dubbed 'red' or a fellow-traveller spontaneously behave in such a way that this does not occur, and effectively it will be the same result as if there had been pressure by authority to conform. Before one knew it, one would only be safe if one screamed out in a loud voice 'I am anti-communist.'57 Maruyama maintained that as soon as there was space for an orthodoxy, there would be no space for democratic pluralism. Orthodoxy was vital to the workings of the fascist dynamic because it provided the glue with which to 'cement' society. Heterodoxy was the excuse used to destroy the alternative means of self-definition for the individual, casting them adrift as atomised parts of the mass. Then a new bonding agent would be found and would be called 'revolutionary'. Maruyama believed that a new type of nationalism would perform that function in postwar Japan. In this way Maruyama identified conformism as one of the mechanisms of postwar fascism. When the individual was denied self-definition, and stripped of all referential guides to help in that task, the atomised individual fell prone to irrational appeals. Without a sense of self, the individual lost in the mass was the foot soldier of the fascist state. 'The uniform following of standards imposed from above is the crudest expression of the fascist cementation tendency.'''

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The total lack of alternative reference points also denied the individual the basis for developing a critical view. Unlike in wartime, the persistence of feudal tendencies postwar did not account exclusively for this state of affairs. It was born in the midst of the contradictions produced by modern society: this process where people become as grains of sand a uniform mass is an unavoidable trend which occurs under the conditions of our present advanced capitalism, and we must not forget that fascism merely accelerates this process and takes it to extremes. 59 For Maruyama modern society atomised and privatised the individual. Mass communications, the trend towards increasing specialisation, the willingness to trust to the expertise of others, all contributed to a decrease in rational political criticism and an increase in political apathy throughout the community. That failure politically to connect provided the opening for the 'cementation' rationale: postwar nationalism. Maruyama had despaired of pacifism and democracy as the substance of neo-nationalism as early as 1951.60 It must have been difficult to be positive about Japan's postwar democracy in the midst of the Korean War and when Japan was heading for a 'partial' peace treaty. Maruyama's dark mood came through in his writings on neo-nationalism. He feared that postwar nationalism was a cause lost to identification with democracy, and that instead it was in the process of becoming the agent of neo-fascist reaction. In terms of substance, neo-nationalism resembled its prewar version. The difference lay in its configuration. Prewar the components of nationalism were made coherent by the kokutai ideology. Postwar the kokutai ideology had lost its legitimating power, but it had not disappeared. Maruyama said that the kokutai ideology had splintered in the postwar era, and dispersed willy-nilly into the psyche of postwar society. Devoid of an organising principle, the raw materials for irrational means of political mobilisation were on call. Democracy had not succeeded in unifying those raw materials into a coherent ideology for 'healthy' postwar nationalism. The way was open for authority once more to provide the unifying rationale from above. In short, Maruyama predicted that postwar 'fascization' would also occur from above, using authoritarian dynamics disguised as democratic ones. The danger was real. According to Maruyama, defeat in 1945 had strengthened the hand of the authoritarian state by eliminating the chaotic configuration of competing powers that had facilitated the

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irresponsible behaviour of the wartime state. Gone were the Emperor, the military, and the transcendental units of government (the Privy Council) which competed for political influence. Postwar authority was more concentrated and, Maruyama remarked, the new internal configuration of authority featured the greater influence of big business. Society assumed the shape of a giant cartel: a pyramid structure with a concentration of authority at the apex, and a broad mass of atomised individuals at the base. How then would neo-nationalism cement this structure postwar? Maruyama made the following prediction in the early 1950s of the course that Japanese society might take. The apex of society would adopt an internationalist front, while propagating neo-nationalism at the base. This neo-nationalism would be irrational, in that it would assume an apolitical demeanour in the tradition of wartime fascist dynamics. From the perspective of the 1990s, Maruyama's predictions throw a sinister light on to Japan's higher profile in United Nations Peacekeeping operations and the push from conservative circles to include armed participation. Likewise the well-publicised ambition of Japan's eclectic coalition of liberal democrats and socialists for Japan to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council does fit the bill of nationalist ambition under an internationalist guise. Other aspects of Maruyama's neo-fascist vision also appear far-sighted. Maruyama foresaw that the state would inspire the revival of those symbols of former nationalist ideology that had no direct political significance: Shinto festivals, national holidays, ethics education, etc. To date we have seen versions of ethics education reappear in Japan's schools and controversy continues over the creation of new holidays which coincide with former imperialist holidays. 61 The domestic reactions to the liberalisation of the Japanese rice market in accordance with the GATT agreement in 1993 similarly conjured up some xenophobic ghosts, with some commentators actually comparing the opening of the rice market to the gunboat diplomacy of Commodore Perry in 1853. In Maruyama's view, what he regarded as this kind of 'fascization' would lay the groundwork for nationalism in place of democracy as a new integrative mechanism. None of these things have a direct political meaning. But under certain circumstances they would have an indirect and passive political effect. Each will arouse nostalgia for the prewar Japanese past, and on the other hand, will be extremely useful as tranquillizers, or sedatives, against the movement to organise politically the masses

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from below, against postwar democracy ... in other words, it will restrict the masses' consciousness to the private sphere and paradoxically by making them apolitical will produce a desirable political effect62 The atomised individual, and the creation of a mass in place of a community, was an essential part of this process. A good deal depended on the masses being apathetic. In a 1965 essay Maruyama created a model based on four personality types which emerged during the modernisation process. He applied his model to Meiji and TaishO societies, but it had relevance for Maruyama's postwar world too. Maruyama suggested that when political power was monopolised in the hands of the few and passed down from above, individuals tended to become 'privatised' and 'atomised'. He associated this response with distance from political decision making, and a sense of self-definition that was narrow and insecure. Individuals who were interested in political decision making but were alienated from the socio-political order were 'democratised' and 'atomised'. From a democratic perspective, the ideal personality type was the individual who was interested in political decision making (democratised), but retained a sense of self that was self-defined (individualised). In such a society, the 'individualised' individual would counter-balance the tendency towards political centralisation. 63 In simple terms, Maruyama envisioned a pluralistic society. The reality of 1950s Japan did not draw close to this ideal. Instead, atomised individuals were adrift, Maruyama thought, and were being lulled by the apolitical pitch of neo-nationalism away from serious engagement with politics. It was through privatising popular consciousness that the state would achieve the 'cementation' process characteristic of fascisms everywhere. Democracy in its institutional form was not only useless, it was an opportunity for fascist machinations to move in an aura of legitimacy: The fact that traditional nationalism can inhabit non-political everyday phenomena in an atomised state proves above all that Japan's postwar democratisation went no further than institutional and legal reforms in the state machinery. It did not reach the social structure or the people's way of life, much less the mental constitution of the people. 64 Maruyama on the other hand advocated a sort of 'interested distance' between the public and private spheres. Wary of explicit integration of public and private but still enamoured of the democratic ideal,

160 Democracy in postwar Japan Maruyama strove against political apathy and spoke in favour of better public information and education on politics. The galling truth was though that his idea of distance between the public and private spheres - albeit for the sake of the integrity of personal and social autonomy - accorded too neatly with his spectre of neo-fascist dynamics in the postwar world. Autonomous space could preserve democratic dynamics, or it could be a front for its fascist antithesis. Maruyama began by advocating distance between the public and private spheres. This distance represented the autonomous space for individuals, and society in general, to define themselves according to their own criteria and their own values. It was a defence against the spiritual insidiousness characteristic of authoritarianism. But in the face of democracy's failure to integrate the people with the system which purported to represent their will, and the threat that democracy would become the facade for its antithesis, Maruyama went beyond searching for autonomous space. He ended by suggesting that the only way for autonomy to fend off the fascist advance was for voluntary associations to proliferate outside the political sphere. Autonomy, both personal and social, could only be found in the private domain. He placed the counter-weight against authoritarianism outside the political realm. Consequently, he ceded the space which was supposed to represent the presence of autonomy to authoritarian forces. Through privatising democracy, Maruyama was admitting that there could be no autonomy in connection with the nation-state. Ultimately, without the existence of the autonomous individual, not even the private voluntary association would be free of the disease of uniformity, conformity, and the fascist cementation dynamic. Maruyama may have developed grave doubts about the tendencies of the postwar state but he was still able wholeheartedly to commit himself in the 1950s to the pacifist cause. This is a testimony to his conviction that pacifism could serve as the universal value underpinning democratic autonomy in society. Through his activism Maruyama demonstrated his faith in the civil society of the postwar period. Ultimately Maruyama believed apathy to be a greater enemy to democracy than a neo-fascist state, and he was willing to risk the political engagement of personal autonomy to realise his ideal.

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NOTES

2

3 4

5 6 7 8 9 10 II 12 13

14

15 16 17 18

19 20 21 22 23

Nakano Yoshio, 'Mo haya "sengo" de wa nai' (It is No Longer 'Postwar'), Bungei Shunjit, Feb. 1956, pp. 56-66. George L. Mosse, International Fascism: New Thoughts and New Approaches, London, Sage, 1979, p. 20. Ernst Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1963, pp. 6-7. See Sternhell in Walter Laqueur, ed., Fascism - A Reader's Guide, Aldershot, Wildwood House, 1976, p. 340. SternheIl, ibid., p. 346. ibid, p. 336 Mosse, International Fascism, p. 31. Laqueur,op. cit., pp. 12-13. Nolte,op. cit., pp. 20-21. Mussolini, Fascism: Doctrine and Institutions, Rome, Ardita Publishers, 1935, p. 10. ibid, pp. 10-11. ibid,p.8. A. James Gregor, Ideology of Fascism: The Rationale of Totalitarianism, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1969, p. 342. The rejection of 'Western' categories when describing Japanese political history has been a favoured refrain of many scholars who disagree that Japan was 'fascist'. See Gordon Berger, 'Showa shi josetsu' (Introduction to ShOwa History), Shiso, June 1976, pp. 198-214; George M. Wilson, 'A New Look at the Problem of "Japanese Fascism' .. , in Henry Turner, ed., Reappraisals of Fascism, New York, New Viewpoints, 1975. Ito Takashi, 'ShOwa shi kenkyii e no ichi shikaku' (One Perspective of the Study of ShOwa Political History), Shiso, June 1976, pp. 215-228. Nakamura Kikuo, 'Tennosei fashizumu wa atta ka' (Was There Emperor System Fascism?), Jiyit, December 1965, p. 59. Peter Duus and Daniell. Okimoto, 'Fascism and the History of Prewar Japan: The Failure of a Concept', Journal of Asian Studies, vol. XXXIX, no 1, November 1979, p. 69. Fletcher also equated the demise of the ShOwa Kenkyiikai with the failure of fascism, though he described their programme as being fascist in nature and ambition. See Search For A New Order: Intellectuals and Fascism in Prewar Japan, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1982. Duus and Okimoto, op. cit., p. 67. Ben-Ami Shillony, Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981. See especially pp. 7-43. ibid, p. 15. Maruyama Masao, 'Fascism - Some Problems: A Consideration of its Political Dynamics', Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 163. See for instance Yamaguchi Yasushi, Fashizumu (Fascism), Yiihikaku Sensho, 1979; Imai Seiichi, 'Nihon fashizumu ni tsuite no danso' (Thoughts on Japanese Fascism), Rekishi Gaku Kenkyit, no. 399, August 1973, pp. 41-44; Abe Hiroatsu, 'Nihon fashizumu no kenkyii shikaku' (Research Perspectives on Japanese Fascism), Rekishi Gaku Kenkyit, no.

162

24 25 26 27

Democracy in postwar Japan 451, December 1977, pp. 2-11; Barrington Moore Jnr, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1966. Furuya Tetsuo, 'Nihon fashizumu ron' (Theories of Japanese Fascism), Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi, vol. 20, Kindai vol. 7, Iwanami Shoten, 1976, pp. 79-126; Yamaguchi Yasushi, op. cit. Nolte, op. cit., p. 453. One writer who holds this view is Komatsu Shigeo, 'Nihon gata fashizumu' (Japanese Style Fascism), Shido sha to taishu, vol. 5, Kindai Nihon shiso shi koza, Chikuma Shobo, 1960, p. 313. See Maruyama Masao, 'Introduction', Morris, I. I., Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan, London, Oxford University Press, 1960, pp. xviiXXVIl.

28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37

38 39 40 41 42 43

44 45 46

Maruyama Masao. Postscript, Gendai seiji no shiso to kOdo (Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics), Expanded, Miraisha, 1964, p.498. See for example Abe Hiroatsu, 'Nihon fashizumu no kenkyii shikaku' (Research Perspectives on Japanese Fascism), Rekishi Gaku Kenkyu, no. 451, December 1977, pp. 2-11. See for example Yamaguchi, op. cit., pp. 278-279. Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1966, p. 313. Maruyama Masao, 'Shihai to fukujii', Gendai seiji no shiso to kOdo, pp.412-422. Maruyama Masao, 'Seiji gaku ni okeru kokka no gainen' (Concept of the State in Political Science), in Senchu to sengo no aida, Misuzu ShoM, 1976, pp. 4--33. ibid., p. 18. ibid., p. 24. ibid., P 32. Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan, University of Tokyo Press, 1974, Mikiso Hane trans., p. 326. Maruyama Masao, 'Nationalism in Japan: Its Theoretical Background and Prospects', Thought and Behaviour, p. 143. Maruyama claims he had not read any of Lasswell's works when he wrote his essays on ultranationalism and fascism, and made up his own terminology which he later discovered resembled that of Lasswell. See the postscript to Gendai seiji no shis6 to k6d6, pp. 495-585. Maruyama Masao, 'Ideology and Dynamics of Japanese Fascism', Thought and Behaviour, p. 26. Maruyama Masao, 'Nashonarizurnu, gunkokushugi, fashizumu' (Nationalism, Militarism, Fascism), Gendai seiji no shis6 to kod6, pp.270-304. See Maruyama Masao, 'Hando no gainen: hitotsu no shiso shi teki sekkin' (Concept of Reaction: An Approach From the Perspective of the History of Ideas), Iwanami koza gendai shiso, vol. V, Iwanami Shoten, 1957, pp. 14--15; and 'Fascism - Some Problems: A Consideration of its Political Dynamics', Thought and Behaviour, p. 176. Maruyama Masao, 'Nashonarizumu, gunkokushugi, fashizumu', p. 294. Maruyama Masao, 'Fascism - Some Problems', p. 165. Maruyama Masao, 'Ideology and Dynamics of Japanese Fascism', pp. 26-34.

Fascism 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54

55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63

64

163

ibid., p. 33. Maruyama Masao, Postscript, Gendai seiji no shiso to kOdo, p. 501. Maruyama Masao, 'Ideology and Dynamics', p. 60. ibid., p. 58. ibid., pp. 82-83. Maruyama Masao, in Maruyama et al., Gendai Nihon no kakushin shiso, Gendai no Rironsha, 1983, pp. 6--10. I. I. Morris, Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan, London: Oxford University Press, 1960. Maruyama Masao, 'Minshushugi no na ni okeru fashizumu' (Fascism By The Name of Democracy), Sekai, October 1952, pp. 41-42; and 'Fashizumu no gendai teki jokyo' (Contemporary Situation of Fascism), Senchu to sengo no aida, pp. 541-542. Maruyama Masao, 'Fashizumu no gendai teki jokyo, p. 536. ibid., pp. 548-549. ibid., pp. 545-546. ibid., p. 541. ibid., p. 549. Maruyama Masao, 'Minshushugi no na ni okeru fashizumu', p. 51. For instance Hirohito's former birthday is now celebrated as 'Green Day'. Maruyama Masao, Minshushugi no na ni okeruJashizumu, p. 37. Maruyama Masao, 'Patterns of Individuation and the Case of Japan: A Conceptual Scheme', in Marius B. Jansen, ed., Changing Japanese Attitudes Towards Modernisation, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1965, pp. 489-531. Maruyama Masao, 'Nationalism in Japan', p. 152.

7 Pacifism, autonomy and the logic of democracy

Peace and democracy have been the leitmotifs of intellectual discourse in postwar Japan since the day of defeat in 1945. 1 During the Occupation these themes, elevated to the status of ideals, met on the negative ground of the 'war responsibility' debate and the war crimes trial. Under these circumstances democracy was accompanied by 'passive' pacifism, an anti-war feeling for which democracy was the promised reward. When these ideals met with the political moment of independence at the beginning of the 1950s in the midst of the Cold War, pacifism was transformed into the opportunity actively to base Japan's postwar democracy on the universal value of peace. Pacifism was initially regarded as a vehicle for personal autonomy, an opportunity to declare values that were independently formulated. But the deterioration of political conditions in the postwar period shocked Maruyama into forcing autonomy from the private, individual sphere into open, public engagement with the state. The imperative of social autonomy was demonstrated in the frustrated hopes of the pacifist movement in the Cold War era. Much more than mere companion themes, peace, democracy and independence were also mutually-conditional premises. Pacifists believed that national political autonomy (independence) could only be achieved through a comprehensive peace treaty with all belligerents, and through a neutralist foreign policy. This called for pacifist activism. Pacifist activism was only possible in a democratic environment, and only legitimate if it aspired to a democratic end-goal. For the peace activists, conditional independence would mean conditional popular sovereignty. A military alliance would not only make independence conditional, but undermine Japan's democracy. It also meant that Japan's democratic identity was dependent on a supra-ideological version of democracy, one that rose above the Cold War divide. The way that Japan re-entered the international community in 1952 threatened

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the basic premises behind Japan's democracy. In this way the debates on peace during the 1950s revealed the criteria for democracy in Japan. Democracy had to have its genesis in personal autonomy, but must ultimately connect with social autonomy. Through pacifism Japanese intellectuals moved decisively from theory to practice. The conceptual relationship between peace and democracy forces us to re-assess the state of the democratic concept in post-Occupation Japan. The tremendous power of the peace-democracy ideal was demonstrated with shocking clarity in the riots and mass activism surrounding the revision of the Security Treaty in 1960. In most cases however the political objectives of the peace movement have failed. With the notable exception of resistance against repeated attempts to revise the pacifist clause (Article 9) of the 1947 constitution, pacifist objectives have been honoured by the state in the breach. Article 9 has been violated in spirit through the existence of Japan's Self Defence Forces, Japan's role in the American military system, and through Japan's own armaments industry. What effect did these compromised pacifist ideals have on perceptions of the democratic ideal? Were the disappointments of the peace movement in Japan due in large part to its own internal logic? If so, have these same flaws compromised notions of democracy in Japan? Any observer of the political and diplomatic life of contemporary Japan would acknowledge that pacifism remains a force in Japanese society. Whether it be a Machiavellian rendering of the utility of pacifism (giving Japan a 'free ride'), or an empathetic tribute to Japan's role as an international icon of peace (the Hiroshima-centred anti-nuclear movement), there can be no doubt that there is within Japanese pacifism an element which represents enduring appeal and relevance to Japan's political culture. Our challenge is to identify this element, and ascertain what it tells us about perceptions of democracy in Japan. As a controversial philosopher of Japanese democracy, and a leading figure in academic circles, Maruyama not only featured in pacifist exchanges and activities of the 1950s but he was instrumental in defining and challenging the parameters of the peace movement as a whole. The debates concerning the peace and security treaties of 1952 saw Maruyama descend with a determined step from the 'ivory tower', and join the ranks of a new postwar breed of intellectual activists. His commitment to his chosen role of 'public intellectual'2 would see him on the philosophical and physical front line through to the maelstrom of 1960. How his experiences changed him, and how his ideas changed

166 Democracy in postwar Japan and challenged his peers and fellow citizens, would be no less significant to conceptions of democracy in postwar Japan than the events of 1960 themselves. PACIFISM AND THE COLD WAR Theorists of pacifism in the Cold War aftermath of World War II such as Raymond Aron and Hans J. Morgenthau were caught in an historical context which demanded a redefinition of pacifism. In this they were in the same predicament as their newly-emerging Japanese counterparts, though the former were free of the added perceptual screen of an American-led Occupation of their countries. Under these circumstances, what had been characterised as an 'absolute theory'] had of necessity to confront the 'reality' of Cold War ideological polarisation in the nuclear age, where peace was impossible and war was improbable. 4 The dilemma revealed itself in the philosophically familiar stand-off of realism versus idealism. In its pristine 'absolute' form pacifism aspired to the transcendentalism of humanity, which surpassed all other considerations and could not be compromised by any earthly cause. Faith in humanity was also a mainstay of this position, in the sense that 'peace is rationally the goal to which societies tend'.s Humanity as its own ultimate priority was the power behind pacifist claims to universalism: '[Pacifism] ... not only regards man's propensity to go to war as a wicked or irrational aspect of human behaviour, but also believes that his conscience can be persuaded of this. '6 The advent of the nuclear nightmare added desperation to this humanistic universalism, but it also made the 'either/or' choice inherent in an absolutist position unacceptably stark. Once the fact of two ideologically-opposed blocs was accepted, peace as idealism was either driven into an even more absolutist direction (anti-nuclear pacifism), or into trying to stress the 'realism', or rationality, of pacifism in a divided world. Raymond Aron is representative of the latter position. He was a 'realist' in that he acknowledged power as the force behind international politics, and as the factor which determined the shape that peace would take: equilibrium, hegemony, or empire. 7 He also reversed Clausewitz's dictum, and depicted policy as 'war by other means'.8 And yet his realism was tempered by and conditional upon the incorporation of idealism: A true realism takes into account the whole of reality, dictates diplomatic-strategic conduct adapted not to the finished portrait of

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what international politics would be if statesmen were wise in their selfishness, but to the nature of the passions, the follies, the ideas and the violences of the century.9 The idea of making realism and idealism complementary was attempted to an extent by Morgenthau, but not in the sense of equilibrium between the two. This champion of the primacy of national interest saw the realist-idealist reconciliation in terms of pragmatism representing ethics in the political sphere, where facts determined the degree to which morality could prevail. 1o Morgenthau's realism insisted that universalism be restrained by the demands of particularity. Moral universality could only work in a particular context, thus it was not truly universal; morality which grew from a particular context could not be universally applied. II The particularistic noose was unacceptable from the perspective of pacifist idealism, and there was no philosophical meeting of minds here. Giovanni Sartori has argued that realism and idealism are only regarded as incompatible through a misunderstanding of reality itself, and that in the political sphere both were essential to each other: If we understand political realism as the search for the factual basis of politics, then the account of the realist stops just where liberalism, democracy and socialism begin. For liberalism, democracy and socialism are not the fruit of a Realpolitik but ... of a Phantasie PoIWk. They are built on facts, but by fantasy . . . Ideals cannot replace facts, they are superimposed on them. 12 But again we find this to be unacceptable in the light of pacifist idealism, for Sartori argued that ideals were not meant to succeed, but only to challenge facts.13 Morgenthau even suggested that the factual could not afford to be compromised by the ideal, for it would undermine the rational treatment of that reality. Specifically, he wrote that democracy could impede the rational course of foreign policy.14 The unwillingness of realists to associate realism with universality, and their dismissal of any notion that power could cohabit with ideals, made the attempts at philosophical reconciliation between realism and idealism appear extremely unconvincing to the postwar pacifists of Maruyama Masao's generation. Their struggle to achieve a more credible reconciliation would see them cross the same philosophical sparring ground, and to the jaded eye of a realist they too ultimately failed. But the failure to change reality is not a true gauge of success for the idealist, and it is in this spirit that Japanese postwar pacifism should be assessed.

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PEACE AND DEMOCRACY: THE LOGIC OF JAPANESE PACIFISM

What was the substance of postwar Japanese pacifism, and who were the pacifists? Japanese pacifism in many ways fits into the Westerncentred definitions, and suffers from the same tensions and intellectual log-jams. Its distinctiveness lies in its historical circumstances, and its moral transcendence derived from the nuclear experience. It is this combination of factors which produced the iron association of peace and democracy as the subslance of pacifism in 1950s Japan. We find in the peace debates of those years most of the themes which were tossed about in the postwar journals and popular press about future directions for Japan. Through the tangled skein of this debate culture it was always peace and democracy which emerged as the thread joining the scatterings of miscellaneous concerns together. Locating this common ground is difficult. We cannot even speak of a united peace movement. Despite ideological and personal differences amongst pacifist intellectuals it is possible to identify commonly-held assumptions about the state and the individual, pacifism as resistance, and the universalism of democracy. The directions taken in debates on peace amongst Maruyama Masao's peers were informed to a considerable extent by the political climate at home and abroad: in short, the consolidation of the Cold War. The interest lies in how Japanese intellectuals interpreted the connection between these events and Japan's emergence as an 'independent' nation. Ultimately the conditions and expectations of independence were formed in response to the problems inherent in those political circumstances. The situation presented three dilemmas. First, independence was clearly conditional on peace, in the form of a peace treaty. However, the peace treaty first proposed by Washington in 1950 and eventually signed in September 1951 did not include all of the co-belligerents (notably the Soviet Union and China). Japan's peace was incomplete, and so was her independence. Second, the peace treaty was to be accompanied by a Mutual Security Treaty with the United States. The associated Administrative Agreement, governing the nature of the United States' continuing military presence in Japan, seemed to many informed Japanese to undermine the integrity of the peace treaty. Not only was Japan embroiled in a military alliance, but her independence received the double onslaught of a 'partial peace' and the loss of sovereignty over United States' military bases on Japanese territory. The blow to democracy was severe for another reason: the Administrative Agreement was not made public until 28 February 1952, after it had

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been signed. Unlike the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Mutual Security Treaty, the Administrative Agreement was not exposed to public discussion and was not ratified by the Diet (instead it was only passed by the Cabinet). This was taken by many intellectuals to be the equivalent of not being accorded due democratic process. The third dilemma, which made the other two more acute and apparently irreconcilable, was that of security. With the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, Japanese who had clung to ideals of peace and independence had been confronted with the equally unequivocal urgency of territorial security. Many Japanese had assumed in the late 1940s that the Cold War was a European affair and not likely to threaten Asia. In such a situation the Security Treaty would have seemed little more than a harmless appendage. But the outbreak of war in June 1950 changed that complacent scenario for the so-called 'progressive' intellectuals. It seemed that if independence depended on peace, and peace depended on the negative instrument of defence, then peace was itself negated in the process. If independence was teamed with security provided by the United States, it was nothing but quasi-independence. Independence would have to be redefined, and the rubric of peace, independence and democracy smashed, in order to rationalise this outcome. From a democratic perspective, the added complication of Cold War ideological polarisation between the Soviet-centred East and the United States-centred West appeared to have turned the peace, democracy and independence ideals into a conundrum. There is a danger that scholars removed in time from those debates will confuse what were implicitly understood by the participants in the debates to be separate, yet interactive issues. The issues involved were those of democratic procedure, democratic principle, and democratic ideology. The matter of the 'partial peace' excluding the Soviet Union, China, Korea and other countries was deeply troubling because it showed the procedure of democracy to be flawed and easily circumvented. These fundamental democratic principles were expressions of two types of social autonomy: popular sovereignty revealed through an independent and principled foreign policy, and social autonomy revealed as the responsiveness of the state to an agenda developed and promoted by the private sphere. Peace and democracy were thus inextricably joined, with the ultimate rightness of this formula codified in Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution. Antonyms such as peace and war, fascism and democracy, the state and the individual were the refrains behind Occupation era debates on war guilt and 'war responsibility'. This view was shared by observers

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outside Japan as well, and reinforced by the two-pronged Occupation programme of democratisation and demilitarisation. The crucial difference during the discussions on the peace treaty and on security in the 1950s was the state-individual dichotomy, as it implied a transference of initiative from the former to the latter. Thus peace was above all the animation of democratic rights, the link between personal and social autonomy. Most intellectuals felt that 'the peace treaty debate was about the fate of democracy in Japan'. IS It is little wonder then that Yoshino Genzaburo, editor of the influential journal Sekai and catalyst and mainstay of the pacifist movement, regarded the 'partial peace' as something which imposed international restrictions on the right of the Japanese people to determine their own destiny.16 Similarly Royama Masamichi, whose intellectual profile places him closer to conservative opinion than that of the radical left postwar, stated in 1953 that perhaps one reason for Japan's unique perspective on democracy was because Japan was not yet truly independent. 17 For activist intellectual peers Maruyama Masao and Shimizu Ikutaro, the passage of the Peace and Security Treaty bills by majority vote through the Diet was not evidence of sound democratic procedure but an example of flagrant disregard for democratic principle. IS The fierce conviction this represented to the postwar generation was amply demonstrated in the Security Treaty Crisis in 1960. Peace, independence and democracy were physically fought for in an unprecedented display of political activism and in the clear belief that keeping this formula intact was the very stuff of Japan's democracy. So deep-rooted is this understanding of democratic integrity that the charge of 'tyranny of the majority' remains a weapon powerful enough to unseat a Prime Minister. 19 This concern, wrapped in the envelope of peace and independence, was treated in the 1950s as a failure of democratic procedure which betrayed the basic democratic principles of social autonomy and popular sovereignty. This perspective was reinforced by pacifist revulsion against conservative justifications of a 'partial peace'. The basis of this pro-partial peace position was unacceptable to pacifist intellectuals because it disavowed the fundamental principles of popular sovereignty and social autonomy. Suzuki Bunshiro is representative of this pro-partial peace stance. Basically, Suzuki argued that because Japan was a defeated country, she had no say in the arrangement of the peace. Instead, this was the preserve of the victor nations who had signed the Potsdam Declaration. 20 Contributors to the Communist Party journal Zen'ei seized on the reference to the Potsdam Declaration to argue the opposite case:

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Unconditional surrender meant acceding to the Potsdam Declaration. Conditions not included in the Declaration cannot be imposed by anybody. Military alliances, economic agreements, and anything which might hinder the guarantees in the Declaration of national independence and peaceful existence, the Allied countries have themselves vowed before the world not to institute. 21 It is indeed striking that the Potsdam Declaration was largely ignored in the peace process by the US State Department and the Allies in general. For the Japanese intellectuals backing a comprehensive peace, the denial of autonomous decision making negated the entire peace process. This aspect was far more important to the integrity of the peace, and to Japan's independence, than the mere signature of a document purporting to deliver them. When we address the substance of democratic principle, we find in the debates of the 1950s a blurring between democratic principle and democratic ideology. The confusion is due to the blurring etTect of historical events. In retrospect, we can trace with ease the apparent link between the disillusionment with Occupation democracy after 1947 through the so-called 'reverse course', and the polarisation of liberal and social democracy patterned after the Cold War ideological stand-otT in Korea after 1950. In order correctly to understand the conceptual linkage between peace and democracy in 1950s Japan, it is essential to place the Korean War in its proper perspective. Japanese intellectuals' responses to the ideological polarisation of the Korean War are often seen as attributable to a copy-cat split within the peace movement between leftist and rightist positions. When one takes into account the peace-democracy paradigm the 'split' is not so stark. Instead we find that one group (including Maruyama Masao and Shimizu Ikutaro) strove to preserve their definition of democracy derived during the Occupation both from the 'reverse course' disillusionment and from becoming mired in the ideological divide of the Cold War by arguing for a supra-ideological definition of peace and democracy. Another group (including Tsuru Shigeto and Kozai Yoshishige) similarly fed on the 'reverse course' disillusionment and, encouraged by Stalin's 'Socialism in One Country' policy, saw a means to preserve their pre-1950 definition of democracy in aligning with socialism. The disillusionment with Occupation democracy did not atTect what had by then already become an indigenous democratic philosophy. Continuity of purpose and conceptual consistency, and the endurance of those democratic principles originally conceived in the aftermath of

172 Democracy in postwar Japan war, are the striking aspects of postwar Japanese pacifism. The idea that the peace movement split after 1950 into irreconcilable left and right ideological oppositions is inaccurate. Rather the split, such as it was, represented two means to the same end. The tragedy of the Japanese peace movement has been, and remains, its inability to recognise this fundamental democratic common ground. In many ways, the fall-out after the Security Treaty Crisis in 1960 should be regarded as the democratic coda of this tragedy. If there was a split, it was between the conservative governments of Yoshida Shigeru and the pacifist intellectuals. The creation of conditions for Japan's independence in a Cold War world was problematic for obvious reasons, but perhaps the most serious problem involved the association of militarisation (through the Security Treaty and the creation in 1950 of a para-military National Police Reserve) with independence. John Dower has described this split in terms of differing interpretations of autonomy. On the one hand, conservatives argued that a military alliance would protect Japan's national autonomy (from communist invasion). On the other hand, pacifist intellectuals regarded this as antithetical and thus illogical, seeing national autonomy as achievable only through the pursuit of a pacifist and neutralist foreign policy.22 Article 9 of the constitution served as a receptacle for both the 'peace through strength' and the 'unarmed neutrality' positions, denying either side unqualified support. 23 This brings us once again to confront the significance of autonomy, and in particular the perceived connection between national and social autonomy. This had two divergent consequences. First, the pacifist debate was firmly grounded in the assumed antipathy between the state and the individual (or public and private), and pacifists derived their raison d'etre from their role as an opposition, and as a resistance movement. Second, due to the peculiar historical context surrounding Japan's independence, pacifism ironically came to be promoted as a neo-nationalist identity. In other words, it was assumed by pacifist thinkers that the attainment of national autonomy would, and should, be the result of the primacy of social autonomy in the Japanese polity. The success of a pacifist foreign and domestic policy would be the success of Japan's new postwar identity, an identity which the Potsdam Declaration, the Tokyo Trials, Occupation policy and successive officials from Washington had implied was the only right and proper course for postwar Japan to follow. The state was derided by pacifist intellectuals before and after the Korean War because it fell into line with a particularistic version of democracy, American democracy, that had shown itself to be hypocritical

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and ethically bankrupt. Such was the force of feeling which met the banning of the 1 February 1947 general strike, the Red Purge of 1950, the release of war criminals without trial in October 1950, and other 'policy reversals'. Shimizu Ikutaro stated this forcefully in 1956, when he referred to the importance of the day of independence for Japan's pacifist and democratic future: 'from that day, all peace debates which did not simultaneously think about independence from America lost all meaning. '24 As Tamamoto has pointed out, the 'reverse course' actually exerted a positive influence on the Japanese peace movement as it reinforced democracy as a universal rather than a particularistic ideal. 25 This pushed pacifists first to look for an internationalist version of peace and democracy through the United Nations and then, after the outbreak of the Korean War, to aspire to a supra-ideological version. The impact of the Korean War then was to shift pacifist debate from idealist internationalism to peaceful coexistence. The hope and inspiration derived by intellectuals from the Five Peace Principles26 which emerged from the Nehru-Chou En Lai summit in June 1954, which were subsequently reaffirmed by the Afro-Asian and the Non-Aligned Movements, is conveyed powerfully by the following extensive quotation from Shimizu Ikutaro. The tension revealed here between the desire for a universalistic peace, and the fact that this was more likely to be achieved through pacifism in the form of Asian nationalism, exposed the complexity of the brief which thinkers like Shimizu sought to fulfil through their pacifism: The five peace principles mark a new stage in the history of the development of democracy. Until now democracy was exclusively a principle related to a country's internal politics. and it was problematic to use it to control relations between states. Especially in the case of Western countries where democracy was developed early, because these countries were at the same time using Asian and African regions as colonies, democracy had a false reputation in the context of relations between Asia, Africa and the West. In addition, even if one distances oneself from these relations. the real gap between so-called large states and small states, strong countries and weak countries. creates doubt about the existence of the democratic principle in international relations. In this respect it can be said that the five principles have demonstrated the life of the democratic principle internationally . . . If we think about the significance of these five principles, it must be seen as only natural that these principles, differing from the great principles and theories to date, were created not in Washington, Paris or Moscow, but in a corner of Asia. That is

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not in the company of power, but rather in opposition to power ... The life of democracy is, through the hands of the peoples of Asia and Africa, being reborn.21 The intermingling of nationalist and internationalist aspirations for peace was complicated further by Japan's status as the world's first nuclear victim. It is extremely significant that information about the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were released alongside Japan's attainment of (nominal) independence. 28 The conceptual interdependence of independence and anti-nuclear pacifism emerged during the 1950s in the form of an acute sense of moral transcendence on the part of Japanese pacifists, based on a particularistic version of pacifist nationalism. This victim-consciousness pushed Japanese pacifists in two directions at the same time: it led them to develop pacifism as a unique national identity, and it propelled them outwards as pacifist role models for the rest of the world. The tenacious defence of Article 9, particularly by the socialist opposition in Japan (until the advent of the Liberal Democrat/Socialist coalition government in 1994), was the clearest expression of this understanding of Japan's identity and international role. Once blackout censorship of news about the atomic bombs had been lifted in the wake of the Occupation, what had been smouldering as outraged 'common knowledge' amongst the intellectual community burst forth as a fierce awareness of a new unique identity - that of nuclear victim. Tracing the interaction between the emotive symbols of 8.l5 (the day of defeat in 1945) and 8.6 (6 August 1945, the day when Hiroshima was bombed) reveals much about the dilemma confronting Japanese intellectuals when they tried to develop their ideas on democracy after the war. As we have noted, the Occupation authorities implicitly regarded evidence of war guilt on the part of Japanese as evidence of democratic integrity.29 But having been faced with the disappointment of the 'reverse course' and then the spectre of the internationalist icon, the United Nations, drawn into battle on the side of American military might in the Korean War, Japanese intellectuals began seriously to question this received view of democratic legitimacy. The explosion of nuclear-victim awareness in 1952 changed the course of Japanese ideas on democracy. The Japanese peace movement first found its persuasive force in its nuclear experience, and this retains its emotive power in the post-Cold War world. More important though is the fact that through its association with pacifism, Japanese ideas on democracy began to develop criteria which were indigenous. It was this mindset which defined

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Japanese attitudes towards the peace and security treaties of 1952, the Security Treaty Crisis of 1960, and which laid the foundation for popular criticism of Japanese democracy. The revival of debates on 'war responsibility' in 1956 were more than an overhang from the Occupation era; they were evidence of a belief on the part of intellectuals that their democratic integrity depended on subjective value creation and the autonomous pursuit of these ethics. It is through the entanglement of pacifism with democracy that democracy in postwar Japan first began to acquire a Japanese character. Hiroshima provided postwar democracy with its sense of direction and creative energy. Even after the Korean War demonstrated that war could assume other forms - a proxy war, or a non-nuclear localised conflict - the democratic value system which emerged out of 1950s Japanese pacifism put down deep roots, becoming a credo to which other things had to be reconciled. The peace movement adjusted to the changing realities of a divided world, and a post-Stalinist world, and struggled against an existence within an American military sphere. In spite of this, ideas on democracy became entrenched. This was the essence of the struggles against the revision of the Security Treaty in 1960, and intimates the extent of the crisis it represented not merely for Japanese pacifism, but for Japanese democracy. Through traversing the issues of the state versus the individual and pacifism as resistance, Japanese pacifists established social autonomy as the means for attaining their version of peace and democracy. At the same time, they journeyed from an identification with particularistic American democracy through redefining democracy as a universal ideal, only to return to what must be described as a particularistic, pacifist version of democracy. To comprehend the implications of this, we shall proceed to examine more closely the direction of debates on peace during the 1950s through the eyes of the most influential group of thinkers on peace, the Heiwa Mondai Danwakai. mE HEIWA MONDAI DANWAKAI

When the Civil Information and Education Section of the Occupation headquarters in Tokyo passed a UNESCO statement on peace to the editor of Sekai in 1948, they surely did not expect that this would galvanise parts of the Japanese intellectual community for two decades. Rather, they no doubt regarded it as consistent with the aims of their propaganda campaign of democratisation. After all, UNESCO was free of the taint of Soviet membership, and the statement spoke in

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vague terms of avoiding war through the application of intellect, motivated by laudable principles such as equality and humanism. 30 The real impact was quite different. With the statement in his grasp, Yoshino Genzaburo enlisted Shimizu Ikutaro's help in drawing together over fifty of the most respected Japanese intellectuals to respond to the UNESCO statement. The result was the formation of the Heiwa Mondai Danwa Kai (Peace Problems Discussion Group, hereafter listed as Heidankai), under whose name Japanese intellectuals would become actively engaged with the most volatile issues of the day: peace, democracy, and security. Themselves children of the Cold War, its members never achieved the idealistic heights to which they aspired and fell victim to the evils they sought to eradicate. Yet in the process they established a discourse which outlasted their own existence and subsequently became the ethical foundation for democratic criticism in Japan. In many ways their appeal stemmed from their failures. As a group, they failed in their push for a comprehensive peace; they failed to curb Japan's circumvention of its pacifist constitution; they failed to prevent the revision of the Security Treaty in 1960. But in doing so they fulfilled the most important criterion for democratic legitimacy: they engaged in active resistance against the state. We are drawn again to the magnitude of the failure of the Anti-Security Treaty movement in 1960 when we consider that the futility of resistance it signified also implied the futility of democracy as it had been defined through the peace movement in the 1950s. The fact that their intellectual tradition survived in a transmuted form to influence the anti-Vietnam War citizen's movement (Beheiren) under the guidance of a younger generation of pacifist scholars (such as Sakamoto Yoshikazu and Ishida Takeshi) implies that they should not be dismissed as dreamers who did not win their day. These second generation postwar pacifists pioneered the internationalist expansion of political science in Japan's top universities, and were the first to travel extensively around the world as academic representatives of postwar Japanese society. Original Heidankai scholars such as Maruyama Masao continued their intellectual activism after 1960 in other forms too, notably in researching and interpreting Japan's constitution through such groups as the Kenpo Mondai Kenkyiikai (Constitutional Problems Research Group). Having burst on to the intellectual scene in 1946 with the publication of his Logic and Psychology of Ultranationalism followed up by several provocative essays on Japanese fascism, Maruyama Masao was a logical person to recruit for the Heidankai. His contributions to the

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Heidankai's output were decisive. Maruyama claims to have been largely responsible for having drafted the Tokyo sub-group's original response to UNESCO. He also wrote the key theoretical first and second chapters of the Heidankai's Third Statement on Peace. 31 In his other writings during the 1950s, Maruyama concentrated on expanding the themes which he promoted under the auspices of the Heidankai: pacifism as realism, and the ideological transcendence of peace (more commonly referred to as the idea of 'peaceful coexistence'). During this decade Maruyama was troubled by tuberculosis, and after 1950 his physical presence in Heidankai gatherings was spasmodic. Nevertheless he kept in touch with the debates, and his views were duly communicated to the others. He even dictated essays on peace from his hospital bed. The proceedings of the Heidankai's meetings and the statements they produced provide us with a fascinating context within which to evaluate Maruyama's intellectual relationship with his peers, and perhaps more interestingly, the way in which he struggled against ideological and political challenges to his ideas. This decade radicalised Maruyama in the sense that he shifted from advocating intellectual leadership of public opinion in 1950 to addressing protest gatherings and marching to deliver petitions to the Prime Minister in 1960. To understand his sense of crisis in 1960, we must follow closely his intellectualjourney in the 1950s. What motivated Maruyama Masao and his peers to form a group such as the Heidankai, and how did the drastic change of circumstances between 1947 and 1950 affect their original objectives? When in 1948 Yoshino felt the first rush of enthusiasm in response to the UNESCO scholars who had gathered together in Paris the previous summer, the Cold War was an unfortunate affair removed from Japan and centred on Berlin. Independence had been suggested by MacArthur in 1947 as an issue whose time had come, but the spectres of 'conditional independence' and a military alliance were not yet on the public agenda. Free of these world-weary constraints, intellectuals could indulge their idealism to the full. Yoshino had other problems on his mind, problems that were closer to home, when he decided to prod a Japanese response to UNESCO out of the talented contributors to Sekai. The shutaisei and modernisation debates had exposed cracks in the intellectual 'united front' between orthodox Marxist scholars and their peers, cracks which were deepening. Maintaining the cooperation of Japanese thinkers for the sake of their common democratic future was important. If the intellectuals

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were divided,· who could protect the populace from being once more misled by unscrupulous authority? There is no mistaking the elitist nature of Yoshino's attitude, but in his eyes he perhaps more than anything regarded himself as a populist. After all, Sekai was a link between the academic world and the common man, a journal designed to bridge the gap of academic elitism. It is well known that Yoshino seized on the presence of a Hungarian social scientist in the UNESCO conference, one Alexander Szalai, as the symbolic inspiration for a supra-ideological approach to peace and democracy. While Szalai's signature appeared on the UNESCO scholars' statement released on 13 July 1948, it is clear from the papers published in 1950 under Hadley Cantril's editorship that Szalai was personally deeply dismayed at the failure of the UNESCO scholars to overcome their 'prejudice' against socialism. When we peruse the criticisms made by Szalai of each written contribution in Cantril's book, we can say the same of Szalai's view of 'capitalist' scholarship. Szalai's parting shot at the conclusion of his own submission, that the UNESCO conference 'remains a pleasant memory, or a pleasant illusion', conveys accurately the singular failure of the UNESCO scholars to achieve academic transcendence over Cold War polarisation. 32 This is not significant when we look at Yoshino's motivation, because it was the symbolism not the reality which actually motivated him to call Japanese intellectuals together. It is interesting though to note the precedent set by the UNESCO group for their Japanese successors. The UNESCO statement inspired the Japanese intellectuals to gather together and publish their support for the UNESCO principles, and to stake their own claim to pacifist leadership. But like their UNESCO peers, the Japanese pacifists were unable to achieve ideological transcendence. The dual discourse revealed here represents an instructive case study of the interaction of idealism and realism that is intrinsic to the pacifist debate. The statements subsequently produced by the Heidankai inspired the Japanese socialists and union movement to adopt pacifism as a central policy objective. The life of the ideal was vital and dynamic. Meanwhile, the Heidankai went to great lengths to conceal their internal divisions first from the Occupation and then from the conservative Japanese authorities. 33 The contradictions of reality were suppressed for the sake of the life of the ideal. A second aspect which inspired Yoshino, Maruyama and others to respond in kind to UNESCO drew painfully closer to reality. The selection of social scientists for the UNESCO conference in Paris was influenced partly by the hardship endured and/or resistance exhibited by the participants during the war. Their qualifications were rooted in

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resistance, and evidenced by their suffering. 34 Maruyama Masao later recalled that the members of the Heidankai had been drawn together by their 'war responsibility', meaning their desire to prevent a recurrence of the events which had led to war in the past. Their pacifist activism was supposed to be proof of their ability to resist, something which they had failed to do in the past. From the very first meeting of the chosen fifty, this was a matter of dispute. Having discussed the UNESCO statement in separate gatherings in Tokyo and in Kyoto, the fifty or so intellectuals chosen by Yoshino gathered together in Tokyo on 12 December 1948 to finalise the text of their response. Under 'old liberal' Abe Yoshishige's chairmanship, the day commenced with a few positive platitudes. But when Abe sought to take the group through their draft statement point by point, Marxist Hani Goro threw a spanner into the works. 'What is the first thing that we should think about before responding to the UNESCO statement?', he asked rhetorically. 'Do we have the qualifications to respond? I do not think so. '35 He proceeded to cast aspersions on the integrity of those assembled, in the knowledge that as a Marxist scholar he carried great moral weight behind him. If anyone group had resisted in wartime, it had been the Marxists. Hani elaborated as follows. First, he stated that Japan's intellectuals on the whole had a poor record, that they could not be regarded as a true 'intelligentsia'. By this he was referring obliquely to their failure collectively to resist. Second, and symptomatic of his first point, Japan's intellectuals had failed to exercise responsibility to the masses: 'under totalitarianism intellectuals faced their responsibility to those above, but totally failed to do so with their responsibility to those below. '36 Third, Hani suggested that before attempting to enlighten the people on peace, intellectuals should establish links with the people. The proceedings fell into disarray at this point, while various people sought to vindicate intellectuals' behaviour during the war. The Marxist economist Ouchi Hy6e pointed out that there had been 'special circumstances' during the war, making resistance difficult. Kawashima Takeyoshi accepted Hani's criticism, but pointed out that the intellectuals could not resist effectively without the support of the people. It was at this stage that Maruyama spoke up, and was the first to dare speak the words 'war responsibility'. 'Ultimately we cannot get by without touching on the fact that we were unable to prevent the war of aggression.'37 Maruyama's solution though was to use the Heidankai to overcome what had been the greatest problem in prewar Japan, namely the lack of unity amongst intellectuals. Coupled with the denial of

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freedom of speech, this had 'prevented' intellectuals from resisting the slide towards war: For example, if we look at the experiences following the Manchurian Incident when the Marxists were oppressed, the liberals acted as though it was something that only concerned the Marxists and had nothing to do with them. As a result, after the oppression of Marxists ceased, the liberals were subsequently oppressed ... Without questioning one's theoretical differences or positions, it is essential that political oppression of social scientists, or any kind of oppression, be of concern to all social scientists as a strong bond between them. 38 The statement issued under the signature of over fifty intellectuals (not yet formally grouped under the Heidankai) incorporated Maruyama's desire for a preamble on intellectuals' 'war responsibility': we Japanese scientists are shamefully aware that ... we as a whole succeeded little in serving as a brake upon the country's march into the war of aggression and certainly showed ourselves to be lacking in both courage and efforts in attempting positively to prevent such a war.39 The final product, though self-critical, also implied that as intellectuals had been denied free speech, they had been 'unable' to resist. Further, it was not so much their personal failure to act, but their inability to lead public opinion that had prevented them from resisting effectively. Twenty years later, Maruyama was taken to task for these sentiments by Sakamoto Yoshikazu in a 'round table' discussion on the Heidankai. Clearly uncomfortable with the elitist distance and lack of self-criticism reflected in the preamble of that first statement, Sakamoto questioned the personal commitment of Maruyama and his peers. In response, Maruyama argued that during the war the intellectual establishment had had little option but to commit themselves to the war effort. 'Speaking for myself as a human being,' said Maruyama, 'I do not feel that I am responsible for committing myself to the war.' The inability to oppose the war implied a responsibility on intellectuals' part to prevent those same circumstances from arising again. 'But this does not mean that one's own hands are dirty.'40 It is difficult for an outsider removed in time to come to terms with this version of 'war responsibility'. It is easier for observers to criticise a lack of bravery on the part of others than it is for those who cooperated to explain in times of peace why they did what they did in times of war. What is clear though is that pacifism postwar was the positive

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transformation of 'war responsibility', the manifestation of what Ozawa Shinichiro called 'postwar responsibility'. With peace as 'an axis for changing the present', the impetus fell directly on democracy to achieve the desired change. 4 \ The peace-democracy link was not simply a vague association borrowed from the honeymoon period of the Occupation. It was a product of indigenous philosophy, founded on indigenously-defined values with full consideration of the lessons of history. For Maruyama, postwar pacifism was the mechanism through which the Japanese people could regain control of their fate. This is what drew Maruyama and other intellectuals who struggled with their 'postwar responsibility' to respond with enthusiasm to the UNESCO statement. The UNESCO scholars had stated plainly in their first point that war was not an inevitable product of human nature. Maruyama seized on this, as it was confirmation that man was indeed in control of his fate and that autonomous action on his part could forestall war. In Maruyama's view fatalism, expressed explicitly as a feeling that war was inevitable, riddled Japanese society. In our country where until now people's control over domestic and international politics has been weak this type of fatalistic concept has put down deep roots, and war - which is only a method of settling international disputes, and the most primitive one at that acquires the reality of a natural phenomenon which cannot be opposed, it spiritually oppresses the citizenry, and continues to do SO.42 This was something that flowed from the incorporation of fatalism into the political structure itself. Unless those undemocratic elements were cleansed from society, he warned, it was useless merely to repeat over and over the fact that war was not a product of nature. 43 The dichotomy Maruyama presented between democracy and fatalism is the essence of his philosophy of autonomy. The Japanese scholars' statement in response to UNESCO echoed this point after its preamble, saying that 'man is gradually becoming the master of his own fate', and 'war is not a natural phenomenon'.44 The remaining nine points in the Japanese statement reflected the sentiments of the UNESCO model, citing economic inequalities as a cause of war, advocating equality of opportunity and putting science to use for mankind to prevent wars in future. No concrete suggestions were made, but both statements were confident that intellectual leadership had a role to play in a world increasingly bent on hard-core realpolitik. The Japanese statement of December 1948 differed from that of UNESCO in two other ways. In addition to the comment on 'war responsibility', the preamble featured a comment on Japan's unique

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position as a defeated nation with a pacifist constitution. The paragraph concerned seems to waver between anxiety that Japan now depended on the goodwill of others for its security, and pride in its pacifist credentials internationally. Such a realistic appraisal of the significance of Article 9 and the ability to regard it even implicitly in terms of nationalistic pride is truly astonishing given that the constitution was barely more than one year old. The other point of difference involved the role of nationalistic myths and symbols in causing wars. The UNESCO version simply stated that such myths tended to distort the reality of international interdependence. The Japanese approach to this issue was curious. No mention was made of the 'Emperor System' in the final statement; instead the use of such symbols and myths was associated with the abundance or lack of natural resources. This logic seems more reminiscent of the Nanshin logic behind Japan's southward advance in the 1940s than of a pacifist creed of a postwar nation. In his summary of the Tokyo Law and Politics Sub-Group's position however, Maruyama specifically mentioned Japan's experience with the Emperor symbol and, again, noted that this remained a problem even under the new constitution: 'we must at least warn against attributing a mystical essence to the symbolic status of the Emperor System as prescribed under the new constitution.'4s Japan's pacifist future depended on democratisation; democratisation depended on peace; both depended on the development of autonomy in society. A niggling worry was the fact that once more, Japan's intellectuals were reacting to stimulus from outside instead of creating their own reality. When Sakamoto Yoshikazu pointed this out to Maruyama in 1968, Maruyama retorted that it took the UNESCO statement to drag issues of war and peace out of the quagmire of Japanese Marxist discourse. 46 Maruyama was not quite right. It was the peace treaty which dragged issues of war and peace out of the comfortable realm of reactive idealism. From 1950 onwards, the treaty debate was the arena where social autonomy, pacifism and democracy took a proactive turn. The Heidankai's 15 January 1950 statement on the proposed peace treaty saw them switch from philosophical musing to a specific, political campaign. Its platform opposed a treaty that would exclude the Soviet Union and China, rejected a military alliance with any power, and advocated a neutralist foreign policy and eventual membership of the United Nations. It was the practical, political manifestation of the values and principles formerly espoused as desirable, but now insisted

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upon as the only viable course for postwar Japan to take. Japanese pacifism had met the 'real world', and believed its future depended on the Japanese people's ability to take its democratic system into its own hands. The philosophical continuity revealed in the Heidankai's second statement was the logical extension of its realisation that war was not an inevitable outcome, a logic that was applied this time to Japan's political decision-making process. In the preamble, this was put quite bluntly: 'regretting the fact that we lost the opportunity to shape our own destiny at the time of the outbreak of the war, we are determined this time to take our fate into our own hands.'47 It was acknowledged that Japan had received a sound democratic foundation from the Occupation, but the Heidankai explicitly stated that this would be meaningless unless Japan took charge. 'It cannot be doubted that the future development of this democracy is only possible through the Japanese people's own responsibility and creativity. '48 The democratic principles behind the imposed constitution and the Potsdam Declaration had taken on lives of their own. The conquered were now insisting that the conquerors live up to their own principles. The second Heidankai statement saw a comprehensive peace with all former belligerents to be the essential starting point for genuine political and economic independence. This type of independence in turn relied on peaceful relations with all states. Neutralism was the only viable foreign policy. Neutralism was only possible through a comprehensive peace. Tying all of these loose ends together, they believed that 'only this could guarantee a national identity internationally consistent with the constitution'.49 This was the circuitous logic motivating the scholars in the Heidankai. Given that the Heidankai represented 'the intellectual mainstream',s° and achieved an impact that reached from the Diet debates on the treaty to the newly burgeoning union movement, we would do well to examine their thinking closely. Of special interest is how their idealism and their conceptual approach to pacifism and democracy survived the traumas of the Korean War and the passing into law of the 'partial peace' and security treaties on 28 April 1952. This would serve to rebut the assumption that a split in the peace movement into ideologically-opposed camps after 1950 signified fundamental disagreement on the peace-democracy paradigm. Demonstrating how pacifists across the ideological spectrum implicitly regarded democracy as supra-ideological rather than something necessarily tied to a specific world-view is the key to this problem. Just when the Heidankai politicised its objectives, it departed from

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its 'united front' public image. Hard on the heels of its powerful second statement, it published an 'appendix' which made plain that not all of the pacifists were united behind the push for a comprehensive peace. 51 Far from an illogical or contradictory gesture, this evidence of difference was a statement of strongly-felt democratic principle. The majority of pacifists in the Heidankai favoured a comprehensive peace, but this did not mean that the minority view should not be heard. Following the logic of minority rights, Maruyama's Tokyo Group acknowledged that as a defeated country Japan could not dictate peace terms, but the democratic co-signatories of the Potsdam Declaration should take Japan's views into account. Naturally, in their view, Japan favoured true independence. Further, the Potsdam Declaration backed up the pacifist constitution of Japan in that it had insisted that Japan should never again become a menace to world peace. It had stated that this could be achieved by ridding Japan of militarism and encouraging democracy. This was the basis of the actual peace; the treaty ought to reflect those principles. As for a security treaty, 'it is something that is discussed after Japan has regained her independence'. Such an alliance would clearly be out of the question, as 'it is not possible to have something more powerful than the constitution'.52 The Tokyo Group argued that the real choice was not between two types of peace but peace through a comprehensive treaty, or a continuation of the Occupation through a 'partial peace': 'while on the one hand Japan would be freed of the shackles of the Occupation through a partial peace, these shackles would on the other hand be replaced by other new ones. '53 The minority view held that nominal independence was important, and that the stationing of American troops in Japan would help to police the peace. Such an outcome, it was argued, would be consistent with the objectives of the pacifist constitution. Leading figures such as Abe Yoshishige and Watanabe Tetsujiro adopted this view, having been spooked by the 1949 Chinese Communist victory, Chinese rapprochement with the Soviet Union, and the new Cominform-influenced militancy of the Japanese Communists. In this they were in accord with Yoshida Shigeru and John Foster Dulles, who were driven by the 'power vacuum' theory for which they believed 'peace through strength' to be the solution. The 'split' in the Heidankai was multifaceted. There was no clear divide between left and right. Tamamoto has described the importance of generational difference as a divisive factor in postwar intellectual movements, which meant that prewar liberals such as Abe emerged in

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the new circumstances of postwar as conservatives. 54 The communists were prised away from a congenial position by the rigours of the Red Purge and the Cominform criticism of 1950. Meanwhile the heirsapparent to the Heidankai pacifist platform, the Socialist party, ended the treaty deliberations with a split into left and right parties, being unable to live as one with a partial peace plus a security treaty. This was a rehearsal for their response to the failure of the Anti-Security Treaty movement in 1960, when they were again unable to see common ground once their idealistic foundations had been eroded. Scholars have subsequently written about the 'red' image of the peace movement as though this were to be taken for granted. Packard described the Heidankai as 'the most famous and influential association of progressive intellectuals', but defined 'progressive intellectuals' as 'a Marxist-oriented intelligentsia' comprising thinkers who were 'all committed to some form of socialism'.55 Japanese scholars such as Ishida Takeshi and Kuno Osamu have acknowledged that the peace movement was seen as 'red',56 but this was more an indication of conservative reaction against the successful appropriation of pacifist symbolism by the organised left (including Stalin) than it was a true depiction of Japanese pacifist ideology. Maruyama fought on behalf of like-minded intellectuals to raise peace and democracy above an association with socialist revolution. Democracy was not inherently hostage to its socialist interpretation when it was teamed with pacifism, though the 'reverse course', the Korean War and the 1954 Fukuryii Maru (Lucky Dragon) incident made the Soviet Union's version appear attractive at certain times. Given the latent presence of division throughout the peace movement, one would expect that the eruption of the Korean War in June 1950 would seal the fate of a pacifist platform motivated by principle and ideals. This would similarly be expected to become overpowering once the reality of the partial peace, the security treaty and the Administrative Agreement appeared. But this was not so. Instead, the Heidankai papered over its divisions in public and produced what has been described as 'an outstanding historical document'.57 The third Heidankai statement on peace was a philosophical exposition affirming the basic ideals of the peace-democracy paradigm, with full recognition of Japan's ethical and symbolic power as a pacifist nation. Written by Maruyama, Tsuru Shigeto and Ukai Nobushige on behalf of the Heidankai, it met the challenge of war with a pacifist platform based on realism and peaceful coexistence. The following section will focus on Maruyama's contribution to the

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establishment of a pacifist philosophy in Japan, both through his Heidankai work and his other writings on peace in the 1950s.

PACIFISM AS REALISM The dilemmas of Cold War pacifism seemed to Maruyama to contain all of the bogies he had identified in the Japanese past, as well as the potential to overcome them. The arguments in favour of a partial peace and a military alliance with the United States cited power politics and 'reality', but to Maruyama they were merely reincarnations of the closed-society mentality founded on the passive acceptance of 'nature'. Pacifism in independent Japan was the opportunity for social autonomy to claim Japan's political fate from 'established reality' - it was the opportunity which the Meiji Restoration had failed to take up. Pacifism was the chance for the modern mode of thinking to triumph over feudal subservience and post-feudal irresponsibility. It was the battleground for democracy, and it was a battle which Maruyama would not relinquish for the next decade. Just as Ogyii Sorai had challenged the 'reality' of Confucian power constructs, so did Maruyama challenge the 'reality' of the Cold War with the force of Invention. A key theme in Maruyama's writings on peace in the I 950s was the subjective nature of reality. Rather than an a priori entity divorced from human judgement and choice, it was a multifaceted entity that reflected the value-judgement of human beings and was formed through the pursuit of those values. Maruyama introduced these ideas in the first two of the four chapters in the Heidankai's September 1950 statement On Peace For The Third Time. The unifying theme of these sections, peace as realism, was for Maruyama the practical expression of a 'modern' mode of thinking. Maruyama pointed out that international 'reality' was fluid not fixed, and contained many possibilities and contradictions. Whether one accepted the inevitability of conflict between the two blocs or the possibility of peaceful coexistence was a matter of subjective judgement, not of fact or fiction. Both were 'subjective arguments which seek to influence the course of reality by emphasising one aspect of it'.s8 Both outcomes were possible, the question was which part of reality the individual chose to pursue. Maruyama's approach was reminiscent of Fukuzawa Yukichi's perspectivism, in that he insisted on establishing a connection between events and humanity. Refusing to accept reality as inherently 'objective' was the first step in placing autonomous individuals in charge of their own reality. The crucial next step

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was to make this connection dynamic by associating reality with subjective, value-driven intervention by autonomous individuals. Put simply, Maruyama argued that peace was ultimately the product of a mode of thought. The important thing in 1950s Japan was to avoid the distortion or manipulation of this mode of thought to suit a 'reality' which pretended to be objective. Maruyama set about ensuring that the opposite occurred. That is, he developed a definition of the pathology of 'reality' which depended on subjective judgement. He did this by deconstructing the philosophy of reality, and exposing it as a man-made and controlled by-product of autonomous thought and behaviour. In his 1952 essay Defects of 'Reality' Maruyama established three key structures of 'reality' as it was being presented by the pro-partial peace conservatives. First, it was being regarded as 'established fact' or a 'fait accompli'. This approach had been shown to be dangerous by the experience of the past war, and had been revealed in its full absurdity during the interrogations of Japanese leaders in the Tokyo War Crimes Trial. It was equally dangerous postwar, because it threatened postwar democracy: 'Postwar democratisation itself has only been affirmed over and over as "the reality of defeat". Soon ... democracy will be called "can't be helped democracy". This would soon become "can't be helped war abolition" and then move on to "can't be helped rearmament". '59 Maruyama was pointing out that even the peace constitution, of which the pacifists were so proud, would be meaningless if it merely represented an imposed reality and was dissociated from an active desire for peace. While the constitution (and especially Article 9) had been in effect 'imposed', its reality could be very different if it was regarded as embodying the genuine desire of the Japanese people. Many would argue that this has indeed been the outcome in contemporary Japan. A second pillar of so-called 'reality' was its one-dimensional aspect. Maruyama scoffed at the idea that fascism had been the only reality in prewar Japan. Similarly, there was no logic in placing Soviet-American tension in the camp of realists, and dismissing the peace movement as unrealistic. Maruyama believed that reality was a product of choice: It is a matter of making a choice of one aspect of 'reality' on the basis of a value judgement between one aspect of reality that is desirable, and the other that is not desirable. Whether it be the peace treaty problem or the rearmament problem, that is at no time a battle between realism and non-realism, but in fact it is nothing but making that kind of choice.60

188 Democracy in postwar Japan Yoshida Shigeru's conservative government had decided that a military alliance with the United States was a preferable option, and had taken that course. We may stand back and say that until Japan became independent she could not resist the United State's peace and security agenda even if she had wished to do so. Maruyama was implying that this did not mean that rearmament and collective security had its own internal momentum. Likewise, the impetus behind the United States' policy was not transcendental but driven by human decisions. It was blind direction, not blind fate, behind the Cold War stand-otT. A third pillar of 'reality' noted by Maruyama was that it was mostly defined by authority. This made any opposing trend seem to be idealistic, even illegitimate. If the peace movement was made to seem illegitimate it was confirmation thai reality had lost its multi-dimensional nature and become hostage to a one-dimensional view. In 1952 Maruyama was still optimistic enough to state that the common sense of history showed the people to be the ultimate force moving reality, not authority.61 In sum, Maruyama depicted reality as something that embodied invention not nature, something that was multi-dimensional, and something that ought to be the product of the many, not the few. Intellectuals were implicitly regarded by Maruyama to be the guardians of 'reality'. Their ability to do this depended on maintaining their critical distance from the received view of 'reality'. In an oblique warning to the left and the right, Maruyama cautioned those intellectuals who sought to force 'reality' to fit into a set theory. This could only lead to either complete divorce from this 'reality', or force the intellectuals to eliminate the incongruity between 'reality' and 'theory' by compromising their own positions. Surely this had been the lesson of the 1931 Manchurian Incident. Maruyama promoted values as the mechanism by which to guide and construct reality. To apply the fluidity of circumstance to value was to abandon one's control over reality. Thus to argue that the pacifist constitution, and even postwar democracy, was no longer 'realistic' in the Cold War world was irresponsible. The Cold War was a fact when the constitution was drafted; Churchill had made his 'Iron Curtain' speech in 1946. These circumstances enhanced, not undermined, the pacifist constitution: 'it was in making a new start "as an unarmed state despite these circumstances that gave the constitution its epoch-making meaning, that is how I remember it and understand it.'62 At the time of writing his contribution to the Heidankai's third statement on peace, it was not yet clear that the Korean conflict would remain localised and non-nuclear. Maruyama began the opening

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chapter of the statement with a repeat of the UNESCO warning that war was an outdated means of contlict resolution. Maruyama was off the mark when he warned that 'any war will be both global and total'.63 Yet even towards the end of the contlict, Maruyama cited the example of TaishO era pacifist Uchimura Kanzo (1861-1930) to dismiss even limited war as acceptable. He [Uchimura] indicated that modern warfare was losing its significance as an instrument which could achieve an objective, that in other words the massive increase in the spiritual and material cost of war had started a trend which made the distinction between a 'just' war and an 'unjust' war unrealistic. 64 The 'reality' of war made its justification under any circumstances 'unrealistic', if one used humanism as the gauge of value. When confined to bed in 1951, Maruyama dictated an essay on the 'reality' of the peace treaty. At the time of writing the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Security Treaty were about to be signed.6s Obviously the press had accepted it as a 'Jait-accompli', and most of the news discussed it as a 'given'. What concerned Maruyama was that the acceptance of the treaty would signify acceptance of rearmament. He thus continued to agitate against the peace treaty in terms which could only be described as 'realistic'. Pointing to the international repercussions of the 'partial peace' coupled with the security treaty, Maruyama lamented the negative impact such an outcome would have on peace in Asia: not even those who argue in favour of a separate peace, first with those countries with which it is possible and later in phases with the remaining countries who also think that indeed a comprehensive peace is desirable but impossible, will deny that such a peace lopsided towards America will make imaginary enemies of China and the Soviet Union. 66 Stressing Japan's obligations towards Asia based on both its pacifist leadership under the postwar constitution and its 'war responsibility', Maruyama asked whether a peace treaty that did not include China could be legitimate. Japan had followed China's lead on the way to becoming 'the hope of Asia', said Maruyama. Was Japan about to 'betray Asia again' by 'lining up with the powerful imperialist countries''?67 It was a desperate last-minute plea which uncharacteristically for Maruyama mixed appeals across the ideological spectrum. But when Japan greeted independence in the grip of a military alliance and followed it up with the communist-led Bloody May Day of 1952, it

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was clear to Maruyama that peace and democracy had to be dragged out of the mire of ideology. PACIFISM AS PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE The philosophy of 'peaceful coexistence' debated by Maruyama and others in 1950s Japan was an important intellectual contribution to international pacifist thought. It was also a metaphor for problems besetting the internal dynamics of the Japanese peace movement which struggled into the decade sharply divided. The pro-Marxist thinkers centred on the Kyoto branch of the Heidankai (Shinohara Takeo, Suekawa Hiroshi etc.) were insisting on a stronger economic focus, highlighting the international trend towards monopoly capitalism, militarisation and the inevitable class-based dynamics of exploitation followed by revolution. Others such as Shimizu Ikutaro had followed Maruyama's political and social science emphasis driven by humanism and realism, only to be radicalised by the disappointment of the 1952 treaty deal into adopting more and more uncompromising ideological positions. By 1954 Shimizu was equating the fight against 'established reality' not only with social autonomy, but also with revolution. 68 Such a link between pacifism and socialism would lead to division, not reconciliation. Maruyama's writings on peaceful coexistence were consciously directed at his own fellow-pacifists as well as the political philosophy of peace, in an attempt to salvage the unity of intellectual leadership in Japan. If peaceful coexistence and peace itself were realistic, then their denial meant that political discourse was founded on an imaginary reality. In Japan this imaginary reality had produced the Red Purge. This was in Maruyama's view having a detrimental effect on Japan's fragile democracy, as the cycle of fear and repression made democracy appear increasingly unrealistic: 'whatever else might come of this atmosphere of fear and unease throughout society, it is certain that it will not be the respect for individual freedom which is written up in textbooks about democracy. '69 A quick perusal of the tone of pacifist debates after 1950 shows how the acceptance of ideological division was fast becoming the premise behind a myriad of supplementary divisions, each making the other appear irreconcilable. Yoshino Genzaburo represented the 'two worlds' stand-off as substantive 'socialist' democracy versus formalistic 'Western' democracy, and elaborated on this distinction by considering the former to be a 'by the people' type of democracy, whereas the latter was a 'for the people' type. 70 Ouchi Hyoe described the polarisa-

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tion in terms of proletarian democracy versus bourgeois democracy, a progression from the former democracy versus socialism divide. 7. Ranged against these views was the fellow-pacifist and Heidankai pioneer Abe Yoshishige, who after 1949 became so concerned about the 'peace offensive' of the Soviet Union and the 'hijacking' of the peace movement by the communist left that he withdrew into the background. On the outside of the Heidankai were the anti-communist campaigners Fukuda Tsuneari and Koizumi Shinzo, who regarded Japan's pacifists as 'totalitarian' and 'pro-communist'.72 Not only was peace hostage to ideological antipathy, but democracy was explicitly regarded by both sides as the conduit of this antipathy. Maruyama approached the problem of internal and external Cold War ideological polarisation by engaging in another deconstruction exercise, this time of the so-called 'two worlds'. The object of this intellectual exercise was to argue for a supra-ideological place for peace and likewise for those who professed to be pacifists. He did so because the ideological battle over peace was threatening to deliver the death blow to a universalistic democratic idea. The fates of peace and democracy were intertwined, and it seemed that one could not survive without the other. In On Peace For The Third Time Maruyama sought to convey the Heidankai's view that the existence of 'two worlds' did not comprise a fatalistic element which made conflict inevitable. Further, the divide was not monolithic, but multi-dimensional and thus manageable. The 'two worlds' were made up of two ideologies, two blocs, and two superpowers. The most important thing was to realise that these ideologies were not monolithic, and that neither was absolute in practice. There were instead scattered throughout each 'bloc' different versions of each ideology. Furthermore, these ideologies had to cope with other competing ideologies such as nationalism. It would be a 'misrepresentation of reality' to assume that all of the countries gathered into a bloc shared exactly the same ideology. Pluralism was rife in each bloc. Trying to concentrate political force within a bipolar system was an artificial construct of what was actually a pluralistic entity. The most effective representation of the reality of the 'two worlds' was a multi-polar system. 73 Maruyama also weighed in behind the idea that Japan and Asia as a whole could dilute bipolarity by becoming a pacifist neutralist 'third force'. In an important sense Japan's 'partial peace' was thus seen as a betrayal of Asia's potential. In the appendix to their second statement, some Heidankai members had specifically attributed this kind of active conciliatory role to Japan's peace treaty settlement. The 'regional pacifist' idea was a move away from merely taking passive credit for

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having a constitution with a pacifist clause, and also went beyond the outward projection of neo-nationalism. The most striking aspect of Maruyama's second chapter in the third Heidankai statement was its optimism. The foundation of this optimism was Maruyama's belief that convergence was a likely outcome of the present ideological divide. Maruyama's identification of democratic complementarity between the two systems informed his conclusion. Put crudely, one system offered 'freedom without equality' while the other offered 'equality without freedom'.74 He believed it was not a question of whether there would be convergence, but how it would be achieved. There were strong incentives for convergence to be achieved through democratic affinity. 'The danger of fascism is by no means a thing of the past', warned Maruyama. 'The social, economic and intellectual foundations ... are still in existence today. '75 The fact that faith in a democratic objective was seen to be the unifying dynamic is of utmost significance to the peace and democracy paradigm. Just when Cold War polarisation was at its most intense stage, Maruyama and the majority of the Heidankai membership clung to democracy as a conduit of peace and as a 'higher idea' than entrenched ideologies. This was the idea which Maruyama developed in his writings on peace in the 1950s when his fellow Heidankai pacifists began to stray into the realms of ideological intolerance. In the midst of pacifist disarray over the Korean War Maruyama once more turned to Fukuzawa Yukichi and Karl Mannheim as intellectual role models. The objective yet interested intellectual was the only possible defender of democratic universality. In Letter to a Liberal Maruyama attacked the conservative knee-jerk reaction against communism, saying that proclaiming anti-communist beliefs was not proof of democratic integrity: The time has come for unaffiliated intellectuals to protect their status as such by becoming aware of their basic attitude towards actual politics from the position of unaffiliated intellectuals and of their strategy and tactics that are based on this self-awareness. 76 Maruyama argued that Japan could not become part of any ideology or idea, whether it be liberalism, communism or democracy, simply by fitting into an imported 'ism'. Both communists and liberals were magnificently 'self-deceived' about the nature of Japanese society because they applied imported values and systems by which to judge Japan. Intellectuals could only provide perspective if they were neutral, at a critical distance from official and external value creation. To enable autonomous value creation 'neutral space' free from external values

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was essential. This adds a new perspective to Maruyama's infamous question - 'where in Japanese society is there enough developed democracy to defend?'" Neither American democracy nor Soviet communism would work. Japanese democracy could only be established via autonomous value creation. This is what Maruyama meant by 'developed' democracy. The 'defence' of this type of democracy was also crucial, because it represented the presence of that neutral space and that critical distance. That was why 'resistance' was integral to peace and democracy in postwar Japan. Resistance was proof of autonomous value creation. No progress could be made on peace or on democracy if intellectuals and politicians persisted in adopting absolute positions. For Maruyama the assumption of ideological polarity represented the re-emergence of the 'closed society'. If the dynamism of politics and thought was ignored, then this was not a reflection of reality but something which created its own reality. Even Khrushchev had acknowledged at the Twentieth Party Congress that peace and revolution were separate phenomena. 78 The problem with establishing absolute categories which are assumed to be contradictory is that it precludes rapprochement. It establishes its own reality through its internal momentum, and this resembles more than anything else a feudalistic acceptance of 'nature' as the driving force of history: Can a struggle for peace be taken as an extension of the class struggle concept prevalent until now? ... without substantially clarifying an awareness of the relative nature of struggle or its instrumental character there is a danger that the struggle for peace itself could result in war.79 While the conservatives remained trapped in a negative anticommunist discourse based on misunderstanding and misinformation peaceful coexistence would not be possible. Similarly, it was time to realise that Soviet communism was not truly a democratic model for the rest of the world. In the USSR 'the determination of values is not left up to free competition amongst the majority', Maruyama said, rather 'the value supremacy of the vanguard is their premise'. so Maruyama maintained that unless ideological explanations were dropped on both sides, there would be no peaceful coexistence. Social autonomy was the dynamic link between peace and democracy. Rather than being an end in itself, peace was for Maruyama the means to a democratic end. This was the logic he employed in defence of the constitution against repeated attempts by conservative governments to revise Article 9:

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The belief that the people have the final right to decide whether a policy decision is correct or not is the basis for democracy ... The conviction that those most affected by a policy decision should be qualified to pass a final judgement over that policy must find its most effective utilisation in the people's power of control over the government in order to prevent war.BI The calls for a neutralist foreign policy were aimed at more than just the machinations of international policy. Neutralism precluded dependence on others; it forced autonomous decision-making and a sense of responsibility for those decisions. This was the underlying significance of neutralism for Japan's postwar democracy. By the late 1950s the original group of scholars who had joined together under the umbrella of the Heidankai had pursued their ideological phantoms. Some like Abe had fallen by the wayside in practical terms. But others including Maruyama had re-grouped under the new Kokusai Mondai Danwakai (International Problems Discussion Group) in 1959 to pursue the peace-democracy paradigm in the context of the proposed revision of the Mutual Security Treaty. Their fight in 1960 showed that despite the ideological trauma of the 1950s, they were still fundamentally united on what they considered to be the absolute essentials of democracy: representation, popular sovereignty and social autonomy. Yet if we delve more deeply into the philosophical dilemmas which troubled the peace movement in the 1950s, we can perhaps foreshadow the subsequent disarray and disunity amongst intellectuals after 1960. The context of the 1950 debates on peace had established a necessary association between peace, democracy and resistance. The implicit assumption that war was an act of state seemed to propel pacifists in the direction of not only resistance, but an irresponsible individualism.82 'Pacifist principles were "the rights of the individual" opposed to "the rights of the state". 'B3 The problem with this is that the imposition of a state-individual nexus precluded autonomous action on the part of politically-involved citizens (that is, social autonomy), and forced democratic action into an apolitical, private sphere. The long-term damage which these assumptions have inflicted on the substance of Japan's political culture will be explored in the following chapter. Let it suffice for us to say that subsequent generations of committed Japanese pacifists continue to attribute the weakness of Japanese democracy and the failures of Japanese pacifism to the absorp-

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tion of the pacifist programme into the agenda of the state. 84 Ultimately even the mainstay of Japanese pacifism, Article 9, suffers under this perspective, as the constitution represents the legal agenda of the state. The fact that able and committed pacifists such as Ishida Takeshi and Sakamoto Yoshikazu insist on tension between the private and public spheres and that pacifism be opposed to state authority tells us more about their lack of confidence in Japan's democracy than it does about their pacifism. Their ideas can be related directly to the tension in Maruyama's thought between personal and social autonomy. In particular, his insistence that social autonomy be premised on personal autonomy meant that there was a danger that democratic discourse would not progress until its version of personal autonomy was firmly established. Maruyama and his fellow pacifists greeted the challenge of 1960 still dedicated to the defence of their version of democracy. Their whole-hearted resistance and public activism speak unequivocally of their belief in the democratic value of resistance. In 1960, their activism was inspired by their belief in participatory democracy. If there was a crisis of democracy in 1960, it was the demolition of popular confidence in the only type of democracy which could incorporate social autonomy in an effective, legitimate manner. NOTES

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

See John Dower, 'Peace and Democracy in Two Systems', in A. Gordon, ed., Postwar Japan as History, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1993, pp. 3-33, for an interesting discussion of how these themes have interacted throughout the postwar era. See Andrew Barshay, State and Intellectual in Imperial Japan: The Public Man in Crisis, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1988, for a discussion of the term 'public intellectual'. Martin Ceadel, Thinking About War and Peace, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 135. Hans 1. Morgenthau, in Gardner, Schlesinger and Morgenthau, Origins of the Cold War, Waltham Mass., Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970, p. 80. Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1962, p. 150. Caedel, op cit., p. 135. Aron, Peace and War, p. 154. ibid., p. 162. ibid., p. 600. Morgenthau's perspective altered considerably after the outbreak of the Vietnam War. See Kenneth Thompson and Robert 1. Myers, Truth and Tragedy: A Tribute to Hans J Morgenthau, New Brunswick, Transaction Books, 1984, pp. 93-94.

196 Democracy in postwar Japan II 12 13 14 15

16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

24 25 26 27 28

29 30

Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle For Power and Peace, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1949, pp. 10-13. Giovanni Sartori, Theory of Democracy Revisited, Part One, The Contemporary Debate, New Jersey, Chatham House Publishers, 1987, p.47. ibid., pp. 68-69. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 7. Masaru Tamamoto, Unwanted Peace: Japanese Intellectual Thought in American Occupied Japan /948-/952, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 1988, p. 194; reprinted by University Microfilms International. Yoshino Genzaburo, 'Mizukara no unmei 0 mizukara no sekinin ni oite' (Making One's Own Destiny One's Own Responsibility), Genten, Hyoronsha, 1969, p. 296. Royama Masamichi et al., 'Minshushugi 0 meguru ideorogii no tairitsu to Nihon' (Japan and the Conflict Between Democratic Ideologies), Sekai, January 1953, p. 107. Maruyama Masao, 'Minshushugi 0 meguru ideorogii no tairitsu to Nihon', p. 113; Shimizu Ikutaro, 'Kokkai' (Diet), Sekai, Apri11952, pp. 50-51. Prime Ministers Nakasone and Takeshita both were widely seen to have exercised 'the tyranny of the majority' when attempting (in Nakasone's case) to force through a consumption tax bill. In Hayashi Kentaro et ai, 'Kowa no hOko' (Directions For Peace), TenbO, December 1949, p. 55. Shiga Yoshio, 'Kowa mondai to Nihon Kyosanto' (Peace Treaty Problem and the Japan Communist Party), Zen'ei, January 1950, p. 14. John Dower, Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience 1878-1954, Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press, 1988, p. 442. The second paragraph of Article 9 imposes conditionality on the undertaking not to maintain war potential, leaving the way clear for Japan to establish forces for the purpose of 'self-defence'. See J. A. A. Stockwin, Japan: Divided Politics in a Growth Economy, London, W. W. Norton and Co, 1982, pp. 196--218. Shimizu Ikutaro, )\tarashiku moeru minshushugi' (Newly-Resurrected Democracy), Sekai, October 1956, p. 63. Tamamoto, op cit., p. 137. The five principles were: mutual respect of territorial sovereignty; non-intervention; non-aggression; equality and reciprocity; peaceful coexistence despite rival ideologies. Shimizu Ikutaro, )\tarashiku moeru minshushugi', pp. 67-68. The first major public release of information was the in Asahi Gurafu magazine on 6 August 1952, the anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima. This edition sold over 700,000 copies. See Ishida Takeshi, Nihon no seiji to kotoba (Japan's Politics and Language), vol. 2, Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1989, p. 107. See chapter 2. Entitled 'A Statement By Eight Distinguished Social Scientists on the Causes of Tensions Which Make For War'. Reprinted in Sekai Special Supplement, Three Statements For World Peace, April 1950, pp. 1-6 (English version); first published in Japanese in Sekai, March 1949.

Pacifism, autonomy and the logic of democracy 31

32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41

42 43 44 45 46 47

48 49 50 51

52 53

54 55 56 57 58

197

Maruyama describes the processes by which each statement was drafted in 'Heiwa Mondai Danwa Kai ni tsuite' (On the Peace Problems Discussion Group), Sekai, July 1985, p. 28. Maruyama's text in each case incorporated the views of his colleagues. Hadley Cantril, ed., Tensions That Cause Wars, Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1950, p. 38. See Midorikawa Toru, 'Heiwa Mondai Danwakai to sono go' (Peace Problems Discussion Group and its Aftermath), Sekai, July 1985, pp. 62-63, p. 78. Hadley Cantril, op. cit., pp. 8-9. Hani Goro, in 'Heiwa Mondai togikai gijiroku' (Record of the Proceedings of the Meeting About the Peace Problem), Sekai, July 1985, p. 260. ibid., p. 261. Maruyama Masao, 'Heiwa Mondai togikai', p. 267. ibid., pp. 267-268. Sekai, Three Statements on Peace, p. 8. ibid., pp. 37-38. Ozawa Shinichiro, 'Sengo shiso toshite no "heiwa" no mondai: kowa ronso, Heiwa Mondai Danwakai no katsudo 0 chushin ni' ('Peace' as a Problem in Postwar Thought: Featuring the Peace Problems Discussion Group), Shiso no Kagaku, No. 46 January 1966, pp. 45-52. Maruyama Masao, 'Tokyo ChihO Hosei Bukai hOkoku' (Report of the Tokyo Law and Politics Sub-Group), Sekai, July 1985, p. 229. Maruyama Masao, in 'Heiwa Mondai togikai', p. 282. 'A Statement By Scientists in Japan on the Problem of Peace', Sekai, Three Statements on Peace, April 1950, p. 9. The Statements were published in English and Japanese in this publication. Maruyama Masao, 'Tokyo Chiho HOsei Bukai hOkoku', p. 230. 'Heiwa Mondai Danwa Kai ni tsuite', p. II, p. 18. 'Kowa mondai ni kansuru Heiwa Mondai Danwakai no seimei' (Statement by the Peace Problems Discussion Group on the Peace Treaty Problem), Sekai, ed., Mitsu no seimei, April 1950, p. 13. ibid., p. 13. Igarashi Takeshi, 'Peace-Making and Party Politics: the Formation of the Domestic Foreign-Policy System in Postwar Japan', Journal of Japanese Studies, vol. II, no. 2 Summer 1985, p. 345. John Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System, London, Athlone, 1988, pp. 55-56. 'Hosoku-kowa mondai no ronten' (Discussion Points on the Peace Treaty Problem), Sekai, July 1985, pp. 112-117. ibid., p. 116. ibid., p. 114. See Tamamoto, op. cit., pp. 87-141. George R. Packard III, Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1966, pp. 26-27. 'Heiwa Mondai Danwakai ni tsuite', p. 24. Sakamoto Yoshikazu, 'Introduction', Key Issues in the Postwar Japanese Peace Movement, 1976, p. 2. 'Mitabi heiwa ni tsuite' (On Peace For The Third Time), Sekai, July 1985, p.124.

198 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68

69 70 71 72

73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81

82 83 84

Democracy in postwar Japan Maruyama Masao, '''Genjitsu'' shugi no kansei' (Defects of 'Real'ism), Sekai, May 1952, p. 123. ibid., p. 124. ibid., p. 126. ibid., p. 130. 'Mitabi heiwa ni tsuite', p. 122. Maruyama Masao, 'Uchimura Kanzo to "hisen" ron' (Uchimura Kanzo and the ~nti-War' Theory), Senchu to sengo no aida, Misuzu Shobo, 1976, p. 559, originally written in April 1953. They were signed in San Francisco on 8 September 1951. Maruyama Masao, 'ByoshO kara no kanso' (Thoughts From a Sickbed), Sekai, October 1951, p. 228. ibid., pp. 228-229. Shimizu Ikutaro, 'Senso to heiwa no riso to genjitsu' (Ideals and Reality of War and Peace), Sekai, April 1954, pp. 89-90. Maruyama Masao, 'Kyofu no jidai' (Age of Fear), Sencha to sengo no aida, Misuzu Shobo, 1976, p. 513, originally published in Shiso in December 1950. Yoshino Genzaburo in ~tarashii jidai no atarashii shiso' (New Ideas For a New Age), Genten, Hyoronsha, 1969, p. 204. Ouchi HyDe, 'Futatsu no minshushugi no kyozon' (Coexistence of Two Types of Democracy), Sekai, October 1956, pp. 18-19. Fukuda Tsuneari, 'Heiwa ron no susumekata ni tsuite no gimon' (Doubts on the Promotion of Pacifism), Chao Koron, December 1954, p. 460. 'Mitabi heiwa ni tsuite', pp. 125-130. ibid., p. 136. ibid., p. 134, p. 136. Maruyama Masao, 'Aru jiyii shugisha e no tegami' (Letter to a Liberal), Sekai, September 1950, pp. 29-31. ibid., p. 36. Maruyama Masao, in 'Gendai kakumei no tenoo' (Platform for Modern Revolutions), in Iwai Yoshimi, ed., Gendai no Kadai, no. 27, Gendai Kyoyo Zenshii, Chikuma Shooo, 1960, p. 355. ibid., p. 367. ibid., p. 371. Maruyama Masao, 'Some Reflections on Article Nine of the Constitution', Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 301. Nishijima Takeo expands on this point in his Sengo no shOchO (Symbols of Postwar), Shinsensha, 1981, pp. 17-24 ibid., p. 23 Ishida Takeshi's two volume publication Nihon no seiji to kotoba, vol. 2, Heiwa to kokka, is the most sophisticated representation of this view. Ishida documents the history of pacifism in Japan according to the extent to which the pacifist agenda was identified with the state. The decline and compromise of that agenda is invariably associated with the state.

8 Democracy in crisis The security treaty crisis of 1960

Today, some ten odd years after the war, the democracy that at the time was relatively unfamiliar to us, has at last spread its roots into Japan's soil. I feel that this democracy constitutes the spiritual foundation of the new Japan, and it is my intention to defend it, no matter what difficulties are encountered, and nurture it. Nobusuke Kishi, June 1959' The above quotation contains sentiments which one would expect to find in a liberal journal or advanced by a pacifist at a round-table conference in mid-1950s Japan. A note of disbelief, if not discord, is struck upon reaching the name 'Kishi'. For this was the man who was remembered on his death in August 1987 as 'a reactionary determined to move Japan away from an alien-imposed democracy back towards the authoritarian state of prewar years'.2 When Prime Minister Kishi's government passed legislation ratifying the revised security treaty with the United States in May and June 1960 they precipitated the greatest political crisis of the postwar era. The nub of this crisis was democracy. 1960 was the time when the stuff of Japan's democracy - ideals and reality, expectations and deficiencies - were hurled into the open in an atmosphere of violence, hatred and unprecedented activism. Clearly Kishi's 'democracy' bore little resemblance to that of many of his fellow Japanese. It seems in retrospect that the intellectual debates and activism of the first fifteen years of the postwar were but a long overture for the myriad thoughts and deeds claiming the democratic mantle in 1960. The difference in 1960 was that intellectuals progressed from intellectual activism to popular activism. Further, resistance was directed not at an American agenda but a conservative Japanese one. The enemy was now within, and the battle lines were clearly drawn. Since 1945 Maruyama Masao and his peers had explored the

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philosophical dimensions of democracy through debating modernisation, shutaisei and war responsibility. In 1960 they stated clearly and unequivocally what this meant in terms of political substance. They had already ventured into the realm of political activism in the 1950s as proponents of pacifism and neutralism, but the sub-text of their activism had always been the political shape of Japan's democracy. Through the opportunity provided by crisis in 1960, they were able to define and consolidate what amounted to an ethical agenda for their polity. It is true to say thatJapan's definition of democracy was forged in 1960. That this process of definition was achieved through resistance demonstrated anew the endurance of the mores which emerged from the war experience. Until 1960, the twin themes of activism and responsibility had been aimed at the individual. Autonomous action meant individual action; pacifist activism was primarily a function of intellectuals' attempt to show personal responsibility for their lack of resistance in the past. By 1960 these sentiments had matured to the point that when confronted with a threat to their criteria for a legitimate democracy, intellectuals turned to the masses to re-create Japan's political system. They looked to active social autonomy, via the resistance and activism of citizens en masse, rather than to personal autonomy to defend the democratic system in which they - the people - were sovereign. No longer restricting activism to a theoretical realm where 'private' individuals criticised the 'public' sphere, intellectuals such as Maruyama openly called in 1960 for participatory democracy. In brief, in 1960 we learn that the sum of Japan's postwar experience produced a definition of democracy which relied on social autonomy expressed as participatory democracy. This was the fight which Maruyama Masao fought in 1960. It has been said that the emphasis on democracy at the peak of the crisis was due to the influence and intellectual leadership of Maruyama. 3 It has also been alleged, by Shimizu Ikutaro and Yoshimoto Takaaki, that the 'failure' of the anti-security treaty movement was due to the inappropriate application of the democratic ideal sustained by Maruyama. The experience of 1960 left deep scars on the Japanese polity. By following the democratic idea as pursued by Maruyama and his peers in 1960 we will determine what this tells us about Japanese conceptions of democracy during, and after, the crisis of 1960. As Maruyama was swift to assert, the failure of the anti-treaty movement did not automatically imply the same fate for democracy. The ratification of the revised treaty despite fervent opposition did not in itself discredit Maruyama's democratic idea. However, the inability of democratic activism to

Democracy in crisis 201 impact upon the political machinery of the state destroyed the criteria of democratic legitimacy which Japanese intellectuals and, through them, the Japanese people, had come to accept. They were left in June 1960 with a democratic void called a parliament, bereft of the ethical substance which most people agreed was essential to a true democracy. THE TREATY ISSUE: THE EXCUSE FOR A CRISIS In 1951 the original security treaty was regarded by pacifist intellectuals as the price that had to be paid for independence. Crucially, the fact that Japan had appeared to have no choice in the matter eased the collective conscience of pacifist Japan. After all, it was difficult to feel responsible for something which could not be helped. Ironically, this attitude only became evident when, in 1957, independent Japan decided under the leadership of its new Prime Minister, Nobusuke Kishi, to initiate revision of this treaty. The tandem formula of independence and responsibility that Maruyama and his companion thinkers in the Heiwa Mondai Danwakai (Peace Problems Discussion Group, known as the Heidankai) had clamoured for in 1951 proved to be most unwelcome when it materialised six years later. This was so much so that the Heidankai's 1959 statements on the issue of treaty revision preferred the original treaty to the prospect of a revised version replete with responsibility for the outcome. The irony is compounded when we realise that in 1957 Kishi claimed revision was desirable precisely in order to retrieve Japan's sovereignty under the treaty. Kishi pointed to the 'inequalities' and infringements of Japan's sovereignty that existed under the original treaty: United States' troops had the right to intervene (on the Japanese Government's request) in domestic disturbances; Japan would not be consulted in the event that the United States used its Japan-based troops in the region; there was no specific obligation on the part of the United States to defend Japan; Japan could not ask any third country to maintain troops in Japan. Furthermore, the treaty had no time limit, thus the 'inequalities' were projected indefinitely into the future. Ostensibly for these reasons, Kishi journeyed to Washington in June 1957 to initiate discussions on revision with President Eisenhower's administration. This led to the establishment of an Intergovernmental Committee which reported in favour of revision in September 1958. From the pacifist intellectuals' point of view, there were other factors which made another look at the original treaty desirable. First, the treaty did not specify its affirmation of and compliance with the charter of the United Nations. With Japan newly-admitted to the UN in

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1956 having normalised relations with the USSR in the same year, this was thought to be a necessary gesture on the part of a nation committed to pacifism. Kishi acted on this, and the Joint Communique issued during Kishi's visit to the United States in June 1957 said the Intergovernmental Committee would 'consult to assure that any action taken under the treaty conforms to the principles of the United Nations Charter'.4 Second, pacifist thinkers were perturbed that the treaty did not contain any non-nuclear provision. These concerns suggested an attitude in favour of revision; however, there were still other factors in favour of jettisoning the treaty altogether. Antipathy towards any security treaty originated in the perception that this and any other security treaty violated the letter and spirit of the 1947 pacifist constitution, and in fact perpetuated the Cold War pattern of international relations. The most unacceptable element was the clearly~stated expectation in the 1951 treaty that Japan would 'increasingly assume responsibility for its own defence'.s This had been re-stated in both the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement of 1954, and in the Kishi-Eisenhower Joint Communique of 1957. The original treaty had been fashioned in the shadow of the Korean War. It seemed to the pacifist intellectuals that for Japan to choose sides in a conflict which in 1957 seemed to be heading for at least an accommodation along the lines of peaceful coexistence would contribute to the continuation of that conflict. That was why the notion of Japan making such a choice as a sovereign nation was so unappealing. The kudos of independent decision making was far outweighed by the responsibility for making the wrong decision. This of course contradicted the thrust of democratic debate in the postwar period to date. I 950s pacifism comprised independence, democracy and pacifism as interdependent criteria. If the treaty revision proposed in 1957 would allow that formula to be put into action, why did the Heidankai members jib at the opportunity? Surely this would be proof of Japan's pacifist and democratic credentials? The reluctance to welcome any security treaty at all was consistent with their pacifist orientation: after all, a security treaty with one power compromised any credibility as a pacifist, neutralist nation. However their statements of 1959 and 1960 on the proposed treaty displayed a feeling of inevitability about the fact that a new security treaty would be enacted. There was never any doubt that a treaty would be put in place. The issue was rather this: the members of the Heidankai, including Maruyama Masao and an increasingly large number of intellectuals and citizens, did not have faith in their government's political decision-making processes. That is why so much atten-

Democracy in crisis 203 tion was focused on the decision-making process involved with the treaty. A security treaty by fiat was regrettable but unavoidable in 1951. It was unacceptable in an independent country, even if this country was in America's strategic orbit. What made it unacceptable was the suspicion that democracy was missing from the equation. In 1960 the pacifist discourse revealed itself as a metaphor for debate on democracy. In this sense the security treaty was only an excuse for the crisis in 1960. The real focus of the crisis was Japan's postwar democracy. The process of revising the 1951 security treaty simply show-cased the crisis of confidence in Japan's democracy that was already simmering near the surface of Japanese political life. SECURITY OR DEMOCRACY? By late 1959 the Heidankai members, approaching their tenth anniversary, felt compelled to join with their intellectual offshoot, the International Problems Discussion Group (Kokudankai), to make a public statement on the proposed revision. Circumstances had changed since the revision process was first announced. Since 1958 Khrushchev had intensified the propaganda campaign against the Japan-United States military alliance. Tensions between the two superpowers had risen through the space race, and the United States was not looking like a winner. At home, Kishi's cabinet had embarked on a series of reforms in the areas of education, labour and police powers - notably in the 1958 Police Duties Performance Bill - which smacked of 'reverse course' mania. And then there was Kishi's past - he had been a member of General Tojo's cabinet, and an A-Class war criminal who had escaped trial through the Occupation's own 'reverse course'. Most serious though was the fact that apart from repeated statements that revision was desirable, the government had released little detail about the revised treaty. The Heidankai and Kokudankai set out to fill this information gap with their statement 'Criticising the Government's Plan to Revise the Security Treaty', released in September 1959.6 This statement was largely aimed at educating public opinion on these issues. Maruyama Masao had dedicated the last six months of 1959 to researching all aspects of the treaty, and his research was put to work in this and subsequent statements. The tensions in the international scene seemed to recreate the atmosphere of 1949, when the potential for crisis rather than its realisation was uppermost in his mind. Accordingly, the thrust of the September statement continued the pacifist arguments against the original treaty. In the tradition of the UNESCO statement of 1948,

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they criticised the mindset behind the revIsion process because it assumed that a military alliance was necessary. This limited Japan's independence to equality within a military alliance, and would serve neither the interests of global peace nor Japan's national independence. At the same time, the statement agreed that the existing treaty was unequal, but unlike Kishi they argued that this meant the treaty did not in itself represent genuine security for Japan. It concluded that revising an unsatisfactory arrangement was futile, and that the treaty system should be abolished altogether. The pacifist intellectuals' sense of crisis intensified with the release of the draft of the revised treaty on 6 October 1959. From Kishi's perspective, it seemed to deliver the equal status and mutuality that had been lacking in the original. The new tone was set by the name, 'Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan', and appeared to have substance to back up this positive impression in the text (though Welfield argues the new text did not improve Japan's position in any substantive way).' There was now a maximum time limit of ten years, at which time either signatory could give notice to terminate the agreement (Article 10). The United Nations received several mentions, notably in Article 1 where the language of Japan's peace clause was borrowed to express the intention of the signatories to settle international disputes 'by peaceful means'. The United States joined Japan in committing themselves to 'meeting the common danger' to either party on Japanese soil (Article 5). Finally, there was a vaguely-worded undertaking for the two countries to 'consult from time to time' on the administration of the treaty (Article 4). Japan's opposition parties and pacifist intellectuals were quick to point out the shortcomings of the revised text. The 1947 constitution was repeatedly undermined in the new text. In the preamble, the UN-sanctioned 'inherent right of individual or collective self-defence' was affirmed; Article 3 combined a commitment to re-arm with an apparently contradictory commitment for each country to honour its constitution. The scope of the treaty, 'international peace and security in the Far East', was never defined. And what had by 1959 become a hotly unpopular issue, the stationing of US troops on Japanese soil, was again specified (in Article 6) 'for the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East'.s Stung by Kishi's opportunistic quoting of their first statement on the treaty, the Heidankai attempted to distance themselves from Kishi's position. However, they did so as a divided entity. Once again,

Democracy in crisis 205

the social-science dominated Tokyo group and the Marxist-economist Kyoto group chose to differ. In this they followed in the steps of the Japan Socialist Party, which had again divided at a time when it was best placed to lead a leftist movement against the conservative administration. This meant that there was a leadership gap to be filled. The Heidankai went to some lengths to play down their differences in order not to betray this need more than necessary: not even their own internal memorandum on the decision to make separate statements was specific on the cause of the dual presentation of statements in December 1959.9 They felt keenly their collective responsibility to provide intellectual leadership, and their growing sense of crisis at this juncture made them ask for action from their fellow citizens instead of just understanding. The Tokyo Sub-Group's statement was drafted by Maruyama and Tsuru Shigeto, and pushed the familiar pacifist line of the early fifties. They pointed out that the peace treaty and the security treaty were part of one package born in the Cold War. The choice to be made in 1959 was 'whether to strengthen the direction enshrined in that package, or throw it out' .10 The logic underlying the preamble of this statement indicated above all that the debate had moved on from the question of Japan's security to the decision-making process behind the revision of the treaty. The old formula of peace, independence and democracy was invoked with a subtle emphasis on democracy. The preamble accused the government of insufficient consideration of the issues, and worse, of not providing enough information and not allowing sufficient time for public debate on the treaty. The latter was essential because Japan was now truly independent, and responsible for her actions in the eyes of the world: Regarding the revision of the security treaty first of all the most basic and important thing is that it will be a treaty that Japan will sign autonomously as an independent nation, and that in the eyes of the international community it will effectively be regarded as a new agreement. According to its official and unofficial statements it is doubtful whether the government has given due consideration to the great significance and responsibility that such an act and decision entails. II Such deliberation and considered decision-making had to be based on the popular will; the popular will had to be both informed and consulted before this process could commence. The Tokyo Statement concluded by reminding people of Japan's status as an international pacifist role model symbolised by its constitution. This type of 'new

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historical experiment' could not work, it was argued, without independent decision making on the part of the Japanese people. The Kyoto Sub-Group's statement agreed with that of Tokyo in substance, but used that substance to conclude that the old treaty, founded as it was on historical circumstance, was preferable to a new one of unknown ramifications and known responsibility. This jarred with the ethical linkage insisted on by Maruyama's group between independence and responsibility, and implied that Japan would rather remain ruled by circumstances beyond its control than by its own will. The reason for separate statements is therein revealed. The Tokyo Sub-Group's line regained the upper hand in a second combined Heidankai-Kokudankai statement on the security treaty revision written by Sakamoto Yoshikazu in December 1959, another statement whose function was to prepare public opinion for its role in determining the fate of the treaty revision issue. 12 But the luxury of academic musing was roughly denied the intellectuals and the political opposition when Kishi left for Washington in January 1960 to sign the treaty. With the war-cries of radical students ringing in his ears, Kishi signed for Japan on 19 January 1960, and brought the document back to a recalcitrant Diet for ratification in February. It seemed to Maruyama Masao and many of his fellow Japanese activists that once more the Japanese people were to be confronted with a fait accompli. The only thing standing between the people and the fait accompli was the Diet. The meaning of defeat in war, the historical experience postwar and the viability of a future disconnected from everything that their Prime Minister's life experience represented depended on the ability of the Japanese people to replace the 'nature' of political fiat with the 'invention' known as parliamentary democracy.

THE POLITICAL CRISIS The actual 'crisis' itself occurred over a 14 hour period on 19 May 1960, and had a coda one month later. It involved no illegal acts, no violation of parliamentary procedure, and in the eyes of the citizens of democratic nations in the West the outcome represented nothing more than the parliamentary workings of the democratically-elected majority. But to Maruyama Masao, the pacifist intellectuals, the labour unions, the organised left (communists, socialists and students), significant sections of the ruling party, housewives and other previously apolitical sections of the Japanese community, it was nothing short of a flagrant disregard for the principles of democracy. So heinous were the

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events of those fourteen hours that for the month between 19 May and 19 June, the streets of Tokyo surrounding the Diet building were not free of demonstrators for a single day. The question of Japan's security against an external enemy was not the issue. Rather, these people expressed their rage against the undemocratic government and person of Nobusuke Kishi. By 19 May 1960, Kishi was in trouble. The revised security treaty had been held up in a special Diet committee since 19 February, and the truculent Opposition showed no sign of allowing it to return to the Lower House. Owing to the rules of procedure of the Japanese parliament, if only the Lower House ratified the treaty, it would automatically pass into law after one month even if the related treaty bills were held up again in the Upper House. Kishi's Liberal Democratic Party had a majority in the crucial Lower House. The only problem was to find a way to get it out of committee and on to the Diet floor. Kishi was pressed for time because he had proceeded with arrangements to welcome President Eisenhower to Japan on 19 June in order to exchange the instruments of ratification for the treaty. With the balance of factional alliances within his Party tipping against him, Kishi was increasingly desperate to put his foreign policy agenda in good order. His tactics in the Diet on 19 May would ensure that history portrayed him as the architect of Japan's greatest political crisis in the postwar era. Just as 8.15 (15 August 1945) marked the advent of a new and radical departure in Japan's history, so did 5.19 (19 May 1960) mark a major turning point in the historical consciousness of the postwar generation. It is a source of deep fascination that intellectuals of the day explored the historical relationship of these two dates in a manner which assumed continuity and causative connection in substance as well as in form. Maruyama Masao wrote the definitive essay on this, and we shall analyse the gist of his thought below. At this stage we can appreciate the contemporary impact of Kishi's parliamentary tactics through liberal critic Hidaka Rokuro's description. Brim-full with historical irony, Hidaka likened Kishi's actions to Japan's sneak attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941. That is, a sneak attack by the enemy in total disregard of all the conventions of decency and fair play. J3 The only difference was that in 1960, the sneak attack was against democracy, and the enemy was Kishi. What Kishi actually did was indeed sneaky, but strictly speaking, not illegal. He had two immediate objectives: to get the treaty bills out of committee and back to the Lower House, and to have the Thirty-fourth Ordinary Session of the Diet extended to allow the

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ratification process to be completed. He achieved these aims by exploiting the opposition parties' favourite tactic of expressing disapproval by absenting themselves from the proceedings. At 10.41 am on 19 May 1960 Directors of the Lower House Steering Committee were debating a fifty day extension to the Diet. The Socialists stalled the proceedings. Meanwhile, the Special Committee considering the treaty bills was also stalled, culminating in the Socialists walking out of the meeting. At 4.30 pm with the Opposition parties still refusing to return to the Steering Committee room, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) members unilaterally approved the extension of the Diet session and scheduled a final plenary session of the Diet to approve this for 5 pm. The Opposition parties gathered their members and physically barricaded the Speaker of the Diet in his office, thus seeking to prevent the Diet being convened at all. In the midst of the confusion the 'sneak attack' began its first phase, as the Special Committee called a vote on the treaty bills and, as the Opposition members filed out of the room, took a vote and approved the treaty. At II pm the Speaker ordered 500 police into the Diet to break the barricade. Then, man-handled by furious Socialists and their staff, the Speaker struggled to the podium and chaired a Lower House vote on the extension. Minutes later, in phase two of the 'sneak attack', the Speaker called a vote on the treaty bills themselves. Just after midnight, in the absence of the Opposition parties, the treaty bills were passed. '4 When Japan awoke the next morning, the pictures on the front pages of every newspaper told the story. In the dead of night, in a half-empty room, the fate of Japan's foreign policy had been decided. There had been no debate, no discussion, no gesture to the thousands of protesters on the streets around the Diet, and no notice taken of the thirteen million petitions that had been handed to the Diet on the matter. There had been violence, and then, silence. It was the room half-full, not the half-empty room, which damned the entire exercise as an assault on parliamentary democracy. For Maruyama Masao and his peers that moment crystallised all of the issues, ideas and philosophical musings of the postwar period into a single, concrete issue: the protection of democracy. 'We have entered a qualitatively different stage, and everything changed totally at that moment ... the points of dispute became remarkably simplified. '15 The attitude of the intellectual establishment is conveyed in the text of a poster produced by one of the groups joined by Maruyama after 5.19 called Mingakken (Minshushugi 0 Mamoru Zenkoku Gakusha Kenkyiisha no Kai: National Scholars and Researchers Group for the Protection of Democracy):

Democracy in crisis 209 From 5.19 through to 5.20 the Kishi cabinet illegally cut off deliberations on the new security treaty, brought police into the Diet, even shut out some LDP members and passed the bills. Democratic principles have been trampled upon. Furthermore, afterwards the Kishi cabinet showed no sign of remorse and is trying to overlook the opposition of a great majority of the people. If the people let this happen democracy will be ruined, and Japan will be at the beck and call of the authorities. In order to bring back democracy, 1 we must not recognise the passing of the bills; 2 the Diet must soon be dissolved. This is the only way. Of course the Kishi cabinet must soon take responsibility. Everyone in the villages, in the towns and in the work-place raise your voices and make these demands. Do not forget 5.19! The perception of 5.19 as a 'sneak attack' was shared by Takeuchi Yoshimi, who described in his diary how he had retired to his futon early on the evening of 19 May exhausted by the round of meetings, speeches and press conferences protesting the proposed treaty revision. He had often found himself in the company of Maruyama at these gatherings, strolling beside him in impromptu demonstrations and sharing taxis to and from protest meetings. That was when all assumed that their activism would make a difference. One such occasion had occurred the day before, when they had met with Kishi to present their argument against the revision. At that meeting Kishi had promised to respect the petition movement. Takeuchi awoke close to midnight on 19 May in time to catch the midnight radio news bulletin. This is his recollection of what he heard: The Speaker forced his way through; he seems to have reached the rostrum. The microphone carried his voice. Extension 50 days, passed. Then after a five minute break a new session was convened on the 20th. New security treaty passed by those who rose to their feet. Ignoring all parliamentary procedure, ignoring 13 million petitions, a forced vote. Applause and cheers. Aahp6 Upon hearing this Takeuchi got up and drank a 'medicinal' sake and thought to himself, 'this is the end of democracy' .17 Two days later, having consulted with Maruyama and other friends and colleagues, Takeuchi resigned from his public university post. Thus began a month of feverish activism featuring the spawning of myriad groups representing spontaneously organised people, previously organised people, and citizens who felt compelled to express their views. Groups also mobilised in favour of the treaty, but

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defending a/ail accompli had little kudos. On both sides, it was the intellectuals to whom most activist groups turned for leadership and understanding. Maruyama Masao was at the front line of this meeting of ivory tower scholar with man-on-the-street. During the month that followed protesters of all persuasions were further enraged by successive violent confrontations with the police leading to the death of a student on 15 June. Five days beforehand President Eisenhower's press secretary had done a 'dummy run' through Haneda airport to test the resolve of the demonstrators and the competence of the Japanese police before Eisenhower's visit. The result was a humiliation for Kishi, who had to evacuate his international guest from the mob by helicopter. One month after the 'deeds perpetrated in the middle of the night'''8 the treaty bills passed through the Upper House automatically, as protesters milled about in total despair at midnight outside the Diet. The final act was symbolically devastating, as the law appeared to be the result not of human decision but, as Hidaka Rokuro pointed out, merely the product of the 'natural' passing of time. 19 Kishi had succeeded in passing the treaty bills, but Eisenhower was not on hand to finalise ratification. His visit had been cancelled on 16 June. Kishi resigned on 23 June, and less than one month later experienced an attempt on his life at the hands of a right wing fanatic. A short four months later, the Liberal Democratic Party was returned to power in elections with an increased majority. Was it really over so soon? Could such an upheaval leave no scars, not even a trace? It is a mistake to equate the end of the political crisis with the end of the democratic crisis. In fact, the end of the political crisis contributed to the perpetuation of patterns of political behaviour and attitudes which have cast a shadow over the integrity of parliamentary democracy for decades thereafter. The crisis of 1960 reinforced the doubts and deficiencies plaguing Japan's postwar democracy, it did not create them. The lessons of 1960 for the citizens of Japan were many and varied according to individuals' perspectives and degrees of involvement. Those lessons can be said to have contributed to the apathy and sense of powerlessness in the electorate towards the government of Japan and towards their parliament; on the other hand the spectacle of a half-empty House and the forced vote have become familiar events in modern Japanese politics. To understand what this means in terms of Japanese concepts of democracy, we shall concentrate below on the democratic crisis in 1960 as it appeared to Maruyama Masao and his contemporaries. In Maruyama we encounter much more than a mere spectator or commentator

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on events. He was in the thick of the fray, and his ideas and speeches were major factors influencing the attitude, behaviour and reactions of his fellow countrymen. It has been said of Maruyama that in his intellectual work on the history of political thought in Japan he always tried to apply the problem consciousness of the present to the past, in order thereby to identify what in the past was relevant for the present.20 In 1960, the past caught up with him. Apart from a couple of rare exceptions, it would be the last time that Maruyama would analyse the contemporary political thought of Japan. THE DEMOCRATIC CRISIS

The sole book in English on the 1960 crisis, George Packard's Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960, argues that the 1960 democratic crisis was attributable to a combination of 'the strongly emotional bent in the Japanese character', the preference for group identification over individualism, 'traditional Japanese mistrust of power in the hands of a single, overtly ambitious individual', non-acceptance of concepts of majority rule and minority rights, and elitist intellectualism on the part of the scholars leading the protest movements. 2 \ He also depicted the ideological trends behind the crisis as tending towards extremism, particularly in the case of the left. He took this to mean that the mass of citizens flocking together under their various umbrella groups were left with no centrist political ground, leaving the field clear for the ruling conservatives to determine the political agenda of normalisation after the events of May and June. Packard concluded that the experience of 1960 had been positive overall for Japan's democracy: If the individual citizen emerged from (future) turmoil as he did in 1960 with the power to choose his own form of government, and his own foreign policy, these crises would be overcome and democracy would grow stronger in Japan. 22 Given the substance of democratic discourse in the postwar era leading up to the crisis, and the outcome in 1960 from the perspective of intellectuals such as Maruyama who developed this discourse, I must disagree with Packard's assessment on a number of points. First regarding majority rule and minority rights: in 1960 the problem was not that the concept of majority rule was not understood, rather it was that this majority was not perceived by intellectuals and citizens to be representative and responsible in the spirit of representative government. The clamour in favour of minority rights was not simply aimed

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at the socialist parliamentary Opposition, but at those whom the Opposition represented. It is obviously impractical to demand that every divisive issue before the parliament be resolved by consulting the electorate. However, due process of consultation with the people is reasonable and intrinsic to the concept of democratic accountability. The unacceptability of the events of 5.19 showed the protesters of 1960 had a good appreciation of the principles and ethics of majority rule and minority rights. Like many of his peers in 1960, Maruyama was unable to accept what he saw as abuse of the principle of majority rule. There was more to his reaction than revulsion against the dubious tactics of Prime Minister Kishi. Maruyama had by 1960 lost confidence in the institutional face of Japanese democracy. Instead of majority rule, he could only see 'dictatorship of the majority'. Within the decision-making processes of the Japanese parliament on the revision of the treaty, Maruyama saw fascist dynamics at work. In 1952 when the original treaty entered into force Maruyama warned that it was dangerous for politicians to despise parliament. Already it was clear to him that Japan's parliament was divorced from its social base. If democracy was a sham, what was driving the mechanisms of parliament? The principle of decisions achieved through a democratic process exists on a social base, and it is through being the superstructure over such a process that parliamentary politics derives its meaning for the first time. But a parliament which only exists as a system possibly can in itself function to restrict democratic freedom.23 Such a parliament could not be relied upon to fulfil its democratic role. It was flawed on two levels: the structure was divorced from the essence, and the essence was atomised. 'When contemporary democratic politics relies on the voting behaviour of such atomized masses it will lead to the establishment of dictatorial politics built on the base of institutional democracy.'24 Majority rule was not inherently flawed. It was unacceptable because in Maruyama's view majority rule was functioning in undemocratic ways. He expanded on the shortcomings of majority rule by attacking the assumption that an electoral system alone made it 'democratic'. 'In order to make democracy work today, more than anything we must fundamentally reappraise the system where one day every few years is the only opportunity for people to make political statements. 25 Maruyama seemed to be complaining about the basic principles of democracy in its institutional form. Parliament in Japan was behaving as though it were the base, and the society

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at large the superstructure. This went against the 'original meaning' of majority rule. On the strength of a single vote it is not consistent with the aims of parliamentary politics that this is perpetuated indefinitely; likewise, to say that the people's rights are restricted to the act of voting, and to enact all other politics under the auspices of parliament, is nothing short of violence. While preserving the structural mechanism of elections, through the fiction of representing those results as 'the people's will' it promotes silent subservience to that system. 26 The line between democracy and fascism had grown fine indeed. Second, the locus of the individual in the political culture of postwar Japan should not be attributed in simplistic terms to Japan's 'group' culture. The entire thrust of democratic thought in postwar Japan had struggled with the concept of individualism not as an irrelevant idea but as the best expression of what was fundamental to a genuine democratic polity: autonomous action based on personal autonomy. The question of Japan's democratic proclivity should not be decided according to whether or not individualism was an established concept. Instead the notion of autonomous action, whether it be expressed through individuals or a collectivity, was the indispensable criterion for democracy. 1960 was remarkable because intellectuals and citizens married social autonomy with personal autonomy through their activism. The fact that opposition was expressed through group action does not as Packard asserted 'raise questions as to the viability of democratic institutions as we know them in the West'.27 It does tell us in clear and concise terms what kind of democracy Japanese themselves regarded as relevant and viable in their own socio-political universe. Finally, the elitism which characterised Maruyama and his fellow intellectual activists vis-a-vis the citizens of Japan was self-evident. But assuming that their elitism made their observations and analysis irrelevant is incorrect. The intellectual elite, of which Maruyama was a leading member and self-consciously proud of being so, was every bit as representative of their society as the citizens who were the objects of their concern. The intellectuals' activism in 1960 radically altered the 'them and us' alienation which Packard alluded to, and in my opinion charged their analysis with the force and immediacy of people who were part of, as well as responsible to, the subject of their writings. In Maruyama's case it was this distance which he believed gave his eye the critical yet interested edge. It was the space in which he developed his autonomous vision.

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Packard's comments on ideological trends also require qualification, though it is true that the most vocal and visible segment of protesters were mobilised by the radical student group Zengakuren and by the Japan Communist Party. Not all of the protesters were motivated by outrage against abuses of democracy: some simply hated Kishi, others were anti-American and opposed to American bases in Japan. Certainly, the American media perceived the issue in the familiar terms of Cold War ideology. Time magazine's Pacific Edition described the Hagerty Incident of 10 June as 'one of the indelible mob scenes of the Cold War'.28 On Japan's democracy, it described America's shock at seeing its democratic protege slip into the abyss of communist insurrection: 'seemingly-firm in its U.S.-designed democracy, Japan had long appeared the cornerstone of free-world strength in Asia', but the U.S. was brutally awakened to the fact that' Japan has become a cockpit in the cold war'.29 Furthermore it seemed in 1960 that 'all the trappings of democracy in Japan were being employed to undermine the foundations of democratic government'.3D Packard's account of the 1960 crisis fitted the Cold War era tendency to be more vigilant towards activism by the left than by the right. 31 The following traces the progress of the democratic idea in 1960 through the eyes and pens of liberal Japanese intellectuals who were more concerned with the encroachment of the right in Japan's political life, and who thought that their experience in 1960 neither proved that they could have the government of their choice nor that they had a say in determining their nation's foreign policy. 1960 was when Maruyama Masao the philosopher gave way to Maruyama the activist. Maruyama himself later denied that 1960 represented a radical change in direction for him, and said that his activism was embarked upon reluctantly at the insistence of others. 32 It is true that he did not depart radically from his ideas on democracy, however two aspects of his thought did change: its presentation, and its audience. Maruyama's speeches, articles and essays written during 1960 were expressed much more simply and directly. And they were aimed at young students and non-academic members of the community rather than at his peers. There was a precedent for this kind of community 'enlightenment' activity on his part. In 1946 he had become involved in the 'shomin daigaku' (commoners' university) initiative, whereby scholars would travel to outlying communities and give public lectures and seminars on the meaning and function of democracy, the Occupation laws and other issues of the moment. For Maruyama these were salutary experiences which demonstrated the need for perva-

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sive 'enlightenment' on the fundamentals of democracy, and inspired him to devote his academic work to the analysis of contemporary issues. 33 Although Maruyama denied any significant change in his ideas in 1960, when we look at the implications of his personal activism, his public speeches and their wider audience, it is clear that Maruyama had moved from a philosophical exploration of democracy in Japan to an agenda for its defence. He may have been reluctant to stand at so many lecterns in public meetings, but once there he spoke with a degree of emotion and conviction that was reminiscent of his early postwar writings on the ultranationalist state. In 1960 the focus of his thought was no longer the conscience and intellect of individuals, but the collective activism of democratic citizens acting on and implementing their expectations of their democracy. Participatory democracy was what Maruyama advocated in 1960, not just passive recognition that democracy was a desirable form of socio-political organisation. The context of crisis demanded a more active response. Like many intellectuals of his era, Maruyama had not been caught in a complacent frame of mind by the events of 5.19. The Police Duties Performance Bill of 1958 had put the sensibilities of war-generation liberals on the alert. In early 1959 Maruyama explained his views on popular activism in the light of the political events of the day. In the discussion Taishu undo ni (suite (On Mass Movements) he was critical of the political ineptitude of people who felt unhappy about the Police Law, yet did not demonstrate against it. He pointed out that 'if ... you remain silent, it implies agreement. Similarly, you appear to be on the side of the government.'34 This was a subtle but important shift from his criticisms of the wartime state, which he had accused of 'silent oppression'. This time the impetus was on those who were oppressed. Maruyama went on in this discussion to reveal his understanding of the relationship between the 'majority' and the 'minority' in a democratic polity. When controversial issues such as the Police Law arise, the majority political party in the parliament can gain credibility for a majority vote on the issue by pointing to the fact that only a minority of people in the wider community oppose the legislation. This, Maruyama said, was the sort of 'silent support' that all governments counted on. 'Through the ages in Europe the cry "the majority of sensible people support us" has come from the mouths of authorities who have feared liberalism.'3s The community's opposition to the Police Bill, which succeeded in persuading Kishi to withdraw the legislation, was applauded by Maruyama as evidence that the normally

216 Democracy in postwar Japan inactive segment of the population would respond when called upon. The lesson for democratic activism was this: There can be no mass movement unless the active group, though they be a minority, either win the inactive group to their side or elicit a negative response on the issue concerned. Without activism and a declaration of views, there can be no mass movement. 36 We see that it is popular activism and the communication of opinion from the community to the Diet, not a numerical majority, which determined the democratic functioning of a parliamentary democracy in Maruyama's view. Popular activism was not 'unparliamentary' as some politicians alleged. According to Maruyama, it was mass activism which 'fills the gap between the facade of parliamentarism and the reality': Voting only takes place once every four years, but the day after the vote, the people should ceaselessly observe whether or not the government is looking after their interests, and this is when parliamentarism will truly be established . . . this is the meaning of the saying 'the people and the public are the foundations of democracy'.37 The fact that in the prewar period people were not free to demonstrate and political authority feared mass activism was evidence that the roots of democracy in Japan had been 'shallow'. By May 1960 Maruyama was even more convinced of the importance of popular activism to maintain and stimulate Japan's democratic political culture. Before the crisis of 5.19 he repeated his views on the subject in a piece which he later wrote was his last opportunity to reflect on the principles underlying the movement against the security treaty before the days and nights of activism began. In Gendai ni okeru taida kettei (Determining One's Attitude Today) Maruyama approached the issue of popular activism from a different angle. Reminiscent of the logic behind the war responsibility debate, he highlighted the responsibility of those who decided not to act and made clear his attitude that given the prevailing conditions in Japan it was everyone's duty to act. His message to intellectuals was to direct their activities at the grassroots of democracy rather than 'escaping to a higher plane'. 38 Significantly, he insisted on distance between the formal political sphere and the private sphere. For him it was only the political activism of political amateurs that could shore up democracy: 'it is particularly through the political activities of people who originally do not intend to make politics a profession or make politics their objective that democracy will assume a vital existence. '39 Again we see that Maruyama advocated the preservation of an

Democracy in crisis 217 autonomous space, where politics could only serve the interests of those who did not have a vested interest in politics. Maruyama's idea of participatory democracy was not direct involvement by all citizens in the governing of the country. It was instead a vision founded on the principle of representation, in a community whose views were freely determined and where the expression of those views was welcomed by the trustees of sovereignty. When this vision was destroyed on the night of 5.19, Maruyama attributed it to a refusal on the part of those in power to accept that autonomous space. It was the nightmare of 1930s Japan, masquerading in the clothes of parliamentary democracy. 5.19 AND THE PROTECT DEMOCRACY CAMPAIGN

In the frantic days which followed the events of 5.19, Maruyama would return repeatedly to the theme of popular activism. With the aid of Kishi and his parliamentary tactics, Maruyama was able to identify tangible issues through which to convey his philosophical and ethical message. His first speech after 5.19 was delivered on 24 May. Entitled Sentaku no toki (Time For Choice), it was widely reported in the media and encouraged the adoption by many disparate anti-treaty groups - and previously unaffiliated individuals - of the protection of democracy as their main objective. Maruyama had been personally concerned with Japan's democracy since the beginning of his academic career. In 1960 he emerged as the intellectual leader of a mass movement which catapulted his ideas on democracy into the public arena. He had moved on from his views expressed in Letter to a Liberal in 1950. Democracy not only existed in Japan: it was definitely worth defending. In Senlaku no loki Maruyama said that 5.19 had marked the beginning of an entirely new phase in the movement against the treaty: With that moment as the borderline everything changed. And so the problem became remarkably simplified. From then on the problem became one of whether or not we would recognise something carried out in one stroke which would determine the people's fate with this important international problem, something that was carried out in a way that does not enter into any definition of parliamentary politics. But it was not the treaty which Maruyama attacked. It was the violation of democratic procedure and the democratic principles underlying

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those actions which Maruyama identified as the real object of popular concern. The question was: Will we consent to this action or not, will we recognise that fait accompli and the coming consequences because they are already in place, or will we continue to think about these measures, and take everything back to before this happened and start again . . . there are no nuances here. There is no middle road. Whether or not one was for or against the treaty, it was imperative that all express their opposition to this flagrant disregard of parliamentary democracy: Even those people who up till now were seriously in favour of revising the treaty, if they have a fragment of reason or common sense, will have no choice but to join with us, rise up and erase this stain from Japan's political history. On the other hand, even those who up till now opposed the treaty, if they dither soon they will lose the right to ever again say 'democracy' or 'respect for the law'. Maruyama could have been addressing a rally in late 1920s Japan. The spectre of unrestrained authority was a real possibility once more. However extreme it may seem to the contemporary reader, for Maruyama it was a stark choice between democracy and dictatorship. This is the moment in our people's democratic history of greatest danger and greatest opportunity. All the major issues of postwar have become concentrated. On one extreme naked power was concentrated in Kishi's hands, on the other the principles and ideals of the postwar democratic movement became concentrated in our hands. If you admit that the authorities are omnipotent, you cannot at the same time accept democracy. To affirm one is to deny the other and vice versa. That is the choice that has been placed before us. At this moment in history let us rise above our differences and join hands so that the security of our nation may be guaranteed, not against any foreign country but first of all against the authorities. 40 Maruyama was joined in his crusade for democracy by Takeuchi Yoshimi, who provided the other 'protect democracy' canon in his article Democracy or Dictatorship, written on 31 May, and subsequently in his speech Four Conditions For the Fight on 2 June. Like Maruyama, Takeuchi saw the situation after 5.19 as a stark choice between democracy and dictatorship.41 Takeuchi went further than Maruyama and identified the authoritarian enemy as fascism. It may seem that the 'protect democracy' debate was taking place in a time

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warp, where it was 1960 in the outside world but in Japan in everyone's mind it was still 1940. This has been one of the criticisms levelled at the 'war generation' intellectuals such as Maruyama and Takeuchi by Western scholars, who imply that those intellectuals were operating in an irrelevant sphere. 42 To continue that logic, it implies further that the 'failure' of the anti-security treaty movement, embracing the protect democracy line, was due to the liberal intellectuals' imposition of irrelevant constructs on to what was really quite a straightforward issue. That Maruyama and Takeuchi did not see it this way is self-evident. While it is difficult to gauge 'relevance' it is possible to assess the conscious motivation and analytical foundations of their work in 1960. It comes down to what they meant by 'democracy'. Maruyama gave us an idea of what he meant in another widely-reported speech given on 1 June. Describing the crisis of 5.19 as one where 'the very raison d'etre of Japan's political system is being questioned', Maruyama set out what he thought that raison d'etre should be. He believed it to be the reflection and incorporation of the competing interests and opinions of the people, and the education of the people on political matters through discussion. It was the communication between those within parliament and those without that was the proof of a functioning parliamentary democracy.43 In the same speech Maruyama referred to this as a matter of distinguishing between the systemic and qualitative functions of parliamentary democracy. If the system worked properly, it had to incorporate the qualitative input of the wider community, and represent those views. If the system was divorced from the qualitative source, it was not true parliamentary democracy. The political decisions emanating from a merely systemic parliamentary democracy would be nothing but 'established realities'. The sub-text of this argument was that democracy could only work in a democratic community, and it was this which drove Maruyama to embrace enlightenment as a legitimate tool in the democratisation process. Maruyama would increasingly be criticised in the 1980s and 1990s for mixing in elitism with his calls for genuine representation. The idea that parliamentary debate had an enlightenment, or educative, function suggests that the people's sovereignty is compromised. Maruyama appears to have been focused exclusively on the end goal, parliamentary democracy. Enlightenment was a means to that end. The fact that this was a patronising attitude was not in itself a problem, but pre-empting or guiding public responses appears to contradict his own previous insistence on social or personal autonomy. The enlightenment function of parliamentary debate could be otherwise described

220 Democracy in postwar Japan as transparency of decision making; but the enlightenment embarked upon by Maruyama and his peers as leaders of the 'protect democracy' movement could also be construed as merely substituting one 'reality' established by government with another established by the intellectuals.44 Maruyama and Takeuchi argued this point in a round table discussion with Kaiko Ken on 27 June 1960. Above all 5.19 was important because it inspired self-generated activism, which Maruyama believed would be recognised in years to come as the beginning of the indigenisation of Japan's democracy. Until 1960, Maruyama argued, people had merely responded passively to issues and debated an agenda established elsewhere. In 1960 the fixed course proved unacceptable. In other words, it was resistance in 1960 which provided proof of active social autonomy for the first time in Japan's postwar history. Instead of a 'pseudo-programme', people were now acting to protect their version of democracy. It was a celebration of social autonomy. 'Until now motivational consciousness was not developed by the self but something brought in from elsewhere and put on like a uniform ... but now one is forced to establish one's own goals and act to achieve them. '45 Democracy was being established at last: 'at the moment all is confusion, but in the midst of that confusion I see evidence that democracy is beginning to be indigenised for the first time.'46 The key to Maruyama's logic was revealed in his association of 5.19 with the day of defeat in 1945. 5.19 and 8.15 In Maruyama's opinion, the isolationism of those within the parliament (innai shugz) from those without smacked of the transcendental cabinets of the prewar years. His fears in the face of continued isolationism by those in parliament were motivated to a large extent by the wartime experience. There seemed to be a belief on his part that the trials of the war and the authoritarian regime were a rite of passage for the emergence of democracy postwar. In an emotional statement, he said that 'the forcing through of the legislation has reversed the benefits from the sacrifices made in blood by hundreds of Japanese'.47 Unravelling the significance of the war experience and the defeat for Maruyama and his generation is vital to an understanding of the discourse through which they expressed their views on democracy in the postwar era. This does not condemn the substance of the discourse to the status of an historical throwback, speaking to a time and place long past. It does expose the psychology of a society which, despite the

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calendar, was in the opinion of those living in it very much a postwar society still living with its ghosts. In early June before the automatic ratification of the treaty legislation by the Upper House Maruyama grew concerned about the tone of resignation which had descended on the media. Maruyama detected the re-emergence of what he regarded as the 'typically Japanese' tendency to accept a/ail accompli. In urging the press to retain their sense of crisis, he used Pearl Harbour as a metaphor. He exhorted the journalists to 'remember 5.19 as the Americans remember Pearl Harbour, because going back to original principles in our case means going back to 8.15'.48 What did he mean by this? In Fukusho no setsu, he implied it meant 'the determination to build a new Japan'.49 Then later in the calm after the storm in August 1960 he elaborated further. His essay 5.19 to 8.15 was written in the style of an interview, where Maruyama responded to 'questions' about his writings and activism in May and June. Here is his answer to the question about what he had actually meant by advocating a return to 8.15: This means I thought that to look again at the Japan of 15 years ago with today's problem consciousness would enable a clearer understanding of the historical significance of the present. ... If we look back, especially to the period of the Korean War, it is clear that there has been a revival of the belief that extra-constitutional influence is justifiable on the part of the political, bureaucratic and financial elites, to the extent that they can now show a natural face. so The spectre of irresponsible, transcendental elites was a feature of the wartime, but surely not of the postwar? If the Korean War had been the excuse for extra-constitutional action, what was the situation in 1960? Was it the worsening US-USSR relationship? Maruyama reveals that the first historical parallel he saw was the 'reverse course' phenomenon, where democracy was systematically undermined by authority. The mere existence of a parliament and an electoral system did not deliver democracy. This had been the prevalent belief after defeat in 1945. This vigilance was troubled though by ignorance of the 'all-pervasive system of political suppression' which had survived the trauma of defeat. Maruyama retrieved quotation after quotation from newspaper editorials in 1945 warning of complacency towards these forces, and made clear his belief that this was precisely the situation faced in 1960. The events of 5.19 had provided opportunity for pervasive democratisation, but they also proved that the 'silent oppression' remained a tangible obstacle. In 1945 one editorial had estimated that it would take fifteen years

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for Japan to democratise. Fifteen years later, Maruyama appraised Japan's democracy like this: 'fifteen years later we have the externallyimposed democratisation and its product, the imposed-from-above constitution firmly cemented into the social consciousness, rooted with creativity and self-genesis. '51 But concurrent with this: 'the structure of benevolent authority that is to be silently obeyed has at some stage reappeared in the definition of democracy. '52 Both 8.15 and 5.19 shared the great opportunity pervasively to democratise Japan's political culture. At both stages, the potential for social autonomy to drive this process was remarkable. In the case of 8.15, the ability to utilise this energy to protect democracy had since been subverted and compromised by authoritarian forces of prewar origin. In the case of 5.19, Maruyama believed that the activism associated with the protect democracy movement had indigenised resistance against a reverse course rearguard assault. But his bravado in the face of universal despair amongst the newly-splintering anti-treaty forces in the summer of 1960 was aimed at a future time and place. The inspiration for 5.19 democracy could be derived from the potential of 8.15. But for the time being democracy in Japan would continue its struggle to realise its potential. Maruyama's lament in June 1960 was that government had squandered the opportunity to invest the spiritual force hitherto dedicated to the Emperor system ideology (kokutai) in the new postwar democracy. Instead, they sought only to perpetuate the control mechanisms of the pre-democratic age: 'in effect, authority is attempting to mount a legalistic democratic system on the expectation of continuing the silent submissive subject consciousness.'53 The positive legacy of 1960 for Maruyama was that it established a precedent for popular activism and proof of the viability of social autonomy. The negative legacy was that this social autonomy would still need to be expressed as resistance against an authoritarian government posing as the legitimate embodiment of a democratic state. AFTER THE SHOUTING: ASSESSMENTS AND RECRIMINATIONS After the anti-climax of automatic ratification on 6.19, there was a concerted push on the part of many in society, including the press and the LDP, to 'normalise' the situation. Having witnessed the death of the student and the cancellation of Eisenhower's visit, they desired a return to orderly political life. In July and August the intellectuals

Democracy in crisis 223 evaluated what had occurred, and determined their future courses. The evaluations took two basic themes: the 5.19 movement had been a success, or, it had been a failure. In both cases there were ramifications for democracy, as all of the activists had become entwined in some way in the protect democracy issue. It was not possible to sit back and evaluate the anti-security treaty movement without also declaring one's assessment of Japan's democracy. As noted above, Maruyama wasted little time in declaring the anti-treaty movement a success. In an interview on 5 July Maruyama claimed that 5.19 had shown the people to be the final arbiters of the law, and that if the people did not wish to recognise the treaty they had the power to nullify its efficacy. Further, Japan had asserted her independence by not meekly following the wishes of the United States. Significantly, Maruyama stated that the manifestation of success was popular resistance: '[in 1960} it was shown that over the fifteen postwar years the sort of healthy democratic sense of resisting what the authorities seek to impose has existed amongst the people in their daily lives.'''' What remained was for the spirit of 1960 to live on through providing 'countless opportunities for discussion' amongst the citizens. The most important thing was that in May and June 1960 the people of Japan had shown the sort of initiative and self-generated activism that had been lacking immediately after the war. There was now an indigenous precedent on which to draw for future activism. Maruyama subsequently explained that his optimism about the positive legacy of the anti-treaty movement was based on the origin of protest in social autonomy rather than the mere fact of a precedent. Shadowing his theory of modernisation, Maruyama pointed out that democracy as an historical phenomenon had arisen in modern Europe first in its social manifestation, then in its political manifestation and finally in its legal manifestation. The dynamic push for democracy had its genesis in popular activism; this was essential to the development of democracy with a solid foundation. What 1960 had done for Japan's democracy was supply this popular foundation. Kishi had tried to treat the legalistic and political spheres of democracy as organs of oligarchy, but the external pressure from the popular sphere had forced Japan's democracy to marry the concepts of parliamentarism and true democracy much in the same way that European countries had done decades ago. 55 Critics sensitive to Maruyama's alleged penchant for things European might dismiss this as yet another example of Maruyama's disdain for Japan's historical experience, but I believe this distorts his intention. His intention was the indigenisation of democracy

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in Japan's political culture, not the duplication of European history for its own sake. Maruyama put Japan's problems with parliamentary democracy in the postwar era down to the distorted nature of her modernisation. The devaluation of the social sphere in political terms was he believed a consequence of the 'late-developer syndrome'. This forced people either to regard democracy as synonymous with protest, or as the alternative to communism. This in tum meant that the people and the government were working with different democratic symbols. All of this was caused by the failure to attach value to social autonomy. The added complication of the Western origin of democracy merely confused the issue. Arguably this confusion was embraced by Maruyama himself, when he insisted that democracy be associated with individualism. 1960 was therefore remarkable in personal terms for Maruyama because he broadened his perspective and linked social autonomy with democratic activism. Maruyama later said, 'If we look at the substance of activism itself then that is democracy. 'S6 We can extrapolate from this that his idea of participatory democracy went beyond mere protest and resistance. Social autonomy ideally would be a positive force as the subject and object of democratic government. The younger generation of pacifist activists emerged from the whirlwind of May and June fired up to embark on their own version of v'narod. Under the auspices of Mingakken, these scholars journeyed to the far-flung regions of the country in a 'Back Home' movement and gave public seminars about democracy to groups of local citizens. Despite the optimism which must have motivated them, a note of despair and recrimination began to creep into their assessments of the events of 1960. They were inspired to search for 'citizens consciousness', but were dismayed that the intellectual leadership had failed to shed their elitist image. As Sakamoto said to Maruyama, the significance of popular activism in 1960 depended on whether this significance was heralded by the people, or imposed on them by a distant elite. 57 In the aftermath of activism, when the treaty was ratified and then later the LOP was returned to power, Maruyama's comment on 'losing the battle but winning the war' had a hollow sound. One of the most damning assessments of the protect democracy movement, and of Maruyama in particular, came from an intellectual who had stood shoulder to shoulder with Maruyama since the early postwar days. Shimizu Ikutaro believed devoutly that democracy should not have been mobilized for the task of defeating the security treaty revision. Instead, he saw that the appropriation of popular energy by the protect democracy slogan increased the popular appeal

Democracy in crisis 225 of the movement but dispersed the energy and unity of popular activism. In the end the forces of government grew stronger and more concentrated, while the opposition movement grew vague, ill-defined and ultimately direction less. The fault for this lay at the feet of elitist scholars such as Maruyama. Shimizu argued that the switch of focus from the treaty to democracy implied an either/or choice which interfered with the political efficacy of popular activism. Defeating the treaty revision would have been a tangible political victory heralding the establishment of participatory democracy. As a result of the advent of the 'protect democracy' slogan, 'a battle we should have won has through the strategy of the leaders been lost'.~8 As for the younger generation of pacifists, Shimizu scoffed at their idealism. 'How does one define a citizen?', he asked: 'is it the people who wave from offices, or those who gather around the Diet obeying directives? Or the individuals who hover around Zengakuren sit-ins?'S9 The passion and personal commitment that intellectuals such as Maruyama and Shimizu invested in their activism was intense; certainly they were united by their shared history to demonstrate active commitment to the postwar world. But in Shimizu's view through clinging to elitism and the vague philosophical realm Maruyama was denying the people the very autonomous space which his thought had identified as the highest priority in Japan's democratic development. Midorikawa Toru suggested that the real difference between Maruyama and Shimizu originated in their differing perception of the role of intellectuals. Shimizu was inspired towards inciting activism and leading the way, whereas Maruyama believed in informing and influencing the public. 60 The impetus for activism had to come from the popular sphere in order to have democratic value. Fukuda Tsuneari echoed Shimizu's criticism of Maruyama as an elitist whose intellectual framework was trapped in an irrelevant time. Calling 8.15 Maruyama's idea of 'year zero', Fukuda suggested his own historical parallel between 1945 and 1960. The 'silent subject consciousness' was not typical of the government, but of the 'citizens' who followed after Maruyama and hung on his every word. If a gap did exist it was not between the government and the people, but the intellectuals and the people. Finally, Fukuda commented drily on the failure of intellectuals in 1960 to turn on themselves the same critical eye that they turned onto the hapless masses. 61 There is within this critique by Fukuda an element of hypocrisy, as the essence of his complaint was not the fact that intellectuals led the protect democracy movement, but that they led it badly. 'Elitism' was implicitly acknowledged. By far the most caustic critic of Maruyama and his activities in 1960

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was Yoshimoto Takaaki. In his article Gisei no shiten (Death of Hypocrisy) Yoshimoto said that the entire protect democracy movement had been based on a delusion propagated by Maruyama on the nature of the state and the nature of the citizen.62 In a relentless leftist tirade, Yoshimoto dismissed the history of postwar as the maturation process of capitalism. This was the real substance of what Maruyama called 'parliamentary democracy'; whether they used it kindly or roughly was beside the point. If the people of Japan had been 'democratised' at all, it was because they felt keenly their estrangement from the monopoly capitalistic order. Quite the opposite of Maruyama's assertion that he applied the consciousness of postwar to the war experience for the benefit of the present, Yoshimoto depicted Maruyama as a dreamer of war generation vintage, who applied his mistaken assumptions about the wartime state and society mistakenly to the postwar reality. Yoshimoto believed that with 1960, 'the fiction of 15 postwar years ended'. Maruyama's democracy had been shown to be a delusion. Maruyama answered Yoshimoto indirectly in the postscript to Gendai seiji no shis6 to k6d6 (1964) where he said he preferred the 'delusion' of democracy to the 'reality' of Greater Imperial Japan. 63 But perhaps the best rebuff to Yoshimoto was Maruyama's presentation of democracy as an 'eternal revolution'. He wrote, 'I have never thought that parliamentary democracy is an ideal political structure.' Rather it was a process that could not be encapsulated in anyone system. An eternal revolution is not something that should ever be considered as existing within a system such as socialism or capitalism. If there is something, an -ism, that can be called an 'eternal revolution' then democracy is the only thing that can assume that name. 64 Maruyama was defending himself using Yoshimoto's own terminology, asserting that in the sense that really mattered he was more of a revolutionary than Yoshimoto. Was Maruyama applying a war scenario to the postwar era? Were his demons imaginary, or present in disguised forms? The strength and penetration of Maruyama's analysis of postwar democracy was derived in large part from his retrospective view of the wartime Japanese polity. But it is a distortion of his thought to imply that his vision was trapped in the past and divorced from his postwar surroundings. Maruyama was not recreating the circumstances surrounding the wartime state, he was actively seeking to prevent its reincarnation. His dedication to democracy as an expression of social autonomy was focused very much on the present and future. Discontinuity, not continuity,

Democracy in crisis 227

was his fundamental premise. If we take him at his word that ultimately it is the locus and orientation of value that determines the course of human experience, then we must credit him with an uncommon dedication to postwar democracy. The legacy of 1960 has been as multifaceted as the disparate groups and ideas which opposed the revised treaty in May and June. While I disagree with Shimizu and Fukuda's penchant to blame the 'failure' of 1960 on intellectuals like Maruyama, it is nonetheless true that 1960 marked the end of intellectual leadership of popular debate in Japan. Since then intellectuals have continued to engage in debate, but their debates revolve in ever-decreasing circulations. They no longer set the agenda, but react to it. This may seem to reinforce Fukuda and Shimizu's point of view. However, Maruyama would instead point to this as proof that debate and opinion forming had moved on into the public domain. He may have thought so soon after 1960, but the shock of the student rebellions in 1970 hardened his perspective. 6s Maruyama's subsequent withdrawal from analysis and commentary on contemporary Japanese politics could also be construed as an act of despair.66 One indication that debate on postwar democracy had moved on significantly since 1945 was that in 1960 the democracy being debated was not vague but clearly defined in its value orientation, ethics and principles. The positive legacy vaunted by Maruyama in late 1960 needs some qualification. If resistance is the proof of Japan's democracy, then it is more accurate to depict the legacy of 1960 as the reinforcement of the legitimacy of protest with 'the nobility of failure'. In contemporary Japan we see evidence of citizen's consciousness in citizen's movements concerning environmental matters, visits by nucleararmed warships and taxes. But these expressions of dissent are still laced with illegitimacy. Implicit in this attitude is the tarring of social autonomy with the same brush. By the end of 1960, Maruyama Masao was driven by disappointment at the outcome of the first fifteen postwar years to define democracy in narrow terms as the preservation of apolitical, personal autonomy. NOTES

2 3 4

Translation appears in Dan Kurzman, Kishi and Japan, New York, Ivan Obolensky, 1960. p. 373. Obituary, The Times, IO August 1987. Shiikan Dokushojin, 27 June 1960, p. 2. Japan-United States Joint Communique, 22 June 1957, in Contemporary Japan, vol. xxv, no. I, September 1957, p. 167.

228 Democracy in postwar Japan 5

6

7 8 9 10 II 12

13 14 15 16 17

18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34

Security Treaty Between the United States of America and Japan, 8 September 1951, in George R. Packard, Protest in Tokyo, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1966, p. 355. Published in Sekai, October 1959; reproduced in Sekai, July 1985, pp. 152-167. John Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System, London, Athlone, 1988, pp. 143-144. 'Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan', in Packard, op.cit., pp. 364-367. Heiwa Mondai Danwakai, memo dated 19 December 1949. Tokyo Heiwa Mondai Danwakai, ~npo kaitei mondai ni tsuite no seimei' (Statement on the Problem of Revising the Security Treaty), Sekai, July 1985, pp. 168-169. ibid, p. 169. Heiwa Mondai Danwakai, Kokusai Mondai Danwakai, 'Futatabi anpo kaitei ni tsuite: dai ni kenkyU hOkoku' (Second Statement on the Treaty Revision: Report of the Second Research Group). First Published in Sekai, February 1960; reproduced in Sekai, July 1985, pp. 175-204. Hidaka Rokuro, 1960 Nen 5.19 (19 May 1960), Iwanami Shoten, 1960, p.46. Based on the account of those events by Packard, op. cit, and Hidaka, op. cit. Maruyama Masao, 'Sentaku no toki' (Time For Choice), Misuzu, August 1960, p. 2. Takeuchi Yoshimi, 'Jishoku no riyu sho' (Reasons for my Resignation), Takeuchi Yoshimi zenshii, vol. 9, Chikuma ShobO, 1981, p. 102. ibid. Maruyama Masao, 'Sentaku no toki', p. 2. Hidaka Rokuro, '5.20--6.19' (20 May to 19 June), Shiso, July 1960, p.129. Interview with Midorikawa Toru, 9 April 1987. Packard,oP. cit., pp. 343-351. ibid., p. 351. Maruyama Masao, 'Nationalism in Japan: Its Theoretical Background and Prospects', Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics, p.44. Maruyama Masao, Seiji no sekai (World of Politics), Ochanomizu ShobO, 1952,p. 79. ibid., p. 81. Maruyama Masao, 'Minshushugi no na ni okeru fashizumu' (Fascism in the Name of Democracy), Sekai, October 1952, p. 44. Packard op. cit., p. 348. Time Pacific Edition, 27 June 1960, p. 10. ibid., p. 11. ibid., p. 12. See Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, p. 140 on rightist activism during the crisis. Interview with Arase Yutaka, Shiikan Dokushojin, 19 September 1960, p. 1. Interview with Maruyama Masao on 17 April 1987. In Maruyama Masao, Hidaka Rokuro, Nagai Michio et aI., 'Taishii undo ni tsuite' (On Mass Movements), Fujin Koron, January 1959, p. 174.

Democracy in crisis 229 35 36 37 38 39 40 41

42 43 44

45 46

47 48

49 50 51

52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62

63 64 65

Maruyama, ibid, p. 174. ibid ibid, p. 176. Maruyama Masao, in Gendai seiji no shiso to kodo (Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics), expanded, Miraisha, 1964, p. 458. ibid, p. 459. Maruyama Masao, 'Sentaku no toki', pp. 2-5. Takeuchi Yoshimi, 'Tatakai no tame no yotsu no joken' (Four Conditions For the Fight), Shisii no Kagaku, July 1960, p. 17; Takeuchi Yoshimi, 'Minshu ka dokusai ka' (Democracy or Dictatorship), Takeuchi Yoshimi zenshu, vol. 9, Chikuma ShoM, 1981, p. 110. See 1. Victor Koschmann in Harootunian and Miyoshi, eds, Postmodernism in Japan, pp. 123-142. Maruyama Masao, 'Midasenu togi seijj' (Politics by Discussion Nowhere to be Found), Asahi Shinbun, I June 1960, p. 7. Yoshimoto Takaaki accused Maruyama of this. See 'Gisei no shiien' (Death of Hypocrisy), Minshushugi no shinwa, Gendai Shicho Sha, 1960, pp. 43-76. Maruyama Masao et al., 'Giji no puroguramu kara no dakkyaku' (Emerge from a Pseudo-Programme), Chuo Koron, July 1960, p. 33. ibid Maruyama Masao, 'Midasenu togi seiji', p. 7. Maruyama Masao, 'Fukusho no setsu' (Return to Original Principles), Sekai, August 1960, p. 370. ibid Maruyama Masao, '5.19 to 8.15' (19 May and 15 August), Chuo Koron, August 1960, p. 46. ibid, p. 50. ibid. ibid., pp. 50--51. 'Shin anpo joyaku hantai undo 0 kaerimiru' (Looking Back at the Movement Against the New Security Treaty), Hokkaido Shinbun, 5 July 1960. Maruyama Masao et al., 'Gikaisei minshushugi no yukue' (Direction of Parliamentary Democracy), Ekonomisuto Bessatsu, Anpo ni yureta Nihon no kiroku, September 1960, pp. 88-90. Maruyama Masao et ai., 'Genzai no seiji josei: nani 0 nasu beki ka' (Today's Political Situation: What Should be Done), Sekai, August 1960, p.225. ibid Shimizu Ikutaro, 'Kateru arasoi ni naze maketa ka' (Why Did We Lose a Winning Battle), Shukan Dokushojin, 25 July 1960, p. 2. ibid. Interview with Midorikawa, 9 April 1987. Fukuda Tsuneari, 'Joshiki ni kaere' (Return to Common Sense), ShinchO, September 1960, pp. 16-27. Minshushugi no shinwa (Myth of Democracy), Gendai ShichO Sha, 1960, pp. 43-76. Maruyama Masao, Gendai seiji no shiso to kOdo, expanded, p. 585. Interview by Arase Yutaka, Shukan Dokushojin. Interview with Maruyama Masao, 8 June 1987.

230 66

Democracy in postwar Japan Most commentators assert that Maruyama withdrew from contempo rary political commentary in the aftermath of the 1968/69 student riots when he was menaced and harrassed. Maruyama does give those inci dents some weight as having had a deep effect on him.

9 Conclusion

Universalism was the distinguishing aspect of postwar Japan's democratic discourse. The strong awareness in Japan of democracy as an external-origin entity made universality the logical aspiration of those liberals who wanted to indigenise it. Thus transcendence over nation, state and culture became part of Japan's postwar democratic ideal. For Maruyama autonomy was meant to be the vehicle for universalism that would supplant particularism. In many respects, Maruyama and his colleagues asked the same question of Japan that Dahrendorf asked of Germany's war experience. 1 The 'German Question' - 'why is it that so few people in Germany embrace liberal democracy?' - mirrored Maruyama's question about Japanese society. Maruyama covered many of the issues which Dahrendorf later addressed: the predominance of the state, the nation and the irrational over the individual and society; the feudal mentality which accompanied the industrial twists of incomplete modernity; the emasculation of civil society by an enlightened authoritarian state hiding under a family state ideology; and the failure of democracy equated with the failure of the open society. In doing so both Maruyama and Dahrendorf trod a delicate path. While pointing to the distortions of history and other 'objective' factors which influenced the appearance of the war society, both introduced particularism into their critiques of their societies. For Dahrendorf it was a 'German propensity for synthesis'; for Maruyama it was a Japanese inability to synthesise identity and modernity into an independent self. Maruyama's democratic dilemma - the tension between personal and social autonomy - does more than just highlight the problems of one nation in coming to terms with democracy. Maruyama's methodology is a major contribution to democratic theory. In a sense his methodology represents the affinity between liberal and Marxist approaches to the role of the subject in history. The combination of a dialectical

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mechanism and a commitment to idealism as a primary force in history brought what is often still regarded in Western thinking as two antithetical philosophies into a working partnership. The 'failure' of his search for autonomy in Japan does not detract from the significance of his democratic formulation. Through his theoretical connection of the subject and universal value Maruyama demonstrated the dynamic potential of paradox in human history. Reformulating individualism and pluralism as personal and social autonomy was a second contribution to democratic thinking. Maruyama did not use this exact terminology, but he conveyed those ideas in his work in the years after World War II when democracy was at the forefront of Japanese consciousness. These versions of autonomy add philosophical flexibility and effectively free democracy from its Western identity without betraying the basic precepts of democratic theory. If there was a 'Japanese' version of democracy that emerged out of the first decade and a half of the postwar era, it was realised in negative forms. Resistance against the state and evidence of distance between state and society became the attributes of 'genuine' democracy. Institutional criteria for democracy are cited by Japan's postwar politicians and conservative bureaucrats as evidence of democracy, but the fact that the most active community response towards political democracy in Japan is a sense of alienation, and the passive response one of apathy, betrays the poverty of democratic engagement of society at large. The space between state and society is not being used to express the popular sovereignty that should embody autonomy in a healthy democratic society. Maruyama's impact on how his peers and successors have viewed democracy in Japan has been significant, though this impact is increasingly being felt through challenges to his ideas. Younger generations of scholars have attacked Maruyama's pro-Western proclivities and abhorred his apparent denigration of Japanese culture and history. In doing so they followed in the footsteps of Maruyama's peers, who tended to grasp for particularism to shore up rejuvenated national pride and see pro-Westernism instead of universalism in Maruyama's work. The upsurge in Nihonjinron writings in the 1980s revealed the growing popularity of particularistic readings of Japanese society, but these works produced no credible theories of 'unique' Japanese democracy. One can sense the force of Maruyama's contrary example in the face of this upsurge in particularism, and see historical ghosts from the 1930s when democracy is portrayed as a hostile and incompatible Western mechanism of conflict management. Maruyama's greatest impact on concepts of democracy in Japan

Conclusion 233 was his association of democracy with a particular configuration of autonomy. As attacks on Maruyama focus increasingly on his Western inspiration, we can only hope that his concept of universal democratic autonomy will also be his intellectual legacy. The fact that Maruyama's ideas on postwar Japanese democracy still resonate in Japan can be attributed to annoyance on the part of a successful industrialised society that it is yet to achieve a democratic discourse that is not imposed, but of its own making. NOTE I Ratf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany, New York, W. W. Norton and Co., 1967.

Bibliographies

Primary sources for Maruyama Masao are listed separately in the Critical Bibliography. Unless otherwise noted, all Japanese sources are published in Tokyo.

INTERVIEWS Midorikawa Toru: 2 April and 9 April, 1987. Maruyama Masao: 17 April and 8 June, 1987. Sakamoto Yoshikazu: 5 December, 1987.

MARUYAMA MASAO: SECONDARY SOURCES (ENGLISH) Barshay, Andrew, 'Imagining Democracy in Postwar Japan: Reflections on Maruyama Masao and Modernism', Journal of Japanese Studies, vol. 18, no. 2, Summer 1992, pp. 365-406. Bellah, Robert N., 'Review of Maruyama Masao's Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan', Journal of Japanese Studies, vol. 3, no. I, Winter 1977, pp. 177-183. Dore, Ronald, 'Maruyama and Japanese Thought', New Left Review, no. 25, 1964, pp. 77-83. Irokawa, Daikichi, 'Emperor System as a Spiritual Structure', Gluck, Carol Trans., chapter 8, Culture of the Meiji Period, Jansen, Marius B. trans., New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1985, pp. 245-311. Koschmann,1. Victor, 'Debate on Subjectivity in Postwar Japan: Foundations of Modernism As a Political Critique', Pacific Affairs, vol. 54, no.4, Winter 1981, pp. 609-631. --'Maruyama Masao and the Incomplete Project of Modernity', Miyoshi, Masao and Harootunian, H. D., eds, Postmodernism and Japan, London, Duke University Press, 1989, pp. 123-141. Matsumoto, Sannosuke, 'Introduction', Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan, vol. IV, no. 2, 1966, pp. 2-19. (See also correspondence on this article in vol. V, nos. 2-3, December 1967, pp. 315-330.) Najita, T., 'Reconsidering Maruyama Masao's Studies', Japan Interpreter, vol. II, no. I, 1976, pp. 97-108. Nakamura, Akira, 'Maruyama Masao and the Ontology of Politics', Japan Interpreter, vol. XII, no. 2, Spring 1978, pp. 260-265.

Bibliographies 235

MARUYAMA MASAO: SECONDARY SOURCES (JAPANESE) Amano, Keiichi, '''Tenn6sei fashizumu" ron no genzai' ('Emperor-System Fascism' Theory Today), Ryudo, January 1980, pp. 56-65. Banno, Junji, 'Nihon kindai shi to kyo no Nihon: "bummei kaika" to "jiyii minken'" (Modern Japanese History and Contemporary Japan: 'Civilization and Enlightenment' and 'People's Rights'), Shakai Kagaku Kenkyu, vol. 38, no. 4, December 1986, pp. 233-243. Furuta, Hikaru, 'Maruyama Masao no shiso to hOhO' (Ideas and Methodology of Maruyama Masao), Ushio, October 1967, pp. 186-191. Gendai Shiso. 'Tokushii: Maruyama Masao', vol. 22, no. I, January 1994. Hayashi, Kentaro, 'Gendai chishikijin no ryoshiki' (Common Sense of Today's Intellectuals), Sekai, October 1950, pp. 97-103. Iida, Momo and Murakami, Ichiro, 'Maruyama Masao: Sengo minshushugi no ronri to shinri' (Maruyama Masao: Logic and Psychology of Postwar Democracy), Gendai no me ed., Sengo shiso ka ron, Gendai Hyoronsha, 1971. Imai, Jiiichiro, ed., Maruyama Masao chosaku noto (Writings of Maruyama Masao), Gendai no Riron Sha, 1987. Inoki, Masamichi, 'Hokoriuru dokutoku teki na gyoseki' (Unique Work of Which One Can Be Proud), Chao Koron, March 1957, pp. 214-217. Ishida, Takeshi, 'Sengo shakai kagaku no shiso - Otsuka Hisao, Maruyama Masao 0 chiishin ni' (Thought of Postwar Social Science - Featuring Otsuka Hisao and Maruyama Masao), Nihon no shakai kagaku, pp. 188193. Kato, Naotake, 'Ochita gUzo Maruyama Masao' (Fallen Idol Maruyama Masao), Shokun, December 1986, pp. 4~2. --'Tokyo saiban to Maruyama Masao' (Tokyo War Crimes Trial and Maruyama Masao), Shokun, July 1987, pp. 26-53. Kozu, Akira, 'Sengo tekijikan to "kindai" no danso: Takeuchi Yoshimi 0 taikyoku ni Maruyama Masao 0 ronzu' (Postwar Time and the Dislocation of 'the Modern': Discussing Maruyama Masao at the Opposite Extreme from Takeuchi Yoshimi), Ryudo, June 1977, pp. 106-125. --'Maruyama Masao: Riberaru chishikijin no shiso teki tenkai' (Maruyama Masao: Intellectual Development of a Liberal Intellectual), TaishU teki chishikijin no jidai, Sairyiisha, 1985, pp. 103-126. Kuno, Osamu; Tsurumi, Shunsuke; Fujita, Shozo, 'Shakai kagakusha no shiso: Otsuka Hisao, Shimizu Ikutaro, Maruyama Masao' (Thought of Social Scientists: Otsuka Hisao, Shimizu Ikutaro, Maruyama Masao), Sengo Nihon no shiso, pp. 199-241. Matsumoto, Kennichi, 'Maruyama Masao, Otsuka Hisao to kindaishugi' (Maruyama Masao, Otsuka Hisao and Modernism), Dento to Gendai, November 1974, pp. 52-60. --'Chiteki erito ishiki no genki' (Foundations of the Intellectual Elitist Consciousness), Ryiido, April 1975, pp. 64-72. Matsumoto, Sannosuke, et af., 'Maruyama riron to genzai no shiso jokyo' (Maruyama's Theories and the Contemporary Intellectual Situation), Gendai no Riron, May, 1972, pp. 73-100. Matsumura, Kazuto, 'Jiyii shugi sha no taido' (Attitude of Liberals), Ningen, November 1950, pp. 142-144. Nakajima, Makoto, 'Maruyama Masao: chiizuri no shiso ka' (Maruyama

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--'Mitabi heiwa ni tsuite' (On Peace For The Third Time), Sekai, July 1985, pp. 118-151. --Kokusai Mondai Danwakai, 'Futatabi anpo kaitei ni tsuite' (Second Statement on Revising the Security Treaty), Sekai, February 1960; reproduced in Sekai, July 1985, pp. 175-204. Hidaka, Rokuro, ed., 'Kojin to shakai ni tsuite' (On the Individual and Society), TenbO, April 1949, pp. 4-14. --'Sensa taiken to sengo taiken' (War Experience and Postwar Experience), Sekai, August 1956, pp. 50-56. --'[Jikkan] to [riron)' [Realisation] and [Theory)), Sekai, August 1958, pp254260. --'Kyo no chishikijin no shutaisei' (ShutaiseiofTodays' Intellectuals), Shilkan Dokushojin, I January 1960, p. I. --'Kenryoku no Mryoku' (Violence of Authority), Tokyo Daigaku Shinbun, II July 1960, p. 17. --'Go gatsu hatsuka kara roku gatsu ju-ku nichi made' (From May 20 to June 19), Shiso, July 1960, pp. 129-136. --Sen kyiihyaku rokujii nen go gatsu jii-ku nichi (19th May 1960), Iwanami Shinsho, 1960. --Kindaishugi (Modernism), vol. 34, Gendai Nihon shiso taikei, Chikuma ShoM,1964. --'Anpo ronso no tenkai to kekkan' (Development of the Security Treaty Crisis and its Flaws), Sekai, August 1966, pp. 23-34. --'Sensa taiken to senso sekinin' (War Experience and War Responsibility), Usui Yoshimi ed., Sengo bungaku ronso, Bancho ShoM, 1972, pp. 160-167. - - ; Matsuoka, Yoko; On ozawa, Kimiko; Sato, Kunio; Nikaido, Haruko, 'Anpo kaitei to minshushugi' (Security Treaty Revision and Democracy), Fujin Koron, June 1960, pp. 112-120. Hirano, Yoshitaro, 'Fukuda Tsuneari shi no gimon ni kotaeru' (Answering Mr Fukuda's Doubts), Chilo Koron, January 1955, pp. 84-98. Huxley, Julian, 'UNESCO: sono mokuteki to tetsugaku' (UNESCO: Its Objectives and Philosophy), Sekai, July 1947, pp. 9-15. --'UNESCO ni okeru Furoito to Marukusu' (Freud and Marx in UNESCO), Sekai, January 1948, pp. 25-30. Ide, Musaburo, Anpo toso (Security Treaty Struggle), Sanichi ShoM, 1960. Imabori, Shinji, 'Shiso teki yuki ni tsuite' (On Intellectual Courage), Shiso no Kagaku, January 1966, pp. 22-28. Imai, Seiichi, 'Gunjiteki shinryaku no rensa hanno I' (Part One: Chain Reaction of Military Invasion), Nihon fashizumu kyOdo kenkyii 3, Shiso, October 1953, pp. 53-63. --'Gunjiteki shinryaku no rensa hanno 2' (Part Two: Chain Reaction of Military Invasion), Nihon fashizumu kyOdo kenkyii 4, Shiso, November 1953, pp.76-85. Inoki, Masamichi, 'Haisen demokurashii no unmei' (Fate of Democracy Born of Defeat), Chilo Koron, May 1956, pp. 48-53. - '-'Seiji teki kiki no tei ni aru mono' (What is at the Bottom of the Political Crisis), Chilo Koron, August 1960, pp. 73-79. Irie, Keishiro; Maebashi, Kenzo; Obata, Misao; Royama, Yoshiro; 'Tsumetai senso kara tsumetai heiwa e' (From Cold War to Cold Peace), Sekai, October 1953, pp. 184-204.

Bibliographies 243 Ishida, Takeshi, '''Fashizumu ki" ni okeru kanryoteki shihai no tokushitsu' (Special Characteristics of Bureaucratic Domination in the 'Fascist Era'), Nihon fashizumu kyooo kenkyu 5, Shiso, December 1953, pp. 52-72. --'Kokkai demo jiken 0 mokugeki shite' (Witnessing the Diet Incident), Sekai, February 1960, pp. 118-131. --'Naze seiji wa kokumin no mono ni naranai ka' (Why Doesn't Politics Belong to the People), Chilo Koron, September 1960, pp. 62-72. --'Sho soshiki no minshushugi teki shid6sei' (Democratic Leadership of Each Organization), Shiso, November 1960, pp. 114-128. - - ; Shinohara, Hajime; Fukuda, Kanichi, 'Yakudo suru shimin seishin: sono ishiki to kooo' (Sprightly Civic Spirit: Its Consciousness and Actions), Chilo Koron, July 1960, pp. 66-83. - - ; Takagi, Takeo; Fujiwara, Hirotatsu; Miyake, Tsuyako. 'Kiki ni tatsuminshu seiji' (Democratic Politics at Crisis Point), Fujin Koron, July 1960, pp. 51-57. Kakehashi, Akihito, 'Kokuhaku no sho' (Confessions), TenM, May 1949, pp.4-32. Kamishima, Jiro, 'Shomin no ishiki ni okeru bunkyoku to togo l' (Part One: Polarisation and Unification in the Popular Consciousness), Nihon fashizumu kyooo kenkyu 7, Shiso, February 1954, pp. 84-94. --Kindai Nihon no seishin kozo (Spiritual Structure of Modem Japan), Iwanami Shoten, 1961. --'Hachigatsujugo nichi noimi' (Meaning of 15 August), Chilo Koron, September 1965, pp. 50-61. Kasanami, Joji, 'BC kyu senzai to sengo shiso' (B and C Class War Crimes and Postwar Thought), Shiso no Kagaku, no. 20, August 1960, pp. 38-52. Kato, Shiiichi, 'Senso to chishikijin' (War and Intellectuals), vol. 4, Kindai Nihon shiso shi koza, Chikuma Shobo, 1959, pp. 325-361. Katsube, Hajime, (Gen), 'Sengo fashizumu no shokeitai' (Various Forms of Postwar Fascism), Hando no shiso, vol. V, Iwanami koza gendai shiso, Iwanami Shoten, 1957, pp. 187-216. Kido, Koichi, Kido Koichi nikki (Diary of Kido KOichi), 2 vols, Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1966. Kinoshita, Hanji. 'Sengo uyoku undo no henshin' (Changed Face of the Postwar Right Wing), Shiso, December 1955, pp. 14-23. Koike Kai, ed., Sekai no gunji josei to Nihon no Mei: Jiminto gaiko mondai kenkyilkai sokiroku yori (International Military Situation and Japan's Defence: From the Records of the Liberal Democratic Party's Foreign Affairs Research Committee), 1958. Koizumi, Shinzo, 'Anpo, boryoku, daigaku kyoju ron no joshiki' (Security Treaty, Violence, and the Common Sense of University Professors' Debates), Bungei Shunjil, August 1960, pp. 94-100. --'Heiwa ron no zenshin' (Promotion of Pacifist Theory), Sekai, August 1952, pp.62-69. --'Watashi no heiwa ron ni tsuite' (On My Peace Theory), Sekai, May 1952, pp.241-252. Kuno, Osamu, 'Futatsu no heiwa wa sekai heiwa ni tsunagaru ka' (Will Two Types of Peace Lead to World Peace?), Sekai, November 1951, pp. 41-5\. --'Fashizumu no kachi ishiki' (Value Consciousness of Fascism), Hando no shiso, vol. Y, Iwanami koza gendai shiso, Iwanami Shoten, 1957, pp. 259-286.

244 Bibliographies --'Minshushugi no genri e no hangyaku' (Resistance to Democratic Principles), Shiso, November 1960, pp. 67-74. Kyooo Sengen, 'Gikai shugi 0 mamore' (Protect Parliamentarism), Asahi Shinbun, 17 June 1960, p. l. Kyoto Heiwa Mondai Danwakai, ~npo kaitei mondai ni tsuite no seimei' (Statement on the Problem of Revising the Security Treaty), Sekai, February 1960, pp. 173-174. Maeda, Tamon, 'Nihon de minshushugi wa mono ni naru ka' (Will Democracy Become Anything in Japan), Chuo Koron, February 1955, pp.28-36. Matsumura, Kazuto, 'Tetsugaku ni okeru shuseishugi: Umemoto Katsumi no tachiba ni tsuite' (Revisionism in Philosophy: Umemoto Katsumi's Position), Sekai, July 1948, pp. 23-38. Minami, Hiroshi, 'TennOsei no shinriteki jiban' (Psychological Foundations of the Emperor System), Shiso, June 1952, pp. 54--63. Miyata, Mitsuo, 'Nachizumu no Igi' (Significance of Nazism), Hando no shiso, vol. V, Iwanami koza gendai shiro, Iwanami Shoten, 1957, pp. 117152. Morimoto, Tetsuro, 'Shutaisei ronso e no hihan teki ketsugo' (Critical Conclusion to the Shutaisei Debate), TenbO, February 1949, pp. 4-13. Murakami, HYOei, 'Senchii ha wa ko kangaeru' (This is How the War Generation Thinks), Chuo Koron, April 1956, pp. 20-33. --'Tenno no senso sekinin' (Emperor's War Responsibility), Chuo Koron, June 1956, pp. 87-97. Nakajima, Kenzo, 'Hitori no heiwa shugisha kara Fukuda Tsuneari e' (From a Pacifist to Fukuda Kozon), Chuo Koron, March 1955, pp. 110-122. Nakano, Shigeharu, 'Hihyo no ningen sei' (Humanity of Criticism), TenbO, March 1947, pp. 40-48. Nippon Dokusho Shin bun, '60 shiso sensen no hitobito' (People on the Intellectual Frontline in 1960), Nippon Dokusho Shinbun, 19 December 1960, p. l. Nosaka, Sanzo, 'Shin anpo danjite yurusazu' (We Will Not Accept the New Security Treaty), Zen'ei, May 1960, pp.4-115. Oitsumerareru Kishi seifu (Hunted Kishi Cabinet), Asahi Shinbun, 26 May 1960. Okuma, Nobuyuki, 'Miketsu no sensosekinin' (Unfinished Issue of War Responsibility), Chuo Koron, March 1956, pp. 57--65. Oshima, Yasumasa, 'Jitsuzon shugi no shakai teki chi ban' (Social Foundations of Existentialism), TenbO, July 1947, pp. 2-19. Ouchi, HyOe, 'Heiwa no atarashiki kadai: Heiwa Mondai Danwakai Keizaibukai hOkoku (New Peace Issues: Report to the Peace Problems Discussion Group Economic Sub-Group), Sekai, October 1954, pp. 6-15. --'Futatsu no minshushugi no kyozon' (Coexistence of Two Types of Democracy), Sekai, October 1956, pp. 15-22. Oyama, Ikuo, 'Senso sekinin to tenno no taii' (War Responsibility and the Emperor's Abdication), Chuo Koron, August 1948, pp. 53-56. Royama, Masamichi, 'Heiwa san gensoku to kowajoyaku' (Three Peace Principles and the Peace Treaty), Sekai, October 1951, pp. 207-208. --'Minshushugi no henshOhO' (Dialectics of Democracy), Chuo Koron, January 1956, pp. 26-35. --'Shin anpo joyaku no shonin to gikai seito no tachiba' (Acceding to the

Bibliographies 245 New Security Treaty and the Position of Parliamentary Political Parties), Sekai, March 1960, pp. 29-35. Royama, Masamichi, 'Nihon ni okeru gikaisei minshushugi' (Parliamentary Democracy in Japan), Shiso, November 1960, pp. 129-136. Sato, Noboru, 'Gendankai ni okeru minshushugi' (Democracy Today), Shiso, August 1957, pp. 1-14. --'Nihon no minshushugi to sengo sedai' (Japan's Democracy and the Postwar Generation), Shiso, July 1959, pp. I-II. Sekai (editorial), 'Yuibutsu ron to shutaisei' (Historical Materialism and Shutaisel), February 1948. Reproduced in Hidaka, Rokuro ed. Kindaishugi, pp. 117-167. --Mitsu no Seimei IThree Statements For World Peace, April 1950. --'Haisen no hi no omoide' (Memories of the Day of Defeat), Sekai, August 1950, pp. 37-74. --'Watashi no hachigatsu jiigo nichi', (My 15 August), Sekai, August 1955, pp.65-102. --'Kokkai demo jiken to shin bun' (Diet Demonstration Incident and the Newspapers), Sekai, February 1960, pp. 114-117. --'Hachi gatsu jiigo nichi wa mada owatte wa inai' (8.15 is Not Over Yet), Sekai, October 1965, pp. 184-202. Shiga, Yoshio, 'Kowa mondai to Nihon Ky6santo' (Peace Treaty and the Japan Communist Party), Zen'ei, January 1950, pp. 1-14. --'Nihon jinmin no kooai na toso: shin anpo joyaku hijun b6shi no tame ni' (Great Struggle of the Japanese People: In Order to Prevent the Ratification of the New Security Treaty), Zen'ei, July 1960, pp. 4-17. Shimizu, Ikutaro, 'Shutaisei no kyakkanteki kosatsu' (An Objective Consideration of Shutaisei), in Hidaka, Rokuro, ed., Kindaishugi, vol. 34, Gendai Nihon shiso taikei Chikuma Shobo, 1964, pp. 168-193. --'Shomin' (Common People), TenbO, January 1950, pp. 6-16. --'Senso to heiwa no riso to genjitsu' (Ideal and Reality of War and Peace), Sekai, April 1954, pp. 82-92. --'Atarashiku moeru minshushugi' (Democracy Newly Resurrected), Sekai, October 1956, pp. 58-68. --'Heiwa no mondai' (Problem of Peace), Gendai Nihon no shiso, vol. XI, Iwanami koza gendai shiso, Iwanami Shoten, 1957, pp. 187-214. --'Heiwa undo no shitsu to ryo' (Quality and Quantity of the Peace Movement), Sekai, June 1958, pp. 80-92. --'Tokumei no shiso' (Anonymous Thought), Sekai, September 1958, pp. 1829. --'Kokumin no anzen hosho' (Citizens' Security), Sekai, January 1959, pp.I4-22. --'Kore made no jii nen kore kara no jii nen: zenmen kowa ronsha no tachiba kara' (Last Ten Years and the Next Ten Years: From the Perspective of Those Who Support a Comprehensive Peace Treaty), Sekai, June 1959, pp.42-51. --'An po hantai undo no genjo' (Present Status of the Movement Against the Security Treaty), Sekai, January 1960, pp. 288-299. --'Ima koso kokkai e' (Now Especially We Must Go to the Diet), Sekai, May 1960, pp. 18-28. --'Kateru toi ni naze maketa ka' (Why Did We Lose A Winning Battle), Shiikan Dokushojin, 25 July 1960, p. 2.

246 Bibliographies Shimizu, Ikutaro, 'Anpo sen so no "fusai na shiiyaku'" ('Unhappy Role' in the Security Treaty War), Chuo Koron, September 1960, pp. 178-189. --'Anpo toso ichinen ato no shiso' (Thought One Year After the Security Treaty Crisis), Chuo Koron, July 1961, pp. 45-57. --Mushiso jida; no shiso (Thought From an Era Without Ideas), Chiio Koron Sha, 1975. Shinohara, Hajime, 'Demokurashii no saihakken: anpo toso kara ichi nen' (Rediscovering Democracy: One Year After the Security Treaty Crisis), Chuo Koron, July 1961, pp. 148-160. Shinohara, Takeo, 'Kyo no bunka no mondaiten: Heiwa Mondai Danwakai Bunka Bu togi no ippan hOkoku' (Problem Points in Today's Culture: Reports to the Peace Problems Discussion Group Culture Sub-Group), Sekai, February 1955, pp. 146-169. Shiso no Kagaku Kenkyukai (editorial), 'Senso sekinin ni tsuite' (On War Responsibility), 20 November 1956 and 20 March 1957, Parts I and 2. Shiikan Dokushojin, Takeuchi Yoshimi shi to Nihon ideorogii: 5.19 to chishikijin no koseki' (Mr Takeuchi Yoshimi and Japan Ideology: 19 May and the Tracks of Intellectuals), Shukan Dokushijin, 26 September 1960, p. I. Takeuchi, Yoshimi, 'Dento to Kakumei' (Tradition and Revolution), TenbO, September 1949, pp. 5-12. --'Kutsujoku no jiken' (Humiliating Event), Sekai, August 1953, pp. 109-113. --'Ajia ni okeru shinpo to hando' (Progress and Reaction in Asia), Hando no shiso, vol. V, Iwanami koza gendai shiso, Iwanami Shoten, 1957, pp. 63-84. --'Kindai no chokoku' (Overcoming the Modem), Kindaika to denIo, vol. 7, Kindai Nihon shiso shi koza, Chikuma ShobO, 1959, pp. 226-281. --'Naze shori to iii ka' (Why Do You Call It a Victory), Shukan Dokushojin, II July 1960, p. I. --'Minshushugi saiken no tatakai' (Fight to Rebuild Democracy), Misuzu, no. 17 August 1960, pp. 13-18. --'Kindai to wa nani ka' (What is Modem?), Takeuchi Yoshimi zenshu vol. 4, Chikuma Shobo, 1980, pp. 128-171. --Takeuchi Yoshimi zenshu vol. 9, Chikuma ShobO, 1981. Tanaka, Sogoro, Nihon Jashizumu shi (History of Japanese Fascism), Kawade ShobO,1960. Tokyo Daigaku Shinbun, Talakai no kiroku (Record of the Battle), II July 1960. Tokyo Heiwa Mondai Danwakai, 'Anpo kaitei mondai ni tsuite no seimei' (Statement on the Problem of Revising the Security Treaty). Seka;, February 1960, pp. 168-173. Tosho Shinbun, 'U reta anpo tokushii' (Sales of Security Treaty Crisis Features), 2 July 1960, p. 3. Toyama, Shigeki, 'Haisen no rekishi 0 do uketomeru ka' (How to Interpret the History of Defeat), Sekai, August 1955, pp. lO3-llO. --'Sengo shi 0 do uketoru ka' (How to Interpret Postwar History), Sekai, August 1957, pp. 19-28. Tsuda, Sokichi, 'Nihon mizukara 0 shiru hitsuyo ni tsuite: heiwa seimei ni tsuite no shokan' (On the Necessity of Japan Knowing Herself: Thoughts on the Peace Statement), Sekai , August 1948, pp. 56-60. --'Hachi gatsujiigo nichi no omoide' (Memories of 15 August), Sekai, August 1950, pp. 37--42.

Bibliographies 247 Tsuneto, Kyo, 'Seiji teki dokuritsu e no shinro: Heiwa Mondai Danwakai Horitsu Seiji Bukai hokoku' (Road to Political Independence: Report to the Peace Problems Discussion Group Law and Politics Sub-Group), Sekai, December 1954, pp. 2~37. Tsuru, Shigeto, 'Koizumi hakushi no heiwa ron ni tsuite' (On Professor Koizumi's Peace Theory), Sekai, March 1952, pp. 32-42. --'Heiwa ron no zenshin no tame ni' (To Promote the Peace Debate), Sekai, June 1952, pp. 31-39. --"'Chikara ni yoru heiwa" wa iji sareru ka' (Can 'Peace Through Strength' be Maintained?), Sekai, January 1953, pp. 39-55. - - ; Mogi, Masashi; Kobayashi, Yuichi; Ishikawa, Ken; '''Chikara ni yoru heiwa" kara "hanashiai no heiwa" e' (From 'Peace Through Strength' to 'Peace Through Negotiation'), Sekai, September 1954, pp.41-54. Tsurumi, Shunsuke. 'Chishikijin no senso sekinin' (Intellectuals' War Responsibility), ChUo Koron, January 1956, pp. 57-63. Uehara, Senroku, 'Minshushugi 0 mamoru tatakai' (Fight to Protect Democracy), Misuzu, no. 17, August 1960, pp. 32-35. Umemoto, Katsumi, 'Ningentekijiyii no genkai' (Limits of Human Freedom), TenbO, February 1947. Reproduced in Usui, Yoshimi, ed., Sengo bungaku ronso, vol. 1, pp. 82-90. --'Mu no ronri sei to toha sei' (Logicality and Partisanship of Nothingness), TenbO, March 1948, pp. 2-13. --'Yuibutsu shikan to dotoku' (Historical Materialism and Morality), TenbO, August 1948, pp. 2-15. --'Shutaisei ron no gendankai: sono keika to kongo no tenbo' (Present Stage of the Shutaisei Debate: Its Progress and its Future Prospects), Shiso, March 1953, pp. 233-242. --'Yuibutsu ron to ningen' (Materialism and Man), in Takeuchi, Yoshimi, ed., Gendai Nihon shiso taikei, no. 21, Chikuma ShoM, 1965, pp. 280-293. Unno Shinkichi et aI., Rekishi e no Shogen: roku ichi go no dokyumento (Testimony to History: Document of 6.15), Nihon Hyoronsha, 1960. Uno, Kozo, 'Shihon shugi no soshikika to minshushugi' (Capitalist Organization and Democracy), Sekai, May 1946, pp. 1~28. Yamazaki, Tsutomu, 'Itaria ni okeru fashizumu no seiritsu' (Establishment of Fascism in Italy), Hando no shiso, vol. V, Iwanami koza gendai shiso, Iwanami Shoten, 1957, pp. 87-115. Yanaihara, Tadao, 'Nihon kokumin no shimei to hansei' (Mission and Reflections of the Japanese People), Sekai, August 1946, pp. 25-32. --'Minshushugi no kiki' (Crisis of Democracy), Misuzu, no. 17, August 1960, pp.5-9. --Nihon no yukue (Japan's Future), Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1964. Yoshino, Genzaburo; Fujita, Shozo, 'Sengo minshushugi no genri 0 kangaeru' (Thinking About the Principle of Postwar Democracy), Gendai no Riron, no. 68, 1968,pp.5-21. Zen'ei, 'Anpo hantai toso to Nihon Kyosanto no seimei' (Statement on Opposition to the Security Treaty and the Communist Party), Zen'ei, August 1960, pp.102-176. --'Anpo toso no seika ni taUe sara ni zenshin shiyo' (On the Basis of the Success in the Struggle Against the Security Treaty Let Us Progress Further), Zen'ei, August 1960, pp. 5-43.

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Bibliographies 259 Yoshino, Genzaburo and Fujita, ShOzo, 'Sengo minshushugi no genri 0 kangaeru' (Thinking About the Principle of Postwar Democracy), Gendai no Riron, no. 68, 1968, pp. 5-21.

Maruyama Masao Critical bibliography

This critical bibliography aims to make Maruyama's writings more accessible to an English-speaking audience. It is selective, chronological, and thematic, in that I have concentrated on those writings that convey Maruyama's thinking on democracy and autonomy. Bilingual scholars will already be aware of the excellent and exhaustive bibliography edited by Imai Jiiichira, Maruyama Masao chosaku noto, Gendai no riron sha, 1987 and its supplement in Gendai shiso, 'tokushii: Maruyama Masao', vol. 22, no. I, January 1994, pp. i-xii. Between September 1995 and January 1997, Iwanami Shoten will publish the first collection of Maruyama's writings, Maruyama Masao Shu (sixteen volumes plus one). This critical bibliography does not seek to duplicate those works; it is hoped that it will complement them by providing critical commentary on the works that appear here. A list of books, anthologies and other collections featuring Maruyama appears first; the critical listings follow.

Books by Maruyama Masao in EngUsb Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan, New Jersey, Princeton

University Press and Tokyo, Tokyo University Press, 1974, trans. Hane, Mikiso. Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics, expanded edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1969.

Books by Maruyama Masao in Japanese 0 yomu (Reading An Outline of a Theory of Civilization), 3 vols, Iwanami Shinsho, 1986. Chiisei to hangyaku: tenkeiki Nihon no seishin shi teki iso (Loyalty and Rebellion: Phases in the Spiritual History of Japan in Times of Change), Chikuma Shobe), 1992. Gendai seiji no shiso to kodo (Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics), expanded edition, Miraisha, 1964. Koei no ichi kara: gendai seiji no shiso to kiJdo tsuiho (From the Rearguard: Afterword to Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics), Miraisha, 1983. Nihon bunka no kakureta katachi (Hidden Structure of Japanese Culture), Iwanami Shoten, 1984 (with Kata Shiiichi and Kinoshita Junji). Nihon no shiso (Japanese Thought), Iwanami Shinsho, 1961.

Bummei ron no gairyaku

Maruyama Masao: critical bibliography 261 Nihon seiji shiso shi kenkyl1 (Studies in the History of Japanese Political Thought), Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1952. Seiji no sekai (World of Politics), Ochanomizu ShobO, 1952. SenchU to sengo no aida (From War to Postwar), Misuzu Shobo, 1976. Sengo Nihon no kakushin shiso (Renovative Thought in Postwar Japan), Gendai no Rironsha, 1983 (with Sato Noboru and Umemoto Katsumi).

1936 'Seiji gaku ni okeru kokka no gainen' (Concept of the State in Political Science). Original in Midorikai journal, appeared as winner of Nanbara essay prize; reproduced in Senchl1 to sengo no aida, pp. 4-33. A fascinating glimpse of Maruyama's mind in its premature state: deeply involved with the ideology and the intellectual systems of Mannheim, Marx, and Weber. We see here in embyro, buried in complicated language, his theories of shutaisei, the state, fascism and the fascist state. The postscript of this piece is also rich in biographical background material on Maruyama's relationship with Nanbara Shigeru. (See also Nanbara sensei 0 shi toshite.)

1942 'Jinno ShOtoki ni arawaretaru seijikan' (Political Perspective Revealed in Jinno ShOtoki ). Original in Nihon gaku kenkyl1, June 1946; reproduced in Senchl1 to sengo no aida, pp. 76-91. A multi-layered piece where the main objective is to describe a manifestation of passive resistance. Mannheim's political theory is a dominant influence in Maruyama's argument. 'Aso Yoshiteru "Kindai Nihon tetsugakushi" 0 yomu' (Reading Aso Yoshiteru's "History of Modem Japanese Philosophy"). Original in Kokka gakkai zasshi, December 1942; reproduced in SenchU to sengo no aida, pp. 116-132. Maruyama goes beyond the spirit-matter paradigm of modernisation, and implies that the interpretation of European thought in the early Meiji period established a conceptual prototype which entrenched an a priori acceptance of the separation of subject and object. This new dimension of Tiiyii Bunka Seiii Gitjutsu anticipated Maruyama's postwar reading of the reasons for the rise of the ultranationalist polity. Familiar strains of uneven capitalist development and its consequences are also present, but the similarly familiar closing refrain - that Japan has not yet fully modernised acquires new poignancy through the contemporary 1942 context. The Meiji Restoration is depicted by Maruyama as a dialectical process. 'Fukuzawa Yukichi no jukyo hihan' (Fukuzawa Yukichi's Criticism of Confucianism). Original in Tokyo teikoku daigaku gakujutsu tairan, 1942; reproduced in Senchl1 to sengo no aida, pp. 93-115. Foreshadows the themes of relativity and historical context later to be developed in a more sophisticated way in Maruyama's essays on Fukuzawa's philosophy. It is the historical context in which this piece was written though

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that makes it interesting. The stress on Fukuzawa's anti-Confucianism is mildly risque, but is more than compensated for by the conclusion that Fukuzawa's anti-Confucianism enabled him to see Japan's forays into Korea and China as missions of enlightenment. The accompanying theme of Fukuzawa's anti-feudalism appears incidental. The pro-Western line taken by Fukuzawa is not developed even in a surreptitious way to imply criticism of Japan's actions in the 194Os. One wonders why Maruyama wanted this piece included in his SenchU collection: perhaps it was to educate the postwar generation about the difficulties and consequences of academic writing in times of political duress.

1943 'Fukuzawa ni okeru chitsujo to ningen' (Order and Humanity in Fukuzawa). Original in Mita Shinbun, November 1943; reproduced in Hidaka, Rokuro, ed., Kindaishugi, vol. 34, Gendai Nihon shiso taikei, Chikuma ShobO, 1964, pp. 55-57, and in Senchu to sengo no aida, pp. 143-146. A piece of expertly-layered meaning, which manages to combine 'patriotic' messages with advocacy of individualism as a weapon with which to control the actions of the state. To a postwar audience this short article is above all a plea for democratic responsibility on the part of the citizens of Japan.

1946 'Kindai teki shii' (Modern Thinking). Original written in 1945, appeared in Bunka kaigi, vol. I, January 1946; reproduced in Senchu to sengo no aida, pp. 188-190. Begins with a brave declaration that despite the trauma of war his thought has not changed. Maruyama is deliberately out to shock, and suggests that men in postwar Japan should seek the modern in Japan's own intellectual tradition. He includes a personal manifesto crediting his inspiration to the influence of Marx and Kant. 'Logic and Psychology of Ultranationalism'. Original in Sekai, May 1946; reproduced in Gendai seiji no shiso to kOdo, Miraisha, 1964 (expanded edition), pp. 11-28; in translation in Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1969, pp. 1-24. Maruyama's landmark essay which made postwar Japan sit up and take notice of its newest and brightest intellectual star. Maruyama introduced in a direct and powerful way the discipline of political pathology in this piece, using it to analyse the psychological structure of the wartime Japanese state. It is where we first read of the 'spiritual structure of oppression'. The English version features a mistranslation of the title: 'ronri' is translated as 'theory' instead of 'logic'. 'Seio bunka to kyosanshugi no taiketsu - Rasuki "Shinko, risei oyobi bummei" ni tsuite' (Conflict Between Western European Culture and Communism - on Laski's 'Faith, Reason and Civilisation'). Original in Shiso no Kagaku,

Maruyama Masao: critical bibliography 263 no. 2, August 1946; reproduced in Gendai seiJi no shiso to kOdo, (1964), pp. 203-223. The first expression by Maruyama of his admiration for Harold Laski. The postscript to the expanded edition of Gendai seiJi reveals that Laski's later works, which were the most 'unacademic' and patronising, nonetheless inspired Maruyama the most. Laski described in his Democracy in Crisis and The State in Theory and Practice a reverse-tenko towards communism by Western thinkers, a stark contrast to the Japanese context of the 1930s. This essay adds an important dimension to Maruyama's penchant for 'great men' in history, and his need to establish the public responsibility of intellectuals. Similarly, Maruyama's determination to reconcile communism and individualism is herein revealed. See also 'Rasuki no Rosh;ya kakumei kan to sono suita', 1947. 'Meiji kokka no shiso' (Thought of the Meiji State). Original speech made to the Rekishigaku Kenkyiikai in October 1946; subsequently published in Nihon shaka; no shiteki kyiimei, Iwanami Shoten, 1949; reproduced in Senchii to sengo no aida, pp. 202-250. Can be used as a defence against critics who accuse Maruyama of Eurocentrism, although Maruyama still bases his appraisal of the Meiji State on the views of Western scholars. His concept of kaikoku is already evident in this piece, and he identifies the enforced congress between East and West as a decisive factor in the warped development of Japanese nationalism. The inherent flaws of the People's Rights Movement are regarded as a natural consequence of that historical environment. Their chief flaw was concurrent dedication to popular and national causes. Of interest is Maruyama's judgement that pacifism and socialism were the only appropriate vehicles for the democratic impulses of the PRM.

1947 'Rasuki no Roshiya kakumeikan to sono suiT (Development of Laski's Views on the Russian Revolution). Original in Sekai no shaka; kagaku, February 1947; reproduced in Gendai seiJi no shiso to kodo, (1964), pp. 224-246. This is an important text for Maruyama's understanding of shutaisei and autonomy. Packaged as a review esssay on Laski's 1943 book Reflections on the Revolution of Our Times, it conveys Maruyama's deep attachment to idealism and value over objective forces as the engine of human history. Laski's judgement of the state rests on its ability to facilitate self-realisation on the part of the citizens; for Maruyama this conveys the centrality of personal autonomy to a valid political system. 'Fukuzawa ni okeru "Jitsugaku" no tenkai - Fukuzawa Yukichi no tetsugaku kenkyii josetsu' (The Development of 'Practical Learning' in the Works of Fukuzawa - an Introduction to the Study of Fukuzawa Yukichi's Philosophy). In Toyo Gakkai, ed., Toyo bunka kenkyii no. 3, published by Nikko Shoin, pp. 1-20. A piece blessed with refreshingly uncomplicated prose, providing welcome relief for the foreign scholar. Maruyama extends the themes of Nature and

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Invention introduced in Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan, this time providing exegesis for Fukuzawa Yukichi. The tone is openly positive, with an interesting hint of inconsistency on Maruyama's part when he addresses Fukuzawa's 'moderate' attitude towards the People's Rights Movement. This essay provides a philosophical bridge between Maruyama's writings on Tokugawa intellectuals and postwar modernism. 'The Ideology and Dynamics of Japanese Fascism'. Original lecture delivered June 1947; published in Sonjo shiso to zettaishugi, vol. 2, Toyo bunka koza; reproduced in Gendai seiji no shiso (expanded) pp. 29-87; in translation in Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics, 1969, pp. 25-83. Maruyama is semi-apologetic for this essay in his Gendai seiji postscript, citing inadequate research and being overtaken by a burgeoning interest in Japanese fascism after publication as regrettable faults. An indispenable aid to Maruyama's distinctive theory of fascism, its ideology and its relationship to the spirit-matter dichotomy. There is fodder for Maruyama's alleged anti-Japanese leanings in the infamous statement about 'true intellectuals' who were distinguished by their familiarity with Western philosophy; likewise Maruyama appears to follow an uncharacteristically fatalistic view of Japanese history since Meiji which feeds criticisms of him as a Koza Marxist. 'Nihon ni okerujiyu ishiki no keisei to tokushitsu' (The Formation and Characteristics of Liberal Consciousness in Japan). Original in Teikoku daigaku shinbun, August 1947; reproduced in SenchU to sengo no aida, pp. 297-306. Another essay that conveys Maruyama's ideas on autonomy, this time using Locke as his inspiration. What Maruyama calls Locke's 'theory of freedom' is in effect a version of shutaisei. 'Freedom' in the sense of Locke's active type versus Hobbes' negative type is the embodiment of social autonomy. The article ends with a call to arms for the workers, whom Maruyama projects as the bearers of active autonomy who should 'complete the democratic revolution which the Meiji Restoration could not carry out'. In the 1947 context Maruyama's rallying call is tinged with despair. 'Fukuzawa Yukichi no tetsugaku: toku ni sono jiji hihan to no kanren' (The Philosophy of Fukuzawa Yukichi: Particularly its Connection With His Critique of the Times). Original in Kokka Gakkai Zasshi, vol. 61, no. 3, September 1947; reproduced in Hidaka Rokuro, Kindaishugi, pp. 58-92. Maruyama's definitive piece on Fukuzawa Yukichi. The structure of this piece is a series of rebuttals of criticisms and 'misunderstandings' of Fukuzawa's thought on the part of other scholars. Maruyama isolates several key themes of Fukuzawa's philosophy: shutaisei is enabled by flexible value judgement, which is only possible when social relations are not fixed; the principle of relativity in value acquisition and evaluation; pragmatism; pluralism. Here we can find the foundation stones for Maruyama's concept of autonomy. Maruyama credits Fukuzawa with the foresight of Marx and Engels, saying his appreciation of historical context resembles the dynamics of historical materialism, even describing Fukuzawa's ideas on freedom as his 'dialectic of freedom'.

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265

'Politics as a Science in Japan: Retrospect and Prospects'. Original 'Kagaku toshite no seiji gaku' in Jinbun, no. 2,1947; translated in Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics, pp. 225-244. Maruyama laments Japan's poor tradition of political science ('no tradition worth reviving'), a discipline that is vital in a time of upheaval and political reform such as the postwar era. Japanese scholars must seek the kernels of a political science discipline by drawing on their own historical context instead of automatically looking abroad.

1948 'Yuibutsushikan to shutaisei' (Historical Materialism and Shutaisel). Original in Sekai, February 1948; reproduced in Hidaka, Kindaishugi, pp. 117-167; and in Yoshino Genzaburo, ed., Genten, pp. 15-60. With Kozai Yoshishige, Matsumura Kazuto, Hayashi Kentaro, Mashita Shinichi, Shimizu Ikutaro, Miyagi Otoya. The landmark debate about the place of idealism in Marxist theory. Maruyama flies his colours as an idealist, but not in opposition to Marxism. Rather he follows Laski in his insistence that Marxism is essentially an idealist theory premised on humanistic values. This zadankai also reveals how Japanese intellectuals sought to rationalise war in general and by implication, World War II. The defeat of the idealist cause in this forum augured ill for progress in the war responsibility debate. The shutaisei zadankai contains one of the earliest mentions by Maruyama of peace as the universalist value that would rescue Japan's postwar democracy. 'Giikan' (Random Thoughts). Original source Mirai, vol. I, July 1948; reproduced in Senchu to sengo no aida, pp. 349-352. Maruyama continues the shutaisei debate, criticising Japanese Marxists' grasp of materialism and idealism. Maruyama modifies his position slightly and advocates approaching materialism through idealism instead of treating materialism as an ideal in itself. He cheekily suggests that studying the young Marx would remedy this theoretical oversight on their parts. 'Minshll, geijutsu, chishiki kaikyll' (The People, Art, and the Intelligentsia). In Mirai, no. I, 1948, pp. 2-19. Zadankai with Uryii Tadao, Nakamura Tetsu et al. Maruyama's contribution provides ammunition for those who brand him an elitist. Mannheim's inspiration is evident as Maruyama affirms the integrity of the intellectual's role as enlightener. 'Nihon shakai no ideorogii to kozo' (Ideology and Structure of Japanese Society), 2 parts. In Sekai Hyoron, February pp. 40-50 and March pp. 26-43, 1948. Zadankai with Isoda Sususmu, Kawashima Takeo, Furushima Toshio, Iizuka Koji, Ubukata Naokichi. A despairing exchange of views reflecting the stringent socio-political context of the day. The premodern, pre-democratic nature of Japanese society is assumed by all, though with varying degrees of negativity. A typical 'modernisation' piece that refers to the need to change the popular conscious-

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ness, rid society of feudal elements etc. Of interest is Maruyama and Kawashima's idea that modernity means exhibiting resistance against the state. 'Jiyfi minken undo shi' (History of the People's Rights Movement). Original in Chijo, February, March and April 1948; reproduced in Sencha to sengo no aida, pp. 308-338. Maruyama portrays the fortunes of the People's Rights Movement, placing even-handed blame on the movement and its historical circumstances for its failure. Intellectually-informed resistance against the state, and an awareness of its ideological composition, were lacking. The movement is described as ideologically confused; thus making it prone to a patriotic, imperialistic message. Interestingly Maruyama blames the movement's weakness above all on the distortions of Japanese capitalistic development which frustrated the movement by depriving it of a class base. 'Nihonjin no seiji ishiki' (Japanese Political Consciousness). Original in Ushio, May 1948, reproduced in Sencha to sengo no aida, pp. 342-348. Autonomy is the underlying theme of this essay on Japanese attitudes to political authority. Significantly Maruyama ties autonomy with pacifism, and identifies the need for 'objective' values to provide the basis for political cooperation. Once again Maruyama cites resistance against the state as evidence that democracy is growing stronger. But the impulse for resistance must originate within, not be merely a borrowed inspiration.

1949 'Kindai Nihon shiso shi ni okeru kokka risei no mondai' (The Problem of the Rationality of the State in Modern Japanese Intellectual History), in TenbO, January 1949, pp. ~15 and in Chasei to hangyaku, pp. 197-229. Maruyama's concept of the state (raison d'etat) betrays the heavy influence of Fukuzawa Yukichi, though Maruyama cites Meinecke as his muse here. Maruyama returns to the theme of the comparative genesis of ideas in Japan and Europe, with a view to developing a new approach to modernisation. The notion of the internal versus the external dichotomy replaces that of East versus West for the first time. 'Nihon no shiso ni okeru guntai no yakuwari' (The Role of the Military in Japanese Thought). In Shiso no Kagaku, no.l, 1949, pp. 80-102. Zadankai with Nosaka Sanzo, Toyosaki Masuji, Iizuka Sanji. The closest that Maruyama comes to personal reminiscences about his time in the army. Maruyama draws a distinction between the popular perception of the army versus that of the police in prewar Japan. The army was a sort of levelling agent on the one hand, and a quasi-democratic institution on the other. The subtext is rebutting the idea that Japanese fascism was not a creature of the nature of state and society post-Meiji. 'Tokyo saiban no jijitsu to hori' (The Truth and Legality of the Tokyo Trial). Horitsu JiM, February 1949, pp. 13-28. Zadankai with Ukai Nobushige, Takano Yfiichi, Tsuji Kiyoaki.

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Fascinating and timely discussion of the controversial issues surrounding the Tokyo trial and its verdict, including the place of the individual in international law, ex post-facto crimes, cultural particularity and concepts of legality. This discussion is a very important asset to a fuller understanding of the war responsibility debates of 1940s and 1950s, especially the conceptual linkage between shutaisei, war guilt, war responsibility and democracy in postwar Japan. Tokyo chiho hOsei bukai hOkoku' (Report of the Tokyo District Division of Politics and Law of the Heiwa Mondai Danwa Kai). Original in Sekai, March 1949; reproduced in Sekai, July 1985, pp. 228-232. Written by Maruyama, but appeared under multiple signatures. The war-peace paradigm enters an activist phase with this sub-commitee report. Peace is identified as the proof of democracy in the sense that peace demonstrates how man can control his political fate, but the implied corollary is that man was somehow not in control of war. War embodied ideological divisions, but peace was meant to be the universal value that transcended ideological divisions. Peace as realism is a secondary theme. Social scientists had a responsibility to project faith in man's ability to prevent war. Thought and Behaviour Patterns of Japan's Wartime Leaders'. Original 'Gunkoku shihai sha no seishin keitai', in Uryu, May 1949; in Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics, pp. 84-134. Maruyama highlights the absence of linkage between power and responsibility amongst the so-called wartime leaders. This essay continues the pathology of fascism that was introduced in 'Logic and Psychology of Japanese Ultranationalism'. Extensive quotations from the Tokyo Trials drive home the attack. Maruyama's 'outlaw theory' of Japanese fascism makes an appearance, but an aside in a footnote shows that 'outlaws' can also be found in the communist movement. Rekishi to seiji' (History and Politics), in TenbO, June 1949, pp. 4-14 (with E. H. Norman and Tsuru Shigeto). The focus is on Norman in this discussion about mass democracy and modernisation. The group ranges widely through the realms of history and philosophy, and expresses reservations about comparing European and Japanese historical experiences on a superficial basis. John Rokku to kindai seiji genri' (John Locke and Modem Political Principles). Original in Ho tetsu gaku shiki hO, August 1949; reproduced in Senchu to sengo no aida, pp. 391-420. This is Maruyama's primer for a liberal state, inspired by Locke but very much a product of Maruyama's mindset. It is one of the first succinct expressions of 'social autonomy', namely the political linkage between citizens and the state. Maruyama lists seven principles of freedom devised by Locke which if embraced by society can limit the state's power. The inherently negative or defensive nature of Maruyama's philosophy of autonomy is already apparent here. From Carnal Literature to Carnal Politics'. Original 'Nikutai bungaku kara

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nikutai seiji e', in TenbO, October 1949; reproduced in Gendai seiji no shiso to kOdo, expanded edition, pp. 375-394; translation in Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics, pp. 245-267. Delivered in mock dialogue form, the essay uses comparisons between Europe and Japan to address modernity from a new angle. In situations of cultural infusion and cultural borrowing it is spiritual autonomy that determines the blending of an indigenous identity with new ideas. It is the function of a modern consciousness to mediate reality. Change may occur dialectically, but the East-West divide is but a perceptual screen for a journey towards self-realisation. 'Gendai shakai ni okeru taishii' (The Masses in Contemporary Society), in Seiki, October 1949, pp. 20-35 (with Tanaka Kotaro and Inoki Masamichi). A wide-ranging discussion which identifies the reasons for pessimism in postwar Japan. These include the continuity of the nature of authority from prewar times, the failure of Japanese to institute reform on' their own initiative, and the low level of respect for individualism. Maruyama explicitly states that resistance to authority is the gauge of democracy in Japan, and that this remains a critical issue. 'Intelligentsia to rekishiteki tachiba' (The Intelligentsia and Historical Context), in Ningen, December 1949, pp. 6-24 (with Takami Jun). A diatribe against the determinism of Japanese Marxists. Maruyama notes that determinism helped communists accept fascism as part of the historical trend towards socialism. This is nothing short of the neo-Confucian law of Nature. On this basis Maruyama renews his plea for a pluralistic value system, for values that are universal, and for history to be the province of individuals, not a de-personalised proletariat.

1950 'Nihon no unmei (I): kaiso gojiinen - Nichiro senso zengo' (Japan's Destiny (I): Going Back Fifty Years - Before and After the Russo-Japanese War). Original in Sekai, February 1950; reproduced in Yoshino Genzaburo, ed., Nihon no unmei - "Sekai' , zadankai ShU I, Hyoronsha, 1969, pp. 23-74. Zadankaiwith Abe Yoshishige, Arahata Kanson, Ouchi HyOe. Tsurumi Shunsuke, Nakajima Kumakichi, Nagayo Yoshiro, Hasegawa Nyozekan, Yoshino Genzaburo. An impressive line-up of the most prolific representatives of the so-called 'progressive' intellectuals of the early postwar period. Their discussion is most valuable for its attempt to contribute perspective to the social and political issues of the period in question. Tsurumi seems intent on redefining democratic criteria to suit Japan's experience, but merely succeeds in highlighting Japan's poverty of democracy in the eyes of his fellow discussants. Maruyama is very much in the background acting as chairman alongside Yoshino. 'Kenryoku to dotoku' (Authority and Morality). Original in Shiso, March 1950 as the introduction to a special feature on 'The Problem of Authority';

Maruyama Masao: critical bibliography 269 reproduced in Gendai seiji no shiso to kodo, expanded edition, Miraisha 1964, pp. 395-411. Represents retrospectively the theoretical model for Maruyama's famous essay 'Logic and Psychology of Ultranationalism'. His postscript states that he wrote this essay with the specific intention of implying parallels between the experience of German Nazism and Japanese Nationalism. Maruyama explores the coexistence, intermingling and antipathy between authority and morality, through the historical struggle in Europe between the principles of 'the rule of law' and 'raison d'etat'. He argues that above all, the tension between these two separate entities must be preserved - Japan's experience illustrates the consequences when one subsumes the other. 'Shihai to fukujii' (Dominance and Submission). Original in Shakai kosei no genri, vol. 3, Shakai kagaku koza, Kobundo, 1950; reproduced in Gendai seiji no shiso to kOdo, vol. 2, 1956, and in expanded edition 1964 pp. 412422. An analytical study of the dynamics of dominance. Maruyama attempts objectivity here, but his colours are flying. Power relations are presented as inextricably involved with the creation and monopolisation of values. Similarly, difference between the dominant and the subordinate is expressed through systemic (the caste system), ideological (Tokugawa feudal hierarchy) and physical (wealth, status, occupation and address) distance. The lack of awareness of the means used by the dominant to maintain their position is a monumental obstacle to the pervasive democratisation of Japanese society. Arujiyushugisha e no tegami' (Letter to a Liberal). Original in Sekai, September 1950, pp. 27-38; reproduced in Gendai seiji no shiso to kOdo, pp. 131-151. Maruyama seeks to rise above the ideological polarisation splitting the intellectual world (not to mention East-West relations) by stressing yet again the need for an 'internal' revolution to combat the forces of absolutism still dangerously prevalent throughout Japanese society. Contains his (in)famous line 'at present there is no democracy worth defending in Japan', rather true democracy is yet to be realised. Instead of attaching to another country's definition of democracy, Japanese society should embark on self-definition: in short, 'modernisation'. 'Rasuki"Gendai kakumei no kosatsu'" (Laski's 'Reflections on the Revolutions of our Times'). Original in Dokusho Shinbun, October 1950; reproduced in Gendai seiji no shiso to kOdo, pp. 509-512. Maruyama reaffirms his admiration for Laski's attempt to integrate the best aspects of Western European democracy and the ideals of the Russian revolution, and for his pacifist motivation. Maruyama shows consistency in his appraisal of Marxism. 'Nationalism in Postwar Japan'. Preparatory Paper, II th Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Lucknow India, October 1950. Maruyama marries modernisation with nationalism and finds Japan lacking. With a Marxian flourish, Maruyama attributes Japan's prewar

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nationalism to uneven capitalistic development, and by the mixture of feudal elements with superficial Westernisation. This prewar nationalism was premodern because it had no sense of self-determi.lation. As for the postwar variant of nationalism, its anti-communist orientation smacked of a neo-fascist revival. See also 1951 essay 'Nationalism in Japan'. 'Mitabi Heiwa ni Tsuite' (The Third Statement on Peace). Original in Sekai, December 1950, reproduced in Sekai, July 1985, pp. 118-151. Maruyama wrote the first two out of four sections for the Heiwa Mondai Danwakai; in translation in Peace Research in Japan, Sakamoto Yoshikazu, ed., 1976. Maruyama elaborates on pacifism as realism. The linkage between peace and democracy is strengthened by presenting peace as the product of autonomy. Peace is a way of thinking, a choice to be made subjectively by autonomous individuals. 'Kyofu no jidai' (The Age of Fear), Shiso no kotoba, Shiso, December 1950, reproduced in Gendai seiji no shiso to kOdo, vol. I, 1956, pp. 145-148, and in Senchu to sengo no aida, pp. 513-517. An opinion piece on the consequences for democracy of the Red Purge. Fear as a tool of political oppression can turn against the design of its masters; making the world safe for democracy is a recipe for neo-fascism. Important for filling in Maruyama's views on democracy against the backdrop of the Cold War and the neutralist movement.

1951 'Nationalism in Japan: its Theoretical Background and Prospects'. Original Cuo Koron, January 1951; reproduced in Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics, pp. 135-156. A polished version of the Lucknow paper. Maruyama specifies that the task of postwar nationalism is to find a way to reconcile democracy and nationalism. Valid nationalism must incorporate autonomy. 'Byosho kara no kanso: kowa mondai ni yosete' (Thoughts from a Sick Bed: on the Peace Treaty Problem), Sekai, October 1951, pp. 227-229; reproduced in Senchu to sengo no aida, pp. 520-526. An example of Maruyama's political commentary, this time about the peace treaty with the Allied powers. Here he draws attention to the linking of the treaty with the Mutual Security Treaty, and the anti-Soviet, Cold War nature of the document. Maruyama asks, 'are we going to betray Asia again?'

1952 Nihon seiji shiso shi kenkyu (Studies in the History of Japanese Political

Thought). Published 1952, Tokyo daigaku shuppankai; in translation in 1974 as Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan (trans. Mikiso Hane). A tour de force by Maruyama which displays the philosophical and methodological touchstones for his postwar writings. Comprising three essays, the

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first introduces Maruyama's dialectical methodology of intellectual history in an analysis of Ogyii Sorai; the second establishes the foundations for autonomy through juxtaposing the categories of (Confucian) Nature and (nationalist) Invention; the third explores the premodern state and nationalism. The introduction to the English edition talks of the intellectual climate at the time of writing, and discusses the impact of Marxism on the Japanese intellectual world. This collection is where Maruyama provides the strongest rebuttal to criticisms of anti-Japaneseness as he powerfully seeks the modern in Japan's own (feudal) intellectual tradition. '''Genjitsu'' shugi no kansei: aru henshu sha e' (The Pitfalls of 'Reality': To An Editor). Original in Sekai. May 1952; reproduced in Gendai seiji no shiso to kiido, expanded edition, pp. 171-186. Maruyama's strongest appeal for neutralism, for a supra-ideological definition of what is and what is not 'realistic' about peace. Maruyama repeats the linkage between peace and universalism in defiance of the Cold War and the compromises of Japan's peace treaty. This essay constitutes a philosophical justification for the principles behind the Heiwa Mondai Danwakai. Seiji no sekai (The World of Politics), Ochanomizu Shobo, 1952.

A textbook on politics and political authority written in a simple style that is rare for Maruyama. He argues strongly for political interest on the part of non-political members of society to maintain balance between authority and society in a democracy. The best democratic defence against authoritarianism is grass-roots organisations, thus providing pluralistic structures throughout society. 'Minshushugi no na ni okeru fascism' (Fascism by the Name of Democracy), Sekai, October 1952, pp. 26-55. (with Tsuru Shigeto and Tsuji Kiyoaki). The chief threats to postwar democracy are according to Maruyama the concentration of authority at the apex of society and the fragmentation of ideology. Maruyama isolates the relative importance of business in the ruling strata as the feature of postwar fascism. He predicts that fascist dynamics will move in apolitical circles in postwar and eventually manifest itself openly as neo-nationalism. It will be perverse in that its political ends will be achieved by privatising political consciousness in the community and isolating it from any apparent link with politics. Macarthyism is Maruyama's model for postwar fascism, which will masquerade as genuine democracy. 'Fascism - Some Problems: A Consideration of its Political Dynamics'. Original 'Fashizumu no shomondai', in Shio, October 1952; reproduced in Gendai seiji no shiso to kiido, expanded edition, pp. 247-269; in translation in Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics, 1969, pp. 157-176. Maruyama expands his theory of fascism and falls in with the view that fascism equals counter-revolution. This in turn strengthens democracy as anti-fascism. The wartime bogies are out in force as Maruyama warns of fascist dynamics running inside democratic institutions. Democracy must be an eternal revolution because counter-revolution is perennial.

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1953 'Some Problems of Political Power'. Original 'Seiji kenryoku no shomondai', in Seiji gaku jiten, Heibonsha, 1953; reproduced in Gendai seiji no shiso to kodo, expanded edition, pp. 423-445. Maruyama defines power in terms of the manipulation of human will, and of values. Maruyama defines power as the control of human relations. This dictionary entry is an essential piece conveying Maruyama's concept of state authority. 'Minshushugi 0 meguru ideorogii no tairitsu to Nihon' (Ideological Conflict about Democracy and Japan). Original in Sekai, January 1953; reproduced in Yoshino, Genzaburo, ed., Genten: sengo to sono mondai, Hyoronsha, 1969, pp. 99-149. Zadankai with Ukai Nobushige, Kuno Osamu, Kozai Yoshishige, Royama Masamichi, Tsuji Kyoaki, Hirano Yotaro and Yoshino Genzaburo. A discussion of the theoretical linkages between peace, democracy and the Cold War provides a useful background for the Heiwa Mondai Danwakai. Maruyama's concept of democracy as both a popular movement and an institutional system is aimed at rescuing democracy from the morass of Cold War ideological conflict. 'Uchimura Kanzo to "hi sen" ron' (Uchimura Kanzo and the Anti-War Theory). Original in Tosho, April 1953; reproduced in Senchii to sengo no aida, Misuzu ShobO, 1976, pp. 556-561. A timely attempt by Maruyama to introduce a Japanese voice into the pacifist debate inspired by the 1948 UNESCO statement on the causes of war. Maruyama proves that the key notions underlying postwar pacifism realism, war as an outmoded instrument, pacifism as resistance - have indigenous roots. 'Fashizumu no gendai teki jokyo' (Contemporary Situation of Fascism). Originally a speech, reproduced in Fukuon to Sekai, April 1953; reproduced in Senchii to sengo no aida, pp. 534-555. Maruyama applies his theory of fascist dynamics to the postwar world using Macarthyism as a departure point for his discussion. He believes that fascist dynamics are consistent with those of wartime, yet their manifestations have changed to suit the modem world. Briefly, this means that fascism has chosen liberal democracy as its cover for counter-revolution against the very essence of liberal democacy itself. 'Kyofu kara kyozon e' (From Fear to Coexistence), Sekai, May 1953, pp. 30-57. Zadankai with Tsuru Shigeto and Kozai Yoshishige. A discussion of the Cold War and methods of conflict avoidance. It is interesting because yet again Maruyama is obviously meant to be the 'liberal' voice flanked by two orthodox Marxists. 'Meijijidai no shiso' (Thought of the Meiji Era), originally appeared as an entry in the Sekai rekishi jiten, vol. 18, 1953; reproduced in Senchii to sengo no aida, pp. 567-572.

Maruyama Masao: critical bibliography 273 Maruyama reiterates the positive assessment of the Meiji state and society which appeared in his 1946 speech 'Meiji kokka no shiso'. This essay concentrates more on the intellectual character of Meiji society, and represents intellectuals as the leading lights of an open society. Here we see Maruyama in his role as enlightener, viewing positively Mannheim's idea of a transcendental elite.

1954 'Nashonarizumu, gunkokushugi, fashizumu' (Nationalism, Militarism, Fascism). Originally appeared as separate listings penned by Maruyama in Maruyama, Tsuji Kiyoaki and Nakamura Tetsu, eds, Seiji gaku jiten, Heibonsha; reproduced with introduction and conclusion in Gendai seiji no shiso to kodo, expanded edition pp. 270--304. A textbook-like treatment of those three phenomena, which comes alive at the end of the discussion on fascism. Maruyama repeats his major themes that fascism is a movement rather than a system; that the process of 'fascization' is the aspect to monitor; that fascism involves certain spiritual tendencies as well as institutional structures; and that Macarthyism is neo-fascism in a postwar guise. Maruyama ends by reminding the reader that 'fascist states have always used the power of the demos to deprive the individual of fundamental human rights'.

1956 'Danso' (Random Thoughts). Original in Sekai, January 1956; reproduced in Senchii to sengo no aida, Misuzu ShobO, 1976, pp. 606-617. Written in the form of entries in a diary, this is one of Maruyama's more eccentric pieces. Maruyama discusses in the first person his musings on the way different people have resisted, rebelled and dissented against certain political situations and ideas. The reader is challenged to derive some implications for Maruyama and his personal experiences in wartime Japan, but the clues are obscure. The clearest suggestion is about intellectual resistance in wartime, and how even the most altruistic dissenters can fall prey to the political opportunism of others. 'Senso sekinin no moten' (Blindspots of War Responsibility). Original in Shiso, 'Shiso no kotoba', March 1956; reproduced in Senchii to sengo no aida, pp.596-602. Maruyama relates the future of democracy to how Japanese accept 'war responsibility'. He stirs controversy by broadening the categories of those who should feel war gUilt beyond the wartime military leaders to include the Emperor, the masses, and the Marxists. The self-criticism in this essay about intellectuals' war guilt is a notable omission. 'Sense) sekinin ni tsuite' (On War Responsiblity), in Shiso no Kagaku, nos. 16 and 17, 1956. Maruyama clarifies what is meant by the calls for war 'responsibility' i.e. responsible for what, to whom, in what sense etc. Maruyama argues along

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the lines of 'Logic and Psychology of Ultranationalism' and 'Thought and Behaviour Patterns of Japan's Wartime Leaders', that responsibility is difficult to locate when there is no acknowledged link between power and responsibility. 'A Critique of De-Stalinisation'. Original '''Sutcirin hihan" ni okeru seiji no ronri', in Sekai, November 1956; reproduced in Gendai seiji no shiso to kOdo, pp. 541-555; translation in Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics, pp. 177-224.

Maruyama sets out to prove that universals exist in all systems, regardless of ideology. Above all this is a critique of Marxism. Maruyama sees in de-Stalinisation an opportunity to raise the sore point of the shutaisei debate namely the Marxist rejection of idealism. This was part of the reason why they had failed to see the power of personality. Maruyama provides a fascinating postscript to this essay in Gendai seiji no shiso to kOdo. 'Nihon shihai so no senso sekinin' (War Responsibility of Japan's Rulers). Insert, Shinju wan e no michi, vol. 3, Gendai shi taikei gepp6, December 1956, Misuzu ShoMo Repeats themes from other essays on war responsibility (including 'Senso sekinin no moten'). Maruyama reiterates that the Emperor should take moral as well as political responsibility for the Asia-Pacific war.

1957 'Gendai kakumei no tenbo' (The Situation of Modern Revolution). Original in Sekai, April and May 1957; reproduced in Usui Yoshimi, ed., Gendai no kadai, vol. 27 Gendai kyoyo zenshii, Chikuma shoM, 1960, pp. 322-373. Zadankai with Takeuchi Yoshimi, Haniya Yutaka, Eguchi Bokuro, Yoshino Genzaburo. Along with Maruyama's essay on de-Stalinisation, this is a strong criticism of modern communism and its destructive effect on pacifism in the postwar world. Maruyama depicts the shared 'logic' of pacifism and revolution which are joined through their embodiment of universal values which ultimately have predominance over ideological divisions. 'Gendai no seiji' (Contemporary Politics). Originally a speech, it appeared in two parts in the Fukui shinbun I and 2, November 1957. Maruyama discusses his book Gendai seiji no shiso to kOdo, his methodology and the discipline of political science. 'Hando no gainen: hitotsu no shiso shi teki sekkin' (The Concept of Reaction: An Approach From the History of Ideas), in Hando no shiso, vol. V, Iwanami koza gendai shiso, Iwanami shoten, pp. 3-31. This essay provides an important building block for Maruyama's philosophy of social autonomy, and in more concrete terms for his theory of fascism. It contains an astonishing defence of the Marxian intellectual tradition, mainly inspired by the Macarthyist reaction in the United States, and a defence of Marx himself whom Maruyama calls 'a child of the enlighten-

Maruyama Masao: critical bibliography 275 ment'. Maruyama develops his philosophy of reaction by placing it in dialectical relation to ·progress'. Shows Maruyama to be a master of political theory, albeit with a European focus. 'Nihon no shiso' (Japanese Thought). Original in Nihon no shiso, vol. XI, Iwanami koza gendai shiso, Iwanami shoten, 1957, pp. 3-46; reproduced in Nihon no shiso, Iwanami shinsho, 1961, pp. 2-66; translation in Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan, vol. 2, no. 1, April 1964, pp.41-48. The second comet to appear on the Japanese intellectual scene after 'Logic and Psychology of Ultranationalism'. Maruyama's trademark methodological tools are in evidence, this time examining the history of political thought in Japan as it relates to modernisation: the 'system of thought', the 'structure of perspective', the 'axis'. Maruyama's koso works can best be understood by referring back to this essay. See also 1961 'Nihon no shiso' listing.

1958 'Seiji teki handan' (Political Judgement), originally a speech, transcribed in Kyoiku, no. 7, July 1958, pp. 4-25. Shows Maruyama's love for and expertise in the discipline of politics. This is the positive side of his dark essay 'Logic and Psychology of Ultranationalism', as he sets out to demystify the 'political way of thinking'. 'Senso to dojidai' (War and the War Generation), in Dojidai, September 1958, pp. 20-41. Zadankai with Usami Eiji, Hashikawa Bunso et al. Interesting biographical material on Maruyama's experiences in the army towards the end of the war. His account of his reaction to the Emperor's defeat broadcast is particularly revealing. He claims in this discussion that the war inspired him to research the premises behind the emperor system and Marxism, but that it is time for him to move on. 'Gendai wa ikanarujidai ka' (What Sort of Era is This). Asahi Jiinaru, vol. 1, no. 21, August 1958, pp. 8-17. Zadankai with Tsuru Shigeto and Kato Shiiichi. Another piece rich in biographical material on Maruyama at the war's end. Here he describes the postwar era as 'the third opening of the country' (kaikoku). Premodern and modem elements still coexist postwar, for example unions that combine activism with low class consciousness. Autonomy remains on Maruyama's agenda as he states that real change can be achieved via the renovation of the self. The shadow of fascism still hangs over this positive picture.

1959 'Taishii undo ni tsuite' (On Mass Movements), Fujin Koron, January 1959, pp. 170-180 (with Hidaka Rokuro, Nagai Michio et al.). Maruyama dominates in this discussion, where he speaks with conviction on the importance of activism in a democratic system. He argues that without

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activism, parliamentary democracy is a sham. His own activism over the next twenty-four months would belie the post-I 960 criticisms of Maruyama as an ivory tower theorist. 'Kaikoku' (Opening the Country). Original Koza gendai rinri, January 1959; reproduced in Hidaka Rokuro, ed., Kindaishugi, vol. 34, Gendai Nihon shiso taikei, Chikuma shobO pp. 282-312; and in Chilsei to hangyaku, Chikuma shobO, 1992, pp. 157-196. Regarded as the key to Maruyama's theory of modernisation, although this piece only addresses one theme in depth, that of equating modernisation with the move from a closed to an open society. (Maruyama's other theme, that of cultural contact between unequals, surfaces later as a sub-theme of his works on 'ancient layers'.) Democracy and autonomy emerge as inherent end goals of modernisation, the process of their attainment representing the modernisation process itself. The Meiji experience functions as a warning to postwar Japan, with the war as the consequence of national kaikoku (openness) accompanied by continuing spiritual and individual sakoku (isolation). 'Historical Background of Democracy', in Democracy in Japanese Culture: Report of the National Seminar, 1959, pp. 5-11. A short piece that warns of the vagaries of power abuse in a democratic system. Posits fascism as the bogey, because it is founded on 'a disbelief in the mass'.

1960 'ChUsei to hangyaku' (Loyalty and Rebellion). Original in Jiga 10 kankyo, vol. 6, Kindai Nihon shisO shi koza, Chikuma ShobO, 1960, pp. 379-471; and in Chuseitohangyaku, pp. 3-109. Maruyama traces the fate of the dynamic impulses which produced the overthrow of the Tokugawa regime through the Meiji period. Well ahead of his time, Maruyama associates this dynamism with feudalism, making this piece a solid rebuke against those critics who accuse Maruyama of despising Japan's past. For instance, Maruyama credits the successful phase of the People's Rights Movement (in his view, the second phase) to the diversity and independence of the middle strata of society. Maruyama's methodological approach anticipates the 'koso' works, and incorporates his penchant for paradox and dialectical thinking. He indirectly attacks Marxism as something which 'snuffed out' the conscious rebellious self. The fate of rebellion in Meiji holds many lessons for 1945 Japan. 'Gendai ni okeru taido kettei' (Determining One's Attitude Today). Originally a speech to the KenpO Mondai Kenkyiikai on 3 May 1960; reproduced in Kenpo 0 ikasu mono (Things Which Make the Constitution Live), Iwanami Shinsho, 1961, pp. 308-327; and Gendai seij; no shiso to kOdo (Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics), expanded edition, Miraisha, 1964, pp.446-461. Given the feverish environment of May 1960 this is a restrained speech by

Maruyama Masao: critical bibliography 277 Maruyama on the importance of expressing one's views in times of political controversy. Maruyama's postscript to the expanded 1964 edition of Thought and Behaviour is more revealing of Maruyama's objectives: this speech was written before 19 May 1960 when Maruyama still had time to reflect; after this he embarked on a round of speeches and demonstrations where scholarly reflection was replaced by emotive political statements. Maruyama believed that this speech better represented his underlying principles than the more straightforward activism which followed. In his postscript he reveals his feelings on parliamentary democracy in the light of the Security Treaty crisis. While he does not regard parliamentary democracy as an ideal system, it was not negated by the events of 1960 as the cynics alleged. Sentaku no toki' (Time For Choice). Speech given on 24 May 1960; reproduced in Tokyo Daigaku Shinbun, 11 July 1960; and in Misuzu, vol. 2, no. 17, August 1960, pp. 2-5. The turning point in Maruyama's engagement with the Security Treaty debate, when Maruyama launched into full-scale activism. This speech was widely reported in all of the major newspapers, and became the ideological launchpad of the 'Protect Democracy' movement against the Security Treaty. While utterly consistent intellectually with his prior work on democracy, this piece and others which followed put his ideas in plain language, applied them to a specific issue, and communicated his sense of crisis better than any other speech or essay. Giji no puroguramu kara no dakkyaku' (Emerge From a Pseudo-Programme). Zadankai held on 27 May 1960, published in Chilo Koron, July 1960, pp. 3041 (with Takeuchi Yoshimi, Kaiko Ken). Maruyama and Takeuchi argue that 19 May 1960 was a turning point in the anti-treaty movement against the scepticism of Kaiko. Maruyama celebrates the popular activism after 5.19 as the beginning of the indigenisation of democracy in postwar Japan. This popular activism is in tum attributed by Maruyama to the strength of 'constitutional consciousness' in the community. Maruyama hints that the 'success' of 1960 will not be evident for a long time, implying he was fully prepared for the immediate political failure of the movement. Midasenu togi seiji' (Politics By Discussion Nowhere to be Found). Transcription of speech entitled 'Passing of the New Security Treaty and Political Science Issues' by Maruyama on 31 May 1960 in Asahi Shinbun, 1 June 1960, p. 7; and in Tokyo Daigaku Shinbun, 1 June 1960 (part 1) and 8 June 1960 (part 2), under the title 'Fiisateki na innaishugi: gikaisei minshushugi no kiki'; in Mainichi Shinbun, 1 June 1960, p. 7, headline 'Minshushugi no kiki'; appears as article in Asahi Jiinaru, vol. 2, no. 24, June 1960, entitled 'Kono jittai no seijiteki mondaiten', pp. 11-17. More straight-talking by Maruyama on the democratic crisis represented by the forcing-through of the security treaty revision legislation on 19 May 1960. Here Maruyama expands on his interpretation of the root causes of the crisis. Parliamentary democracy needs more than just rule by majority fiat; legitimate majority rule must be preceded by discussion to incorporate minority views. The process is legitimised by a connection between

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parliamentary discussion and discussion in the wider community. Kishi's Diet strategy abused this principle. Interestingly, Maruyama calls Kishi's act a 'reverse course' manoeuvre. '''Shimizu Ikutaro shi no tatakai" ni yosu' (In Response to 'Shimizu Ikutaro's Battle'), Tosho Shinbun, 30 July 1960. Maruyama joins Hidaka Rokuro in rebutting a speech and comments attributed to Shimizu in the same magazine about the anti-security treaty revision movement. In particular, Maruyama flatly denies all memory of the criticisms he supposedly made about Shimizu's relationship to the communist party. 'Fukusho no setsu' (Return to Original Principles). Speech given on 12 June 1960; reproduced in Misuzu, no. 17. August 1960. pp. 26-32; and in Sekai, August 1960. pp. 367-371. Maruyama's critique of the Japanese media and their weaker tone after 5.19. Maruyama exhorts his audience to 'remember 5.19 as the Americans remember Pearl Harbour'. This was the first allusion Maruyama made to the connection between the war and Japan's democratic crisis in 1960. He explored this idea further in '5.19 to 8.15'. 'Shin anpo joyaku hantai undo 0 kokoromiru' (Looking Back at the Movement Against the New Security Treaty), interview in Hokkaido Shinbun, 5 July 1960. Maruyama lauds the democratic legacy of the movement against the security treaty, but a note of despair nonetheless creeps in. He celebrates the popular realisation that resistance against an unreasonable authority is possible, but believes that only the continued political activism and interest of the apolitical sphere of society will build on this legacy. 'Seiji no taihai ni kosuru mono' (Things Which Oppose the Deterioration of Politics), Shiso no Kagaku, no. 31, July 1960, pp. 2-14 (with Takeuchi Yoshimi and Sakamoto Tokumatsu). Another attempt to specify the legacy of the anti-security treaty movement. Maruyama remains positive about the legacy in democratic terms, this time stating that the experiences of mid-1960 showed that resistance was no longer regarded as rebellion in society at large. This according to Maruyama is a criterion of a modem society. 'Genzai no seiji jokyo: nani 0 nasu beki ka' (Today's Political Situation: What Should Be Done?), Sekai, August 1960, pp. 217-253. Zadankai with Ishida Takeshi, Sakamoto Yoshikazu, Shinohara Hajime, Sumiya Mikio, Taguchi Fukuji, Hidaka Rokuro and Fujita ShOzo. A wide-ranging discussion amongst key anti-security treaty activists who attempt to make sense of the events of May and June, and construct an agenda for future activism. The intellectual disarray is evidence not of the lack of a common interest in Japan's democracy, but what this democracy consists of. It is evident that no intellectual leadership will emerge from this group as a group, yet Maruyama implies that the popular activism of preceding months represents the passing of the baton from the intellectuals to the

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279

masses anyway. Herein lie the kernels of dissent which pushed the new generation of intellectual activists on to different paths from those hewn by Maruyama and his peers.

8.15 to 5.19: Nihon minshushugi no rekishiteki imi' (15 August and 19 May: the Historical Meaning of Japanese Democracy), Chuo Koron, August 1960, pp.44-54. Written in the style of an interview, Maruyama responds to a rag-bag of 'queries' about his writings and actions during the months of May and June. Maruyama attempts to recapture the essence of the democratic movement in 1960 for the sake of future activism by recalling the similarly inspiring circumstances of 1945. The sub-plot is obviously Maruyama's distress at the despair pervading the anti-security treaty movement. He places blame at the feet of authority.

5.19 to chishikijin no "koseki": Maruyama Masao shi no shiso to kooo' (19 May and the Paths of Intellectuals: Mr Maruyama Masao's Thought and Behaviour), interview by Arase Yutaka in Shakan Dokushojin , 19 September 1960, p. 1. A disjointed interview which nonetheless conveys Maruyama's philosophy of democracy as an eternal revolution. Kanso mitsu' (Three Thoughts), contribution to Koe naki koe tayori, 20 September 1960; also appeared in Nihon Dokusho Shinbun, 26 September 1960, p. 6. Three philosophical vignettes, united by the message of the value of activism on the part of pluralist entities in society. Gikaisei minshushugi no yukue' (The Direction of Parliamentary Democracy). Ekonomisuto Bessatsu, Anpo ni yureta Nihon no kiroku, September 1960, pp. 83-97. Zadankai with Kata Shiiichi, Arai Tatsuo and Fujita Nobusuke. Discussion took place 21 July 1960. Maruyama's contribution to this discussion was to outline the historical background of democracy in Japan and its developmental shortcomings. His argument has much in common with his theory of modernisation, calling Japan's post-Cold War democracy a casualty of the 'late-developer syndrome'. In this discussion Maruyama ties together the threads of his thought on the major debates of postwar and links them directly to the deficiencies and latent strengths of Japanese democracy. Kindaika to seiaka' (Modernisation and Western Europeanisation). Daija-hachi kai kokai koza kogi yoko, Tokyo Daigaku Shinbun, September 1960. Maruyama outlines his university course on international politics. He includes a definition of the process of modernisation and the open society. Introduction', in Morris, I. I., Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan, London, Oxford University Press, 1960; in translation Gendai seiji no shiso to kOdo, expanded edition, pp. 187-199. Maruyama provides the prewar foundations for Morris' work on fascism and fascist tendencies in postwar Japan. Morris relies heavily on Maruyama's interpetations of Japanese fascism in the remainder of the book.

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This introduction contains the oft-quoted statement by Maruyama that the entire society of prewar Japan was right wing. Maruyama takes the opportunity to warn America against importing its version of postwar fascism (Macarthyism) into its democratic pupil's world.

1961 'Politics and Man in the Contemporary World'. Original 'Gendai ni okeru ningen to seiji' in Maruyama, ed., Ningen to seiji, Yiihikaku, 1961; reproduced in Gendai seiji no shiso to kodo, expanded edition, pp. 462-492; in translation Thought and Behaviour in Modem Japanese Politics, pp. 321-348. A thoughtful piece that reveals Maruyama's opinion of politics and his place in relation to that world. This is where he warns that life consists of various fictions; what matters is developing a sense of self that can make the best choices. Maruyama describes his place as 'on the brink between commitment and irresponsibility'. 'Hi-seio sekai no kindaika: toku ni Chiigoku to Nihon ni tsuite' (Modernisation of the Non-Western European World: Particularly China and Japan), Asahi Janaru, vol. 3, no. 24, 1961, pp. 67-75 (co-author with Kaiko Takashi). This is really a piece about the 'third kaikoku', i.e. Japan's Occupation after World War II. Maruyama again emphasises the opportunity that Japan has to act as a pacifist model for the rest of Asia. Nihon no shiso (Japanese Thought), Iwanami Shoten, 1961. Comprising four essays, 'Nihon no shiso' (1957), 'Shiso no arikata ni tsuite' (1957), 'De are

koto to suru koto' (1958) and 'Kindai Nihon no shiso to bungaku' (1959).

One of the canons of modernisation writing in postwar Japan. This is the famous debut of Maruyama's theory of the lack of a 'coordinating axis' in Japan's political culture, leading to the coexistence of premodern and modem elements in Japanese society. Maruyama elaborates on the importance of Marxism in Japan's intellectual tradition. In 'De aru koto to suru koto' he discusses the dangers of the passive acceptance of reality, and with one eye on his contemporary political context calls for the active formulation of reality, i.e. personal autonomy as a necessary component of modernisation. 'Shiso shi no kangaekata ni tsuite. Ruikei, han'i, taishO' (On Thinking About the History of Ideas. Type. Sphere, Object), in Takeda, Kiyoko, ed., Shiso shi no hOhO to taishO: Nihon to Seio, Sobunsha, 1961, pp. 3-33; and in Chasei to hangyaku,pp.353-388.

This is the first major think piece on Maruyama's historical methodology and contains the kernels of what would become the koso (deep layers) concept. It shows clearly the influence of Mannheim's perspectivism and provides good refutation for the accusation that Maruyama was scornful of Japanese tradition. Modernisation remains a preoccupation.

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1964 'Some Thoughts on Article Nine of the Constitution'. Original'Kenpa dai kyu jo 0 meguru jakkan no kOsatsu', based on a paper given to the Kenpa Mondai Kenkyu Kai on 14 November 1964; appeared in Minshushugi, Gendai Nihon shisa taikei, vol. 3, Chikuma ShobO, 1965, pp. 399-425; also appeared in Sekai, June 1965; reproduced in Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics, pp. 290-320; and in Koei no ichi kara, 1982, pp.21-70. One of the few occasions when Maruyama addresses the issue of consitutional revision as part of his work on 'peace as realism'. The context of the Korean War and the subsequent realignment of political parties in 1955 forced rearmament onto the agenda. Strains of 'Thought and Behaviour of Japan's Wartime Leaders' appear as Maruyama warns against accepting the Self Defence Forces as a 'fait accomplt whose destiny is now beyond control. The symbiotic relationship between pacifism and democracy in Japan is stressed when Maruyama connects the preservation of Article Nine with the sovereignty of the people. 'Fuhen teki ishiki 0 kaku Nihon no shiro - Maruyama Masao 0 kakonde' (Japanese Thought Lacks a Universal Consciousness - Speaking With Maruyama Masao), Hitotsubashi Shinbun, 15 July 1964, pp. 2-3. Covers Maruyama's thoughts on Marxism and its impact on his scholarship: the ideas and methodologies with which he analysed Sorai; the intellectual obstacles to modernisation in Japan; and the significance of the Anpo riots. The unifying element is the question of universality, a reworking of his ideas on the 'open society'. Maruyama argues that as long as the internaHxternal nexus persists in Japanese popular consciousness the universal will never be able to liberate social values from the political realm. The name for the 'closed society' is now Particularism. 'Niju seiki saidai no paradokusu' (The Greatest Paradox of the Twentieth Century). Originally a speech to the Hachi ichi go kinen kokumin shukai no kiroku; appeared in Sekai, October 1965, pp. 198-202. Part of feature '8 gatsu 15 nichi wa mada owatte wa inai'. Contains insights into Maruyama's experiences of being interrogated by the Tokka in high school, and in Hiroshima in 1945. He reveals that his mother died on 15 August 1945, thus 8.15 evokes complex feelings in him. The paradox of the title is that Japan while having been the last developed in terms of imperialism is now the world leader in pacifism.

1965 'Patterns of Individuation and the Case of Japan: A Conceptual Scheme', in Jansen, M. B., ed., Changing Japanese Attitudes Towards Modernisation, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1965, pp. 489-531. Here Maruyama schematically defines the democratic ideal as 'associative individualism'. The focus is carefully restricted to the prewar era only, in keeping with Maruyama's decision after 1960 to avoid commentary on

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contemporary politics. Maruyama recalls the inability of Japanese and American scholars to agree at the Hakone conference about the interpretation of 'modernisation'. This essay shows that he remains focused on the impact of the modernisation process on the individual.

1966 'Hito marukusu shugi tetsugaku sha no ayumi' (The Footsteps of One Marxist Philosopher), in Ekonomisuto, 1966, vol. 44, nos. 24-27, 29-34 (ten parts). An amble down memory lane with Maruyama leading the way for the main focal point, Kozai Yoshishige. The disparity between the two is often revealed in a bemusing way, with Maruyama asking for Kozai's reaction to specific events and contexts, and Kozai usually responding that he did not think it important at the time. Kozai raises the question of the relationship between the self and theory on the one hand, and activism and the public realm on the other, and its implications for tenko, (apostasy). Tenko is the main sub-theme of this piece, with the emphasis on Kozai's (and to a lesser extent Maruyama's) intellectual biography. 'Abe sensei to Heiwa Mondai Danwa Kai' (Professor Abe and the Peace Problems Discussion Group), in Sekai, August 1966, pp. 121-134 (with Yoshino Genzaburo). Maruyama reflects on the Heiwa Mondai Danwa Kai and the motivations of its members. Includes some interesting biographical and personal reminiscences, including the relationship between politics and intellectuals, and interpretations of liberalism. 'Fukuzawa, Uchimura, and Okakura - Meiji Intellectuals and Westernisation'. Originally appeared as an introduction to Fukuzawa Yukichi, Uchimura Kanzo, Okakura Tenshin shu, vol. 51, Gendai Nihon Bungaku Zenshii, Chikuma ShoM, 1958, pp. 409-17; translation in The Developing Economies; Special Issue: The Modernisation of Japan II, vol. IV, no. 4, December 1966, pp. 1-18; and in Chase; to hangyaku, pp. 271-292. Useful for an enhanced understanding of Maruyama's approach to modernisation. Through a commentary on these three thinkers, Maruyama allows glimpses of his views on the evaluation of tradition and its accommodation with nationalism and universalism; the problem of perceived opposition between spirit and matter and its transference to an East-West analogy; and the idea of 'emanation' (genesis). Maruyama reiterates his belief in the importance of intellectual commentary from outside the institutional confines of orthodoxy.

1968 'Heiwa Mondai Danwa Kai ni tsuite' (On the Heiwa Mondai Danwa Kai), Sekai, June 1968; reproduced in Sekai, Special Edition, July 1985, pp. 2-53. Zadankai chaired by Midorikawa Toru. Essential background reading for the Heiwa Mondai Danwa Kai, the mood

Maruyama Masao: critical bibliography 283 of the times, their objectives and main issues. It provides some insight into the intellectual culture of the day, i.e. very introspective, with a tendency to categorise each thinker. Maruyama notes that a sense of war responsibility on the part of members was a major motivation for their pacifist activism.

1969 '24 nenme ni kataru hibaku taiken' (Speaking About the Experience of the Atomic Bombing after 24 years), ChUgoku Shinbun, 5 and 6 August 1969. Marks one of the few occasions when Maruyama has spoken about his experience in Hiroshima. This is largely a third person text, with some direct quotations interspersed between. Maruyama regrets his failure to use his experience in Hiroshima in his intellectual work. (Ref., Tsurumi Shunsuke, Kalari Isuku sengo shi (A Narrative of Postwar History), vol. I, Shiso no Kagaku Sha. 1969. Maruyama makes a similar remark.) Of interest is Maruyama's observation that Americans of even extreme rightist persuasion seem to feel a sense of shared guilt for Hiroshima. This piece provides biographical background for Maruyama's work on peace and neutralism, as he notes that his attitude towards the atomic bombing changed after the Bikini Incident in 1954. 'Fuhenteki genri no tachiba' (From the Perspective of Universal Principles), in Tsurumi Shunsuke, ed., Katari tsuku sengo shi, vol. I, Shiso no Kagakusha, 1969, pp. 79-107. A revealing and personal exchange between Maruyama and Tsurumi, written up in the style of a zadankai. Describes his failure to use his experience in Hiroshima as the greatest deficiency in his intellectual work on peace, and says he still cannot describe himself as an 'hibakusha' (atomic victim). (He redresses this somewhat in '24 nenme ni kataru hibaku taiken'.) Reflecting on his intellectual journey in the postwar era, Maruyama felt that the peace treaty debates of 1950 onwards were a turning point in his development, yet his participation in the anti-security treaty movement in 1960 was 'uncharacteristic'. Maruyama also addresses his failure to respond to Yoshimoto Takaaki's famous criticism of him ('Maruyama Masao ron,' Shiso ka ron, vol. 12, Yoshimoto Takaaki zen chosaku shU, Keio shobo, 1969, pp. 5-96).

1972 'Rekishi ishiki no "koso'" (The 'Ancient Layers' of Historical Consciousness), in Nihon no shiso, Rekishi shiso shu, vol. 6, Iwanami Shoten, 1972, pp.3-46. Maruyama raises an argument that Nihonjinron (theories about the Japanese) theorists would embrace. He explains that it is Japan's unique historical consciousness which is responsible for Japan's standing in the world today. The key is the 'ancient layers', which basically enable continuity (identity) to be concurrent with change. It appears as the defence of a Japanese identity in the modernisation process, by attributing the dynamism of historical change to the interaction of modernisation and the koso. He

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claims that there is a connection between one of the koso and the lack of shutaisei: an interesting idea but unexplored here. 'Rekishi ishiki to bunka no pataan' (Historical Consciousness and Cultural Patterns). Insert for Nihon no shiso, vol. 6, Rekishi shiso shii, Chikuma ShobO, 1972. With Kato Shiiichi. Acts as a commentary on the koso essay and fills in Maruyama's thinking on his historical methodology. He also continues to address the concepts of modernisation, 'war responsibility' and shutaisei. Maruyama's misgivings about determinism (Marxism) are a powerful undercurrent.

1974 Introduction', Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan, Dore, R., trans., University of Tokyo Press, 1974, pp. xv-xxxvii.

~uthors

Provides background on the context in which those essays were written, both in terms of history and methodology. Maruyama otTers both an appraisal and a critique of Marxism that is an invaluable preparation for the book.

1975 'Nanbara sensei 0 shi toshite' (Professor Nanbara as a Teacher), Kokka Gakkai Zasshi, July-August 1975, pp. 395-416. Excellent biographical information on Maruyama's early university years and his relationahip with Nanbara Shigeru. He describes the repression of intellectuals and the need for self-censorship during those times. This is useful background reading for 'Seiji gaku ni okeru kokka no gainen'.

1978 'Shutaisei ron' (Debate on Subjectivity). Original in Warerware ga seishun, Gendai no riron sha, 1978; reproduced in Maruyama, Sato Noboru and Umemoto Katsumi, Sengo Nihon no kakushin shiso, Gendai no Riron Sha, 1983, pp. 383-405. A useful piece for the shutaisei debate, but with the benefit of hindsight on the part of the participants. Maruyama blames the inadequacies of Marxism for the breakdown of the discussion. He relates that Umemoto tried to combine existential ideas (ethics) with Marxism and failed. Maruyama makes a plea for ideals - 'the reality you can't see' - as an alternative to the war situation, 'the reality you can see'. Ends with a discussion on individuality and universality. 'Ogyii Sorai no zokui mondai' (Problem of Conferring a Posthumous Rank on Ogyu Sorai), in Kindai Nihon no kokka to shiso-Ienaga Saburo kyoji1 Tokyo Kyoiku Daigaku taikan kinen ronsha 2, Tokyo, Sanseido, 1978, pp. 108-139. A piece of detective work by Maruyama concerning why Sorai has still not been included in the Imperial Court Rankings of posthumous scholars.

Maruyama Masao: critical bibliography

285

Maruyama has two main objectives here: first, it is another opportunity for Maruyama to underline his belief in the significance of Sorai to Japan's intellectual development; and second, to indicate the continuing insidiousness of the kokutai ideology in the life of postwar Japan. 'Shiso shi no hOhO 0 mosaku shite' (Forming a Methodology For Intellectual History), Nagoya Daigaku hOsei ronsha, no. 77, September 1978, pp. 1-31. An invaluable piece of intellectual autobiography that discusses the intellectual influences on Maruyama, ranging from Marx to Weber to Windelband to Mannheim and others. Marxism and its intricate role in Maruyama's intellectual life is showcased here, and while he does not claim the label 'Marxist' he does say that 'Marxism ... was not just a way-station'. He attempts to put his koso idea into this context, with indeterminate results.

1979 'Nihon shiso shi ni okero "koso" no Mondai: Maruyama Masao sensei 0 maneki shite' (The Problem of ~ncient Layers' in Japanese Intellectual History: An Invitation to Professor Maruyama), in Uchiyama Hideo kenkyUkai, 1979. Another piece of intellectual biography where Maruyama reminisces about the political atmosphere in Japan during his high school and university years. Buried within this long monologue are some important theoretical underpinnings for Maruyama's modernisation theory; in particular it provides the conceptual bridge between modernisation, the attainment of universality and postwar democracy. He declares Article 9 to be a vanguard concept of postwar democracy and at the same time laments the divorce of ideas and institutions in postwar Japanese democracy.

1982 Koei no ichi kara (From the Rearguard), Miraisha, 1983. A long postscript to Gendai seiji no shiso to kocJij. Includes a think-piece on intellectuals and war guilt, coining the famous phrase 'community of regret' (kaikon kyoootai) to describe the predicament of himself and his peers. Includes Japanese translations of English language reviews.

1984 'Genkei, koso, shikko teion: Nihon shiso shi hOho ron ni tsuite no watakushi no ayumi' (Model, Substructure, Basso Ostinato: My Progress Towards a Methodology for Japanese Intellectual History). Original in Takeda Kyoko, ed., Nihon bunka no kakureta katachi, Iwanami Shoten, 1984, pp. 87-152. Maruyama discusses the real motivations and priorities behind his scholarship. He regards himself not as a commentator on contemporary events but as an analyst of Japanese political thought. He admits that after the war he did really change his orientation (ref: 'Kindai teki shii'). He delves into dialectics and the logic behind the koso approach. It is no longer the

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'genesis' of ideas that matters, but instead the dynamics of the moment of interaction of two modes of thought. It is in fact an extension of the modernisation concept into his methodology. Maruyama flatly denies a Marxist inspiration behind 'basso ostinato' (kosO). 'It is theoature of change that is constant' in Japan.

1988 'Structure of Matsurigoto: The Basso Ostinato of Japanese Political Life', in Henny, S. and Lehman, J. P., eds., Themes and Theories in Modern Japanese History: Essays in Memory of Richard Storry, Athlone, London, 1988, pp.27-43. Maruyama continues the argument on koso regarding the relationship between homogeneity, change and continuity in Japanese political thought. Historical methodology is further explored, especially the idea of structures and patterns of thought. Maruyama concludes that these structures are responsible for the lack of a sense or locus of ultimate responsibility in the political system. The same structure also prevents the development of a full dictatorship. Maruyama notes that the features of the structure of thought are the separation of legitimacy and actual power, and acceptance of the concept of joint rule.

1990 'Unser Stolz ist Schnell Dahin' (Our Pride Vanishes Quickly). Interview by Tiziano Terzani for Der Spiegel, no. 43, 22 October 1990, pp. 217-230. An illicit interview with Maruyama using a hidden microphone, and published without Maruyama's permission. The article seems candid, but due to its origin in deception it cannot be quoted with confidence.

Index

Ancient Studies School 53-4, 57 Aron, Raymond 166 Aso Hisashi 80 authoritarianism, Japanese tradition of 4,5,7 Berlin, Isaiah 2, 102 Bernstein, Eduard 3, 80, 87, 89-90, 93, 95 Chu Hsi Confucianism, philosophy 52-4, 57-8, 60 closed society 53, 133; definition of 124-6; move to an open society 110; Popper 127, 131 Cold War, general 10,24,92,105,1312, 138, 154, 164, 166, 169, 171, 174, 178, 186, 188, 192,202,205,214; in Asia 5, 13,40, 105, 117 'comfort women' 14, 29-30,44 Confucianism49,5l,57,71;Confucian ethics 52 democracy, Japanese tradition of 6, 7, 30,34-5 dialect, the 50, 52,57-61,64,67, 73, 78, 84,98, WI, 131, 146, 148; Hegelian 52, 59, 83, 85; dialectical tension 53,65,231-2 Emperor, general 17-18, 20, 35-fi, 57-8,60,62,69,73, 113, 143, 158, 182; surrender broadcast 15-19; as a war criminal 20, 26, 39; ideology and its rationalisation of atrocities 31-3; Emperor System 63, 70,1434,182 Fukuda Tsuneari 36, 39, 225, 227 Fukuzawa Yukichi 63-65, 71-3, 102,

104-5,128-9,186; on pluralism 72; on enlightenment 115; reviewed by Maruyama Masao 128-9 general strike, banning of 7,92, 132, 154,173 Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere 29,113-14, 143 Heidelberg School 81-2 Heiwa Mondai Danwakai (Peace Problems Discussion Group) 17585,201-3; third statement on peace 185-fi, 188, 191;joint statement with Kokudankai 203, 206

hibakusha 42

Hidaka Rokuro 15,114,207,209-10 Hirohito (Emperor Showa), death of, 14,27-8 Hiroshima 8, 16-18,28,42, 165, 174 Hosokawa Morihiro 43 humanism 2, 3, 80, 82-4, 93, 98

idealism 1,79,87,90-2,98,114,166-7, 178,232; tension with materialism 2, 3, 89; conflict with determinism 88 Ienaga Saburo 44 individualism 3, 213, 224, 232; idealist individualism 3 individuals, responsibility 14,43; relationship between the individual and the state 3, 14, 32,43, 70-2, 101,137,201; status in international law 27; in fascist ideology 141, 148 intellectuals, general 14-15; 'progressive' 36; and war resonsibility 37-8, 40, 42, 180,200; and fascism 152; activism 199-200, 215.222

288

Index

Irokawa Daikichi 71 Ishida Takeshi 176, 185, 195

kaikoku 118, 123, 125; three periods of 119,133; Maruyama's theory of 125-7,130 Kant 2,88,90; neo-Kantians 81, 86, 90,101 Kato Shuichi 20, 120 Kawakami Hajime 80 Kishi Nobusuke 199,201-2,207,210, 212,214,217-18,223 kokutai2l,3l,69-70, 113-14, 144-5, 157,222 Kozai Yoshishige 80 Laski, Harold 96-8 liberalism 2, 8, 167 Locke, John 102-4 Maeda Tamon 7 majority rule 19,211-13 Manchurian Incident 8, 18 Mannheim, Karl 51, 84, 86-8, 96, 117, 192 Maruyama Kanji 8 Marxism, revisionism 2, 91-2; Koza School and Rono School 5, 80; Communist Manifesto 9; 'the young Marx'3,80, 82, 84,89,98, 105; Maruyama Masao as a Koza marxist 58, 138, 146; orthodox 60, 78-9,93, 96, 99, 102, 117; as a world view 78, 93; as an economic theory 79, 147; existential 95; Maruyama's critique of 51, 60,789, 84-5; Maruyama's admiration of 79,84,88 Matsumoto Sannosuke 116, 119 Meiji Restoration 60-2, 64, 68 -9, 11516,118,132,146, 154, 186 Meirokusha (Meiji Six Society) 63, 129 minority rights 19,211-2 Morgenthau, Hans 1. 166-7 Motoori Norinaga 57-8, 66; transcendence over Sorai 58 Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement 37 Nagasaki 28, 174 Nanbara Shigeru 8, 9,51

Nanking, Rape of 35 National Studies School 57, 119 nationalism 140, 149-50, 157-8; in fascist ideology 143, 147 Nature, Confucian theory of 49,54,5961,65-6,74 Nazi, leadership 33-4; Germany 63 Nihonjinron 50, 75, 113 Nishida Kitaro 95 Occupation, of Japan I, 4, 13, 15, 18, 20,31,37,74, 105, 112, 120, 142, 147, 164, 172, 183; institutional reforms 1,4,6,24, 132, 153, 170-1, 214; censorship 7, 22; purges 22, 24-5; distrust of Japanese democratic proclivity 21-4,174 Ogyii Sorai, general 53, 55, 71; politicisation of Confucianism 56, 186 open society 52, 231; definition of 1234,130 Otsuka Hisao 30, 114, 116 Ouchi Hy6e 179,190 peace treaty 164, 168 People's Rights Movement 50, 64 political culture, Japan I, II, 14, 25, 30, 49,74,165, 194,213,216,224 postwar constitution, peace clause 37, 165,169,172,174,182,187,192-3; and the security treaty crisis 202 Potsdam Declaration 16-17,22-5,41, 170-2,183-4 POWs, of the Japanese 14 resistance 9,36,49,65, 121, 148, 165, 222-3,227,232; movements 36, 69; pacifism as 168, 172, 175-6, 193-5; against conservatism 199; failure to resist 9, 13 reversecourse92,138,154,17l,174, 203 rights, natural 66; democratic 66; state's 68; people's 68-9 rondan bunka (debate culture) 5, 9,168 Shimizu Ikutaro, in Sekai debate 99, 101; in peace movement 171, 1734,176,190; in 1960 200; criticism of Maruyama 224-5, 227

Index 289 Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers 17,21 TaishO democracy 20,30,65, 145 Takeuchi Yoshimi 120-2,209,218-19 textbooks, revision controversy 14,29 tokko (Special Higher Police) 9 Tokyo (Imperial) University 8,19,81 Tokyo War Crimes Trial 14, 20, 22, 25-9,33,35, 113, 142, 150, 187; criticisms of 26-9 Tsurumi Shunsuke 14, 36-7 UNESCO statement on peace 175-9, 181,188,203 universal 68, 81-2, 87, 101, 105, 141;

universalism 62,166-7,232; Habermas on universalism 131; of democracy 7; as distinguishing aspect of Japanese democracy 231, 233; universal democratic thinking 2; universal values 122 victim-consciousness 15, 19,28,33 Yamaga Soko 53-5 Yoshida Shigeru 172, 184, 188 Yoshimoto Takaaki 200, 226 Yoshino Genzaburo 176-9, 190 Yoshino Sakuzo 138

zadankai6,26