Democracy and Event: The Promise and Perils of Catastrophe 1032281596, 9781032281599

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DEMOCRACY AND EVENT

Catastrophes unsettle our safe places within the world. As such, they provide an interesting site to analyze the intersection of our affective and political lives. Bringing radical democratic thinking, affect theory, psychoanalysis, and discursive analysis to bear on contemporary catastrophic events, Democracy and Event presents a fresh perspective on the study of affect and its impact on democratic sensibilities and practices. Situated in different countries with differing institutional histories and cultures – the Grenfell Tower fire in London, England (2017); the SARS epidemic in Toronto, Canada (2003); the Parkland shooting in Florida (2018); the early days of the COVID-19 crisis and the murder of George Floyd in Minneapolis, USA (2020) – Elaine Stavro interprets the rhetoric, discourse, and affective communication of politicians and passionate protestors. She examines their linkages to well-established organizations informed by democratic ideals, as well as the context in which they arise, which have a bearing on their ability to challenge neoliberal and authoritarian practices. Inspired by the urgent need to bring theory back to politics and politics back to theory, Elaine Stavro demonstrates how theory might inform our attitudes to contemporary events while recognizing that political action and events cannot be captured in their complexity by theory. Her skillful engagement with various theoretical approaches, read through the lens of catastrophic events, will speak to a wide-ranging scholarly readership in numerous academic fields. Elaine Stavro is Professor Emerita of Political Theory in the Department of Political Studies at Trent University. She has written numerous articles on Simone de Beauvoir, most recently “Why Thoughtfulness Matters Black Lives Matter and Elsewhere,” forthcoming (2023), in Simone de Beauvoir: A  Toolkit for the 21st Century and published Emancipatory Thinking: The Political Thought of Simone De Beauvoir (2018). Her research interest focuses on feminist thinking, continental philosophy, radical democratic theory, and the intersection of deliberation and affect, as reflected in “SARS and Alterity: The Toronto-China Binary” in Political Science (2014).

DEMOCRACY AND EVENT The Promise and Perils of Catastrophe

Elaine Stavro

Designed cover image: © LordHenriVoton/Getty Images First published 2024 by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 and by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2024 Elaine Stavro The right of Elaine Stavro to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Stavro, Elaine, 1952– author. Title: Democracy and event : the promise and perils of catastrophe / Elaine Stavro. Description: New York : Routledge, 2024. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Summary: “Catastrophes unsettle our safe places within the world. As such, they provide an interesting site to analyze the intersection of our affective and political lives. Bringing radical democratic thinking, affect theory, psychoanalysis, and discursive analysis to bear upon contemporary catastrophic events, Democracy and Event presents a fresh perspective on the study of affect and its impact on democratic sensibilities and practices. Situated in different countries with differing institutional histories and cultures: the Grenfell Tower fire in London, England (2017); the SARS epidemic in Toronto, Canada (2003); the Parkland shooting in Florida (2018); the early days of COVID crisis and the murder of George Floyd in Minneapolis, United States (2020), Stavro interprets the rhetoric, discourse and affective communication of politicians and passionate protestors. She examines their linkages to well established organizations informed by democratic ideals, as well the context in which they arise have a bearing upon their ability to challenge neoliberal and authoritarian practices. Inspired by the urgent need to bring theory back to politics and politics back to theory, Elaine Stavro demonstrates how theory might inform our attitudes to contemporary events while recognizing that political action and events cannot be captured in their complexity by theory. Her skillful engagement with various theoretical approaches, read through the lens of catastrophic events, will speak to a wide-ranging scholarly readership in numerous academic fields”—Provided by publisher. Identifiers: LCCN 2023025502 (print) | LCCN 2023025503 (ebook) | ISBN 9781032281599 (hardback) | ISBN 9781032281582 (paperback) | ISBN 9781003295518 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Grenfell Tower (London, England)—Fire, 2017. | Democracy—Social aspects. | Crisis management—Political aspects. | SARS (Disease)—Ontario—Toronto. | Parkland Shooting, Parkland, Fla., 2018. | COVID-19 Pandemic, 2020—United States. | Floyd, George, 1973–2020—Death and burial. Classification: LCC JC423 .S8444 2024 (print) | LCC JC423 (ebook) | DDC 321.8—dc23/ eng/20230808 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023025502 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023025503 ISBN: 978-1-032-28159-9 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-28158-2 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-29551-8 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003295518 Typeset in Sabon by Apex CoVantage, LLC

CONTENTS

List of figures ix Acknowledgmentsx 1 Theoretical perspectives on democratic sensibilities and democratic practices

1

Vital materialism: ontologies of lively materiality countering social determinism  2 Populist thinkers: turning to the political and away from the social  5 Navigating novelty and indeterminacy – embodied creativity versus the post-human  8 Rethinking emotion and affect: challenging autonomous affect  10 The monstrous event  13 2 Engendering fear and racism during the SARS epidemic: a deficit in deliberative thinking The event: the impact of fear  21 Debates that frame this catastrophe  23 Abjection: scapegoating the Chinese  24 The Orientalist thesis – essentializing the Asian – linking negative affect to Social Othering 28

21

vi Contents

Media management of the crisis – the pairing of the war on terror and bioterror  29 Representations and responses to the SARS crisis: China versus Toronto  31 From fear to disbelief: challenging WHO’s travel advisory 33 Attending to emotion’s material effects  35 SARS effects on deliberation and democratic decision-making 36 Toward a more reliable account of the catastrophe: material conditions – mega slums and global livestock production  38 Post-SARS 42 3 Burning inferno: the Grenfell Tower fire in the era of austerity

45

The event: affective representations overwhelm facts  45 Confronting vital materialists’ and populists’ thinking on affect and emotion  48 Social weightlessness  49 Fostering solidarity: a tangled event that produced multiple narratives and feelings  51 Challenging earlier narratives – the case for investigative journalism  57 Applying vital materialism to the event: confederate agency and human responsibility  60 A new collective subject fails to emerge  62 Attending to larger frames of reference  66 The effects of Brexit – ignoring economic interests  67 The power of neoliberal governing strategies – the demise of democratic practices  68 4 Students’ passionate participation: a democratic movement in the digital age The terrifying event  77 The public sphere in the age of internet and social media – the prospect for democratic opinion formation 79 MOFL’s success: cultivating affective solidarity and pursuing strategic actions  84

77

Contents  vii

Differences in social powers: March for Our Lives versus Black Lives Matter  88 Collaboration across differences: practice surmounts theoretical problems  90 Striving for a leaderless movement: achievements and compromises  92 Strategic actions in the face of a history of defeats  94 The government’s response or lack thereof  95 Gun culture: another impediment to gun control  98 Institutional and cultural differences matter  100 5 President Trump’s response to the COVID pandemic: affective ideology and authoritarian mismanagement

104

The turn to facts in a world of fear: a veneer of certainty  105 Eschewing scientific expertise and journalistic critique 108 Social Othering strategies: blaming the democrats, China, and WHO  111 Cultivating a divided and uninformed public: the effects of anti-science and anti-expert sentiments 116 Efforts to consolidate affective solidarity: “we are all in this together” #alonetogether  119 Trump’s populism: corporate freedom versus public well-being 122 Populist leadership: the allure of tough talk  124 Mishandling of COVID: the erosion of democratic procedures 127 Addendum 130 Thinking critically about the pandemic: why were we unprepared?  130 The promises and perils of the COVID catastrophe  133 6 The murder of George Floyd and the meteoric rise of Black Lives Matter: the success of an affectively rich event Affective solidarity: the power of the event  140 The appearance of Black Lives Matter: a political movement in the digital age  145

140

viii Contents

Symbolic politics, celebrity support, performative activism – the process of emotional reorientation 147 Spontaneous affective events – dismantling statutes waiving public debate  150 Ambiguity of violence: triggering solidarity and undermining support  153 The counter-narratives of the alt-right: stoking up fear and loathing  157 Emotional reflexivity: the power of reason and good arguments 161 Transforming beliefs: raising awareness of systemic racism 163 Strategies and ideals of BLM – the complicated path toward instantiating democratic practices  166 Moving forward: a case for social democracy or billionaires’ charities?  172 Addendum 175 Conclusion

180

Index

185

FIGURES

2.1 Outside a Chinese wet market: a notable lack of modern hygiene and refrigeration 3.1 Grenfell Tower aflame: take note that the fire hoses fail to extend to 20 floors 3.2 The burned-out shell of Grenfell Tower is white-washed 4.1 Millions march in Washington on March 24, 2018, protesting gun violence 5.1 Anti-lockdown signs on a lawn in Michigan 5.2 COVID Memorial Project: American flags representing the 200,000 dead from COVID-19 planted at the base of the Washington Monument 6.1 George Floyd Protestors in Miami on June 6 

27 46 54 85 118

126 143

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Without memory there is no future. I dedicate this book to Nick, Rory, Stephanie, Blake, and Viktoria, who remind me of the importance of taking risks as well as the value of loving attention. I want to thank my long-standing colleagues and friends Diana Coole and Mark Warren, who are a continual source of inspiration, also Charmaine Eddy, Frank Pearce, and Davide Panagia, with whom I enjoy an agonistic intellectual relationship but also a deep friendship. Over the years I  have enjoyed illuminating conversations with Colleen O’Manique, Emilia Angelova, Ian Balfour, Nadine Changfoot, Patricia Dailey, Catherine Doran, Sue Ehrlich, Veronica Hollinger, Caroline Kay, Sonia Kruks, Winnie Lem, Devin Penner, Joan Sangster, Doug Torgerson, Maxine Molyneux, Alex Tarnopolsky, and Hasmet Uluorta. I  wish to acknowledge all the students in my political imagination course and my political theory courses who pushed me to think more concretely. Also, I  want to thank Jordan Williams and Tyler Majer, who introduced me to relevant social media platforms, various Twitter accounts and tweets; Kate Greenslade for her photographic talent; and Matthew Hamilton, who helped me with my theoretical chapter. I want to thank Natalja Mortensen, Charlie Baker, who believed in this project, and Euan Rice-Coates and Venkatesh Sundaram for their editorial assistance. I want to thank my sons, Rory and Blake, my daughters-in-law, Stephanie and Viktoria, for all their loving support and tech assistance, and my

Acknowledgments  xi

grandchildren, Leo and Calla, who provide endless opportunities to play. My parents (Sally and Steve, in memoriam) and sisters (Constance, Deborah, and Stephanie) and the whole Stavro clan for being there. Finally, Nicholas Rogers, an astute and prolific reader/writer who continually reminds me of the complexity of history and the shortcomings of history in the present.

1 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRATIC SENSIBILITIES AND DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES

Since the rise of populist movements in Spain, Greece, and Italy and the election of Donald Trump in the USA, there has been a renewed interest in the power of affect and emotion in the political sphere. The outbreak of the pandemic and the passionate protests for social justice worldwide have also contributed to this interest. All too often affect theorists want to focus on the good affect, those that create new social meanings and disclose new worlds and avoid the bad affect that has contributed to fascism, racism, and populism. Having turned away from electoral politics, representative institutions, and deliberative processes, radical democrats focus on the modality of action, fugitive processes, and sensory events that catalyze perceptual change but gloss over the historical and social conditions which underpin the outcome of events. I will focus on affective experiences (positive and negative affect and emotions) and the context in which they arise, which necessarily condition and constrain all emergent politics. This book explores the powers of affect and meanings that enhance and undermine democratic sensibilities and democratic practices. Catastrophes are truly devastating events causing extreme suffering. Because they unsettle our safe places within the world, they provide an interesting site to analyze the intersection of our affective and political lives. These events provide an opportunity to recognize our vulnerability and interdependence, but they can also aggravate existing hateful feelings and social divisions. Catastrophes require collective resolutions and trigger strong collective emotions, and by so doing they challenge neoliberal governing strategies, which are predicated upon market logic and robust individualism. But catastrophes can also generate anti-democratic sentiments and populist reactions which DOI: 10.4324/9781003295518-1

2  Theoretical perspectives on democratic sensibilities

undermine their potential for collective change. Catastrophes can open up the public sphere to fresh explorations of democratic practice, but they can also have contradictory effects. In exploring how these contradictions manifest themselves, I have chosen five catastrophic events: an epidemic, a fire, a mass shooting, a pandemic, and a murder. These calamities range from the local tragedy of fire to the devastating ruin caused by the spread of the global virus COVID-19. On the surface these events don’t appear to be political in the classic sense of that term. They are presumed to be freak accidents or social contingencies of great magnitude, but I  aim to show they are also vitally connected to neoliberal governing strategies and social structures. To understand the democratic potential of the event, it is crucial to address the debates around affect and emotion. At this point I hope to engage some of the finer theoretical arguments that frame my project. Two schools of contemporary thinking on emotion and affect scaffold my argument. Vital materialism: ontologies of lively materiality countering social determinism

Vital materialism arose as a response to the limitations of the social constructivist thesis of post-structuralism; that is to say that everything is mediated by language. Eve Sedgwick (2003) was concerned that poststructuralism produced social determinism and that the epistemological dimensions of Foucauldian power/knowledge discourses undermined its own Nietzschean project. Nietzsche believed that contingencies always exceeded the control of regimes of knowledge and political authority. The will to power or the affirmative imperative disrupts language and cannot be contained by it. Hence social constructivism is limited by its inability to address the affective level of life. Theorists like Sedgwick consequently believe that subjectivity overlooks or stifles the affective realm. To appreciate life beyond social regulation, both she and Brian Massumi (2002) and more generally vital materialists called for a turn to ontology and a turn away from epistemology. They look at what the body can do rather than privilege meaning. Affect is distinct from emotion in the sense that emotion is directed to an object which channels its energy, meaning, and direction. Affect, by contrast, shifts feelings from one thing to another: its fluidity makes it more labile, unpredictable, and unruly and hence potentially disruptive of the present order. Affects focus on the quirky, the unusual, something that escapes social determination and conditioning. They constitute a self-empowering joyfulness that has the power to define expressions of thought and action without external influence, or so it is argued. Emotion, insofar as it is circumscribed by language and subjectivity,

Theoretical perspectives on democratic sensibilities  3

is “tame,” “domesticated,” and always over-coded by pregiven idioms and clichés. In my view, the critique of representation, language, subjectivity, and reflection underlying this approach is exorbitant, over-extended, and underdeveloped. The reliance upon the contingency of affect undermines the normative distinctions required to articulate the difference between the needs of the present and their realization in the future – reaffirming the link between a past and the needs of the present that promise is necessary to aspire to a healthy democratic future. Vital materialists reflect upon the powers of sensation, affect, and the nonhuman. Technology and nonhuman conditions disrupt human habits, but they do so from a post-humanist lens that overlooks the specificity of social subjects and the distinctively human relations/structures that frame agency. If action-oriented decisions are based upon gut responses that are unconscious and dislodged by impersonal affects, and this visceral response is very much their focus, it is difficult to be optimistic that this response will produce enduring democratic sensibilities and socially progressive politics. Some vital materialists do focus more explicitly upon the political rather than the cultural, although some would also be unhappy with my parsing in this manner, believing that everything cultural is ipso facto political. William Connolly (1999) and Jane Bennett (2010) describe their sociopolitical vision as an “immanent naturalism.”1 Following Spinoza, they believe there is only one worldly substance with two aspects (thought and extension), denying human exceptionalism. They presume humans and nonhumans (whether they be organic or mechanical) share a substrate of lively matter and durational time that infuses a flux of energy into the material world. This will throw up or generate unpredictable modes of becoming. Embracing the world’s liveliness, its abundance, humans will challenge instituted being, imposed identities, and the stinginess of contemporary neoliberal capitalism. Through enhanced sensory experiences provided by films, social media, and computer technology, Connolly believes people can retrain their brains to engage the pluripotential of the world. In experimenting upon themselves, embracing episodic events, and watching films, human sensory experiences will be deepened and “civic virtues of agonistic respect and critical responsiveness” cultivated (2005, 65). By respecting the power of things, Bennett believes humans will assume a more responsive and modest relation to the natural world. Informed by neuroscience, Connolly turns away from the mind (consciousness) to the brain. Seeing the individual agent manifesting purposes and intentions is a false, pre-scientific view of human cognition and behavior. The cerebral cortex (the seat of thinking, reflexivity, speaking, and arguing) is subordinate to and structured by the limbic system. Organs

4  Theoretical perspectives on democratic sensibilities

associated with the regulation of emotion are the hippocampus, amygdala, and basal ganglia. Feelings like disgust, hate, and fear are gut reactions lodged in the limbic system, rather than the products of the cerebral cortex. Dangerous and unpalatable events elicit a spontaneous precognitive “fight or flight” bodily reaction, well before reason kicks in (Damasio 1999, 2003). Focusing on thinking as a transparent register where reasons are compared and revisited through argument and logic overlooks visceral reactions and affect-imbued appraisals that happen spontaneously and unconsciously. There is a feedback loop between the proto thoughts of the limbic system and its spontaneous visceral appraisals and action. Hence, claims Connolly, deliberation or reflection is a post-hoc rationalization rather than a motivator. Connolly’s politics of immanence presumes a shift from macro-politics to micropolitics and from thinking to visceral appraisals. Instead of trying to assume or influence state power through well-argued interests, he relies on action that is simply able to disorganize. Following Deleuze, Connolly turns to the micro or (molecular) level of power, which disrupts unconscious affects, moods, memories, and habits. He turns away from the macro or molar politics which engage state power. By their nature micro-politics is plural, existing virtually (below the level of language and culture), hence less state-controlled, more labile, and capable of having disruptive effects. To stimulate an ethos of generosity or democratic sensibility, Connolly believes work on the visceral register of life is necessary and has the potential to change habitual patterns of thoughts, judgment, and feelings (2007, 68). By focusing on the intellect (reason, will, or cortical activity) where “the realm of the decidable remains slim” (Deleuze 1987, 211), one overlooks the limbic system, the subliminal register of life where ethics and judgment occur. “Working tactically on thought-imbued intensities below the level of feeling and linguistic complexity, on thought-imbued feelings below the level of linguistic sophistication, on images that trigger responses on both levels and linguistic patterns of narrative, argument and judgement” (Connolly 2007, 107), he hopes to tap into the unconscious and disrupt our habits. Connolly glosses over differences between social groups. Populist groups have a strong sense of belonging; they are attuned to and respectful of others within their group, yet they impede democratic sensibilities. This suggests we need to distinguish between social groups and the forms of belonging they cultivate. Not all groups portend democratic promise. Connolly also ignores the affective life of differently situated subjects. Marginalized groups, whose public lives have been severely constrained by alienating labor, racist/sexist practices, are less able to engage the

Theoretical perspectives on democratic sensibilities  5

pluripotential of creative becoming. When they do, their actions are less likely to be as effective as the more privileged members of the community. Connolly himself admits that “nothing in infrasensible thinking necessarily generates generosity and pluralism, and so these tactics could harden relations between partisans and nourish subordination” (1999, 3). This admission opens the possibility of exploring different ways of cultivating generosity. Even if these techniques deepen sensory experiences, I am not convinced that they will be sufficient to produce ethical, responsible, and free subjects.2 In seeing humans and nonhumans as different in degree rather than kind, the distinctive capacities of humans to speak, judge, formulate concepts and to be inspired to act ethically and initiate new projects are obscured. This ontological assumption is supported by neuroscience and specifically the ideas of Damasio. However, other cognitive scientists contest the subordination of cortical activities to the limbic system. Though the mind relies upon the brain, for Daniel Dennett (1991) and John Searle (1992) mental states are not reducible to brain states or brain-body-culture networks. “Although we can explain the origin of the brain in biology and physiology, in the end we are a symbolic species living in a world defined by language” (Gunnell 2007, 728). Dogs think and are conscious, but they do not use language or concepts which support the reflective and constructive capacities distinctive of humans. Hence human exceptionalism is reaffirmed. The contents of consciousness amount to “units of language, memes and culture which produces something functionally equivalent to the self” (Gunnell 2007, 726). These are not characteristics of nonhuman life. I affirm Gunnell and company’s critique of Damasio but support modest exceptionalism given the significance I  attribute to feelings and sensations. Populist thinkers: turning to the political and away from the social

Ernesto Laclau (2005) and Chantal Mouffe (2016) do not identify themselves as vital materialists, yet they share some of their assumptions: people are motivated by feelings rather than reason or interest. They also turn away from existing social inequalities to focus on the political. Like Jacques Rancière (1991, 2005) and Connolly (1991), they believe the socially marginal are free and equal in political protest movements (Frank 2021, 95). Informed by neuroscience, new materialists argue that deep-seated gut feelings are hardwired in brain/body/culture networks: we act with our guts rather than our mind. Hence judgment involves a visceral response rather than inviting a reflective appraisal of the situation. Laclau and Mouffe come

6  Theoretical perspectives on democratic sensibilities

to a similar conclusion through a psychoanalytic lens. They focus on the embodied “lack” which they derive from Jacques Lacan; it distinguishes them from the post-human affect theorists who presume a fullness of being. Nevertheless, they all emphasize the importance of subliminal affects in determining action-directed decisions and seriously erode the power of reason or critical thinking in judgment. They assume ideological critique (the disclosure of falsehoods) and the pursuit of reliable information will have little effect on beliefs. In employing the insights of linguistic semiology, populist theorists Laclau and Mouffe argue that social and political meanings are constitutively constructed and hence must be defined in contingent relational terms. Hence there is no core or essential identity “behind” contested meanings. Their approach is indebted to the work of Derrida and Lacan who criticize the philosophical presumption that meaning, identity, essence, or desire is capable of being exhaustively or fully fulfilled. For Derrida and Lacan such notions are constituted by an originary absence or “lack” that structures the operation and production of all meaning and desire. Laclau aligns these ideas with revolutionary political theory by suggesting that political space is constitutively haunted by “transcendental antagonisms” that can never be fully or exhaustively represented, no matter how inclusive or pluralistic a society may purport to be. Politics, for Laclau, occurs through the erection of antagonistic political frontiers under the banner of “empty signifiers” or labile, undefined referents. These hold together an intersectional array of political actors that come together to share a political claim and contest the contingent arrangement of the body politic (Laclau 2005, 105). Moving away from the stable identities of class and structural inequality that condition revolutionary political action, Laclau and Mouffe argue new political identities are continually formed through the expression of grievances and unachieved claims that attest to the “gaps” or perceived inadequacies of the political body. Instead of building consensus, they work on establishing a political frontier that keeps dividing society into two camps: the “underdog” versus “those in power.” They aim to build a new subject of collective action – “the people” – capable of reconfiguring a lived social order currently understood as unfair, forming an “anti-community” (Laclau 2005, 108). There is no ideological content, shared meanings, or preexisting identities underpinning their counter-hegemonic action; rather protestors are linked by empty signifiers and amorphous meanings which cannot be preestablished. Vague meanings are pivotal in creating an interior frontier, which suture together these disparate groups. Notions like “personal liberty,” “the American way of life,” and “Make America Great Again” allow for various interpretations and attract diverse followers. While most populist thinkers

Theoretical perspectives on democratic sensibilities  7

believe common themes (e.g., xenophobia, anti-government, white supremacy) underpin populist movements, Laclau insists, “[E]verything depends upon the performance” (2005, 12). This is why Trump wants to sensationalize his imminent arrest as a handcuffed “martyrdom.” Jason Frank makes the case that their work doesn’t accord with populist history (Frank 2021, xii). I concur. In analyzing President Trump’s rhetoric in Chapter 4, I expose the significance of the neoliberal values of the minimal state, which champions the anti-expert mentality and is replete with sexist, anti-immigrant, and white supremacist prejudice. These have deep resonances in American history as the work of David Roediger and others have shown. Far from political meanings and identities being fluid, they are more stable and hence more resistant to radical articulation than Laclau and Mouffe assume. Not only do Laclau and Mouffe dispense with common populist themes, but they shed the pejorative associations of populism with mob rule. They claim all struggles against those in power are populist. This theoretical conviction supports their optimism that the alt-right could be lured into the radical democratic fold. Mouffe claims there is something legitimate in the Right-Wing populists’ claim to give back to the people the voice that has been confiscated by the elites. Regardless of the problematic forms that some of these movements may take, it is important to recognize that they are the expressions of legitimate aspirations (Mouffe 2016) Nevertheless, given the assault in Washington on January 6, 2021, it is difficult to be confident that Trump’s populist supporters have legitimate or democratic aspirations.3 It is also naive to assume that identities are as unstable as they assume. By tracing the more or less stable meanings associated with populism I hope to understand its allure. Those theorists who prioritize ontological or formalist paradigms (notably the new materialists and Laclau and Mouffe) undervalue the sedimented ontic field (Diprose and Ziarek 2018) that necessarily conditions and constrains all emergent politics; that is to say, the historically contextual, institutional, and social structural factors within which these contingent events and political acts arise. By prioritizing ontological “excess,” “supplement,” or “lack,” and repudiating the critical and epistemological approach to politics, theorists have turned away from the historical and social. Methodologically, I attempt a rapprochement of affect/emotion and critical thinking, less through exegetical, textual disagreements, but rather through theoretical insights from the study of concrete empirical events.

8  Theoretical perspectives on democratic sensibilities

My approach will aspire to elucidate the complex relation between social, political, and affective registers that both enhance and inhibit democratic political agency. While most radical democratic theorists dip into politics to provide a concrete illustration of their theoretical novelty4 they avoid a fulsome treatment of these demotic movements or the socioeconomic and political contexts of their struggles. This work hopes to address and rectify that shortcoming. Navigating novelty and indeterminacy – embodied creativity versus the post-human

Every time a new theoretical turn is announced, previous insights and categories are discarded or reconceived. This has occurred in the last 30 years with increasing rapidity, and it is both unnerving and unhelpful. I return to thinkers who have been theoretically displaced in this maelstrom of canonical rejection. I believe they have much to offer in understanding the power of noncognitive experiences without depleting human agency. The recent turn to new (vital) materialism and neuroscience is premised upon a critique of the decentered subject of psychoanalytic and critical phenomenological thinking. The consequence is an anemic account of human agency. The concern with what “exceeds” speech and intentionality, the focus on intense experiences, and the moment of disrupting subjectivity entail a devaluation of the social order and the context within which acts happen. For it is the mark of these rogue affects to defy regularity, control, and conditioning. In considering Social Othering discourses, I  attend to emotional forces that contribute to reinforcing racism and social inequalities rather than disrupting them. My focus on the historically contextual, institutional, and social structural forces aims to bring a non-reductive account of the socioeconomic world back into the picture, to provide a critical approach to the entanglement of affective life and democratic agency in our contemporary world. While there are many reasons why liberal individualist theories may be found wanting, one doesn’t have to be a vital materialist or poststructuralist to make sense of a decentered human condition or focus on the limits of human knowing. By coming to appreciate that the boundaries of the embodied subject are necessarily located outside itself, in the social norms, social structures, and history that makes it possible, one can avoid throwing out the critical subject with the humanist bathwater. It is possible, I argue, to avoid both voluntarism and social determinism – and it is necessary to retain a place for critical reflection in order to avoid the abdication of political responsibility and lapse into resignation that emerges wherever we are in thrall to the thought that fate is a throw of the dice.

Theoretical perspectives on democratic sensibilities  9

Simone de Beauvoir’s problematic of the “body as situation” (2016, 46) or embodied potentialities helps make sense of the decentered human condition, without denying human capacities to feel, initiate, think, and organize.5 Moving away from the primacy of the mind and consciousness and refusing to see the subject as a cipher of material forces, she manages to accommodate the fact that we are singular beings and have specific responses to the external world while recognizing the power of exterior, ontic forces to structure the possible. For Beauvoir “the situation is not an external structure that imposes itself on the individual, but rather an irreducible amalgam of free projects of that subject and the conditions in which freedom finds itself” (Moi 1999, 74). Hence while we chose, we do not choose “the conditions in which freedom finds itself” (Moi 1999, 74). Existing social relations (racialized and gendered identities), social structures, and authoritative discourses must be engaged for political and social transformation. The effects of these cannot be ignored in the name of fugitivity or the contingent but must be embraced to ensure we deepen and intensify our radical democratic projects. While the post-humanists and vital materialists focus on the nonhuman powers toward a critique of rationalist mastery and the pretension of individual or collective autonomy, this had already been achieved several decades ago by critical phenomenology, without displacing the human agent or human freedom. One doesn’t have to appeal to post-structuralism, vital materialism, or post-humanism to challenge the idea of the self-sufficient and masterful individual or appreciate the power of things. My argument is that vital materialism thinks past its goal and that it is necessary at this moment to take account of the political price of this turn as we confront the demands of the political present. Reliance upon things or amorphous forces to catalyze socially progressive change entails dramatically eroding the framework upon which intelligible normative distinctions have and can be made in political modernity: the permeable and revisable yet durable boundary between what we are and are not responsible for. While new/ vital materialism offers insights into rethinking or questioning our relation to the environment, the meaningfulness of practical action and shared life requires the possibility of marking distinctions between zones of responsibility. The attempt to re-mystify nature by returning to it the capacity to create and surprise – to attribute to it the status formerly reserved for subjects – and the attendant plea for rethinking human subjects as a complex of disparate forces or “assemblages” not only unsettles our account of political responsibility but also threatens to annul it altogether. We need to retain an account of our shared world as directed by practices and initiatives, supported by resilient, ethically inspired, and politically committed agents.

10  Theoretical perspectives on democratic sensibilities

In fact, the turn to things and the optimism associated with the impersonal affect have ended up displacing rather than augmenting previous insights into the process of political mobilization. We must respect the work of emotions: compassion or empathy, and/or anger lends itself to solidarity with others, to act collectively, and to understand the impact of humanly organized power relations and institutions to best engage existing sources of power to cultivate democratic practices. Rethinking emotion and affect: challenging autonomous affect

The present debates within radical democratic theory focus on episodic events, particularly those that exceed the existing frame of intelligibility and have the potential to disrupt the status quo. In exploring the power of visceral feelings, l focus on their embodied and situated affect rather than impersonal exterior intensities, with the consequence that embodiment becomes an important site of critical analysis rather than a condition to overcome or exceed. But before I do this, I need to explore in more detail the distinction between affect and emotion. Affect refers to “those unconscious, unformed bodily experiences, that have no particular target,” whereas emotion concerns “the feelings which are more conscious since they are anchored in language and meaning.”6 Affects are produced by technology, things, or the environment and can be understood as enhancing one’s bodily capacity to produce a “felt” aliveness. The post-humanist and vital materialists’ focus on exhilarating experiences produced from without are rarely concerned with how they affect human emotions. Rather than looking at the independent exterior powers of the nonhuman to trigger disruptions, my more human-centered approach turns to sites of embodiment where affects are entangled with affect and emotion and encoded by the logic of social and political life and human sensibility, contributing to reflexive action and political commitment. Like the vital materialists, I focus on the world-building potential of affects, but I also explore lively dynamic affects that are channeled into negative emotions which fuel hate and resentment. To further distinguish my approach from new materialists, I  defer to Spinoza, the “father” of vital materialism. Spinoza distinguishes between affections of the body (corporis affectiones) and affects themselves (affectus). Vital materialists focus on the later impersonal and unownable affects prior to embodiment or actualization that have the capacity to be self-animating, whereas I  focus on the former embodied affects. I’m less interested in how lively matter (things) gives structure to agency and more inclined to think about how affects are embodied in a particular situation.

Theoretical perspectives on democratic sensibilities  11

My attention to embodiment rather than impersonal affect avoids a universalist perspective, “a view from nowhere” (Lettow 2017), where the effects of social relations and history are diminished. The concepts of “affective solidarity” (Clare Hemmings)7 and “emotional reorientation” (Sara Ahmed)8 allow us to clarify or refine Beauvoir’s claims about the power of emotion. All three of these thinkers believe that dissonant events or experiences can disrupt or unsettle existing modes of being in the world and promote radical transformation and hence are particularly relevant to thinking about the impact of catastrophes. Hemmings and Ahmed believe engagement starts with affective dissonance. Not only do they look at positive feelings like wonder (a resource for Jane Bennett (2010) and Sara Ahmed), but Hemmings and Beauvoir look at the power of rage, anger, frustration, and feelings of connection. Throughout these chapters, performative or bodily acts, such as the acts of demonstrations, lie-ins, and the dismantling of statutes, are modes of engagement. These bodily experiences prompt belonging and contribute to shifts in attitudes and beliefs. Ahmed also makes this claim. Shocking events or catastrophes are disorienting. They are an occasion where the reordering of one’s emotions and commitments is possible. These unsettled moments are risky; affects can be channeled into Social Othering and hate rather than compassion and empathy. For Ahmed, emotions are not things that we can have or possess; in fact, they are bound up in the constitution of individuals and bodies. They “shape the very surfaces of bodies, which take shape through the repetition of actions over time, as well as through orientations toward and away from others” (2004, 4). Emotions involve (re)actions or relations of “towardness” or “awayness” in our orientation (2004, 8). They are the glue that holds subjects together. Ahmed connects emotion and sensation and argues that it is through the emotional interpretation of sensations “themselves,” the responses to the impressions of objects and others that “bodily surfaces take shape” (Ahmed 2004, 25). So the visual and sensory experiences associated with witnessing the burning of the Grenfell Tower, the death of the Parkland kids, and the murder of George Floyd slide into anger and rage. In the face of social injustices and cruelty, the acknowledgment of senseless suffering and cruelty fosters empathy and compassion. Emotional reorientation can move us to freer and more reciprocal relations with others and an acknowledgment of the constraints they find themselves in. All three thinkers reject Massumi’s strong distinction between affect and emotion.9 Ahmed says that this under-describes the work of emotions. .  .  . While you can separate an affective response from an emotion that is attributed as such (the bodily

12  Theoretical perspectives on democratic sensibilities

sensation from the feeling of being afraid), this does not mean that in practice, or in everyday life, they are separate. In fact, they are contiguous; they slide into each other; they stick, and cohere, even when they are separated. (2010, 230–1 n1) This unsettling experience also prompts critical inquiry for one begins to question the givenness of the situation. Though one can distinguish affect (an unrepresentable intensity) from an emotion (which has subjective content) in everyday embodied experience they are entwined. Beauvoir assumes sensations are entrained by emotionally situated subjects. She appreciates a general mode of judging that accommodates affects, emotions, and thoughtfulness. Reorienting one’s beliefs may be catalyzed by intense feelings, but work must be done on the subject’s relations, and an enlarged understanding is vital. Hemmings is wary that affects can be ephemeral and don’t provide sufficient grounding for transformative politics. Both she and Ahmed believe reorientation involves shuffling between epistemology and ontology or knowing and feeling, confirming the importance of critical thinking. As a sensorial and thinking being, Beauvoir sees the subject shuffling between feeling and knowing. One has feelings and one tries to make sense of them. In the process of sense-making one’s passions, one’s intuition, and one’s reflective capacity are engaged. While a catastrophic event disrupts one’s usual state of being (one’s habits), for the dislocation to lead to democratic feelings and practices, one must not only be moved but challenge our received wisdom – what we take to be objective truth and commonsense. Recognizing we are situated beings, whose knowing reflects one’s location, we develop a critical consciousness of our micropolitical life and the macropolitical world. The ontological monism of post-humanism and vital materialism, which focuses upon what bodies can do, the micropolitical, does not allow one to think deeply about the macropolitical – the social structural impediments to these intense experiences. Their focus on human and nonhuman assemblages does not do justice to the power of intersubjective or human-to-human power relations. Here Sonia Kruk’s insight is noteworthy. The use of the term “agency,” she argues, conflates the dynamism of matter, that is its effective energy or force, with the intentional agency which humans are capable of, namely freedom. [Further, the vital materialists’] persistent focus on indeterminancy . . . obscures rather than illuminates many phenomena that are effects of distinctively human action. (Kruks 2019, 254)

Theoretical perspectives on democratic sensibilities  13

I concur with her assessment that the vital materialists occlude the more stable identities and structures that presently configure our world and impede freedom (Kruks 2010, 276). Further, their focus on good affects (like wonder) which are enhancing overlooks how affects can strengthen antidemocratic sensibilities.10 Taking on board affects mediated by emotion and ideology in social circumstance, rather than autonomous impersonal affects, one is able to distinguish alt-right movements from radical democratic. While rich affective experiences inspired President Trump’s followers, they supported Social Othering and neoliberal ideals of minimal government, market freedom, rugged individualism, and anti-democratic forces. Throughout these chapters, disdain and disgust for immigrants, Chinese, Blacks, democrats, the poor, and ethnic minorities involve the discharge of intense energy, but the ideas that inform them and the movements that inspire them must be considered. They are linked to political logic and actions that undermine the democratic values of equality and liberty and expose vulnerable populations to what Adorno referred to as “rage at the victim” (Adorno et  al. 2002, 22). In giving more space to emotion than the affect thinkers, I appreciate how emotions like hate and resentment can block the potential of the lively material forces and understand the allure of populism. The monstrous event

I have selected five catastrophic events that are situated in different countries with differing institutional histories and cultures: the SARS epidemic in Toronto, Canada (2003); the Grenfell Tower fire in London, England (2017); the Parkland shooting in Florida (2018); the COVID-19 pandemic in the USA (2020); and the murder of George Floyd in Minneapolis, USA (2020). Inspired by the words of Pierre Nora, I believe “the event is tangled, it illuminates more than the story itself, a narrative that generates others, radiates out of itself to explore larger frames of reference” (Nora 1995, 427–436). In using Nora, I try to capture how an event can be a game changer: it can reorganize people’s feelings and change their political commitments. Shifts in feelings and political orientations were evident in all the events except the SARS crisis. In the case of the Grenfell Tower fire, it was temporary, and its scope limited, whereas the experience of COVID-19, the Parkland School shooting, and the murder of George Floyd has had a longer afterlife. Pierre Nora’s notion of a monstrous event is a resource. He called the mass protest following the massacre at the offices of Charlie Hebdo on

14  Theoretical perspectives on democratic sensibilities

January 11, 2015 “monstrous.” Millions of people gathered and acted in common, yet their motives were different and inexplicable. On Nora’s account, the monstrous event is unpredictable, transient . . . a collective rupture in which society as in a flash of lighting becomes visible to itself. It is an image that destroys all images and thus reawakens the imagination. (Jonsson 2021, 518) Alain Badiou has a similar understanding of the event. “The event is something that brings to light a possibility that was invisible or even unthinkable. . . . It is not a creation of a reality; it is the creation of a possibility” (2014, 9). For it to be made real, he believes “a group effort in the political context is required” (2014, 10) and the “dominant structure that opposes the event” must be tackled (2014, 10). I have a stronger affinity with Badiou, who emphasizes the work that must be done on the micropolitical and the macropolitical to realize the democratic potential of the event. For Nora, the term “monstrous”11 presumes delight and disgust and foreshadows the future as perilous and promising. He used the term “monstrous” to refer to the murder of the cartoonists of Charlie Hebdo offices – in a matter of hours the consequences of contemporary culture clashes within France were revealed. Since the event “radiates outside itself” and resonates with current conversations, it has a significant afterlife. The event anticipated more disquieting terrorist attacks which have occurred since 2015. It holds out the tenuous promise that the French state and civil society will take steps to mitigate this cultural clash. While the events I’ve chosen to examine are monstrous, in the sense of portentous, they also alert us to something deeply troubling and calamitous. COVID-19 has involved unprecedented suffering, yet it holds forth the promise of revisioning the social world, unsettling the logic of neoliberalism that presumes the free market delivers the best social outcomes. It challenged the ideal of the sovereign individual, who is believed to be a master of his/her destiny and highlighted the reality of human interdependence. Not only did individual liberty prove vacuous during a public health emergency, but also the assumption of the efficacy of trickle-down economics has been thrown into doubt. Collective solutions in the name of the common good were necessary to mitigate COVID-19’s worst effects. Emmanuel Macron observed, “[W]e have stopped half the planet to save lives . . . it will change the nature of globalization . . . it [neoliberalism]was undermining democracy” (Mallet and Khalaf 2020). President Joe Biden also called for a paradigm shift. “Trickle-down economics has failed,” hence neoliberalism or market fundamentalism is no longer up to the task

Theoretical perspectives on democratic sensibilities  15

of delivering good society. On the other hand, COVID-19 also triggered a ferocious response to state regulation: masks, social distancing, vaccinations, and stay-at-home policy were treated as an attack on individual freedom. And the supposed freedom fighters took to the streets. The murder of George Floyd was another monstrous event, in terms of both the number of protestors (believed to be 26 million, October 2021) and the scope of the disruptive forces shared by people of different nations. Its effects have been vast. In Nora’s words it constituted “a collective rupture in which society as if in a flash became visible to itself” (quoted Jonsson 2021, 518). The reality of American racism was revealed in a matter of 9 minutes and 29 seconds and resonated with other young Black and brown people around the world who have died or have been abused by the police. Though there were other pivotal events, like the beating of Rodney King, they did not have the explosive effect of George Floyd’s death. In part this is due to advances in technology and social networking. Floyd’s death was more graphic; it traveled further, reached other parts of the world within hours, and was more explosive – radiating out and changing the terms of reference of democratic politics. It has triggered others to think of their colonial past and the persistence of racist policies. Again, the scope and the continuation of protests and campaigns against anti-Black racism signify the potential for radical change, a new more inclusive democracy, and practices for decolonization. Yet this event and its afterlife have also exacerbated divisions in American and European civil society. A rise in racist and anti-Semitic attacks in liberal democratic countries has been reported. Nora was also prescient in noting that the mass media has “deprived historians of their object of analysis” (Jonsson 2021, 518). The mass media selects and focuses upon items and transforms them into “historical events,” “[w]hereas everything that is not reported disappear or are at best preserved as anecdotes, or fait divers.” His conclusion was dramatic: “henceforth mass media holds the monopoly over history” (Jonsson 2021, 518). This resonates with my project which takes very seriously the construction of meaning through the mass media and social media. Not only do I  analyze the discourses used to represent events and shape opinions but the feelings that enliven them. In addition, I engage in critical thinking, distinguishing dogmatic from more deliberative discourses in struggling to make sense of the real world of democracy. I’ve chosen to look at catastrophes that involve issues of public health and safety. Although events that involve war or political conflict (i.e., the Russian invasion of Ukraine or 9/11) are affectively rich and emotionally saturated, they are not considered here. Even though the most

16  Theoretical perspectives on democratic sensibilities

horrific acts of corporate mismanagement and deaths have happened in the Global South, neither are they considered.12 My focus is upon biopolitical events as they unfold in liberal democratic countries, where public health and safety are assumed to be secure. I  will show otherwise. In addition to exploring the semiotic world, how attitudes were shaped by popular discourses, images, and stage performances in the public sphere, I  also appreciate the effects of social structures. In doing so, I  will make some effort to explore the macropolitical in which public safety has been sidelined in the name of corporate profit, most adversely affecting the most vulnerable and precarious (Butler 2004). SARS, COVID-19, and the Grenfell Tower fire were represented as freak accidents and unavoidable events. However, all these tragedies could have been avoided or mitigated by stronger commitments to public health and safety and stricter regulation. For some time, scientists had predicted pandemics and the emergence of highly infectious diseases, yet little was done. Suggestions for sophisticated surveillance systems, preparations, and planning were not put in place. Although there were laws to ensure health and safety measures in the UK they were circumvented. In privatizing social housing and reducing costs in line with neoliberal governing strategies, the Grenfell Tower was renovated with flammable material. Management was driven by cost rather than care which led to a lack of proper inspections, failure to repair dangerous places, and a total disregard for the concern of residents. The occurrence of mass shootings of schoolchildren, as well as police abuse and violence toward African Americans, also reflects the power of entrenched interests rather than the focus on the collective good. Not only are policy changes required to address these shortcomings, but micropolitical or attitudinal changes are in order. In exploring the Social Othering (racism, classism) and populist themes (the deep state, anti-expert, antiimmigrant, and white supremacy) that transpired in these various events, I  hope to get a grasp of the specificity of micropolitical impediments to their democratic promise. The linking of the micro and the macro is important, and I  endorse Gilles Deleuze’s statement that “every politics is simultaneously a macropolitics and a micropolitics” (Deleuze 1987, 213). Yet, in the end, his visceral approach does not sufficiently deal with the historical specificity of macroprocesses.13 He privileges contingency over history and the nonhuman assemblage, thereby denying strong human agency. Echoing Diana Coole and Samantha Frost (2010), Susanne Lettow (2017), and Beauvoir, I want to acknowledge the power of sedimented relations without denying the importance of contingency or the power and responsibility of humans to alter existing relations. Coole’s distinction between the weak agency of

Theoretical perspectives on democratic sensibilities  17

things and the strong agency of humans is vital (Coole 2013, 451–469). Furthermore, the afterlife of the catastrophe ought to be considered. While feelings may lead to democratic sensibilities, unless they are tied to democratic movements it is unlikely that they will translate into more enduring democratic practices. To ensure that democracy is deepened, affiliation with an inspiring democratic social movement able to harness feelings and reorient conduct and action is invaluable. There are several concerns that inform this book: To what extent did these events mediated by public rhetoric, discourses, and images cultivate or inhibit the production of democratic sensibilities?14 Finally, given the significance of social and protest movements in sustaining the life of the event, I will try to assess the extent to which these movements have fostered democratic practices. The later concern involves a turn to and an understanding of the historically contextual, institutional, and social structural factors that frame (the event), shape existing movements, and influence their ability to tackle social inequalities and further democratic practices. Notes 1 By “immanence” Connolly means “a world of becoming in which the existing composition of actuality is exceeded by open, energized potentialities simmering in it” (Capitalism, Christianity, American Style 80). He argues that the universe is “unruly” and its actions exceed the description of “lawlike statements.” 2 Lois McNay (2014) makes the case that radical democrats see agency as an empty process of flux and contestation. Seeing the social world as being endlessly reshaped occludes the effect of deeply rooted social inequalities, which impact one’s ability to act politically. She employs Pierre Bourdieu’s term “social weightlessness” to capture their thinking. 3 While radical democrats refuse to reduce democracy to representative institutions and procedures, the Trump presidency has prompted the need to protect existing democratic practices and institutions to further radical democracy. 4 Two examples of this approach are Judith Butler’s Performative Theory of Assembly (2015) which references various protests and Jodie Dean’s Crowds and Party (2018) which focuses on incidents in the Occupy movement and communist party practices. 5 This is different from vital materialists’ plane of immanence where affects seem to constitute a self-empowering joyfulness that has the power to define expressions of thought and action without external influence. 6 In Politics and Emotion: The Affective Turn in Contemporary Political Studies (2012, pp. 2–3), Simon Thompson and Paul Hoggett offer a different reading of affect and emotion than Deleuze; they appreciate the positive role of emotion in political mobilization, a position I support. 7 See Clare, Hemmings. 2012. “Affective Solidarity: Feminist Reflexivity and Political Transformation.” Feminist Theory 13 (2): 147–161. 8 See Ahmed, Sara. 2004. Cultural Politics of Emotion, 8. New York: Routledge.

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9 The former is an “unqualified intensity” that is “not ownable” by a subject and, on the other hand, emotion is the “subjective content” of “qualified intensity” given conscious meaning and function by the subject (Massumi 2002, 28). 10 William Connolly (2005) and John Protevi (2009) are exceptions. Connolly demonstrates how the alt-right has used the mass media to produce an Evangelical-Capitalist Resonance Machine circulating and legitimating vengeful and hateful feelings toward minorities. John Protevi addresses connections between affect and policy that emerged in the Katerina disaster. 11 Neither Nora nor his followers have reflected upon his meaning of “monstrous” though Stefan Jonsson does in “Art of Protest” in Political Theory (2021). 12 The faulty construction of a Union Carbide factory in Bhopal, India, released isocyanide into the air killing between 2,259 and over 8,000 in a matter of two weeks and injuring over 574,366. 13 Gilles Deleuze and Rosi Braidotti’s treatment of the macro-processes of capitalism is general and abstract; it fails to appreciate the historical specificity of the event or the processes that condition the event’s persistent effects. 14 I use the term “sensibilities” and avoid the term “tolerance” since the latter speaks from a dominant position, presuming that otherness is irritating and foreign, something that creates cognitive dissonance but ought to be morally upheld. Sensibility communicates responsiveness to others, mutual respect, and reciprocal relations. I  echo Kompridis’ insight receptivity involves a struggle to be open to what is unfamiliar and upsetting; it is not a passive opening but involves a willingness to be vulnerable and risks self-dispossession. See Nikolas Kompridis (2014, 166).

References Adorno, Theodor W., et  al. 2002. The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology. Translated by Glyn Adey and David Frisby. London: Heinemann Educational Books. Ahmed, Sara. 2004. Cultural Politics of Emotion. New York: Routledge. Bennett, Jane. 2010. Vibrant Matter- a Political Ecology of Things. Durham: Duke University Press. Butler, Judith. 2004. Precarious Life: The Power of Mourning and Violence. London: Verso. ———. 2015. Notes Towards a Performative Theory of Assembly. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Connolly, William. 1999. Why I Am Not a Secularist. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. ———. 2005. “The Evangelical- Capitalist Resonance Machine.” Political Theory 33 (6): 869–886. ———. 2007. Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Coole, Diana. 2013. “Agentic Capacities and Capacious Historical Materialism; Thinking with New Materialisms in the Political Sciences.” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 41 (3): 451–469. Coole, Diana and Samantha Frost, eds. 2010. New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency and Politics. Durham & London: Duke University Press.

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Damasio, 1999. The Feeling of What happens: Body and Emotions in the Making of Consciousness. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co Press. ———. 2003. Looking for Spinoza, Joy, Sorrow and the Feeling Brain. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co Press. Dean, Jodi. 2018. Crowds and Parties. London: Verso. Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. 1987. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Translated by Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Dennett, Daniel. 1991. Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little Brown. Diprose, Rosalyn and Ewa Plonowska Ziarek. 2018. Arendt, Natality and Biopolitics, Toward Democratic Plurality and Reproductive Justice. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Frank, Jason. 2021. The Democratic Sublime: On Aesthetics and Popular Assembly. New York: University of Oxford Press. Gunnell, John. 2007. “Are We Losing our Minds? Cognitive Science and the Study of Politics.” Political Theory 35 (6): 704–731. Jonsson, Stefan. 2021. “Art of Protest: Understanding and Misunderstanding of Monstrous Events.” Political Theory 24 (2). Kompridis, Nikolas. 2014. “Recognition and Receptivity: Forms of Normative Response in the Lives of Animals We Are.” In The Aesthetic Turn in Political thought, edited by Nikolas Kompridis. London: Bloomsbury. Kruks, Sonia. 2010. “Simone de Beauvoir: Engaging Discrepant Materialisms.” In New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency and Politics, edited by Coole Diana and Samantha Frost. Durham & London: Duke University Press. Kruks, Sonia. 2019. “For a Modest Human Exceptionalism.” Simone de Studies 30 (2): 252–274. Laclau, Ernesto. 2005. Populist Reason. London: Verso. ———. 2006. “Ideology and Post-Marxism.” Journal of Political Ideologies 11 (2): 103–114. Lettow, S. 2017. “Turning the Turn: New Materialism, Historical Materialism and Critical Theory.” Thesis Eleven 140 (1): 106–121. Mallet, Victor and Roula Khalaf. 2020. “Emmanuel Macron Says It Is Time to Think the Unthinkable.” Financial Times. April  16. https://www.ft.com/ content/3ea8d790-7fd1-11ea-8fdb-7ec06edeef84. Massumi, Brian. 2002. Parables of the Virtual: Movement, Affect and Sensation. Durham: Duke University Press. McMahon, John. 2016. “Emotional Orientations: Simone de Beauvoir and Sara Ahmed on Subjectivity and the Emotional Phenomenology of Gender.” PhiloSOPHIA: A Journal of Continental Feminism: 215–240. McNay, Lois. 2014. The Misguided Search for the Political: Social Weightlessness in Radical Democratic Theory. Cambridge: Polity. Mouffe, Chantal. 2016. “The Populist Moment.” Open Democracy, July 30. www. opendemocracy.net/en/democraciaabierta/populist-moment/. Nora, Pierra. 1995. “The Return of the Event.” In Histories: French Constructions of the Past, edited by Revel, Jacques and Lynne Hunt, 427–36. New York Press. Protevi, John. 2009. Political Affect: Connecting the Social and the Somatic. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

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Rancière, Jacques. 1991. The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation. Translated by Kristin Ross. Paulo Alto: Stanford University Press. ———. 2005. Hatred of Democracy. London: Verso. Searle, John. 1992. The Rediscovery of the Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT, Penguin. Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky. 2003. Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity. Durham: Duke University Press. Thompson, Simon and Paul Hoggett. 2012. Politics and Emotion: The Affective Turn in Contemporary Political Studies. London: Bloomsbury.

2 ENGENDERING FEAR AND RACISM DURING THE SARS EPIDEMIC A deficit in deliberative thinking

The event: the impact of fear

On February 22, a doctor from Guangdong, a southern province in China, threw up in the Metropole’s hotel’s elevator and hallway. Shortly after the same elevator was used by Mrs. Tse who was spending her previous night in a complimentary hotel in Hong Kong. The next morning, she left for Toronto, and ten days later she died, as did her son and husband. She was responsible for the transmission of SARS to Toronto. Over the next few months, 44 people were to die of SARS in Toronto. By June the SARS epidemic was declared over. By early March the acronym SARS was on everyone’s lips. Since SARS was transmitted to Toronto by a Chinese immigrant, it was portrayed as a foreign invasion. We were urged to police our boundaries and borders vigilantly, be they internal or external to avoid contraction. Since the disease was highly contagious and believed to be transmitted by the cough of a carrier and the initial symptoms were those of the common flu – a cough and fever – the fear of undiagnosed carriers walking around infecting the population was commonplace. Instead of the city being a place where people enjoy meeting strangers, where they strike up conversations, and where they stroll through parks or unfamiliar neighborhoods taking pleasure in each other’s company, public spaces became potential sites of danger and contamination. Practices around care and quarantine were rehearsed in the media: everyday habits were disrupted. Torontonians were instructed to ritually wash, disinfect, and mask themselves. If they were in contact with a SARS carrier or suspected carrier, they were obliged to quarantine. DOI: 10.4324/9781003295518-2

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Informed of these dangers, people kept away from public spaces such as malls and restaurants, particularly those located in China town and places frequented by Asians. Large downtown corporate and Bay Street offices closed their doors for several weeks; hospitals were out of bounds for all but emergency cases for several months. People cocooned themselves in their homes for fear of being coughed on. When entering public spaces some donned masks to protect themselves from the deadly breath of strangers and used hand cleansers. They touched public door handles with tissues. The outbreak of SARS in Toronto altered our everyday habits. But this event did not lead to an awareness of human interdependence and shared vulnerability, nor did it further democratic sensibilities or practices. Those prone to catastrophizing, or fretful by nature, were deeply distressed, and many developed agoraphobias. At the outset health officials who were uncertain of the transmissibility of SARS boosted the fear factor to ensure people took the virus seriously: a simple cough was deemed to be sufficient to expose one to this deadly disease. Later we were told most of these measures were ineffective since SARS was not air-borne, yet some people continued to sanitize their hands and wear face masks. Even after we were informed by scientists that we had to be in contact with the bodily fluids (vomit, fecal matter, or spit) of a SARS’ patient to be contaminated, many people stayed home as much as possible and refused to enter Chinese spaces. The disjunction between what one felt, what one believed, and what was being communicated by the virologists was striking. The SARS virus shocked the public, instantly disrupting everyday habits and producing insecurity. Torontonians had never encountered anything like this before. This event could have catalyzed awareness of our interdependent existence and shared vulnerability; however, it did not. Fear of contamination led to a withdrawal from the public sphere and unease around being with others. At the outset this was understandable, but when it became clear that the virus was not air-borne (one had to be in bodily contact with the fluids of a SARS victim), fear of community infection persisted. The mainstream media not only contributed to fear but echoed populist themes: scorning science and blaming immigrants. Anxiety was quelled by identifying an external target – the Chinese. Although SARS was earth-shattering, the disorientation and anxiety caused did not lead to the reshaping human inclinations and attitudes to better manage this actuality. The SARS crisis was popularly treated as an anomaly, a natural disaster like a plague, an earthquake, not something one could learn from or be prepared for. Yet we know this was not the case. If more attention to scientists’ warnings of newly emergent virulent diseases and a more robust system of public health was in place, this event could have been avoided.

Engendering fear and racism during the SARS epidemic  23

In British Columbia, where public health systems were on alert, Chinese immigrants carrying SARS were quarantined at the airport. Debates that frame this catastrophe

In this chapter I  look at the role of emotions in popular discourses and how they inhibited the development of democratic sensibilities or an emotional reorientation. Far from disrupting social inequalities and social injustices affective communication aggravated them: the mainstream media promulgated anti-Asian racism. Although populist thinkers Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe believe Othering discourses are vital in constructing anti-hegemonic identities and fueling radical democratic projects, in this case these discourses resonated with alt-right populist attitudes. Popular discourses encouraged nativist and anti-science beliefs, yet there was no leader, no claims were made, and SARS never became part of a populist movement. The reporting of the SARS crisis was not an example of fake news – there were no outright lies used to manipulate to public. This is a case where the mainstream media used strong images, harnessed negative emotions (fear, intolerance, racism), and recounted inspirational tales of sacrifice to move the public (Stavro 2014). Spaces for scientific assessment, deliberation, and dialogue were rare. In exploring the potential to cultivate an informed and tolerant public I  rely upon concepts within psychoanalysis (Sigmund Freud, Julia Kristeva), cultural studies (Deleuze), and postcolonial studies (Edward Said, Daniel Solarano, and Tara Yosso, 2002). The concepts of abjection, Othering, and Orientalism help flesh out the forces that demeaned the Chinese and impeded an informed and tolerant public. Although Freud and Kristeva are usually invoked to explain obstacles to ethical creative actions and fellow feelings, I rely upon an optimistic reading of their work. One of the underlying premises of psychoanalytic practice is summarized in the following statement of Freud: “where it (id) was, there I (ego) will be.” As unconscious feelings come to the surface, one is less driven by them; hence, the possibility of critical thinking and thoughtful judgment improves. Instead of projecting unwanted feelings onto others, in this case Chinese immigrants, Kristeva believes accepting one’s otherness (the foreigner within) leads to the diminution of xenophobic or prejudiced feelings. I also engage in debates around catastrophes, specifically Sadi Ophir and Antonio Y., Vázquez-Arroyo’s belief that it is possible to distinguish catastrophization from conditions that justify real fear. The former, a sociopsychic condition (that misrecognizes the event, blows it up, exaggerates it as unmanageable) is distinguishable from the more objective perspective

24  Engendering fear and racism during the SARS epidemic

that signals the existence of catastrophic conditions (Ophir 2010). This is consistent with my theoretical approach that challenges binaries, relies upon more trustworthy facts, and encourages a historical reappraisal of the concrete situation. Throughout this chapter, I offer a fuller understanding of this event and its afterlife. In the final section, I advance a realistic assessment of the causes of the epidemic which would lead to identifying factors that contributed to this outbreak and thinking about how we could have been prepared for such events going forward. Not only did the surfeit of Othering discourse problematize coming to terms with more reliable accounts, but the prevalent tropes of heroes and villains (Jameson 2009 also Ophir 2007) contributed to de-historicizing and de-contextualizing the event. Not only will I critically interrogate these essentialist discourses, but to counter catastrophizing I  will remap the macro-political terrain of the disaster revealing its connections to factory farming, poor public health provisions, and insufficient attention to global health crises. Anxiety and fears around pandemics are not going to be eliminated, and those who suffer from catastrophizing are not going to be cured, but hopefully more realism will prepare people to confront these imminent dangers and pressure the state to be better prepared. In each chapter I look at the afterlife of the event; Pierre Nora was interested in how it radiated out: in resonating with other concerns, it managed to extend itself. In addition to Nora’s thinking I  draw attention to two factors: technology and organizations. Both of these two factors were instrumental in keeping the catastrophe alive. In 2003 there was no social media or smartphones, so publicity was limited to the mainstream press. Also, there was no social movement or protest group that made a claim: there were few victims seeking reparation; in fact, people wanted to erase the memory of this disaster as quickly as possible. For these reasons SARS faded quickly from the popular imagination. Abjection: scapegoating the Chinese

While affect theorists and new materialists focus on how an event is dissensual – able to disrupt perceptibilities and materialities that sustain social inequalities – in this case the disorientation caused by SARS was extensive; existing habits and orientations toward others and spaces were unsettled; however, this did not lend itself to freer, more responsive bearings toward others. Employing the psychoanalytic concept of abjection I make sense of how images, narratives, and public discourses filled the gaps with fear and contributed to racism and scapegoating. The term is derived from Freud’s theory of projection and introjection. Freud writes, “[I]t is always possible to bind together a considerable number of people in love, so long

Engendering fear and racism during the SARS epidemic  25

as there are other people left over to receive the manifestations of their aggression” (Freud 1962, 61.) Writing in the wake of the First World War, Freud was aware of how adjoining countries created strong bonds of love by projecting negative characteristics onto their neighbors, who may unwillingly assume or introject them. This social/psychic mechanism invites strong differentiations and stereotypes. Since differences are usually overstated in the process, Freud describes this dynamic as producing “the narcissism of small differences” (Freud 1962, 61), thereby exaggerating differences. Julia Kristeva (1982) adapted and popularized the term “abjection,” capturing the ambivalent process of subject formation where the nascent subject gets rid of repugnant bits in order to be. The subject represses nasty bodily functions (i.e., excrement, vomit, death) that makes one feel vulnerable and offends one’s growing sensibilities. These bodily functions are refused, expelled, and designated repugnant, yet they can never be definitively and permanently externalized and escaped for they are part of human life. Nevertheless, the affirmation of one’s bodily self is often premised upon strong distinctions between inside and outside, pure and dirt, self and others, even though these distinctions are tenuous. Abjection is also an experience associated with a dismembered limb, death, and a contagious disease. We experience an intense need to cast off (abject) or deny these horrible experiences. Kristeva says: There looms within abjection violent dark revolts against being, directed against a threat that is either inside or outside, it lies beyond the thinkable, the possible, it cannot be assimilated, it beseeches, worries and fascinates desire . . . which does not let itself be seduced . . . desire turns aside sickened. (Kristeva 1982, 3) According to Kristeva, since abjection is situated outside the symbolic order (hence a pre-linguistic experience) and its repression is a precondition for subjectivity, it is difficult to capture this experience in words and somehow get traction on it. Fear of death by contagion was elicited by SARS. Since death or illness cannot be escaped or completely externalized, it is liminal and looms and is inherently distressing. While one tries to cast it off, one can never unsuccessfully do so. Troubled by such things that threaten our existence, Kristeva notes, we cast them off and project our fears onto others in effort to identify the cause of our fear. Although we are all too familiar with masked faces today, that was not the case in 2003. The repeated image of the Asian masked face on daily news served as a target upon which we could discharge our anxieties. The Asian press, politicians, and their hospital services were always masked.

26  Engendering fear and racism during the SARS epidemic

They were covering and protecting themselves from disease and blame. They refused to disclose facts to the World Health Organization (WHO) or allow them to enter their country. Torontonians presumed they were guilty and secretive. The images of infectious deceased bodies transmute and sublimate our lingering fear of death and contagion. As Kristeva argues abjection “beseeches, worries and fascinates desire, but does not let itself be seduced” (Kristeva 1982, 1). Not only can we not successfully get rid of those feelings and experiences, but there is also a strange allure around it. We are intrigued, fascinated by the dying and infected bodies, but we are also terrified. We remain in an ambivalent uncanny position vacillating between pleasure and pain, fear and relief. Kristeva argues that abjection is also associated with fears of impurity. This was particularly true in the case of SARS. Asians were continually shown on TV hosing down dirty and crowded bird cages and lingering over tables of dead bats and bins of fish; these images strengthened our associations with the Chinese as dirty, premodern, and harbingers of disease. There was little evidence of refrigeration in these Chinese wet markets: pigs, birds, snakes, and bats are openly displayed in plastic bins. Our culture that privileges cleanliness, health, and modernity was disgusted by the lack of hygiene. Not only do we abject our bodily functions that cause disquiet, but our fears around hygiene and cleanliness cause us to reroute and abject SARS: associating contagion with filth and the premodern life of the wet market. In the media discussion of the origin of SARS, the civet cat, a Chinese delicacy, was identified as its source. The recurring image of this black cat resonated with superstitions around black cats and linked SARS to the AIDS epidemic. Like HIV, this infectious disease was linked to eating strange animals. Yet there were differences. The eating of bush meat and monkeys for West and East Africans that triggered HIV/AIDS was deemed a necessity to replace the loss of fish in their diet while the eating of the civet cat was portrayed as a perverse delicacy. Of course, this largely unknown fact would have little impact on the fear and disgust associated with eating domesticated animals. Moreover, by drawing parallels between SARS and HIV/AIDS, the media intensified anxieties around SARS.1 Since the AIDs epidemic was primarily identified with homosexuality, it too was associated with deviant pleasures. In Popular Science, July 2003, Michael Lai, a virologist, wrote, “[T]he fact that most flu viruses originated in Southern China is no surprise, the region’s social customs of catching and eating wild game expose people to animal viruses.” In the same article, Joanne Lee-Young says the “first case [was] diagnosed in a bird and snake merchant in South China, where

Engendering fear and racism during the SARS epidemic  27

humans and critters live cheek by jowl.” These Asian voices affirmed the norms of Western civilized society disparaging their ancestors. Those who eat cats and who live “cheek by jowl” with animals and those who live in overcrowded and unhygienic conditions enabled the transmission from animal to human. The repeated images on the evening news of dirty and stuffed cages in wet markets and displays of snakes, bats, dogs, and cats evoked feelings of barely civilized people.2 Witnessing merchants hosing down blood from slaughtered animals conjured up images of a preindustrial society. Portraying Asians as lacking modern hygiene and sanitation is a common trope (Lin 1998, 1). On television images of Chinese wet markets (the quintessence of dirt and disease) were routinely followed by pictures of modern hospitals in

FIGURE 2.1 Outside

a Chinese wet market: a notable lack of modern hygiene and refrigeration. Author: Daniel Care

28  Engendering fear and racism during the SARS epidemic

Toronto (the epitome of hygiene). The story of the nurse Grace was representative of the Toronto experience. “In the course of a single shift, Grace goes through at least 25 pairs of latex gloves, 10 gowns 10 masks and five sets of green scrubs” (The Toronto Star, June 24, 2003a). She described her face as sore and dry. She constantly washed her hands with alcohol jelly, was forced to wear two masks at work and at home, and never ate with her family. However scrupulous Grace was this was not true of all medical practitioners. There were many examples of dangerous and cavalier behavior: a doctor who had vented a SARS patient went to a wedding. After the crisis the American Medical Association’s report on SARS was critical of Toronto’s doctors for failing to comply with rules pertaining to proper clothing and hygiene. So, the simple binary pairing of meticulous Toronto doctors and filthy wet markets was spurious. The “need” to exteriorize our fear and cast it onto Asian bodies was not without its allure. Some people took every precaution and were intensely fearful of contracting the disease to such an extent that large downtown businesses were closed, and riders on the subway were drastically reduced, but given SARS was difficult to contract outside a hospital setting, many of these restrictions were unnecessary. But abjection had an important psychic role to play. The Orientalist thesis – essentializing the Asian – linking negative affect to Social Othering

Focusing on the Middle East, Edward Said’s book Orientalism illustrates how Western thinkers fail to truly see and understand Middle Eastern society: for they see it through their own eyes. This insight could also be applied to Western journalists’ representation of SARS: the Othering discourses that circulated presumed and perpetuated the originality and superiority of the West and demeaned the Chinese. Piecing together representations of the Asians from images, stories, and news reports in the popular media, I aim to explore how Asians were essentialized and blamed. Western professionals (journalists, health workers, scientists, and politicians) were portrayed as producing reliable knowledge, partaking in transparent practices, and furthering the global public good, yet this was not true of the Chinese professionals. They were secretive and dangerous, and their knowledge was deemed untrustworthy. Far from contributing to global public good, their lack of transparency ended up compromising it. They hid the disease from the world at the outset of its outbreak which led to its global transmission. While the democratic citizenry of Toronto was believed to be civic-minded doing their best to tackle the disease, Chinese citizens were portrayed as overly submissive to

Engendering fear and racism during the SARS epidemic  29

their authoritarian leaders. The repeated images of the silent and masked Asian populations on CBC news reaffirmed multiple dangers: they were silent (failing to speak the truth or lying), as well as being the cause of this horrendous contagion. They were carriers of illness: posing a biological, symbolic, and political threat to our democratic way of life. Their propaganda units were contrasted with our freedom of speech. Public representations of Asians as a threat to democracy and civilized society reveal the insidious essentialism and racism that are trafficked under the banner of Torontonian multiculturalism (Kymlicka 1995). Media management of the crisis – the pairing of the war on terror and bioterror

Anticipating the effects of emerging epidemics, Gilles Deleuze draws parallels between threats of global terror and threats of global bioterror. Our society is threatened with obliteration, he says; not only is it due to the threat of war, but also our internal defense mechanisms are breaking down. Though he was referring to HIV/AIDs, this also held for SARS and the looming threat associated with avian flu. They have become new “weapons of mass destruction.” Pairing the “war on terror” with the “war on bioterror” amplifies fear and associates these non-Western faces with danger. This is not a cheerful multicultural space where Western and nonWesterners are equally admitted, where each is treated as mutual and reciprocal subjects, but an insidiously racialized space, where brown faces were presumed to be dangerous: the source of harm and evil. The SARS outbreak in the West and the War on Iraq occurred within one month of each other. SARS became a media event in Toronto toward the end of February, and the WHO travel advisory was issued on March 12, 2003. The invasion of Iraq occurred on March 20, 2003. The media coverage of these events was strikingly similar. During the daily press conferences, experts reported on suspected cases, deaths, and progress toward “containment.” Coverage of the War on Iraq followed the same format: commanding officers, field marshals, and experts held daily briefings announcing progress and causalities. Just as Saddam Hussein and his rebels could be wiped out, so it was presumed that SARS could be defeated. However inappropriate the language of annihilation was to SARS, associations with the war and the metaphor of the battle persisted. Treating these two very different events with different causes as if they were alike involved exaggerating the dangers associated with SARS as well as misdiagnosing efforts to contain it. SARS would not be eliminated despite warlike tactics. Scientists informed politicians and the wider educated audience that the avian flu or SARS would not disappear, yet this information was not

30  Engendering fear and racism during the SARS epidemic

readily communicated to the general population. In fact, SARS was generally represented as an anomaly, a bit of bad luck, something that would disappear. Yet scientists warned that viruses in water birds and ducks were here to stay. Since birds travel the world, they would continue to spread viruses, so it made no sense to speak of eliminating the disease. Nor did it make sense to blame the Chinese; while they may have been a precipitant cause in 2003, they are not the root cause of avian flu or SARS. The WHO’s discourses also linked SARS and the war on terror. In their briefs they used the language of war and diplomacy to describe tactics to tackle SARS. Nouns such as “combat,” “containment,” and “diplomacy” were common. They identified SARS as a form of “biological terror” with “global hotspots in China, Taiwan, Singapore and Toronto.” Just as external aggressors can devastate the population and wreak havoc on the economy, they insisted that bioterror will have these same effects if it is not contained. WHO’s Director General Dr. Gro Harelm Brundtland spoke of strategies of “diplomacy” to combat SARS: “We can no longer rely on national efforts alone to implement the scaled-up system of global alert and response that the world now needs.” UK health secretary reiterated this point: “given infectious diseases in one part of the world are a problem for another . . . every nation owes an obligation to put in place surveillance and planning to combat new threats” (BBC News, “Warning” May 19, 2003). New threats were coming not only from pursuing aggressive wars in the Middle East but from emerging infectious diseases (EDIs). Our common perception that Western mainstream media coverage is reliable and impartial underestimates the effects of associations, such as the conflation of the war on terror with the war on bioterror. The use of the same militaristic terms contributes to their conflation. The fears associated with the war on terror were displaced into the war on SARS; their danger is amplified in the meantime. In addition to fueling fear of destruction and the need to combat this disease aggressively, the media also produced stories of unsung heroes and heroines – doctors and nurses who risked their lives for the collective good. These narratives promulgated good feelings; they cushion people from confronting reliable facts. In doing so, they undermine the capacity of the public to tolerate less-than-optimistic realities. Far from the Western media communicating scientific information as it emerged and informing the population of the limited possibility of contracting SARS in the community, they used images to soothe the minds of the panic-stricken. Photo ops with politicians were frequent. Just as the war in Iraq provided promotional opportunities for politicians, so too did the war against SARS. Just as G. W. Bush flew over to Iraq in a show of strength, fearless and in support of American troops on Thanksgiving Day, Prime Ministers – Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin – displayed their

Engendering fear and racism during the SARS epidemic  31

courage and superhuman qualities by lunching in China town – hoping to quell the fears associated with the Chinese community. Just as G. W. Bush chided the American population to do the patriotic thing and show their confidence in the nation by shopping in the post-9/11 days, Toronto mayor, Mel Lastman, prompted Torontonians to go out and spend. In fact, he orchestrated cheap entertainment and dining out to help the shattered leisure industry. Not only did the pairing of the war on terror and the war on bioterror de-historicize and de-factualize SARS but so did the prevalent tropes of heroes and villains (Jameson 2009 and Ophir 2007). Stories of true public-spiritedness where people pull together were common. Stories of self-sacrifice were frequent. Nurses, community workers, and doctors were portrayed as risking their lives. Yet there were numerous events that collided with the narrative of public spiritedness. Many nurses (unlike Grace who continued to work hard at Scarborough General despite her worries that she might threaten the safety of her children and friends) decided, even if their pay was doubled, the risks were too great. They left the hospitals. These stories were not foregrounded, nor was the fact that most doctors sat idle throughout the SARS crisis while nurses and untrained hospital workers manned emergency rooms. Stories of heroic acts and those that produced good feelings were preferred to realistic accounts that might be troubling. Representations and responses to the SARS crisis: China versus Toronto

Robust measures of surveillance, truthfulness, and transparency were seen as necessary to combat SARS, but WHO officials and Western bureaucrats believed they had a monopoly on these. They did not trust the Chinese. There were good reasons for this; however, by essentializing and Othering the Chinese they too contributed to catastrophizing the virus. At the outset of the outbreak, in December, the Chinese claimed the deaths were due to Chlamydia and Mycoplasma pneumoniae. Guangdong health department, a communist stronghold, did not engender Western confidence by informing reporters “that all information would be disseminated by the party propaganda unit” (WHO, 95). In early February China had prevented WHO from visiting Guangdong and investigating a strange contagious disease that had reportedly killed more than 100 people in a week. The failure of Chinese authorities to report information about the disease when it was first detected is seen to be a factor in the spread of SARS. The Chinese were believed to have covered up the epidemic, for fear of its effects on international trade. The Economist magazine describes their self-serving attitude

32  Engendering fear and racism during the SARS epidemic

as having “had disastrous consequences – allowing SARS to spread to 30 countries, causing 744 deaths” (The Economist January 8, 2004). When WHO authorities were admitted into China in early April, at first, they were blocked from inspecting military hospitals where most of the victims had been held. China was less than cooperative. On April 16 WHO took the unusual step of chastising the Chinese for inadequate and inaccurate reporting. In early May China reported that its deaths dropped from triple to single digits. WHO was suspicious and was close to accusing China of lying. “We will be happy if these latest figures are genuine, however, . . . China is a vast country and there are areas far away from the emperor” (Asian Times 2003). This statement smacks of essentialism, failing to discriminate between modern China ruled by the communist party and the premodern rule of emperors. Nor did WHO acknowledge differences between the Chinese propaganda machine and the inscrutable Chinese; both were secretive and produced unreliable knowledge. This reductive and essentialist discourse serves to not only demean the Chinese but validate Western democratic societies, and as such is culpable of orientalism. WHO suggested that Western professionals ought to carry out checks and instruct the Chinese as to how to make their calculations, implying that Asian scientists and bureaucrats were either incompetent or dishonest. “In Hong Kong, WHO is working with them. At least we know what they are doing, in China we do not” (Asian Times 2003). Scientists from Hong Kong insofar as they accept the guidance of the West are commended and will produce reliable knowledge while Asian scientists under the pressures of the communist party will not. Since it was researchers in Hong Kong and Shenzhen who isolated the coronavirus discovering that SARS was not an influenza virus but rather sui generis, their scientific capacities or skills should not be in doubt. I am not endorsing the Chinese cover-up or justifying the hierarchal and less-than-transparent practices of Chinese politicians and journalists, but I am bringing to visibility how the Chinese professionals and less frequently those from Hong Kong were represented. Othering discourses serve to not only dismiss the Chinese but endorse the Westerners as exemplary of good global citizenry. The practices of the good citizens are open and objective and explicitly contrasted with the secretive unreliable propaganda producers from Asia. Just because Torontonians didn’t have propaganda units did not mean their information was always based on reliable and objective facts. In fact, my attention to the emotional rhetoric of SARS suggests otherwise. While our democratic institutions are assumed to be transparent, our media is believed to produce objective knowledge, and our politicians are alleged to be accountable, this is not always so. During the SARS event, the Toronto media and politicians, as I have shown, were not transparent,

Engendering fear and racism during the SARS epidemic  33

and their rhetoric was informed by political goals, and politicians were not held accountable. On the other hand, in China incompetent politicians and bureaucrats were held responsible for their errors. President Jiang Zemin was dismissed for his inaction and his censorship, and the mayor of Peking was sacked. Hu Jintao was installed. Immediately 1 billion dollars were made available to upgrade state hospitals and public health services. Villages, apartment complexes, and university campuses were cordoned off; tens of thousands of people were quarantined; 80 million people were directed to clean Guangdong’s streets and businesses. Roadside booths were set up to take people’s temperature. Their policies to stop the epidemic and safeguard public health were decisive and resolute. By mid-June, the epidemic was arrested, and WHO’s travel warnings to Hong Kong and China were canceled. In Toronto no politicians or bureaucrats were held responsible for the SARS catastrophe. Even though it was clear that this crisis could have been prevented by more careful monitoring of global emerging diseases and better lines of communication, or mitigated by different medical practices, these criticisms were rarely heard at the time. Instead of Western journalists praising the momentous Chinese effort in the late spring, they were more concerned with how the Chinese ran roughshod over individual civil liberties. Yet, in Canada, civil liberties were compromised as well as democratic decision-making. Far from hospital policies being determined through debate and dialogue, they were prepared by hospital presidents and CEOs. Far from allowing for deliberation among concerned parties, they were formulated in a highly exclusionary manner. Liberal Democratic Toronto did not hold their professionals accountable, nor were their policies any more consensually agreed upon than those of the Chinese. Nor for that matter did they trust WHO’s recommendations, the representatives of global health. From fear to disbelief: challenging WHO’s travel advisory

At the outset of the SARS crisis, local government, public health authorities, and media whipped up people’s fear to ensure people took the right precautions to avoid the spread of SARS. The fear of social breakdown and incivility was widespread. After the travel advisory had been issued by WHO on March 12 and the extent of economic fallout estimated, there were cries of injustice. While Canadian politicians had themselves exaggerated the risks, they now blamed the American media and WHO officials for grossly exaggerating the SARS epidemic in Toronto. There were complaints about the nightly CNN and NBC newscasts portraying Toronto as masked and under siege. Following the travel advisory there were cries of media bias.

34  Engendering fear and racism during the SARS epidemic

Torontonians’ reactions to the travel advisory were incredulous – hardly the reactions one would expect of good global citizens. The infamous quote by Toronto mayor, Mel Lastman, former furniture salesman, “How dare they [do this to Toronto] and whoever the hell they are . . . who? WHO”3 (The Toronto Star, Watchdog, April 24, 2003c), was challenging not only the information produced but also the authority of WHO. The mayor appeared not to know what the acronym stood for! WHO health officials in Washington reported a risk of community transmission in Toronto, “the disease has spread beyond health care workers and family members and is in the community” (The Toronto Star, Watchdog, April 24, 2003c). At this point Toronto doctors “were thrown into an angry frenzy” (The Toronto Star, Watchdog, April  24, 2003c); they strongly disagreed that there were cases of community transmission. Although China’s relation with WHO, the global watchdog, was poor, Toronto’s relation once the travel advisory was made was not good. The “good’ global citizens protested vigorously and challenged the credibility of this international agency of public health experts. More attention was paid to celebrations and producing good feelings than educating the population as to what transpired and what could be expected in the future. Nevertheless, the circulation of positive feelings was not wholly successful in diminishing the fear. Toronto boosters emerged. Mike Myers, a Canadian actor residing in the USA, appeared on primetime American TV, sporting an “I love Toronto” T-shirt. He declared, “Toronto’s got a bit of a bad rap from the media and it’s kinda unfair.” Dan Aykroyd, another influential Canadian actor, took up the role of cheerleader supporting Toronto on American TV. His role was described as trying “to get the no epidemic message out” (The Globe and Mail May 14, 2003). Far from thoughtful investigative journalism, the promotion of good feelings was uppermost in the minds of public representatives. The issue of Canada’s unfair treatment involved it being unfairly and wrongly lumped together with China and Hong Kong. This point was raised by Jim Lehrer in his interview with the head of WHO, Dr. David Heymann. While China is at the heart of the problem and a serious and legitimate concern, Lehrer suggested this is not true of Toronto, insinuating that the travel advisory was unfair and politically motivated. Not wanting to appear biased against Asian countries, WHO, Lehrer implied, unfairly slapped a travel advisory on Canada for three weeks. Following this announcement, an entourage of Canadian politicians and health workers descended upon Geneva and protested. The prime minister promised to speak to WHO. The travel advisory was subsequently lifted; it had been reduced to six days. Although Toronto politicians and media are presumed to respectful of the decisions of WHO, here they forcefully challenged them.

Engendering fear and racism during the SARS epidemic  35

Again, in the wake of the lifting of the travel advisory the city was intent on promoting positive feelings, rather than providing reliable knowledge as to the state of the epidemic or the likelihood of reoccurrences. Toning down fear and negativity was uppermost in the minds of politicians. Reassuring photo ops were commonplace. Various levels of government orchestrated a public celebration to mark the end of the SARS crisis and announce to the world that “Toronto is back in Business.” Included in these celebrations was a Rolling Stones concert, underwritten by the government and various corporations. However, a large percentage of the seats allocated for American tourists remained unsold; the fear of the epidemic persisted. Attending to emotion’s material effects

The consequence of this event is also a lesson to historical materialists who ignore or underplay the effects of the symbols and affective discourses. Not only people were relating to their bodies differently – monitoring their bodies for signs of contagion – but these microprocesses of power had economic effects. They related to urban spaces differently: hospitals were virtually closed to all but emergency cases; large corporations shut their offices; Chinese communities were avoided as much as possible. This event not only triggered emotional crises having to do with the fear of contagion but also catalyzed a social crisis which had economic effects. Not only were tourist dollars lost but billions of dollars of revenue were lost in public transport, the restaurant industry, and hospital services. It is estimated that there were 1.5 million fewer rides on TTC, Toronto’s Public Transit System, in the six-week period. Many restaurants went bankrupt, especially Asian ones. Even Easter communion practices were canceled or altered in the Catholic Church to avoid risks.4 Although optimistic discourses that marked the end of SARS were circulating this did not allay the fears of many. Travelers stayed away from Toronto – not only for the six days for which the WHO had issued a travel advisory but for months. All attesting to the power of catastrophization, despite there was no community transmission, Toronto as a tourist destination suffered hugely. Losses in tourist revenue in Toronto were estimated at 190 million dollars from April 6 to June 8. Other major Canadian cities where there was no incidence of SARS recorded a loss of tourist dollars, which attests to the contagion of the fear. Montreal lost 17.1 million dollars, Ottawa 7.1 million dollars, Calgary 6.2 million dollars, and Vancouver 39.4 million dollars. The Stratford festival, located 1.5 hours outside of Toronto, did not recuperate its loyal supporters for several years. This illustrates the effects of fear; it swamped reason and more reliable scientific evidence.

36  Engendering fear and racism during the SARS epidemic

The SARS crisis attests to the power of emotions to produce palpable and material effects. In the case of SARS clear distinctions between a psychic/cultural world and socioeconomic/material worlds were difficult. Yet I resist blurring this distinction altogether. We know that some people hang onto their gut feelings, and many are prone to catastrophizing which makes thoughtful evaluation and reality-checking difficult, yet if the thinkers associated with the catastrophization thesis are correct, there is the possibility of distinguishing the psychic force of catastrophization, from appreciating catastrophe as a more objective condition. In the spirit of mitigating catastrophization, I  draw attention to previous epidemics, scientific expectations of future epidemics, and concerns around addressing them. Insofar as is possible, analyzing the political and socioeconomic conditions that contributed to the SARS outbreak is a way of getting prepared to handle epidemics going forward. While the SARS catastrophe was deeply unsettling, it was not a freak accident, but something one can be prepared for. SARS effects on deliberation and democratic decision-making

In subsequent chapters of this book, I access the democratic practices of the political protests and social movements that sustained the catastrophic event. In the case of SARS, its afterlife was brief; claims were limited to disgruntled hospital workers and businesses; there were no substantial protest groups that articulated their demands. However, the event itself did have notable effects on democratic institutions and deliberative practices. In this section I will explore these more systematically. In the late 1980s researchers coined the acronym EIDs to identify new virulent and mysterious diseases that were appearing (Weir and Mykhalovskiy 2010). HIV/AIDS, avian flu, H1N1, and SARS were among them. Prior to COVID-19 there was evidence of epidemics (the Zika virus, periodic outbreaks of avian flu, the SARS epidemics, and HIV/AIDS) prompting anxiety and fear of being in the presence of others. With the increasing fears around the rapid transmission speed of diseases, demands for decision-making and vigilant practices have risen, which encroach upon civil liberties and state sovereignty. At the same time, democrats have increasingly insisted that public policy decisions should be transparent and deliberative. Herein lie the perils of these events. The need for clandestine and quick decisions in the name of national security or global public health now threatens to trump the growing consensus that the decision process should be open: people who have a stake in policy decisions should have a role in their outcome. The SARS crisis in 2003 illustrated these contradictory pressures. While town halls and spaces for

Engendering fear and racism during the SARS epidemic  37

formulating deliberation are held up as a norm in liberal democratic societies (places where people’s voices are heard potentially influencing policy),5 during the SARS crisis decisions were made by elites behind closed doors by the new breed of business-oriented hospital managers with almost no consultation of interested parties. Public policy was determined by senior hospital administrators, government officials, select senior doctors’ unions, nurses, and hospital workers, and public voices were excluded. This marked a break with more negotiated settlements characteristic of public hospitals, where unions, doctors, and administrators had a role in forming policy. The policy that was produced left much to be desired: hospital employees whether they were psychotherapists or librarians worked in SARS clinics testing incoming patients, while doctors sat idle in their offices. While the public was invited to frequent public hearings, these hearings were more informative than deliberative. Daily press conferences informed the public of their findings and instructed them as to what was to be done to avoid contracting the disease. Lack of deliberation was also evident at the global level. WHO issued a travel alert on March 12, 2003, warning travelers to postpone all but essential travel to Toronto, Shanxi, Guangdong province in China, Hong Kong, and Beijing. Given the virulence of the disease, the absence of a SARS vaccine, and the lack of clarity around its contractibility, WHO justified this extreme and undemocratic measure. They assumed powers that they did not have at the time. Several months later (May 2003) its assembly of international delegates passed international health regulations giving them the mandate to announce an international health emergency and collect epidemiological information without the consent of the countries involved. With this mandate the nation state no longer had absolute sovereignty over information of diseases within its bounds, nor can the nation block health warnings or travel alerts. Fears around infection that loomed over the Global North posed a challenge to the assumptions of deliberative democracy and the ideals of popular democracy. Face-to-face interaction and collaboration that are believed to work toward more inclusive and reciprocal relations were troubled by fear whether it is associated with terrorism, bioterrorism, or EIDs. The positive feelings associated with being with others and being with strangers in public places were seriously undermined by the negative affective contours of social life in an age of bioterror. While the epidemic undermines positive experiences of sociality, those who suffer from acute anxiety, catastrophizing, agoraphobia, or paranoia were devastated. The SARS epidemic required quick solutions, given the substance of discussion (horrible bodily functions) and emotions of fear and anger, it was hardly the context6 (Douglas 1966) for deliberation, a process guided by

38  Engendering fear and racism during the SARS epidemic

reason. Furthermore, the deliberative process is often protracted and not conducive to speedy results. Democratic practices are ill-suited to deal with states of contagion where their cause is uncertain and where fear was rampant. While knowledge about the cause of the disease and possible information about protection supported by a well-organized and trusted system of public health may have assuaged fears of contamination; in the case of SARS in Toronto, these were not forthcoming. The hospitals and institutions of public health were unprepared. Since there was a general awareness of the threat of EIDs, hospitals, and public health units could have been prepared and could have engaged in deliberative procedures with their employees, prior to its outbreak. Further, the general population could have been warned of the possibility of such dangerous diseases and involved in deliberation before the event, but this did not happen. Democracy and the practices of good governance were eroded not only by elite decision-making and perceived incompetence but more profoundly by racist and essentialist discourses that circulated in public, seriously threatening Toronto’s multicultural spaces and practices. On both the macropolitical level and the micropolitical level, epidemics pose threats to democracy. Toward a more reliable account of the catastrophe: material conditions – mega slums and global livestock production

Consistent with the theme of this book, reorientation in the wake of shock requires emotions to move us toward more responsive relations with others and encourage questioning the givenness of the situation. Through critical inquiry and efforts on the part of public health providers’ improved information on the risks of EIDs, citizens will be better prepared. Hopefully micropolitical factors (fear, anxiety) that lead to scapegoating and overreactions can be reduced; however, macropolitical factors (historical material conditions) also pose a challenge. On the surface there seems to be little in common between the pre-industrial animal markets of China, which presumably spawned SARS, and the fancy agribusinesses factory farms in Europe and North America, yet both areas are vulnerable to super-viruses. Guangdong is a product of recent urban industrialization and one of the world’s leading export manufacturers of chicken and is increasingly important in export food production. The presence of huge poultry farms close to processing plants and adjacent to pig farms is not specific to Guangdong but is also found in western Arkansas, northern Georgia, Brazil, British Columbia, Alberta, and Ontario. Guangdong is one of three of the largest poultry producers in China and is also renowned

Engendering fear and racism during the SARS epidemic  39

for pig production. Seven hundred million chickens coexist with pigs and wild birds; the latter have been found to be hosts of super-viruses like H5N1 and often infect terrestrial birds. The microbial traffic between birds and animals and between animals and humans is high. “Battery chickens located directly above pig pens depositing waste in pig troughs” (Sydney Morning Herald 2003) create a toxic situation. In addition to new forms of factory farming, growth in urban poverty contributes to avian flu. In Guangdong the urban population increased from 32 to 70% over a matter of a decade. Many of these people are rural immigrants or floaters, who live in dormitories while working and then return to their villages. Their sanitation is poor as are their health-care provisions. Many of them are chronically sick. State spending on health care in China had sharply declined from 34% to 20% of GDP since a market economy has been introduced. The animal and human population density is very high (1,273 people per kilometer). Due to rapid industrialization, people are exposed to environmental hazards, toxins, smog, and the emission of high sulfur dioxides. They eat more meat, so new markets for chicken and swine have emerged. The result is increased human and animal intercourse. New mega cities of the slum-dwelling poor are particularly vulnerable to toxins and viruses. These are the major ingredients of bird flu. Guangdong is believed to be a disease epicenter or a site where the pathogenic load is extremely high. In 1994 in Surat (an area known for sweatshop textile production and diamond cutting), in India, a pneumonic plague broke out. The public health was very poor; 80% of the doctors (who were privately employed) fled the city at the outset of the outbreak. Antibiotics were depleted, and few countries had vaccines for the plague, and the production of vaccines would take six months. The population was quarantined; by sheer luck, the virus became less virulent and was ultimately contained. Vietnam, Thailand, and Hong Kong combine these potent factors of poverty, poor public health, and livestock production, all of which contribute to super-spreading diseases. During the SARS epidemic in Hong Kong, a carrier of SARS used the toilet in the Kowloon area; he had a severe case of diarrhea; within days 321 people were infected in the apartment complex. SARS was disseminated through a less-than-safe sewage system. In 2012 there was a cholera outbreak in Haiti. An infected Nepalese UN peacekeeper and a broken-down sanitation system led to the spread of cholera among 7,000 Haitians. Circling back to the Spanish flu in 1918, poor sanitation and poverty also factored into the deaths of those infected. High percentages of deaths were reported among those who were poorly fed and housed (i.e., fighting

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soldiers on the front). Sixty percent of all deaths due to the Spanish flu occurred in India, where famine, malnutrition, and nonexistent public health were prevalent. While EDIs are particularly virulent and destructive, they are not without historical precedents. Being apprised of their precursors (i.e., the Spanish flu, cholera, bubonic plague, and factors associated with their emergence), the public could have been better prepared for the possibility of future epidemics. In 2003, scientists warned these super-viruses would reoccur. They first appeared in ducks in Hong Kong in March  1997. At the time they were not believed to be of threat to humans, yet they did cross the species barrier killing five humans. Twenty percent of the chicken population dropped dead within days necessitating the killing of 1.6 million poultry. Several outbreaks of bird flu occurred in Western countries, most notably in British Columbia and Holland, though they were not widely publicized. In March 2003 in Gelderland, Holland, there was an outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza, HPAI; it was also discovered in pigs, which were immediately slaughtered given the fears of cross-species transmission. Poultry workers were vaccinated, immigrant workers were tracked down, and one-eighth of them reported conjunctivitis or other flu symptoms. A veterinarian developed viral pneumonia and died after exposure to sick birds. His respiratory fluids were infected with H7N7 which had undergone 12 mutations. Public health authorities have been aware of the potential risks of a pandemic due to avian flu or bird flu for some time. Since 2001 it was predicted that it could kill 70 million people. Some countries are more prepared than others, but most are unprepared. A University of Hong Kong research team headed by Guan, Peiris, and Shortridge studied in detail the influenza that was circulating in the avian population in the area around Guangdong. From ducks in the live poultry markets in Shantou, they found 500 distinct strains of influenza and 53 different iterations of the H9 subtype. In the past the flow of the flu gene was from water birds to other animals, but now there was evidence of two-way transmission. Given the genetic traffic among aquatic birds, chickens, and mammals, the local culling of birds is insufficient. More worrying is that lethal strains of H5N1 were found in migrating birds. H5N1 was found in Siberia birds, and now these viruses are believed to be ineradicable. Several viruses were at risk of reaching pandemic levels. The rate of interspecies transmission accelerated. In the wake of SARS, a catalogue of viruses has emerged in Vietnam and Thailand, but this did not lead to an acceleration of intensified planning. This is also true of Western countries; there was little evidence of public planning or educating the community about the reoccurrence of these flu epidemics. But in the wake of COVID-19, one hopes that preparations and public planning will be ramped up.

Engendering fear and racism during the SARS epidemic  41

Representing SARS as a natural catastrophe of our times, or an aggressive war that must be fought, downplays how viral epidemics are affected by resource allocation, public health readiness, and speedy communication of information. A much underplayed fact is that authorities in Vancouver were more clued into the health advisories of WHO, which had identified and quarantined a SARS case. The SARS epidemic was not just a matter of bad luck or external aggression but rather the consequence of serious underfunding of public health. The Ontario Conservative governments under Mike Harris had pursued strategies that put public health care at risk. In 2002 they fired all microbiologists working for the department of public health. The Ontario government downloaded responsibility from the provinces to the municipalities and “there was no public health communications strategy and confusion persisted about liability and legal responsibilities” (The Toronto Star, April 21, 2004). This deregulation of public health occurred in the context of 20 years of threats to reduce expenditures on health care and privatize it. It is no wonder that hospitals and public health authorities were unprepared in Toronto. Given the knowledge that health workers and scientists had regarding the severity and risks of EIDs, one would have expected more preparation. In fact, deliberations among experts and between experts and the community could have been carried out before the crisis broke. The Journal of American Medical Association (JAMA) confirmed that public funding and hospital preparedness could have mitigated the effects of SARS. In assessing the management of the epidemics in Hong Kong and Toronto, they claimed, “[B]oth areas’ efforts were hampered by underinvestment in public health infrastructure, the diminution of public health leadership and weaker links between health care and public health” (Davis 2005, 76). No one had anticipated the devastating effects on health-care personnel – 43% of deaths in Toronto, 90% of cases in the early days of Guangdong, and 22% of victims in Hong Kong. What is more surprising was that the spread was not due to the super-infectivity of the virus but the failure of medical staff to comply with proper protective clothing and hygiene (Davis 2005, 77). JAMA also claimed that ordinary doctors are not fully informed of procedures. These findings raise issues of importance: the seriousness of SARS had less to do with its super-infectivity and more to do with things that could have been avoided had hospitals been prepared. SARS would have been more readily contained if not prevented had proper precautions taken place. In Toronto a SARS patient was transferred from one hospital in Scarborough to another as part of a cost-saving strategy; this led to increased transmission. If a stronger public health infrastructure had been in place and proper communication links established between different health-care providers, SARS in Toronto could have been prevented.

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Post-SARS

In the era of epidemics, the public space is seen as potentially infectious, and the private space is assumed to be a haven, a sanctuary from contagion. Yet it is, at best, a tenuous one. One can try to cocoon oneself away and prepare for the next virus, but ultimately this strategy is not possible for everyone and not possible for long. Or alternatively one complacently is set on believing that SARS was an accident that would never happen again. COVID-19 has shown us the naivety of these options. Given the developments in livestock production the risk of super-viruses is not going to disappear. Investment in public health infrastructure and leadership, and improving links between health-care personnel and public health are critical, yet there was little evidence that preparation was widely pursued in the wake of SARS. An “on-line information” service was made available, which would immediately communicate the outbreak of an epidemic to others around the world. But this service required the individual state quickly declare the outbreak of a super-virus,7 which, as SARS demonstrated, states are hesitant to do, given the financial risk at stake. Governments that have a stronger tradition of investment in public health would fare better. Planning should involve the public at large. Deliberative sites work toward policy that is acceptable to all, or minimally policy that involves the consultation of parties concerned, but it is difficult to achieve during a state of emergency. While the emotions of fear and anxiety around contagion are to be expected, there are ways that they can be mitigated. Institutional preparedness, popular education, and media cooperation will not eliminate the negative affective responses to contagion but can hopefully reduce its toxic effects. Had the findings from inquires been revealed and attention to the geopolitical and economic context of the SARS epidemic been relayed to the public, Canada may well have been better prepared in 2020 to tackle COVID-19. Well before Bill Gates’ infamous TED on epidemics, warnings of predictable pandemics were widespread in the scientific community. Yet once the epidemic was over in Toronto there was little appetite to publicly return to this avoidable catastrophe. There is reason to be relatively optimistic. Factory farming could be better regulated, and while birds will carry avian flu going forward, they needn’t seriously harm humans if proper measures are taken. Since the severity of SARS was due to factors that humans could control – hospital preparedness, investment in public health infrastructure, and development of global surveillance systems – states could be better equipped. Poverty and poor health provisions for migrant laborers are a source of concern. However, considering the emotional and financial costs incurred from the COVID-19 pandemic, it will be difficult for governments to bury their heads in the sand and not be prepared.

Engendering fear and racism during the SARS epidemic  43

Notes 1  www.who.int/gho/hiv/en/ Globally 35  million deaths due to HIV/AIDS and 36.7 million people are infected and live with HIV. WHO (December 2015) Global deaths due to the SARS crisis were 744 globally (accessed February 20, 2021). 2  There is a long history of this representation of Asian immigrant communities as less than human. See Jan Lin (1998). “In public discourse and representation, Chinatowns in most developed societies have often been depicted as overcrowded and dilapidated places, beset with social problems such as sweatshops, undocumented immigrants, poverty, and organized criminal syndicates, that require clean ups, redevelopment and concerted efforts by governments to maintain law and order.” 3  The Toronto Star. April 24, 2003b, “This isn’t a city in the grip of fear and panic.” Mel Lastman’s response to World Health Organization’s Travel Advisory: “Where did this group go to? Who did they speak to? I don’t even know where the hell they come from, Geneva or someplace and they make decisions. .  .  . I’m going to do all these things until we beat SARS and if the rest of the city joins me, we will make it through the crisis. And the message I’m sure will reach them through you. . . . I dare them, I dare them to be here tomorrow. We’re setting up the committee. It’ll be set up as of tomorrow. And we’re going to start right away and we’re going to be doing everything possible. And What I’, doing right now, is sending out a message to this CDC group, whoever the hell they are. . . . Who? WHO, sorry. Well, who’s the CDC? Oh, Okay. The WHO. And the message I’m sure will reach them through you that I dare them, I dare them to be here tomorrow.” 4  Having spent over two years under the shadow of COVID-19 none of these rituals or events sound surprising; however, in 2003 there were. 5  The Town Hall forum may allow the airing of opinions, but often politicians vet those who will speak, and even when opposition is voiced, there is no requirement that widely held opinions are taken on board. Hence, Town Halls often serve a legitimating purpose, rather than a deliberative function. 6  Anthropologist Mary Douglas (1966) argued decades ago that dirt is not intrinsically dangerous but is socially defined as such. It is simply “matter that is out of order.” Notions of purity/impurity, or contagious versus healthy matter, are constitutive of social order, so when an event like SARS, which is contagious and seriously challenges health and taken-for-granted social boundaries, erupts it is dangerous on various levels. It symbolically threatens order as well as actually threatens life. Moreover, psychoanalyst Julia Kristeva believes a subject’s stability requires the abjection of horrible bits of the self – bodily matter (like spit, shit) as well as psychic matter to constitute the self. So the presence of contagion – uncontainable and threatening bodily fluids – destabilizes not only the health of the community but also an individual’s well-being, whose identity requires keeping horrible material body functions and anger under wraps. 7  Recently South Africa identified the Omicron variant of COVID-19, and consequently a travel ban was initiated by many Western states which adversely affected South Africa’s economy. Such a response may inhibit countries from announcing new viruses.

References Asian Times. 2003. “Who to Belief?” Asia Times, May 23. BBC News. 2003. “Warning Over New Killer Diseases.” BBC News, May  19. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/3040709.stm.

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Davis, Mike. 2005. The Monsters at Our Door. New York: The New Press. Deleuze, G., and Guattari, F. 1987. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Translated by B. Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Douglas Mary. 1966. Purity and Danger. London: Routledge. Freud, Sigmund. 1962. Civilization and Its Discontents. Edited and Translated by James Strachey. New York: Norton. Jameson, Fredric. 2009. Valences of the Dialectic. London: Verso. Kristeva, Julia. 1982. Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection. New York: Columbia University Press. Kymlicka, Will. 1995. Multicultural Citizen. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Lin, Jan. 1998. Reconstructing Chinatown: Ethnic Enclave, Global Change. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Ophir, Adi. 2007. “The Two-State Solution: Providence and Catastrophe.” Theoretical Inquiries in Law 8 (1). ———. 2010. “The Politics of Catastrophization: Emergency and Exception.” In Contemporary States of Emergency, edited by Didier Fassin and Mariella Pandolfi, 59–88 (or p. 745 in Political Theory). New York: Zone. Rancière, Jacques. 2010. Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics. Translated by Steven Corcoran. London: Continuum. Sydney Morning Herald. 2003. Has SARS Emerged From Pandora’s Box. April 7, 2003. Solórzano, Daniel and Yosso Tara. 2002. “Critical Race Methodology: CounterStorytelling as an Analytical Framework for Education Research.” Qualitative Inquiry 8 (1): 23–44. https://doi.org/10.1177/107780040200800103. Stavro, Elaine. 2014. “SARS and Alterity: The Toronto-China Binary.” The New Political Science 36 (2): 172–192. The Economist. 2004. “Here We Go Again.” January 8. https://www.economist. com/science-and-technology/2004/01/08/another-twist-in-the-tale. The Globe and Mail. 2003. “Myers Leads Pro-Toronto Team.” May 14. The Toronto Star. 2003a. “Fear and Loathing on the Hospital Floor.” June 24. The Toronto Star. 2003b. “This Isn’t a City in the Grip of Fear and Panic.” April 24. The Toronto Star. 2003c. “Why Watchdog Targeted Toronto.” April 24. The Toronto Star. 2004. “Report on The Campbell Report.” April 21. Weir, Lorna and Eric Mykhalovskiy. 2010. Global Public Health Vigilance: Creating a World on Alert. New York: Routledge. WHO. 2003. “SARS: Chronology of a Serial Killer.” Update 95. https://www.who. int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2003_07_04-en.

3 BURNING INFERNO The Grenfell Tower fire in the era of austerity

The event: affective representations overwhelm facts

Since people base their opinions on trusted messages, interpreting those messages and the emotions that support them is useful to understand popular attitudes. The public rhetoric in this chapter was sympathetic to the victims of the fire, yet the culture, institutions, and social economic relations impeded the development of democratic sensibilities toward those in public housing and prevented the deepening of democracy. An analysis of concrete circumstances will show how neoliberal governing strategies produce fertile grounds for cross-class coalitions, but they did not develop. Consistent with the theme of the book, I will bring to the fore more reliable narratives and empirical work that qualifies and complicates reliance upon emotion. Consistent with Pierre Nora’s notion of a monstrous event, the fire remains in the public imagination and will have a marked effect on conversations around public safety going forward. In this situation the afterlife of the event (the success in keeping these grievances alive) had as much to do with the community activists, the ongoing government inquiry, the fact that this dangerous cladding still wraps the homes of many leaseholders (private homeowners) as well as the powers of protestors and social movements. At 00:53 on June 16, 2017, the first 999 calls were received regarding a small fire on the fourth floor of Grenfell Tower, a council block amid one of the wealthiest boroughs in London. As the firemen departed, having dealt with a fire arising from a freezer, they noticed that the external cladding was ablaze. Within 28 minutes the fire took hold. It took more than six hours to contain this fire and four months to determine the number of casualties. DOI: 10.4324/9781003295518-3

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FIGURE 3.1 Grenfell

Tower aflame: take note that the fire hoses fail to extend to 20 floors. Author: Natalie Oxford

Scenes of chaos and tragedy dominated the TV screens within hours. Viewers saw a building engulfed in flames. Images of the fire were terrifying, people dodging huge swaths of burning planks. Viewers witnessed friends and family members on their phones urging their loved ones to escape the building. Many obeyed the “stay put” orders of the fire marshal and local council. A woman could be seen through the window, and the next minute her flat was engulfed in flames. A baby was thrown from a building landing in someone’s arms; several people jumped to their deaths. As Figure 3.1 illustrates the fire hoses did not reach beyond the fifth floor. These images, saturated with intense feelings and horrifying sounds, were caught on videos and circulated in mass media and social platforms for some time. This qualifies as a monstrous event; in a matter of hours, it revealed the inequalities in the residents of the richest borough in England. Witnessing this event on TV or downloaded videos captured the horror of trapped residents and the sorrow of grieving friends and families. As the fire raged, viewers were stunned by the speed of the fire, the failure of the fire services to contain it, and the chaos around the rescue. Shock and disbelief were universally felt, and solidarity for the residents followed. Witnessing this

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event was disorientating; it unsettled faith in the government’s ability to provide public safety and the capacity of the fire department to act effectively, yet were these feelings sufficient to reorient people emotionally and disrupt their political commitments? Journalists around the world began their coverage: “This is not Mumbai nor Bangladesh, but this fire happened in one of the richest boroughs of London England: Kensington Chelsea.” They pointed to glaring class differences. Luxury multimillion-pound flats were situated within several hundred meters of Grenfell Tower’s public housing. As it turned out, most of the residents of this council flat were immigrants and former refugees. The building had been recently refurbished, but more attention had been paid to the exterior beauty than interior safety. Residents of the building had complained about safety concerns for several years (surges of power, sparks coming out of lamps), yet their criticisms were ignored. Wealthy residents in the area lobbied to have the markers of council building architecture (public housing) covered up, complaining that their property values were compromised. The slick new cladding was installed to remove the evidence of it being a council block. While its exterior was transformed, the material used in the cladding and insulation proved not to be fire retardant. In fact, the cladding product was outlawed for high-rise buildings in Germany and the USA and not recommended in France. This fire was like no other fire; a lace curtain that was alight spread rapidly to the exterior cladding and up one side of the building to the 24th floor. In a matter of hours fire engulfed the entire building and huge swathes of glowing matter were careening through the air. The sprinkler system was inadequate, as were the alarms, fire doors, hoses, and ventilation. Friends outside the building warned residents about the extent of the fire and urged them to escape. But fire regulations were clear: people had been told to remain in their apartments. Many obeyed the regulations and died in this raging inferno. Many perished in the one stairwell due to smoke inhalation. People described crackling noises and popping sounds like fireworks, as burning/melting sheets of cladding flew through the air. Not only was the scene deeply disturbing but so too was the news that the Conservative council had had a budget surplus in 2016. Instead of dealing with the safety concerns to sort out the problems identified by the resident’s association and the fire department, they issued rebates to property owners in the borough. Weeks later, the gutted building was visible from the flyover, and the London tube was covered in white plastic. Some reports allege that dust and debris from the building persisted and had to be contained to protect residents; others reported that this looming reminder of incompetence and possibly corruption of a Tory council had to be covered up.

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The fire exposed in glaring detail social inequalities: residents of this building were treated as “disposable” (Mbembe 2003); their “lives did not count” (Butler 2004). Journalists drew attention to the disdain of the building managers who failed to address serious long-standing complaints about wiring (sparks coming from lamps and mini fires), but also in the aftermath the council failed to treat this event as a disaster. While charities, volunteers, church groups, mosques, and synagogues offered food, clothes, and their time, members of the local council were nowhere to be seen, or so the story goes. It was reported that Nicholas Paget-Brown, leader of the council, showed up later that day and diffidently expressed his sympathy and failed to act expeditiously (O’Hagan 2018). Another member of the council was reported to have suggested that residents didn’t want sprinkler systems. Other local councils, specifically Labour ones, offered help, but their offers were declined by the Tory councilors, thus contravening existing government protocol for the handling of disasters. Prime Minister Theresa May showed up, yet she did not meet with the residents in the street since her bodyguards declared it a security risk. This contributed to the popular perception that May was cold and indifferent, as was the Conservative council. The Queen and Jeremy Corbyn, leader of the opposition, showed up; they walked around and talked to the residents and members of the community. May later visited victims in the hospital and offered 5,500 pounds per household to deal with their needs. Corbyn embraced the people’s anger, calling for empty properties to be requisitioned to provide houses for those now homeless. Another Labour MP, David Lammy, labeled the disaster “corporate manslaughter” and demanded arrests. The manhandling of the event appeared to be a triumph for the Labour Party. It took months to determine with certainty how many people died in the fire and for their remains to be identified. This ever-rising number smacked of carelessness or a cover-up. Yet the firemen defended their conduct reporting that on some floors there were over 15 tons of debris that had to be shifted through to identify bones, which made identification a very difficult and protracted process. Yet the repeated images of the fire revealed deficient fire hoses. These images, facts, and the various narratives that surfaced contributed to the popular perception that these residents, the global working classes, did not count. Confronting vital materialists’ and populists’ thinking on affect and emotion

In this chapter, I  engage vital materialists (William Connolly, Jane Bennett) and political constructivists (Ernesto Laclau and Lisa Disch (2021). They focus on the impact of things and visceral feelings in the creation

Burning inferno  49

of political opinions and the mobilization of new constituencies. While these theorists have provided meaningful critiques of Habermasian theories of the public sphere1 I believe they exaggerate the powers of visceral affects and emotions in creating new subjectivities. Believing that “the social world is able to be re-shaped in limitless ways” (Laclau 2005, 30), they gloss over the less-than-lively and deeply entrenched beliefs, political loyalties, and institutional practices that impeded the emergence of a new collective subject in the wake of the Grenfell Tower fire. Inspired by Diana Coole’s theorization of strong human agency and weak thing power, and her effort to give socioeconomic and political relations their due, I  am interested in exploring the historical material/ institutional context as well as the complicated emotional terrain of the catastrophe. In this case study, I  argue deep-seated neoliberal governing strategies pitted private property owners against public housing residents hindering their emotional reorientation and their collaboration around public safety. Privatization schemes traced to the Conservative government in the 1980s and the private/public partnerships that were developed by New Labour in the 1990s that brought market criteria to bear had a negative impact on social welfare spending. Withdrawing resources from care and public safety measures affected everyone; however, the Conservative Party has managed to stay in power since 2007. Social weightlessness

Refugees, immigrants, and residents have been subject to economic exploitation and marginality and de-meanment. While both the vital materialists and populist thinkers want to avoid seeing refugees, immigrants, the poor, and un/underemployed as victims and incapable of action by failing to acknowledge the disempowering effects of their social locations, they exaggerate their capacity to act and be effective. Jacques Rancière claims that minorities are as intelligent as any others (1991); from this he assumes they are effective in disrupting the system, but this ignores the poor and global working classes’ impediments that impact their agency. Seeing agency as dependent upon amorphous or passionate forces that percolate up to disrupt existing relations or being part of a human/nonhuman assemblage that provides a vibrant lift ignores the impact of that “up lift” given the structured power relations and precarious conditions of these minority groups. Drawing upon the ideas of Pierre Bourdieu, Lois McNay (2014) argues radical democrats (specifically Laclau, Connolly, and Mouffe) presume “a social weightlessness” failing to consider the impact of social location on political agency.

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The Ethiopian cab driver who had lived in the building for 25  years and whose freezer short-triggered the fire was blamed in the popular press. His story was not heard until the inquiry. He was vindicated during the hearing since he had called in the firemen; however, he had been publicly maligned. How could one possibly compare his voice with those of Arconic (the American company which produced the cladding)? In early March it was estimated that Arconic had spent more than 30 million pounds on lawyers and advice to defend itself from culpability. This is more than the entire cost of the inquiry. So when we speak of performative political acts which can be dissensus and disruptive of the order, we must consider the constraints as well as the social powers that actors are able to rely upon. Judith Butler’s words are the apposite here: “none of us act, without the conditions to act” (Butler 2015, 16). The power of Arconic to have its voice heard outweighs the power of the small architectural firm employed, the survivors’ group, the resident’s association, or the nameless Ethiopian resident. Hence, the energetic flux or dynamism of matter, an assumption of the vital materialists, is very much affected by one’s social power. Minorities may be part of an assemblage, supplemented by social media, yet the capacity of their voices to be amplified depends upon their social location. People who live in unsafe housing and dangerous neighborhoods and have limited access to social and health services “lack the infrastructure and social relations that make their lives livable” (Butler 2015, 21), and I might add they make their voices and protesting bodies less effectual. Although vulnerability is an existential condition, “we are all subject to injury, illness, rehabilitation, or death by virtue of events or processes out of our control.” Butler argues, “[T]his general truth is lived differentially since exposure to injury at work, or faltering social services, clearly affects workers and the unemployed much more than others” (Butler 2015, 20–21). In this case, the voices of “the precarious” (Butler 2004), the victims of the fire, mostly poor (under- or unemployed), native-born, and immigrants, didn’t count. Even when they were mobilized and appeared in social and mass media, their claims and voices were audible but not effective. On the other hand, Chelsea’s wealthy private residents counted: they had prompted the costly and unsafe renovations to the tower block and got tax rebates as property owners. They had argued that their property values were diminished by the prominence of this ugly tower, clearly distinguishable as public housing. It may be apocryphal, but given this building was in the direct sight line of Buckingham Palace, the royals also wanted a facelift. On the other hand, the resident’s association was unable to get the management team and the council to do the work necessary to address fire hazards despite numerous failed fire inspections and a budget surplus.

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Fostering solidarity: a tangled event that produced multiple narratives and feelings

Journalists contributed to mobilizing support for the victims of the fire by producing thoughtful and emotionally rich stories recounting the failures of the Conservative council. There was a consensus among them: the fire foregrounded gross inequalities of contemporary Britain. The needs/interests of the global working classes, traditional British working classes, and the poor were not being addressed. They reiterated the binary of the rich residents and the underprivileged. They also relied upon images of the fire and its aftermath capturing this reality in shocking visuals. Open Democracy, a popular left-leaning online journal, portrayed this horrific event as a dramatic display of inequality and disregard for the poor. Their authors were forthright about the systemic causes of the fire and its impact on the global working classes. Hsiao-Hung Pai notes: Contempt for Grenfell residents is representative of the way the city of London treats its global working-class. They were ignored; their disenfranchisement is permanently tied to their lack of citizenship. They have no voice, no representation. Public housing stock has been sold off since the early 80’s and has not been replenished. People, who may have lived in a borough for generations are being moved out/relocated, in places like Stoke on Trent, hours from London, because of property values in London. (2017) To take another example from Open Democracy, this time by Angela McRobbie: Kensington and Chelsea council, one of the richest councils in the country, refused to abide by health and safety regulations. They had monies that could be spent upon improvements, but did not make the improvements necessary, their councilors were very much Tories and property owners, and it was their interests that were represented. (2017) This event stressed the priorities of the Conservative Party: the interests of the propertied and business classes prevailed over those of the global working classes. The Economist, a centrist magazine, also embraced the narrative of the haves and have-nots. The fire highlighted the striking contrasts between the lives of the super-rich and the working and unemployed poor. Grand town houses and swish coffee shops stand 200 or so meters from the remains of the building. It seems possible that the Grenfell fire could

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become a big contributor to a broader shift in British attitudes, particularly towards public spending. (Editor of The Economist 2017) Some journalists couched their representation of the catastrophe in terms of heroes and villains. Narratives of heroic and altruistic acts by firemen, doctors, neighbors, and strangers proliferated. Victims were interviewed in print and on TV; spontaneous acts of commiseration and kindness were narrated. In addition to all the heroes, there were villains: the local Conservative council, the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organization (KCTMO), and the federal Conservative government. It was reported that they treated these residents dismissively: most were poor, foreign, and reliant on subsidized housing. They saw the local Conservative council as comprised of “toffs” with double-barreled names: they had no understanding of the reality of the working classes and the poor. The press drew attention to the council’s failure to follow protocol and solicit help. In addition, their perceived tardiness in arranging temporary housing, and the idea that relief efforts were spearheaded by volunteers, contributed to blaming the council. The reporters harnessed the disdain of the privileged, and uncovered convincing facts about human negligence, which fostered the development of affective solidarity. Revelations in the Independent newspaper suggest there might be more outrage about Grenfell as news disclosed that the building failed two fire inspections and its management tolerated 46 infractions. The report “called on the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organization (KCTMO) to move quickly with the planning authority stipulating that action must be taken by May 2017 to address fire hazards, one month before the fire tore through it.” Some believe this is the smoking gun and that charges of gross negligence and manslaughter were imminent (Agerholm 2018). Yet five and a half years later the inquiry is still incomplete. A year after the disaster there were more TV programs and newspaper articles on the victims of the fire and their families. Reggie Yates’ “Searching for Grenfell’s lost lives” (2018) is exemplary in this regard. He tracked down those who knew these people before they became victims, creating a rich tapestry of their lives. These victims came from Morocco, the Philippines, Spain, and Brazil, but not all were immigrants. They were hard-working, lively, and active members of the community. Naming them and giving them an identity and history help cultivate sympathy and erode the detachment and objectivity that often accompanies the disclosure of facts and statistics. Again, in narrativizing the stories of actual individuals, the media managed to cultivate empathy for the victims and undercut the rhetoric of Social Othering.

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Yet disdain and even contempt for those on benefits are deeply embedded in popular British culture, specifically though not exclusively associated with Conservative voters. A BBC documentary film “Grenfell Tower one year later” interviewed a surviving resident who recounted having queried the installation of a boiler close to an electric panel. She was told by the contractor not to complain since she was getting her accommodation for nothing. This sort of sentiment around council tenants is commonplace. Momentarily shamed, she did not speak up, but when interviewed she protested that, in fact, she paid 700 pounds per month and had lived in the building since 1974. Most journalists conveyed sympathy for the residents and cultivated democratic sensibilities, yet I argue, most popular sentiments were only temporary and hence did not entail emotional reorientation. So far, I  have been looking at feelings and emotions communicated through the mass media. For the most part sympathy and compassion were shown toward the victims in the wake of the fire. The harrowing event: residents trapped in the building, burning planks careened through the air, and plaintive calls produced a rich affective experience. The popular response to the event was affective and emotionally driven, not deliberative. The journalist’s tropes of the haves and have-nots (the elite property owners versus the global working classes) contributed to sympathy for the residents. In addition to the stories televised, performances of local council meetings reflected the inequality between the Conservative representatives and the Grenfell community. The Conservative leader blocked members of the community and the press from the first meeting after the fire: scuffles between the white authorities and the mainly non-white residents ensued. Many of the council members resigned. TV footage of the second meeting was equally telling: the class and racial differences were blatantly obvious. The residents were racially mixed, and the council members were all Caucasian. New council members apologized for their failure to act and for not taking the resident’s complaints seriously, but they did not turn around and address the victims in the gallery as they spoke. Journalists interpreted this as a sign of disrespect or fear of a face-to-face encounter. Only the new head of council acknowledged class differences. She openly stated that she had never been in a council flat – hitting home stark differences in their life experiences. To further my discussion of sensory impact, I  interpret the visual experience derived from images and their associations. In doing so, I focus on the meanings, rather than simply the power of autonomous affect in triggering emotional reorientation. I rely upon Ariella Azoulay’s research on the power of the photograph. The spectator needs “prolonged observations” to figure out the instrumentalized meaning of a picture that has been imposed by the state (2008, 168). Azoulay urges us to “reconstruct

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FIGURE 3.2 The

burned-out shell of Grenfell Tower is white-washed. Author: Kate Greenslade

what was there from both what is visible and what is not immediately manifest, but what can – in principle – become visible in the exact same photography” (2008, 159). What is visible is the wrapped building, clean and bright, and a popular benign slogan, “Grenfell Forever in our hearts.” What is not immediately manifest is the terrifying memories of the building in flames as well as the bombed-out shell. The local council’s rationale was to protect the locals from flying and toxic debris, but upon reflection we know that some of the debris would have been human remains, which is a horrible thought. In addition, it speaks to the local government’s desire to figuratively white-wash or cover up their crime. Interestingly unlike the Parkland Kids and Black Lives Matter (BLM) where photo ops, images, and photographs were encouraged to keep the issue alive, here members of the survivor’s group, resident’s association, and local community forbid

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pictures. As one exited the metro stop, messages warned tourists not to take pictures, out of respect for the dead. Nevertheless, many images remain in memory and are still on the internet, specifically the raging fire and the burned-out shell of a building, so the cover-up is not successful. So far, I have speculated on the power of the fire through popular journalism and images to disrupt existing modes of being in the world and rally support and solidarity for immigrants, refugees, or more generally public housing residents; now I turn to quantitative research which supports my claim that the event generated democratic sensibilities toward the victims, at least temporarily. A government poll conducted on June 16, 2017, in the wake of the fire, clearly attested to the spontaneous empathy catalyzed. Five thousand and hundred people were asked: Should luxury flats in Kensington be requisitioned to provide accommodation for residents of Grenfell Tower left homeless by the fire? Jeremy Corbyn called for luxury properties in Kensington that are owned but left empty to be requisitioned and provided as accommodation for Grenfell Tower residents who have been made homeless by the fire. Would you support or oppose such a move? The results were as follows: Strongly support 33% Tend to support 26% Tend to oppose 15% Strongly oppose 13% Don’t know 13% (you/gov June 16, 2017) Fifty-nine percent supported this proposal, which is substantial. If one visits the comments section on the YouGov website one gets a different impression. Here there is evidence of resentment and disdain. Few respondents fully endorsed Jeremy Corbyn’s suggestion and several were concerned that his proposal smacked of communism. Among the handful of commentators, most thought it made more sense to use this money to rent out two Premier Inns. This would be more cost-effective, and some of the money could then be used toward building permanent housing. Given the difficulties in finding accommodation and the expense of housing in London, sympathy evaporated for some. It was felt that victims of this disaster should not get preferential treatment. One person suggested that they be housed in Lincolnshire to see how the rest of the country lives. Others expressed their contempt that some victims had turned down the housing

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offered because it would mean relocating themselves or their children. People felt that they should take what is offered. The suggestion that the victims should be housed in luxury flats triggered older arguments about welfare scroungers and preferential treatment of refugees. In the context of chronic shortages and costs of housing in London, signs of resentment were not uncommon. How does one square strong support for Corbyn’s suggestion of requisitioning unoccupied (foreign-owned) property with very several specific negative comments? Those who are strongly invested in a particular position, particularly a contrarian one, will take the time and energy to make detailed comments. While a healthy majority were spontaneously generous and sympathetic toward the victims, there was evidence of more complicated feelings: 28% opposed Corbyn’s statement about foreign property ownership and vacant luxury flats. Foreign ownership had created a spike in property prices, which made property ownership and housing difficult for locals. Most Londoners are angered by foreign ownership and unoccupied flats, but those who spent most of their income on housing would not readily identify with council residents or the idea of occupying someone’s private property. While there was significant support to relocate immigrants to luxury flats, some felt they shouldn’t be getting special privileges. These comments reflect some of the sentiments that Christian Peters and John Protevi identify, sentiments evident in Arlie Hochschild’s research on the Tea Party and Trump supporters in the USA (Peters and Protevi n.d.). Some British people see immigrants, refugees, and foreigners jumping the queue for social services or housing benefits. In fact, many believe foreign-born citizens and refugees should not have the same privileges and rights as the native-born. Nativist sentiments underpin populist movements in the USA and the UK but also inform anti-immigrant movements in Europe. This attests to the limitations of Ernesto Laclau’s optimism that right-wing populists could be recruited to forces of radical democracy. Relying on the antagonism between “the underdogs and the elite” to constitute a new democratic citizen is more complicated than what Laclau and Mouffe’s formalist logic allows. Corbyn’s strategy of using the binary of the “many versus the few” was sufficiently vague to have broad appeal, but it glossed over the complexity of political identities. The ontological belief in the transformative effect of desire as “lack” is complicated by the ontic (social/historical actuality) of sedimented anti-democratic practices and sensibilities. Corbyn pitted the privileged foreign property owners against the underdogs (the poor, underemployed, unemployed, and underclasses) all of whom have housing concerns. Yet this binary reinscribed and intensified differences among the many: the white Brits (nativists) believed they are entitled to housing, not refugees, immigrants, and foreigners. Also, many property owners were

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upper working class or middle class who spend a large percent of their incomes on private housing and would not identify with residents of social housing. This binary of the “underdog” and “those in power” didn’t capture the complexity of feelings. The working- or middle-class homeowners would not identify with the “underdog” or with the elites. While many of them would benefit from a robust welfare state, a state that makes their lives more livable, they did not see themselves as dependent upon state benefits, especially in our neoliberal times, where any form of state dependency has negative connotations. Hence this dichotomy (the few versus the many) did not build new political identities but ended up fueling nativism and resentment. This attests to the shortcoming of Laclau and Mouffe: relying upon emotionally laden rhetoric to create new political subjects must take into account more stable identities. Challenging earlier narratives – the case for investigative journalism

On the fire’s first anniversary Andrew O’Hagan, an investigative journalist, produced a detailed study of the fire. Having painstakingly interviewed fire inspectors, firemen, council members, social workers, activists, and the TMO, he claimed that the media were in a rush to find a villain and that they wrongly blamed the Conservative council, rather than the Conservative government. So far, I have shown how Social Othering tends to demonize racial minorities, the economically disadvantaged, and the socially marginal, but, in this case, the local council became the target of blame, and the residents were deemed victims of neglect and greed. O’Hagan’s work indicates how factual truths do not stand alone but are embedded in a narrative where unverified hypotheses and emotions have a role. His work also illustrates how reliable facts can challenge simple binaries and enlarge one’s understanding and possibly avoid emotional excesses which delude people. In this case, he scrutinized some of the facts and omissions to offer a more accurate account of blame. In doing so he draws attention to how journalists, in their speed and desire to tell a captivating story, drew false conclusions about the fire. This also attests to the feasibility and importance of more reliable facts in sustaining support for democratic movements over time. We (the journalists) wanted political scalps before the fire was out, even if it meant that the worst failures of the night would take a long time to be recognized. A game of political name-calling and blaming began, which appeared, for the better part of the coming year, to meet the needs of a world that demanded stock villains. (O’Hagan 2018)

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The government’s role was cynical from the start, though everyone missed this and blamed the local council. You saw it everywhere, channel 4 New, The Guardian, The Daily Mail, The New York Times. They began to turn the fire into a story they wanted it to be. . . . The tragedy wasn’t bad enough, it had to be augmented, facts couldn’t be gleaned quickly enough, and stories went without investigation, research. . . . In a world of perpetual commentary in which everyone and anyone is allowed their own facts, accusations stand as evidence. (O’Hagan 2018) On the morning of June 14, the action groups’ blog posted a statement that had been published six months previously. A fire had been narrowly averted in 2013, and concerns about complaints of terrifying power surges were not investigated. The residents posted this prescient blog, which was circulated and recirculated. “It is our conviction that a serious fire in a tower block or similar high-density residential property is the most likely reason that those who wield power at the KCTMO will be found out and brought to justice!” (O’Hagan 2018). However prophetic this accusation may have been, it seemed irrefutable after the fact, yet the fire had little to do with wiring or service vans blocking emergency vehicle access. There was no mention of the cladding or the absence of safety control measures which proved to be the major culprits of the fire. The relations between the tenant’s association and the council had been hostile for five years. The association complained about double glazing, air pollution, housing policy, gentrification, the Holland Park Opera, the school that was built across the street, and all Tory councilors. Denunciations on blog postings, emails, and Twitter were widespread. O’Hagan does not exonerate the council for their failure to ensure a safe building but does put into perspective the toxic relationship between the residence association and the council. Discrediting the general perception that the council was doing nothing to help the victims, he documents the work done by the local social workers and council workers. He found out that 340 staff were mobilized. People believed that local voluntary organizations and charities did all the work in the wake of the fire. Since many of these organizations “had been maintained, supported or set up by the council” (O’Hagan 2018), this judgment is misguided. The resident’s association reported that local council members were not there, and they even claimed that the leader did not show up for 14 hours. Since he was interviewed on-site in the early hours of the morning, this accusation was false. Also, the

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council social workers and officers were working 18 hours a day settling people in accommodations, buying supplies for families, taking family members to doctors’ appointments, getting their prescriptions filled, and even arranging for bringing family members over from Iran. The social workers expressed their exasperation as to how they were portrayed by the resident’s association and within the media – as remiss and neglectful. As social workers they reiterated their vocation and commitment to work with struggling people; they were hardly indifferent, as the press had characterized them. Nicholas Peyton Brown (council leader) and Rock Feilding-Mellen (deputy leader of the council) were blamed for the fire. Since they were spending all their time helping the victims, O’Hagan claims, they did not go back through hundreds of emails of the resident’s associations and action groups to see how they had responded to their complaints. They failed to defend themselves, but they were not without blame. When interviewed by BBC at 3:45 a.m. about the advice given to people to stay in their flats, Peyton-Brown said, “[T]he council will always ensure that its own properties are inspected by the fire services and high standards are met.” After the fact it was clear that fire inspections had failed, high safety standards were not met and there was no effort to address the failed fire hazards. His rhetoric was defensive and basically false. O’Hagan’s in-depth report attests to the problems of staging the event in terms of villains and heroes: it obscures facts that complicate a simple binary and fuels strong feelings of anger, which may be displaced. Although O’Hagan challenged the simplistic blaming of the local Conservative council, he did not exonerate the Conservative Party. He acknowledged the neoliberal context within which the event took place increased the risk of disaster. Thirty-plus years of the Conservative Party’s deregulation and privatization practices have had dramatic effects. He also addressed the failures of the council, the architects, and the suppliers of the cladding that authorized the use of this combustible material and the failures of the council to take seriously failed fire inspections. The TMO had asked for “good prices and a savings” in the refurbishment. The use of aluminum panels instead of zinc meant almost 300,000.00 pounds of sterling were saved (O’Hagan 2018). The fact that no inspector stepped into question this choice of material was a consequence of privatizing housing services. A former council’s building control officer reported that “20 years ago he would have been obliged to investigate its flammability” but today independent inspectors “lacked competence and confidence” and were hesitant to challenge approval for “fear of losing future work” (O’Hagan 2018). This highlights some of the problems of privatization; blame was not any individual’s fault but was systemic: a consequence of privatization and

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austerity programs that had undermined the infrastructure that preserved health and safety in public housing. This leads us to reflect upon Bennett and Connolly’s approach to dispersed agency. Applying vital materialism to the event: confederate agency and human responsibility

In this section, I will “apply” the ontology of immanent naturalism and confederate agency to the Grenfell Tower disaster. Reflecting upon the Black Out of 2003, Jane Bennett uses the term “confederate agency” to explore the agency of a human and nonhuman assemblage. For her government policy, corporate greed, a consumer culture, as well as flows of electrons, fires, and material actants all participated in this event (Bennett 2010, 28). As a monist thinker, Bennett refuses to discriminate between human and nonhuman matter: it was the intra-action of the human and nonhuman, “a smarm of vitalities at play” (Bennett 2010, 31–32) that caused the event. For Bennett things are social actants: “they produce effects and affects.” “They alter the course of events by their action. They may allow, encourage, authorize, influence, block, and/or suggest” (quoted in Coole 2013, 459). Denying the distinctiveness of human action, she presumes “agency arises in cracks, folds, fractures, non-coincidences, relationality, encounters that endow matter with internal effulgence” (quoted in Coole 2013, 459). These descriptives do not help us understand the socioeconomic factors that lead to the fire. In order to respect contingency and human and nonhuman assemblages that enabled the fire, theorists of confederate agency (Bennett and Connolly) would cite faulty fire doors, fire equipment shortages, damaged vents, and ventilation systems, failed fire inspections, gross management and negligence, and years of underfunded public housing as all contributing to this raging inferno. Seeing the tragedy from this perspective does not hierarchize causes or correlations, nor does it facilitate the attribution of guilt. Not all elements (human and nonhuman) are equally effective. Since Connolly tries to respect the indeterminacy of assemblages, he produces a shopping list of how things and humans might fit together. In seeing things as self-organizing and humans partaking of this organization, he significantly reduces human effectivity and responsibility. Since vital materialists believe (humans and) nonhumans are lively matter, change is immanent and generative. However, since inanimate things don’t have motives or the capacity to reflect a reason to increase their efficacy or transform their life, they are distinct from humans. Echoing Diana Coole (2013) I am concerned about granting things agency. Granted things are social actants, they have effects; yet they are lacking the stronger forms

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of agency associated with humans who have motives, powers of reflexivity, and responsibility. So contrary to Bennett’s and Connolly’s monist assumptions, I believe humans are not different in degree but are different in kind from nonhuman matter. While there were various material factors at play in the fire (the flammable cladding, the combustible insulation, short fire hoses) human negligence and cost savings were crucial. Lax government regulation, austerity measures, and corporate greed contributed to the fire’s occurrence. These practices are associated with neoliberal governing strategies that have involved the application of market criteria to public services. The desire of Connolly and Bennett to avoid causality leaves them short on explanatory power. In fact, by failing to distinguish human and nonhuman actants, Bennett ends up expressing her sympathy for the corporate executives in 2003 who are blamed but were not responsible for the brownout. Of course, the CEOs were not the sole agent or actants for there were multiple factors that contributed to the brownout. But as CEOs of a public service, they were responsible for providing a reliable and safe electrical supply system and failed to do so. Their actions and failure to act reflect a strong sense of agency which things are incapable of. To maximize corporate profit, they neglected the advice of regulators who previously suggested infrastructural investments were necessary to provide a reliable service. They opted for a cheap, unreliable service that put people’s safety at risk. Gross human negligence was not only a factor in the Black Out of 2003 but is a primary factor in this catastrophe. The inquiry is still underway, yet the culprit, the installation of flammable cladding and insulation, have already been identified. The details of its installation and culpability of the building managers, the council, the engineers, and the architects are not yet fully revealed, though it appears they all wished to get the job done as cheaply as possible. The Tory councilors and the Chelsea and Kensington Tenant Management Corporation’s desire to economize on the renovations disregarded concerns for public safety. Granted Bennett has a point: the cladding is a social actant; it had effects, but we cannot overlook the significant contribution of humans who made these dangerous choices to buy, negligently install, and fail to check this inferior material. This management decision makes total sense in terms of neoliberal practices which vilified regulation in the name of profit, efficiency, and market freedom. Yet the general contempt for people in public housing fueled the attitude that they were lesser humans and didn’t count. Their complaints which were confirmed by fire inspections were not heeded, and their bodies were deemed disposable. These factors figured into the diminished capacity of the resident’s association and activists to effect the change that was required to ensure a safe building.

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A new collective subject fails to emerge

Having explored the feelings and messages communicated by the mass media, I will try to determine if the usual feelings of contempt for people on benefits were altered by witnessing their tragedy. Was the fear often associated with foreigners translated into a more general and sustained feeling of generosity and solidarity with them? Did these spontaneous feelings of compassion have more permanent implications? Did they promote democratic sensibilities and emotional reorientation? As I noted before many of the residents of Grenfell Tower were recent immigrants, former refugees, and people who a year earlier were perceived as stealing jobs and depleting the ever-diminishing social services of the British born. Did this event generate new political identities and political alliances? Were they capable of shifting political perceptions and affiliations? Did new political identities get constituted in the wake of this catastrophic event? Consistent with Sara Ahmed’s idea that critical inquiry contributes to emotional reorientation, I’ve argued that a deepened understanding of the situation is a necessary ingredient in shifting one’s feelings and transforming one’s political commitments. Hence, I’ve coined the term “affective reflexivity.” Political mobilization relies on not only fears but strong beliefs (that public housing was mismanaged, fire services were unreliable, and health and safety measures disregarded) confirming that the residents were wronged. Laclau presumes a grievance; an unfulfilled demand produces new identities enabling a redefinition of the people. Lisa Disch (2021) concurs believing that political representatives do not represent preexisting constituencies but rather are engaged in creating new ones. I take up the middle ground that recognizes the salience of representative premises and constructivist ones. Political representatives engage existing social constituencies and participate in the construction of new political identities. In addition, while visceral feelings and amorphous forces can disrupt existing attitudes, emotions are situated, and neoliberal ideas, existing political identities, and institutional practices cannot be ignored. Urging a realistic assessment of the situation avoids the naive optimism that comes with the assumption that new identities are continually being created and are unhampered by preexisting social inequalities and identities. While it is reasonable to assume indeterminate meanings and amorphous affects may create new identities, it is worth exploring if it was relevant in this case. Two new groups spawned in the wake of the fire: Grenfell4justice and Survivors. Affective events were numerous: public protests, vigils, and walks marked the event and fostered affective solidarity. These strategies kept the event alive. Stronger alliances with housing activists, the local Labour Party, and concerned citizens were made. The existing resident’s

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association gained further support in the aftermath. Many occupants who had not been active members joined. These and other advocates for social justice were a constant presence at council meetings. The government made some effort to respond to their grievances. They set up the Hackitt review to deal with building regulations and fire safety. Its mandate was to ensure a robust regulatory system and safe buildings and offered a guarantee that residents’ concerns would be addressed going forward. A public inquiry was also established to determine responsibility and liability. New coalitions and richer networks of activists and movements extended the event and kept their grievances alive. Nevertheless, the inquiry is incomplete after five and a half years. To pursue the logic of Ernesto Laclau: did their grievances, and their desire for justice, become hegemonic? Did it become a rallying call for others who were reliant upon every diminishing public service? All the hallmarks of successful coalitions between underdogs and elite were evident: robust publicity in the public sphere shored up this binary, and the idea of public safety was compelling. Yet were the activists, members of the Labour Party, and resident groups able to inspire a new collective subject with a democratic aspiration and voice? Most British citizens presume that health and safety regulations are respected, and reliable building inspections are made. In the Grenfell fire case this clearly was not the case. The fire department was in disarray due to austerity measures: their equipment was inadequate; their staff were unfamiliar with the layout or material of the building; hence, they should not have insisted upon “stay put” orders. It took hours for them to extinguish the fire, and lives were lost. Would not the witnessing of this disaster caused by poorly coordinated fire services, insufficient hosing, and a failure on the part of the fire department to know the composition of the cladding prompt alarm? Further, did not the publicity of lax inspection, corporate greed, and shoddy management of the building prompt rethinking of the need for improved health and safety standards? These revelations in addition to the feelings cultivated by the fire should have engendered a thoughtful response. People were moved by this horrific event and were increasingly apprised of the violations of health and safety standards and the failings of the fire services, yet they did not appear to support more government regulation. In the wake of the disaster, it was also revealed that many private buildings have installed this inflammable cladding. This revelation should have produced popular support for the more rigorous enforcement of health and safety standards. However, again the private property owners and council flat residents were divided. Their division was aggravated by the fact that private residents were going to pay for the cladding’s removal and replacement whereas the council flat residents

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would not. A few Conservative MPs felt this was unfair, though legislation was passed, which required private property owners to pay to replace this dangerous cladding. Though very recently the Conservative government has back-tracked, they have accepted fault for the disaster and instructed contractors to enter contracts to replace the flammable cladding in private properties. Yet it is not at all clear that the homeowners won’t have to foot the bill. Thinking beyond this fire to larger frames of reference would have involved reflecting upon the need for regulation to ensure health and safety standards were maintained. This would have entailed the public to switch allegiance from the party of deregulation – the Conservative Party – to the party of regulation, infrastructure, and social spending – the Labour Party, or alternatively supporting the claims of housing activists. But this did not happen in 2017, 2018, or 2019. Perhaps would such experiences accumulate and would help construct a new democratic subject in the future? Yet, as of 2023, this has not happened. Despite the local council’s disastrous decision to use this flammable material and the failings of the management team to provide a reliable refurbishment plan, one would expect that the Conservatives to be defeated a year after the fire. Yet they were re-elected. Shock, horror, and sympathy for the victims did not de-legitimize Conservative support and translate into support for the Labour Party or the Liberal Democrats. While the Grenfell Tower fire generated compassion and people offered donations and briefly volunteered their services, it appears their feelings and actions were temporary and failed to reorient them emotionally and alter their long-standing party loyalties. The difference between the 2018 and 2014 election results in this borough was minuscule: in 2014, there were 37 Conservatives, 12 Labour, and 1 liberal democrat. The only difference in 2018 was in St Helen’s ward, the site of the Grenfell disaster, one Conservative councilor was replaced by a Labour one. While the survivors were struck by the abundant support and care offered by the local and greater community, the acts of generosity did not translate into undermining loyalty to the Conservative Party. This pattern of behavior illustrates how unsettling experiences could have immediate visceral affects and even temporarily alter one’s mode of being in the world, but this does not necessarily lead to long-lasting changes. Furthermore, Dish’s constructivist assumptions have some salience: the event allowed representatives to construct new political identities, yet party loyalties and preexisting identities were more stable than assumed. In the wake of the fire and the dreadful conduct of the Conservative Party, there was a modest shift in Conservative attitudes and practices. Almost half of the previous Conservative councilors decided not to run in

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the election. Ms. Campbell said the election had brought in a whole array of new faces; she hopes it will “refresh and the renew” the local Tory party. She added: “We also recognise that all of us in Kensington and Chelsea live in the shadow of Grenfell. And Grenfell was, Grenfell is, and Grenfell will be our first priority.” “I think we all recognise we still need to rebuild trust. And to do that we need to earn trust. And we need to earn it day by day and by our actions, not just by our words” (Farand 2018). Although loyal Conservatives did not abandon the party, it appears that this horrendous event threatened the legitimacy of Tory councilors. Within a week of the fire, the Conservative government announced that about 250 Grenfell survivors would be rehoused as social tenants in 68 flats of a luxury development in South Kensington purchased by the City of London Corporation (Editor of The Economist 2017). Although housing the residents in luxury apartments was a contentious move, the government had to restore confidence – to reassure the public all 600 public housing buildings were inspected to reassure the residents’ safety. Seventyfive of these failed the combustibility test, and residents were relocated in order that work would be done to pass this test. This revelation was both shocking and reassuring. The discourse of “underdogs” versus “those in power” and the press’ rhetorical strategy did not appear to have much success in constituting “a new people” as Laclau would have hoped. At this point in time, this claim hasn’t been able to capture the imagination of the many and defeat of the Conservative Party geared to slashing public spending and allowing for the construction of dangerous buildings. But the inquiry is not complete, and other similar disasters that highlight the differences between the treatment of the wealthy and majority may succeed at constituting a new subject. Although Theresa May’s leadership suffered, her fall in popularity was not significantly tied to the fire. In the run-up to the election of 2016, Theresa May’s popularity declined significantly at the same time that Jeremy Corbyn’s rose. In 2018 that gap had narrowed. So, despite talk of a shift in attitudes around social spending, this didn’t yet seem to have the effects anticipated. Interest in Grenfell Tower seems to have been eclipsed by Brexit. Despite the government’s incompetence and inability to conclude a deal, the Tories remained in power and commanded support in the country. The Labour Party was not able to capitalize on the Tories’ predicament, in part because of deep divisions over Brexit within Labour voters. The center was not recruited under Corbyn’s leadership to constitute the kind of progressive populism on the left that Mouffe believes possible. This has much to do with Corbyn’s diffident position in Europe as well as his aspirations to renationalize major industries.2 Charges of anti-Semitism also plagued

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his election campaign of 2019. Many potential supporters in the south of England voted to “Remain” or wanted a soft Brexit, as did the Scots and Irish, yet English Northerners supported “Leave”. This outcome draws attention to a shortcoming of the theses of Laclau, Mouffe, and Disch. Seeing the catastrophe as dissensual constituting new political identities, and presuming those identities would mobilize new forms of agency are an abstract formulation that did not apply in this case. Though new meanings and feelings may emerge, yet older political affiliations are not always displaced; in fact, many are difficult to displace. Also, the effective agency has to do with preconditions that may or may not facilitate democratic mobilization. While rhetoric and passion have effects, they are temporary and hence are unreliable, unless they are linked to trusted democratic or social movements. In 2018/2019 the Brexit deal had dominated the British press, eclipsing attention to the Grenfell Tower fire. The inquiry had been ongoing: victims have been interviewed, 68 contractors and innumerable officials were being interrogated, and the proceedings were being podcast. But who was following the podcasts? Apart from journalists, officials, local activists, and members of the immediate community, the fire was no longer in people’s minds. So, to summarize, the Grenfell tragedy has not served as a catalyst to address social inequalities, nor did new political subjectivities emerge. Locally, people remained rooted in older political affiliations, and the tragedy was eclipsed by the larger national issue of Brexit, where party political positions produced political stasis and confusion. Brexit is also a more expansive and long-term issue affecting people’s economic well-being and hence generated more news and attention. Attending to larger frames of reference

As I have argued, the attention of radical democrats to flux and contestation tends to ignore the impact of more stable identities and neoliberal governing strategies. To understand the effects of this event and the power of emotions more fully, one must understand the historical context and give socioeconomic relations their due. In the first part of this section, I will offer a counter-example, where rhetoric was effective in catalyzing new subjectivities, and former Labour voters supported the Conservative Party in 2019. In the second part I  deal with how neoliberal governing strategies threatened democratic practices. In the final part I will explore the social structural or sedimented relations which sustained neoliberalism and impeded radical democratic change.

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The effects of Brexit – ignoring economic interests

While I’ve argued that one should not dismiss the importance of interest and reason in political mobilization or exaggerate the power of emotion, however, the election of Boris Johnson provides a counter-example. Despite the threats to public safety (i.e., the installation of dangerous cladding, a diminished fire service, and the delivery of dangerous water by private company Thames Water), Boris Johnson was able to capitalize on the population’s weariness around Brexit. After three years of discussions and debates on Brexit and several failed deals, people were weary of further discussion. They wanted a resolution. Boris Johnson’s mantra “to get the job done” resonated with the undecided voters and even managed to gain the support of Labour voters. For the first time in their lives, some Northern Labour voters voted for Conservatives.3 Even though they had been warned of the financial implications, they were attracted by the call to reclaim Britain’s autonomy and were not persuaded by Corbyn’s intentions to nationalize some public utilities. Renowned journalists from around the world waded in on Brexiteers’ belief that Britain would be able to recuperate its former relations with commonwealth countries, but all were very pessimistic. Yet the idea that Britain would regain its former glory and rule its own house seems to have been a compelling idea. In addition to feelings of post-imperial nostalgia, part of the attraction of the Brexit imaginary was the reduction of costs associated with bureaucracy. Cutting ties with the big government in Brussels would replenish the coffers of the National Health Service (NHS), or so Brexiters promised. As Brexit deals were envisioned, it became clear that even more bureaucracy and more detailed procedures would have to be put in place to satisfy multinational production. Small- and medium-sized businesses have been unable to survive given new regulations, and some have had to open offices in Europe. Instead of reducing bureaucracy it has increased. Sadly, the Labour Party had not interrogated Conservative rhetoric more rigorously before the vote in 2016. The rhetoric of reclaiming control of the economy and state may have been appealing to many, but it is not realistic in the context of Britain’s global economy. Here emotional reflexivity or the ability to reappraise one’s feelings and reconsider one’s judgment considering strong arguments did not happen. The majority were more attracted by the idea of “going it alone” than sound arguments against Brexit. In part the election of 2019 confirms the significance of contagious feelings and contingency; the Conservative affirmation to “get the deal done” became hegemonic. Yet it challenges Mouffe’s optimism that the right can be drawn into supporting radical democracy of the left. In fact, the Labour Party in 2019 offered the strongest platform for radical

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change for decades which failed to capture the imagination of not only right-wing nationalists but also traditional Labour Party voters. The power of neoliberal governing strategies – the demise of democratic practices

The discourses that endorse deregulation have dominated the scene in the UK for the last 40 years. For radical change to come from Grenfell, these sentiments and their arguments must be contested and disproven. Even though the visceral memory of the fire persists in the minds of many, political transformation is structurally impeded. Since the 1980s the rhetoric of the Tory party has been neoliberal, persistently relying upon a critique of the social democratic state for overregulating the lives of citizens and corporations. Thatcher’s term “the nanny state” encapsulated this sentiment.4 Tory rhetoric presumed that the welfare state turned citizens into dependent children and shackled corporations making them uncompetitive. Furthermore, the discourse around deregulation supplemented the other strongly believed “truth” in the benefits of the free market. The problems with the Labour Party on the eve of Margaret Thatcher’s victory were captured in the refrain: “The Winter of Discontent.” Unionized workers (from garbage men to gravediggers) were portrayed as holding the country hostage; uncompetitive nationalized industry and big government interfered in business practices making people dependent on the state. Neoliberal practices offered the solution: privatizing, deregulation, and breaking the unions were the order of the day. Over 40 years, these practices have become hegemonic and are not easy to uproot: they are supported by law, institutional policies, and governing practices. Furthermore, the ideas that inspire neoliberalism – the free market, the sovereign individual, and responsibility – are compelling. No one wants to feel they are dependent upon the state. When New Labour was elected in 1997, it did not dramatically depart from neoliberal governing strategies. They put more money into health care, education, and social services, but they did not renationalize industries or return to their activist and egalitarian commitments. They also tapped into the idea that public services ought to be subject to market forces. They introduced Quango’s not-for-profit corporate/private partnerships that would oversee the provision of social services. They called for a lean and effective state, resonating with the ideals of the neoliberal minimal state, ensuring that market-friendly policies would inform the delivery of social services. Council houses had been sold off in the Thatcher years and scant few resources were put into social housing needs. Existing council housing was overseen by these Quango’s (private/ public partnerships) that were to administer council housing. These were

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supposed to be arm’s-length management structures (ALMS). Interestingly visiting the site of Grenfell Tower in August 2017, one noticed a “wanted” poster for one of the members of the ALMS, a contractor, who had a commercial connection to the company that provided the cladding. Hardly an arm’s-length relation! The Hackitt Review set up to assess the fire services and reassure the public made 50 recommendations. I  will point to two in particular: that contractors should not pick their own inspectors for building inspection. Presumably the violation of this policy allowed this dangerous cladding and insulation to be installed by inspectors who were wary of losing future contracts. Furthermore, it was recommended that the management structure must listen to tenants’ complaints. The resident’s association bitterly complained about infractions around health and safety issues, yet they were continually ignored. Leaked letters show how ministers were repeatedly warned that fire regulations were not keeping people safe and that people living in high-rise blocks such as Grenfell Tower were “at risk” (Boyle 2017). The inquiry reveals the importance of protecting and enhancing existing democratic institutions in addition to being more responsive to the resident’s association. The revelation of these facts could have supplemented the feelings of compassion for the victims of the fire. But not only will a sea change in political attitudes be necessary, but confidence in a political movement that can and will make a difference is required. Given the electoral success of the Conservative Party, it appears this horrific event did not shift the position of the uncommitted center or the alt-right toward a more interventionist state. While democratic sensibilities were cultivated for the victims and the voices of anti-poverty and housing activists enhanced (Koksal 2017), this has not produced significant policy changes yet. Nevertheless, anger and discontentment with the Conservative government policy might accumulate – a tipping point might be reached – and the middle classes and working classes might be radicalized. By focusing on rhetoric in the mass media and opinions in the wake of the event, one has the impression that political dispositions are volatile. As I  have argued elsewhere in this book emotions are promiscuous, but also to understand their democratic potential, one must understand their concrete context. Many who might have felt empathy for the residents of Grenfell Tower were angered that some of the victims refused housing that had been offered them (because of their distance from work or schools). Those who are unable to qualify for housing benefits and spend 80% of their income on private housing were equally infuriated that the council had put them up in expensive flats or paid for oversea relatives to comfort them. Since private property owners are being forced to pay for recladding of their homes, another impediment is being created between them and

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residents of public housing. Witnessing this horrific fire and its disastrous effects prompted compassion for the victims, yet their emotional reorientation was thwarted by their inability to support emergent or existing forces of change. Solidarity for the victims was countered by resentment that the policies spawned. These negative feelings obstructed the creation of a new constituency and the mobilization of the working and middle classes around issues of public safety. Again, in the spirit of Judith Butler’s belief that political agency has social conditions of existence, I have argued that attitudes, existing institutions, and social location factor into political agency. Not only is the deep-seated contempt for welfare recipients difficult to dissipate, but the austerity measures introduced in 2010 have made the lives of the precarious more unlivable limiting their political voices. Neoliberal ideology and practices remain largely intact: the idea that public housing institutions should follow a business model with market governance and the idea of regulation as inhibiting business are rarely challenged. Jeremy Corbyn challenged them; he proposed plans to renationalize Thames Water in his election campaign. Yet despite the evidence – that this private water provider seriously mismanaged water supplies, threatening public health – he lost the election. Not only are stronger and emotionally rich counter-narratives needed to circulate and persuade people, but legislation like the 3–1 policy must be repealed if these discourses are to be effective. Consistent with deregulation and free market ideology, David Cameron introduced a one-in-three out-policy, targeted to cut red tape and free up corporations to be more competitive. No government department can introduce new laws that impose a cost to business unless it can repeal a law that cuts costs 3x’s that amount (Tombs and Whyte 2018). This piece of legislation is not about saving money that goes to paper shuffling but helps big businesses cut corners and makes the passage of new environmental or health and safety legislation and laws that would protect citizens difficult. This law definitely serves the interest of business and not the majority of citizens. In order to improve corporate accountability and strengthen democratic practices, this legislation ought to be repealed. The Grenfell fire attests to the failure of new public management schemes that replaced the public provision of services. Although there is a veneer of social responsibility: housing departments are outsourced to not-for-profit companies, and arm’s-length management structures are guided by market criteria. Directors are supposed to be impartial but often have their own interests that conflict with the interests of the many. Also, they are paid large salaries, which is a burden to the taxpayer and members of the boards. As the inquiry has recently shown the housing management team were grossly negligent – consistently failing fire inspections and failing to

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rectify the infractions identified. Building control and safety functions are outsourced to private and not-for-profit companies that offer services more cheaply, but they do so by paying workers much less and paying less attention to health and safety regulations. Given the savage cuts to local council budgets under David Cameron’s austerity budget in 2016 these expensive salaries mean that less money is available to provide social services (Tombs and Whyte 2018). Again, this attests to the need to ensure that existing institutions are effective in preserving democratic practices. In this case the management scheme hindered the provision of safe public housing. The consequences of outsourcing or the carving up of the functions, a practice of these private/public partnerships, will become clearer in the second stage of the inquiry. Given there were 68 contracting companies involved in the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower, how will responsibility, guilt, and liability be determined? For the inquiry to proceed, a compromise had to be reached: to get to the truth of the matter, it was agreed that the details revealed will not be used in criminal proceedings. This did not please Justice4Grenfell. In addition, a law passed by David Cameron in 2007 further problematizes corporate responsibility. “The Corporate Man Slaughter and Homicide Act” gave a blanket exemption to directors and senior officials of corporations. So, the CEOs or directors of these companies will not be culpable for manslaughter. In the end, will it not be the council who will be fined? And the taxpayers will bear the burden of the compensation. The first stage of the inquiry was completed on October 30, 2019. Martin Moore-Bick was appointed chair of the second stage “as soon as he announced that he would be seeking answers rather than taking dictation from those with passionate feelings, he was dismissed as a ‘posh white guy’ (Ford and Baker 2017). The community said he had “the wrong background.”5 There was some mention that the community would stage their own independent inquiry. On the advice of Teresa May two members from the local community were appointed to the committee of investigation. The first part of the inquiry was concluded in October 2019, and the second part was suspended due to COVID-19 in March 2020. To what extent were the grievances and claims of the resident’s association, community, and activists met? This awaits the conclusion of the inquiry. Yet many of the residents felt vindicated by the findings during the first stage. It was determined that the cladding that was installed broke building regulations. There were also systemic and personnel problems with the fire department: they failed to carry out rescues and were reluctant to evacuate the building when it became apparent that the apartments were not compartmentalized. They were not aware that the material of the building was combustible or apprised of the structure of the apartments and hence

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unprepared to tackle the fire. There has been some pushback from the firemen and activists, who felt the inadequacy of the fire service was connected to the loss of 600 jobs (Booth and Bowcott 2019). More than a decade of Conservative austerity measures meant personnel were inadequate and poorly trained. Though there are many recommendations, more will follow when the second stage of the inquiry is complete. In the second stage, the management team, the architects, engineers, and producers of the cladding (Arconic) and insulation (Celotex and Kingspan) will be interrogated for their role in the fire. How was it that flammable cladding materials were installed? Emails between the management team, the council, and the architects suggest that aesthetics and cost were major concerns, and safety was not named as a priority (Akehurst 2017). The resident’s association were happy to have the inquiry determine that the cladding installed had broken building code, producing an unsafe building. They were equally pleased that attention to the failures of the firemen, as well as the under resourced fire services, was made. Hopefully not only these will help determine guilt, but the publication of these findings will contribute to further citizen’s understanding of mismanagement and corruption. The second stage of the inquiry was suspended due to COVID-19 several times. Before the last suspension there was a lot of mutual blame. The architect of Grenfell Tower claimed that the council’s priorities were cost and aesthetics. The firm responsible for the refurbishment admitted they did not read building regulations aimed at preventing cladding fires and had no idea that panels used to insulate buildings could be combustible. The CEO of the Sounes, the architectural firm, told the inquiry it was the responsibility of the council’s building control department to check on compliance, and other expert consultants were expected to advise. The inquiry also heard that they manipulated its fees to avoid the contract being put out to open tender. At the request of the tower’s landlord, KCTMO, Sounes deferred charging some of its fees so the threshold that would have obliged the client of the council-owned block to issue an open tender was not met. Under EU procurement rules, known as OJEU, public works above a certain threshold must be put out to open tender. They admitted it would not have been selected for the job in competition because it had no experience in dealing with high-rises or over-cladding works (Booth 2020). When the second stage of the inquiry resumed in November  2020, two companies that provided the cladding were questioned. Both Arconic (a giant multinational) and Celotex were aware of the poor performance of the product before it was installed in Grenfell Tower. In France the cladding had been reclassified as Class E ranking due to testing failures. The company still advertised the cladding as obtaining Class B ranking, yet executives claimed they were keen to target markets “with national

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regulations that are not as restrictive.” Celotex, another provider, rigged a key large-scale safety test: introducing noncombustible panels, reducing the gaps between panels, and adding fire-resistant boards around monitors. They gave the cladding the best chance of passing6 (Apps 2020). They also put a 22-year-old business studies student, who knew nothing about fire regulations, in charge of the testing process. In April  2022 Minister Pickels admitted that he sat on recommendations from a 2014 report that suggested serious changes had to be made to ensure public safety in council buildings due to a similar fire in Lakanal House. He alluded to the fact that it was out of step with the spirit of austerity and deregulation. Even though the inquiry is incomplete, a major corporate scandal has been revealed, and there is no single perpetrator. While the agency is distributed, as Jane Bennett claims, government policy, the TMO, the local council, the architects, firemen, and corporations are all culpable. In contrast to attributing agency to things, responsibility lies with humans. Negligence, greed, and fraud are crucial. In addition, the failure of public safety measures has to do with decades of neoliberal governing strategies and more restrictive austerity measures where laws protect CEOs and management teams encouraging profit above the safety of public housing The failure of activist groups to mobilize and create a new constituency had much to do with their inability to build a successful counter-hegemonic opposition, which had to do with the stable identities (loyalties of the middle classes) as well as the contingent factor – the overwhelming desire to get Brexit done. While populist thinkers and new materialists focus on gut reactions and emotional self-interest in mobilizing radical democratic forces, they risk denying the impact of preexisting identities and an analysis of the situation within which emotional reorientation takes place. Even if people are fearful, or prone to resentment, they are not necessarily unmoved by considering their economic self-interest, reasoned argument, or verified evidence. The facts revealed during these inquiries and the thoughtful work of Andrew O’Hagan are worth taking on board. Disclosing the extent of corporate negligence, institutional failure of the fire brigade, and corruption are shocking. As the effects of deregulation impact people directly, whether they are private property owners or residents of council properties, one remains hopeful that the rhetoric of deregulation, the free market, and individual liberty will become increasingly specious. This monstrous event brought visibility to social inequalities and dangers to public safety. But to alter popular attitudes, neoliberal beliefs in deregulation and the free market must be engaged and countered. This horrific event may have catalyzed emotional reorientation, toward the victims and residents of the fire, but it did so only temporarily and did not lead to questioning one’s political identity. Becoming aware of how Quango operated in this context, how

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corporate responsibility was dodged by hiring an inexperienced student, how contractors avoided health and safety regulations as well as how EU guidelines were mitigated can have an effect, not necessarily immediately but possibly in the long term. While feelings have been neglected by political scientists and political theorists in the past, too much attention to this visceral register ignores the importance of critical thinking and the need to engage macropolitical realities to be effective in fostering democratic processes. While emotional reorientation would have been beneficial in consolidating coalitions between council housing residents and the private property owners struggling for safe public buildings, in this case, stable political identities, deep-seated neoliberal governing strategies, and their complementary ideas impeded a new political subject representing public safety from emerging. Recently, Secretary of State Michael Gove, Conservative “Minister for Levelling Up,” has admitted some responsibility for the fire: claiming lax regulations were partly to blame for Grenfell. This admission marks a dramatic shift in attitude. Since only 7% of dangerous homes have had their cladding replaced, and leaseholders (private owners) have been stung with more than 200,000 pounds sterling for fixing something they were not responsible for, the government has decided to act. It has been reported that 90% of the leaseholders claim their mental health has been seriously eroded and 23% have reported suicidal thoughts. These property owners are in a bind: they cannot sell their property, nor can they afford to pay for fixing the cladding. Gove has given 49 housing developers six weeks to sign a contract to fix safety defects and replace the dangerous cladding or lose their licenses, but residents want assurance that they won’t have to pay (Editor of The Guardian February 5, 2023). You might ask, what has triggered this dramatic turnaround in Conservative Party policy? It is critically trailing in the polls, and many of these leaseholders (small property owners) are loyal Conservatives. Notes 1 The ideal of communicative action, where people’s deliberation is guided by rules of logic and public reason, and the belief that approaching consensus was at least possible, has been challenged by agonistic thinkers who endorse the role of affect (gut feelings) agonism and pluralized identities. 2 Since Brexit appealed to many traditional Labour supporters in the North (often those left behind by globalization) it was difficult for Corbyn to endorse “Remain,” which was popular among urban Labour voters since he supported a more autonomous socialist Britain. 3 Many of the northerners who voted for the Conservative Party in 2018 no longer support them. If an election was held on February 15, 2023, 47% of the

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population would vote for Labour and 24% would vote for Conservative Party. www.statista.com/statistics/985764/voting-intention-in-the-uk/ 4 This term is still used among Conservatives. Tory Backbenchers opposed Boris Johnson’s program of mandatory masking and restrictions on personal freedom as evidence of the “nanny state” (BBC world service. December 14, 2021). 5 See Ford, Anna and Amanda Baker. Sir Martin Moore-Bick was designated head of the inquiry. Given their “gargantuan loses” he hoped the inquiry would eventually provide a “small measure of solace” for victims’ families. Many condemned him for his class insensitivity.

References Agerholm, Harriet. 2018. “Grenfell Tower Failed Two Fire Inspections Before the Fire.” The Independent, August  9. www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/homenews/grenfell-tower-failed-safety-inspections-before-fire-a8483151.html. Akehurst, Nathan. 2017. “Developers (How Developers Can Get Away with Murder).” Open Democracy, September  26. www.opendemocracy.net/ uk/nathan-akehurst/developers-can-get-away-with-murder-interview-withkensington-s-emma-dent-coad. Apps, Peter. 2020. “The Most Shocking Moments from the Grenfell Tower Inquiry  in 2020.” The Spectator, December  29. www.spectator.co.uk/article/ eight-shocking-moments-from-the-grenfell-tower-inquiry-in-2020. Azoulay, Ariella. 2008. The Civil Contract of Photography. Brooklyn, NY: Zone Books. Bennett, Jane. 2010. Vibrant Matter- A Political Ecology of Things. Durham: Duke University Press. Booth, Robert. 2020. “Architect Admits He Did Not Read the Fire Cladding Regulations.” The Guardian, March 3. www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/mar/03/ grenfell-tower-firm-set-fees-to-avoid-contract-going-out-to-tender-inquiry. Booth, Robert and Owen Bowcott. 2019. “The Grenfell Tower Inquiry Chair’s Findings Far.” The Guardian, October  30. www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/ oct/30/grenfell-tower-inquiry-chair-findings-so-far-firefighters. Boyle, Danny. Grenfell Tower Firefighters. 2017. “Grenfell Tower firefighters Put Out Fridge Blaze and Were Just Leaving When Flats Erupted in Flames.” The Telegram, June  20. www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/20/ grenfell-tower-firefighters-put-fridge-blaze-just-leaving-flats/. Butler, Judith. 2004. Precarious Life: The Power of Mourning and Violence. London: Verso. ———. 2015. Notes Towards a Performative Theory of Assembly. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Coole, Diana, 2013. “Agentic Capacities and Capacious Historical Materialism; Thinking with New Materialisms in the Political Sciences.” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 41 (3): 451–469. Disch, Lisa Jane. 2021. Making Constituencies: Representation as Mobilization in Mass Democracy. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. Editor of The Economist. 2017. “The Ramifications of the Grenfell Tower Fire Continue to Spread.” July  24. www.economist.com/britain/2017/06/24/ the-ramifications-of-the-grenfell-tower-fire-continue-to-spread.

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Editor of The Guardian. 2023. “The Guardian View on the Cladding Scandal: Tough Talk Must be Matched with Substance.” February 5. www.theguardian. com/commentisfree/2023/feb/05/the-guardian-view-on-the-cladding-scandaltough-talk-must-be-matched-with-substance. Farand, Chloe. 2018. “Tories Keep Hold of Kensington Chelsea Council Elections Despite Outrage Over Grenfell Tower Tragedy.” The Independent, May  4. www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/kensington-chelsea-council-electionresults-tories-conservatives-grenfell-tower-tragedy-a8335786.html. Ford, Anna and Amanda Baker. 2017. Local Community Should Set Up Their Own Grenfell Tower Inquiry in The Guardian, September  17. www.theguardian. com/uk-news/2017/sep/17/local-community-should-set-up-their-owngrenfell-fire-inquiry. Koksal, Izzy. 2017 “How Housing Activists are Challenging Town Hall Decisions.” Open Democracy, November  22. www.opendemocracy.net/en/shine-a-light/ housing-activists-stand-up-to-dodgy-landlords-and-council-bulli/. Laclau, Ernesto. 2005. Populist Reason. London: Verso. Mbembe, Achille. 2003. “Necropolitics.” Public Culture 15 (1). McNay, Lois. 2014. The Misguided Search for the Political: Social Weightlessness in Radical Democratic Theory. Cambridge: Polity. McRobbie, Angela. 2017. “The Burnt-out Shell of Grenfell Tower is a Visible Reminder that Public Responsibilities Should Never be Watered Down.” Open Democracy, June  19. www.opendemocracy.net/transformation/angela-mcrobbie/ fire-in-neo-liberal-london. O’Hagan, Andrew. 2018. “The Tower.” The London Review of Books 40 (11) https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v40/n11/andrew-o-hagan/the-tower#vii-thefacts. Pai, Hsiao-Hung. 2017. Grenfell Tower and People without Capital in Open Democracy, July  14. www.opendemocracy.net/en/opendemocracyuk/grenfell-towerand-people-without-capital/. Peters, Christian Helge and John Protevi. n.d. “Affective Ideology and Trump’s Popularity.” Protevi.com. www.protevi.com/john/TrumpAffect.pdf. Tombs, Steve and David Whyte. 2018. “One Law For the Rich and One for the Poor.” Open Democracy, June  21. www.opendemocracy.net/uk/steve-tombs-anddavid-whyte/on-grenfell-one-law-for-rich-one-poor. Yates, Reggie. 2018. BBC2, March  25. www.facebook.com/bbctwo/videos/ reggie-yates-searching-for-grenfells-lost-lives/10155672920530787/. you/gov. 2017. “Should Luxury Flats in Kensington be Requisitioned to Provide Accommodation For Residents of Grenfell Tower Left Homeless by the Fire?.” June 16. https://yougov.co.uk/opi/surveys/results#/survey/c9858cf0-527a-11e786f0-4e52bfafa255/question/f7a01240-527a-11e7-bfce-be36d6dc7ab1/toplines.

4 STUDENTS’ PASSIONATE PARTICIPATION A democratic movement in the digital age

The terrifying event

On Valentine’s Day 2017, Nikolas Cruz broke into Marjory Stoneman Douglas High,1 an affluent public school in the suburbs of Parklands. Built upon reclaimed land its sprawling campus housed 20 buildings, with a student body of 3,200. The shooter had been expelled from school a year earlier. He had planned to randomly shoot people in the park, but on the anniversary of his expulsion from school, he changed his mind. On YouTube, on September 2017, he announced he would be a professional school shooter. He posted, with “the power of my AR-15 you will all know who I am” (Ovalle and Nehamas Miami Herald). He texted his intentions, but the sheriff’s office did not follow up. He planned to take an Uber car to school on the pretense of going to a music class; he placed his AR-15-style semi-assault rifle and multiple magazines (which he had purchased legally) in what appeared to be a guitar bag and managed to avoid notice. He had told his guardians, his friend’s parents whom he had moved in with on the death of his adoptive mother in September of the previous year, that he was going on a school outing. On YouTube he declared his desire to kill at least 20 people. He wore an ROTC T-shirt and walked into the school. His final text came at 2:18 p.m.: “hey yo, hey whatcha doing?” Due to all the smoke from the shooting the fire alarm went off, and hundreds of students fled. The shooter ran into a student as he was loading his rifle in the stairwell, telling him to leave because something bad was about to happen. He then proceeded to pull the fire alarm, and hundreds of students left the classrooms. The shooting DOI: 10.4324/9781003295518-4

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began at 2:21 p.m. Teachers ushered students into rooms to take cover in closets. Although they had been told not to use their cell phones in such events, they did and were able to determine from parents and friends that this was not just a lockdown drill but the real thing. No one called CODE RED (to announce a lockdown of the school) for there was confusion as to who had the authority to do so (Price and McCarthy 2018). He stormed through the building killing 17 and seriously injuring 17 while students cowered in fear for hours. Two survivors later committed suicide. There was a school resource officer on-site at the time, whose job is to confront the shooter and protect students in case of school shootings. However, he remained outside the building. The Broward Police were on-site, but they too failed to enter the building. The shooter slipped through unnoticed and was later apprehended at the local mall – 2 km from the school. The shooting took seven minutes, but the students were in lockdown for 3.5 hours; they had to be sure that the police had picked up the right person and he was acting alone. Students were in closets for hours, facing hours of fear, their brains flooded with norepinephrine (a relative to adrenaline and cause of PTSD). Parents were assembled, and gradually students were reunited with their parents, but the parents of the victims were not informed until after midnight, leaving them in an excruciating state of waiting. There was much criticism of the school resource officer and the policemen who failed to enter the building. Even after the shooter’s arrest, the Broward Police denied paramedics entry to the building. Forty-five calls/ complaints around Cruz’s anti-social and threatening behavior had been made to the Sherriff’s office, yet they were largely ignored. His Facebook page was ridden with racial and anti-Semitic slurs, and his private Instagram group continually expressed xenophobic, racist, and white supremacist ideas. Schools and social services were also familiar with his threats. Problems had been identified since preschool: he had mental health issues and was diagnosed as having fetal alcohol syndrome at birth. In 2013, psychiatrists recommended that he go to a residence treatment center. This was ignored by his adoptive parents. The school’s resource officer was dismissed and later sued for negligence. Sheriff Israel Scott was asked to step down, but he refused. He was ultimately removed by Governor Ron de Santis. The Marjory Stonemen Douglas School spend $185,000 in legal fees trying to mitigate their responsibility in the shootings; much of this went to their efforts to legally oppose the release of Cruz’s school records. Cruz’s trial was delayed by COVID-19. In September  2022 it commenced and was concluded on November 2, 2022. He was sentenced to a life sentence without parole. The families were furious; they wanted a death sentence. Three jurors were swayed by the defendant’s arguments: he had

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been poisoned at birth by drugs and alcohol and suffered from neurodevelopment disorder. Further, his adoptive mother did not follow the medical and health advisors’ recommendations. The families were not moved by these considerations. His killings were cruel, cold premeditated slaughters and warranted the death penalty. Governor de Santis was also angered by the juries’ recommendations and promised changes. As it stands the death penalty requires unanimity.2 Consistent with the insights of Pierre Nora, this catastrophe was monstrous, terrifying to witness. One of the students videoed the event and immediately uploaded it. Parents’ worst fears were triggered: children were terrorized in their classrooms. As I’ve argued earlier, if the event is to be a game changer it must resonate with other concerns and sustain itself over time. In this case, its aftermath depended upon the effectiveness of the protest movement as well as its ability to collaborate with other groups who were also concerned with gun control. Unlike other catastrophes that were portrayed as freak accidents, this tragedy was all too familiar. This was just one of many tragic school shootings that have taken place since the Columbine massacre. Its publicity and support have been unparalleled. March for Our Lives (MFOL), the protest movement that emerged in the aftermath of the catastrophe, and its use of social media served to prolong the intensity and horror of the event and keep their goal of gun control alive. Given my interest in understanding the democratic potential of the event, I apprise the MFOL’s ability to cultivate democratic sensibilities, and emotional reorientation, as well as its ability to instantiate democratic practices. By looking at the details of this protest movement, I aim to show how MFOL promulgated affective solidarity through performative bodily acts, emotional manipulation, and effective sound bites. While MFOL may have encouraged emotional reorientation for many, it did little to cultivate critical thinking since it was concerned about undermining unity. As a single-issue protest rather than a social movement, its intent was singular: to institute gun control as quickly as possible. Their success at garnering support through affective solidarity (committed bodily actions) was unparalleled, but their reliance upon emotional and affective tactics sidelined critical thinking, which is a trait of democratic agency. The public sphere in the age of internet and social media – the prospect for democratic opinion formation

In this section, I  look at the spaces where opinion formation and emotional reorientation took place. By 2017 the technology of social media, the internet, and blogging was well established, providing deliberative sites

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and online communities where people can participate without top-down directives from the government. This technology provides multiple decentralized spaces for engaged citizens to speak and talk back and in addition to participating in aesthetically rich and pleasing experiences. Since it communicates without directives, it can be effective in shifting opinions, especially among those who disdain experts and authority. Aletta Norval is cautiously optimistic that new technologies have facilitated training the masses in public reason (2012, 802). Here she departs from Jurgen Habermas, who believes the masses are semi-literate and noncritical consumers. If social media users listen to diverse arguments and points of view in the formulation of their opinions, she believes, they are participating in the creation of a public that will press public authorities to legitimate themselves. In fact, this involves the critical use of public reason as Habermas envisions it. Protests, occupying public spaces, and demonstrating don’t quite fit Habermas’ idea of critical reflective debate and deliberation, but they do challenge his belief that citizens in mass democracies are simply passive consumers. In fact, in providing a forum where citizens can gather, talk back, and protest, social media and alternate platforms are challenging common sense and received narratives and facilitating the expression of popular grievances, demands, and claims. Although they do not always engage in alternate opinions (since logarithms create silos where people speak to like-minded individuals, and many of these sites are devoted to consumption needs) they can be successful in providing information and opinions that are not available in the mass media. In any case, given the popularity and ever-evolving models of new technological media, Norval believes, it is naive to imagine a world without them. Zeynep Tukekci (2017) is also optimistic about the capacity of online technology to enhance political agency. In the past one had to live in the right neighborhood or go to the right university; now one only needs to find the right hashtag (Tukekci 2017, 9). Today politically informed, like-minded people find each other online; they also find activists who help them define their politics and foster the development of social movements. While they also meet offline, most of the communications between activists, followers, movements, and the public space are online. Tukekci argues the digital networked public sphere does not replace mass media but interacts with and supplements it. The focus of mainstream journalists is narrow, reporting the obvious, whereas social media journalists document the unexpected. They are quicker, nimbler, and more effective in communicating breaking news. A  YouTube director claimed within an hour the footage of an event can be filmed on video or smartphone, uploaded, and distributed. If events go viral, it is difficult for them to be covered up.

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Consistent with the ideas of Simone de Beauvoir, and her belief in the specificity of embodied and situated subjects, I  refuse to make universal claims about social media. Tukekci’s argument seems to hold up better in authoritarian regimes like Tunisian and Turkey than in liberal democratic societies. In the West, Jodie Dean and Norval believe Facebook is more likely to connect families and friends and satisfy consumption needs. While these activities are not absent on Facebook pages in the Middle East, there is more space devoted to radical politics. Since the mass media is more controlled by the state and censorship is routine, radical practices and parties have found a home, albeit a precarious one, on Facebook and Twitter. Since Facebook is a useful marketing tool in the Middle East, and most of the online traffic is not explicitly political, the state has been hesitant to outlaw this platform. While most users of Facebook connect to family and friends and post “cute cat pictures,” Tukekci believes that these are not always apolitical. If one’s friend “likes” a particular post, one might be prompted to follow suit. Although a singular intervention may not have positive consequences, routine mulling over political posts may trigger dissonance and may have cumulative effects. This is consistent with the idea of affective solidarity; one is moved by these images or tweets, and one’s imagination is activated, prompting a challenge to the givenness of the situation. Since humans like to belong, they are attuned to the judgments of friends and the voices of celebrities. They may be encouraged to shift their opinions to follow the trend without reflecting or fully affirming them. Analysis of Facebook users notes that it helps people with “weak ties” to build bridges. In the process, one is tempted to reveal feelings that they may not have been fully aware of or share sentiments or observations that they might not have otherwise (Tukekci 2017, 25). But support based upon influencers may be subverted by other influencers; if one’s values and relations are not reworked, they are not reliable. Though some of Tukekci’s insights derive from experiences within authoritarian countries where the censorship of the media is commonplace, her account of the potential for recruiting the lonely and bored is applicable in the West. In fact, online mobilizing of the alt-right and progressives have skyrocketed in the last few years. This medium has the potential to deepen democracy, but alt-right platforms also threaten existing democratic institutions. The proliferation of conspiracy theories and fake news has seriously eroded the public sphere as a place where public are informed. Tukekci is aware of a problem that particularly troubles Jodie Dean – that the audience has difficulty discriminating between real news and fake news (Tukekci 2017, 42). Nevertheless, she is more optimistic than Dean in the human capacity to think critically. Again, this may have to do with her

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cultural and political context. Turkish and Iranians are familiar with censorship, are overall more politically engaged, and hence are more experienced in distinguishing the more reliable from fake news. A state that “controls” or strongly influences the press can censor what is being communicated. Tukekci offers an example of the killing of 38 Turkish youths: the story was barely mentioned in the press. With a change of regime, the killings were mentioned, but the youths (who were engaged in low-level contraband of cigarettes) were misrepresented as terrorists. The continual circulation of videos of the shootings and stories on Facebook prompted the mainstream media (CNN, BBC) to pick up a more “accurate” story than the one the Turkish media circulated. This is an example of how digital media covers a broader range of news items than the traditional press. Minimally it supplements the traditional media’s coverage. If an event is covered online and has significant followers, the mainstream press will then pick up the story. In 2009 Dean was skeptical of the potential of the internet to produce informed democratic citizens; she believed face-to-face exchanges were required to mobilize protestors. By 2017 its potential to mobilize was no longer in question. However, some of the problems she identified with social media still stand. It allows “millions to access information and register their points of view on websites or blog” (Dean 2009, 25–26), yet the specificity of messages gets lost in the deluge: the message gets detached from the sender and its content is irrelevant. While Habermas felt understanding is part of communicative action, in Dean’s model, “communicative capitalism” does not lend itself to fostering understanding. People participate, but it is the exchange value, the circulation of messages, rather than their substantive content that is important. The internet promises global communication, but, Dean insists, this is a fantasy, for the World Wide Web is broken into four continents and people do not communicate across these separate spaces.3 While social media has been celebrated as a democratizing force, where everyone can speak to anyone and participate irrespective of their social powers, in fact, access to others outside one’s hub is limited, and internet amplifies existing inequities. Internet users believe they partake in molding public opinion by blogging, commenting on news stories, or liking candidates, but they are not equally influential. Celebrities, politicians, and successful entrepreneurs are more successful influencers, but they don’t necessarily enhance democratic change. Facebook is often seen to be de-skilling and depoliticizing, criticized for its slacktivism/clicktivism (activism that amounts to clicking and reposting). Clicktivism and tweeting might provide attractive sensory experiences

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that temporarily disrupt common sense, but she convincingly argues these aren’t sufficient to challenge existing behavior. The Parkland Kids campaign serves to contest some of Dean’s assumptions around Slacktivism.4 The Parkland students weren’t simply clicking, posting, and sharing ideas with others; they engaged in offline protests. They used social media to motivate students, families, friends, and other protest groups in the USA and worldwide to protest, march, and spread their message. Supporters didn’t just feel connected; in participating in marches, die-ins, and lie-ins, they were physically connected. While social media messages can be decontextualized, and their meanings depleted, in this case the message was singular, clear, and constantly repeated by engaged bodies. Since MFOL recruited students to be content producers and encouraged them to organize sibling groups, they were taught skills rather than being de-skilled. The scope and depth of mobilization would have been impossible without social media. Social internet, Instagram, Twitter, Snapchat, and YouTube have created new public spaces where non-authorized opinions could be expressed, performative subjectivities cultivated, and emotions reoriented. Whereas the Columbine survivors went to Hollywood and their story emerged years later, the meme/Instagram generation told their story within days. David Hogg, while trapped in a closet during the lockdown, filmed his experience and uploaded it within hours. Technology had moved on. Nokia Flip phones were available in 1999, but few students would have been in possession of them in their classrooms, and they could not film or download videos; hence they played no role in publicizing the shootings or protests. By 2017 that was no longer true – the cell phone clearly enhanced human agency: a video could be uploaded and could go viral within an hour. The meme generation continually posted and blogged, proving that anyone could become an influencer (though not all were equally influential). In addition, the cell phone proved to be their lifeline. They had been told not to use their cell phones in a lockdown, but they disobeyed and found out they were amid an actual shooting, not just a lockdown drill. They were able to contact others outside the buildings, figure out what was going on, and communicate with others within the school grounds who were differently located. A  teacher saved them from walking into the freshman building where the shooter was. While social internet, Instagram, Twitter, Snapchat, and YouTube saved students’ lives and facilitated the cultivation of democratic sensibilities, they also contributed to anti-democratic feelings. In a private Instagram group, Cruz found a community who encouraged him to express and act upon his homophobic, white supremacist, anti-Semitic, and xenophobic views. On his personal Facebook page, he threatened the police and ANTIFA and shared his racist and Islamophobic ideas with others.

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MOFL’s success: cultivating affective solidarity and pursuing strategic actions

Within hours of the shooting the students formed #Never again but soon realized this hashtag referred to the Holocaust, so they changed their name to March for Our Lives (MFOL). In the 20 years since Columbine, 683 lives have been lost in 81 mass shootings. This figure does not consider shootings in Dayton, El Paso, Los Vegas, Santa Fe (Sullivan, Wan and Tate 2018), Buffalo (2020), or Uvalde (2022). After the Columbine shooting activists focused on trying to explain why the shooting happened. “Were the boys bullied?” “Were they outsiders?” The Parkland Kids were not going to discuss causes; they wanted immediate action to protect school children. They had been brought up on lockdowns – active shooter protocol – they were tired of the anxiety they lived with at school every day. They chose to focus on guns: they did not mention the name of the shooter; nor did they speculate upon the probable causes of his crime. They were aware that the focus on mental health issues had managed to deflect interest in gun control. Much research has been done about the mental health of the perpetrators: the students did not want to get embroiled in debate.5 Many of those who opposed gun control believed mental illness was the cause of the Parklands mayhem, not the availability of attack guns. This was the NRA’s line of argument. In the wake of the El Paso and Dayton Ohio shootings, Donald Trump promised the building of more mental hospitals to take the shooters off the streets. MFOL advocates took immediate action: they planned their first rally. In four days, they marched on the state capital in Tallahassee. Within a month they organized the fourth largest march in Washington in American history: Twitter, Snapchat, and Facebook were vehicles of organization. They managed to generate and coordinate 762 domestic and 38 international walks to support their march in Washington. The internet helped the students communicate talking points and cues as to how to organize online support, proving invaluable in their political mobilization. In addition to being instrumental in organizing their demonstrations, recruiting followers, inspiring, and skilling sibling movements, social media allowed for staged encounters with the NRA. They didn’t engage in argument but relied upon embodied affects and predictable slogans, as did the NRA. The NRA had been quiet in the days after the shooting, except on their own TV station (NRATV), yet they began to tweet two weeks later, claiming that “elites” and “socialists” (who didn’t give a whit about kids) were trying to take away our Second Amendment rights. “Every lying member of the media are manipulating these kids.” (Cullen 2019, 119). The NRA portrayed the students as pawns or “crisis actors,” claiming the shootings were a hoax (Arkin and Popken 2018). The secretary of a Republican congressman claimed David Hogg, Cameron Kasky, and

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most members of the MFOL were hired actors. The Alliance for Securing Democracy (a bipartisan advocacy group run by former US intelligence officials from the CIA and FBI) linked Russian Twitter accounts and other platforms to the shooting’s aftermath. They believed protests served to inflame tensions and divide Americans by posting loaded comments that oppose gun control. Other Russia-linked accounts labeled the shooting as an operation that the US government staged to seize guns from citizens.6 A month after the shooting the NRA issued a meme “Enough is enough” and tweeted a close-up of an AR-15 with the text “I control my own guns thank you.” The picture was uploaded to Snapchat with MFOL’s caption: “we’ll control our own lives, thank you.” It took one hour from the first spotting of the tweet to its first reply. Members of the MFOL drew significant positive support on this exchange. Sarah Chadwick drew 722 tweets and 4,878 likes; Cameron Kasky got 1,238 tweets and 6,565 likes (Cullen 2019, 184). On Oscar night, the NRA went on the offensive, again relying on affective experiences rather than persuasive arguments. A spokeswoman in a black dress, appropriating the #Me Too blasted “every Hollywood phony. . . . Your time is running out; the clock starts now,” flipping over the hourglass (Weiss and Relman 2018). There were 4.4 million views that week. Parodying their video, MFOL got 1.2 million views. This result was impressive given the media and organizational strength of the NRA. Consistent with Clare Hemmings’ thesis these emotional and embodied (affective) experiences catalyzed solidarity.

FIGURE 4.1 Millions

march in Washington on March 24, 2018, protesting gun violence. Author: Phil Roeder

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Within a month MFOL organized the fourth largest march in Washington in American history: Twitter, Instagram, Snapchat, and YouTube were used to publicize, recruit, and organize the march. Speeches were carefully orchestrated to boost emotional attachment: spine-chilling accounts of the lockdown, tearful stories, as well as strong expressions of resolve were offered. The event was choreographed by the leaders to elicit as much affective support as possible. Alfonso described the terror of 60 kids: cuddled and crying in the 10-foot closet they were thinking they might die. Then David took the stage asserting, “Ok America. . . . This is what we need to do about it” – a powerful combination of emotion and resolve, feeling and conviction, and finally a call to action. They also recruited the Black voices of Yolanda Renee King, the ten-year-old granddaughter of MLK, as well as the Peace Warriors. The Peace Warriors drew attention to the systemic racialized violence Black people suffered. Then Emma came out grimacing; after four minutes of uncomfortable silence, she broke into tears. The audience began to chant, “Never again! never again!” Finally, Emma spoke, “Since the time I came here it has been 6 mins and 20 secs. Fight for your lives before its some else’s job” (Lucero 2018). The speeches were moving: the audience were in tears. These young people had organized an inspiring emotional event for millions, which would not have been possible had it not been for social media. But the power of the event, its effervescence, and the feeling of belonging that it generated were the result of an offline event – active participation in the demonstration. MFOL tried to broaden its appeal through music, again emphasizing the power of sensations, rather than words or arguments. In addition to rap artists and folk singers, they invited country musicians to attract gun enthusiasts. Even though MFOL became associated with Democratic voters they did everything in their power to appear non-partisan. They repeated this refrain: “The NRA was not an enemy, gun violence is the enemy, yet they were blocking a solution” (Cullen 2019, 109). From the outset, it tried to win over the NRA. When they went to Arizona, a state where one could openly carry a gun, they encountered a lot of counter-protestors totting AK-47s, waving Gadsden flags. This demonstration was in stark contrast to hundreds of students staging lie-ins on the floors of the House and Senate lobbies. In the press it was reported that it was the campaign trail of Hiral Tipirneni, the local Democrat, that upset them since they actively sought to convince Republicans of the righteousness of their cause (Cullen 2019, 238). They stressed the idea that these shootings were a national tragedy and kept insisting they did not want to interfere with Second Amendment rights. Though there was little evidence of any attempt on their part to establish how this would be possible. Their message was

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simple: they insisted it was in everyone’s interest and the common good to ban assault weapons. MFOL advocates repeated their goal with resolve but without debate. Nevertheless, their bodily and emotional strategies were hugely successful, confirming the idea that mobilization relies on emotional and affective experiences. A crowd-counting consortium thought 470,000 attended the march in Washington. There were 1.4–2 .1 million people at 763 locations nationwide; there were also 84 marches across the world. The historic civil rights march in Washington in 1963 drew ¼ of a million, the US invasion of Iraq 1  million, and the Vietnam War Moratoriums in 1969/70 drew 2  million. The march was described as captivating: 10% of the marchers were under 18 (their average age was 49), 70% were women, and 72% were college educated. Many mums and previous survivors of other disasters were present. Marches in other cities and countries were significant. Some were organized by elementary students. Naomi, an 11-year-old Black American, organized a walkout at George Mason Elementary School in Alexandria, Virginia. MFOL was successful in amplifying its message and growing supporters. Empirical research confirms this. The Trace, a company that tracks media coverage, saw something distinct happening with the movement. Usually, media coverage dwindled several days after the shooting. Two days after the shooting the media coverage was 4% and hit a phenomenal 5% one month after the national school walkout (Cullen 2019, 121). Its ability to sustain attention in the media was explicable in terms of its organizing ability and the availability of social media. It proved successful on social media platforms, Twitter, and YouTube, as well as in the mass media. Emma González had 1.2 million Twitter followers; Cameron Kasky and Sarah Chadwick had another 1.1 million collectively on Twitter, Instagram, and Snapchat. Ten million watched 60 minutes on TV. From the numbers who attended the marches, lie-ins, and die-ins they had increased grassroots support; there was also evidence that it changed popular attitudes proving the success of affective solidarity, presumably among Middle Americans. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) (an organization that solicits public comments) revealed a dramatic shift in public opinion from December 2017 to March 2018. In December  2017, 85% of respondents opposed gun regulation, and there were only 13% in favor of regulation. There were 23,000 unique responses written by individuals to support their position (both for and against). In March 2018, 26% opposed regulation, and there were 73,000 unique responses in favor. This reversal is attributed to the Parkland Kids activism. The pro-gun lobby in the past has been able to muster huge financial support and active participation, but it appeared the tables were turning

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due to the success of MFOL. Supporters of regulating bump stocks (the mechanism that allows the gun to fire in quick succession) now outnumber opponents 3–1 in comments to the ATF. The Trace, July 19, 2018, notes the “Big Reversal.” Elsie Jordan, a true Second Amendment supporter and member of the NRA, came forward claiming the NRA is out of step with its members: many do not want their children killed in the classroom. The Parkland Kids were effective at moving the public and cultivating affective solidarity. Consistent with my reflections throughout this book, affective solidarity and emotional reorientation if tied to reflexivity are more likely to cement progressive attitudes. For people to reorient themselves in an increasingly insecure and unsafe world, there is the need to know as well as feel – the need to critically assess the situation as well as experience sympathy. To foster democratic citizenship more broadly, followers need to understand that freedom (reducing insecurity and creating circumstances of human flourishing) involves state intervention. MFOL relied upon visceral experiences, yet focusing on the impact of this tragic event did not translate into persuasive arguments or policy directives. MFOL were more concerned with working on people’s feelings. The students stuck to their action points, and their interventions were more manipulative than persuasive. In fact, they strategically chose not to engage in debate as to the causes of the shooter’s motivations since this would end up feeding into the NRA’s position: that mass shooters are mentally unstable. Differences in social powers: March for Our Lives versus Black Lives Matter

My focus on embodied situated affect rather than autonomous impersonal affect gives further weight to the student’s social location and helps us understand the successes of the Parkland Kids. It is not random, unpossessable, and impersonal affects, nor a technological assemblage that drove the movement but rather the embodied potentialities of situated subjects. By focusing on the strong agency of these students I resist the path of the vital materialists and post-humanists who believe that the agentic capacities of things structure human agency. Instead of focusing on free-floating affects deriving from technology, I  will consider the effect of specific embodied subjects.7 The students who founded MFOL were confident and savvy technophiles; they demonstrated a keen sense of what was required and had no qualms in pursuing their goals. David Hogg (one of the leaders was a news director at the school TV station) filmed and posted everything as it was happening. Hours after the shooting, he cycled over to school, shot

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pictures, and was interviewed by the popular press. The next day he was interviewed on Good Morning America, NBC, and New Day CNN. The ability of high school students to use the mass media as effectively as they did attests to their social privilege. David Hogg gave almost 1,000 interviews in two months. Barely home from Tallahassee, a march on the state capital, and an audience with the governor of Florida, David went to Los Angeles to appear with Dr. Phil. After Tallahassee Emma González, one of the cofounders, went to Los Angeles to be on Ellen DeGeneres’ show. Their voices were heard, and they also managed to accrue financial support. Within several weeks they had raised $3.5 million: 1 million from the Clooneys and 1 million from Oprah Winfrey who said that they reminded her of the freedom fighters in the 1960s.8 The remaining funds came from small donors. Again, social media facilitated the contributions of small donors. Their strategies and organizational ability were facilitated by digital technology, but one can’t underestimate their abilities, skills, and cultural capital. While MFOL was able to successfully use the available technology and mass media in its struggle for gun control, and Black students in Chicago, New York, Oakland, Ferguson, and elsewhere had lobbied for gun control for years without much success. To attribute MFOL’s success to the agentic capacities of things, cell phone or Twitter accounts, social media, and Instagram (its ability to reach great swathes of people) are to gloss over the significance of its cultural capital. Jacques Rancière (1991) and William Connolly (1991) believe the socially marginal are free and equal in political protest movements (Frank 2021, 95). However, I believe the effects of structural inequalities cannot be ignored. Marjory Stonemen Douglas High ranked in the top 7% of high schools in Florida and within the top 12% of high schools in the USA. The leaders in the movement were privileged and accomplished. David Hogg was the director of the school’s TV station (not very many schools have their own TV station). When CNN and NBC arrived at the school on the evening of the shooting, David was there to be interviewed. He knew how to use the press effectively, and he was the kind of kid that CNN wanted to interview – white and middle class. The Parkland Kids were more effective than Black activists in capturing the mass media’s support and in garnering support from celebrities. Within days they had a huge amount of money to work with and lots of expert advice. George Clooney texted the kids and connected them to administrators and lawyers to help them manage the $3.5 million they had raised. Also, the organizer of the annual Women’s March against Trump in 2016 gave them advice on organizing their march in Washington. They attended a workshop at Harvard University that would help them target

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and persuade their audience. Their associations and networks furthered their movement. The difference between the representation of middle-class white protesters and Black protestors in the mass media was glaring. In 2017 BLM were portrayed as hoodlums and militants: they are televised as blocking traffic, destroying public property, burning cars, and engaging in struggles with the police, thus, framing them as other than a nonviolent movement that they claimed to be. Their representation in the media shaped public perception and public sympathy. Illegal acts committed by the Parkland students did not involve police intervention or scuffles. When they were disrupting grocery stores in Florida or unlawfully staging student walkouts, they were not arrested. MFOL targeted “Publix,” a grocery store chain in Florida, where lie-ins were staged in the aisles of the store making shopping almost impossible. Concerned with their reputation among middle-class shoppers, Publix did not call upon their security guards to drag the students out. Nor were the police called to deal with the students when they blocked public spaces or staged illegal walkouts. The representation of MFOL might usefully be compared to BLM. The cofounders of BLM – three queer-identified Black women, Alicia Garza, Opal Tometi, and Patrisse Cullors – were seen as outliers on the fringe. Even the more straight members of Black communities found their sexual politics difficult to swallow. This was not ideal for mass media coverage. One of the leaders of MFOL was bisexual, yet that didn’t seem to influence the media coverage. In fact, the media imagined a romantic scenario where the two leaders went to the prom together. Collaboration across differences: practice surmounts theoretical problems

So far I have demonstrated the success of MFOL in terms of its ability to mobilize support by nurturing democratic sensibilities and acting strategically. Compassion for the victims, anger at the senseless killing of school children, distress at lockdown drills, and successful collaboration fueled their support. Since I am interested in the capacity of this event to catalyze democratic change, I will look at MFOL’s democratic aspirations and try to assess their success at realizing them. The students collaborated with other movements that had been addressing gun violence for some time. Arne Duncan (who had served as Chicago’s school superintendent for eight years and Obama’s secretary of education) got in touch with the Parkland Kids and connected them to Father Pfleger who ran BRAVE (Bold Resistance Against Violence Everywhere) and Peace Warriors. The leaders of these groups, Alex King and D’Angelo Mc Dade,

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along with ten others, were invited to come to Parkland (Witt, The New Yorker). From all accounts the Parkland students treated them as equals and respected their differences. They listened and appreciated their stories. While the Parkland students were anxious in their classrooms, they heard Black kids from Chicago feared violence in their community; especially the threat of violence to and from school (Witt 2018). Their strategies were different: BRAVE had to try to stop kids from getting recruited to gangs even though gang membership was alluring, whereas the students wanted to control the purchase and use of guns and the banning of assault weapons. In the first months of 2018, 1,700 Black kids were killed in gang activity; their organizations were unable to raise the sort of money that MFOL did, or they couldn’t attract the media attention. In Judith Butler’s (2004) words, these children did not count; their black bodies were presumed to be disposable. MFOL made every effort to treat members of these established movements as equals. They clearly did not share life experiences or social group identities, but they shared the goal of gun control. They exemplified the success of a non-identitarian movement. Though the students were the most powerful voices in the movement, they listened to BRAVE and Peace Warriors who had years of experience and were persuaded to adopt MLK’s principles of nonviolence. MFOL invited members of BRAVE to speak at the march in Washington. Leaders of MFOL and Peace Warriors wore each other’s T-shirts and jackets to symbolize their solidarity. When Emma, later in the year, won a peace prize awarded by Desmond Tutu, she shared the accolades with the founder of Peace Warriors. They traveled together to South Africa to receive the award. Not all their practices were as exemplary as their collaboration with BRAVE and Peace Warriors. At one point ten Black students from Marjory Douglas Stonemen held a press conference complaining they had not been included in the movement. Fifteen percent of the school was Black, and they weren’t being represented, yet they too were fighting for gun control. MFOL advocates explained their oversight. In the flurry of organizing, they admitted they had relied upon their close friends; for this they apologized. Since they had Latinos and bisexual students among them, they wondered if they had to check all the boxes. Notwithstanding this sentiment they acknowledged their failure and immediately welcomed them into MFOL. Despite racial and class differences, they managed to collaborate on equal terms. If one’s lived experience (race/class/gender) defined membership, then this movement would have suffered. In this case, they appeared to establish respectful and cooperative relations since they were working toward a common goal. BRAVE, Peace Warriors, and the excluded Black students had no qualms of joining MFOL which had been up to then a predominately white group. For they shared the goal of gun control.

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This provides an example of where activists can teach theorists. Democratic theorists Wendy Brown (2015) and Linda Zerilli (2005) believed identity politics (specifically those based upon racial, ethnic, and gender identities) fragmented and undermined the egalitarian movements of the 1960s and 1970s and would do so going forward. Basing commitment upon social group identities made it difficult to collaborate with other groups around broad-based goals. But here pragmatism trumped identity. Since Black activists were intent on regulating guns to change the life of young Black children in their community, they collaborated with white middle-class students and were part of a non-identitarian movement. While their Black identity was important, they were more flexible in practice than political theorists imagine.9 Striving for a leaderless movement: achievements and compromises

There has been much debate on the role of leadership in protest politics. In the 1960s there was a concern that the educated elite made decisions and directed actions ignoring the know-how of those who were oppressed. While their leadership was deemed to be a temporary measure (there to help the oppressed assume their power) in practice many leaders held onto their power rather than transferring it. Intellectuals have also been criticized for leading radical movements. Speaking on behalf of others they colonized the voices of the oppressed, the exploited, and the marginalized. In this context the ideal of “participatory parity” (Bozalek et  al. 2020) and leaderless movements came to the fore. MFOL promoted a leaderless movement and supported popular participation, but to what extent did it achieve these goals? To what extent was this feasible if they wanted to remain effective? The students wanted everyone to take part: encouraging and assisting sibling movements both nationally and internationally. They prepared a YouTube launch to elicit and assist student collaborators. They were good at attracting an audience, but they needed others to spread their message and sustain their influence, so they solicited content producers. They knew their cohorts were born to meme. “Every teen in America is a content creator . . . they were born communicators: communicating on two wavelengths, emotional and intellectual” (Cullen 2019, 177). Their supporters were not passive slacktivists but content producers. MFOL claims to have had transparent criteria around participation: everyone who contributed had veto power; every piece of content would be vetted twice. There were rules: no profanity, no violence – actual or symbolic, and no ad hominem attacks. It encouraged parody and irony: one didn’t always want to be heavy. Martin Luther King’s six principles also informed their

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conduct (Witt 2018). The movement wanted to be inclusive and enhance popular participation, yet it was also strategic. In order to be effective, the movement had to be unified; therefore, leaders produced action points and agreed upon strategies. Although it claimed everyone who contributed had veto power, this was unlikely. Some level of control over procedures and content was necessary if it wanted to be a unified movement with a single goal. When it organized the march in Washington, it had 800 group leaders online; there were too many to speak, so they were put into listen mode. “We have to create a united front,” Matt said, “the people in power would like nothing more than for us to be diverted” (Cullen 2019, 174). The desire for unity and common action points excluded open debate and dialogue, again hallmarks of democratic organizations. MFOL advocates banked on the impersonal energy or “collective effervescence” (Emile Durkheim’s term) that emanated in a crowd. They felt equal and their “absolute equality is felt intensely in a moment of discharge” (Dean 2016, 6). In coming together, communicating the same thought, and participating in the same action, the students believed anything was possible. However, I’m not convinced these collective moments are sufficient to constitute their actions as egalitarian. The demonstrators hand-painted their signs and freely determined their catchphrases: “We will vote, well will rise; the smallest coffins are the heaviest; Ban assault weapons or we will ban you” or “The Price is right $1.05” (this was the amount that the NRA donated to Rubio’s campaign divided by the number of students in Florida); yet their input into the organization of the demonstration was limited. MFOL espoused the goal of horizontalism and professed to be egalitarian and leaderless, even if it weren’t always faithful to these values. It resisted the media’s desire to focus on their leaders believing it would eclipse their gritty political message, yet in order to stay in the media, they spent much time on being interviewed. Although it was dependent upon student organizers and content producers, it also relied heavily upon celebrities to amplify their message. While the students resisted being turned into celebrities, they constantly appeared on TV, and they became renowned. Also, they sought celebrities to further their goal. Amy Schumer, Julianne Moore, and Tolsi Gabbard (the soldier veteran, congresswoman) were recruited, as well as long-standing movements such as Mum’s Demand Action and the petition site Change.org. On May 19 and 20, 14,000 written comments were recorded by The Trace. These coincided with the viral tweets posted by David Hogg and Emma Gonzalez, leaders of the movement. While the leaders eschewed being lionized, their desire to be effective trumped their support for democratic ideals in this case. Digital networks facilitated their horizontal organization, yet as I’ve shown human organizational abilities cannot be underestimated. In the

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past, a social movement’s strength rested upon fund-raising: the more organized and better equipped, the more successful. Today the competitive advantage of a strong organization is reduced. Most of the tasks and the coordination of activities can be done by volunteers and organized online (Tukekci 2017, 51). Since their visibility and followers do not rely upon expensive advertising, they don’t require well-funded offices. Crowdfunding displaces the work of foundations that requires large donations (Tukekci 2017, 33). MFOL’s success in garnering support from Go Fund Me and recruiting volunteers and followers (many of whom meaningfully participated in the movement) was unprecedented. Here again technology has contributed to democracy-empowering popular movements that aren’t well funded. Strategic actions in the face of a history of defeats

MFOL managed to realize some of these democratic ideals – its relations with collaborators and followers appeared to be respectful, and it encouraged active engagement. However, some of its strategies were manipulative. The students focused on affirmation, not on explanation. The repetition of a refrain was commonplace, and debate and dialogue were not mainstays in their conversation with sibling collaborators or their followers. They made two strategic decisions: to speak with a united voice and focus on one topic – gun control (Cullen 2019, 11). They prescribed and dogmatically repeated their goal of banning assault weapons. They agreed not to digress from a single demand, disagree with each other, or depart from their talking points. While these are hallmarks of populist and authoritarian strategies, for their democratic goal to be realized, not all acts could be deliberative. The students faced an uphill battle. In the aftermath of mass shootings, there was a period of intense media attention and concentrated pressure on the government, which then subsided. MFOL was aware of this pattern. Given the frequency of mass shootings in America, the number of groups that had been organized to control assault weapons, and their lack of success, it was difficult to be optimistic. Immediately after shootings support for gun control grew. Often progressive legislation was introduced; however, these laws were temporary. After the shooting at Columbine, intense lobbying for assault weapons were banned, but five years later looser legislation was reintroduced. The NRA orchestrated the introduction of new bills to weaken gun laws, and they were successful in displacing older stricter laws. Legislation banning assault guns or limiting large-capacity magazines was failing. After the Pulse shooting in 2016, the media firm the Target wrote of the disillusionment and defeat those activists experienced. The

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Onion’s headline after the shootings reads, “No Way to Prevent This,” “Only Nation where This Regularly Happens” (Cullen 2019, 6). The Parkland Kids were aware of the failures of previous movements; they were intent on “flipping” the pessimism. They were not concerned with the whys but wanted immediate action. In order to sustain media attention and grow their supporters, the Parkland Kids engaged in manipulative tactics. In the aftermath of the shootings, they got grieving victims’ parents to foster sympathy and compassion. Tio Manney’s mother stood up and received his diploma at the end of the school year. She believed they needed to use “this opportunity to get your message out, you need to take these opportunities and just change it. Flip it” (Cullen 2019, 265). A moment of silence at the school on the students’ return on February  28 was marked by camera shutters clicking away. Some thought organizing a photo op was disrespectful to the victims, but it was effective in sustaining their public visibility, which was required to further their goal. Also, their march demonstration in Washington was choreographed to create emotional solidarity. The tactic of shaming is questionable from the perspective of developing democratic sensibilities but proved useful. CNN invited Marco Rubio, the Parkland Kids, and the NRA to a town hall; the issue to be discussed was the influence that the NRA exerts on politicians. Though the students were cognizant of the fact that the NRA had spent 3.3 million on Rubio’s behalf over the course of his career and was the sixth largest beneficiary of the NRA in the US Senate, most people would not have been. Cameron Kasky continually repeated this fact and tried to shame Rubio into refusing NRA funding. “In the name of the 17, can you not ask the NRA to keep their money out of your campaign?” Rubio was evasive, saying he would support a bill that would stop such a killer. Post-debate commentaries and comedians were brutal, but Rubio did not budge. This intervention would have had a significant effect on those witnessing the debate, especially those who were unaware of the extent to which the NRA funded Rubio and other representatives. Some of MFOL’s acts were manipulative, though many of their actions instantiated democratic values, and overall, they did not sabotage the movement’s democratic intent, which was to secure a safe public space. The government’s response or lack thereof

Democratic theorists assume that a strong political protest movement will pressure the government to intervene on their behalf; this did not happen, at least not during the Trump presidency. While the students marched in Washington, President Trump was playing golf in Palm Beach 45 miles

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from the Parkland shootings. The MFOL made much of this for it contributed to the drama of the event. Days later the president was involved in a “listening session” organized to hear the complaints of the students and their parents. Just as with other meetings promises were made and sympathies expressed. On February  20, Trump directed the Department of Justice to ban bump stocks.10 He also suggested arming up to 20% of the teachers to stop “maniacs” from attacking students, claiming “highly trained, gun adept, teachers/coaches would solve the problem instantly, before police arrive.” Most Republican Congressmen and Senators favored improved facilities for mental health. They argued it is not the guns but the people who use them that is the issue. Their resolutions focused on the individual, rather than focusing on changing institutions or gun culture. They focused on “the few bad apples.” Several supported increased background checks. Rubio claimed these proposals would not have prevented the killings in Parkland. Other Republicans were slightly more conciliatory: Governor of Ohio, John Kasich, and several others were willing to increase age restrictions to buy AR-15-style rifles. One Congressman blamed video games for de-sensitizing people to routine killing. Several sympathized with Florida’s Democratic Senator Bill Nelson’s comment: “I have hunted all my life. But an AR-15 is not for hunting. It’s for killing.”11 None of them focused on the institutional and cultural changes that were required to make school a safer place. Though MFOL didn’t get what they wanted, all levels of government and the school responded to the intense pressure they created. A month after the shooting the federal government passed (STOP school violence) as part of an omnibus bill. It increased funding for metal detectors, security training, and other safety measures. In the same month, the state government of Florida passed “The Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act” adding restrictions to Florida’s gun laws. It raised the minimum age for purchasing rifles from 18 to 21. It increased waiting times and background checks: blocking seriously mentally unstable, violent, and certain criminally charged people from buying guns. It also supported Trump’s banning of bump stocks, supported the idea of arming of properly trained teachers, and mandated the hiring of more school resource officers. On the day this bill was passed into law, the NRA challenged the legality of the ban on gun sales to people between 18 and 21. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida upheld the constitutionality of the law and dismissed the NRA’s suit in June 2021. The school also responded. It would reduce school entrances and would have law enforcement officers at each entrance. It mandated identity badges for students and staff. All bags would have to be in clear plastic,

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hence eliminating the use of knapsacks. Students were not happy; they felt these measures were ineffective and intrusive. Again, the focus was on a few bad apples, rather than systemic factors that contributed to school shootings. The MFOL were furious; they wanted stricter gun control, not safety measures, and the fortification of the school. They “pass something very easy and simple that everyone can get behind. But that’s because it doesn’t do anything.”12 MFOL turned to corporations to rally support. They managed to persuade Publix to withdraw their support from NRA candidates or from those with NRA agendas. The grocery chain had donated over $750,000 to Gubernatorial candidate Adam Putnam, a self-identified “a proud NRA sell-out.” After the die-in, they revoked their support. MFOL had some success in getting businesses to terminate relations with the NRA, gun vendors, and manufacturers. Bank of America and Citibank agreed. MFOL called for the boycotting of gun rights groups and their business affiliates. Several companies such as Walmart, Dicks’, and Fred Meyer voluntarily decided not the sell guns to people under 21. More recently President Biden passed a new federal law incentivizing individual states to introduce “Red flag warnings” to the tune of $750 million. These would allow the police to identify and remove firearms from high-risk individuals (those without a previous criminal record or mental health record). Presently 19 states (all Democrats apart from Indiana and Florida) have these laws in place. The new federal gun law also adds juvenile and mental health records of buyers of 18 to 20 years old to the FBI’s background check database and increases the length of time allowed for a youth background check to ten days. But again, these laws do not deal with the proliferation of guns and the ability of most citizens to purchase assault weapons. Some police departments in the USA have chosen to use some of their operating funds to pay people to voluntarily surrender firearms they no longer want. In Florida there are buyback programs, offering gifts, money, and even the prospect that their guns will be sent to assist the Ukrainians. This has some advantages; since it is voluntary, it avoids the fury of gunrights advocates who oppose any rule that limits the right to carry arms. It also doesn’t offend those who rail against government intervention. However, given the millions of privately owned guns, some describe it as trying to empty the ocean with a thimble. There are 390 million guns in circulation in the USA in 2018 (Matza and Zurcher 2022). Though President Trump and Republicans favored teachers being trained and armed, very few teachers are interested in taking up arms. In Texas, only about 250 of the 320,000 public school teachers have applied to be part of the state’s armed “school marshal” program. Also, the

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Republican’s focus on making schools safer is far from realistic. The cost of realizing this far exceeds even the most ambitious government funding programs, let alone the $300 million for school security funding in the new congressional gun law.13 David Hogg expressed his distress that Biden hadn’t been more receptive to their demands. Rather than banning assault weapons and combatting gun violence, he too focused on increasing background checks and fortifying schools. Presently in collaboration with Guns Down America and Change the Ref, MFOL have launched a tool (Shock Market) that will track gun violence in the USA under Biden’s watch. In collaboration with these groups MFOL is now engaged in thinking about policy. This coalition group is asking the president to “establish a national office of gun violence prevention”; to “invest in community violence intervention programs”; to “hold the gun industry accountable” by nominating a new director to lead the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; and to “use the presidential bully pulpit” to bring attention to the issue and coordinate a comprehensive response. In addition to remaining attentive to the NRA’s ability to pass new gun laws when old ones are expired, MFOL remains visible and audible in school shootings. Founding members of MFOL were interviewed during mass school shootings in Uvalde, Texas, in 2022. Gun culture: another impediment to gun control

MFOL didn’t get what they wanted, but they were successful in mobilizing supporters through affective solidarity. They also managed to keep alive the event for years and continue to be consulted. Though they collaborated respectfully and engaged their followers, they were less successful in encouraging critical thinking. They managed to gain support from some Republicans and members of the NRA, but to have more democratic impact, they would have to unseat the entrenched power of the NRA, the advocates of the Second Amendment, and many loyal Republicans, as well as initiate a cultural revolution. The USA is exceptional in being the only modern industrial nation that persists in maintaining a gun culture, or so the renowned historian Richard Hofstadter argues. While it was a necessary tool in an agricultural and frontier society, it later took hold as a sport and an ingredient in the American imagination (Hofstadter 1970, Yamane 2017). In 1871 when the NRA was founded, it promoted rifle marksmanship – for the young and professionals; today it is known for its lobbying activity. While gun culture has been linked to leisure activities – hunting, marksmanship, and collecting – these have declined in the last 50 years, and the importance

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of self-defense has increased (Yamane 2017). Other thinkers believe that self-defense has always been an important factor in American gun culture. In a frontier society, guns were required for protection, since there were no police forces, and battles with Native Americans were not uncommon. During reconstruction, half a million disgruntled white southerners returned from the war with guns. Believing the state was illegitimate, they were intent on protecting their families and property. In the post-civil war era, the murder rate was 18 times higher in the south than in New England (Buttrick and Mazen 2022). More recently the possession of guns has been tied to the assertion of masculinity (Carlson 2015). As Detroit men experienced job loss and socioeconomic decline, they were defining themselves as citizen protectors, reasserting their masculine right to protect their family and community. The argument for self-defense has always been strong and continues to be strong. Two-thirds of people interviewed said they owned guns in part to protect their family and property. However, the data shows that the presence of guns does not protect people from assault or theft. In fact, it doubles the likelihood that people will die of homicide and triples the likelihood that someone will die of suicide. The purchase of guns has dramatically increased in the last three years, despite legislation. Mass shootings (defined as death or injury of more than four people) are on the rise. There have been 130 mass killings in the USA this year (as of March 27, 2023), including the Nashville killing. In the last three years, there are two mass killing days in the USA, and 50 people are killed each day by a firearm. In the USA 79% of all homicides are attributed to guns; in the UK only 4% of homicides are due to guns (Matza and Zurcher 2022). The issue of gun control is divisive and intractable as the work of MFOL illustrates. Ninety-one percent of Democrats favored stricter laws, whereas only 24% of Republicans and 45% of independents agree. Fiftyseven percent of all Americans favor stricter laws, though 32% would like the laws to remain the same and 10% want fewer restrictions. So although the majority of Americans want stronger regulation, the pro-gun lobby spends significantly more on messaging and lobbying than do those groups advocating gun control. While gun control seems to conflict with the liberal idea of individual autonomy and freedom, it does not conflict with those who believe that institutions are necessary for their protection. Democracy rests upon trust and respect among citizens, yet when people openly carry handguns (a right in all but five states) respect and fellow feelings are undermined. When children get trained in lockdown drills, they are taught to fear strangers and live in a state of fear. The presence of guns promotes the idea that differences will be resolved through violence, not through discussion; this

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seriously threatens the pluralist ideal of America and its belief that differences are respected. A country inundated with guns, with a history of mass shootings, is not a peaceful safe place, nor is it a place where democracy flourishes (Bouie 2023, 3). Institutional and cultural differences matter

All the events explored in this book have taken place within neoliberal governing strategies in liberal democratic regimes in the USA, UK, and Canada, yet the potential to shift opinion and practices varies from country to country, protest movement to social group, and context to context. The experience of the Parkland protestors attests to those differences. The situation in Parkland contrasts starkly with the events in New Zealand in 2019 and Canada in 2020. Twenty-four hours after their first mass slaying in New Zealand, legislation was passed to outlaw attack weapons without lobby or lengthy protest. In the wake of Canada’s first mass shooting in Nova Scotia (April  2020), the liberal government approved through an order-in-council from cabinet (not through legislation14) the outlawing of the use of 1,500 assault-style firearms. How do we explain these differences? Culture and institutions matter. A robust and well-funded gun culture, social attitudes toward state regulation, and different institutions and institutional practices have to be considered. This attests to the shortcomings of a micropolitical approach to politics. In this catastrophe, affective solidarity mobilized support, yet the macropolitical forces mitigated their effects. The gun lobbies in New Zealand and Canada are weak; campaign financing doesn’t work to facilitate them. While there is a pro-gun lobby in the province of Alberta in Canada, its power does not rival the National Rifleman’s Association in the USA, which has a grip on politicians due to the significance of the Second Amendment and laws around campaign financing and lobbying practices. Nor do any of the major parties in these countries support gun culture as the Republican Party does. Institutions and culture are not set in stone. Interestingly in 18th-century Britain the public had the right to arm themselves, but this law was overruled when police forces were put in place. One might ask why this did not happen in the USA. Why did the Second Amendment persist even after their victory over the British? Initially the militia was mandated to bear arms, but it was not a universal right. The period of restoration, where the southerners felt alienated from the policies of the state, provides a fruitful avenue to investigate this issue. However, the answer to this question is complex and cannot be addressed in this chapter. My concern has been to assess the democratic potential of this catastrophe. While the shooting spawned MFOL, which managed to cultivate democratic sensibilities and

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foster democratic practices, their goal of gun control was impeded by entrenched macropolitical forces, yet their struggle continues. Notes 1 The school was built on swamp lands and ironically named after the activist Marjory Stoneman Douglas who fought to preserve the wetlands in 1920. She wrote a book in 1947 predicting ecological disaster would ensue if developers reclaimed the land. She would have been insulted to have the school named after her. Some felt this disaster was a sign of reprisal – delayed justice. 2 Mike, Hayes, and Aditi Sangal, CNN. Parkland Shooter Nikolas Cruz Formally Sentenced. November  2, 2022. www.cnn.com/us/live-news/parkland-shooternikolas-cruz-sentencing-11-02-2022/index.html 3 Jodie, Dean (2009, 167–168) relies upon Albert-László Barabási’s findings. 4 In Crowds and Party, Jodie Dean reassesses her negative attitude toward social media and network forms of communication, arguing they point to new forms of connectivity and communication. 5 “After two decades of research based upon victims and victim advocates,” experts suggest the following reforms: do not lionize the shooter, impede access to guns, and screen teenagers regularly for mental health/teen depression (Cullen, p. 10) 6 Applebaum, Ann, “After the Parkland Shootings Pro-Russian Bots Are Pushing False Flag Allegations Again.” Washington Post, February 17, 2018. 7 The contradictory opinions around social media are illustrated in the very recent violent protests in France over the police shooting of Nahel M. (June 2023). Social media’s intense visceral experiences are being blamed by authorities for not only organizing the protest but recruiting underage youths into the burning of cars and buildings. The allure of the intensive experiences may have mobilized some, but the substantive content of the message (racist policing) also contributed to youth participation. So it is not just the power of the thing (social media and its unpossessable affects) that has driven violent protest but the experience of French of North Africans in the ghettoized communities and the excessive aggression on the part of the French police. 8 www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/feb/23/oprah-florida-studentsblack-lives-matter Oprah Winfrey supports the Florida students. “What about Black Lives Matter?” Khanya Khondlo Mtshali asks. Winfrey compared the Parkland Kids to the Freedom Riders of the civil rights movement; at the same time she has been accusing BLM of “lacking leadership” and needing “to take note of strategies peaceful intentions of the civil rights movement in the 60’s.” She was clearly unaware of BLM’s intent to avoid a single leader. They rejected a Black messiah that would lead America out of its racist past stressing the need for a leaderful movement. 9 Both Linda Alcoff (2000) and Lois McNay (2014, 115–116) have argued that identity politics can be transformative and more open to collaboration than some radical democrats think. 10 This ban had more to do with the shooter who used this device in Las Vegas to kill 60 people and injure 413 in October 2017. In January 2023 this ban was overturned by the New Orleans Court of Appeal, claiming it was not a machine gun (an illegal gun under the federal law). www.npr.org/2023/01/07/1147698112/ bump-stocks-ban-struck-down-court 11 Fisher, Marc, “The AR-15: America’s Rifle or Illegitimate Killing Machine.” The Washington Post, February 15, 2018 (archived June 12, 2018)

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12 “Transcript: Parkland Student Activists on ‘Face the Nation’.” CBS News, March  25, 2018. Archived  from the original on March  31, 2018. Accessed April 1, 2018. 13 Matza, Max and Zurcher, Anthony, “What Comes Next for US Gun Control.” BBC News, July 15, 2022. www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-62157480. 14 Such legislation had been pending but was interrupted by the closing of parliament due to the COVID-19 crisis.

References Alcoff, Linda. 2000. “Who’s Afraid of Identity Politics?” In Reclaiming Identity. Realist Theory and the Predicament of Postmodernism, edited by Paula Moya and Michael Hames-Garcia. Oakland: University of California Press. https://doi. org/10.1525/9780520924949-012. Arkin, Daniel and Ben Popken. 2018. “How the Internet’s Conspiracy Theorists Turned Parkland Students into ‘Crisis Actors’.” NBC News, February 21, 3:12 PM EST. https://www.grafiati.com/en/literature-selections/memes-internet-culturepublic-sphere-politics/journal/. Bouie, Jamelle. 2023. “Why Must We Go About Our Lives with an Eye on the Nearest Exist.” Sunday Opinion New York Times, January  13. https://www. nytimes.com/2023/01/13/opinion/guns-open-carry-concealed-weaponsdemocracy.html. Bozalek, Vivienne, et al., eds. 2020. Nancy Fraser and Participatory Parity: Reframing Social Justice in South African Higher Education. New York: Routledge. Brown, Wendy. 2015. Demise of the Demos. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Butler, Judith. 2004. Precarious Life: The Power of Mourning and Violence. London: Verso. Buttrick, Nicholas and Jessica Mazen. 2022. “Historical Prevalence of Slavery Predicts Contemporary American Gun Ownership.” PNAS Nexus 1 (3): 117. https://doi.org/10.1093/pnasnexus/pgac117. Carlson, Jennifer. 2015. “Mourning Mayberry: Guns, Masculinity and Socioeconomic Decline.” Gender and Society 20 (3). https://journals.sagepub.com/ doi/10.1177/0891243214554799. Connolly, William. 1999. Why I Am Not a Secularist. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Cullen, David. 2019. Parkland. New York: Harper. Dean, Jodie. 2009. Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies. Durham: Duke University Press. ———. 2016. Crowds and Parties. London: Verso Frank, Jason. 2021. The Democratic Sublime: On Aesthetics and Popular Assembly. New York: Oxford University Press. Hofstadter, Richard. 1970. America as a Gun Culture. New York: American Heritage Publishing Company. Lucero, Louis, II. 2018. “What Emma González Said Without Words at the March for Our Lives Rally.” The New York Times, March 24. https://www.nytimes. com/2018/03/24/us/emma-gonzalez-march-for-our-lives.html. Matza, Max and Anthony Zurcher. 2022. “What Comes Next for US Gun Control.” BBC News, July 15. www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-62157480.

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McNay, Lois. 2014. The Misguided Search for the Political: Social Weightlessness in Radical Democratic Theory. Cambridge: Polity. Price, Wayne and John McCarthy. 2018. “Step by Step: How the Parkland School Shooting Unfolded.” Florida Today, February  19. https://www.floridatoday. com/story/news/2018/02/17/minute-minute-how-parkland-school-shootingunfolded/345817002/. Rancière, Jacques. 1991. The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation. Translated by Kristin Ross. Paulo Alto: Stanford University Press. Sullivan, Kevin, William Wan and Julie Tate. 2018. “Fla. Shooting Suspect Had a History of Explosive Anger, Depression, Killing Animals.” The Washington Post, February  15. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/fla-shootingsuspect-had-a-history-of-explosive-anger-depression-killing-animals/2018/02/1 5/06f05710-1291-11e8-9570-29c9830535e5_story.html. Tukekci, Zeynep. 2017. Twitter and Tear Gas: The Power and Fragility of Networked Protest. New Haven: Yale University Press. Weiss, Brennan and Eliza Relman. 2018. “ ‘Enough is Enough’: Hundreds of Thousands Descend on Washington and across the US for the ‘March for Our Lives’ Rally against Gun Violence.” Business Insider, March  24. https://www.businessinsider.com/march-for-our-lives-protestors-call-for-end-to-gun-violence2018-3?r=US&IR=T. Witt, Emily. 2018. “How the Survivors of Parkland Began the Never Again Movement.” The New Yorker, February 19. https://www.newyorker.com/news/newsdesk/how-the-survivors-of-parkland-began-the-never-again-movement. Yamane, David. 2017. “The Sociology of U.S. Gun Culture” in Sociology Compass. 11 (7). June. https://doi.org/10.1111/soc4.12497. Zerilli, Linda. 2005. Feminism and the Abyss of Freedom. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

5 PRESIDENT TRUMP’S RESPONSE TO THE COVID PANDEMIC Affective ideology and authoritarian mismanagement

By focusing on six weeks of President Trump’s White House briefings and the mass media’s response I  have framed COVID-19 as a catastrophic event (though its worst effects were to come), and as I revise this book in 2023 the pandemic persists. A range of reporting and commentary will be explored from popular outlets like CNN or Fox News to the more investigative journalism provided by The Guardian, Washington Post, VOX, Politico, and The New York Times. My interest lies in exploring how this catastrophe shaped the public. Some emotional reorientation took place, but in this chapter, I will focus primarily upon Trump’s Othering discourses that shored up populist sentiments, neoliberal values, and authoritarian strategies. His opposition to science, elites, established institutions, racial minorities, and immigrants brings his thinking in line with contemporary populist themes. Yet his actions also reflect his commitment to neoliberal ideals: faith in the free market, rugged individualism, and minimal government. In framing his response in terms of populist strategies and neoliberal practices, he mishandled COVID and caused unnecessary suffering and deaths. By contrast, many state governors and public authorities intervened to promote public health and challenged his divisive rhetoric and neoliberal practices. Both the perils arising from neoliberal and populist governing strategies and the promises of deepening democracy were manifest in early responses to the COVID pandemic. My use of examples from the media may appear excessive, but to fully establish my interpretation of Trump’s rhetoric – a muddle of populism and neoliberalism – I have chosen to include them.1 To understand the allure and techniques of populism, a careful analysis of Trump’s rhetoric is in DOI: 10.4324/9781003295518-5

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order. Many of you have probably forgotten the disturbing facts and emotional rhetoric of the early COVID days. In my concrete and meticulous analysis of public discourse and performances, I hope to draw attention to their ideological and emotional framing. This made thoughtful responses difficult. In the spirit of critical inquiry, I will interpret Trump’s and Fox News’ affective ideology2 (Peters and Protevi n.d.) as well as the counterdiscourses of the liberal mainstream press. The critique will prove useful in understanding the power of antidemocratic feelings and ideas that were generated during the pandemic and how they contributed to the mishandling of the pandemic. Ernesto Laclau recognizes how populist politicians rely upon empty signifiers to constitute political identities. The vaguer the meaning, the broader the appeal. For him there are no core ideas behind populist rhetoric (2005, 105). This was true of Trump’s appeal to “freedom.” It became associated with those who refused to wear masks, those who believed the virus was a hoax of Big Pharma, and later those who declined to be vaccinated. While it is important to acknowledge contingency in such crises, one should not underestimate the power of preexisting identities that leaders strive to represent. This was evident during COVID: people quickly took a stand on the virus. Attitudes to the virus and later to the vaccines often correlated with political loyalties. Republicans tended to dismiss the virus and were more often anti-vaxxers, whereas Democrats took it more seriously and were more likely to get vaccinated. The core of the Republican Party, business leaders and professionals, may not have liked Trump’s style, but they endorsed his neoliberal policies: an unencumbered economy, minimal regulation, and reduced taxes. Apart from Mitt Romney, the Republican Party failed to criticize Trump’s handling of the pandemic. Trump’s attitude toward the economy and his contempt for issues of inequity and inequality resonated with many of the middle and upper middle classes. In exaggerating the power of affect and the fluidity of political identities, one can easily gloss over all those voters who discern their economic interest. The turn to facts in a world of fear: a veneer of certainty

The popular experience in the first six weeks of COVID-19 was unprecedented.3 In the terms of Fredrick Jameson, Sadi Ophir, and Antonio Y. Vázquez-Arroyo, COVID amounted to an objective catastrophe. As of May 27, 2020, almost 10,000 Americans had lost their lives, and the USA led the world in the numbers of deaths and infections (NBC News “Death Toll”). By June 28 over 10 million people worldwide had been infected, and almost 500,000 had died. We knew these figures seriously underestimated both those infected and those who had died, given the shortage of

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testing. There was uncertainty about the origin, symptoms, and possible end date of the pandemic. At one point, we felt relieved that contracting the disease gave one some immunity, although it was unclear how effective it would be. It was assumed children were not seriously affected, and that too turned out to be questionable. The cough and fever seemed to be the main symptoms, but the possible list of symptoms grew. Various drugs for mitigating the effects of COVID were aired, but their effectiveness was unproven. Uncertainty in this context produced fear, and Trump capitalized upon the desire for certainty. Although I have appealed to reliable facts to counter fake news or catastrophization, facts do not stand alone; they presume a theoretical model and a set of assumptions. Even rudimentary facts, like reporting deaths due to COVID-19, were not a simple matter of counting. These facts were provisional. In the UK their statistics did not include deaths in residence or care homes; when they were included, reported deaths spiked. In America, if people were admitted to the hospital and subsequently died without being tested for COVID 19, they were not considered COVID deaths. When deaths in residence homes were added to the figures in the USA, there was a dramatic uptick. We also knew that infections were underreported since massive testing had not been done. Hence, worldwide and national figures of infection were unreliable. The pandemic put millions of people out of work: 19.7% of the American workforce were reported to be unemployed in the month of April (Rosenberg and Long 2020), and many had been displaced from their usual work experience. The financial costs were huge, and society was on shaky grounds. Countries and states began to open after lockdowns, but the effects of that decision were unclear. Scientists were predicting a second wave unless people took social distancing seriously. In the USA, what was certain was Trump’s belief – in opening the economy, “fighting through it” . . . the economy would “roar back.” So, despite the uncertainty and caution among scientists, sentiments shared worldwide, President Trump’s rhetoric of certainty was unfailing and alluring. The world was very different in 2020 than it was during the SARS epidemic of 2003. The emergence of social media and the prevalence of cell phones and online platforms mean there are multiple and more diverse ways of delivering news and scientific and social scientific research.4 Herein lies a paradox: more information and wide-ranging opinions were readily available to the general population (hence the potential for an informed citizenry has improved), yet, increasingly, citizens relied on news that catered to their preexisting preferences. Scientific or social scientific information was more widely available, but conspiracy theories were more widespread than ever. In 2013, polls indicated 56% of Democrats and 75% of Republicans believed

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in at least one conspiracy theory (D’Ancona 2017, 164). In July 2020, 70% of the American population polled were familiar with the conspiracy theory that COVID-19 was planned by powerful people. Thirty-seven percent of conservative Republicans and right-leaning people believed this, but only 10% of liberal Democrats did. Education was also a significant factor in conspiracy susceptibility: the less educated were far more likely than the college educated to believe in them (Schaeffer 2020). With the increasing strength of alt-right news (Breitbart and Fox) and with new social media platforms catering to extremism, fake news, lies, or “alternate facts” (the term was coined by Kelly Anne Conway, Counselor to President Trump from 2017 to 2020) proliferated. To combat this deluge, routine fact-checking and reality news programs have arisen. CNN often engaged in checking Trump’s facts, or questioning his hyperboles and affirmations, yet they too engaged in affective communication to support Trumpian alternatives. Google News, Twitter, and regulators worked to counter/interrupt the circulation of fake news sources with limited success. Twitter tagged Trumps tweets glorifying violence and issuing warnings to fact-check. In the aftermath of the assault on Washington on January 6, Twitter and Facebook suspended Trump’s accounts. Yet with Elon Musk’s purchase of Twitter, Trump’s account has been restored. Both Trump’s rhetoric and the rhetoric of the liberal press and Democratic Party were emotionally saturated. Whereas the former relied on Othering, nativism, and anti-expert sentiments, the latter struggled to emotionally reorient people to respect and acknowledge social differences, trust scientific authorities, and act in the common good. Persuasive rhetoric, emotionally loaded discourses, and staged performances cannot be eliminated from the public sphere but interpreting and critically evaluating them are beneficial. Not all discourses are equivalent. One hopes that people can distinguish between rhetoric that serves the common good from rhetoric that simply purports to; communication that is persuasive from that which is manipulative; and rhetoric that is “morally defensible” and open to being publicly challenged from rhetoric that is “morally indefensible” and “dogmatic” (Spragens 1990, 249). During the COVID crisis, the president’s rhetoric was divisive, partisan, indefensible, and dogmatic; in contrast, the discourses of the liberal press and Democratic Party struggled to be inclusive, morally justifiable (based on science and the common good), and honestly tentative. However, it is difficult to be optimistic about the popular capacity to distinguish truth from lies when, a year after the US 2020 election, 53% of Republican voters still believed that the election was stolen from Trump (The Guardian, “Election Stolen” 2021). Facts are neither self-validating nor naked; they are mediated by concepts that have theoretical assumptions. This allows for both cynical

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manipulations and progressive revisioning of the world. Facts can be made to matter differently. Responsible scholarship and journalism do not condone fake news, but it cannot claim wholly impartial reporting. Facts need to be corroborated facts, and when embedded in public rhetoric, they become open to debate. This must be distinguished from the cynical reduction of political debate to rhetorical manipulation, in which discourse becomes mired in controversies over fake news, falsehoods, and indisputable superlatives, which disguise themselves as serving the common good. Eschewing scientific expertise and journalistic critique

In analyzing Trump’s early televised briefings, I hope to expose his antiscience, anti-expert attitudes as well as his gratuitous antagonistic remarks. Contrary to Ernesto Laclau’s (2005) formalist logic that strips populism of its substantive meanings, I believe many populist tropes appear in Trump’s rhetoric. Scorning experts (specifically scientists), attacking the mainstream press, and propagating anti-institutionalist, anti-elitist, and nativist sentiments were all planks in Trump’s COVID playbook. In this section I focus on the first three of these strategies. In the spirit of critical inquiry, I will analyze his theatrical (affect-laden) performances, the associations he nurtured, as well as his authoritarian actions. For the last 75 years, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) had been at the center of decision-making and carried out the briefings on every infectious disease outbreak. This time they were silenced. Scientific information was rolled out during the briefings headed by the president at the White House. Doctors Deborah Birx and Anthony Fauci, experts in the field with decades of experience, reported on the state of the virus. The scientists were there to communicate and explain the science, though Trump did not leave expertise to them. He claimed that chloroquine, an anti-malaria drug was “a game changer” and offered “a cure for COVID 19.” Scientists were troubled. Dr. Fauci diplomatically called Trump’s statement “hopeful”; other scientists outside the USA called it “insane.” This drug was for parasites, not a virus. A former principal deputy of the FDA responded: “Efforts to widely distribute unproven treatments are misguided at best and dangerous at worst” (Piller 2020). Scientists and medical officers were often involved in damage control. After the chloroquine revelations, Dr. Fauci had to correct Trump, saying the drug had not been tested. Dr. Rick Bright, a top vaccine expert, was fired for disagreeing with Trump’s endorsement of hydroxychloroquine. In late May, in a flippant gesture, Trump announced he was using it. Perhaps the most serious unscientific gaff was on April 22, when Trump suggested that infected people could swallow disinfectant. Or possibly, UV lights

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could be used internally, both of which, he believed, would be effective at eliminating the virus. Companies like Clorox or Johnson and Johnson immediately had to issue warnings against this. In the spirit of damage control, Dr. Deb Birx was interviewed and affirmed that disinfectants could not be ingested, but she was intent upon deflecting questions about Trump’s statement. She insisted that the press had to let this incident go and think constructively about moving forward. Four days later Trump claimed he was being sarcastic, but if you viewed the briefing, it is clear there were no signs of sarcasm. In one of the briefings, Fauci was asked if lives would have been saved had they acted earlier; his response was a qualified yes. Trump supporters tweeted that Fauci should be fired, and Trump retweeted this. He did not fire him, but there was a noticeable absence of Fauci from the briefings for several days. His cavalier attitude to the science and experts in the field resonated with his and his followers’ contempt for authority. Not only did Trump expedite the use of hydroxychloroquine, but he also recommended Remdesivir, a drug developed for Ebola. On May  1, Trump appeared with the CEO of Gilead, the manufacturer of the drug at the White House; he announced a donation of 1.5 million doses. This drug was used for HIV and hepatitis C and appeared to reduce the length of a hospital stay from 15 to 11 days; yet it was hardly a gamechanger. Since it had not been widely tested for COVID-19, its effectiveness or safety was uncertain. More importantly, having a CEO of the corporation, who has a vested interest in the production of this drug, appear as a public benefactor and stand shoulder to shoulder with the president was hardly reassuring, especially to those who are concerned about impartiality or the power of Big Pharma. This was one of many performances staged to enhance the president’s reputation for being resolute and effective. However, his handling of COVID proved otherwise. Following Trump’s serious gaffes, live White House briefings diminished. On May  5 it was announced that the task force would be disbanded. Going forward, Trump would set up a group oriented toward opening the economy. Since infection rates and deaths were rising (well over 120,000,000 infected and over 80,000 dead), people were alarmed by Trump’s decision that the task force was no longer necessary. One can only think of it as a strategy to improve his image by silencing the CDC. While he had been fairly effective in managing Birx and Fauci (their disagreements with him were gentle), he did not get the approval that he wished for. There was such alarm at his decision to disband the task force that the plan was abandoned in the end. Since briefings were not going that well, he switched to being interviewed by journalists from Fox News, seriously curtailing debate.

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Not only were Trump’s deeds inappropriate (willful spurning of scientific evidence, firing those who disagreed with him), but so were his words. In mid-May, he announced how he was going to deliver the vaccine at “ ‘warp speed,’ by the end of the year – that meant big and fast. It was touted as a massive scientific, industrial and logistical endeavour unlike anything our country has seen since the Manhattan Project” (Smith 2020) – an unfortunate analogy. At this moment, Dr. Fauci, masked face and eyes downcast, reached to adjust his tie. Several days earlier, before the Senate committee, Fauci said, “there is no guarantee that the vaccine is going to be effective” (Smith 2020). There was an ongoing dissonance between the public rhetoric of the President and the scientists, which can be summarized as hubris versus prudence. Not only did Trump reject scientific expertise, muzzling and monitoring Fauci and Birx, but he also failed productively to engage journalists. During the QAs, mainstream journalists were often attacked or dismissed. If Trump didn’t like a question, he would humiliate or cut the speaker off. In response to several female journalists, he dismissed them with a wave of his hand: “I’ve had enough of that” or “we are not talking about that today.” He laughed. In the spirit of social distancing, he said, he would like to be able to hand-select those allowed into the briefing. Journalist Peter Alexander asked if he was giving Americans a false sense of hope by promising the immediate delivery of a drug (chloroquine) that experts said was unproven. Trump disagreed, “You know I’m a smart guy, I feel good about it.” He was then asked: “What would he say to Americans that are at home watching and scared?” Instead of offering reassuring words, Trump snapped. “I would say that you are a terrible journalist, that is what I would say.” When asked about the availability of test kits for everyone who needs them, Trump shouted, “Nobody is even talking about this except you, which doesn’t surprise me.” Jim Acosta of CNN tried to engage Trump in a discussion about his tendency to produce a rosy picture of the pandemic – his “happy talk.” Trump shot back with a sarcastic, dismissive remark. “This was very sad talk, not happy talk” (Concha 2020). He evaded the concern about his tendency to produce a rosy picture. Trump’s briefings were less a platform to provide the public with the most reliable and up-to-date information available and more a stage for him to demonstrate his personal strength and competence. This behavior was entirely consistent with leaders in populist movements. He spread fake news and made numerous blunders, for which he never apologized. In January he compared COVID to the flu. When there were 15 cases in the USA, he said they would soon be zero; they then shot up to over 1,000. He said everyone who wanted a test could have one, which again was irresponsible and ill-informed. While professional athletes and actors were being tested,

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healthcare workers were unable to be tested. Trump’s hyperboles or happy talk persisted. “We have done a phenomenal job on this: even democratic governors have agreed. I mean they are saying ‘we are doing a great job’.” He also enthused about the USA being the biggest and best economy in the world and exclaimed the economy “will skyrocket” when opened. Months later, it appeared the economists were correct: it would take some time for the economy to reboot. Trump’s statements were intended to make people feel good and were described most sympathetically by Dr. Fauci as “aspirational.” In March  2020, Trump said he would like to see people go to church on Easter Sunday; very quickly health officials challenged this. Some evangelical churches did hold services of more than 50 people with little social distancing; they believed they would be saved by God. His confident demeanor and happy talk may have been alluring and temporarily soothing, but as he raised false expectations and wrongly cushioned people from confronting the real, his behavior was unconscionable. Occasionally Trump hit a catastrophic note when it served to boost his popularity. On March 15, he drew attention to the worst-case scenario: if no action had been taken to slow the virus, he predicted 214  million Americans would be infected and 1.2–2  million people would die (Regalado 2020). This was followed by his self-congratulatory statements, that he should be commended for closing borders to China and Europe, which saved lives. Social Othering strategies: blaming the democrats, China, and WHO

Far from cultivating unifying narratives around public health and the public good, the president’s rhetoric was divisive, pandering to his base and loyal Republicans. He relied on Social Othering strategies prior to the pandemic, and their use persisted during it. Consistent with populist tactics, Trump created a political frontier to mobilize “the people” against the elite. This was paradoxical, if not contradictory, for Trump occupied the office of the president, yet he managed to present himself as an outlier. In this section, I analyze his rhetoric as well as those on Fox News who helped mobilize his base and aggravate divisions in the American public. Far from encouraging emotional reorientation, where people would be open to empathize with others and respect their differences and work toward freer less constrained relations for all, Trump’s discourses and behavior encouraged hate and reproach. Consistent with my argument in Chapter 1, I believe that to understand the democratic potential of feelings, one must look at the embodied emotions of situated subjects rather than

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presuming that lively, impersonal affects will challenge the status quo. In the COVID scenario, affects bolstered intolerant and angry feelings rather than fostering empathy or compassion. In the SARS chapter I have shown how Social Othering involves creating a world of friends and enemies and projecting negative feelings onto foreign Others, whether they are from within or outside the nation. This tactic succeeds at harnessing and redirecting anger and fear. Instead of experiencing fears and disappointments, one blames others. In the process, strong bonds of group identity are consolidated by essentializing the “enemy” and treating them as a threat that one must guard against. The president relied upon internal enemies (the democratic elite, the liberal establishment, the left, as well as the hoodlums and terrorists) as well as external enemies (the Chinese and WHO) to foster identification. Far from Trump’s lively feelings (happy talk and affirmative performances) fostering democratic sensibilities, they were linked to anger, hateful, vengeful emotions, and Othering discourses, which contributed to antidemocratic sentiments. At the outset of the pandemic, Trump and the alt-right press blamed Obama Care: it was useless and a waste of taxpayer’s dollars. The problems associated with the CDC’s test kits were also attributed to Obama Care (Cook 2020). He blamed Obama personally: it was his fault that the USA was unprepared. Yet Predict, the organization set up by Obama to predict the outbreak of epidemics, was closed down by Trump. Trump stoked up partisan loyalty by denouncing the “whining” democratic governors and in the process created a site where Republicans could discharge some of their negative energy. Governor Gretchen Whitmer had criticized the federal government for not taking COVID seriously enough earlier. Trump responded swiftly, “I won’t speak to that “woman in Michigan.” The politics of Social Othering and blame were also daily tactics of Fox News. They provided sites for discharging negative feelings and amplifying differences. At the outset Fox News presented the epidemic as a hoax, and Trish Regan blamed “the liberal press” for using the virus “to demonize and destroy Trump.” “This is impeachment all over again.” Regan said Trump’s critics were “using the pandemic to spark panic and destabilize the economy to harm his chances of being re-elected” (CNN “Trish Reagan”). Despite the popularity of this opinion, Fox Business Network decided to let Regan go, though her ideas were not without effect. She was only one of many Republicans who did not take this infection seriously. On the Fox & Friends program, Jerry Falwell Jr, a Christian evangelical leader and ardent supporter of Donald Trump, also claimed people were using this virus as a way of defeating Trump. It’s just strange to me how so many are overreacting. The H1N1 virus, in 2009, killed 17,000 people. It was the flu, also, I  think, and there

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was not the same hype. You just didn’t see it on the news 24/7 and it makes you wonder if there’s a political reason for that. Impeachment didn’t work and the Mueller report didn’t work and Article 25 [the 25th Amendment to the constitution] didn’t work so maybe now this is their next attempt to get Trump. (The Hill, “Falwell interview” 2020) Falwell also fabricated a conspiracy theory, claiming COVID-19 was a gift from China and North Korea. The owner of a restaurant asked me last night. . . . “You remember the North Korean leader promised a Christmas present for America, back in December? Could it be they got together with China, and this is that present?” I don’t know but it really is something strange going on. (The Hill, “Falwell interview” 2020) While Trump’s base (specifically the America firsters) and Fox News were Sino-phobic from “the get go,” this was not true of President Trump himself. Consistent with populist leaders who suture together conflicting interests, Trump tried to secure a favorable trade deal with China, which would satisfy the neoliberal globalists among his supporters. On January  24 he tweeted, “China has been working hard to contain the virus, the US greatly appreciates their efforts and transparency on behalf of the American People I want to thank President Xi Jinping.” On February 7, “Just had a conversation with President Xi, he is strong, sharp and powerfully focused on leading the counterattack on the virus, he feels they are doing well . . . even building hospitals in a matter of days . . . we are working closely with China to help.” The same day he reported that “they are doing a very professional job, a very good job” (Forgery 2020). While Trump expressed his assurance that the virus was under control, Michael Pompeo and Matthew Pottinger, the China Hawks in his office, warned against a deadly pathogen made in China. They consistently talked about the Wuhan flu or the Chinese flu, but Trump ignored their warnings. He was uncritical of China until he was informed that the Chinese were saying COVID-19 was brought to China by US army personnel. After that, he was furious and started using the term “Chinese Virus.” As his pandemic performance proved less than stellar and the election loomed, he needed to find someone or something to blame to detract from his shortcomings. China provided that target. In late April, Trump and the Republican Party ramped up their accusations. On May  4 Pompeo authorized the CIA to investigate the virus’ origin; “there is extraordinary evidence that in came from a lab in Wuhan” (Viswanatha and Leary 2020). He claimed the Chinese had unleashed the virus on the USA, and he

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promised they would be sued for damages.5 The security services of five of the American allies found this charge improbable. Still, a cold war attitude toward China was ramping up. On June 19, at his Tulsa rally, Trump used the racist term Kung Fu Virus to animate his followers. The Chinese are not blameless; they refused to give WHO access to the wet market or labs, the suspected source of the virus. They muzzled the whistleblower. In December Dr. Li, Wenliang posted on WE CHAT that a curious disease had been contracted by seven workers in the Wuhan market with SARS-like symptoms. He was detained and harassed by the police and accused of “rumor mongering.” When he died from COVID on February 7, the post about his death was removed. Millions posted, “we want freedom of speech,” and began blowing whistles to honor his death. Chinese censors could not keep up with the postings; in the end, the party allowed public grief on social media. Li was no longer an enemy of the state. The Communist Party turned him into a national hero, a proud member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) who had warned the country about the disease. China appears to have mastered the art of flipping the story. Another common theme in the arsenal of Fox News was that WHO acted as an arm of the CCP. WHO’s bias toward the Chinese meant they didn’t respond early enough or with the seriousness that was warranted. Dr. Hertelendy, a Florida-based expert in biomedicine, told Fox News that “(WHO) has been trying to be politically correct by underestimating the extent of the threat . . . they are simply too slow, burdened by bureaucracy and political correctness” (Garcia 2020). Consistent with the alt-right’s demonizing of WHO, Trump initiated the withdrawal of American funding, an unprecedented action. While the mainstream press was clobbering Trump’s lack of preparedness for the virus, the alt-right were constantly praising his effectiveness and foresight, attesting to the power of fake news. As death counts rose and the ineptness of Trump’s handling of the crisis became apparent, Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, praised the administration’s “great success story” (Vazquez 2020). On the day that the country surpassed a million infections and 60,000 deaths, CNN thought this compliment was laughable, although Kushner was “deadly” serious. Othering not only relies upon strong emotions harnessed to words but relies upon associations or affects that are not easily translatable. That doesn’t mean they aren’t decipherable. Here is where I depart from the new materialists. I focus on the dissensual experiences caused by the disaster, as they do, but in deciphering the meaning, I try to understand the allure of Trump’s discourse and hopefully prompt thinking of ways of challenging it. Exploring the rhetoric of Fox News, I expose their tactics: their stories can’t be verified, but they aren’t strictly lies, but rather associations that

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foster support. I’m also drawn to think about the power of abjection. During the SARS epidemic, the civet cat was believed to be the intermediary, and the disease was contracted by workers in the animal market. During COVID-19, the Pantholin (a pre-historic looking anteater whose scales were used in traditional medicine) was believed to be the host. More recently, the Chinese have attributed the transmission to the bat. Just as the idea of eating the civet cat is creepy to most Westerners, so, too, is the idea of using the scales of the Pantholin or using boar bile as a treatment in combatting a disease. Most Westerners find these habits disgusting. These gut feelings fuel racism and xenophobia. However, on a rational level, people are outraged by the permanence of wet markets. China is no longer struggling to modernize as a world economic power; it is technologically sophisticated yet reluctant to close wet markets. It appears that the Chinese government is buying these wild animals to avoid their sale in the wet markets, but many believe these markets should be closed. In mid-June 2020, another outbreak of COVID was found in a wet market in Peking, alarming most Westerners. The mechanism of Othering fueled racist feelings against Chinese Americans, but strong negative feelings toward the Chinese were not exclusive to the American media or society. The incidents of racist attacks on Asians have increased exponentially in Australia and Canada. Niall Ferguson, a British journalist, wrote that the Chinese were blocking local airplanes leaving Wuhan on January 23, but international planes were still departing for the rest of the world, implying that China was deliberately spreading the virus. Daniel Bell, a political scientist, resident in China, challenged this statement demanding proof. Ferguson ultimately admitted that he did not have proof of this. He too was guilty of fake news and stoking up antiChinese sentiments (TVO ‘Steve Paiken’ 2020). The persistence of strong affects and emotions in the rhetoric of Trump and Fox News makes fact checking difficult. Nevertheless, The Washington Post identified over 30,000 lies or misleading statements over the four years of Trump’s presidency (Kessler 2021). As I’ve shown earlier, associations and exaggerations were emotionally oriented to support Trump, even though they proved false or were unverifiable. By contrast, there were strong counter-narratives, supported by facts, which circulated blaming the president. The New York Times and The Washington Post routinely published articles reproaching the president. “70 days of Denial, Dysfunction and Deferral” recounts Trump’s refusal to take the virus seriously, earlier. The CDC had reported a cluster of novel COVID cases on December  31, 2019. This was confirmed by a Chinese official on January 3, but the administration chose not to act. In January, Alex Azar, the secretary of HHS (the department of Health and

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Human Services), the office that oversees the CDC, raised an alarm and suggested that the CDC build a national COVID-19 surveillance system. Yet they were denied the $100 million plan to do so; at the time, it was considered too costly. Azar, who was battling to get the president’s attention, was also blamed for not being more forceful. In early February, The Washington Post reported (weeks after Chinese officials had locked down 11  million people in Wuhan) two letters were sent to the White House Office of Management and Budget to allocate $136 million of department funds to combat the virus should it take hold in the USA. At the end of February 2020, CDC Fauci called for the closure of schools. All these initiatives were denied, for they were thought to be “alarmist.” On President Trump’s return flight from India, he read a warning from Dr. Nancy Messonnier that precipitated a dramatic fall in the stock market. Trump was furious that he had not been contacted. Azar was demoted and replaced by Mike Pence. But it would be another three weeks before mitigation plans were put in place. Trump’s reluctance to move on the virus is attributed to his preoccupation with impeachment proceedings, the fallout from the killing of the Iranian major general Qasem Soleimani, and, of course, his efforts to strike an economic deal with China. Also, his distrust of the CDC and scientists were factors in his failure to support their warnings and initiatives. Had Trump responded thoughtfully to these warnings from China and the HHS, there would have been less suffering and fewer causalities. Cultivating a divided and uninformed public: the effects of anti-science and anti-expert sentiments

The story on testing reveals a larger problem: not only with Trump’s and the White House’s attitude to scientific authorities, but also with the veneer of certainty and optimism that he propagated. The importance of testing was continually repeated by scientists worldwide. Yet Trump failed to “commandeer and distribute testing kits to states and hospitals in the massive amounts needed” (Connolly 2020). Connolly coined his policy on testing as the “Great Test Refusal.” All the while he enthused, “we’re doing the most tests of any country almost 20,000 per day”. . . . “they are beautiful.” Bill Gates also squashed the White House’s optimism: “American testing is bogus.” The lower classes were not being tested, and since they were on the frontline and more likely to be carriers, Gates believed the testing is not as effective as it could be. Testing is not just a numbers game. Since people aren’t getting the results quickly enough (there ought to be 24-hour turnaround so that contact traces can be meaningfully made), they are unable to reduce the exponential spread. Countries like South Korea and Germany were successful not only because they did a lot of testing, but because there was a quick turnaround in terms of results. This

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meant they could quarantine those who were in contact with the positive carrier. This made all the difference (CNN “Gates Interview” 2020). Since the USA did nothing for six weeks, they missed the window when testing could have been effective in flattening the curve. So, while numbers matter, numbers on their own do not tell the full story. But do people want to know the full story? Did they want the depressing details? Many wanted to be reassured, and Trump’s positive spin provided that reassurance. Several weeks later, Trump announced, “testing is over-rated.” In his Tulsa rally in mid-June, he called for the “slowing down of testing,” believing America’s high rate of infection had to do with high levels of testing. Again, scientists disputed Trump’s statement, and his press secretary and Peter Navarro claimed Trump was being sarcastic. Yet in response to a journalist, Trump said he was not kidding. Trump’s anti-science and divisive rhetoric are best summarized by his response to his own administration’s April  17 three-phase guidelines on opening the economy. He dismissed it and supported those who protested stay-at-home orders. In the wake of issuing these guidelines, there were protests in state capitals, specifically in Michigan. The partisan attitudes were graphically illustrated. Most of the protestors refused to wear masks and failed to socially distance. As they rampaged through the streets, they were confronted by medical workers in scrubs who blocked their cars. Trump tweeted his support for the protestors, who were discounting his own administration’s guidelines. Many donned swastikas and nooses. Others carried assault weapons and confederate flags, clearly expressing their support for the Second Amendment and their anti-Semitic and racist convictions. Signs bearing the mantra “USA the land of freedom” were ubiquitous. People were threatening Governor Gretchen Whitmore, shouting, “lock her up.” President Trump managed to bring together white supremacists and those who spurned government regulation. He tweeted, “these very good people . . . are angry . . . they want their lives back,” comparing them to “those who were afraid to resume public life” (Ray 2020). He appealed to his alt-right and neoliberal base by backing up those who were defying government policy and portrayed those who took seriously government regulations as frightened. Not only did Trump eschew scientific expertise on the handling of COVID-19, he also eschewed scientific guidelines for opening the economy. Given the huge financial and emotional sacrifices that people have made, CDC believed a second wave could possibly be avoided.6 Several weeks later a seven-page document was released that replaced the original document, leaving protocol for opening the economy to individual states, cities, towns, and even corporations (The New York Times, April  10, 2020). Conflicts within states ensued: the state of Georgia called for opening, while the city of Atlanta opposed that policy.

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FIGURE 5.1 

Anti-lockdown signs on a lawn in Michigan.

Source: Kches16414/Wikimedia. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:COVID-19_AntiLockdown_Yard_Signs_in_Michigan.jpg

Trump had managed to frame the pandemic in politically divisive terms, where unifying narratives would have been beneficial. He supported those who were demanding their personal liberty (mainly Republicans and the alt-right) versus those who are worried about their health and public health (mainly Democrats). Most Americans could no longer afford to stay at home, but if they could, they might have done so. Their return to work was based on necessity rather than choice. Fears and concerns were drowned out by this celebratory libertarian discourse of individual liberty. Trump also appealed to the patriots and war veterans, reiterating a discourse of war and sacrifice. He described America as “fighting the invisible enemy and prevailing.” Chris Christie, former governor of New Jersey, an ardent Trump supporter, similarly framed COVID: Just as in WWII, we sent our boys off to fight for freedom, knowing many would not return, in opening up the economy, we’ve got to let

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some of these folks get back to work because if we don’t, we’re going to destroy the American way of life in these families – and it will be years and years before we can recover. (Harvey 2020) Trump confirmed this statement, believing that we should be willing to sacrifice 3,000 deaths a day, and furthermore he reiterated the proverb “the cure is worse than the disease.” Associating COVID with WWII was inept and contributed to de-factualizing the pandemic. American involvement in WWII was urgent; during the pandemic, delay would lessen the loss of lives and ensure safer public spaces. Efforts to consolidate affective solidarity: “we are all in this together” #alonetogether

In this section I will look at the discourses used by the liberals and the left to challenge the narrative of the president and Fox News and take seriously the pandemic. Within the first few weeks of the virus, Dr. Sanjay Gupta of CNN reiterated the refrain “we are all in this together” to consolidate solidarity for public health initiatives and promote responsible behavior. It was not an empty signifier, but scientists and medical professionals used it to draw attention to human interdependence and offered it as an alternative to the Trumpian celebration of sovereign and “free” individuals. Since the virus was highly contagious and did not respect neighborhood boundaries or national borders, everyone was believed to be at risk. Inspired by sovereign individualism and market freedom, governors of red states were reluctant to lock down their economies and contested being regulated. By April, southern and southwestern states were opening their economies. In pursuit of individual freedom, citizens were spreading the virus. People were flocking to bars, restaurants, and shops and were refusing to mask and social distance; they were acting irresponsibly and causing harm. Two months later in the height of summer, June 25, their selfishness was confirmed. The highest number of new cases in any one day was reported. The refrain “we are all in this together” was taken up by liberals and the left, but its meaning was tweaked. Aware of the public health risk and recognizing our interdependent existence, they believed some were more vulnerable to contagion than others. “We all are at risk, but we are not equally at risk.” They pointed to differential rates of infection. Re-interpreting the refrain swayed emotions and drew attention to social differences. When the quarantine was called, there were those who escaped to their holiday homes in the Hamptons or Florida. Most people lived in shared apartments in New York City and when quarantined were relegated to a room.

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When the NBA Basketball player Rudy Gobert tested positive for COVID, the season was closed. Within days another dozen NBA players tested positive. In the scramble for tests, the rich and famous came first: Edris Elba, Tom Hanks and his wife. While celebrities were being tested, doctors and frontline workers complained about being unable to get the test. When Amy Knolbachar’s husband came down with COVID, she celebrated the magnificent care at the Mayo clinic. The care at a private hospital could hardly be compared to the local public hospital in Queens, where PPE were in short supply, where people were crowded in the corridors, and where unclaimed dead bodies were piled up to be put in mass unmarked graves. COVID underscored existing social differences. There were stark differences between those who could work at home (white-collar workers) and those who could not (frontline workers). As the death figures mounted in March and April, it became clear that Black Americans and Latinos were more likely to contract COVID and die from it. A  new mantra emerged “the color of COVID.” Within two days, CNN reported that since Black and Brown people were cleaners and caregivers and were in closer contact with COVID patients, they were more likely to be infected. They had poorer health coverage, often lived in crammed housing with conditions like molds and unhealthy water and had poorer health. Also, illegal migrants needed to work to stay alive and often worked in unsafe conditions. They were more likely to contract the disease, spread the virus, and even die from it. Consistent with Nora’s insight that the power of the event depended on its ability to radiate out or speak to larger concerns, COVID fed into debates around underfunded public health and inequality. Although the CDC and other research institutions are renowned for cutting-edge work, their budget had been cut by 10% in 2019. This measure differentially hurt minorities, who were more reliant on public health, but also affected CDC’s preparedness. Michel Foucault’s biopolitical insight comes to mind. Though the modern state’s basic function is “to improve life and prolong its duration” (2003, 254), it is premised upon eliminating inferior species, the abnormal, so the stronger species can live. “Racism is a way of separating out the groups that exist within a population,” he believes. “It is primarily a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die . . . the distinction among races, the hierarchy of races, the fact that certain races are described as good and that others, in contrast, are described as inferior” (Foucault 2003, 254–255). These practices are intrinsic in modern disciplinary power. This refrain “we are all in this together” obfuscates the biopolitical power of the state, the power to determine “who lives and who is let to die”

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(Foucault 2003, 256). Residents of underfunded and under-regulated nursing homes and care facilities were differentially affected by COVID. Death is not only correlated to age, but class and race are factors in contracting COVID. Infection depends upon one’s contact with high viral load. As of April 5, over 10,000 American healthcare workers had been infected with COVID. Risks in nursing homes were acute: many workers lacked masks and gowns – several were interviewed wrapped in black garbage bags. Providing PPE for hospitals rather than residence homes was a priority. In so far as the state regulates these facilities or fails to, they determine who lives and who will die. Both the workers and residents in care facilities in Canada, the USA, and the UK were hit hard. Given the racial composition and social class of the frontline workers, these policies have been racist and classist in their consequences if not in their intent. The starkest expression of biopolitical disciplinary power was evident in the practice of the herd mentality in the UK and Sweden. In early March, when France, Italy, and Spain were enforcing stay-at-home policies and closing schools, Sweden and, temporarily, the UK were letting the virus move through the community and run its course. Warning the elderly to stay home, but otherwise suggesting prudence, their policy was informed by the theory of herd immunity. If 60% of the population contracted the disease, the community would develop immunity, or so they presumed. This policy was loudly denounced, in the hashtag #ToryGenocide. The weak and elderly should not be sacrificed to strengthen the rest of the population. Around March 22, there was a public outcry. The UK government abandoned this strategy and ordered a lockdown. They failed to order PPE until the first week of April and were well behind all other states. Since they had seriously considered herd immunity, the UK quickly became the worst-hit country in Europe, surpassing Italy and Spain. British scientists demanded an explanation as to why the government refused to follow other European countries’ approach to COVID. Again, narrow partisan politics seems to have prevailed. Instead of thinking about the public good, Boris Johnson, the British prime minister, was swayed by his Brexit vision. He had been a cheer leader for UK’s financial independence and was strongly committed to leave the EU without a deal. This factored this into his action to go it alone over COVID. For him, collaborating with Europe would have felt like a defeat, yet this decision cost lives. Many states in the USA refused to follow CDC’s guidelines (snubbing mask mandates) and opened their economies in the spring knowing there would be an increase in deaths. The president systematically refused to don a mask. When he did on a visit to a factory, he refused to be photographed with it on. Not only did he defy his own government’s recommendations, so did members of his family. While the population was warned not to

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meet over the holidays, Ivanka Trump went to a Passover event in New Jersey with family and security agents in toe. This performative defiance of rules strikes a chord with those who complain about big government and the deep state’s regulations. Trump and Pence’s praise of individuals who defy regulations and endanger the health of the community collided with the spirit of “we are all in this together.” Trump’s individualist rhetoric and “happy talk” failed to acknowledge human interdependence, the color of COVID, and how failing to mask, social distance, and prematurely opening the economy contributed to spreading the virus. His positive spin might have been expedient and strategic, but in the end it cushioned people from confronting the real. People want to hear good news rather than negative forecasts, and the president catered to that need. However, as infections and deaths rise, as friends, co-workers, or family succumb to COVID, one would imagine “happy talk” would prove hollow. Furthermore, building human resilience to confront the actual serves people in the long run. Despite the alternate responses to this refrain “we are all in this together,” it is not an empty signifier. As I have shown, scientists and democratic politicians employed it to acknowledge human interdependence; others used it to underline social privilege. Nevertheless, there was a certain truth to it. As the Western world vaccinated its citizens, India, South Africa, and Peru failed to and hence have been responsible for further variants of COVID. Unless there were high levels of vaccinations throughout the world, the COVID virus, Fauci warned, would persist and mutate. The Delta variant, associated with India, wreaked havoc on America because some people refused to be vaccinated in 2021. It is estimated that more than 200,000 Americans died unnecessarily from the Delta variant. Trump’s populism: corporate freedom versus public well-being

In this section, I will analyze Trump’s public rhetoric around freedom and public well-being. In re-energizing the ideology of neoliberalism (the selfreliant free individual, market freedom, a virulent opposition to government intervention and regulation), he not only breathed new life into these ideas, but these ideas played a role in mishandling of the pandemic. Trump appeals to individual freedom as if it was universal, possible for all. However, his actions reflected his primary interest in the liberty of the 1% to accumulate capital. Most theorists trace neoliberal values to the 1980s and the rise of the New Right under Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, yet this ignores their precursors: the deeply embedded values of liberal political culture.7 Neoliberal values and practices have a deep affinity with classical liberal political culture of John Locke and the Bill of Rights, espousing the

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individual as supreme, self-sufficient, and autonomous. Admittedly, there are differences between Locke and the values of neoliberalism, but both fail to acknowledge that we are relational beings who become individuals in social relations. The sovereign individual also resonates with American mythology of the Wild West. Americans’ claim to belong to a nation composed not only of individuals but of “rugged individualists” – a term Herbert Hoover coined – sees the state as an impediment to personal freedom. Liberty is defined by Locke and subsequent liberals and neoliberals as freedom from the state. The notion of negative freedom and minimal rule is ideological and unlikely to be reconfigured without a huge effort. In this light, federal guidelines or regulations were seen to be interfering in individual, state and corporate liberties, rather trying to mitigate suffering. The discourse of negative freedom has not only informed American protestors but also European and Canadians who believed their freedom was compromised by submitting to lockdowns, masking, and vaccine mandates. While President Trump claimed to support the “courageous” protestors who were affirming their freedoms, his primary interest was the well-being of corporate America. In Trump’s eyes market freedom and economic growth are primary American values. Public health, which serves to protect workers and the public good, is subordinate to corporate profit and capital accumulation. This was evident in his ordering the Tyson pork plant to open despite the COVID infection. Over 1,000 workers were infected by mid-April. The mayor and health officials had tried unsuccessfully to get them to close. Finally, due to high rate of absenteeism among their workers, the owners agreed, yet Trump stepped in and ordered them back to work in early May. He also cleared the way for the Tyson corporation to avoid liability for any deaths or illness due to COVID. His new guidelines gave corporations the power to open and challenge state guidelines. CEO of Tesla, Elon Musk took advantage of this; he contested the safety measures imposed by the Californian state as fascistic. He threatened to move operations to Texas. Many Republicans concurred with Trump’s priorities: corporate profit over the safety of workers. Consistent with Trump’s ideological commitments to the market and corporate well-being, the first 3 trillion dollars of government aid went to large corporations. A month later Warren Buffet, known for his abstemious lifestyle and apparent public virtue, sold his airplane stocks, sending the market tumbling. His concern was driven not by the common good but by his shareholders’ interest. This had immediate and disastrous effects on the industry. An industry that the treasury had bailed out with tax payers’ money lost value. These actions resonated with the refrain of protestors during the financial crisis of 2008: the government was committed to save Wall Street not Main Street.

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While large corporations managed to get funds in 2020, many small businesses, especially those owned by minorities, were less successful. Small businesses that did not have strong relations with banks found it particularly hard to get a loan on the government scheme. Former CEO of Starbucks reiterated his concern: independent franchises have been able to get loans, but small independent store owners have not, since they did not have the necessary collateral. Individuals stepped up to correct this situation. Black billionaire, Paul Tudor Jones, helped small Black businesses get loans. Representative Joaquín Castro of Texas concerned that small Latino businesses were not accessing funds through big banks urged that money be channeled through community development institutions. While aid to middle and working classes was speedy, those who were generally poorer and did not have a direct debit account would have to wait for months to get their check from the government. The government announced that the rolling out of personal checks would happen in monthly tranches: the first in April, the last tranche would not be rolled out up until September. The issuing of the checks was further delayed by Trump’s decision to have his name on each check – treating it as a personal gift! Populist leadership: the allure of tough talk

Trump’s rhetoric has provided a fertile ground for populist speculation. Giving people what they want to hear, rather than what they ought to hear, has been standard practice in politics. This is true of most politicians, yet the extent of President Trump’s lying, manipulation, and deception to shore up his personal power and serve his base has been unparalleled. Consistent with Freud’s theory of group psychology, powerful leaders rely upon identification. The leader embodies the ego ideal: all the attributes and accomplishments that his followers aspire to. Laclau develops this idea further. He believes the populist leader is the “first amongst equals,” he is like them, and hence they identify with him, yet he is also superior to them, hence they are justified to lead. Trump and his pundits have been terrific at dissembling and crafting compelling images and associations to extend his appeal. He is a billionaire and has lived a privileged life, yet he manages to attract the hardworking. His gruff, straight-talking approach has popular appeal. It suits those who disdain the educated, elite, expert, and politically correct liberals. Like Reagan, 20  years before him, Trump used the refrain “making America great again” to successfully fuel his campaign in 2016 and 2020. This optimism attracts those who feel they have lost out, have been left behind by globalization, or lost their union jobs or decent incomes. His rough and tough demeanor appeals to “proud” Americans, nativists, American

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firsters, supporters of the Second Amendment, those who define themselves in opposition to “wet” liberals. This sentiment is reflected in the following quote. “When you have prisons letting out criminals thank ‘God’ you have a president that supports Second Amendment rights” (Mc Kay 2020). Trump successfully dissembles his class position and class loyalty. His image of being a strong straight shooter is based on deception. He presents himself as a self-made man, though his father’s trust fund made him a multi-millionaire as a youth. He appears to be business savvy: having built an empire, yet he has bankrupted several large projects, skewering his investors, contractors, and workers. He has refused to submit his tax returns, no doubt covering up transactions with foreign governments, but wins support from those who would also like to defy the state. He is smug, continually narrating his tales of successful intimidation and strength. He constantly talks about his rapport with heads of state and CEOs, boosting his good relations with Xi Jinping or Kim Jong-un. He recounts having notified the NFL sports franchises to get ready to open the season and is reported to have told the CEOs of 3M (producers of N95 masks) that they couldn’t sell masks to South America and Canada. Condemning them as “profiteers” and “unpatriotic,” he claimed they were denying their country of much-needed medical supplies. This strong talk and embodied performance may have pleased America firsters, yet in the end 3M kept their contractual obligations. What was missing from this story was Justin Trudeau’s response. Since over 1,600 care workers and nurses live in Windsor Ontario and daily travel to work in US hospitals in Detroit, Trudeau had some clout. He responded: “it would be a mistake to reduce the medical trade between Canada and the USA” (Forrest 2020), (Weeks 2020). In the end a deal was struck: nurses traveled, and Canada got the medical supplies it needed from 3M. In the same vein, Trump continually talks about bringing manufacturing back home; however, his battle has always been more symbolic than real. While his “happy” talk and machismo may reassure some people, it is not likely to satisfy those who have suffered considerable losses. While Trump has proven incapable of expressing genuine empathy, there have been innumerable acts of affective solidarity and emotional reorientation during the catastrophe. Acts of giving and self-sacrifice were commonplace: donating food, giving money to hospitals and charities, delivering groceries to neighbors and the elderly. These individuals responded to the needs and care of others in the context of this tragic event. Every newspaper/news media around the world were singing the praise of hospital staff, nurses, doctors, as well as frontline workers (those manning grocery stores, pharmacies, Amazon, and residence homes). Concerts, plays, poems, and art flourished online. Artists and performers donated their work as sign of solidarity, and citizens offered financial assistance

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to artists. The Unity Concert (with 28  million online viewers) managed to raise millions to support WHO. Ironically, this event coincided with Trump’s decision to cut American support for WHO. Humility is a sentiment that was totally foreign to Trump. Flouting science is not only a sign of his inability to accept the knowledge of experts, but it resonates with his base, who do not trust Big Pharma or science. They also are unable to accept uncertainty, vulnerability, and mourn the loss of their previous standard of living (Tarnopolsky 2017). Many of Trump’s supporters have been adversely affected by globalization – having lost their stable jobs. From 1979 to 2019 real wages fell by 3% for median earners and 7.7% for those in the bottom tenth (Congressional Research Services, Real wages). Working-class jobs in mines and manufacture have disappeared (Hambree 2018). Youth unemployment and underemployment, the growth of zero-hour contracts, and volunteer work have proceeded apace, further eroding the American dream of guaranteeing well-paying jobs for those who work and study hard. All these factors have contributed to the growth of vulnerable and precarious peoples. Instead of coming to terms with the loss of stable employment, their disillusionment with the American dream of upward mobility, Trump supporters blamed and directed their anger at immigrants and racial minorities.

FIGURE 5.2  COVID

Memorial Project: American flags representing the 200,000 dead from COVID-19 planted at the base of the Washington Monument.

Source: Ted Eytan/Wikimedia. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2020.09.23_Covid_ Memorial_Project,_Washington,_DC_USA_267_17027_(50376986002).jpg

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The tragedy of the pandemic – the suffering, pain, and loss experienced were rarely mentioned by the president and vice president. Rather they focused on their competence – their ability to “fight through” and win. In contrast to Trump’s posturing, Governor Cuomo8 of New York’s briefings managed to be both effective and compassionate. He never underestimated or denied the severity of the virus as Trump did, yet he managed to show resolve. Cuomo and other governors conveyed their sympathy with the families who had lost their loved ones. These representatives also expressed genuine worry about those on the frontline who were risking their lives and acknowledged the differential effects of COVID. He refused to open the economy, prematurely acting in the name of the common good. His persona was crafted to appeal to those with Democratic leanings. Leaders around the world have responded to the needs of the public differently. For the most part, populists like Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil and Narendra Modi in India favored Trump’s approach to the virus. They were wary of regulations, and their populations suffered higher rates of infection and deaths. While Modi was selling Astra Zeneca to Canada and elsewhere, his population was not being vaccinated. The result was avoidable deaths and the emergence of the Delta variant of COVID that affected the world in 2021. Other world leaders, Emile Macron, Angela Merkel (Eddy 2021) and Justin Trudeau expressed their condolences to those who lost members of their family and friends and admitted they could have done better. While they acknowledged human vulnerability, President Trump and other populist leaders failed to, which was consistent with their machismo. Mishandling of COVID: the erosion of democratic procedures

Trump called a state of emergency, yet he delayed in announcing the procurement of supplies. He announced we aren’t “shipping clerks” and chivvied state governors to use their own networks, to call on charity and donations to avoid the red tape associated with the federal government bureaucracy. Responding to the president’s statement that the states should fend for themselves and that he would provide backup, Jay Inslee of Washington State said: “we need a quarterback, Tom Brady, not a backup, we have to federalize production of medical supplies” (Costa 2020). Trump’s unwavering commitment to the free market and minimal state was reflected in his refusal to invoke the “Defense Production Act.” It delayed action.9 Trump appeared to ignore the fact that the emergency measures act allowed him to act quickly and avoid red tape. Late March, New York State Governor Cuomo urged the president to use his emergency powers to mandate companies to produce ventilators, masks, gowns, and testing kits. Supplies were low and health providers and

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frontline workers would not be protected for long. Trump’s reluctance to act meant that governors were competing for scarce resources in the global market, and the prices of these goods were escalating. Since 95% of PPE came from East Asia and China, a point glossed over in the press – they were not readily available. At least two governors sent their own planes to retrieve the PPE to ensure they had the supplies when they needed them. Though Trump had declared the feds were not shipping clerks, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) had a stockpile of goods, and the administration began distributing it. Yet it was unclear as to what was in the stockpile or how it would be distributed. The newly appointed head of FEMA, Gaynor said they were shipping out “tons of supplies daily” though when asked explicitly as to the amount of the supplies, he couldn’t answer. Several days later he reported the contents of the stockpile, but it was unclear how these scarce resources were being distributed. In organizing his response to the pandemic and distributing PPE (part of FEMA’s stock), Trump fired seasoned experts and hand-picked new ones in an effort to cultivate patronage and loyalty. For several weeks, governors, specifically Cuomo, had been calling for the government to call upon Ford and GM to produce ventilators, since at least 62,000 would be needed around the country, and there are only 10,000 in stockpiles. Finally, on March 26, Trump tweeted that GM and Ford should help. But the delay in calling upon these companies meant they would not be ready for the peak of infection in April (Feldman 2020). By mid-May or early June GM expected to be producing around 10,000 a month. Trump congratulated himself for getting GM and Ford involved, but he did not acknowledge that his delay cost lives. He also lagged in calling for local American companies to produce N95 masks, gowns, swabs, and other PPE. In the spirit of market freedom, states had to compete with the federal government for PPE; this contributed to unnecessary anxiety and increased costs. Andy Beshear, Governor of Kentucky, complained that in the process of purchasing protective equipment, FEMA bought it all out from under them (Duvalla 2020). Illinois Governor J.B. Pritzker spent over $1.7 million on flights bringing medical supplies from China in secret – out of fear that “the Trump administration would seize the cargo for the federal stockpile” (Main 2020). Maryland Governor Hogan’s South Korean wife helped him obtain COVID-19 testing kits from Korea. In addition to the failure to use his emergency powers, he refused to follow democratic procedures and expert in place as to allocating resources. He made separate side deals, setting states in competition with each other. He expected and rewarded public thanks. Robert Mackey writes, “In exchange for Aid, Trump Wants Praise from Governors He Can Use in Campaign Ads” (Mackey 2020).

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Many Republicans had similar concerns as Trump: they were anxious of “big government” and state regulations. Mike Braun Republican Senator of Indiana expressed his disdain for government intervention and faith in entrepreneurs and private corporations. During Senate hearings, he faulted the CDC and FEMA and their bureaucratic incompetence for the problems the USA encountered during the pandemic (Indiana Public Media, “Braun” 2020). Braun wrongly presumed the state failed to engage private entrepreneurs in the process before early March. However, Hahn, head of FEMA, responded that private corporations were recruited on January 24. If anything, the failure to spearhead production was a result of Trump’s reluctance to “federalize production of medical supplies” and coordinate their distribution in a transparent manner. The Trump administration’s ambivalence around intervening in the “free” market” led to not only delays and dysfunction but also fraud. Instead of relying upon experienced bureaucrats who followed preexisting transparent procedures, he hired members of his family and fired those who appeared disloyal. The results were disastrous. On the advice of Jared Kushner, the state of New York ordered and paid for $68.1  million for ventilators that never materialized. Trump’s rhetoric around supplies was like his rhetoric around opening the economy: he flip-flopped, all the while thinking primarily about his reelection. One day he announced, “I have ‘total authority’ to open the country.” The following day, in conversation with governors, Trump concedes the states will decide. Either Trump had been given a lesson on the constitution, realizing this area was not designated under the constitution, and hence a state responsibility, or he devised a way of avoiding responsibility.10 Some have been suspicious of Trump’s decision to let states decide. Martin O’Malley, the former Maryland Governor, called it “a Darwinian approach to federalism; that is states’ rights taken to a deadly extreme”. . . . “The better read of federalism is that the states and federal government work together when the U.S. is attacked, whether it is by imperial Japan or a pandemic.” This tactic “could give the White House an opportunity to extract Trump from future criticism as the virus spreads throughout the nation and threatens to kill hundreds of thousands of Americans” (Cook 2020). Again, Trump’s interest in reelection, rather than responsibility for public welfare, informed his actions. Partisan approaches to the virus were evidenced in the USA, India, the UK, and Brazil but rarely elsewhere. “When you look at per capita cases and deaths across the course of the entire outbreak, the USA had over two times the confirmed cases and twice as many deaths as Canada by May 4th, 2020” (Beauchamp 2020). Lack of coordination between levels of government and partisan politics obstructed the US’s efforts to tackle the pandemic. In countries like Canada, politics were put aside, and the federal government led

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the requisitioning of the PPE needed, expediting local production, distributing supplies with transparency, not according to party lines. Even populist leader Rob Ford (Premier of Ontario), a noted free marketeer, promised never to be reliant upon foreign production of PPE again. Cooperating with the federal and local government, he railed against protestors (many from his base) who called for an immediate opening of the economy. Addendum

In February 2022, Canadian truckers “Freedom Convoy” blocked Ottawa’s downtown for more than two weeks; this protest spread to several major border crossings, stopping all passage. The ideas of freedom from state regulation or negative freedom fueled their struggle. At the outset, the truckers were protesting a mandatory vaccination that was required if they crossed the USA and Canada border. Ninety percent of truckers had been vaccinated, and over 85% of Canadian population have had one vaccine, yet the protestors gathered support under the banner of freedom from mandates. They wanted all COVID mandates lifted immediately. The Truckers Union did not support this protest; in fact, many of the protestors were nonunionized truckers who had small pickup trucks and were there with their families. Some vaccinated people who were experiencing COVID fatigue supported them. They disrupted the livelihoods of residents and businesses in Ottawa and Windsor and blocked the largest border crossing between the USA and Canada. A week after the bridges between the USA and Canada were blocked and the flow of business interrupted, the Canadian government introduced “Public Order Emergency Act,” believing this constituted a threat to national security. The Freedom Convoy was made possible by social media. They were able to mobilize, strategize, and finance themselves online. GO FUND ME financed them: over 50% of the funds came from America and monies came from abroad. While neoliberal/liberal values of personal freedom as freedom from the state may have been unsettled during the pandemic, this provides evidence that its appeal persists. Furthermore, even though governments in the USA and Canada paid people to stay home and tried to mitigate the effects of the COVID, serious distrust in government persists. Thinking critically about the pandemic: why were we unprepared?

So far, I  have focused on how the pandemic was framed and handled. In this section, I  will try to approach an obvious paradox: why were Western liberal democracies whose policies are informed by the most

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sophisticated theories of science ill-prepared? Why was America’s CDC (an institution renowned in the field of disease control and public health) not more effective? I have shown how science was flouted and the CDC marginalized by Trump. But even prior to the Trump presidency, there appears to have been little preparation despite the evidence of dangerous viruses. In the 1980s the scientific community identified the emergence of new highly infectious diseases, but warnings about the possibility of a pandemic went unheeded, even though there were outbreaks of Ebola, SARS, MERS, H1N1, and swine flu. Scientists warned that it was not a question of if but rather a matter of when there would be a pandemic. Though the CDC has been at the forefront of disease protection, its budget was cut by 10% in 2019. Austerity measures in the UK and cutbacks in public health in Canada all contributed to a less than robust system of warning, preparedness, and protection. Increasingly, the need to respond to climate emergencies due to global warming and the everincreasing healthcare needs of an aging population put extra demands on the coffers of these three countries. Lack of tax revenue (in part due to tax evasion or avoidance in the USA, Canada, and the UK) is not an insignificant factor in lack of preparedness. It is not as if there hadn’t been dangerous viruses to prompt preparedness. In 2009 (H1N1) influenza pandemic spread to one billion people, perhaps half a million people died. Since many of the deaths were among the very poor, their deaths were less visible. In England deaths were three times higher in the poorest fifth of the population than the wealthiest (Soyemi et al. 2014). Ebola was a virus that affected West African countries. While Zika found its way to parts of the USA, it mainly affected Brazil and South America. Transmission of SARS in 2003 was limited to the city of Toronto. This speaks to the West’s inclination to ignore the suffering of the Global South and diseases that don’t directly affect them. As we have seen, there is a popular aversion to negative news. The mass and social media have contributed to cushioning people from confronting nasty facts by blaming others for the unpalatable facts of contemporary life. Going forward, there will be speculations as to why non-Western countries were more successful than others. In the first wave, China, Singapore, and South Korea were three countries that flattened the curve. Apart from their use of surveillance equipment, which was not insignificant, they had more robust epidemic plans. In 2015, Bill Gates gave a TED talk about the need to have simulations to prepare for a future epidemic; this was not done. Preparedness would have taken 2% of the military expense, a bargain in hindsight. After a failed test exercise, a British scientist established a pandemic plan for the UK (shortages in supplies were laid out and suggestions made), but these were ignored. This scientist produced a similar

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plan for Singapore, which was successfully executed, which may help explain their success during the first wave of COVID. Why was it that these three Asian countries were more prepared than Western liberal democracies? Did they have anything in common? They shared a belief in Confucianism, a tradition that respects knowledge and science. As evidenced earlier, scientific knowledge and expertise were disregarded by President Trump and Prime Minister Johnson, overridden by a discourse of hubristic mastery – exemplified in the words we can “fight our way through.” Chris Christie nailed it when he said: “the US economy had to be opened up to safeguard the American way of life.” Belief in the free market, individual achievement, and mastery of nature conflicts with beliefs in interdependence, recognition of vulnerability, and the possibility of epidemics. The flouting of science and expertise is not limited to America; in fact, there were fervent protests to COVID regulations in most Western liberal countries after a year of lockdown. Not all Western political cultures are the same: differences between American and the Canadian and European political cultures must be mentioned, if only briefly. The robust individualism of America that sees the state as a threat to individual freedom is tempered in countries that have a stronger welfare state tradition. Even though neoliberal governing policies have eroded health and welfare provisions in Canada, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand, there is still some faith in social democracy. In these countries the state does not simply limit one’s freedom – it aspires to provide social rights (good-quality health care, public education, and safe work environments), thereby enhancing individual opportunities, specifically, for those whose lives are precarious. The single payer systems of health in Canada and Europe provides a reasonable level of care for all its citizens; however, austerity measures and cutbacks have compromised the universal health services available and public health provisions.11 Nevertheless, these citizens still expect the state to further their well-being, not simply encroach on their freedoms. So far, I have speculated on a very general level as to why Western countries were ill-prepared, now I will look at very specific factors, which were difficult to mitigate. While the CIA tries to connect COVID-19 to acts of bioterror, scientists and researchers are pursuing other paths. Even if they link COVID-19 to a leak in a Wuhan lab, there are other factors that contribute to the emergence and circulation of highly infectious diseases. The links between viruses and high viral load in wet markets has been established. COVID-19 appeared again in Peking in 2021 and was linked to a local wet market. The wet markets in Lagos are a ticking time bomb. Since poor countries like Nigeria cannot afford refrigeration, wet markets will persist. Since poor Africans people cannot afford to eat domesticated and

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tested meat, wild meat will be eaten. So, the risk of animal to human transmission will continue. In order to protect ourselves from future viruses we will need to financially support poor African countries. Human practices in the global north are also blameworthy. In our excessive demands for wood, minerals, and resources we have degraded natural habitats and landscapes causing ecological disruptions. Kate Jones studies how changes in land use contribute to the risk of infections. “We are researching how species in degraded habitats are likely to carry more viruses which can infect humans” (Piller 2020). “There are countless pathogens out there continuing to evolve which at some point could pose a threat to humans,” says Eric Fevre, chair of veterinary infectious diseases at the University of Liverpool. “The risk [of pathogens jumping from animals to humans] has always been there.” The difference between now and a few decades ago, Fevre says, “is that diseases are likely to spring up in both urban and natural environments” (Vidal 2020). We have created densely packed populations where alongside us are bats and rodents and birds, pets and other living things. That creates intense interaction and opportunities for things to move from species to species. “The risks are greater, since these pathogens, move more quickly and further, hence we must be prepared going forward” (Vidal 2020). In 2008, Jones and a team of research “identified 335 diseases that emerged between 1960 and 2004.” Of these zoonotic EID (Emerging Infectious Diseases) events, 71.8% were caused by pathogens with a wildlife origin (Jones 2008).12 Increasingly, says Jones, these zoonotic diseases are linked to environmental change and human behavior, both of which can be altered, but they will need concerted and coordinated human efforts. The promises and perils of the COVID catastrophe

In a pandemic individual freedom means nothing unless it is premised upon collective well-being, freedom of the many to live and work in a safe environment. Not only is the language of liberty ill-suited to managing a pandemic, but the optimism around neoliberal practices of globalized economies and the trickledown theory has been brought into question. The belief that global capitalism is improving the lives of all is proving more and more difficult to sustain, as the inequalities in income, lifestyle, and health between the rich and poor are becoming ever vaster. While I have argued that catastrophic events can disrupt our habits and lead to reorienting our relations to others and the world, in this case, prejudices were deep-seated, and Trump’s rhetoric and affective communication reinforced them. Yet the length, breadth, and depth of the crisis also provided fruitful conditions for reflection. Contingent facts arose in the

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context of the catastrophe that holds forth promise. The circumstances of lockdown created lived experiences, which have challenged neoliberal governing strategies and the values of individual liberty and market freedom that support it. The state had to stand up and act resolutely in the name of public good in a way that it has not done before. Public health prevailed over profit, at least temporarily. The federal governments stepped into correct failures of the free market: paying people not to work. To ensure public spaces and workplaces were safe, regulation and government intervention have been necessary to quell fear and protect individuals and companies. Over the course of 40 years, neoliberalism political and social life have been reduced to economic criteria. Public policy decisions and public services have been subject to market forces. The virus has challenged the priority given to economic growth and market freedom, at least temporarily. In the absence of public health, one cannot have a healthy economy. No longer were the financiers and billionaires (apart from Bill Gates) celebrated, the heroes or heroines were the first responders, the frontline workers, the cleaners, the public transit workers and the police who risked their lives to care, feed, and protect. There were many cases where competition gave way to collaboration: scientists around the world shared information, assisting others in getting a vaccine. When the Chinese scientists successfully sequenced the genome of COVID 19 they shared their knowledge determining it was like MERs and SARS and transmitted by a bat. The Oxford group that discovered Astra Zeneca decided not to charge a licensing fee, so even the most strapped economy would be able to afford the vaccine. Unless the vaccine is distributed worldwide, Dr. Fauci reminded Americans that they would not be safe. In this situation public interest and self-interest are complementary. Not only was public good and public health, the new mantra, but collaborative practices were emerging that spurned competition and challenged the ideal of robust individualism. In the literary world, counter narratives and ecological imaginaries were produced. A 26-year old’s children’s story, Tomfoolery, went viral, resonating with young and old alike. In the story, the virus marked a historical turning point: gas consumption was significantly reduced, people walked or cycled rather than drove their cars and the air was noticeably cleaner. People enjoyed each other’s company more and spent less time in shops and malls. In the story people decided to change their lives forever. Since many people had a break in employment, they had time to reflect. The pandemic provided an occasion for rethinking the value they placed on work. Many people who worked online for several years were reluctant to return to the office. Many decided not to return to full time work immediately, having enjoyed their freedom from full time work. All of these

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factors have jeopardized faith market driven society and the ideal of rugged individualism. A change in government also affords promise. During the early days of the Biden presidency there appeared to be a formidable commitment to public health. He promised to inoculate 100 million in 100 days and delivered 100 million by April 4th, 2021. Although the offices of the Presidency are embedded in neoliberal institutional practices there appears to be a difference. President Biden is committed to pursuing democratic procedures and relying upon democratic institutions, whereas Trump was not. Biden is committed to restore American leadership in international institutions as well as believing that public health is key to restore the economy. On May 3rd, 2020, a global initiative was established which supported WHO’s solidarity trial and invested in international collaboration and research to maximize their efforts fight against COVID. Trump was notably absent. One is re-assured by President’s Biden’s intent on repudiating American isolationism, joining the Paris accord, re-instating funding to WHO and assuming a leadership role in international collaboration. However, the acute problem of spurning scientific authorities and experts remains to be tackled. One feels hopeful that caring and collective arrangements between nations will flourish, though equally possible is a turn toward authoritarian solutions. Herein lies the perils associated with COVID. Countries which had the most success in containing the virus relied on cell phone surveillance. Some prohibited movement of those who had the virus and warned people before entering buildings where COVID was present. This was true of China,13 Israel and Singapore. They also delivered strict warnings and quarantined people. This level of surveillance and control is worrying and Trump’s followers who are libertarian would be incredulous if the US went down this road. Although Americans believe that their privacy has been protected, Dr. Murray revealed otherwise. In recalibrating the projected deaths, he blithely admitted relying upon cell phone tracking, so the use of surveillance technology was used (Cimpanu 2020). The loss of faith or credibility in neoliberal governing practices may morph into the pursuit of more authoritarian practices. Trump’s refitting convention centre and naval hospitals to house COVID patients pales in comparison to the two hospitals that were built (ground up) in Wuhan, in 10 days. Cosmopolitanism has been dealt a blow. The fact that China was responsible for COVID has been a factor in exacerbating relations between China and the West. Western countries were reliant on Chinese and foreign production of medical supplies –medical supplies from 75 countries were banned. Many nations announced that they would no longer rely on foreign suppliers. Although the production of vaccines may have been

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collaborative, the distribution of vaccines was driven by national self-interest. Though Canada promised to contribute a percentage of vaccines to the Global South, they failed to deliver. Isolationism is a worry going forward, this has been signaled by Brexit, America First supporters, but also Italy’s threat to withdraw from the EU and the strength of anti-immigrant parties in Europe- Italy and Finland to name two. It appears Biden is seeking to recuperate America’s place in international community, but the isolationist sentiments that Trump cultivated are far from extinguished. Solutions today must be global, based on the reality of our interdependence and our pressing needs to save the planet, protect our communities from epidemics, growing inequality and preserve international peace and security. Some elites will try to restore high levels of consumption, prop up the fossil fuel industry which will affect the dire need for collective action to save the planet. One only hopes the ideology of individual autonomy and liberty and the practices associated with it have been sufficiently unsettled to warrant rethinking. Notes 1 For further discussion of manipulative strategies to influence crowds see Gustave Le Bon, 1995. The Crowd. New Brunswick and London: Transactions Publishers (Original publication, 1895). 2 To make sense of Trump’s rhetoric, I have relied upon Tom Protevi’s notion of “affective ideology”, he balances the powers of affect and ideology: emotional intensities and deeply embedded words. 3 As of November 17, 2020, over 11.4 million Americans had been infected and 249, 477 reported dead. These figures rose daily: 160, 000 new cases were reported on November 17. In April 2020 America had the second highest recorded deaths per 100,000.00. At the time the pandemic had put 20 % of the American population out of work. www.cnn.com/interactive/2020/health/ coronavirus-us-maps-and-cases/ 4 The lockdown was less restrictive since Zoom calls allowed for social as well as work related interaction. 5 Popular response on social media indicated that the families of the “4 million Muslims who have been killed by Americans [ought] to sue the US. Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen etc. should all sue the US for the damages and killing of its citizens.” 6 In retrospect this statement was hugely optimistic. By January 2022, the world experienced 5 consecutive waves of COVID. By December  2022 there have been over 6 million confirmed deaths globally. https://bmcinfectdis.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12879-022-07909-y 7 Wendy Brown differentiates neoliberal practices that entail the economization of social life and the evacuation of liberal democratic values from liberalism which does not reduce ethical concerns to the market. See Brown, Wendy. 2015. Demise of the Demos. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 8 The current accusations of sexual misconduct and cruelty suggest his acts of compassion were selective. His popularity has plummeted. In 2020 many in the Democratic Party believed he would have been a good candidate for President,

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later he was forced to resign from office. This revelation attests to the volatility of emotion in the media: one day he was represented as a hero, a year later his relation to office workers reveals him to be a villain. 9 Even as late as July 14, the Nurses’ Union has claimed that the Federal government has not embraced its role in federalizing production of PPE. Presently there are shortages, but huge shortages are predicted as children go back to school and the flu session is imminent. Individual institutions (hospitals, residence homes, schools) are having to source PPE on the open market. 10 In Printz v. United States (1997) the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the state rights were infringed if commandeered into serving as an arm of the federal regulatory structure. 11 Privatization of health services in Ontario is being introduced by the conservative government to manage long waiting lists in routine surgery, this threatens to create a two-tier system. 12 Jones, Kate, et  al., 2008. “Global Trends in Emerging Infectious Diseases.” Nature, February 21, 2008. Accessed March 2023. www.nature.com/articles/ nature06536 13 Ultimately, Chinese citizens protested around strict lockdown in the fall of 2022 and the state was compelled to lift strict measures.

References Beauchamp, Zach. 2020.  “Canada Succeeded Where US failed Why?” Vox, May 4. www.vox.com/2020/5/4/21242750/coronavirus-covid-19-united-statescanada-trump-trudeau. Cimpanu, Catalin. “US, Israel, South Korea, and China Look at Surveillance Solutions.” ZDNet. www.zdnet.com/article/us-israel-south-korea-and-chinalook-at-intrusive-surveillance-solutions-for-tracking-covid-19/. Cook, Mary. 2020. “A Darwinian Approach to Federalism.” Politico, March 31. www.politico.com/news/2020/03/31/governors-trump-coronavirus-156875. Concha, Joe. 2020. “Trump, Acosta Tangle about Happy Talk.” The Hill, April  10. https://thehill.com/homenews/media/492285-trump-acosta-tangleafter-question-about-happy-talk-coronavirus-briefings. Connolly, William. 2020. “Life, Time, and Pandemic Events.” Theory and Event 23 (Suppl. 4). Costa, Robert. 2020. “Inslee Clashes with Trump over Leadership.” The Washington Post, March  26. www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-governors-insleecoronavirus/2020/03/26/afd25a8c-6f9a-11ea-b148-e4ce3fbd85b5_story.html. CNN News. CNN News. www.cnn.com/2020/03/10/politics/trish-regancoronavirus-donald-trump/index D’Ancona, Matthew. 2017. Post Truth: The New War on Truth. London: Ebury. Duvalla, Tessa. 2020. “FEMA Outbids Kentucky.” Courier, March  24. www. courier-journal.com/story/news/2020/03/24/coronavirus-kentucky-femaoutbid-state-protective-gear/2912221001/. Eddy, Melissa. 2021. “Reporting on CNN GPS- Fareed Zakcaria.” Inside Germany’s Struggle with COVID, April 5, 2021. www.cnn.com/videos/tv/2021/04/04/ exp-gps-0404-germany-melissa-eddy.cnn. Feldman, Amy. 2020. “The Jump by Ford and GM Into Making Ventilators.” Forbes, April  11. www.forbes.com/sites/amyfeldman/2020/04/11/video-insidethe-jump-by-ford-and.

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Forgery, Quint. 2020. “Trump Predicts Xi Will be Successful in Stopping Coronavirus.” Politico, February  7. www.politico.com/news/2020/02/07/trumppredicts-china-will-stop-coronavirus-outbreak-111915. Forrest, Maura. 2020. “Trudeau Warns against Denying Exports.” Politico. www.politico.com/news/2020/04/03/3m-warns-of-white-house-order-to-stopexporting-masks-to-canada-163060. Foucault, Michel. 2003. Society Must be Defended. Translated by David Macey. New York: Picador. Garcia, Victor. 2020. Fox News, March  28. www.foxnews.com/media/victordavis-hanson-says-trumps-coronavirus-policies-now-conventional-wisdom. Gates, Bill. 2020. “Interviewed.” CNN Town Hall, April 30. Hambree, Diana. May 2018. “CEO Pay Skyrockets to 361 Times That of the Average Worker.” Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/dianahembree/2018/05/22/ ceo-pay-skyrockets-to-361-times-that-of-the-average-worker/. Harvey, Josephine. 2020. “Chris Christie “People are Going to Have to Accept More Deaths.”” Huffington Post, May  5. www.huffpost.com/entry/chrischristie-reopen-economy_n_5eb0c4bdc5b62b850f90ea2a. The Hill. March 13, 2020. https://thehill.com/homenews/media/487494-jerry-falwelljr-says-coronavirus-is-north-korea-china-weapon-to-hurt-trump Fox & Friends. Indiana Public Media. 2020. Sen Braun Blocks Release of CDC Guidance, May13. https://indianapublicmedia.org/news/sen.-mike-braun-blocks-release-of-cdcguidance-on-reopening-businesses.php. Jones, Kate, et al. 2008. “Global Trends in Emerging Infectious Diseases.” Nature, February 21. www.nature.com/articles/nature06536. Kessler, Glenn. 2021. The Washington Post, Trump’s False or Misleading Claims, January  24. www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/01/24/trumps-false-ormisleading-claims-total-30573-over-four-years/. Laclau, Ernesto. 2005. Populist Reason. London: Verso. Main, Frank. 2020. “Pritzker’s Secret Flights to China.” Chicago Sun Times, April  14. https://chicago.suntimes.com/coronavirus/2020/4/14/21221459/ pritzker-secret-flights-china-illinois-ppe-trump-coronavirus. Mackey, Robert. 2020. “In Exchange for Aid Trump Wants Praise from Governors.” The Intercept, March  28. https://theintercept.com/2020/03/28/ exchange-aid-trump-wants-praise-governors-can-use-campaign-ads/. Mc Kay, Hollie. 2020. “WHO under Microscope.” Fox News, March 28. www. foxnews.com/world/world-health-organization-coronavirus-what-went-wrong. Peters, Helge Christian and John Protevi. n.d. “Affective Ideology and Trump’s Popularity.” Protevi.com. Accessed February  2021. www.protevi.com/john/ TrumpAffect.pdf. Piller, Charles. 2020. “This is Insane!.” Science, March 26. www.sciencemag.org/ news/2020/03/insane-many-scientists-lament-trump-s-embrace-risky-malariadrugs-coronavirus. Ray, Robert. 2020. “The Perils of a Pandemic.” The Washington Post, May  1. www.washingtonpost.com/video/national/perils-of-a-pandemic/armedprotesters-gather-in-michigan-to-denounce-stay-at-home-orders/2020/05/14/ e603777e-ca7f-4df1-a162–1ef3bd545641_video.html. Regalado, Antonio. 2020. MIT Technology Review Worst-case Coronavirus Scenario: 214  Million Americans Infected, 1.7  Million Dead, March  13. https://

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www.technologyreview.com/2020/03/13/905318/worst-case-coronavirus-scenario-214-million-americans-infected-17-million-dead/. Rosenberg, Eli and Heather, Long. 2020. “Unemployment Rate Drops and 2.5  Million Jobs Added, After States Reopened.” Washington Post, May  5. www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/06/05/may-2020-jobs-report/ Schaeffer, Katherine. 2020. “A Look at the Americans Who Believe There is Some Truth to the Conspiracy Theory that COVID-19 was Planned.” Pew Research, July  24. www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/07/24/a-look-at-the-americanswho-believe-there-is-some-truth-to-the-conspiracy-theory-that-covid-19-wasplanned/. Smith, David. 2020. “Trump Unveils “Warp Speed Effort.” May  16. www. theguardian.com/us-news/2020/may/15/trump-coronavirus-warp-speedvaccine-white-house. Soyemi, Kenneth, et  al. 2014. “Disparities Among 2009 Pandemic Influenza A (H1N1) Hospital Admissions . . . .” PLOS One 28. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih. gov/pmc/articles/PMC4002432/. Spragens, Thomas A. 1990. Reason and Democracy. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Tarnopolsky, Christina. 2017. “Melancholia and Mania: On the Trump Campaign.” Theory and Event 20 (1). “The Agenda” TVO. 2020. Steve Paiken. April  27. https://www.tvo.org/video/ will-covid-19-change-china. The Guardian. 2021. “Most Republicans Still Believe 2020 Election Was Stolen From Trump.” The Guardian, May 24. www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/ may/24/republicans-2020-election-poll-trump-biden. The New York Times. 2020. “Trump Wants to Reopen Economy.” The New York Times, April  10. https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/04/trump-reopencoronavirus-polls-biden-election.html. Vazquez, Meagan. 2020. Kushner Calls US Coronavirus Response a Success Story in CNN Politics, April  29. www.cnn.com/2020/04/29/politics/jared-kushnercoronavirus-success-story/index.html. Vidal, John. 2020. “Destroyed Habitat.” Scientific American, March  18. www.scientificamerican.com/article/destroyed-habitat-creates-the-perfectconditions-for-coronavirus-to-emerge/. Viswanatha, Arun, and Alex Leary. 2020. “Pompeo ‘Evidence that Coronavirus Came from Human Lab.’ ” Washington Post, May  3. www.wsj.com/ articles/pompeo-says-there-is-evidence-coronavirus-came-from-wuhan-lab11588544574. Weeks, Carley. 2020. “Ontario Hospitals Ban Health Care Workers from Crossing Borders.” The Globe and Mail, April 6. www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/ article-ontario-cities-ban-health-care-workers-from-crossing-borders-to-work/.

6 THE MURDER OF GEORGE FLOYD AND THE METEORIC RISE OF BLACK LIVES MATTER The success of an affectively rich event

Affective solidarity: the power of the event

In this final chapter I  explore the effects of the catastrophic murder of George Floyd. This event was momentous and exemplary in its ability to catalyze democratic sensibilities as well as foment democratic change. Previous catastrophes that I have discussed have generated strong compassion and empathy, but none led to such prolonged national and worldwide protests as the murder of George Floyd. In terms of the questions that inform this book, this event is exemplary. This affectively rich and emotionally charged event disrupted existing feelings and perceptual experiences that sustained inequality; however, its formidable aftermath was attributable to social movement M4BL, which was indispensable in organizing protests, generating celebrity support, growing affiliates, and keeping the struggle for racial justice alive. Not only did they need to cultivate solidarity but they also had to displace received truths of America’s past, reminding us of the importance affective performances as well as of convincing arguments. At the outset, the police claimed there was no wrongdoing, though in a flash the witnessing of Floyd’s death drew attention to racist policing practices. The continual reporting of this harrowing incident and the protests that ensued were unprecedented and kept this act of racial injustice and its grievances alive. However powerful witnessing this event was, its persistence is at least partly attributable to the social movement M4BL (a highly organized and established umbrella group that links numerous anti-Black racist movements committed to change). DOI: 10.4324/9781003295518-6

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In addition, to interpreting public rhetoric in this chapter, I  will concentrate on images, sensory experiences, and their ability to reorient emotional life. One of the bystanders videoed and uploaded the event, allowing millions around the world to witness it. Watching the encounter and slow death of George Floyd was decisive. On August 11 the body cam videos were televised and made publicly available. Since previous videos were reconstructed through security cameras and a personal cell phone, images were disjointed and conversations were barely audible. These body cam videos produced clearer sounds and a coherent display of the sequence of events relating to the police officer’s interventions. Derek Chauvin’s affectless demeanor shocked people, but when the cam video recordings were released and the anguished voice of George Floyd was heard and the more than nine minutes of torture were witnessed, the gruesome nature of his death was undeniable. At the outset of the video, George appears slumped over, possibly drifting off as the police aggressively start banging on the window of his car. Within a few seconds, they drew a gun. He opens the door and states that he has had COVID and is claustrophobic. He is cuffed and begins to plead for his life again and again, telling them not to shoot him. He clearly is terrified; he appeals to his mother. His fear is palpable and his voice plaintive. Since we are aware of the outcome of this event, witnessing it is difficult to bear. Other police officers arrive. They aggressively pull him into the backseat of the police cruiser; he is struggling, insisting he is claustrophobic; he is pulled out of the car placed face down in the street. Derek Chauvin applies his knee to his neck. Three other officers appear to be looking on.1 More police cruisers and police arrive. An onlooker, who is filming, is told to leave. Officer Lane insists he should turn him to his side. Chauvin ignores him. Blood is dripping from his mouth. Emergency services are called. As George Floyd was gasping for life, bystanders urged the police to desist. They did not. One didn’t need proof of wrongdoing: one was spontaneously outraged by the cruel indifference of the police officers. Chauvin, who was in charge, was unmoved by Floyd’s pain, revealing his contempt for the victim. Other police officers stood by and passively watched; onlookers expressed their horror. Following Sara Ahmed, I’ve argued that although affect and emotion are distinguishable, in everyday life they slide into each other. Seeing Chauvin’s heartless indifference, sensing Floyd’s panic and fear, hearing his plaintive cries were sensory experiences that prompted emotional solidarity. Again, empathy and compassion were not the result of deliberation but arose spontaneously in response to witnessing this act. Sound bites were also effective: Floyd’s last words “I can’t breathe” were repeated millions of times in the following days and weeks: it appeared on

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T-shirts and signs that protestors carried. In fact, it became a symbol at his funeral. Given the inability to breathe was one of the symptoms of the COVID crisis, this refrain resonated with those suffering from or fearful of contracting the virus. Previously, Eric Garner had also mouthed those words, as he died from suffocation in police custody. People were moved: responses to the event were neither deliberative nor irrational but rather impassioned and appropriate to the witnessed event. Shock at these horrible senseless deaths led to empathy for Black men, who were subject to the arbitrary police power. The frequency of these crimes and the acquittal of police officers involved were all too familiar. This affective event (the murder of Floyd) was a tipping point. It galvanized fervent solidarity for Black men, though it was preceded by the equally senseless murders of Michael Brown, Trayvon Martin, and Eric Garner. Recent killings were uploaded on smart phones and amplified the death of George Floyd. Ahmaud Arbery was killed by a former police officer and his son; Breonna Taylor was shot in her bed on a mistaken drug raid. Several days after Floyd’s murder, Rayshard Brooks, who had been out celebrating and resting in his car, was murdered in a Wendy’s parking lot. In a few days, a young Latino security guard was killed by police in the course of his work in Los Angeles, and an illegal choke hold was recorded in New York. Within hours these video recordings were uploaded on YouTube or tweeted to hundreds of thousands of followers, persuading many who had been unconvinced. The rage of Black people, who had witnessed murders like this countless times, was emboldened in their conviction that something must be done. Mayhem followed in the wake of Floyd’s death: there was rioting in the streets, shops were pillaged, and buildings set alight. Black Lives Matter called for the end of looting and the destruction of property. On the eve of Floyd’s murder, a Black member of CNN was arrested as he stood by watching the police station in Minneapolis. Fires were lit, and fire trucks appeared hours later. Some speculated that the local authorities facilitated the community going up in flames by not responding earlier. The visuals of the protesting crowds were moving; many were inspired to join the protests. In addition to the street violence and protests, there were vigils: flowers, candles, pictures of George Floyd at the site of the murder and elsewhere. Countless celebrities, politicians, and family members were interviewed, increasing the grief, anger, and sense of injustice. All these events were captured on social media and reported in the mainstream press, keeping the heinous killing of George Floyd alive and fostering support for BLM. The witnessing of George Floyd’s murder by millions around the world and public expressions of solidarity cannot be underestimated. Not only were there responses spontaneous, but people joined demonstrations signaling emotional reorientation was underway.

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This event trigged the largest protest movement in US history in terms of numbers, depth, and scope. Coordinated largely by M4BL and its numerous affiliates, within the first three weeks following Floyd’s death, 440 counties or 40% of all counties in the USA participated in demonstrations. Protests were noteworthy even in counties where the majority population was white (Jiachuan, Chiwaya and Smith 2020). This was still true eight months later. Portland Oregon, one of the largest white cities in America, experienced the longest BLM protests. The demonstrations peaked on June 5, 2020, with 1/2 million protestors in 550 locations in the USA. It is estimated that between 15 to 26 million have protested in total (based upon 15,026 CIVIS ANALYTICS polls). Even if we assume a large percentage have not told the truth about their participation in the protests, 50% of that figure translates into 7 million protestors (Cohn and Quealy 2020). Not only was this larger than the march in Washington by MFOL, and women’s march that followed the day after Trump’s inauguration, which topped 4 million, but these protests endured for months and had a huge geographic and demographic spread, which attests to their depth. Another surprising fact is that Midwestern states and even rural communities (traditionally socially conservative) showed support for BLM, signaling a shift in opinion and demographics.

FIGURE 6.1 

George Floyd Protestors in Miami on June 6

Source: Mike Shaheen/Wikimedia https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:George_Floyd_ Protests_in_Miami,_Florida_-_49979243886.jpg

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In the first two weeks after Floyd’s death, support for Black Lives Matter increased by nearly as much as it had over the previous two years (Cohn and Quealy 2020), by a 28-point margin, according to data from Civiqs, an online survey research firm. They found that a majority of American voters supported the movement, a dramatic increase from a 17-point margin before the most recent wave of protests began. In the four large cities polled, it appeared that the largest support came from young white men (Cohn and Quealy 2020), a revelation that shows how quickly the social boundaries of support widened. It is noteworthy that MFBL managed to raise $77 million in donations in 2020. Demonstrations affected Chauvin’s indictment. The original charge was third-degree murder (May 29), but days later after the video was released, it was upgraded to second-degree murder, and the other officers were charged with aiding and abetting the murder (Cohn and Quealy 2020). The change in the charge attests to the power of public pressure. While BLM demanded that Chauvin be charged with first-degree murder, the protests had significant results.2 This murder was not only watched by millions in the USA, but it was viewed by millions around the globe. Support cascaded worldwide. Forty countries held demonstrations. Unlike almost any other protest movement in history, there have been protests in Europe, Africa, Asia, Australia/New Zealand, Hong Kong, South Korea, and more. How do we explain this unprecedented support? Witnessing this horrendous event and images from the video was continually repeated; I believe, had a huge impact, increasing sensibility to the Black oppression worldwide and sparked renewed interest in the effects of the slave trade. Even 18 months after the murder of George Floyd, demonstrations inspired by his murder persisted. During the trial of Floyd, this video was continually replayed; jurors, witnesses, and members of the Black community felt they were being retraumatized by seeing it again. Support for BLM relied upon feeling, but people’s existing beliefs were also challenged. This is consistent with my idea that affective and cognitive experiences are entwined in embodied subjects. Emotional reorientation triggered by visceral dissonance invites one to challenge the givenness of the situation. In this case, the murder prompted the questioning of established narratives of race in America. M4BL and their affiliates continually posted acts of police brutality, but they also knew they had to shift people’s beliefs. Its numerous webpages, hashtags, and links to collaborators on multiple platforms succinctly communicated the oppression they experienced as well as stating their demands and soliciting political and financial support. In addition, M4BL urged their allies to pursue self-education. This was facilitated by an uptick in mass media attention to systemic racism in

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the USA. The publicity of accounts of racism and systemic violence and microaggressions not only elicited an emotional response but also stimulated rethinking. The appearance of Black Lives Matter: a political movement in the digital age

In this chapter I will focus on the importance of images and videos that captured the events as they unfolded in the aftermath. Nicholas Mirzoeff’s online manuscript The Appearance of Black Lives Matter (2018) is a resource to understand the depth of the visual world. He shows how the circulation of low-resolution pictures, videos, cellphones, body cams, dash cams, and closed-circuit footage allows for the witnessing and sharing of police brutality but also the documenting of protests. Spaces were doubled: they served to document violence and make these gruesome events sites of resistance, all the while making Black lives more visible. Given the huge rise in photographs and videos since 2012, the presence and power of the image has skyrocketed. In 2016 alone an estimated 1.2 trillion photographs were taken. To put that in perspective, Mirzoeff notes that in 2012 an estimated 3.5 trillion photographs had been taken since the invention of photography in 1839. That means that every year we now take a third of all pictures ever taken up to 2012. Some 400 hours of YouTube video are posted every single minute. Even allowing for repetition and copying, this is an astonishing transformation. In this digitized world of the image, the power of rich, affective experiences is monumental. Since the outset of BLM images, social media has been formative. BLM grew from the rage perpetrated by the trial of George Zimmerman, who was acquitted of murdering Trayvon Martin and charged only with manslaughter. Alicia Garza, Patrisse Cullors, and Opal Tometi set up hashtags; Tumblr and Twitter accounts engaged people to speak about how “Black Lives Matter.” In addition to the posting of videos of deaths and violence toward Black men and women from around the country, positive stories – stories of accomplishment – were shared. Videos or pictures of acts of violence posted on Instagram or Vine were coordinated within minutes and have been indispensable to growing M4BL. Social media’s ability to report events that the mainstream press has ignored has made it an effective tool in struggles for racial justice. Before Floyd’s death, the shooting of Ahmaud Arbery (during a citizen’s arrest) was reported in the local media, with little effect. After the video of his stalking went viral, the public outcry led to the immediate imprisonment of his pursuers, a former police officer and his son. This event underscored the irrepressible power of social media as a powerful political tool. It afforded rapid,

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effortless communication of opinions between people. By contrast, the mainstream media in Middletown, America, is more likely to misrepresent events and contribute to the representation of Blacks as hoodlums. Michael Brown’s picture in the mass media is a case in point. Shot from below, Michael Brown glows at the camera. Half shadowed, his fingers in the shape of a V, he was represented in the mainstream as a gang member. This proved to be a misperception. Nevertheless, this image persisted in the mainstream media for some time. In response, private individuals, not members of M4BL, produced the hashtag #ifIwasgunneddown and posted two contrasting images of Michael Brown; thousands of others followed suit. Drawing attention to the pernicious stereotypes of Black people circulating in the mass media, alternative social media provided a way of exposing and rectifying these representations. The posting of videos and pictures has created and constitutes what Mirzoeff calls an archive of American Visual Culture. This archive of assembled Black bodies contests their disposability. By restaging their exposure in critically performative actions, Blacks fortify their claim that Black Lives Matter. Twitter and Tumblr have been invaluable in enlisting support and cultivating democratic sensibilities. White and other colored bodies joined their struggle to fight systemic racism – posting and tweeting were key to everyday acts of violence and resistance that would not make their way into mass media. Enhancing the visibility and perceptibility of Black bodies, social media has contributed to enlivening and enhancing their spaces of appearance. As Black bodies continue to being restaged, a new social and political order is being imagined and realized. In addition, videos have facilitated making police accountable for their acts of aggression; no longer is it one word against another, for the video provides evidence of fault. Taking an affective and emotional approach to agency, allows for images and memes (imparting feelings) to play an important role in recruiting support, especially from those who resist didacticism and the voice of experts. It has proven to be an effective way of influencing people without teaching and without words. This may appear to contradict my insistence upon the importance of critical thinking and the need for persuasive arguments and a deepened understanding to dislodge established narratives, though I believe both new ways of feeling and new ways of thinking contribute to political transformation. New feelings are necessary to further emotional reorientation, but to develop sound relationships which are the basis of social engagement and transformation, a deepened understanding of the systemic oppression of African Americans is vital. Focusing on the meanings of these affective experiences, rather than treating them as unrepresentable, I depart from the new materialist Davide Panagia who focuses on affect as a heterological experience that is disruptive.

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He believes that autonomous exogenous sensations will catalyze change and obliterate the subject (Panagia 2018). While dissonance is important, it depends in part on the subject’s capacity to entrain these impersonal affects as well as meanings associated with those feelings. So, again, in contrast to the anti-humanists, I bring the subject, albeit sensory, situated and therefore decentered back into the picture. I envision this catastrophe as unsettling one’s habits, existing ways of seeing, but also their common sense, so it is important to explore the meanings that get disrupted. While a catastrophic event creates an opening for transformation, work must be done to reconfigure existing relations and beliefs. Hence, I see this unsettling event as facilitating reorientation rather than obliteration. Symbolic politics, celebrity support, performative activism – the process of emotional reorientation

This brings me to a consideration of the power of images, in particular the power of celebrities. As American mass media and their cultural values have become global, the gap between politics and Hollywood has narrowed. The rise of celebrity politicians or celebrity activists involves, what Wheeler calls, the “PRization of issues,” where celebrities enlist their powers to whip up mass popular opinion. This has been described as a turn to taste and affective identification. Narrowing the gap between politics and entertainment may extend the audience, but many argue it diminishes the role of rationality and critical thinking and ultimately has a de-politicizing and de-factualizing effect. Theorists of celebrity culture believe that the turn to image, style, and identity is a turn away from substantive politics. Foregrounding matters of aesthetics and style, it “favors more eclectic fluid issue specific personalitybound forms of recognition” (Wheeler 2013, 12). For this reason, Mark Wheeler believes followers of celebrities maybe temporarily moved but are unlikely to be politically engaged (Couldry and Markham 2007). Yet in the present context, this appears not to be the case. There appears to have been a dramatic shift in celebrity activism, it is less about personal style and more about supporting acts of anti-Black racism and social justice. Also given the importance of social networking, image and sensations contribute to opinion formation. In the past, sports franchises remained aloof from politics, but the NFL, NASCAR, and the NBA actively supported BLM throughout these protests. A colossal number of celebrities, influencers, and vloggers joined the protest using their platforms to push the agenda of M4BL. They articulated and amplified the political messages of anti-Black racism: demanding changes in policing, education, social housing, and health provisions. While BLM renounced symbolic politics and demanded substantive change – these strategies are not mutually exclusive, especially in the world that Mirzoeff

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describes. The turn to the micropolitical, democracy as a modality of action, acknowledges the significance of emotional and aesthetic experiences, specifically in the context of radical transformation. My problematic of embodied and situated politics allows for the entwining and appreciation of both symbolic and historical material worlds. Symbolic politics have been vital to the meteoric rise of BLM. Relying upon affective media experiences, the identificatory power of fans and celebrities have been able to increase the visibility and audibility of Black lives and therefore enhanced their struggles for substantive change. Not all symbolic acts are politicizing. The NBA organized its opening night of the renewed season to show their support – players would choose a slogan like BLM, social justice, equality, and so on to replace their names on their opening night jerseys. The optics looked good. Young people who aren’t particularly political may have been moved by their idols’ responses. Since the younger generation tends to be strongly influenced by celebrities, stars, and now even influencers, such tactics are worth considering. However, the opening night of the NBA was as much a promotional gimmick as an expression of solidarity; it didn’t cost the NBA much and had huge financial and symbolic benefits. The opening game jerseys with social justice messages were auctioned off with proceeds going to a player-administered social justice fund of the NBPA Foundation. It is unclear how the funds would be used or who was selecting the recipients. Some names were considered too political. For example, Trayvon Martin was not allowed, nor were any other victims of violence. Jay Morant had joked publicly online about having the word FUCK 12, (12 being his jersey number) on his jersey. This phrase effectively means “fuck the police.” Not only did the league reject his wish, but he was reprimanded and had to offer a public apology for his disrespectful actions. The bland emptiness of some of the slogans reflects the franchise’s desire to dilute the politics and generate good feelings, which is more in line with previous forms of celebrity politics. The NBPA gave the players hoodies and T-shirts to wear in Orlando. Messages include: “Everybody Love Everybody,” “Make the Change,” and “Break the Cycle” (Spears 2020). Many players refused to be part of this campaign, which banked upon sentiment rather than commitment to change. The NHL’s messages were even more vacuous. The Boston Bruins announced that their players would link arms during the opening game’s national anthem in solidarity with BLM, hardly a striking sign of solidarity. At the same time one of their players was seen wearing a Boston Police cap (Srinivasan 2020). NHL followed a boycott a day later. It is difficult not to be skeptical of the motives of sports franchises. The symbolic acts of the basketball players were strident and committed fostering their fans to feel and think differently about race. However, the corporate gestures by the NFL and NBA were vacuous, and their actions were

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of dubious intent. However, I believe the continual presence of accomplished Black people in the public sphere helps counter their years of invisibility and presumed inferiority. Wildcat strikes were staged by NBA, MLB, NFL, tennis, and soccer players to protest the shooting of Jacob Blake on August 22. This was initiated by the Milwaukee Bucks, who called upon the Wisconsin governor to recall congress to immediately address racial injustice and police brutality. LeBron James, who has over a million followers on Twitter, warned that he and Kawhi Leonard might boycott the NBA finals of 2020, if change were not imminent. Basketball players and celebrities used their Instagram and Facebook followers to spread the message of BLM and helped consolidate affective solidarity. The murder of Floyd marked a turning point: athletes decided to put their community and politics before their profession. This is uncommon in pro sports. There was no response from the NBA players in 1991, when officers involved in beating Rodney King were not charged. In 2016 when Colin Kaepernick took a knee during the national anthem he was dismissed by the NFL and subject to considerable criticism. In 2016, 52% of respondents supported Kaepernick, but in 2020 this figure had increased to 76% (Schad 2020). The murder of George Floyd was a gamechanger – triggering a profound shift in popular attitudes. There was an “about turn” on the part of the players, and administrators expressed their support. Teammates of Kaepernick were worried that they would be fired or benched if they took a knee, though in 2020, they urged the owners of the NBA and NFL to do more than print jerseys or allow slogans to be strewn in the arenas. Post May 26 Commissioner Roger Goodell admitted he was wrong to criticize Kaepernick and said the league “would encourage all to speak out and peacefully protest” (Schad 2020). However, Kaepernick was not rehired. This draws our attention to another outcome, the proliferation of support for BLM also generated a backlash. Many sports fans did not like the politicization of sports or the increased power of Black athletes. At the outset of a game on September  11, 2020, the Texans and Chiefs joined arms in a moment of unity and were booed by many of the 17,000 fans in attendance. In response to the announced boycotts, Jared Kushner stated “they could afford not to play” stressing the basketball players’ privilege. This statement resonated with those who believe professional athletes are overpaid – even those who might share a commitment to the BLM movement. But it was directed to those who are annoyed by the politicization of sports, as well as those troubled by the ubiquity of BLM. Not only did athletes act in solidarity with BLM in the aftermath of the murder, but actors also stepped up to express their complicity with white privilege. Big Mouth actor Jenny Slate decided to step down from voicing

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the role of a young mixed-race girl on this popular program. She told her 894,000 followers that her original reasoning for accepting the voiceover job was “flawed” and “an example of white privilege.” She now realized that she was “engaging in an act of erasure of Black people.” She publicly declared she had been “racist” (Owoseje 2020). Public apology is another form that affective solidarity has taken throughout these protests. There is a paradox in celebrity activism. The meritocratic assumptions of the celebrity conflict with the values of M4BL. By focusing on the exceptional few, one turns away from the dispossessed many – the Blacks whose lives don’t count, those who weren’t lucky enough to have the opportunity to become an NBA basketball player or a Hollywood actor. Acknowledging this reality, Jimmy Butler attempted to wear a blank jersey during the first game of the NBA but was benched until he agreed to wear a jersey with his number and name on it. The NBA censored his symbolic gesture. His action points to the tension and complexities of the performative activism by the league owners. M4BL seeks equality and social justice, yet the ideological practices behind professional sports and acting presumes talent, and profit triumphs. Possibly, this is where symbolic politics has advantages over rational argument, at least temporarily. It manages to recruit and mobilize without instructing; hence the paradoxes of celebrity activism get glossed over. However, an appeal to taste, aesthetics and feelings might temporarily garner support but if it established beliefs are not displaced, these affects are unlikely to be politicizing in the long run. Although celebrities have supported M4BL, the movement spurns the lionizing of celebrities. The movement embraces the diversity of Black people, not just the “the good” and “achieving ones” but “the fragile, disabled, queer, trans, precarious and flawed.” M4BL expresses their commitment to the freedom for all, not just the privileged few. They support “unapologetic blackness” – life outside the white gaze and white values – rather than praising those who have internalized white values and succeeded (i.e., the Obamas and Oprah Winfrey) (Woodly 2022). In fact, some members of the BLM have criticized former President Obama for failing to mitigate structural inequality, restrain state violence, or change racial attitudes (Woodly 2022, 108). Sawyer and Anup (2018) claim he did little to change implicit or explicit anti-Black racist ideas during his term as president. Spontaneous affective events – dismantling statutes waiving public debate

In this section I will look more systematically at the effects of performative acts. In collective corporeal actions (marches, vigils, and demonstrations) affective solidarity were constituted. Protestors also dismantled

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statutes – those which glorified the colonial past of slavery. Their pleasures were palpable in the act of disassembling: pictures and videos were posted. Without having to persuade or explain their actions, pictures went viral, inspiring others to participate and deface or pull down colonial “heroes.” In this context, Jodi Dean’s ideas come to mind. People are equal in a protesting crowd, she argues; they equally feel the collective discharge of energy from their participation (Dean 2018). Activists describe the euphoria or joy they experience. They are uplifted and feel empowered: they believe they can do things that they would not have done alone. Since these experiences are impersonal and exceed emotions and words, the term “affect” is applicable. Marching, singing alongside others as well as the collective dismantling of statutes of confederate generals or slave traders were exhilarating and contributed to a sense of collective power. These televised/videoed acts were inspiring but also infectious. The statute of Edward Colston, a Bristol-born slave trader, was taken off its plinth and thrown into Bristol Harbour. Several days later, without authority from the local council, sculptor Marc Quinn placed a statue of Jen Reid, a protestor, on Colston’s plinth with her right fist in the air (Togoh 2020). Acts of defiance spread from the UK to the USA to Belgium and Holland and beyond. In Minneapolis, Minnesota, and Richmond, Virginia, the statues of Christopher Columbus were removed and thrown into the water. A makeshift tombstone that read “Racism, you will not be missed” was placed at the water’s edge. Acts of destroying, defacing, or simply removing notables who had engaged in heinous acts of barbarity caught on. In Boston, Christopher Columbus was beheaded (Grovier 2020). Protesters in the USA also targeted statues of slave-owning President Andrew Jackson and Confederate General Robert E. Lee, among other historical figures. In Canada, statues of John A. MacDonald, Canada’s first prime minister who supported residential schools for aboriginal children, were defaced, and one was removed from downtown Kingston, Ontario. In Montreal, a statue of MacDonald was torn down. In Belgium, authorities removed statues in Antwerp and Ghent of King Leopold II, whose brutal colonial rule of the Democratic Republic of Congo in the 19th century saw millions of Congolese people killed and maimed. This attests to the power of emotionally laden performative acts. These acts were appropriate; they felt right. While these performative acts actively recruited followers through joy and affirmative action, they also generated negative responses. Such fervent actions ran roughshod over previous orderly public discussions on the fate of these statues. One wonders about the effectivity of these acts: did they expedite democratic change that was stalled by debate, or did they put popular support for M4BL at risk? Many citizens viewed these acts as destructive. Floyd’s death was a spark, but debates in the UK, the

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USA, and Canada around symbols and statues associated with slavery and oppression were not new. Again, the specificity of the event is worth exploring. Community dialogue about the Colston statue had been ongoing for many years. Though Colston had invested in the slave trade, this was by no means the most lucrative source of his wealth. Since he was a philanthropist and supported apprenticeships for the working classes, his reputation was not entirely damaged.3 At the same time, the video of a Black woman captured the negative feelings this statue evoked: whenever she walked by it, she felt as if she had been slapped in the face. Some historians wanted another statue commemorating heroic slaves to be placed along Colston; yet there was no agreement about what should be done, and George Floyd’s death circumvented further discussions. A plaque commemorating the loss of African lives had been placed in the harbor where ships embarked on the Middle Passage, but this was deemed insufficient. For several years there had been debate about the removal of the statue of Cecil Rhodes in Oxford. Rhodes had made his fortune exploiting African people and natural resources, but he also provided prestigious scholarships for superior students: white and Black. Opinions were divided, though most students strongly supported its removal. There had been previous threats that the statue would be removed. While committees in Bristol and Oxford had discussed and deliberated over what to do with the Colston and Rhodes statutes, they reached no definitive conclusion. The actions of protestors were spontaneous and forthright. In the wake of the May protests and the dismantling of Colston, the governing body of Oriel College voted to take Rhodes down, although no dismantling has yet taken place.4 There is some concern that this movement has gone too far: there is a push to change the name of Rhodes Avenue Primary School in Muswell Hill, London. Many resist this move, arguing that the school was named after a nephew of Rhodes, who was born after Cecil Rhodes’s death. Many citizens and politicians worry about the unnecessary changing of names and the plundering of their city’s monuments that mark the past and “adorn” public places. The mayor of London, Sadiq Khan, announced the convening of a special commission to debate the dismantling (and erection) of the city’s monuments. Banksy, with 10.1 million Instagram followers, waded into the debate. Here’s an idea that caters for both those who miss the Colston statue and those who don’t. We drag him out the water, put him back on the plinth, tie cable round his neck and commission some life size bronze statues of protestors in the act of pulling him down. Everyone happy. A famous day commemorated. (Banksy 2020)

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This solution is hardly going to satisfy those who enjoy the beauty or dignity of the original monument. Considering events in the USA, Nancy Pelosi, the speaker of the House, called for the quick removal of 11 statues that commemorated Confederate leaders in Washington. Fear was disguised as public virtue in her statement. “The statues in the Capitol,” she insisted, “should embody our highest ideals as Americans, expressing who we are and who we aspire to be as a nation” (Grovier 2020). In the last few years, a considerable number of monuments commemorating politicians and military leaders of the defeated confederacy (men who fought to preserve slavery) have been dismantled or relocated. The death of George Floyd and the rise of BLM reignited these sentiments expediting debate. In discussing the dismantling of memorials, some consideration of longterm effects on historical understanding is important. Those who were unconvinced by these acts would have benefited from public discussions. The immediate impact of their removal may be positive, but the long-term effects, some argue, will entail the erasure of history. If these statutes are tagged with information, they could provide an aesthetically inspired history lesson and contribute to citizens developing a critical historical perspective. Understanding the historical context helps determine whether these statutes ought to be removed or used as an opportunity for education. The Confederate memorials in America were not erected in the immediate aftermath of the civil war; the majority were commissioned by the United Daughters of the Confederacy between 1900 and 1920 to “conserve confederate culture.” (Best 2020) They coincided with the introduction of laws that disenfranchised Blacks in Southern States (projects fivethirtyeight). Consequently, they were less about honoring heroes and preserving their history and more about preserving white supremacy. As such their removal is more justifiable. In focusing on the specific concrete events, whether it be the dismantling of the statue of confederate leaders, or Winston Churchill (who has also been seen as a candidate for canceling given his racist comments on East Asians), there may be different tactics. A formalist and anti-humanist approach fails to link impersonal affect to concrete personal emotions and their specific social and political contexts. Given the ambivalent feelings toward Colston and Churchill and the concerns about plundering the city’s monuments and canceling revered politicians, more public dialogue and debate would be helpful. Ambiguity of violence: triggering solidarity and undermining support

Many affect theorists focus on positive feelings – the pleasurable experiences of being among throngs of protestors who were guiding change, or feelings of wonder, but the power of negative emotions cannot be ignored.

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Witnessing the murder of George Floyd improved sensitivity to the situation of Black Americans, but rage and negative affect associated with policing were instrumental in garnering support. Clare Hemmings acknowledges the role of anger in engendering affective solidarity. Portland protestors “Mothers in Helmets” joined the demonstrations in Portland having watched the aggression of federal officers on TV. The spectacle of tear gas, injured protestors, and mayhem infuriated them; they presumed they would have a calming effect. They locked arms and chanted: “Feds stay clear. Moms are here” (Olmos, Rojas and Baker 2020). Christopher David, 53, a former Navy civil engineering corps office, was drawn to M4BL protests by the violent images of the federal agents. “I wasn’t even paying attention to the protests at all until the feds came in,” Mr. David said. “When that video came out of those two unmarked guys in camouflage abducting people and putting them in minivans, that’s when I  became aware” (Olmos, Rojas and Baker 2020). He traveled to Portland and was intent on asking them why they were failing to uphold the constitution. A dramatic video of his being pepper sprayed and beaten with a baton while remaining totally still is distressing. We are told his arm was badly broken and had to be repaired with pins and plates. Mr. Marquez, a member of Antifa, echoed the significance of violence: “With every act of violence they commit, our numbers seem to grow, people seem to get angrier” (Olmos, Rojas and Baker 2020). Watching microaggressions against protestors also drew support for M4BL. A couple pointing guns at a group of protestors were videoed in broad daylight. The protestors moved quickly; they had no interest in approaching or damaging property though the property owners perceived them as dangerous. This videoed scene evoked annoyance if not anger. Shocked by the conduct of the property owners, many viewers commiserated with the innocent protestors. The civil authorities charged the owners with the dangerous use of a firearm. Nevertheless, images of hordes of protestors parading through neighborhoods also incited fear. This brings us to explore the volatility of emotion and affect; unless it is anchored to thoughtfulness and reconfigures one’s social relations, it can easily slip into support for authoritarian actions. Witnessing aggressions on protestors might build support for democratic movements, but images of street violence, property damage, scuffles with the police also incite fear and lead to a withdrawal of support. Emotions are promiscuous (Hannah Arendt uses the word “boundless” to describe a public expression of emotion). To understand the democratic potential of emotions, one needs to understand them in their concrete situation. Black Congressmen in 2020 expressed their concerns about violent protests. They recall how the mantra of “burn baby burn” in the 1960s and

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1980s backfired. The looting, property damage, and burning during the Watt’s riots in LA, the uprisings in Detroit in 1968, and the protests after the failure to convict the police officer in the brutal beating of Rodney King in the 1992 (all tragic events that spontaneously promoted empathy) ended up alienating working- and middle-class Americans. In the beating of King, rioting lasted six days and killed 63 people, and 2,383 more were injured. The national guard had to be called in to restore order. The Black Caucus warned of the lost opportunities of the 1960s, 1980s, and 1990s due to the fear of violent protest, civil unrest, and property damage. Peaceful protests are recommended, but confrontation with the police also leads to fervent encounters, which are amplified by the media. But reactions to confrontation are mixed. Some people are moved by protestors standing up to the police; others are deeply troubled by the prospect of social unrest and property damage. In the wake of John Lewis’s death, a leader in the civil rights movement, the Black Caucus reiterated Lewis’ deep concern that violent protests would sabotage institutional change. He had expressed his concern that the refrain “Defunding the Police” was unwise. He drew attention to the fact that the Republican Party of “law and order” were often the beneficiaries of these events. Trump’s campaigners capitalized on fear and the fact that most citizens were unlikely to explore what defunding the police entails. A GOP commercial in the fall of 2020 portrayed an elderly woman being robbed, phoning 911, only to get an answering machine. However inaccurate, the connection between Biden’s presumed support for defunding the police and public insecurity was starkly drawn. In this case the unsettled feelings that arose in the wake of Floyd’s death did not lead to emotional reorientation (respecting differences) but triggered fear and insecurity, which were mobilized around the refrain “Defund the Police.” Even though BLM wants only 5% of police budgets divested toward health, community services, and education, in the mind of some it threatened their safety. This underlines the shortcomings of relying upon affects alone; they are promiscuous, and support can turn into opposition. For this reason, critical inquiry, which promotes a complex understanding of the historical and social situation, is a supplement to affective solidarity. Some residents feared that “anarchy” was being unleashed, and public and private property was in peril. Trump used this event as well as the M4BL demonstrations and Portland “riots” as examples of the chaos that was unfolding in America. Even democratic supporters were concerned, since downtown Portland was boarded up and inaccessible for months. Trump represented the protestors and democrats as the source of the violence rather than the alt-right white supremacists, who were provocateurs,

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or the federal officers, who promulgated aggression in Portland. This portrait raises the question of how attuned people are to the details of these events. On the fourth night, when the vigilantes were absent, there was peaceful protest, but were people paying attention? This was also true when the federal agents withdrew from Portland. Yet awareness of the specifics presumes an attentive and thoughtful public, which is often in short supply and aggravated by free floating emotions. The dramatic images associated with tear gas, property destruction, violent confrontation between the alt-right and progressives prey on people’s fears of anarchy and unrest. This scenario plays into the need of a strong leader with a law-and-order agenda to quell the storm. The sheriff of Kenosha reported callers urging him to deputize fellow citizens to protect city and private property. Fear was being promulgated by these encounters, and many in the community saw the protestors as having created the chaos. Following the death of Jacob Blake and the violent protests of Kenosha, Civiqs polls noted a drop in overall support for BLM from 52% on May 27 to 49% and on August 23, 2020, and a notable increase in opposition from 31% to 38%. Also more people had opinions on BLM in August, there was a sizeable drop from 21% to 12% amongst those who neither supported nor opposed the movement (Civiqs Poll n.d.). Without knowing more details of the questions posed in the poll, it is difficult to draw an accurate assessment of its various causes, yet urban unrest seems to be attributed to the decline of M4BL. This is odd, since events in the wake of Jacob Blake’s shooting attest to the inordinate destructive power of the alt-right rather than M4BL. On the third night of Kenosha protests, white vigilantes entered the scene, and two protestors were shot dead. Armed and dressed in camouflage, alt-right supporters represented themselves as officials, claiming to be protecting property. Community members and protestors were concerned about the police’s relations to the vigilantes. Rather than questioning their legitimacy when they were witnessed bearing arms, the local police offered them bottled water.5 So, it is not factual evidence that swayed their opinion but fear. In addition, support for BLM’s policies (at least around defunding the police) appeared to be waning. In the New York mayoral election (June 2021) security was a big concern. Since 2020 there has been a spike in gun violence and homicides, up 25%, so safety and homelessness are the two of the biggest issues among the New York voters. Of eight democratic mayoral candidates, only two supported defunding the police, marking a dramatic shift in democratic opinions from 2020. In fact, the chosen candidate, a former policeman, supports more and better police funding, not defunding. It is hard to establish causes with certainty, but the rise in homicides, spikes in mass shootings as well as civil

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disruptions, and property damage due to protests are troubling for many. Even those who may have been sympathetic to M4BL, after May 26, 2020, are deeply troubled by civil unrest that has ensued. As Ahmed claims, disorientation is risky. Fears and anxieties can foreclose solidarity as well as thoughtful responses. There is little evidence to suggest that the rise in gun violence or homicides is a result of defunding the police; however, the events of 2020 have led to a general feeling of anxiety. Yet for those who suffer from the social-psychic condition of catastrophizing (those who experience fear and anxiety irrespective of objective catastrophes), fears will be aggravated. This might explain the sale of 23 million guns in America in 2020. The counter-narratives of the alt-right: stoking up fear and loathing

So far, I  have focused on how sensory and emotional experiences (the witnessing of Floyd’s murder, celebrity protests, dismantling statues, and community demonstrations) have extended the afterlife of the catastrophe and catalyzed solidarity with BLM. I have also shown how emotions are volatile, specifically fear and anger. They have supported M4BL as well as fueled a backlash. In this section, I will pursue more systematically the performances of Trump as well as the rhetoric of the Alt- Right press that energized antidemocratic sentiments and authoritarian politics. In the days after the murder of Floyd, there were moves to redirect affective energies and emotions to the right. President Trump tried to galvanize affective support from his Christian base. Memorable was his walk across Lafayette Square (renamed Black Lives Matter Plaza on June 5th) surrounded by soldiers in camouflage, appearing with a Bible raised in his hand before St. John’s Episcopal Church. To achieve this photo op, Trump ordered the use of tear gas and the aggressive removal of protestors and journalists. In the scuffle that ensued, an Australian journalist lost her eye after being shot with a rubber bullet. The Episcopal Bishop of Washington expressed anger at the use of the bible as a prop for a message that was antithetical to the teachings of Jesus. Twitter users and comics couldn’t resist roasting Trump for this photo op as he held the bible backward. Fox News and the right-wing media played some of the predictable conservative cards in order to discredit M4BL. In analyzing their rhetoric, I aim to expose their manipulation based on suggestion, exaggeration, and lies. Not only do they wrongly identify Antifa, the anti-fascist movement, as a terrorist organization, but they claim it controls M4BL. Further, they continually portray BLM’s founders as Marxist revolutionaries whose sole purpose is to destroy America. The New York Post relies upon a YouTube

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Video posted in June  2020, where co-founders Patrisse Cullors and Alicia Garza admit they are “trained Marxists” immersed in its ideological framework. Cullors describes her mentor Eric Mann as having provided her first home – a labor/community/strategy center. According to Breitbart, Mann was a leader of domestic terrorist group engaged in bombing. He was a member of the Students for Democratic Society and the Weatherman, though he did not participate in bombing campaigns. He is renowned as a labour activist who helped shape the environmental justice movement in the USA by drawing attention to the significance of capitalist exploitation. While not always lying, the alt-right press is engaged in constant exaggeration, deception, and manipulation to undermine the credibility of BLM and other progressive movements. Though it is true that BLM pursues radical changes to undo the systemic racism of the USA and much of that problem stems from capitalist exploitation and white supremacy, there is no evidence that they want to destroy America, nor is there a consensus on whether violent means should be deployed (Haskins 2020). Their goal is racial equality and justice, cultivating dignity, and empowering Black people. The alt-right and conservative press rely upon shoddy statistics to support white supremacy. No matter how much money has been spent on anti-poverty programs, the New York Post claims, African Americans fail to progress. In the last two decades, the paper claims, $20  trillion have been spent on welfare programs yet Black poverty persists. Despite this huge investment, there has only been a modest decrease in African American poverty – confirming their racial inferiority. The article fails to specify how this money was spent or how it targeted African Americans and blames them for their welfare dependency. While readers who trust this paper would not question the glib facts and shoddy statistics, for it corroborates their feelings, other readers would query their analysis. Another predictable trope of Fox News and the alt-right press is to disparage BLM’s policy proposals as ludicrous. Far from making the streets American safe, defunding the police will contribute to anarchy and diminish the safety of Black peoples. We are told activist Yah Né Ndgo wants to abolish the police in five years. There is no further explanation or discussion. They cite Minneapolis as exemplary, where the present police force has been disbanded, though some security forces have replaced it. Defund the police was chanted by thousands of radicals, but The Post claims was not supported by most Blacks, who were concerned about the safety of their community. The New York Post maligned “Socialist Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez D. New York,” who “complains that the cuts of $1.5  billion didn’t go far enough, since it involved moving police officers in schools from police

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budget to school budget” (Fredericks, New York Post 2020). This comment is intent upon inducing fear and serves to underline how unreasonable and outrageous Ocasio-Cortez and BLM’s claims around policing are. It cements the image of Ocasio-Cortes as anti-American and invites contempt. To describe someone as socialist in American political culture is to suggest that they are complicit with all the evils of the twentieth century and pose a serious threat to the American way of life. Tucker Carlson of Fox News continually promulgates such fears and incites loathing. In addition, he has expressed his deep concerns that BLM is going to become a political party and run the country. They aren’t just a lobby group, he claims; they want to assume power. Rasmussen, a group of right-leaning pollsters, declared that “62% of voters have a favorable opinion of BLM . . . they are almost as popular as the American military.” Carlson believes they are more popular than President Trump or Joe Biden. He is troubled not only by their popularity but by their intransigence and their inability to compromise. He represents M4BL as un-American. Not only are they a bunch of gay and lesbian activists, but they are a force to be reckoned with. They are dictating what is to be done, and surprisingly people are submitting to their demands. He provides an example of a school principal in Vermont, a predominantly white state, who was dismissed for having supported both the local police and BLM on his Facebook page. He decries that BLM are getting what they want, the dismissal of the principal, but there is no evidence that BLM demanded this. Furthermore, there are insufficient details on this case to pass judgment. He chides those who are submitting to their strength, claiming “they want to be on the winning side.” He fears for America’s future (Fox News 2020). An opinion piece in The Washington Times conjures up more hatred and fear: Cullors is a trained Marxist endorsing a “soulless ideology.” She has been successful in persuading others to follow suit. The editor claims 67% of BLM are crude materialists or atheists who threaten the American way of life. “BLM conflicts with Judea-Christianity, instead of the clenched fists of BLM, if one wishes to advance a more perfect union, one should forswear BLM and promote forgiveness” (The Washington Times: Opinion 2020). This diatribe is extreme and misrepresents the peaceful protests and non-violent intervention of BLM. The hair-trigger harpies screaming obscenities in the faces of police officers attempting to keep the peace, the masked bullies yanking down statues of historical figures, the hooded guerrillas hurling Molotov cocktails – all are putting Marxist ideology into action . . . Students of history have seen it all before. The Marxist revolutions of the 20th century that wracked Russia, China, Vietnam, North Korea and elsewhere

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piled up victims approaching 100 million. This is the bitter harvest of the perpetually angry, steeped in Marxism and deaf to the call for human kindness. (The Washington Times: Opinion 2020) There is little evidence of Molotov cocktails in these peaceful protests, but such is the power of association. In addition to the right-wing media, President Trump’s rhetoric was effective in fueling antidemocratic sentiments. He identifies the protestors as “vandals, anarchists, hoodlums and thugs, domestic terrorists and anarchists” – people who want to destroy America. While many members of ANTIFA are active supporters of BLM, particularly in Portland, there is no evidence that they comprise the majority nor that they want to destroy America. They envision a different future for America. Not only was President Trump’s struggle with protestors rhetorical, but he also sent in federal agents to Portland Oregon on the grounds of protecting federal property. The mayor asked Trump to desist, since the camouflaged troops were aggressively engaging with protestors. Their interventions were not limited to overseeing federal property, and they were fomenting violence and precipitating scuffles throughout the downtown. This appeared to be a ploy to gain media attention: cultivating fear and alleviating his sagging popularity. In 2016, Trump presented himself as the law-and-order candidate and did so again in 2020. His rallies were premised upon Othering liberals, specifically targeting BLM as un-American. In rhetoric typical of Trump, he declares there are more whites killed by police than African Americans in the USA. This is a fact, yet since African Americans comprise around 13.4% of the American population, they are 3.5 times more likely to be killed than white Americans (who comprise 63% of the population). In Trump’s acceptance speech at the Republican convention, he warned of the carnage associated with a democratic vote. Biden’s hard left agenda, he ranted, is pro-criminal and will lead to anarchy and socialism. Only he would put an end to violence in the streets and protect the American way of life. He persisted with his law-and-order tag; however, violent protests have been associated with his interventions, be it in Lafayette Square or Portland Oregon. He actively encouraged the militarization of the police and the normalization of white supremacy groups and has thrown out existing measures to regulate police brutality and racism. Most shocking, a Qanon-supporting Republican was invited to the Republican convention in 2020. A Republican who tweeted their presence and drew attention to them as an anti-Semitic domestic terrorist group leader was removed as a speaker during the convention. Not only Trump’s rhetoric but also his actions – directing the FBI and CIA to concentrate

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their surveillance on these movements, rather than the Alt- Right extremists who stormed the White house of January 6, 2021 – had serious consequences. His Social Othering and law-and-order rhetoric resonated with his base, but also with those working- and middle-class voters, who were concerned about street violence, property damage, and disorder. Not only did BLM rely upon affective solidarity, but so did their opponents, which included President Trump and alt-right press. This illustrates how one must situate affects and emotions in order to understand that their democratic potential, liveliness, disruptive affects can lead to shoring up antidemocratic feelings. Emotional reflexivity: the power of reason and good arguments

In focusing on unpredictable events, compelling images and non-rational processes, affect theorists overstate their case and diminish the capacity and importance of critical thinking. The smoke produced by the tear gas, the batons cracking on Christopher David’s arm in Seattle, and the swarming groups of protestors have generated intense responses and visceral judgments. However, in the process of emotional reorientation, dissonant visceral feelings will initiate critical inquiry: the givenness of the situation will be questioned, and reflexivity encouraged. Let me speculate as to how emotional reflexivity might work. Christopher David recounts having been shocked by the violence perpetrated by the police; but he also describes being disturbed by the denial of their constitutional rights. Here visceral experience immediately triggers reflection. Why were the police not respecting the constitutional right to protest? Similarly, while one responds viscerally to the burning of public buildings or the looting and scuffles between the police and protestors, we are reminded of remarks by members of the Black community and investigative journalists. Boarded-up shops, gutted-out neighborhoods, and grim surroundings are not new. They are not the result of protests in the wake of police brutality but are evidence of a neglected community – a community that does not count. Here an awareness of life in a ghetto and knowledge of the long-standing history of police brutality toward protestors are important in cushioning BLM from being discredited. As the violence persisted and even escalated in Kenosha and Portland in 2020, some supporters reversed their stance. With the persistence of violence and unrest, those who previously supported BLM immediately after May 26 withdrew their support. Those who suffer from castrophization would have found the constant images of destruction and chaos extremely distressing. Nightly broadcasts of BLM encounters with the police and the alt-right resulted in scuffles, deaths, property damage,

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and disruption. While these disorderly acts can be traced to the events of May 2020, many fail to consider the years of aggressive policing, systemic violence, and microaggressions that African Americans have endured for generations, which underpins their struggle for change. This predicament leads into a discussion of debates on judgment. While the vital materialists believe judgment is visceral and reflection is a post hoc rationalization, I  have tried to accommodate thoughtfulness in the process of dissonance. Hannah Arendt believes that one’s decisions and actions are premised on taking one’s bearings in history, and the failure to do so has disastrous consequences. Writing about the Vietnam War, she remarked, thousands of lives were lost and millions of dollars wasted because the president did not accept that the war was unwinnable. The CIA and other experts had predicted that since the mid-1960s, but various presidents and their advisors could not imagine been defeated by Vietnam. If a careful appraisal of the historical and political situation guided action, she believed unnecessary human suffering and financial loss would have been avoided (Arendt 1972). Echoing Hannah Arendt, democratic theorists distinguish determinate judgment, which relies upon preexisting criteria and logic, from reflective judgment, which manages to persuade because it convincingly extends preexisting concepts to present reality. Since emergent political struggles don’t rely upon truth claims, they rely upon reflective judgment, which taps into common sense and shared worldviews (Zerilli 2014). Lori Morso makes a similar point, believing “judgment is not a rule-governing activity, instead it is a risk-taking venture that prizes surprise, and discomfort of encounter” (Morso 2017, 38). While it is important to give space for something new to emerge and determinate judgment may not facilitate that, it still has a role to play in political mobilization. As I have reported, Christopher David was drawn into the protests having witnessed the mistreatment of demonstrators by federal troops. He did not follow rules per se, yet his decision was based on his evaluation that the troops’ actions denied the protestors’ constitutional rights. America’s commitment to equality, the right of the protest, was being repudiated. His action involved applying experiences to preexisting concepts as well as extending those concepts. Arguably, his judgment is both determinate and reflective. To foster commitments to democratic movements, I believe both forms of judgment are beneficial. To alter pre-conceptions and established narratives, new facts and new interpretations of the past are required. Here determinative judgment (that presumes logic and preestablished criteria of reliable evidence) has a role to play. The Floyd family relied upon reliable facts. They insisted upon an independent autopsy report after George’s murder. The independent autopsy

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determined that the cause of death was due to asphyxiation rather than prior medical conditions, which was what several medical experts argued. Floyd’s history of drug abuse and prior medical conditions would be used in Chauvin’s defense, but they were scientifically contested by the autopsy report. This proved vital in the process of shifting the terms of debates and people’s minds. Transforming beliefs: raising awareness of systemic racism

In the first section of this chapter, I focused on how the murder of George Floyd moved people to engage in acts of affective solidarity, but did this experience involve reorienting one’s emotions and previously held beliefs? Statistics support the dramatic uptick in empathy and support for M4BL in the wake of May 26, but statistics and opinion polls also note that opinions around race took place over a period of years. Monmouth University polls published on June  2, 2020, indicated a dramatic shift in opinions over the last five years. They found 76% of Americans consider racism and discrimination as a “big problem.” This was up 26 points from 2015. Most Americans believe that the police are more likely to use deadly force against African Americans and that there’s a lot of discrimination against Black Americans in society. They may not agree with the violence of recent protests, but “many whites say they understand where that anger is coming from” (Monmouth University Polling Institute 2020). The poll found that 57% of voters thought the anger behind the demonstrations was fully justified, while a further 21% called it somewhat justified. Back in 2013, when Black Lives Matter began, a majority of voters disagreed with all these statements. So, the witnessing of the murder of George Floyd was a tipping point; it catalyzed change but was preceded by years of compelling evidence of racism in American society. There is also evidence that emotional reorientation took place; it wasn’t that protestors identified with Black people but, as Ahmed argues, they supported them while acknowledging and respecting they were differently situated. One wonders how this transformation of attitudes came about. I have already illustrated the power of this catastrophe, but this momentous event was preceded by innumerable other murders as well as decades of aesthetic practices; art, films, music, TV programs, and museum projects that acknowledged America’s hidden past of slavery. As well, investigative journalism revealed facts (past and present) regarding systemic racism, police brutality, and the period of slavery. While facts cannot always be relied upon to change attitudes, facts embedded in stories and manifest in cultural projects can be persuasive, especially as they proliferate in the public spaces. Since emotional reorientation involves questioning established

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narratives, historical and social scientific research is important in shifting beliefs. Substantial academic research on slavery and racism is not new but can be traced to the 1960s. Analyses of inequality and structural disadvantage facing blacks have been reported for some time in the liberal and leftleaning journals and magazines. In The Nation in January 2015, two white journalists reported the increasing economic divide: by 2010, whites had six times the wealth of blacks, up from four times the wealth in 2007. The median net worth of white households today is thirteen times higher than that of black ones. Median wealth for black families fell 33.7 percent between 2010 and 2013, while white households saw theirs’ rise. (Covert and Konczal 2015) The Black community is dominated by high levels of unemployment, poverty, and low-wage, service-industry jobs (January  12, 2020), and these worsened in the years following the crisis of 2008. It is these socioeconomic conditions, as well as the unrelenting police brutality, that spawned the current M4BL movement. While received narratives of America’s cultural heritage and economic development have been challenged for some time, these analyses as well as stories and documentaries have become more prevalent in the wake of the murder of George Floyd. Uncovering America’s brutal past and the ongoing legacy of slavery is evident not only in the mainstream and liberal press (New York Times, Washington Post, CNN, PBS, CBS) but also in tweets, BuzzFeed, Facebook, and You Tube. Recently, most of these have been produced by BIPOC reporters and journalists. An upsurge in attention to systemic racism was evident in the weeks after the murder. To cite one article among many: the cover article of the New York Sunday Times magazine June 2020, Nikole Hannah-Jones makes the argument that since their emancipation African American families have suffered more from poverty, poor education, poor health care than whites of the same socioeconomic class. They may have been given their freedom, but the reparations promised were not delivered. Lincoln freed the slaves, but many of them starved after their liberation. They did not have the financial resources to support themselves. The reparations promised – 30 acres and a mule – were reneged on. From the New Deal Writer’s Project of the 1930s, former slaves recounted the horrors of their lives after emancipation. Without shelter, money, and skills (apart from those associated with plantation farming), many liberated Americans did not survive. They were free, but free to starve! (Hartman 1997). They sought shelter in

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burnt-out buildings, scrounging for food, and finally were forced to return to the field as sharecroppers (Hannah- Jones 2020, 51). While we might assume that social circumstances have continued to improve since the civil rights movement, Covert and Konczal argue to the contrary. Efforts to destroy Black power movements in the 1960s were followed by the War on Drugs (initiated by President Nixon in the 1970s). These ended up suppressing and imprisoning more Black youth. The result has been mass incarceration, labeled the “New Jim Crow” by Michelle Alexander (2020). Her research shows the level of incarceration in the USA is the highest in the world, and far higher than in any other advanced capitalist country. Six million Blacks are under “correctional supervision.” Ashley Nellis and Nicole D. Porter (2021) confirms the overrepresentation of African Americans among the incarcerated. In state prisons they are incarcerated at more than five times the rate of whites, and at least ten times that rate in five states. In addition, Alexander notes, since 2015, five Black men per week have been killed by police. These reports have contributed to inform and persuade the public of the racial injustice. More recently, the daily reports on COVID shored up this research, revealing how Black and Hispanics were overrepresented victims. They are 2.6 times as likely to get the disease, 4.1 times more likely to be hospitalized, and 2.1 times more likely to die than non-Hispanic white people (CDC n.d., Covid Data). The repetition of these facts embedded in narratives, by different authors in different contexts, has begun to have an effect. So, in addition to the affective experiences and symbolic events that helped garner support for BLM, the persistent repetition of facts and analyses have a positive role in persuasion. Given the abundance of work now being published in the academy, reported in the mass media, screened on TV, communicated in multiple platforms on social media, documenting the systemic racism and prejudicial attitudes, a reappraisal of received narratives is understandable. It also has been argued that BLM’s ability to secure concessions has inspired further support. Black activists have been intent on making sure that embodied experiences (mass protests and symbolic support) would be translated into action and institutional changes. Throughout the protests, BLM focused on results. Within 5 weeks BLM managed to produce significant changes, and their success appears to have attracted further support. Within months, in Minneapolis, the City Council pledged to dismantle its police department. In New York, lawmakers repealed a law that kept police disciplinary records secret. Cities across the country passed new laws banning chokeholds. Mississippi lawmakers voted to replace their state flag (Rojas 2020), which prominently includes a Confederate battle emblem (Buchanan, Quoctrung and Patel 2020). Institutional changes

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continue, although they are not always successful. In February 2021, Joe Biden put forward the George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2021 – a bill to combat police misconduct, excessive force, and racial bias. The bill passed the Democratic-controlled House of Representatives on a mostly party-line vote of 220–212 but was opposed by the Republicans in the senate and collapsed in September 2021. Strategies and ideals of BLM – the complicated path toward instantiating democratic practices

I have made a strong case to support the idea that the murder of George Floyd spawned democratic sensibilities around the globe, but I’m also interested in seeing if the event has fostered democratic practices. To this end I assess the actions of M4BL; they not only coordinated protests and framed the narrative that would circulate in the public imaginary but also insisted on concrete policy changes. M4BL was a space where Black groups could strategize over the most effective and valuable interventions. Democratic theorists may learn from the successes of M4BL. Instead of theory driving democratic politics, the reality of racism and strategies to tackle racism informed their action. M4BL’s pragmatic approach is consistent with continental political theory (e.g. Simone de Beauvoir). Instead, of judging this movement in terms of abstract principles and normative ideals, I assess their ability to navigate the impediments they faced while instantiating their democratic ideals. They forged new forms of leadership, introduced successful strategies for collaboration, and instituted policy initiatives, all inspired by the democratic values of horizontalism, egalitarianism, and equality. Alicia Garza, one of the founders of the movement, admitted they didn’t have a strategic plan. However, political theorist Deva Woodly claims M4BL produced a new political philosophy informed by Radical Black Pragmatic Feminists (RBPF) and the practices of Ella Baker. Since their philosophy is a pragmatic one, there may be less of a contradiction than is apparent on the surface. Liberal democracy, which is defined in terms of procedures, individual rights, and autonomous individuals, does not meet the needs of African Americans who have been exploited and oppressed since 1612. Since American democracy was built on slavery, and since systemic racism and violence persist, African Americans are not autonomous free individuals who are able to access their rights but are structurally oppressed and exploited. They earn less, they have been unable to accumulate capital, their homes are less valuable, and they have been socially and culturally marginalized. M4BL proposes radical changes to transform their situation so that

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the values of freedom and equality can be approximated. In addition to political changes, M4BL envisions cultural and social changes. The RBPF practices are informed by an ethic of care. They strive to provide the social and material preconditions where Black people will flourish. Resources for food, safe housing, mental health, healing, and finding work for Black Americans are their priorities. In striving to create supportive communities, they believe people will no longer harm each other – hence prisons will not be needed. Inspired by Dewey’s democratic pragmatism, RBPF believe their work ought to be based on factual realities rather than ideals. This involves developing sound relations, which are the basis of social engagement and envisions people being “transformed in the service of the work” (Dewey 2005, 283). The practices of Ella Baker, an effective organizer in Southern Christian Leadership conference, also inspired M4BL. She worked on existing social relations to transform them. Confident in the wisdom and experiences of ordinary people, she emboldened them to define their problems and imagine appropriate solutions. Her suspicion of experts and leaders was shared by M4BL. They trusted the most marginal and oppressed and encouraged any Black person to take up a leadership role. BLM describes their movement as leaderful rather than leaderless. The founders had a vision to create a new civil rights movement that didn’t involve charismatic straight Black men. Alicia Garza said: “These new activists will not be preachers.” Women, specifically gay women, had been subject to violence and marginalized in the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s; their new movement would be inclusive and would welcome women, lesbian, and queer trans people (Black Lives Matter.com). However, sexual politics got sidelined after the killing of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri. This event gave rise to formations like the Organization for Black Struggle, Don’t Shoot Coalition, Hands Up United, Michael Brown Leadership Coalition, and other NGOs intent on addressing racist police practices. Individuals like Tef Poe, Tory Russell, Rev. Osagyefo Uhuru Sekou, and Ashley Yates were the new leaders coming out of Ferguson and St. Louis. They forged a deeper discussion and debate about the course of the movement, encouraging sporadic and spontaneous acts of civil disobedience – for example, the blocking of highways and establishing solidarity with Antifa. Cullors notes in her Twitter account that she accepted the focus on racial injustice (police brutality, incarceration, and excessive control of Black people’s movements), though with a slight regret that sexual politics would be sidelined. Nevertheless, sexual politics has not been erased. Their website of February 19, 2021, “affirms the lives of Black queer and trans folks, disabled folks, undocumented folks, folks with records, women, and all Black lives

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along the gender spectrum . . . those who have been marginalized within Black liberation movements” (Black Lives Matter.com). Inclusion is not always easy, especially when grievances are diverse and so strongly felt, yet BLM is sufficiently de-centralized to accommodate differences. There is also an ongoing tension between the theory and practice of revolutionaries and reformists. Young activists booed Jesse Jackson and his spiritualist agenda; Al Sharpton’s message was not well received. Young activists did not support organizations like NAACP. Yet the reformist elements within BLM are strong: a BLM super PAC was formed to garner donations, and many members are ardent supporters of the Democratic Party. In the funeral of George Floyd, reformers (Jesse Jackson, Al Sharpton) took center stage. Despite dramatic political and tactical differences within the movement, BLM tries to absorb the tensions to ensure they remain unified and effective. This is facilitated by their decentralized structure. “M4BL is a place for black organizations across the country to come to debate, discuss, develop shared assessments of what political interventions were necessary” (Woodly 2022, 23). Instead of “head office” formulating policy, they allow multiple organizations with different interests and goals to come together to formulate their interventions. An example of how this decentralized structure works is evident from their initial off-line convention in 2015 (Ransby 2018). Their mantra was “Neither Headliners nor Lionized Personalities” (Woodly 2022, 39). The conference was comprised of multiple workshops: ideas were proposed and planned by participants. The final line-up was decided by online voting. Some of the panels included the legacy of Black Panthers, Queer trans gender leadership, Healing, Organizing for Resilience, Political Prisoners and Prison Reform. Clearly there is a diversity of interests and orientations. Through surveys and calls BLM solicited feedbacks from organizations, individuals, and task groups and began to frame policy priorities from the bottom-up (Woodly 2022, 43) BLM managed to spawn local chapters in the USA and worldwide, inviting debates around systemic racism specific to local needs and interests. Committed to local autonomy, individual chapters devise strategies with their local concerns in mind. In addition, task groups that have specialized interests and expertise have a significant role in framing policy initiatives. Their decentralized and dispersed approach to power and authority has fostered democratic practices. Yet some organizational structure or “chain of command” is necessary to formulate their strategies and establish action points. In theory they allow local autonomy, but there are limits. Local chapters make decisions about policies specific to them, but they cannot radically depart from the core ideas and demands of BLM USA. During the summer of 2020, BLM UK was not recognized on the BLM’s website;

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their pro-Palestinian position and critique of Israel didn’t go down well at “home office” USA. It appears that not all differences are tolerated, and leadership is not wholly dispersed and decentralized. At times, effective strategies trump the democratic ideal of a horizontal structure. As the movement progresses and policy changes are promoted, differences among members of the collective and between collectives will continue to surface, and decisions will have to be made. Some people will be more decisive. New social media has contributed to the materialization of horizontal leadership. As we have seen, activities can be coordinated without a hierarchically structured organization or a party. A post on Facebook could organize a protest within minutes. The movement insists there are no gatekeepers: all stories or videos can be posted on their digital networks. However, M4BL has been savvy around their communications; trained communication and visual media people are responsible for framing and circulating the narratives, so they will get the most sympathetic response (Woodly 2022). This is hard to square with the idea that there are no gatekeepers. Their policy of not censoring posts cannot always be respected. As noted, ANTIFA shares many of the values of BLM, but they are willing to use violence in self-defense and do not bar damaging property.6 This may accord with many in the M4BL but not all. No doubt debate has ensued, and some opinions have had to be removed. In order to cultivate broad support, they must accommodate reformists without alienating the revolutionaries. This has meant acting strategically without undermining their shared values and broad goals. So far, it appears, they have been successful in doing so. Another tension within the movement is between identity and coalitional politics. M4BL is about building respect, cultivating dignity, and empowering Black people; however, BLM has been able to cultivate unprecedented multi-racial support. Some Black activists have welcomed white supporters, though not all. White presence within the movement is not without strains: whites can support, join in, but Black activists believe the “movement is to be black led.” Therefore, whites should listen and be supportive, but they have no place in strategy or decisions. Other members of BLM have said “if you don’t have roots in the community why should we listen to you.” For some this means that the voices of more privileged Blacks should not speak for those who reside in deprived communities. Many Black activists are skeptical of white support. Journalist Thomas Fuller remarks, “is it not with some irony, one of America’s whitest cities, Portland, became the center of BLM protests” (Fuller 2020), and countless white voices were chanting “black power.” Some Black activists were pleased by this, though others believe they wrongly have appropriated Black gestures. Rev. E.D. Mondainé, the president of the Portland branch

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of the NAACP, called “the protests a ‘spectacle’ that distracted attention from the Black Lives Matter movement. Others asked skeptically if this was not another example of white co-optation?” (Fuller 2020) Xavier Warner, a Black protest organizer, called the predominance of white protesters “a beautiful thing” that speaks to the progressive ethos in the city. This has not stopped white Americans for joining protests, but many of those who have joined are progressives who have long-standing commitments to social justice. Data on the demography of the protesting crowds confirms this. These people were not mobilized by witnessing the gruesome death of George Floyd, for they were already committed to radical politics. Left-wing groups mobilized their supporters to join protests, especially to honor Juneteenth (the holiday that commemorates the emancipation of slaves). For this event 80% of demonstrators identified as left leaning, 54% white, 21% Black, 7 Latinx, 8% multiracial, 11% Asian Pacific Islander. It is not that racial identity was insignificant, but stable values in racial justice and equity were more salient (Fisher 2020). This is further supported by the polls: 88% of democrats support BLM, whereas 84% of Republicans oppose them. These statistics seem to contest the belief that political identities are fundamentally fluid. Again, to regard support of BLM as a result of dissensual moments or empty signifiers is to ignore that radical democratic groups share values and goals with M4BL. The anti-fascists had a strong presence in Portland because they shared BLM’s commitment to radical egalitarian goals. The “racial justice advocates and the largely white anti-fascist movement want police powers curtailed, brutality checked, and the presence of rightwing supremacist groups limited” (The New York Times, July 3, 2020). Not only do Black and white protestors share explicit goals, but they are also struggling for structural change: social and racial justice and equality. Hence, the significance of shared ideals and their commitment to political transformation cannot be underestimated. Some have argued that BLM’s coalitional strategies and their recruitment of non-Blacks are strategic. They don’t want white intellectuals, union leaders, or elites directing their movement. However, since African Americans comprise 12.2%7 of the population, they must accrue support from members from the Hispanic (18.5%), Asian (5.5), and White 60.1% communities. Coalitions are not simply tactical, for they are informed by allyship.8 M4BL prescribes what allyship involves: it is described on innumerable social media sites. It is about building respect, cultivating dignity, and empowering Black people. It is not the task of Black people to educate white people. Allyship includes “proactive educating  yourself, researching, listening and not talking. Showing up at protests, observing and protecting people who are more vulnerable to police action. Donating

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to organizations on the frontline, centering and amplifying the voices of Black people” (Al Jazeera 2020). Not only does BLM do the work of prescribing what is entailed in allyship, but this work has been amplified by a dense network of their task groups that provide workshops on allyship to like-minded progressives. As well, they inform training in Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion to corporate, public sector, and educational workers. Making the population aware of the systemic racism and microaggressions that Black people have endured, as well as prescribing what is to be done, directs popular support. M4BL relies upon affective experiences and empathy to build solidarity, but they also provide information to foster understanding. These well-devised strategies are useful, specifically for those who are politically naïve, but they are not without their problems. Democratic pedagogy presumes individuals are provided with facts and information, but they individually access the situation and decide how to act. While social movements often prescribe the language and practices that ought to be used by their supporters, democratically inclined people do not like being told what to say or do. However, for the movement to be successful, repeated refrains and coordinated interventions are vital. This again alludes to tensions around tactics. Social media has been an essential tool in mobilizing, yet there is a shortcoming with this medium. Its speediness encourages people to expect quick responses, but effective changes in law, policy, and institutional practices take time and rigorous research to get it right. In addition, their understandable aversion to state institutions does not bode well for those who seek policy changes. This reflects the unresolved/unresolvable tension in the movement between those who want to up-end existing institutions and practices and those who seek to ensure that prejudice is overcome and democracy within existing institutions is enhanced. The latter involves an understanding of existing practices so they can be reworked and extended to deepen democracy. There is another tension within the movement: while they resist educating and encourage others to educate themselves, they prescribe how people should act towards Black people. M4BL insists it is not their responsibility to figure out how to instantiate equality, demilitarize the police, or end police brutality. They will make suggestions, but they resist taking responsibility for formulating and instituting these changes. However, leaving these actions to others outside the movement is unlikely to produce the results they expect. The research must be geared to local and specific needs hence research must be pursued by local people. Samuel Sinyangwe, data analyst, turned his skills to mapping police violence. His group was able to collect information on the race and ethnicity of those killed by police. In 2014, over 26% of victims were Black, which is twice as many as one would

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normally expect. This database has had positive effects. In 2015, 24 states passed measures that would more effectively control police officers: including the wearing of body cameras, training about biases, independent investigations following uses of force, and new limits on the flow of military equipment. However, some vocal members of M4BL support abolishing police services altogether. BLM has managed to realize some its core values while responding to diverse tensions within the movement and contingent factors, all the while sustaining its energy and unity. Moving forward: a case for social democracy or billionaires’ charities?

While BLM has been able to maintain a balance between the reformers and revolutionaries up to this point, it may be difficult to sustain going forward. Support from the corporate world has been unprecedented. BLM has managed to recruit capitalists; yet their vision is in tension with many of the young activists and revolutionaries who have anti-capitalist aspirations. Making arenas available for polling booths was a good offer that owners of NBA franchises came up with, but getting billionaires to support state intervention smacks of social democracy, which is more of a stretch. The Coke brothers come to mind. In the past billionaires have supported the Tea Party or the Republican Party, but today some billionaires want to improve the world and diminish poverty and suffering, but are they willing to support an interventionist state and a dramatic increase in taxes? One of the action points of BLM is equality. What does that mean to the owners of sports franchises, or large corporations? Providing more scholarships for Black students to have a good education is one obvious avenue of democratic reform. Corporations and institutions are earmarking jobs for Black people, but BLM spurns tokenism and supports the freedom and dignity of all not simply for those who achieve. While American’s billionaires have created foundations to distribute generous gifts, they have the right to give where and what they wish. Isn’t the call for equality really a call for more state intervention? The proposed redistribution of 5% of police funding to community services, education, and health care would have been done through government intervention. Hence, a social democratic or enhanced welfare state is called for. A state intent upon equalizing opportunities, enhancing public education, and improving public health to enable Blacks to compete on a more level playing field is in order. Biden’s “building back better,” his $4  trillion proposal for investment in families and infrastructure, approaches that goal. However, his inability to have this passed in the House attests to resistance to government intervention, not only among the Republicans but within his own party.

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In his first formal speech to the nation, Biden talked about the failure of trickle-down economics, marking a radical departure in rhetoric from former democratic Presidents, who supported neo- liberal governing strategies. Diminishing inequality can only be achieved through increased taxation but to what extent will billionaires, millionaires, and the Democratic Party support this? How far will their support go? Or is it just good optics so that they can garner the goodwill of the people? M4BL appears flush with cash at this moment: $77 million were donated in 2020 and $42 million in 2023 remain. However, tackling structural racism, inequality, and poverty will require a more coordinated and systemic plan. Will millionaires and billionaires be willing to pay more taxes to ensure equality of opportunities? One recalls the clamor around affirmative action. In fact, Trump recently tapped into that negative sentiment by saying Obama only got into Columbia and Yale because of affirmative action. One wonders if resentful feelings will be reignited undermining the pursuit of reparations and structural change. Given the diversity of local ordinances and laws that collide with racial justice, it might be necessary to introduce federal legislation to counter state and local differences and ensure racial justice. Whether or not this is feasible or acceptable will remain to be seen. One of the demands of BLM is reparations. While America has supported survivors of the Holocaust and their families, Hannah-Jones notes, Congress has refused to consider HR 40 – a bill simply to study reparations. Hannah-Jones quotes Darity and Mullen, who have provided a roadmap to reparations: “the technical details are easy, they argue, but the difficult part is garnering political will” (The New York Times 2020, 52). It is not about punishing white Americans, and white Americans are not the ones who would pay for them. It does not matter if your ancestors engaged in slavery or if you just immigrated two weeks ago, reparations are a societal obligation in a nation where our constitution sanctioned slavery. Congress passed laws protecting it and our federal government initiated, condoned and practiced legal racial segregation and discrimination against Black Americans. And so, it is the federal government that pays. (Hannah-Jones 2020, 51) If the federal government is to fund reparations through taxpayer’s money, it is the people who will pay. As support for BLM is declining across the board, among White, Hispanic, and Black Americans, so too is the political will. In other countries, families and corporations who have benefitted from slavery and the slave trade are contributing to reparations. In the UK Llyod’s bank is contributing to reparations, as are some other

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families who have benefitted from slavery. Why not in America? Why not make the families of former plantation owners, or corporations who benefited from slavery contribute? Recently February  8, 2023, Laura Trevelyan’s family did just that. She apologized for her British family’s slave owing past, and her family gave $120,000 to the community in Grenada, where her family-owned slaves. After this announcement Trevelyan retired as an American BBC announcer. On August 20, 2023, the descendants of Sir William Gladstone PM will pay reparations of 100,000.00 pds. One of the bulwarks to social democracy is America’s deep-seated belief in the free market, corporate success, and therefore an antipathy to state intervention and taxation. These beliefs are widespread, not only supported by the upper, but often the middle and working classes. During townhall meetings around healthcare reform during the Obama years, the Canadian system was presented as socialist. Citizens demanded that the state should stay out of their Medicare. How does one explain the failure of recipients to know that Medicare is state-funded? Attitudes around individual responsibility circulate, but the public must be better informed. Bernie Sanders took a different angle on American exceptionalism. He noted it is only in America where private health care is the order of the day. Reluctance to federalize supplies during COVID was another example of anti-government sentiment. As Trump reiterated in his speech to the Republican Party convention, socialism (which for him is identical to social democracy) is the alternative to the Republican Party. Biden’s policy has also been branded socialist by the GOP’s amplifying fears of the deep state and big government. It is not only among the conservatives in America that provisions for public health, public education, efforts to regulate industry are deemed socialist. This is true of neoliberal and alt-right supporters in the UK, Canada, and Australia. Differences between demands for socioeconomic equality and antidiscriminatory policies are not new. In 1967, Martin Luther King gave a speech before a group of white politicians and civil rights leaders expressing the limitations of the civil rights movement. For 12 years the struggle was to end legal segregation. A struggle for decency. A struggle to end humiliation and the syndrome of deprivation surrounding the system of legal segregation . . . it didn’t cost anything to integrate lunch counters . . . it didn’t cost the nation a penny to guarantee the right to vote, now we are in a period where it will cost the nations millions to end poverty . . . now we are going to lose friends. . . . The allies who were with us in Selma, will not all stay. . . . There has never been a determined effort on the part of white Americans to genuine equality for Negroes. (quoted by Hannah-Jones 2020, 51)

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A month before his assassination in a speech to striking sanitation workers in Memphis, King reiterated his commitment to “struggle for genuine equality, which means economic equality. For we know that it isn’t enough to integrate a lunch counter, what does it profit a man to eat at an integrated lunch counter, if he doesn’t have the money to buy a hamburger” (Quoted by Hannah-Jones 2020, 51). Ensuring that Black votes are not suppressed is central to democracy and political equality. Yet, this alone is not going to secure equality. Economic justice is central to equality. In Ferguson Missouri, where Michael Brown was killed by Darren Wilson, the poverty rate was as high as 40%, and in the adjacent district, the median household income was $14, 390 per year. If poverty is not tackled, if good-quality education, public housing, and trustworthy social security cannot be provided for Black people, then equality is unlikely. It is easy to protest; now comes the hard part – accepting the policies and reforms necessary to further BLM’ s democratic values; this call for equality or re-distribution of wealth and opportunities. BLM is correct in noting that radical reform of the economy and reconfiguring social and political institutions and culture are necessary to deepen democracy. While democratic values have been instantiated in many of the practices of BLM, in order to facilitate the structural/systemic change, BLM demands it faces a huge challenge, since social democracy and government intervention are not popular. Furthermore, as support for BLM declines, it becomes more difficult to press for radical changes. Addendum

Recent polls (February  2023) on M4BL are noteworthy. Overall support for the movement’s goals has dropped from 65% to 49% and African American respondents’ approval dropped from 67% to 56% from April 2021 to May 2022. “This decline is seen across the board, with ardent supporters of police reforms such as progressives, Democrats, African Americans and young Americans also exhibiting a decrease in their support for these changes.” The author of the poll suggests people are “tiring of the movement.”9 In addition, “the disaffection with the civil rights group comes after the leadership faced wide criticism that the purchase of a $6  million Los Angeles mansion by leadership was made without full transparency and with donations.”10 This seems to confirm my thesis that support driven by affect/emotion alone without relying upon critical thinking or shifting one’s understanding is unlikely to be secure.

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Notes 1 On February 24, 2022, three police officers who failed to intervene were found guilty of having violated George Floyd’s civil rights and for failing to give medical attention when needed. 2 The charge of 3rd degree murder has been re-introduced, which is used to cover a particularly grisly event. At the outset the prospect of a prosecution seemed slim. Since there need only have been one juror who could not subscribe to beyond a reasonable doubt. In the end, Derek Chauvin was convicted and sentenced to 22.5  years imprisonment which exceeds the Minnesota sentencing guideline range of 10 years and eight months to 15 years for a second-degree crime. On February  24, 2022, the three police were convicted for failing to intervene and failing to respect George Floyd’s civil rights (Forliti, Steve and Tammy 2022). 3 This is not a time for historical accuracy. Colston is continually presented as a slave trader, though he invested in the slave trade as many capitalists of the day, though he was not directly a slave trader as charged. In fact, some historians argue his fortune was based upon trade in wine, and other goods. Also, there is the tendency many activists to ignore the progressive anti-racist work that has been done in the past, attention to the slave trade and efforts to draw attention to it are not new. In MSHED, across from the Colston Statue, a plaque commemorating the slave trade has been in place for several years. 4 Since Rhodes’ name is inscribed in concrete beneath his sculpture, authorities now claim it is impossible to remove evidence of Rhodes without endangering the structure of the building. 5 Their fear was vindicated when the shooter of two protestors was not charged with manslaughter. 6 Literature from the Antifa movement encourages followers to pursue lawful protest activity as well as more confrontational acts, according to a 2018 Congressional Research Service report. The members do not abstain from involvement in direct physical confrontations or in monitoring the activities of white supremacist groups. They publicize online the personal information of perceived enemies, develop self-defense training regimens and compel outside organizations to cancel any speakers or events with “a fascist bent” — such as the Yiannopoulos speech at Berkeley. 7 Google Search reveled that African American comprise 12.2% of the American population, this differs from the data which believes they comprise 13.4 %. 8 The concept and practice of allyship has spread. On March 22, 2023, a CBC broadcast dealt with how to be ally to Muslims celebrating Ramadan. www.cbc. ca/news/canada/manitoba/ramadan-muslim-community-manitoba-1.6784585 9 www.bet.com/article/tszncy/black-support-of-black-lives-matter-movement-indecline-poll-finds 10 www.bet.com/article/tszncy/black-support-of-black-lives-matter-movement-indecline-poll-finds

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Schad, Tom. 2020. “Nearly Four Years after Colin Kaepernick First Took a Knee, NFL Tides Are Turning on Protests during the National Anthem.” USA Today. Gannett Satellite Information Network, June  12. www.usatoday.com/story/ sports/nfl/2020/06/12/nfl-protest-kneeling-national-anthem-colin-kaepernicksocial-justice/5341565002/. Spears, Marc J. 2020. “ ‘Equality’ Tops List of NBA Players’ Most Popular Social Justice Jersey Messages.” ESPN Internet Ventures, July  8. www.espn. com/nba/story/_/id/29430249/equality-tops-list-nba-players-most-popularsocial-justice-jersey-messages. Srinivasan, Arun. 2020. “NHL Misses the Mark Entirely with Performative Gestures Regarding Black Lives.” Yahoo! Sports, July 29. https://ca.sports.yahoo. com/news/nhl-misses-the-mark-entirely-with-performative-gestures-regardingblack-lives-200145049.html. The Washington Times: Opinion. 2020. “Black Lives Matter Is Rooted in a Soulless Ideology.” June  29. www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/jun/29/ editorial-black-lives-matter-is-rooted-in-a-soulle/. Togoh, Isabel. 2020. “A  Toppled Statue of Slave Trader Sparked Global Protests, Now a Monument to Black Lives Matter Occupies That Plinth.” Forbes Magazine, July  15. www.forbes.com/sites/isabeltogoh/2020/07/15/a-toppledstatue-of-slave-trader-sparked-global-protests-now-a-monument-to-black-livesmatter-occupies-that-plinth/#df297a46190e 9. Tucker, Carlson. 2020. “Black Lives Matter Is Working to Remake and Control the Country - And Is Immune From Criticism.” FOX News Network, June 16. www.foxnews.com/opinion/tucker-carlson-black-lives-matter-is-working-toremake-and-control-the-country-and-is-immune-from-criticism. Wheeler, Mark. 2013. Celebrity Politics: Image and Identity in Contemporary Political Communications, 12. Cambridge: Polity. Woodly, Deva. 2022. Reckoning: Black Lives Matter and Democratic Necessity of Social Movements. New York: Routledge. Zerilli, Linda. 2014. “We Feel Our Freedom” Imagination and Judgment in the Thought of Hannah Arendt.” In The Aesthetic Turn in Political Thought, edited by Krompridis. London: Bloomsbury.

CONCLUSION

These events were catastrophic – in a flash they created strong visceral responses and disrupted the status quo. Without underplaying their ability to shake things up, I have argued if their effects are to be enduring and democratic, the political and social movements they enlist and the contexts in which they arise must be considered. To determine an event’s ability to foster democratic sensibilities and practices I have analyzed the mass and social media (in terms of their narratives and affective communication), the movements that kept these grievances alive, as well as the neoliberal governing practices in which these events have arisen that impede their effectiveness. To get a fulsome account of the event, I have incorporated insights from previous generations of cultural and democratic thinkers (i.e., Arendt, Butler, Habermas, Freud, Kristeva) as well as contemporary radical democrats (populist, poststructuralist, deliberative, and new materialist thinkers). While the recent turn to affect and posthumanism have prompted us to think about the power of things (cell phones, social media, and logarithms) and the fluid identities of populism have prompted us to appreciate the contingency of identity, they tend to occlude the significance of critical thinking, human intention, and collective political action. They also have ignored the fact that these apparatuses or identities are nested in power relations that affect human agency. In the chapters on the Grenfell Fire disaster and the Parkland school shooting, this is highlighted. By relying upon the critical phenomenology of Simone de Beauvoir, I try to rectify this by considering embodied potentialities in concrete situations; this helps make sense of the decentered human condition, without denying human DOI: 10.4324/9781003295518-7

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capacities to feel, initiate, think, and organize. In our contemporary digital culture, where images and sensations are increasingly important, I rely upon Clare Hemmings’s notion of affective solidarity and Sara Ahmed’s notion of emotional reorientation to theorize the importance of emotion and affect in mobilizing for democratic change. In addition to disrupting established narratives through persuasive argument, unsettling events can cause people to reorient their everyday habits and feelings and engage in questioning the givenness of their situations; as such, the micropolitical becomes an important resource for political change. In contrast to those democratic thinkers who focus on the micropolitical processes, I also study the macropolitical field in which the event arises. Not only does solidarity arise from strong feelings, but deliberation and critical thinking facilitate making democratic commitments. My focus on historically contextual, institutional, and social structural forces aim to bring a non-reductive account of the socioeconomic world back into the picture and provide a critical approach to the entanglement of affective life and democratic agency in our contemporary world. While the SARS epidemic in Toronto in 2003 unsettled everyday life, it did not involve emotional reorientation, where people became more respectful of others and apprised of social constraints. At the micropolitical level, Othering discourses and negative affects were enlisted in the mass media, enhancing fear and aggravating existing Chinese racism. Though there were deliberative sites and scientific and social scientific evidence available to counter the catastrophizing effects of the mass media, they were rarely employed and for the most part swamped by discourses of fear. While scientists argued that epidemics were likely due to agribusiness and increased viral loads between humans and nonhumans and urged preparation to manage future epidemics, warnings were not heeded. This incident, structured by deregulatory practices in Ontario, failed to block the travel of a SARS’ victim and prompt the work necessary to mitigate the devastating effects of epidemics going forward. Hence, its ability to further democratic processes was limited. While it did alert the population to the shortcomings of cutbacks in public health and the need for collective preparation and deliberative approaches to change, these were for the most part ignored going forward. Witnessing the Grenfell Tower fire was a shocking experience that spontaneously prompted sympathy and solidarity with the victims, who were for the most part immigrants and refugees, yet empathy did not translate into emotional reorientation regarding immigrants; in fact, these feelings also fueled Brexit. Even though this disaster revealed a structural flaw in the Tory council’s program of austerity and deregulation, it did not involve a turn against the Conservative Party, whose programs produced deep

182 Conclusion

cuts in the fire department and social services, precipitating this disaster. It also failed to produce a new collective subject aiming to protect public health and safety. Despite the shocking visuals that prompted democratic sensibilities, their effects were temporary and did not seriously challenge conservative political loyalties, deeply entrenched feelings for people in public housing, or neoliberal governing strategies that favored market freedom. This case tested the populist assumption of the fluidity of political identities. The Parkland Kids protests in the wake of the school shooting provided evidence of the power of technology (i.e., cell phones, social media, and logarithms) to mobilize for democratic change. Not only was social media indispensable to their success in organizing demonstrations, recruiting supporters, and mounting sibling movements, but they also relied upon offline embodied protests (affective solidarity) to pursue the struggle for gun control. Unlike other democratic movements that relied upon rational arguments and critical thinking to sustain support over time, this singleissue movement managed to produce unparalleled support by focusing on a few reiterated action points. Though their practices were emotionally and affect-driven, they also instantiated democratic practices: urging students to produce content for their platforms, collaborating with other established groups, and promoting sibling movements. Although they were successful in launching the largest protest movement up to 2020, the pressure they exerted and the visibility they sustained over time did not manage to significantly change the laws. This had less to do with their movement and more to do with the structural power of the NRA, the Second Amendment advocates, loyal republicans, and a culture of guns. Though there was a marked turn against the NRA agenda, which portends a positive future, legislative changes from both parties have focused on fortifying schools and increasing checks on those under 21 rather than dealing with systemic factors. Nevertheless, MFOL in collaboration with other protest groups persist in their struggle for gun control. The COVID catastrophe was deeply unsettling – not only at the micropolitical level, involving dramatic adjustments in everyday conduct, but also at the macropolitical level: trade and the global economy were temporarily closed down and movement between nations ceased. In this chapter, I  focus on the populist rhetoric and affective performances of President Trump in the first six weeks of COVID. As a populist he managed to weave together different constituents: American Firsters, globalists, white supremacists, and loyal Republicans. In order to understand the nature and allure of his support, I  have analyzed his rhetoric and affective performances, which depended on populist ideas (anti-science, anti-establishment, and anti-immigrant) and neoliberal ideals. Far from revealing his commitment

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to public health and safety his commitment to state’s rights, the free market undermined his efforts to handle COVID successfully. Yet many governors took public health and safety seriously and were able to save lives. Nevertheless, deaths in the USA were among the highest per capita in the first three months of COVID. The COVID crisis also provides democratic promise. The shortcomings of neoliberal governing strategies were revealed – market-led solutions failed to deliver. The state closed 50% of the economy, provided income and care for its citizens, and regulated social life – measures that were inconceivable several years earlier. In the age of pandemics, the values and practices of neoliberal life are no longer viable. Scientists shared information on vaccines, facilitating their speedy delivery; countries donated vaccines; and frontline workers risked their lives. Global cooperation and recognition of human interdependence challenged the values of individualism and nationalism, yet there was a backlash to state regulation and science. Protests arose to counter COVID regulations (masking, social distancing, and lockdowns) in the name of freedom not only in America but in the UK and Canada as well. Finally, witnessing of the murder of George Floyd was the most impactful visceral event I  have considered. It triggered democratic sensibilities through anger and compassion and continues to catalyze anti-Black racist movements worldwide. This event has been a gamechanger. It has not only meant Black people would be listened to and recognized, but existing practices and institutions would have to change to be more equitable. It would be a mistake to overplay the significance of feelings in extending its afterlife and ignore the multiple organizations (specifically M4BL) and their ability to use social and mainstream media to keep this event and its grievances alive. I have demonstrated how strong affective experiences were able to mobilize support, but also how cognitive experiences were able to sustain support over time. Received narratives of American development were persistently challenged, Black prejudice in the media was exposed, and celebrities supplemented organized protests and demonstrations in support of the M4BL. This event was not only exemplary in catalyzing emotional reorientation, but the social movement M4BL contributed to rethinking radical democracy. Instead of judging this movement in terms of abstract principles and normative ideals, I  assess their ability to navigate the impediments they faced while sustaining their democratic ideals. Through the astute use of social and mass media, M4BL organized demonstrations, stimulated fund-raising campaigns, and provided a space for Black people to gather, discuss, and prioritize interventions. Though compromises were necessary, they forged new forms of leadership, successful strategies for

184 Conclusion

collaboration, and instituted policy initiatives to address inequality and prejudice. The persistence of urban protest and civil unrest in the late summer of 2020, the call for defunding the police in the face of rising crime rates, and fatigue have contributed to diminishing support for M4BL. For some, compassion has given way to fear and disrupted the process of reorienting attitudes and conduct. Nevertheless, the event of George Floyd’s murder provided the occasion to seriously reflect upon the past and present systemic racism in liberal democratic countries. Reparations for slavery, reform in policing, and incarceration are proposed, and some reform instituted, but it is unclear how successful they will be in the long run. What is clear is that neoliberalism, which has dominated policy decisions since Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, and Brian Mulroney, is being challenged – more equitable and humane societies are being demanded. Joe Biden’s massive infrastructure spending and Trudeau’s coalition with the New Democratic Party foreshadow a possible reinvigoration of social democracy. Yet as new social arrangements are being planned and new imaginaries are being visualized, populist solutions that oppose the deepening of democracy and a more inclusive future are also growing. In fact, in the European Union, where social democracy is more embedded and the mantra of freedom from state intervention has flourished, anti-immigrant and authoritarian sentiments have flourished.

INDEX

abjection 23–28, 43n6, 115; see also Freud, Sigmund; Kristeva, Julia Acosta, Jim 110 activism: clicktivism 82–83; Grenfell Tower fire and 62–64, 73; Parkland school shooting and 87, 92; performative 147–150; social media and 80 Adorno, Theodor 13 affect 43n6, 48–49; autonomous 53; communicative action and 74n1; embodied situated 88; emotion and 10–13, 141, 154; as heterological experience 146; Social Othering and 28 affective ideology 136n2; see also Protevi, John affective representation 45–48 affective solidarity 11, 84–88, 85, 140–145; see also Hemmings, Clare affectivity: subjectivity and 2 agency 8, 10–12, 16–17, 17n3, 49, 61, 80, 146; confederate agency (see Bennett, Jane); strong (human) versus weak (non-human) (see Coole, Diana) Ahmed, Sara 11–12, 62, 141, 157, 163; see also emotional reorientation Alexander, Michelle 165

Alexander, Peter 110 “alternative facts” 107 alt-right 7, 13, 18n10, 69, 81, 107, 112, 114, 118, 155–161, 1117 ANTIFA 83, 154, 157, 160, 167, 169, 176n6 Arbery, Ahmaud 142, 145 Arendt, Hannah 162 arm’s-length management structures (ALMS) 69 austerity 60–61, 63, 70–73, 131–132 autonomy 10–13, 53, 147, 166, 168, 181 avian flu 29–30, 36, 39–40 Azar, Alex 115–116 Azoulay, Ariella 53–54 Badiou, Alain 14 Baker, Ella 166 Banksy 152 basketball 120, 148–150 Beauvoir, Simone de 9, 12, 81, 180 Bennett, Jane 3, 11; lively matter 3, 10, 60; see also thing power Beshear, Andy 128 Biden, Joe 14, 135, 155, 159, 166, 173–174, 184 Birx, Deborah 108–109 Black Lives Matter 88–90, 101n8, 142, 144–147, 156–159, 161–162, 165–172; see also M4BL

186 Index

Black Out of 2003 61 Blake, Jacob 149, 156 Bolsonaro, Jair 127 Bourdieu, Pierre 49; see also social weightlessness Braidotti, Rosi 18n13 brain 3–4 Braun, Mike 129 Brexit 66–68, 74n2, 136 Bright, Rick 108 Brooks, Rayshard 142 Brown, Michael 142, 146, 167, 175 Brown, Nicholas 59 Brown, Wendy 92, 136n7 Brundtland, Gro Harelm 30 Buffet, Warren 123 Bush, George W. 30–31 Butler, Jimmy 150 Butler, Judith 17n4, 91 Cameron, David 70–71 Capitol insurrection see January 6 Carlson, Tucker 159 catastrophization 22–24, 31, 35–37, 106, 157, 181 celebrity politics 147–150 Chadwick, Sarah 87 Charlie Hebdo massacre 13–14 Chauvin, Derek 141, 144, 176n2 China and Chinese people: COVID-19 pandemic and 111–116, 128, 134–135; SARS epidemic and 24–28, 30–39, 181 Chinatowns 43n2; see also race and racism Chrétien, Jean 30–31 Christchurch mosque shooting 100 Christie, Chris 118, 132 civet cat 256 class: Grenfell Tower fire and 47, 51–52; Trump and 124–125 cleanliness 26–27, 43n6 clicktivism 82–83 Clooney, George 89 Colston, Edward 151–152, 176n3 communicative action 74n1, 82 Connolly, William 3–5, 17n1, 18n10, 49, 89, 116; see also immanent naturalism; new materialism; vital materialism Conservative Party 49, 59–60, 64–67, 69, 74n3, 181–182

Conway, Kelly Anne 107 Coole, Diana 16–17, 49, 60 Corbyn, Jeremy 48, 55–56, 65, 67, 70, 74n2 cosmopolitanism 135 COVID-19 pandemic: democracy and 127–130; expertise and 108–111; facts and 107–108; fear and 105–108; journalism and 108–111; masks in 121–122; media and 108–115, 125–126; as monstrous event 14–15; “nanny state” and 75n4; populism and 104–105, 108, 110–111, 122–127; SARS epidemic and 42, 131; SARS epidemic vs. 106–107; Social Othering and 111–116; solidarity and 119–122; testing in 116–117; Trump and 108–112, 116–119, 122–129, 182–183; unpreparedness for 130–133 “crisis actors” 84–85 Crowds and Party (Dean) 17n4, 101n4 Cruz, Nikolas 77–79 Cullors, Patrisse 90, 145, 158, 167 Cuomo, Andrew 127–128, 136n8 David, Christopher 154, 161 Dean, Jodi 17n4, 81–82, 101n4, 151 Deleuze, Gilles 16, 18n13; see also new materialism; vital materialism deliberation: communicative action and 74n1; George Floyd murder and protests and 141–142; Grenfell Tower fire and 53; SARS epidemic and 33, 36–38; social media and 79–80 democracy: COVID-19 pandemic and 127–130; George Floyd murder and protests and 162–163, 166–172; neoliberalism and 68–74; opinion formation and 79–83; SARS epidemic and 36–38; social 172–175 Dennett, Daniel 5 Derrida, Jacques 6 de Santis, Ron 78 determinism: vital materialism and 2–5 Dewey, John 167 diet 26–27

Index  187

dirt 26–27, 43n6 Disch, Lisa 62, 64, 66 Douglas, Mary 43n6 Duncan, Arne 90 Durkheim Émile 93 economics, trickle-down 14–15, 173 emotion 2–3; affect and 10–13, 141, 154; agency and 146; Grenfell Tower fire and 48–49; populism and 48–49; SARS epidemic and 35–36; sensation and 11; see also fear emotional reflexivity 161–163 emotional reorientation 147–150 equality 172 experts, critique of 108–111 Falwell, Jerry Jr. 112–113 Fauci, Anthony 108–111, 116 fear: COVID-19 pandemic and 105–108; George Floyd murder and protests and 156; SARS epidemic and 21–23, 33–35 Feilding-Mellen, Rock 59 Ferguson, Niall 115; lying 115 Fevre, Eric 133 Ford, Rob 130 Foucault, Michel 120 Frank, Jason 7 Freedom Convoy 130 Freud, Sigmund 23–25, 180 Frost, Samantha 16 Garner, Eric 142 Garza, Alicia 90, 145, 158, 167 Gates, Bill 42, 116, 131 George Floyd murder and protests: affective solidarity and 140–145; Black Lives Matter and 144–147; celebrities and 147–150; convictions over 176n1–176n2; counternarratives with 157–161; democracy and 162–163, 166–172; emotional reflexivity and 161–163; emotional reorientation and 147–150; media and 140–142; as monstrous event 15; solidarity and 153–157; Trump and 155–157, 160–161

globalization 14, 74n2, 124, 126, 133 Gobert, Rudy 120 González, Emma 87, 89 Goodell, Roger 149 Gove, Michael 74 Grenfell Tower fire 46, 54; affect and 48–49; affective representation in 45–48; class and 47, 51–52; emotion and 48–49; in media 46, 57–60; as monstrous event 45; populism and 48–49; Social Othering and 52; social weightlessness and 49–50; solidarity and 51–57; vital materialism and 48–49, 59–60 gun control 84–85, 96, 99–100, 182 gun culture 98–100 Gupta, Sanjay 119 H1N1 influenza pandemic 36, 112, 131 Habermas, Jürgen 49, 80, 82, 180; see also public sphere Hannah-Jones, Nikole 164 Hemmings, Clare 11–12, 154, 181; see also affective solidarity Heymann, David 34 historical materialism 35, 38, 49, 148 HIV/AIDS 26 Hochschild, Arlie 56 Hogan, Larry 128 Hogg, David 83–86, 88–89, 98 Hong Kong 39 hygiene 27–28, 43n6 images, power of 53–55; see also Azoulay, Ariella; Mirzoeff, Nicholas; Panagia, Davide immanence 4, 17n1, 17n5 immanent naturalism 3–4 impurity 26–27, 43n6 incarceration 165 indeterminacy 8–10, 60, 62 individualism 8, 13, 104, 119, 122–123, 132, 134–135, 183 inequality 48, 51–52, 89, 120–121 Iraq War 29 isolationism 135–136 Jackson, Andrew 151 Jackson, Jesse 168 James, LeBron 149 Jameson, Fredrick 105

188 Index

January 6 7 Jian Zemin 33 Johnson, Boris 67, 75n4 Jones, Kate 133 Jones, Paul Tudor 124 Jordan, Elsie 88 Kapernick, Colin 149 Kasich, John 96 Kasky, Cameron 84–85, 87 King, Alex 90–91 King, Martin Luther, Jr. 92–93, 174–175 King, Rodney 149, 155 Kompridis, Nikolas 18n14 Kristeva, Julia 23, 25, 180 Kruk, Sonia 12; see also Coole, Diana; historical materialism; Lettow, Susanne Kushner, Jared 129 Labour Party 49, 64, 66–68, 74n2 Lacan, Jacques 6, 23, 62 lack 6, 56 Laclau, Ernesto 5–7, 49, 56, 63, 65–66, 105; empty signifiers 6, 105, 170; see also populism Lai, Michael 26 Lammy, David 48 Lastman, Mel 31, 34, 43n3 leaderless movements 92–94 Lee, Robert E. 151 Lee-Young, Joanne 26–27 Leonard, Kawhi 149 Lettow, Susanne 16; see also historical materialism Lewis, John 155 livestock production 38–41 Li Weinliang 114 Locke, John 122 M4BL 140, 143–147, 150–151, 154–157, 159, 163–164, 166–173, 175, 183–184; see also Black Lives Matter MacDonald, John A. 151 Mackey, Robert 128 Macron, Emmanuel 14, 127 Mann, Eric 158 March for Our Lives (MFOL) 79, 84–88, 85, 88–91, 93–94, 97 marginalization 4–5, 92, 131, 166–168

Martin, Paul 30–31 Martin, Trayvon 142, 145, 148 Massumi, Brian 2 May, Theresa 48, 65 McDade, D’Angelo 90–91 McNay, Lois 17n2, 49; see also social weightlessness McRobbie, Angela 51 media: COVID-19 pandemic and 108–115, 125–126; George Floyd murder and 140–142; Grenfell Tower fire in 46, 52–53, 57–60; investigative journalism 57–60; mass 15; Parkland school shooting and 89, 94–95; SARS epidemic in 23, 29–31, 34; social 15, 79–83, 107, 130, 145, 171, 182 memorials, dismantling of 151–153 Merkel, Angela 127 Messonnier, Nancy 116 Mirzoeff, Nicholas 145, 147–148; see also images, power of Modi, Narendra 127 Mondainé, E. D. 169–170 Morant, Jay 148 Morso, Lori 162 Mouffe, Chantal 5–7, 23, 49, 56, 66–67 Mulroney, Brian 184 “nanny state” 68, 75n4 National Basketball Association (NBA) 120, 148–150 National Rifle Association (NRA) 84–86, 95, 98–99, 182 Navarro, Peter 117 Nellis, Ashley 165 Nelson, Bill 96 neoliberalism 14, 16, 45, 49, 57, 59, 61–62, 66, 68–74, 100, 104–105, 113, 117, 122–123, 130, 132–135, 136n7, 174, 180, 182–184 neuroscience 3–4 New Jim Crow 165 New Labour 49, 68 new materialism 5, 7, 10, 24, 73, 114, 146–147, 180; see also vital materialism Nietzsche, Friedrich 2 Nixon, Richard 165

Index  189

Nora, Pierre 13–15, 18n11, 45, 79, 120; monstrous event 13–15 Norval, Aletta 80–81 Nova Scotia 2020 attacks 100 novelty 8–10 Obama Care 112 Ocasio-Cortez, Alexandria 158–159 Occupy movement 17n4 O’Hagan, Andrew 57, 59, 73; see also Grenfell Tower fire O’Malley, Martin 129 ontology 2, 7, 12, 56, 60 Ophir, Sadi 23–24, 105 opinion formation 79–83 Orientalism 23, 28–29, 32; see also Said, Edward Othering 23–24; see also Social Othering Paget-Brown, Nicholas 48 Pai, Hsiao-Hung 51 Panagia, Davide 146–147; see also images, power of Parkland school shooting: Black Lives Matter and 88–90, 101n8; government response in 95–98; gun culture and 98–100; leaderless movements and 92–94; March for Our Lives and 79, 84–88, 85, 88–90; in media 89, 94–95; as monstrous event 77–79; and practice vs. theory 90–92; slacktivism and 83; social media and 79–83, 182; solidarity and 84–88 participatory parity 92 Pelosi, Nancy 153 Pence, Mike 116, 122 performance 7; affective 140; embodied 125; staged 107; by Trump 108–109, 112–113 performative activism 147–150 performative bodily acts 79 performative defiance 122 performative political acts 50 performative subjectivities 83 Performative Theory of Assembly (Butler) 17n4 Peters, Christian 56 photography 53–55 Pompeo, Michael 113–114

populism: COVID-19 pandemic and 104–105, 108, 110–111, 122–127; emotion and 48–49; Grenfell Tower fire and 48–49, 65–66; nativism and 56; rise of 1; of Trump 104–105, 122–127; in turn to political from social 5–6; see also Laclau, Ernesto; Mouffe, Chantal populist groups 4–5 Porter, Nicole D. 165 postcolonial studies 23 post-human 8–10 post-structuralism 2, 8–9 Pottinger, Matthew 113 poultry industry 38–39 Pritzker, J. B. 128 privatization 49, 59–60, 137n11 Protevi, John 18n10, 56, 136n2 psychoanalysis 23–25 public sphere 79–83 Pulse nightclub shooting 94–95 Quinn, Marc 151 race and racism: allyship and 170–171, 176n8; COVID-19 pandemic and 114–115, 117, 120–121; emotion and 8; George Floyd murder and protests and 15, 140, 144–147, 150–151, 153, 160, 163–168, 171, 173, 183–184; incarceration and 165; reparations and 173–174; SARS epidemic and 23–24, 29, 181; statue removals and 151, 153; systemic 163–166 Radical Black Pragmatic Feminists (RBPF) 166 Rancière, Jacques 5, 89 Reagan, Ronald 122, 124, 184 Reid, Jen 151 reparations 173–174 Rhodes, Cecil 152, 176n4 Romney, Mitt 105 Rubio, Marco 95–96 Said, Edward 28 sanitation 27–28, 39 SARS epidemic: abjection and 24–28; COVID-19 pandemic and 42, 131; COVID-19

190 Index

pandemic vs. 106–107; debates framing 23–24; democratic decision-making and 36–38; emotions and 35–36; fear and 21–23; material conditions and 38–41; in media 23, 29–31, 34; Orientalism and 28–29; representations and responses to 31–33; scapegoating of Chinese in 24–28; Social Othering and 28–29; terrorism and 29–31; travel advisory in 33–35 scapegoating 24–28 Scott, Israel 78 Searle, John 5 Sedgwick, Eve 2 September 11 attacks 31 sewage 39 signifiers, empty 6–7, 105, 119, 122, 170 slacktivism 82–83 Slate, Jenny 149–150 slavery 151–153, 163–165, 174 slums 38–41 social determinism 2–5, 8 Social Othering 8, 11, 13, 28–29, 52, 111–116 social weightlessness 49–50 solidarity 11, 51–57, 70, 84–88, 85, 119–122, 140–145, 153–157 Spanish flu 39–40 Spinoza, Baruch 3, 10–11 statues, removal of 151–153 subjectivity 2–3, 8, 25 terrorism 29–31 Thailand 39 Thatcher, Margaret 68, 122, 184 thing power 49, 180 Tipirneni, Hiral 86 Tometi, Opal 90, 145 travel advisory: in COVID-19 pandemic 43n7; in SARS epidemic 33–35

Trevelyan, Laura 174 Trudeau, Justin 125, 127 Trump, Donald: class and 124–125; COVID-19 pandemic and 108–112, 116–119, 121–129, 182–183; George Floyd murder and protests and 155–157, 160–161; Parkland school shooting and 95–98; performance and 7; populism of 104–105, 122–127; social media and 107; Women’s March 89–90; see also January 6 Tukekci, Zeynep 80–82 Vázquez-Arroyo, Antonio Y. 23–24, 105 Vietnam 39 vital materialism 2–5, 8–9, 12, 17n5, 48–50, 59–60, 88, 162; see also new materialism War on Drugs 165 wet markets 26–28, 27, 114–115, 132–133 Wheeler, Mark 147; see also celebrity politics white supremacy 16, 153, 158 Whitmer, Gretchen 112, 117 Wilson, Darren 175 Winfrey, Oprah 89, 101n8 Women’s March 89–90 Woodly, Deva 166; see also Black Lives Matter World War I 25 Xi Jinping 113 Yates, Reggie 52 Zerilli, Linda 92; determinative and reflective judgment 161 Zimmerman, George 145