Defending the West: the Truman-Churchill Correspondence, 1945-1960 : The Truman-Churchill Correspondence, 1945-1960 9780313053818, 9780313283307

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DEFENDING THE WEST

Recent Titles in Contributions to the Study of World History Sanctions and Honorary Whites: Diplomatic Policies and Economic Realities in Relations between Japan and South Africa Masako Osada Personal Policy Making: Canada's Role in the Adoption of the Palestine Partition Resolution Eliezer Tauber One King, One Law, Three Faiths: Religion and the Rise of Absolutism in Seventeenth-Century Metz Patricia Behre Miskimin South Sea Maidens: Western Fantasy and Sexual Politics in the South Pacific Michael Sturma A History of the French Anarchist Movement, 1917-1945 David Berry Security and Progress: Lord Salisbury at the India Office Paul R. Brumpton Exploring Nationalisms of China: Themes and Conflicts C. X. George Wei and Xiaoyuan Liu, editors Tolerance, Suspicion, and Hostility: Changing U.S. Attitudes toward the Japanese Communist Movement, 1944-1947 Henry Oinas-Kukkonen Churchill's Guests: Britain and the Belgian Exiles during World War II Robert W. Allen Securing American Independence: John Jay and the French Alliance Frank W. Brecher The Oder-Neisse Line: The United States, Poland, and Germany in the Cold War Debra J. Allen The Last Word? Essays on Official History in the United States and British Commonwealth Jeffrey Grey, editor

DEFENDING THE WEST THE TRUMAN-CHURCHILL CORRESPONDENCE, 1945-1960

EDITED WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY G. W. SAND

Contributions to the Study of World History Number 107

mm

Westport, Connecticut London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Truman, Harry S., 1884-1972 Defending the West: the Truman-Churchill correspondence, 1945-1960 / edited with introduction by G. W. Sand. p. cm. — (Contributions to the study of world history, ISSN 0885-9159 ; no. 107) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-313-28330-3 (alk. paper) 1. Truman, Harry S., 1884-1972—Correspondence. 2. Churchill, Winston, Sir, 1874-1965—Correspondence. 3. Presidents—United States—Correspondence. 4. Prime minister—Great Britain—Correspondence. 5. United States— Relations—Great Britain. 6. Great Britain—Relations—United States. 7. United States—Foreign relations—1945-1953. 8. United States—Foreign relations— 1953-1961. 9. World War, 1939-1945—Peace. 10. Cold War. I. Churchill, Winston, Sir, 1874-1965. II. Sand, G. W. (Gregory W.) III. Title. IV. Series E814.A4 2004 327.73041 , 09 , 045—dc22 2003064766 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 2004 by G. W. Sand All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2003064766 ISBN: 0-313-28330-3 ISSN: 0885-9159 First published in 2004 Praeger Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.praeger.com Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48-1984). 10

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Copyright Acknowledgment Crown copyright ministerial correspondence reproduced with the permission of the Controller of HMSO.

To Jane, in remembrance of Cambridge

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Contents

Acknowledgments

ix

Editor's N o t e

xi

Introduction

1

Part One: The End of the Second World War

17

1

Ending the War in Europe

19

2

Preparing for Potsdam—and After

67

Part Two: Cold War to the Korean War

149

3

Journey to Fulton, 1945-1946

151

4

The Cold War, 1947-1951

163

5

Churchill's Second Premiership

185

Part Three: The Last Years

207

6

The Years 1953 to 1955

209

7

The Last Phase

217

viii

Contents

Conclusion

229

Appendixes

231

Bibliographical Essay

237

Index

239

Acknowledgments

Though the editing of the Truman-Churchill correspondence can be described as a daunting task, it has been eased considerably by the abundant help provided by the archival staff of the Churchill Archives Centre of Churchill College, Cambridge, and by the archival staff of the Truman Library of Independence, Missouri. Accordingly, I am indebted to Dr. Piers Brendon, who, until recently, was Keeper of the Churchill Archives of Churchill College, for his encouragement of my proposal to undertake a scholarly edition of this important correspondence. I also owe a special thanks to Gavin McGuffie, archivist of the Churchill Papers, and to Alan Kucia, senior archivist, in addition to Allen Packwood, Louise King, Katharine Thomson, Natalie Adams, and Sharon Maurice. Similarly, among the archival staff of the Truman Library, Dennis E. Bilger has been a constant source of help, as has Pauline Testerman, audio-visual archivist, and Randy Sowell. Additionally, without the Archival Committee's offer at Churchill College of a By-Fellowship to spend the Michaelmas and Lenten terms at Cambridge in 1999-2000 and the invaluable support of an Earhart Foundation

x

Acknowledgments

fellowship research grant, the editing of this work would not have been possible. Lastly, I wish to acknowledge the support of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the Churchill Center for the opportunity to prepare a paper for the Churchill symposium on "Winston Churchill in the Postwar Years" in 1996, as that paper in abbreviated form has been rewritten to serve as the introduction to this volume.

Editor's Note

In order to guide the reader throughout this lengthy correspondence, 1945 to 1960, a single principle has been followed of supplementing the official correspondence between Truman and Churchill through the use of headnotes 1 —introductory editorial notes—as a guide to the documentary record. The same principle has been followed in the case of their unofficial correspondence, although Churchill's became an issue, though not Truman's more chatty personal correspondence with Churchill. The issue involves the uncertain monetary value attached to Churchill's personal correspondence with Truman between 1945 and 1951, when Churchill was Leader of the Opposition, and after April 1955, when he resigned as prime minister, even though National Heritage Lottery Funds (used for good causes) were used to purchase the entire Churchill collection in 1995, with the expressed purpose of preserving this collection of papers for the nation under "a specially established charity, the Sir Winston Churchill Archives Trust." Additionally, the Heritage Lottery Fund provided the new trust with the necessary funds to make the Churchill papers more accessible.2 To the editor's chagrin, the issue even surfaced in the print media, never imagining that a relatively small number of personal letters

xii

Editor's Note

would ever become such headline news 3 , especially because the issue seemed to involve the principles of reasonable access and of adherring, above all, to scholarly standards. It is for this reason, then, that all of Churchill's personal letters to Truman not asserted under Crown copyright have been paraphrased under the doctrine of "fair use," 4 even though a number of Churchill's personal letters to Truman have already been published in whole or in part in Martin Gilbert's official biography of Churchill, Winston S. Churchill, Vol. VIII, 'Never Despair' 1945-1965, published in 1988. Lastly, as to the matter of endnotes, the 1945 Churchill papers are referred to as the CHAR papers, and the post-1945 Churchill papers are referred to as the CHUR papers. For easy reference, then, each document cited—whether official or personal—invariably refers to this principal source and is numbered accordingly. In addition, the series known as the Foreign Relations of the United States, or FRUS in the endnotes, published by the Department of State, contains many of these same official messages. Nonetheless, this published collection of their correspondence is not well-ordered or complete for the World War II period, and for this reason is referenced in the endnotes only after the same document is cited from the Churchill papers, for the latter (except, perhaps, for the Potsdam Conference) is well-ordered and complete. NOTES 1. Mary-Jo Kline, A Guide to Documentary Editing (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 193. 2. Allen Packwood, "Churchill Archives History," Finest Hour (Journal of the Churchill Center and International Churchill Societies) Number 105 (Winter 1999-2000): 7. For a critical comment on this issue from an historical perspective by the former keeper of the Churchill Archives, see Corelli (Bill) Barnett's comments in the Churchill Review, Volume 37 (2000): 64-65. 3. Maurice Chittenden, "Lottery-Funded Churchills Charge Academics £50 a Letter," The Sunday Times, 13 February, 2000, 3. 4. The editor has sought to convey the substance of Churchill's meaning in his personal letters to Truman while at the same time remaining faithful to the rule concerning "fair use." See Philip C. Brooks, Research in Archives: The Use of Unpublished Primary Sources (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969), 69-72.

Introduction

The correspondence between Truman and Churchill affords the reader an unparalleled view of Anglo-American relations from the time the correspondence began towards the end of the Second World War, following the death of President Franklin Roosevelt on 12 April 1945. Whatever the shortcomings of their correspondence in later years, their wartime messages allow a view of that conflict as Anglo-American forces confronted the specter of Soviet military power in the heart of Europe with the end of the Second World War and the surrender of Japan to the Allied powers in the Pacific. Indeed, only two months after the "Big Three" meeting at Yalta, Truman's accession to the presidency had occurred at a time of increasing tension with the Soviet Union and with Stalin, the Soviet Premier, in particular. For Churchill's part, it seemed "extraordinary" that Roosevelt's Vice President had been kept in the dark about the deliberations resulting from his last wartime meeting with Roosevelt and Stalin that February in the Crimea. Churchill had wanted to talk things over with the new President at the earliest date and regretted that he had not accepted President Truman's invitation to visit America again on the occasion of Roosevelt's funeral, for there were many points on which personal

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Defending the West

talks "would have been of the greatest value," if they had been able to talk, as Truman suggested, over a period of several days. 1 On 13 April 1945, the day after Roosevelt's death, Churchill conveyed his hope that he would be able "to renew . . . the comradeship" with the President that he had shared with Truman's predecessor. "You can count on me to continue the loyal and close collaboration which . . . existed between you and our great President," Truman replied.2 The key issues with which Truman was then unacquainted were the same issues that disturbed Churchill: the magnitude of the Soviet advance, and the fear of Soviet "domination" of Eastern and Central Europe should the Russians fail to honor the Yalta agreements on Poland. As Churchill recalled in his war memoirs, "Every question about the future was unsettled between us. The agreements and understanding at Yalta . . . had already been broken or brushed aside by a triumphant Kremlin." 3 While the West was still at full strength, it was Churchill—not Truman—who wanted to adopt a "showdown" strategy in a face-toface meeting with the Soviet Premier. Truman, who was still feeling his way, was uncertain of how to cope with the Russians in the spring of 1945. As he confided in his telegram to Churchill on 9 May, following V-E Day, it was his "present intention to adhere to our interpretation of the Yalta agreements." And as to any early meeting with Stalin, Truman thought they should proceed separately so as to avoid any suspicion of "ganging up" on the Russians.4 In the midst of these exchanges, Churchill had poured out his concerns to Truman about an "iron curtain" being drawn down by the Russians along a front of some three to four hundred miles from Liibeck to Trieste only a few days after the German surrender at Rheims on 7 May. It was the first time in their correspondence that Churchill had used the phrase "iron curtain" to emphasize the Allied claim "against Russia on behalf of Poland." A fortnight before, in his meeting with Stalin's foreign minister, V. M. Molotov, the new President had conveyed in strong language the American disfavor with Soviet conduct in Europe. The meeting has often been cited as an example of Truman's "get tough policy" with the Russians. Yet it remained an isolated incident, and was never conceived as part of any concerted strategy to pressure the Russians into complying with the Yalta accords, as Truman was constrained by Russia's pending collaboration in the war against Japan and by the public's clamor for demobilization as the war in Europe ended.5

ntroduction

3

Not long after his meeting with Molotov, Truman had told Roosevelt's daughter, Anna Boettiger, that he thought his "get tough" demarche had been "a mistake." 6 In turn, he decided on the idea of sending Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt's longtime aide, to Moscow to help resolve the impasse involving the Yalta agreements on Poland. Hopkins, who was ill at the time, had nonetheless accepted this mission with enthusiasm. And so, in late May and early June, Hopkins conferred with Stalin on the issue of Russia's seeming inability to carry into effect the Yalta agreements on Poland. For his part, Stalin charged that British conservatives, including Churchill, had opposed the Soviet formula for a free Poland because they desired to create a hostile cordon sanitaire on Russia's borders. In reply, Hopkins averred that the United States desired to see only friendly states on Russia's borders, though he avoided taking issue with Stalin's views on British policy. On the main issue of broadening the Lublin government—a regime of Moscow's own making—to include London and non-Lublin Poles, Stalin would agree only to the naming of three London Poles and five from inside Poland itself. As Churchill remarked in his telegram to Truman on 4 June, Hopkins' proposals represented "an advance upon the deadlock," although they represented "no advance on Yalta."7 Hopkins' interpreter, Charles Bohlen, had similarly noted that their talks had been "inconclusive."8 Indeed, Truman's initiative to reach an agreement on Poland with the Russians, and to keep alive the Yalta agreements, would come to naught following the conclusion of Hopkins' mission to Moscow. The London Poles, whose aim was to restore some semblance of representative government, were given minor posts, but were subsequently forced to flee. For George Kennan, the charge d'affaires of the U.S. embassy in Moscow, Poland had been "a lost cause," 9 as Stalin established a "personal autocracy" 10 over Poland itself. Truman's other initiative in May 1945 had been his appointment of Joseph E. Davies, a former U.S. ambassador to Russia, to confer with Churchill in London, and to make plain that the measures advocated by Churchill in his recent messages to the President could not be adopted. Davies was to say that nothing should be left undone "in an effort to solve their differences" with the Russians to reach an agreement. Davies practically accused Churchill of being the source of tension in Allied relations with the Russians while Davies' pro-Soviet views "struck Churchill as dangerous appeasement." 11 Davies seemed an unfortunate choice to represent Roosevelt's successor in discussions with Churchill prior to the tripartite

4

Defending the West

conference to be held that July. As ambassador in the late 1930s, Davies had been "sublimely ignorant of even the most elementary realities" of Soviet power,12 not unlike other Western liberals of the time who admired Stalin and his regime. Churchill, who was also preparing for a general election, could do little else under the circumstances but to go along, though he found the American attitude something else to worry about. Churchill could only hope that he was wrong about President Truman. As he did not yet know him on a personal basis, he had no way of judging him save through their correspondence up to that time, and by those who represented him, such as Davies. 13 In fairness to Davies, however, and the Hopkins mission to Moscow, Truman's purpose in sending these envoys had also been "to lay the groundwork" for the tripartite meeting that summer on the outskirts of Berlin. He believed, too, that he had little choice in the matter of withdrawing American forces from the Soviet zone in Germany, as the U.S. Army had overrun Russia's occupation zone along a four-hundred mile front at a depth, at one point, of o n e - h u n d r e d and twenty miles. In fact, had Truman taken Churchill's advice of holding down the Soviet zones in Saxony and Thuringia, it would have given the Kremlin a reason for charging that the relationships developed in the war had now been discarded by the United States; and because the Soviet Army occupied nearly all of Austria, they could then have retaliated by occupying the entire country. 14 The meeting which followed at Potsdam that July, and which unofficially convened on the 15th, was the occasion of the first meeting between Churchill and Truman the following day. The two men met together for two hours, after which Churchill told his daughter, Mary, that he liked Truman "immensely," and that he was sure that they could work together. Two days later, when the President came to Churchill's villa for lunch, their meeting again lasted nearly two hours, at which they also discussed the atomic bomb. Churchill's government had previously given its consent to the bomb's use against Japan; at a luncheon that same day both men agreed that Stalin should be informed of the experiment's success at the proper time, as news of the plutonium bomb test at Alamogordo had reached Truman only hours before. Truman spoke of this second meeting with Churchill in the strongest terms, saying "that this had been the most enjoyable luncheon he had had for

Introduction

5

many years," and that he hoped their relations would continue as they had before then. Churchill, too, felt reassured that Truman's outlook had been "exactly along the lines of Anglo-American relations as they had developed," and "that further developments" at the conference would vindicate these hopes. 15 As the conference proceeded, it became apparent that Poland was no longer the key issue, save for Poland's border with Germany, but that the key issue was the future of Germany itself. When Churchill again used the apt phrase of an iron curtain to describe Stalin's policies in Soviet-occupied Europe, Stalin dismissed his description as "fairy tales." 1 6 According to Truman's daughter, Margaret, her father "knew exactly what was going on," and he was not about to acquiesce in Stalin's desire for "a share in control of the Ruhr" any more than he was willing to grant the Soviets a base in North Africa "under the guise of a trusteeship" on the shores of the Mediterranean. One claim the two Western leaders neglected to challenge was Stalin's bogus demand that Russia not be denied "at least one ice-free port at the expense of Germany," the reference being to the city of Konigsberg in East Prussia.17 A related issue was the Allied Control Council, whereby the Four Powers agreed to administer Germany preparatory to a peace settlement, though the Allied Control Council would work only if the "objectives" in maintaining it remained the same. Kennan, who was appalled by the idea that Germany could be administered jointly with the Soviets, regarded such a prospect as illusionary. And in a draft paper on the subject at the time, he argued that "we are basically in competition with the Russians in Germany," and ought "not to compromise in the Control Comission on anything which is really of importance in the running of our zone." 18 In retrospect, the Potsdam Conference provided ample proof of the "deep gulf" which existed between the two Western Powers and the Soviet Union, as the Declaration on Liberated Europe, for example, bound the Russians "to direct in unison [with the Western Powers] the affairs of the former German satellites and other liberated countries of Europe." 1 9 Rather than being a "showdown," then, between the Anglo-Americans and the Russians, the Potsdam Conference had tested Truman's approach of trying to reach tolerable agreements with the Soviets. And so, at its close, it could not be held against the Western Powers that the effort to get along with Stalin had not been tried.

6

Defending the West

Truman had found the experience of Potsdam "wearing and disturbing," but the defeat of Churchill's government in Britain's general election and its subsequent departure from the conference before the end of July had also been disheartening for Truman. The upside, however, in the waning months of 1945, had been the new President's association with the former Prime Minister at Potsdam and the expectation of renewing their wartime comradeship in the future. Indeed, when the occasion arose to invite Churchill's return to America later that year, President Truman wrote in the margin of the invitation that Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, was a "wonderful school in my home state," and hoped that Churchill could accept the invitation to deliver a series of lectures at the college.20 The invitation of 3 October, which Churchill duly accepted, thus became the genesis of what would become the justly-famed "iron curtain" speech of 5 March 1946. In the interval, Stalin delivered his own speech in Moscow on 9 February 1946. The gist of his "election" speech that day divided the world into two warring camps, capitalist and communist, and claimed that it had been this division that had caused the Second World War. Yet in advancing this view, Stalin ignored his own role in bringing it about by Russia's adherence to the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939, as well as Britain's valorous struggle in virtually standing alone against the Axis, while Russia merely looked on, until Russia herself would be invaded by Germany in June 1941. Nonetheless, Stalin's speech had served its purpose in calling for a renewed effort to rebuild Russia for its own security, including "security against attack by the capitalist" West.21 Truman had not taken Stalin's election speech all that seriously, although his Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, and Charles Bohlen, his "special assistant," had. In fact, Bohlen had viewed Stalin's speech as a point of departure in Russia's dealings with the West and as representing no less than a reaffirmation of the correctness of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. 22 Kennan, too, followed suit; and in a further query concerning Russia's refusal to join the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, he rendered his appraisal of Soviet conduct on 22 February 1946. And so, in a lengthy telegraphic message from the U.S. embassy in Moscow, he portrayed the regime as being on a collision course with the West, and that Moscow, as the hub of the "world

Introduction

7

communist movement," represented a real political threat for that reason. 23 Kennan's "Long Telegram"—as he called it—had made the rounds in Washington, and even became required reading, especially among military officers. In retrospect, the Long Telegram seems all the more relevant because it was received in Washington on the eve of Churchill's "iron curtain" speech, and thus served as an early warning of trouble ahead in East-West relations. Still, Truman was reluctant to meet the Soviet challenge headon. 24 He had not, for example, been willing to endorse Churchill's Fulton speech, at least not publicly. And in his talk with Adolf Berle a week later—Berle had been assistant secretary of state from 1938 to 1944—Truman told him that his Russian policy would be "to keep any agreement we make and to expect them to keep any agreement they make." Beyond that, Berle averred, "he could not see." Before his leave-taking, however, he urged Truman "to have his intelligence people get up the best estimate that they could of Russia's present potentialities," because Roosevelt had failed to do that in preparing for Yalta, and that this failure, Berle believed, had been a mistake. 25 Truman had doubtless been thinking along these lines when the topic of Russia came up in a staff meeting only a few months later. As Truman's Special Counsel, Clark Clifford, recalled, the President had talked of how the Russians had continued "to chisel away a little here, a little there," and that if the forthcoming Paris Conference should break up, he would use the occasion to reveal "the full truth" about Russia's "failure to honor agreements." And so, Clifford was charged by the President to produce "a record" of Russia's violations of its international agreements entered into with the United States since 1941. When Clifford sought to expand the scope of that report four days later, the President immediately approved the idea, adding that it should be completed without delay.26 The report was entitled "American Relations with the Soviet Union," and was submitted to the President on 24 September 1946. It had achieved its purpose of being a comprehensive review, and conveyed in forceful language the issues surrounding East-West relations, and how they might be resolved. Its author, George M. Elsey, Clifford's assistant, had the distinct advantage of having served as a Naval Reserve officer in the Map Room of the White House throughout the war years.

8

Defending the West

The report thus provided a much needed review of Soviet-American relations since 1941, and echoed positions Churchill had taken earlier that year, and, even earlier, in 1945. The report, for instance, maintained that if it became "impossible to enlist Soviet cooperation in the solution of world problems," the United States "should be prepared to join with the British and other Western countries in an attempt to build up a world of our own," and that nations "not now within the Soviet sphere should be given generous economic assistance and political support in their opposition to Soviet [political] penetration." 27 Again, even after reading that report, Truman was reluctant to give up on Stalin, and wanted all copies of this "Top Secret" report—twenty in all—to be locked up in the White House safe. As Clifford recalled, Truman did not want this report to get out for fear that its release would impede or even end any real hope for Soviet-American cooperation. 28 Yet had Truman not already given up the idea of reaching a general settlement with the Russians? And could he convince them that "cooperation" would somehow lead to a "fair and equitable settlement" of outstanding issues, given the nature of the Soviet regime, or even that a conflict between capitalism and communism was not inevitable? These and similar questions began to be answered in early 1947, beginning with the withdrawal of British assistance to Greece and Turkey on 31 March. As Truman told Clifford on that occasion, it was fortunate that Britain had placed the Greek-Turkish crisis "on our doorstep, for if they had not, our response to Communist expansion may have been 'too late and too slow.'" 29 The discussions which followed between Truman and his advisors made it clear that the United States had little choice but to lend its support in an effort to stem the communist tide in the eastern Mediterranean. Truman's subsequent address before both Houses of Congress had dramatically illustrated this fact, wherein he linked American aid to Greece and Turkey "to the survival of the Western World" itself.30 Remembered as the "Truman Doctrine" speech, the address had been badly composed, as Clifford later acknowledged, but it well conveyed the new doctrine's intent that "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure." 31 So-called

Introduction

9

the "containment" policy, the new doctrine would later become a slogan, but in March 1947 it represented "a real policy" in stating that the American government would "support free peoples resisting direct or indirect aggression" from those "seeking to impose on them totalitarian regimes." 32 On 12 May 1947, ten days before the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill became law, Churchill took the occasion to congratulate his friend in a private letter, and in a manner which recalled their last meeting at Fulton, on a first name basis. "I cannot resist," Churchill wrote, "after the year that has passed and all that has happened . . . to tell you how much I admire what you have done for the peace and freedom of the world, since we were together." 33 As Churchill's warnings about the Russians became increasingly apparent that spring and summer, so they became apparent to Truman and his advisors in recognizing that aid to Greece and Turkey would not be enough, and that nearly "the entire continent would have to be rehabilitated" if Western Europe itself were not to fall prey to the communist tide and economic collapse.34 And so, even as the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill had served as a preliminary step in dealing with the issue of Soviet power in the eastern Mediterranean, the Marshall Plan that followed made up in draftsmanship and statesmanship what had been lacking in the "Truman Doctrine" speech. Marshall's speech on 6 June—George Marshall had replaced Byrnes earlier that year as secretary of state—made no mention of communism, but only of the threat of "hunger, poverty . . . and chaos." Nor were the Russians excluded from participating, on the assumption that they would not participate for fear of losing control over eastern Europe should the Marshall Plan prove successful.35 On 24 September, in another private letter to Truman, Churchill conveyed "how much" he admired the current policy being followed in doing so much "to save the world from Famine and War," and "that all the strongest forces in Britain are and will be at your side if trouble comes." Truman replied in October, and in his own hand wrote how much the "Fulton speech becomes more nearly a prophecy every day," and that he hoped conditions would "warrant . . . paying us another visit." 36 In the interval, trouble indeed came as the Communist parties from nine European countries, led by the Soviet delegation, convened in Polish Silesia in late September. The meeting drew

10

Defending the West

attention to the Kremlin's decisions on the policies and actions to be followed "in the new circumstances created by the rallying of the West." The nine Communist parties agreed to the formation of the Communist Information Bureau, or Cominform, in marking "Stalin's formal declaration of political warfare against the West." And so, though its aim was to defeat the Marshall Plan, the Cominform also looked beyond Europe in the hope of weakening the West through armed uprisings in Latin America. 37 In the case of the former, for example, the aim was to derail the Marshall Plan before it could be implemented in late 1947 by converting a "string of general strikes" into something like a "civil war." 38 This Soviet maneuver would be rebuffed, however, while the civil insurrection that they had hoped to ignite had failed to materialize. But would the Soviets not try again? Berlin was the West's weakest link, a Western enclave physically separated from West Germany by a hundred miles through Soviet-occupied territory. The earlier Moscow Conference of March and April 1947 revealed that a fourpower agreement on Germany would not be possible, because the Soviet government was not prepared to accept the economic unity of Germany on any "genuine basis," and the London Conference of Foreign Ministers, the Allied mechanism for resolving issues agreed to at Potsdam, merely confirmed this fact. Churchill's concerns had been right all along. The war against the West continued into the following year with the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, an event that Truman viewed as an even greater outrage than the coup in Hungary the year before. Truman had earlier planned to talk about the "menace of Communism" in a Saint Patrick's Day speech in New York, but had instead decided to address a joint session of Congress on 17 March. As he stated on that occasion: "one nation has . . . refused to cooperate in the establishment of a just and honorable peace, but—even worse—has actively sought to prevent it," naming the Soviet Union as the chief reason for "the critical situation in Europe today." 39 Earlier that month, in a letter to his daughter, Mr. Truman wrote how "Churchill had urged him to send our troops to the eastern border of Germany and keep them there," and how three years earlier that this may have been sound advice, but that he could not have known this at the time. 40 Alas, on 20 March, only three days after Truman's address before Congress, Marshal Vassily Sokolovsky broke up a meeting of the

Introduction

1 1

Control Council in Berlin by walking out after reading a "prepared statement," abruptly ending any further meetings of the Allied Control Council. Thereafter, from Soviet headquarters in Karlshorst, the West was put "on notice" that Moscow intended to interfere with normal East-West traffic between Berlin and West Germany. 41 When the Soviets imposed a blockade on 24 June, in violation of Allied rights, on all rail- and road-access to Berlin, the question of how the United States should respond had to be decided at the highest level. Accordingly, at a meeting with his advisors four days later, Truman made his decision. "We were going to stay, period," he declared, and also approved the sending of B-29s to American bases in Europe. 42 Truman and his advisors had further agreed that even the Marshall Plan would not be enough to restore confidence "in an atmosphere of insecurity and fear among the peoples of Western Europe." And so, even before the Berlin airlift became a reality for more than two million Berliners, "secret talks" were started between the Anglo-American governments with a view to establishing an Atlantic alliance; and in the ensuing months decisions followed more quickly because an alliance had become "a necessity," and because any other solution may have opened the area to possible "Soviet domination." 43 Twice before, the United States had been drawn across the Atlantic: in 1917, and in 1940-41. It was being drawn across the Atlantic again to restore the confidence, well-being, and safety of a Europe ravaged by war and the threat of communism—"our next great problem," as Truman noted in his letter to Churchill of 10 June 1948. 44 For his part, Churchill had insisted that Europe would have fallen to Communist tyranny had it not been for the United States, and in a private moment with the President a few days before the North Atlantic Treaty came into force, he urged his friend to make public that the United States would consider, if the time ever came, the use of the atomic bomb if it might some day be required to defend democracy.45 Except for Churchill and Truman, then, few Western observers might have imagined that within a year's time the use of the atomic bomb would actually become the subject of discussions between Washington and London. Yet with the outbreak of war in Korea in June 1950, the subject did in fact become an issue between the two governments before the end of that year.

12

Defending the West

The Korean War, though viewed as part of a Soviet move against Germany at the time, had its origins in North Korea rather than in Moscow, as it was Kim II Sung who would gain the military backing of the Soviets when he and his delegation went to Moscow to meet with Stalin in 1949. 46 Thereafter, when Kim II Sung's North Korean Army invaded South Korea—the ROK—on 25 June 1950, President Truman was again forced to meet with his advisors on short notice. The decision to come to the aid of the ROK was unanimous, the consensus being that it "was the test of all the talk" about collective security over the past half-decade. Clifford, who had only left the White House as Truman's special counsel earlier that year, thought that the President should have sought "a formal authorization of war from Congress," and that Truman had erred in not doing so. 47 Perhaps the most controversial issue during the early months of the war centered on the conflicting advice of whether the war should be halted at the 38th parallel, the political boundary separating the two Koreas, or carried beyond that point. The State Department's Russian experts, Bohlen and Kennan, were unalterably opposed to any "counterinvasion of North Korea," warning that the two Communist countries, China—under Communist rule since October 1949—and the Soviet Union, "would react strongly if hostile forces approached their borders." 48 There was the further question of knowing the adversary's intentions, and to some degree, no doubt, the United States was disadvantaged through the furtive gathering of intelligence by traitors like Kim Philby, who was still a highly placed Soviet spy working at the British embassy in Washington. Perhaps it was such intelligence which Stalin used to his advantage, though possibly also to the disadvantage of the Chinese who were being encouraged to enter the war, as Stalin withdrew Soviet officers who were advising the North Korean Army for fear that some of them might be taken prisoner by U.S. forces.49 The defense of South Korea, then, had been a "test case" of collective security, and Churchill rendered his own appraisal of the decision when he told Truman in 1952, a few months after he again became prime minister, that the "decision to resist in Korea had done more than anything else to reverse the tide in our relations with the Soviets in the postwar period." 50 Similarly, Churchill went on to reaffirm the importance of that decision on the occasion of his resignation as prime minister three years later when he wrote his friend

Introduction

13

of ten years on 30 June 1955: "The decision that confronted you at the opening of the Korean War was . . . doomladen", but "[t]he courage with which you faced it is . . . to a great extent responsible for the degree of easement we may now happily detect in the world. This and the building of NATO," he added, " . . . must assure your lasting reputation and the gratitude of the free world." 51 Churchill's praise had not been exaggerated any more than his expressions of admiration for Truman's earlier decisions had been from 1947 to 1949, as Truman abandoned the idea of postwar cooperation with the Soviets in favor of a policy of "free world" defense. That policy, which Churchill had so eloquently championed, had steadily helped to avert "disaster," 52 and thereby ensured the economic and political recovery of Western Europe. Had Truman vacillated, had he listened to Davies and to Cabinet members like Henry Wallace, Roosevelt's vice president until 1944, he would have courted disaster instead of having finally thwarted Soviet aggression in Europe, beginning with the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill of 1947. In all, the correspondence is divided into three parts. Part One begins with Churchill's first messages to Truman on the passing of President Roosevelt in April 1945 and vice versa, and ends, in the course of two chapters, with the Potsdam Conference and Churchill's re-election defeat in Britain's general election of July 1945. Part Two takes up their correspondence again, together with Churchill's preparation of his "iron curtain" speech, and in the course of three chapters covers the early cold war years and Churchill's return as prime minister in 1951, following the earlier outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. Part Three begins with Truman's retirement in 1953, followed by Churchill's eventual retirement as prime minister in 1955. A conclusion briefly reviews their correspondence in light of Churchill's close collaboration with President Truman in ending the Second World War and in view of their like-mindedness in defending the West in the cold war years that followed. NOTES 1. Winston S. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1953), 479. 2. Message, Truman to Churchill, April 13, 1945, Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Vol. V, Europe (Washington, D.C.: Dept. of State, 1957), 211. Hereinafter referred to as FRUS.

14

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3. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 510-11. 4. Message, Truman to Churchill, May 11, 1945, FRUS, The Potsdam Conference, 1945, Vol. 1,8. 5. Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History, 1929-1959 (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1973), 216. 6. John Morton Blum, ed., The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A. Wallace, 1942-1946 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1973), 448. 7. Message, Churchill to Truman, June 4, 1945, FRUS, Vol. V, 321. For a detailed discussion of the Hopkins-Stalin talks, see Herbert Feis, Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 98ff. 8. Bohlen, Witness to History, 218. 9. George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1967), 219. 10. Howard Trivers, Lectures on Foreign Affairs (Muncie: Ball State University, 1974), 17-20. 11. Feis, Between War and Peace, 124-25. 12. Bohlen, Witness to History, 44. 13. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 576-77. 14. Bohlen, Witness to History, 216; Margaret Truman, Harry S. Truman (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1973), 266; see also, Robert H. Ferrell, Harry S. Truman: A Life (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1994), 202. 15. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 633-34; see also, Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Vol. VIII, 'Never Despair' 1945-1965 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1988), 70. 16. Bohlen, Witness to History, 234. 17. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950, 263-64; M. Truman, Harry S. Truman, 271. 18. Trivers, Lectures on Foreign Affairs, 34; Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-50, 258. 19. Herbert Feis, From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1970), 50. 20. Letter, F. L. McCluer to Winston Churchill, October 3, 1945; Churchill Papers, Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge. Hereinafter referred to as CHUR papers, 2/230. 21. Charles E. Bohlen, The Transformation of American Foreign Policy (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1969), 75. 22. Feis, From Trust to Terror, 75; Bohlen, The Transformation of American Foreign Policy, 75-76. 23. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-50, 292-93. 24. Faced with the public demand for "rapid demobilization" before the end of 1945, Truman also felt constrained not "to do or say anything that the Soviets could point to as justification for their own actions." See Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945-1948 (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1977), 128ff. 25. Beatrice Bishop Berle and T. B. Jacobs, eds., Navigating the Rapids, 1918-1971: From the Papers of Adolf A. Berle (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), 573. 26. Clark Clifford, Counsel to the President (New York: Random House, 1991), 110-11.

Introduction

15

27. The "Top Secret" report was published for the first time in 1968. See Arthur Krock, Memoirs: Sixty Years on the Firing Line (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1968), Appendix A, 476ff. 28. Clifford, Counsel to the President, 123-24. 29. Feis, From Trust to Terror, 191. 30. Clifford, Counsel to the President, 132. 31. Calling it the Truman Doctrine did not impress President Truman, Clifford wrote, because he regarded it as only a part of the foreign policy of the United States; nor was it ever intended as a policy that would be applied "equally" to "every corner of the globe." See Clifford, Counsel to the President, 133-37, 139. 32. Howard Trivers, Three Crises in American Foreign Policy and a Continuing Revolution (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1972), 99-100. 33. Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Vol. VIII, 326. 34. David Rees, The Age of Containment: The Cold War, 1945-1965 (London: Macmillan & Co., 1967), 22. 35. Bohlen, Witness to History, 265; see also, Louis J. Halle, The Cold War as History (London: Chatto & Windus, 1967), 129-30. 36. Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Vol. VIII, 351-52. 37. G. W. Sand, Soviet Aims in Central America: The Case of Nicaragua (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989), 1-2. 38. Berle, Navigating the Rapids, 589. 39. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope, Vol. II (New York: New American Library, 1965), 278-79. 40. M. Truman, Harry S. Truman, 359. 41. John H. Backer, Winds of History: The German Years of Lucius DuBignon Clay (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1983), 224-25. 42. Backer, Winds of History, 239-40. 43. Bohlen, Witness to History, 267. 44. M. Truman, Harry S. Truman, 15-16. 45. Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Vol. VIII, 4 6 4 . T r u m a n had shared Churchill's thoughts about the possible use of the atomic bomb to protect the democracies "in an informal talk" with members of Congress in April 1949, but the NATO alliance, he thought, should prevent the United States from ever having to make that decision. 46. Jerrold L. Schecter and V. V. Luchkov, eds., Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes (Boston: Little, Brown &c Co., 1990), 145-46. 47. Clifford, Counsel to the President, 274-75. 48. Bohlen, Witness to History, 292; see also George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1950-1963 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1972), 23-24. 49. Schecter and Luchkov, Khrushchev Remembers, 146. 50. Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Vol. VIII, 680. 51. Letter, Winston S. Churchill to Harry S. Truman, 30 June 1955 (Name File), General corr., 1953-56, Box 16, Post-Presidential Files, Truman Library. 52. Anatoliy Golitsyn, The Perestroika Deception (London: Edward Harle Ltd., 1995), 41-2, 209; but see also, Alonzo Hamby, Man of the People: A Life of Harry S. Truman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 641.

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Part One

The End of the Second World War

Photograph of President Harry S. Truman and Prime Minister Winston Churchill taken at the Potsdam Conference, July 1945. (Courtesy of the Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri, and the U.S. Army Signal Corps)

1

Ending the War in Europe

THE EARLY CORRESPONDENCE The passing of President Roosevelt on 12 April 1945 remains a subject of historical interest, if only because of Churchill's later admission that his failure to attend Roosevelt's funeral and not going "to meet Truman after Roosevelt's death" was his biggest mistake. 1 As Churchill confided to his wife two days later, "At the last moment I decided not to fly to Roosevelt's funeral on account of much that was going on here. Anthony has gone instead." 2 For his part, President Truman had welcomed the idea of Churchill's coming, especially if he could spend a few days in talks, although the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, quoted Mrs. Roosevelt as saying that she "would have been distressed" if he had come, knowing "how heavy were the immediate responsibilities" n o w that her husband could no longer take part in the defense of the West. 3

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (Unnumbered) April 13, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal Pray accept from me the expression of my personal sympathy in the loss which you and the American nation have sustained in the death of our

Defending the West

20

illustrious friend. I hope that I may be privileged to renew with you the intimate comradeship in the great cause we all serve that I enjoyed through these terrible years with him. I offer you my respectful good wishes as you step into the breach in the victorious lines of the United Nations. 4 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 1) April 13, 1945 President Truman to the Prime Minister, Top Secret and Personal I am grateful for your message of sympathy to me and to this nation. In the presence of the great irreparable loss which we have suffered which I know you feel as deeply as I do, I wish to send you this personal message of assurance that with God's help I will do everything in my power to move forward the great work to which President Roosevelt gave his life. At no time in our respective histories has it been more important that the intimate, solid, relations which you and the late President had forged between our countries be preserved and developed. It is my earnest hope that before too long in the furtherance of this that we can arrange a personal meeting. In the meantime there are, however, urgent problems requiring our immediate and joint consideration. I have in mind the pressing and dangerous problem of Poland and the Soviet attitude towards the Moscow negotiations. I am, of course, familiar with the exchanges which you and President Roosevelt have had between yourselves and with Marshal Stalin. I also know in general what President Roosevelt had in mind as the next step. I shall send you in my immediately following telegram my suggestions, in line with President Roosevelt's thoughts, as to the replies which might be made to Stalin's messages of April 7 on Poland. You can count on me to continue the loyal and close collaboration which to the benefit of the entire world existed between you and our great President.5 HEADNOTE As President Truman was new to the task of dealing with issues of war and peace, his immediate concerns were divided "between the war situation on one hand and the problems of the coming peace on the other." Among the latter, the Polish issue had been in the forefront, i n a s m u c h as Russia's military o c c u p a t i o n of P o l a n d a n d Stalin's attitude offered faint hope that a "truly representative" government could be established in that country. Truman thus acted

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21

"promptly" in addressing the Polish issue and explains the urgent tone of his next message to Churchill. 6 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 2) April 13, 1945 President Truman to the Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Stalin's replies to you and to President Roosevelt make our next step of the greatest importance. Although with a few exceptions he does not leave much ground for optimism, I feel very strongly that we should have another go at him. I have very much in mind your observations to President Roosevelt on the danger of protracted negotiations and obstructionist tactics being utilized to consolidate the rule of the Lublin group in Poland and I recognize the compulsion you are under to speak in the House of Commons. I feel, however, that we should explore to the full every possibility before any public statement is made which could only be as matters now stand to announce the failure of our efforts due to Soviet intransigence. Once public announcement is made of a breakdown in the Polish negotiations it will carry with it the hopes of the Polish people for a just solution of the Polish problem to say nothing of the effect it will have on our political and military collaboration with the Soviet Union. I suggest for your consideration, therefore, that we send a joint message to Stalin over both our names to be delivered personally by our Ambassadors in reply to his messages to us. I give you below for your consideration a suggested text of this joint message. If you agree that a joint message is desirable I hope you will go over most carefully the following proposed text and let me have as soon as possible your comments and suggestions so that we can without delay get it offa to our Ambassadors for delivery to Stalin. 7 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 1) April 14, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Secret Link up of Soviet and Anglo-American forces in Germany is rapidly approaching. I think it would be heartening to all our peoples if the occasion could be marked by short messages broadcast by you, Marshal Stalin and me. Please let me know if you agree to this proposal. I am sending a similar message to Marshal Stalin.8 a

Text of this proposed joint message to Stalin is reprinted in Appendix A.

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HEADNOTE Churchill's second telegram to President T r u m a n had dealt with an earlier cable sent by Roosevelt on 29 M a r c h concerning the use of pilotless b o m b e r s in an " a l l - o u t offensive against Germany." Churchill had been much disturbed by this proposal, as he feared that its use might lead the Germans to retaliate against London. CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 2) April 14, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret 1. I received from President Roosevelt on March 29 Telegram No. 728. I regret there should have been delay in replying to this communication, which I felt it my duty to refer to the British Chiefs of Staff. If the United States military authorities really consider this practice necessary to bring about the end of the German war, we will not dissent. 2. However it is to be observed, first, that the war situation has turned so much in our favour that the making of these great explosions in German cities is no longer of its former importance; and secondly, that if the Germans have a number of war-weary bombers that could make the distance, London is the obvious and indeed the only target, and even a few very big explosions in London would be a very great disappointment to the people at this time when they had hoped that their prolonged ordeal was over. 3. May I mention in this connection that a calculation has been shown me which ascribes the losses to the Greater London area in killed by enemy action as one in 131. This adds together the deaths on land, at sea and in the air of London citizens in the Forces and the killing of 30,000 men, women and children by the air onslaught. This figure of one in 131 represents . . . the highest losses sustained by any similar locality on the Allied side in the Second Great War. 4. Having put these facts before you I leave the decision entirely in the hands of your military advisers, and we shall make no complaint if misfortune comes to us in consequence.9 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 3) April 14, 1945 President Truman to the Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 1. I thoroughly approve of the suggestion made therein. If Stalin agrees, I would be pleased to receive from you for consideration your draft of the message.10

Ending the War in Europe

23

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 3) April 15, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret 1. It gave me great pleasure to receive your message No. 1 and I am thankful indeed for the expression of friendship and comradeship which it contains. I reciprocate these most cordially. 2. I have just read the draft joint message which you propose we should send to Stalin. In principle I am in complete agreement with its terms but there is one important point which Eden will put before you, and as you and he will be able to discuss the text together any points of detail can I am sure be adjusted. I will consult the Cabinet on Monday if the final draft reaches me by then, and I hope we may despatch the message with our joint authority on that very day, as I strongly agree with you that our reply is of high urgency. Moreover, it is important to strike the note of our unity of outlook and of action at the earliest moment. 3. Meanwhile Eden will no doubt discuss with you our impressions of what is actually happening in Moscow and Warsaw. As I see it, the Lublin Government are feeling the strong sentiment of the Polish nation, which though not unfriendly to Russia, is fiercely resolved on independence, and views with increasing disfavour a Polish Provisional Government which is, in the main, a Soviet puppet. They are, therefore, endeavoring in accord with the Soviet Government, to form a government more broad-based than the present one by the addition of Polish personalities (including perhaps Witos) whom they have in their power, but whose aid they seek and need. This is a step in the right direction but would not satisfy our requirements or the decisions of the Crimea Conference. 4. Eden saw Mikolajczyk before his departure and Mikolajczyk promised to make the declaration desired of him in Stalin's private introductory telegram to me dated April 7, which I repeated to President Roosevelt in my 946. I hope to have this afternoon the form of his declaration which he will publish in his own Polish paper here next Thursday. This, if satisfactory, can be telegraphed to Stalin Monday either simultaneously with or as part of our joint message and if it is not satisfactory I will wrestle with him to make it so and thereafter repeat to you. 11

HEADNOTE A n o t h e r episode w a s C R O S S W O R D , which Churchill informed President Truman about in his next telegram on April 15th. In his N u m b e r 141 of April 1 1 , 1945, from Warm Springs, Roosevelt had t h a n k e d Stalin for his "frank explanation of the Soviet point of

24

Defending the West

v i e w " concerning C R O S S W O R D , t h a t is, "the Bern i n c i d e n t , " which Roosevelt chose to portray as a "minor misunderstanding" but which Stalin chose to view as the West's desire to negotiate a separate peace with the German High C o m m a n d at Soviet expense. CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 4) April 15, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret With regard to the episode CROSSWORD, you have laid out before you the answer No. 741 which President Roosevelt sent to Stalin and repeated to me. I complied by sending the following telegram: Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin "I have received your message of April 7th. I thank you for its reassuring tone and trust that the CROSSWORD misunderstanding may now be considered at an end." 1. I should add that the rest of the telegram was of a purely personal nature, thanking him and Molotov for the kindness with which my wife has been received during her visit to Moscow in connexion with her Aid to Russia Fund. 2. About CROSSWORD. Our Staff and I myself have become worried about the continuance of parleyings in Switzerland between O.S.S.b agents and some of these Germans who were brought out. Our Chiefs of Staff have telegraphed to our Joint Staff Mission asking that all these pourparlers may be brought to a close at once. That is surely the consequence of President Roosevelt's No. 741 and of my similar message referred to above. We and you know our consciences are clear. One must make some allowance for Russian suspicions, however base. They knew about these meetings. Their Secret Service no doubt reported O.S.S. activities to bring them about. The Russians were told they must not come. Meanwhile events dragged on in Switzerland for over a fortnight during which Kesselring was moved from North Italy to the Command of the Western Front. Here he would be in contact with General Westphal who had been previously mentioned in the prior contacts with Eisenhower. The Russians, with their suspicious nature, might naturally suppose that all this was part of a plot hatched in Switzerland to procure the Allied Armies in the West an easy march across the Rhine through Germany, and that Kesselring went there to carry it out. At the same time they would notice the movement of quite a substantial number of Divisions from the sorely-tried Germans' b

The O.S.S. (Office of Strategic Services), the precursor of postwar American intelligence, was renamed the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947.

Ending the War in Europe

25

Western Front to their Eastern Front. Putting the two together, they had been led most improperly to suggest that we were trying to get a walkover at their expense and for our especial glory. Hence Stalin's offensive telegram of April 3rd (President Roosevelt's No. 734) and I fear that in spite of our conclusive answer the tale may become a legend in the Russian Army. Therefore as there is no prospect of the contacts in Switzerland procuring the surrender of the Army in Northern Italy, or even a rendezvous to which parliamentaires may come, the sooner they are stopped the better. Otherwise we run the risk of a new outburst of suggestions which we cannot tolerate without making most severe rejoinders. 3. The removal of the above sore points will only clear the way for the decided action you contemplate and we support on the Polish issue. Every good wish. 12 HEADNOTE The Pacific War had also required the earliest attention of President Truman, and in his communication with Churchill on the same day, April 14th, he cabled the Prime Minister in reply to his N u m b e r 943 (April 11th) to Roosevelt. TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 4) April 14, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret The following answer to your 943 to President Roosevelt is prepared in consultation with my Chiefs of Staff: General Wedemeyer reports that his conference with Admiral Mountbatten resulted in an agreement that the latter would notify Wedemeyer when he desired to conduct an operation in Indo-China and that the operation would not be conducted until approval was given by the Generalissimo. Wedemeyer's understanding is that the procedure will be for Mountbatten to notify General Carton de Wiart, who would inform Wedemeyer in his capacity as Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo. If the proposed operation from SEACC could not be integrated with China theatre plans, then Mountbatten agreed he would not undertake it. This agreement seems to be a satisfactory method of solving the problem of SEAC Forces operating into the Generalissimo's theatre and follows the accepted practice that theatre commanders operating in contiguous theatres confine their operations to the limit of the theatre unless the situation develops as to require one to send forces into an adjacent theatre, and in C

SEAC is the Southeast Asia Command.

26

Defending the West

such case he does so after coordination with the other commander. If, as in this case, the theatre commanders concerned can effect the required coordination without getting a directive from a higher authority, there appears no need to give them instructions along the line of the first paragraph of your suggested message to Mountbatten. It would seem, however, a good idea to recognize the close coordination required between the two theatres, and a message along the line of the last three paragraphs of your proposal should be helpful. As to the last paragraph, it should be made clear that in the case of any matters these two commanders feel should be referred to the combined Chiefs of Staff, this should be done through their respective Chiefs of Staff. With this modification, the United States Chiefs of Staff are dispatching a message to Wedemeyer substantially as that contained in the last three paragraphs of your proposal. Wedemeyer has been instructed to give to the French resistance groups such assistance as is practicable without prejudice to his present or future operations. 13 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 5) April 16, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret I have had a long talk with Mr. Mikolajczyk,d who has signed the declaration in my immediate following. This seems a great improvement on the rather complicated article which he had proposed to publish on Thursday. Mr. Mikolajczyk wished the declaration to be issued immediately, and especially before any purely Soviet-framed new Polish Government could be announced. I have therefore not thought it right to delay his action which seems to me highly beneficial.14 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 6) April 16, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret My immediately preceding telegram. Following is Mr. Mikolajczyk's declaration. " 1 . I consider close and lasting friendship with Russia is the keystone of future Polish policy within the wider friendship of the United Nations. 2. To remove all doubt as to my attitude, I wish to declare that I accept the Crimea decision in regard to the future of Poland, its sovereign independent position and the formation of a provisional Government representative of National Unity. d

Mikolajczyk, Poland's prime minister in exile, was regarded outside Poland as the "outstanding Polish figure" in the West.

Ending the War in Europe

27

3. I support the decision arrived at in the Crimea that a Conference of leading Polish personalities be called with a view to constituting a Government of National Unity as widely and fairly representative of the Polish people as possible and one which will command recognition by the three major Powers." 15 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 5) April 17, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Reference your No. 2. Taking into account all the considerations involved, it seems to me this project concerning war-weary, explosive ladened aircraft should not be pressed further in Europe at this time. I am instructing my Chiefs of Staff accordingly.16

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 7) April 18, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Your armies soon, and presently ours, may come into contact with Soviet forces. Supreme Commander should be given instructions by Combined Chiefs of Staff as soon as possible how to act. In my view there are two zones: (a) Tactical zone in which our troops must stand on the lines they have reached unless there is agreement for a better tactical deployment against continuing resistance of the enemy. This should be arranged by the Supreme Commander through Deane and Archer in Moscow or if convenient across the line in the field. Combined Chiefs of Staff have already taken up the issue of instructions to cover this phase. (b) Occupational zone which I agreed with President Roosevelt on advice of Combined General Staffs. In my view this zone should be occupied within a certain time from V.E. day whenever this is declared, and we should retire with dignity from the much greater gains which Allied troops have acquired by their audacity and vigour. I am quite prepared to adhere to occupational zones. But I do not wish our Allied troops or your American troops to be hustled back at any point by some crude assertion of a local Russian General. This must be provided against by an agreement between the Governments so as to give Eisenhower a fair chance to settle on the spot in his own admirable way. These occupational zones were outlined rather hastily at Quebec in September 1944 when it was not foreseen that General Eisenhower's

28

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armies would make such a mighty inroad into Germany. The zones cannot be altered except by agreement with the Russians. But the moment V.E. day has occurred, we should try to set up Allied Control Commission in Berlin and should insist upon a fair distribution of food produced in Germany between all parts of Germany. As it stands at present, Russian occupational zone has the smallest proportion of people and grows by far the largest proportion of food. The Americans have a not very satisfactory proportion of food to feed conquered population. And we poor British are to take over all the ruined Ruhr and large manufacturing districts, which are like ours, in normal times large importers of food. I suggest that this tiresome question should be settled in Berlin by A.C.C. before we move from tactical positions we have at present achieved. The Russian idea of taking these immense food supplies out of food producing areas of Germany to feed themselves is very natural. But I contend that feeding the German population must be treated as a whole and that available supplies must be divided pro rata between the occupational troops. I should be most grateful if you would let me have your views on these points, which from information I receive from many sources are of highest consequence and urgency.17 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 8) April 19, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret As we have all three agreed to broadcast messages when our Forces link up in Germany, I suggest the following procedure. Each State should broadcast all three messages. We will have to exchange the records by air. Mine will read as follows: "After long journeys, toils and victories across the land and oceans, the Armies of the great Allies have traversed Germany and joined hands (in Berlin). Now their task will be the destruction of all areas of German military resistance, the rooting out of the Nazi power and the subjugation of Hitler's Reich. For these purposes ample Forces are available and we join hands in true and victorious comradeship and with inflexible resolve to fulfill our purposes and our duty. Let all march forward upon the foe." I am having this recorded and flown to you at once. It would be convenient if you could send me yours as soon as possible, and telegraph the text in advance so that we know its length. As regards the order, I think after inquiry it would be appropriate that we should each have our own message broadcast first from our own stations. It seems to me to be best to leave it to the broadcasting authorities in each country to decide the precise time at which they wish to broadcast the records to their respective audiences. They would, of course, be under pledge not to put these broadcasts on the air until a firm link-up of the

Ending the War in Europe

29

Russian and Anglo-American Armies has been officially reported. It would be a great convenience if this official announcement could be made in all three countries at the same time. I have asked Marshal Stalin whether he would agree to synchronize his announcement with a similar one by General Eisenhower, and if he agrees I will ask General Eisenhower to make these arrangements direct. I am sending a similar telegram to Marshal Stalin.18 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 6) April 19, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret The following quoted message is a preliminary draft of the message which I propose to issue following the meeting of the Anglo-American and Soviet Armies in Germany at a date and time that will be agreed upon by the three of us. I will be very pleased to receive any comments and suggestions that you may wish to make. "The Anglo-American Armies under the c o m m a n d of General Eisenhower have met the Soviet forces where they intended to meet, in the heart of Nazi Germany. The enemy has been cut in two. "This is not the hour of final victory in Europe, but the hour draws near, the hour for which all the American people, all the British peoples and all the Soviet people have toiled and prayed so long. "The union of our arms in the heart of Germany has a meaning for the world which the world will not miss. It means, first, that the last faint, desperate hope of Hitler and his gangster Government has been extinguished. The common front and the common cause of the Powers allied in this war against tyranny and inhumanity have been demonstrated in determination. Nothing can divide or weaken the common purpose of our veteran Armies to pursue their victorious purpose to its final Allied triumph in Germany. "Second, the junction of our forces at this moment signalizes to ourselves and to the world that the collaboration of our Nations in the cause of peace and freedom is an effective collaboration which can surmount the greatest difficulties of the most extensive campaign in military history and succeed. Nations which can plan and fight together shoulder to shoulder in the face of such obstacles of distance and of language and of communications as we have overcome, can live together and can work together in the common labor of the organization of the world for peace. "Finally, this great triumph of Allied arms and Allied strategy is such a tribute to the courage and determination of Franklin Roosevelt as no words could even speak, and that could be accomplished only by the persistence and the courage of the fighting soldiers and sailors of the Allied Nations.

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"But, until our enemies are finally subdued in Europe and in the Pacific, there must be no relaxation of effort on the home front in support of our heroic soldiers and sailors as we all know there will be no pause on the battle fronts." 19

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 9) April 20, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 4. We are very willing to give full and fair trial to the arrangements you have been good enough to propose. If difficulties arise, I am sure you would wish me to present them to you. Orders have been given, in accordance with this telegram, to Admiral Mountbatten/' 2 0

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 10) April 20, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman Thank you for your draft message on the link-up. I can think of no improvement. It will do good to the troops to hear it.21

TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 7) April 20, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Referring to your message No. 1 of 14 April and your No. 8 of 19 April. I find, upon investigation, it is impracticable for me to broadcast the message. I therefore propose to issue it as a statement from me to the press and radio for release on the date and hour that is agreed upon. Since I have had no communication on this subject with Marshal Stalin will you be kind enough to transmit this information to him. 22

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 11) April 21, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 7. I have sent the following message to Marshal Stalin. "President Truman informs me that he finds it impracticable to broadcast message on linking-up of Armies. He therefore proposes to issue it as e

Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten was supreme allied commander, Southeast Asia, 1943-1946.

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a statement from him to the Press and Radio for release on the date and hour that are agreed upon. "I suggest that General Eisenhower be instructed to agree with Soviet Military authorities as to the appropriate time for release. "Recording of my own message is being flown to you." 23 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 8) April 21, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Replying to your No. 11, I will see that General Eisenhower is given instructions to inform the Soviet, British, and United States Governments at earliest possible date the day when an announcement may be made by the three Chiefs of Government of the Soviet-Anglo-American Armies meeting in Germany. In order that an announcement may be made simultaneously in the three capitals, I would like to have your agreement that the hour of the day recommended by Eisenhower be twelve o'clock noon Washington time. I am sending an identical message to Stalin.24 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 12) April 22, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 8. I agree. I have telegraphed to Marshal Stalin as follows: "Thank you for your telegram of April 20th about the link-up of our forces. I agree with President Truman's proposal that the announcement should be made simultaneously in the three capitals at 12 noon, Washington time, on the day in question, and unless we hear that you have any objection our arrangements will be made accordingly." 25 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 9) April 23, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Replying to your No. 7 of April 18, the following is a message which I consider suitable for sending to Stalin if you agree, and if you will send him a similar message. Please let me know what you think of this suggestion. "The approaching end of German resistance makes it necessary that the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union decide upon an orderly procedure for the occupation by their forces of the zones which they will occupy in Germany and Austria. I therefore propose the following: " 1 . That we agree that in both Germany and Austria our respective troops should, as soon as the military situation permits, retire to the zone which it has been agreed they should occupy.

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"2. In order to avoid any confusion between our armies in the field we agree that whenever one of our commanders is ready to occupy a portion of the zone allotted to his country which is held by other Allied troops, he inform his own Government of the sector he is prepared to occupy. " 3 . That we agree that the Government concerned would then consult the other two Governments in order that the necessary instructions be given for the immediate evacuation of the area involved and its occupation by the troops of the country to which it is assigned. "Please let me know if this arrangement is satisfactory to you. "It is of course essential that we promptly reach an agreement on the zones which we are to occupy in Austria. "I think we should, at an early date, reach a common decision as to the time when the control machinery for both countries should be brought into operation." 26

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 13) April 24, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret I thank you for your No. 9 in answer to my No. 7. I agree with the preamble, but paragraphs 1 and 2 would simply allow the Russians to order us back to the occupational zones at any point they might decide, and not necessarily with regard to the position of the fronts as a whole. It is your troops who would suffer most by this, being pushed back about 120 miles in the centre and yielding up to the unchecked Russian advance an enormous territory. And this while all questions of our spheres in Vienna or arrangements for triple occupation of Berlin remain unsettled. I suggest the following alternative version of your proposed message to Marshal Stalin. " 1 . Our immediate task is the final defeat of the German Army. During this period the boundaries between the forces of the three Allies must be decided by Commanders in the field, and will be governed by operational considerations and requirements. It is inevitable that our armies will in this phase find themselves in occupation of territory outside the boundaries of the ultimate occupational zones. "2. When the fighting is finished, the next task is for the Allied Control Commissions to be set up in Berlin and Vienna, and for the forces of the Allies to be redisposed and to take over their respective occupational zones. The demarcation of the zones in Germany has already been decided upon and it is hoped that we shall very soon reach an agreement on the zones to be occupied in Austria at the forthcoming meeting proposed by you in Vienna.

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" 3 . The occupation of the zones would normally follow immediately upon the signature of the instrument of surrender. It may be, however, that no such signature will be forthcoming. In this event governments may well decide to set up at once the Allied Control Commissions, and to entrust to them the task of arranging for the withdrawal of the forces to their agreed occupational zones. "4. In order to meet the requirements of the situation referred to in paragraph 1 above, namely the emergency and temporary arrangements for the tactical zones, instructions have been sent to General Eisenhower. These are as follows: "(a) To avoid confusion between the two armies and to prevent either of them from expanding into areas already occupied by the other, both sides should halt as and where they meet, subject to such adjustments to the rear or to the flanks as are required, in the opinion of the local commanders on either side, to deal with any remaining opposition. "(b) As to adjustments of forces after cessation of hostilities in an area, your troops should be disposed in accordance with military requirements regardless of zonal boundaries. You will, in so far as permitted by the urgency of the situation, obtain the approval of the British and American Governments prior to any major adjustment in contrast to local adjustments for operational and administrative reasons. "5. It is requested that you will issue similar instructions to your commanders in the field."27 The End of the War in Europe There was accordingly much to discuss between the two Allied leaders with the war in Europe drawing to a close. For his part, Truman had indicated that he "would be disappointed" if he and Churchill could n o t meet w i t h i n the next t w o m o n t h s . And on 24 April, Churchill conveyed his own disappointment in not being able "to see the President personally," adding that he was "reluctant to go to the United States in the next sixty days" 2 8 on account of the upcoming general election in a cable via the British embassy in Washington.

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 14) April 24, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret I have carefully considered the message you have handed to Molotov for Marshal Stalin and have brought it before the War Cabinet who have authorized me to inform you of their entire agreement to the course that

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you have adopted. I shall now therefore send to Marshal Stalin the message contained in my immediately following telegram.29 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 15) April 24, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret My immediate preceding telegram. Following is the text of my message to Marshal Stalin. "I have seen the message about Poland which the President handed to M. Molotov for transmission to you, and I have consulted the War Cabinet on account of its special importance. It is my duty now to inform you that we fully support the President in the aforesaid message. I earnestly hope that means will be found to compose these serious difficulties, which if they continue will darken the hour of victory." 30 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 10) April 25, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret I have transmitted the following to Marshal Stalin: "I am informed by the American Minister to Sweden that Himmler, f speaking for the German Government in the absence of Hitler due to incapacity, approached the Swedish Government with an offer to surrender all the German forces on the Western Front including Holland, Denmark and Norway. In keeping with our agreement with the British and Soviet Governments it is the view of the United States Government that the only acceptable terms of surrender are unconditional surrender at all fronts to the Soviets, Great Britain and the United States. If the Germans accept the terms of paragraph two above, they should surrender on all fronts at once to the local commanders in the field. If you are in agreement with paragraphs two and three above, I will direct my minister in Sweden to so inform Himmler's agent." 31 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 11) April 26, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Please make my message War No. 72816 of 25 April 1945 No. 10 in my series to you. 32

f

Heinrich Himmler was Nazi Chief of the S.S.

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CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 16) April 25, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret You will no doubt have received some hours ago the report from Stockholm by your Ambassador on the Bernadotte-Himmler talks. I called the War Cabinet together at once, and they approved the immediately following telegram, which we are sending to Marshal Stalin and repeating through the usual channels to you. We hope you will find it possible to telegraph to Marshal Stalin and to us in the same sense. As Himmler is evidently speaking for the German State, as much as anybody can, the reply that should be sent him through the Swedish Government is in principle a matter for the triple Powers, since no one of us can enter into separate negotiations. This fact however in no way abrogates General Eisenhower's or Field Marshal Alexander's authority to accept local surrenders as they occur.33 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 17) April 25, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret My immediately preceding telegram. Following is telegram which I have sent to Marshal Stalin. "The telegram in my immediate following has just reached me from the British Ambassador in Sweden. The President of the United States has the news also. There can be no question as far as His Majesty's Government is concerned of anything less than unconditional surrender simultaneously to the three major powers. We consider Himmler should be told that German forces, either as individuals or in units, should everywhere surrender themselves to the Allied troops or representatives on the spot. Until this happens the attacks of the Allies upon them on all sides and in all theatres where resistance continues will be persecuted with the utmost vigour." 34 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 12) April 26, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Your messages Nos. 14 and 15 received. I am very pleased to note the full support you have given to my messages handed to Molotov for delivery to Stalin.35 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 13) April 26, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Referring to your No. 13. It appears to me, particularly in view of the fact that the Armies now in the Soviet zone are American, that any agreement

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entered into regarding withdrawal to the designated post hostility zones of occupation in Germany and Austria should be tripartite. I therefore suggest for your consideration that you address the following message to Marshal Stalin and to me: " 1 . The Anglo-American armies will soon make contact in Germany with Soviet forces, and the approaching end of German resistance makes it necessary that the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union decide upon an orderly procedure for the occupation by their forces of the zones which they will occupy in Germany and in Austria. "2. Our immediate task is the final defeat of the German Army. During this period the boundaries between the forces of the three Allies must be decided by Commanders in the field, and will be governed by operational considerations and requirements. It is inevitable that our armies will in this phase find themselves in occupation of territory outside the boundaries of the ultimate occupational zones. "3. When the fighting is finished, the next task is for the Allied Control Commissions to be set up in Berlin and Vienna, and for the forces of the Allies to be redisposed and to take over their respective occupational zones. The demarcation of the zones in Germany has already been decided upon and it is necessary that we shall without delay reach an agreement on the zones to be occupied in Austria at the forthcoming meeting proposed by you in Vienna. "4. It appears now that no signed instrument of surrender will be forthcoming. In this event governments should decide to set up at once the Allied Control Commissions, and to entrust to them the task of making detailed arrangements for the withdrawal of the forces to their agreed occupational zones. " 5 . In order to meet the requirements of the situation referred to in paragraph 2 above, namely the emergency and temporary arrangements for the tactical zones, instructions have been sent to General Eisenhower. These are as follows: "(a) To avoid confusion between the two armies and to prevent either of them from expanding into areas already occupied by the other, both sides should halt as and where they meet, subject to such adjustments to the rear or to the flanks as are required, in the opinion of the local commanders on either side, to deal with any remaining opposition. "(b) As to adjustments of forces after cessation of hostilities in an area, your troops should be disposed in accordance with military requirements regardless of zonal boundaries. You will, in so far as permitted by the urgency of the situation, obtain the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff prior to any major adjustment in contrast to local adjustments for operational and administrative reasons. "6. It is requested that you will issue similar instructions to your commanders in the field."

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Upon receipt of the above message from you, I will at once inform Marshal Stalin that I am in full agreement therewith. 36 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 14) April 27, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret I have today sent the following message to Minister Johnson, Stockholm: "Replying to your message of April 25, 3AM, inform Himmler s agent that the only acceptable terms of surrender by Germany are unconditional surrender on all fronts to the Soviet Government, Great Britain, and the United States. "If the above stated terms of surrender are accepted the German forces should surrender on all fronts to the local Commanders in the Field. "In all theatres where resistance continues the attack of the Allies upon them will be vigorously prosecuted until complete victory is attained." 37 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 18) April 27, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 13. I have addressed at your request the message to yourself and Marshal Stalin, on which you propose to telegraph us back a message of your agreement. " 1 . The Anglo-American armies will soon make contact in Germany with Soviet forces, and the approaching end of German resistance makes it necessary that the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union decide upon an orderly procedure for the occupation by their forces of the zones which they will occupy in Germany and in Austria. "2. Our immediate task is the final defeat of the German Army. During this period the boundaries between the forces of the three Allies must be decided by Commanders in the Field, and will be governed by operational considerations and requirements. It is inevitable that our Armies will in this phase find themselves in occupation of territory outside the boundaries of the ultimate occupational zones. "3. When the fighting is finished, the next task is for the Allied Control Commissions to be set up in Berlin and Vienna, and for the forces of the Allies to be redisposed and to take over their respective occupational zones. The demarcation of the zones in Germany has already been decided upon and it is necessary that we shall without delay reach an agreement on the zones to be occupied in Austria at the forthcoming meeting proposed by you in Vienna.

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"4. It appears now that no signed instrument of surrender will be forthcoming. In this event governments should decide to set up at once the Allied Control Commissions, and to entrust to them the task of making detailed arrangements for the withdrawal of the forces to their agreed occupational zones. " 5 . In order to meet the requirements of the situation referred to in paragraph 2 above, namely the emergency and temporary arrangements for the tactical zones, instructions have been sent to General Eisenhower. These are as follows: "(a) To avoid confusion between the two armies and to prevent either of them from expanding into areas already occupied by the other, both sides should halt as and where they meet, subject to such adjustments to the rear or to the flanks as are required, in the opinion of the local commanders on either side, to deal with any remaining opposition. "(b) As to adjustments of forces after cessation of hostilities in an area, your troops should be disposed in accordance with military requirements regardless of zonal boundaries. You will, in so far as permitted by the urgency of the situation, obtain the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff prior to any major adjustments for operational and administrative reasons. "6. It is requested that you will issue similar instructions to your Commanders in the Field." Pray therefore, in accordance with your plan, inform Marshal Stalin accordingly. PS I think Stalin is pleased at our having informed him in such quick unity of our spontaneous view of the Himmler-Bernadotte contacts.§ Even if there is a short delay or setback, all our forces will be in much more favorable position. I thank you so much for promoting the easy way in which we are handling this three-cornered business.38 HEADNOTE

The following telegram from Churchill, N o . 19, would initially be addressed in Truman's N o . 17 concerning the further issue of Trieste and Tito. The issue concerned the principle of whether territorial changes must await a peace settlement or be allowed to be settled by force and intimidation. §Two days earlier, Churchill had telephoned President Truman, who had not known about the Himmler-Bernadotte contacts, concerning the proposal of a German surrender on the Western Front, as he had felt that quick Allied action would allay any "Russian suspicions" as had occurred over CROSSWORD.

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CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 19) April 27, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Field Marshal Alexander11 has telegraphed to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, number 932. It seems to me vital to get Trieste if we can do so in the easy manner proposed, and to run the risks inherent in these kinds of politicalmilitary operations. The late President always attached great importance to Trieste, which he thought should be an international port forming an outlet into the Adriatic from all regions of the Danube Basin. There are many points to consider about this, but that there should be an outlet to the south seems of great interest to the trade of many states involved. The great thing is to be there before Tito's1 guerillas are in occupation. Therefore it does not seem to me there is a minute to wait. The actual status of Trieste can be determined at leisure. Possession is nine points of the law. I beg you for an early decision. Field Marshal Alexander and his trusty lieutenant, Mark Clark, are in the process of gaining quite soon an overwhelming and timely victory in North Italy. This is the time to back our successful generals, as we are doing on the northwest front. The plan for the Anglo-American occupation of Venezia Giulia has been hanging fire in Washington for a considerable time, with the result that Field Marshal Alexander is still without orders. I should therefore be most grateful if you would give your personal attention to this. 39 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 15) April 27, 1945 President Truman to the Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Referring to your No. 18.1 have sent the following message to Stalin: "I have received a message addressed to you and to me by Prime Minister Churchill on 27 April in regard to an orderly procedure for the occupation by our forces of the zones which they will occupy in Germany and Austria. "This will inform you that I am in full agreement with the above referred to message addressed to both of us by Prime Minister Churchill and I will inform him also of my agreement therewith." 40 h

Sir Harold Alexander was supreme allied commander in Italy.

'Tito, the name adopted by Josip Broz, was the Communist leader whose partisan forces opposed the Axis in Yugoslavia.

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CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 20) April 28, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret 1. I have decided to send Stalin the message contained in my immediately following telegram in answer to his message to me of April 25 of which the British Embassy will give you the text. 2. I do not know whether Stalin has sent you a similar answer but in any case I hope you will agree to my answering independently so as to enable me to put the specifically British case. I naturally would be very glad if you could support me by sending Stalin a message on similar lines.41 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 21) April 28, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret The message referred to in my No. 20 follows: 1. I thank you for your message of April 24. I have been much distressed at the misunderstanding that has grown up between us on the Crimean agreement about Poland. I certainly went to Yalta with the hope that both the London and Lublin Polish Governments would be swept away and that a new government would be formed from among Poles of good-will, among whom the members of M. Bierut'sJ government would be prominent. But you did not like this plan, and we and the Americans agreed therefore that there was to be no sweeping away of the Bierut government but that instead it should become a "new" government "reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from the Poles abroad." For this purpose M. Molotov and the two ambassadors were to sit together in Moscow and try to bring into being such a government by consultations with members of the present provisional government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad. 2. The commission then would have to set to work to select the Poles who were to come for consultations. We tried in each case to find representative men, and in this we were careful to exclude what we thought were extreme people unfriendly to Russia. We did not select for our list anyone at present in the London Polish Government, but three good men, namely Mikolajczyk, Stanczyk and Grabski, who went into opposition to the London Polish Government because they did not like its attitude towards Russia, and in particular its refusal to accept the eastern frontiers which you and I agreed upon, not so long ago, and which I was

>M. Bierut, a Pole, whose real name was Krasnodewski, had been for many years a Soviet agent.

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the first man outside the Soviet government to proclaim to the world as just and fair, together with the compensations, etc. in the west and north. It is true that Mikolajczyk at that time still hoped for Lwow, but as you know he has now publicly abandoned that claim. 3. Our names, for those from inside and outside Poland, were put forward in the same spirit of helpfulness by the Americans and ourselves. The first thing the British complain of is that after nine weeks of discussion on the commission at Moscow, and any amount of telegrams between our three Governments not the least progress has been made because M. Molotov has steadily refused in the commission to give an opinion about the Poles we have mentioned so that not one of them has been allowed to come even to a preliminary round-table discussion. Please observe that these names were put forward not as necessarily to be members of a new and reorganized Polish government but simply to come for the round-table talk provided for in the Crimean declaration out of which it was intended to bring about the formation of a united provisional government, representative of the main elements of Polish life and prepared to work on friendly terms with the Soviet government, and also of a kind which we and all the world could recognize. That was and still is our desire. This provisional government was then, according to our joint decision at the Crimea, to pledge itself to hold "a free and unfettered election as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot," in which "all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and put forward candidates." Alas, none of this has been allowed to move forward. 4. In your paragraph 1. you speak of accepting "the Yugoslav precedent as a model for Poland." You have always wished that our private and personal series of telegrams should be frank and outspoken. I must say at once that the two cases are completely different. In the case of Poland, the three powers reached agreement about how we should arrange for the emergence of a new government. This was to be by means of consultations before our commission between representatives of the Bierut government and democratic Polish leaders from inside and outside Poland. In the case of Yugoslavia, there was nothing of this kind. You seem now to be proposing that after your representative on the Moscow Poland commission has made it impossible to start the conversations provided for in our agreement, that the agreed procedure should be abandoned. Thus we British feel that after all this time absolutely no headway has been made towards forming the "new" and "reorganized" Polish Government, while on the contrary the Soviet Government have made a 20-year treaty k with the present provisional Polish Government under M. Bierut although it

k

The Polish-Soviet agreement of friendship, mutual assistance, and postwar cooperation was signed on 21 April, 1945.

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remains neither new nor reorganized. We have the feeling that it is we who have been dictated to and brought up against a stone wall upon matters which we sincerely believed were settled in a spirit of friendly comradeship in the Crimea. 5. I must also say that the way things have worked out in Yugoslavia certainly does not give me the feeling of a 50-50 interest and influence as between our two countries. Marshal Tito has become a complete dictator. He has proclaimed that his prime loyalties are to Soviet Russia. Although he allowed the members of the royal Yugoslav Government to enter his government, they only number 6 as against 25 of his own nominees. We have the impression that they are not taken into consultation on matters of high policy and that it is becoming a one-party regime. However I have not made any complaint or comment about all this, and both at Yalta and at other times have acquiesced in the settlement which has been reached in Yugoslavia. I do not complain of any action you have taken there in spite of my misgivings and I hope it will all work out smoothly and make the Yugoslavs a prosperous and free people, friendly to both Russia and ourselves. 6. We could not, however, accept the "Yugoslav model" as a guide to what should happen in Poland. Neither we nor the Americans have any military or special interest in Poland. All we seek in material things is to be treated in the regular way between friendly states. Here we are all shocked that you should think that we would favor a Polish Government hostile to the Soviet Union. This is the opposite of our policy. But it was on account of Poland that the British went to war with Germany in 1939. We saw in the Nazi treatment of Poland a symbol of Hitler's vile and wicked lust of conquest and subjugation, and his invasion of Poland was the spark that fired the mine. The British people do not, as is sometimes thought, go to war for calculation but for sentiment. They had a feeling which grew up in years that with all Hitler's encroachments and doctrine, he was a danger to our country and to the liberties which we prize in Europe, and when after Munich he broke his word so shamefully about Czechoslovakia, even the extremely peace-loving Chamberlain gave our guarantee against Hitler to Poland. When that guarantee was invoked by the German invasion of Poland, the whole nation went to war with Hitler, unprepared as we were. There was a flame in the hearts of men like that which swept your people in their noble defense of their country from a treacherous, brutal and, as at one time it almost seemed, overwhelmingly German attack. This British flame burns still among all classes and parties in this island, and in its selfgoverning dominions, and they can never feel this war will have ended rightly unless Poland has a fair deal in the full sense of sovereignty, independence and freedom on the basis of friendship with Russia. It was on this that I thought we had agreed at Yalta. 7. Side by side with this strong sentiment for the rights of Poland, which I believe is shared in at least as strong a degree throughout the United

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States, there has grown up throughout the English-speaking world a very warm and deep desire to be friends on equal and honorable terms with the mighty Russian Soviet Republic and to work with you, making allowances for our different systems of thought and government, in long and bright years for all the world which we three powers alone can make together. I, who in my years of great responsibility have worked faithfully for this unity, will certainly continue to do so by every means in my power, and in particular I can assure you that we in Great Britain would not work for or tolerate a Polish government unfriendly to Russia. Neither could we recognize a Polish government that did not truly correspond to the description in our joint declaration at Yalta with proper regard for the rights of the individual as we understand these matters in the western world. 8. With regard to your reference to Greece and Belgium, I recognize the consideration which you gave me when we had to intervene with heavy armed forces to quell the EAM-ELAS1 attack upon the center of government in Athens. We have given repeated instructions that your interest in Roumania and Bulgaria is to be recognized as predominant. We cannot however by excluded altogether, and we dislike being treated by your subordinates in these countries so differently from the kindly manner in which we at the top are always treated by you. In Greece we seek nothing but her friendship, which is of long duration, and desire only her independence and integrity. But we have no intention to try and decide whether she is to be a monarchy or a republic. Our only policy there is to restore matters to the normal as quickly as possible and to hold fair and free elections, I hope within the next four or five months. These elections will decide the regime and later on the constitution. The will of the people expressed under conditions of freedom and universal franchise must prevail; that is our root principle. If the Greeks were to decide for a republic, it would not affect our relations with them. We will use our influence with the Greek government to invite Russian representatives to come and see freely what is going on in Greece, and at the elections I hope that there will be Russian, American and British commissioners at large in the country to make sure that there is no intimidation or other frustration of the free choice of the people between the different parties who will be contending. After that our work in Greece may well be done. 9. As to Belgium, we have no conditions to demand though naturally we should get disturbed if they started putting up V-weapons, etc. pointed at us, and we hope they will, under whatever form of government they adopt by popular decision, come into a general system of resistance to prevent Germany striking westward. Belgium, like Poland,

'EAM-ELAS (National Liberation Front-National People's Liberation Army) was an element of the same Communist-controlled resistance organization in Greece.

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is a theatre of war and corridor of communication, and everyone must recognize the force of these considerations without which great armies cannot operate. 10. As to your paragraph 3, it is quite true that about Poland we have reached a definite line of action with the Americans. This is because we agree naturally upon the subject, and both sincerely feel that we have been rather ill-treated about the way the matter has been handled since the Crimea Conference. No doubt these things seem different when looked at from the opposite point of view. But we are absolutely agreed that the pledge we have given for a sovereign, free, independent Poland with a government fully and adequately representing all the democratic elements among Poles, is for us a matter of honor and duty. I do not think there is the slightest chance of any change in the attitude of our two powers, and when we are agreed we are bound to say so. After all, we have joined with you, largely on my original initiative early in 1944 in proclaiming the Polish-Russian frontier which you desired, namely, the Curzon line including Lwow for Russia. We think you ought to meet us with regard to the other half of the policy which you equally with us have proclaimed, namely, the sovereignty, independence and freedom of Poland, provided it is a Poland friendly to Russia. Therefore HMG cannot accept a government on the Yugoslav precedent in which there would be four representatives of the present Warsaw provisional government to every one representing the other democratic elements. There ought to be a proper balance and a proper distribution of the important posts in the government; and this result should be reached as we agreed at the Crimea by discussing the matter with true representatives of all the different Polish elements which are not fundamentally anti-Russian. 11. Also, difficulties arise at the present moment because all sorts of stories are brought out of Poland which are eagerly listened to by many members of Parliament which at any time may be violently raised in Parliament or the press in spite of my deprecating such action and on which M. Molotov will vouchsafe us no information at all in spite of repeated requests. For instance, there is the talk of the 15 Poles who were said to have met the Russian authorities for discussion over 4 weeks ago, and of M. Witos about whom there has been a similar but more recent report; and there are many other statements of deportations, etc. How can I contradict such complaints when you give me no information whatever and when neither I nor the Americans are allowed to send anyone into Poland to find out for themselves the true state of affairs? There is no part of our occupied or liberated territory into which you are not free to send delegations, and people do not see why you should have any reasons against similar visits by British delegations to foreign countries liberated by you. 12. There is not much comfort in looking into a future where you and the countries you dominate, plus the Communist parties in many other

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states, are all drawn up on one side, and those who rally to the Englishspeaking nations and their associates or dominions are on the other side. It is quite obvious that their quarrel would tear the world to pieces and that all of us leading men on either side who had anything to do with that would be shamed before history. Even embarking on a long period of suspicions, of abuse and counter-abuse and of opposing policies would be a disaster hampering the great developments of world prosperity for the masses which are attainable only by our trinity. I hope there is no word or phrase in this outpouring of my heart to you which unwittingly gives offense. If so, let me know. But do not I beg you, my friend Stalin, underrate the divergencies which are opening about matters which you may think are small to us but which are symbolic of the way the English-speaking democracies look at life.42 HEADNOTE Truman's following message to Churchill, N o . 16, of 29 April, does not fully convey the drama of the Allied forces under Alexander's c o m m a n d to end the war in Italy. Only the day before, the terms of surrender had been handed to the Germans at Allied Headquarters in Italy, and signed on 29 April, along with the surrender of the Italian divisions u n d e r G e r m a n c o m m a n d . Three days later, on 2 May, with the cessation of hostilities, the war in Italy was over. 43

TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 16) April 29, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Referring to Field Marshal Alexander's 934 I suggest that announcement of the local surrender of German armies in Italy to Combined AngloAmerican forces be announced by Alexander at a time that is in his opinion suitable and correct and that the first announcement be not made elsewhere. If you agree please give the necessary instructions to Alexander. 44 HEADNOTE While the war in Europe was thus drawing to a close, Anglo-American relations with Tito and his Yugoslav partisans, not to mention Stalin's tacit support of Tito's actions, gave pause to Allied hopes that all armed conflict in Europe would soon be over. Indeed, it was on this account that Churchill and Alexander "sought to avert trouble by

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getting Tito to agree to the extension of Allied Military Government (AMG) over the whole of the province of Venezia Giulia as elsewhere in Italy." 45 It was to avert such trouble that the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Telegram 536 instructed Alexander to establish A M G throughout Venezia Giulia, as referred to in Truman's next message to Churchill (No. 17). TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 17) April 29, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Replying to your N o . 19, the Combined Chiefs of Staff in 536, on 28 April, with my approval, authorized Alexander to accomplish what I understand to be your idea regarding Trieste and other areas formerly under Italian rule as a matter of military necessity. I do not know what the effect of the forthcoming German surrender in Italy may have on Alexander's plans in this matter. 46 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 22) April 30, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret 1. Combined Chiefs of Staff telegram 536. The military part seems to me very good; but it is surely a delusion to suppose the Yugoslav Government, with the Soviet Government behind them, would agree to our entering or taking control of Venezia Guilia including Fiume etc. They will undoubtedly try to overrun all this territory and will claim and occupy the ports of Trieste, Pola and Fiume, and once they get there I do not think they will go. No one is more keen than I to play absolutely fair with the Soviet on matters of the surrender of the German armies, and as you see the messages we have both sent to Stalin have completely restored his confidence in this respect. On the other hand we have never undertaken to be limited in our advances to clear Italy, including these Adriatic Provinces, of the Germans by the approval either of the Yugoslavs or of the Russians, nor to report to them the military movements our Commanders think it right to make. I shall be agreeably but extremely surprised if, for instance, para. 4 of 536 receives anything but a stubborn refusal coupled with a renewed effort of the Yugoslav partisans to arrive at Trieste before us. We are as much entitled to move freely into Trieste, if we can get there, as were the Russians to win their way into Vienna. We ought if possible to get there first and then talk about the rest of the Province. After all the basic principle on which we have been working is that territorial changes must be left for the peace or armistice settlement.

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2. I therefore hope that Alexander will be left to carry out the plan, which the Chiefs of the Combined Staffs have approved, as quickly and as secretly as possible and that above all we shall try to take possession of Trieste from the sea before informing the Russians or Yugoslavs, assuming of course that the Supreme Commander considers that it can be successfully accomplished with the amphibious and other Forces at his disposal. 3. In conclusion, it would seem that while the Allied Forces will arrive in Trieste as liberators laying no claim to territorial gains, the Yugoslavs will arrive as conquerors laying their hands on territory which they vehemently covet. It has seemed to me, in view of the United States friendly sentiments towards Italy, some defense of Italian rights at the head of the Adriatic might be the means of harmonious combination between the United States, the British and the Italian Governments and would split or render ineffective the Communist movement in Italy and especially in Northern Italy. There will be a great shock to public opinion in many countries when the American Armies of the North withdraw, as they have to under the occupational zone scheme, on a front of several hundred miles to a distance of upwards of 120 miles to the West, and when the Soviet advance overflows all those vast areas of central Germany which the Americans had conquered. If at the same time the whole of the Northern Adriatic is occupied by Yugoslavs, who are the Russian tools and beneficiaries, this shock will be emphasized in a most intense degree. I beg you will consider these matters before allowing any disclosure of plans, which remain entirely within our accredited zone of action, to the Russians or the Yugoslavs. Postscript 1. Just as I was sending off the above I received your No. 17 for which I thank you very much. My remarks are in no way out of harmony with your decision except that I think we are entitled to act first and explain afterwards in this particular case. 2. I have also heard that Ustachi bands pro-German in character are being moved into these regions in order to embroil us with the Yugoslavs. They are said to number 20,000 men apart from those gathered further East by Mihailovic. All this accentuates the need for speed provided that Alexander and Mark Clark think they can get. All this Italian business is a grand victory for our Armies and will probably mean the greatest mass surrender yet achieved. All my good wishes. 47 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 23) April 30, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Thank you for your No. 16. I entirely agree and have instructed Alexander accordingly and I have also notified Stalin.48

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HEADNOTE Churchill had wanted the Allied advance to include the liberation of Prague, and as much of "western Czechoslovakia" as possible, and on 30 April he cabled a message along these lines to President Truman. The State Department also favored the idea, but Truman deferred any decision in this matter to the judgment of General Eisenhower. Churchill, w h o continued to advocate the use of Allied forces "to counteract" Russia's advance, worried that the Russian threat would only intensify n o w that the war in Europe would soon be over. Truman, however, decided against such a move in his message (No. 21) to Churchill. 4 9 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 24) April 30, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret There can be little doubt that the liberation of Prague and as much as possible of the territory of western Czechoslovakia by your forces might make the whole difference to the post-war situation in Czechoslovakia, and might well influence that in nearby countries. On the other hand, if the western Allies play no significant part in Czechoslovakian liberation, that country will go the way of Yugoslavia. Of course, such a move by Eisenhower must not interfere with his main operations against the Germans, but I think the highly important political considerations mentioned above should be brought to his attention. The British Chiefs of Staff have, therefore, on my instructions, asked the United States Chiefs of Staff to agree to the dispatch of a message to Eisenhower in order that he should take advantage of any suitable opportunity that may arise to advance into Czechoslovakia. I hope this will have your approval. 50 HEADNOTE O n 30 A p r i l , in his n e x t t w o t e l e g r a m s t o P r e s i d e n t T r u m a n , Churchill raised the further issue involving the failure of the Soviets to allow the European Advisory Commission, the EAC, to carry out its w o r k of sending representatives into Austria for the purpose of reaching an agreement on zonal boundaries. According to Truman's own account, the reality was that no decision on zonal boundaries could be reached until the EAC had agreed on the respective zones, and that this could not be achieved "until there was an examination on the spot." 5 1

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Established in J a n u a r y 1 9 4 4 to r e c o m m e n d for a p p r o v a l the zones of occupation for Germany, it was only later that the EAC took into account the zonal boundaries for Austria. CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 25) April 30, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret I am much concerned about the way things are going in Austria. The announcement of formation of a Provisional Austrian Government, together with refusal of permission to our Missions to fly into Vienna, makes me fear that the Russians are deliberately exploiting their arrival first into Austria to "organize" the country before we get there. It seems to me that unless we both take a strong stand now we shall find it very difficult to exercise any influence in Austria during the period of her liberation from the Nazis. Would you be willing to join me in sending Stalin a message in terms of my immediately following telegram? 52 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 26) April 30, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Following is message referred to in my immediately preceding telegram: We have been much concerned to hear from our Charge d'Affaires in Moscow that, despite invitation extended to Mr. Harriman on April 13th, the Soviet Government will not agree to Allied Missions proceeding to Vienna until agreement has been reached in EAC regarding respective zones in Vienna and provisional control machinery. We have also been disagreeably surprised by announcement of the setting up in Vienna of a provisional Austrian Government, despite our request for time to consider the matter. It has been our understanding that treatment of Austria, as of Germany, is a matter of common concern to the Four Powers who are to occupy and control these countries. We regard it as essential that British, American and French representatives should be allowed to proceed to Vienna in order to report on conditions there before any final settlement is reached in EAC on matters affecting occupation and control of the country and especially of Vienna itself. We hope you will issue the necessary instructions to Marshal Tolbukhin m in order that Allied Missions may fly in at once from Italy. 53

m

Marshal Fyodor Tolbukhin was the Soviet contact in Vienna for consultation with Allied representatives of the EAC.

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TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 18) April 30, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 22 April 30. It seems to me that Field Marshal Alexander has all the guidance he needs from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. I agree that in the operational phase when he is endeavoring to establish his lines of communication to Austria and to establish his control over Trieste and Pola, there is no need for obtaining prior Russian consent. I note from 932 that before his task force enters Venezia Giulia Alexander will inform Marshal Tito that if any of his forces remain in that area they must necessarily come under Alexander's command. 536 directs Alexander to communicate with the Combined Chiefs of Staff before taking further action in the area in question if the Yugoslav forces there fail to cooperate. I think this is important for I wish to avoid having American forces used to fight Yugoslav forces or being used in the Balkan political arena. 54 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 19) April 30, 1945 President Truman to the Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Replying to your Nos. 25 and 26, the Department of State has today transmitted, via our Embassy in Moscow with a copy to our Embassy in London, for your information, a protest in regard to the provisional Government of Austria which I believe to be in general agreement with your protest on the same subject.55 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 27) May 1, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret On April 26th I notified Marshal Stalin of the renewal of contact with German emissaries in Switzerland on the subject of the capitulation of the German forces in Northern Italy. In doing so I asked Marshal Stalin to appoint a Soviet representative to be present at any negotiations which might take place at A.F.H.Q. n The same day I received the following reply from Marshal Stalin: "I have received your message of April 26th about CROSSWORD; thank you for the notification. "For my part I hereby notify you that the Soviet Military Command has appointed Major-General Kislenko, now representative of the Soviet "Allied Forces Headquarters (Caserta, Italy).

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Government on the Advisory Council for Italy, to take part in the conversations at Field Marshal Alexander's Headquarters on the subject of the capitulation of the German forces in Northern Italy." I send this information now to complete your record. The tone is greatly improved. 56 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 28) May 1, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 18. Events have superseded my No. 22 to you. I am therefore in full agreement with your No. 18 and also with Alexander's No. 936. 2. When the present objectives of No. 936 have been achieved and the situation has been discussed between Alexander and Tito or his representatives on the spot, the moment will come to open the matter to the Russians.57

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 29) May 1, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 19. 1. I have now received from Ambassador Winant a copy of the protest which you have instructed your Representative at Moscow to deliver to the Soviet Government after concerting with our Charge d'Affaires. I am in entire agreement with this protest and our representative in Moscow is instructed to make a similar protest. 2. He is further to make the following separate communication: 1. His Majesty's Government are much concerned to hear from the British Charge d'Affaires in Moscow that despite the invitation you extended to Mr. Harriman on April 13, the Soviet Government will not now agree to the Allied Missions proceeding to Vienna until agreement has been reached in the EAC regarding representative zones in Vienna and the provisional control machinery. It is impossible for the EAC to reach any agreement about the zones in Vienna and the provisional control machinery until the Allied Missions have reached Vienna and have been able themselves to ascertain the conditions there. The results of the Soviet refusal to allow them to go to Vienna have thus produced a complete deadlock and leave the Soviet Government in sole control of Austria. 2. We therefore regard it as essential that the Allied Representatives should be allowed to proceed at once to Vienna and thus enable a settlement to be reached on matters affecting the occupation and control of the country, and especially of Vienna itself, on the spot. We request that the

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necessary instructions be issued to Marshal Tolbukhin in order that the Allied Missions may fly in at once from Italy. 3. I trust, Mr. President, that this will be in accordance with your views, and that if so you will instruct your Charge d'Affaires to support his British colleague.58 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 20) May 1, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister Receipt is acknowledged of your No. 27. We hope that the "Crossword" problem may be solved in a very few days. 59 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 21) May 1, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Your N o . 24. General Eisenhower's present attitude, in regard to operations in Czechoslovakia, which meets with my approval, is as follows: The Soviet General Staff now contemplates operations into the Vitava Valley. My intention, as soon as current operations permit, is to proceed and destroy any remaining organized German forces. If a move into Czechoslovakia is then desirable, and if conditions here permit, our logical initial move would be on Pilsen and Karlsbad. I shall not attempt any move which I deem militarily unwise. 60 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 3 0 ) May 2, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 21: I am in full agreement with the attitude of General Eisenhower, in whom His Majesty's Government have always had the fullest confidence.61 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 22) May 2, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Receipt is acknowledged of your Numbers 28 and 30. T. 713/5—Future Operations in Italy; T. 726/5—Czechoslovakia. 6 2

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TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (Unnumbered) May 2, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister The following message of appreciation and congratulation to Field Marshal Alexander is forwarded with a request that it be transmitted to Field Marshal Alexander: "On this momentous occasion of the surrender of the German armed forces in Italy, I convey to you from the President and the people of the United States congratulations on the signal success of the Allied Armies, Navies and Air Forces under your command, gained only by persistent heroic effort through many months of a most difficult campaign. I send also to you personally our appreciation of the high order of your leadership which conducted our Armies to their complete victory." Harry S. Truman 63 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 31) May 3, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal I have received the generous tribute to Field Marshal Alexander and the Allied forces under his command which you, Mr. President, have sent to me. I forwarded it to him immediately, as you desired, and have requested him to reply direct to you. I know that he will value profoundly, as also do indeed the nations of the British Commonwealth represented in these campaigns, the warmth of the feelings which you express. May I also, in my turn, express British gratitude for the services of the highest quality, both in counsel and on the battleline, of General Mark Clark 0 of the United States Army, who commanded the fighting front with its magnificent United States divisions and whose comradeship with Field Marshal Alexander, shared by this Army of many states and races, will long be cherished in both our countries and commended by history. 64 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 23) May 3, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 31. Please accept my appreciation of your expression of gratitude for the services of General Mark Clark of the United States Army. 65

"General Mark W. Clark, chief of staff, U.S. Ground Forces, Europe.

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HEADNOTE With victory in sight, there still seemed to be no end to the problem of dealing with the Soviet Union, as in the case of the Allied occupation of Austria, 6 6 which, like related issues elsewhere, remained unresolved, as the following telegram illustrates.

TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 24) May 3, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 29. 1. I agree entirely with your No. 29 and the American Charge d'Affaires at Moscow is accordingly being instructed to deliver the following message to the Soviet Government after concerting with his British colleague: "Following Marshal Stalin's suggestion and Vyshinski's confirmation that American, British and French representatives proceed immediately to Vienna to settle the respective zones of occupation, the British and American Governments made plans for their representatives to proceed from Caserta and the French Government send representatives to join them there en route to Vienna. We were therefore greatly surprised to receive the Soviet Government's subsequent intimation that the arrival of American and Allied representatives in Vienna would be undesirable until after the zones have been agreed to in the European Advisory Commission and are unable to understand the reasons for this change in attitude. "The European Advisory Commission has been unable to agree on the zoning of Vienna, partly through lack of information about conditions there. The Soviet representative has already had occasion to alter his own recommendations in the European Advisory Commission because of the discovery that part of the proposed Soviet zone had been destroyed in battle. It is equally important that we examine on the spot the factors bearing our own proposals in the European Advisory Commission. Soviet unwillingness to permit this thus is blocking conclusion of the agreements in the European Advisory Commission. "We therefore hope that appropriate instructions will be issued to Marshal Tolbukhin that the Allied representatives may fly to Vienna immediately."67

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 3 2 ) May 4, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Most grateful for your No. 24. 68

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TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 25) May 5, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Receipt is acknowledged of your No. 2 1 . For your information I have today sent the following to Uncle Joe:P "PRESIDENT TRUMAN TO MARSHAL STALIN. "Replying to your message of April 24, Prime Minister Churchill has sent me a copy of his message to you of April 28. Since you are aware of the position of the United States Government from the messages you have received from President Roosevelt and myself, I need hardly tell you that in regard to the reorganization of the Polish Government I agree with the views Mr. Churchill has expressed in his message of April 28. This Government still considers that the Crimea decisions constitute a fair basis for the settlement of the Polish question and should be carried out. "The meetings of the 3 Foreign Secretaries on the Polish matter have not yet produced a formula which is satisfactory. I consider it of the utmost importance that a satisfactory solution of the problem be worked out as soon as possible. I must tell you that any suggestion that the representatives of the Warsaw Provisional Government be invited to San Francisco, conditionally or otherwise, is wholly unacceptable to the United States Government. To do so would be the acceptance by the United States Government of the present Warsaw Provisional Government as representative of Poland which would be tantamount to the abandonment of the Yalta agreement."69 HEADNOTE Among the other issues that came up in their correspondence, the subject of G e r m a n U-boats received only m i n o r a t t e n t i o n , even though the U-boat remained one of the few weapons of war still being used until the very end. TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 26) May 5, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Following is proposed submarine statement for April: "German submarine activity continued during the month of April. Yet despite enemy underwater operations, fewer United Nations merchant vessels were sunk in April than in March. Moreover, the Nazis lost more U-boats in April than in any month in nearly a year. The enemy submarine menace will continue until all of the U-boats have been accounted for, and there can be no letdown in the vigilance of our PUncle Joe or UJ was occasionally used in referring to Stalin in the correspondence.

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forces. Virtually all German bases in France have been destroyed and the Germans are operating from bases in the Baltic Sea and in Norwegian ports. The major U-boat activity is around the United Kingdom with a small number penetrating into the Western Atlantic." 70 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 27) May 5, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret General Eisenhower has arranged to notify us sufficiently in advance of his proclamation of V-E Dayq so that we may coordinate our announcement with his proclamation. Don't you agree that it is most important that your, Stalin's and my statements should coincide as to their timing? I am sending a similar message to Stalin.71 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 3 3 ) May 5, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Your Nos. 25, 26 and 27 received. 1. I am very much obliged to you for number 25. I am also most concerned about the fate of the fifteen Polish representatives in view of statement made by Mr. Molotov to Stettinius at San Francisco that they had been arrested by the Red Army, and I think that you and I should consult together very carefully upon this matter. If these Poles were enticed into Russian hands and are now no longer alive, one cannot quite tell how far such a crime would influence the future. I am in entire agreement with Mr. Eden's views and actions. I hope he will soon pass through Washington on his homeward journey and that you will talk it all over with him. 2. Your No. 26. We concur. However in view of the very rapid movement of events it may be that this will be outdated before May 10. Perhaps the last of our joint monthly statements about U-boat warfare on this side of the globe has already been made. There will be nothing to regret in this. Should these hopes be realized our Admiralty are rather keen on a final statement being published whenever convenient over both our names, setting forth all the slaughter of the U-boats that we have made in this Hemisphere during the War, and I will send you a draft of the kind of thing they wish to say. The very large number of U-boats destroyed will not be cheering to the Japanese. 3. Your No. 27. We desire to set out workpeople free to celebrate as early as possible on the day of announcement. I am informed that if you spoke at 9 A.M. your time and we in London spoke at 3 P.M. British Double W-E Day, marking the end of the war in Europe, was on 8 May 1945.

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Summer Time, and Moscow spoke at 4 P.M. MOSCOW time, the announcements would be simultaneous. 3 P.M. is rather late for me and I would far rather have noon, or as near noon as possible, but that would drive you into very early hours. Therefore I have resigned myself to 3 P.M. Double Summer Time. It is very hard for me to talk to the people after 3 P.M. Please let me know what you will do. I am sending a message to Stalin telling him the substance of this. I should add that my announcement will consist simply of a short statement of what has happened, and will be made by me as Executive Head of the Government. Three or four minutes will be the outside. There will also be a broadcast to the nation and Empire from His Majesty the Kingr at 9 P.M. This will not be lengthy and should not conflict in any way with any address you may wish to make. I do not propose myself to make any broadcast, apart from the announcement until Thursday, May 10 at 9 P.M., which will be very personal to the British Commonwealth and will mark the end of the fifth year of my tenure as Prime Minister. 72 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 3 4 ) May 6, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret I send you in my immediately following telegram the personal answer which U.J. has sent to me on my long telegram of 29 April which latter you thought well of and also supported by the message quoted in your No. 25. It seems to me that matters can hardly be carried further by correspondence and that, as soon as possible, there should be a meeting of the three heads of government. Meanwhile we should hold firmly to the existing position obtained or being obtained by our armies in Yugoslavia, in Austria, in Czechoslovakia, on the main central United States front and on the British front reaching up to Liibeck including Denmark. There will be plenty to occupy both armies in collecting the prisoners during the next few days, and we may hope that the VE celebration will also occupy the public mind at home. Thereafter I feel that we must most earnestly consider our attitude towards the Soviets and show them how much we have to offer or withhold.73 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 35) May 6, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Following is a message from U.J. referred to in my No. 34. "I have received your message of April 28th on the subject of the Polish question. r

George VI.

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"I am obliged to say that I cannot agree with the arguments which you advance in support of your position. " 1 . You are inclined to regard the suggestion that the example of Yugoslavia should be taken as a model for Poland as a departure from the procedure agreed between us for the creation of a Polish Government of National Unity. This cannot be admitted. The example of Yugoslavia is important, in my opinion, principally as pointing the way to the most effective and practical solution of the problem of establishing a new united Government, there being taken as a basis for this purpose the Governmental organization which is exercising sovereign power in the country. "It is quite understandable that, unless the Provisional Government, which is now functioning in Poland and which enjoys the support and confidence of the majority of the Polish people, is taken as the foundation of the future Government of National Unity, there is no possibility of envisaging a successful solution of the problem set before us by the Crimea Conference. "2. I am unable to share your views on the subject of Greece in the passage where you suggest that the Three Powers should supervise elections. Such supervision in relation to the people of an Allied State could not be regarded otherwise than an insult to that people and a flagrant interference with its internal life. Such supervision is unnecessary in relation to the former satellite States which have subsequently declared war on Germany and joined the Allies, as has been shown by the experience of the elections which have taken place, for instance in Finland; here elections have been held without any outside intervention and have led to constructive results. "Your remarks concerning Belgium and Poland as theatres of war and corridors of communication are entirely unjustified. It is a question of Poland's peculiar position as a neighbor State of the Soviet Union which demands that the future Polish Government should actively strive for friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union, which is likewise in the interest of all other peace-loving nations. This is a further argument for following the example of Yugoslavia. The United Nations are concerned that there should be a firm and lasting friendship between the Soviet Union and Poland. Consequently we cannot be satisfied that persons should be associated with the formation of the future Polish Government who, as you express it, 'are not fundamentally anti-Soviet,' or that only those persons should be excluded from participation in this work who are in your opinion 'extremely unfriendly towards Russia.' "Neither of these criteria can satisfy us. We insist and shall insist that there should be brought into consultation on the formation of the future Polish Government only those persons who have actively shown a friendly attitude towards the Soviet Union and who are honestly and sincerely prepared to cooperate with the Soviet State. " 3 . I must comment especially on Point 2 of your message, in which you mention difficulties arising as a result of rumors of the arrest of 15 Poles, of deportation and so forth.

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"As to this, I can inform you that the group of Poles to which you refer consists not of 15 but of 16 persons, and is headed by the well-known Polish General Okulicki. s In view of his especially odious character the British Information Service is careful to be silent on the subject of this Polish General, who 'disappeared' together with the 15 other Poles who are said to have done likewise. But we do not propose to be silent on this subject. This party of 16 individuals headed by General Okulicki was arrested by the military authorities on the Soviet front and is undergoing investigation in Moscow. General Okulicki's group and especially the General himself are accused of planning and carrying out diversionary acts in the rear of the Red Army which resulted in the loss of over 100 fighters and officers of that Army, and are also accused of maintaining illegal wireless transmitting stations in the rear of our troops which is contrary to law. All or some of them, according to the results of the investigation, will be handed over for trial. This is the manner in which it is necessary for the Red Army to defend its troops and its rear from the diversionists and disturbers of order. The British Information Service is disseminating rumors of the murder or shooting of Poles in Siedlice. These statements of the British Information Service are complete fabrications and have evidently been suggested to it by agents of Arciszewski^ 4. It appears from your message that you are not prepared to regard the Polish Provisional Government as the foundation of the future Government of National Unity and that you are not prepared to accord it its rightful position in that Government. I must say frankly that such an attitude excludes the possibility of an agreed solution of the Polish question." 74 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 28) May 6, 1945 The President to the Prime Minister, Priority, Personal and Top Secret Replying to your No. 33. The hours suggested by you for the simultaneous announcement of victory in Europe, 9 A.M. Washington time, 3 P.M. in London, and 4 P.M. in Moscow, is entirely agreeable to me. I hope Marshal f Stalin] will also agree. Please inform me of his reply to your message. My announcement will be very short and it will probably be followed immediately, or at a later hour by statements by some of the American military and civil leaders of our war effort.

s

General Okulicki was among the fifteen or sixteen arrested by the Soviet military authorities, even though their personal safety had been guaranteed in order to meet with a representative of Marshal Zhukov. In the so-called "Trial of the Sixteen" that followed, in June 1945, all but three received prison terms, which they served in Soviet camps, including General Okulicki. r

Arciszewski, a leader of the Polish Socialist party, had been a staunch opponent of any compromise with Moscow.

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Regarding the overall submarine announcement suggested by you, I will be pleased to receive, for consideration, a draft of your proposed joint announcement. Truman 75 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 29) May 7, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Referring to General Eisenhower's message 358 of 7 May and assuming it is agreeable to you I will announce surrender at 9 A.M. Washington time on Tuesday 8 May as recommended by Eisenhower. This is a momentous occasion for the United Nations and the world. I am repeating this message to Stalin.76 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 3 6 ) May 7, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Most

Immediate

1. You will have seen from this telegram 358 of May 7 that Eisenhower thinks it hopeless to keep the news secret until Tuesday. He suggests that the news should be released at the earliest hour at which simultaneous announcements by the three of us can be arranged. I feel that in the light of what Eisenhower says we cannot wait until 3 P.M. in London Tuesday as now agreed with U.J. I therefore suggest that the announcement should be made today Monday at noon in Washington, 6 P.M. here and 7 P.M. in Moscow. I understand that General Eisenhower has told the Russians that he is quite willing to proceed to Berlin and summoning the Germans also for formal signatures to be appended to the agreement signed at SHAEFU this morning at 1:41 A.M. 2. I shall be most grateful if you will call me up on the open line as soon as you get this asking for Colonel Warden, Whitehall 4433. In speaking back I will address you as Admiral. We can then both tell U.J. what we are going to do. 77 HEADNOTE O n the basis of the preceding telegram from Churchill, Admiral Leahy, at the direction of the President, took Churchill's call at the Pentagon, where he spoke on the same phone which Truman had used on 25 April to discuss Himmler's peace offer with Churchill. U

SHAEF is the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force.

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Leahy's account of his talk with Churchill, later published in his memoirs, resulted in the following cable being sent to Churchill. LEAHY TO CHURCHILL ( U n n u m b e r e d ) May 7, 1945 Admiral Leahy to Prime Minister President fully understands your difficulties but he cannot make his official announcement until the agreed upon hour, 9 o'clock tomorrow, unless Stalin approves and earlier release.78 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 3 7 ) May 7, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret In view of Admiral Leahy's message I have decided with regret to postpone my broadcast statement until tomorrow, Tuesday 8th May, at 3 P.M., British Double Summer Time; i.e. 9 A.M. Washington time. A statement has been issued to the press intimating the time of the announcement tomorrow and stating that tomorrow, Tuesday, will be treated as Victory in Europe Day and will be regarded as a holiday. This was necessary on account of the masses of workpeople who have to be considered. I have informed Marshal Stalin.79

TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (Unnumbered) May 8, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister With the unconditional surrender of all the armies of Nazidom and the liberation of the oppressed people of Europe from the evils of barbarism I wish to express to you and through you to Britain's heroic Army, Navy and Air Forces, our congratulations on their achievements. The Government of the United States is deeply appreciative of the splendid contribution of all the British Empire forces and of the British people to this magnificent victory. With warm affection we hail our comrades-in-arms across the Atlantic." 80 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 3 8 ) May 8, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret U-boat Statement for April Do you now think that as suggested in paragraph 2 of my No. 33 we might regard this as outdated and therefore not issue it?

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I hope to have the overall statement ready to send to you in the course of a day or two. 81 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 30) May 9, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 38. Your proposal to not issue a U-boat statement for April is approved. 82 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 3 9 ) May 9, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman Your message is cherished by the British nation, and will be regarded as if it were a battle honour by all His Majesty's Armed Forces, of all the races in all the lands. Particularly will this be true throughout the great Armies which have fought together in France and Germany under General of the Army Eisenhower, and in Italy under Field Marshal Alexander. In all theatres the men of our two countries were brothers-in-arms, and this was also true in the Air, on the oceans and in the narrow seas. In all our victorious Armies in Europe we have fought as one. Looking at the staffs of General Eisenhower and Field Marshal Alexander, anyone would suppose that they were the organization of one country, and certainly a band of men with one high purpose. Field Marshal Montgomery's 21st Army Group with its gallant Canadian Army has played its part both in our glorious landing last June and in all the battles which it has fought, either as the hinge on which supreme operations turned or in guarding the Northern Flank or advancing northward at the climax. All were together heart and soul. You sent a few days ago your message to Field Marshal Alexander, under whom, in command of the Army front in Italy, is serving your doughty General, Mark Clark. Let me tell you what General Eisenhower has meant to us. In him we have had a man who set the unity of the Allied Armies above all nationalistic thoughts. In his Headquarters unity and strategy were the only reigning spirits. The unity reached such a point that British and American troops could be mixed in the line of battle, and that large masses could be transferred from one Command to the other without the slightest difficulty. At no time has the principle of alliance between noble races been carried and maintained at so high a pitch. In the name of the British Empire and Commonwealth I express to you our admiration of the firm, far-sighted and illuminating character and qualities of General of the Army Eisenhower. I must also give expression to our British sentiments about all the valiant and magnanimous deeds of the United States of America under the leadership

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of President Roosevelt, so steadfastly carried forward by you, Mr. President, since his death in action. They will forever stir the hearts of Britons in all quarters of the world in which they dwell, and will I am certain lead to even closer affections and ties than those that have been fanned into flame by the t w o World W a r s through which we have passed with h a r m o n y and elevation of mind. W.S.C. 8 3

NOTES 1. Lord Moran, Winston Churchill: The Struggle for Survival, 1940-1965 (London: Constable, 1966), 347. 2. Mary Soames, ed., Speaking for Themselves: The Personal Letters of Winston and Clementine Churchill (London: Doubleday, 1999), 526. The reference is to Anthony Eden. 3. Message, Halifax to Churchill, April 13, 1945; Chartwell papers, Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge, 20/214; hereinafter referred to as CHAR papers. 4. CHAR papers 20/214; Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Year of Decisions, 1945, Vol. I (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1955), 20-21; Winston S. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1953), 419; W.F. Kimball, ed., Churchill & Roosevelt, The Complete Correspondence, III (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 632. 5. CHAR papers, 20/214; FRUS, 1945, V, 211; see also Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, VII, 'Road to Victory', 1941-1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1986), 1294-95. 6. Truman, Year of Decisions, I, 22-25. 7. CHAR papers 20/214; FRUS, 1945, V, 211-12. 8. CHAR papers 20/214. 9. CHAR papers 20/214. For Roosevelt's cable of 29 March, see Kimball, Churchill & Roosevelt, III, 592. 10. CHAR papers 20/214; Truman, Year of Decisions, I, 33. 11. CHAR papers 20/214; FRUS, 1945, V, 218-19. Number 946 is reprinted in Kimball, Churchill & Roosevelt, III, 628-29. 12. CHAR papers 20/214; see also, Kimball, Churchill & Roosevelt, III, 609-12, 629-30. 13. CHAR papers 20/214. 14. CHAR papers 20/214; see also President's Secretary's Files, Box 115, Truman papers, Truman Library. Hereinafter referred to as PSF, Truman papers. 15. CHAR papers 20/214. 16. CHAR papers 20/214; Truman, Year of Decisions, I, 34. 17. CHAR papers 20/215; FRUS, III, 1945, 231-32. 18. CHAR papers 20/215. 19. CHAR papers 20/215. 20. CHAR papers 20/215; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers. 21. CHAR papers 20/215; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers. 22. CHAR papers 20/215.

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23. CHAR papers 20/215. Churchill's message to Stalin, quoted in this message to Truman, was sent the same day. 24. CHAR papers 20/215. 25. CHAR papers 20/215; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers. 26. CHAR papers 20/216; FRUS, III, 1945, 240. 27. CHAR papers 20/216; FRUS, III, 1945, 240-41. 28. Telegram, Halifax to Foreign Office, 22 April 1945, CHAR papers; see also Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 418, 423. 29. CHAR papers 20/216; FRUS, 1945, V, 262. 30. CHAR papers 20/216. 31. CHAR papers 20/216; Truman, Year of Decisions, I, 97-98. 32. CHAR papers 20/216. Refers to Truman's previous message to Churchill, though he had sent an identical message to Stalin. 33. CHAR papers 20/216; FRUS, 1945, III, 761-62; Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 466-67; in U.S. ed., 536. 34. CHAR papers 20/216; Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 4 6 7 - 6 8 ; in U.S. ed., 537. 35. CHAR papers 20/216. 36. CHAR papers 20/216; FRUS, 1945, III, 244-45. 37. CHAR papers 20/216. 38. CHAR papers 20/216; Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, in U.S. ed., 536-37. 39. CHAR papers 20/216; FRUS, 1945, IV, 1125; M. Gilbert, Churchill, VII, 1315. 40. CHAR papers 20/216. 41. CHAR papers 20/216; FRUS, 1945, V, 264-65. 42. CHAR papers 20/216; FRUS, 1945, V, 265-71. 43. Truman, Year of Decisions, I, 118. 44. CHAR papers 20/216. 45. Herbert Feis, Between War and Peace: The Postdam Conference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 40ff. 46. CHAR papers 20/216; FRUS, 1945, IV, 1126. 47. CHAR papers 20/216; Gilbert, Churchill, VII, 1322-23. 48. CHAR papers 20/216. 49. Truman, Year of Decisions, I, 134-35. 50. CHAR papers 20/216; FRUS, 1945, IV, 446. 51. Truman, Year of Decisions, I, 136. 52. CHAR papers 20/217; FRUS, 1945, III, 102. 53. CHAR papers 20/217; FRUS, 1945, III, 102. 54. CHAR papers 20/217; Truman, Year of Decisions, I, 163-64. In his memoirs, Truman added: "I was trying to be extremely careful not to get us mixed up in a Balkan turmoil." 55. CHAR papers 20/217. 56. CHAR papers 20/217. 57. CHAR papers 20/217. 58. CHAR papers 20/217; FRUS, 1945, III, 111. 59. CHAR papers 20/217. 60. CHAR papers 20/217; Truman, Year of Decisions, I, 134.

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61. CHAR papers 20/217. 62. CHAR papers 20/217. 63. CHAR papers 20/217. 64. CHAR papers 20/217. 65. CHAR papers 20/217. 66. CHAR papers 20/217. 67. CHAR papers 20/217. 68. CHAR papers 20/217. 69. CHAR papers 20/217. 70. CHAR papers 20/217. 71. CHAR papers 20/217. 72. CHAR papers 20/217; an abridged version appears in FRUS, 1945, V, 284. 73. CHAR papers 20/217; FRUS, 1945,1, 3-4. 74. CHAR papers 20/217. 75. CHAR papers 20/218. 76. CHAR papers 20/218. 77. CHAR papers 20/218. 78. CHAR papers 20/218; William D. Leahy, I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1950), 425. 79. CHAR papers 20/218. 80. CHAR papers 20/218. 81. CHAR papers 20/218. 82. CHAR papers 20/218. 83. CHAR papers 20/218; Gilbert, Churchill, VIII, 4-5.

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2

Preparing for Potsdam— and After

THE CORRESPONDENCE BEFORE TERMINAL

On 6 May, Churchill had cabled President Truman to the effect "that matters can hardly be carried further by correspondence" among the three heads of government. Truman, for his part, concurred in his message of 9 May to Churchill, saying that a tripartite meeting "would be desirable in order to get action on the questions of interest to the three governments" on which no decision or understanding has been reached. In thus deciding to approach Stalin about their next meeting, code-named "Terminal" by Churchill, there now appeared to be a new conflict aborning; the European war had been brought to a successful conclusion but the matter of Anglo-American relations with their Soviet ally had not. Indeed, in a "Private and Top Secret" message to his Foreign Secretary only two days after receiving Truman's message of the 9th, Churchill would describe "the Russian peril as enormous." 1

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TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 31) May 9, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Your messages Nos. 34 and 35. I am in agreement with your opinion that a meeting of the three heads of government would be desirable in order to get action on the questions of interest to the three governments upon which either a decision or a common understanding have not been reached. I very much prefer to have the request for such a tripartite meeting originate from Marshal Stalin and not from either one of us. Perhaps you have means of some kind with which to endeavor to induce Stalin to suggest or request such a meeting. In the meantime it is my present intention to adhere to our interpretation of the Yalta agreements, and to stand firmly on our present announced attitude toward all the questions at issue. In order to prepare for a possible tripartite meeting in the not distant future, I would be very pleased to have from you a list of the questions that you consider it necessary or desirable for us to bring up for discussion, and also suggestions as to meeting places. There should be no valid excuse for Stalin's refusing to come west toward us. In regard to timing, it will be extremely difficult for me to absent myself from Washington before the end of the fiscal year (30 June), but I probably will be able to get away after that date. 2 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 3 2 ) May 10, 1945 The President to the Prime Minister, Operational Priority, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 39. We are very much pleased with the compliments to American Commanders and American Troops expressed in your message No. 39. Our feelings in regard to the British participants in the campaign are identical with those expressed by you in regard to the American participants. Truman. 3 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 3 3 ) May 10, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Referring to your message No. 34. For your information Marshal Stalin had also sent me directly a copy of the message he sent you in reply to

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your telegram of April 28. He has done so under cover of the following brief message: "In view of the fact that you are interested in the Polish question and probably are acquainted with Mr. Churchill's message of April 28 on the Polish question, addressed to me, I consider it not superfluous to send you the full text of my reply to Mr. Churchill forwarded to him on May 4." 4

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 40) May 11, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret 1. Your No. 31.1 think we should offer an invitation jointly or severally at the same moment to Stalin to meet us at some agreed unshattered town in Germany for a tripartite meeting in July. We should not rendezvous at any place within the present Russian military zone. Twice running we have come to meet him. They are concerned about us on account of our civilization and various instrumentalities. But this will be greatly diminished when our armies are dispersed. 2. I do not know at the moment when our general election will be, but I do not see any reason why it should influence your movements or mine where public duty calls. If you will entertain the idea of coming over here in the early days of July, His Majesty will send you the most cordial invitation and you will have a great reception from the British Nation. I would have suggested the middle of June but for your reference to your fiscal year (30 June) because I feel that every minute counts. Thereafter we might move to the rendezvous fixed in Germany and have the grave discussions on which the immediate future of the world depends. I should of course bring with me representatives of both parties in our state and both would use exactly the same language about foreign affairs as we are closely agreed. Therefore I urge your coming here in the earliest days of July and that we leave together to meet U.J. at whatever is the best point outside Russian-occupied territory to which he can be induced to come. Meanwhile I earnestly hope that the American front will not recede from the now agreed tactical lines. 3. I doubt very much whether any enticements will get a proposal for a tripartite meeting out of Stalin. But I think he would respond to an invitation. If not what are we to do? 4. I rejoice that your present intention is to adhere to out rightful interpretation of the Yalta agreements and to stand firmly on our present announced attitude towards all the questions at issue. Mr. President, in these next two months the gravest matters in the world will be decided. May I add that I have derived a great feeling of confidence from the correspondence we have interchanged.

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5. We are drawing up as you desire a list of subjects for discussion amongst us three which will take a few days but will be forwarded to you immediately. 6. I also send you in my immediately following a copy of a telegram I sent on the 4th to Eden.5 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 41) May 11, 1945 Prime Minster to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Following is text of telegram referred to in my immediately preceding telegram. 1. I consider that the Polish deadlock can now probably only be resolved at a conference between the three heads of governments in some unshattered town in Germany, if such can be found. This should take place at [the] latest at the beginning of July. I propose to telegraph a suggestion to President Truman about his visit here and the further indispensable meeting of the three major powers. 2. The Polish problem may be easier to settle when set in relation to the now numerous outstanding questions of the utmost gravity which require urgent settlement with the Russians. I fear terrible things have happened during the Russian advance through Germany to the Elbe. The proposed withdrawal of the United States Army to the occupational lines which were arranged with the Russians and Americans in Quebec, and which were marked in yellow on the maps we studied there, would mean the tide of Russian domination sweeping forward 120 miles on a front of 300 or 400 miles. This would be an event which, if it occurred, would be one of the most melancholy in history. After it was over and the territory occupied by the Russians, Poland would be completely engulfed and buried deep in Russian-occupied lands. What would in fact be the Russian frontier would run across from the North Cape in Norway along the Finnish-Swedish frontier, across the Baltic to a point just east of Liibeck along at the present agreed line of occupation and along the frontier between Bavaria and Czechoslovakia to the frontiers of Austria which is nominally to be in quadruple occupation, and half-way across the country to the Isonzo River behind which Tito and Russia will claim everything to the east. Thus the territories under Russian control would include the Baltic provinces, all of Germany to the occupational line, all Czechoslovakia, a large part of Austria, the whole of Yugoslavia, Hungary, Romania, [and] Bulgaria until Greece in her present tottering condition is reached. It would include all the great capitals of middle Europe including Berlin, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia. The position of Turkey and Constantinople will certainly come immediately into discussion.

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3. This constitutes an event in the history of Europe to which there has been no parallel and which has not been faced by the Allies in their long and hazardous struggle. The Russian demands on Germany for reparations alone will be such as to enable her to prolong the occupation almost indefinitely at any rate for many years during which time Poland will sink with many other states into the vast zone of Russian-controlled Europe, not necessarily economically Sovietised but police-governed. 4. It is just about time that these formidable issues were examined between the principal powers as a whole. We have several powerful bargaining counters on our side, the use of which might make for a peaceful agreement. First, the Allies ought not to retreat from their present positions to the occupational line until we are satisfied about Poland and also about the temporary character of the Russian occupation of Germany, and the conditions to be established in the Russianised or Russian-controlled countries in the Danube valley particularly Hungary, Austria and Czechoslovakia and the Balkans. Secondly, we may be able to please them about the exits from the Black Sea and the Baltic as part of a general settlement. All these matters can only be settled before the United States armies in Europe are weakened. If they are not settled before the United States armies withdraw from Europe and the Western world folds up its war machines, there are no prospects of a satisfactory solution and very little of preventing a third world war. It is to this early and speedy showdown and settlement with Russia that we must now turn our hopes. Meanwhile I am against weakening our claim against Russia on behalf of Poland in any way. I think it should stand where it was put in the telegrams from the President and me. 6 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 42) May 11, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 33. Thank you for informing me. 7 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 43) May 12, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret The latest reply of the Soviet Government about our missions proceeding to Vienna is wholly unsatisfactory. It is quite unacceptable that the Russians should continue in this manner to exclude our representatives from Vienna. I am perfectly willing that the question of zones in Vienna should be concluded in the EAC, but I feel that we should insist that our representatives should first be allowed to make a survey on the spot. Field Marshal Alexander holds the same view very strongly. As we have now reached a

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deadlock on the diplomatic level, would you now be willing to send either a joint or parallel message to Marshal Stalin on the following lines: " 1 . I am surprised to learn that, despite the invitation you extended to Mr. Harriman on April 13th, the Soviet Government are still refusing to allow Allied representatives to proceed to Vienna. The fact, to which M. Vyshinski has drawn attention in a letter to the British Charge d'Affaires, that the zones of occupation in Germany and Berlin were established on a tripartite basis by the EAC before Allied troops entered German territory seems to me to have no relevance to the refusal of the Soviet Government to allow the representatives of their Allies to proceed to Vienna which has been liberated by Soviet forces. I have no wish, as suggested by M. Vyshinski, to transfer the ultimate decision of the zones [in] question from the EAC to Vienna. But, the Soviet representative on the EAC having had occasion to alter his own recommendations to the Commission because of the discovery that part of the proposed Soviet zone had been destroyed, makes me feel that we too are fully entitled to have the opportunity to examine on the spot the factors bearing on our proposals in the Commission. "2. In order therefore to facilitate a rapid conclusion of the agreements in the EAC, which you will I am sure agree to be very desirable, I request that the necessary instructions may be issued to Marshal Tolbukhin so that Allied representatives may fly at once to Vienna." 8 HEADNOTE W h a t can also be said about their correspondence at this time was the degree of Anglo-American unity which came to prevail in spite of Churchill's desire for a " s h o w d o w n " with the Soviets, and despite Truman's reluctance to postpone the transfer of U.S. forces to the Far East in the war against Japan. Thus in Truman's telegram of 12 May, N o . 34, he averred that the issue was "essentially one of deciding whether our two countries are going to permit our Allies to engage in uncontrolled land grabbing or tactics which are all too reminiscent of those of Hitler and Japan." In effect, he concluded that the United States and Britain had no choice but to repudiate such methods if "the fundamental principles of territorial settlement by orderly process" were to be upheld "against force, intimidation or blackmail." 9

TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 34) May 12, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Since sending you my telegram of April 30 I have become increasingly concerned over the implication of Tito's actions in Venezia Giulia. You are no doubt receiving the same reports which indicate that he has no

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intention of abandoning the territory or of permitting a peaceful solution of this century old problem as a part of a general pacific postwar settlement. I have come to the conclusion that we must decide now whether we should uphold the fundamental principles of territorial settlement by orderly process against force, intimidation or blackmail. It seems that Tito has an identical claim ready for South Austria, in Carinthia and Styria and may have similar designs on parts of Hungary and Greece if his methods in Venezia Giulia succeed. Although the stability of Italy and the future orientation of that country with respect to Russia may well be at stake the present issue, as I see it, is not a question of taking sides in a dispute between Italy and Yugoslavia or of becoming involved in internal Balkan politics. The problem is essentially one of deciding whether our two countries are going to permit our Allies to engage in uncontrolled land grabbing or tactics which are all too reminiscent of those of Hitler and Japan. Yugoslav occupation of Trieste, the key to that area and a vital outlet for large areas of central Europe, would, as I know you will agree, have more far-reaching consequences than the immediate territory involved. In these circumstances I believe the minimum we should insist upon is that Field Marshal Alexander should obtain complete and exclusive control of Trieste and Pola, the line of communication through Gorizia and Montfalcone, and an area sufficiently to the east of this line to permit proper administrative control. The line suggested by Alexander at Allied Force Headquarters in March extended to include Pola would, I believe, be adequate. Tito seems unsure of himself and might not put up more than a show of resistance, although we should be prepared to consider if necessary further steps to effect his withdrawal. I note that Alexander, who has lost patience with Tito's latest moves, is prepared to go ahead if we agree. I suggest that as a first step we instruct our Ambassadors at Belgrade to address Tito along the following lines: "The question of Venezia Giulia is only one of the many territorial problems in Europe to be solved in the general peace settlement. The doctrine of solution by conquest and by unilateral proclamation of sovereignty through occupation, the method used by the enemy with such tragic consequences, has been definitely and solemnly repudiated by the Allied Governments participating in this war. This agreement to work together to seek an orderly and just solution of territorial problems is one of the cardinal principles for which the people of the United Nations have made their tremendous sacrifice to attain a just and lasting peace. It is one of the cornerstones on which their representatives, with the approbation of world public opinion, are now at work to build a system of world security. "The plan of Allied Military Government of Venezia Giulia was adopted precisely to achieve a peaceful and lasting solution of a problem of admitted complexities. It is designed to safeguard the interests of the

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peoples involved. Its implementation, while assuring to the military forces of the Allied Governments the means of carrying on their further tasks in enemy territory, would bring no prejudice to Yugoslav claims in the final settlement. "With these considerations in mind, and in view of the previous general agreement of the Yugoslav Government to the plans proposed for this region, my Government has instructed me to inform you that it expects the Yugoslav Government will immediately agree to the control by the Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean of the region which must include Trieste, Gorizia, Montfalcone and Pola, and issue appropriate instructions to the Yugoslav forces in the region in question to cooperate with the Allied Commander in the establishment of military government in that area under the authority of the Allied Commander. "I have been instructed to report most urgently to my Government whether the Yugoslav Government is prepared immediately to acquiesce in the foregoing." I also suggest we both inform Stalin in accordance with the Yalta agreement for consultation. If we stand firm on this issue, as we are doing on Poland, we can hope to avoid a host of other similar encroachments. 10 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 35) May 12, 1945 President Truman to the Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Receipt is acknowledged of your Nos. 41 and 4 2 . n HEADNOTE

ChurchilPs next message that same day also proved to be a guidepost. It was the echo of a phrase which was used only days before, and published in the London Times, wherein Graf Schwerin von Krosigk, the German Minister, was quoted as saying in a broadcast to the German people that an "iron curtain" was descending from the East and "moving steadily forward." 1 2 Churchill, w h o would also use this phrase, attached much importance to it and preferred to be judged by it more than any other statement concerning Russia. CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 44) May 12, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret 1. I am profoundly concerned about the European situation as outlined in my No. 4 1 . I learn that half the American air force in Europe has

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already begun to move to the Pacific Theatre. The newspapers are full of the great movements of the American armies out of Europe. Our armies are also under previous arrangements likely to undergo a marked reduction. The Canadian Army will certainly leave. The French are weak and difficult to deal with. Anyone can see that in a very short space of time our armed power in the Continent will have vanished except for moderate forces to hold down Germany. 2. Meanwhile w h a t is to happen about Russia? I have always worked for friendship with Russia, but like you, I feel deep anxiety because of their misinterpretation of the Yalta decisions, their attitude towards Poland, their overwhelming influence in the Balkans excepting Greece, the difficulties they make about Vienna, the combination of Russian power and the territories under their control or occupied, coupled with the Communist technique in so many other countries, and above all their power to maintain very large armies in the field for a long time. What will be the position in a year or two, when the British and American armies have melted and the French has not yet been formed on any major scale, when we may have a handful of divisions mostly French, and when Russia may choose to keep two or three hundred on active service? 3. An iron curtain is drawn down upon their front. We do not know what is going on behind. There seems little doubt that the whole of the regions east of the line Liibeck-Trieste-Corfu will soon be completely in their hands. To this must be added the further enormous area conquered by the American armies between Eisenach and [the] Elbe, which will I suppose in a few weeks be occupied, when the Americans retreat, by the Russian power. All kinds of arrangements will have to be made by General Eisenhower to prevent another immense flight of the German population westward as this enormous Muscovite advance into the centre of Europe takes place. And then the curtain will descend again to a very large extent if not entirely. Thus a broad band of many hundreds of miles of Russianoccupied territory will isolate us from Poland. 4. Meanwhile the attention of our peoples will be occupied in inflicting severities upon Germany, which is ruined and prostrate, and it would be open to the Russians in a very short time to advance if they chose to the waters of the North Sea and the Atlantic. 5. Surely it is vital now to come to an understanding with Russia, or see where we are with her, before we weaken our armies mortally or retire to the zones of occupation. This can only be done by a personal meeting. I should be most grateful for your opinion and advice. Of course we may take the view that Russia will behave impeccably and no doubt that offers the most convenient solution. To sum up, this issue of a settlement with Russia before our strength has gone seems to me to dwarf all others. 13

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TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 36) May 12, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 40. I would much prefer to have Stalin propose the meeting and believe it is worthwhile to endeavor, through our Ambassadors, 3 to induce him to propose the meeting. If such an effort fails, we can then consider our issuing an invitation jointly or severally. When and if such a meeting is arranged, it appears to me that in order to avoid any suspicion of our "ganging up" it would be advantageous for us to proceed to the meeting place separately. When the conference ends, if my duties here do not make it impossible, I shall be very pleased to make a visit to England where you and I may discuss fully our common interests and problems. I am fully in agreement that the next few months will decide questions of the greatest consequence to the whole world. 14 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 45) May 12, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 34. 1. I agree with every word you say and will work with all my strength on the line you propose. You will have received by now my No. 44, which shows how gravely we both view the situation. If it is handled firmly before our strength is dispersed, Europe may be saved another blood bath. Otherwise the whole fruits of our victory may be cast away and none of the purposes of world organization to prevent territorial aggression and future wars will be attained. 2. I trust that a standstill order can be given on the movements of the American armies and air forces from Europe, at any rate for a few weeks. We will also conform in our demobilization. Even if this standstill order should become known, it would do nothing but good. 3. Alexander's 959 asks urgently what part of his present troops, the Fifteenth Army Group, will be at his disposal in the event of hostilities against Yugoslavia. He has available for action seven United States divisions, four British divisions, one New Zealand division, one South African division, two British-Indian divisions, two Polish divisions and one Brazilian division, total 18 divisions. I have no doubt that if these were placed at his disposal he would feel himself in a good position to carry out any policy which our Governments may order. I must of course obtain a

The two ambassadors, respectively, were W. Averell Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.

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permission from the New Zealand and South African Governments in respect to their two divisions and I cannot doubt that this would be accorded, especially to any policy in which Great Britain and the United States would be acting together. 4. In accordance with your suggestion I am instructing our Ambassador at Belgrade to address Tito on the lines which you have set forth and to keep in step with your Ambassador at every stage, whether in oral presentations or the delivery of identical or parallel notes or of a joint note. 5. The only minor amendment I would suggest to the proposed message to Tito would be towards the end, after the words "which must include Trieste, Gorizia, Monfalcone and Pola," to add the words "the lines of communications through Gorizia and Monfalcone to Austria and an area sufficiently to the east of this line to permit proper administrative control." This is what you say in your introductory message to me except that I have suggested the addition of the words "to Austria." If you agree, pray insert and dispatch without further reference to me. 15 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 4 6 ) May 13, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 36. 1. F.D.R. b promised me he would visit England before he went to France or, as it has now become, Germany. We should feel disappointed if you did not come to us. But having regard to the gravity of the next few months, no question of ceremonial should intervene with the organized sequence of events. Therefore I am for the conference of the three as soon as possible and wherever possible. 2. In this case I consider it that we should try to bring the meeting off sometime in June, and I hope that your fiscal year will not delay it. We greatly hope you will come to England later. 3. I agree that our Ambassadors should do their utmost to induce Stalin to propose the meeting, and instructions will be given accordingly by us. I doubt very much whether he will accede. Time is on his side if he digs in while we melt away. 4. I look forward to your meeting with Eden. 16 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 47) May 13, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret 1. In your message to me No. 34 of May 12th about Venezia Giulia you mention Tito's claims in south Austria (Styria and Carinthia). President Roosevelt.

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2. As these two provinces are in the proposed British zone of occupation, the British Ambassador in Belgrade was instructed on May 10th formally to request Tito on behalf of His Majesty's Government that all Yugoslav forces at present in Austria should immediately be withdrawn. I am asking Halifax to show you the text of this instruction. It would be a great help if you could now instruct Mr. Pattersonc to inform Tito that the communication made by the British Ambassador on the subject of Carinthia has the approval and support of the United States Government. 17 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 48) May 14, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Your message No. 34 last paragraph. I would propose, unless you disagree, that we should instruct our representatives in Moscow to make to the Soviet Government the communication contained in my immediately following telegram. 2. You will observe that I have not referred to the Yalta declaration on liberated Europe. d I doubt whether it was really intended to cover a case of this nature, and the Soviet Government might argue that under this declaration we were not entitled to take the action we have taken without having first consulted them. 18 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 49) May 14, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Following is text of a proposed communication to Stalin referred to in my immediately preceding telegram. "I am sorry to say that a serious situation has arisen in the Italian province of Venezia Giulia. "2. It has always been recognized that the future of this province, which was acquired by Italy after the last war, will have to be decided at the peace settlement, since its population is largely Yugoslav and only partly Italian. Until the peace settlement it would be only right and proper that the province should be placed under the military government of Field Marshal Alexander who will occupy and administer it on behalf of the United Nations. " 3 . Before however this could be done Yugoslav regular forces entered the province and occupied not only the country districts where the Yugoslav guerillas had already been active, but also entered the towns of Pola, Trieste, Gorizia and Monfalcone where the bulk of the population is c

Richard C. Patterson, Jr., U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia.

Nonetheless, this seems to have been Truman's understanding of the agreement reached at Yalta on the Declaration on Liberated Europe in the case of the Yugoslav occupation of northeastern Italy.19

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Italian. Field Marshal Alexander's forces advancing from the west reached Trieste at about the same time and took the surrender of the German garrisons in Trieste and elsewhere. "4. Field Marshal Alexander thereupon proposed to Marshal Tito that the Yugoslav troops and administration should be withdrawn from the western part of the province so as to enable the Field Marshal to control the lines of communication by road and rail between Trieste and Austria. This was a very modest request. In this western portion of the province the Field Marshal proposed to set up an Allied Military Government, including in particular the town of Trieste, it being clearly understood that this arrangement was made purely for the sake of military convenience and in no way prejudiced the ultimate disposal of the province which His Majesty's Government consider should be reserved for the Peace Table. "5. The Field Marshal sent his Chief of Staff to Belgrade to discuss the proposal with Marshal Tito, but unfortunately the latter refused to accept it and insisted instead on extending his own military government as far as the Isonzo River, while merely offering Field Marshal Alexander facilities for communicating with Austria through Trieste. "6. His Majesty's Government cannot agree to such an arrangement. Yugoslav occupation and administration of the whole province would be in contradiction with the principle, which we seek to maintain, that the fate of the province must not be decided by conquest and by one-sided establishment of sovereignty by military occupation. "7. As you know, Field Marshal Alexander is in command of both British and American troops and speaks therefore on behalf of both the British and United States Governments. In view of the unhelpful attitude adopted by Marshal Tito he has now referred the matter to these two Governments. "8. The latter having carefully considered the situation with which they are faced, have decided to make the following communication to the Yugoslav Government: [Here would follow text in President's message to Prime Minister No. 34 as modified by Prime Minister's message to President No. 45.] "9. In view of the serious issues at stake the British and American Governments have deemed it right to inform the Soviet Government at the earliest possible moment of the action that they have found it necessary to take as a result of the attitude adopted by the Yugoslav Government and Army in Venezia Giulia." 20 HEADNOTE In his following telegram to Churchill, N o . 37, Truman acknowledged the fact that only if Tito engaged in hostile action would they "be justified" in using force to repulse any attack, although Churchill believed that Tito would conform to Allied wishes, especially when

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he realized that "we are in deadly earnest," as he cabled in reply in his N o . 5 1 . TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 3 7 ) May 14, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 45. I have sent to the American Ambassador in Belgrade the message proposed in my No. 34, corrected as suggested by you. In regard to your suggestion that a standfast order be given to American arms in Europe, I prefer to await further developments before giving serious consideration to a further temporary continued occupation of the agreed upon Soviet zone in Germany. It appears to me necessary that we should have a report regarding our message to Belgrade before reaching a decision on what forces to authorize for use in the event of our troops being attacked by the Yugoslavs. Unless Tito's forces should attack, it is impossible for me to involve this country in another war. If Tito should take hostile action and attack our Allied forces anywhere I would expect Field Marshal Alexander to use as many troops of all nationalities in his command as are necessary. Truman 21 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 38) May 14, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Your N o . 47. I have today informed the American Ambassador in Belgrade that the communication made by your Ambassador on the subject of Carinthia has the approval of the United States Government and that he may so inform Tito. 22 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 39) May 14, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Your Nos. 44 and 46. Thank you for your estimate of the future situation in Europe as outlined in your No. 44. From the present point of view it is impossible to make a conjecture as to what the Soviet may do when Germany is under the small forces of occupation and the great part of such armies as we can maintain are fighting in the Orient against Japan. I am in full agreement with you that an early tripartite meeting is necessary to come to an understanding with Russia.

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A report from our Embassies in Moscow seems necessary before we can approach a decision on the time or place for the meeting. I have talked with Mr. Eden today and I shall make every practicable effort to so arrange my affairs here as to permit an early meeting somewhere.23

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 50) May 15, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 39 has just arrived. I agree with what you say. I will take a chance of getting a snub from Stalin by sending him a telegram urging a friendly tripartite meeting.e 2. I am deeply gratified by your very kind remarks about my speech yesterday, and am delighted to know that it was in harmony with the broad thoughts of the American people. 24

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 51) May 15, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 37. I quite understand your wishing to await further developments before deciding on such serious steps, and that we should await the result of our message to Tito. 2. I am not quite clear about your sentence "Unless Tito's forces should attack it is impossible . . . etc." I thought, from your No. 34, that if he were recalcitrant, we should have to push his infiltrations east of the line you have prescribed. I presume his prolonged intrusion into these regions would, if persisted in, constitute "an attack." I believe myself he will give in and conform to our wishes, especially when he realizes we are in deadly earnest.^ Anyhow I agree we must wait till he replies. 3. Your No. 38. Thank you very much. 25

e

Nearly two months before, on 21 March, Churchill had ended a message to Stalin with an appeal for a heads-of-government meeting to sweep away all the difficulties which had arisen since the Yalta conference. In his reply, Stalin ignored Churchill's appeal for just such a postYalta meeting. f

George F. Kennan, then the charge d'affaires at the U.S. embassy in Moscow, in a diary entry at the time, had noted that Tito would "be influenced not by personal cordiality of the Western representatives in Belgrade but by the strength and decisiveness of the governments they represent." 26

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HEADNOTE By 15 May, accordingly, it had become clear to President Truman that he might have to make a show of force, if circumstances warranted. In a meeting with the Army's Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, he asked if General Eisenhower "could send three divisions to the Brenner Pass or above Trieste." Truman also asked his Naval and Air chiefs, Admiral Ernest King and General " H a p " Arnold, respectively, for the necessary ships and air squadrons to be made available should trouble come. "We have had enough of being pushed around," he averred, adding that "I am here to make decisions, and whether they prove right or wrong I am going to make them." 2 7 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 4 0 ) May 15, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Your Nos. 48 and 49. I have directed the American Embassy in Moscow to inform Marshal Stalin that "I fully agree with Prime Minister Churchill's message regarding the situation that has arisen in the Italian Province of Venezia Giulia as a result of the attitude adopted by the Yugoslav Government and Army in Venezia Giulia." 28 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 41) May 16, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret As suggested by your No. 4 3 , I am sending the following message to Marshal Stalin along the lines of your message to him: "I am unable to understand why the Soviet Authorities are now refusing to permit American and Allied representatives to proceed to Vienna, contrary to the good suggestion you made to Ambassador Harriman on April 13 that representatives go there to study the Vienna zones of occupation, in order that the agreements on the occupation of Austria now pending in the European Advisory Commission may be completed. "Intelligent arrangement of the Vienna zones would be greatly facilitated by an examination and discussion on the spot by the Military Authorities who will later be responsible for smooth operation of the interAllied administration of Austria. For example, the Soviet representative in the European Advisory Commission has recently proposed that the air communication needs of the American Forces be met by placing under American administration the airport of Tulln, 20 kilometres northwest of Vienna, in lieu of an airport in Vienna itself. However, neither he nor we

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know the precise dimensions or conditions of this airport, and to give his proposal proper consideration we should be permitted to survey it. "Since the area to be zoned is no longer in enemy occupation it seems only reasonable to examine it, as you suggested, in order to facilitate completion of the agreements in the European Advisory Commission. Continued refusal of the Soviet Authorities to permit this, in spite of your original suggestion, would not be understood by the American public. "I therefore hope that you will yourself let me know whether you will issue the necessary instructions to Marshal Tolbukhin to facilitate a survey by the Allied representatives of those Vienna areas which are now under discussion in the European Advisory Commission." In these messages we contemplate having the representatives merely survey and discuss prospective zones, so that formal zoning and control machinery agreements can be completed in EAC. I consider the latter our primary objective in Austria now and am inclined to think it would be a mistake to have our representatives reside in Vienna or assume any functions or responsibilities there beyond surveying the zones, until full joint control of Austria can be instituted on a basis of full equality among the occupying Powers. I fear that the Russians want before then to do things in Vienna that we would not approve, but that they want equally much to do them in our name rather than carry the onus alone. Until we can have equal control it seems desirable to maintain the position that what is done there is done unilaterally; otherwise we might slip there into the uncomfortable position we occupy in the Allied Commission in Rumania and Bulgaria.29 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 42) May 16, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Your Nos. 50 and 51 received, and I am pleased with your agreement that we should await results of our messages to Tito before deciding upon further action. To clarify understanding of my message No. 37 (your No. 51), beginning, "Unless Tito should attack, it is impossible, etc.," it means definitely that I am unable and unwilling to involve this country in a war with the Yugoslavs unless they should attack us, in which case we would be justified in using Allied Forces to throw them back to a distance that would preclude further attack on our troops. 30 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 5 2 ) May 19, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 42. 1. I hope you will not mind my putting to you with great respect the need for some further consideration of the words "A war with the Yugoslavs"

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and secondly "attack us." I do not envisage a war with the Yugoslavs, and, short of war, I do not consider ambassadors should be withdrawn. It is at critical junctures that ambassadors should be on the spot. Meanwhile Tito's answer has arrived and is completely negative. We clearly cannot leave matters in this state, and immediate action will now be necessary. Otherwise we shall merely appear to have been bluffing and will in fact be bluffed out. 2. I think we should prevent the rough handling of our front line troops, or infiltrations ostensibly peaceful but contrary to the directions of the Allied commanders and on a scale to endanger the position of our forces where they now stand. For instance, supposing they take up positions all around a British or American unit until they have it at their mercy, are we to wait till they open fire before asking them to move back beyond the line you have indicated is desirable? I am sure this is not what you mean, but it is just the sort of incident which I think may arise. 3. A short time back I received the following from Field Marshal Alexander. "If Tito puts his fighting and administrative troops under my command in areas for which I am responsible, it will meet my military needs, although I should prefer that he withdrew completely. If he refuses to do so, it will inevitably lead to armed conflict, since I must very soon insist on the proper functioning of my AMG. For example, I must remove Tito's proclamations and replace them with my own. Again, I cannot allow my movements to be restricted by Yugoslav posts and sentries." 31 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 43) May 21, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret In view of recent developments in the disputes with Tito over the occupation and administration of North East Italy, I have today sent the following telegram to Stalin: "Through the Embassy in Moscow I have been keeping you informed of the American position on the interim administration of the Venezia Giulia. In particular your Government was given copies of the recent American and British notes to Marshal Tito which proposed, in accordance with the previous understanding reached in February between Field Marshal Alexander and Marshal Tito, that the Supreme Allied Commander should exercise control in an area including Trieste, Monfalcone, Gorizia and Pola in order not to prejudice any final disposition through occupation by either claimant. We have now had a reply from Marshal Tito which is entirely unsatisfactory in that he states that his Government is not prepared 'to renounce the right of the Yugoslav army holding the

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territory up to the Isonzo river'. As regards the administration of the area he offers a solution which cannot be reconciled with the principles we have enunciated. Meanwhile the proximity of Alexander's and Tito's troops in undefined areas of occupation and the dual nature of control thus created are fraught with danger. You will have seen from Ambassador Harriman's communication to Mr. Molotov last March, from our recent public statement, and from the communication to Marshal Tito that we cannot consider this simply in the light of an Italian-Yugoslav boundary dispute but must regard it as a question of principle involving the pacific settlement of territorial disputes and the foundation of a lasting peace in Europe. We will not now or in the future take or permit any action in respect to this territory which does not fully take into account legitimate Yugoslav claims and the contributions which Yugoslav forces made to the victory over Germany won at such great cost to us all. We cannot, however, accept any compromise upon the great principles of an orderly and just settlement and are so informing Marshal Tito. "I know you will agree that we must stand firm on the issue of principle and I hope that we can count on your influence also to assist in bringing about the provisional settlement outlined in our recent note to Marshal Tito. After Field Marshal Alexander has extended his authority in the Venezia Giulia east of the line indicated in our note and tranquility has thus been restored, we could then continue in the spirit of our Yalta understandings looking towards further adjustments of the problem." 32

TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 44) May 21, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 52. I agree that we cannot leave matters in their present state. It seems our immediate action should be to reject Tito's answer as unsatisfactory and urge him to reconsider his decision. At the same time, I suggest we have Field Marshal Alexander, with assistance from General Eisenhower, immediately reinforce his front line troops to such an extent that our preponderance of force in the disputed areas and the firmness of our intentions will be clearly apparent to the Yugoslavs. General Eisenhower has already communicated with Field Marshal Alexander concerning preparations for some such action. I suggest that we now direct General Eisenhower and Field Marshal Alexander to proceed with the implementation of a show of force, both air and ground, and that the presentation in Belgrade of our rejection of Tito's stand be timed, if practicable, so that our commanders' troop movements will be already be evident to Tito.

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There should be no question about our commanders taking essential precautions to prevent their forces being placed in untenable military position. However, I think we should make very clear to our leaders that this should be done with maximum precautions to insure that the overt act, if any, comes from Tito's forces. It may be that a heavy show of force will bring Tito to his senses. I question, however, that if hostilities should break out, it could be considered as frontier incidents. In keeping with the foregoing, I therefore propose that you and I issue the following instructions to Alexander and Eisenhower: "In connection with the problem of occupying Venezia Giulia and portions of Austria, Marshal Tito's reply to our proposals is unsatisfactory, and he is being urged to reconsider his decision. Meanwhile, Field Marshal Alexander is directed, with maximum practicable assistance from General Eisenhower, immediately to reinforce his troops in the disputed areas so that our preponderance of force in those areas and the firmness of our intentions will be clearly apparent to the Yugoslavs. Special precautionary measures will be taken so that an overt act, if any, will be by Tito's forces and will not be based on some local display by a few turbulent individuals." I must not have any avoidable interference with the redeployment of American forces to the Pacific.33

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 5 3 ) May 21, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 44. 1. I am in entire agreement with the message you are issuing to Alexander and Eisenhower and our Chiefs of Staff will notify yours accordingly so that Combined Chiefs of Staff can give the necessary directions. To save time I am notifying Field Marshal Alexander privately. 2. I think there is a very good chance that if our deployment is formidable, a solution may be reached without fighting. Our firm attitude in this matter will I believe be of value in our discussion with Stalin. It seems to me that the need for our Triple Meeting at the earliest moment is very great. There will probably be a General Election Campaign here during June, but as all Parties are agreed on foreign policy it need not make any postponement necessary. Could you give me any idea of the date and place which would be suitable so that we can make our several requests to Stalin. I have a fear that he may play for time in order to remain all powerful in Europe when our Forces have melted. 3. I also like very much the message to Moscow contained in your No. 43 and our Embassy in Moscow will be instructed to support it in

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every way either by direct association or if you prefer it, and will let me know, by presentation of a separate but similar message. The only additional point which I think worth mentioning is the necessity of making it clear that we do not propose to deal with the Tito territorial problem separately as all outstanding issues concerning the frontiers of Europe should be settled at the Peace Table having due regard to the structure of Europe as a whole. Pray let me have your views on this. 34 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 45) May 21, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 53. I am informing the Chiefs of Staff of our approval of the message to Eisenhower and Alexander. I may, within the next weeks, have more information bearing on a date and location for the Tripartite Meeting if Stalin agrees to participate. I hope he will agree to come west into Germany or further west, but I am advised that he is not likely to go beyond Soviet controlled territory. Referring to my No. 43. It would seem at the present time that support by your Embassy in Moscow would probably be as effective as a separate but similar message from you. I indulge in a hope that Uncle Joe will use his influence to assist in reaching a settlement^ of the Tito problem in Venezia Giulia.35 The Widening Allied Issues before Potsdam Illustrative were the missions to London and Moscow at the President's request. In the case of the former, Truman sent former ambassador Joseph Davies h to meet with Churchill in London to say that there w o u l d be no s h o w d o w n with Stalin, because the President believed that only through unity among the Three Powers could a durable peace be achieved, and that he did not w a n t anything to stand in the way of such an attempt being made. The Moscow mission was more complicated, but Truman hoped that Harry Hopkins 1 §For Stalin's reply, see Truman's message No. 47 to Churchill. A settlement was reached, in fact, on 9 June 1945 when an agreement was signed which divided Venezia Giulia into two military occupation zones. In that agreement, the western zone, including the city of Trieste, came under Anglo-American occupation, while the eastern zone came under Yugoslav occupation, even as Stalin continued to support "Tito's case" instead of his Anglo-American allies.36 h

Joseph E. Davies, U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, 1936-1938.

'Harry Hopkins, U.S. official and diplomat in the Roosevelt and Truman administrations.

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could help to achieve its purpose, including an agreed-upon meeting of the three heads-of-government "to discuss the problems arising out of the end of the war in Europe," Soviet entry into the Pacific War, and the question of U.S.-Soviet relations toward China. 3 7 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 46) May 22, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret I am asking Mr. Joseph E. Davies to come to see you prior to the pending conference between you, Marshal Stalin and myself. There are a number of matters that I want him to explore with you and which I would prefer not to handle by cable. Mr. Davies will be in London probably the twentyfifth. I would appreciate it if you could see him at your convenience. Truman 38 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 54) May 23, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Thank you for your No. 46. I shall be delighted to see Mister Davies as soon as he arrives. 39 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 47) May 23, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret The following quoted message is received from Marshal Stalin this date: "I have received on May 21 your message on the question of IstriaTrieste. Somewhat earlier I have also received from you, through Mr. Kennan, the text of the message transmitted by the American Ambassador in Belgrade to the Yugoslav Government on the same question. Thank you for this information. "In regard to the essence of the question I have to say the following: "Your opinion, that this question is of principle and that in respect to the territory of Istria-Trieste no action should be allowed which will not fully consider the lawful claims of Yugoslavia and the contribution made by the Yugoslav Armed Forces to the common cause of the Allies in the struggle against Hitlerite Germany, seems to be quite correct. It goes without saying that the future of this territory, the majority of whose population is Yugoslavian, should be determined during the Peace adjustment. However, at the present time the question under consideration is the temporary military occupation of this territory. In this respect it is necessary, in my opinion, to take into consideration the fact that it is the Allied Yugoslav troops who have driven the German invaders from the territory of Istria-Trieste, thereby

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rendering an important service to the common cause of the Allies. By virtue of this circumstance only it would not be fair and would be an undeserved insult for the Yugoslav Army and the Yugoslav people to refuse Yugoslavia the right to occupy territory retaken from the enemy after the Yugoslav people has made so many sacrifices in the struggle for the national rights of Yugoslavia and for the common cause of the United Nations. "It seems to me that the correct solution of this question is the one which would provide that the Yugoslav troops remain in the region of Istria-Trieste as well as the Yugoslav administration functioning at the present time in this region. At the same time in this region be established a control of the Allied Supreme Commander, and, on mutual agreement between Field Marshal Alexander and Marshal Tito, a demarcation line be drawn. By accepting these proposals the question of administration in the region of Istria-Trieste would also receive a correct solution. "As the Yugoslav population is in majority on this territory and already in the period of German occupation a local Yugoslav administration was being formed, which at the present time enjoys the confidence of the local population, the present situation should be taken into consideration. By subordinating the already existing Yugoslavian civilian administration in this region to the Yugoslav military command the question of administrative direction of this territory would be appropriately regulated. "I would like to hope that the misunderstanding regarding the situation of the region Istria-Trieste, arisen among the Governments of the United States and Great Britain on the one hand and the Yugoslav Government on the other, will be eliminated and the whole matter will be favorably settled."40 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 5 5 ) May 27, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 47. Thank you very much for repeating to me this important telegram. 41 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 56) May 27, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret I have sent the following message to Marshal Stalin in reply to his telegram of May 23 about the German fleet. "Prime Minister to Premier Stalin, Personal and Top Secret. "I thank you for your telegram of May 23. It seems to me that these matters should form part of the general discussions which ought to take place between us and President Truman at the earliest possible date, and I thank you for giving me this outline of your views beforehand." 42

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TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 48) May 28, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Your messages Nos. 55 and 56 received. I am in general agreement with your reply to Stalin regarding surrendered German naval and merchant ships and I will send him a similar message. Stalin has informed me through Mr. Hopkins that he would like to have our Three Party meeting in the Berlin area and I will reply that I have no objection to the Berlin area. 43 HEADNOTE The issue of Lend-Lease concerned the continuation of Lend-Lease assistance to Britain following the end of the war in Europe, and British anxiety over the prospect of diminishing assistance under the Lend-Lease Act. The following message from Churchill on 28 M a y was an "urgent appeal for continued Lend-Lease aid" that was earlier brought to the attention of Treasury Secretary Morgenthau by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir John Anderson. 4 4

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 57) May 28, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret 1. I am distressed to have to bother you with this telegram when so many other graver matters are pending. But the machine has come to a standstill on the subject and it is felt on all sides here that the matter should be referred by me to you. 2. When I met President Roosevelt at Quebec in September 1944, we both initialled an agreement about Lend-Lease after the defeat of Germany. In accordance with that agreement a detailed plan was worked out with your Administration by the Keynes-Sinclair mission.' It is on this basis that our production plans have been laid. 3. I now hear that your War Department has told our people in Washington that they are expecting so large a cut in their forthcoming appropriations for the U.S. Air Corps that supplies to us must be drastically curtailed below the schedule of our requirements as agreed last autumn. These requirements were, of course, subject to subsequent modification in the light of changes in the strategical situation. I am hopeful that 'The Keynes mission to Washington, and not his first concerning Lend-Lease, included Sinclair, a member of Churchill's war cabinet and leader of the Liberal Party in Britain.

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our requirements as agreed last autumn can now be reduced, but the details of the reduction depend upon discussions between our respective Chiefs of Staff, which will not have been completed before May 31st. Meanwhile I hope that your people can be told that the principles your predecessor and I agreed at Quebec still stand, and in particular that the appropriations given to your War Department will be enough to provide for our needs as finally worked out between us. 45 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 5 8 ) May 29, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 48. I have sent the following telegram to Premier Stalin: " 1 . Your message of May 27. I shall be very glad to meet you and President Truman in what is left of Berlin in the very near future. I hope this might take place about the middle of June. "2. Have repeated this telegram to President Truman who has informed me that this point was raised in your talks with Mr. Hopkins. All good wishes. I am very anxious to meet you soon." 46 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 49) May 29, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 58 received. I am now making a study of a possible date for our three party meeting and hope to have further information on the subject in the not distant future. 47 HEADNOTE Another Allied problem at the end of the European war concerned French interests in the Near East, where France had formerly held Syria and Lebanon as mandates under the League of Nations. The issue of "special concessions" of a cultural and politico-military nature which General de Gaulle sought to obtain for France in both Syria and Lebanon, but w h o m the Allied governments recognized as independent countries during the course of the war, had become the focus of strained relations between de Gaulle as head of the provisional government of France and his Anglo-American allies. Hence the following t e l e g r a m from C h u r c h i l l t o T r u m a n on 30 M a y , asking for U.S. support of British intervention to curb de Gaulle's actions, especially in Syria.

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CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 5 9 ) May 30, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret 1. You will no doubt have had reports confirming our news of the situation in Levant States especially Damascus. Here the French have been shelling the town and causing serious loss of life and destruction of property. Position has deteriorated seriously in the last 24 hours. Continuance of the present situation both in Damascus and elsewhere in Syria, will, I am convinced, cause most grave trouble throughout the Middle East and upon our joint line of communication via Egypt and the Canal with the Far East. 2. We should therefore be prepared to order the Commander-in-Chief Middle East to intervene with British troops in order to stop fighting. Before doing so I feel I ought to know that we should have your approval and support. In this case will you telegraph at once that you are in agreement. Any representations that you may decide to make in Paris will of course be of the utmost value. We will, on hearing from you in this sense, send the following telegram to General de Gaulle. "In view of the grave situation which has arisen between your troops and the Levant States, and the severe fighting which has broken out, we have ordered the Commander-in-Chief Middle East to intervene to prevent the further effusion of blood in the interests of the security of the whole Middle East, which involves communications for the war against Japan. In order to avoid collision between British and French Forces, we request you immediately order the French troops to withdraw to their barracks and to cease fire thereafter except in self-defense. "We have communicated with the U.S. Government and have received their approval to our taking these steps, which are a cause of deep sorrow to us, especially because of the hopes of a Treaty between France and the Levant States, upon the satisfactory conclusion of which, as I told you a month ago, we should be ready to withdraw our troops from Syria and Lebanon. Once firing has ceased, and order has been restored, we shall gladly begin tripartite discussions in London." 1. I most earnestly hope to hear from you at the earliest moment. k [Winston S. Churchill] 48 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 6 0 ) May 31, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret 1. I am hoping that you will soon be able to let me know your date for the meeting of the three in Berlin.1 As you can imagine, many of my plans depend upon it at the present time. k

Truman replied the following day in his next telegram to Churchill, Number 50.

'The day before, 30 May, in a telegram to President Truman, Stalin accepted Truman's proposal for the meeting of the three on 15 July. 49

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2. I had agreeable talks with Mr. Davies, which he will report to you when he returns. I may say however at once that I should not be prepared to attend a meeting which was a continuation of a conference between you and Marshal Stalin. I consider that at this victory meeting, at which subjects of the gravest consequence are to be discussed, we three should meet simultaneously and on equal terms. 3. There are always plenty of opportunities for private discussions between the heads of governments at these meetings while the preliminaries are being arranged and the agenda fixed. I am also hoping to have the pleasure of meeting you for the first time. 50 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 61) May 31, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret In the light of the deteriorating situation in the Levant States, His Majesty's Government felt bound to order the Commander-in-Chief Middle East to intervene in order to prevent further effusion of blood. My immediately following telegram contains the statement on the subject which the Foreign Secretary has just made in the House of Commons. 2. Owing to the emergency, His Majesty's Government felt that they could not wait longer for your reply to my telegram No. 59 but I feel sure that I may count on the support of the United States Government for the steps which we have felt bound to take. 51 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 62) May 31, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal My immediately preceding telegram. Following is Foreign Secretary's statement: I had to inform the House last night of a very serious situation which has developed in Syria, where there is fighting between the Syrians and French troops. I promised to keep the House fully informed as early as I could of any decisions H.M. Government might take. The situation has deteriorated still further since last night. Our Minister in Damascus reports that there was heavy firing and shelling during the night and that two great fires were burning in the centre of the city, about one mile apart but spreading. All telephone communication has been cut between Damascus and the sea coast, and we are only in touch with H.M. Minister by wireless. An armistice was arranged with the French military authorities yesterday afternoon and British and United States civilian colonies were evacuated from Damascus. After that, the centre of the city was subjected to the heaviest and most concentrated shell-fire yet directed upon it. It was also bombed from the air. The Governor of Hama has

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appealed to the 9th Army to arrange an armistice in order that the many dead and wounded may be evacuated. The fighting has spread to other parts of Syria, notably to Jebel Druze, where French officers have been taken prisoner. The President and Government of Syria have sent an urgent appeal to H.M. Government reminding us that we have endorsed the promise of independence and that we have also said that the treaty negotiations with France should be conducted freely and not under duress. The greatest concern has been caused in the Middle East and serious fears are entertained for the state of tranquility which is so necessary in that area if a vital line of communication to the Far East is not to be disturbed. Every possible effort has been made to enjoin calm on both sides and I do not think that a further appeal in this sense would have any effect. In all the circumstances, H.M. Government have come to the conclusion that they cannot any longer stand aside and the Prime Minister accordingly today sent the following message to General de Gaulle: "In view of the grave situation which has arisen between your troops and the Levant States, and the severe fighting which has broken out, we have with profound regret ordered the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, to intervene to prevent the further effusion of blood in the interests of the security of the whole Middle East, which involved communications for the war against Japan. In order to avoid collision between British and French Forces, we request you immediately to order the French troops to cease fire and to withdraw to their barracks. "Once firing has ceased, and order has been restored, we shall be prepared to begin tripartite discussions in London." I feel sure the House will agree with me in deploring these events and will share my hope that once order has been restored, we shall be able to resume the diplomatic initiative which I mentioned last night and to arrange a peaceful settlement which will be satisfactory to the parties concerned. We also have in mind of course arrangements by which the Syrian and Lebanese Governments will be associated with these discussions. We are in the closest touch with all the Governments concerned, including the United States Government, but I would not wish to say more about the diplomatic arrangements which we contemplate at this stage. I feel sure the House will also share my hope that nothing should be said at this stage which would make that diplomatic initiative more difficult.52

TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 50) May 31, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret The telegram to General de Gaulle proposed in your No. 59 meets with my approval. [Harry S Truman] 53

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TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 51) June 1,1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 60. Marshal Stalin has informed me that he is agreeable to having our forthcoming meeting in the vicinity of Berlin about July fifteenth, which date also seems to be possible from the point of view of my domestic duties. I am looking forward with pleasure to seeing you at that time and with confidence that the meeting will produce results of great value to the future of our world. 54 HEADNOTE Churchill's disappointment with the proposed meeting of the three in July can be judged by his next telegram to Truman, as, in his estimable view, time w a s of the essence in reaching a settlement with the Russians. CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 6 3 ) June 1,1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret 1. I will gladly come to Berlin with a British delegation but I consider that July 15, repeat July the month after June, is much too late for the urgent questions that demand attention between us, and that we shall do an injury to world hopes and unity if we allow personal or national requirements to stand in the way of an earlier meeting. Although I am in the midst of a hotly-contested election, I would not consider my tasks here as comparable to a meeting between the three of us. I have proposed June 15, repeat June this month before July, but if that is not possible why not July 1, 2, or 3? 2. I have sent a copy of this message to Premier Stalin.55 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 5 2 ) June 1, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Receipt is acknowledged of your Numbers 61 and 62. 56 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 5 3 ) June 1, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Harry Hopkins has just sent me a most encouraging message about the Polish situation. As perhaps you know, Stalin has agreed to invite to Moscow for consultation, in conformity with our interpretation of the

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Yalta agreement, the following Poles from London: Mikolajczyk, Grabski or Stanczyk, and Kolodzei. He has also agreed to invite for the consultations the following non-Lublin Poles from inside Poland: Archbishop Sapieha or Witos, Zulawski, and Kutrzeba, as well as two non-Party men—Kolodziejski and Adam Krzyanowski, the latter two being Stalin's candidates. We know little about the last two men except that Stalin stated that Kolodziejski was a Doctor of Economic Science, former Director of the Library of the Diet, and present Chairman of the Cooperatives. Hopkins and Harriman approve of the list of names agreed upon and I have informed Hopkins of my whole-hearted approval. I feel that this represents a very encouraging, positive step in the long drawn out Polish negotiations, and I hope that you will approve the list as agreed to in order that we may get on with this business as soon as possible. In regard to the arrested Polish leaders, most of whom were apparently charged only with operating illegal radio transmitters, Hopkins is pressing Stalin to grant amnesty to these men in order that consultations may be conducted in the most favorable atmosphere possible.111 I am submitting the list to Mikolajczyk and urging that he accept it. I hope you will use your influence with him to the same end. I have asked Hopkins to remain in Moscow at least until I hear from you regarding this matter. I am sure you will appreciate the necessity for an early reply to this message. 57 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 64) June 2, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret 1. I have been much occupied the last few days by the formation of our very complicated Government, which is now completed.11 I have made it clear that nothing in the British Election will prevent the meeting of the three major Powers at the earliest possible date. 2. The news from Yugoslavia is not good. Very abrupt demands have been made, both to Britain and United States troops, and there is a clear show of force. I earnestly hope for the sake of the future that we shall not be overawed by this nor lend ourselves to schemes for saving Marshal Tito's face. The words which you used in your message about landgrabbing methods strike home to my heart. Field Marshal Alexander is, I understand, ready to move forward any time after June 1st and eject the m

See Churchill's previous message, No. 35, concerning these arrested Polish leaders, and Stalin's cable, in Chapter 1.

"Churchill's reference here is to the formation of a "Caretaker Government" with the general election to follow on 5 July.

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enemy from their positions. It seems to me that unless Tito returns a satisfactory answer to your Ambassador and ours within three days of the presentation to him of the agreement we have drawn up, Alexander should be instructed to complete the occupation in force of such an area of Venezia Giulia as he may consider necessary for the protection of his lines of communication and his Allied Military Government. As soon as he is ready to move he should let the Ambassadors in Belgrade know, and they would tell Tito that the Field Marshal was now taking matters into his own hands. The fact that the Russians have so far remained quiescent is important. If we once let it be thought that there is no point beyond which we cannot be pushed about, there will be no future for Europe except another war more terrible than anything that the world has yet seen. But by showing a firm front in circumstances and a locality which are favourable to us, we may reach a satisfactory and solid foundation for peace and justice.0 3. I hope however that unless we have unqualified submission on our front by these land-grabbers, the operation which is being prepared may take place. I understand from Field Marshal Alexander that he contemplated operations which would be sharp and short. The support which he is being given by General Eisenhower is of immense consequence. I do not think myself that we shall get through this business by bluff. It is my great hope that you will act in the spirit of your No. 34. The humiliation which we shall take if we do not settle this matter in accordance with our just and disinterested requirements may well be fatal to the future of the great causes you set forth so powerfully in your message.58 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 54) June 2, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret On May 27 Marshal Stalin proposed that our Governments establish diplomatic relations with Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria and, at a later time, Hungary. He said he was sending you a similar message. I am today replying to him as follows: "I have given considerable thought to your message of May 27 in which you propose that our Governments should at this time establish diplomatic relations with Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria and, at a later time, Hungary. "Your suggestion shows that you feel, as I do, that we should endeavor to make the period of the armistice regimes as short as possible and also give prompt recognition to all efforts which may be made by those countries which have been our enemies to align themselves with the democratic °As previously noted, Tito's government relented, signing this Allied agreement a week later, on 9 June.

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principles of the Allied nations. I therefore agree that normal relations with these countries should be established at the earliest feasible time. "I am accordingly prepared to proceed at once with the exchange of diplomatic representatives with Finland, all the more readily, of course, because that country has not been in a state of war with the United States, but also because through their elections and other political adjustments the Finnish people have demonstrated their genuine devotion to democratic principles and procedures. "In Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, however, I have not found the same encouraging signs. There, and particularly in the latter two countries, I have been disturbed to find governments which do not accord to all democratic elements of the people the rights of free expression, and which in their system of administration are, in my opinion, neither representative of or responsive to the will of the people. You already know, from Ambassador Harriman's note of March 14, the reasons why the United States Government considers that the political situation in Rumania should be made the subject of consultation among the three principal Allied Governments. As regards Bulgaria, you are also aware of American concern over the proposed electoral procedures and certain other political manifestations there. "I sincerely hope that the time may soon come when I can accredit formal diplomatic representatives to these countries. To this end I am ready at any moment to have my representatives meet with Soviet and British representatives in order more effectively to concert our policies and actions in this area. I think this would be a constructive move toward the restoration of normal peacetime relations with them as independent states ready to assume the responsibilities and to share the benefits of participation in the family of nations. "I am informing Mr. Churchill of this message to you." Would you let me know what you think of Marshal Stalin's proposal? 59 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 6 5 ) June 2, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret I send you in my immediately following telegram the draft which His Majesty's Government suggest for the last of our joint statements on the Battle of the Atlantic. After it has been issued I should propose to publish a statement of the British achievement. I note that Admiral Ingram has given a very full account of the part played by the United States Navy in the Battle of the Atlantic, which has been fully publicized. After the issue of the joint statement I propose therefore to issue a British statement showing actually what we did in the Atlantic and Mediterranean during our sixty-six months of war. W.S.C. 6 0

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CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 6 6 ) June 2, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Reference my telegram No. 65. Draft referred to follows: With the surrender of Germany the Battle of the Atlantic has ended; German U-Boats have ceased to operate and are now proceeding under Allied Orders. Beginning in September 1939 it has been a long and relentless struggle; a struggle demanding not only the utmost courage, daring and endurance, but also the highest scientific and technical skill. Germany's object was to cut the Allied sea communications, upon which the maintenance of the Allied war effort depended. This included the movements and supply of armies and air forces during successful campaigns in four continents. Losses have been heavy both in lives and materials; at the peak in 1941 and 1942 the issue of the struggle hung in the balance. On the other hand over 700 U-Boats have been sunk and many others have been destroyed by the Germans themselves in the final stage. Most of these successes have been achieved by the combined Allied naval and air forces working in the closest cooperation; others are due to mines laid from aircraft and ships; others to bombing in harbour, and a few U-Boats were lost by marine dangers. But success was achieved. Thanks to the sailors and airmen, the scientists and technicians, the shipbuilders and the factory workers, the convoys reached their destination, and enabled the soldiers and the airmen to fulfill their tasks. We, President and Prime Minister, in this our last joint statement on the U-Boat war can now report that the Allies have finished the job. 61 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 6 7 ) June 2, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 53. 1. Harry Hopkins had made very remarkable progress at Moscow and I am entirely in sympathy with what he has already achieved. 2. Mikolajczyk has sent you his comments on the list and he has also given them to us. Cannot these points be cleared up by Harry, if his health can stand it before he leaves? The word "amnesty" should be interpreted as including "release." I am having the matter examined in more detail by the Foreign Office, and am quite ready to put additional pressure on Mikolajczyk if he makes needless difficulties. Indeed you can count upon me to support you in the very considerable forward movement you have initiated.

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3. As Anthony Eden is now laid up for a few weeks and cannot do any official work, the burden falls on me at a rather rough moment. I may telegraph you tomorrow the more detailed views of the Foreign Office.62 HEADNOTE The following telegrams from Churchill to T r u m a n , N o . 68 and N o . 69 concern the Soviet request, assented to at the Teheran Conference in 1 9 4 3 , for the use of a number of Italian warships and merchant ships following the surrender of Italy for use by the Soviet Navy in the war effort against Nazi Germany. But because the Italian ships were more suitable for use in temperate waters rather than in the N o r t h e r n Seas where the Soviets intended to employ them, it was agreed that an equivalent number of warships and merchant ships of the U.S. and British fleets should be provided in lieu of the Italian ships. CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 68) June 3, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Shortly after the Italian surrender it was agreed at Teheran that a number of Italian merchant ships and warships should be handed over to the Red Navy for use against Germany. The Combined Chiefs of Staff however expressed grave anxiety that at a critical stage of the Italian campaign the confiscation of the Italian ships might jeopardize the success of the operations by prejudicing the cooperation of the Italian Fleet and dockyards. The Admiralty also emphasized that the Italian ships were unsuited to northern waters. Accordingly, the late President and I agreed to find between us equivalent ships to meet the Russian request. In the event, the United States provided the cruiser and half the merchant tonnage while we handed over the battleship, eight ex-American destroyers, four submarines and the other half of the merchant tonnage. 2. The result is that, although the Italians obtained some hint of the transaction from a Press Conference given by President Roosevelt on March 3, 1944 they are unaware of its true nature or extent. For the same military reasons I have never explained the transaction to Parliament, although the fact that a number of British warships are on loan to the Red Navy has become generally known in this country. 3. I have promised to give Parliament full information about our warships on loan to the Red Navy. The Russians insist that if anything is said at all upon this question the full story must be told. I agree with them. I therefore intend, after hearing from you, to make the statement contained in my immediately following telegram to the House next Tuesday. 63

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CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 69) June 3, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Following is Statement referred to in my immediately preceding. After the Italian Fleet had surrendered the Soviet Government raised with the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States the question of handing over to the Soviet Government a number of Italian warships and merchant ships. The Soviet Government represented that they had waged war against Italy in alliance with His Majesty's Government and the United States Government, and that the Soviet Navy would make good use of any ships so handed over for prosecuting the war against the principal enemy, Nazi Germany. 2. The ships for which the Soviet Government asked were: 1 Battle ship 1 Cruiser 8 Destroyers 4 Submarines 40,000 tons of merchant shipping.

These ships the United Kingdom and United States Governments agreed, at the Teheran Conference, should be made available to the Soviet Navy. 3. His Majesty's Government later pointed out however that the Italian ships were built to sail in the temperate waters of the Mediterranean and were unsuitable for service in the severe climate of the Northern Seas where the Soviet Government proposed to employ them. It had moreover to be borne in mind that the Italian Navy had sailed forth from their ports to join the Allies in defiance of German orders, that they were pursued by aircraft and suffered losses in vessels and personnel, including one modern capital ship. Their surrender was received by Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham in Malta harbour and must be considered an honourable naval event. The accession of the Italian Fleet to the naval forces of the Allies was, at this time, definitely helpful. Some served in the Mediterranean as warships, others as warship transports, and a good deal of valuable work was done by them. They also served in the Indian Ocean and on anti-blockade runner patrols in the Atlantic. Their dockyards rendered important service. 4. The question then arose of how to meet the very reasonable and natural request of Soviet Russia. His Majesty's Government did not wish to see Italy, at that moment, deprived of its Navy, which was an essential part of the national life we are resolved to preserve. We therefore proposed that the request of Soviet Russia for this share of the Italian Navy should be met by the United States and Great Britain. Accordingly it was further agreed that the Italian ships should, for the time being, continue to serve

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the Allied cause, which they have done with discipline and vigour, and that an equivalent number of British or American warships and merchant ships should be delivered to the Soviet Navy on temporary loan. This leaves the issue of the disposition of the Italian Navy to the Peace Conference, which I hope will take place some time or other, it being quite usual that wars should be followed by Peace Conferences. 5. The following action was therefore taken. Half the merchant shipping and all the warships, with the exception of the United States cruiser MILWAUKEE, were provided by His Majesty's Government. The British warships handed over to the Soviets were the battleship ROYAL SOVEREIGN, eight ex-American (TOWN Class) destroyers and four modern submarines. A further non-operational TOWN Class destroyer was made available to provide spare parts. Full details, including names and tonnages of all these ships, will be circulated in the official report. 6. The Russian sailors came to the United Kingdom in the spring of 1944 and spent some weeks here working up the ships preparatory to taking them to North Russia. When this important Fleet of 13 vessels sailed into the Russian harbour of Murmansk, a good impression was made upon our Soviet ally, and I received a message of thanks from Marshal Stalin himself. I feel bound to state that I take full responsibility for this transaction. The units of the Royal Navy have since then been operating as part of the Red Fleet. The destroyer CHURCHILL and submarine SUNFISH have been lost on active service and the remaining ships will continue on loan to the Soviet Government until otherwise agreed between the two Governments.64 HEADNOTE A further controversy involving General de Gaulle concerned the unilateral French occupation of the Franco-Italian frontier in northwest Italy, even t h o u g h French t r o o p s were under the Supreme Allied C o m m a n d and General Eisenhower had already ordered their w i t h d r a w a l from Italy. Thus de Gaulle's action collided with the administration of this area of Italy under the Allied Military Government. Accordingly Churchill's telegrams N o . 70 and N o . 7 1 , especially his N o . 7 7 , convey in some detail his estimate of de Gaulle's actions and conduct. CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 70) June 4, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Please see my immediately following telegram. Is it not rather disagreeable for us to be addressed in these terms by General de Gaulle, whom we have reinstated in a liberated France at some

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expense in American and British blood and treasure. I am willing to support any action the Combined Chiefs of Staff may propose to A.F.H.Q. Nonetheless our policy with France is one of friendship. It is de Gaulle who needs correction. 65 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 71) June 4, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Following is text of telegram from Resident Minister's Office, Central Mediterranean, to Foreign Office referred to in my No. 70. On May 30th General Doyen commanding the French Army of the Alps sent a letter to General Crittenberger commanding the United States 4th Corps referring to an attempt to establish Allied Military Government in the province of Cuneo. The letter ends with the following paragraph: "France cannot consent that a modification against her will be made in the existing state of affairs in the Alps Maritimes. This would be contrary to her honour and her security. I have been ordered by the Provisional Government of the French Republic to occupy and administer this territory. This mission being incompatible with the installation of any Allied Administrative agency in the same region, I find myself obliged to oppose it. Any insistence in this direction would assume a clearly unfriendly character, even a hostile character, and could have grave consequences." 2. On June 2nd General Crittenberger received another letter from General Doyen referring to his previous letter. Following is text. "I have sent to General Juin simultaneously a copy of the letter I asked Major Rogers to deliver to you. I beg to let you know that I have just been notified of the full approval given by the Chief of the Provisional Government of the French Republic. "General de Gaulle has instructed me to make as clear as possible to the Allied Command that I have received the order to prevent the setting up of Allied Military Government in territories occupied by our troops and administered by us by all necessary means without exception." 3. Allied Force Headquarters are submitting to Combined Chiefs of Staff a full report based on the contents of above letter and covering the recent developments in French Occupied Area of North West Italy.66 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 5 5 ) June 4, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Referring to my No. 54. On the recommendation of Harriman and Hopkins, I am authorizing a delay in delivery of the message to Stalin until Harriman considers the time appropriate.

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Harriman and Hopkins are of the opinion that its delivery now might adversely affect prospects of an agreement on the Polish problem. 67 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 56) June 4, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Your Nos. 68 and 69. I perceive no objection to your issuing the statement contained in your No. 69 in regard to the loan of British warships to the Soviet Government.68 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 57) June 4, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret I approve the proposed joint statement in your No. 66.69 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 72) June 4, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret 1. I send you in my immediately following the text of a message prepared in the Foreign office, with which I am in general accord, dealing principally with the views and wishes put forward by Mr. Mikolajczyk. As these are set forth in considerable detail, I am also sending them to Lord Halifax for transmission to the State Department. This fulfils my undertaking to you in my No. 67 replying to your No. 53. 2. I agree with you that Hopkins' devoted efforts have produced a breaking of the deadlock. I am willing that the invitation should be issued to the non-Lublin Poles on that basis, if nothing more can be gained at this moment. I also agree that the question of the 15 or 16 arrested Poles should not hamper the opening of these discussions. We cannot, however, cease our efforts on their behalf. I will therefore join with you, either jointly or separately, in a message to Stalin accepting the best that Hopkins can get, provided of course that our Ambassadors are not debarred from pressing for further improvements in the invitations once conversations have begun again. 3. While it is prudent and right to act in this way at this moment I am sure you will agree with me that these proposals are no advance on Yalta. They are an advance upon the deadlock but we ought by now, according to Yalta and its spirit, to have had a representative Polish Government formed. All we have got is a certain number of concessions for outside Poles to take part in preliminary discussions, out of which some improvements in the Lublin Government may be made. I cannot feel therefore that

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we can regard this as more than a milestone in a long hill we ought never to have been asked to climb. I think we ought to guard against any newspaper assumptions that the Polish problem has been solved or that the difficulties between the Western democracies and the Soviet Government on this matter have been more than relieved. Renewed hope and not rejoicing is all we can indulge in at the moment. 4. I am particularly anxious for the Conference to resume, especially with the invited delegates, before we meet, because I am sure more business will be done between "The Three," as Stalin calls us, in a fortunate hour than can be wrangled out with Molotov and the Ambassadors, try they ever so skillfully. 5. You have no doubt seen my No. 63 about the date of our next meeting. I am sure you understand the reason why I am anxious for an earlier date, say the 3rd or the 4th. I view with profound misgivings the retreat of the American Army to our line of occupation in the central sector, thus bringing Soviet power into the heart of Western Europe and the descent of an iron curtain between us and everything to the Eastward. I hoped that this retreat, if it has to be made, would be accompanied by the settlement of many great things which would be the true foundation of world peace. Nothing really important has been settled yet and you and I will have to bear great responsibility for the future. I still hope therefore that the date will be advanced. However, if this cannot be, I accept July 15. In either case it would be necessary to bring with me Mr. Attlee, the Leader of the Socialist party p in Great Britain. He is, as you know, in full agreement at the present time with our foreign policy, but the United States and Soviet Russia have a right to know that they are dealing with the whole of Britain, whatever our immediate Party future may be. 6. You can imagine what a blow it is to me to have Eden laid up at this moment. 70 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 73) June 4, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Following is text of message prepared in the Foreign Office referred to in my immediately preceding telegram. 1. Following are M. Mikolajczyk's views on new proposals as expressed to us on June 2nd. 2. (a) M. M. and M. Stanczyk would be prepared to accept invitation to participate in discussions in Moscow on sole condition that invitation is issued by the Commission of Three in conformity with the Crimea decision.

PThat is, the Labour party.

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(b) M.M. points out however that the list of candidates for the discussions now prepared excludes any representation of the Christian Labour Party and the National Democratic Party altogether. He considers representation of the Christian Labour Party most important, since although a progressive party it represents the religious elements: If it were excluded conversations could not be considered really representative of popular opinion in Poland, which would thus be split. M. M. does not believe that there will be real difficulty in persuading the Russians or Lublin to accept M. Popiel the Christian Labour Leader in this country and the Reverend Piwowarczyk, a progressive and representative priest for Cracow, as representative of the party at the conversation. M. M. urged that a strong effort should be made to secure Russian agreement on this point although he did not make it actually a condition of his own acceptance. (c) M. Grabski is very ill and beside M. M., M. Stanczyk should therefore be invited from London. M. Kolodzie, who was leader of the Polish Seamen's Union here but was expelled from posts after declaring himself in favour of Lublin, represents nobody, according to M. M.: But latter does not object to his being invited. (d) Of candidates from inside Poland M. Witos cannot of course be excluded and therefore Archbishop Sapieha who otherwise would be suitable, must be dropped. M. M. said that of [the] remainder only M. Zulawski is a real party representative: Others suggested are however distinguished figures and can be accepted. (e) M. M. stated that M. Trampczynski, venerable and highly respected National Democrat in Poland, has recently been allowed to give an interview to the Lublin Press Agency which has been published in spite of the fact that it expressed some criticism of the present administration. In these circumstances, M. M. thinks it quite possible that he would be accepted by Lublin and by the Russians as a candidate for the conversations, thus securing representation for the National Democrat Party, which would otherwise be unrepresented. M. M. would be much in favour of this being suggested. (f) M . M . assumes that all those participating in the conversations in Moscow would be guaranteed: (1) Freedom of movement and discussion during the conversations and (2) Freedom from arrest and from interference during and after the conversations, including the right to go wherever they wish outside Russia and Poland when the conversations in Moscow are over. M. M. would like this to be agreed by the Russians. (g) As regards the arrested party leaders, M. M. would not wish to await their release, but he considers their release absolutely necessary in order to create appropriate conditions for the conversations and he points out that it would not be sufficient that Stalin should agree to Mr. Hopkins' request that they should be granted amnesty, since the Russians interpret an amnesty as not excluding detention and isolation. M . M . said that in

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negotiating the Stalin-Sikorski agreement,^ the Russians insisted on the use of the term amnesty for the Poles in Russia and consequently large numbers of them were kept in isolation and not released. 3. M . M . made it plain that, while he felt bound to accept the invitation to Moscow, subject to the single condition of its being issued by the Commission of Three he was not hopeful of the result. He thought that the Russians under pressure were merely giving way as regards the conversations knowing that the subsequent step, the formation of a government, was the only point that really mattered. 4. We have now heard from the U.S. Charge d'Affaires to Polish Government that M. Mikolajczyk expressed very similar views to him. Only differences of any importance were: .

(1) In reply to question, M. Mikolajczyk definitely expressed concurrence in proposed list of candidates for conversations: (2) As regards (d) above, M. Mikolajczyk only said that M. Witos would be preferable to Archbishop Sapieha: (3) M. Mikolajczyk did not mention M. Trampczynski to U.S. Charge d'Affaires at all: (4) As regards (f) above, M. Mikolajczyk said merely that he assumed all the Poles invited would be allowed to meet freely and discuss among themselves without restrictions: (5) As regards (g) above, M. Mikolajczyk said that he hoped that by the time the conversations in Moscow took place, the majority at least of the arrested leaders would have been released and proceeded to make and emphasise the point about an amnesty, as he did to us. 5. M. Mikolajczyk's points under paragraph 2 (a)-(g) above all seem reasonable. As regards (a) it is no doubt intention that the invitation should be issued by the Commission of Three. We hope that President Truman will be ready to instruct Mr. Hopkins to try to secure Russian acceptance of Christian Labour Party and National Democrat Party representatives mentioned under (b) and (e). While it is not essential that all four parties should be represented at the conversations, it would clearly make [a] far better impression on Poles generally and on world opinion, if they were. While [the] attitude of [the] extreme Nationalist Right Wing of National Democrat Party makes its exclusion excusable, exclusion of Christian Labour Party and thus of direct representation of [a] very important religious element would be really unfortunate. As regards (f) above it will be remembered that early in discussions of Commission of Three M. Molotov treated it as a matter of course ^Stalin and General Sikorski, the latter as Prime Minister of the Polish government in exile, had signed a declaration of friendship and mutual assistance in Moscow in December 1941, though an earlier agreement concerning mutual aid had been signed by Sikorski and the Soviet ambassador to Britain in London on 30 July, 1941.

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that participants in conversations should be free from restrictions, so this point should present no difficulty: But having regard to the arrest of the 15 political leaders and Russian attitude of Poles generally we feel that M. Mikolajczyk is entitled to be reassured on this point. We agree with M. Mikolajczyk in attaching importance to (g). 6. While in no way minimising the value of Mr. Hopkins' admirable work or importance of resolving the deadlock with the Russians and of getting them back to basis of Crimea agreement, we cannot but agree with M. Mikolajczyk that Russian agreement to opening of conversations before the Commission of Three (which should have taken place over 3 months ago) will represent no real advance in Polish question if the Soviet Government do not allow these conversations to result in formation of a government in which non-Lublin elements are adequately represented and can exercise real influence and which can ensure conditions for election on [a] proper basis. We should not disguise from ourselves that we shall have to keep up pressure on the Russians to secure these real results and it would no doubt be a tactical mistake vis-a-vis the Russians and of world opinion, when the news comes out, to give the impression publicly that the Polish question is solved. We propose to take the line here of guarded satisfaction that the present deadlock has been resolved, but to point out that this is only the first, long delayed step, towards tackling the problem of forming a new Polish Government in accordance with Crimea agreement.71 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 74) June 5, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret I fully agree that your No. 54 should await a tactical moment for its delivery. But do not let us lose that moment for [the] future of the world hangs upon "countries which accord to all democratic elements of people the rights of freedom of expression." This will come up in its good time quite soon.72 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 58) June 5, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Thank you for your encouraging message No. 67 expressing your concurrence with the efforts Harry Hopkins has made in Moscow to get on with the Polish business. I am repeating in my next message my reply to Harry Hopkins' latest communications in regard to this matter. I sincerely hope that you concur in my suggestions. I would appreciate receiving any comments you may care to make.

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TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 59) June 6, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret The following is the message to Hopkins referred to in my No. 58. "I am very pleased with your continued and strenuous efforts reported in your messages of June 3 to induce Stalin to release at least some of the detained Polish political leaders before consultations begin. I feel that you should continue in the same vein in the hope that Stalin will agree to the release of the majority of these men. I fear that if Stalin does not make some concession to us on this point the otherwise favorable reaction, which will come when it is known that consultations are to begin, will be jeopardized in the eyes of a large part of the American public opinion. I also fear that if the majority of these men are not released this question is liable to be one of the principal points of discussion during at least the initial stages of the consultations rather than the real point at issue—the creation of a new Polish Government of National Unity. If you feel it is advisable, I suggest that you also endeavor to meet Mikolajczyk's suggestion that Stalin release some of the held Polish political leaders rather than grant them amnesty as he first suggested. As you know the Prime Minister has also suggested that an effort be made to meet Mikolajczyk's suggestion on this point. "If, however, you feel that the possibility of initiating consultations may be jeopardized by insisting on the release of some of the political leaders, you may separate the question of the release of the prisoners from the question of the list of names of persons to be invited for the consultations. If your further efforts to obtain Stalin's agreement to the release of these men are not immediately successful I hope you will continue to impress upon him the adverse effect this will have in the United States. I also feel that it would be very helpful if you could obtain the inclusion of PopieP in the group from London. The inclusion of Popiel with Mikolajczyk and Stanczyk would mean that the most important Polish political parties would be represented and this would help to create favorable reaction among Polish circles abroad. I feel it would be advisable to eliminate Kolodzei if you can arrange it. But if it is necessary to include him in the group from London in order to get Popiel I do not believe we should object."73 HEADNOTE The following telegram, Truman's N o . 60, would have resulted in the overthrow of General de Gaulle had it been released "to the American Press" according to Churchill in his N o . 77 to the President. Truman, however, who would reverse his decision in this matter, irrespective of r

Karol Popiel, who headed the Christian Labour party, had been Minister of State in the Polish government in exile in London.

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Churchill's concurrence, underscored his method of decision-making in reconsidering a decision and then reversing it if he thought that the initial decision had been a mistake. 7 4 For Truman's revised message, see hereinafter his unnumbered telegram to Churchill of 7 June 1945 on page 112.

TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 60) June 6, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret I request your concurrence in my issuing the following quoted release to the American Press: "In the closing days of the fighting in Europe, troops of the First French Army in the Alpine region crossed the frontier and moved forward into northwestern Italy, in the province of Cuneo. Later orders were issued by General Eisenhower, Allied Supreme Commander on the Western Front, for the withdrawal of this French force to the frontier in keeping with the arrangements for the occupation and organization of Allied Military Government in Italy under the direction of Field Marshal Alexander. This order was ignored by the French Units concerned under the authority of their Government. "More recently the following events have taken place. On May 30 General Doyen commanding the French Army in the Alps sent a letter to General Crittenberger commanding the United States 4th Corps in northwestern Italy referring to an attempt to establish Allied Military Government in the province of Cuneo. The letter ends with the following paragraph: Trance cannot consent that a modification against her will would be made in the existing state of affairs in the Alps Maritimes. This would be contrary to her honor and her security. I have been ordered by the provisional Government of the French Republic to occupy and administer this territory. This mission being incompatible with the installation of an Allied Military Agency in the same region, I find myself obliged to oppose it. Any insistence in this direction would assume a clearly unfriendly character, even a hostile character and could have grave consequences.' "On June 2 General Crittenberger received another letter from General Doyen referring to his previous letter. Following is the text: CI have sent to General Juin simultaneously [a] copy of the letter I asked Major Rogers to deliver to you. I beg to let you know that I have just been notified of the full approval given by the Chief of the Provisional Government of the French Republic. " 'General de Gaulle has instructed me to make as clear as possible to the Allied Command that I have received the order to prevent the setting up of Allied Military Government in territories occupied by our troops and administered by us by all necessary means without exception.'

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"The Allied Supreme Commander in Italy, Field Marshal Alexander, has reported the facts to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and requested instructions. He recommends that he be directed to complete the occupation of North West Italy and to establish Allied Military Government there. "In consequence of the foregoing I have issued instructions that no further issues of United States Military equipment or munitions will be made to French Troops in view of the threat by the French Government headed by General de Gaulle to utilize these munitions against American soldiers. "With further reference to the foregoing situation, I am authorized by the Prime Minister of England to disclose the text of the following message just received from him today: " 'Is it not rather disagreeable for us to be addressed in these terms by General de Gaulle, whom we have reinstated in liberated France at some expense of American and British blood and treasure. Our policy with France is one of friendship.' "I am communicating with the Prime Minister with regard to the instructions to be given Field Marshal Alexander. Meanwhile I wish the American people to be aware of the situation." For your information it is my thought that the British, French and American public reaction to this Press Release should be obtained prior to our approval of the recommendations of Field Marshal Alexander. 75 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 61) June 6, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Replying to your 63 and paragraph 5 of your 72 in regard to the forthcoming meeting, I find, after full consideration, that July 15 is the earliest date that is practicable for me to attend. Arrangements are therefore being perfected for me to proceed to the vicinity of Berlin to arrive on July 15. 76 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 75) June 6, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 61.1 accept July 15 and am telling Stalin. Thank you so much for your message to Eden which I am sending on to him. His condition is in no way serious and I hope that in a few weeks he will be completely recovered. 77 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 76) June 6, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 60. I concur in publication as you propose. I think your method is very wise.78

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TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (Unnumbered) June 7, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret O n further reflection, I have reached the conclusion that before placing the situation in Northwestern Italy before the public it would be preferable to address a further appeal to General de Gaulle, particularly in view of the possible effect on San Francisco. Consequently, instead of making public the statement referred to in my N o . 60 to you, I have asked Ambassador Caffery s to deliver in my name the following message to General de Gaulle. " M y dear General: "You have by this time no doubt seen the message from this Government which was communicated to your Foreign Minister yesterday. I wish to appeal to you directly in this matter and to notify you with w h a t great concern and h o w seriously I view the action of the First French Army in the province of Cuneo in N o r t h w e s t Italy. "This Army, under the c o m m a n d of General Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied C o m m a n d e r on the Western Front, ignored orders issued to it to w i t h d r a w to the frontier in keeping with the arrangements for the occupation and organization of Allied Military Government in Italy under Field M a r s h a l Alexander, the Allied C o m m a n d e r in Italy. M o r e recently the following events have taken place: O n M a y 30 General Doyen, commanding the French Army in the Alps sent a letter to General Crittenberger, commanding the United States Fourth Corps in Northwestern Italy, referring to an attempt to establish Allied Military Government in the province of Cuneo. The letter ends with the following paragraph: 'France cannot consent that a modification against her will would be made in the existing state of affairs in the Alps Maritimes. This would be contrary to her honor and her security. I have been ordered by the Provisional Government of the French Republic to occupy and administer this territory. This mission being incompatible with the installation of an Allied military agency in the same region, I find myself obliged to oppose it. Any insistence in this direction would assume a clearly unfriendly character, even a hostile character and could have grave consequences.' " O n June 2 General Crittenberger received another letter from General Doyen referring to his previous letter. Following is the text: 'General de Gaulle has instructed me to make as clear as possible to the Allied Command that I have received the order to prevent the setting up of Allied Military Government in territories occupied by our troops and administered by us by all necessary means without exception.' "This constitutes a very blunt statement of the intention of the French G o v e r n m e n t to m a i n t a i n its forces c o n t r a r y to the order of the Allied s

Jefferson McCaffery was U.S. ambassador to France.

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Supreme Commander and in direct contravention of the principles which I accept, and I know you will agree, as representing the best interest of all Allied Governments in preserving a hard won peace, namely the avoidance of military action to accomplish political ends. "The messages above referred to also contain the almost unbelievable threat that French soldiers bearing American arms will combat American and Allied soldiers whose efforts and sacrifices have so recently and successfully contributed to the liberation of France itself. "Indeed, this action comes at the time of the very anniversary of our landings in Normandy which set in motion the forces that resulted in that liberation. "The people of this country have only the friendliest motives and feelings toward France and its people, but I am sure they would be profoundly shocked if they were made aware of the nature of the action which your military officers, presumably with your personal approval, have threatened to take. Before I acquaint the people of the United States with this situation, I beg of you to reconsider the matter, withdraw your troops from the area and await an orderly and rational determination of whatever ultimate claims your government feels impelled to make. Such action cannot fail to advance rather than reduce the prestige of France and at the same time operate to the immediate advantage and welfare of the French people. "While this threat by the French Government is outstanding against American soldiers, I regret that I have no alternative but to issue instructions that no further issues of military equipment or munitions can be made to French troops. Rations will continue to be supplied." Harry S. Truman. 79 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 77) June 7, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret I believe that the publication of your previous message would have led to the overthrow of de Gaulle, who after five long years of experience I am convinced is the worst enemy of France in her trouble. I hope you will make sure that your new letter reaches the French Foreign Secretary and other Ministers. I consider General de Gaulle one of the greatest dangers to European peace.r No one has more need than Britain of French friendship, but I am sure that in the long run no understanding will be reached with General de Gaulle. 80 f

In documents recently released in Great Britain by the Public Record Office, Churchill, with Roosevelt's support, tried unsuccessfully to remove General de Gaulle as the wartime leader of the French Resistance, then based in London, because of Churchill's opposition to "this marplot and mischief-maker."81

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HEADNOTE

Several of the telegrams that follow concern matters which were discussed by Davies and Hopkins in their respective talks with Churchill and Stalin, especially in the latter's talks concerning Poland. CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 78) June 7, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret 1. I should be most grateful if Harry u could stop off here for a couple of days. He has so much to tell that would be helpful, and he could then bring on my tale too for you to hear. 2. I have never been more anxious than I am now about the state of Europe. 82 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 6 2 ) June 7, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Your N o . 75 is received and I appreciate your agreement with my proposed date. Mr. Davies has reported fully to me upon the matters discussed. Engagements made and the accumulation of important matters incident to the close of the fiscal year made it impossible for me to meet earlier than July 15. Your position as to the simultaneous character of the first meeting as reported by Mr. Davies I can readily understand and gladly concur with it. The cooperation which I am assured you will extend connected with the purposes which I have in mind and which you appreciate and understand will be a helpful contribution to unity. The discussions of the specific situation explored by Mr. Davies and Mr. Eden have also been fully reported and have been helpful to me. Thank you and Foreign Minister Eden for your courtesies to him. 83 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 79) June 7, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 62. Thank you very much. I am conveying your kind regards to Eden. 84 u

Harry Hopkins.

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TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 63) June 7, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret I have just received another message from Harry Hopkins on the Polish matter. He reports that Stalin was adamant in refusing to substitute Popiel for Kolodzie. He insisted that the London list be limited to three and the only concession he will make is to substitute Julian Zakowski for Kolodzei or Popiel for Stanczyk. Since Mikolajczyk insists on Stanczyk, Hopkins believes we should leave him on the list instead of substituting Popiel. According to Stalin, Zakowski is a teacher of engineering at Liverpool University and is non-party. We have no precise information regarding him but perhaps Mikolajczyk can give us some guidance as to whether it would be better to accept Zakowski for Kolodzei. The tentative list agreed to at Moscow is now composed of Mikolajczyk, Stanczyk, Kolodzei or Zakowski from London: Witos, Zulawski, Kutrzeba, Kolodziejski and Krzyanowski, non-Lublin Poles from Poland, plus three or four Lublin representatives. Hopkins pointed out to Stalin that although the tentative agreement on the list was a great step forward it is not a final solution which depends upon the Commission in consultation with the Poles, and he made it clear that no decision would be taken during the consultations which did not have the unanimous approval of all three Commissioners. He pointed out that, while by unanimous decision it might be possible to invite additional people for consultation, Stalin seemed to by standing firm on inviting only three from London and five from Poland to represent the non-Lublin groups. Hopkins told Stalin that he was authorized by the United States and British Governments to agree to this list subject to the decision as to whether we prefer Zakowski for Kolodzei. He again took up the question of the release of the majority of the political leaders accused of operating illegal transmitters and while Stalin did not make a commitment on this point, Harriman and Hopkins gained the impression that Stalin was going to do something about them. I am sure that you will agree that this is the best solution we can hope for in the circumstances and I shall appreciate it if you will let me know urgently whether you feel we should agree to Kolodzei or Zakowski. I am putting this same question to Mikolajczyk with whom I am sure you will discuss the matter. Truman 85 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 64) June 7, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 78. I regret that it is not possible for Hopkins to stop in England en route home. 86

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CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 80) June 9, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Thank you for your Nos. 58, 59 and 63 about the Polish negotiations. I assume that you will have received my Nos. 72 and 73 which contained my views in this matter in the light of our consultation with Mikolajczyk. I have also heard from our Ambassador at Moscow about Harry Hopkins' latest conversation with Stalin on the 6th [of] June. I agree with you that he has obtained the best solution we could hope for in the circumstances, although he has not obtained substantial satisfaction on any of Mikolajczyk's points summarized in my No. 73. The Foreign Office have explained the resulting situation to Mikolajczyk who confirms that he and Stanczyk are still ready to go to Moscow in response to an invitation from the Commission of Three. As regards the third Pole from abroad, he has expressed a preference for Stalin's new candidate Zakowski rather than Kolodzei. I have accordingly instructed Clark Kerrv to inform Stalin that I confirm my acceptance of the following list of candidates to be invited by the Commission: Mikolajczyk, Stanczyk, Zakowski, Witos, Zulawski, Kutrzeba, Krzyanowski, and Kolodziejski plus three or four representatives of the Warsaw Provisional Government^ I am telling our Embassy at Washington to show to the State Department for your information the instructions which I have sent to Clark Kerr. 87 HEADNOTE One m o n t h before, following Germany's surrender, Churchill had pleaded with Truman to allow the U.S. Army to hold its ground in Europe, though Truman, w h o shared the Prime Minister's concern about Russian intentions, could not then, he held, "go along with him on m e t h o d . " 8 8 N o w a m o n t h later, Churchill c o n t i n u e d to advance essentially the same views he had advanced in early May, as in his following telegram of 9 June. CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 81) June 9, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret 1. Our missions to Vienna have been ordered by Marshal Tolbukhin to leave by June 10th or 11th. They have not been allowed to see anything outside the strict city limits, and only one airfield can be permitted for the

v

Clark Kerr was British ambassador to the Soviet Union.

w

In reply, see Truman's No. 66.

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Allies. Here is the capital of Austria which by agreement is to be divided, like the country itself, into four zones: but no one has any powers there except the Russians and not even ordinary diplomatic rights are allowed. If we give way in this matter, we must regard Austria as in the Sovietized half of Europe. 2. On the other hand, the Russians demand the withdrawal of the American and British forces in Germany to the occupation line, fixed so long ago in circumstances so different, and Berlin of course is so far completely Sovietized. 3. Would it not be better to refuse to withdraw on the main European front until a settlement has been reached about Austria? Surely at the very least the whole agreement about zones should be carried out at the same time? 4. A telegram has been despatched to the State Department showing the actual situation of our missions in Vienna which, as ordered, will I presume depart on June 10th or 11th after making their protests. 89 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 82) June 9, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret While I have agreed in principle to our triple meeting in Berlin on July 15th, I hope you will agree with me that the British, American and Russian delegations shall have entirely separate quarters assigned to them and have their own guards, and that there shall be a fourth place prepared in which we shall meet to confer. I could not accept as at Yalta the principle that we go to Berlin, over which it is agreed we are to have triple or with the French quadruple parity, merely as guests of the Soviet Government and armies. We should provide everything for ourselves and be able to meet on equal terms. I should like to know how you stand about this. 90 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 65) June 9, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret My No. 55. Harriman has now delivered to Stalin the message concerning the recognition of Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary quoted to you in my No. 54. Harriman deleted the phrase mentioning the fact that Finland has not been in a state of war with the United States.91 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 66) June 9, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Referring to your No. 80, I am in agreement with the list of candidates accepted by you to be invited by the Commission on the establishment of a new Polish Government.

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Ambassador Harriman has been directed to inform Stalin of my agreement. 92 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 8 3 ) June 10, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Thank you for your No. 65. I have sent the following to Stalin: "Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin. 10th June 1945. "Thank you for your message of the 27th May informing me that you think the time has come to resume diplomatic relations with Roumania, Bulgaria and Finland with the possibility that a similar action can be taken with regard to Hungary in the near future. "2. We have ourselves been considering our future relations with these states and we hope very shortly to put comprehensive proposals before you and the United States Government. I should hope that we might then discuss them when next we meet." 93 HEADNOTE Truman's earlier reference to "land grabbers," first enunciated in his N o . 34, would be reaffirmed by Churchill in his next message to the President. For Truman's reply the same day, see his N o . 69. CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 84) June 1 1, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret 1. In my immediately following are telegrams exchanged between me and Alexander which I am sure will have your concurrence. 2. On the whole the Levant, Venezia Giulia plus Pola, and Western Italy are not encouraging for land grabbers but they are a proof to you and me applicable to far larger spheres that the motto holds "United we Stand." 94 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 85) June 11,1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Following are telegrams referred to in my immediately preceding. " 1 . Field Marshal to Prime Minister. F. 91069. 10 June 1945. "You will have seen my No. 1008 to CCSX with reference to Juki's message about the French Delegation arriving here today to settle details of X

CCS, the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

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their troops' withdrawal from Italy. I take it that I can go ahead with such arrangements and propose to press that withdrawal is complete not later [than the] end [of] this month. Do you agree? "2. Prime Minister to Field Marshal Alexander. 11 June 1945. "Your F. 91069. I entirely agree and you should act continuously as the situation requires." 95 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 67) June 11,1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 82. I am in agreement and will instruct Eisenhower to make the necessary arrangements to accomplish your expressed desires.96 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 6 8 ) June 11, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 83, receipt acknowledged. I have received a message from Stalin on the same subject dated 9 June. 97 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 69) June 11,1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Your messages Nos. 84 and 85 acknowledged. I am in full agreement with Field Marshal Alexander's action reported therein. 98 HEADNOTE Truman's N o . 70 concerning zones of occupation had not, in fact, been drawn up "after long consideration and detailed discussion" between Roosevelt and Churchill at the Second Quebec Conference in September 1944, though the EAC had held frequent discussions concerning this question at its meetings in London in the months prior to the Second Quebec Conference. For Churchill's reply, see his N o . 87. TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 70) June 12,1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 81. In consideration of the tripartite agreement as to zones of occupation in Germany approved by President Roosevelt after long consideration and

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detailed discussion with you, I am unable to delay the withdrawal of American troops from the Soviet zone in order to use pressure in the settlement of other problems. Advice of the highest reliability is received that the Allied Control Council cannot begin to function until Allied troops withdraw from the Russian zone. I am also convinced that the military Government now exercised by the Allied Supreme Commander should, without delay, be terminated and divided between Eisenhower and Montgomery, each to function in the zone occupied by his own troops. I am advised that it would be highly disadvantageous to our relations with the Soviets to postpone action in this matter until our meeting in July. I therefore propose to send the following message to Stalin: "Now that the unconditional defeat of Germany has been announced and the Control Council for Germany has had its first meeting, I propose that we should at once issue instructions which will get forces into their respective zones and will initiate orderly administration of the defeated territory. As to Germany, I am ready to have instructions issued to all American troops to begin withdrawal into their own zones on June 21 in accordance with arrangements between the respective commanders, including in these arrangements simultaneous movement of the national garrisons into greater Berlin and provision of free access by air, road and rail from Frankfurt and Bremen to Berlin for United States forces. "As to Austria, it seems that arrangements can be completed more quickly and satisfactorily by making our commanders on the spot responsible for determining the definition of zones both in Austria itself and in the Vienna area and the readjustment of forces, referring to their respective Governments only those matters that they are unable to resolve between themselves. I consider the settlement of the Austrian problem as of equal urgency to the German matter. "If you agree with the foregoing, I propose that appropriate instructions be issued at once to our respective commanders." 99 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 86) June 12, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 67. Thank you very much. 100 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 87) June 14, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 70. 1. Obviously we are obliged to conform to your decision, and necessary instructions will be issued.

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2. It is not correct to state that tripartite agreement about zones of occupation in Germany were the subject of "long consideration and detailed discussion" between me and President Roosevelt. References made to them at Octagon^ were brief and concerned only the Anglo-American arrangements which the President did not wish to be raised by correspondence beforehand. These were remitted to Combined Chiefs of Staff and were certainly acceptable to them. 3. As to Austria I do not think we can make the Commanders on the spot responsible for settling outstanding questions. Marshal Stalin made it quite plain in his message of May 18th that agreement on the occupation and control of Austria must be settled by the EAC. I do not believe that he would agree to the change and in any case our Missions may have already left Vienna. I suggest for your consideration the following redraft of the penultimate paragraph of your message to Marshal Stalin. "I consider the settlement of the Austrian problem is of equal urgency to the German matter. The redistribution of forces into the occupation zones which have been agreed to in principle by the EAC, the movement of national garrisons into Vienna and the establishment of the Allied Commission for Austria should take place simultaneously with these developments in Germany. I therefore attach utmost importance to settling the outstanding Austrian problems in order that the whole arrangement of German and Austrian affairs can be put into operation simultaneously. I hope that the recent visit of American, British and French Missions to Vienna will result in the EAC being able to take the necessary remaining decisions to this end without delay." 4. I for my part attach particular importance to the Russians evacuating the part of the British zone in Austria that they are now occupying at the same time as the British and American forces evacuate the Russian zone in Germany. 5. I sincerely hope that your action will in the long run make for a lasting peace in Europe. 101 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 88) June 14,1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret 1. As our conference beginning on July 15 at Berlin will probably be continuing before the British election results are made known, I think it well to bring with me Mr. Attlee, the official leader of the opposition, in order that full continuity of British policy may be assured. I have informed Premier Stalin of my intention in similar terms. 2. I am looking forward very much to meeting you. 102 y

Code name for the Second Quebec Conference, September 11-16, 1944.

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HEADNOTE In his f o l l o w i n g t e l e g r a m , N o . 7 1 , T r u m a n i n c o r p o r a t e d t h e changes suggested by Churchill's N o . 87, which he then forwarded t o Stalin on 14 J u n e c o n c e r n i n g the z o n a l q u e s t i o n . Churchill replied the following day in his N o . 90.

TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 71) June 14,1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret I have today sent the following message to Marshal Stalin: "Now that the unconditional defeat of Germany has been announced and the Control Council for Germany has had its first meeting, I propose that we should at once issue definite instructions which will get forces into their respective zones and will initiate orderly administration of the defeated territory. As to Germany, I am ready to have instructions issued to all American troops to begin withdrawal into their own zone on 21 June in accordance with arrangements between the respective commanders, including in these arrangements simultaneous movement of the national garrisons into greater Berlin and provision of free access by air, road, and rail from Frankfurt and Bremen to Berlin for U.S. Forces. "I consider the settlement of the Austrian problem is of equal urgency to the German matter. The redistribution of forces into occupation zones which have been agreed in principle by the EAC, the movement of the national garrisons into Vienna and the establishment of the Allied Commission for Austria should take place simultaneously with these developments in Germany. I therefore attach utmost importance to settling the outstanding Austrian problems in order that the whole arrangement of German and Austrian affairs can be put into operation simultaneously. I hope that the recent visit of American, British and French Missions to Vienna will result in the EAC being able to take the necessary remaining decisions to this end without delay. "If you agree with the foregoing, I propose that appropriate instructions be issued at once to our respective commanders." 103

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 89) June 15, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret I suggest that we use the code word TERMINAL for the Berlin Conference. Do you agree? 104

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CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 9 0 ) June 15, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret I have received your message No. 71 giving the text of your message to Marshal Stalin about withdrawal into our respective zones in Germany and Austria: I am grateful to you for meeting our views about Austria. As I have already told you, we are conforming to your wishes, and I have sent the following message to Marshal Stalin: "I have seen a copy of President Truman's message to you of June 14 regarding the withdrawal of all American troops into their own occupation zone beginning on June 21 in accordance with arrangements to be made between the respective Commanders. "I also am ready to issue instructions to Field Marshal Montgomery to make the necessary arrangements in conjunction with his colleagues for the similar withdrawal of British troops into their zone in Germany, for the simultaneous movement of allied garrisons into greater Berlin, and for the provision of free movement for British forces by air, rail and road to and from the British zone in Berlin. "I entirely endorse what President Truman says about Austria. In particular I trust that you will issue instructions that Russian troops should begin to withdraw from that part of Austria which the European Advisory Commission has agreed in principle should form part of the British zone on the same date as movements begin in Germany." 105 HEADNOTE The following telegram from T r u m a n to Churchill, N o . 72, concerned the matter of Russia's entry into the war against Japan on condition that China's Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek, concurred in the Yalta agreement, a condition conveyed to Hopkins in his last talk with Stalin on 6 June. In the interval, Truman had confided the terms of the secret agreement reached at Yalta to T. V. Soong, China's prime minister, concerning this "personal agreement" made with Stalin in February 1945. Churchill replied the same day in his N o . 9 1 . TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 72) June 15, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret T.V. Soong departed by airplane today for Moscow via Chunking. He will arrive Moscow before July 1 to discuss details of arrangements for Soviet-Chinese agreements.

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Ambassador Hurley7 had been directed to inform Chiang Kai-shek on June 15 of Soviet conditions and to make every effort to obtain the Generalissimo's agreement therewith. Hurley is directed to inform Chiang Kai-shek that the Yalta Agreement will have the support of the United States Government.106 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 73) June 16, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Receipt is acknowledged of your No. 88. 107 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 74) June 15, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 89 meets with my approval. 108 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 91) June 15, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Reference your No. 72. I entirely agree and welcome these arrangements. 109 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 9 2 ) June 15, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret 1. During the progress of our conference from July 15th onwards, the King will be travelling in France and Germany inspecting his troops and I understand General Eisenhower hopes he will visit SHAEF.aa His Majesty desires to come to Berlin for a day. He would not, of course, take any part in our discussions. My idea is he would arrive in the British Sector and, if convenient to Marshal Stalin, would lunch with the Russians. In the evening there would be a dinner in the British Sector at which you and he as heads of states, and Stalin would meet. The King would leave early the next morning to continue his inspection. The reason why I have been led to suggest that he would not have a meal with you is because we hope you will almost immediately afterwards be in London, where he is waiting to entertain you. If however it is desired that he should attend luncheon the next day at the American Headquarters, nothing would please him better. The interruption of our main discussions would be very slight and Committees of Foreign Secretaries and so forth could go on all the time. His Majesty would take the z

Patrick J. Hurley, U.S. ambassador to China.

aa

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces.

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opportunity of his visit to give a number of decorations to various officers of the Allied Forces, and I think it might be an occasion for rejoicing. 2. I have sent the same news, mutatis mutandis, to Stalin. Pray let me know what you think about this so that I may be in a position to advise His Majesty. 110 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 93) June 16, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret I see reports in the papers that you propose to stop in Paris and see General de Gaulle before coming on to the Conference at Berlin. President Roosevelt promised me on several occasions that he would not visit France before he visited Britain. I am sure you will bear this in mind in any decision you may take. bb

w.s.c.111

TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 75) June 16, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Receipt is acknowledged of your Nos. 90 and 91. 1 1 2 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 76) June 16, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Replying to your No. 92, I will be very pleased to agree to any arrangements you may make to accomplish His Majesty's desires during his projected visit in Berlin. It is my intention to visit London en route home from the Conference, and it appears probable that the British-American Chiefs of Staff will wish to have a combined staff meeting in the United Kingdom at that time. 113 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 94) June 17, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Following is repetition of a telegram concerning TERMINAL which I have today sent Marshal Stalin: " 1 . It is most important that the exact venue of the forthcoming conference should be settled as soon as possible since much preparatory work will be necessary. bb

See Truman's reply in his No. 78.

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"2. I feel strongly, and I am sure you will agree, that on this occasion the Russian, American and British delegations should each have separate enclaves, and that they should make their own arrangements for accommodation, food, transport, guards, communications, etc. I suggest that, in addition, there should be a fourth place in which the three delegations could meet to confer. It would be much appreciated if the Soviet Government would make arrangements for this common meeting place. " 3 . President Truman is in entire agreement with the above proposal. "4. I should therefore be glad if you would let me know as soon as possible the area in the vicinity of Berlin that you propose for the conference, and the precise localities within that area that it is proposed to allot to the Soviet, American and British delegations respectively. On receipt of your reply, I would immediately instruct Field Marshal Montgomery to send advance parties to make all arrangements for the British delegation, in consultation with Marshal Zhukov and General Eisenhower. "5. I hope that it will be borne in mind that we will require the use of an airfield as near as possible to our delegation area. We could, if convenient, share an airfield with the Americans." 114 HEADNOTE With the end of the war in Europe, another issue had been the food crisis in countries w h o s e agricultural p r o d u c t i o n h a d been disrupted or even destroyed by the war. This and related factors had at least impelled Churchill to address this urgent issue. Hence the following telegram from Churchill which Truman did not reply to until 24 June in his N o . 82. CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 9 5 ) June 18, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret You will recall that last November we were strongly pressed by the United States Government to postpone for six months the conclusion of a long term meat contract with the Argentine in view of the difficulties which had arisen in your relations with the Argentine Government. We were at that time most anxious to conclude a long-term contract with the Argentine and we feared that if we did not do so we might be faced later by a refusal to supply the same quantities or at least a demand for a much higher price. We agreed to a six months' postponement and I believe that our action then has helped you. When we agreed to postpone the contract I told President Roosevelt that we did so on the understanding that all the influence and weight of the United States Government would be used to

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keep other buyers out of the Argentine market and to make sure that they did not get refrigerated cargo space. In his reply President Roosevelt said: "I am deeply grateful for your message (No. 832, November 26th, 1944) informing me of your decision to continue purchases on a month to month basis for a further six months' period. We will do everything in our power to satisfy our understanding with respect to other buyers, as well as with respect to refrigerated cargo space to which you refer in paragraph four." 2. The Memorandum of Understanding negotiated during the recent visit of Lyttelton and Llewellincc assumed that we should obtain the full supply from the Argentine and the quantities which the United States was asked to supply to the United Kingdom were calculated on this assumption. 3. As we foresaw last November, we are now having great difficulties in concluding a firm long-term contract with the Argentine Government. These difficulties are increased by the fact that France and Belgium, who under the Combined Food Board meat allocations will probably get no supplies of meat during the second and third quarters of 1945, are faced with very serious shortages of meat, and may well be driven by pressure of public opinion to enter the Argentine market. Both France and Belgium have the necessary hard currency to make them formidable competitors, and there is no doubt that the Argentine Government, being aware of this possibility are less likely to agree to the contract that we propose and are protracting negotiations in the hope that there will be competitors in the market. 4. It would greatly ease this tense position if in order to bridge the gap between now, when France and Belgium are receiving nothing, and the fourth quarter of the year, when they will probably begin to receive some supplies of meat under the Combined Board allocations, we could jointly agree to give them some help by releasing stocks which have been built up for our military needs but which might now be spared. This help would, of course, be conditional upon France and Belgium refraining from entering the Argentine market. I think that we here could make available 15,000 tons of meat and vegetable rations, and if you could match this with a similar proportionate contribution, say of 45,000 tons, we could at least tide them over their most acute difficulties during the next month or two. You gave a sympathetic reply to Lyttelton when he saw you about this in April and indicated that you were enquiring into the matter of reserves in the American Army which might become surplus at the end of the European war. 5. I very much hope that you will be able to agree to this proposal, since great help may be given at the cost of comparatively insignificant quantities. As you know, our own meat supplies have been cut to the limit and the loss of any quantity of Argentine meat will be nothing less than disastrous to our population. 115

cc

OHver Lyttelton, British Minister of Production, and J. J. Llewellin, Minister of Food.

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TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 77) June 18,1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret In reply to a message from Stalin dated June 16, I have today replied as follows: "Your message of June 16 regarding Allied occupation of agreed zones in Germany and Austria is received. "I have issued instructions to the American Commanders to begin the movement on July 1 as requested by you. It is assumed that American troops will be in Berlin at an earlier date in sufficient number to accomplish their duties in preparation for our Conference." 116 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 78) June 18, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret The press reports referred to in your No. 93 are not authentic. I shall keep the promise made to you by President Roosevelt if conditions at the time make it practicable. May I express a hope that the contents of this message will not get into the papers. 117 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 79) June 18, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Receipt is acknowledged of your No. 94. 118 HEADNOTE The war with Japan, in its final phase, which included the Okinawa campaign in the spring of 1945, had demonstrated Japan's desperate attempt to ward off defeat against overwhelming odds. Its victorious o u t c o m e , despite being a long a n d costly c a m p a i g n , h a d prompted Churchill to send the following message on 22 June. CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 96) June 22, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman I wish to offer my sincere congratulations upon the splendid victory gained by the United States Army, Fleet and Air Force in Okinawa. This strength of willpower, devotion and technical resources applied by the United States to this task, joined with the death-struggle of the enemy of whom 90,000 are

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reported to be killed, places this battle among the most intense and famous of military history. It is in profound admiration of American valour and resolve to conquer at whatever cost might be necessary that I send you this tribute from your faithful Ally and all your British comrades-in-arms, who watch these memorable victories from this Island and all its camps abroad. We make our salute to all your troops and their commanders engaged. This is for publication unless you do not desire it or wish to make any alteration. 119 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 8 0 ) June 22, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 96. Please accept this expression of appreciation of your kind message of congratulations from our British Allies on the victory gained by our forces in Okinawa. This has accomplished another long step towards the total defeat of the one remaining threat of our civilization.120 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 97) June 23, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret I suggest that following the precedent of the Crimea Conference the press should not be allowed at TERMINAL, but that photographers should be permitted. I have repeated this telegram to Marshal Stalin.121 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 9 8 ) June 23, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Reference my No. 94. A. Stalin has replied as follows: "I have received your message of the 17th June. " 1 . The delegations will be housed as you propose in your message and as was arranged in the Crimea. Each delegation will have its own closed territory under a regime regulated at the discretion of the head of the delegation. The area in which the three delegations will be housed is Babelsberg, southeast of Potsdam. There will be a fourth building for the joint sessions—the Palace of the German Crown Prince in Potsdam.

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"2. Marshal Zhukov will be in Berlin on June 28th. The advance parties of Montgomery and Eisenhower should be sent in about this time to reconnoitre and take over the buildings in Babelsberg. Montgomery's and Eisenhower's advance parties will be able to obtain on the spot all the necessary information and further details about the buildings from General Kruglov,dd who is known to your people from Yalta. " 3 . Not far from the area where the delegations will be housed there is a good airfield in the small village Kladov, which could also be used as a landing ground." B. I have instructed Montgomery to send an advance party to Babelsberg as soon as possible to reconnoitre and take over the buildings allotted to the British Delegation. 122 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 81) June 23, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 97. I am in agreement. 123 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 82) June 24, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret I have your No. 95. I share the late President's gratitude for the confidence you reposed in us when you continued your Argentine meat contracts on a temporary basis. I recognize our obligation to use our influence in keeping other buyers out of the Argentine market. It will be difficult for us to find meat for France and Belgium during the third quarter. We have no surplus military stocks as yet, and shall not have so long as we continue to feed German prisoners. Allocations have been announced here by Jones ee on the basis of no exports during the third quarter. These allocations were based on Crowley's published report to Vinsonff at the time of Lyttleton and Llewellin's visit. Shortages of meat in our civilian market have placed a severe strain on our price and distribution controls, so that during the past two months civilians in our urban centers have obtained less than your per capita civilian consumption. Further reduction in our civilian allocations at this time would create additional difficulties.

dd ee ff

S. N. Kruglov, Soviet Minister of the Interior.

Jesse H. Jones, War Food Administrator.

Fred Vinson, Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion; Leo Crowley, U.S. Foreign Economic Administrator.

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I do not feel that we can properly allocate meat to France and Belgium and ignore the rest of Europe. If we can find any meat, there must be at least a semblance of uniformity in its allocation. However, in the light of the genuine needs of Europe, and in the light of our desire to fulfill the late President's commitments, I can arrange to ship fifty million pounds, carcass weight, to France and Belgium in the third quarter. You may use this information in arranging your contract with the Argentine. 124 HEADNOTE There was also concern regarding an impending coal crisis which threatened to paralyze Europe in the months ahead. To avert such a crisis, Truman proposed to send the "following directive" to Eisenhower, and asked that a similar directive be sent to Montgomery. Churchill replied in his N o . 100.

TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (Unnumbered) June 24, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister The coal famine which threatens Europe this coming winter has impressed me with great urgency of directing our military authorities in Germany to exert every effort to increase German coal production and to furnish for export the whole quantity over and above minimum German needs. From all the reports which reach me, I believe that without immediate concentration on the production of German coal we will have turmoil and unrest in the very areas of western Europe on which the whole stability of the continent depends. Similar representation should be made to France and Belgium to take drastic steps to increase their production within their own boundaries. I, therefore, propose to send the following directive to General Eisenhower. Before dispatching it I should like to have your agreement that a similar directive will be sent by you to General Montgomery. I am sending a similar communication to the Provisional French Government to cover the production in the Saar region. It is my belief that there are a number of other urgent measures relating to coal which must be undertaken if a situation dangerous to the stability of western Europe is to be averted. However, I think the steps proposed above should be taken at once. Text of directive follows: "Directive to the American Commander-in-Chief in Europe: "Unless large quantities of coal are made available to liberated Europe in forthcoming months there is grave danger of such political and

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economic chaos as to prejudice the redeployment of Allied troops and to jeopardise the achievement of the restoration of economic stability which is the necessary basis for a firm and just peace. Coal for western Europe in adequate quantities cannot as a practical matter be obtained from any source other than Germany. It is a matter of great urgency that Germany be made to produce for export to other European nations the coal which they must have to support economic life on at least a minimum basis. "You are therefore directed in your capacity of Commanding General of United States Forces in Germany and as United States member of the Allied Control Council to take all steps necessary to achieve the following objectives: " 1 . To make available for export from Germany out of the production of the coal mines in western Germany a minimum of 10 million tons of coal during 1945 and a further 15 million tons by the end of April 1946. "2. To the extent necessary to accomplish the export of 25 million tons of coal at the rate directed, to assign the highest priority to all matters pertaining to maximizing the production and transportation of German coal, with this priority to be subordinated only to requirements necessary to insure the safety, security, health, maintenance and operation of the occupying forces and the speedy redeployment of the Allied forces from Germany. " 3 . To recommend to the Allied Control Council an assignment to the production and export of coal from eastern Germany of an urgency as great as that applied in the required export of 25 million tons of coal from western Germany by the end of April 1946. "4. To follow the principle, in the allocation of coal within Germany, that the export of coal from Germany is to take precedence over the use of coal for industrial production and civilian purposes within Germany, to the extent necessary to accomplish the export of 25 million tons of coal from western Germany at the rate directed and to comply with paragraph 3 above, subject only to providing for the safety of the occupying forces and the redeployment of Allied forces from Germany. It is recognized that the following of this policy during the period of critical coal shortage will delay the resumption of industrial activity in Germany. " 5 . To make available to the European Coal Organization full and complete details of coal production and coal allocations within Germany, in order that the member nations of the European Coal Organization may know the relationship that prevails between the level of coal consumption in Germany and the level of coal consumption in liberated Europe. "6. To assign a high priority status to the production of brown coal and the production and export of brown coal briquettes and of additional quantities of other coal in excess of the 25 million tons specified in paragraph one. "7. In order to meet the emergency existing in western Europe, you are requested to assist in every reasonable way efforts in the Ruhr and the Saar areas to maximize the production of coal there.

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"It is recognized that the carrying out of the above policies with respect to German coal may cause unemployment, unrest and dissatisfaction among Germans of a magnitude which may necessitate firm and rigorous action. Any action required to control the situation will be fully supported." 125 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 99) July 1, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal, Private, and Top Secret Your No. 76. The King has decided he must visit Ulster in the period during the Berlin conference and therefore your kind telegram on this subject would have no application. You will no doubt have received His Majesty's invitation to visit this island. 126 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 100) July 2, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret I am in full agreement in principle with your proposal and a similar Directive to Field Marshal Montgomery is being prepared. There are certain points on which the Foreign Office are addressing the State Department, and we should like to have these considered before despatching our telegram.127 HEADNOTE W h a t had been a source of heightened friction between the AngloAmericans and their Soviet ally on the eve of Germany's surrender, namely the Polish problem, had on the eve of the Potsdam Conference appeared to have been resolved, if only with respect to the recognition of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity which had been formed on 28 June. Accordingly, in his message N o . 83, Truman's decision to accord recognition to the new government was made with the understanding that this "was only the beginning," and that "no useful purpose" would be served by further delay in refusing to recognize the new Polish government. For Churchill's messages concerning recognition, see his Nos. 101 and 102. TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 83) July 2, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister Ambassador Harriman has informed me and I concur that the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been established in conformity with the Crimea Decision. As you know, the new government has addressed parallel communications to us requesting that we accord recognition.

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On the basis of the assurances given by the New Government and on the recommendations of Ambassador Harriman, I plan to accord recognition to the New Government to become effective at 7 P.M. Eastern War Time on July 3. I feel that now the matter has moved this far forward any further delay would serve no useful purpose and might even prove embarrassing to both of us. I hope, therefore, you will agree to accord recognition simultaneously with us. 128 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 84) July 2, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 99 acknowledged. 129 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 101) July 3, 1945 Most Immediate Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret 1. I was surprised by your No. 83, giving me only a few hours' notice of your decision to recognize the new Polish Government. Our position is different from yours. The old Polish Government is seated here in London, with officials and very large staffs. It administers a Polish army of 170,000 men, whose attitude has to be carefully considered. It is, of course, our intention to recognize the new government, but we should hope that some consideration could be shown to us in meeting difficulties which you, in no way, share. We had been hoping to give the London Poles at least twenty-four hours' notice, which seems only reasonable, as they have to tell all their employees about their immediate future, and that three months' salary will be paid, etc. 2. I would therefore ask you whether you would not substitute 7 P.M. Eastern War Time July 4 for July 3. If you feel unable to do this, I fear there can be no synchronization. 130 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 85) July 3, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret I have just received your message No. 101 and in view of the reasons given by you I concur with your suggestion that we delay temporarily the recognition of the new Polish government. The twenty-four hour delay suggested by you would mean that we would accord recognition on Independence Day. I, therefore, suggest and

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hope you will concur that we postpone recognition for forty-eight hours; that is until seven p.m. Eastern War Time, July 5. Unless I hear from you to the contrary, we shall go ahead with this plan so that we may both recognize simultaneously the new Government on July 5. 131 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 102) July 4, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret Your No. 85. Am deeply grateful to you. We shall synchronize exactly. 132 HEADNOTE The exchange of telegrams as to whether the press would be invited to attend the Potsdam Conference composed the substance of their last t w o messages before journeying to Berlin. The reasons for excluding the "world press," according to Truman's own account, had to do with the fact that the Allied powers were still at war with Japan and because many acute problems in Europe remained to be resolved. 1 3 3 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 103) July 4, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret As we are all agreed that the press should not be allowed at TERMINAL I think that it would be advantageous to announce this publicly in advance. This will avoid disappointment and the sending to Berlin of high powered press representatives. I suggest we should each let it be known that they will not be allowed at TERMINAL and that all that will be issued will be official communiques as may be decided from time to time. I am sending a similar telegram to Stalin.134 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 86) July 5, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret In conformity with our understanding, I am announcing today that the Press will not be allowed at TERMINAL and that all that will be issued from TERMINAL will be such official communiques as may be decided upon from time to time. I am sending a similar message to Premier Stalin.135

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After

Churchill had been pleased to learn that Truman contemplated a meeting that would be unhurried, that would last two weeks, if not longer, and that the meeting would go on and not end so abruptly as happened at the Crimea Conference at Yalta, whatever happened in the British General Election. Churchill's view was that a Peace Conference would "be held later in the year" or in the spring of 1946, following the end of the Japanese war. 1 3 6 Truman, for his part, averred that his "immediate purpose" for going to Potsdam "was to bring the Russians into the war against J a p a n , " although his main purpose was to achieve a "working relationship" to prevent another world conflict from happening again. 1 3 7 Truman and Churchill had never met before, though their liking for one another grew quickly from their first meeting on 16 July, reinforced by their outlook on life and the "great principles" they held in common, in contrast to Stalin's differing outlook which was "guided by the calculation of power." As Truman wrote of his first meeting with Churchill on the m o r n i n g of July 16th: "I h a d an instant liking for this m a n w h o h a d done so m u c h for his o w n country and for the Allied cause. There was something very open and genuine about the way he greeted m e . " 1 3 8 At Potsdam, accordingly, the following m e m o r a n d a and correspondence between Truman and Churchill dealt with such key matters as the Japanese war and Lend-Lease, and such others as the Munitions Boards, and even Palestine.

TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (Babelsberg) July 17, 1945 Memorandum for the Prime Minister, Secret I have gone into the question that you raise in your telegram of May 28 in regard to Lend-Lease during the Japanese war. We intend to furnish LendLease to the British Commonwealth for the prosecution of the war against Japan generally in accord with the schedules of requirements for the first year following the defeat of Germany and other terms worked out between British and American supply representatives in October and November 1944. You, of course, realize that the policy I have indicated does not necessarily mean that either the munitions or the non-munitions program for the present year will be equal in total or individual items to the Lend-Lease requirements as estimated in the meetings of last fall. Those estimates were subject to changing strategic demands as well as to supply, procurement, and allocation considerations, and to the provision of the necessary funds by the Congress.

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Individual requisitions are of course handled by the usual administrative and allocative channels, will full discussion between our supply representatives. In connection with the foregoing, it has come to my attention that the British gold and foreign exchange holdings are now considerably higher than was anticipated at the time of the Phase II discussions. I do not wish to propose reopening the Phase II discussions on this account. However, I would like to request that your Government relax its position with respect to permitting dollar payments on certain items, particularly those where the unwillingness of your Government to make payments leads to political criticism in the United States. For example, it would be of considerable assistance if your Government relaxed its restrictions on dollar payments for the proceeds of property sales in the Middle East and elsewhere; if the United Kingdom continued to take its share of the burden of the military relief and UNRRA^g programs in Europe; and if dollar payments were allowed on other items which arise from time to time in our relationships. I urge that you provide this flexibility in the long-term interests of both your country and mine. Harry S. Truman 139

TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (Babelsberg) July 23, 1945 Memorandum for the Prime Minister, Top Secret In 1942 when the munitions resources of the United States and the United Kingdom were insufficient to meet the requirements of the United Nations forces you and President Roosevelt agreed to pool our munitions resources and to create Munitions Assignments Boards in London and Washington to assign finished war material to the several United Nations in accordance with strategic need. Since the munitions resources of the United States and the United Kingdom are now generally more than sufficient to insure the success of combined strategy, I consider that the Munitions Assignments Board, Washington, no longer serves a useful purpose. I therefore propose to abolish this Board and would appreciate your concurrence in this action. Harry S. Truman 140

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (Babelsberg) July 24, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Top Secret My Dear Mr. President, I thank you for your memorandum of 17th July. I am pleased that you say the Agreement made in Washington last autumn stands. We have never, of course, regarded the munitions schedules as ssUNRRA is the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

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absolutely rigid. Indeed I am told that our munitions requirements have already been scaled down from the 2.2 billion dollars agreed last autumn for the first year of Stage II to 1.8 billion, and that all these items are within the terms then arranged. Unfortunately the Departments in Washington have recently been insisting that nothing can be delivered save what is needed for direct use against Japan, and interpreting this in the narrowest possible sense; this has reduced munitions supplies almost to [the] vanishing point, and has put us in a very difficult position. Much as I dislike troubling you with technical questions of this kind at the present time, it is urgently necessary for us to find a solution. I attach a note on the position by the Chiefs of Staff, and very much hope that you will find it possible to let me know whether their reading of your intentions, as expressed in paragraph 1 of the note, is correct. If so, I earnestly hope you will be able to see your way to issue the necessary directive to your agencies.hh The important financial questions mentioned in your last paragraph are, of course, of a somewhat technical character, and I should hesitate to enter into them deeply at this stage. But I am told that our present gold and dollar balances (1.8 billion dollars) do not exceed what was agreed as reasonable last autumn in Washington by the United States Administration; on the other hand our external liabilities, owing to the prolongation of the war, have increased to 13 billion dollars. The Chancellor [of the Exchequer]11 asks me to add that, both in the matter of sales of surplus in the Middle East and elsewhere and in the matter of relief to Europe, he has, in an earnest endeavor to meet your wishes, already authorised proposals to the State Department which go a long way beyond what he could have justified on any other ground. In particular we have told the State Department that we are willing to continue relief during the military period in Italy until UNRRA takes over relief there in the early autumn, and to make a further contribution to the general work of UNRRA for the next year. Both of these proposals are at present under discussion with the State Department, though the Chancellor has not yet any Parliamentary authority for this further relief expenditure. All these questions, of course, are linked up closely with the general post-war economic arrangements which will have to be worked out before the War ends. For this purpose, I should be very glad if you would agree to our sending a special delegation to Washington as soon as convenient—say in September. It will, I am sure, be in our common interest to achieve as

hh

Truman answered Churchill's letter the following day, 25 July, but it was not until 28 July that he issued such a directive to the Joint Chiefs in accordance with Churchill's request for additional Lend-Lease assistance. "Sir John Anderson.

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soon as possible agreement on these vital post-war issues, so that we can view the economic picture as a whole. Yours very sincerely, Winston S. Churchill 141

TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (Babelsberg) July 24, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Memorandum Subject: Palestine There is great interest in America in the Palestine problem. The drastic restrictions imposed on Jewish immigration by the British White paper of May, 1939," continue to provoke passionate protest from Americans most interested in the Palestine and in the Jewish problem. They fervently urge the lifting of these restrictions which deny to Jews, who have been so cruelly uprooted by ruthless Nazi persecutions, entrance into the land which represents for so many of them their only hope of survival. Knowing your deep and sympathetic interest in Jewish settlement in Palestine, I venture to express to you the hope that the British government may find it possible without delay to take steps to lift the restrictions of the White Paper on Jewish immigration into Palestine. While I realize the difficulties of reaching a definite and satisfactory settlement of the Palestine problem, and that we cannot expect to discuss these difficulties at any length at our present meeting, I have some doubt whether these difficulties will be lessened by prolonged delay. I hope, therefore, that you can arrange at your early convenience to let me have your ideas on the settlement of the Palestine problem, so that we can at a later but not too distant date discuss the problem in concrete terms. 142 HEADNOTE The secret that Truman had taken to Potsdam concerned the atomic b o m b test which had been conducted in N e w Mexico only the day before the conference officially convened on 17 July. O n 25 July, as Churchill was a b o u t to leave for England, the Declaration to be issued from Potsdam asked for Chiang Kai-shek's concurrence as a party to the Declaration in calling upon Japan to surrender. Only Japan's acceptance of the proclamation to surrender would have prevented the use of this n e w w e a p o n of mass destruction, the atomic b o m b . T h u s while the following exchange of letters h a d

"See Palestine: Statement of Policy (London: HMSO, 1939).

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dealt in part with this fateful issue of the Japanese war, they would also mark the last official messages between Churchill as Britain's wartime Prime Minister and President Truman.

TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (Babelsberg) July 25, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister My Dear Mr. Prime Minister: In reply to your letter of the 24th, the Secretary of State is preparing a copy of the memorandum directive to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the issuance of Lend-Lease material. It is my intention to abide strictly by the law as passed by the United States Congress on LendLease, as I explained to you yesterday, although a liberal construction will be given to the distribution of those items referred to in your memorandum from your Chiefs of Staff. I am making every effort to get a construction of the new Lend-Lease renewal act so as to cause the least difficulty and embarrassment to our Allies. As soon as the memorandum to our Chiefs of Staff is finally prepared, I shall send you a copy. We sent you last night a copy of our telegram to Chiang Kai-shek. I am hoping that we will receive a concurrence from him, and that we may be in a position to issue the Proclamation at the earliest possible moment. I shall inform you, as soon as I hear from him, and we will issue the Proclamation jointly from here, if that is satisfactory to you. Very sincerely yours, [Harry S. Truman] 143

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (Babelsberg) July 25, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Most Secret My Dear Mr. President, I thank you for your letter of July 25, and I await the Memorandum on Lend-Lease which you are kindly having prepared. I return the copy of the Proclamation to Japan by the Heads of Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Republic of China, which I received from you yesterday. I am willing to sign it on behalf of His Majesty's Government in its present form, and I hope you will issue it as you propose whenever you choose and as soon as possible. On a minor point, I suggest that the word "industries" might be added where shown in paragraph 11, otherwise the word "those" would seem at first sight to apply to Reparations. Yours very sincerely, Winston S. Churchill 144

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HEADNOTE Churchill's last official telegrams to President Truman also date from his last day in office as Prime Minister on 26 July 1945. In the first of these he invited the President to visit King George VI before his departure in Plymouth Sound, and this was "accepted with appreciation" in Truman's N o . 87. Churchill's final telegram concerned the issuance of their Proclamation to Japan in view of a statement made earlier by the Office of War Information (OWI) to the press regarding an O W I J a p a n e s e - l a n g u a g e b r o a d c a s t calling u p o n J a p a n t o surrender, although the "official spokesman," Captain E . M . Zacharias, United States Navy, was not identified in the broadcast. CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 104) July 26, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret ONWARD No. 220. Assuming your departure would be 6th or 7th, it would be very agreeable if you would come by air to Plymouth and join Augusta there. Your privacy between the airfield and the ship would be carefully protected. The King feels he would not like you to touch our shores without having an opportunity of meeting you. He would therefore be in a British cruiser in Plymouth Sound, and would be very glad if you would lunch with him. He would then pay a return visit to Augusta before she sailed. I hope these arrangements will be convenient to you. 145 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (No. 87) July 26, 1945 President Truman to Prime Minister, Personal and Top Secret Your Onward 220. I fully expect to get away from Terminal earlier than August 6th and I will give you as much advance notice as possible. Your permission to join the Augusta at Plymouth is accepted with appreciation. I will be very much pleased to meet with the expressed desires of His Majesty at Plymouth if my necessity for early departure for Washington meets entirely with his convenience.146 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (No. 105) July 26, 1945 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Top Secret ONWARD No. 221. In view of Zacharias' statement which I read, it would seem important that our document should issue as soon as possible.147

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HEADNOTE

With the outcome of the British general election resulting in the defeat of the Conservative party, Churchill resigned after serving more than five years as Britain's wartime prime minister. As Truman wrote to his mother and sister following Churchill's defeat: "Attlee has been here with Churchill all the time, and he has been Deputy Prime Minister in Churchill's cabinet, so we ought to be able to proceed all right." 1 4 8 That same day, 30 July, Truman sent a handwritten letter to Churchill, telling him h o w much he was missed and wishing him "the happiest possible existence."

TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (Berlin) July 30, 1945

My Dear Mr. Churchill: I could hardly refrain from saying as my predecessor used to say, "Winston." In the short time we were associated here I became a very great admirer of yours. It was a shock to me when I returned from Frankfurt and learned the result of the English elections. Immediately, I released our proclamation to Japan. Molotov wanted delay but as soon as I heard from Chiang Kai-shek, the release was made. We miss you very much here, the Secretary of State,kk Admiral Leahy and I, but we wish you the happiest possible existence from now to the last call and we shall always remember that you held the barbarians until we could prepare. My very best regards to Miss (Captain) Mary.11 Believe me sir, Most sincerely yours, Harry Truman 149

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (Paraphrase) (Chartwell) July 30, 1945 Private

My Dear Truman, Thanks so much for your photograph and your kind words. I cherish the hope that our friendship will continue, and send by the American Ambassador's hand a small token which I had intended to bring back to Potsdam. May this small token record great words of peace and unity between our two countries. Very sincerely yours, Winston S. Churchill 150

kk u

James F. Byrnes.

Mary Churchill.

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TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL (Handwritten) August 2, 1945

My dear Churchill: Thank you so much for the beautiful pen. I shall use it constantly and always think of you. We missed you very much at the Conference. Glad you liked the picture. Please send me one of yours. The best of everything to you. Most sincerely, Harry Truman PS I just opened the other package—and the picture is there! Thanks again. I appreciate the sentiment very very much. HST 151

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (Paraphrase) August 1 0, 1 945 Telegram Accept my profound congratulations on the occasion of Japan's surrender in reply to our ultimatum. WSC 152 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL August 18, 1945 Message to Mr. Churchill from the President of the United States Accept my heartfelt thanks for your message of congratulations on the surrender of Japan in response to our ultimatum. I shall always have happy memories of the meetings with you in Potsdam when we discussed the terms that happily were the forerunner of victory. Harry S. Truman 153 NOTES 1. Churchill to Eden, May 11, 1945, CHAR papers 20/218. 2. CHAR papers 20/218; FRUS, 1945, I, 4. 3. CHAR papers 20/218. 4. CHAR papers 20/218. 5. CHAR papers 20/218; FRUS, 1945, I, 5-6; Winston S. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1953), 571-72. 6. CHAR papers 20/218; FRUS, 1945, I, 6-7. 7. CHAR papers 20/218. 8. CHAR papers 20/218; FRUS, 1945, III, 118-19. 9. Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Vol. VIII, 'Never Despair' 1945-1965 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1988). 10. CHAR papers 20/218. 11. CHAR papers 20/218.

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12. Gilbert, Churchill, VIII, 7. 13. CHAR papers 20/218; FRUS, 1945, 1, 8-9. 14. CHAR papers 20/218; FRUS, 1945, I, 8. 15. CHAR papers 20/218; FRUS, 1945, IV, 1157-58. 16. CHAR papers 20/219; FRUS, 1945, I, 10. 17. CHAR papers 20/219; FRUS, 1945, V, 1319. 18. CHAR papers 20/219. 19. See Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Year of Decisions, 1945, Vol. I (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1955), 14-17. 20. CHAR papers 20/219. 21. CHAR papers 20/219; FRUS, 1945, IV, 1160; Gilbert, Churchill, VIII, 11-12. 22. CHAR papers 20/219. 23. CHAR papers 20/219; FRUS, 1945, 1,11. 24. CHAR papers 20/219; FRUS, 1945, I (extract of message), 12. 25. CHAR papers 20/219. 26. See George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-50 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1967), 356. 27. Truman, Year of Decisions, I, 168. 28. CHAR papers 20/219. 29. CHAR papers 20/219. 30. CHAR papers 20/219; Truman, Year of Decisions, I, 167. 31. CHAR papers 20/219; FRUS, 1945, IV, 1167-68. 32. CHAR papers 20/219. 33. CHAR papers 20/219; FRUS, 1945, IV, 1169-70. 34. CHAR papers 20/219; FRUS, 1945, I (extract of message), 19; Truman, Year of Decisions, I, 169. 35. CHAR papers 20/219; FRUS, 1945, I (extract of message), 19. 36. Truman, Year of Decisions, I, 169-72. 37. Herbert Feis, Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 115-24; Truman, Year of Decisions, I, 178-79. 38. CHAR papers 20/219; FRUS, 1945, I, 63. 39. CHAR papers 20/219; FRUS, 1945, I, 63. 40. CHAR papers 20/219. 41. CHAR papers 20/220. 42. CHAR papers 20/220; FRUS, 1945, I, 156. 43. CHAR papers 20/220; FRUS, 1945, I (extract of message), 156. 44. Truman, Year of Decisions, I, 147-48. 45. CHAR papers 20/220. 46. CHAR papers 20/220; FRUS, 1945, I, 87. 47. CHAR papers 20/220; FRUS, 1945, 1, 87. 48. CHAR papers 20/220; FRUS, 1945, VIII (paraphrase), 1116-17; Truman, Year of Decisions, I, 160-61. 49. FRUS, 1945,1, 88. 50. CHAR papers 20/220; FRUS, 1945, I, 89; Gilbert, Churchill, VIII, 26. 51. CHAR papers 20/220; FRUS, 1945, VIII (paraphrase), 1123-24. 52. CHAR papers 20/220. 53. CHAR papers 20/220; FRUS, 1945, VIII, 1121. 54. CHAR papers 20/220; FRUS, 1945, I, 90.

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55. CHAR papers 20/220; FRUS, 1945, I, 90-91. 56. CHAR papers 20/220. 57. CHAR papers 20/220; FRUS, 1945, V, 314-15. 58. CHAR papers 20/220; FRUS, 1945, I (extract of message), 91. 59. CHAR papers 20/220; FRUS, 1945, V, 550-51. 60. CHAR papers 20/220. 61. CHAR papers 20/220; draft statement also appears in Victory: War Speeches by the Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill, Compiled by Charles Eade (London: Cassell & Co., 1946), 181. 62. CHAR papers 20/220; FRUS, 1945, V,317. 63. CHAR papers 20/220. 64. CHAR papers 20/220. 65. CHAR papers 20/220. 66. CHAR papers 20/220. 67. CHAR papers 20/220. 68. CHAR papers 20/220. 69. CHAR papers 20/220. 70. CHAR papers 20/220; FRUS, 1945, V (extract of message), 320-21. 71. CHAR papers 20/220; FRUS, 1945, V, 321-24. 72. CHAR papers 20/220; FRUS, 1945, V, 552. 73. CHAR papers 20/220; FRUS, 1945, V, 327-28. 74. See, in this regard, Harry S. Truman, Mr. Citizen (New York: Bernard Geis Assoc, 1960), 263. 75. CHAR papers 20/220. 76. CHAR papers 20/220; FRUS, 1945, I, 93. 77. CHAR papers 20/220; FRUS, 1945, I (extract of message), 93. 78. CHAR papers 20/220. 79. CHAR papers 20/220. 80. CHAR papers 20/220. 81. International Herald Tribune "Allies Wanted to Get Rid of de Gaulle," Warren Hoge (January 6, 2000), 7. 82. CHAR papers 20/220. 83. CHAR papers 20/220; FRUS, 1945, I, 94. 84. CHAR papers 20/220. 85. CHAR papers 20/220; FRUS, 1945, V, 331-32. 86. CHAR papers 20/220. 87. CHAR papers 20/220; FRUS, 1945, V, 334-35. 88. Truman, Year of Decisions, I, 136. 89. CHAR papers 20/220; FRUS, 1945, III, 132. 90. CHAR papers 20/221; FRUS, 1945,1, 94-95; also, Gilbert, Churchill, VIII, 42. 91. CHAR papers 20/221. 92. CHAR papers 20/221. 93. CHAR papers 20/221; FRUS, 1945, 1,163. 94. CHAR papers 20/221; Gilbert, Churchill, VIII, 42-43. 95. CHAR papers 20/221. 96. CHAR papers 20/221; FRUS, 1945, I, 95. 97. CHAR papers 20/221. 98. CHAR papers 20/221. 99. CHAR papers 20/221.

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100. CHAR papers 20/221. 101. CHAR papers 20/221; FRUS, 1945, III, 134-35. 102. CHAR papers 20/221; FRUS, 1945, I, 96. 103. CHAR papers 20/221. 104. CHAR papers 20/221; FRUS, 1945, I, 98. 105. CHAR papers 20/221. 106. CHAR papers 20/221. 107. CHAR papers 20/221. 108. CHAR papers 20/221; FRUS, 1945, I, 98. 109. CHAR papers 20/221. 110. CHAR papers 20/221; FRUS, 1945, I, 98-99. 111. CHAR papers 20/221; FRUS, 1945, I, 104. 112. CHAR papers 20/221. 113. CHAR papers 20/221; FRUS, 1945, I (extract of message), 104. 114. CHAR papers 20/221; FRUS, 1945, I, 106-07. 115. CHAR papers 20/221. 116. CHAR papers 20/221. 117. CHAR papers 20/221; FRUS, 1945, I (extract of message), 107. 118. CHAR papers 20/221. 119. CHAR papers 20/221; Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 626-27. 120. CHAR papers 20/221. 121. CHAR papers 20/221; FRUS, 1945, 1,117. 122. CHAR papers 20/221; FRUS, 1945, I, 118. 123. CHAR papers 20/221. 124. CHAR papers 20/221; Truman, Year of Decisions, I, 400. 125. CHAR papers 20/221. 126. CHAR papers 20/222; FRUS, 1945, I, 137. 127. CHAR papers 20/222. 128. CHAR papers 20/222; FRUS, 1945, I, 733; Truman, Year of Decisions, I, 245-46. 129. CHAR papers 20/222. 130. CHAR papers 20/222; FRUS, 1945, I (extract of message), 733. 131. CHAR papers 20/222; FRUS, 1945, I (extract of message), 734. 132. CHAR papers 20/222. 133. Truman, Year of Decisions, I, 277. 134. CHAR papers 20/222; FRUS, 1945, I, 145. 135. CHAR papers 20/222. 136. Telegram, Churchill to Halifax, July 6, 1945; CHAR papers 20/222. 137. Truman, Year of Decisions, I, 247. 138. Truman, Year of Decisions, I, 265. 139. FRUS, 1945,1, 1179-80. 140. FRUS, 1945,1, 1204. 141. FRUS, 1945,1, 1180-81. 142. FRUS, 1945, I, 1402; see also Vol. VIII, 716-17. 143. FRUS, 1945, I, 1183, 1279. 144. FRUS, 1945, I, 1184, 1279. 145. CHAR papers 20/222; Gilbert, Churchill, VIII, 106. 146. CHAR papers 20/222; Truman, Year of Decisions, I, 343-44.

Preparing for Potsdam—and After 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153.

CHAR papers Truman, Year CHUR papers CHUR papers CHUR papers CHAR papers CHUR papers

20/222. of Decisions, I, 331. 2/142; Gilbert, Churchill, VIII, 123. 2/142; Gilbert, Churchill, VIII, 124. 2/142. 20/229. 2/449.

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Part Two

Cold War to the Korean War

Photograph of President Truman and Prime Minister Winston Churchill taken on January 5, 1952; courtesy of the Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO, and Abbie Rowe of the National Park Service.

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Journey to Fulton, 1945-1946

THE EARLY POSTWAR CORRESPONDENCE

The great moment of Allied victory that President Truman had addressed in his last wartime message to Churchill cannot be said to have been coextensive with the prospects for peace in the postwar world. For Truman, in fact, the Potsdam Conference had been a sobering experience in dealing with the Russians. "It did not seem possible," he recalled, "that only a few miles from the war-shattered seat of Nazi power" that "the head of any government would not bend every effort to attain a real peace"; and so, the experience of Potsdam confirmed his belief "that the Russians were not in earnest about peace" in any meaningful sense. Still, he believed that his going to Potsdam had yielded some useful results. One of these had been to get Stalin's personal assurance that Russia would enter the war against Japan, even though he had no intention of allowing Stalin to exercise any control over Japan once the Pacific War had ended. Another result, he felt, had been the agreement to establish a Council of Foreign Ministers as a consultative body in the hope that this entity would pave the way for a future peace conference in settling such unresolved issues as the frontiers of Poland. On balance, however, Truman had walked away from Potsdam with a foreboding sense about the Russians as a power to be reckoned with in the

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years ahead. "Force is the only thing the Russians understand," he added, and though he hoped that they "might some day be persuaded to work in cooperation for peace," 1 he remained wary of Soviet aims and intentions. It may be taken as a given, therefore, that President Truman and the former Prime Minister, the leader n o w of the opposition in British politics, would resume their association at some future date. Indeed, the earliest occasion, an occurrence that would prove to be eventful in the postwar era, was a letter from the President of Westminster College in Missouri, F. L. McCluer, dated the 3rd of October, in which he invited Churchill to deliver the Green Lectures on international affairs that winter or in the spring of 1946. Truman's well-remembered connection with McCluer's letter was his o w n handwritten postscript, which read: "This is a wonderful school in my home state. H o p e you can do it. I'll introduce you. Best regards, Harry T r u m a n . " 2 Some days later, on 11 October, the President would again write Churchill on another—if not unrelated—matter.

TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL October 11, 1945 The White House My dear Mr. Churchill: One of President Roosevelt's fondest desires was to have a painting of you, Premier Stalin and himself placed in the Capitol here in Washington as a testimony of the historical importance of the meetings at Teheran and Yalta. He had hoped that the work could be done by Mr. Douglas Chandor whose peculiar kind of artistic gift he admired and who, he felt, was better fitted than anyone else for doing this particular painting. Knowing how strongly President Roosevelt felt that such a painting would be a worthy addition to the historical mementos of this country, I should like to ask you if you would be willing to sacrifice some of your valued time to allow Mr. Chandor to come over to do this painting. I have also written to Premier Stalin asking if, he, too, could spare sufficient time to permit Mr. Chandor to paint his picture in order to complete this historic work symbolizing the unity of our three nations. You may be sure that your acquiescence in helping to consummate this cherished desire of President Roosevelt would be greatly appreciated by me. Sincerely yours, Harry Truman 3

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CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (Paraphrase) November 8, 1945 Private and Personal My dear Mr. President: I have had the pleasure to receive several agreeable notes from you, for which I thank you. I have had it in mind to visit the United States about the end of January, and to stay in Florida for several weeks at the house of a friend, Colonel Frank Clarke, a Canadian. Under your aegis, I would be glad to give an address at Westminster College on the world scene, as this might be advantageous from several points of view. I would also be favorably disposed to the idea of having myself painted by Mr. Chandor in accordance with your expressed wishes. Perhaps you will let me know then what you feel about my tentative plans for this visit early next year. Warmest regards, Winston S. Churchill4 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL November 16, 1945 The White House My dear Mr. Churchill: I certainly did appreciate your good letter of November eight. I am most happy that you have made up your mind to spend some time in Florida, and that you are willing to deliver a speech on World Affairs at Westminster College in Missouri. I would be most pleased to introduce you. I don't know what to say to you about a visit to Mexico, 3 it is a lovely country and the climate is ideal but the City of Mexico is at an elevation of Eight Thousand feet—the atmosphere is extremely rare and anyone who has any bronchial difficulties finds it difficult to breathe comfortably there. I know though you would enjoy a visit in that great country—they are very hospitable people. I am sure that Mr. Chandor could make arrangements to paint your picture while you are in Florida, if that would not be an imposition on your vacation. Please let me know definitely the date of your arrival and the date that would suit you best to go to Missouri.

a

In his letter of 8 November, Churchill mentioned an invitation from the President and government of Mexico to visit that country, a visit, however, he decided to forgo.

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Prime Minister Attlee, and Prime Minister Kingb and I had a very satisfactory meeting and, I think, came to the right conclusion. I am looking forward with much pleasure to seeing you. Sincerely yours, Harry Truman 5 Journey to Fulton, 1945-1946 In Churchill's mind there were two related issues that stood out during this period between the end of the Second World War and his "iron curtain" speech given at Westminster College in March 1946. One centered on the question of how to escape from future disaster in the face of what he regarded as an impending Soviet threat to the free world, and relatedly, his belief that only a closer Anglo-American association, though not anything like a formal alliance, could stave off such a disaster. W h e r e u p o n , in his n e x t letter t o T r u m a n , Churchill wrote that he would inform him of the line he proposed to take at Fulton so that the occasion could not cause any "embarrassment" in dealing with the subject of Russia on the postwar situation.

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (Paraphrase) November 29, 1945 My dear Mr. President: I have received your most kind letter of November 16th. With my wife and our daughter Sarah, we will travel from England in one of the "Queens" c to New York, and from there to Miami where I plan to rest for a few weeks. After that, I would be glad to come to Westminster at any date after February 23, and will let you know beforehand the line I propose to take so that nothing said by me on that occasion could cause you any embarrassment. I do not intend to make any other public speaking engagements during my visit to America, and very much look forward to some talks with you. I often think of you as I did of our friend F.D.R., and am most thankful that you are there to take his place. Yours sincerely, W. S. C.6 HEADNOTE O n 6 December, President Truman replied to Churchill's confirmatory letter of the 29th via the U.S. ambassador to Great Britain, John G. Winant, in the following message. b c

Mackenzie King was prime minister of Canada.

The Churchill's departed for New York aboard the Queen Elizabeth on 9 January 1946.

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TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL December 6, 1945 From: The President to Ambassador Winant. Please deliver the following message to Mr. Churchill: "Referring to your letter of 29 November, enroute by air mail, which Winant has telegraphed to me and to which I will reply by mail upon its receipt, it is believed you should have the following information without delay. "The Westminster College had tentatively set Tuesday, 5 March, as the date for your address. "The College would like to know if this date is entirely satisfactory to you and when it can make a public announcement of your forthcoming address. "I can provide air transportation from here to the college in my plane or from Florida if you prefer to go that way. "I am looking forward with great pleasure to seeing you." Truman 7 HEADNOTE O n 10 December, President Truman wrote to Dr. McCluer of Westminster College of Churchill's acceptance of the date, 5 March, to deliver an address on "world affairs," and of Churchill's desire to announce the event both in Washington and London at the same time. Subsequently, Churchill thanked the President for releasing the " n e w s " in a brief message on 22 December, and again in late January, writing from Miami, to thank him for making his personal pilot available in order to visit Cuba for a week. TRUMAN TO F. L. McCLUER December 10, 1945 Dear Dr. McCluer: I have received from Mr. Churchill an acceptance of your invitation to deliver an address to you on March fifth. He desires that the following announcement be made simultaneously here and in London: "Mr. Churchill has accepted the invitation of Westminster College, Missouri, to deliver an address on 'world affairs' on March 5, 1946. This invitation was endorsed by the President of the United States who will himself introduce Mr. Churchill to the members of the College. "Mr. Churchill will leave England by sea for New York about the middle of January. He has been recommended by Lord Moran, his medical

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advisor, to spend a month or more in a warm climate, and to have a complete rest. He has accepted the invitation of Colonel Frank Clarke of Quebec to stay at his house in Florida during February. Mr. Churchill does not contemplate any other public engagement in the United States at the present time. He will be accompanied on his visit to Florida by Mrs. Churchill and his daughter Mrs. Sarah Oliver." Please inform me by telegraph when you wish the announcement made. Sincerely, Harry S. Truman 8

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (Paraphrase) December 22, 1945 From: Winston Churchill To: The President Many thanks for your [December 6th] message and the release of my news. I greatly look forward to seeing you, and every good wish for Christmas and the New Year.9

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (Paraphrase) January 29, 1946 My dear Mr. President: I avail myself of this opportunity to thank you for placing a powerful plane at my disposal in order to visit Cuba for a week. I am also considering the possibility of visiting Veracruz, and about which I hear the view is very fine for painting, although I will be back here by February 10th. I am very glad to hear that you will be coming along this coast by ship, and would very much like to visit with you on this occasion before our Fulton date to discuss the message I plan to deliver there to your country and the world, and that, under your auspices, will command some attention and the opportunity of doing some good. I have just heard by telegram from the wife of Harry Hopkins that he is failing rapidly. Yours sincerely, Winston S. Churchill 10 HEADNOTE P r e s i d e n t T r u m a n replied on 2 F e b r u a r y , sending his letter to Churchill in care of the British embassy in Havana, Cuba. TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL February 2, 1946 My dear Mr. Churchill: It was a pleasure to furnish you with a pilot and I hope you had the use of him as long as you needed him.

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I shall probably be in Florida on the eleventh of February and will immediately get in touch with you. I hope you find it convenient to visit me on the yacht. d I know you have a real message to deliver at Fulton and, of course, I shall be most happy to talk with you about it. It certainly was too bad about Mr. Harry Hopkins, e but I had been expecting it for almost a week. He is a great loss to the country and especially to me, because he was familiar with all the meetings which Mr. Roosevelt attended during the war. I sincerely hope you are having a good rest and enjoying your visit to Florida. Veracruz is a lovely city at this time of the year and has some very beautiful scenery. One of the most beautiful mountains in the world is just a short distance from Veracruz—seeming to rise right out of the Gulf of Mexico when you are coming into the harbor, to a height of over 18,000 feet. That mountain, Mount Rainier in the State of Washington and Popocatepetl at Mexico City, I think, are our most beautiful peaks, principally because they stand alone and are not surrounded by other mountains. I am looking forward to a pleasant visit with you. Sincerely yours, Harry S. Truman 11 HEADNOTE O n 5 February, Churchill conveyed his acceptance of the President's invitation for dinner in Miami aboard the USS Williamsburg via the U.S. ambassador to Cuba, R. Henry N o r w e b , a "career diplomat." O n the following day, the Churchills dined at the U.S. embassy in Havana at the request of Ambassador N o r w e b , an occasion which enabled Churchill to speak his mind on some of the "major issues," as N o r w e b indicated in his letter to the President on 7 February, and to which President Truman replied on 18 February.

NORWEB TO TRUMAN Secret and Personal February 7, 1946 My dear Mr. President: I had the honor last evening to have Winston Churchill as a guest at the Embassy residence for a small unpublicized family dinner, which gave him an opportunity to speak rather intimately of some major issues preoccupying his mind even during this holiday trip. He spoke with great d e

The presidential yacht, the USS Williamsburg.

Harry Hopkins passed away on 29 January 1946.

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anticipation of seeing you again very shortly, and I wish to pass on to you in advance an outline of the thoughts he expressed and which he will probably communicate to you in much greater substance and detail. Mr. Churchill is obviously and deeply apprehensive as to the future of the United Nations Organization, which he sees as an armored chain no stronger than its weakest link—Russia, the ever-threatening "Bear who walks like a man." The armed force behind UNO, he holds, does not of itself guarantee any better fate than befell the League of Nations since all and everything depends upon the political relations between the three great powers around which the whole structure is built, and these relations he feels are now neither clear nor promising. Churchill's greatest fear, as he expressed it, is that Russia will not only master the secret of atomic warfare but will not hesitate to employ it for her own ends in this atmosphere of postwar friction and confusion. Should this dread eventuality occur, Churchill wryly remarked, UNO would perish with the epitaph of "United Nations Orphan." In the face of what he clearly considers to be a real Russo-Communist menace, he stated that it would appear to be his lifetime fate to issue "clarion calls" regarding the dangers he foresees. The grimness with which he set forth this view recalled to no little degree his world-shaking oratory directed against the "Nazis" six years ago. Mr. Churchill went on to express his conviction that the only escape from future disaster, the only hope for UNO, lies in the development over the years of some definite working agreement between the American and British Governments. He fully understands, he said, that any formal merger or alliance would doubtless now be impracticable, untimely and unpopular on both sides of the Atlantic—but he holds that the sheer pressure of events will of necessity force our two great commonwealths to come together in some workable manner if the peace and order of the world are to be preserved from chaos. I am sending these observations on to you as an indication of what Mr. Churchill is thinking at this critical time, and also because he gave me a strong impression that he wanted these thoughts passed on to you. Faithfully yours, R. Henry Norweb 12

TRUMAN TO NORWEB February 18, 1946 My dear Mr. Ambassador: I appreciated most highly your thoughtfulness in giving me a transcript of your impressions gathered from your conversation with Mr. Churchill. It was very helpful in my interview with him. Sincerely yours, Harry S. Truman 13

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HEADNOTE

F o l l o w i n g the C h u r c h i l l s ' d i n n e r e n g a g e m e n t a b o a r d the USS Williamsburg, Churchill sent a brief message to the President on 14 February suggesting an alternative journey to Fulton by train from Washington instead of flying to Missouri. Hence Churchill's query in conclusion: "Will you please wire me whether this change commends itself to y o u . " 1 4 O n 4 M a r c h , t h e n , as C h u r c h i l l h a d r e q u e s t e d , his e n t i r e entourage and the journey by train proceeded from Union Station in Washington enroute to Missouri where, on the following day, he delivered his address at Fulton entitled "The Sinews of Peace." The Fulton address, in retrospect, had represented much of what had been on Churchill's mind concerning the Soviet Union since the end of the war in Europe. Indeed, the issue of Stalin's expansionist policy would be reinforced by Churchill's experience at Potsdam when he again raised the idea of an "iron curtain," only to be dismissed by Stalin himself as "all fairy tales." In summary, Churchill's address h a d alerted the American people and peoples elsewhere about what had only previously been discussed in private concerning the attitude toward the postwar peace on the part of one of the three great powers, namely, the Soviet Union. Two days later, on 7 M a r c h , in a h a n d w r i t t e n letter from the British embassy in Washington, Churchill thanked his host in a brief letter, beginning with the salutation " M y dear H a r r y . " T r u m a n reciprocated as few days later, addressing Churchill as " M y dear Winston."

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (Paraphrase) March 7, 1946

My dear Harry/ I am sending you a set of my war books for your library, and two more at a later date, the two being "Victory" and the "Secret Session Speeches," when they are published along with the Fulton address. I enjoyed so much my journey with you and all the kindness shown me during the course of my visit. Very sincerely yours, Winston S. Churchill 15 f On their journey to Fulton, Churchill made an agreement with the President to address him as Harry, if he (Truman) would address him as Winston, to which Truman assented.

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TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL March 12, 1946 My dear Winston: I can't thank you enough for the autographed volumes on the war period. I am going to read them with a great deal of interest. I can't tell you how very much we all enjoyed your visit to this country and hope it will not be the last one. The people in Missouri were highly pleased with your visit and enjoyed what you had to say. Please express my best wishes to Mrs. Churchill and Mrs. Oliver. I regret exceedingly I did not have the privilege of meeting them. I know you will have a grand reception in New York and I hope you have a most pleasant voyage to England. Sincerely yours, Harry S. Truman 16

HEADNOTE O n the eve of Churchill's only other address in 1946 that bears comparison with his Fulton address was that which he delivered nearly six months later at Zurich University on the 19th of September. The occasion concerned a talk between the American Minister in Bern, Leland Harrison, and Churchill in recalling the latter's visit earlier that year with President Truman and at Fulton. T h e ensuing c o r r e s p o n d e n c e , namely, H a r r i s o n ' s letter t o the P r e s i d e n t a n d T r u m a n ' s reply, conveys the m u t u a l esteem a n d friendship between the two men, and their common goals in dealing with the issues facing the West, and of Europe in particular, in the new postwar world.

HARRISON TO TRUMAN September 18, 1946 Dear Mr. President: Winston Churchill, Mrs. Churchill and their daughter, Mary, have as you may know, been for some time in Switzerland in a villa on the Lake of Geneva placed at their disposal by Swiss admirers. Yesterday, Mr. Churchill, accompanied by his daughter, was received here with all honors by the Federal Council, and the Government of the Canton and the Mayor of Bern. Mrs. Churchill was unable to be present as she was suffering with a broken rib following a fall. The people of Bern gave Mr. Churchill a most enthusiastic reception. Their tribute was spontaneous and very flattering. Most unusual for so undemonstrative a population.

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I had an opportunity to talk with Mr. Churchill after dinner at the British Legation. He spoke in high terms of his regard for you. He recalled your last meeting and voiced his conviction that Europe would continue to count on your sympathetic understanding and support. Europe with its historic civilization should, he felt, face its responsibilities manfully and not lean always on us. At his request he had been furnished with a copy of Mr. Byrnes' Stuttgart speech, with which he said he was fully in agreement. He also told me that in his address tomorrow in the Aula of the Zurich University he would emphasize the importance of a unified Europe. He contrasted Mr. Wallace's^ reference to British imperialism at a time when the British Government is offering independence to four hundred million people (India)—a policy with which he was frank to say that he was not in entire accord. The present situation, he said, caused him grave anxiety. Our possession of the atomic bomb was the sole restraint to Russian expansionism. He was glad that the secret was in safe hands, for if the Soviets also had it they would be far more difficult to restrain, and if they had it and we did not have it, their appetite would know no bounds. On taking his departure, Mr. Churchill repeated his request that I convey to you an expression of his regard. Faithfully and sincerely yours, Leland Harrison 17

TRUMAN TO HARRISON October 2, 1946 My dear Mr. Minister: I appreciated very much your letter of September eighteenth, regarding the visit of Mr. Churchill, Mrs. Churchill and their daughter. His conversation with you was along the same line as that which I had with him when he was in this country. I think very highly of him, of course, and I think he does of me. Sincerely yours, Harry S. Truman 18 NOTES 1. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Year of Decisions, 1945, Vol. (London: Hodder &c Stoughton, 1955), 341-42; Herbert Feis, Between War and Peace: The Postdam Conference (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1960), 322-23. 2. Letter, McCluer to Churchill, October 3, 1945; CHUR papers 2/230. 3. CHUR papers 2/230.

sHenry A. Wallace, secretary of commerce, at President Truman's request, had resigned from the Cabinet on 20 September 1946.

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4. Letter, Churchill to Truman, November 8, 1945; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers. 5. Letter, Truman to Churchill, November 16, 1945; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers. 6. CHUR papers 2/230; cf. Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Vol. VIII, 'Never Despair' 1945-1965 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1988) 172-73. 7. CHUR papers 2/230. The message is marked "Secret." 8. Letter, Truman to McCluer, December 10, 1945; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers. 9. Telegram, Churchill to Truman, December 22, 1945; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers. 10. CHUR papers 2/158; copy, January 29, 1946; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers. See also Gilbert, Churchill, VIII, 189. 11. Letter, Truman to Churchill, February 2, 1946; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers. 12. Letter, Norweb to Truman, February 7, 1946; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers. 13. Letter, Truman to Norweb, February 18, 1946; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers. 14. CHUR papers 2/158. 15. CHUR papers 2/158; copy, PSF, Box 115, Truman papers; cf. Gilbert, Churchill, VIII, 205. 16. CHUR papers 2/158; copy, PSF, Box 115, Truman papers. 17. Letter, Harrison to Truman, September 18, 1946; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers. 18. Letter, Truman to Harrison, October 2, 1946; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers.

4

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THE EARLY COLD WAR CORRESPONDENCE

Not until 1947 would the correspondence between President Truman and Churchill be resumed. Its resumption, in fact, had been aided by their "immediate friendship in 1946," much as it would be aided after 1946 by their like-minded devotion to the common cause.1 As the new year opened, a major issue had centered on the crises—economic, political and civil—facing the Greek and Turkish governments, especially in the case of Greece because Great Britain had decided to withdraw its support from that country due to its own financial exigencies. Thereafter, when it was announced that the British government would end its assistance to Greece and Turkey on 31 March, it was hoped that the American government would assume that role and the burden of assisting both countries after that date. Alas, prior to Truman's address before Congress on 12 March concerning aid to Greece and Turkey, Churchill's brother, John Churchill, had passed away, prompting the President's message of "heartfelt sympathy" on his loss, and Churchill's reply of 26 February.2 Although no record of any March or April message has been found from Churchill in response to Truman's historic Truman Doctrine

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address on the question of aid to Greece and Turkey, the President's handwritten letter that follows suggests that such a message may have been sent. In any case, Churchill wrote the President in this same vein ten days before the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill became law on 12 M a y 1947.

TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL April 24, 1947 My dear Winston: To follow instructions as you have I make the same style of address. I appreciate very much your addressing me as "My dear Harry." You are exceedingly kind in your statement that I have made a contribution to world peace. I hope I have. You have not been idle yourself. Eventually, I am sure we shall attain our goal. May God bless and keep you in good health. Most sincerely yours, Harry S. Truman 3

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (Paraphrase) May 12, 1946

My dear Harry, I cannot resist telling you how much I admire what you have done for world peace and freedom since our meeting at Fulton. Yours sincerely, WSC 4

HEADNOTE In the ensuing m o n t h s , however, Truman and his advisors recognized that aid to Greece and Turkey was only a beginning, and that further aid would be needed if Western Europe itself were not to fall prey to the threat of economic and social collapse. Accordingly, w h a t followed would be k n o w n as the "Marshall Plan" in paying tribute to the address given by Secretary of State George Marshall at Harvard on June 5, 1947. When Churchill, then, again wrote the President on 24 September, it was to acknowledge this larger policy of postwar economic assistance even though he did not mention the Marshall Aid Plan by name.

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CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (Paraphrase) September 24, 1947

My dear Harry, As our friend Lew Douglas 3 is returning home for awhile I am sending a few lines by his hand to convey my admiration for all that you are doing to save the world from famine and war. I indeed wish that I could visit with you, but am unable to come on account of the political situation here which requires my constant attention. Please accept my warmest regards, and know that all of Britain's strongest forces will be at your side if trouble comes. b ' 5

TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL October 14, 1947

My dear Winston: It was kind and thoughtful of you to send me the message by Mr. Douglas. The world is facing serious problems and it has been my lot to have to make decisions on a great many of them. Our Russian "friends" seem most ungrateful for the contribution which your great country and mine made to save them. I sometimes think perhaps we made a mistake—and then I remember Hitler. He had no heart at all. I believe that Joe Stalin has one but the Politburo won't let him use it. Vashinskic [sic] has assured my re-election I think, although the voters would do me a very great favor if they retired me. No one man can carry the burden of the Presidency and do it right. But I have a good team now. Your Fulton, Mo. speech becomes more nearly a prophecy every day. I hope conditions will warrant your paying me another visit. I certainly enjoyed your stay here immensely. You are very kind to me, and, I think, give me too much credit. But I like it—particularly from you. May you continue to enjoy health and happiness and a long life—the world needs you now as badly as ever. Most sincerely, Harry S. Truman 6 a

Lewis (Lew) W. Douglas, U.S. ambassador to the United Kingdom, 1947-1949.

b

Churchill's letter could not have been more prescient, inasmuch as an all party conference was then being held in Polish Silesia, where the Communist parties had been convened to rubber-stamp Stalin's formal declaration of political warfare against the West. The nine European countries represented had agreed to the formation of the Communist Information Bureau, or Cominform, and had called for the defeat of the Marshall Plan by means of a general strike. c

Vyshinsky; the permanent Soviet delegate to the United Nations, 1945-1949.

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HEADNOTE

Before the year ended, the President cabled the former prime minister on the occasion of his seventy-third birthday. TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL November 30, 1947 Right Hon. Winston Churchill May great length of days be yours. The world needs the counsel which you can give out of such a wide experience and the example of your courage and determination to inspire hope in these anxious days. Happy Birthday. Harry S. Truman 7

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (Paraphrase) December 3, 1947 Telegram sent via U.S. embassy President Truman Your very kind telegram has given me the greatest pleasure. Winston Churchill8 HEADNOTE Despite growing concern about the developing crisis between Russia and the West, the correspondence in the new year opened on a different note in M a y 1948. Two years before Churchill had told his former literary assistant, R W. Deakin, that his help was again needed to tell the story of his wartime premiership, although w o r k on the first volume did not begin until the following year. Accordingly, when Churchill encountered opposition from the State Department to the publication of some selected wartime messages to President Roosevelt, he decided to appeal his case to President Truman in his effort to overcome any official objection to the publication of these messages to ED.R.

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (Paraphrase) May 5, 1948 My dear Mr. President, I am, as you may know, writing an account of my conduct in the late war. The messages I sent to President Roosevelt are an essential part of the story in telling of the British contribution to victory. In the first volume

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there were only three such messages which I have paraphrased. And in the second volume, the telegrams enclosed have all been approved for publication by His Majesty's Government. They are all of my own composition and belong to my correspondence with him. I am not seeking to publish any of his textually, but only brief summaries of his replies. The State Department has informed me that they do not want any of these messages to be published. At the same time, I feel a great sense of responsibility to uphold the interests of both our countries now so closely associated since the defeat of our common enemies. I shall be most grateful, therefore, if you would agree or, at least, acquiesce in what is now history. Yours sincerely, Winston S. Churchill 9

TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL May 18, 1948 Dear Mr. Churchill: I wanted to address you as Mr. Prime Minister. It was a very great pleasure to me to get your letter of May fifth and the enclosed personal note to me addressed "Dear Harry." . . .d I had the State Department make an examination of the whole matter along with the first request made by you. There seems to have been a misunderstanding as to what you had proposed to do. I have this memorandum from Mr. Lovette to me: "I see no reason why the D e p a r t m e n t of State should object to the publication of these proofs. I therefore recommend that we join with Admiral Leahy in advising the President to comply with M r . Churchill's request and that he acquiesce in the publication of these proofs after J a n u a r y 1, 1 9 4 9 . "

I had Admiral Leahy make a survey of this situation and he made the same recommendation that the State Department has now made. I am more than happy that the publication will not come out until January first, 1949, because, as you know, we are in the midst of a very bitter political presidential election in this country and it will be better for all concerned if this publication comes out after that election is over. I am very sorry for the misunderstanding and I am very happy that it has now been straightened out. Sincerely yours, Harry S. Truman 10

d

His accompanying note of May 5, 1948, was addressed "My dear Harry."

e

Robert A. Lovett, undersecretary of state, 1947-1949.

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HEADNOTE

O n 7 June Churchill thanked the President for removing the State D e p a r t m e n t ' s objections to certain messages he h a d w a n t e d to include in the second volume of his war memoirs, and on 16 June Churchill duly sent him a copy of the first volume of his account of the Second World War, The Gathering Storm.11

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (Paraphrase) June 7, 1948 My dear Harry, Thank you for your letter and for sweeping away so many difficulties. I am so much indebted to you. I think a good deal about our mutual affairs, and am not free from anxiety about the coming months. In European affairs, I greatly applaud your conduct, and only wish that I could be of some help. Very sincerely yours, Winston S. Churchill 12 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL July 10, 1948 My dear Winston: I was deeply touched by your good letter of June 7. I am going through a terrible political "trial by fire." Too bad it must happen at this time. Your great country and mine are founded on the fact that the people have the right to express themselves on their leaders, no matter what the crisis/ Your note accompanying "The Gathering Storm" is highly appreciated, and I have made it a part of the book. We are in the midst of grave and trying times. You can look with satisfaction upon your great contribution to the overthrow of Nazism & Fascism in the world. Communism—so called is our next great problem. I hope we can solve it without the "blood and tears" the other two cost. May God bless and protect you. Ever sincerely your friend, Harry S. Truman 13 f

In June 1948, President Truman had decided to take his case directly to the people in seeking re-election as the leader of the Democratic party. It meant travelling thousands of miles by train to all parts of the country, but in light of the "Politics of 1948"—a key document—it appeared to him as the only alternative; and it so proved to be. His whistle-stop campaign demonstrated the soundness of that approach in electoral politics, and brought welcome relief to Churchill, whose handwritten letter followed the autumnal election of 1948.

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CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (Paraphrase) November 8, 1948

My dear Harry, My heartfelt congratulations on your great victory. I felt keenly the way you were treated, especially by Wallace^ who seemed to us over here a greater danger than he proved to be. Of course, my business is to keep out of American politics, but it was a relief to me and so many here that the continuity between us and the Democratic party will continue uninterrupted as the best means of pursuing peace. Mrs. Churchill who predicted your victory sends her best wishes to Mrs. Truman. Our sincerest regards, Winston S. Churchill 14 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL Personal and Confidential November 23, 1948 Dear Winston: I can't tell you how very much I appreciated your cable h and your good letter of November eight. I had a terrific fight and had to carry it to the people almost lone handed but when they knew the facts they went along with me. It seemed to have been a terrific political upset when you read the papers here in this country. Really it was not—it was merely a continuation of the policies which had been in effect for the last sixteen years and the policies that the people wanted. I hope everything is going well with you and that sometime or other we will have a chance for another meeting. Please remember me to Mrs. Churchill and tell her I appreciate the fact that she was a good prophet. Mrs. Truman and Margaret want to be remembered to you and Mrs. Churchill. Sincerely yours, Harry S. Truman 15 HEADNOTE O n 30 November, exactly one week later, President Truman sent a W e s t e r n U n i o n c a b l e g r a m t o C h u r c h i l l o n t h e o c c a s i o n of his seventy-fourth birthday; and, on 2 December, Churchill acknowledged Truman's birthday cablegram. sHenry A. Wallace, Roosevelt's vice president until 1944, was the Progressive party candidate for president in 1948. h

Churchill's congratulatory telegram of the same date.

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TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL November 30, 1948 Right Honorable Winston Churchill Chartwell, Westerham, Kent Accept with my hearty birthday greetings best wishes for your continued health and that full measure of happiness which should be the portion of one who has lived so useful a life and served his country and the cause of civilization so faithfully and well. Harry S. Truman 16

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (Paraphrase) December 2, 1948 President Truman Thank you my friend for your birthday greetings, and every good wish. Winston 17 HEADNOTE The year 1949 opened with the inauguration of President Truman in his own right on 20 January. Shortly thereafter he had received an invitation from the president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dr. Karl Compton, to deliver an address in Boston on the occasion of a convocation to explore basic questions confronting h u m a n i t y at mid-century, especially as these questions had been raised or influenced by science. Knowing that his friend had also received an invitation, the President wrote Churchill at his Hyde Park Gate address in London on 2 February, asking him to accept. TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL February 2, 1949 Dear Winston: I have accepted with great pleasure the invitation extended to me by Dr. Karl T. Compton, Chairman of the Corporation of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to deliver an address in Boston on the evening of April first, next.1 The occasion, as I understand Dr. Compton has written you, is a twoday Convocation on the subject, "The Mid-Century," and the Convocation

'Afterwards, of "necessity," President Truman was to cancel his acceptance of this engagement.

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will be followed on April second by the inauguration of Dr. Compton's successor, as president of this outstanding institution of learning. I have no hesitancy in saying that the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, chartered more than eighty years ago, was the first of the great technological schools in this country. From its establishment to this day it has upheld the highest ideals of intellectual leadership and public service. It has always given its students a combination of humanistic, scientific, and professional training and is today and always has been a seat of learning of national and international influence. I, therefore, write to express the hope that you will find it possible to accept Dr. Compton's invitation to participate in so notable an assembly. With old-time regard, Always sincerely, Harry S. Truman 18 DOUGLAS TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE February 10, 1949 For the President from Winston Churchill. "Am delighted to get your letter and will certainly accept Dr. Compton's invitation. Winston. "i Douglas 19 The Cold War Before Mid-Century—and After The Blair House meeting again gave Churchill an opportunity to speak his mind on the subject of Russia and the issue of the atomic b o m b , and on that account he had urged the President to address the atomic issue in light of present conditions and the current Soviet threat to world peace. 2 0 When, in fact, Truman commented on this subject within days of the signing of the N A T O Pact on 4 April, he was quoted in the press as saying that he " w o u l d not hesitate" to use the A-bomb again if the "welfare of the United States and the democracies of the w o r l d " were ever at stake. But he also observed that this fifty-year alliance should prevent the United States from ever having to make that decision again in time of crisis. 21 Jin a personal message to the President, Ambassador Douglas who had talked with Churchill about the MIT invitation had stated that he "would very much appreciate being informed of your plans." Truman accordingly conveyed through Ambassador Douglas an invitation to Churchill to dine with him at Blair House in Washington on the evening of 24 March. And so, on 3 March, Douglas notified the President by telegram of Churchill's acceptance, and how much he wished "to have a talk with you before Boston." 22

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Churchill, who was pleased to know that the President was following his advice, so acknowledged this fact in his next letter of 29 June.

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (Paraphrase) June 29, 1949 My dear Harry, I felt I ought to send you the enclosed memorandum. It is based on a visit to Greece by an able member of the House of Commons, Mr. Alec Spearman, due to a continuing concern about the future of Greece after the expenditure of so much to rescue that country from Communist control. Also, I was impressed by your statement concerning the use of the atomic bomb if it would ever become necessary, and that this statement of policy can only help to prevent another world war. Yours sincerely, Winston S. Churchill 23 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL July 2, 1949 Dear Winston: I appreciated your good letter of the 29th most highly, and read the enclosed note on a visit to Greece by Mr. Alec Spearman with a great deal of interest. I am in agreement with you that Greece must be kept from the hands of the Communists, and we expect to do everything possible to fulfill that objective. I am not quite as pessimistic as you are about the prospects for a third world war. k I rather think that eventually we are going to forget that idea, and get a real world peace. I don't believe even the Russians can stand it to face complete destruction, which certainly would happen to them in the event of another war. I hope you are in good health and that everything is going well with you. It is always a pleasure to hear from you. Sincerely yours, Harry S. Truman 24 HEADNOTE O n a lighter note, the Trumans attended that autumn a stage production of "The Philadelphia Story" in which Churchill's daughter, Sarah, played the leading part. The President's enthusiasm prompted the following letter to Churchill. k It is no longer uncommon, if not the prevailing view of late, to refer to the cold war as World War III.

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TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL September 27, 1949 Dear Winston: Yesterday evening, Mrs. Truman, a couple of guests and I drove out to Olney in Maryland to see 'The Philadelphia Story' by Philip Barry. Your lovely daughter Sarah had the leading part. I know you must be as proud of her as I am of Margaret. We enjoyed the presentation very much. I went behind the scenes and had my picture taken by a large number of news photographers, with Miss Sarah Churchill. This happened immediately after the first act. After the show was over Mrs. Truman and our guests accompanied me to an informal reception, where we met all the members of the cast, and had a most pleasant visit with Sarah. I hope all goes well with you and that Old England is on the road to happiness and prosperity. Very sincerely, Harry S. Truman P.S. Sarah is a wonderful actress!25

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (Paraphrase) October 10, 1949 Dear Harry: Thank you for your kindness to Sarah and your delightful letter, and also for the signed programme, as these gestures of friendship are much valued at a time when so much uncertainty remains. Yours sincerely, Winston S. Churchill 26 HEADNOTE Nearly a fortnight later the President again wrote to Mr. Churchill, sending him a p h o t o g r a p h of their respective daughters taken in Atlanta, Georgia. And in a concluding message that year from Key West, Florida, Truman cabled another message to Churchill on the occasion of his seventy-fifth birthday on 30 November. TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL October 21, 1949 Dear Winston: I am sending a picture of Sarah and Margaret taken in Atlanta, Georgia, where both of them are appearing—Sarah on the stage, and Margaret in her role as a concert singer.

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You would have to go around the world several times, I think, to find two lovelier daughters. Please give my kindest regards and best respects to Mrs. Churchill. Sincerely yours, Harry S. Truman 27

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (Paraphrase) November 4, 1949 President Truman Thank you greatly for the photographs. Winston Churchill 28

TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL November 30, 1949 Rt. Honorable Winston Churchill In the hope that you have recovered completely from your reported illness1 I send hearty greetings and best wishes for a birthday full of happy memories of the yesterdays with lively expectations of many fruitful years to come. Harry S. Truman 29

HOLMES™ TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE December 1, 1949 The following is for the President from Mr. Churchill: "I am most . . . grateful to you, Mr. President, for your kind message." WSC Holmes 30 HEADNOTE The onset of 1950 did n o t begin with any lessening of concern about the uncertainties which had occupied the attention of Truman and Churchill in their previous correspondence, especially in relation to the Soviets, but these uncertainties were more than offset by the ties of friendship and their devotion "to the c o m m o n cause" which had come to mark their association as the cold war at midcentury unfolded. Churchill, w h o continued to work on his war memoirs, had also reached the midway point of this undertaking by early 1950, and 'Churchill had been recovering that autumn from a stroke. m

Julius C. Holmes, charge d'affaires in the United Kingdom.

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w h e n Volume III was published t h a t spring, the occasion again became one to write to President Truman.

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (Paraphrase) April 16, 1950 My dear Harry, Only our friendship entitles me to send you the third volume of my war memoirs, and you can expect the remaining volumes to follow. Yours sincerely, Winston S. Churchill 31 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL May 1, 1950 Dear Winston: I can't tell you how much I appreciated your new Volume III. Every single page you have written has interested me immensely and I'll be looking forward to Volumes IV, V, and VI. I hope everything is well with you and that it will be possible sometime in the not too far distant future for us to meet again. Please remember me to Mrs. Churchill. Sincerely yours, Harry S. Truman 32 The Korean War W h a t followed m o r e t h a n a m o n t h later w o u l d leave no d o u b t about the continuing Soviet threat when N o r t h Korea, a client state, invaded South Korea across the 38th parallel on 25 June 1950, thus extending the cold war onto the Asian mainland. By early August, after Churchill had talked with Prime Minister Attlee about the need to protect the American base in East Anglia and the need also to create an "emergency Army" to offset the tento-one advantage in Soviet ground forces, Churchill decided to issue a call for a European Army in a meeting at Strasbourg (France) of the Council of Europe on 11 August. Two days later, following the approval of his proposal for a European Army, he again wrote to President Truman.

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (Paraphrase) August 13, 1950 My dear Harry, I hope that you read my speech before the Strasbourg Assembly which led to a majority by which the Resolution for a European Army was

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approved. It is what I have labored for ever since my speech at Zurich" four years ago. The Resolution marks an end to the quarrel between France and Germany, and is an immense step towards the kind of world for which we are both striving. It offers also the best hope of avoiding another World War. Such an Army would be a deterrent to Soviet aggression, since the deterrent would apply equally to all countries represented in the European Army. The only other alternative to a European Army would be a neutrality agreement between Germany and France and the smaller countries with the Soviets. This, in turn, is what the Communists are striving to achieve since they would then become neutral European countries with the prospect of being absorbed like Czechoslovakia. Yours sincerely, Winston S. Churchill 33 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL August 18, 1950 Dear Winston: I certainly appreciate your good letter of August thirteenth. I read it with deep interest as I had already read your Strasbourg speech and the copy of the speech which you had made four years ago. We are living in a tumultuous and uncertain age and I am sincerely hoping that the right decisions may be made by our Government to create a condition that will lead to general world peace. I hope that everything is going well with you and that sometime in the not too distant future it will be possible for us to see each other again. Please remember me to Mrs. Churchill. Sincerely yours, Harry S. Truman 34 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL November 30, 1950 Telegram The enthusiastic reception accorded "The Hinge of Fate" 0 by American readers should bring you additional satisfaction on your birthday.P Best wishes for many more happy and fruitful years. Harry S. Truman 35

"Speech at Zurich University, as referred to in Chapter 3, on 19 September 1946. °The fourth volume of Churchill's memoirs was published in the United States, though not in the United Kingdom, on 27 November 1950. p

Churchill had turned seventy-six at mid-century.

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HOLMES TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE December 2, 1950

For President Truman from Churchill "I greatly value your most kind message sent among so many cares. . . . " Winston. 36 HEADNOTE Churchill's concern in early 1 9 5 1 , and his reason for writing the President on 12 February, was his belief that the secret Quebec Agreement of 1943 should be published, since he had been a co-signatory of the "original agreement" concerning the use of atomic energy for military purposes. It was, however, in 1 9 5 1 , an unwelcome subject as neither the Attlee government nor the Truman administration wanted this wartime agreement made public, as its publication, in Attlee's words, "could only lead to further unwelcome questioning." 3 7

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (Paraphrase) February 12, 1951 My dear Harry, Forgive my burdening you with the enclosed letter. Your friend, Winston S. Churchill [Enclosure]q Dear Mr. President: I venture to address you on the publication of the Quebec Agreement which President Roosevelt and I signed concerning the atomic bomb in 1943. It has to do with the changes made by the Attlee government concerning this Agreement, since the Parliament was never told about its terms, and since it was intended to cover more than the wartime period. Although it has been superseded, the Agreement has acquired a practical significance due to the American airbase in East Anglia, and I believe that Parliament would consider that the atomic bomb should not be used from this airbase without the consent of His Majesty's Government. I congratulate you on the turn of events in Korea; and while I continue to hope that the United States will look to Europe more than the Far East in confronting the mortal challenge to world freedom, the Eisenhower Mission r is a far-reaching measure and the best hope of world peace. Yours sincerely, Winston S. Churchill 38 ^This letter is paraphrased, though it has been a matter of public record since 1979. •"General Dwight D. Eisenhower, though under the authority of the NATO alliance, had been appointed Supreme Allied Commander in Europe by President Truman, an appointment that would normally be made only in time of war.

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TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL February 16, 1951 Dear Winston: Your personal note, attached to your request for the release of the Quebec Agreement of 1943, is highly appreciated. I am making a sincere effort to carry out the Atlantic Treaty with opposition in the Congress, which might be termed vicious and unfair under present emergency conditions. I hope you won't press me in this matter. It will cause unfortunate repercussions both here and in your country, as well as embarrassment to me and to your government. The reopening of this discussion may ruin my whole defense program both here and abroad. Your country's welfare and mine are at stake in that program. I hope you are in good health and enjoying life as much as one can enjoy it in these troublous times. Most sincerely yours, Harry S. Truman 39 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL March 24, 1951 Dear Mr. Churchill: I have given most careful consideration to your request contained in your letter to me of February twelfth, 1951, for publication of the Quebec Agreement. While I appreciate and have given full weight to the considerations prompting your request, I am forced to the conclusion that the Agreement should not be made public at this time. It is true, as you say, that the Agreement recognized certain problems of cooperation in this field after the termination of hostilities. The resolution of these problems has been and continues to be a matter of discussion and arrangement between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States. Publication of the Agreement would be misleading unless it were also decided to make public the current status of cooperation and collaboration among the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States in the field of atomic energy. Indeed, it would be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to resist pressures to make known this information once the Agreement were made public. I feel strongly that in the present circumstances such a development would be seriously prejudicial to the interests of the United Kingdom and the United States as well as to our Allies under the North Atlantic Treaty. I wish to express the appreciation of the United States and my own personal gratification for your far-seeing and generous support for the granting of air base rights in East Anglia to the United States. I have been

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informed that the understandings that have been arrived at concerning these base rights are mutually satisfactory to the political and military authorities of the two Governments. I am moved by the sentiments you express concerning the turn of events in Korea s and your gratitude for the Eisenhower appointment, developments of great significance to our common cause. Most sincerely, Harry Truman 40

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (Paraphrase) April 11, 1951 President Truman Thank you for your official reply to my letter of 12 February, and even more for your personal letter preceding it. I am no longer pressing the issue in question. Kind regards, Winston 41 HEADNOTE O n 2 April 1 9 5 1 , the new U.S. Ambassador, Walter S. Gifford, had conveyed to President T r u m a n a message from Churchill that he would be glad to make a speech in the United States on M a y 8th or 9th on the occasion of the Philadelphia Bicentennial, after which he w o u l d like t o call o n the P r e s i d e n t a n d t h e n fly h o m e . 4 2 T h e expected address t h a t Churchill h a d h o p e d to deliver, however, never came off, because of a change of mind undoubtedly influenced by the recall of General Douglas M a c A r t h u r from the Far East by President Truman.

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (Paraphrase) April 27, 1951 Message to President Truman I am grieved that my plan to attend the bicentennial at the University of Pennsylvania has fallen through due to the movement of events. My hope is that the time will soon come when I can again be of some use to the common cause by coming over. Winston 43

s

The U.S.-led United Nations military position in Korea had become stabilized, a fact that soon led to the opening of armistice talks with North Korea.

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TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL April 28, 1951

Dear Winston: I am certainly sorry that conditions have come about which prevent your attending the ceremony in Pennsylvania and I am sorrier still that you won't be able to be with us for the luncheon on the tenth. I had a most pleasant visit with Sarah when she was here and arrangements had been made for her and her husband to be our luncheon guests along with you, Mrs. Churchill and Mary. I understand the situation and the conditions which brought about the cancellation of your visit. I hope things will work out so that in the not too far distant future you can still make the visit. Sincerely yours, Harry S. Truman 44

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (Paraphrase) June 15, 1951 My dear Harry, I had the pleasure of entertaining your daughter Margaret on her visit to England. I asked her if she would give you a painting which I had intended to bring with me had I been able to keep my engagement at the University of Pennsylvania. The painting is about as good as anything I have done, and shows the picturesque Atlas Mountains from Marrakech. Yours sincerely, Winston S. Churchill 45

TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL June 28, 1951 Dear Winston: Thanks very much for your good letter of June fifteenth, which came yesterday. I can't find words adequate to express my appreciation of the beautiful picture of the Atlas Mountains, painted by you. I shall treasure that picture as long as I live and it will be one of the most valued possessions I will be able to leave to Margaret when I pass on. Mrs. Truman and I appreciate most highly all of your courtesies to Margaret while she was in Great Britain. She has written us of the wonderful hospitality that you and your family showed her. Sincerely yours, Harry S. Truman P.S. Margaret will arrive home on the thirteenth of July if her schedule goes through as planned. 46

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HEADNOTE Two further messages—the last until the autumn of 1951—followed that summer in the aftermath of the nationalization of all foreign oil concessions in Persia (Iran) with the appointment of the new Prime Minister, Mohammed Mossadeq, in March 1951. The oil crisis could not have occurred at a more inopportune time for the fortunes of the Labour government, especially with the loss of Bevin, who had been Attlee's foreign secretary since 1945, and who had done so much to get the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company "to improve the living conditions of the workers in the industry" at its Abadan Refinery. Finally, the oil crisis illustrated a familiar problem after World War II when, as in the case of Iran, an "insurgent nationalism comes into conflict with oldestablished commercial interests." 47

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (Paraphrase) June 29, 1951

President Truman Private and Personal I feel a duty to my Government's representations to add my own for your help in confronting the challenge posed by the Soviet Union to the strategic and moral interests of our two countries in Iran, and in light of the question of commercial oil if that resource were to be denied to the West. Yours sincerely, Winston S. Churchill 48 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL July 12, 1951

Dear Winston: I appreciate your personal message of June twenty-ninth regarding the situation in Iran, and fully share your views as to the dangers involved. This matter is being given constant and most careful attention by this Government and we are, as you know, in touch with the Government of the United Kingdom concerning all developments. I earnestly hope that counsels of moderation will yet prevail and that a satisfactory solution can be found. I will do everything possible to assist in bringing this about. With kind personal regards, Very sincerely yours, Harry S. Truman 49 NOTES 1. John Colville, The Fringes of Power: Downing Street Diaries 1939-1955 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1955), 636.

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2. Telegram, Churchill to Truman, February 26, 1947; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers; for Truman's telegram, see CHUR papers 1/43. 3. CHUR papers 2/158. 4. CHUR papers 2/158; Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Vol. VIII, 'Never Despair' 1945-1965 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1988), 326. 5. CHUR papers 2/158; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers; Gilbert, Churchill, VIII, 351. 6. CHUR papers 2/158; Gilbert, Churchill, VIII, 351-52. 7. CHUR papers 2/254. 8. CHUR papers 2/454. 9. Letter, Churchill to Truman, May 5, 1948; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers. 10. Letter, Truman to Churchill, May 18, 1948; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers. The outside envelope was marked "Personal and Confidential." 11. CHUR papers 4/14B. 12. CHUR papers 4/23A. 13. CHUR papers 2/158; Gilbert, Churchill, VIII, 4 2 1 ; also, see Margaret Truman, Harry S. Truman, (New York: William Morrow &c Co., 1973), 15-16. 14. Letter, Churchill to Truman, November 8, 1948; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers; CHUR papers 2/158; and see Gilbert, Churchill, VIII, 444-45. 15. Letter, Truman to Churchill, November 23, 1948; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers. 16. CHUR papers 2/455. 17. Telegram, Churchill to Truman, December 2, 1948; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers. 18. CHUR papers 2/266. 19. Telegram, Douglas to the Secretary of State, February 10, 1949; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers; also CHUR papers 2/266. 20. In his Boston Garden address of 31 March, however, Churchill warned that no technical knowledge alone can outweigh a knowledge of the humanities in providing us "with a safe harbor and the hope of a bright new dawn." See "Churchill to the Scientists," The Catholic World (May 1949), 81-85. 21. The Herald Tribune, European ed., April 8, 1949. 22. Telegram, Douglas to the Secretary of State, March 3, 1949; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers; also CHUR papers 2/266. 23. Letter, Churchill to Truman, June 29, 1949; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers; also CHUR papers 2/158; see also Gilbert, Churchill, VIII, 468. 24. Letter, Truman to Churchill, July 2, 1949; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers; also CHUR papers 2/158. 25. CHUR papers 2/158. Letter is handwritten. 26. Letter, Churchill to Truman, October 10, 1949; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers; also CHUR papers 2/158; see also Gilbert, Churchill, VIII, 491. 27. Letter, Truman to Churchill, October 2 1 , 1949; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers. 28. Cablegram, Churchill to Truman, November 4, 1949; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers. 29. CHUR papers 2/455. 30. Telegram, Holmes to the Secretary of State, December 1, 1949; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers; also CHUR papers 2/456.

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31. Letter, Churchill to Truman, April 16, 1950; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers; see also Gilbert, Churchill, VIII, 522. 32. Letter, Truman to Churchill, May 1, 1950; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers; also CHUR papers 2/158. 33. Letter, Churchill to Truman, August 13, 1950; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers; CHUR papers 2/32; see also Gilbert, Churchill, VIII, 543-44. 34. CHUR papers 2/32. 35. CHUR papers 2/459A. 36. Telegram, Holmes to the Secretary of State, December 2, 1950; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers; also CHUR papers 2/459A. 37. CHUR papers 2/28. 38. Letter, Churchill to Truman, February 12, 1951; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers; FRUS, 1951, 1, 693-94; see also Gilbert, Churchill, VIII, 592-93. 39. CHUR papers 2/28; see also Gilbert, Churchill, VIII, 595-96. 40. CHUR papers 2/28. 41. Telegram, Churchill to Truman, April 11, 1951; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers; also CHUR papers 2/28. 42. Memorandum, Secretary of State to the President, April 2, 1951; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers. 43. Telegram, Churchill to Truman, April 27, 1951; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers; also CHUR papers 2/286. 44. CHUR papers 2/286; Letter, Truman to Churchill, April 28, 1951; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers. 45. Letter, Churchill to Truman, June 15, 1951; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers. 46. Letter, Truman to Churchill, June 28, 1951; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers. 47. C.R. Attlee, As It Happened (London: Heinemann, 1954), 175. 48. Gilbert, Churchill, VIII, 618-19. 49. Letter, Top Secret, Truman to Churchill, July 12, 1951; Confidential File, State Dept. Folder, Truman papers.

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5 Churchill's Second Premiership

THE YEARS 1951-1953

After six years as the Conservative party's leader in the House of Commons, and just over a month before his seventy-seventh birthday, Churchill again became Prime Minister following the General Election of 25 October 1951. Churchill, moreover, wasted no time in deciding to visit President Truman in order to talk over "a wide range of matters of joint concern," including defense "and the progress of the Korean War." His initial plans for such a visit, as conveyed by the British embassy in Washington in a message delivered to President Truman, stated that he planned to visit Canada at the end of the year, and that during this same visit he should come to Washington for private talks before returning to the United Kingdom. 1 What followed, then, would mark the renewal of their official correspondence since the closing days of the Potsdam Conference more than six years before, and in circumstances which continued to affirm the importance of the "special relationship" between the two countries in defending the West and the cause of freedom against a continuing Soviet threat.

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CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN November 5, 1951 Prime Minister to the President, Top Secret I expect our session will be over in the first week of December. I should then propose for a few days to visit Canada where I have not been since the war. I wonder whether you would like me to come to see you, there are many things I need to talk over with you and also as Minister of Defence I should like sometime to meet your Military Chiefs. Please let me know what would be convenient and agreeable to you. I must get home before Christmas. I look forward to a renewal of our former comradeship. Kindest regards, Winston 2 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL November 6, 1951 President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill, Top Secret Thank you for your cordial message. I, too, look forward to the renewal of our former happy association and to an early meeting with you. As you know, I am shortly leaving for Florida and do not expect to return to Washington until after mid-December and will be leaving for Christmas in Missouri on the 24th. While that is a busy period because of preparation of my annual messages to Congress, I could arrange to start our meeting December 20 if that is more agreeable to you. December 27, however, would be a little more convenient for me. Also, by then our Secretary of Defense and our military chiefs whom you wish to meet will have completed their budget preparations. Please let me know which date you prefer. With warmest regards, Harry S. Truman 3 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN November 9, 1951 Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman, Top Secret Thank you for your message of November 6th. Would it be convenient to you for me to come after the New Year, arriving in Washington say Thursday, January 3rd? I could stay at the British Embassy for the best part of a week and be at your disposal anytime you were free to see me. Eden will be with me most of the time and I think I will also bring Lord Ismaya and some military advisers.

a

General Hastings Ismay, formerly chief of staff, was then secretary of state for commonwealth relations in the new Churchill government.

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After our talks are over I will go on to Canada and so home. The answer I received to my telegram to U.J. was "Thank you for greetings." This was, of course, my first interchange with him since Fulton or even since Potsdam. Apparently we are again on speaking terms which is about as much as I expected at this stage. I hope your interlude in the Southern sunshine of Florida will be as pleasant as it is deserved. I never had any idea of disturbing you there. Winston Churchill4 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL November 10, 1951 President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill, Top Secret The January 3 date for our meeting is entirely satisfactory, and I look forward to seeing you then. I shall also be happy to see Mr. Eden again, and will welcome Lord Ismay and your military advisors. I appreciate your good wishes for Florida sunshine during my stay at Key West. Harry S. Truman 5 HEADNOTE Although there were no further c o m m u n i c a t i o n s concerning the upcoming Washington talks until 10 December a m o n t h later, in the interval, President Truman cabled his usual greetings to Churchill from Key West on his seventy-seventh birthday. TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL November 30, 1951 Right Honorable Winston Churchill Hearty congratulations and best wishes for a Happy Birthday. Harry S. Truman 6 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN November 30, 1951 President of United States of America Key West Thank you indeed for your telegram. I am looking forward very much to seeing you again. Winston 7

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CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN December 10, 1951 Prime Minister to President Truman, Secret Anthony and I are looking forward to our visit to Washington. We shall arrive by the "Queen Mary" on January 3 and would like to dine quitely at the Embassy that night. If convenient I could call upon you on the 4th. Although I am bringing two of my colleagues besides the Foreign Secretary, namely Lord Ismay and Lord Cherwell, b and two out of the three Chiefs of Staff, namely the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the First Sea Lord, I have not contemplated a pre-arranged series of conferences. We are drawing up a list of general topics for your consideration. I thought we would stay a week or so in Washington and make such contacts as were agreeable to you and to your officers. My wish and object is that we should reach a good understanding of each other's point of view over the whole field, so that we can work together easily and intimately at the different levels as we used to do. Anthony has already had many good talks with Dean Acheson.c I have not yet met Mr. Lovett nor have I seen Mr. Snyderd for several years. (I hope it may be possible to arrange a few informal meetings or meals some of which I should be glad to have at the Embassy if you think well.) Before leaving England I shall, on December 22, make a broadcast about "The state of the Nation," and in this I shall discount beforehand any exaggerated hopes which may be attached to our meetings and put it in its right position as the renewal of close confidential ties between those who are resolved to serve the same great causes. After leaving Washington I shall stay a couple of days in New York with Bernie.e The only public engagement I have in mind is perhaps to address the Order of Cincinnati, of whom I am a member, at Rochester, New York, where my grandfather lived and began his career, but I have made no promises or fixtures. After New York I go to Ottawa and shall probably fly home from there. I thought you would like me to let you know the way I was looking at my visit and I should be grateful if you would give me your reactions. Above all, I do not want to add to your burdens, knowing well what they must be. Winston 8

b c

Lord Cherwell, advisor to Churchill on atomic energy.

Dean Acheson, secretary of state, 1949-53.

Respectively, Robert A. Lovett, secretary of defense, 1951-53, and John W. Snyder, secretary of the treasury in Truman's cabinet. e

Bernard M. Baruch, a former government official and friend of Churchill's.

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TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL December 13, 1951 President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill, Secret Thank you for your letter of December 10, giving me your thoughts about some of the details of your visit to Washington. It will be a pleasure to have you here and I am looking forward to seeing you and your colleagues. I presume that some of those mentioned in your letter will participate in our talks, and on my side I would naturally include Dean Acheson and others of my Cabinet rank such as Bob Lovett and Averell Harriman. It might also be advisable on occasion to have the views at our talks of General Bradleyf and the other service chiefs. I shall be glad to receive your list of general topics for discussion to which you referred. I always feel that conversations covering problems of such magnitude run along more smoothly if conducted according to a general plan of procedure. I am also having a list of subjects prepared. After we examine each other's list, I hope we can then work out a frame of reference for our talks. As you will no doubt know, I am planning a luncheon for you on January 4th, and it might be a good idea to have our first conversation in the morning before the lunch. We can meet again on the 5th if you like. Then there might be an interval in our direct discussions during which you may wish to see other people in Washington, and when the subjects which we have already brought up might be considered in greater detail by our colleagues. It is my sincere belief that talks of this sort reinforce the close ties that link our two countries, the maintenance of which is of vital importance. I believe, however, that you are wise in your proposed broadcast on "The State of the Nation" to attempt to avoid the impression that our meetings will produce easy solutions to the many serious problems facing us. Once again I want you to know how delighted I shall be to see you here and to have this opportunity for a frank exchange of views. Harry S. Truman 9 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN December 23, 1951 Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman, Top Secret Thank you for your message through the American Embassy of December 15th.s We shall doubtless be discussing further the detailed arrangements. The general list of topics we have in mind is shown below. We should be glad to receive, as you suggest, the list which you are having prepared. ^General Omar N. Bradley, chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. ^Doubtless this refers to Truman's previous message of December 13th.

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Topics for Discussion in Washington 1. Defence (a) Organization of the West for defence (including economic and organizational questions). (b) The European Army. (c) The Atlantic and other Commands. (d) The strategic air plans and the use of the atomic weapon. (e) Technical cooperation in atomic energy. (f) A rifle. 2. Foreign Affairs (a) General survey. (b) Policy towards the Soviet Union. (c) Far East. (d) South East Asia. (e) Middle East. (f) Atlantic Community. 3. Economic Questions (a) The economic position and problems of the United Kingdom. (b) Steel and equipment. Winston 1 0

T R U M A N TO C H U R C H I L L December 27, 1951 President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill, Top Secret T h a n k you for your message of December 2 3 received through the British Embassy giving me the list of topics which you have in mind. The list in general follows our o w n ideas as to w h a t might be profitably discussed between us. We are particularly a n x i o u s to cover the E u r o p e a n Defense Community, 1 1 our relationships with the Continent and the relationship of Germany with the West. Under our Far East heading I would like to have a general review of our respective policies with regard to China. Korea should also be covered as well as the matter of Japan's relationship to nationalist China. I am looking forward with interest to getting your views about the critical situation in South East Asia.

h

The European Defense Community (EDC) became a dead letter when the French ultimately refused to sign the EDC Treaty of 1952.

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We assume that under Middle East you will desire to talk about such specific problems as Egypt and Iran and the coordination of our policies in the Middle East area as a whole. In addition to your suggestion that we discuss steel, I think we can extend this to a few other strategic materials. I suggest that we hold regular meetings without advisers on Saturday morning, the 5th, in the morning and afternoon of Monday, the 7th, and Tuesday morning, the 8th. In view of the uncertainty of the arrival of the Queen Mary on Friday, January 4, I think it may be wiser to have our luncheon on Saturday, the 5th, instead of Friday as we had originally planned. In addition, I hope that you will be able to dine with me on the Williamsburg Saturday evening. I am looking forward with particular pleasure to that occasion as an opportunity for a good informal talk. Harry S. Truman 11 The Washington Talks Churchill's journey to Washington in J a n u a r y 1952 had been his twelfth visit to N o r t h America since 1 8 9 5 . Following his arrival aboard the Queen Mary, the Prime Minister and his party boarded the President's plane, the Independence, and from Long Island flew to the National Airport in Washington for the first round of meetings at Blair House on Saturday, followed by a lengthy visit that same day a b o a r d the presidential yacht. The " a t m o s p h e r e was excellent," Acheson wrote, and of those gathered around the table that evening aboard the Williamsburg, it was a "most successful" visit, he added. 1 2 The Prime Minister had found much to praise in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy in helping to ease the threat of any conflict with the Soviet Union. Chief among these had been "the President's decision to resist in Korea," a decision, he thought, that "had done more than anything else to reverse the tide in our relations with the Soviets in the postwar period." Similarly, from the perspective of Middle East policy, Churchill confided that if those now sitting around the table a year ago had been considering the Iranian problem, "Iran would not have dared to take the action" that has in fact been taken. 1 3 While the Washington talks, then, considered issues of common concern, including matters affecting the security of both countries, it was the Middle East and the issue of Iran in particular that would come to d o m i n a t e the correspondence between T r u m a n and C h u r c h i l l in t h e c o m i n g m o n t h s — i n late s u m m e r a n d in t h e autumn—of 1952.

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CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN March 10, 1952 Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman, Secret You will no doubt have seen what has been happening over here and I am sure you will be interested in the Budget. Our defence programme is already somewhat spread out. It is not certain that even with a struggle we shall be able to fulfill it. I quite understand you have difficulties as well as we. When I was over with you there was much talk of "offshore purchases" which could help the N.A.T.O. front and enable us to fulfill our programme. It would be possible for me to arrange for Canberra and Venom aircraft of the latest types now being made by us in the United Kingdom to be delivered to the United States and distributed by you to N.A.T.O. wherever Eisenhower thought they could be most useful. If as I hope, you think these ideas are worth pursuing I suggest that our people should talk to Mr. Battle1 in London and that Franks^ should discuss the matter with Averell Harriman. Thank you for what you said about the little package of meat. A memo follows.k Winston 14 HEADNOTE While no message from the Churchills has been found to mark the occasion of Truman's sixty-eighth birthday on 8 M a y 1 9 5 2 , the President acknowledged such a message being received in his reply of M a y 9th. TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL May 9, 1952

The Right Honorable Winston Churchill My heartfelt thanks to you and Mrs. Churchill for your kind remembrance of my birthday. Your message on this occasion is something which I shall always treasure. Harry S. Truman 15

'Lucius D. Battle, a key state department aide to the secretary of state. 'Sir Oliver Franks was the British ambassador to Washington. k

This aide-memoire, dated 12 March, presented a detailed proposal for the United States to accept several hundred aircraft from the United Kingdom, for use by NATO, in order to ease Britain's balance of payments problem.

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Iran and the Oil Question C o n c e r n i n g the u n r e s o l v e d oil q u e s t i o n w i t h Iran's M o s s a d e q , Churchill's thinking had turned to the idea of a joint a p p r o a c h , something that had not been tried since 1945, because of the American fear of "ganging u p " against a third power. Accordingly, in Churchill's further messages to President Truman in late August and September he endeavored to advocate such an approach in an effort to break the deadlock. CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN August 16, 1952 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Secret In A n t h o n y ' s absence, I am taking charge of the Foreign Office correspondence. I am concerned about the Alton Jones'1 visit to Mussadiq111 after his personal interview with you. If it came about that American oil interests were working to take our place in the Persian oil fields after we have been treated so ill there, this might well raise serious controversy in this country. We are doing our utmost to bear the heavy load, and do not possess the bi-partisan support of the Opposition which we gave the late Government in foreign and defence affairs. We are also helping all we can in Korea. No country is running voluntarily the risks which we are, should atomic warfare be started by Soviet Russia. I hope you will do your best to prevent American help for Musaddiq, either Governmental or commercial, from becoming a powerful argument in the mouths of those who care little for the great forward steps towards Anglo-American unity in the common cause which you and I have worked for so long. With kind regards and many thoughts. Winston 16 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL August 18, 1952 President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill, Secret and Personal I have your message of August 16 and understand your concern over the Jones visit to Iran. However, Jones impressed me favorably and was emphatic about his desire to be helpful in facilitating a British-Iranian oil !

W. Alton Jones, President, Cities Service Oil Company of New York, a private company engaged in the sale of oil, had opened talks with Iran's Mossadeq, doubtless to market Iranian oil. 17 'Mossadeq.

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settlement. He seems to be sincere in his belief that resumption of largescale oil operations in Iran is impossible without the cooperation of the AIOC n and said he would emphasize this to Mossadeq. As we told Sir Oliver Franks, Jones plans to talk to the AIOC people after seeing Mossadeq. As we see it, there are two problems: 1) An agreement must be reached with the Iranians on the amount of compensation due the AIOC, and 2) means must be found to enable Iran to pay this sum out of oil revenues. I think there is a good chance Jones can be helpful on the second problem. First of all, he will again explain to Mossadeq the facts of life in the oil industry and the need of dealing with the AIOC. Secondly, if the latest Iranian proposals lead to an agreement with the Company for the sale and distribution of Iranian oil, Jones may be able to help the Iranian Government resume production and refining processes so that there will be oil for the AIOC to buy and market. If Jones can work out something it might be useful, since, with the political temper in Iran as it is, I think there is no possibility that British management as such would be allowed to return and take charge of the oil fields or refinery. By the same token, no other foreign interests could take the place in Iran which the AIOC formerly held, and I am certain the American oil companies understand this. I need not tell you that we have not the slightest wish to profit by your present difficulties. We will do everything possible to avoid even the appearance of this. On the wider issues, I am hopeful that you will be able to take up Mossadeq's most recent proposals in a broad and conciliatory spirit. Our reports make me think there is no chance that this or any other Iranian Government can come forward with anything better, and the danger which would be involved in missing this opportunity seems to me too great to be risked. It looks to me as if time is running out for us. In particular, I hope you will be willing to accept the Iranian nationalization law. I see no possibility of any agreement if you include in the Court's terms of reference any question of the validity of that law, which seems to have become as sacred in Iranian eyes as the Koran. This need not of course prevent you, during the arbitral proceedings, from maintaining the validity of the 1933 concession and claiming damages for its unilateral abrogation. Dean Acheson sent a message to Eden along this line on August 12. If Iran goes down the communist drain, it will be little satisfaction to any of us that legal positions were defended to the last. The strategic consequences of the loss of Iran to the West and the possibility therein of gradually losing the great bulk of the Middle East with its oil resources to

"The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), a British oil company, had controlled the extraction and marketing of Iranian oil since 1933. 18

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the Soviets are too obvious to mention. Such a disaster to the free world would undoubtedly also place a strain on general Anglo-American relationships not pleasant to contemplate. It is my earnest hope that we can avoid these misfortunes and move forward together in the common cause. I think you know how much AngloAmerican unity means to me. With warm regards, Harry 19 HEADNOTE T w o messages from C h u r c h i l l followed on 2 0 A u g u s t , a n d on 2 1 August, the President replied. An attachment, Annex A, was attached to Truman's message. CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN August 20, 1952 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Secret 1. Thank you so much for your deeply considered reply. Why do we not send a joint telegram personal and secret to Musaddiq? It is true we could not sign it with our Christian names because he has not got one. Nevertheless if we could agree to say "If you Musaddiq will do (A), (B) and (C), we two will do (X), (Y) and (Z)," and if this could be put down shortly it might be a help to our common interests. If you think well of this idea, shall I try my hand at a draft or will you? 2. We are dealing with a man at the very edge of bankruptcy, revolution and death but still I think a man. Our combined approach might convince him. The alternative is the United States taking on the burden of being indefinitely blackmailed by Persia to the detriment of her greatest friend. It will be worse for you even than for us if what is called Persia thinks that she can play one off against the other. 20 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN August 20, 1952 Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman, Personal and Secret I thought it might save time if I sent this draft to you which expresses our view of the policy we might perhaps put forward together. Following are my ideas of a possible joint message: If the Persian Government will agree to (I) the submission to the International Court of the question of the compensation to be paid in respect of the nationalisation of the enterprise of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in Persia and the termination of the 1933 Concession Agreement having regard to all the claims and counter-claims of both parties

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(II) appoint suitable representatives to negotiate with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company arrangements for the flow of oil from Persia to world markets, then (a) the United Kingdom Government will agree on behalf of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to the submission to arbitration set out in (I) (b) the United Kingdom Government will relax certain of the restrictions on exports to Persia and on Persia's use of sterling (c) the United States Government will make their immediate grant of $10 million to the Persian Government (d) the United Kingdom Government will arrange for the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to take their part in the negotiations set out in (II). W h e n agreement on the submission under (I) and (a) has been completed, (II), (b), (c) and (d) will become operative. Thus far the message. The form of words in (I) is not meant to be a precise formula for the reference to the C o u r t . I do n o t think there will be any difficulty in our accepting the Nationalisation Law as fact. The terms of reference must not, however, prevent us from maintaining, as you put it, the validity of the 1933 Concession and claiming damages for its unilateral abrogation. I should hope that further aid from the United States would be conditional on the progress of (II) and (d). W h e n delivering the message the United Kingdom and United States representatives should point out that the negotiations under (II) and (b) stand no chance of success unless the anti-British and anti-United States campaign in Persia has been stopped. Winston21

TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL August 2 1 , 1952 President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill, Secret and Personal I w a n t you to k n o w that I am personally grateful for the fine message you sent me last evening. I consider its contents a great step forward in the solution of a problem which seems fraught with grave danger to the interests of our t w o countries. I shall be happy to give your latest proposal my support, and to assist in every way we can to convince the Iranian Government that it is in their interest to accept this offer. O u r physical separation complicates the p r o b l e m of a joint message. Furthermore, I am concerned lest the enemies of the West in their propag a n d a seize on such an a p p r o a c h as evidence t h a t our t w o nations are "ganging u p " on Iran. The most logical procedure seems to me to have each of us send a message to Mossadeq but so drafted as to clearly indicate

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consultation and agreement between us. I would much prefer this procedure and hope you can agree. My suggestions for drafting are attached in Annex A.° In agreeing with you as I have above, I wish to point out certain matters which I believe will continue to merit your personal attention: (1) If we are successful in this approach, the type of representation of AIOC for the scheduled talks will be of utmost importance. I earnestly ask your consideration of the appointment of a highly qualified and preferably well-known representative of your Government to be in fact the AIOC representative. I would be extremely reluctant to join in the approach if I felt that future negotiations would be conducted on anything but the broadest possible point of view in the interests of our Governments. (2) Mossadeq's request for immediate financial assistance from the United Kingdom Government seems to have been met only partially. If you can see your way clear in finding additional and immediate funds, that would be of great importance. We have in the past suggested as an approach to this problem that you make immediate arrangements to lift and make payment against the oil now stored in the tanks, and Mr. Eden in his message to Mr. Acheson of August 9th indicated that advances in respect to oil lifted could be made after satisfactory terms of reference of the arbitration had been agreed upon. (3) In agreeing to your proposal, I assume that the wording of paragraph (II) in which you spoke of the arrangements for the flow of oil refers to the distribution problem. As you know, I consider that unfortunately it is not any longer a matter for discussion as to whether AIOC would produce oil or operate the Abadan Refinery. We would probably both have to stand ready to offer assistance to the Iranian Government in its arrangements for the efficient future operation of the oil industry in Iran, if requested to do so. (4) I hope in drafting the message you would send you will be able to rearrange Point I so as to avoid specific mention of "termination of the 1933 Concession Agreement." Henderson^ has informed us in the past that direct reference to this matter might place Mossadeq in a difficult position with some of the more extreme elements of [the] Nationalist Front. Perhaps this could be avoided by the deletion of this phrase and the substitution of "having regard to the legal position of the parties existing at the time of nationalization." (5) The matter of handling publicity on this deserves consideration. With so many unfortunate leaks these days, I think we should both use every precaution to keep our approach secret until we discover how

"For Annex A, see Appendix B. PLoy Henderson, a career foreign service officer, was the U.S. ambassador to Iran.

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Mossadeq would like the matter handled. I think perhaps only he can judge whether immediate publicity would be helpful or harmful. (6) Of course, I am certain you understand our agreement in this particular matter does not limit the freedom of action of either of our Governments in the future to meet situations not now known. I believe in these critical times we will both want to maintain our freedom to judge each situation as it occurs, and on what we believe to be the merits of the case. I wish again to express my appreciation for your message which I consider to represent a statesmanlike approach to an extremely difficult problem. With warm regards. Harry 22 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN August 22, 1952 Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman, Secret-Personal All that I have ventured to suggest to you about Mussadiq was on the basis of a joint approach. I thought that it might do good if we had a gallop together such as I often had with F.D.R. There is little doubt that a brief cogent, joint telegram would be far more effective than a continuance of the futile parleying which has got us no further in all these months. 2. Our "physical separation" did not prevent such methods in the war. However, there was often a fear of our being accused of "ganging up" and this hampered necessary action, for instance about the Warsaw massacre in August, 1944.^ I do not myself see why two good men asking only what is right and just should not gang up against a third who is doing wrong. In fact I thought and think that this is the way things ought to be done. 3. I see that your Government on July 31st actually proposed a joint approach with us to Mussadiq. This was a fine idea which might prevent him or anything else that turns up in Persia from thinking they can play one of us off against the other. 4. From the United States' point of view I should have thought it would be a most unprofitable course to pay Persia indefinite sums of money in order that she should not become communist. It does not follow that even far larger sums than the 10 million dollars you have mentioned would avert these dangers. Also the fact that blackmail pays and that those who behave the worst make the largest profits will not have a good effect over all the vast area of your own oil interests in the Persian Gulf and Iraq. I therefore hoped that a strong note could be sounded now by both of us together. It was on this basis that I proposed and could defend further ^As to Churchill's comment about "ganging up," and the price of not doing so, he tellingly refers to the doomed Warsaw rising of 1944, and so of Soviet malfeasance in contributing to the "massacre" of the Polish underground.

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concessions on our part. It is not that I fear criticism here, though that would be troublesome, but it is because I believe that your name and mine at the foot of a joint telegram would be an effective assertion of right over wrong. Please see what you can do. 5. All my personal regards and many thanks for your consideration and courtesy. Winston 23 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL August 24, 1952 President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill, Personal and Secret Like you I want very much to see our two Governments reach full agreement on the Iranian problem and to see us put, at the earliest practicable date, an offer before Mossadeq in an effort to settle the present dispute. In view of your strong feelings on the matter, and the fact that we are in agreement that this approach limits neither you nor me nor our governments to particular courses of action in the future, I agree to join with you in a common message to the Prime Minister of Iran. I have restudied our messages to each other and your Government's latest views on my six points, which Sir Oliver Franks has given us. While I am disappointed that action by your Government cannot be more immediate on the question of financial assistance to the Iranian Government, I am prepared to proceed in the hope that the course of action upon which we are in concert may succeed. Since days are slipping away which we can ill afford to lose, I suggest a draft which I would be willing to sign. I propose a very short cover message jointly from you and me which would have attached to it the substantive points of the proposal. For the covering message I suggest the following: "We have reviewed the messages from our two embassies in Iran regarding recent talks with you, as well as your communication of August 8, 1952 to H. M. G. It seems clear to us that to bring about a satisfactory solution to the oil problem will require prompt action by all three of our Governments. We are attaching proposals for action which our two Governments are prepared to take and which we sincerely hope will meet with your approval and result in a satisfactory solution. We are motivated by sincere and traditional feeling of friendship for the Iranian nation and people and it is our earnest desire to make possible an early and equitable solution of the present dispute." In view of the comments of your Government, it seems to me that the following could well be used for the text of the attached annex. "(1) There shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice the question of compensation to be paid in respect of the nationalization of

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the enterprise of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in Iran, having regard to the legal position of the parties existing immediately prior to nationalization and to all claims and counter-claims of both parties. "(2) Suitable representatives shall be appointed to represent the Iranian Government and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in negotiations for making arrangements for the distribution of Iranian oil to world markets. "(3) If the Iranian Government agrees to the proposals in the foregoing two paragraphs, it is understood that (a) representatives of the AIOC will seek arrangements for the movement of oil already stored in Iran, and as agreements are reached upon price, and as physical conditions of loading permit, appropriate payment will be made for such quantities of oil as can be moved; (b) H.M.G. will relax restrictions on exports to Iran and on Iran's use of sterling; and (c) the United States Government will make an immediate grant of $10,000,000 to the Iranian Government to assist in their budgetary problem. I believe you and I are substantially in accord on the offer that should be transmitted to Mossadeq and I am extremely eager to have it made without further delay. If you have other ideas as to drafting, I suggest you notify me immediately as to exact wording of the changes you would desire so that we may promptly produce an agreed text. With warm regards, Harry 24

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN August 25, 1952 Prime Minister to President Truman, Secret 1. I am delighted we are in such close agreement. I will gladly sign the Truman-Churchill cover message. 2. Barring one drafting point in the annexe, which we are mentioning to the State Department, we hope it and the message can be delivered to Mussadiq tomorrow at latest. It would surely be best for our two representatives in Tehran to take it personally together. 3. There are two points which do not alter the text of the message but which should be agreed between the United States and British Governments and kept for record, namely: (a) It is vital to us that, as mentioned in your No. 1 of the annexe, the International Court of Justice should be the tribunal on compensation. (b) It would be against the interests both of the United States and Great Britain if the Persians got better terms for their oil than other oil-producing countries who have kept their agreements. Winston 25

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TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL August 25, 1952 President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill, Secret I am gratified that we are agreed on the contents of a joint message to Dr. Mossadeq. I accept the change you suggest in paragraph 2 of your message of the 25th. I am telegraphing Ambassador Henderson tonight to be prepared to go ahead in concert with Middleton r just as soon as Middleton receives your instructions. I agree to the point you make in paragraph 3(a). With respect to paragraph 3(b), I of course agree that it is in the interests of both of us that the basis negotiated for the future flow of Persian oil not be such as to dislocate arrangements elsewhere in the Middle East. There are of course so many complex considerations of volume, quality, location, relation to compensation, and the like, that the variable factors make it difficult to judge the comparability of any two arrangements. Naturally, we should want to look at concrete proposals before we could judge their effect and reasonableness. I want to thank you for your understanding in handling this difficult problem. I have high hopes that a solution can be reached. With best regards, Harry 26

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN August 28, 1952 Prime Minister to President Truman, Personal and Secret Anthony has now returned and we have considered together the very lengthy account which our representatives have given of their three-and-a-half hour talk with Mussadiq. I feel that they should have presented our very carefully considered message and withdrawn as soon as possible with all diplomatic courtesy. It is clear, however, from the account they give that Mussadiq (repeat Mussadiq) feels very acutely the pressure of a United States-British message from us both. Though we have not yet received the comments of our two representatives, our immediate view is that the message should now be presented and published immediately (and) this has been done. We have decided to offer what is right and fair. Let the world judge. Anthony is seeing Mr. Gifford this afternoon. Winston 27

r

George Middleton, charge d'affaires, U.S. embassy, Tehran.

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HEADNOTE It was not until 24 September, nearly a month later, that Mossadeq replied to the joint communication from Truman and Churchill. It was at this juncture, however, that British and U.S. policy came to differ on the continuation of this joint approach, with Churchill and Eden wanting to continue along that path and with Truman and Acheson viewing the continuation of that approach as unwise. CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN September 29, 1952 Prime Minister to President Truman, Secret You will no doubt have already seen the lengthy message which Mossadeq sent me in reply to our joint telegram. Anthony and I have prepared a draft answer for your consideration. Evidently his hope is to avoid our approach. It seems for this very reason all the more important that we should continue together. Britain has suffered by Persian depredations losses which I am told may amount to six million pounds sterling a year across the dollar exchange. We cannot I am sure go further at this critical time in our struggle for solvency than the proposals which you agreed were fair and just. It seems also to me, if I may say so, that it would be a hard prospect for the American taxpayer to have to bribe Persians (and how many others?) not to become communists, once this process started it might go a long time in a lot of places. Naturally I have thought a great deal about the danger of a revolution and Soviet infiltration or aggression. I may of course be wrong but as I at present see it I do not feel that it will happen that way in the near future. Anyhow it seems far more likely that Mossadeq will come to reasonable terms on being confronted with a continued Truman-Churchill accord. I earnestly hope therefore that we can send him a message from us both on the line [of] this draft. Winston 28 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL October 1, 1952 President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill, Secrets I do not believe that a joint reply to Mossadeq's note would be wise. I had hoped that our reasonable and fair joint offer which seemed to meet Mossadeq's principle points of difficulty would break the log-jam. I'm now convinced that Mossadeq will not and believes he cannot (if he is to survive) accept this solution. The situation in Iran has deteriorated so far s

This message of which the previous is a "draft," and signed by Acheson, was approved by President Truman.

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that he is threatened by the extremists who will not have it. To lock ourselves into this offer by a joint reply seems to me to so construct our future relations with Iran as to preclude any influence or action which might help to save the country. I believe that pressure will not save it by bringing Mossadeq to reason but will hasten its disintegration and loss. We both want to accomplish the same results in Iran to prevent a communist take-over and to preserve the moral and legal rule of just compensation for property taken. There seems very little that any such reply can accomplish except to keep the record straight. I can understand, too, your belief that you must answer the accusations made against British action in Iran. So I think that if this Government replies at all it should do so separately. We are thinking of something along lines which Mr. Acheson will show to Sir Oliver. Harry S. Truman 29 HEADNOTE With the Iranian oil question still unresolved, the U.S. presidential election that November doubtless influenced Churchill's own decision to remain on as prime minister with the election of Eisenhower as president on 4 November 1952. As he confided to his private secretary the day after the General's election victory: "For your private ear, I am greatly disturbed. I think this makes war much more probable." 3 0 "Such fears," however, "gave Churchill a new sense of mission," to stay on as Prime Minister until he could bring about, by his own exertions, a detente or reconciliation between the two Great Powers— the United States a n d the U.S.S.R. 3 1 So t o o , the election gave Churchill another reason for making an early return visit to the United States: to say farewell to his friend President Truman and to meet the new President-elect, General Eisenhower. CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN November 8, 1952 Prime Minister to the President, Private and Personal Dear Harry I have felt shy of obtruding myself on you while all this battle was on and all my best friends in the US were fighting one another. We tried to follow with discerning eye all the movements of the troops in the field. It must have been very exciting for those engaged. Our island is unhappily too small for any really full-sized whistle stop tour but I am studying the plan with attention in case which is unlikely I should have a next time. I hope

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to come over some time next year and look forward to seeing you again if only in my capacity as an Honorary Doctor of Civil Law of Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri. Let me however meanwhile express my gratitude to you for all you have done for our common show. I am very glad we had that final gallop together. With kindest regards. Winston 32 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL November 12, 1952 Dear Winston: I can't tell you how very much I appreciated your cable of November eight, which was forwarded to me by Sir Oliver Franks. The whistle stop tour on my part didn't work out as well this time as it did before. I think the people were voting for their great military hero because the majority in the House and Senate is very narrow and a great many members of the House and Senate were elected in the states that went for the General. If you come to the United States at any time I certainly do want to see you and have a visit with you. I'll never forget the pleasant time we had when we received the degrees at Westminster College. Sincerely yours, Harry S. Truman 33 HEADNOTE Although Truman's usual greeting to Churchill on his birthday has not been found, Churchill's reply duly thanked the President for his "very kind message," and that he hoped they would "meet before long." 3 4 Churchill, w h o was then seventy-eight, was not to disappoint his friend, and on 20 December confirmed his arrangements to arrive for the N e w Year. CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN December 20, 1952 Prime Minister to President Truman, Private and Personal I am planning to get a fortnight's sunshine in Jamaica. Will arrive by Queen Mary on fifth and stay sixth and seventh in New York where I shall meet Eisenhower informally for a friendly talk. I should very much like to pay my respects to you. Would it be convenient for me to call upon you some time in the afternoon of the eight? I shall be staying at the Embassy and start for Jamaica on the ninth. Kindest regards. Winston 35

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TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL January 1, 1953 President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill aboard the Queen Mary As you embark for our country, M r s . T r u m a n and I w a n t to wish you a very H a p p y N e w Year and to t h a n k you and M r s . Churchill for your greetings at Christmas. I look forward to seeing you soon. HST36 C H U R C H I L L TO T R U M A N January 1 , 1 9 5 3 M y wife and I thank you both so much for your very kind message. All good wishes for the N e w Year. I look forward to making my saluted Winston S. Churchill 3 7 r

As previously suggested in his message of 20 December, on "the afternoon of the eight" the President and Prime Minister met again. The meeting was largely a social one. Churchill, however, did express his appreciation for the "brilliant efforts" of the State Department in seeking to resolve the oil question, and Acheson responded that he too hoped that the issue "might be brought to a successful conclusion and urged the greatest efforts to this end."38

NOTES 1. FRUS, 1951, IV, 980. 2. Message, Churchill to Truman, November 3, 1951; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers; FRUS, 1952-54, VI, Part 1, 693. 3. Message, Truman to Churchill, November 6, 1951; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers; FRUS, 1952-54, VI, Ft. 1, 694. 4. Message, Churchill to Truman, November 9, 1951; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers; FRUS, 1952-54, VI, Ft. 1, 694-95. 5. Message, Truman to Churchill, November 10, 1951; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers; FRUS, 1952-54, Ft. 1, 699-700. 6. CHUR papers 2/464. 7. Telegram, Churchill to Truman, November 30, 1951; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers; CHUR papers 2/464. 8. Message, Private and Personal, Churchill to Truman, December 10, 1951; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers; FRUS, 1952-54, Ft. 1, 704-05. 9. Message, Truman to Churchill, December 13, 1951; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers; FRUS, 1952-54, VI, Ft. 1, 705-06. 10. Message, Churchill to Truman, December 23, 1951; FRUS, 1952-54, VI, Ft. 1, 718. 11. FRUS, 1952-54, VI, Ft. 1,719. 12. Memorandum, Secretary of State, January 5, 1952; FRUS, 1952-54, VI, Ft. 1, 731. 13. FRUS, 1952-54, VI, 740, 784. 14. FRUS, 1952-54, VI, 867.

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15. Cablegram, May 9, 1952; CHUR papers 2/201. 16. Message, Churchill to Truman, August 16, 1952; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers. 17. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation; My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), 681. 18. See Peter G. Boyle, ed., The Churchill-Eisenhower Correspondence, 1953-1955 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 52. 19. Message, Truman to Churchill, August 18, 1952; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers. 20. Message, Churchill to Truman, August 20, 1952; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers. 21. Second Message, Churchill to Truman, August 20, 1952; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers. 22. Message, Truman to Churchill, August 21, 1952; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers. 23. Message, Churchill to Truman, August 22, 1952; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers. 24. Message, Truman to Churchill, August 24, 1952; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers. 25. Message, Churchill to Truman, August 25, 1952; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers. 26. Message, Personal, Truman to Churchill, August 25, 1952; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers. 27. Message, Churchill to Truman, August 28, 1952; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers. 28. Message, Churchill to Truman, September 29, 1952; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers. 29. (Draft of) Message, Truman to Churchill, October 1, 1952; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers. 30. John Colville, The Fringes of Power: Downing Street Diaries 1939-1955 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1985), 654. 31. Gilbert, Churchill, VIII, 7 7 3 - 7 4 . See also John W. Young, Winston Churchill's Last Campaign: Britain and the Cold War 1951-55 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 110. 32. Cablegram, Churchill to Truman, November 8, 1952; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers. 33. Letter, Truman to Churchill, November 12, 1952; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers. 34. Telegram, Churchill to Truman, December 1, 1952; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers. 35. Telegram, Churchill to Truman, December 20, 1952; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers. 36. Telegram, Truman to Churchill, January 1, 1953; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers. 37. Cablegram, SS Queen Mary, Churchill to Truman, January 1, 1953; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers. 38. Memorandum of Conversation between President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill, January 8, 1953; PSF, Box 115, Truman papers.

Part Three

The Last Years

Photograph of Harry S. Truman with Sir Winston Churchill taken at Chartwell in June 1956. (Courtesy of the Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge, England)

6 The Years 1953 to 1955

WINDING DOWN The last volume of Churchill's war memoirs had been scheduled to be published before the end of 1 9 5 3 , and although he had completed this last volume before he again took office, he had wanted to include certain messages that Truman had sent to him up to the period ending with the Potsdam Conference in July 1945. Hence his letter t o T r u m a n of 30 M a r c h 1 9 5 3 . T h e T r u m a n s , h o w e v e r , and their daughter M a r g a r e t had already left Independence for a month-long vacation in the Hawaiian Islands. Hence, too, the delay in Truman's reply to Churchill's letter. CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN March 30, 1953 My dear Harry, I am proposing to publish this year the sixth and last volume of my History of the Second World War. This will cover the period from the launching of "Overlord" to the Potsdam Conference; and the second part of the volume will enter upon the period of your Presidency. I am naturally anxious to follow the method which I have adopted in earlier volumes, and to reproduce the text of some of the personal messages which I sent to those with whom I was associated in the strategic control of the war. I prefer to be judged by what I wrote at the time, rather

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than rely on present narrative and argument which is liable to be influenced by after-events. In order that I may be able to tell my story in this way, I should like to reproduce the text of a dozen personal messages from you which came to me during this period. A list of these, together with the text of each is attached. I should be obliged if you would allow me to reproduce in full the text of these few personal messages from you. If you would prefer that they should not be published textually, I can readily turn them, by paraphrase, into narrative form. But, as I have said already, for myself I prefer to rest on the actual words which I used at the time; and I dare say that you also will prefer that these messages should be printed as they were sent. I must soon put this volume into its final shape for the publisher. I should be grateful therefore if you could look through the enclosed texts and let me know your views. I see that you are writing a book yourself. Pray let me know if there is any point on which I can be of assistance. With all good wishes. Yours sincerely, Winston S. Churchill1 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL April 14, 1953

Dear Winston: I certainly appreciated most highly your good letter of March 30th, which reached me here in Hawaii. I will be back in Independence in two weeks and I will get all of the facts together at that time and will write you promptly. I am sure as soon as I have had an opportunity to look at my files there will be no difficulty about granting your request. I am on the first vacation I have really taken in thirty years and it is an unusual feeling. Mrs. Truman and Margaret are with me and want to be remembered to you and Mrs. Churchill. We had a lovely note from Sarah the other day. Sincerely yours, Harry S. Truman 2 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL May 20, 1953

Dear Winston: As I told you in my communication from Coconut Island, I have tried to get to my files and I find that they are not in shape for me to get into them at the present time because the man from the National Archives has not appeared on the scene as yet.

The Years 1953 to 1955

21 1

I am working on a historical volume covering the period from 1935 to 1952, particularly the seven years and nine months while I was President and I am hoping that I can use the text of the cables to which you refer. I would suggest that you paraphrase these cables for the reason that I can't get at the originals at the present time. It is perfectly all right for you to paraphrase them and use them but I hope you won't publish the text as yet. I would like to do it as a joint affair when I get around to the point of making publication of my own—then we can simultaneously release the exact text if that is satisfactory to you. I hope everything is going well with you and I congratulate you on that "Sir" before your name. 3 Please remember me to Mrs. Churchill. Mrs. Truman and Margaret join me in wishing you the best of everything. Most sincerely, Harry 3 HEADNOTE The following month, on 23 June, Churchill suffered another stroke as he had in 1949, the news of which prompted a message from the former President. TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL June 28, 1953 I hope for a good rest for you and that you soon will be back in harness. Sincerely, Harry S. Truman 4 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN June 28, 1953 Mr. Truman Thank you so much for your kind message. Winston 5 HEADNOTE Though there is no record that Truman sent a congratulatory message to the Prime Minister on being awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature for his war memoirs later that year, President Eisenhower had sent Churchill such a letter on 16 October 1953. 6 The matter is

a

On April 24, 1953, Churchill was made a Knight of the Garter by Queen Elizabeth II.

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of interest if only because the Prime Minister had been asked by the former Attorney General of the United States, Francis Biddle, to endorse the proposed nomination of President Truman for the Nobel Peace Prize in a letter addressed to Churchill on 13 January 1953. The Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, had also been consulted, and indicated the "advantage" of endorsing the President for the Peace Prize, if Churchill wished to do so. In his reply of 29 January, as Churchill had still been vacationing in Jamaica, he indicated that while he had "the highest opinion of Mr. Truman," he felt "that he would not wish to make or endorse any Nobel prize recommendations at all at present." 7 Ironically, this was the Prime Minister, w h o , earlier that month, had told the President that, since 1945, "y° u ? more than any other man, have saved Western civilization." 8 Coincidentaly, though there is also no record of any greeting from Mr. Truman on the occasion of Churchill's birthday that November, he w r o t e a g a i n t o C h u r c h i l l t h a t D e c e m b e r c o n c e r n i n g his friend, Eddie McKim, w h o had been a member of his field artillery battery, Battery D, in the First World War. TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL b December 22, 1953 Dear Sir Winston: This will introduce Mr. Edward D. McKim who served with me in the First World War and was one of my Administrative Assistants in the White House while I was President. He is on a grand tour of Europe and I am happy to give him a letter of introduction to you. Any courtesies you care to extend to him will be highly appreciated. Sincerely, Harry S. Truman 9 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL April 24, 1954

Dear Sir Winston: I am enclosing you three photographs which were taken at Fulton, Missouri when I delivered the Green lecture for the same Foundation for which you delivered the Iron Curtain speech.

b

For Churchill's reply, addressed to Truman's private secretary, see his message of April 27, 1954.

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I've signed one of these pictures for you and I'll appreciate it very much if you will sign one for me individually. Just autograph the other one and return the two of them to me. I hope everything is going well with you and that before too many moons roll by I'll have an opportunity for another most pleasant visit with you. Sincerely, Harry S. Truman 10 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN April 27, 1954 Churchill's Private Secretary, Anthony Montague Browne, to Truman's Private Secretary Dear Private Secretary, The Prime Minister was very glad to receive Mr. Truman's letter of introduction from Mr. Edward D. McKim.c Unfortunately Mr. McKim's stay in London was brief, and he had left before we were able to get in touch with him. Sir Winston Churchill is so sorry that he did not therefore have an opportunity of helping to make Mr. McKim's stay here a pleasant one. Yours sincerely, AMB 11 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN May 18, 1954

Thank you so much for the photographs taken at Fulton when you delivered the Green lecture. I have signed two of them and return them herewith. The third I am having framed and shall have much pleasure in keeping. I hope that all goes well with you and that we may have the pleasure of meeting again before too long. With my best wishes. Yours sincerely, WSC 12 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL May 26, 1954

My dear Sir Winston: I certainly appreciate your kindness in signing the pictures for me. I shall have the one inscribed to me framed and put it where I can look at it frequently, along with another one I have of you with an inscription on it.

c

Mr. McKim had been the President's chief administrative assistant, April-June 1945.

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Sir Roger Makins d delivered your message for my birthday. I can't tell you how much I appreciate that also. I hope you are in good health and that everything is going well with you. It is always a very great pleasure to me to hear from you. Sincerely yours, Harry S. Truman 13 HEADNOTE In June 1954 Truman had to be hospitalized, where he was operated on for a gangrenous gall bladder and infected appendix at the Kansas City Research Hospital in Kansas City, Missouri. O n learning of this, the Prime Minister cabled the former President on June 20th. CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN June 20, 1954 To Mr. Truman I am much distressed to hear of your illness and hope so much you will soon be quite recovered. Winston Churchill 14 TRUMAN (BESS) TO CHURCHILL June 21, 1954 The Right Honorable Sir Winston S. Churchill My husband deeply appreciates your very kind message. Our best wishes to you and Mrs. Churchill. Bess W. Truman 15 HEADNOTE

Instead of sending the Prime Minister a telegram on the occasion of his e i g h t i e t h b i r t h d a y , T r u m a n sent the f o l l o w i n g letter of November 22nd. TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL November 22, 1954 Dear Sir Winston: I am hopeful that you will have the happiest birthday you have ever had and that you will have many more of them.

d

In January 1953, Makins had succeeded Franks as the new British ambassador to the United States.

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215

I certainly wish I could be present in London for the celebration of this milestone of yours and I hope you have many more such celebrations because the world and the British Empire need you now as badly as they ever did at any time previous to this. As I contemplate the association which you and I had I feel that it was one of the greatest events of my whole life. Please pay my respects to Mrs. Churchill and also remember that Mrs. Truman joins me in everything I have said in this note to you. Sincerely, Harry S. Truman 16 CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN November 29, 1954 Telegram

Thank you so much for your most kind letter. Winston Churchill 17 Churchill's Retirement O n 5 April Churchill resigned as Prime Minister shortly before the Geneva Conference of 1955, and more than four months after his eightieth birthday. When he assumed the Premiership for a second time it had been his hope to bring about an easement of the cold war, and he had the further hope of holding a second summit—a belated peace conference. It was not to be. O n 6 April, Truman took the occasion to write the outgoing Prime Minister, and friend of nearly a decade, to offer his own salute. TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL April 6, 1955

Dear Sir Winston: I feel as I know the whole free world feels—that something has gone that will be most difficult to replace. We all know that we cannot go on forever. I wish that you could have gone on indefinitely. My association with you was one of the highlights of my life. Your contribution to the salvation of the free world from the totalitaria n and the tyrants have never been equalled in history. May your retirement be no retirement but a happy relief from responsibility and a continued contribution to the safety and welfare of this old world. Most sincerely, Harry 18

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CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (Paraphrase) June 30, 1955 M y dear Harry, Of all the letters I received on my resignation none has given me more pleasure than yours. You wrote of my contribution to history, but it was your decision at the outset of the Korean W a r and before that with the establishment of N A T O w h i c h are responsible for the degree of calm we n o w h a v e , a n d t h a t together must ensure your reputation and the gratitude of the free world. Yours sincerely, Winston S. Churchill 1 9 NOTES 1. Letter, Churchill to Truman, March 30, 1953; Post-Presidential File, General Correspondence, 1953-56, Box 16, Truman papers; hereinafter referred to as PPF, Gen. corr., Box 16, Truman papers. 2. CHUR papers 4/63A. 3. Letter, Truman to Churchill, May 20, 1953; PPF, Gen. corr., Box 16, Truman papers; also CHUR papers 4/63A. 4. CHUR papers 2/201. 5. CHUR papers 2/201. 6. Peter G. Boyle, ed., The Churchill-Eisenhower Correspondence, 1953-1955 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 91. 7. CHUR papers 2/230A-B. 8. Margaret Truman, Harry S. Truman (New York: William Morrow 6c Co., 1973), 556. 9. CHUR papers 2/206. 10. CHUR papers 2/201. 11. CHUR papers 2/206. 12. CHUR papers 2/201. 13. CHUR papers 2/201. 14. CHUR papers 2/201. 15. CHUR papers 2/201. 16. CHUR papers 2/470. 17. CHUR papers 2/470. 18. Letter, Truman to Churchill, April 6, 1955; PPF, Gen. corr., Box 16, Truman papers; Robert H. Ferrell, ed., Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman (New York: Harper &c Row, 1980), 315. 19. Letter, Churchill to Truman, June 30, 1955; Gen. corr., Box 16, Truman papers.

7

The Last Phase

THEIR LAST MEETING The end of 1955 saw the publication of the first volume of Truman's memoirs of his presidency, which he called Year of Decisions. It was followed in March 1956 by the publication of the second volume, Years of Trial and Hope. Churchill, w h o had read the first volume, thanked him for sending it in his brief message of 27 February 1956. The year 1956 had marked Truman's first visit to the continent since the Potsdam Conference, a brief journey to England to receive an honorary degree from Oxford, and an invitation to dine with the Churchills at Chartwell. Indeed, Truman's visit to Chartwell was to evoke many memories of their association since Potsdam and of their friendship since Fulton. It was also to mark their last meeting together.

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (Paraphrase) February 27, 1956 My dear Harry, Thank you for sending the first volume of your memoirs. I have read it with a great deal of interest. Yours sincerely, WSC 1

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CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (Paraphrase) March 6, 1956

My dear Harry, Now that your trip to England is set, I am writing to ask if you will dine with me on the occasion of your visit. Yours sincerely, Winston Churchill2 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL March 24, 1956

Dear Sir Winston: I certainly did appreciate your invitation of March 8th, and, of course, I want to accept your invitation. Definite arrangements have only been set for three affairs— one for the Degree on Wednesday, June 20th, one for the Pilgrims3 dinner on Thursday, June 21st, and one for a luncheon with the Lord Mayor on Friday, June 22nd. You can be sure your invitation is a definite engagement and is most highly appreciated. Sincerely yours, Harry S. Truman 3

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (Paraphrase) April 4, 1956

Thank you for your March 24th letter. Mrs. Churchill and I would be delighted to have you and Mrs. Truman dine with us at home, if this is agreeable, on Sunday, June 24th. b Very sincerely, Winston 4 [Postscript] "Sir Winston and Lady Churchill met us at the door. We stopped for pictures. Many of the neighbor people were at the gate. They gave a wave and a cheer as Mrs. Truman & I entered.

a

In his Pilgrims dinner address, Truman reaffirmed the importance of the English language and of the democratic way of life as the ties that bind "our two countries." b

That date, June 24, 1956, would be recorded by Mr. Truman in a memorable postscript of their last meeting that same day. It reads as follows.

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"Sir Winston and I had a most pleasant conversation about Potsdam, its agreements and Russian perfidy. I walked around the place with him, feeding the goldfish in two ponds and sitting in the garden watching his three grandchildren play. It was a scene long to be remembered and an experience never to be forgotten. "Mr. Churchill is as keen mentally as ever. He still has the ability to meet quip with quip and to turn a phrase in his own inimitable manner. But his physical condition shows his 82 years. He walks more slowly and he does not hear well. He told me that he could do whatever had to be done as he always did but that he'd rather not do it. He walked around and up and down steps with no more effort than would be expected of a man his age. He remarked that it would be a great thing for the world if I should become President of the United States again. I told him there is no chance of that. "Lord Beaverbrookc impressed me very much. I had quite a conversation with him. He is a great admirer of Sir Winston. He also told me that, on this European trip, he thought I'd made the greatest ambassador of goodwill U.S.A. had ever had here. Quite a statement from that source. He also said that Margaret had done a wonderful piece of work along the same line. He may have been pulling my leg but I don't think so. It was all over too soon and we had to return to London." 5 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL July 16, 1956 Dear Winston: I do not know when I have enjoyed a visit more than ours at Chartwell. The opportunity of talking with you there and seeing you at the Prime Minister's dinner were the highlights of our stay in England. The first volume of your "History of the English-Speaking Peoples" was awaiting my return to Missouri. I am very proud to have the book and am grateful to you for your thoughtfulness in sending it. The second volume of my memoirs, by the way, has been mailed and should reach you in due course. Mrs. Truman joins me in expressing our appreciation and best wishes to you and Lady Churchill. It was a pleasure to be with you both and to have an opportunity to renew acquaintance with Mary and Sarah. Please remember us to them and to your charming grandchildren. Sincerely yours, Harry S. Truman 6

c

Lord Beaverbrook, newspaper proprietor and friend of Churchill.

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CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (Paraphrase) August 9, 1956

Thank you for sending the second volume of your memoirs, which I expect to enjoy reading as much as the first volume. Yours sincerely, Winston 7 HEADNOTE Truman's message followed with his customary greeting on the occasion of Churchill's birthday on 30 November. Churchill had replied by telegram to the birthday message from Mr. and M r s . Truman, although only the draft, approved by Churchill, and not the message itself, has been found.

TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL November 30, 1956 Right Honorable Sir Winston Churchill Congratulations on another Birthday. We hope you will have many more happy ones. Mr. and Mrs. Harry S. Truman 8 THE END OF THE CORRESPONDENCE

With the completion of the Truman Library in 1957, a formal invitation had been sent to Churchill on 5 June to attend the Library's dedication, although he had declined to come. Between that date and the beginning of the following year, there appears to be no record of any correspondence between the two men. Not until January 1958, when the Trumans attended an exhibition of Churchill's paintings in Kansas City—the first such "exhibition devoted solely to Churchill's paintings," according to his official biographer—would their correspondence be resumed. 9

TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL January 31, 1958 Dear Sir Winston: Last evening Mrs. Truman and I visited the Nelson Art Gallery in Kansas City to see the paintings which you allowed to be placed on exhibition there. Both of us more than enjoyed the privilege but regretted that you were not there to tell us about them.

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It is my hope that the time will come when you can pay another visit to this part of the United States, where a speech of the quality of your "Iron Curtain" statement in Fulton, Missouri, would be welcomed by us all. Sincerely yours, Harry S. Truman 10

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (Paraphrase) February 5, 1958

My dear Harry, Thanks so much for your letter and for your agreeable comments on my paintings. I do hope to visit America soon again, but would expect to make no speeches however in the course of my visit. I think of you often. Very sincerely, Winston 11

HEADNOTE Later that same m o n t h Churchill, w h o was eighty-three, fell ill and w a s d i a g n o s e d by his d o c t o r as h a v i n g b r o n c h i a l p n e u m o n i a . Nonetheless, with the proper antibiotic he seemed to have made a rapid recovery. Truman reacted to the news by writing his friend again on 28 February.

TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL February 28, 1958 Dear Sir Winston: Your letter of the fifth was highly appreciated, and I hope my remarks about you as a painter, which you saw in the press, were more accurately reported than usual by that spurious estate. My reason for writing you again is to tell you how happy I am that you fooled the doctors, just as I did. I know that you will soon be back in Churchillian fighting trim. Nothing would please me more than another visit with you, and perhaps one of these days we can manage it. Mrs. Truman joins me in best wishes for your rapid and speedy recovery. Sincerely yours, Harry 12

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HEADNOTE Truman, w h o turned seventy-five on 8 May, was the recipient of a telegram from Winston and Clementine Churchill that same day in offering their congratulations. Mr. Truman, w h o replied on 15 May, wrote again later that year on the occasion of Churchill's eightyfourth year. TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL May 15, 1958 This last May eight was made even more memorable for me when I received the birthday cablegram from you and Lady Churchill. I only wish it were possible for me to express fully my deep appreciation of your continuing thoughtfulness. I have been following very closely the reports of your progress towards recovery from your recent set-back and was highly pleased to get your second message at noon today through the good offices of Mr. Edward R. Murrow. d Again, my thanks to you for your kindness. Sincerely yours, Harry S. Truman 13 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL November 29, 1958 Dear Sir Winston: A copy of a cablegram I have just sent is enclosed. It is my sincere hope that you had a very pleasant and happy eightyfourth birthday. I only wish I could have been with you to help celebrate it. I have said many a time that the great man of our age will be Winston Churchill. Nothing seems likely to happen now that would cause me to change that opinion. Sincerely yours, Harry Truman 14

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (Paraphrase) December 6, 1958 My dear Harry, I was greatly pleased to hear from you on my birthday, and to be remembered in so agreeable a fashion. d

Murrow, who had been the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) bureau chief in London during World War II, was then the emcee of the popular television program "Person to Person."

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I look forward to visiting America again next May, and hope very much to see you then. In the meantime, best wishes this holiday season to you and Mrs. Truman. Yours sincerely, WSC 15

HEADNOTE Later that month, in response to a letter from the President of the U n i v e r s i t y of M i s s o u r i , Dr. E l m e r Ellis, T r u m a n i n q u i r e d if Churchill would be willing to visit Missouri in the N e w Year to receive the University's Distinguished Service Award in Journalism.

TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL December 20, 1958 Dear Sir Winston: I have a letter from Dr. Elmer Ellis, the President of the University of Missouri in Columbia, Missouri, requesting that I write you regarding the University's invitation to you to accept its Distinguished Service Award in Journalism at a World Press Congress meeting at the University on March 4, 1959. An alternative date for the presentation of the award is May 3, 1959, when the University will have its annual Journalism Week banquet. I understand that you may attend other meetings of the World Press Congress in March, and if you could come to Missouri, as you did for the "Iron Curtain" speech in Fulton, nothing would make me happier. Sincerely, Harry Truman 16

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (Paraphrase) January 4, 1959

My dear Harry, Thanks for your letter of December 20th. There is no chance, however, of my being able to come to Missouri, since my visit in May will be brief and will be limited to New York and Washington. Yours sincerely, Winston S. Churchill 17

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TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL February 2, 1959 Dear Sir Winston: I was very sorry indeed that you could not make the visit to the University of Missouri. I had hoped you might have another "Iron Curtain" speech in your system and would like to have a place to release it, but, of course, if you can't come that is all there is to it. Maybe a future date can be arranged for the same purpose. I am always most happy to hear from you and I sincerely hope that you had a wonderful rest and vacation in Marrakech. Please give my very kindest regards and best wishes to Lady Churchill and Mrs. Truman joins me in that request. Sincerely, Harry 18 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL May 16, 1959 Dear Sir Winston: I am sorely disappointed that it proved impossible for me to see you while you were in the United States. Unfortunately, the invitation from the White House was not delivered until but a few days before the dinner there in your honor, too late for me to make any change in my calendar. Earlier, I did receive formal invitations from the British Embassy in Washington but for dates on which I had engagements set many months before. For your personal information, Mrs. Truman has been ill, and I have had to take her to the hospital for a check-up which undoubtedly will end in an operation. My daughter is going to the hospital in New York on Monday, and her second child will be born there on Tuesday by Caesarian section. So you see, everything seems to be happening at once. I hope that you will forgive me for not being able to meet with you during your visit here and that you will express my kindest regards to Lady Churchill. Sincerely yours, Harry S. Truman 19

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (Paraphrase) May 21, 1959 My dear Harry, I was grieved to learn that Mrs. Truman has been ill, and pray that she will make a speedy recovery.

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While I missed seeing you in Washington, I trust that we shall meet again before long. All good wishes from us both. Yours sincerely, Winston S. Churchill 20 TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL May 27, 1959 Dear Sir Winston: I have not received a letter in a long, long time that pleased me so much as yours of the twenty-first. I was very anxious for you to understand the situation and to know that I had no intention of appearing discourteous to you. Circumstances developed which left me no other course of action. Sometime I hope that you and I can discuss the attitudes that prevail here. They are fantastic. Please say to Lady Churchill that Mrs. Truman was highly pleased to receive the message signed by you both. If you have need of a second-class campaign orator for your re-election and are certain that I would not cost you any votes, I will be glad to come over to make my contribution. Sincerely yours, Harry S. Truman 21 HEADNOTE Truman sent a handwritten letter to Churchill on the occasion of his eighty-fifth birthday on 2 7 November. It was in fact Truman's last handwritten letter to his distinguished friend. TRUMAN TO CHURCHILL November 27, 1959 Dear Winston: Another birthday comes around on Monday. I am sure you will have a happy one, and I hope you'll have many more. The world, Great Britain, the United States and France all need you. May God bless you and keep you and make His Face to shine upon you for many years. Most sincerely, Harry S. Truman e ' 22 e

Churchill had replied to Truman's second message by telegram on December 1st.23

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HEADNOTE

The new year had duly marked the end of their correspondence of more than fifteen years. It had ended as it began when Churchill first wrote to Truman in 1945. So, in 1960, it was Churchill who would write to Truman for the last time in thanking him for sending a copy of Mr. Citizen (1960), Truman's memoirs of his years in retirement and of his reflections on the past, and on the office he had occupied for nearly eight critical years—from 1945 to 1953.

CHURCHILL TO TRUMAN (Paraphrase) September 2 1 , 1960 M y dear Harry, M y thanks for sending me a copy of your post-retirement memoirs for my library. Your thoughts on affairs in retirement are most interesting. Yours sincerely, Winston S. Churchill 2 4

NOTES 1. CHUR papers 2/201. 2. Telegram, Churchill to Truman, March 8, 1956; PPF, Trip File, 1956, Box 8, Truman papers; CHUR papers 2/201. 3. Letter, Truman to Churchill, March 24, 1956; PPF, Trip File, 1956, Box 8, Truman papers; CHUR papers 2/201. 4. CHUR papers 2/201. 5. Diary entry, June 24, 1956; PPF, Trip File, 1956, Box 8, Truman papers; see also Ferrell, ed., Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman (New York: Harper & Row,1980), 337-38. 6. CHUR papers 2/201. 7. CHUR papers 2/201. 8. CHUR papers 2/201. 9. M a r t i n Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Vol. VIII, 'Never Despair' 1945-1965. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1988), 1249. 10. CHUR papers 1/122. 11. CHUR papers 1/122. 12. CHUR papers 1/122; Gilbert, Churchill, VIII, 1262. 13. CHUR papers 2/536. 14. CHUR papers 2/536. 15. CHUR papers 2/536. 16. CHUR papers 2/341. 17. Letter, Churchill to Truman, January 4, 1959; PPF, Gen. corr. 1957-59, Box 16, Truman papers; CHUR papers 2/341.

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18. Letter, Truman to Churchill, February 2, 1959; PPF, Gen. corr. 1957-59, Box 16, Truman papers. 19. Letter, Truman to Churchill, May 16, 1959; PPF, Gen. corr. 1957-59, Box 16, Truman papers. 20. Letter, Churchill to Truman, May 2 1 , 1959; PPF, Name File, 1956-59, Truman papers. 21. Letter, Truman to Churchill, May 27; PPF, Name File, 1956-59, Truman papers; CHUR papers 2/536. 22. CHUR papers 2/490B. 23. CHUR papers 2/491. 24. CHUR papers 2/536.

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Conclusion

Truman and Churchill had been brought together as wartime associates and, finally, as friends because of the vicissitudes of history. Hence their association, beginning at Potsdam, was to endure long after that event and, in no small measure, because of the evolving conflict between Russia and the West following the end of the Second World War in 1945. Thereafter, their friendship grew out of their memorable rendezvous at Fulton, when the former prime minister gave expression to the thoughts of many but which an equal number, perhaps, also preferred to ignore. This had to do with the substance of Churchill's justly-famed "iron curtain" speech of March 1946, and at a time when the hopes for a postwar settlement still seemed to be within reach. Together, then, the two men had come to view the postwar world in much the same light, and their friendship was nurtured by their agreement on the importance of maintaining what they regarded as essential to the defense of free society, or the "common cause" as they often referred to it in opposing the mortal threat of Stalinism abroad. The inconsistencies in their association and even their friendship were few, although two instances may be noted. Once instance had

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to do with Churchill's failure to visit the new President on the occasion of Roosevelt's passing in April 1945, and the fact that no satisfactory answer has ever been rendered as to why he chose not to, despite the advantages of doing so. The other instance concerned Churchill's refusal to recommend the outgoing President for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1953, despite, again, the "advantages," as Eden had remarked. Nonetheless, both men upheld the values and traditions of the Western view of life as instanced in their convictions about the differences between right and wrong in public life, and in the life of the two great countries that each in turn aspired to represent.

Appendix A

The following from Truman to Churchill of 13 April 1945 was the text of a joint proposal to Stalin concerning Poland. We are sending this joint reply to your message of April 7 in regard to Polish negotiations for the sake of greater clarity and in order that there will be no misunderstanding as to our position on this matter. The British and United States Governments tried most earnestly to be constructive and fair in their approach and will continue to do so. Before putting before you the concrete and constructive suggestion which is the purpose of this message we felt it necessary, however, to correct the completely erroneous impression which you have apparently received in regard to the position of the British and United States Governments as set forth by our Ambassadors under direct instructions during the negotiations. So it is most surprising to have you state that the present Government functioning in Warsaw has been in any way ignored during these negotiations. Such has never been our intention nor our position. You must be cognizant of the fact that our Ambassadors in Moscow have agreed without question that the three leaders of the Warsaw Government should be included in the list of Poles to be invited to come to Moscow for consultation with the Commission. We have never denied that among the three elements from which the new Provisional Government of National Unity is to be formed the representatives of the present Warsaw Government will play, unquestionably, a prominent part. Nor can it be said with any

232

Appendix A

justification that our Ambassadors are demanding the right to invite an unlimited number of Poles. The right to put forward and have accepted by the Commission individual representative Poles from abroad and from within Poland to be invited to Moscow for consultation cannot be interpreted in that sense. Indeed in his message of April 1 President Roosevelt specifically said: "In order to facilitate the agreement the Commission might first of all select a small but representative group of Polish leaders who could suggest other names for consideration by the Commission". The real issue between us is whether or not the Warsaw Government has the right to veto individual candidates for consultation. No such interpretation in our considered opinion can be found in the Crimea decision. It appears to us that you are reverting to the original position taken by the Soviet delegation at the Crimea which was subsequently modified in the agreement. Let us keep clearly in mind that we are now speaking only of the group of Poles who are to be invited to Moscow for consultation. With reference to the statement which you attribute to Ambassador Harriman it would appear that real misunderstanding has occurred since from his reports to his Government the remark in question would appear to refer to the Polish Government in London and not as you maintain to the Provisional Government of Warsaw. You mention the desirability of inviting eight Poles—five from within Poland and three from London—to take part in these first consultations and in your message to the Prime Minister you indicate that Mikolajczyk would be acceptable if he issued a statement in support of the Crimea decision. We, therefore, submit the following proposals for your consideration in order to prevent a breakdown with all its incalculable consequences of our endeavors to settle the Polish question. We hope that you will give them your most careful and earnest consideration. 1. That we instruct our representatives on the Commission to extend immediately invitations to the following Polish leaders to come to Moscow to consult: Bierut, Osubka-Morawski, Rola-symerski, Bishop Sapieha, one representative Polish leader not connected with the present Warsaw Government to be proposed by you; and from London, Mikolajczyk, Grabski, and Stanczyk. 2. That once the invitations to come for consultation have been issued by the Commission the representatives of Warsaw could arrive first if desired. 3. That it be agreed that these Polish leaders called for consultation could suggest to the Commission that names of a certain number of other Polish leaders from within Poland or abroad who might be brought in for consultation in order that all major Polish groups be represented in the discussions. 4. We do not feel that we could commit ourselves to any formula for determining the composition of the new Government of National Unity in

Appendix A

233

advance of consultation with the Polish leaders and we do not in any case consider the Yugoslav precedent to be applicable to Poland. We ask you to read again carefully the American and British messages of April 1 since they set forth the larger considerations which we still have very much in mind and to which we must adhere.

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Appendix B

The following was the text of a proposed message from President Truman to Mossadeq, as an annex of his message to Churchill of 21 August 1952, in his effort to help resolve the Iranian oil question. ANNEX A Text of my message to Mossadeq. "Mr. Churchill has consulted me on the proposals that he is communicating to you in an effort to secure a settlement of the oil question. My Government has had an earnest and continuing interest in the efforts to bring about a resumption of the flow of Iranian oil to world markets and it is my belief that the present proposals offer a splendid opportunity for the parties to resolve their difficulties. I believe that the proposed course of British action is one which fairly meets your problems and on behalf of this Government I am glad to urge you to give it the most sympathetic consideration. "The interest of the United States is solely that of standing ready to assist in this matter if such assistance is desired by the parties. I wish to assure you that if agreement is reached on the present proposals, this Government is prepared to assist you in your current financial difficulties, if you so desire, and will for this purpose make an immediate grant of $10,000,000 available to your Government.

236

Appendix B

"It is my sincere hope that a basis can now be found which will permit a renewal of oil operations in Iran and afford an opportunity for bringing about improvement of conditions of the Iranian people through the programs of development for which we all so devoutly hope." If the above would be acceptable I should think you would wish to place a cross reference in your message to your consultation with me and our agreement. Specifically, I should think Paragraph 2(c) which speaks of United States assistance should be worded to indicate that I had informed you of our willingness to provide such a grant. I hope in drafting your message you will consider the other points I have made above and wish to assure you that any drafting suggestions on my part for your message are due entirely to my conviction of the urgent need for arriving speedily at an agreement acceptable to the Iranians and satisfactory to you. If the points I have made are agreeable to you, it might be possible to put forward the proposals in terms of such a formula as the following: 1. Submission to the International Court of Justice of the question of the compensation to be paid in respect of the nationalization of the enterprise of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in Iran, having regard to the legal position of the parties existing at the time of nationalization and to all the claims and counterclaims of both parties. 2. The appointment of suitable representatives of both parties to negotiate arrangements for resuming the flow of oil from Iran to world markets. As a first step, HMG are prepared to seek appropriate arrangements for the lifting of all the oil products presently held in storage in Iran and for advances in respect of such oil products. 3. Upon agreement to submit the claims of both parties to the International Court of Justice (a) HMG will relax restrictions on exports to Iran and on Iran's use of sterling, and (b) it is our understanding that the United States Government will make an immediate grant of $10,000,000 to the Iranian Government.

Bibliographical Essay

The Truman-Churchill correspondence, if only at the outset, held out the hope that big power agreements would lead to a tranquil postwar world insofar as the prospects for such agreements looked promising. That this vision was a fleeting one at best, even before the end of the war in Europe, seems almost elementary in retrospect, even though that vision still seemed hopeful at the time concerning Russia's relations with the West. Hence the explosion of a body of work under the name of revisionist history followed in the aftermath of the postwar crisis in East-West relations. What the correspondence affirms, however, was not that U.S. or Anglo-American policy initiated the cold war, but that Stalin's own policies brought on the cold war or, put another way, World War III. To elucidate this fact, it is only necessary to indicate some of the complementary sources that remain essential to an understanding of what happened between 1945 and 1960, with particular reference to the period between 1945 and 1947. Among such sources, the last volume of Churchill's own memoirs, Volume VI, Triumph and Tragedy, published by Houghton Mifflin, Boston, in 1953, must be counted as essential reading, especially Chapter 9, in Book Two, from the death of President Roosevelt

238

Bibliographical Essay

until the end, Chapter 21. Another account, though not written in the style that would capture the moment by moment narrative of this British statesman in commenting on what he had written and remembered at the time, is Truman's own memoirs, which in the first volume covers the end of the war in his Year of Decisions, published by Doubleday, New York, in 1955. A number of other memoirs, in addition, and not a few secondary sources, should be added to this list of complementary sources. Among the former is Dean Acheson's memoir, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, published by W.W. Norton, New York, in 1969, and Clark Clifford's, Counsel to the President: A Memoir, published by Random House in 1991. Another such memoir that should be added to this list is Charles E. Bohlen's, Witness to History, 1929-1969, published by W.W. Norton, New York, in 1973. Even at lower diplomatic levels, it was apparent that the Soviets were bent on promoting policies at variance with that of their Control Council colleagues in Berlin, as reported, for example, by U.S. diplomats such as Howard Trivers in his notable Lectures on Foreign Affairs, published by Ball State University in 1974. Among secondary sources, two very different biographies of Churchill should also be mentioned. One is by Churchill's official biographer, Martin Gilbert, notably his Volume VIII, 'Never Despair', 1945-1965, published by Houghton Mifflin, Boston, in 1988, and the insightful biography of Churchill by Roy Jenkins, Churchill: A Biography, published by Farrar, Straus and Giroux in 2001. Among Truman biographies the editor's preference remains Robert H. Ferrell's Harry S. Truman: A Life, published by the University of Missouri Press, Columbia, in 1994. Lastly, for the years 1945-1947, it is important to emphasize again that the Truman Doctrine was not "a call to arms," but a decision to aid two nations, Greece in particular, against the threat of Communist subversion. So too, as noted in the introduction to this text, the memoirs of George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950, published by Little, Brown, Boston in 1967, retains its importance for readers of that pivotal period, 1945-1947, when the initial steps were taken by the Soviet regime to provoke an historic conflict with the West in September 1947—six months after the decision had been taken by the United States to aid the governments of Greece and Turkey.

Index

Acheson, Dean G., 188-89, 191, 194, 197, 205 Alexander, General Sir Harold, 35, 39; end of the war in Italy, 45; instructed to establish AMG in Italy, 46; as to Trieste and Pola, 73-74, 76; including Venezia Giulia, 78-79; and other references to AMG, 47, 50-51, 53, 62, 71, 84-89, 96-97, 110-11, 118-19 Allied Control Council (A.C.C.), 5, 10-11, 28, 32-33, 36, 38, 120, 132 Allied Forces Headquarters (A.F.H.Q.), 50, 73, 103 Allied Military Government (AMG), 46,73,79,84,97,103,110-12 Anderson, Sir John, 90, 138 Anglo-American relations, 1, 5, 11, 67, 87, 154, 195; WSC held that only such an accord can hope to avert disorder and future conflict, 158; and "Anglo-American unity," 72, 193, 195 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), 181, 194-97,200,236

Archer, E.R., 27 Arciszewski, Tomasz, 59 Argentine Foodstuffs: food shortages, contracts needed to meet, 126-27, 130-31 Arnold, General Henry ("Hap"), 82 atomic bomb, 4, 11; on use of, 15, 171-72, 177; and ultimatum to Japan, 139; Soviet development of, 158; and "atomic warfare," 158, 193. See also Quebec Agreement (1943) Attlee, Clement R., 105, 121, 142, 154, 175; Quebec Agreement, opposed to publication of, 177 Augusta (U.S. Navy cruiser), 141 Austria, 4, 31-32, 36, 39, 48-51, 54, 57, 70-72, 77-79, 82-83, 116-17, 120-22, 128 Barry, Philip, 173 Baruch, Bernard M., 188 Battle, Lucius D., 192 Beaverbrook, William Maxwell Aitken, 219

240

Index

Belgium, 43-44, 127, 130-31 Berle, Adolf, 7 Berlin blockade, 11 Bernadotte, Count Folke, 35, 38 Bevin, Ernest, 181 Biddle, Francis, 212 Beirut (Krasnodewski), Boleslaw, 40-42 Boettiger, Anna, 3 Bohlen, Charles, 3, 6; and Korean War, 12 Bradley, General Omar N., 189 British Chiefs of Staff, 22, 48, 86, 91, 138, 140 British Information Service, 59 Browne, Anthony M., 213 Byrnes, James F., 6, 9, 142, 161 Caffery, Jefferson, 112 Chamberlain, Neville, 42 Chandor, Douglas, 152-53 Cherwell, Lord, 188 Chiang Kai-shek (Generalissimo), 25, 123-24, 139-40, 142 China, 88, 140; and "nationalist China," 190 Churchill (British destroyer), 102 Churchill, Clementine S. (wife), 19, 154, 156, 160, 169, 175, 180, 192, 205,210,219,224-25 Churchill, John S. (brother), 163 Churchill, Mary (daughter), 4, 142, 160, 180,219 Churchill, Sarah (daughter), 154, 156, 160,173,180,210,219 Churchill, Winston S. (Sir Winston Churchill): on FDR's death, 1, 19; and WSC on Poland, 2-3; and initial attitude toward HST, 4-5; toward HST's policy in 1947, 9; and on HST's policy concerning the Korean War, 12-13; his initial letter to HST, 19-20; and his Number 1 to 21; and fear of pilotless bombers, 22; and CROSSWORD (Bern incident), 23-25, 38, 50-51; and mention of Stalin in corr., 24, 30-34, 37-38, 40-45, 50-51, 57-61, 68-69; and

Polish issue, 25; and FDR's view on occupation zones, 27; and Yugoslavia in corr., 45-48, 57, 70, 76, 78-79, 83-84, 96-107; and arrest of Polish agents, 56, 69; WSC urges early meeting, 69-70, 81, 89; "iron curtain" telegram to HST (May 12, 1945), 74-75; text of message to Stalin on Yugoslavia, 78-79; and need for action, 82-86; as to German fleet, 90; on LendLease, 90-91; and accepts Stalin's offer to meet in Berlin area, 91; but disappointed about date of their meeting, 95; and Caretaker Government, 96; on the "Battle of the Atlantic," 98-99; on Soviet request concerning the Italian navy, 100-102; and Moscow Mission, 104; accompanied by Attlee, 105, 121; the delegations to have own quarters, 117; on recognition of Finland, etc., 118; Octagon (the Second Quebec Conference, 1944), and role of EAC, 120-21; suggests code word "Terminal," 122; message to Stalin in conformity with HST's concerning occupation zones, 123; mentions king's plans to visit British troops, 124; reported visit by HST to Paris before Potsdam, 125; sends message to Stalin on Berlin meeting, 125-26; visit to de Gaulle denied by HST, 128; WSC surprised by HST's request to recognize new Polish Government, 134; that "world press" should be excluded from Potsdam deliberations, 135; on munitions supplies and the Japanese war, 137-38; last messages to HST on Proclamation to Japan, 140-41; corr. concerning Fulton address, 153-54; visits Cuba on eve of Fulton speech, 156; his friendship with HST, 159; sends HST his two books, Victory (1946) and Secret

Index Session Speeches (1946), 159; averred that only U.S. m o n o p o l y of A - b o m b deterred Soviet expansionism, 1 6 1 ; in address at Zurich (1946) emphasized import of a unified Europe, 1 6 1 ; requests HST's help for his w a r memoirs concerning some wartime messages to FDR, 166-67; sends H S T The Gathering Storm, 168; accepts M I T invitation, 1 7 1 ; sends H S T third volume of his w a r memoirs, 175; sees agreement between France and Germany as only alternative to European Army, 176; H S T opposed publication of Quebec Agreement (1943), 177; cancelled speech at Univ. of Pennsylvania, 179; entertains HST's daughter and gives her painting of his from M a r r a k e c h , 180; concerned a b o u t loss of Iranian oil to the West in 1 9 5 1 , 1 8 1 ; Boston Garden address stressed import of " h u m a n i t i e s " as against import of technical knowledge alone, 182; official corr. renewed as of October 2 5 , 1 9 5 1 , 185; prepares for Washington talks, 188; W S C sends H S T agenda for, 1 8 9 - 9 0 ; and aidememoire, 192; and concern a b o u t Jones visit, 193; recalls W a r s a w episode (August 1944) as a consequence of not "ganging u p , " 198; to pay visit to his friend on leaving office, 2 0 3 ; enroute to N e w York, 2 0 4 ; desires HST's help again concerning certain wartime message for last volume of w a r memoirs, 2 0 9 - 1 0 ; declines to endorse H S T for Nobel Peace Prize, 2 1 1 - 1 2 ; suffers another stroke (1953), 2 1 1 ; and sends cable on learning of HST's illness, 2 1 4 ; resigns as P M , 2 1 5 ; and reciprocates HST's letter on resignation, 2 1 6 ; WSC wishes H S T

241

to dine with him, 2 1 7 - 1 8 ; and sends first volume of his History of the English-Speaking Peoples, 2 1 9 ; thanks H S T for comments on his paintings, 2 2 1 ; reciprocates birthday greetings, 2 2 2 ; regretted not seeing H S T on his visit to Washington (1959), 2 2 5 ; in last letter, thanked H S T for sending copy of Mr. Citizen (1960), 226 Clark, General M a r k W., 39, 4 7 , 5 3 , 62 Clarke, Colonel Frank, 1 5 3 , 156 Clifford, Clark M . , 7; and report on "American Relations with the Soviet U n i o n , " 7 - 8 ; and T r u m a n Doctrine speech, 8 - 9 , 15; and on Korean W a r , 12 cold war, 13ff. See W o r l d W a r III Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2 6 - 2 7 , 36, 3 8 - 3 9 , 4 6 - 4 7 , 50, 86, 1 0 3 , 1 1 1 , 1 1 8 - 1 9 , 1 2 1 ; and reference to post-Potsdam meeting of, 125 Combined Food Board, 1 2 6 - 2 7 C o m m u n i s t China (PRC), 12, 190 Communist Information Bureau (Cominform), 10; and Stalin's initiative against the West (Sept. 2 2 - 2 7 , 1947), 9 - 1 0 , 165; Communism and Communists, 168, 172; "prevent a communist takeover" of Iran, 2 0 3 . See also Greece C o m p t o n , Karl T., 1 7 0 - 7 1 " c o n t a i n m e n t " policy, 8-9 cordon sanitaire, 3 Council of Foreign Ministers, 151 Crimea. See Yalta Crittenberger, General W . D., 1 0 3 , 110, 112 Crowley, Leo T., 130 Cuba, 155-57 Czechoslovakia, 10, 4 2 , 4 8 , 5 2 , 5 7 , 70-71, 175-76 Davies, Joseph E.: L o n d o n mission, 3, 8 7 - 8 8 , 9 2 - 9 3 , 114; and views on Soviet regime, 3 - 4 Deakin, F . W . , 166 Deane, General J o h n R., 2 7

242

Index

Declaration on Liberated Europe, 5,78 de Gaulle, General Charles, 91-94; and controversy concerning North West Italy, 102-3, 109-13; WSC and FDR's view of de Gaulle, 113. See also Levant States demobilization, 2, 14, 76 Democratic party, 168-69 Denmark, 57 Douglas, Lewis W., 165, 171 Doyen, General Paul, 103, 110, 112-13 Eden, Sir Anthony, 19; concerning message to Stalin, 23; arrest of Poles, 56; and "Russian peril," 67; and mentioned in corr., 70, 77, 81, 1 0 0 , 1 0 5 , 1 1 1 , 1 1 4 , 1 8 6 - 8 8 , 193, 197, 201-2; and as to Nobel Peace Prize, 212 Egypt, 191 Eisenhower, General Dwight D., 24, 27-29, 31, 33, 35-36, 38, 48, 52, 56, 60, 62, 82, 85-87, 97, 102, 110,112,119-120, 124, 126, 130-31, 177, 179, 192; elected president (1952), 203-4 Elizabeth II, Queen, 211 Ellis, Elmer, 223 Elsey, George M., 7 European Advisory Commission (EAC), 48-49,51,54,71-72,82-83, 120-23 European Army, 175-76 European Defense Community (EDC), 190 Finnish Government, 97-98 First World War, 212 France: French resistance, 26; French forces in the Near East, 92-94; in North West Italy, 102-3, 110-13; foodstuffs, shortages of, 127, 130-31; and coal production, 131-32; and Council of Europe, 175. See also General de Gaulle Franks, Sir Oliver, 192-94, 199, 204, 214

Fulton address (Westminster College, 1946), 6-7, 154, 159-60, 165, 212-213, 221, 223 Gathering Storm, The (1948), 168 George VI, King, 124-25, 133; HST's visit with, 141 Germany, 10-11; mentioned in corr., 21-63; and postwar coal production essential to Europe's recovery, 131-33. See also Potsdam Conference Gifford, WalterS, 179,201 Grabski, Stanislaw, 40, 95-96, 106 Greece, 8-9; and EAM-ELAS (National Liberation Front-National People's Liberation Army), 43; and mentioned on, 70, 75, 163-64, 172 Greek-Turkish Aid Bill, 9, 13, 164 Halifax, Lord, 19, 78 Harriman, W. Averell: mentioned in corr., 49, 51, 72, 103-4, 117-18, 189, 192; tripartite meeting, approach to Stalin concerning, 76; as to occupation of Austria, 82; and Italian-Yugoslav boundary dispute, 85; and as to Poland, 96; and Rumania, 98; delivered message to Stalin as to recognition of Finland, etc., 117; and recognition of the Polish Provisional Government, 133-34 Harrison, Leland, 160-61 Henderson, Loy, 192, 201 Himmler, Heinrich, 34-35, 37-38, 60 Hinge of Fate, The (1950), 176 History of the English-Speaking Peoples, A (Vol. 1, 1956), 219 Hitler, Adolf, 28-29, 42, 72-73, 165 Holmes, Julius C , 174 Hopkins, Harry: Moscow mission, 3-4, 87-88; and encouraging message about Polish situation, 95-96; and delay of message to Stalin on Poland, 103; remains key issue, 104, 108-9, 114-16; and in last

Index

talk with Stalin as to Japan, 123; and Hopkins' death, 157 Hurley Patrick, J., 123-24 Ingram, Vice Admiral Jonas H., 98 Iraq, 198 Iran (Persia), 181, 191, 193-94, 199-200, 202-3; and on fear of "ganging up," 193, 198; and nationalization law, 194-96 "Iron Curtain," 2, 6, 74-75, 159, 212, 221, 223-24. See also Fulton address Ismay, Sir Hastings (Pug), 186, 188 Japan: on surrender of, 1; and the atomic bomb and its use against, 4; on transfer of U.S. forces to Far East, 72, 80, 86; and issue of "uncontrolled land grabbing," 72-73; on Soviet entry in war against, 88; on the Middle East relative to, 92, 94; at Potsdam, 135-36; and on the Proclamation to Japan, 139-41. See Okinawa Jones, Jesse, H., 130 Jones, W. Alton, 193-94 Juin, Field Marshal Alphonse P., 103, 118 Kennan, George F.: "a lost cause," 3; on the four power administration of Germany, 5; and "Long Telegram," 6-7; on Korean War, 12; his view of Tito, 81; and mentioned by Stalin in corr., 88 Kerr, Sir Archibald Clark, 76, 116 Kesselring, Field Marshal Albert: Bern incident, 24 Keynes, John M., 90 Kim IL Sung, 12 King, Admiral Ernest J., 82 King, W. L. MacKenzie, 154 Kolodziejski, H., 96, 115-16 Konigsberg (East Prussia), 5 Korean War, 11-13, 175, 177, 179, 185, 190-91, 193,216

243

Krosigk, Graf Schwerin von, 74 Kruglov, General S.N., 130 Krzyanowski, A., 96, 115-16 Kutrzeba, S., 96, 115-16 Labour party: described by WSC, 105 Latin America, 10. See also Argentine foodstuffs Leahy, Admiral William D., 60-61, 142, 167 Lend-Lease, 90-91; and meeting with WSC at Quebec on, 91; and memorandum on, 136-37 Levant States, 91-92; on situation in Damascus, Syria, 93-94; and Lebanese and Syrian Governments, 94 Llewellin, J., 127,130 Lovett, Robert A., 167, 188 Liibeck, 2, 57 Lyttelton, Oliver, 127, 130 MacArthur, General Douglas, 179 Makins, Sir Roger, 214 Marshall, General George C , 9, 82 Marshall Plan, 9-10, 164 McCluer, F. L., 152, 155-56 McKim, Edward D., 212-13 Middleton, George, 201 Mihailovic, Draza, 47 Mikolajczyk, Stanislaw, 23, 26, 40, 99, 104; accepted Yalta declaration on Poland, 26-27; invited to Moscow for consultation, 95-96, 105-9, 116 Milwaukee (U.S. cruiser), 102 Molotov, V.M., 2, 34-35, 40-41, 44, 56, 85, 105, 107-8, 142 Montgomery, Field Marshal Bernard L., 62, 120, 123, 126, 130-31, 133 Moran, Lord, 155-56 Morgenthau, Henry, 90 Moscow Conference (1947), 10 Mossadeq, Mohammed (Mussadig), 181, 193-203. See also Iran Mountbatten, Admiral Lord Louis, 25-26, 30 Mr. Citizen (1960), 226

244

Index

Munitions Assignment Boards, 137 Murrow, Edward R., 222 Nazism, 151, 158; and Nazi-Soviet Pact (1939), 6. See also Hitler Nobel Peace Prize, 211-12, 230 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 11, 13, 171, 177-78, 192,216 Norweb, R. Henry, 157-58 Office of War Information (OWI), 141 Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 24 Okinawa: campaign of, 128-29 Okulicki, Leon, 59 Palestine, 139 Patterson, Richard C , 78 peace settlement, 46, 78-79; frontiers should be settled at "Peace Table," 86-87; and Peace Conference, 102; WSC viewed Potsdam as prelude to postwar peace settlement, 136 Philby, Kim, 12 Poland, 2-3; on Polish Provisional Government, 23; and Stalin on, 57-59; WSC and deadlock on, 70-71, 75; and Mikolajczyk on, 104-8; and Hopkins on, 108-9, 115 Popiel, Karol, 109; and Stalin's refusal to accept him, 115 Potsdam Conference, 4-6, 13, 136, 139-40, 142-43, 185, 187, 209, 217, 219; "Terminal," 67, 122, 125; press not allowed, except for photographers, at, 129; delegations housed at Babelsberg, 129-30; and recollections of, 151-52 Quebec Agreement (1943), 177-79 Queen Elizabeth (Cunard liner), 154 Queen Mary (Cunard liner), 188, 191,205 Republic of Korea (ROK), 12, 175 Rheims, surrender at (May 7, 1945), 2 Roosevelt, Eleanor (wife), 19

Roosevelt, Franklin D.: on death of, 1-3, 13, 19-20; and Polish issue, 20-21; on pilotless bombers, 22; and CROSSWORD, 23-25; and on the Pacific war, 25; occupational zones, 27; as V.E. Day approached, 28; and further mentioned in corr., 55, 62-63, 77, 100, 113, 119-20, 125-28, 152, 154, 157, 166, 177; and meeting with WSC at Quebec (1944), 91 Royal Sovereign (British battleship), 102 Sapieha, Prince Adam, Archbishop, 96, 106-7 Second World War, 1, 6, 13, 154, 181,222 Sikorski, General Wladyslaw, 106-7 Sinclair, Sir Archibald, 90 Snyder, John W., 188 Sokolovsky, Marshal Vassily, 10-11 Soong, T. V., 123 Southeast Asia Command (SEAC), 25-26 Spearman, Alec, 172 Stalin, Marshal Josef V.: his view of WSC, 3; on Polish issue, 3; attitude at Potsdam on "Iron Curtain," 5; his Moscow speech of February 9, 1946, 6; and in relation to Korean War, 12; on Polish issue in corr., 20-21; and on link up, 21; on his offensive telegram to FDR, 23-25; and his support of Tito on Trieste, 38-39, 45-46; and in corr. concerning Yugoslav government, 72-74, 82-87; and on tripartite meeting, 86-87, 92-93, 95; on the German fleet, 89-90; on accepting some London Poles for consultation, 95-96; and on recognition of Finland, etc., 97-98; and mentioned in postwar corr., 152, 165, 187. See Tito Stanczyk, Jan, 40, 96, 105-6, 115-16 Stettinius, Edward R., Jr., 56 Sunfish (British submarine), 102

Index

Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), 60, 124 Tito, Marshal Josip (Broz), 38-39; "a complete dictator," according to WSC, 42; mentioned in corr., 50-51, 72-73, 77-81, 83-87, 96-97; and Stalin's support of "Tito's case," 87, 89 Tolbukhin, Marshal Fyodor, 49, 5 1 - 5 2 , 5 4 , 7 2 , 8 3 , 116 Trieste, 2, 38-39, 46-47, 72-74, 78-79; and agreement reached on, 87-89 Truman, Bess W. (wife), 169, 173, 180, 205, 210-11, 215, 218-21, 223; replies to WSC's cable concerning her husband's illness, 214; and facing illness herself, 224 Truman Doctrine, 8-9, 15, 163-64. See also Greek-Turish Aid Bill Truman, Harry S.: HST's reply to WSC's first message, 1-2, 20; HST's initial attitude toward WSC at Potsdam, 4-5; and Truman Doctrine address, 8-9; and address before Joint Session of Congress (1948), 10; HST's decision to stay in Berlin, 11; and his decision to aid ROK (1950), 12; on FDR's death, and his response to, 19; on Polish issue, 20-21; on joint message to Stalin, 22-23; on FDR in corr., 25, 29, 55; on Pacific war, 30; and on Stalin in corr., 34-37, 82-83, 87; on Balkans in general, 50, 64; on CROSSWORD, 52; prefers "request" from Stalin for tripartite meeting, 68, 76; and Tito, 72-74; and concerned about "ganging up," 76; on further consideration of tripartite meeting, 80, 87; Stalin agrees to meeting in Berlin area, 90; HST concurs on date of meeting, July 15, 95; and cables WSC that that date is the earliest "practicable," 111; concurs also on

245

the "loan" of British warships to Soviet government, 104; on HST's decision making, 109-10; and on de Gaulle, 110-13; and Stalin's corr. concerning resumption of diplomatic relations with Finland, etc., 117; and proposed message to Stalin concerning occupation zones, 119-20; revised by HST in accordance with WSC's suggested changes, 122; as to Soviet conditions for entry in Pacific war, 123-24; HST concurs in arrangements as to king's visit, and his own to England, 125; corr. concerning coal crisis, 131-33; delays recognition of new Polish government, 134; and views Potsdam as means of achieving a "working relationship" with the Russians, 136; and on first meeting with WSC, 136; and HST's message on Lend-Lease, 140; on telegram to Chiang Kai-shek, 140; and message following WSC's defeat in general election, 142; and proclamation to Japan, 140; and surrender of, 143; on postwar corr., and painting of Churchill, 152; concerning Fulton address, 153; on invitation to WSC to visit Mexico City, 153; and corr. concerning meeting with Attlee and MacKenzie King, 153-54; and HST's initiative before Fulton, 155; and aboard Williamsburg to discuss speech before Fulton, 156-57; on passing of Hopkins, 157; Fulton becomes prophecy, 165; birthday greetings mentioned in corr., 166, 170, 174, 176, 187, 214, 220, 222, 225; and "whistle-stop campaign," 168; HST not as pessimistic about another World War, 172; and letter about "The Philadelphia Story," 172-73; regrets WSC's cancellation of his engagement at the University of Pennsylvania, 180; as to picture from WSC, will treasure painting,

246

Index

180; on corr. concerning oil crisis, 181; and reciprocates concerning agenda for Washington talks, 190-91; and acknowledges WSC's birthday greeting, 192; replies to WSC's concern about the Jones visit, 193-95; HST preferred parallel rather than joint approach to Mossadeq, 196-97; concludes that joint approach would be unwise, 202-3; on HST leaving office, 204; sends greeting to WSC on trip to New York, 205; and replies to WSC from Hawaii, 210; reciprocates as promised, 210-11; corr. resumed, December 1953, 212; and after, 212-13; and with WSC's resignation as PM, 215; visits England (1956), 218; and visits with WSC, 218-19; acknowledged receipt of first volume of WSC's History of the English-Speaking Peoples, 219; on dedication of Truman Library, sends invitation to, 220; visits Nelson Art Gallery, 220; and hopes for another visit from WSC, 221; thanks him for 75th birthday greeting, 222; describes WSC as "the great man of our age," 222; WSC received Journalism award, 223; HST regretted WSC's decision not to visit Missouri again, 224; and HST's last handwritten letter to WSC, 225 Truman, Margaret (daughter), 5, 10, 173-74, 180, 209-11; second child born by Caesarian section, 224 Turkey, 8, 163-64; Aid Bill becomes law, 9, 13, 164 U-boats, 55-56, 60-62; over 700 U-boats sunk in the "Battle of the Atlantic," 98-99; U-boat war, 55, 99

unconditional surrender: 34-35, 37, 61 United Nations Organization (UNO), 26, 60, 179; WSC's view on, 158 United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), 137-38 United States Chiefs of Staff, 26-27, 48, 87, 140 USS Willamsburg (presidential yacht), 157, 191 V.E. Day (Victory in Europe, May 8, 1945), 27-28, 56-57, 61 Vinson, Fred M., 130 V-weapons (The V-l and V-2), 43 Vyshinsky, Andrei, 54, 72, 165 Wallace, Henry A., 13, 161, 169 Wedemeyer, General Albert C , 25-26 Westminster College (Fulton, MO), 6, 152-54, 204. See Fulton address Winant, John G., 51, 142, 154-55 Witos, Wincenty, 23, 44, 96, 106, 115-16 World War III, 71, 172 Yalta: on Poland, 2 - 3 ; Berle on, 7; and Crimean agreement on Poland, 40, 55; in corr. before Potsdam, 68, 78, 81; and WSC's views on, 69, 85 Year of Decisions (1955), 217 Years of Trial and Hope (1956), 217,220 Yugoslavia, 39, 42, 46-47; and Stalin on, 57-58; and further mentioned in corr., 70, 72-74, 76-80, 82-87. See also Tito Zacharias, Capt. E. M., 141 Zakowski, Julian, 115-16 Zhukov, Marshal G.K., 59, 126, 130 Zulawski, Zygmund, 96, 106, 115-16 Zurich University, 160-61, 176

About the Author G. W. SAND is Adjunct Professor of History at the Saint Louis College of Pharmacy. He holds a Ph.D. in American and Modern European History from Saint Louis University. He has also been a member of the Liberal Arts faculty of Concordia University Wisconsin, St. Louis Center, since 1994, and is the author of two books on twentieth-century history and international relations. In 1999-2000, he was a Visiting Fellow at Churchill College, Cambridge, England.