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English Pages 169 Year 2006
Deconstructing
Reagan
Deconstructing
Reagan
Conservative Mythology and America’s Fortieth President Kyle Longley • Jeremy D. Mayer Michael Schaller • John W. Sloan M.E.Sharpe
Armonk, New York London, England
Copyright©2007byM.E.Sharpe,Inc. Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthisbookmaybereproducedinanyform withoutwrittenpermissionfromthepublisher,M.E.Sharpe,Inc., 80BusinessParkDrive,Armonk,NewYork10504. LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData DeconstructingReagan:conservativemythologyandAmerica’sfortiethpresident/ KyleLongley...[etal.]. p.cm. Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex. ISBN13:978-0-7656-1590-9(cloth:alk.paper) ISBN10:0-7656-1590-8(cloth:alk.paper) 1.Reagan,Ronald—Influence.2.Reagan,Ronald—Publicopinion.3.Conservatism— UnitedStates.4.Symbolisminpolitics—UnitedStates.5.UnitedStates—Politicsand government—1981–1989.6.UnitedStates—Politicsandgovernment—1945–1989. 7.UnitedStates—Politicsandgovernment—1989–8.Publicopinion—UnitedStates. I.Longley,Kyle. E877.2.D442007 973.927092—dc22
2006016005
PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica Thepaperusedinthispublicationmeetstheminimumrequirementsof AmericanNationalStandardforInformationSciences PermanenceofPaperforPrintedLibraryMaterials, ANSIZ39.48-1984. ~ BM(c) 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Contents
Introduction:AmericanConservatism 1. ReaganandtheColdWar MichaelSchaller
vii
3
2. TheEconomicCostsofReaganMythology JohnW.Sloan
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3. ReaganandRace:ProphetofColorBlindness, BaiteroftheBacklash JeremyD.Mayer
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4. WhenCharacterWasKing?RonaldReaganandthe IssuesofEthicsandMorality KyleLongley
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Epilogue:ContemporaryPoliticsandtheMythsofReagan Notes AbouttheAuthors Index
121 127 139 141
Introduction AmericanConservatism
AmIbigenoughmanfortherace? —WarrenG.Harding Don’tmakemelaugh!ThedayofgiantsinthePresidentialchairis past.Ourso-calledGreatPresidentswereallmadebytheconditions ofwarunderwhichtheyadministeredtheoffice.Greatnessinthe Presidentialchairislargelyanillusionofthepeople. —HarryM.Daugherty,TheInsideStoryoftheHardingTragedy
InFebruary1999,RepublicancongressmanMattSalmonfromArizona defendedhisrecentlegislativeproposalthatcalledforputtingRonald Reagan’sfaceonMountRushmore.AccordingtoSalmon,Reaganwas an outstanding president for several reasons. “Reagan won the Cold Warwithoutfiringashot,”hestressed,“makinghimoneofthegreatest presidents.”Inaddition,Reagan“inauguratedtheunprecedentedeconomicgrowthwehavebeenenjoyingnowfor17years,andherestored America’s hope and faith in the future.” Salmon complained bitterly aboutPresidentBillClinton’s“outrageousconduct”andstated,“Our children should be discussing the achievements of other presidents.” “Onceuponatime,RonaldReaganbroughtAmericabackfrom‘malaise,’”heemphasized,adding,“Perhapsthroughthisdebate,theGipper canbringAmericabackagain,thistimefromthedestructivecynicism sweepingournation.”1 ItwasnotsurprisingthatSalmonwouldproposewhatoneconstituent characterizedasan“ill-conceivedpublicitystunt”thatcapturednational mediacoverage,includingdiscussionontheTodayshow.Salmonwasa classicReagansupporter,awhitemaleinhismid-forties,comparatively affluent,andareligiousfundamentalistfromthestatethatproducedBarry Goldwater,notfarfromthehotbedofReaganconservatism,southern California.Hehadarecordoffiercepartisanshipandvotedforlimited government with the exception of intervention into people’s private vii
viii INTRODUCTION
livesregardingabortionandhomosexuality.Healsowantedtoposition himselfasheleftCongressforarunforArizonagovernorin2002,in whichheknewhewouldfaceintheprimaryseveralpotentiallystrong Republicanchallengerswithmoderatecredentials.Heclearlycalculated the Mount Rushmore maneuver to gain support among conservative votersinArizona. WhileSalmon’slegislationneverwentanywhere,therearemanyexamplesofeffortsbyconservativestopromotetheirhero,RonaldReagan, andbyextensiontheconservativemovement.Theirlaborshavebeen impressive.Aspecialcommission,theRonaldReaganLegacyProject, whosenationaladvisoryboardmembersincludedKarlRoveandJohn Ashcroft,evolvedtomakesurethateverycountyintheUnitedStates hasastatueoranothertypeofmemorialtoReagan.Eachyearconservativespushformorebuildings,airports,schools,andstreetstobenamed aftertheformerpresident.Therearealreadymanyinstancesincluding the NationalAirport, the Department of Commerce building, and an aircraftcarrier. TheRepublicans’euphoriaaftertheelectionsin2000and2002when theytookcontroloftheexecutiveandlegislativebranchesensuredeven more efforts to enshrine Reagan in theAmerican political pantheon. SomelegislatorsevenproposedbuildingamemorialontheWashington mall,althoughReaganhadsignedabillthatprohibitedsuchactionuntil twenty-fiveyearsaftertheperson’sdeath.Yettheysoughtanexemption. OtherscalledforreplacingFranklinRoosevelt’sfaceonthedimeor, attheleast,mintinghalfwithReagan’sportrait.Somelegislatorseven proposedreplacingfoundingfatherAlexanderHamiltononthe$10bill. Themobilizationalsoincludeddrivingabiopicthatwasperceivedas negativeoffmainstreamtelevisionandthesecondBushadministration’s executiveorderstoppingthereleaseofReagan-eragovernmentdocuments,inparttoshieldtheformerpresidentfromscrutiny.2 Theintentisclearfromstatementsofthosedoingasignificantamount ofthework.GroverNorquistofAmericansforTaxReformemphasized that renaming the NationalAirport allowed for “100,000 mini-civics lessons”forthesmallchildrenflyingintoReaganNationalAirport.A newgenerationwouldaskquestionsaboutReagan,andparentswould havetheopportunitytotellabouthisrisingfromhumblebeginningsto becomeagreatpresident,allthewhilestressingtheconservativevalues thatherepresented.3 Norquistanswersalargequestion:whysomeprominentconservatives
INTRODUCTION ix
rushforwardtoidolizeReaganaswellastheeffortsofthoselikeSalmon. Themostimportantreasonisthattheyneedaherotoperpetuatetheir politicalvisionandwincontemporarysupport.Theyneedsymbolsto elicitfondmemoriesoftheirpoliticalmovement.Politicsisoftenabout symbolismandbeingabletofindacommonpositiveimagetostiremotion.Thisneedhasbeenalong-termcomponentofAmericanpolitics. ThisisespeciallytrueintheeffortstowinmiddleAmerica,bothinthe struggle for control between progressives, moderates, and conservativeswithintheRepublicanPartyandingeneralelectionsagainstthe Democrats.Thepoliticsofsymbolismisanimportantcomponentofany politicalmovement.4 Themajorquestionthatmustbeaddressediswhyconservativeshave latchedontoReaganandsodesperatelytriedtoenshrinehimwithinthe pantheonofAmericanleaders.Themajorreasonisthattheyhavefew alternativesatanationallevel.Inthetwentiethcentury,conservatives have primarily allied with the Republican Party except for southern Democrats,whoeventuallyboltedtheDemocraticPartyandmergedwith theRepublicansinthe1950sand1960sinresponsetocivilrightsand culturalissues.Asaresultofthatchange,thetraditionalpoliticaliconof theRepublicanParty,AbrahamLincoln,becamemuchlesspalatableto politicalleadersandtherankandfileintheSouth.Whilemanyuphold Lincolnwithintheparty,especiallyoutsideoftheSouthandMountain West,hisstatusclearlyhassufferedovertime. Thebest-knownRepublicanpresidentoftheearlytwentiethcenturywas TheodoreRoosevelt.However,hepresentsfewpalatableideastoconservatives.Hebattledbigbusiness,supportedconservationefforts,andactively involvedtheUnitedStatesinworldaffairs,ofteninareasnotconsidered of vital interest to the United States. Furthermore, he broke from the RepublicanPartyin1912andformedtheBullMooseParty,whichmany believedhandedthepresidencytoDemocratWoodrowWilson.Clearly, Rooseveltwastoomoderateandprogressiveforconservatives. Theonlyrealconservativeofthefirsthalfofthetwentiethcentury wasoneofReagan’sheroes,CalvinCoolidge.Hefavoredbigbusiness, statingthatthe“businessofAmericaisbusiness.”Hishands-offstyleof management,anticommunism,andwillingnesstodefertoSecretaryof theTreasuryAndrewMellon,whopushedhugetaxcutsforthewealthy, madeCoolidgeaprimecandidate.Severalobstaclesexisted,however. First,Coolidgelackedcharismaandinspiredfewoutsidetheranksof dedicatedandeducatedconservatives.Moreimportant,awholegenera-
x INTRODUCTION
tionofAmericanssawhimaslargelycontributingtotheonsetoftheGreat Depression,thusdoominghisentryintothepoliticalpantheon. Theconservativesofthe1930sand1940sfoundthemselvesunder theheeloftheGreatDepressionandtheNewDealandthepopularity ofFranklinRoosevelt.Ataboutthetimetheyfoundthemselvesonthe upswingattheendofthe1930s,WorldWarIIintervenedandtheidentificationwithisolationismunderminedtheirappeal.Furthermore,within thatperiod,moderateRepublicansledbyWendellWillkieandThomas Deweytookleadershiproles. Inthepostwarera,asTrumanandtheDemocraticPartylostground andtheconservativesappearedonthevergeofseizingcontrolofthe RepublicanPartyundertheleadershipofRobertTaft,JosephMcCarthy, andWilliamKnowland,anew,moderateforceintheRepublicanParty, GeneralDwightEisenhower,co-optedthem.ThefirstRepublicanpresidentsince1933,Eisenhowerbelievedinspecificpartsofearlyconservativeorthodoxy,especiallytheemphasisonabalancedbudget.Yethedid littletorollbackthepopularNewDealprogramsandactuallyexpanded government’sroleinbuildingfederalhighwaysandfundingeducation.He alsoprovidedsomesupportforcivilrights,includingtheuseoffederal troopstoenforceadesegregationorderinLittleRock,Arkansas. Inforeignpolicy,Eisenhowerwasastronganticommunist,butnot tothedegreefavoredbymanyrabidanticommunistconservatives.He opposed the witch-hunts conducted by McCarthy, ultimately helping ensure theWisconsin senator’s demise.Also, he negotiated with the Sovietsonnucleartesting,asuresignofweaknessinmanyconservatives’eyes.Eisenhoweralsowouldwarnaboutthedevelopmentofthe “military-industrial” complex, another indication of unwillingness to paythenecessaryprice.Furthermore,Eisenhoweropposedattemptsto reininthepoweroftheexecutivebyhisstrongoppositiontotheBricker Amendment,whichwouldhavelimitedtheabilityofthepresidentto joinforeignallianceswithoutcongressionalapproval. Finally, Eisenhower believed that right-wing conservatives were a divisive, corrosive force inAmerican politics. He described them as “themostignorantpeoplelivingintheUnitedStates,”addingin1956 that“Ithinkfarfromappeasingorreasoningwiththedyed-in-the-wool reactionaryfringe,weshouldcompletelyignoreit,andwhennecessary, repudiateit.”5Suchattitudes,manypublishedfrompersonaldiariesafter helefttheWhiteHouse,havemadehimveryunpopularwithmanyconservatives,althoughmoderateRepublicansralliedtohisside.
INTRODUCTION xi
Formanymodernconservatives,BarryGoldwaterwasthefounderof theirmovement.Theylikedhisappealtolimitedgovernment,including opposition to civil rights and many government health and education programs.TheArizonan’sboldstatements,suchas“extremisminthe defenseoflibertyisnovice.And...moderationinthepursuitofjustice isnovirtue,”heartenedmanyconservatives.Hisardentanticommunism andwillingnesstogivearmycommandersdiscretionaryauthorityfor the use of tactical nuclear weapons emboldened those who wanted a presidenttoughonMoscow.6 Goldwaterhadtwomajorstrikesagainsthimineffortstofullyenshrine himinthepoliticalpantheon,especiallyamongmiddleAmericans,who oftenviewedhimasanextremist.First,helostthepresidentialelection byahugemargintoLyndonJohnson.Johnsontookover61percentof thepopularvoteandwontheelectoralvote,486to52.Goldwatertook onlyhishomestate,Louisiana,Mississippi,Alabama,Georgia,andSouth Carolina.Whilesomearguethathelostindefenseofprinciple,hestill suffered a substantial defeat, limiting his access to political stardom. MostAmericanslikeandrememberwinners. More important, Goldwater never adopted fully the principles of contemporaryconservativeorthodoxy.Heneverwasasocialconservativeandremainedconsistentlyopposedtogovernmentinterferencein privatematters.HisfirstwifePeggywasafoundingmemberofPlanned ParenthoodinArizona,andhenevermadeRoev.Wadeacornerstone of his principles.When Christian evangelist Jerry Falwell denounced the1981nominationofSandraDayO’ConnortotheSupremeCourt becauseshelackedantiabortioncredentials,Goldwatercalledonevery “goodChristian...tokickJerryFalwellrightintheass.”7 Goldwateralsofailedanotherlitmustestamongsocialconservatives overhomosexuality.Neverareligiousfundamentalistorculturalwarrior, hesaidin1994thathesupportedgaysinthemilitary:“Youdon’tneed tobestraighttofightanddieforyourcountry.Youjustneedtoshoot straight.”8WhilemanyconservativesarguedthatGoldwater’ssecondwife Susancorruptedhimwithherideas,theyignorethatthroughouthislife hewasaconservativewithcivillibertarianleaningsinallareasoflife. StillanotheractionisolatedGoldwaterfromconservatives.Violating a fundamental Reagan principle, he criticized his fellow Republican, Governor Fife Symington.At several junctures in his career, he supported Democratic candidates Dennis DeConcini and Mo Udall over Republican ones when he believed the opposition party member was
xii INTRODUCTION
better.HeevencontributedmoneytoDemocraticcandidates.Forhim, partisanshiphadaplace,butnotattheexpenseofthecountry.Thisstance furtherisolatedhimfromthosewhochoosewhositsinthepantheonof conservativeheroes. Forhistransgressions,attimes,Goldwaterreceivedthewrathofconservatives.In1994,conservativeRepublicanstriedtoremovehisname fromthestatepartyheadquartersnamedafterhim,callingGoldwater “anembarrassment”whosoundedlikehehad“lostit.”Othersprotested hispositions,andhedoesnotfigureasprominentlyinconservativelore inArizonaasReagan,whomsomelegislatorstriedtohonorbycreating aspeciallicenseplate.Goldwaterneverseemedtomind.Whenasked aboutthecriticisms,hesimplyreplied,“Youknowsomething,Idon’t giveadamn.”9 ThenextinlinetoinherittheconservativemantleafterGoldwater shouldhavebeenRichardNixon.Therabidanticommunistwhohelped McCarthyappearedlikelytorollbacktheGreatSocietytide.YetconservativesneverreallylikedNixonforseveralreasons.First,bysupporting thecreationoftheEnvironmentalProtectionAgencyandextendingaffirmativeactionthroughexecutiveorder,hedidnotshowproperdedication toconservativecauses. Most important, Nixon did the unthinkable in foreign policy. He negotiatedwiththeSovietsovervariousissues,includingdisarmament, in what his administration called détente. Even more sinister, Nixon opened relations with the communist government of China. Through secretnegotiations,hehelpedpushalongtheprocessofnormalization ofrelations,inturnmovingtheUnitedStatesawayfromitsfullcommitmenttoTaiwanasthelegitimategovernmentofChina.Onitsown, eachoftheseactionswouldhavedoomedhimamongconservatives,but takentogethertheyborderedontreasontosome,especiallythosewithin theChinaLobby. Finally,Nixondisqualifiedhimselfwithhisactions.Thenumerous underhandedactivitiesrelatedtoforeignpolicyandreelectionthatultimatelyconcludedinWatergateandhisresignationindisgracealienated evenhismostardentsupporters.HowcouldconservativesupholdNixon asaherowhenthemajorityofAmericansviewedhimasacontemptible crook?Fortunatelyforconservativesofallpersuasions,notlongafter, Reaganbecamethestandard-beareroftheirmovement. After Reagan, entry into the conservative pantheon became even moredifficultashecastalongshadow.GeorgeH.W.Bush,whohad
INTRODUCTION xiii
languishedinReagan’sshadowthroughoutthe1980s,wonthepresidency, butnotreallyconservativesupport.Hismoderatepositionsonabortion andotherculturalissues,hiscommitmenttonegotiatewiththeSoviet Union and perceived proxies elsewhere, and his famous commitment to“readmylips,nonewtaxes,”apactheviolated,ledtosignificant conservativeantipathy.Asonecommentatorlamented,Bush’s“failure demonstratedthetruthofthemaximthatyoucantakethecountry-club Republicanoutofthegolfcourse,butyoucannottakethegolfcourse outoftheRepublican.”10 That left Reagan as the sole standard-bearer of the conservative movementuntiltheriseofGeorgeW.Bush.DineshD’Souzastresses that “Reagan was not merely a successful president who belongs in theimpressivecornerofWoodrowWilson,HarryTruman,andDwight Eisenhower,Reaganwastrulyagreatpresidentwhoseachievementrivals thatofFranklinRoosevelt.Onlythetwonationbuilders,Washingtonand Lincoln,occupyamoreelevatedplaceinthepresidentialpantheon.”11 D’SouzameldsthetwoapproachestothememoryofReagan.Onone hand,therearethosewhotrulystruggletomaintainReagan’slegacy because of their devotion to the president.There is some precedent forthisapproach.InJohnKennedy’scase,peoplesuchashisadvisers ArthurSchlesingerJr.andTheodoreSorensonsoughttosustainavision ofCamelotbuiltonthelegacyofthepresidentandnotnecessarilyan ideology.InReagan’scase,thispersonalapproachisseenintheworks offamilyandcloseassociatessuchasNancyReagan,MichaelDeaver, PeterWallison,MartinAnderson,andKironSkinner,theeditorofhis diariesandletters.TheyaretheguardiansofthememoryofReagan andhislegacies,andtheypushhardtoportrayhimthroughtheprism oftheirdevotion.12 However, many pushing to memorialize Reagan have, besides a commitmenttothepresident,theirownpoliticalagendaasadriving force.TheyunderstandthesymbolicvalueofReaganinwinningthe strugglefortheheartsandmindsofmiddleAmericaaswellasshoring uptheirstandingamongtheRepublicanbase.Conservativeswantto convinceAmericansthatReaganwasaheroandthat,sinceherepresentstheirvalues,theyshouldhavepoliticalpower.Heputa“kinder, gentler”faceontheconservativemovement,whoseleadershaveincludedRepublicanpoliticiansStromThurmond,RobertTaft,William Knowland, Jesse Helms, Newt Gingrich,Trent Lott, Pat Robertson, PatBuchanan,DanBurton,TomDeLay,andtheirsupporters,suchas
xiv INTRODUCTION
ConservativeactivistsRupertMurdoch,RichardMellonScaife,Rush Limbaugh,JamesDobson,andOliverNorth.Ineachcase,thesepeople havetypicallyappealedtotheconservativebase,buttheyhavelittle reachbeyondbecauseoftheirpolarizingnatureandmiddleAmerica’s negative perceptions of them. While the conservative label has not becomepoliticallyradioactive,liketheliberalone,ithasoftenbeen viewedasreactionary,racist,xenophobic,andelitistbyitsopponents andsomemiddleAmericans.ThisiswhySenatorJamesJeffordsof Vermont,forexample,foundlivingwithinapartythatkowtowedto theextremefringesodisconcertingthathedecidedtobecomeanindependentin2001.Therefore,havingReaganasaconservativeicon,one withmuchhigherapprovalratingsamongthegeneralpublic,makesthe taskmucheasierthanharkeningbacktoThurmond,Taft,orothers.As theWallStreetJournalobserved,Reaganshiftedconservatismfromthe crankyoppositiontoaself-confidentrulingphilosophy:“Pre-Reagan, 20th-centuryAmericanconservatismhadbeentingedwithgloominess: Westerncivilizationwasindeclineandtheroadtoserfdominevitable. Mr.Reaganneversignedon.Unlikesomeontheright(andalmostall ontheleft),hehadadeeperfaithbothinAmericanprinciplesandin ahumannaturethatoweditselftoaDivinehandthathadmademen freeandmadeAmericatoproveit.”13 ThischangelargelyexplainstherushtomemorializeReaganasconservativesunderstandtheimportanceofsymbolisminAmericanpolitics, especiallyinastruggleforlegitimacyinmiddleAmerica.Inpart,thisis whySenatorSamBrownbackofKansas,apresidentialcandidatefor2008, canstandupinfrontofalargecrowdandcrow,“IamSamBrownbackand IamaRonaldReaganRepublican.”14ThatiswhyMattSalmonpushedfor puttingReagan’sfaceonMountRushmorein1999,andithelpsexplain manyoftheothereffortstomemorializeReagan. Itshouldalsobenotedthattherearethosewhoarefearfulofsuch actionsgoingoverboard.Someconservativesbelievethattheeffortsto mythologizeReaganhavegonetoofar.Reagan’sbiographer,LouCannon, believesthatReagan“wouldhavebeenveryuneasyaboutthis.They’re doingsomethingReaganhimselfwouldnothavewanteddone,andthey’re doingsomethingthatisunnecessary.Theconservativemovementmay be in trouble, but I don’t think Reagan’s reputation is.” Conservative columnistGeorgeWillagreesthatthereis“somethingun-Reaganesque abouttryingtoplasterhisnamealloverthecountrythewayLeninwas plasteredoverEasternEurope,MaooverChinaandSaddamHusseinall
INTRODUCTION xv
overIraq.It’stimeforustorescueRonaldReaganandhislegacyfrom hismorezealousfriends.”15 Nevertheless,asMattSalmon’sstatementsdemonstrate,severalcornerstonesoftheconservativemythologysurroundingReaganstandout andasaresultdeservespecialattention.TheseincludeReagan’srolein winningtheColdWarandthelong-termimpactofhisforeignpolicy, Reagan’seconomicpolicyandwhetheritreallylaidthegroundworkfor thegrowthofthe1990s,Reagan’srepresentationofthecommonpeople inhisrhetoricandactions,andfinallythecharacterissuethatenteredthe debateduringtheClintonpresidency. Theessayscontainedinthisbookseektoaddalevelofdebateto theargumentsofconservativesregardingtheReaganpresidency.Each raisesthequestionoftheconvergenceofmythandrealityandcritically analyzes various parts of the standard arguments for the greatness of Ronald Reagan. The goal is to provoke thought and debate, thereby achievingthekindofbalancedandrationalapproachthatoftenhasbeen absentinexaminationsoftheReaganpresidency,asthosewhoadmired ordespisedhimhavedominatedthedebate. ThefirstessayfocusesonissuesrelatedtoReagan’sforeignpolicy anditsshort-andlong-termconsequences,withparticularattentionto theargumentthatReaganwontheColdWar.ProfessorMichaelSchaller, Regent’sProfessorattheUniversityofArizona,buildsonhissubstantialworkonReaganinbooks,includingRightTurn:AmericanLifein theReagan-BushEra,1980–1992(2006)andReckoningwithReagan: AmericaandItsPresidentinthe1980s(1992)toquestion“whetherarms spendingandtoughtalkhadmuchtodowithchangingSovietpolicy.” WhileacknowledgingthatReaganhadaroleinthecollapseoftheUSSR, Schallerexaminesotherfactors,includingMikhailGorbachevandinternalSovietweaknesses.Inaddition,inordertoplaceReagan’slegacyin alargercontext,helooksattheroleofReaganinthenonindustrialized worldandthelong-termimpactofsupportingtheMuslimfightersin AfghanistanaswellastheU.S.buildupofSaddamHusseininIraqand itsultimateresults. Thesecondessay,byJohnW.SloanofthePoliticalScienceDepartmentoftheUniversityofHouston,buildsonhisearlierwork,TheReagan Effect: Economics and Presidential Leadership (1999). Sloan argues thattheReaganadministration“didsucceed—partlybydesign,partly bycompromise,partlybymuddlingthrough—increatingaconservative regimethatwascapableofpromotinglong-termeconomicgrowthwith
xvi INTRODUCTION
lowinflation.”Heexaminestheeffectoftaxcuts(andtaxincreases)on theeconomyaswellasdeficits,thesignificanceoftheFederalReserve Board,andotherimportantfactorsinordertounderstandthetrueimpact oftheReaganadministration’seconomicpoliciesonthegrowthofthe 1980sand1990s. Inthethirdessay,JeremyMayerbuildsontheresearchinhisbook, RunningonRace:RacialPoliticsinPresidentialPolitics,1960–2000 (2002).AnassistantprofessorintheSchoolofPublicPolicyatGeorge MasonUniversity,MayerquestionsthebasicideathatReaganwasa presidentforallAmericans,anordinaryAmericanwhorosetobecome anextraordinarypresident.Inparticular,hefocusesonthedisconnect betweenReaganandtheAfrican-Americancommunity.Heemphasizes, “There are reasons why whiteAmerica and blackAmerica perceived Reagansodifferently.”MayerlooksatReagan’sbackground,hisrhetoric andactions,andtheultimateimpactofthepresident’spoliciestoanswer thequestionofwhythedivideexisted. Finally,IfocusontheissueofReagan’scharacter,buildingonmy books, In the Eagle’s Shadow:The United States and LatinAmerica (2002)andarecentbiography,SenatorAlbertGore,Sr.:TennesseeMaverick(2004),whichcoveredmuchoftwentieth-centuryAmericanpolitics. TheessayasksquestionsaboutReagan’scharacter.Itconcentratesonthe methodofcomparison,focusingonacharacterdebatecenterednoton BillClinton,butonJimmyCarter.Italsolooksatthedifferencesbetween Reagan’srhetoricandactionsonabortionandreviewsthecorruptionand scandalthatsurroundedReagantocontextualizehischaracter.Finally,it addressestheperceptionscreatedbyReagan’ssupporters,suchasPeggy Noonan,andteststhemagainstrealities. Alltheseissuesareimportantbecausethecurrentadministrationof GeorgeW.BushhasvigorouslytriedtousetheReaganrecordtojustify itsactions,fromhighdeficitstoforeignmilitaryadventures.Itisalso likelythatfutureconservativeswillbasetheirappealsonsimilarassertions.However,differencesbetweenthetwopresidenciesabound,from comparingthestruggleagainsttheSovietUniontothehighlyambiguous, nebulousstruggleagainstMuslimterrorism,thecontrastbetweena$2 trilliondebtandan$8trillion(andrising)one,andthedifferencebetween Reagan’sconservatismtoBush’s“compassionateconservatism.”Given theimportanceofthemythology,currentpolicymakersandvotersneed toexaminetherealitiesbeforecraftingpublicpolicy. Evenmoreimportant,thereisthetruthfactor.Eachessayasksim-
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portantquestionsaboutdeterminingtherealReaganlegacy.Hopefully, intoday’spoliticalculture,Americanswillnotdigresstothelevelhighlightedinthefamous1962JohnFordmovie,TheManWhoShotLiberty Valance.At the end of the film, one of the main characters, Ransom Stoddard,asksthejournalistcoveringthestory,“You’renotgoingto usethestory,Mr.Scott?”MaxwellScottreplies,“ThisistheWest,sir. Whenthelegendbecomesfact,printthelegend.”16
Deconstructing
Reagan
1 ReaganandtheColdWar
PopularmemoriesofRonaldReaganfocusonhisembraceoffreemarkets athomeandstridentanticommunismabroad.TomanyAmericans,his unapologeticcelebrationofpatriotismandmilitaryfortitudenotonly madethenationsafer,butalsointhewordsofBritishprimeminister MargaretThatcher,wontheColdWar“withoutfiringashot.”Uponhis deathinJune2004,RepublicanleaderssuchasTexascongressmanTom DeLaypraisedReaganinawayfewanticipated:asan“intellectualwarrior”who“marshaledideasliketroops”andfreedtheworldfromthe threatofcommunism.Bythen,Reaganhadnearlypassedintomythology. Hisonceridiculednaivetéwasrecalledassincerity;hisreputedlaziness cametosymbolizeaninnercalm;hiswell-knowndisinterestindetails merelyprovedhismasteryofthebigpicture. Manyofthosewhoservedthepresident,alongwithconservativejournalists,praisehisrecordofachievement.ShortlybeforeReaganleftoffice in1989,RobertMcFarlane,thethirdofReagan’ssixnationalsecurity advisers,wrotehisformerbossthatthetransformationoftheSovietsystemrepresenteda“vindicationofyourseven-yearstrategy.”Confronted bythe“renewal”ofAmericaneconomic,military,andspiritualpower, Sovietleadersunderstoodthat“theysimplyhadtochangetheirsystem or face inevitable decline.” One adoring chronicler, Peter Schweizer, arguedthepointmoreforcefully.Unlikepresidentsbeforehim,Reagan madetherollbackanddefeatofcommunismaprimarygoal.Dwight D.EisenhowerandRichardM.Nixontalkedatoughgame,butvalued stabilityoverconfrontationandsoughttomakedealswiththeKremlin. Reagan, in contrast, considered communism both a moral evil and an 3
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inherentthreattopeace.Bynotonlytalkingbutalsoactingtough,by rearmingAmericaandchallengingSovietpowerglobally,the“so-called bumpkin,”asSchweizerputitadmiringly,“wonthecoldwar.”Perhaps the shrillest praise of Reagan’s foreign policy accomplishments came from journalistAnn Coulter. Liberals, she wrote, “lie about Reagan’s victorybecausewhenReaganwontheColdWar,heprovedthemwrong oneverythingtheyhaddoneandsaidthroughouttheColdWar.Itistheir lastdefensetofiftyyearsoftreason.”1 Withoutquestion,ReaganexpandedU.S.militarypowerandrestored publicconfidenceinpresidentialleadership.Hisrhetoricstirredandlifted thespiritsofAmericans—andmanyforeigners—whohadconsidered themselves victims in an unfriendly world of hostage taking, nuclear threats,risingoilprices,andthirdworldinsurgencies.Yet,asinhisdomesticpolicy,agulfoftenexistedbetweentheidealism,self-assurance, andoccasionalblusterofReagan’scallstoactionandhisadministration’s actualaccomplishments.Tobesure,Reaganoversawthelargestmilitary buildupinpeacetimehistoryandplayedacriticalroleintransformingthe Soviet-Americanrelationship.Whetherarmsspendingandtoughtalkhad muchtodowithchangingSovietpolicyremainsuncertain.OtherReagan initiatives,suchasusingcovertforceinCentralAmerica,theMiddle East,andAfrica,hadunintended,sometimesdire,consequences.U.S. interventiondidnotcausetheviolenceendemictotheseregions,butit didlittletoalleviateitortofurtherAmericaninterests.Forexample,the extensiveprogramoftheCentralIntelligenceAgency(CIA)from1982 to1988ofarmingIslamistfightersresistingSovietforcesinAfghanistan ultimatelypromotedtheriseofafundamentalistterrornetworkledby OsamabinLaden.Reagan’soccasionalsupportfordictatorships,along with a willingness to negotiate secretly with terrorists, marked some ofhisadministration’sworstfailures.Reagan’spenchantforunilateral militaryactionstillechoesinpost–9/11Americanforeignpolicyandis oftencitedbyPresidentGeorgeW.Bushandhisaidesasjustification forsomeoftheirpolicies. Background LongafterherejectedFranklinRoosevelt’sNewDealliberalism,RonaldReagancontinuedtoadmirehischildhoodidol’sspiritandstyle.To Reagan,theinspirationalRooseveltremaineda“soldieroffreedom”who rallieddispiritedAmericansagainsttheheartbreakoftheDepressionat
REAGANANDTHECOLDWAR 5
homeandthethreatofAxisaggressionabroad.Aboveall,heledwhen othersfaltered.JustasfascismthreatenedRoosevelt’sAmerica,communism,Reaganbelieved,hadchallengedglobalfreedomsince1945. Like millions ofAmericans his age, Reagan recalled with special fondnessRoosevelt’suseoftheradiotocommunicatehisthoughtson everything from banking reform to foreign affairs. In October 1964, whenReagandeliveredhisfirstnationallybroadcastpoliticalspeech,on behalfofRepublicanpresidentialcandidateBarryGoldwater,helifted verbatimoneofRoosevelt’smostfamouslines,declaringthatAmericans “havearendezvouswithdestiny.”ReaganbelievedthatGodhadselected Americansashischosenpeoplewithaspecialmission. During the 1970s, as his own ambition turned toward the White House,Reaganbroadcasthundredsofshort,inspirationalradiotalks thatplacedhisnameandideasbeforeanationalaudience.Atypical commentaryinMay1975describedcommunismasa“formofinsanity”that“willonedaydisappearfromtheearthbecauseitiscontraryto humannature.”AnticipatinghislaterassertionaspresidentthatSoviet leaders would “commit any crime” to advance their cause, Reagan depictedcommunistsaswillingtocarryoutanycrime“ifitadvances thecauseofsocialism.”2 Onceelectedpresident,Reaganrevivedthelapsedpracticeofdeliveringweeklyradiocommentaries.InAugust1984,whileheengagedin banterwithtechniciansbeforedeliveringaSaturdaymorningradiotalk, Reaganspokeintoamicrophonethathedidnotknowwasactivated. “MyfellowAmericans,”hebegan,“Iampleasedtotellyoutodaythat I’ve just signed legislation that will outlaw the Soviet Union forever. Webeginbombinginfiveminutes.”Hismakingajokeofwarappalled critics. Soviet officials took the off-the-cuff remark seriously enough toinstructtheirintelligenceagentsinWashingtontoreportanysigns ofwarpreparation.Thepresidentsimply laughed off criticism of his jokeasifitweresomethinghisfriendJohnWaynemighthavesaidina Hollywoodwestern. Toeveryone’ssurprise,however,lessthaneightyearslater,legislation wassignedabolishingtheSovietUnion.OnChristmasday1991,Soviet presidentMikhailGorbachevissuedadecreedissolvingthecrumbling communistempire.Withthisfinalact,Gorbachevturnedoverauthority totheelectedleaderofRussia,BorisYeltsin.Althoughbythentheformer president’smindwascloudedbytheravagesofAlzheimer’sdisease,his manyadmirersandevensomeofhiscriticscredited“theGreatCommu-
6 MICHAELSCHALLER
nicator,”asjournalistsdubbedhim,withtheleadershipanddetermination thatculminatedinAmerica’sColdWarvictory. ReaganspokeforcefullyaboutthedivisionhesawbetweenthepeacefuldemocraticworldofAmericaanditsalliesandtheaggressivewebof communistdictatorshipscontrolledbyMoscow.Asacandidatein1980 andoftenthereafter,heremarkedthattheSovietUnion“underliesall theunrestthatisgoingon”intheworld.If“theyweren’tengagedinthis gameofdominos,therewouldn’tbeanyhotspotsintheworld.”Reagan alsostressedhisreligiousantipathyforcommunism,asinanaddressto theNationalAssociationofEvangelicalsonMarch8,1983.TheSoviet Union,hedeclared,was“thefocusofevilinthemodernworld,”truly an“evilempire.”3 Reagan,hissupportersstressed,recognizedasimpletruththatmore sophisticatedobserverssometimesignored:theSovietUnionwasdoomed tofall.InaddressingtheBritishParliamentonJune8,1982,thepresident dismissedtheSovietUnionasaforcethat“runsagainstthetideofhistory.”Withitseconomic,political,andsocialsystemall“astounding” failures,heconsignedcommunismtothe“ashheapofhistory.”Although Reagan’sperceptionoftheSovietUnionmightbe“primitive,”asCIA deputydirectorRobertGatesdescribedit,itcoincidedwithreality.The president’sclarityofvision,hisadmirersbelieved,allowedhimtosee thefutureinwaysthateludedmorenuancedthinkers.4 WhilecampaigningfortheWhiteHouse,Reaganinsisted,“thereare simpleanswerstocomplexquestions.”Hetoldagatheringofveterans inAugust1980thatunderincumbentpresidentJimmyCarterAmerica sufferedfromwhathecalledthe“Vietnamsyndrome,”anunwillingness touseforcetoresistSovietpressureortodefendforeignfriendsandinterests.ThisreluctanceexplainedwhyAmericandiplomatsin1979had beenseizedandheldashostagesinIranwhileSoviettroopsoccupied AfghanistanandMoscow-backedinsurgentsmadeaplayforpowerin CentralAmericaandAfrica.ReagantracedtheproblemtotheU.S.failuretowininVietnamandaguiltcomplexleftoverfromthatwar.“It’s time,”hetoldthecheeringveterans,“werecognizethatours,intruth, wasanoblecause.”AlexanderHaig,whomthenewlyelectedReagan named secretary of state in 1981, echoed this theme. TheAmerican peoplewerereadyto“shedtheirsackclothandashes.”Takingacuefrom thepresident’scallinhisinauguraladdressto“dreamheroicdreams,” thenewadministrationmovedtorestorethenation’smilitarysuperiority,defendallies,and,inwhatwaslaterinformallycalledthe“Reagan
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doctrine,”assistanticommunistmovementsthroughouttheworld.Not bychance,thepresident’saidesexplained,didIranreleaseitslong-held AmericancaptivesjustasReagantookthepresidentialoathonJanuary 20,1981.5 Reagan’spersonalaswellashisadministration’sapproachtoworld affairsrestedonakeyassumption:sincetheNixonadministration,the UnitedStateshadpursuedamisguidedpolicyofdétentetowardtheSoviet Union.Thisefforttoreducesuperpowerrivalryreliedonarmscontrol agreements,expandedtrade,andanacceptancebyeachsideintheCold Waroftheother’slegitimatesecurityinterests.Athisfirstpressconference,onJanuary29,1981,Reaganechoedthecomplaintsofconservative strategiststhatdétentehadbecomea“one-waystreet,”littlemorethan asmokescreenbehindwhichtheSovietshadexpandedtheirstrategic nucleararsenal,cheatedonarmscontroltreaties,andsupportedcommunistinsurgentsinthethirdworld.Byachievingmilitarysuperiority, heargued,theSovietUnionwasontracktodominatethethirdworld andisolatetheUnitedStateswithoutfearofretaliation.Reagansawhis historicmissionasreversingthisflowofpoweranddelegitimizingthe SovietUnion.6 Althoughheneverassertedthispublicly(andhisaidesclaimedthis asastrategyonlyafterheleftoffice),Reaganwassaidtobelievethat theinherentweaknessofthecommunistsystemmadetheSovietUnion vulnerabletoAmericaneconomicpressure.ByblockingaccesstoWesterntechnologyandmarkets,Washingtoncouldcrippletheinefficient Sovieteconomy.Simultaneously,risingAmericandefenseexpenditures wouldoverstressSovietindustryifittriedtomatchtherapidbuildup. Accordingtoseveralhighofficialswhospokeoutafter1989,theplanto crippletheKremlinthroughanarmsraceandeconomicwarfareformed acenterpieceofReagan’sstrategytowintheColdWar.7 Inadditiontobringingmilitaryandeconomicpressuretobear,Reagan,proddedbyCIAdirector,WilliamCasey,confrontedSovietproxies inPoland,Afghanistan,Lebanon,Angola,Mozambique,ElSalvador, Grenada,andNicaragua.BydefeatingtheSovietsintheseproxywars, Caseyargued,theUnitedStatescouldunderminetheappealofcommunismandunravelSovietself-confidence,creatingasortofVietnam syndromeinreverse.Ultimately,theSovietUnionwouldhavenochoice buttofundamentallyalteritsforeignanddomesticpolicies.Diplomacy andnegotiationswiththeSovietswould,atmost,beanafterthoughtto certifyAmericansupremacy.
8 MICHAELSCHALLER
Duringhisfirstfiveyearsinoffice,Reaganjustifiedshunningtalks with Moscow for two reasons. The United States, he insisted, must negotiatefromstrength.Evenwithrecordlevelsofdefensespending, it would take several years to restore military superiority.Also, he quippedinresponsetoajournalist’squestion,howcouldhemeethis Sovietcounterpartswhen“theykeepdyingonme.”Thisreferenceto thedecrepithealthofSovietleaders—and,implicitly,tohisownvitality despiteage—deflectedpubliccriticism.Butatamorebasiclevel,well intohissecondterm,Reaganfoundhimselfpulledindifferentdirections by advisers who disagreed on fundamentals and disliked each other almostasmuchastheyhatedcommunism. AdministrationInfighting Reagan’sseniorforeignpolicyadviserssharedhisgeneralantipathy toward the Soviet Union and a determination to build upAmerican military strength; but that was about all they agreed on.Alexander Haig, who served as Reagan’s first secretary of state, described the WhiteHouse“asmysteriousasaghostship.Youheardthecreakof theriggingandthegroanofthetimbersandsometimesevenglimpsed thecrewondeck.”Buthehadnoidea“whichofthecrewwasatthe helm.”Haigconsideredthepresidenta“cipher”whovirtuallynever discussedforeignpolicywithhim.8 Manysuccessfulpresidents,suchasFranklinRooseveltandDwight Eisenhower,playedoffcontentiousaidestoachieveapolicyconsensus. This“hiddenhand”approachofallowingsubordinatestotakethecredit —orheat—couldprovidevaluablepoliticalcover.ButReagan’sdistance frompolicydetailswasofawhollydifferentorder.Evenhisclosestaides, likeCIAdirectorCasey,weretakenabackbytheirboss’spassivity.With fewexceptions,suchasmissiledefenseandIran-contra,Reaganinitiated nothingandissuedfeworders.Thepresidentwhocameacrosssoforcefully inscriptedtelevisionspeechesontheSovietthreatlostfocusoffcamera. Atmeetingswithhisforeignpolicyadvisers,thepresidentfrequentlyread fromamusinglettersorpressclippingssenttohimbyadmiringcitizens. Thenheoftenfellsilentandexhibitedwhatoneaidecalledhis“glassy-eyed look.”Ifhisstaffreachedaconsensus,heendorsedit.Ifnot,hedeferred deciding.Reagan’saideskepthisattentionatmeetingsbyputtingonaslide orvideoshowthatpresentedsimple,sometimessimplistic,alternatives. Afterinitiatingapolicy,thepresidentrarelyfolloweduponit.9
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Reagan’sthreeclosestaidesduringhisfirstterm,ChiefofStaffJames Baker,deputychiefMichaelDeaver,andcounselorEdwinMeese,carefullycontrolledthepresident’sdomesticanddiplomaticagendas.The so-calledtroikameteachmorningtoreviewthepastday’seventsand currentday’splans.OneofthethreemensatinwithReaganonvirtually everymeeting. Baker,Deaver,andMeesewantedtopreventtheemergenceofapowerfulnationalsecurityadviser,inthemoldofHenryKissinger.Thus,the firstfournationalsecurityadvisers,RichardAllen,WilliamClark,Robert McFarlane,andJohnPoindexter,wererelativelymarginalfiguresinthe administration.SecretaryofStateHaig,whobarelyknewhisboss,also remainedoutsideReagan’sinnercircle.GeorgeP.Shultz,whosucceeded HaiginJune1982,ultimatelyemergedasthemostinfluentialandrespectedmemberofReagan’scabinet;buthisroleremainedmutedduring thefirsttermwhilehistwoprincipalrivals,DefenseSecretaryCaspar WeinbergerandCIAdirectorWilliamCasey,oftenundercuthim. Broadlyspeaking,pragmatistsandideologuescompetedforReagan’s attention.Pragmatists,includingHaig,Shultz,Baker,Deaver,andNancy Reagan,believedthatastheUnitedStatesadoptedastrongermilitary posture,itshouldresumearmscontrolandothernegotiationswiththe Sovietsfromapositionofstrength.Hardliners,orso-calledneoconservatives,withintheadministration,includingWeinberger,Casey,United Nations (UN) ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, and Pentagon adviser RichardPerle,rejectedentirelythenotionofbargainingwiththeSoviets. BettertorearmandchallengeMoscowonallfronts. JamesBakerrecalledthatduringReagan’sfirstsixyearshisforeign policystructure“wasoftenawitches’brewofintrigue”andcompeting agendas.Amidbureaucraticinfighting,nooneknewexactlywhatthe president wanted. Reagan’s fifth and sixth national security advisers, FrankCarlucciandColinPowell,wereforcedtodecideontheirown a fundamental arms control question because they could not get the presidenttomakeadecision.AsPowellrecalled,afrustratedCarlucci “moaned”astheyleftameeting,“MyGod,wedidn’tsignontorun thiscountry.”10 EconomicadviserMartinAnderson,acloseassociateofthepresident, acknowledged this same trait. “We just accepted Reagan as he was,” Andersonrecalled,“andadjustedourselvestohismanner.”Everyone “compensatedforthefactthathemadedecisionslikeanancientkingor aTurkishpasha,passivelylettinghissubjectsservehim.”NovelistJohn
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Updike’saccountoflifeinthe1980scapturedthisquality.“Reagan,”he wrote,“hadthatdreamdistance;thepowerfulthingabouthimaspresident wasthatyouneverknewhowmuchheknew,nothingoreverything,he waslikeGodthatway,youhadtodoalotofityourself.”11 DefenseSecretaryWeinberger,anunwaveringopponentofnegotiationswithMoscow,pushedcontinuouslyforadditionalmilitaryspending.Atthesametime,hediscouragedcommittingAmericanforcesto regionalconflicts.Takingcasualtiesinmurkycauses,Weinbergerworried, underminedpublicsupportforrearmament.SecretaryofStateShultz,in contrast,believedthatapowerfulmilitarywouldinducetheSovietsto talkonAmericantermsandallowReagantomeetcommunistchallenges inplaceslikeCentralAmerica.Atonecabinetmeetinganexasperated Shultzsnappedatthedefensesecretary,“Ifyouarenotwillingtouse force,maybeweshouldcutyourbudget.”Reagan,whofounditeasierto standuptotheSovietsthantohisownbickeringaides,declinedtooverruleeitherman.Instead,heaskedhiscontentiousadviserstosettletheir differencesamongthemselves,asolutionthatNationalSecurityCouncil (NSC)headRobertMcFarlanedescribedas“intrinsicallyunworkable.” The standoff between Shultz andWeinberger permitted CIA director CaseytowinReagan’sbackingforriskycovertoperations,atleastone ofwhich—theIran-contrascandal—nearlysanktheadministration.12 TheMilitaryBuildupandStarWars Inexplaininghisdeterminationtoboostthearmsbudget,Reagandeclaredthat“defenseisnotabudgetissue...youspendwhatyouneed.” Surprisingly,JimmyCarterhadagreed.Defyingthenotionthathehad coweredbeforetheSoviets,Carter’sfinaldefensebudgethadproposed a5percentincreaseannuallyforthenextfiveyears.Reaganbuiltonthe basesetoutbyhispredecessor.13 BudgetDirectorDavidStockmanrealizedthatthenewadministration’s plan for increased defense spending contained a mathematical errorthatwouldboostthemilitarybudgetforthenextfewyearsby$200 billionmorethanReaganhadcalledfor.WhenStockmantriedtocorrect theerror,DefenseSecretaryWeinbergerbalkedandtookhiscasetothe WhiteHouse. Weinberger stressed “how awesome the Soviets were and how far behindwewere.”Anyonecuttinganickeloutofthemilitarybudget, he implied, “wanted to keep us behind the Russians.” Weinberger’s
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show-and-telldisplaysuperimposedSovietdefenseplantsonamapof Washington.OtherillustrationsdepictedSovietnuclearandconventional forcesdwarfingthoseofthefreeworld.“Sir,ourB-52planesareolder than their pilots,” the defense secretary remarked while the president noddedinagreement. AsStockmangazedindisbelief,Weinbergerdisplayedacartoondepictingthreesoldiers.One,apygmycarryingnoweapon,represented theCarterbudget.Thesecond,abespectacledwimpresemblingWoody Allen,carriedatinyrifle.ThisrepresentedStockman’sslightlyreduced militarybudget.Thefinalillustration,“GIJoehimself,190poundsof fightingman,alldeckedoutinhelmetandflakjacket,andpointingan M-60 machine gun,” represented Weinberger’s plan, which Reagan endorsed.14 Duringthenextfiveyearsthemilitaryshareofthegrossnationalproductgrewfrom5.7percentto7.4percent.Inrealterms,militaryspending increased50percent,totaling$1.5trillion.By1985,thePentagonspent $300billionannually,ormorethan$30millionperhour.Mostofthis moneywentfornewweaponslikeneutronbombsdesignedtoirradiate attackingSovietforces;ahundredMXintercontinentalmissiles,each capableofdeliveringtennuclearwarheadswithpinpointaccuracy;the B-1intercontinentalbombertoreplacetheagingB-52;radar-avoiding stealthbombersandfighterplanes;newD-5submarine-launchedmissiles;intermediaterangecruiseandPershingIImissiles;a600-shipnavy; andantimissileresearch. Manyoftheseexpensiveweaponscausedunintendedproblems.No one,includingReagan’scongressionalsupporters,wantedMXmissiles basedintheirstate,sincethemissilestemptedtheSovietstolaunchafirst strike.Ultimately,themissileswerehousedinexistingsilosthatReagan hadpreviouslycriticizedasvulnerabletoSovietattack.TheB-1bomber hadsomanytechnicalproblemsthatitremainedgroundedmostofthe timeandneverreplacedtheB-52.Infact,theB-52remainedthemilitary workhorseoftheU.S.AirForcewellintothetwenty-firstcentury,outlastingmanyofthenewaircraftdesignedtoreplaceit.Stealthtechnology proveddifficulttoperfectuntilthe1990sandplanesthatutilizeditwere notoriouslyhardtomaintain.Billionswerespentonantimissileresearch butnosystememerged. AlthoughReaganhaddenouncedpreviousarmscontrolagreements withtheSovietsas“fatallyflawed,”hedidnotabrogatethem.In1982and 1983,theJointChiefscautionedReaganthattheunratifiedStrategicArms
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LimitationsTreaty (SALT) II negotiated by President Carter actually enhancedU.S.security—eveniftheKremlincheatedatthemargins—by placingcapsonthenumberofSovietstrategicweapons.ReagancontinuedtodenounceSALTII,butgenerallyadheredtothepact. OneofReagan’smostcherishedmilitaryinnovations—theStrategic DefenseInitiative(SDI)—representedanefforttobeattheSovietstechnologicallyand,perhaps,bankruptthem.Despitemuchcriticismofthe schemeinthe1980sandbeyond,Reagan’sdefenders,likeBritishprime ministerThatcher,arguedthatthepresident’s“originaldecision”tosupport missiledefense“wasthesinglemostimportantofhispresidency.”15 Shortlybeforehetookoffice,Reaganreportedlyexpressedshockat learningthatinanuclearwarmorethanhalfofallAmericanswould quicklyperish.Thepresidentpartlyblamedthepolicyofmutualassured destruction(MAD),comparingittotworivals(say,theUnitedStates andtheUSSR)pointingloadedgunsateachotherandhopingthatneitherwouldpullthetrigger.Infact,MADpresumedthatneithergunman wouldfiresincetodosowouldbringcertainretaliationfromsurviving weapons,nomatterwhoshotfirst. Initially,theReaganadministrationtriedtodampenfearsofnuclear holocaustbyclaimingthatarevivedfalloutshelterprogramcouldsave millionsoflives.ButwhenPentagonspokesmanT.K.Jonesannounced thatmostAmericanscouldsurvivenuclearwarifonlytheytooktimeto “digahole,coveritwithacoupleofdoors,andthenthrowsomedirton top,”thecampaignbecameanobjectofderision.16 AlthoughmostAmericanssupportedReagan’soveralltoughstand, during1982and1983,asmanyas70percentofAmericans,alongwith a growing number of clergy and members of Congress, questioned Reagan’s nuclear arms buildup. Many voiced approval of a nuclear freezemovementthatcalledforcappingweaponsatcurrentlevels.A best-sellingbookbyJonathanSchell,TheFateoftheEarth(1982),depictedingruesomedetailtheeffectofasinglehydrogenbombdropped onNewYorkCity.OnOctober26,1982,theNewYorkTimesreported thatthenation’sRomanCatholicbishopsissuedapastoralletterthat decriednuclearweaponsas“immoral”andthearmsraceas“robbery ofthepoor.”Thesemisgivingstroubledthepresident,who,despitehis rhetoric,harboreddoubtsaboutthemoralityofnuclearweapons. Inthelate1970s,physicistDr.EdwardTellerandretiredairforce generalDanielGraham,whoheadedagroupcalledHighFrontier,told Reagan of the possibility of an antimissile shield.At an Oval Office
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meetingearlyin1983,Tellerdescribedprogress(bogus,itturnedout) inbuildinganuclear-poweredX-raylaserthatifbasedinspacecould generateenergybeamstoshootdownSovietmissilesshortlyaftertheir launch.ThisspaceshieldconceptmayhaverekindledReagan’smemories ofa1940movieMurderintheAir,inwhichhe,playingsecretagent Brass Bancroft, protects an “inertia projector” that could stop enemy aircraftinflight.17 Thepresidentlatchedontotheconceptofaspaceshieldandmade itoneofhismostintensepersonalcauses.Nuclearwar,hetoldfriends, mightbeArmageddon,thebiblicallyprophesiedbattlebeforeChrist’s return.PerhapsSDIcouldpreventit.Justhowatechnologicalfixwould preventarainofruinordainedbyGodwasunclear.ButSDIpromised arangeofmaterialaswellasspiritualrewards. The Joint Chiefs of Staff doubted the practicability of a leakproof umbrella,butthoughtitmightbepossibletodeviseasystemtoprotect asmallnumberofAmericannuclearmissilesites—notcivilians—from aSovietattack.Thiswouldenhance,notreplace,deterrence,asReagan erroneouslybelieved.Defensecontractorsanduniversityscientistsrelishedtheprospectofmassiveresearchanddevelopmentcontractsthat wouldflowfromsuchaprogram.Somearmscontrolexpertshopedto usetheleverageofanantimissilesystemtoprodtheSovietsintoanew roundofstrategicarmscontrolnegotiationsonAmericanterms.Administrationhard-linerswhoopposedanydealingswithMoscowhopedthat SDIwouldoutragetheSovietsandopenthewayforanevenlargerarms buildupbytheUnitedStates. Virtuallyalone,Reaganclungtothebeliefthathewastalkingabouta leakproofshieldcapableofprotectingAmericancivilians,missiles,and allies.Withthisbeliefinmind,helatchedontoastatementbyArmy ChiefofStaffGeneralJohnW.Veseythatitwouldbe“bettertoprotect theAmericanpeoplethantoavengethem.”OnMarch23,1983,Reagansharedwhathecalledhis“vision”withtheAmericanpeople,ina televisedaddressthatspokeofrenderingSovietmissiles“impotentand obsolete”bydestroyingthembeforethey“reachedourownsoilorthat ofourallies.”Inanadroitmaneuver,SDIchroniclerFrancesFitzgerald noted,Reaganhad“appropriatedthelanguageoftheanti-nuclearmovement”evenasheendorsedaplantoexpandthenucleararmsraceto outerspace.18LikePrimeMinisterThatcher,someofReagan’sadvisers laterdescribedReagan’sfixationonSDI—orStarWars,ashiscritics promptlydubbedit—asabrilliantdeception.DeputyCIAdirectorGates
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arguedthatSDIdidnotevenneedtowork,sincethemereconceptstoked terrorinsidetheKremlin.SDIrepresentedthetriplethreatofsuperior Americantechnology,managerialskills,andwealthharnessedtoaproject thattheSovietscouldnotpossiblyhopetomatch.Infact,Gatesargued, theonlyrealbelieversinSDIwereReaganandtheSovietPolitburo. GatesandThatcherimplythatReaganintuitivelysensedthatSDIwas a“symbolicthreat”totheSoviets,asortof“perfectstorm”thatwould crippleMoscow.19 GatesjustifiedSDIinpartbecausetheSovietsthemselvesinvested heavilyinantimissileresearch.Ofcourse,headmitted,theylackedthe requisitetechnologytoachievemuchofvalue.Atthesametime,Gates interpretedSovietoppositiontoSDIasproofoftheirfrustrationover theprospectofhavingspentbillionsofrublesonanucleararsenalthat mightbecomeobsolete. Even Gates recognized that Soviet hostility toward SDI stemmed fromseveralsources.AsidefromReagan,virtuallynoonebelievedthat theUnitedStatescouldinthenearfuturedeployanantimissilesystem capableofneutralizingafullSovietattack.ThePentagonitselfestimated thatitmightrequireseveralthousandflightsofAmerica’sficklespace shuttletoboostallSDIcomponentsintoorbit.Sincetheshuttleflew onlyafewtimeseachyear,atthispacedeploymentofthesystemmight takeacentury!Intheory,theUnitedStatesmightmorerapidlydevelop a“leaky”systemcapableofshootingdownasmallnumberofenemy rockets.FromtheSovietperspective,thiscouldenabletheUnitedStates tolaunchafirststrikeandsitbackwithenoughantimissilecapacityto withstandweakSovietretaliation—neutralizingMAD. SomewhoservedReaganlaterarguedthatSDIwaspartofthe“bankrupttheSoviets”strategyhatchedin1981–1982;butotherReaganadviserscloselyinvolvedwithSDIdisputethisaccount.CIAdeputydirector RobertGatesfoundlittleevidencetosuggestthatSovieteffortstocounter SDIoverstressedtheSovieteconomy.ArmscontrolnegotiatorLieutenantGeneralEdwardL.Rownydoubtedthatscholarswoulddiscoverin thearchivalrecord“anyserioustalkabout[spendingtheSovietsinto theground]atall.”Rowny,alongwithnationalsecurityadviserRobert McFarlane,arguedthatReaganpushedtheplanprimarilybecausehe believeditwouldcounterSovietmissilestrengthandsecondarilybecause hethoughtitmightactuallysavetheUnitedStatesmoneyinitsongoing armscompetitionwiththeSoviets.20 Although Reagan offered little beyond generalities in defense of
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SDI,histalkofabandoningtheconceptofmutualassureddestruction andpullingoutofthe1972antiballisticmissiletreaty(ABM)aroused grave anxiety in Moscow.As discussed below, it may have delayed, ratherthanaccelerated,Soviet-Americancooperation.UnderReagan, theUnitedStatesspentnearly$20billiononantimissileresearch.After 1989,presidentsGeorgeH.W.Bush,BillClinton,andGeorgeW.Bush spentabout$60billionmoreonaspectsofthisproject.In2001,President GeorgeW.Bushputantimissiledefensebackonthefasttrack.In2004 the United States began to deploy a largely untested missile defense systeminAlaskadesignedtointerceptahandfulofrocketsthatmight belaunchedbyNorthKoreaoranother“roguestate.”Thisground-based programwasnotdirectlyrelatedtoReagan’sconceptofSDI.Despite thelackofhardevidence,conservativesarguethatReagan’sdream—or bluff—helpedbreaktheColdWarstalemateandofferedgreaterprotectiontoAmerica. TheEconomicColdWar InadditiontobulkingupAmericanmilitarystrength,Reaganbelieved theUnitedStatesshoulddomoretounderminetheSovieteconomy.In March1982,hereceivedabriefingthatyearslaterhesaidconvinced himthattheSovietswere“inverybadshapeandifwecancutofftheir creditthey’llhavetoyell‘uncle’orstarve.”CIAdirectorCaseyassured thepresidentthattheagencycouldidentifySovietvulnerabilitiesand produceaguideforeconomicwarfare.AssuringReaganthat“wecan dothemin,”Caseyprovided“vulnerabilityassessments”thatbecame partofthepresident’sregularreading.21 ReaganhadlongconsideredtheSovietsysteminherentlyunstable.In aMay1975radiocommentary,forexample,hedeclared“communism isneitheraneconomicorapoliticalsystem—itisaformofinsanity.” InradioremarksofSeptember1979,heendorsedthenotionthat“given ourindustrialsuperiority,”America“couldnotpossiblylose...anunrestrainedarmsrace.”22 AlthoughReaganandhisaidessharedageneralbeliefinaweakand vulnerableSovieteconomy,theydisagreedonwhat,ifanything,they shoulddoaboutit.NationalsecurityadviserRobertMcFarlanerecalled that“manyinReagan’sowncabinet...didn’tagreewithhim”that“a moreenergeticcompetitioncouldimposesuchburdensastobringdown theSovietUnion.”DouglasMacEachin,directoroftheCIA’sOfficeof
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SovietAnalysisfrom1984to1989,voicedsimilardoubts.America’s Sovietexpertswere“virtuallyunanimous”thatthecommunistsystem had reached a “near critical” mass of social and economic problems. Butthesamematrixofrigidcentralcontrolsthatcausedtheseproblems madeitlikelythattheSovietUnionwouldcontinuetomuddlealongin slowdecline,perhapsfordecades.Tobesure,someofReagan’spolicies“imposedcosts”onMoscow,but,McFarlaneconcluded,“80to90 percent of what happened to the USSR was because Marxism was a dumbidea.”23 AftertheSovietcollapse,stridentideologueslikeRichardPerle,and scholarandNSCstaffmemberRichardPipestookcreditforimplementinganeconomicwarfarestrategy.Butthetwoadviserswhoultimately influencedReagan’smostimportantSovietinitiativesfrom1983onward, careerdiplomatJackMatlockandSecretaryofStateGeorgeShultz,disputeclaimsthatReaganpursedamasterplanto“bringdown”theevil empire.“Noneofthekeyplayers,”Matlockremarkedin1998,“were operatingfromtheassumptionthatweweregoingtobringthemdown. ...That’sallthinkingafterthefact.”Thegoalwasalways“togivethe SovietsincentivestobringtheColdWartoanend.”Shultzarguedthis pointforcefullytoReaganina1983reportthatpredictedalongperiod ofongoingcompetitioninSoviet-Americanrelations.Shultzhopedthat arestoreddialoguewiththeSoviets,inplaceofname-calling,mightlead to“actualimprovement”inhowthetwopowersgotalong.TheSoviet systemhad“seriousweaknesses,”Shultzaffirmed,“butitwouldbea mistaketoassumethattheSovietcapacityforcompetitionwithuswill diminishatanytimeduringyourpresidency.”24 ForeignexpertshadgreatdifficultyassessingtheSovieteconomy.It hadrecoveredfromthedevastationofWorldWarIItobecome,despite chronicagriculturalshortages,oneoftheworld’sbiggestproducersof steel,cement,fertilizer,tractors,andmachinetools.Toachievethese levelsofproductioninwhateveryonerecognizedwereinefficientfactories,Sovietindustryutilized—andoftensquandered—thenation’svast naturalresourcebase.Tocoverthecostsofvitalimportsandfood,the Sovietsexportedlargeamountsofoilandpreciousmetals. Severeproblemslurkedbeneaththefacadeofsuccess.Theindustrial growthratebegantodeclineafter1980.ThequalityofSovietlife,as measuredbyratesofinfantmortality,longevity,alcoholism,andsoon, wasdeteriorating.ThetechnologydividebetweentheWesterneconomies andJapanontheonehandandtheSovietblocontheotherhandhad
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becomeayawningchasmbythetimeReaganbecamepresident.Market economiesutilizedcomputers,hightechnology,andinformationmanagementtosurgeahead.TheSovietcommandsystemmobilizedlaborand resources,butnotcreativityorinnovation.Fearfuloflosingcontrol,Soviet managersfrownedonbasictoolslikepersonalcomputersandphotocopiers.AsoneKremlinleaderobservedprivatelyintheearly1980s,“the SovieteconomyisnotinmuchbettershapethanthatofPoland.”25 After1981,ReaganmovedtodenytheSovietseasyaccesstoWestern technologyandcredit.TheUnitedStatespresseditsEuropeanandJapanesealliestocancelorrestrictsalesofoilandgasdrillingandpipeline technologytotheSovietUnion.AsecretU.S.initiativeprovidedflawed computerprogramstotheSovietsthatcontributedtoamassivepipeline explosion.CIAdirectorCaseyandDefenseSecretaryWeinbergerpromotedarmssalestoSaudiArabiaasawayofconvincingtheArabstate to expand oil pumping. Increased Saudi production not only lowered pricestoU.S.consumers,butalsoreducedrevenuestheSovietsearned frompetroleumexports.By1985,partlyinresponsetoAmericanpolicy, theSaudisraisedproductionfrom2millionbarrelsperdaytoalmost9 million.Thisincreasedrovedownpricesfromabout$30perbarrelto lessthanhalfthatamount,deprivingtheSovietsofbillionsofdollars inexportsales.26 SeveralReaganaidesattributedthecollapseoftheSovietUnionto thiseconomicwarfarestrategy.However,thefactssuggestotherwise.As earlyas1984,barelythreeyearsafterimposingsanctions,ayearanda halfbeforereformerMikhailGorbachevassumedpower,andsevenyears beforetheSovietcollapse,Reaganactuallybeganliftingmanyofthe sanctions.Thepresidentactedwhenitbecameclearthatthesanctions hadmanyunintendedconsequences.Forexample,pressureonU.S.allies tostopsellinggasandoildrillingandpipelinetechnologytoMoscow infuriatedtheBritish,French,Germans,andJapanese,who,unlikethe Americans,wantedtoimportmoreSovietenergysupplies.Inresponse totheircomplaints,Reaganrelaxedmanytraderestrictions. ThefactthattheUnitedStatesinsistedonitsownrighttosellthe SovietswhatitwantedangeredtheEuropeansandJapanese.In1980, PresidentCarterhadretaliatedagainsttheSovietinvasionofAfghanistan byplacinganembargoonU.S.grainsalestoMoscow,eventhoughthis annoyedmidwesternfarmersandhurthisownreelectionprospects.DespiteReagan’srhetoricaltoughlineandefforttochokeoffforeigntrade withtheSoviets,soonaftertakingofficeheresumedgrainsalestothe
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SovietUnion,largelytoappeasefarmers.Foreignobserversconsidered thisgrosslyhypocritical. ClaimsbyReagan’sadvisersthattheyengineeredtheSaudidecision in1985toturnontheoilspigotandquadrupleproductionprovedmore complicatedthantheyfirstappeared.Drivingthepriceofpetroleumdown bymorethan50percentdriedupmuchoftheforeigncurrencyearned bySovietoilexports,butatanespeciallygreatcosttotheU.S.energy sector.Fallingpricesdevastatedmanysmallandmediumproducersin the“oilpatch”statesoftheAmericanWest.Bythelate1980s,tumbling propertyvaluesintheregionspedthecollapseoftheshakysavingsand loan(S&L)industry.Thescopeofthebankingcrisisdidnotbecome apparentuntilafterReaganleftoffice.Thefederalbailoutofbankrupt S&Lsintheearly1990scostAmericantaxpayersseveralhundredbilliondollars.27 Reagan’sforeignpolicyhadotherunintendedeconomicresults.To financethehugemilitarybuildupwhilealsocuttingtaxesandtopreventthealreadyrecordbudgetdeficitfromgrowinglarger,theReagan Treasury Department borrowed massively from foreign investors and governments.Reaganinheritedacumulativenationaldebtofjustunder $1trillionin1981.Overthenexteightyears,annualbudgetshortfalls rangedfrom$128billiontoover$200billion.By1989,federalindebtednesshadtripled,toarecord$2.7trillion. Increasingly, Japanese, Saudi, German, and other foreign sources purchasedtheU.S.Treasurynotesandbondsthatfinancedthedeficit resultingfromdefenseincreasesandtaxshortfalls.BytheendofReagan’s presidency,foreigncreditorsheldnearly20percentofthenationaldebt, ahistorichigh.UnderReagan,thenation’sforeigntradeimbalancealso grewdramatically.ThecumulativeforeigntradedeficitoftheUnited Statestotalednearly$1trillionby1989. Duringthe1980s,theUnitedStateschangedfromtheworld’sbiggest creditornationtothelargestdebtor.Agrowingportionoftheinterest paidondebtandofprofitsearnedfromconsumerpurchasesflowedinto thehandsofforeigninvestors.ButwhenareporteraskedReaganwhat hethoughtofthisseismicchange,hesimplydenieditwasso.28 Terrorism,Democracy,andCovertWarfare Reaganandleadingmembersofhisadministrationportrayedterrorism intheMiddleEastandagainstAmericaninterestselsewhereasamong
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thegravestthreatsconfrontingtheUnitedStates.Inspeechesdelivered withindaysoftakingoffice,thepresidentandhisnewsecretaryofstate issuedclearwarnings.“Letterrorists beware,” Reagan declared, “our policywillbeoneofswiftandeffectiveretribution.”In1985herepeated “Americawillnevermakeconcessionstoterrorists”andcondemnedIran andLibyaasexamplesof“outlawstates...runbythestrangestcollectionofmisfits,LooneyTunesandsqualidcriminalssincetheadventof theThirdReich.” InabackhandedslapatPresidentCarter,theReaganadministration abandonedthepolicyofputtingpressureonpro-Americandictatorships toimprovetheirhumanrightsperformance.Thepresidentpraisedthe ideasofJeaneKirkpatrick(whomhenamedasambassadortotheUnited Nations), voiced in an article she wrote for the conservative journal Commentary in 1979. Kirkpatrick berated Carter’s failure to support friendly“right-wingautocracies”likethoseoftheshahofIranorthe Samoza family of Nicaragua. Unlike left-wing regimes, she opined, pro-Americandictatorships“sometimesevolveintodemocracies.”Haig declaredthatthestruggleagainst“internationalterrorismwilltakethe placeofhumanrightsinourconcernbecauseitistheultimateabuseof humanrights.”Reagan’sstrongpersonalattachmenttoanticommunist despotslikeFerdinandMarcosinthePhilippinesandJeanClaude(“Baby Doc”)DuvalierinHaitireflectedthesepriorities.29 WhileReaganandHaigblamedtheSovietsforterrorismingeneral, CIA director Casey and his deputy, Robert Gates, tried to prove that Sovietagentsmastermindedthe1981attemptbyaTurktoassassinate Polish-bornpopeJohnPaulII.TheycitedclaimsbyjournalistClaire SterlingthatthegunmanhadworkedforSoviet-controlledBulgarian intelligence.WhencareerStateDepartmentandCIAanalystsnotedthat SterlingmostlyrecycleddisinformationfedtoherbyU.S.intelligence agentswhohopedtodiscredittheSoviets,Caseywouldnotrelent.Over thenextfouryearsheandGatesdoggedlypursuedevidenceofSoviet complicity.Casey’scriticsguessedthathisrealgoalwastoconvinceReagantorejectanydealingswitharegimethattriedtokillthepope.30 DespiteeffortsbyHaig,Casey,and Reagan to define all terrorism asmadnessoraSovietplot,theadministrationoftenbentitsownrules barringsupportforornegotiationswithgroupslinkedtoterror.Overthe courseofeightyears,Reaganandhisaidessoldweaponstotwonations they publicly condemned as terrorist states (Iraq and Iran), provided weapons to anticommunist guerrillas linked to terrorism in Lebanon,
20 MICHAELSCHALLER
Afghanistan,Africa,andCentralAmerica,andseveraltimesnegotiated secretlyforthereleaseofAmericanhostagesseizedbyterrorists.Even someofReagan’sdefendersagreed“itwouldbehardtoimagineacase wherethereisalargergapbetweenwordsandactioninAdministration policy.”31 Terrorismwasasoftenasymptomasasourceofregionalviolence. Somehavedescribeditastheatomicbomboftheweak.Grislyjournalisticaccountsfueledpublicanxietyoverterrorism.Thekidnappingofa handfulofAmericansinLebanon,occasionalaircraftandshiphijackings,andthebombingofseveralairlinersweredespicablebutmarginal actsintheworldarena.Inaggregateduringthe1980s,aboutasmany Americancivilianswerekilledbylightningwhileplayinggolfasdied atthehandsofterrorists.Terrorismbecameapopularobsessionpartly because of media hype and partly because President Reagan made it so.UntilSeptember11,2001,thetwodeadliestforeignterroristattacks againstAmericansoccurredduringtheReaganadministration.Intwo bombings in Lebanon during 1983, nearly 300 marines and embassy personneldied.TheDecember1988bombingofaPanAmflightover Scotlandkilled259onboardand11peopleontheground. AlthoughconservativesdismissedJimmyCarterasawimp,during 1979and1980hisadministrationinitiatedbothamajorarmsbuildup (thatsetthestageformanyoftheweaponssystemsattributedtoReagan) andseveralofthecovertoperationscreditedtohissuccessor.Evenif manyAmericansdoubtedhisresolve,theSoviets,CIAdeputydirector Gatesasserted,“sawCarterasacommittedideologicalfoeaswellasa geopoliticaladversary.”Carter“preparedthegroundworkforReaganin thestrategicarena,inconfrontingtheSoviets”inthethirdworld.32 CIADirectorCasey,withhelpfromtheNationalSecurityCouncil, servedastheadministration’scoordinatorofpoliciesonterrorismand covertchallengestotheSovietUnion.Casey(aveteranoftheWorldWar II–eraOfficeofStrategicServicesandawealthyWallStreetinvestor whomanagedReagan’s1980electioncampaign),hisdeputyrecalled, “trulyadmiredReagan.”Butinprivateevenhe“wouldcomplainabout thePresident’slackofinterestinspecifics,hisunwillingnesstotakehard decisions...andhisrathersimplisticviewoftheworld.”Reagan’sinner circle,Baker,Meese,andespeciallyDeaver,worriedthatthespychief “playedtoReagan’sdarkside.”Casey’shabitofmumbling,combined withthepresident’simpairedhearing,oftenleftReagan’saidesunsure whatthetwomendiscussedoragreedupon.AfterReagan–Caseymeet-
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ings,Deaverdebriefedhisboss.IfCaseyhadsoldthepresidentonsome wildscheme,DeaverpassedwordtoBaker,whospokewithNancyReaganandarrangedforthefirstladytotalkherhusbandoutofit.33 Caseyfavoredarminganticommunistgroupsaroundtheworldbecause ofhisbeliefthattheSovietUnionwas“tremendouslyoverextendedand vulnerable.”IfAmericachallengedtheSovietseverywhereanddefeated themeveninoneplace,“thatwillshatterthemythology...anditwill allstarttounravel.”Reaganendorsedthisconcept,sometimescalledthe Reagandoctrine,inseveralinternalpolicypapersandinawidelycited speechdeliveredathisalmamater,EurekaCollegeinIllinois,onMay9, 1982,wherehepromisedactivesupportforpeoplefightingcommunism, wherevertheywere.34 Reaganinheritedanunstable,violentMiddleEastandlefttheregion inprettymuchthesamecondition.ConflictsbetweentheIsraelisand Palestinians,amongLebanesefactions,withinAfghanistan,andbetween IraqandIrancontinuedduringthe1980sandsetthestageforfutureproblems,someinvolvingterrorismaimeddirectlyattheUnitedStates. Intheearly1980s,Lebanesereligiousandpoliticalfactionsresumed theirperiodiccivilslaughter,withIsraelandSyriabackingarmedgroups. WhentheWhiteHousecriticizedSecretaryofStateHaig’sJune1982 support for an Israeli invasion of Lebanon, he quit abruptly. George Shultz,namedasHaig’ssuccessor,hadnomoresuccessinstabilizing thearea. As chaos engulfed Lebanon, the United States dispatched marines tojoinFrenchandItaliantroopsaspeacekeepers.Attimes,themarines assistedChristianmilitiasfightingMuslimforcesbackedbySyria.In response,onApril18,1983,asuicidesquadblewuptheU.S.embassy inBeirut,killingsixty-threepeople.U.S.NavyshipsoffLebanonthen bombardedseveralIslamicstrongholds.OnOctober23,aMuslimsuicide bomberretaliatedbydrivingatruckfilledwithexplosivesintoaU.S. MarinebarracksneartheBeirutairport,killing241Americans. PresidentReaganofferedastirringtributetothefallenmarines,but nocredibleexplanationoftheirmissionorthereasonfortheirdeaths.A fewmonthslater,inhis1984StateoftheUnionaddress,hedescribed the marine presence as “central to our credibility on a global scale.” Two weeks later, without explanation, he withdrewAmerican forces fromBeirut. Publicreactiontothedisasterwasmuted,inpartbecauseoflavish mediaattentionfocusedonGrenada,atinyCaribbeanisland.Although
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MarxistshadruledGrenadasince1979,neithertheCarternorReagan administrationshadpaidmuchattentiontoit.TheonlyAmericanpresenceontheislandconsistedof500studentsenrolledinaprivatemedical college.AcontingentofarmedCubanconstructionworkerslaboredon anairportdesignedtoboosttourism(asGrenadaclaimed)ortoserveas aSoviet-Cubanairbase(asWashingtonasserted). AmoremilitantMarxistfactionseizedcontrolofGrenadaonOctober 12,1983.ImmediatelyafterthecatastropheinBeirutonOctober23, ReagandeclaredthattheAmericanstudentsonGrenadamightbecome hostages,althoughnonehadbeenthreatened.OnOctober25,heordered thousandsofmarinesandamphibiousarmytroopstoliberateGrenadaand theAmericanstudentsfromwhathecalleda“brutalgangofthugs.”35 Inanactionthatwasmoreofacomic opera than a war, the U.S. invaders quickly secured the island. The students were flown home andaphotographofonekissingAmericansoilbecameastapleinthe president’sreelectioncommercials.AsiftocompensatefortheBeirut debacle, the Pentagon awarded an unprecedented 8,000 medals to members of the assault force. Free elections restored representative government to the island. MostAmericans approved the operation, tellingpollstersineffecttheywerepleasedthattheUnitedStateshad wononeforachange.Ironically,newscoverageoftheinvasionalerted manyAmericanstoGrenada’slovelybeachesandeventuallysparkeda touristboom,facilitatedbytheCuban-builtairport! Washington focused much of its antiterrorist sentiment during the 1980sonLibya’sdemagogicandoil-richstrongman,MuammarQaddafi. Flushwithcash,hepurchasedSovietweaponsandfundedseveralterrorist groupsintheregion.Tocontainthethreat,theU.S.Navydeployedships closetoLibyaandengagedQaddafi’sairforceinseveraldogfights.In April1986,afterLibyanagentswerelinkedtothebombingofaBerlin nightclub frequented byAmerican GIs, Reagan condemned Qaddafi asthe“maddogoftheMiddleEast.”36HeorderedAmericanplanesto bombtargetsinTripoli,includingQaddafi’sresidencewherehisinfant daughterwaskilled. Followingtheattack,LibyaandtheUnitedStatesengagedmostin verbalwarfare.Reagan,hisaidesquipped,hadputQaddafi“backinhis box.”37Infact,plummetingoilpricesandfeudsbetweenLibyaandits NorthAfricanneighborsconstrainedQaddafiasmuchasanything.Two yearslater,however,inDecember1988,Libyanagentsplantedabomb aboardaPanAmjetthatexplodedoverScotland,killing270people.38
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ThemostintenseviolenceintheMiddleEastoccurredduringanineyearwarbetweenIraqandIranthatstartedin1980.Foughtoverregional influence, oil, and deepwater ports, the war claimed nearly 2 million livesbeforefightingceasedin1988.ThewarputtheUnitedStatesin an awkward position. Understandably,Washington opposed both the zealousexpansioneffortsbyIran’sIslamistfundamentalistrulersand the drive by the secular but thuggish Iraqi ruler, Saddam Hussein, to dominatethePersianGulfandArabianPeninsula.Alopsidedvictoryby eithersidemightfurtherdestabilizetheoil-richregion.Topreventthis outcome,Reaganauthorizedcovertmilitaryassistancetobothnations. Aidflowedtobothsidesdependingonthebattlefieldsituation.Tobolster IraqidictatorSaddamHussein,theReaganadministrationmutedcriticism ofhisregimeevenwhenheusedpoisongastokilltensofthousandsof dissidentKurds(anethnicminoritylivinginnorthernIraq)andinvading Iraniansoldiers.InDecember1983,ReagansentatopPentagonaide, DonaldRumsfeld(latersecretaryofdefense),onagoodwillmissionto BaghdaddesignedtoboostU.S.-Iraqitradeandcooperation.In1988, war-wearyIranandIraqagreedtoacease-fire—withbothsidesnursing deepresentmentagainsttheUnitedStates. Among the several Reagan-era interventions,Afghanistan is often praisedasthemostsuccessful.In1979,theSovietsinvadedthatbleakland ontheirsouthernborderinanefforttoshoreupashakynativecommunist regimeestablishedafewyearsearlier.Soon,over100,000Sovietsoldiers becametrappedinaviciousguerrillawaragainstmujahideen,orfreedom fighters,manyofwhomwereinspiredbyfundamentalistIslam. PresidentCarter,encouragedbyhisnationalsecurityadviser,ZbigniewBrzezinskiwhospokeoftrappingtheSovietsinsomethinglike theirownVietnam,hadinitiatedaidtotheseanti-Sovietguerrillas.The Reaganadministrationgreatlyexpandedassistance.In1982,CIAdirector WilliamCasey,amongotherAmericans,fellundertheswayofPakistani strongmanMohammedZiaul-Haq.ZiaconvincedhisAmericanfriends thattheSovietsviewedAfghanistanasaplatformforwiderexpansion. Moscow,heargued,hadrevivedanineteenth-centuryczariststrategy (“TheGreatGame”)aimedatdominatingthePersianGulf,Pakistan,and India.Casey’sideaofbuildingupthemujahideenintoaseriousfighting forcefoundfavorwithaflamboyantTexascongressman,CharlieWilson, whopersuadedhiscolleaguestofundamajormilitaryaidprogram.By 1986,theAfghanguerrillasreceivedU.S.antiaircraftmissilesandother advancedweaponrythattookaheavytollonSovietforces.39
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TodeliverAmericanweapons,theReaganadministrationworkedclosely withAfghanistan’sneighbors,ChinaandPakistan.Chinesecommunist leaders resented the Soviets almost as much as did the anticommunist Reagan.Theircooperationconvincedthepresident,alongtimesupporterof Taiwan,tomutehispastcriticismofthePeople’sRepublic.Pakistandrove aharderbargain.ZiainsistedthatWashingtonprovidehisrepressiveregime withsubstantialmilitary,economic,andpoliticalsupport.WithtacitU.S. approval,Pakistanbegandevelopingitsownnucleararsenalandalloweda groupofscientistsandmilitaryofficerstosellnucleartechnologytoother nations,includingLibyaandNorthKorea.Pakistanalsoevolvedintoa trainingcampforIslamistfundamentalistsfromthroughouttheworldwho weredrawntothefightinnearbyAfghanistan.Amongthosearrivingwas OsamabinLaden,awealthySaudiwhoviewedtheanti-Sovietstruggle asthefirstphaseinawiderwaragainstWesterninfidels.Atthetime,the Reaganadministrationaskedfewquestionsaboutthebeliefsorultimate goalsofitsalliessolongastheytookananti-Sovietstance. From 1981 to 1986, Reagan authorized several other CIA covert operations.TheagencyprovidedmoneytosustaintheSolidaritylabor movementchallengingcommunistdominationofPolandandgaveweaponstoanti-VietnameseguerrillasinCambodia.TheCIAalsosupported guerrillaarmiesinAngolaandMozambiquethatwerebattlingSovietand Cuban-backedmovements.AlthoughaidtoSolidarity—liketheAfghan resistance—enjoyedbroadsupportamongAmericansandEuropeans,the operationsinCambodiaandAfricaalliedtheUnitedStateswithbrutal, antidemocraticgroups. Inspiteofclaimsthattheseoperationsachievedpositiveresults,the recordis,atbest,mixed.Theonlyreal“victories”intheseshadowwars cameinPoland,whereAmericanfinancial(notmilitary)supportwent togenuinedemocratswithpopularbacking,andinAfghanistan,where weaponshelpedthededicatedbutundemocraticguerrillasstymiethe Soviets.CIA-backedoperationsinLebanon,SoutheastAsia,andAfrica failedbyalmostanymeasure.Reagan’smostcontroversialintervention tookplaceinCentralAmerica,wherehissecretaidtoanticommunist forcesnearlyendedhispresidency. FromBananaWarstoIran-Contra PresidentReaganandhisclosestaidesappearedobsessedbyaperceived SovietandCubanthreattotheWesternHemisphere.Tocounterthis,and
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toerasethehumiliatingmemoryofVietnam,thepresidentrevivedthe traditionofU.S.muscleflexinginLatinAmerica.Administrationrhetoric oftensoundedlikeareplayoftheearlyColdWar.StateDepartmentand CIAspokesmendescribeda“Moscow-Havana”axiswhoseSoviet-armed CubanagentsconspiredtospreadrevolutioninbothAfricaandLatin America.UNambassadorJeaneKirkpatrickcalledCentralAmericaand theCaribbean“themostimportantplaceintheworldforus.”Reagan warnedthatMoscowandHavanaconspiredtosetuppuppetLatinAmericanregimestosevertheU.S.“lifelinetotheoutsideworld.” Asacandidate,ReagancriticizedCarterforabandoningNicaraguan dictatorAnastasio Somoza, whose family had ruled the country as a fiefdomsincethe1920s.Onceelected,Reaganclaimedthattheleftist SandinistamovementthathadtoppledSomozahadturnedNicaraguainto aSovietoutpostanda“safehouseandcommandpostforinternational terror.”40Inoneespeciallyvividpresidentialspeech,heconjuredupa visionofSandinistasdrivingaconvoyofarmedpickuptrucksnorthinto Harlingen,Texas,atownontheMexicanborder.PoliticalsatiristGarry TrudeauparodiedthiswarninginhisDoonesburycomicstrip,depicting agroupof“goodol’boys”fromHarlingenpeeringthroughthesightsof theirhuntingriflesreadytorepulseaninvasion.41 Democraticcritics,likeConnecticutsenatorChristopherDodd,counteredthatReaganandhisadvisersknew“asmuchaboutCentralAmerica” inthe1980s“asweknewaboutIndochinain1963.”42AsaformerPeace CorpsvolunteerinLatinAmerica,Doddinsistedthatiftheregion“were notrackedwithpoverty,therewouldbenorevolution.”Tocountersuch criticism,ReaganaskedHenryKissingertoassessthesituation.In1984a commissionledbytheformersecretaryofstateacknowledgedthatSoviet meddlingdidnotcauseallofCentralAmerica’sproblems.Still,inorder toblockMoscow’sattempttoexploitLatinAmericaninstability,Kissinger urgedincreasedmilitaryaidtoanticommunistregimeslikeElSalvadorand toguerrillasfightinginNicaragua. InspiteofReagan’spassionatecallsforgreaterU.S.involvement,the publicprovedapatheticwhenitcametoLatinAmerica.Pollstersfound thatmostAmericansdidnotcarewhodominated,say,Tegucigalpaor Managua.Atthesametime,however,theydeferredtoReagan’sjudgment aslongasAmericantroopswerenotkilledincombat.Asaresult,the administrationfocusedonsupplyingmilitaryaidtofriendlygovernments intheregionandsupportingcovertwarfarethatplacedfewAmerican livesatrisk.
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Duringthe1980s,Reaganauthorizedspendingnearly$5billionto shoreupthegovernmentoftinyElSalvador,anominaldemocracy dominatedbyhard-linemilitaristswhohadbeenbattlingaleft-wing rebellionsince1979.Aterriblypoornationinwhich2percentofthe populationownednearlyeverything,ElSalvadorhadbeenwracked byruralrebellionsformostofthetwentiethcentury.Inspiteofmassive military aid, the Salvadoran army could not defeat the leftist rebels and their civilian allies. The army squandered much of the moneywhilegovernmenttroopsandparamilitarydeathsquads,some trainedbyAmericans,killedabout70,000peasants,teachers,union organizers,andchurchworkersduringthe1980s.Congressimposed acapofafewhundredonthenumberofU.S.militaryadvisersin ElSalvador,butotherwiseaskedfewquestions.Thebrutalcivilwar continueduntil1992,whenatrucerestoredasemblanceofrepresentativegovernment.43 ThemoralmorassofElSalvadorseemedcrystalclearcomparedto the hole Reagan dug for himself in neighboring Nicaragua. Nothing the president did in eight years so tarnished his reputation or called intoquestionhisjudgmentsoseriouslyashisdecisiontosellweapons toIranaspartofaschemetoransomU.S.hostagesinBeirutandfund anticommunistfightersinCentralAmerica. ReaganaccuratelydescribedNicaragua’sSandinistaleadersasdedicated Marxists who disliked the United States and received aid from CubaandtheSovietUnion.Also,ashecharged,theyharassedpolitical opponentsandblockedpromisedfreeelections.ButSandinistaabuses paledincomparisontotheviolenceinflictedonciviliansandespecially indigenousIndiansbythepro-U.S.regimesofnearbyElSalvador,Guatemala,andHonduras.Inanycase,Nicaraguawasatinynationwith fewerinhabitantsthanmanyAmericancities.Toportrayitasarealor potentialthreattohemisphericsecuritydistortedreality. Nevertheless,bothReaganandCIAdirectorCaseysawglobalstakes atplay.Casey,accordingtohisdeputy,RobertGates,“becameobsessed withCentralAmerica”andbelievedthatiftheUnitedStatescoulddefeat aSovietproxyinjustoneplace,theentireevilempirewould“unravel.” “Nick-a-wog-wha,”ashepronouncedit,“isthatplace.” In1981ReaganorderedCaseytoorganizeananti-Sandinistaforce calledthecontrarrevolucionarios,orcontras.Thepresidentpraisedthem as“freedomfighters”and“themoralequalofourFoundingFathers.” With generous U.S. aid, contra ranks swelled to between 10,000 and
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20,000men.Mostofthemovement’sleaderswereveteransoftheold Samozadictatorship,notincipientThomasJeffersons.44 When Congress questioned CIA funding of the guerrillas, Casey falselyassuredthelawmakersthatthecontrasdidnotintendtooverthrow the Sandinistas, a regime technically at peace with the United States. Rather, U.S. aid enabled the guerrillas to interdict Sandinista militaryaidtoSalvadoranrebels.Infact,inDecember1981Reaganhad signedasecretorderauthorizingcontraaidforthepurposeofdeposing theSandinistas.In1982,asreportssurfacedlinkingcontraattacksto thousandsofciviliandeathsinNicaragua,Congresspassedaresolution namedforRepresentativeEdwardP.BolandthatcappedCIAassistance totherebelsat$24millionandorderedthatnoneofthefundsbeused totoppletheNicaraguangovernment.InOctober1984,afterlearning thattheCIAandthecontrashadillegallyminedNicaraguanharbors, CongresspassedastricterversionoftheBolandlawthatbarredanyU.S. governmentfundsgoingtothecontrasforanypurpose. TheserestrictionsinfuriatedReagan,whodisparagedCongressasa committeeofbusybodies.HeinformednationalsecurityadviserRobert McFarlaneandhisdeputy,AdmiralJohn Poindexter, as well as NSC stafferLieutenantColonelOliverNorth,“todowhateveryouhaveto dotohelpthesepeople[thecontras]keepbodyandsoultogether.”For apresidentwhoseldomissuedclearinstructionstosubordinates,this wasadefinitiveorder.45 AfterconferringwithCaseyandseveralStateDepartmentofficials, McFarlane,Poindexter,andNorthdevisedaschemeto“privatize”contra aidbysolicitingfundsfromfriendlyforeigngovernmentsandwealthy Americanconservatives.NorthopenedSwissbankaccountsintowhich hedepositedmoneydonatedbyIsrael,SaudiArabia,SouthAfrica,South Korea,Taiwan,andBrunei,aswellasoilmanNelsonBunkerHuntand beerbaronJosephCoors.Someoftheforeignfundsactuallyoriginated asU.S.assistancetothecountriesthat“donated”themtothecontras. Reagan also permitted his aides to deal with Panamanian strongman ManuelNoriega.AlthoughNoriegahadturnedPanamaintoabanking andtransportationhavenforColombiancocainedealers,U.S.officials lookedtheotherwaysinceheallowedtheCIAtousePanamaasaconduit foraidtothecontras.Reagandidnotknow—orwanttoknow—allthe detailsofcontraaid,butMcFarlaneandhissuccessorasnationalsecurity adviser,JohnPoindexter,kepthimcloselyinformedoftheiractivities andreceivedhisblessing.46
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AlthoughsometwodozenseniorCIA,StateDepartment,andWhite Houseofficialswerelinkedtotheillegalschemetoaidthecontras,SecretaryofStateShultzconsideredtheoperationfoolhardy.InJune1984 hewarnedReaganthatsolicitingfundstocircumventCongressmight constituteanimpeachableoffense.ThepresidentunderstoodShultz’s concern,sincehequippedtoaidesthatifthestoryofhisassistingthe contrasevergotout“we’llallbehangingbyourthumbsinfrontofthe WhiteHouse.”47 InMarch1986,evenwhileSoviet-Americanrelationswerebeginning toimprove,Reagandeliveredadramatictelevisedspeechwarningthat theSovietsandCubanshadturnedNicaraguaintoabasetoseverU.S. accesstoSouthAmerica,thePanamaCanal,andtheCaribbeansea-lanes. MoscowandHavana,hedeclared,hadimplementedthe“oldCommunist slogan”that“theroadtovictory[overtheUnitedStates]goesthrough Mexico.”Congress,stillawedbyReagan’spopularity,bowedtohisurgent pleatoresumelimitedaidtothecontras.Bythen,however,Reaganhad approvedyetanotherillegalscheme.48 UnbeknowntoCongressorthepublic,duringthepreviousyearthe illicitcontraaidprogramhadmergedwithongoing,secret,andillegal contactswithIran.Reaganhadseveraltimespubliclycondemnedthe Iranianregimeasan“outlawstate”linkedtoterrorism.U.S.lawbarred sellingorgivingIrananymilitaryequipmentunlessthepresidentinformedCongressinwritingofacompellingreasontodoso.Reagan foundareason,butdeclinedtonotifyanyone. For some time Reagan had been moved by the plight of seven AmericanswhohadbeenkidnappedinBeirutandheldashostagesby IslamistmilitiaslinkedtoIran.Withtheexceptionofonehostage,CIA agentWilliamBuckley(whowaskilledshortlyafterhisabduction),all wereprivateU.S.citizenswhohadremainedinLebanondespiteofficial warnings to leave. Recalling public disgust with Carter’s handling of theIranianhostagesin1979–1980,Reaganactedboldly.Inmid-1985, anIranianbusinessmancontactedNSCadviserRobertMcFarlaneand claimedthathecouldsecurethehostages’releaseinreturnforU.S.arms salesto“moderate”elementsinIranwhomighttakepowerfollowing thedeathofAyatollahKhomeini. Despitehispledge“nevertonegotiatewithterrorists,”Reagantold McFarlane,“Gee,thatsoundsprettygood.”Inhisdiary,thepresident stressedthathelikedtheideaofadealtoget“oursevenkidnapvictims back.”BuildinganewrelationshipwithIranappearedasanafterthought.
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Over the next year, Reagan authorized several additional secret arms salestoIran.Threehostageswereeventuallyreleased,butthreemore were taken as replacements. Reagan had not only deceived Congress andbrokenhispledgenottobargainwithterrorists,buthehadcreated alucrativemarketforseizingAmericans. ThisschemetookanevenmorebizarreturnwhenNSCstafferOliver Northconceivedwhathecalleda“neatidea.”Whynotoverchargethe Iranians for theAmerican weapons they received and use the excess profitsfromthesalestosupporttheNicaraguancontras?AsNorthjoked, theIranianswouldunknowinglymakea“contra-bution.”Likeotherelementsoftheplan,thistooviolatedfederallaw,sinceprofitsfromany saleofU.S.governmentproperty,includingweapons,hadtobereturned totheTreasury,notgiventothePresident’spetguerrillacharityindefianceofCongress.49 ThetangledschemebegantounravelinOctober1986whenSandinistagunnersshotdownaCIA-charteredplanecarryingweaponstothe contras.AsurvivingAmericancrewmembertoldhisinterrogatorsthat hewaspartofasecretU.S.contraaidprogram.InearlyNovember,just asAmericanvotersreturnedcontroloftheSenatetotheDemocrats,Iran disclosedthesecretarmssalesandchortledthattheAmericanweapons hadnotgoneto“moderates,”buttoanti-U.S.Khomeiniloyalistswho hadhoodwinkedtheReaganadministration. PresidentReagan,Casey,North,andotherparticipantstrieddesperatelyatfirsttocoverupthescandalbyshreddingincriminatingdocuments andlyingabouttheiractionstothepress,thepublic,andeventuallyto Congressandaspecialprosecutor.Despitecompellingevidenceofhis activeroleinthescheme,Reaganinsistedthatheknewvirtuallynothingaboutanyarms-for-hostagesdealorillegalfundingofthecontras. ButthepublicnolongerbelievedhimandbyDecember1986Reagan’s approvalratingplummetedfrom67percentto36percent Undertremendouspressuretocomeclean,andwiththeactiveinvolvementofNancyReaganandaideDavidAbshire,thepresidentappointed a blue-ribbon inquiry panel chaired by former senator John Tower. After hearing misleading and confused testimony from Reagan (who firstadmitted,thendenied,thensaidhecouldnotrecalltradingarms for hostages and diverting funds), the Tower Commission concluded initsFebruary1987reportthattheIranarmssaleshaddevolvedintoa sordidransomschemedesignedtoillegallyfundthecontras.Reagan’s actionsran“directlycounter”tohispublicpromisetopunishterrorists.
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Thereportportrayedthepresidentasdisengaged,uninformed,andeasilymanipulated.Reagansidesteppedthecriticismbyfiringmanyofhis aideslinkedtotheIran-contrascheme(Caseydiedofabraintumorin themidstofthescandal)andbygivingaspeechonMarch4,1987,in whichheappearedtoacceptresponsibilitywithoutactuallydoingso.The “facts”mightsuggesthepermittedransompaymentsandotherillegal acts,Reaganasserted,butinhis“heart”henevermeanttobreakthelaw. Severalcongressionalprobesandcriminaltrialsoverthenextfewyears addedmanydetailstotheIran-contraepisode.AfterReaganleftoffice, participantsintheschemeconfirmedthathehadapprovedtheiractions andimpededfulldisclosure. DespitesometalkamongDemocratsofimpeachment,Reagansurvivedthescandalforseveralreasons.Thecompetingcongressionaland judicialinvestigationsintoIran-contraoftenlackedfocus.Despitepublic disappointment in his actions, Reagan retained an important quotient of goodwill. But perhaps the most important reason why the scandal faded was the striking improvement in Soviet-American relations. In 1985,athawhadbegunbetweenMoscowandWashington.By1987, fundamentalchangeshadoccurredinsidetheSovietUnionandReagan rushedtoembracethem.Ironically,improvedrelationswiththe“evil empire”salvagedReagan’slegacy. Reagan,Gorbachev,andtheEndoftheColdWar Ashissupporterssawit,evenifthepresidenterredin“smallthings” likeIran-contra,hesteeredatruecourseonthemostimportantissue, engineering the demise of the “evil empire.”AsAlaska senator Ted StevensremarkedatReagan’sfuneralinJune2004,theSovietUnion was“winningtheColdWar”atthetimeofhisinaugurationin1981;just eightyearslater,itwaspoisedtocollapse.Incontrasttothisclaimof causeandeffect,mosthistoriansdisputetheassertionthatcommunism wasonavictoryrollin1981andthatReagan’spoliciesleddirectlyto Sovietcollapseadecadelater. TheReaganadministration’srelationshipwiththeSovietUnionstarted badlyin1981andsoongotworse.Athisfirstpressconference,Reagan condemneddétenteandbrandedSovietleadersasliarsandcriminals committedtoworlddomination.Itwouldnolongerbebusinessasusual withMoscow.Yetevenashespoke,ReaganaskedSecretaryofState HaigtoinformSovietambassadorAnatolyDobryninthathisstatement
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wasnotmeanttooffendanyone,“butwasjustanexpressionofhisdeep convictions.” Dobrynin responded that the clarification “only made thingsworse.”50 ThispatternpersistedintoReagan’ssecondterm.Thepresidentpushed amilitarybuildupandchallengedSovietproxiesinthethirdworld.He condemnedtheSovietUnionasthe“focusofevilinthemodernworld” andarottensystemreadytobeshovedontothe“ashheapofhistory.” YetReaganoftenfollowedtheserhetoricalattackswithwarmpersonal letterstoSovietleaders(LeonidBrezhnev,whodiedinNovember1982, and his successorsYuriAndropov from November 1982 to February 1984,KonstantinChernenkofromFebruary1984toMarch1985,and MikhailGorbachevafterMarch1985)containingpleasforcooperation and understanding. Reagan told aides that if he could only talk oneon-onewithSovietleaders,hecouldconvincethemofAmerica’sgood intentionsandshowthemthecorrectpathtochange. Inspiteofthisprofessedinterestindialogue,Reaganshunnedmeeting any Soviet official before February 15, 1983, when Secretary of StateShultzbroughtAmbassadorDobrynintotheWhiteHouseforan impromptuchat.Reagantooktheopportunitytovoiceconcernforseven SiberianPentecostalsholedupintheU.S.embassyinMoscowsince 1978.Twomonthsafterthisconversation,thereligiousdissidentswere permitted to emigrate. In July, Reagan responded by agreeing to sell theSoviets$10billionworthofgrainoverthenextfiveyears,despite hispressureontheEuropeansandJapanesetostoptheirtradewiththe Kremlin.51 ThistypifiedthecontradictionsinReagan’sSovietpolicy,especially thoserelatedtonuclearweapons.Reagansometimesspokeofnuclear warasthebiblicallyprophesiedbattlecalledArmageddon.Yethetook officedeterminedtoexpandAmerica’sarsenalof10,000orsoatomic bombs to counter the Soviet’s 8,000 weapons.After starting a rapid buildup,Reagancalledforabolishingnuclearweaponsin1984.By1987 heandhisSovietcounterpartagreedtodoawaywithasmallnumberof nuclear-tippedmissiles.Yetafterthisstarthespurnedfurthereffortsby Gorbachevtoslashnucleararsenals. FrostyrelationswiththeSovietshitnewlowsduring1983.OnSeptember1,U.S.intelligenceofficialslearnedfromelectronicintercepts thataSovietfighterplanehadthepreviousdaydownedKoreanAirlines Flight 007, which was carrying 269 people (including a member of Congress)andhadstrayedintoSiberianairspacenearamissiletestsite
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whileflyingfromAnchoragetoSeoul.Evidencelaterconfirmedthata navigationalerrorcausedtheintrusion.Sovietspokesmen(uncertainof thefactsandpreoccupiedbythedisablingillnessofCommunistParty chiefYuriAndropov) first denied that the shootdown had occurred, theninsistedthattheairlinerwasaspyplaneandalegitimatetarget. Frominterceptedmessages,U.S.intelligenceanalystsrealizedthatthe Sovietssincerely,althoughmistakenly,believedKAL007hadbeenon aspymission.Inspiteofthisconfusion,Reaganquicklycondemned theattackasanintentional,unprovokedmassacreanda“crimeagainst humanity.”52 Also in September 1983, the imminent deployment ofAmerican PershingIIandcruisemissilestoWesternEuropeinfuriatedSovietleaders.ReaganinsistedthatthenewmissilesonlyredressedearlierSoviet deploymentofsimilarweaponscapableofhittingWesternEurope.From hishospitalbed,Andropovcondemnedthemissiletransferasdispelling “anyillusion”thatReaganfavoredimprovingties.TheSovietscanceleda plannedroundofdisarmamenttalks.InOctober1983,aftertheU.S.invasionofGrenada,theSovietpresscomparedReagantoHitler,amadman “makingdeliriousplansforworlddomination.”ThatDecember,when U.S.forcesconductedasecretwargamecalledExerciseAbleArcher, SovietintelligencewarnedAndropovthatthesimulationmightbeacover forarealnuclearattack,perhapsrequiringaSovietfirststrike.53 ReaganviewedthedeploymentofU.S.intermediate-rangemissiles inEurope,alongwiththeGrenadainvasionandarmsbuildup,asgreat achievements.Atthesametime,pollsterswarnedhimthatnearlyhalfof allAmericansvoicedconcernoverrisingtensionswiththeSovietUnion. SecretaryofStateShultzandRobertMcFarlane,whoreplacedthemore conservativeWilliamClarkasnationalsecurityadviserinOctober1983, alongwithAssistantChiefofStaffMichaelDeaverandNancyReagan, urgedthepresidenttotakeamoreconciliatoryapproach.Heagreedand onNovember11inaspeechinJapandeclared,“mydreamistoseethe daywhennuclearweaponswillbebanishedfromthefaceoftheearth.” InDecember,atShultz’sprompting,thepresidentsentapersonalletter toAndropov.Then,onJanuary16,1984,Reaganmadeaspeechinwhich he described a coming “year of opportunities for peace.”The United StatesandtheUSSRshouldresumeadialoguebasedon“realism”anda “spiritofcompromise.”Headdedacodaabouthowwonderfulitwould beifordinaryRussianslike“IvanandAnya”couldmeettheirAmerican counterparts,“JimandSally.”54
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SovietleaderAndropov’slingeringterminalillnessanddeathonFebruary9,1984,precludedaresponse.Hissuccessor,KonstantinChernenko, held power for barely one year, until March 1985.A plodding party functionary,Chernenkosufferedfromsevereemphysemathatlimitedhis activities.ThesuccessionofdecrepitleadersinMoscowreducedpressure onReagantojustifytotheworldhisowntoughapproach. In the run-up to the 1984 U.S. presidential election, Reagan carefully modulated his anti-Soviet rhetoric, backing off from his early confrontationalline.Hedeniedharboringadesireorplantooverthrow thecommunistregime.“Wemadeitplainwe’renotouttochange”the Sovietsystem,Reagandeclared.“We’recertainlynotgoingtoletthem changeours”;but“wehavetoliveintheworldtogether.”Thishardly soundedlikeamanwhoplannedtotoppletheUSSR.Reagan’sconciliatorytone,combinedwithanimprovingAmericaneconomy,soothed voters’ fears and assured the president’s reelection by a landslide in November1984.55 TheSoviet-AmericandynamicchangeddramaticallyonMarch11, 1985, when the young (age fifty-four), vigorous, and well-educated MikhailGorbachevwaschosenbyCommunistPartyofficialstoleadthe SovietUnion.Asthebesteducated,mosttraveled,mostmedia-savvy, andmostarticulateSovietleadersinceLenin,Gorbachevimpressedall Westernleaderswhoinitiallymethim,includingSecretaryofStateShultz and British prime minister Thatcher. They (along with an astrologer consultedbythepresidentandfirstlady)encouragedReagantomeet Gorbachev. A “getting-to-know-you” encounter at Geneva in November 1985 provedhelpful,evenifnoformalagreementsemerged.Reaganfound Gorbachev’sopennessandlackofdoctrinairerhetoricappealing.During theirinitialchat,thepresidentstartledGorbachevbybreakingintowhat hisaidescalledhis“littlegreenmenspeech.”Achievingpeacewould besimpler,Reaganexplained,“iftherewasathreattothisworldfrom someotherspecies,fromanotherplanet,outsidethisuniverse.”Ifso, SovietsandAmericanswould“forgetallthelittlelocaldifferencesthat wehavebetweenourcountriesandwewouldfindoutonceandforall thatwereallyareallhumanbeingshereonthisEarthtogether.”This scenarioresembledthatofa1950sfilmReaganadmired,TheDaythe EarthStoodStill. ItishardtoknowwhatGorbachevmadeofthisparable,whichthe president often recited to his own confused aides, but Reagan’s easy
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charm overcame any awkwardness. In any case, Gorbachev enjoyed hearingthepresident,aformermovieandtelevisionactor,tellinsider storiesaboutHollywoodfilmstarsfromthe1940sand1950s. The two leaders also broached more substantial issues at Geneva, includingtheideaofdeepcutsinavarietyofstrategicnuclearweapons. Gorbachev wanted to explore details; but when Reagan insisted thatanyreductioninnuclearweaponsmustbelinkedtoagreenlight fortheUnitedStatestodevelopanddeploytheSDIantimissilesystem (despitetheclearprohibitionsagainstthiscontainedintheABMTreaty signedbybothcountriesin1972),discussionended.WhenGorbachev complainedthatSDImarkedadangerousescalationofthearmsrace, Reagan countered with his mantra that the antimissile scheme was a “shield,notaspear.”56 Reagan’s rigidity on SDI puzzled some of his aides as much as it angeredGorbachevsincenoworkablesystemexistedorwouldlikely bedevelopedbeforeadecadeorlonger.Ineffect,Reagan’srefusalto discussseriousarmsreductionsuntiltheSovietsconsentedtoAmerican testinganddeploymentofSDIblockedprogresstowardReagan’sstated goalofanuclear-freeworld. Gorbachev’sdesiretoendtheColdWarstemmedprimarilyfromforces andideaswithintheSovietsystem.Asoneofthebestinformedscholars oftheperiod,RaymondGarthoff,observes,America’sso-calledvictory intheColdWar“camewhenanewgenerationofSovietleadersrealized howbadlytheirsystemathomeandtheirpoliciesabroadhadfailed.” Gorbachev, unlike his predecessors, recognized the “interdependence oftheworld,”thepriorityof“allhumanvaluesoverclassvalues,”and theindivisibilityofcommonsecurity.InspiteoflaterclaimsbyReagan andhisconservativeadmirers,theSovietsdidnot“lose”thearmsrace becauseofAmerica’sfasterpace.Gorbachevsimplycalleditoff.Reagan hadthegoodfortune—andgoodsense—torespondtothesechangeseven ifhehadonlyasmallpartininitiatingthem.57 During1986,Gorbachev,alongwithhisnewforeignminister,Eduard Shevardnadze, initiated fundamental changes in Soviet domestic and foreignpolicy.Gorbachevattemptedtosavecommunismbyreforming it.Hebeganliftingpressrestrictions,releasingpoliticalprisoners,and easing immigration restrictions. To revitalize the economy, he introducednewmarketmechanisms.Toimplementthesereforms,thenew Sovietleadershipsoughtreductionsinglobaltensionandlowerarms expendituresalongwithexpandedeconomictiestothecapitalistworld.
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Gorbachev’sinitiativescoincidedwithAmericaninterestsbutwerenot forcedonhimbyReagan. ThelengththeSovietswerepreparedtogobecameclearasthetwo leadersmetasecondtimeinReykjavik,Iceland,inmid-October1986. GorbachevstunnedAmericandelegatesbyproposing50percentcutsin thenumberofheavymissilesalongwithsubstantialreductionsinother weaponssystems.Inturn,hewantedtheUnitedStatestoadheretothe ABMtreatyforanothertenyears,confiningSDItolaboratorytesting. Reaganagainbalked. Asproposalsflewbackandforth,theteamsofnegotiatorsproposed deeperandwidercutsofnucleararsenals.Criticalissuesremainedunclear,includingthefuturestatusofBritishandFrenchmissiles,thesize ofconventionalarmedforces,andwhetherthereductionsappliedonly todeliverysystems(suchasmissilesandplanes)ortonuclearweapons themselves.Reaganultimatelyproposedeliminatingallnuclearweapons (notjustdeliverysystems).Gorbachevagreed,solongastheUnitedStates didnotdeployanantimissilesystemforatleastadecade.Declaringthat hehad“promisedtheAmericanpeople”hewould“notgiveupSDI,” Reaganbrokeoffdiscussionsandreturnedhome.58 Inretrospect,Reagan’ssupportersassertthatthepresident’sunbending commitmenttoSDIbrokeGorbachev’sresistanceandsetthestagefor ageneralSovietretreat,butthisassertionisdifficulttoconfirm.Both Gorbachev and Reagan’s aides, including George Shultz, recognized thatSDIdeploymentwas,atbest,manyyearsaway.WhywouldReagan notmovenowtowardmeaningfuldisarmamentandproceedwithSDI researchthatGorbachevdidnotoppose?Conversely,whydidGorbachev giveupthechancetowinarmscutshedesperatelywantedwhenallhe hadtodowasgiveanapprovingnodtowardalargelyimaginarySDI systemthatfascinatedReagan?Therigiditydisplayedbybothleaders doomedthesummit.ManyofReagan’smoreconservativeaideswere privatelyrelievedbythefailuretoreachadealsincefewofthemunderstoodexactlywhatthepresidentthoughthewasagreeingto. ThreeweeksaftertheconfusedReykjaviksummitbrokeupwithout agreement,theIran-contrascandalerupted.InthesimultaneousNovember1986congressionalelection,RepublicanslostcontroloftheSenate. Asthescandaldeepenedandasthepublicexpressedgrowingdisillusionmentwiththepresident’sbehaviorandability,Reaganworkedtosalvage hispresidencybyreplacingmanyofhishard-lineanti-Sovietadvisers with more moderate strategists. Frank Carlucci took over as national
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security adviser from the disgraced John Poindexter; former senator HowardBakerreplacedtheabrasiveDonReganasWhiteHousechief ofstaff;FBIdirectorWilliamWebstertookchargeoftheCIAfromthe ailingWilliamCasey;afewmonthslaterCasparWeinbergerresigned asdefensesecretary.CarluccithentookoverthePentagonpost,opening theNSCslotforGeneralColinPowell.SecretaryofStateShultz,long thelonevoiceadvocatingnegotiationswithMoscow,nowenjoyedthe backingofamuchmorepragmaticandlike-mindedgroup. During1987,eventspushedbothGorbachevandReagantowarda morecooperativerelationship.WhenGorbachev’seconomicandsocial reformprogramranintoroadblockscreatedbyCommunistPartybureaucrats,theSovietpublicgrewfrustratedathisinabilitytodeliverabetter life.GorbachevhopedtoslashSovietdefensespending(anestimated 25percentofgrossnationalproduct,ascomparedto3percentinthe UnitedStates)tofreeresourcesforeconomicrestructuring.Hehoped thatdemocraticreformswouldbothmobilizesupportforhisleadership andwinconcessionsfromWashington. Tothisend,in1987GorbachevproposedtoReaganadealeliminating mostintermediate-rangenuclearmissiles,whileleavingtheAmericans wiggleroomforSDI.TheSovietleader’sproposalreflectedadvicegiven himbytherecentlyfreeddissident,physicistAndreiSakharov.The“fatheroftheSovietH-bomb,”whohadbecomeapeaceactivist,convinced GorbachevthatSDIeitherwouldnotworkorcouldbeeasilyandcheaply overwhelmed.BecauseitposedlittlethreattoSovietsecurity,Sakharov arguedpersuasively,itshouldnotbararmsreductionagreementsbetween thetwosuperpowers.ShultzandothermoderatesnowadvisingReagan saw this new Soviet stance as something of a lifeline for a president flounderingintheIran-contrascandalandwatchinghispublicapproval ratingsfallingsharply.CongressionalDemocratshadalreadyblocked increaseddefensespendingrequestedbytheWhiteHouse,haltedaidto thecontras,andbalkedatendorsingReagan’sviewthattheABMtreaty couldbereinterpretedtopermitSDItestinganddeployment.Inthespring Gorbachevsuggestedsharpcutsofbothlong-andshort-rangemissiles, withanunderstandingthattheUnitedStatescouldconductlimitedSDI research.Yet,onceagain,ReaganrefusedtoacceptanylimitsonSDI. DefenseSecretaryWeinbergeractuallyproposedacceleratedSDIdevelopmenttocounterwhathecalledagrowingSovietthreat.59 Frustrated by Reagan’s refusal to compromise, Gorbachev went forwardaccordingtohisownroadmapandsimplyignoredtheissueof
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SDI.Inlate1987,heannouncedhewouldpullallSovietforcesoutof Afghanistan.HefollowedthisdeclarationbyendorsingpeacefulsolutionstoarmedconflictsinNicaraguaandAfrica.Theseactionspavedthe wayforatreatysignedbyGorbachevandReaganinDecember1987that eliminatedtheentirearsenalofbothpowers’intermediate-rangenuclear forces(INF).AlthoughtheINFtreatyreducedonlyabout4percentof thetensofthousandsofnuclearweaponscontainedintheoverallU.S. andSovietarsenals,itmarkedthefirsttimethetworivalshadagreedto completelyeliminateaclassofweapons. Unfortunately,theINFtreatyrepresentedthefirstandlastarmsreductionagreementoftheReaganadministration.Gorbachevhopedto buildonthemomentumbymovingtowardbigreductionsinlong-range missilesandevenofferedtoignorefutureU.S.testingofSDI,whichhe toldReaganhenowconsideredmoreawasteofmoneythanathreat.The presidentwhoseemedsoself-assuredwhenconfrontinghostileSoviet leadersappearedtolosehisbearingswhenhegotyesforananswer. During Gorbachev’s December 1987 visit toWashington for the INF treaty signing, the Soviet leader and the president met in the cabinet room. When Gorbachev described an opportunity to further reduce nucleararsenalsandcooperateinareaslikeAfrica,LatinAmerica,and Afghanistan, the president appeared confused. To the visible fury of Shultz,Reaganrespondedtotheproposalbytellingoff-coloranti-Soviet jokes.Shultztookthepresidentasidetoberatehis“terribleperformance.” WhiteHousechiefofstaffBakerandShultzagreedtocloselymonitor Reagan’sfuturediscussionswithforeignleaders,sensingthathismental facultieswerenolongeradequateforconductingnegotiations.Bythis pointmoreAmericans(65percent)heldafavorableviewofGorbachev thanofReagan(61percent).WhenTimeselectedits“ManoftheYear” for1987,MikhailGorbachevgracedthemagazinecover.60 Reagan’spassivityduringhisfinalmonthsinofficeimpededefforts tobuildontheINFtreatyandonGorbachev’sdesiretomovequickly beyondtheColdWar.During1988,thepresidentsimplycoastedtoward retirement.Whenhesteppeddown,over80percentofAmericansexpressedafavorableviewoftheSovietleader(ascomparedto70percent forReagan)andonly30percentstillcalledtheSoviets“theenemy.”Yet, insteadofencouragingGorbachev’sdemocraticreformsandeffortsto buildinternationalcooperation,inpublicandprivatevenuesReagantook toboastingthathishardlinehadforcedaSovietretreat.Heappearedto loseinterestinfurtherantinuclearinitiativeswhensomeofhisconserva-
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tivesupporterscomplainedabouthismisguided“rushtodisarm.”When SovietforcesdepartedAfghanistanaheadoftheirannouncedschedule, ReaganspurnedGorbachev’scallforWashingtonandMoscowtojointly supportanewmoderateregimeinKabul.Instead,despiteearlierpledges tohaltweaponsaidonceSovietforcesleftAfghanistan,theUnitedStates continuedtoarmIslamistfightersseekingtocontrolthecountry.Many oftheseextremistslaterformedthecoreoftheTaliban.61 InJune1988,thepresidenttraveledtoMoscowforsomethinglike avictorylap.Inaremarkablephotoop,theoldColdWarriorspoketo acrowdwhilestandingonLenin’stomb.WhenaskedbyanAmerican reporterhowhefeltaboutvisitingthe“evilempire,”Reagananswered, “Iwastalkingaboutanothertime,anotherera.”ButwhenGorbachev againsoughttoinvolvehiminadiscussionofbroaderdisarmamentas wellascooperationtoresolvelingeringregionaldisputes,Reagandid littlemorethansmileforthecameras. Legacies NeartheendoftheReaganera,MikhailGorbachevsardonicallyasked thepresident’ssixthnationalsecurityadviser,ColinPowell,“Whatare yougoingtodonowthatyou’velostyourbestenemy?”62Powell,like Reagan,hadnoeasyanswer. BythetimetheSovietUniondissolvedinDecember1991,newthreats hademergedinthepost–ColdWarworld.GeorgeKennan,thearchitect ofcontainment,spoketothisfactinanopinionpiecehepublishedinthe NewYorkTimesonOctober28,1992.Itwas“simplychildish,”Kennan asserted,tosaythatReagan’spoliciesachievedvictory.TheUnitedStates hadnot“won”thelongstrugglethatcostbothsidessodearly.Eachbore responsibility for its inception and duration. Politicians should pause beforepattingthemselvesontheback. ThepremiernovelistoftheColdWar,JohnLeCarré,offeredasimilar cautionagainstAmerican“triumphalism.”MasterspyGeorgeSmiley, LeCarré’sfictionalnarrator,observes,“Wewon.Notthatthevictory mattersadamn.Andperhapswedidn’twinanyway.Perhapstheyjust lost.Orperhapswithoutthebondsofideologicalconflicttorestrainus anymore,ourtroublesarejustbeginning.”63 In the wake of the Reagan presidency, the United States faced a rangeofunanticipatedchallenges.Theanti-Sovietfixationofthe1980s didnotpreparethenationforemergingchallengessuchastheriseof
REAGANANDTHECOLDWAR 39
Islamist-inspiredterrorism,theproliferationofnuclearweaponsamong roguestates,America’sgrowingdependenceonimportedenergy,andthe acceleratinglossofmanufacturingjobstoChinaandotherdeveloping nations.Reagan’sstridentcampaigntodelegitimizetheSovietUnion carriedoverintoanerosionoffaithamongAmericansinthelegitimacy oftheirowngovernment. UnderRegan’ssuccessor,PresidentGeorgeH.W.Bush,thenation’s foreignpolicycenteredonarrangingasoftlandingfortheSovietcollapse andoncreatinganeffectivecoalitiontoforceIraqisoldiersoutofoil-rich Kuwait.In1993,afterRepublicansinCongressblamedPresidentBill ClintonforthedeathsofafewdozenU.S.soldiersengagedinhumanitarianreliefworkinSomalia,hehesitatedtoundertakenewforeigninterventions.TheUnitedStates,likemostoftheworld,ignoredtheRwandan genocideof1994andhesitatedtointerveneintheethnicslaughterthat afflictedtheformercomponentsofYugoslaviaduringmuchofthe1990s. WhenClintonfinallyconvincedNATOtolaunchanairoffensiveagainst SerbianforcescarryingoutethniccleansinginKosovoin1999,hedid soovertheobjectionsofmostcongressionalRepublicans. As a presidential candidate in 2000, GeorgeW. Bush appeared to strikeanisolationisttone,stressinghisoppositiontousingAmerican power and armed forces to implement what he descriptively called “nation-building”inpoorcountries.Yetthe9/11terroristattackswithin theUnitedStatesin2001pushedtheBushadministrationinnewdirections.SeveralofthediplomaticandmilitaryadvisersBushcametorely on,includingVicePresidentDickCheney,DefenseSecretaryDonald Rumsfeld,PentagonaidesPaulWolfowitzandRichardPerle,diplomats ElliottAbramsandJohnNegraponte,hadbeeninfluentialfiguresinthe Reaganadministration.Theseso-calledneoconservatives,orneocons, hadencouragedReagan’searlyconfrontationalpolicieswiththeSoviet Union; covert military intervention inAfghanistan, the Middle East, Africa,andCentralAmerica;andstrongsupportforIsraelihard-liners intheirconfrontationwithPalestinians.Mostweresidelinedafterthe Iran-contrascandalandplayedmarginalornorolesinthefirstBushand theClintonadministrations.In2001,severalassumedimportantpositions inthenewlyelectedBushadministrationbut,asagroup,theygained dominanceonlyaftertheeventsof9/11.Theirinfluenceshowedclearly inthelanguageemployedbyBushduring2002and2003when,updating Reagan’sreferencetotheSovietsasan“evilempire,”hedescribedIraq, Iran,andNorthKoreaasan“axisofevil.”
40 MICHAELSCHALLER
Collectively, these neocons advocated increased defense spending, therapiddeploymentofamissiledefensesystem,preemptivemilitary strikes against hostile regimes or terrorist groups, contempt for the UnitedNations,andtheoverthrowoftheSaddamHusseingovernment inIraq.FollowingtheterroriststrikesofSeptember11,2001,George Bushreliedheavilyontheadviceofthisgroupandimplementedmost oftheirpolicies.Infact,theIraqwarwasapillarofReagan-eraneocons whoservedBush.RecallinghowfreedomrapidlytookrootinEastern EuropeoncetheSovietyokedisappeared,theypredictedthatdeposing SaddamwouldsimilarlytransformIraqintoashowcaseofdemocracy intheMiddleEast.Theirtheories,liketheirenthusiasm,provedapoor predictorofactualevents.
2 TheEconomicCosts ofReaganMythology
Mythscanbedefinedastraditionalstoriesorfablesthatexplainphenomenathroughthefeatsofgodsandheroes.1Thefunctionsofmythsareto clarifythepastandserveasaguideforthefuture.Mythscontainmoral truthsmeanttobelearnedandfollowed.Manyconservativewritersuse themythicmode,atonethatreflectsaweandreverence,whendiscussing RonaldReagan.Theydescribehimasanextraordinarymanengagedin performingheroicdeeds.Intheconservativeview,hiswords—evenhis jokes—reflectthewisdomofeternaltruthsthathadbeenviolatedinthe decadesbeforeReaganassumedthepresidencyinJanuary1981;hislife andrhetoricprovidelessonsforindividualsandthenationtoemulate. ConservativewritersportraythemythicalReaganasthelonewarrior, dedicated to fulfilling visions based on traditionalAmerican values.2 There was no need for him to study the details of issues because he intuitivelyunderstoodthebigpicture:liberalpolicieshadweakenedthe nation,andconservativepolicieswouldstrengthenit.Hewaspolitically courageous because he was willing to defy the conventional wisdom ofliberalexpertswithhissimplebutprofoundideasandunwillingto compromisehisconservativegoals.Reaganhadalucid,precisevision ofwhatneededtobedonetogettheUnitedStatesbackonitstraditional track,andheneverwaveredinhispursuitofconservativeprogramsthat wouldguaranteeaprosperousandmoralfuture. ThereisaneedtodeconstructthemythologyoftheReaganpresidency. The deconstruction of Reagan does not mean the destruction of his 41
42 JOHNW.SLOAN
reputationandachievements.Itdoessuggestascholarlycommitmentto findingthetruthabouttheReaganadministration,regardlessofwhether theevidencesupportsorrefutestheideologicalbeliefsofliberalsorconservatives.Therealworldoftenhasawayofsurprisingtheexpectations ofmice,men,and,especially,ideologues.Weneedtocutthroughthe mythologicalmistthatobscuresthesuccessesandfailuresofReagan’s economicpolicies.TheperpetuationofseveralReaganmythsislikelyto causepolicymakerstomisdiagnosethenation’sproblemsandlimitour searchforsolutions.Inbrief,ideologicallyderivedimagesoftheReagan presidencycanpreventusfromunderstandinghowhispresidencyreally operatedandprovideadangerousmodelforpresidentialbehavior. ADemythologizedViewofReagan’sEconomicPolicies OnJanuary20,1981,RonaldReaganbecamepresidentwiththegoalof fulfillingthemostambitiouspolicyagendasinceFranklinRoosevelt’s NewDealin1933.Reagan’spoliticalprojectwasbothtodestroythe liberalregimecreatedbyRooseveltandadvancedbyLyndonJohnson’s GreatSocietyandtoconstructaconservativereplacement.TheReagan administration failed to eliminate most liberal programs and was not successful in passing constitutional amendments outlawing abortion, allowingprayerinpublicschools,orrequiringabalancedbudget.However,asIarguedinmybookTheReaganEffect,itdidsucceed—partly bydesign,partlybycompromise,partlybymuddlingthrough—increatingaconservativeregimethatwascapableofpromotinglong-term economicgrowthwithlowinflation.3Themalaiseandstagflationofthe 1970swerereplacedinthe1980sbyanadaptiveeconomythatgenerated millionsofnewjobsanddiscreditedthethesisthattheUnitedStateswas adecliningsuperpower. Bydesign,Reaganwascommittedtolargetaxcuts,andmuchofhis politicalsuccesscanbeattributedtothatfact.TheoriginofthiscommitmentforReaganwasnotphilosophicalstudy;hewasreceptiveto thesupply-sidereasoningthatlowertaxrateswouldstimulateeconomic growthbecauseitwascompatiblewithhisHollywoodexperience.He oftenrepeatedtheanecdotethat,afterWorldWarII,hemadeonlyfour moviesayearbecausehisincomefromthosefouraloneplacedhimin thetoptaxbracketof91percent.Thehighlyprogressivetaxratescreatedadisincentivetomakemoremovies.4Thesehighratesalsocaused ReagantodevelopavisceraldislikeoftaxesandtheInternalRevenue
THEECONOMICCOSTSOFREAGANMYTHOLOGY 43
Service,whichhedisdainfullycalledhis“seniorpartner.”ThisanimositytowardincometaxesmadeReaganadifferentkindoftaxcutterthan manysupply-siders.Whilesupply-sidersbelievedthatreducingthetop rateswouldsignificantlyincreasesavingsandinvestment,Reaganwas committedtoslashingeveryone’staxrates. Reagan’sbeliefinandcommitmenttotaxdecreasesweredemonstrated in his speeches. For him, government was essentially a wasteful tax spenderthat—withtheexceptionofnationaldefense—didlittlegood.In 1958,hewarnedthatthegraduatedincometaxhadthepotentialtotax themiddleclassoutofexistenceandthusbringaboutsocialism.5Ina 1964speechforSenatorBarryGoldwater,heerroneouslyclaimed,“No nationhaseversurvivedataxburdenthatreachedathirdofitsnational income.”6BothasgovernorofCaliforniaandaspresident,Reaganliked to picture himself as a hero protecting taxpayers from the voracious appetitesoftax-spendingbureaucrats.Hisspeechesattackedboththe debilitatingeffectsoftheprogressiveincometaxonincentivestowork, tosave,andtoinvestaswellasitsabilitytofinanceanever-expending federalgovernment.Asapresidentialcandidatein1980,Reaganaccepted themostsanguinepredictionsofthesupply-siders,namely,thatathreeyearcutintaxrateswouldstimulateproductivity,increaserevenues,and reducebudgetdeficits.7In1984,threeyearsafterCongresshadpassed Reagan’staxcutandthenationwasfacedwithmassivebudgetdeficits, thepresidentresistedtheeffortsofMartinFeldstein,chairoftheCouncil ofEconomicAdvisers,andDavidStockman,directoroftheOfficeof ManagementandBudget,tosupporttaxincreases.Reagan,basinghis wordsonasupply-sidemyth,asserted,“Therehasnotbeenonetaxincreaseinhistorythatactuallyraisedrevenue.Andeverytaxcut,fromthe 1920stoKennedy’stoours,hasproducedmore.”Feldsteinimmediately dashedoffabriefhistoryoftaxrevenuesbeforeandaftertaxincrease andconcludedthat“everyincreaseintaxrateswasfollowedbyarisein taxrevenue[emphasisinoriginal].”Forgoodmeasure,Feldsteinlooked atthehugetaxincreaseduringWorldWarIIandconcluded:“Thereis noevidencethattherisingtaxrateswereincompatiblewithincreased realGNP[grossnationalproduct].”8 Twoexpertsontaxpolicy,W.ElliotBrownleeandC.EugeneSteuerle, arguethat,“duringthelate1970s,Reagandiscoveredthatdismaleconomicconditionswerecreatingabreedinggroundforapopularrevolt against government and especially against the tax system.”9 Changes inthetaxratestructurefrom1960to1980hadgiventhesupply-side
44 JOHNW.SLOAN
philosophy a populist appeal that Reagan was able to exploit brilliantly.AsThomasEdsallpointsout,in1960,theprogressivityofthe taxsystemwastargetedatthetop5percentofthepopulation.Only3 percentofmarriedcouplesearnedasmuchas$15,000ayearin1961; over80percentofthepopulationmadelessthan$8,000.Forthebulk ofthepopulation,therewaslittleornotaxdisadvantageinreceiving a major salary increase or from inflation-induced bracket creep.As Edsallexplains,“Between1960and1979,however,themedianfamily incomegrewfrom$5,620to$19,684,inpartfrominflationandinpart fromrealincreasesinspendableincome.Whathadbeenastatistically exceptionalincomein1960becamein1978themedianincome.... Asaconsequenceofthisprocess,thesharplyrisingmarginalratesthat hadbeentargetedattheveryaffluentintheearly1960s—whilemostof thepopulationfacedwhatamountedtoaflattax—becameasystemin whichthevastmajorityoftaxpayersfacedsharplyincreasingmarginal taxratesastheirincomegrew.”10By1980,abouthalfofallincometax returnswerereflectinghighermarginalratesthanin1960.Brownleeand Steuerleaddthat,“the‘bracket-creep’inincometaxratesoftenbecame ‘bracket-leap.’Attheextreme,someupper-middle-classpeoplesawtheir marginalfederalincometaxratealmostdoublefrom22percenttoover40 percent,whiletheirstateandlocalincometaxwerealsogrowingmuch fasterthantheirincomes.Anditwasnotjusttherichandmiddleclass whowereaffected.Manylower-incomepeople,especiallythosewith dependents,hadtopayincometaxforthefirsttimeasthevalueoftheir personalanddependentexemptionsandtheeffectivetax-exemptlevelof incomeeroded.”11Thus,by1980,theaveragetaxpayerwaspayingrates thathadbeendesigned(byDemocrats!)totaxtherich.Thissituation wasexacerbatedbyinflation-drivenbracketcreep;inflationsoaredfrom 7.7percentin1978to13.5percentin1980. Reagan’sresponsetothestagflationofthelate1970swastwomajor taxbills:theEconomicRecoveryTaxAct(ERTA)of1981andtheTax ReformAct(TRA)of1986.ERTAwasthetoppolicypriorityduringthe firstyearofReagan’spresidency;itspassage,whichfulfilledoneofhis majorcampaignpromises,helpedtoestablishhiscredentialsasaleader whoknewhowtowieldpresidentialpowersuccessfully.In1981,Reagan beganhispresidencybyrollingoverCongresswiththepassageofERTA and$35billionworthofbudgetcuts.ThepassageoftheTRAin1986 wastheadministration’smajordomesticsuccessinReagan’ssecondterm. Althoughbothbillsloweredtaxrates,thephilosophyunderlyingeachof
THEECONOMICCOSTSOFREAGANMYTHOLOGY 45
themwasquitedifferent.Whatconservativemythmakersalsooverlook is that the success of the administration’s economic policies was not dependentonastrictadherencetoReagan’svisions—popularlyknown as“stayingthecourse”—butinsteadreliedonsuchcoursecorrections astaxincreasesandamajorchangeinmonetarypolicy. ERTAwasthelargesttaxcutinthehistoryoftheUnitedStates.It providedataxcutofover$37billionin1982,increasingtoabout$267 billionin1986,foratotalfive-yearrevenuelosstotheTreasuryof$750 billion.The rates on individual income taxes would be reduced by 5 percentonOctober1,1981,10percentonJuly1,1982,and10percent onJuly1,1983.Thetoptaxratewasslicedfrom70percentto50percent onJanuary1,1982.Forindividuals,ERTAincludedmarriagepenalty relief,indexing(beginningin1985,therewouldbeannualadjustments in personal exemptions, zero bracket amounts, and income brackets tooffsetbracketcreepcausedbyinflation),adropinthecapitalgains ratefrom28to20percent,andwidermarginsontaxbreaksforhome sellers.Businessesreceivedgenerousdepreciationwrite-offsforbuildings,equipment,andvehicles;theyalsobenefitedfrominvestmenttax credits ranging from 6 to 10 percent and reductions in the corporate taxrates.Savingsincentiveswereincreasedbyauthorizingbanksand savingsinstitutionstoissueone-yearsavers’certificatesandbyexpandingthenumberofpeopleeligibletoparticipateinIRAprograms.The thresholdforestatetaxeswasraisedfrom$175,625to$600,000,and thetaxexemptionforgiftsfromparentstochildrenorbetweenspouses wasexpandedtocovergiftsupto$10,000peryear(previously$3,000). Therewerealsonumerousbenefitsfortheoilindustryandoilroyalty owners.Inbrief,ERTAhadtwoprovisionsthatraisedrevenuesandthirty thatreducedthem.12 ERTAwassupportedbyaphilosophythatheldthatitwasgoodto riddlethetaxcodewithtaxexpenditures(alsoknownastaxloopholes) aimedatbenefitingsaversandinvestors.Supply-sidersarguedthatthe liberalregime’s“incometaxpenalizessaversbytaxingtwiceincome earnedandsavedwhiletaxingonlyonceincomeearnedandspent,and thattheincometaxtaxescapitalincometwice—atboththecorporate andtheindividuallevel.Toredressthisimbalance,conservativesoften wantedtolowerfurthertheeffectivetaxrateoncapitalincomeandsupportedtheadoptionofnewtaxexpendituresfavoringcapital.”13Since Reaganhadpubliclysupportedtaxexpendituresduringthe1970sand evenmadetheincredibleargumentthatfewloopholesbenefitthewealthy,
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hedidnotobjectwhenbusinesslobbyistslikeCharlesWalkerfilledERTA withtaxbreaks.14ButC.EugeneSteuerle,ataxexpertwhoworkedin Reagan’s Treasury Department, did object since he believed that the multitudeoftaxexpendituresinERTAviolatedrationaltaxprinciples. InSteuerle’swords,“Unlikemanyprevioussubtleandhiddenattempts tograntspecialfavors,herewasawideopenandreadilyacknowledged attempttocreatezeroornegativeeffectiveratesonaneconomy-wide scale. Many taxpayers began to believe that the government favored thepurchaseofshelters....Thegovernmentseemedtoclaim,atleast temporarily,thatwhatwasgoodforthesheltermarketwasgoodforthe country.”15Itwasnot. ForSteuerle,themostsignificantcomponentofERTAwastherequirementthatthefourteentaxbrackets,thepersonalexemption,and thestandarddeductionbeindexed,whichmeantannuallyadaptedtothe inflationrateafter1984.Nolongerwouldtheperverseincentiveexist wherethefederalgovernmentwouldberewardedwithincreasedrevenue becauseofinflation.“By1990,”accordingtoSteuerle,“theadjustment forinflationalonewasestimatedtohavereducedreceiptsbyover$57 billionrelativetoanunindexedtaxcode.”16TheironyhereisthatindexingwasnotpartofReagan’sinitialtaxbill;Congressaddedit. ThepassageofERTAdidnotproducetheeconomicmiraclespredicted byReaganandhissupply-sideadvisers.InSeptember1981,theeconomy nose-divedintoarecession,unemploymentroseto10.7percentinlate 1982,revenuedeclined,andthebudgetdeficitrosefrom$73.8billion in1980to$207.8billionin1983.PublicperceptionsthattheReagan administrationwaspromotingtaxbreaksfortherichandbudgetcuts forthepoorhurtboththepresidentandtheRepublicanParty.In1982, Reagan’spublicapprovalratingsdeclinedtoabout35percent,andthe Republicanslosttwenty-sixHouseseatsinthecongressionalelections. The public’s fear of budget deficits forced the administration to considerpainfulalternatives,suchastaxincreasesandcuttingthegrowth inmandatoryentitlementspendingforpopularprogramssuchasSocial Security and Medicare. The Reagan administration’s response to the policydilemma,inSteuerle’swords,wasnotaprofileincourage. Leadershipforthedetailsofinitiativeswasseldomtobeprovidedbythe presidentandtheWhiteHouse.Realresponsibilitywastorestwiththe RepublicanSenateandwithacommission[headedbyAlanGreenspan] designedtodealwiththepossibilitythatthesocialsecurityprogrammight haveinsufficientfundstomeetitsobligations.Withintheadministration,
THEECONOMICCOSTSOFREAGANMYTHOLOGY 47
politicalforcesweresplit:someproclaimingtheneedforfurthertaxcuts, andothersworkingtotrytoreducethedeficit.Theadministrationwould waffleinitsrole.Itdidnotwanttotakeresponsibilityforanytaxincreases, butsomeofitsmemberswanteddeficitreductionthatmightincludesome taxincreases.Thepresident’spublicpositionwasthatheopposedalltaxes, butheeventuallyacceptedmanyincreases.Inthissituation,thevisible leadershiprolewasoftenlefttoothers.17
ItwasnotpartofReagan’soriginaldesignthathewouldfeelcompelled to accept several tax increases in order to respond to the unexpected (forhim)deepeningdeficits.Jittersaboutbudgetdeficitsandconcerns aboutsavingSocialSecuritycausedCongresstopasstaxincreasesin 1982,1983,and1984,allofwhichweresignedintolawbyReagan.The mostsignificantbillwastheTaxEquityandFiscalResponsibilityAct (TEFRA)of1982,whichwasdesignedtoraise$98.3billionoverthree yearsandthuseffectivelyregainone-fourthofthetaxrevenuelostin 1981.CongresspassedTEFRAinAugust1982largelybecauseofthe politicalskillsofSenatorRobertDole,whowasthenchairoftheSenate FinanceCommittee.Thiswasthefirstsignificanttaxincreaseenactedby Congressduringanelectionyearinpeacetimesince1932.18InJuly1984, CongresspassedandReagansignedanotherbill,theDeficitReduction Act(DEFRA)of1984,whichraisedtaxesbyclosingsixteenloopholes. “Taken together,” according to Brownlee and Steuerle, “TEFRA and DEFRAraisedrevenuesontheaverageof$100billionperyearat1990 levelsofincome.Increasesthisbighadneverbeenenactedexceptduring majorwars.”19Obviously,therehadbeenaretreatfromthethinkingthat hadsupportedERTAin1981.TheWhiteHousespinmachinedidnotcall thesechangestaxincreases;itlabeledthemrevisionsinthetaxcode. Theretreatcontinuedastheadministrationpreparedforthepresident’s 1984StateoftheUnionaddress,whichfortuitouslylaunchedasetof forcesthatbroughtaboutmajortaxreformin1986.InDecember1983, TreasurySecretaryDonaldRegan,withtheinformationthatmanycorporationswereabletoavoidfederaltaxationbytakingadvantageoftax loopholes,triedtoconvincethepresidenttoadvocatetaxreforminhis StateoftheUnionaddress.Thetaxsystemneededtobefundamentally changedbecauseitwastoocomplex,toounfair,andtoorestrictiveon economicgrowth.20JamesBakerandRichardDarman,thepresident’stop pragmaticadvisers,wantedReagantostressdeficitreductionandwere skepticalabouttheappealoftaxreformintheupcomingpresidential election.ButBakerandDarmanwerefearfulthatWalterMondale,the
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likelyDemocraticpresidentialcandidate,mightfocushiscampaignon theunfairnessofthetaxcode.Hence,earlyin1984,Baker,mistakenly believingthatMondalemightchampiontheBradley-Gephardttaxbill, whichwouldsimplifythetaxcodeandlowertaxrates,suggestedthat ReagandirecttheTreasuryDepartmenttodevelopcomprehensivetax reformlegislation.AcceptingBaker’sadvice,thepresidentinhisState oftheUnionaddressorderedSecretaryRegantoconductastudyoftax reformandreportbacktohiminDecember1984.Thismaneuveressentiallyneutralizedtaxreformasanissueduringthe1984campaign. Duringthecampaign,thefocuswasonthefactthatMondalewantedto raisetaxesandReagandidnot. Afterthe1984election,theTreasuryDepartmentpresenteditsrecommendedtaxreformbill(calledTreasuryI)tothepresident.TreasuryI, skillfullypreparedbytheneutrallycompetentbureaucratsinthedepartment,recommendedtheeliminationof38of105taxexpenditures.Early in1985,ChiefofStaffJamesBakerandTreasurySecretaryDonaldRegan switchedjobs.InreviewingTreasuryI,TreasurySecretaryBakerandhis deputy,Darman,decidedthattheproposalwouldhavetoberevisedto makeitmorepoliticallyfeasiblebeforeitcouldbeintroducedtoCongress.Thiswasdone,andPresidentReaganpresentedhistaxbill(known asTreasuryII)toCongressinlateMay1985.Unlikethesituationin1981, Reagancouldnotsteamrollhisopponentsin1985,buthewasableto imposeamajorrule:anybillwouldhavetoberevenue-neutral.Thatis, anynewtaxbillwouldhavetoraisethesameamountofrevenueasthe existingtaxlaw.AccordingtotaxpolicyexpertJohnWitte,“Revenue neutralityhadanimportantdirecteffect.Itrepressedthetemptationto addrevenue—losingtaxbreaksbecauseitprovidedthecommitteechairs withasimplerule—foreverybreakproposed,theproponenthadtofind anoffsettingrevenuegain.”21Still,eachhouseofCongresssignificantly modifiedthebill;theresultwasnotsimplyafulfillmentofReagan’s vision.TheTaxReformActwasfinallypassedbyCongressandsigned byPresidentReaganonOctober22,1986. ThephilosophyunderlyingtheTRAwasthat,inbroadeningthetax basebyreducingthenumberoftaxloopholes,thegovernmentcould significantlylowertaxrates.TRA’schiefsellingpointwasthatitreducedthefourteenratebracketstotworatesof15and28percent,with acomplicatedsurtaxthatplacedsomeupper-middle-classfamilies(with jointincomebetween$71,900and$149,250)ina33percentbracket. Anestimated80percentofAmericanfamiliesfellintothe15percent
THEECONOMICCOSTSOFREAGANMYTHOLOGY 49
bracket.Thus,asMichaelBoskinpointedout,“Thetopmarginaltaxrate inthepersonalincometaxwillhavegonefrom70percentin1980to 28percentby1988,anastoundingreduction,makingthetopmarginal taxrateintheUnitedStateslowerthanthebottommarginaltaxratein manycountries.”22Byalmostdoublingtheexemptionsforself,spouse, anddependents,TRAremovedapproximately6millionpoorfromthe taxrolls.DemocratssupportedthisprovisionforitsfairnessandRepublicansforbeingpro-family.TRAeliminatedthepreferentialtreatment ofcapitalgainsincomebyraisingthetaxratefrom20percenttothe topindividualrateof28percent.Formanyindividuals,beingableto takethestandarddeduction,whichhadbeensignificantlyraised,greatly simplifiedthefilingoftheirtaxreturns.Itwasestimatedthatabout60 percentofallAmericanspaidslightlylowertaxes(afewhundreddollars peryear)becauseofthisreformlaw,andanother25percentpaidwhat theyhadbeenpayingbefore.Theremaining15percentfacedarelatively smalltaxincrease.23 TheTRAwasanoutstandingexampleofreformlegislationbecause itovercamepoliticians’naturalinclinationstorewardspecialinterests (especiallythosegroupswhoprovidegenerouscampaigncontributions) with tax breaks.According to Witte, “TRA dwarfs any of the three priorpeacetimereformacts....Seventy-twoprovisionstightenedtax expenditures,includingfourteenthatinvolvedcompleterepeal,afigure approximatelyequaltothetotalnumberoftaxexpendituresthathad beenrepealedfrom1913to1985....Theinitialestimatesofrevenue gainsfromtighteningandclosingtaxexpenditureswere$324billion overfiveyears.”24 ThemostsurprisingfeatureoftheTRAwasthat,between1986and 1991,itshiftedanestimated$120billionofthetaxburdenfromindividualstocorporations.AsexplainedbyBoskin,“Thisoccursdespite thefactthatthebasiccorporatetaxrateisbeingreducedfromforty-six percenttothirty-fourpercentbecauseofaverysubstantialincreaseinthe corporatetaxbase,achievedthroughtheeliminationoftheinvestment taxcredit,muchslowerdepreciation,andastiffalternativeminimum taxforcorporations(toinsurethatnocorporationthatreportscurrent profitstoitsshareholderswillavoidpayingtaxes).”25Theplayingfield forcorporationsmayhavebeenleveledbythistaxreform,butitwas nowalsomoreexpensivetoplay. ThechiefplayerinpromotingtheunlikelypassageoftheTRAwas RonaldReagan.Heplacedtaxreformonthepolicyagendabymakingit
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thesymbolofhis“secondAmericanRevolution”inhis1985Stateofthe Unionaddress.Reaganhadthechameleon-likecapabilityofidentifying withandappealingtothosewhofeltthattaxesweretoocomplex,those whofeltthattaxeswereunfair,thosewhofeltthattherichwerenotpayingtheirfairshare,andthosewhofeltthattaxesimpededtheirchancesto moveup.Oneofhismajorpublicrelationsachievementswastoplantthe ideathattheprogressiveincometaxwaselitistandthatflatterrateswere egalitarianbecausetheyprovidedmoreopportunitiesformorepeopletodo better.Thepresident’staxreformwasportrayedaspro-fairness,pro-family, andpro-growth;itepitomizedReagan’sconservativepopulism. ReagansavedthebillinNovember1985whenHouseRepublicans wererepelledbythemodificationsimposedbyDanRostenkowski’sWays and Means Committee. He helped create an atmosphere in which no onewantedtoappearresponsibleforkillingthereformproposal.Witte suggests,“Reagan’ssupportoftaxreformamplifiedtheuniquepolitical jockeyingthattheissuestimulatedinbothparties.Inabizarrepolitical reversalof1981,indeficit-plagued1985and1986,taxreformacquired thesamepoliticalmomentumaswholesaletaxreductionandloophole expansionhadin1981.”26AsSteuerleexplains,“Onceitbecameclear thatanadministrativelyfeasiblesystemcouldbedesignedthatwould lowerratesandeliminateshelters,removethepoorfromtaxrolls,and treatindividualswithequalincomemoreequally,noonewantedtobe knownasthepersonwhostoodinthewayofthiseffortandcausedit tofail.”27InamajorstudyofthepassageoftheTRA,twoWallStreet Journalreportersconcludedthat“Reaganwantedtogodowninhistory asthepresidentwhocutthattoptaxrateatleastinhalf,from70percent to35percentorlower.Ifabandoningtaxbreaksandraisingcorporate taxeswerethepricehehadtopaytoachievethatgoal,sobeit.”28 However, despite Reagan’s enthusiastic speech making in support oftheTRA,itislikelythathewasnotknowledgeableaboutthemajor provisionsinhisownproposal.Inaninterviewfollowinghis1985State oftheUnionaddress,thepresidentrevealedthathedidnotunderstand thathisTreasuryIIproposalincludeda36percentincreaseincorporate taxes.29InAlbertHunt’swords,“Thepresident’signoranceofthespecificsofhisownproposalwasstartling;throughout,hemisrepresented ormisunderstoodthemeasure’staxincreaseonbusiness,butPresident Reagan’sattachmenttolowerrateswasrealandhiscommitmenttothe conceptoftaxreformwasevenmorepowerfulthanhisignoranceofthe details.Heneverquiteconvincedthepublic,buthispoliticalpersona
THEECONOMICCOSTSOFREAGANMYTHOLOGY 51
Table2.1 TheReaganAdministration’sEconomicRecord 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
GNP Percent Gross (billions change private of from investment 1982 preceding (billionsof dollars) year 1982dollars) 3,187.1 –0.2 509.3 3,248.8 1.9 545.5 3,166.0 –2.5 447.3 3,279.1 3.6 504.0 3,501.4 6.8 658.4 3,618.7 3.4 637.0 3,717.9 2.7 639.6 3,845.3 3.4 669.0 4,016.9 4.5 705.7 4,117.7 2.5 716.9
Federal Unem- yearly ployment change rate inCPI 7.0 13.5 7.5 10.3 9.5 6.2 9.5 3.2 7.4 4.3 7.1 3.6 6.9 1.9 6.1 3.6 5.4 4.1 5.2 4.8
Federal budget deficits (billions) –73.8 –78.9 –127.9 –207.8 –185.3 –212.3 –221.2 –149.7 –155.1 –153.4
Source:EconomicReport(1991).
andcommunicationskillscommandedsuchrespectthattheyscaredoff alotofpotentialopponents.”30 Byfocusingonreducingthetopratesonindividualincometaxes,ReaganfailedtoseehowphilosophicallyinconsistentERTAandTRAwere. WhereasERTAhadcreatedanumberoftaxexpenditurestoencourage savingsandinvestment,theTRAemphasizedlevelingtheplayingfield byeliminatingorreducingseventy-twotaxexpenditures.Taxbreaksthat hadbeendesignedtoencouragespecificeconomicactivitieswerenow removed because it was felt that they distorted the choices taxpayers andbusinessesweremaking.Theironyofthe1986taxreformwasthat itwasdesignedtoclosemanyoftheloopholesinERTA.Wittewryly concludes,“RonaldReaganthushastheuniquehistoricalpositionof supportingboththelargesttaxreformandthelargestanti-taxreform legislationinthehistoryoftheUnitedStates.”31 TheConsequencesofReagan’sEconomicPolicies ThestatisticalevidencesummarizingtheReaganpresidencydoesnot supporttheconservativeassertionthattherewasa“Reaganrevolution”; itdoesbolsterthepropositionthathehadagood,solideconomicrecord (seeTable2.1).WhenReaganandhissupply-sidesupporterscameto power,theyeuphoricallyexpectedthattheirtaxcutswouldbothstimulate
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theeconomyandshrinkthefederalgovernmentbyreducingitsfunding. Onceinoffice,however,confrontingaDemocraticallycontrolledHouse throughoutthe1980s,theyfounditwasmorepoliticallyfeasibletocut taxesthantocutexpenditures.In1980,federaltaxesconstituted19percentandfederalexpenditures21.4percentofthegrossdomesticproduct (GDP).By1989,taxesconstitutedaslightlylower18.5percent,while expendituresremainedat21.4percentofaconsiderablylargerGDP.32 DespiteReagan’srhetoricopposingbiggovernment,heeliminatedvery fewprogramsandsucceededonlyinslowingthegrowthoffederalspending(adjustedforinflation)fromabout4percentayearduringtheCarter years(1977–1981)toabout2.5percentduringthe1980s.33 Sincethe1981taxcutsdidnotproduceasupply-sidemiracle,theresult wasannualbudgetdeficitsleadingtomassiveincreasesinthenational debt.Reaganhadpromisedtobalancethebudgetby1984,butinhiseight yearsinoffice,heneverproposedabalancedbudget.Duringthe1980s,the U.S.nationaldebtincreasedfrom$914billionto$2.6trillion.Thetotal nationaldebtaccumulatedunderthenation’sfirstthirty-ninepresidents morethandoubledunderitsfortieth,RonaldReagan.WhenReaganwas inaugurated,itcosttheTreasury$71billionayeartoservicethenational debt;whenheleftoffice,debtservicehadsoaredtoover$150billionannually.Notuntil1995wouldthebudgetdeficit,measuredasapercentage oftheGDP,fallbelowthelevelReaganinheritedin1981. The Reagan administration predicted that the passage of the $750 billiontaxcutinAugust1981wouldgeneraterationalexuberancein financialmarkets.Supply-sidersbelievedthatevenbeforethetaxreductionstookeffect,thedepressedstockandbondmarketswouldquickly reactwithbriskrallies.Instead,defyingtheseideologicalforecasts,both marketsdeclinedinAugustandSeptember1981.Ratherthanenjoyinga burstofprosperity,Reaganfoundhimselfchallengedbyarecession. The1981–1982slumpwastheeighthrecessiontheUnitedStateshad sufferedsincetheendofWorldWarII.Therewereover25,000businessfailuresin1982,thesecondhighestnumbersince1933,duringthe Depression.InNovember1982,morethan9millionAmericanswere unemployed,anumberthatwouldclimbtoapeakof11.5millionin January1983.Whereasthesevenpostwarbusinesscyclesbefore1982 averagedanunemploymentrateof7.1percentattheirtroughs,theeighth cyclehitanunemploymentrateof10.8percentattheendof1982.About 2.3millionmanufacturingjobswerelostintherecession,whichfueled fearsaboutthedeindustrializationoftheUnitedStates.
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Reagan handled this trial by recession fairly well. When Murray Weidenbaum,thechairoftheCouncilofEconomicAdvisers(CEA), toldReaganinlateJuly1981thatarecessionwasabouttobegin,the normallyamiablepresidentreactedwithacoldstareofdisbelief.34By October,headmittedpubliclythattheeconomywassufferingfroma “slightrecession,”buthepredictedafastrecoveryifwehadthecourageto“staythecourse”andcontinuehispolicies.Whilesupply-siders andTreasurySecretaryReganblamedtherecessiononFederalReserve BoardchairPaulVolcker’s“excessive”tighteningofthemoneysupply, thepresidentdidnot.Heviewedtherecessionasstemmingfromthefact thathisoriginalsupply-sideproposalforcuttingtaxesby10percentfor threesuccessiveyearsbeginningonJanuary1,1981,hadbeendelayed and watered down. Reagan had unshakable beliefs that shielded him fromdoubtsabouttheefficacyofhispolicies. Aseconomicconditionsdeterioratedin1982,Reaganplayedtherole of cheerleader, encouraging citizens not to lose faith. He condemned themediaforemphasizingpessimisticstories,whichhebelievedwere delayingtherecovery.Inhis1982economicreporttoCongress,Reagandeclared,“Iamconvincedthatourpolicies...aretheappropriate responsetoourcurrentdifficultiesandwillprovidethebasisforavigorouseconomicrecoverythisyear.Itisofthegreatestimportancethatwe avoidareturntothestop-and-gopoliciesofthepast.Theprivatesector worksbestwhentheFederalGovernmentintervenesleast.TheFederal Government’staskistoconstructasound,stable,long-termframework inwhichtheprivatesectoristhekeyenginetogrowth,employment, andrisinglivingstandards.”35Inpublicspeeches,Reagandepictedhis administrationasthe“cleanupcrew,”tidyingupthemesscausedbya forty-year“nonstopbinge”(asignificantmetaphorforthesonofanalcoholic).Fromhisperspective,thisrecessionprovidedconclusiveevidence thattheeconomicpoliciesofthepreviouspresidenciesdidnotwork. HeexhortedAmericanstoincreasetheirsavingsratebytwopercentage points,whichwouldaddabout$60billionayeartothenation’scapital pooltocombathighinterestratesandtofinanceinvestments,mortgages, andnewjobs.Reaganassuredthenationthathispolicieswerebasednot on“quickfixes”butondealingwiththe“rootcauses”oftheeconomic problemsandthatbytaminginflation,whicheventuallywouldleadto unemployment if unabated, he was constructing a recovery that was “builttolast.”36 TherecessionhelpedtheDemocratspickuptwenty-sixseatsinthe
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HouseofRepresentativesinthe1982congressionalelections,thusending Republicaspirationstocontrolbothchambersduringthe1980s.Reagan’s publicapprovalratingsdeclinedfromahighof67percentinApril1981 tothemid-30sinearly1983.Butexitpollsinthe1982electionsindicatedthatvotersweremorelikelytoblametheDemocratsratherthan Reaganforeconomicproblems.37HistorianAlonzoHambysuggested that“itwasameasureofthedepthofpublicdissatisfactionwithCarter andtheDemocratsthatReaganwasabletosurvivetheworsteconomic troughsincetheGreatDepressionwithlittledamage.”38LouCannon wrote,“Laterinhispresidency,afterReaganhadbecomearemoteand disengagedmonarch,first-termaideswouldrecallthegrimmonthsof recessionasiftheywereagoldenage.TheywouldrememberReagan scoffing at his critics and the polls and defiantly proclaiming that he would‘staythecourse’withhiseconomicprogram.‘Thegreatestshow ofhisleadershipwasthen,’saidspeechwriterBentleyElliott.”39 Theironyofthisepisode,aswillbeexplainedlater,isthatthesuccess oftheReaganadministration’seconomicpolicieswasnotdueto“staying thecourse”butchangingitsignificantlyinthesummerof1982. ThepoliticalsuccessoftheReaganadministrationwaslargelybased onitseconomicperformance.AsindicatedinTable2.1,theeconomy beganalong-lastingrecoveryfromtherecessionin1983,withtheGNP increasing3.6percentinthatyearandawhopping6.8percentduring thepresidentialelectionyearof1984.From1983to1990,theeconomy grewatabout3.5percentayear,andtheGNPexpandedby32percent. TheDowJonesindustrialaveragewentup32.8percentinReagan’sfirst termand71percentinthesecond.From1982to1989,theStandard andPoor’sindexof500stockswentupalmost300percent.Reaganhad fulfilledhis1980campaignpromisetorejuvenatetheeconomy. Themostremarkableattributeofthisperiodofeconomicgrowthwas itsdurability.Itlastedninety-twomonths,whichwasmorethantwice theaveragelengthofexpansionssince1945althoughitwasexceeded bythe106-monthgrowthperiodfromFebruary1961toDecember1969, whichwaspartlyfueledbytheVietnamWar.Anewandmoreresilient economyemergedinthe1980s,onethatwasabletogrowdespitefears raisedbybudgetandtradedeficits,bythe508-pointdropintheDow JonesindexinOctober1987,andbyallthetechnologicalchangesthat seemedtobeaccelerating.Duringthe1980stheUnitedStatesunderwent a metamorphosis from a manufacturing economy to a more flexible information-based, service-providing economy created by computer,
THEECONOMICCOSTSOFREAGANMYTHOLOGY 55
revolutionsinshipping(UPS),just-in-timeordering,efficiency-minded reorganizationsandplantclosings,outsourcing,andtheincreasinguse oftemporaryworkers. Supply-sidersexaggeratethesuccessofReagan’seconomicpolicies. They evaluate Reagan’s performance using data from 1983 to 1990, blamingthe1981–1982recessiononPresidentCarterandthe1990–1991 recessiononPresidentBush’sdecisiontoraisetaxes.In1990,Martin Andersondeclared,“Wedon’tknowwhetherhistorianswillcallitthe GreatExpansionofthe1980sorReagan’sGreatExpansion,butwedo knowfromofficialeconomicstatisticsthattheseven-yearperiodfrom 1982to1989wasthegreatest,consistentburstofeconomicactivityever seenintheUnitedStates.”40Theevidencedemonstrates,however,that theeconomyperformedbetterinthe1960s,undertheKeynesianpoliciesofKennedyandJohnson,thaninthe1980s.Inthe1960s,theGDP expanded52.8percent;inthe1980s,34.7percent.Inthe1960s,worker productivityimproved31.8percent;inthe1980s,15.6percent.Inthe 1960s,medianfamilyincome(adjustedforinflation)increasedby39.7 percent;inthe1980s,itincreasedbyonly4.3percent.41IntermsofannualGDPgrowth,presidentsTruman(5.9percent),Kennedy/Johnson (4.9percent),andJohnson(4.4percent)hadbetterrecordsthanReagan (2.3percentinhisfirsttermand3.2percentinhissecond).42Whatmade Reagan’seconomicrecordlooksogoodwascomparisonstothelasttwo yearsoftheCarterpresidency. ThepoliticalsuccessoftheReaganpresidencywaslargelydependentonthe18millionnewjobsthattheAmericaneconomyproduced duringthe1980s.In1980,over99millionAmericanshadjobs,andthe unemploymentratestoodatabout7percent;by1990,almost118millionworkerswereemployed,andtheunemploymentratehaddroppedto 5.4percent.43ApologistsforReaganskipoverthepointthat1.9million jobswerelostbetweenApril1981andNovember1982andstressthat inthetwenty-sevenmonthsafterNovember1982,7.6millionjobswere produced.Conservativesalsoneglecttoreportthattheeconomyproduced morejobsinthe1970sand1990sthaninthe1980s.44 The Reagan presidency had less success in increasingAmericans’ propensitytosaveandinvestthanitdidinprovidingjobs.In1981,the administration’sprogramforeconomicrecoverystressedthat,incontrast totheinflationary,demand-ledexpansionsofthepast,growthinthe1980s wouldbebasedonthesupplysideoftheeconomy.Increasesinsavings and investment would allow the economy to flourish without anxiety
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aboutcapacity-inducedinflationpressures.Administrationsupply-siders suchasNormanTurepredictedthattaxcutswouldincreasegrossprivate savings(composedofpersonalandbusinesssavings).Personalsavingsas aproportionofdisposablepersonalincomewereprojectedtorisefrom anaverageof5.4percentin1977–1980to7.9percentin1986.Business savings,whichgenerallyaccountforslightlymorethantwo-thirdsof totalprivatesavings,wereforecasttoclimbabovethe17percentofGDP ratethathadbeenmaintainedsince1956.45 Thesegoalswerenotachieved.Personalsavings,insteadofrisingto8 percentofdisposableincome,fellandaveragedonly4.5percentduring the1980s.Grossnationalsavingsdeclinedfrom19.2percentoftheGDP in1980to15.6percentin1989.46From1971to1980,thenetnational savingsratioaveraged8.9percentoftheGDP;from1981to1988,it averagedonly3.7percent.47Changesinthetaxcodedidnotcausethe Americanpeopletogiveuptheirinclinationtoconsume.Instead,we continuedtobeabuynow,paylatersociety.Consumerdebt,asaproportionofpersonalincomeaftertaxes,climbedfrom62.7percentin1970 to74.9percentin1980andreached96.9percentin1990.48Increased consumptionaccountedforovertwo-thirdsofthegrowthduringtheeconomicexpansionfrom1982to1990.Fortunatelyfortheadministration’s pro-growthpolicy,however,thecapital-short,consumption-drivenU.S. economywasbailedoutbyanunforeseenboostinforeigninvestment, whichwasattractedtoourlow-inflation,high-interestsafehaven. ButtheReaganpresidencywasdependentonmorethanitsabilityto promoteeconomicgrowth;sustainablegrowthwouldrequireamonetary policytopreventinflation.WhenReaganbecamepresidentin1981,accordingtoGeorgeWill,“prudentpeoplewereworriedthatinflationwas thesystemicdiseaseofdemocracies.Thatis,democraciescouldnotresist deficitspending,andwoulduseinflationasslowmotionrepudiationof theirdeficits.Furthermore,democracies,withlowpainthresholds,could notendurethepaininvolvedinwringinginflationfromthesystem.”49 BythetimeReaganleftoffice,inflationwasconsideredamanageable problem.CreditfortaminginflationshouldbesharedbetweentheadministrationandPaulVolcker’sFederalReserveBoard.Duringthedecade, theconsumerpriceindex(CPI)wasreducedfrom13.5percentin1980 to 4.1 percent in 1988. Inflation averaged about 3.6 percent between 1983and1989,whichhelpedtolowerinterestrates.Sinceinflationhas corrosiveeffectsonboththevalueofmoneyandincentivestopromote economicgrowth,loweringinflationrateswasanessentialingredientin
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promotinglong-termexpansion.Inthepast,growthperiodshavebeen derailedbysevereinflation,whichhaveledtotheimpositionofhigh interestratesbytheFederalReserve.Cannoncorrectlyargues,“Thelong periodoflowinflationhadastabilizingeffectintheUnitedStatesand wasofenormouspoliticalbenefittoReagan....[T]heReagan-Volcker legacyoftreatinginflationasPublicEnemyNo.1...maywellprovethe mostenduringandpopularofReagan’sconflictingeconomiclegacies.”50 Inbrief,confrontinginflationwasasimportantforReagan’ssuccessas dealingwithunemploymentwasforFranklinRoosevelt’s. Theadministration’sinitialanti-inflationstrategywasbasedonMilton Friedman’stheory,whichassumedthattherewasadirectrelationship betweenthequantityofmoneyintheeconomyandthelevelofoutput. Whenthemoneysupplydecreased,therewasarecession;whenitexpandedmoderately,therewassustainableeconomicgrowth;andwhen itgrewtoofast,therewasinflation.Obviously,thecorrectchoicewasto havetheFederalReserveprovideaslow,steadyincreaseinthesupplyof money,butthisalternative,soeasytoselectintheory,provedimpossible toimplementinpractice. MonetarypolicyprovedtobeessentialforReagan’ssuccessinthe 1980s, but not as originally planned by the administration.The key strategistinthebattleagainstinflationwasPaulVolcker,whohadbeen appointed chair of the Federal Reserve Board in 1979 by President Carter. Just as Reagan was attempting to restore confidence in the presidency,Volcker was trying to restore confidence in the Federal ReserveBoardafteritsfailuretocontrolinflationinthelate1970s. DuringVolcker’sSenateconfirmationhearings,helabeledhimselfa “pragmaticmonetarist,”whichsignaledthathewouldnotrigidlyadhere toFriedman’sdoctrine.Volckerstronglybelievedthatinflationwasa growingmenacethatthreatenedthehealthoftheeconomyandthatonly ahard-nosedmonetarypolicycouldfreeusfromitsinsidiouseffects. Hesawthatinflationhadbecomedeeplyentrenchedinoureconomic expectationsandbehavior.Bytheendofthe1970s,theinflationary processwasfeedingonitselfanddistortingeconomicincentives.In Volcker’swords,“Toomuchoftheenergyofourcitizenswasdirected towardseekingprotectionfromfuturepriceincreasesandtowardspeculativeactivity,andtoolittletowardproduction.”51UnlikeReagan,he feltthatonlyaprolongedandpainfulprocesswouldbesuccessfulin combatinganinflationarysystemthathadgrowntoolargetobeharnessedbymoderatemeans.Therepeatedfailuressincethelate1960s
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hadbredskepticismastowhetherpolicymakershadtheknowledge, commitment,andcouragetosubdueinflation. Withinflationappearingoutofcontrol,Volckerledtheseven-person FederalReserveBoardintoaFriedman-inspiredmonetaryexperimentin October1979.Insteadoftryingtocontrolinterestrates,theFederalReservewouldsetspecificsupplygoalsandemployitsauthorityoverbank reserves.Theshiftinfocusfrominterestratestorestrictingthegrowth ofthemoneysupplywasdesignedtosignalmarketsthatanewandfar moreseriouseffortwasunderwaytocombatinflation.Theplanwasto establishatargetforM1(currencyincirculationpluscheckingaccounts) growthandthen“hit”itbymanipulatingbankreserves.Bankreserves areinfluencedbytheactivitiesoftheFederalOpenMarketCommittee (FOMC),whichmeetseighttimesayear.TheFOMCiscomposedof thesevenmembersoftheFederalReserveBoardandfiveofthetwelve Federal Reserve Bank presidents. It always includes the president of theFederalReserveBankofNewYork;theothermembersrotate.The FOMCdeterminesopenmarketpolicy—thatis,itdecideswhetherto buyorsellgovernmentsecurities(bills,notes,andbonds).FOMCdirectivestoeaseortightenthemoneysupplyareimplementedbytheOpen MarketDeskoftheFederalReserveBankinNewYork.Tostimulate monetarygrowth,theFederalReservebuysgovernmentsecurities;to tightenthemoneysupply,itsellsgovernmentsecurities.AsAlbertRees explains,“WhentheFederalReservebuyssecurities,itpaysforthem bycreatingdepositsforthesellersintheFederalReserveBanks;these depositsserveasadditionstoreservesforcommercialbanks.Theadded reservespermitcommercialbanksasagrouptoexpandtheirloansand depositsbyamultipleofthenewreserves;thismultipleistheinverse ofthereserveratio.Forexample,ifreservesoftenpercentarerequired against all deposits, an additional dollar of reserves could ultimately support$10ofadditionaldeposits.”52 WhentheFederalReservesells governmentsecurities,ithastheoppositeeffect. Withinflationaryexpectationssoembeddedinpricingandwagebehaviorandwithpoliticiansrefusingtomakethecompromisesnecessary topreventsoaringbudgetdeficits,Volckerknewthatitwouldtakealong periodoftightmoneytoslowdowninflation.Notoperatinginarosecoloredcampaignmode,Volckerneverpromisedaquickoreasyvictory overinflation.AstheFederalReservetightenedthemoneysupplyand allowedinterestratestofloat,theeconomysloweddown,andthenwent intoasevererecessionintheautumnof1981.Highinterestratescause
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businessfailuresandrisingunemploymentrates.Volcker’scureforinflation seemedtobecausingmorepainthanthedisease.Inevitably,awidevariety ofcongressionalleaders—HouseMajorityLeaderJimWright,CongressmanJackKemp,SenatorTedKennedy,andSenatorHowardBaker—condemnedVolcker.Supply-siderscomplainedthat,whileReagan’splanhad calledfortheautomaticandgradualdecreaseintherateofmoneygrowth overafour-tosix-yearperiod,Volcker’spolicyhad“delivered80percent ofthisreductioninmoneygrowthinthefirstyear—anextraordinarily recessionarypolicy.”53MiltonFriedmanaccusedtheFederalReserveof sabotaginghispolicy,notbecauseitdidnotknowhowtobringaboutstable monetarygrowth,butbecausemostofitspolicymakerswere“unreconstructedKeynesians”whoweremoreinterestedincontrollingcreditthan inprovidingsteadymonetarygrowth.Theresults,accordingtoFriedman, wereerraticmonetarygrowthandinterestrates.54 Within the Reagan administration,Volcker was reprimanded by TreasurySecretaryDonaldReganandTreasuryUndersecretaryBeryl Sprinkel(aformerstudentofMiltonFriedman),whovaguelythreatened theFederalReserveBoardbytalkingaboutadministrationstudiesthat would reduce its independence.Yet Reagan generally supported the FederalReserveBoard.InVolcker’swords, PresidentReaganmusthavereceivedlotsofadvicetotakeontheFed himself,butheneverdiddespiteplentyofinvitationsatpressconferences. ...Ineversawhimoften,asIhadMr.Carter,nordidIeverfeelableto developmuchpersonalrapportorindeedmuchinfluencewithhim.He wasunfailinglycourteous,butheplainlyhadnoinclinationeithertoget intoreallysubstantivediscussionsofmonetarypolicyor,conversely,to seekmyadviceinotherareas.ButIhadthesensethat,unlikesomeofhis predecessors,hehadastrongvisceralaversiontoinflationandaninstinct that,whateversomeofhisadvisersmighthavethought,itwasn’tagood ideatotamperwiththeindependenceoftheFederalReserve.55
Asinflationratesdeclinedin1982,Volckeracknowledgedthatstabilizingpricesduringthemostsevererecessioninfortyyearswasnotagreat victory.Therealchallengewastopromoteanoninflationaryrecoveryand sustainedeconomicexpansion.Hisgoalwastousemonetarypolicyto makethe1980sa“mirrorimageofthe1970s,”reversingthedebilitating trendsofthepastdecade.56Bypreventinginflationthattypicallybecomes aproblemafterfourorfiveyearsofeconomicexpansion,heaimedto prolongthegrowthphaseofthebusinesscycle.
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InJuly1982,afterestablishingitscredibilityasaninflationfighter,and withCongressabouttopassa$98billiontaxincreasethatwouldlower futurebudgetdeficits,theFederalReservebegantoloosenthemoney supplybyraisingmoneytargets.OnJuly19itloweredthediscountrate from12to11.5percent.TheFOMCalsoannouncedthatitwastemporarilysuspendingmoneysupplytargeting;Volckerwasendingthemonetarist experimentandallowingthemoneysupplytoexpandatafasterpacein ordertolowerinterestrates.InAugust1982,ReagansignedtheTEFRA. OnAugust17,theDowJonesindexexperienceditshighestsingle-day riseinitshistory(38.81points)tofinishat831.24,withanearrecord tradingvolumeofover92millionshares.57BetweenJulyandOctober 1982,theFederalReservepermittedtheM1moneysupplytogrowby 15percent.Itappearsthatanimplicitcompromisewasnegotiated—the administrationacceptedatighterfiscalpolicyinexchangefortheFederal Reserve’spursuingaloosermonetarypolicy.Volckerhadbothinitiated andendedFriedman’smonetaristexperimentandsetthestageforalong periodofnoninflationaryeconomicgrowth.InAugust1982,thestock marketbeganthelongestbullmarketinU.S.history. The 1980s were not kind to Friedman’s theory.After the Federal Reservetightenedthemoneysupplyin1981and1982,itallowedM1 togrowby11percentin1983and7percentin1984.JamesAltreports, “Forthe1980sasawhole,M1growth[was]justunder8percentper annum,twopointshigherthaninthe1970s,whileM2growthaveraged justover8percent,thesameasitwasinthe1970s.”58Despitethisgrowth inthemoneysupply,inflationratesinthe1980swereconsiderablylower thaninthe1970s.In1982,Friedmanforecastariseininflationfollowed byarecessionin1984,predictionsthatwereembarrassinglywrong.59 BenjaminFriedman(norelationtoMilton)pointedout“since1980the relationshipbetweenmoneygrowthandthegrowthofeitherincomeor pricesintheUnitedStateshascollapsed....Further,becausethemid1980sbroughtboththefastestmoneygrowthofthepostwarperiodand thegreatestdisinflation,thecorrelationbetweenmoneygrowthandprice inflationcalculatedinthewayrecommendedbyMiltonFriedman(usingtwo-yearaveragestosmoothoutshort-runirregularities,andatwo yearlagbetweenthemoneygrowthandtheinflation)isnownegative forpostwarsamplesincludingthisdecade.”60 Friedman’stheorywasalsowoundedbythefactthat,withthegovernment deregulating the banking system, it became more difficult, perhapsimpossible,fortheFederalReservetocontrolthegrowthofthe
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moneysupply.ThereweremonthswhentheFederalReservesoughtto restrictM1,yetitexpanded.Atothertimes,theoppositeoccurred.Arthur Schlesinger lampooned Friedman’s monetary experiment by writing, “Friedmanism,withitsspuriousclaimtoprecision,receiveditsobituary fromSirIanGilmouratlastyear’sConservativePartyconferencewhen, evokingOscarWilde’sdescriptionoffoxhuntingas‘theunspeakablein pursuitoftheuneatable,’hecalledmonetarism‘theindefinableinpursuit oftheuncontrollable.’”61 MiltonFriedman’stheoryconcentratedontheslow,steadygrowthof thesupplyofmoneyandconsideredinterestratesandunemployment ofsecondaryimportance.Sincemostofthepublichasnounderstanding about the quantity of money but is affected by interest rates and unemployment,itisnotsurprisingthatpoliticalsupportforFriedman’s monetarismdisintegratedduringtheearly1980s.AfterVolckerended Friedman’smonetaristexperimentin1982,Reaganreappointedhimchair in1983.(CouldhisreappointmenthavebeenpartofthepriceforVolcker’s agreeingtoloosenthesupplyofmoneyinJuly1982?)Thus,Friedman experiencedtherewardofwinningtheNobelPrizeforeconomicsand thehumiliationofhavinghistheoryprovenunworkablewhenapplied tonationalmonetarypolicy. ThesuccessofVolcker’spragmatic,discretionarymonetarypolicy, as opposed to Friedman’s automatic monetary policy, played an indispensable role in supporting Reagan’s presidency.Volcker helped Reaganconstructavitalcomponentofanewpolicyregimethatwas abletopromoteeconomicgrowththatwaslesssusceptibletoinflation thantheKeynesian-inspiredone.Becausetheoldsystembasedonthe Phillipscurve(wherebytheFederalReserveallowedinflationtoinch upinordertobringdownunemployment)hadbrokendownbytheend ofthe1970s,anewstrategywasrequiredinthe1980s.Insteadofusing Federal Reserve control over the money supply to balance levels ofinflationandunemployment,thenewsystemstressedthestrategic importance of preventing inflation. In permitting interest rates to rise andfallmorefreely,theFederalReservestabilizedthebusinesscycle byinhibitingbothoverheatingandstalling.Thenewstrategyheldthat sustainedeconomicgrowthwasderivedfromaneffectiveanti-inflationary policy,whichmeanthikinginterestratesinresponsetothefirstsigns ofinflation.Giventherigiditiesofthebudgetandthefrequentgridlock betweenthepresidentandCongress,fiscalpolicywasplayingadeclining roleincontrollinginflationandinstabilizingthebusinesscycle.With
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thefederalgovernment,privatecorporations,andindividualspilingup debtsandwithincreasinginternationalmobilityofprivatecapitalseeking higherinterestrates,theroleofmonetarypolicyhadgrownrapidlyand becomepreeminentinpromotingprosperity.Itcouldfuelinvestmentand growthwithoutexpandingfederalspending.By1986,evenaKeynesian economistcouldwrite,“themonetarypolicyoftheFederalReservehas becomethedominantinstrumentofmacroeconomicmanagement.Ifany fineorcoarsetuningoftheeconomyisdone,it’stheFedthatcallsthe tune,throughitscontrolofmoneyandinterestrates.Afterall,Chairman Volckerandhiscolleaguescanmakenineortenmovesayear.Thebudget makersintheexecutiveandCongresscanmakeonlyone,andinrecent yearstheirprocedures,politicsandconflictshavebecomesocomplex that national economic prospects and strategies play little role in the outcome.”62Inbrief,thechairmanoftheFederalReservehasbecome themostimportanteconomicpolicymakerintheUnitedStates. ThesuccessofVolcker’spoliciescausessomeproblemsforReagan’s ideologicalsupporters.First,Volckerwasoriginallyappointedchairof theFederalReservebyCarter,thepersonificationoffailedliberalism. AftermuchdebatewithintheReaganadministration,Volckerwasreappointedin1983butwasreplacedbyAlanGreenspanin1987.Second, Volcker’smonetarypolicy,whichwaslargelyfollowedbyhissuccessor, wasanationalpolicy,formulatedbyacentralizedpoliticalinstitution thatsuccessfullymuzzledinflationwithoutinhibitingjobcreationand economic growth.After the economy recovered from the 1981–1982 recession, the Federal Reserve’s goal was to navigate an overheated economyintoa“softlanding,”allowinggrowthtoremainpositive,thus avoidinga“hardlanding,”whichwouldcausetheeconomytocontract. Such metaphors sounded suspiciously like the Keynesian concept of “fine-tuning”thebusinesscyclethathadsooffendedconservativesinthe 1960s.TheVolcker-Greenspansuccessstoryweakenstheconservative assertionthatdiscretionarygovernmentpoliciescannotimprovemarket outcomes.Mostimportant,therecordindicatesthatVolckerdidmoreof the“heavinglifting”infightinginflationthanReagan.Whilethepresidentcuttaxesandranlargebudgetdeficits,Volckerborethepolitical heatofkeepinginterestratesfairlyhigh.Theself-servingconservative narrativeisthatVolcker’spoliciescausedtherecession,andReagan’s policiesbroughtaboutnoninflationaryeconomicgrowth.Reagandeserves creditfornotattackingVolckerduringthedarkdaysofthe1981–1982 recessionandforreappointinghimin1983,andVolckerwasclearlythe
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architectoftheanti-inflationarystrategythathasprovedsoessentialin promotingaprolongedeconomicexpansion. President Reagan made major contributions to the creation of this policyregime,whichovercamethedilemmasofstagflationanddemonstratedthattheeconomycouldenjoyalongperiodofeconomicgrowth whileavoidinginflation.Histaxcutsforbothindividualsandcorporationsstimulatedtheprosperitythat,exceptforashort,mildrecession in1990–1991continuedintothe1990s.However,thisframeworkfor economic growth was not simply a function of fulfilling Reagan’s originalvisionsin1980.ContrarytoReagan’sspeechesandconservativemythspinners,thepresident’ssuccesswasnotbasedon“staying thecourse”;rather,itderivedfromhisskillinshiftingpolicydirection whilemaintainingrhetoricalconsistency.By1982,itwasapparentthat therewasafundamentalincompatibilitybetweenReagan’sfiscaland monetarypolicies.Animplicitcompromisewasarrangedwherebythe administration accepted a tighter fiscal policy by acquiescing to tax increases,andVolcker’sFederalReserveBoardagreedtoimplementa loosermonetarypolicy.VolckerendedFriedman’sexperimentin1982, wasreappointedchairmanin1983,andthenskillfullydirectedmonetary policytoconstraininflation.Lowlevelsofinflationwereanessential ingredientinprolongingthegrowthstageofthebusinesscycle.There wasnothingcourageousinReagan’ssigningseveraltaxmeasuresthat hadbeennegotiatedbyaCongressanxioustoreducebudgetdeficits, thusloweringthethreatofinflationandfreeingVolckertoloosenthe supplyofmoneyandcredit. MythicalLessons The challenge for conservatives has been to explain the economic phenomena of the 1990s and George W. Bush’s first administration (2001–2005)fromtheperspectiveoftheeternaltruthsthatReaganhad rediscovered.Conservativeshadnoprobleminaccountingforthefailure ofGeorgeH.W.Bush(1989–1993).Hewasviewedasmoreofacountry clubRepublicanthanaReaganite.In1980,hehadcalledReagan’sproposedsupply-sidetaxcut“voodooeconomics,”andso,in1990,itcame asnosurprisethatheviolatedhis“Readmylips”campaignpromiseand signedamajortaxincreasetoreducethebudgetdeficit.Bushsuffered theinevitableandproperfate:theeconomydeclinedintoarecession,the budgetwasnotbalanced,andhewasdefeatedbyBillClintonin1992.
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ConservativesdisregardthefactsthatBushfelthehadtosignthetaxincreasebecauseofthebudgetconstraintsimposedbytheGramm-Rudman law,abillsignedbyReaganin1985;hehadtodealwiththeenormous expensesofbailingouthundredsofsavingsandloaninstitutionsthat hadbeenderegulatedduringthe1980s,aproblemthatReaganrefused toface;andhehadtomakesurethemilitarywasadequatelyfundedto fighttheGulfWartoliberateKuwait. Asecondchallengeforconservativeswastoexplain—ortoexplain away—BillClinton’seconomicsuccesses.Asa“newDemocrat,”Clintonwaspersuadedbyhismoderateadvisers(LloydBentsenandRobert Rubin) to raise taxes in order to lower the budget deficit, which was about$290billionin1992.WhileClintonwasnothappytobereneging onhiscampaignpromisetocuttaxesforthemiddleclassandrespond to the needs of bondholders, a Republican constituency, Bentsen and Rubin,plusGreenspan,convincedhimthatprogresstowardbalancing thebudgetwouldsignificantlylowerinterestrates,promotelong-term growth,andplacemoredollarsinthepublic’spocketsthanataxcut would.WhenClintonsignedhisdeficitreductionpackageonAugust 10, 1993, conservatives, particularly outraged by the hike in the top individualincometaxrateto39percent,predictedthatthelegislation wouldcausegreatharmtotheeconomy.NewtGingrichproclaimed,“I believethiswillleadtoarecessionnextyear....ThisistheDemocratic Machine’srecessionandeachoneofthemwillbeheldaccountable.”63 RobertRubin,Clinton’ssecondsecretaryofthetreasury,summarizes whathappenedduringtherestofthe1990s: The1993deficitreductionprogramwasatestcaseforsupply-sidetheory. Insteadofthejoblosses,increaseddeficits,andrecessionthesupply-siders predicted,theeconomyhadaremarkableeightyears—thelongestperiod ofcontinuouseconomicexpansionyetrecorded.Unemploymentfellfrom morethan7percentto4percent,accompaniedbythecreationofmore than20millionnewprivate-sectorjobs.InflationremainedlowwhileGDP averaged3.5perannum.Productivitygrowthaveraged2.5percentayear between1995and2000,alevelnotseensincetheearly1970s.Poverty rateswentdownsignificantly,includingamongBlacksandHispanics, andincomesroseforbothhigherandlowerearners.Forthefirsttimein nearly30years,thebudgetbalancedin1998.64
Thefactthattheworlddidnotconformtotheirideologicalpredictionsdidnotfazemostconservatives;theydisingenuouslyshiftedtheir
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argument that Clinton’s tax increase would cause a recession to one thatproposedthattheprosperityofthe1990shadnothingtodowith Clinton’spoliciesandeverythingtodowiththecontinuationofReagan’s. RepublicansinsistedthatReagan’spoliciesweretotallyresponsiblefor theeconomicgrowthofthe1980s,butthatClinton’sprogramshadno effectontherecord-breakingeconomicgrowthofthe1990s.65Ideology blindedmanyconservativesfromseeingthatbothBushandClinton,in confrontingthepainfulissuesofthefailingsavingsandloansandthe risingstructuralbudgetdeficits,hadprovidedkeypegsfortherecordbreakingexpansionofthe1990sanddemonstratedmorepoliticalcourage thanhadReagan.ThemovementtowardabalancedbudgetsoothedfinancialmarketsandallowedtheFedtokeepinterestratesatlowlevels. AdheringtotheReaganmythologyhashelpedGeorgeW.Bushpoliticallybutwillseverelydamagethenationeconomically.ThisBush administration,influencedbyseniorpoliticaladviserKarlRove,hasbeen guidedbyconservativemythsthatbudgetdeficitscanbeignored,thattax reductionsmainlytargetedforthebenefitoftherichwillstimulatethe economy,thateconomicgrowthwillinevitablysolvebudgetproblems, andthattheseniorBushpresidencycommittedanunforgivablesinby agreeingtoataxincreasein1990andthussufferedtheinevitableresult ofarecessionandanelectoraldefeat.Convenientlyforgottenarethethree taxincreasesthatReagansignedinordertoreversethesoaringbudget deficitscausedbytheoverlygeneroustaxcutsenactedin1981.Theresult wasanegativetransformationinthefiscalsituationfromsmallbudget surplusesduringthelastthreeyearsoftheClintonpresidency(obviously constrainedbyaRepublican-controlledCongress)toexpandingbudget deficitsunderBush,includingarecordhighdeficitof$413billionin fiscalyear2004.WhileBushpromisestoslicethebudgetdeficitinhalf by2008,fewanalystsbelievethatispossible,sincetheadministration isengagedinanexpensivewarandoccupationinIraq,aswellasbeing committedtoanexpensive(measuredinthetrillions)SocialSecurity reform,andsinceitremainsvehementlyopposedtotaxhikes.Afterthe congressional elections in November 2002, Bush’s treasury secretary PaulO’Neillwarnedatabudgetmeetingthatthefederalgovernmentwas approachingafiscalcrisis;hewasabruptlyinterruptedbyVicePresident DickCheney,whoretorted,“Reaganproveddeficitsdon’tmatter....We wonthemidterms.Thisisourdue.”66Forconservatives,themythology ofReaganomicsdefangedthefearofdeficitsandfreedthemfromthe responsibilityofweighingthecostsofdiminishedrevenueinproposing
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taxcuts.Hence,conservativeRepublicansareaspronetoflingtaxbreaks atproblemsasliberalDemocratsweretothrowmoneyatmaladiesin the1960s.67Operatinginthisideologicalnever-neverland,Bushcan winelectionsandcansteadfastlystayonmessageinhisdemandsfortax cutsandoppositiontotaxincreases,butneitherhenorconservativescan changethelawsofmath.WithReagan’smythologycastingitsdelusional spelloverboththeBushadministrationandmostoftheRepublicansin Congress,theabilityofthepoliticalsystemtodealhonestlywithbudget issuesintheforeseeablefutureappearsslight. AnothermajorcostoftheReaganlegacyisthatitcreatedaregimethat ignoresgrowingdisparitiesinincomeandwealthintheUnitedStates.For reasonsthatarenotentirelyclearandsubjecttofiercedebatesbetween liberalsandconservatives,indexesofinequalityhaveincreasedsincethe 1970s.ThesechangesarealteringthenatureoftheUnitedStatesfrom oneofthemostegalitarianindustrializednationstooneoftheleast.The evidenceindicatesthatthepoliciesoftheReaganadministrationwere nottheoriginofthisgrowinginequality,butitdoessuggestthatthey contributedtothattrend.Moreimportant,Reagan’spoliciesandrhetoric did nothing to inhibit inequality, and his administration attempted to delegitimizeanygovernmentalendeavorstopromoteequality.Byadding barrierstothealreadyHerculeantaskofhelpingthepoor,Reaganserved hispartisanpurposesbutnotnecessarilythenation’sgood.Theclaims ofReagan’ssupportersthathewasagreatmoralleadercanbeseriously challengedbecausehecontributedtopoisoningthepolicymilieuagainst proposalstobringaboutamoresociallyjustnation. Reaganchampionedtheconservativeideaofindividualfreedomover equality.Whereasliberalsbelievethatequalityandlibertycanbereconciled,conservativesdonot.Whereasliberalsclaimthatbyextending equalityanationisexpandingfreedom,conservativesassertthatattempts toaugmentequalityconstitutelethalthreatstoindividualfreedom.While liberalstendtothinkofequalityaspromotingsocialjustice,conservativesbelievethatthepursuitofequalitybringsaboutstiflinguniformity, leveling,andbureaucraticoppression.Forliberals,equalityisamoral incentiveleadingtoamoresociallyjustsociety;forconservatives,itis economicallycounterproductive,politicallydangerous,andademagogic appealtoenvy. Guided by this conservative perspective, the Reagan presidency pursuedeconomicpoliciesthatpromotedeconomicgrowthbutdidnot distributeitsgainswidelyorevenly.Reagan’staxpoliciesmainlyben-
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efitedtherich,andhisbudgetcutsdisproportionatelyhurtthepoor.The unequalresultshavebeenextensivelydocumented.In1991,aCensus Bureaustudyof24,000householdschosentoberepresentativeofthe nation’s92millionhouseholdsconcludedthatthewealthofthemost affluentAmericans increased substantially during the 1980s while thenetworthofothercitizensbarelykeptpacewithinflation.Afteradjustingforinflation,thewealthoftherichestone-fifthofallhouseholds increased14percentfrom1984to1988,whiletheremainingfour-fifths ofhouseholdsdidnotexperienceanysignificantchangeinnetworth.68 In1970,therichest1percentofhouseholdspossessedabout20percent ofthenation’swealth.Twenty-fiveyearslater,datafroma1995Federal Reservestudyshowedthatthewealthiest1percentofhouseholds—with networthofatleast$2.3millioneach—nowownednearly40percent ofthenation’swealth.69In1980,therewere4,414millionairesinthe UnitedStates;by1987,therewere34,944;by1994,therewereabout 65,000.70In1982,thereweretwenty-onebillionairesinthenation;by 1991,therewereseventy-one.71AttheendoftheReaganadministration, thetop1percentofhouseholdsownedalopsidedproportionofmany typesofassets:49percentofpubliclyheldstock,62percentofbusiness assets,78percentofbondsandtrusts,and45percentofnonresidential realestate.Controllingtheseassetshasmeantthattheseaffluenthouseholdshaveattractedthree-fourthsofthegaininpretaxincomefrom1977 to1989.SylviaNasarconcludes,“By1989,theonepercent(834,000) householdswithabout$5.7trillionofnetworthwasworthmorethan thebottom90percentofAmericans(84millionhouseholds)withabout $4.8trillioninnetworth.”72 Inbrief,theReaganmythologyandrhetoricfocusedmoreprideon thegrowingnumberofmillionairesthancompassiononthemillionsof citizenswhoremaintrappedintheprisonofpoverty. Conclusion SinceReaganwasthe“father”ofaregimecreatedinthe1980s,conservativesfelttheneedtoexaggeratehisideologicalcredentialsandachievementsanderaseevidenceofhispragmaticcapabilitiesandcompromises. TheybelievethattoomuchofRoosevelt’sandJohnson’sliberalregime survived and that not enough of Reagan’s visions were implemented duringthe1980s.IndeifyingReagan,conservativeshaveanunhidden agenda—to commit future Republican presidents and Congresses to
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fulfillingconservativepolicypreferences.Intheireyes,Reagan’spolicies workedmiraclesduringthe1980sandshouldcontinuetobesuccessful inthetwenty-firstcentury. Reagan’seconomicpoliciesmadeamajorcontributiontoovercomingstagflationinthelate1970sandrejuvenatingtheeconomy,butthe mythologizingofReaganinthenewcenturythreatenstobringabout economicdisasters.ThemajorcostofReaganmythologyisthatitis reducingtherationalityofpolicymakersbylimitingthescopeofoptionsindealingwitheconomicproblems.Bydistortinghoweconomic growthandabalancedbudgetwereachieved,goalsthatweredependent on painful decisions to raise taxes and confront the savings and loan crisis,Reaganmythologyisprovidingfalseguidelinesfordealingwith contemporaryproblems.Itisridiculoustobelievethateveryproblem canbesolvedwithataxbreak.Moreover,itistimeforconservativesto acknowledgethatbothReagan’sandGeorgeW.Bush’staxcutshavenot increasedthenation’slowpropensitytosaveandhavewidenedincome disparities. Reagan’saxiomthatgovernmentistheprobleminhibitsanalyzing whengovernmentisthesolution,orispartofthesolution.(Obviously, the same holds true in examining the role of the market in resolving problems.)Reaganmythsmakeavirtueoutofavice,namely,avoiding expertadvice.BureaucraticexpertiseintheTreasuryDepartmenthelped ReaganachieveeconomicandpoliticalsuccessintheTaxReformAct of1986.WalterWilliamspointsout,“Eventhoughantigovernmentism didnotvisiblyshrinkthesizeofthefederalbudget,adherencetothe philosophyoflimitedgovernmentproducedgreatdamagetothebody politic.ThesimplisticWashington-is-the-problemargumenttendedto dullthepublic’sawarenessoforinterestintheseriousdomesticpolicy issuesthatneededtobeaddressedandblockedanyinstitutionalefforts torealisticallydebatethem.”73TheReaganmythsamplifythealready presentdangerthatapresidentoperatinginthepoliticized,comfortable cocoonoftheWhiteHousecanbeshieldedfromunpleasanttruths.Becausethesemythsareacceptedastruthbytheconservativemovement, responsiblebehaviorindealingwithpainfulissuesbyseekingexpert adviceandbybeingwillingtoacceptreasonablecompromises(asin theTaxReformActof1986)isoftencondemnedandpunished.Thatis notaformulaforasuccessfulpoliticalsystem. TheeconomiccostsofReaganmythologyarehighbecauseitencourages conservative policy makers to believe in ideologically deduced
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miraclesratherthanwhatisfeasiblebasedonempiricallyderivedprobabilities.Trustinmiraclesprovidesperverseincentivesforpoliticians toavoidconfrontingpainfulissueslikebudgetandtradedeficits,global warming,thefuturefundingofSocialSecurityandMedicare,andthe rebuildingofthegulfcoastafterthedevastatinghurricanesofthesummerof2005.OperatingunderReagan’sshadow,rigidanddelusional behavior is defined as moral, and attempts to forge compromises are consideredimmoral.Reagan’slegacyinspiresconservativestochampion ideologicallybasedinitiativesandcondemnbothreality-basedthinking and pragmatic adjustments.When there is conflict between Reagan’s truths and the evidence from math and science, conservatives argue thatpolicymakersshouldcontinueReagan’scourseanddisregardthe evidence.BelievingthatGodandhistoryareontheirside,American conservativesareabsoluteintheirfaiththatmoralandideologicalcertaintycanchangetherealworld.Butitmustbenotedthat,inthepast, Godandhistoryhavebeenknowntoconfoundthosewhoaresorigid intheirhubristicbeliefs.
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3 ReaganandRace ProphetofColorBlindness, BaiteroftheBacklash
ThevastmajorityofblackAmericansweresuspicious ofReaganthroughouthiscampaignand, indeed,throughouthispresidency. —StephenL.Carter,ReflectionsofanAffirmativeActionBaby
RonaldReaganendedhispresidencyamongthemostpopularfiguresin Americanlife.Hiscountryembracedthefirsttwo-termpresidentsince Eisenhower,leavingofficewithrelativelyhighpersonalapprovalratings. The “Teflon president” had weathered the scandal of Iran-contra and avoidedimpeachment.UnlikeBillClinton,whowasoftenlesspopular thanhispolicies,Reaganwasjusttheopposite:apresidentwhowasfar morebelovedforhisavuncularattitude,hispersonalcourageintheface ofanassassinationattempt,andhissunnydispositionthanforhispolicies, hisideology,oreventhepositiveresultsofhisleadership. YetReagan’spopularityalwayscarriedwithitacaveat,anexception, asubsetofcitizensimmunetohisprodigiouscharisma:blackAmericans. EvenasReagansuccessfullywooedwhiteAmericans(andAmericansof otherraces)tovoteforhiminrecordnumbersintheelectorallandslide of1984,blackAmericansremainedoverwhelminglyopposedtotheman andhispresidency.ItwasalmostasifthereweretwoReagans,theupbeat, optimistic,andfriendlyReaganthatwhiteAmericasawandthedistant, cold,anddangerouslyinsensitiveReaganthatblackAmericaperceived. The pattern continued long after his presidency. Even asAmerica mournedReagan’spassingin2004,thecrowdattheNationalCathedral 70
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forhisburialwasalmostentirelywhite.Television cameras captured few blacks publicly mourning the man many pundits proclaimed the mostsuccessfulpresidentsinceRoosevelt,ifnotoneofthetwoorthree greatestpresidentsinAmericanhistory. How can we explain this stark racial division in attitudes toward Reaganinlifeandindeath? BookswrittenbyReagan’smostprominentsupportersshowanextraordinaryabsenceofdiscussionofthisimportantquestion.Thesilence isdeafening.DineshD’Souza,inhishagiographicaccountofReagan’s life,makesnoreferencetoMartinLutherKing,JesseJackson,Ralph Abernathy,theNationalAssociationfortheAdvancementofColored People(NAACP),mostofthefewblacksintheadministration(ClarencePendletonandClarenceThomas),thebattleoverthecivilrights commission,orevencivilrightsgenerally.Affirmativeactionmeritsa minormentioninreferencetotheReaganadministration’sattemptsto reinitin,butalmosteveryaspectofReagan’slifeandpresidencythat touchedonraceisignored.1 FormerReaganspeechwriterPeggyNoonansimilarlyignoresalmost allracialaspectsofhispresidency.LikeD’Souza,shedoesnotmention JacksonortheNAACPandignorescivilrightsalmostentirely,exceptto sayerroneouslythatReaganagreedwithMartinLutherKingJr.While Reagan voiced agreement with King’s broad positions long after his death,Reaganwasafierceandfrequentcriticofthecivilrightsmovement whilethemanwasalive,and,asnotedbelow,evenissuedanambivalent statementonthedayofKing’sassassination.WhileNoonanmanagesto findspaceforafamousanecdoteaboutReagan’sracialtoleranceduring hiscollegeyears,sheavoidsalmostallmentionofraceinherdiscussionofhiscareerandadministration.Finally,inalonglistoftheattacks madeagainstReagan,shedoesnotincludethechargeof“racist.”2True ornot,itwasoftensaidbyprominentblacksandisdiscussedinevery nonpartisanbiographyofReagan.Noonaneitherconsideredthecharge unworthyofrefutationorirrefutable. SimilargapsappearinalmosteveryconservativeaccountofReagan’s lifeandpresidency.ItisasifblackAmerica’sopinionaboutReagan,and theissuesthatdividedhimfrom12percentoftheAmericanpopulation, didnotexist.EvenReagan’sattorneygeneral,EdwinMeeseIII,who ledtheexecutiveagencymostconcernedwithcivilrights,cannotbring himselftoincludemorethanasmidgenaboutblacksandcivilrights. MeeserecountsJimmyCarter’sattacksonReaganasaracistduringthe
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1980campaignandmentionshowmuchtheyangeredReagan,“since anyonewhoknowshimatallknowsheisnotaracist.”3 Thesebooks,andseveralotheraccountsoftheReaganadministration, simplyignorethequestionofReagan’sracialpolitics,hisracialpolicies, andhisraciallegacy.ButtherearereasonswhywhiteAmericaandblack AmericaperceivedReagansodifferently. ToexplainthesharpdivergenceinattitudetowardReaganduringand afterhislife,thisessaywillexplorefouraspectsofReaganandrace: Reagantheman,Reaganthecampaigner,Reaganthepolicymaker,and Reagan’sraciallegacy.WebeginwithReagantheman,becauserace andracialissuesarefarmorepersonalthanmostintheAmericanfirmament.Likethosesurroundingabortionandhomosexuality,racequestions frequentlyleadtoinvestigationof,speculationabout,andconfrontation overapolitician’spersonalbeliefs,history,andcharacter.Inthecaseof Reagan,hisbiographyhasplayedadeeperrolethanusualinthestructuringandsellingofhisracialviews. ReagantheMan:TheProphetofColorBlindness RonaldReagangrewupinandaroundDixon,Illinois,atowninwhich blackswerepresentbutseldomprominent.Theycouldnotstayovernight atthehotel,gettheirhaircutdowntown,orjointhegolfclub.4Although farlessopenthaninmuchoftheSouthor,indeed,insouthernIllinois, racismwaspartofthefabricofdailylifeinDixon.Blackswerefew innumberandrarelychallengedthesupremacyofwhites.Yearslater, inthe1980presidentialdebate,Reaganmadeafamousgaffewhenhe spokeofatimebeforeAmericaevenknewithadaracialproblem.Yet Reagan’swordsweresurelyanaccuratedescriptionofthemind-setof mostofthewhiteresidentsofDixonduring the early decades of the twentiethcentury. Most,butcertainlynotall,andamongtheexceptionsseemtohave beenReagan’sparents,NellandJackReagan.Sixtyyearslater,Reagan wasstillrecitingstoriesoftheirlackofracialprejudiceandopennessto blacksinparticular.5Reaganrepeatedtwoanecdotesendlesslywhenever thetopicofracialdiscriminationarose.Thefirstdealtwiththeappearance inDixonofarereleasedversionofthefamouslyracistfilmabouttheKu KluxKlan,BirthofaNation.Reagan,alreadyadevotedfilmaficionado, wasforbiddenbyhisfatherfromattending,becauseofJack’saversion totheKlan.Reaganprotestedthatthemoviewasnotaboutthemodern
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Klan,butaboutthehistoricalone,andJackwassupposedtohaveanswered,“TheKlan’stheKlan,andasheet’sasheet,andanymanwho wearsoneoverhisheadisabum.”6InReagan’smemoirs,thisincident isthemostpositivereferencehemakestohisfather,adeeplytroubled alcoholicwhorepeatedlyfailedatbusiness.7 While Jack Reagan’s rejection of the Klan might have been motivated by its anti-Catholic stance (Reagan’s father, unlike his mother, wasCatholic),itseemsthatNellandJackwereunusuallyprogressive onracialquestionsforDixonandfortheirtime.Intheothertreasured Reagananecdoteaboutrace,Reagan’scollegefootballteamfounditself inajambeforearoadgamefifteenmilesawayfromDixon.Thehotel atwhichtheyhadreservationswassegregated,anditrefusedserviceto thetwoblackmembersoftheteam.8Thecoachdecidedthatthewhole teamwouldthereforesleeponthebus.However,Reagan,afraidthatthis wouldcreateresentmentagainstthetwoblackplayers,makingthemfeel awkward,offeredtohavethetwoplayersstayathishouse.Thecoachhad troublebelievingthatawhitefamilyin1930sIllinoiswouldwelcome theirsonandtwoblackboarderswithoutanyadvancewarninginthe middleofthenight.Butasoneoftheblackteammatesattesteddecades later,Reagan’sconfidenceinhisparentswaswell-founded,andthecrisis wasquietlyavoided.9Itisdifficultforthosebornlatertounderstandhow trulyunusualsuchanactwasforawhitefamilyatthattime,butReagan’s blackteammatesunderstoodandneverforgot. Yearslater,whenReaganwasaHollywoodactor,henotedwithpride inalettertoafriendthathehadjustfinishedamovieinwhichheplayed areformistpolicechiefwhobattledtheKlan.Reaganpointedouthow proudthiswouldhavemadehisfather,anotherrarepositivereferenceto Jackbyhisson.10Reaganwassocertainthathehadbeenraisedwithout prejudicethataccusationsthathewasracistweredeeplyoffensiveto himthroughouthispoliticalcareer.Howmanypresidentswouldtake thetimetohandwriteapersonallettertotheleaderoftheNAACPwho hadaccusedhimofworkingagainst theinterestof blacks?11 Reagan didsobecausehefirmlybelievedthathehadnotashredofracismin hischaracter. InhisfirstcampaignforgovernorofCalifornia,Reaganresponded withrarepublicangertotheimplicationthathewasracist.Inadebate beforeagroupofblackRepublicans,Reagan’sopponentsuggestedthat Reaganwasopposedtoblacks,atwhichpointReaganshouted,“Iresent theimplicationthatthereisanybigotryinmynature!Don’tanyoneever
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implythat—inthisoranyothergroup!”Reaganwassoovercomeby hisangerthathecrumpleduphisspeechandfledthedebate,withwhat appearedtobetearsofrageinhiseyes,andhewasoverheardtocurse hisopponent.Ittookafewhoursbeforehisstaffcouldcalmhimdown enoughtoreturntothevenue.ThiswastheonlytimeReaganlosthis temperintheentirecampaign.12 Reagan’supbringingbyraciallyprogressiveparentsdidnotjustproduceamaneasilyoffendedbytheideathathewasburdenedwithracial prejudice;italsoproducedamanwithanunusualwillingnesstoexpress publicdisdainorangeratblackpeople,particularlyblackwomen.Outside the1968Republicanconvention,anaggressiveblackfemaleprotester whopointedoutthepaucityofblacksinattendanceconfrontedReagan. Instead of simply ignoring the comment, Reagan got into a shouting matchwithherinfrontofreporters.In1980,whilerunningforpresident, anothershoutingblackwomanconfrontedReaganduringanill-fated campaign appearance in the South Bronx. Reagan shouted down the heckler,againinfrontofreporters,saying“Ican’tdoadamnthingfor youifIdon’tgetelected!”ThepowerfulimageofaninfuriatedReagan shoutingatblackswashighlyunusualforawhitepolitician.13During histimeasgovernorofCalifornia,oneofReagan’sfavoritetargetswas radicalactivistAngelaDavis,whomhetriedtohavebannedfromthe UniversityofCaliforniasystem.Inthe1976primarybattlewithGerald Ford,RobertKeyes,Reagan’smostprominentblacksupporterduringhis timeinCalifornia,ultimatelysupportedFordoutofdismayatReagan’s recordonrace.WhenKeyeswasonhisdeathbed,yearslater,Reagan refusedtotakehiscall,arareactofbitterangerinamanknownforhis abilitytoforgivepoliticalopponentsandforhismasteryofthesympatheticgesture.14Althoughtheseincidentsarenotparticularlynumerous inapubliccareerthatlastedfortwenty-fouryears,whatissurprisingis thattheyoccurredatall,givenReagan’spubliclysunnydispositionand thesensitivenatureofraceinAmericaduringthisperiod. Ultimately,wasReaganthemanaracist?Thequestionisdifficultto answerinpartbecauseofthemultiplicityofdefinitionsofwhiteracism. Certainly,unlikethepublicGeorgeWallaceortheprivateRichardNixon, Reagandidnotuseracisttermsforblacks15ortrafficinodiousstereotypes abouttheblackraceingeneral.Reagan’srecordrevealsscantevidence that the man was burdened with racial prejudice on a personal level. Amonghisintimates,therewerenoblacks,butnotonlywasthisquite commonforhisera(and,indeed,forAmericanpresidentsofhisgenera-
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tion),butReaganwasfamouslyalooffromevenhisclosestassociates.In the1960s,heoncetoldajokeaboutAfricansandcannibalism,butgiven theHollywoodmilieuandReagan’sgiftfortellingjokes,itseemsathin reedtobuildacaseagainsthimasaracist.Suchjokeswerecommonin theroutinesofmanycomediansatthetime,blackandwhite.16 YetthequestionofwhetherReaganwasaracistornotmaybeless importantthanwhatwasReagan’soverallattitudetowardrace.Reagan seemedtothinkthatracewasaproblemhehadlongagosolvedinhis ownheart.Devoidofprejudice(oratleastbelievinghimselftobe),he arguedthroughouthiscareerthatgovernmenteffortstoameliorateracial prejudicewereatbestfarinferiortopersonaleffortstochangehearts. Inthisway,ReaganwasthefirstprophetofRepublicancolorblindness onrace.Inthe1950s,theliberallineonracewasthatthegovernment shouldstepintopreventofficialdiscriminationagainstblacks.Thegoal wasacolor-blindsociety.AsthemassivelegacyofAmerica’scenturies ofracismbecameeverclearerinthe1960sand1970s,manyliberals shiftedtoapolicyoftakingcognizanceofraceinanefforttoeradicate racismanditspowerfullingeringeffects.Atthesametime,manyconservatives,graduallyrejectinggovernmenttoleranceofracism,adoptedthe color-blindrhetoricabandonedbytheliberals.Reaganledthisshiftmore thananyotherpoliticalfigure.Hisfaiththathelackedracialprejudice allowedhimtotakepositionswidelyperceivedasantiblackwithoutany hesitation.Amoreintrospectiveorambivalentwhitepoliticianmighthave retreatedinthefaceofnearlyunifiedblackangerathispolicypositions andcampaigntactics.Asweshallsee,suchretreatswerealmostunknown inthecampaignsandpoliciesofRonaldWilsonReagan.Thusarethe characterandexperiencesofthemanfathertothecampaigntacticsand governingchoicesofthepolitician. ReaganasCampaigner:TheSunnySalesman oftheWhiteBacklash Reagan’sfirstventureintoelectoralpoliticsstruckconservativeAmericanslikelightninginOctober1964.Inanationallytelevisedaddress, ReaganelectrifiedGoldwatersupporterswithhispowerful,boldrhetoric andextraordinaryeaseindelivery;butsomethingwasmissingfromthe speech.InoneofthemostraciallychargedelectionsinmodernAmerican history,inwhichGoldwater’soppositiontothe1964CivilRightsAct wasoneofhismajorappealsformillionsofAmericans,Reagansaid
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notawordaboutraceorcivilrights.YetsurelyReaganmusthavebeen awareofhowhisantigovernmentrhetoricwouldsoundintheAmerican Southatthetime.WhenGoldwaterwasdefeatedinalandslide,theonly areaofthecountrywhereRepublicanssawgainsatthepresidentialand congressionallevelswastheSouth,wheresegregationwasstillwidely practiced and wildly popular. Reagan could have easily clarified his positiononcivilrightsinhisfirstmajornationaladdressorinallthe subsequentspeecheshemadeonbehalfofGoldwater.Instead,Reagan’s speechestendedtoavoidraceortopointoutwaysinwhichlegislative effortstoexpandcivilrightsweremisguidedifwell-intentioned. Followinghisspeech,ReaganquicklybecameastarinRepublican circles,muchindemandasaspeakeraroundthecountry.Encouragedto getintotheraceforgovernorofCaliforniain1966,Reaganhadtofinally addressracialissues,asseeninthedebatebeforetheblackRepublicans. ReaganwasnowfirmlyontherecordasagreeingwithGoldwaterthatthe 1964CivilRightsActwasamistake.Reaganwasalsolessthanfulsome inhispraiseofthe1965VotingRightsAct(VRA).Inthegeneralelection, Reaganranaradioadthatreferredtourbanareasas“jungles.”Inthe raciallychargederaofblackriotsandinatimewhenaderogatoryterm forblackswas“junglebunnies,”thewordstrucksomeasadirectappeal towhiteracismandbacklash.17Reaganalsofacedaconundrumwhen itcametonondiscriminationinhousinglegislation.Previouslyhehad arguedagainstsuchlegislationatthenationallevel,sayingthathousing wasastatequestion.Butinhisgubernatorialcampaign,hetriedtorepeal California’santidiscriminationlegislation,seeingitnowasaproperty rightsissue:“IfanindividualwantstodiscriminateagainstNegroesor othersinsellingorrentinghishouse,itishisrighttodoso.”Itseemed thatnomatterhowReaganmadethecalculation,hewascomingouton theantiblackside.18 Following his stunning victory in 1966, Reagan was so nationally prominentinRepublicancirclesthathewaswidelyconsideredpresidentialtimberfor1968.HismajorrivalwasRichardNixon.Aninternal NixonmemocaptureshowmanysawReagan:“Reagan’sstrengthderives frompersonalcharisma,glamour,butprimarilytheideologicalfervor oftheRightandtheemotionaldistressofthosewhofearorresentthe Negro,andwhoexpectReagansomehowtokeephim‘inhisplace’or atleasttoechotheirownangerandfrustration.”19Reaganwasseenas quitelikelytodenysouthernsupporttoNixon,whereReagancommanded truepassionfromwhitesopposedtoblackequality.Nixon’sstaffalso
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consideredReagantheonlycandidatewhocouldneutralizeAlabama’s GeorgeWallace,aracisticoncontemplatinganindependentrunforthe WhiteHousein1968.20Ultimately,Nixonhadtomovefartotheracial righttodefeattheReaganchallenge.AlthoughitislikelythatNixon wouldhaveadoptedhissouthernstrategyevenifReaganhadneverrun forpresident,itmightnothavebeensuchananti–civilrightsstrategy haditnotbeenforReagan’spressure. Althoughbriefandunsuccessful,Reagan’slittle-notedeffortatthe presidential nomination in 1968 is highly significant for what it says abouthiscampaignappeal.InrecentAmericanhistory,howmanyother Californiapoliticians,aftertwoyearsinoffice,couldhavebeenexpected torelyonsolidstrengthfromsouthernstatedelegatesinaracefora presidentialnomination?HowdidRonaldReagan,aCalifornianwith norecordofanimositytowardblacksandnosustainedculturalexposure totheAmericanSouth,becomesopopularamongraciallyconservative whitesinsuchabriefperiodoftime?Inmanyways,Reaganwasthe idealfaceforracialconservatism,amovementdesperatelyopposedto blackprogressbutawarethatopenracismhadbecomeanathematomost Americans. Moreover, Reagan had traveled extensively in the South onbehalfofGeneralElectric,afterhisfilmcareerended.Givingthese speeches,aswellasRepublicanpartyspeechesthroughouttheSouthfrom 1964to1968,taughtReaganverywellhowtopleaseasoutherncrowd withoutcrossinglinesofopenracism.Inaddition,manyofReagan’s otherpositions,onschoolprayer,taxes,foreignpolicy,federalism,and welfare,fitwellwithsouthernculturalconservatism.ReagancouldallowmanywhitesouthernerstobelievethattheyhadopposedtheCivil RightsActortheVotingRightsActnotbecausetheyhatedorfeared blacks,butbecausetheybelievedintraditionalAmericanvaluesoflocal government,federalism,andconservatism.Thisplausibledeniabilityon racewasperhapsReagan’sgreatestappealtomanyracistwhites. ItisalsoimportanttonoteReagan’sroleasamongthemostprominent voicescallingforstronggovernmentactionagainsturbanriots,which werehighlysalientformanynorthernandsouthernwhitesfromthemid1960stothemid-1970s.Inthemidstoftheriotingera,Reaganmadethis stunningstatement:“Thegreatestproofofhowfarwe’veadvancedin racerelationsisthatthewhitecommunityhasn’tliftedafingeragainst the Negroes.”21 In addition to being factually incorrect (many more blackswerekilledbywhitesintheriotsofthe1960sthantheconverse), praisingwhitesfornottakingvengeanceagainstblacksastheyhadin
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therecentpastwasthekindoflanguagethatfedthemorallegitimacy ofthewhitebacklash. In1976,ReaganagainenteredtheRepublicanprimaries,thistime takingonasittingpresident,GeraldFord.Asin1968,Reaganrantothe racialrightofamoremoderateRepublican.Ford’scampaignaccurately perceivedthatReagan’sappealwasdeeplyrelatedtohispositionsonrace. Ford’spollsterfoundthatReagansupporterswerealmostindistinguishableinattitudefromWallacesupporters.22Reagan,likeWallace,endorsed aconstitutionalamendmenttostopschoolintegrationthroughbusing. Inanationallytelevisedspeech,Reaganlinkeddeclinesineducational achievementtointegrationbybusing,apopulariflittlesupportedcontention,whichagaingavecovertothosewhoopposedliberalsolutionsfor lessdefensiblereasons.23Inanothernationaltelevisionaddress,Reagan condemnedaffirmativeactionandquotas.24 InMichiganandTexas,Reagan’scampaignreliedonformerWallace backersnowthatWallacehimselfhadbeeneffectivelyremovedfromthe Democraticprimaries.Morethan100,000brochuresweremailedtoWallacesupportersonbehalfofReagan.25Reagan,likeWallace,alsospoke warmlyoftheapartheidgovernmentsofRhodesiaandSouthAfrica,while Fordwascautiouslyinfavorofvotingrightsforblacksinthosecountries.26 Inhisfamous“welfarequeen”anecdote,toldrepeatedlyinthe1976campaign,ReaganechoedWallaceinusingwelfaretocourtthewhitebacklash. InReagan’stelling,awomanintheMidwesthadusedasmanyasnineteen identitiestobilkthegovernmentofhundredsofthousandsoftaxdollars. WhileReaganneveridentifiedthewoman’srace,theoriginalstorywas wellknown,atleasttomanyintheMidwest.Thefactswerealsowell knowntomanyreporters,whopointedouttoReaganthathewasgreatly exaggeratingthecase.Theactualwomanhadtakenonjusttwoidentities, andtheamountofmoneydefraudedwasexponentiallylessthanReagan claimed.Reagancontinuedtogivehiserroneousversion,whichwasvery popular with his audiences.27 In perhaps the most odious outreach to whiteracismofthe1976campaign,ReagansupportersinNorthCarolina distributedaflyerallegingthatFordwasgoingtoputSenatorEdward Brooke,amoderateblackRepublican,ontheticketashisvicepresident. ReaganwasbrieflycaughtbytheshiftingtideofAmericanattitudes toward race by one stray comment during the campaign.As he had sincethemid-1960s,Reagancavalierlyquestionedwhethertheentire civilrightsmovementhadaccomplishedmuch.GiventhatReaganwas ontherecordopposingeverymajorplankofthatmovement,hemight
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havethoughtthathecouldgetawaywithit,butthemediasignaledthat suchpositionscouldnolongerbepitchedasnonracial.Whenchallenged abouthiscomments,Reaganretreatedintostaleplatitudesaboutrace.28 Perhapsmoreimportant,thefewremainingblackRepublicansvoting inappreciablenumbersintheprimariesalmostuniformlywentforFord overReagan.Intheextraordinarilytightcontest,thatmayhavemadethe differenceinthecrucialstatesofTennesseeandKentucky.29Reagan’s 1976campaignwassignificantfortheevolutionofracialpoliticsinthe RepublicanParty.ItwasthelasttimethatblackRepublicansactually matteredandthefirsttimethatformerWallacesupporterswerecrucial. Reaganwascentraltobothdevelopments,ashisoppositiontocivilrights helpeddriveblacksoutandpullbacklashwhitesin. In1980,Reaganwaspositionedasthefront-runnerfromthestartof theRepublicanprimaryseason.ButtheReaganof1980wasradically differentintermsofraceandcampaigning.Reagansimplydidnottalk aboutcivilrights,busing,orevenaffirmativeaction,exceptwhenquestionedaboutthosespecifictopicsbyreporters.Accordingtocampaign insiders,thechangerepresentednotanalterationinReagan’sviewsbut ratherhisbeliefthat,asafront-runner,heshouldfocusonissuessuch asdefensepolicy,taxes,andeconomicrenewal.30Inone“off-message” moment,ReaganblamedtheVRAforthe“humiliation”itbroughtthe South. Others might have felt that theAmerican South should have beenembarrassedandhumiliatedbythedecadesofracistviolenceand systemicdisenfranchisementthatmadetheVRAsonecessary,butfor Reagan,itwasthereportingrequirementsthatwerehumiliating.31 The most unforgettable image of Reagan and race from the 1980 campaigncamewhenhechosetoopenhiscampaignattheNeshoba CountyFairinMississippi.Thiscounty,andthetownofPhiladelphia, hadfamousovertonesforbothsouthernwhitesandcivilrightsactivists, becauseitwasherethatvotingrightscampaignersAndrewGoodman, MichaelSchwerner,andJamesChaneywerekidnapped,executed,and entombedbyracistwhitesin1964.Reagan’spollsterrepeatedlyasked him to reconsider kicking off his campaign at such a loaded venue, butReagangotsoangryatthesuggestionthathethrewafolderathis staffer.32NotonlydidReaganstarthiscampaigninNeshoba,buthis speech endorsed states’ rights, the very principle advocated by those whomurderedthethreecivilrightsmartyrs.Itisdifficulttoimaginethat Reaganwasunawareofwhatitwouldmeantobothblacksandsome whitestoendorsestates’rightsattheNeshobaCountyFair.
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YeteventhedarkmomentsatNeshobashouldnotobscurethatthe Reaganof1980wasevolvingonrace,atleastintermsofstyle.Neshoba andthecommentontheVRAwerefarfromthecentraldiscourseofhis campaign,whereasin1976busingandracialissueswereeasilyinthe topfiveconcernsofhiscampaign.Twonationallytelevisedspeechesof Reagan’sin1976focusedonjusttheseissues.Moreover,asopposedto 1976,Reaganhadsomesignificantfiguresfromtheblackcommunity behind him. RalphAbernathy, formerly Martin Luther King Jr.’s top aide,andtwootherminorblackcivilrightsactivistsopenlysupported Reagan.Moreover,ReaganspoketotheNationalUrbanLeague,met withblackleadersVernonJordanandJesseJackson,andevenvisited animpoverishedblackneighborhoodintheSouthBronx.Itwasatthis visit,shortlyaftertheNeshobakickoff,thatanangrycrowdofblack residentsconfrontedReagan.Ironically,theonlymajoreventdesignedto showReagan’swillingnesstoworkonissuesofblackpovertyprobably helpedhimshoreuphissupportwiththewhitebacklash,sincetelevision capturedReaganyellingatpoorblacksinanger.33Butthevisititself, aswellastheoutreachtoblackleaders, showed that Reagan at least desiredtoappearmoderateonrace.AttheDetroitconvention,Reagan intervenedpersonallytoensurethattheleaderoftheNAACPwasgiven aprime-timespeakingslot.34 Inthegeneralelectioncampaign,perhapsinresponsetoReagan’s attempt at moderation on race or out of desperation at the lowered enthusiasm for Carter in the black community, Carter made a rather patheticattempttolinkReagantotheKuKluxKlan.OneofCarter’s mostprominentblacksupporters,AndrewYoung,warnedblacksthatif Reagangotelecteditwouldbe“okaytokillniggers.”Carteralsotried todrawattentiontoReagan’ssupportforwhiteruleinAfrica.These effortslargelybackfired,asReagan’scarefulbalancingonraceandhis cheerfulpersonagemadethesewilderclaimsabouthisallegedracism seemstrainedanddesperate,atleasttomostwhites.35 InReagan’sfinalcampaignin1984,hecontinuedtolessentherolerace playedinhisrhetoric.The“old”Reaganof1976madeabriefappearance whenheattackedbusinginCharlotte,NorthCarolina,butthecomment wassounpopularlocallyandnationallythatitwasneverrepeated.Polls showedthatoneofReagan’sfewareasofvulnerabilityheadingintothe 1984campaignwasthathewasperceivedasunconcernedaboutjustice andfairness,inpartbecauseofhisstanceonracialquestions.However, ratherthanaddressingtheseissueshead-on,Reagan’scampaignrein-
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terpretedhistaxreformproposalasaquestionoffairness.AsReagan’s pollsterputit,“ratherthanattemptingtooutdoMondaleonthefairness issuebymoreaggressivelygoingaftertheblackvotewetookthetax issueandturneditintoafairnessissue.”36 In response to Reagan’s first-term policies on race, the few black leaderswhohadsupportedhimin1980werenowheretobefoundinhis reelectioneffort.ThecivilrelationshiphehadinitiallywiththeNAACP vanishedinangrychargesandcountercharges.Almosttheonlyoutreach Reagan’scampaignhadtoblackvoterswasapatheticbillboardcampaign tellingblacksthatthreeblackboxers(MuhammadAli,JoeFrazier,and FloydPatterson)werebehindReagan. TheangerinblackAmericawassogreatthathundredsofthousands ofblacksrespondedtovoterregistrationdrivesledbyJesseJacksonand othersin1983–1984,whichgreatlyfrightenedwhiteRepublicansinthe South.TheresponseoftheReagancampaignandaffiliatedgroupswasto exploitthatfeartoregisterwhites.AsoneReagansupporterattested,“Jesse Jacksonmade[white]peoplesomad...foreveryblackvotehegot,the Republicansandindependentsregisteredtwowhites.”37Reagan’svictory showedhowpolarizedthenationwasbytheactorfromCalifornia.Atthe verymomentthatwhiteAmerica(andtoalesserextent,AsianandHispanic America)wascrowningReaganpresidentbyoneofthegreatestmargins inAmericanhistory,blackswereevenmoreunanimouslyrejectinghim. Fromhisfirstcampaignspeechin1964tohisfinalappearancesonthe campaigntrailin1984,Reagandemonstratedasustainedlackofinterest inwooingblackvotesor,perhapsmoredirectly,asincereinterestinwooingthevotesofwhiteswhowereopposedtoorfearfulofblackprogress. Ofcourse,millionsofAmericansralliedtoReaganfornonracialreasons, andReaganneverpracticedthekindofcruderacistpoliticsofStrom Thurmondin1948orGeorgeWallacein1968.Reaganalwaysreacted toaccusationsofpersonalracismbychallenginghisaccuserstoshowa singleraciststatementthathehadevermade,andheoftenresortedeither tothetimewornstoriesofhischildhoodoppositiontoracismortodry recitationsofthenumberofblacksappointedwhenhewasgovernorof California.Atonepoint,ReagantoldacrowdofRepublicanblacksthat hewouldhavemademorepublicreferencestohis“record”numberof blackappointees,buthedidnotwanttopractice“cheappolitics.”38At thesametime,Reaganhadnoaversiontooccasionallyusingthecheapest ofpoliticsontheothersideoftheracialfence,suchasexploitingwhite southernfearofablackvicepresident.
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Thetwenty-yearhistoryofReaganthecampaignershowsapeculiar arc.Whilehisdebutspeechin1964avoidedraceandracialissues,Reagan highlightedracialissuessuchasbusing,affirmativeaction,andwelfare whenthebacklashagainstblackprogressandblackriotsbecamewhitehotfrom1966to1972.Reaganhadalotlesstosayaboutracein1980 and1984.Perhapsthiswassimplybecausethepublicwaslessconcerned abouttheseissues,orbecauseReagan’sreputationasastrongopponent ofcivilrightslegislationwassowellestablishedthatitwasunnecessary tobringituptoreapelectoralrewards.YetReagan’sdeftappealstothe Wallaceblochelpedtransformhisparty.AlongwithRichardNixon’s 1972campaign,Reagan’s1968,1976,and1980campaignsbroughtabout agreatelectoralshiftinthepartycoalitions,asmillionsoflow-income and middle-class whites in the suburban North andAmerican South trendedRepublican.Whileitwouldbefalsetoattributetheentiretyof thatshifttorace,alongwithnationalsecurity,moralvalues,andcrime, itwascrucialtothechange. Campaignscannotbestudiedinavacuum,however.Thepromises madeonthecampaigntrailoftenendupshapingthesubsequentgoverningpolicies,andthosepoliciesinturnshapethenextelection. ReaganonRacialPolicies:BacklashontheBackBurner Reagan’s first elected office was the governorship of California from 1967 to 1975. In his two terms, he took credit for radically reducing California’swelfarerolls,aswellascuttingtaxes.Whilehewasnever popularwithCalifornia’sblackcommunity,racewasnotcentraltohis agenda.AsopposedtogovernorsintheSouthduringthesameperiod, Reagandidnothavetoaddressfundamentalquestionsofblackequality suchasintegrationandintermarriage.Duringhistenure,Californiadid notexperiencethemassiveurbanunrestoftheWattsriotof1965.Nor diditfacethehighlysymbolicissuesofhonoringMartinLutherKing Jr.ortheConfederateflag.Also,unlikemorerecentRepublicangovernorsaroundthecountry,Reagandidnotmakeoppositiontoaffirmative actionandracialadmissionspoliciesatstateuniversitiescentraltohis administration.Onhiselectiontothepresidency,however,awholearray ofracialissuesrequiredhisattention.Inalmosteveryinstance,Reagan tookpositionsthateitherexacerbatedtensionswiththeblackcommunity orfailedtoamelioratetheexistingones. Reagan’seconomicpolicieswerewidelyperceived,accuratelyornot,
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asresponsibleforthebriefbutdeeprecessionof1982–1983.Manyblack leaders argued that Reaganomics itself was racist. It certainly affected blacksmoreseriouslythanitdidwhites,althoughthiscouldbesaidofevery recession,giventhestubborngapbetweenwhiteandblackunemployment. Still,asStephenCarterpointsout,atonepointduringReagan’sfirstterm, blackunemploymentwasaboveblackapprovalforReagan.39 Reagan’sadministrationconsistentlyarguedthatblackswerenotbeing wellled,thattheirleadershipwasinpartresponsibleforconveyingan inaccuratepictureofReagan’sattitudeonrace.Reaganactivelysought torecruitandmentoranewgenerationofconservativeblackleaders, whocouldeventuallysupplanttheexistingblackleadership.Ultimately, however,Reaganfailedtomakeblackconservatismanythingmorethan afringemovementintheblackcommunity. AmongthereasonsforthatfailurewasReagan’sconsistentinsensitivity to black concerns. In 1982, his administration suggested that tax exemptions should be granted to southern private academies that refusedtoadmitblacks.WhileaveryminorissueforReaganandfor mostAmericans,itwasahigh-profileconcernforsouthernRepublicans like Congressman Trent Lott, who wrote to Reagan demanding that segregated schools receive tax-exempt status. Private white southern academieshadbeenthefinalsegregationistresponsetotheeventualvictoryofintegrationinthepublicschools,andforLottandothers,itwas wrongtodenythemtaxexemptionjustbecausetheydiscriminated.In fact,inalittle-noticedportionoftheRepublicanplatformof1980,this so-calledunconstitutionalvendettaagainstall-whiteChristianacademies hadbeentargetedforelimination.Whenthepressgotwindofthemove, however,Reaganclumsilytriedtoclaimthathehadalwayssupportedthe currentpolicyandwasmerelyhopingthatCongresswouldenactthetax policyintolaw,ratherthanrelyonthefederalbureaucracytodenythe exemptions.40Thispatentlyfalseclaimdidnothingtostopthedamage toRepublicanoutreachtoblacks.AsClarenceThomas,aleadingblack conservative,observedatthetime,theefforttogivetaxexemptionsto whites-onlyschoolswasthe“deathknell”forsellingconservatismto blacks.41However,eveninlosing,somefeltthatReaganhadhelpedhis standingamongsomewhites:“Actingonitstrueinstincts,theadministrationhaslinedupwithsuburbanwhitesinoppositiontogovernment insistenceonequalrightsforminorities,thussignalingtowhitemiddle classAmericansthattheirvaluesandinfluencewereonceagainpredominantinnationalaffairs.”42
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Every six months or so during Reagan’s presidency, a racial issue wouldemergethatremindedblackAmericanswhereReaganstoodon race.Asanopponentoftheoriginal1965VRA,Reagan’sattitudetoward the1982renewalofthelegislationcouldhavebeenpredicted.While administrationofficialswouldnotopenlyopposerenewalwithaveto threat,theymadeitclearthattheywouldnotbeunhappytoseethebill’s opponentswin,andtheysoughttoweakentheVRAifpossible.43The messagethatReaganwasreluctanttosupporteventhisnearlysacred partoftheblackagendawasdevastatingtohisfewblacksupporters. Similarly, Reagan actively sought out a confrontation with the Civil RightsCommission,anotherlegacyofthecivilrightsera.Hefiredthe controversialchair,MaryFrancesBerry,aswellastwootherliberals,and soughttopackthepanelwithracialconservatives.Althoughtheliberal commissionersultimatelywontheirseatsbackincourt,thepublicity hardlyhelpedReagan’sracialimage.44 Reagan’shighest-profileengagementwithracewasthecontroversy overaholidaytohonorMartinLutherKingJr.Reaganhadlongbeen ambivalent about King, as he had been about the entire civil rights movement.OnthedayKingwasshot,Reagancalledtheassassination “a great tragedy that began when we began compromising with law andorderandpeoplestartedchoosingwhichlawsthey’dbreak.”45The comparison between nonviolent marches and boycotts against racial discrimination and the assassination of a black leader was not likely to win Reagan many black supporters. Moreover, it echoed the criticismsofKing’ssegregationistopponentssincehisearliestcampaigns againstracism.TheyarguedthatKing,bychallengingthestatusquo, wasresponsiblefortheviolencethatthewhitepowerstructureusedto defenditsprivileges.Reaganseemedtoagree,justatthemomentthat Kingwasenteringthepantheonofmartyredleaders.Itwasperhapsa historicalironythatthelongmovementtohonorKingwithaholiday wouldfinallypassthroughCongressatatimewhenthemanwhohad tosignthelegislationwasalifelongopponentofgovernmentactionsin defenseofblackcivilrights. Reaganfacedpressurefromhisconservativesupporterstovetothe bill, which was opposed by such recovering racists as Senator Jesse Helms.ManyconservativesbelievedthatinadditiontotreasonablyopposingthewarinVietnam,Kinghadbeenapromiscuousphilanderer andacommunist.TheypressedReagantoreleasesecretFederalBureau ofInvestigation(FBI)filesonKing,despitetheFBI’slegalagreement
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withtheKingfamilynottodoso.ThefactthattheFBIinformationhad beengainedthroughunconstitutionalsurveillanceofadomesticpoliticalfigurewasinconsequentialtoHelmsandhissupporters.Reagan’s truefeelingsinthemattercanbegleanedfromrecentlypublishedcorrespondence.Writingtoahard-coreright-wingerwhoopposedtheKing holidaybecauseofKing’ssexualimmoralityandleft-wingtendencies, Reaganwrote,“Ihavethereservationsyouhavebuttheretheperceptionoftoomanypeopleisbasedonanimagenotreality.Indeedtothem theperceptionisreality.Wehopesomemodificationsmightstilltake placeinCongress.”46UltimatelyReagandecidedtosignthelegislation, whichmighthavedonealittletohelphisimageintheblackcommunity. However,askedaboutHelms’scharges,Reagangavecredencetothem, revealinghistrueattitudetowardKing.Inonesentence,helostwhatever goodwillhemightotherwisehavegenerated.47 Reaganandhisstaffwerewellawareoftheeffectoftheseaccumulatedinsensitiveandoffensivepoliciesandmisstepsontheblackcommunity.BeforeaWhiteHousemeetingwithselectblackclergy,astaffer preppedReaganforthereceptionhewaslikelytoreceive.Afterreviewing Reagan’sattemptstoweakentheVRA,undermineaffirmativeaction, givetaxexemptionstosegregatedschools,andcuturbanspending,the memoconcluded,“Whilenosinglecategoryofacusation[sic]might inandofitselfpresentacauseforalarm,thecumulativeeffectofall ofthemtogetherhascreateddistrustandbitternesswithintheminority community...thereisawidespreadsentimentthattheAdministration is‘anti-black’orengagedinasystematicefforttorollbackcivilrights achievementsofthepast.”48Althoughthisverdictwasrenderedmidway throughthefirstterm,Reaganneverlaunchedanyefforttochangeblack America’sopinionofhim.Eveninhisappointments,Reaganshowed greater interest in other minorities.While appointments of blacks to highgovernmentpostscomparedtotheCarteryearsfellbymorethan 66percent,Hispanicappointmentsheldrelativelysteady.49 Perhaps the best that could be said of Reagan’s racial policies as presidentwasthatheneverputahighpriorityonanyofthem.Oneof thereasonsforReagan’ssuccess,particularlyinhisfirstterm,washis relentlessfocusonthreeissuesattheexpenseofallothers:cuttingtaxes, raisingdefensespending,andconfrontingtheSovietthreat.Inparticular, Reaganputalmostallsocialpoliciesonthebackburner,andracewasone ofthem.Indeed,oneofhiskeysouthernsupporters,JerryFalwell,wrote tohimin1983demandingactionagainstracialbusing.50Whilesome
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itemsonReagan’sagenda,particularlyweakeningtheVRAandtaking strongactionagainstaffirmativeaction,werethwartedbyCongress,in neitherbattledidReagancommitmuchpoliticalcapital. WhenReaganconsideredsomethingtrulyvital,suchastaxcutsoraid totheNicaraguancontras,hislobbyinganddeal-makingskillswereconsiderable.NoracialissueeverapproachedthecoreofReagan’sagenda. ForReagan,racialissuesweremostprominentonthecampaigntrail, notinoffice.TheonlypossibleexceptionwassanctionsonSouthAfrica. Fromthe1970son,manyAmericanshadbeenincreasinglyunhappywith thecloseassociationoftheU.S.governmentwiththeracistgovernment ofSouthAfrica.DuringReagan’spresidency,themovementtoimpose sanctions on SouthAfrica grew to a crescendo. Facing considerable publicandCongressionalpressuretogivein,Reaganfoughtlongand hardforhispolicyof“constructiveengagement”withtheapartheidgovernment.OnnootherracialissueofhispresidencydidReaganexhibit suchwillingnesstofight,evenafteritbecameclearthatCongresshad thevotestowinonthisissue.However,itisalmostcertainthatwhat motivatedReaganherewasnotanylovefortheodiousBothagovernment,butratherthebeliefthatsomeSouthAfricancommoditieswere vitaltotheU.S.militaryand,moreimportant,thatiftheblackmajority tookoverSouthAfrica,itwouldquicklybecomealliedwiththeSoviet Union.WhatdifferentiatedReaganfrommanyotherswhoalsosawthe communistthreatinsouthernAfricawasthatReaganwassoimmuneto thechargeofracismbythispointthatheproceededtopursuehispolicy goalsregardless. Reagan’sRacialLegacy:IronicandSubtle Takentogether,whatdidRonaldReagantheman,thepolitician,andthe presidentmeanforraceinAmerica?WhatisReagan’sraciallegacy? First,andperhapsmostimportant,ReagancontributedtotheracialpolarizationofAmericanpartypolitics.In1960,32percentofblacksvoted forRichardNixon.SincetheGoldwatermovementof1964,blacksupport foraRepublicannomineehasneverrisenabove13percent.Reagan,as Goldwater’smostprominentheir,continuedandexacerbatedthealienationofblacksfromtheRepublicanPartythatbeganwithGoldwater.He alsowasmoreresponsiblethananyotherRepublicanfortherecruitment intotheRepublicancoalitionofraciallyconservative,formerWallace supporters.Ultimately,Reagan’ssuccesswithsuchwhitevoters,andhis
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failurewithblacks,hadsimilarroots:hispositionsonsensitiveracial questions.Reaganopposedeverysinglecivilrightsactthroughoutthe 1960s,whenthevastmajorityofblackscouldnotvoteorexercisemost otherbasiccivilrights.EvenGoldwaterhadsupportedtheVotingRights Act,asasimplequestionofjusticeandfairness.Reaganevenopposeda measuretogiveblackAmericancitizenstherighttovote. ThelegacyofReagan’soppositiontotheCivilRightsActandtheVotingRightsAct—thefoundationalmeasurestogiveblacksbasicequality —shapedhiscampaignsforhisentirecareer.Modernblackpolitical, economic,andsocialequality,totheextentthatithasbeenrealized,has been built largely on the basis of these two legislative achievements. Thosewhoopposedthematthetimehaveeitherhadtoapologizeand “repent,”asWallaceandSenatorRobertByrdeventuallydid,orfacea verydifficulttimewithblackaudiences.Reaganneverapologizedfor hisearlierpositions,althoughhetriedtoavoiddiscussingthemasthe CivilRightsActandtheVotingRightsActinparticularbecamenearly assacredasconstitutionalamendments.Buttheseindeliblepositions, whilehurtingReaganamongblacks,wereakeyfactorinhisearlynational appealin1968and1976and,toalesserextent,inhisgreatvictoriesof 1980and1984.Morethananyotherpoliticalfigure,ReaganwasresponsibleforthedefeatoftheforcesofcivilrightswithintheRepublican Party.In1964–1965,Republicansweremorepositivetowardcivilrights forblacksthanwastheaverageDemocrat.BythetimeoftheReagan revolution,whilemostRepublicans,unlikeReagan,acceptedthebroad achievementsandworthofthecivilrightsmovement,thecivilrights wingoftheRepublicanPartywaslargelydead. During his eight years in the Oval Office, Ronald Reagan never succeeded in reversing any of the major victories of the civil rights movement,assomeofhismostferventsupporterssuchasFalwelland Lottseemedtoadvocate.Reagan’spresidencycanbeseenasanironic affirmationofthetriumphofblackequality.Agenerationearlier,PresidentDwightEisenhowerultimatelyinstitutionalizedtheNewDealby failingtooverturnanyofitscoreprograms,eventhoughEisenhowerand hissupportershadopposedsomeofthemforyears.Inthesameway, partofReagan’slegacyisthatthelegislativevictoriesofthecivilrights movementandthemoralstatureofitsgreatleader,MartinLutherKing Jr.,havebecomepartofthefabricofAmericanpolitics,unchallengeable fortheforeseeablefuture.IfevenRonaldReagan,whohadopposedall themajorcivilrightsactsandharboredgravedoubtsaboutDr.Kingand
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thecivilrightsmovement,wasforcedtosigntherenewaloftheVRA andabillauthorizingaholidayforKing,nootherpresidentwaslikely toreversetheachievementsofthecivilrightsera,evenassumingsuch apersoncouldbeelected. WhileReagandidnotleavemuchofapolicylegacyoncivilrights directly,hisappointmentstothejudiciaryhavehadandwillcontinue tohaveaseriousimpactonracerelations.Reaganappointedhundreds offederaljudgeswho,likehim,wereeitherambivalentaboutorhostile tothegreatachievementsofthecivilrightsmovement.Inallthemajor casestrimmingbackWarrencourtdecisionsoraffirmativeaction,Reaganappointeesoccupyaprominentposition.AcursorylookatAdarand v.Pena(affirmativeaction)orShawv.Reno(votingrights)showsthat whileReaganneversucceededinendingaffirmativeactionorweakening theVotingRightsActdirectly,hisappointeeswentalongwaytoward hisstatedgoals. In the end, Ronald Reagan’s legacy was a missed opportunity for African-Americans.HadReaganbeenlessconvincedofhisownabsolute immunitytoanytaintofracism,criticismofhispoliciesbyblacksmight haveledhimtoreachouttoblacksandtoofferthemcompromisepositionsonmajorracialissues.Reaganwaswithoutquestionthedominant forceinhispartyfromthefallofNixonin1974tohisdeparturefrom politicsin1989.HadReaganmetblackAmericanshalfwayonafewissuesorpaidmoreattentiontotheblackcommunity,mostblackswould nothavebeenleftwithonlyonechoiceineveryelectionfromGoldwater toBush.Instead,theygotapresidentwhoappointedalmostnoblacksto highofficeandwhodidnotrecognizehisonlyblackcabinetappointee inoneoftheraremomentsthattheyactuallymet.51UnlikeHispanics inthecurrentera,whoarecourtedbybothparties,blacks,intheface ofReagan’srelentlessinsensitivitytotheirhistory,achievements,and leaders,werelefttobedemonizedoratbestignoredbyonepartyand oftentakenforgrantedbytheother. ThelostopportunityrepresentedbyReaganmaybestbegleanedin examiningtherecordofhistrueideologicalandpoliticalheir,George W.Bush.NootherRepublicanhasbeenasconsistentorsuccessfulinhis openemulationofReagan,somuchsothataperceptiveanalystrecently titled a chapter-length study of Bush “Reagan’s Boy.”52Amid all the stylistic,political,andpolicysimilarities,perhapsthegreatestdomestic differenceistheirapproachtorace.Bush,whilegainingveryfewblack votesineither2000or2004,hasmuchbetterrelationswithindividual
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blackleadersthanReaganeverdid.Fromhisearliestcampaigns,Bush hastriedtopitchhimselfasa“differentkindofRepublican”onrace. Whilesomecriticsquestionthesincerityofhisviews,eventheywould havetoconcedethattheBushtoneandapproacharesignificantlydifferentfromReagan’s,whoinhiscampaignsoftenseemedcontenttowin theelectiononthebasisofwhitevotes.Hypocrisyisthetributethatvice paystovirtue;evenifweassumethatBushismerelymouthingwarm platitudesonracethathedoesnotbelievein,atleasthefeelstheneedto mouththemmoreoftenandmoreconvincinglythanReaganeverdid.And thereiscompellingevidencethatBushisinfactdifferentfromReagan inmorethanwords.Bushwaswillingtocompromiseonaffirmativeaction,notunderpressurefromCongress,asReagandid,butbecauseof pressurefromblacksinhisadministration.Blackshavemaderemarkable breakthroughsduringhispresidency,includingunprecedentedappointments,albeitinareasfarawayfromdomesticpolicies.Ablackwoman, CondoleezzaRice,isnotonlyoneofBush’sveryclosestadvisers,butis crediblymentionedashissuccessor.Bushcommittedmajorresourcesto blackoutreachin2000(althoughnotsomuchin2004)andhastriedto usehisantigaypositionsandhisfaith-basedinitiativetowinoverreligious blacks.Despitesomesuccessusingblackantipathyforgayrightstowoo blackvotes,BushremainsalienatedfrommostAfrican-Americansinthe masspublicandunabletowintheirapprovalinthepolls.Bushhasbegun thedifficultlaborofgivingblackstwoacceptableoptionsinpresidential elections,butmuchofthereasonthetaskissochallengingisbecauseof Reagan’sraciallegacy.ThemanfromDixonwhobelievedthathewas absolutelyinnocentofaniotaofprejudiceagainstblacksleftbehinda partythatwasalmostincorrigiblywhite.
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4 WhenCharacterWasKing? RonaldReaganandthe IssuesofEthicsandMorality
In2001,aformerspeechwriterforPresidentReagan,PeggyNoonan, wroteabook,WhenCharacterWasKing:AStoryofRonaldReagan. Sheemphasized,“Hewasagiant.Hewasourgiant,agiantofhistory; weknowthatnow,andwewishwecouldputourarmsaroundhimand rockhimtosleep.”Reagan’sstrength,accordingtoNoonan,wasthat “hehadcourage.Healwaystriedtodowhathethoughtwasright.And whendoingwhatwasrightdemandedfromhimgreateffortorpatience ortenacity,ormadehimthefocusofunendingattacksandcriticism,he summonedfromwithinthepatienceandthetenacityandthecourageto faceitall....Andwhenhisgreatworkwasfinishedheleft,andwent peacefullyhome.”1 Noonan’stitleunderscoresherargumentandthoseofmanyconservativewritersthatReaganwasamanof“character,”asdefinedbyone dictionaryasthe“inherentcomplexofattributesthatdetermineaperson’s moralandethicalactionsandreactions.”2Accordingly,heneverletpolls determine his positions, cared little about how history would portray him, and sustained a vision ofAmerica that brought about economic prosperityandtheendoftheSovietUnion.Hestoodinmarkedcontrast toBillClintoninthecharacterdebate.Nevertheless,Reagan’ssupporters recognizethecritiquesofReaganregardingcharacter,andtheyoftentry toturntheweaknessesnotedbyReagan’scriticsintostrengthsoratthe leastneutralizethem. Of course, there are some significant problems for people such as Noonanwhotrytoeitherexcuseorexplainquestionablecharacterissues 90
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relatingtoReagan.Thischapterasksseveralquestionsrelatingtothe characterissue.First,itchallengesthemethodofcomparison.Insteadof focusingonClinton,whomReaganneverfacedinanelection,whynot chooseasthepointofcomparisonJimmyCarter,whomReagandefeated in1980?Second,itreviewsaparticularissue,abortionrights,toexamine whereReaganstoodonit.Didhereallystandbyhisprinciplesonthis complexissue?Finally,itlooksatthecorruptionthatcharacterizedthe Reaganadministration,manyoftheculpritscloselyassociatedwiththe presidentsincehisdaysasgovernorofCalifornia.Italsocoversindetail theverystickyissueoftheIran-contraaffairinordertoplaceReagan’s characterunderamicroscope.TheultimateconclusionisthatReagan was,ashisdefendersargue,notClinton,buthewashardlybeyondreproach.Intheend,hewasapragmaticpoliticianwithsignificantflaws, whooftensubordinatedideologyandprinciplesforpolitics. CreatingtheStrawMan:Choosingthe CharacterComparison InthediscussionofReagan’scharacter,mostconservativesjuxtapose hisactivitiesagainstthoseofPresidentClinton.Formorethanadecade, conservatives vilified Clinton and his wife, Hillary Rodham Clinton. Clearly,theClintonsprovidedplentyoffodderonthecharacterissue, includingtheMonicaLewinskyaffairandthepardonshandedoutas Clintonleftoffice.WhilethenumberofscandalsintheClintonadministration,includingthenumberofadvisersindictedorinvestigated,was notthatfardifferentfromtheeightyearsoftheReaganadministration, thechorusofdenunciationsfromtherighthasbeendeafeningandhas slantedthedebate. DineshD’SouzaprovidesarepresentativeexampleofwhatconservativeshavesaidaboutClinton:“Hischaracterflawsandnakedpursuit of power and self-aggrandizement have led to numerous scandals— Whitewater,Travelgate,PaulaJones,theuseoftheLincolnBedroom forcampaignfund-raising—whichhavedemeanedthepresidencyand demonstratedClinton’sunworthinesstobeleaderofagreatcountry.”3 Othershavebeenequallystrongintheircriticisms,allthewhileraising Reaganupastheanti-Clintonintherealmofmoralsandethicsand,by extension,asthevirtuousRepublicanversustheimmoralDemocrat. Thereisasignificantproblemwiththepointofcomparison,primarily thatReaganneverranagainstClinton.Infact,thebetterchoiceofcontrast wouldbeJimmyCarter,Reagan’sopponentin1980.Carter,however,
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providesasignificantchallengeforconservativesinthecharacterdebate. Anevangelical,born-againChristianwithalonghistoryofprincipled positions,Carterhasarecordofuntarnishedpublicserviceandenviable dedicationtoservinghisfellowAmericansandothersinhispostpresidency.ItisrelativelyeasytoholdupReaganastheconsummatemanof characteragainstClinton.Ontheissueofmoralityandethics,however, Cartermakesmostpeople,includingReagan,paleincomparison. Ironically, Reagan’s victory over Carter ushered in a significant politicalforceintheconservativemovementandinAmericanpolitical cultureasawhole:thereligiousright,asrepresentedinitiallybyJerry FalwellandtheMoralMajority.ManyconservativesvotedforReagan basedonhispositiononissuesofabortionandschoolchoice,despitehis lackofastellarrecordofchurchgoing,hisbeingthefirstpresidentwho wasadivorcé,andhismixedrecordonabortionasCaliforniagovernor. Reagan’srecordhascreatedtensionsforconservativesintheirstruggle tosustainthenotionthatconservativeleadershaveamonopolyongood character,sinceCarterisadevoutsouthernBaptistwhoattendedservices religiously,servedasadeacon,andregularlytaughtSundayschoolat theFirstBaptistChurchofPlains,Georgia,andtheFirstBaptistChurch of Washington. The Reverend Billy Graham writes, “Many leaders, I am afraid, place their religious and moral convictions in a separate compartmentanddonotthinkoftheimplicationsoftheirfaithontheir responsibilities.JimmyCarter,however,wasnotlikethat.”Headdsthat Carteris“amanoffaithandsterlingintegrity”and“undoubtedlyoneof ourmostdiligentPresidents,persistentandpainstakinginhisattention tohisresponsibilities.”4 TheGeorgian’scredentialsaslivingtheChristianfaithheespoused onlyincreasedafterheleftoffice.HedevotedsignificanttimeandenergytowritingbookssuchasLivingFaith(1998)andSourcesofFaith: MeditationsonScriptureforaLivingFaith(1999).Heopenstheformer bookwiththestatementthat“religiousfaithhasalwaysbeenatthecore of my existence,” an important insight into his own self-perception.5 Thelatterbookisacompilationoffifty-twoSundayschoollessonsthat hedevelopedovertheyears.Carter’snumerousbooks,whichhighlight hisfaithanditsorigins,havesoldexceptionallywell.Theyprovethat conservatives, much to their chagrin, lack a monopoly on a personal relationshipwithChrist. Carter’sopenpronouncementoffaith,publiclyasaleaderandwithin hiswrittenworks,createsasubstantialproblemforconservativesdeter-
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minedtoretainthemoralandethicalhighgroundrelatedtoreligionand politicsfortheirmovement.Therefore,theyhaveemphasizedReagan’s religiousness,strivingtojustifyhisirregularchurchattendance,deprecatingthelackofasignificantpapertrailrelatingtohisreligiousbeliefs, andusinghispublicpronouncementsasdemonstratingthedepthofhis relationshipwithGod.TheyreachconclusionssuchasthatofSteven F.Haywardthat“RonaldReagan’sdeepreligiousfaithhasbeenoverlooked because, in his typical modest way, Reagan kept it hidden in plainsight.”6 The most pronounced of these works is Paul Kengor’s God and RonaldReagan:ASpiritualLife(2004).Inhisintroduction,hestresses “Reaganwassaidtobeprivateabouthisfaith,notsharingitwiththose aroundhim.Toasignificantextent,thatwastrue.Yet,thereitwasan endlesstrailofreligiousremarksthatcoursedunmistakablythroughhis papersandletters.AlmosteverywhereIseemedtolook,therehewas: thereligiousReagan,motivatedineveryaspectofhislifeandcareerby hisspiritualconvictions.”7 Seekingtoprovehispoint,Kengorstressesthereligiousoriginsof Reagan’sthoughtsandspeeches.Tohiscredit,therearesome,buthe stretcheshisargumentsaboutReaganasopposedtoCarter,whosepublic statements and actions constantly reaffirmed his Christian beliefs. Reagan’s allusions to the “evil empire” or the “shining city” become prominentpartsofKengor’sargument,buthelargelyignoresthatthese ideasareimbuedinallAmericans,regardlessofreligion.Evensecular humanistshavethebeliefinAmericanexceptionalismandtheconceptof goodversusevilinstilledinthembytheeducationalsystem,themedia, andothersocializingagencies.Inmanyways,ReaganwasrepresentativeofgenerationsofAmericans,espousingtheidealsofU.S.history andpoliticalcultureinpublicpresentations,butthatdoesnotmeanthat hehadadeep-down,abiding,long-termfaithlikeCarter’s.Likemany otherconservativewriters,Kengortrieshardtotieeverything(speeches, stories,actions)toReagan’sreligioninordertocompensateforthelack ofovertsignsofitinhiseverydaylife.Conservativesdesperatelywant to further the perception that the greatest conservative president was morallyandethicallysuperiortoallchallengersbecauseofhisreligious foundations. Inmanyways,theeffortstopromoteReagan’sreligiouslifeforcontemporarypoliticalpurposesdemeanthepresident.LikemostAmericans, Reaganhadnospecialinterestinstudyingtheologicalquestions,learning
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thescripturesindepth,orovertlyproselytizinghisfaith.Yethebelieved the basic concepts of the Christian faith, including prayer and divine intervention.Inmanyways,Reaganwasthenorm,comparedtotheexceptionslikeCarterandthepastor’sson,WoodrowWilson,whosedeep abidingfaithconsistentlyguidedtheirdecisions.Ultimately,effortsby conservativestoprovesuchafaithinthecaseofReaganareintellectually dishonestanddisingenuous,drivenbypoliticalmotivationsratherthan thedesiretofullyunderstandtherealnatureofReagan’sreligion. However,Carter’sactions,aswellashispublicstatementsandwritings,mustbeseenincontextinordertofullyrevealthedepthofhis commitment.Asamatterofcharacter,Cartertypicallystoodfirminhis principles, which were rooted in his Christian faith.A representative exampleoccurredevenbeforeCarterenteredpolitics.Inthemid-1950s, CarterreluctantlyreturnedhometoPlains,Georgia,frommilitaryservice totakeoverthefamilybusiness.Hearrivedatatimeofgreatturmoilin theSouth,whenthesegregatedsystemwasunderfirefromtheBrownv. BoardofEducationdecision.Whitesegregationistsmobilizedtodisrupt attemptstoendtheoldsystemofdiscrimination.OnewaywasthecreationoftheSouthernCitizens’Council,composedoftheleadingmembers ofcommunities,includinglawyers,businessmen,anddoctors. Thesegregationistsneededunifiedeffortstoholdtheline.InPlains, theSouthernCitizens’CouncilpressuredCartertojoin.Withastrong beliefinequalrightsimbuedinhimthroughhisreligiousbeliefs,Carter refused. The group threatened to boycott his store, but he remained resolute.Severalofhisfriendsofferedtopayhisduesandallowhimto remainintheshadows,buthesteadfastlyrefused.Aboycottfollowedthat nearlyruinedhim,butheremainedloyaltohisprinciplesandsurvived despitetheeconomicloss.Ashebeganhispoliticalcareerheavoided overtandcovertusesofrace,helpingbreakacycleofusingracebaitingforpoliticaladvantage,acourageousstandduringadifficulttimein GeorgiaandtheSouth.8 TherearemanyotherexamplesofCarterremainingloyaltohispoliticalprinciplesandChristianbeliefs.Animportantexamplewashis emphasisonhumanrightsasacornerstoneofAmericanforeignrelations whenhetookthepresidency.Hebuiltontheideaofanearlystatement: “Whatweseekis...aforeignpolicythatreflectsthedecencyandgenerosityandcommonsenseofourownpeople.”9Emphasizinghuman rightshadasignificantrealistapplicationregardingtheSovietUnion assuchanapproachsoughttochangeitsbehaviorandtowinthemoral
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highgroundinthestrugglefortheheartsandmindsofthepeopleofthe nonindustrializedworld.Atthesametime,Carter’sapproachrejected theshort-termappealofcooperatingwithdictatorswhotrampledonthe rightsofpeoplewithazealequaltothatofthecommunists.Heheartily criticizedSouthAfricaforapartheid,denouncedtheArgentinemilitary foritsgrosshumanrightsabuses,andtookactionstopromotedemocracy andfreedomaroundtheglobe. Ofcourse,therewereproblemswithhischoices.First,hewasnot alwaysconsistentinhisapplicationofpolicyfocusingonhumanrights, aproblemexacerbatedbytensionsintheforeignpolicybureaucracythat undermineditsapplication,especiallyconservativesinCongressandthe militarywhobelievedthatsuchapolicyaidedthecommunistsagainst America’sauthoritarianallies.CarterconsistentlycriticizedtheSoviet Unionforitshumanrightsabusesandretaliatedin1980withthegrain embargoandboycottoftheMoscowOlympics,aswellassignificant militarybuildup,andheimplementedhishumanrightspolicyinLatin America,butfailedinuniformapplicationinIranandotherareas.For this, he was bitterly chastised by conservatives, including prominent membersoftheReaganadministrationsuchasJeaneKirkpatrick,who arguedthattheUnitedStatescouldworkwithauthoritarian,pro-Americanstatesbutnottotalitarian,pro-Sovietstates.WhenCarterwavered, conservativescriticizedhim;whenhewassteadfast,theydidthesame. LikeReagan,Cartershowedthatprincipleswereoftensubordinatedto realpolitik.Still,manyanalystsnotethattheideawascorrectevenifthe applicationfailed. Perhaps the most definitive and public way that Carter lived his principlesanddemonstratedhischaracterwasafterhelefttheWhite House.Whilemostpresidentsinthelasthalf-centuryhaveretiredfrom public life, occasionally emerging to accept large gifts for speaking engagements,CarterhasdonemoreforhisfellowAmericansandothersintheworld.Besidespublishingmorethanfifteenbooksandgiving thousandsofspeeches,hehaslivedhisfaithbyworkingtoprovidehousingforlow-incomepeoplethroughHabitatforHumanity,andworking toeradicatediseasessuchasriverblindnessandguineawormdisease, andtopromotechildren’simmunizationsandmentalhealththroughthe CarterCenter.10 Inaddition,CarterhaslaboredthroughtheCarterCentertopromote humanrightsanddemocracyaroundtheworld.Hehasworkedasan electionmonitorandnegotiatorinCentralAmerica,theMiddleEast,the
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Balkans,andAsia,tryingtohammeroutdealstostoptheunendingcycle oftensionandviolence.Agoodexampleoccurredin1994,whentheClintonadministrationfacedoffwiththemilitarydictatorsinHaitiovertheir coupagainstthedemocraticallyelectedgovernmentofJean-Bertrand Aristide.WhennegotiationsfailedandAmericantroopspreparedforan invasionthatprobablywouldhavecostthousandsoflives,Carterworked withColinPowellandformerGeorgiasenatorSamNunntoremovethe militaryjuntaandtransferpowertoAristide.Despitestrongopposition bysomewithintheClintonWhiteHouseandCongress,Cartersucceeded: themilitaryleaderssteppeddown,preventingsignificantbloodshedin whathasbeentermedthe“immaculateinvasion.”11 Despitehisefforts,criticsfromtheleftandrightchastisedCarterforhis workwithdictatorsandothersordidcharactersinhismissiontoestablish peaceandstability.Yet,ashisproponentshighlight,atleasthetriedtodo somethingandinmostcasesachievedsignificantsuccessesasaprivate diplomat.Onewriterobserved,“Jesus,whomCarterworships,wassaid tohaveconductedhisministryamongthedowntrodden,amonglepersand prostitutes.AsaprivatecitizenwithnorankotherthanformerPresident, Carterdealsregularlywithinhabitantsofgodforsakenvillagesandrenegade leaderswhomAmericanofficialsordinarilyrefusetotouch.”12 ConservativesrecognizethevalueofCartertoDemocratsinthevalues issue,especiallycontrastingReagan’slackofahumanitarianagendaduringandafterthepresidency.AshistorianDouglasBrinkleyhighlights, “Theself-servingpursuitsofhisextantpredecessorsappealedtoCarter evenless:RonaldReaganhadsoldthecachetofhisU.S.presidencyto theJapanesefor$2millioninspeakingfees;GeraldFordspentmuch ofhistimeinPalmSpringsworkingonhisgolfswingwhilecollecting director’sfeesfromcorporateboards;andRichardNixonwasholedup inNewJerseywithhisDictaphoneinanendlessquesttoremakehis imagefromdirtycrooktointernationalsage.”13 Asaresult,conservativeshaveincreasinglylaunchedbitingattacks onCartertotrytoinfluencepublicopinion.AgoodexampleisSteven F. Hayward’s The Real Jimmy Carter: How OurWorst Ex-President UnderminesAmericanForeignPolicy,CoddlesDictators,andCreated thePartyofClintonandKerry.ThisisamisleadingtitleasHayward focusesonCarter’spostpresidencyinonly30ofthe231pagesofthe book.Ultimately,however,heconcludes“notsinceTheodoreRoosevelt hasanex-presidentbeenasperipateticortroublesometohissuccessors asJimmyCarter,”addingthat“everypublicfiguredeservestohavemyths
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andinaccuraciesdebunked,butJimmyCarter’sfailuresarerootedinthe characterandideologyofthemanhimself.”14 While denigrating Carter, supporters of Reagan blame his lack of activitysinceleavingtheWhiteHouse,otherthanwritinghismemoirs, testifyinginseveraltrialsofformeradministrationofficials,andtaking exorbitantspeakingfees,ontheonsetofhisAlzheimer’sdisease.However,neitherbeforenorduringhispoliticalcareerhadReaganshown anyinterestinspecialprojectslikeHabitatforHumanityortheCarter Center.Heretired,whichwasthenormratherthantheexception,and thatisfine,exceptwhencomparinghisexampletothatofCarter,who increasinglysetthestandardforthebehaviorofex-presidents. JimmyCarter’scharacter,bothinrhetoricandaction,providesconservativeswithsignificantchallengeswhentryingtopaintReaganina positivelight.IftheyfocusonClinton,whichtheyinvariablydo,they haveamucheasiertaskinmakingReaganlookgood.However,when theyjuxtaposethetwocandidateswhoranin1980,thepicturechanges asCarterclearlyshinesasaresultofwritings,hispersonalrecord,and hislonghistoryofhumanitarianefforts.Thus,ifpeoplewanttofocus oncharacterandthepresidencyincontemporaryAmerica,thestarting pointshouldbeCarter,althoughconservativesclearlyunderstandthe challengesthatresult. AMatterofConscienceandPrinciple?TheAbortionIssue Whilepointsofcomparisonaresignificant,thetruetestofcharacterin politicsremainsthecommitmentofapersontoanunpopularpositionand subsequentactionwithoutfearoftheconsequences.Reagan’ssupporters, especiallyevangelicalChristians,focusonhisoppositiontoabortionas demonstratingthischaracter.PeggyNoonanemphasizes,“taxes,SDI, andabortionwereissuesthatcapturedhisimagination”as“hecouldsee thefetuskickingawayfromtheneedle.”15Noonan,aswellasothers, likedtoquoteasectionfromReagan’sfamous“evilempire”speechthat “humanlifelegislationendingthistragedy[abortion]willsomedaypass theCongress,andyouandImustneverrestuntilitdoes.”16D’Souza underscoresthatReagan’s“greatestregretwasthathewasunabletodo moreaspresidenttoprotectthelivesoftheunbornandthatAmerica wouldneverbe‘completelycivilized’aslongasabortionondemand waslegal.”17Eachyear,pro-lifersdedicatetheirralliestoReaganand constantlyusehisquotestofurthertheirpoliticalagenda.
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WhileReaganmayhavebelievedinthehorrorofabortion,therewas asignificantgapbetweenrhetoricandpracticethatunderminesefforts onhisbehalftosubstantiatethatheneverpaidattentiontopollsinhis decisions.Afewoftheinconsistenciesregardingabortionincludehis signingintolawoneofthecountry’smostliberalabortionlawsasgovernorofCalifornia,hisappointmentoftwopro-choiceSupremeCourt justices,hisfailuretopubliclyembracethepro-lifemovementforfear ofalienatingpro-choiceRepublicanvoters,andthenoticeableabsence ofapostpresidencyefforttosupportthepro-lifemovement.Therecord suggeststhatsomeofhisadvisers,morethanReagan,werewillingtotake onthecontentioustopicandthatcompetingvisionsintheadministration causedinaction,ultimatelyleavinganextremelyambivalentlegacy. Oneofthedarkstainsonhispro-liferecordoccurredearlyinReagan’s political career.When Reagan became California governor, state law allowedforlegalabortionsonlytosavethelifeofthemother.In1967 legislators,includingmanyprominentRepublicans,introducedatherapeuticabortionbill,whichpermittedlegalabortionsinthecaseofrape andincestandthreatstothemother’sphysicalandmentalhealth.18 Reagan’shandlingoftheissuereflecteddivisionsinhisfamilyand hisstaff.AdvisersLynNofzigerandEdwinMeesesupportedthebill, whileBillClarkopposedit.ReaganmetsecretlywithCardinalFrancis McIntyre(whichheinitiallydenieddoing),whofirmlyagreedwiththe argumentoftheCatholicbishopofSacramentothat“theunbornchild, howeverbriefitsexistence,isclearlyidentifiedbyscienceeveninembryonic form as belonging to the human family.” On the other hand, Reagan’s influential father-in-law, physician Royal Davis, backed the liberalization.Reaganwouldadmitlater“Ihaveneverdonemorestudy onanyonethingthanontheabortionbill.”19 WhileReaganpersonallyagonizedoverthedecisiononthebill,his officeissuedanimmediatestatementpromisingthathewouldsignthe legislation,whichwonvictoryintheCaliforniaAssemblyinJune1967. HedidandTherapeuticAbortionActwentintoeffect.Asopponentspredicted,ideaseffectivelycommunicatedtoGovernorReagan,abortions skyrocketedfrom518legalabortionsin1967tomorethan199,089in 1980whenReagantookoveraspresident,thetotalnumberexceeding 1,444,778inthatperiodinCaliforniaalone. Furthermore, during his next six years as governor of California, Reagandidlittletotrytooverturnthestatute,merelyholdingtheground againstextendingitsprovisionstofetuseswithperceiveddeformities.
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Hisattentionturnedtootherpriorities,includingtaxcutsandlawand orderissues.Inturn,California(asinmanycases)setatrendforthe liberalizationofabortionpoliciesatthestatelevel,aprocessculminatinginthe1973SupremeCourtdecisionRoev.Wade,whichmadelegal abortionthelawoftheland.20 EvenhismoststridentsupporterssuchasD’Souzaacknowledgethat GovernorReagan’sactionsrelatingtoabortionwereacolossalfailure. However,theyarguethatthisdisappointmentmadehimmorecommitted tostoppingabortionaspresident,althoughtheexacttimingoftheconversionthatwasnotcalculatedtowinconservativesupportisunclear.For example,intheperiodfrom1975,whenheleftthegovernorship,untilhe tookoveraspresident,Reaganwrote1,044pieces,mostforradiospeeches. Ofthose,onlyonefocusedextensivelyontheabortionissue.21 SupporterswouldrespondthatonceReaganfocusedonnationalpolitics,hisinterestinabortionintensified.InJuly1979,hespokeinfavor ofaconstitutionalamendmentallowingtheprocedureonlyifathreatto themother’slifeexisted.22HealsobackedCongressmanHenryHyde’s effortstorestrictfederalfundingforabortions,apositionalsosupported byDemocratsincludingPresidentJimmyCarterandCongressmanAl Gore ofTennessee.23The presidential primary saw him paint George H.W.Bushaspro-choice,andduringtheregularcampaign,hisrhetoric broughtnortheasternandmidwesternCatholicsandsouthernevangelicals intotheRepublicanfold,helpingensureadecisivedefeatofCarter. Onceinoffice,ReagansupportedtheeffortsofSenatorsOrinHatch andJesseHelmstopushconstitutionalamendmentsseverelyweakening abortionrights.Yetthemostimportantandlong-lastingactionofReagan regardingabortionrightswashisappointmentin1981ofSandraDay O’ConnortotheSupremeCourt.Ratherthanbackingtheconservative choicessuchasAntoninScaliaandRobertBork,Reaganfollowedup onhiscampaignpromisetoappointawomantothehighestcourt.This wasdonedespitethevirulentoppositionofMoralMajorityheadJerry Falwell,whocalledonall“goodChristians”toopposetheappointment, andtheNationalRighttoLifeCommittee,whichhighlightedO’Connor’s recordasamemberoftheArizonaSenatewhenshepromotedafamily planningbillthatoverturnedonethatbannedabortions.24 Despitesuchcriticisms,ReagandefendedhisnominationofO’Connor, tellingoneconstituentwhodenouncedhisselectionthat“Iamconfident Imadetherightdecision”andthat“Ifeelasdeeplyasyoudoaboutthe issueofabortion.”25Inhismemoirs,heemphasizedthat“theonlylitmus
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testIwanted,Isaid,wastheassuranceofajudge’shonestyandjudicial integrity”andthat“Iappointedherandsheturnedouttobeeverything Ihopedfor.”26 Iftheabortionissuewascentraltohisviewofthenominationprocess, thenitplayedvirtuallynoroleinthechoicetonominateO’Connor.This decisionhadalong-termandsignificantimpactontheabortiondebate inAmerica.Formorethantwentyyears,O’Connorconsistentlyvoted withthemajoritytoupholdthebasicprinciplesofRoev.Wadeaswell asotherliberalinterpretationsoffamilyplanningoutsideoftheabortion debate.Overandoveragain,O’Connorremainedaswingvoteinthe abortiondebate,leavingsomepro-lifecriticsdisillusionedwiththeearly statementthatReaganmadeinregardtotheirissue. Nevertheless,Reagan’ssupporterswouldrespondthatthepresident followedthismistakewitheffortstocorrecttheproblem.In1986,he nominatedAntoninScaliatotheSupremeCourtreceivingunanimous Senate approval. Scalia has been an ardent opponent of abortion, althoughwhetherthiswasthelitmustestforReaganasmuchasScalia’s strictconstructionistinterpretationoftheConstitutionremainsunclear. Certainly,peopleintheadministrationandtheJusticeDepartmentliked hispositiononabortion,butthepresident’struepositionremainsmurky becauseoftheambiguityofhisfirstchoiceandtheabsenceofanydiscussioninhismemoirs.27 Then,in1987,Reagansoughttoappointanotherjustice,RobertBork, whohadsolidcredentialsasanopponentofabortion(atleastwanting toreturnittostatejurisdiction),buthadbeenpassedoverthreetimes fornomination,oncebyFordandtwicebyReagan.Again,whetherthe choicehingedonBork’soveralljudicialandpoliticalrecordonabortionremainsunclearasseveralpeoplestressedthatReagandidnothave muchofapersonalconnectiontothenominee.Althoughurgedbymany peopletoavoidthecontroversy,especiallyinthewakeoftheIran-contra scandalandthereturnofDemocratstothecontroloftheSenatein1986, Reagansentthenominationforward. ThenominationprocesswasarguablythemostbitterinAmericanhistory.Civilrightsgroups,abortionrightsorganizations,andcivilliberties groupsalllinedupagainstBork,citinghislonghistoryofopposition tomuchofwhattheCourthaddoneduringtheEarlWarrenandWarren Burgeryears,includingRoev.Wade.Inhearings,Borkpromisedtosupporttheprecedentsestablishedandseveralsenatorsextractedconcessions regardingtheFirstandFourteenthAmendmentsaswellasabortionand
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discrimination,buthiseffortsfailedtowinapproval.TheSenatevoted 58–42torejectthenomination,withmanyRepublicansjoiningtheoppositiontocreatethemostlopsideddefeatinhistory.28 Reagan’s actions during the whole process were limited. In midAugust,asthedebateheatedup,thepresidentleftforatwenty-four-day vacationathisCaliforniaranch.Duringthattime,hemadefewpublic statementsandnoeffortstolobbyforthenominee.Infact,hisfirstphone calltosenatorsdidnotcomeuntilSeptember30,longaftermostsenatorshaddecidedtheirvote.Despiteurgingbysomeadvisers,Reagan alsofailedtoeventrytoreachouttoconservativesouthernDemocrats whocouldpossiblyhavebeenpersuadedtosupportBork.29Thepresidentappeareddistantduringtheprocessandunwillingtoexpendmuch politicalcapitalindefenseofBork,despiteprotestationsbysomeofhis aides,includingAttorneyGeneralEdMeese,thathedidworkforthe nomination.30 The embarrassing nomination of Douglas Ginsburg followed. Ultimately,hewithdrewaftertheconservativesfoundoutthathiswife, anobstetrician,hadperformedabortions.Moreimportant,herevealed thathehadsmokedmarijuanaasayoungman.Intohisplacestepped AnthonyKennedy,whowonconfirmation.Whilehehadneverpublicly expressedhisviewsonabortion,hisCatholicismheartenedsocialconservatives,whohopedthathewouldtakehisseatandworktooverturn Roev.Wade. Inthelongterm,theyweredisappointed.Kennedyvotedtorestrict theprocedures,butconsistentlybackedupholdingthe1973decision. ThefinalresultwasthatReagan’sappointments,ratherthanoverturning Roev.Wade,sustaineditintothetwenty-firstcentury.Hisfirstappointment,SandraDayO’Connor,clearlywaspivotalandfailedthelitmus testregardingabortion,apointunderscoredbyheropponents.TheScaliaappointmentwasavictory,althoughitisunclearthathesupported overturningRoev.Wadeorreturningjurisdictiontothestates(manyof whichwouldhavesustainedthedecision).31Finally,Kennedy’sappointmenthelpedprotectthebasicconceptsofRoev.Wade.Clearly,Reagan’s recordontheSupremeCourtwasmixedandnevermatchedtherhetoric, asabortionneverappearedasalitmustest. BesidestheSupremeCourtnominees,thereareotherexamplesofambivalenceinReagan’sabortionrecord.Heandhisalliesslashedfundingto domesticandinternationalfamilyplanningservices.Also,speechwriters ledbyJusticeDepartmentlawyerMichaelUhlmannpennedanarticlefor
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ReaganinHumanLifeReviewthatfurtherexplainedhispro-lifeposition, apiecethatultimatelybecameabooklet,AbortionandtheConscience oftheNation(1984).HepreviewedanantiabortionfilmintheWhite Houseandhostedprivateeventsforantiabortionleaders. Despitesuchactions,Reaganandhisadvisersalwaysmaintaineda distancefromantiabortiongroups.Animportantsymbolicact,albeitone withsubstance,wasthatwhenReaganreceivedinvitationsfrompro-life groupstospeakatannualralliesinthenation’scapital,hewouldmake atelephonecallratherthanpersonallyaddressingthegroupssothat“he wouldnotbeseenwiththeleadersofthemovementontheeveningnews.” LouCannonnotesthatmanyofReagan’ssupportersblamedthismove onMichaelDeaverandhisfearofthenegativeimages,butthatReagan “continuedthepracticeafterDeaverhadlefttheWhiteHouse.”32Itfit wellwithwhataWhiteHouseaideargued:“WewanttokeeptheMoral Majoritytypessoclosetoustheycan’tmovetheirarms.”33 Therewereotherexamplesofthepresident’swillingnesstodistance himselffromtheabortioncontroversy,especiallyashispresidencyunraveledunderthepressureoftheIran-contraaffairandhisclosestadvisers, includingNancyReagan,becamemoreprominent.SheexpressedhappinessaboutPatBuchanan’sdeparturefromtheWhiteHouseandthe arrivalofanewspeechwriter.WhenshesawafirstdraftofReagan’s 1987StateoftheUnionaddress,sheannounced,“Thepartsaboutabortionhavegottocomeout.”34BytheendofReagan’spresidency,clearly abortionhadfadedfrompoliticalprioritiesasthevicepresident,George H.W.Bush,whoserecordwasdecidedlymoreliberalthanReagan’son thematter,begantotakecenterstage. Whiletherewasambivalenceduringhispresidency,Reagan’sposition after1989allowedhimtomakeclearerhissupportfortheoverturningof abortionwithoutfearofpoliticalramifications.Yethedidnot,although supporterswouldspeculatethathisAlzheimer’sdiseaselimitedhisefforts.Still,hefoundtimetotraveloverseas,oftenreceivingsubstantial feesforspeeches.Itwasanotherfiveyearsbeforethefamilyannounced thathewassufferingfromthedisease.Aswhenhesignedtheabortion lawasgovernorofCalifornia,therewasasubstantiallackoftalkoractionontheissueofabortion. Asanexample,inthe726pagesofhismemoirs,AnAmericanLife, whichappearedin1990,Reagandevotedsignificantspacetowritingabout taxes,theColdWar,armscontrol,andmanyothertopics.Intheindex, however,thereisnotonereferencetoabortion.Therearenograndstate-
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mentsaboutthehorrorofthepracticeandtheneedforchangeorapologies fornotdoingmorewhileinoffice.Thislackcontrastssignificantlywith theemphasisonabortioninthememoirbyPatBuchanan,thepresident’s formerspeechwriter,whoincludedalistofissuesforwhathecharacterized asasecondconstitutionalconvention.Atthetopwas“forpurposesofthis Constitution,theunbornchildshallbeconsidereda‘person’whoseright tolifeshallnotbeabrogatedwithoutdueprocessoflaw.”35 TherewasasimilarlackofdiscussionoftheissueamongReagan’s former advisers, although Nancy Reagan wrote in 1989, “I can’t get pastthefeelingthatabortionmeanstakingalife.Butincasesofincest, rape,orthemother’swell-being,Iacceptit.”36Reagan’smostprominent advisers,includingDeaverandMeese,didnotdiscusstheissueintheir booksasitwasalwayssubordinatedtotopicsliketaxes,lawandorder, andanticommunism. Inthefinalanalysis,WilliamPembertoncorrectlynotesthatReagan “kepthisReligiousRightfollowershappythroughrhetoricandsymbolic gestures,ratherthanthrougheffectiveactionontheiragenda.”37Nonetheless,DonaldCritchlowobservesthat“whateverambivalencetheymight havefeltattimesduringReagan’sadministration,grassrootsconservativesforgotpastambivalenceonboththeirandtheadministration’spart. TheirviewofhistoryplacedReaganasbolddefenderoftheircause. Hispresidencyimpartedinspirationtocarrytheirbattleintothenext millennium with the knowledge that Heaven’s gates awaited them as onward-marchingsoldiersforabetternation.”38 Still,thefinalevaluationofReagan’spositiononabortionmustlook beyondtherhetorictotheactions.Theoverallrecordrevealshisfailure totrulyadvancethecauseoftheantiabortionmovement.Thisfailure reflectsambivalencewithintheRepublicanPartyaseconomicconservativesandsocialliberals(civillibertarians)suchasBarryGoldwater clashedwithsocialconservativesdeterminedtoimposetheirmoralvalues onthecountry.Thesecleavagespersistedwithintheadministrationand Reagan’s own family. Ultimately, if character requires sacrificing for unpopularbeliefs,Reaganclearlyfailedthetestinthisarea,despitethe refusalofsocialconservativeRepublicanstorecognizethefact. TheIncorruptiblePresident? ReadingmanyofthebiographiesandworksonReaganbyconservatives, leavestheimpressionthattheformerpresidentwasamanofscrupulous
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character,especiallywhencontrastedwithClinton.Inmanyways,Reagan’s supportersappeartoplacetheirpresidentonanequalfootingwithGeorge Washington and his “I cannot tell a lie” myth. However, under closer scrutiny,Reagan’srecordfailstocorrespondwiththoseperceptions.He oftentoldlies,inprivateandpublic,confusingstorieshereadormovie plotswithrealevents.Inaddition,adisproportionatenumberofofficialsin hisadministration,includingmanyclosetothepresident,perpetratedacts thatwereattheleastunethicalandoftencriminal.Finally,questionsraised bythepresident’sperformanceduringtheIran-contraaffairsignificantly underminehissupporters’perceptionofamanofscrupulouscharacter.In theend,Reaganwasapoliticianwhoseunethicalactionsmayhavepaled whencomparedtoClinton’s,buttheywerehardlythoseofarolemodel. OneoftheareasthatrequirescloserscrutinyisReagan’struthfulness. LouCannonemphasizes,“Reaganlongagolearnedtoacceptasthetruth whateverversionofeventsheusedtoexplainthings.Thishabitserved himwellpoliticallybuthasprovedabarriertohistoricalreconstruction.”39 EvenReagan’ssupporters,suchasD’Souza,acknowledgedtheproblem: “EventhecarefulscrutinyofWhiteHouseaidescouldnotpreventhim fromrecitinganincidenthehadreadaboutsomewherebutdidn’tverify, orthenewsitemthatherememberedwithoneortwoembellishments.” D’Souzaaddsinanexcuseforthepresident:“Reaganwasunapologetic, becausetohimthestorieswere‘moralitytales,’andtheparticularincident athandwasonlyanillustrationofabroadertheme.Ashesawit,just becausethisorthatparticulardetailmightbeerroneousdidnotmean thatthemoralofthestorywasinvalid.”40 Thereweremanyexamplesofthisproblem.Anoftenrepeatedstory that Reagan liked to tell (including once to the Congressional Medal ofHonorSocietyin1983)wasthatofaB-17pilotinadamagedplane whorefusedtobailoutbecauseoneofthegunnerswastoobadlyhurtto eject:“Hetooktheboy’shandandsaid,‘Nevermind,son,we’llrideit downtogether.’CongressionalMedalofHonor,posthumouslyawarded.” Therewereseveralproblemswiththestory,includinghowpeoplewould knowabouttheconversationifthetwocrewmembersdied.Areporter investigatedtheclaim,comparingittothestoriesofthe434Medalof HonorwinnersinWorldWarII,andfoundnomatchingevidence.Ultimately,observersconcludedthatReagantookthestoryfromeithera movie,AWingandaPrayer,oraReader’sDigeststory.WhileWhite HousespokesmanLarrySpeakesargued“ifyoutellthesamestoryfive times,it’strue,”theissueofReagan’struthfulnessremained.41
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Inanothercase,ReagantoldtwodifferentpeoplethatduringWorld WarIIhehadbeenintheSignalCorpsandfilmedthehorrorsofthe HolocaustfirsthandwhenU.S.troopsliberatedthedeathcamps.Reagan told this story to Israeli prime ministerYitzhak Shamir, emphasizing “fromthenon,IwasconcernedfortheJewishpeople.”Helaterrepeated theaccounttoSimonWiesenthal,emphasizingthathehadshownthe filmstopeoplewhoquestionedtheextentoftheHolocaust.TheWhite Housetriedavarietyoftacticstodisengagefromthestory.JamesBaker emphasizedthatReaganacknowledgedthathehadneverleftthecountry duringthewarandthatheneversaidanythingtothecontrary.TheWhite HousealsotriedtoarguethatShamirandWiesenthallackedtheEnglish skillstoproperlyunderstandthepresident.Thiswasapoorefforttocover upsincebothmenhadmorethansatisfactoryEnglishskillsnottohave confusedthesamestorytoldatdifferenttimes.42Ultimately,thefuror dieddownandthepressmovedontootherstories. Reagan’spenchantfornottellingthetruthinsuchsituationsrarely backfiredonhimasherarelyadmittedtheabsenceoftruthandmany people, including journalists covering the president, either did not have the curiosity to check the facts or merely attributed them to the president’s age or way of doing things. For Reagan, the act of apologizingforlyingwouldhavebeenlikesubmittingaretractionin anewspaper,onethatpeoplerarelyread;theoriginalstatementhad themosteffect.However,itpointedtomoralambiguitythatnomattertheoriginhighlightedaconsistentproblemfacedbyhisaidesin keepingthepresidentgroundedinrealityandthefact-checkersfrom highlightingthatwhatthepresidentsaid(orwrote,forthatmatter) wasthetruth.WhileRegan’sdefendersmaydefendhislackoftruthfulness,theyhaveheldtheiropponents,suchasBillClintonandAl Gore,todifferentethicalstandardsthanReaganwhentheyskewered themaboutsimilarexaggerationsordistortions. AnothersubstantialprobleminvolvingthemoralandethicaldimensionsofReagan’scharacterliesinthecorruptionthatplaguedhisadministration.Whilethepresidentdoesnotappearpersonallyinvolved inthescandals(exceptforIran-contra),hislackofinterestintheevents unfoldingandhisdefenseofcloseassociatesinvolvedinvariouspublic andprivatescandalsestablishedatoneofcorruptiontoit.Thiscreateda seriousblotonhisrecordandcharacterasaseriouscultureofcorruption existedinhisadministration. At least 138 officials from the Reagan administration were con-
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victed,indicted,orinvestigatedforcriminalactions,themostofany president’sadministrationthroughthattime(otherreportsplacethe numberat190).43OneofthemostdamagingcasesinvolvedSecretary ofHousingandUrbanDevelopmentSamuelR.PierceJr.andmany employees,whowereimplicatedininfluencepeddlingandtheftinvolvingmillionsofdollars.Duringtheinvestigations,acongressional subcommittee sought the testimony of Pierce, who became the first cabinetmembersinceAlbertFallintheTeapotDomescandaltoinvoke theFifthAmendment.44 Ultimately,eventheadministration’sstaunchestsupporterscondemned thescandal.JamesJ.Kilpatrickwrote,“Itnowappearsthatthetaxpayers willtakealossofatleast$2billiononacozylittle,sleazylittle,greedy littledealsthatweremade.”Hewenton:“Letitbesaiduptop:theprimaryresponsibilityforthisdebacleliessquarelyinthelapofRonald Reagan.Thebuckstoppedthere.Fortheeightyearsofhisadministration,itnowseemsevident,thepresidentpaidvirtuallynoattentionto thishugecostlydepartment.”45Whencombinedwiththesavingsand loancrisis,thePiercescandalcosttaxpayersasignificantpricetagfor thegrosscorruptionthatplaguedbothprograms. Closertothepresident,scandalsplaguedpeoplewhoactedasReagan’slongtimesenioraidesandchiefadvisers.Therehadalwaysbeen suspicionsaboutmanyofthepeoplearoundthepresidentandhowthey enrichedthemselvesthroughtheirconnectionstohim.Several,likeJohn Poindexter,haddifficultieswinningcongressionalapprovalbecauseof allegationsofmisconductevenbeforeenteringtheWhiteHouse. ThefirsttoreceivepunishmentforhisactionswasMichaelDeaver, wholefttheWhiteHousein1986.AninvestigationofhislobbyingactivitiesafterleavingtheWhiteHousefoundthathehadcommittedperjury. Hereceivedathree-yearsuspendedsentenceandwasorderedtopaya $100,000fineandperformcommunityservice.46Soonafter,ajuryfound LynNofzigerguiltyofthreeviolationsoftheEthicsinGovernmentAct, whichwaspassedin1978inresponsetoWatergateandseveralother scandals.Hereceivedafineof$30,000andninetydaysinjail.Anappealscourtoverturnedtheconviction,butthedamagehadbeendoneto hisreputationand,byextension,tohisboss.47 Byfar,themostseriouschargesaroseagainstReagan’slongtimeclose associateAttorneyGeneralEdwinMeese.Numerouschargesofimproprietyevolved,leadingtoseven-and-a-half-yearsofinvestigationforfailing toreporttravelreimbursements,violationofconflict-of-interestrules,
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filingoffalseincometaxreturns,andinterventiononbehalfofWedtech tohelpthecompanysecuredefensecontractsandanoilpipelinefrom IraqtoJordan.In1987,aspecialindependentcounselbeganinvestigating chargesofbribery,fraud,andotherillegalactivities.48 AttacksonMeeseoftencamefrompartisanRepublicans.Criticisms mountedfromwithintheJusticeDepartment,wheremoraleplummeted underMeese’sleadership.GraffitiappearedcallingMeesea“crook”and a“pig.”TerryEastland,aformerspeechwriterandstronglyconservative RepublicanintheJusticeDepartment,emphasizedthatMeese“lefthis shirttailhangingoutatsuchlengththatitwaseasyforthosewhowished himilltotrytopullhimdown.”49 The most serious challenge arose from two partisan Republicans, DeputyAttorneyGeneralArnoldBurnsandAssistantAttorneyGeneral WilliamWeld(futuregovernorofMassachusetts).InMarch1988,they resignedindisgustandmetwithReagantoexplaintheirdecision.Inthat meeting,Burnsdenouncedtheflagrantviolationsofconflict-of-interest rules, criticized Meese for shaming the “temple of justice,” and told Reaganthatthemoraleinthedepartmentwasthelowest“probablysince thefoundingoftherepublic.”Weldconcludedthatifthedecisionwere lefttohim,hewouldseekanindictmentagainsttheattorneygeneral. Despitetheprotests,ReagancontinuedtosupportMeeseuntilhefinally resignedinAugust1988.50 TheinvestigationofMeesecontinuedformorethanayearafterward. Thefederalprosecutor,withtheapprovalofU.S.AttorneyRudolphGiuliani,publiclycalledMeese“asleaze.”51ThefinalreportbyspecialprosecutorJamesMcKayinJuly1988concludedthatMeesehad“probably violatedthecriminallaw”butdeclinedtoprosecuteonthefourmatters because“thereisnoevidencethatMr.Meeseactedfrommotivationfor personalgain.”52McKayaddedthatitappearedthatMeesehadtaken bribes but that there was “insufficient evidence” for an indictment.53 WhileMeesedeclaredvindication,theJusticeDepartment’sOfficeof ProfessionalResponsibilityissuedareportin1989sayingthatMeese’s conduct“shouldnotbetoleratedofanygovernmentemployee,especially nottheattorneygeneral.”54 HaynesJohnsonnotesthatReagan’sdefenseofhiscolleagueswasa signofloyalty,butalsothat“itsignaledsomethingmoreseriousabout theethicalstandardRonaldReagansetaspresidentoftheUnitedStates. Heneverbotheredtoestablishstricterstandardsofconduct.Nordidhe ensurethatexistingoneswereproperlyenforced.Ineightyearsinoffice
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henevermadeasingleformaladdressonthequestionofgovernment ethics,neverissuedasinglecallforadherencetohigherstandards.”55 Another historian writes that Reagan’s attitude resulted in a “record ofethicalmalpracticewhich,ifitlackedthewholesaleplunderingof thepublictreasuryexperiencedintheGrantandHardingadministrations,surpassedeventhoseyearsinthefrequencywithwhichReagan appointeeswereobligedtoresign(theywereneverfired)forillegalor unethicalpractices.”56TheproblemlaypartlyinReagan’sstyleofrule andhistendencytoignorebadthings,apatterndevelopedinresponse tohisalcoholicfather.Inanyevent,therecordofcorruptionwithinthe administrationwassignificant,apointunderscoredbythemostdisruptiveelementoftheadministration,theIran-contraaffair. The Iran-contra affair creates great difficulties for Reagan’s supporters.IftheyarguethathewasadynamicleaderincontrolofU.S. foreignpolicy,thentheymustacceptthatheknewaboutthevarious levelsoftheliesandcover-upoftheaffair.Iftheyarguethathehad noknowledgeoftheaffair,thenhewasnotincommandofthesituation,whichwouldweakentheideathathereallyinfluencedanything inforeignrelations. ThemostcommonwaythatReagan’ssupportersdefendtheentire affairistodismissitasapoliticalwitch-hunt.PeterWallisonarguesthat theIran-contramatterwas“atmost,aforeignpolicyblunder”andmerely “anotherexampleofthedestructivetendencytocriminalizepoliticalor policydisputes.”57Oneoftheconvictedconspiratorslaterpardonedfor hisactions,ElliottAbrams,agreesinhisbookUndueProcess:AStoryof HowPoliticalDifferencesAreTurnedIntoCrimes.58Otherconservatives blametheaffaironReagan’spersonality;PeggyNoonan,forexample, claimsthat“Reaganwasaromantic,andthistimepaiddearlyforit.”59 The entire Iran-contra affair revolved around two issues that had perplexedtheReaganadministrationsinceittookover.Thefirstwas aninternationaleffortagainstterrorismandtheotherwasthefunding oftheanti-Sandinistacontras.Inbothcases,frustrationsmountedfrom theinabilitytofindeasysolutionstocomplexproblems,especiallythe contra issue, which engendered significant domestic opposition from thosefearfulofgettingembroiledinanotherVietnamandassociating withpeopleintimatelytiedtothedictatorshipofAnastasioSomoza.These frustrationsresultedinthenearcollapseoftheReaganadministration andpermanentlystaineditsreputation. Thebattleagainstinternationalterrorismhadintensified,especially
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duringthe1970safterthekillingofIsraelihostagesatthe1972Munich OlympicsandthetakingoftheAmericanhostagesinIran.Fromdayone, PresidentReaganhaddeclared,“Letterroristsbeawarethat...ourpolicy willbeoneofswiftandeffectiveretribution.”60Problemsheightened earlyonwhentheIsraelisintervenedinsouthernLebanontostopborderattacksbyIslamicmilitants.Inresponse,in1982,PresidentReagan placedAmericantroopsinBeirutas“peacekeepers”whobecameallied withtheChristianmilitia,angeringLebaneseMuslimsandPalestinian exiles.ThisresultedinthedisastroussuicidebombingofaU.S.marine barracks that claimed the lives of 241 marines on October 23, 1983. Devastated,theUnitedStatesbeganitswithdrawalfromLebanonsoon after,butwithincreasedresentmenttowardthoseintheMiddleEastwho hadperpetratedtheheinousact. The problems became even more acute when terrorists and their allies,supportedbyIranandSyria,begankidnappingprominentU.S. citizens(includingCIAagentWilliamBuckley)whoremainedthroughouttheregion.Thepresident,genuinelyconcernedaboutthehuman sufferingofAmericancitizens,soonbecameembroiledinascheme tousetheIranianstowinthefreedomofthehostagesinexchangefor arms. WhiletheimbroglioinLebanonandtheMiddleEastwasunfolding, theadministrationhaddevotedsignificanttimeandenergytotryingto overthrowtheNicaraguanSandinistas,whohadtakencontrolin1978 followingtheirsuccessfulrevolutionagainstthelongtimeU.S.-supported dictatorAnastasioSomoza.BelievingthattheSandinistaswerestoogesof FidelCastroandbyextensiontheSovietUnioninanareadeemedvital totheUnitedStates,Reaganandmanyconservativesdevelopedanear obsessionwiththeanti-Sandinistacontras,whomReagancharacterized as“freedomfighters”andthe“moralequivalentoftheFoundingFathers.” However,manyAmericanslookedonthecontrasastheremnantsofthe SomozaregimeandworriedabouttheUnitedStatesbeingdrawninto anotherVietnam.61 Theproblemsbeganfortheadministrationin1982whenCongress, a group characterized by Reagan as the meddlesome “committee of 535,”beganrestrictingcontraaidinresponsetoatrocitiesandliesbeing toldbyadministrationofficialsregardingU.S.assistancetothegroup. BolandIin1982andBolandIIin1984severelyrestrictedmilitaryaid totheorganization,leadingthepresidenttosupportquestionableefforts throughprivatecitizensandforeigngroupstokeepthecontrastogether.
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HeinstructedNationalSecurityCouncil(NSC)headRobertMcFarlane in1985tokeepthecontrastogether“bodyandsoul”anddidnotquestionabasicpolicyofoutsidegroups,inthiscasetheSaudis,providing assistance to circumvent the congressional edicts.62 Soon, McFarlane putamarinelieutenantcolonelintheNSC,OliverNorth,inchargeof theoperation. In June 1985, despite the behind-the-scenes move toward trading armsforhostages,Reagantoldthepressthat“Americawillnevermake concessionstoterrorists—todosowouldonlyinvitemoreterrorism. Onceweheaddownthatpath,therewouldbenoendtoit.”63InJuly 1985,inaspeechtotheAmericanBarAssociation,hecalledIranpart ofa“confederationofterroriststates...anewinternationalversionof MurderInc.”GroupingtheIranianswithNorthKorea,Cuba,Libya,and Nicaragua,hebrandedthemas“outlawstatesrunbythestrangestcollectionsofmisfits,LooneyTunesandsqualidcriminalssincetheadvent oftheThirdReich.”64Thesepublicstatements,combinedwithReagan’s opensupportofeffortssuchasOperationStaunch,whichsoughttolimit Iran’saccesstomilitaryequipment,werethepublicfaceoftheadministrationregardingtheroguenation. Despitethepublicstatements,theadministrationmovedtowarddealingwiththeIraniansinthesummerof1985.Ashady,exiledIranian armsdealer,ManucherGhorbanifar,madeoverturestotheIsraelis,who reachedouttoU.S.officials,especiallyMcFarlane.TheIranianpromised anopportunitytodealwithIranianmoderateswhocouldpossiblybein apositiontoshapethecountryafterthedeathoftheAyatollahRuholla MussauiKhomeini. Thatsummer,seriousdebatesbeganwithintheadministrationabout selling tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missiles toIraniansinreturnforassistanceinsecuringthereleaseofAmerican hostagesinLebanon.SecretaryofDefenseCasparWeinbergervigorously opposedthedeal,arguingthatitwasprobablyillegal.Nevertheless,on July27,thepresidentphonedMcFarlaneandtoldhim,“Iwanttofind awaytodothis.”65Lessthantwoweekslater,therewasameetingin theprivatepresidentialquarterswithVicePresidentGeorgeH.W.Bush, SecretaryofStateGeorgeShultz,Weinberger,andMcFarlaneatwhich thepresidentcalledfora“goslow”strategythattheopponentsofthedeal viewasstoppingit.However,afewdayslater,ReagancalledMcFarlane intohisofficeandstated,“Well,I’vethoughtaboutit...andIwantto goaheadwithit...Ibelieveit’stherightthingtodo.”66
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Overthenextfourmonths,therewouldbeaseriesofarmstransfers toIranthroughtheIsraelis.Afterthesecondone,captorsinLebanon releasedahostage,BenjaminWeir.AdditionallayersdevelopedasNorth incorporatedoutsidepeopleledbyretiredgeneralRichardSecord,and JohnPoindexterreplacedMcFarlane.ProblemsresultedastheIranians askedformoresophisticatedweaponryandthearms-for-hostagesnature of the operation became more apparent, even though the numbers of peoplereleasedremainedverysmall.67Theadministrationlaboredto developplansthatcircumventedcongressionaloversight,althoughShultz andWeinbergercontinuedtovigorouslyresistthescheme.ThesupporterssettledonthedirecttransferofarmstotheIranians.ByJanuary17, 1986,Reagansignedafinding,thethirdoneinsixweeks,thatapproved theplan.Hewroteinhisdiary,“IagreedtosellTOWstoIran.”There wasnoquestionabouthisknowledgeoftheplan.68 Overthenextyear,SecordandNorthsetabouttheirtaskwithzeal. Thesaleofweaponsproducedasignificantcashflow,notonlyforthe AmericangovernmentbutalsofortheIranianmiddlemenwhoskimmed offsignificantamounts.NorthandPoindexterfunneledthemoneyintoa SwissbankaccountandbeganusingittofundcontraoperationsinCentral America.AcoupleofAmericanhostageswerereleasedasexpected,but theterroristsinLebanonsimplytookmoreafterward. Ultimately,thewholeplanunraveledinOctober1986whentheSandinistasshotdownaplanecarryingsuppliestothecontrasflownbyan Americanpilot,EugeneHasenfus.Notlongafter,aLebanesemagazine, Al-Shiraa,brokeastoryaboutthearms-for-hostagesactivitiesofMcFarlane,whichstartedafirestormoffollow-upnewsreports. In response, Reagan went on national television on November 13, believingthathecouldconvincetheAmericanpeopleofthesincerityof hisattempttoopenadiplomaticdoortoIrantocounterSovietefforts.He filledthespeechwithinaccuraciesandoutrightlies,includingtheclaim thatallthespareparts“couldeasilyfitintoasinglecargoplane”and that“wedidnot—repeat,didnot—tradeweaponsoranythingelsefor hostages,norwillwe.”Withinashortperiod,pollstersbeganproducing theirfindings.Inone,only14percentoftheAmericanpeoplebelieved thepresident’sversionofthestory.69 Reaganfollowedtheperformancewithanationallytelevisedpress conference on November 19. Working off a flawed chronology of eventspreparedbyPoindexter,thepresidentagainmisledtheAmerican people.WhenqueriedaboutIsrael’sroleinthearmsexchange,Reagan
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responded,“We,asIsayhavehadnothingtodowithothercountries ortheirshipmentsofarmsordoingwhatthey’redoing.”Whenasked whetherterroristshadlearnedfromtheentireepisodethatAmericawould dealwiththem,Reaganresponded,“Idon’tseewherethekidnappers... gainedanything.Theydidn’tgainanything.Theyletthehostagesgo.”He wentontoblamethemediaforbreakingthestoryandpreventingmore hostagesfrombeingreleased.WhenaWashingtonTimesreporterasked whyReaganwouldnotadmitthemistakeandmoveon,Reaganretorted, “Idon’tthinkamistakewasmade.Itwasahigh-riskgamble,anditwas agamblethat,...Ibelievethecircumstanceswarranted.”70 Severalinvestigationsoftheadministrationbegansoonafter.PoindexterandNorthvigorouslyshreddedimportantevidence,andPoindexter andCIAdirectorWilliamCaseyliedtotheHouseandSenateIntelligence Committee,sayingthatnooneinthegovernmentknewaboutthearms dealandthattheybelievedthattheshipmentswereoil-drillingequipment.Atthesametime,theadministrationbegandamagecontrol.On November25,ReaganannouncedtheresignationofPoindexterandthe firingofNorth,whomonlyashortwhileafterwardReagancalledand told“Ollie,you’reanationalhero.”71Thedayafter,Reaganagreedto theformationofaspecialreviewboardheadedbyJohnTower,former senatorfromTexas.ThenonDecember2,Reaganaskedforaspecial independentcounseltoinvestigatetheaffair,includingthediversionof fundstothecontras.Withinacoupleofweeks,LawrenceWalshreceived theappointmentandbeganhisinvestigation.72 Overthenextyear,thedifferentgroupssetabouttheirtasksofinvestigatingtheentirearms-for-hostagesschemeanddiversionoffundsto thecontras.Reagan’sperformanceintalkingwiththeTowerCommissionwasespeciallytroubling.OnJanuary26,1987,Reagan,tothegreat astonishmentofseveralofhisadvisers,includingWhiteHousecounsel PeterWallison,admittedtoapprovingthefirstshipmentofarmsbythe IsraelisandagreeingtosubsequentresupplyofweaponstotheIsraelis. ReaganessentiallysupportedMcFarlane’stimelinegiventotheSenate ForeignRelationsCommitteeafewdaysearlier.73 Duringafollow-upinterview,WallisonandVicePresidentBushhelped Reagandevelopadifferenttimeline,emphasizingthatReaganwassurprisedtolearnoftheshipmentofarms,thussupportingthetestimony givenbyhischiefofstaffDonaldRegan.Duringthisinterview,Reagan askedWallisonforthememorandumthat(Wallison)hadprepared.Then, Reaganreaditverbatimtothecommittee:“Ifthequestioncomesup
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attheTowerBoardmeeting,youmightwanttosaythatyouweresurprised.”Aflabbergastedcommitteestoppedtheinterviewatthatpoint. Anexasperatedmemberofthecommittee,EdmundMuskie,expressed frustrationthatthepresidentconsistentlyaskedaboutthehostagesand obviouslyagonized“overthisthingeveryday,andyethecan’tremember anythingaboutit.MyGod!”74 Reagan’sfinalstatementontheissuecamealittlewhileafterward.He wroteamemoexplainingthathehadnonotesorrecordstohelphimwith hismemoryoftheapprovalofarmssalesinAugust1985.“Myanswer thereforeandthesimpletruthis,‘Idon’tremember,period.’”75 Reagan’stestimonytotheTowerCommissionsparkedmuchcontroversyandskepticism.Itappearedtoestablishapatternthatremindedsome peopleofReagan’sappearancebeforeafederalgrandjurytwenty-five yearsearlier.WhenhewaspresidentoftheScreenActor’sGuild,hisclose friendLewWasserman(whohadbeenhisagentandhadhelpedhimdelay hisentryintothereserves)andtheMusicCorporationofAmerica(MCA) receivedaveryfavorablecontractfromtheguildthatdepartedsignificantlyfromtypicalguildrules.Chargesofconflictofinterestandbenefits accruingtoReaganplaguedhimforseveralyearsinHollywoodandthe contracteventuallysparkedaJusticeDepartmentinvestigation.76 Whencalledtotestifyin1962,Reagandefendedhisactions,arguingthathehaddonewhathebelievedwasbestfortheactorsdespite theappearancesofimpropriety.Whenpressuredbytheprosecutorona pivotalpartofthecontract,Reaganresponded,“Idon’trecallit,no... Idon’thonestlyrecall.”Hethenaddedthatduringthesummerof1952, whentheseeventsoccurred,hewasinGlacierNationalParkmakinga movieand“soit’sverypossiblethereweresomethingsgoingonthatI wouldparticipatein.”Inreality,themoviehenotedwasnotfilmeduntil thesummerof1954.Yetthe“Idonotrememberdefense”worked,and whiletheincidenttarnishedhisreputation,itfailedtobealethalblow tohispoliticalaspirations.77 While the arms-for-hostages portion of the crisis was significant, thepotentiallymoredamagingchargeoriginatedfromthedecisionto diverttothecontrasthefundsfromthesalesofthearms.Thischargeled manyadministrationinsiderstofearapossibleimpeachment.Reagan consistentlydeniedthechargesandthedeathofCaseyprovidedsome cover,ashewouldhavemostlikelybeentheonewhoprovideddirect informationonthesubjecttothepresident.Still,BrentScowcroft,who servedontheTowerCommissionandremainedapartisanRepublican,
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believedthatReaganmayhavebeentoldaboutthediversionoffunds, butthatheforgotormorelikelythatsomeonelikePoindexter“mayhave foundawayinbriefinghimtosay,‘Bytheway,we’vefoundawayto helpthecontrasfromthistoo.’Itmayhavebeendoneinacasualway thatdidn’traisethelegalitiesoftheissue.”78 ThereremainedagreatdealofskepticismabouttheextentofReagan’s knowledgeofthediversion.Hisactiveroleinsolicitingfundingfrom outsidegroups,includingtheSaudisandTaiwaneseaswellasprivate Americans,andclaimsthatheactivelyinvolvedhimselfinsuchmatters raisedsuspicionsofwhatheknewandwhen.Reaganpoliticaladviser StuartSpenceremphasized,“thekeytothewholethingishecanremember.Therearesomethingsheremembersverypoorly,butIthinkhe wantstorememberthemverypoorly.Hereallyhasagoodmemory.”79 OliverNorthwroteaftertheaffair“thepresidentdidn’talwaysknow whatheknew.”80 TheTowerCommissionreport,releasedinlateFebruary1987,concluded,“ThearmstransferstoIranandtheactivitiesoftheNSCstaff insupportofthecontrasarecasestudiesintheperilsofpolicypursued outsidetheconstraintsoforderlyprocess.”Itadded,“TheIraninitiative randirectlycountertotheadministration’sownpoliciesonterrorism, theIran/Iraqwar,andthemilitarysupporttoIran.Theinconsistencywas neverresolved....TheresulttakenasawholewasaU.S.policythat workedagainstitself.”81 OnMarch4,1987,Reaganwentonnationaltelevisionandtoldthe Americanpeople,“AfewmonthsagoItoldtheAmericanpeopleIdid nottradearmsforhostages.Myheartandmybestintentionsstilltellme that’strue,butthefactsandtheevidencetellmeitisnot.”82Whilehe wouldcontinuetodenythetruthinhismemoirs,hehadbeenpersuaded byhisnewchiefofstaff,HowardBaker,andothersoftheneedtoaccept some responsibility. The backhanded acknowledgment, nevertheless, deflectedmuchofthecriticism,aseventhenormallycriticalWashington Post acknowledged that “President Reagan gave the right speech last night...headmittedplenty,andhepledgedtoredeemthedamagein hisfinaltwoyearsinoffice.”83 TheinvestigationscontinuedintheHouseandSenateandthrough thespecialprosecutor,LawrenceWalsh.Thecongressionalcommittees concludedthattheresponsibilityfortheentireaffairlaywithReagan, noting,“IfthePresidentdidnotknowwhathisNationalSecurityAdvisersweredoing,heshouldhave.”84
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TheWalshinvestigationlastedseveralyearsandledtotheconviction ofthirteenofReagan’ssubordinates,includingPoindexter,Weinberger, North,andAbrams.NorthandPoindexterhadtheirconvictionsoverturnedontechnicalitiesandseveralpeoplereceivedpretrialpardonsfrom bythenPresidentGeorgeH.W.Bush,butothersservedtimeandReagan hadtotestifyinseveralofthetrials. RegardingReagan,theWalshReport,releasedin1994,arguedthat Reagan’sactions“fellwellshortofcriminalitywhichcouldbesuccessfullyprosecuted”andthatnoinformationexistedthatcouldprovewithout adoubtthathe“knewoftheunderlyingfactsofIran/Contrathatwere criminalorthathemadecriminalmisrepresentationsregardingthem.” Instead,Walsh argued that “President Reagan created the conditions whichmadepossiblethecrimescommittedbyothersbyhissecretdeviationsfromannouncednationalpolicyastoIranandhostagesandbyhis owndeterminationtokeepthecontrastogether‘bodyandsoul’despite astatutorybanoncontraaid.”Inconclusion,Walshunderscoredthathe haduncoveredfactsthatattheleastshouldhavegivenCongresspause andthatimpeachmentshouldhavebeendiscussed.85 Other critics, including many who had served in theWhite House withReagan,beganwritingtheirmemoirsintheaftermathoftheReaganpresidency.GeorgeShultzemphasizedthat“theU.S.government had violated its own policies on antiterrorism and against arms sales toIran,wasbuyingourowncitizens’freedominamannerthatwould onlyencouragethetakingofothers,wasworkingthroughdisreputable internationalgo-betweens,wascircumventingourconstitutionalsystem ofgovernance,wasmisleadingtheAmericanpeople—allintheguiseof furtheringsomepurportedregionalpoliticaltransformation,ortoobtain inactualityahostagerelease.”HewentontoblameMcFarlane,Poindexter,andCaseyforsellinghisversion“toapresidentalltooreadyto acceptit,givenhishumanitarianurgetofreeAmericanhostages.”86 PartoftheproblemwiththeIran-contraaffairmayhavebeentheadministrativestyleofReagan.MartinAndersonemphasizedthatReagan “madedecisionslikeanancientkingoraTurkishpasha,passivelyletting hissubjectsservehim,selectingonlythosemorselsofpublicpolicythat wereespeciallytasty.Rarelydidheasksearchingquestionsanddemand toknowwhysomeonehadorhadnotdonesomething.Hejustsatback inasupremelycalm,relaxedmannerandwaiteduntilimportantthings werebroughttohim.”87 Whatever the final outcome in relation to Reagan, the Iran-contra
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scandalreflectedpoorlyonhisleadershipstyleandintegrity.Ifsupporters continuetoinsistthatthepresidenthadnoknowledgeofthearms-forhostagestransferordiversionoffunds,thenReaganhadlimitedinfluence ontheimplementationofU.S.foreignpolicyatacriticaljunctureofhis presidency.Ifthiswasthecase,thenhehadlittlecontroloversuccesses attributedtohiminrelationtotheSovietUnionorelsewhere.Onthe otherhand,ifhewasavibrantpresident,thenitwaslikelythatoperationsrelatedtotheIran-contraaffairwerewithinhispurviewandthathe committednumerouscriminalviolationssuchasperjury.Mostlikely,the truthwassomewhereinbetween,withReaganclearlyunderstandingthe arms-for-hostagesexchangebuthavingonlyvaguetiestothediversion. Inthiscase,heclearlyliedtotheAmericanpeopleonhisroleandmost likelytoinvestigatorswiththeTowerCommission,butfailedtoriseto criminalbehaviorforthediversionoffunds.Thelatterscenarioclearly demonstratesthathewouldlietoprotecthimselfwhenpressed,hiding undertheguiseofmemorylapses.Thisscenarioseverelydamagesany characterizationofhimastherolemodelforcharacter. In the final analysis, while conservatives try to portray Reagan as aparagonofvirtue,thelies,thecorruption,andthescandalsthatsurroundedhimweresignificant.WhilenotrisingtothelevelsofRichard Nixon,theycloselyparallelthoseofBillClintonandotheradministrationssuchasGrant’sandHarding’sindegreeandfrequency.Reagan’s propensityforexaggerationandlies,whetherinhisstoriesorhisrole inIran-contra,furtherunderminestheargumentsofNoonanandothers. Intheend,Reaganwasapoliticianinaprofessioninwhichthetruth factoroftenescapeseventhemostethicalofpeople.Whilemorehonest andforthrightthanmanyothers,Reaganfailedtoreachthestandardof themythologyofhisfollowersandinmanywaysfailedtorisetothe standardsestablishedbyhisrolemodelsincludingFranklinRoosevelt. Conclusion AsconservativesseektoenshrineReaganinthepantheonofAmerican leaders,otherissuesofcharacterrelatingtoReagancalloutforinvestigation.Theseincludehispersonallife,whichraisestheissuesthathe wastheonlydivorcedAmericanpresident,thathischildrenoftenserved asposterchildrenforthedysfunctionalfamily,andthathisdevotionto hissecondwife,Nancy,ledtoarelianceonanastrologerinhisdaily activities.
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Inanotherrealm,therearetheissuesthataroseafterhispresidency, when,duringtheshortperiodthatheremainedactivebeforetheonset ofAlzheimer’s,hereceivedmillion-dollarspeakingengagementsfrom theJapanese,spenttimeincourtdefendinghisformeraides,andtook hugegiftstorefurbishhisCaliforniaranch,somecriticsarguingthatthe moneywaspaybackforservicesrenderedwhileinoffice(thegiftswere claimedtobeloans,butonesatverybeneficialrates).Inbothcases,there areopenareasforinvestigationthatfitwellintotheissuesofcharacter thathavebeenacornerstoneoftheconservativemovements’effortsto discreditClintonandtheDemocratsandconservativesraisetheirstature inpublicdebatesoverReagan’scharacter. The final conclusion is that Reagan was not corrupt like many of thepeoplesurroundinghim.Ontheotherhand,hewasnottheglowingparadigmofcharacterthatNoonanandothersseektoportray.His principleswereflexiblewhennecessaryonissuessuchasabortion.He toldlieswhenitsuitedhispoliticalpurposes,andtheIran-contrascandal highlightedhislapsesinjudgment.WhencomparedtoCarter’s,hismoral andethicalpositionsfaremuchworsethanwhencomparedtoClinton’s. Likemostpeople,andespeciallypoliticians,Reaganfailedthelitmus testsofcharacteronnumerousoccasions,buttherewerealsosuccesses thatconservativescorrectlyhighlightwhileignoringthoseexamplesthat failtosupporttheirarguments.Moreresearchanddebateshouldremain acornerstoneofthediscussionofReagan’slegacyandhowitappliesto contemporarypoliticalissuesrelatingtocharacter. The issue of Reagan’s character, and in particular the mythology surroundingit,alsofitnicelyintotheeffortsofconservativestodayto frame their candidate, GeorgeW. Bush, on the character issue. From thestart,BushwrappedhimselfintheChristianflagandaccompanying moralandethicalstandards.Hisworkonhisfather’scampaignin1988 asliaisontotheChristianCoalitionimprintedonhimthevalueofthe evangelicals.Whenheranforpresident,theeffortstowinthecharacter battleaccelerated,aidedinpartbyClinton’smisadventuresandGore’s misstepsonthetopicofcampaignfinancesandmisrepresentationsof hisroleinthecreationoftheInternet. As Bush’s presidency unfolded in the aftermath of September 11 and the run for reelection in 2004, a plethora of books started to appearextollingthevirtuesofPresidentBushasamanofprincipleand foresight.TheseincludebookssuchasDavidFrum’sTheRightMan: AnInsideAccountoftheBushWhiteHouse(2003),RonaldKessler’sA
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MatterofCharacter(2004),KarenHughes’sGeorgeW.Bush:Portrait of a Leader (2005), and Fred Barnes’s Rebel-in-Chief: How George W. Bush Is Redefining the Conservative Movement andTransforming America(2006).Ineach,ReaganremainsthestandardthatBushhas metorsurpassed;likehispredecessor,Bushappearsabovereproachon issuesofcorruptionandethicalandmoraldilemmas.Bushhasremained steadfastinhisvisionsofastrongAmerica,evenwhenthosepositions appearunpopular.Totheseauthorsandotherconservatives,Bushisthe rightmanattherighttimewiththecharactertoleadthecountryandin somewaystransformAmerica. TherearealsoasignificantnumberofbooksfocusingonBush’sfaith asthesourceoftheethicalandmoraldecisionsofhispresidency,includingavolumeofhisspeeches,GeorgeW.BushonGodandCountry: ThePresidentSpeaksOutAboutFaith,Principle,andPatriotism,which appearedduringtherun-uptothe2004election.OthersincludeStephen Mansfield’s,TheFaithofGeorgeW.Bush(2003),DavidAikman’sAMan ofFaith:TheSpiritualJourneyofGeorgeW.Bush(2004),PaulKengor’s GodandGeorgeW.Bush:ASpiritualLife(2004),andJosephJ.Martos’s MayGodBlessAmerica:GeorgeW.BushandBiblicalMorality(2004). Thesebooksfocusprimarilyonthepresident’sethicalandmoralbeliefs andhowtheyevolvedandarelivedoutthroughhisChristianfaith.While KengoralreadyhasatrackrecordinwritingsaboutReaganandhisChristianprinciples,mostoftheseauthorsgofarbeyondmerelytyingBush tohisChristianvalues,largelybecause,unlikeReagan,Bushpublicly makesstatementsandleavesasignificantpapertrailontheissue.Still, aswithReagan,evangelicalsandconservativeChristianshaveflocked toBush’ssideandbeenastrongfoundationofhispoliticalpower. Therearealsomanywithinthepresident’sinnercirclewhohavepromotedhisstraightforwardnessandcharacter.CondoleezzaRiceargues thatthemostsimilarthingbetweenReaganandBushisanassertionof moral certainty: “Many people are much more comfortable with onthe-one-hand-on-the-other-hand-explanations.Butthereareveryoften caseswheretherearenotargumentsonbothsides.AndIthinkPresident Bushhasbeenprettywilling,whenthatisthecase,tospeakinblackand-whiteterms.”88 Through 2005, the character issue remained a very positive rating forthepresidentevenwhenhispollnumbersinmanyotherareasbegan plummeting.However,inthewakeofrevelationsaboutthelead-upto
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warinIraq,thedisclosureoftheidentityofValeriePlame,anousted undercover CIA agent, and the political scandals of the Republican Party,thepollsnumbershaveerodedveryquicklyoneventhisstrength. OnlytimewilltellwhetherBushwillreboundinallareas,foroncethe damageisdone,itisoftendifficulttoovercome.Still,Bushsupporters cantakehopefromReagan’ssuccessafterIran-contra.GeorgeW.Bush couldachievethesame,dependingonhoweventsunfoldandhisapproachandattitude.
Epilogue ContemporaryPoliticsand theMythsofReagan
InJanuary2003,BillKellerwroteintheNewYorkTimesanarticleabout GeorgeW. Bush titled “Reagan’s Son.” He observed that “the party faithfulhavebeenpiningforanewReagansinceReagan,andforBush the analogy has the added virtue of providing an alternative political lineage;he’snotDaddy’sBoy,he’sReaganJr.”Kelleraddedthat“Bush isnot,asReaganwas,anoriginal,buthehasadaptedReagan’sideas tonewtimes,andfoundsomenewlanguageinwhichtomarketthem.” EvenoldReagansupporterslikeMichaelDeaveremphasized,“Ithink he’sthemostReagan-likepoliticianwehaveseen,certainlyintheWhite House.Imean,hisfatherwassupposedtobethethirdtermoftheReagan presidency—butthenhewasn’t.Thisguyis.”1 Aseachprecedingchapterinthisvolumehasnoted,theeffortbythe administrationofGeorgeW.BushtoutilizetheReaganlegacyhasbeen significant.Itbeganevenbeforethepresidentialracestartedwiththe purchaseofaranchin1999whereBushcoulddemonstratehistiestothe commonpeoplebybeingphotographedcuttingbrushanddrivingaround inapickuptruck.Itcontinuedwiththecampaignfocuson“values,”with Bushadoptingtheconceptofthe“compassionateconservative”andtryingtotakethehardedgeoffthetraditionalperceptionsofconservatives, ataskReaganhadperformedwell. Inmanyways,Bushsupporters,eventhoseoutsideofthecampaign, framedthecomparisonbetweenBushandReaganearlyon.AWallStreet Journalreporteremphasized,“IntheearlyweeksofthisBushadministration,aveteranU.S.senatortoldmenottocomparethenewPresidentto 121
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hisfatherbutrathertoRonaldReagan.Thesenator,whoknewallthree, saidthatwhilethefirstPresidentBushhadbeenoneofAmerica’sfinest publicservants,hissonandMr.Reaganhadmoregreatnessinthem.Both shareddeeperconvictionsthattheyhadalargermissiontofulfill.The terroristattacksofSeptember11providedGeorgeW.bothconfirmation anddirectionforthatsenseofcalling.”Thejournalistacknowledged, “ThecurrentBushadministrationhasrelishedcomparisonstotheGipper. LikeMr.Reagan,...GeorgeW.wouldconfoundhiscriticswithhistoric accomplishmentsbecause,likeMr.Reagan,hepossessedafervorabout Americaanditstransformativenature.”2 Therearemanyothersimilaritiesunderscored by analysts.As one observernoted,“ReaganaskedAmericanstodreamheroicdreams,but herarelyaskedthemtogiveupanything.PresidentBush,evenwithawar on,showsnogreaterdesiretobetonsacrifice.”Intheareaofabortion rights,Reagan“wasalwaystreatedbytheanti-abortionconstituencyas akindredspirit.ThisisanotherReaganlessonBushseemstohavetaken onboard:ifyouhaveunderlyingcredibilitywiththeadvocacygroups, youdonothavetoundertakequixoticeffortsontheirbehalf.”3 Someofthecomparisonswerenotalwayspositive.Asoneanalyst observed,“righteouspurposeisstrongstuff,anditcanbehighlyflammable”asinthecaseoftheIran-contraaffair.“Bushhasnotonlyrehired severaloftheIran-contraintriguers,buthasalsoreproducedelementsof theclimateinwhichtheplotwashatched—obsessivesecrecy,apremium onloyalty,atasteforworkingthroughforeignproxies,animpatience withCongressionaloversight.”4 The efforts to tie Bush to Reagan only increased after the latter’s deathinthesummerof2004.JournalistHowardFinemanwrote,after Reagan’s death and before the Republican National Convention that wouldbecomeatributetotheGipper,that“thereislittlerisk,andabit togain,forBushinassociatingwiththeReaganaura.Votersontheleft whothinkthecomparisonisdamningtoBushweren’tgoingtosupport himanyway;votersontherightwhothinkthecomparisonmakesBush looksmallaregoingtovoteforBushanyway.Votersinthemiddlewho stillaren’tsurewhattomakeofBushmayseeaweebitmorevisionin histhinking—andvisionisathingeverypresident(andeverypresident runningforre-election)needs.”5 Inthelongrun,significantproblemshaveevolvedforReagansupporters and the efforts of the Bush people to tie Bush to the former president.Bush’spollsplummetedintheaftermathofthewarinIraq,
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theresponsetoHurricaneKatrina,uncontrolledspendinganddeficits, andinternalspyingonAmericans.Inresponse,Reaganloyalistshave increasedtheircallstofocusonReaganinhisownlight,notwithinthe prismoftheconservativemovementofthetwenty-firstcenturyand,in particular,GeorgeW.Bush. TheprocesshadalreadybegunevenbeforeBush’sdeclineinpopularity,beingledinpartbyRonReaganJr.WhentheBushteamtriedto exploithisfather’sdeathforitsownpoliticalgain,Reagancounterattacked.Anopeningsalvooccurredathisfather’sfuneralinJune2004. “Dadwasalsoadeeply,unabashedlyreligiousman,”hetoldthecrowd andnationaltelevisionaudience.“Buthenevermadethefatalmistake ofsomanypoliticianswearinghisfaithonhissleevetogainpoliticaladvantage.True,afterhewasshotandnearlykilledearlyinhispresidency, hecametobelievethatGodhadsparedhiminorderthathemightdo good.Butheacceptedthatasaresponsibility,notamandate.Andthere isaprofounddifference.”6 Inanearlierinterviewin2003,Reaganhadstressed,“Someofthe currentpoliciesareanextensionofthe’80s.Buttheoverallthrustof thisadministrationisnotmyfather’s—thesepeopleareoverlyreaching, overlyaggressive,overlysecretive,andjustplaincorrupt.Idon’ttrust thesepeople.”Hehadtakenaswipeearlierin2000attheGOPconventionwhenhetoldareporterthat“thebigelephantsittinginthecorner isthatGeorgeW.Bushissimplyunqualifiedforthejob....What’shis accomplishment?Thathe’snolongeranobnoxiousdrunk?”Hestressed hisfather’scredentialsinpoliticsasunionleader,governor,andcandidate.“Sure,hewasn’tatechnocratlikeClinton.Butmyfatherwasa man—that’sthedifferencebetweenhimandBush.ToparaphraseJack Palance,myfathercrappedbiggeronesthanGeorgeBush.”Headded thathisfather“didn’thavetoaskDickCheneywhathethought.”7 TheattackscontinuedaftertheRepublicanconventionin2004when theBushpeoplemadesurethatRonaldReaganreceivedacentralstage inthepoliticsofmemory.InascathingarticleinEsquire,RonReagan talkedabouthowBush’sattempttoexploitPresidentReagan’sfuneral andothereffortshadbackfired.“Peopleweretreatedtoaside-by-side comparison—RonaldW.ReaganversusGeorgeW.Bush—andit’sno surprisewhosufferedforit.”AfterascathingrebuketoBushforhaving“cometoembodydishonestyitself,”RonReaganconcluded,“I’ll acknowledgeoccasionalannoyanceatthepretensethathe’ssomehowa cloneofmyfather,butfarfromthreatening,Iseethismoreassillyand
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pathetic.Myfather,actingrolesexcepted,neverpretendedtobeanyone buthimself.HisRepublicanparty,furthermore,seemsafarcryfrom thecurrentmodelwithitscringingobeisancetothereligiousRightand kill-anything-that-movesattackinstincts.”8 WhileBushsupportersdismisstheyoungerReaganasjealous,atool of the liberal media, or just seeking attention, increasingly hard-line ideologicalconservativeshavebegunattackingthepresident.EarlyattackscamefromWilliamF.BuckleyandPatBuchanan.Inthelatter’s book,WheretheRightWentWrong:HowNeoconservativesSubverted theReaganRevolutionandHijackedtheBushPresidency,theformer Reaganspeechwriterdenouncedthe“Bushdoctrine”andthepolicyof preemptivewar,whichhedescribedas“aprescriptionforpermanentwar forpermanentpeace,thoughwarsarethedeathofrepublics.”Inparticular,heattackedtheinvasionofIraq,whichwas“ourownLebanonof24 millionIraqis”andcharacterizedbyaguerrillawarwhere“U.S.prestige hasplummeted.”Buchananarguedthatfreetrade,illegalimmigration, and activist courts have underminedAmerica, but saved his harshest critiqueforthepartyinpower,concludingthat“conservatism,astaught bytwentieth-centuryleaderslikeRobertTaft,BarryGoldwater,Ronald Reagan,andJesseHelms,isdead”andthatthereis“noconservative partyleftinWashington.”9 Conservative columnist Jonah Goldberg asked different questions than Buchanan or the younger Reagan and focused on Bush’s move away from traditional conservative economic viewpoints in a speech inJanuary2004.Hehighlightedafewquickfacts,notingthatGeorge W.Bushhas“increasedfederalspendingoneducationby60.8percent; increased federal spending on labor by 56 percent; increased federal spendingontheinteriorby23.4percent.”Goldbergfocusedonthehuge buildupofhomelandsecurityandchastisesthepresidentforsigninga campaign finance bill, and other programs, stressing that he “signed thefarmbill,whichwasanon-kosherpiñatafilledwithenoughpork tobendspaceandtime;pushedthroughaMedicareplanwhichstarts with a price tag of $400 billion but will—according to every expert whostudiestheissue—goupagazillion-bajilliondollarsoverthenext decade;...notvetoedasinglespending—oranyotherbill,andhehas nointentionofeliminatingasingledepartment.”Goldbergconcluded with“readTuesday’sleadeditorialintheWallStreetJournal,andyou’ll findthatthisisthespendiest(yes,that’sright,‘spendiest’)presidentin Americanhistory,secondonlytoLBJ.Maybethere’ssomethingabout
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presidentsfromTexas—theylikeeverythingbigdownthere,including theirgovernment.”10 Goldbergalsomadecomparisonstootherpresidentswhopreceded Bushbyemphasizing,“RonaldReagandeclaredinhisfirstinaugural that‘governmentistheproblem.’GeorgeW.hasneversaidanythingof thesort.Infact,heevensaidlastLaborDay,‘wehavearesponsibility thatwhensomebodyhurts,governmenthasgottomove.’TheGipper wouldhavespontaneouslyburstintoflamesifhe’dsaidsomethinglike that.” He concluded, “Compassionate conservatism always struck me as the Republican version of Clintonism, rather than the Republican alternativetoit.”11 OthershavejoinedGoldbergontheright,manyconcernedaboutlarge deficitsandgovernmentexpansionaswellasissuessuchastheassault oncivillibertiesinthePatriotActanddomesticspying.Newexamples includeBruceBartlettinImpostor:HowGeorgeW.BushBankrupted America and Betrayed the Reagan Legacy (2006), which bitterly denounced Bush’s policies. Like other writers, Bartlett seeks to defend Reagan’slegacybydismissingthetiesbetweenBushandReagan.With Bush’s numbers spiraling downward and the effects of his economic andforeignpoliciesbecomingapparent,thefrequencyofattacksfrom conservativeswillmostlikelyincrease. Ontheotherhand,ultimately,theBushloyalistsmaytakeumbrageat thoselikeGroverNorquist,whoemphasized“Bush43isexactlywhere Reaganwas,buthestandsonReagan’sshoulders.”12Bush,alreadyhavingdesperatelysoughttoescapeanyshadowofhisfather,willprobably seektodistancehimselffromcomparisonsovertimeasheattemptsto definehisownlegacy.AshetoldNBCanchorTomBrokawin2004,“[I] thinkofmyselfasa‘GeorgeW.Republican.’”13 Whatevertheoutcomeofthesebattles,theissueofReagan’slegacy isnotlikelytodiminishinimportanceformanyyears.Afullerpicture shoulddevelopovertimewiththereleaseofnewprimarydocuments,and debatesinsideandoutsideoftheconservativewingoftheRepublican PartywillhelpdeterminehowReaganandGeorgeW.Bushcoexist.Inthe longterm,apicturemaydevelopofacontrastlikethatbetweenFranklin RooseveltandHarryTruman.Whateverthepath,thedebatesoverthe Reaganlegacyanditsapplicationtomodernpoliticswillcontinuewell intothetwenty-firstcentury.
Notes
Introduction 1.ArizonaRepublic,February17,1999. 2. NewYork Times, October 21, 2003; Christian Science Monitor, November 7, 2001. 3.WashingtonPost,June17,2001. 4.MichaelKammen,MysticChordsofMemory:TheTransformationofTraditionin AmericanCulture(NewYork:Knopf,1991);DavidWaldstreicher,IntheMidstofPerpetualFetes:TheMakingofAmericanNationalism,1776–1820(ChapelHill:University ofNorthCarolinaPress,1997).LiberalsoftendothesamewithJohnKennedysinceno strong,vibrantpresidenthasemergedsinceFranklinRoosevelttorepresenttheirvision ofAmerica.ThatiswhywhenGeorgemagazinedidastorytitled“WhoWillMakeUs ProudAgain?”inAugust2000,theeditorsselectedtwodifferentcovers.Ononewas JohnKennedyandontheotherRonaldReagan. 5.ByronC.Hulsey,EverettDirksenandHisPresidents:HowaSenateGiantShaped AmericanPolitics(Lawrence:UniversityPressofKansas,2000),78. 6.ThomasA.BaileyandDavidM.Kennedy,TheAmericanPageant:AHistoryof theRepublic,8thed.(Lexington,MA:D.C.Heath,1987),868. 7.AscitedinMichaelSchaller,ReckoningwithReagan:AmericaandItsPresident inthe1980s(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1992),41. 8.ArizonaRepublic,June6,2001. 9.ArizonaRepublic,June6,2001. 10.DineshD’Souza,RonaldReagan:HowanOrdinaryManBecameanExtraordinary Leader(NewYork:FreePress,1997),258. 11.D’Souza,RonaldReagan,23. 12.HistorianKristinHasscomments,“Ithinkalotoftheirimpulseisbornoutof anxietyabouthowReaganisgoingtoberemembered.Theymustfeelinordertohold ontotheideahewasthegreatest,theyhavetomakeitinstoneeverywhere.”Washington Post,June17,2001. 13.WallStreetJournal,June7,2004. 14.AbileneReporter-News,March12,2006. 15.WashingtonPost,June17,2001. 16.MemorableQuotesfromTheManWhoShotLibertyValance,IMDb,www.imdb. com/title/tt0056217/quotes. 127
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Chapter1 1. Multiple tributes to Reagan appeared in the NewYork Times, June 10–12, 2004;William E. Pemberton, Exit with Honor:The Life and Presidency of Ronald Reagan(Armonk,NY:M.E.Sharpe,1997),154;PeterSchweizer,Victory:TheReaganAdministration’sSecretStrategyThatHastenedtheCollapseoftheSovietUnion (NewYork:AtlanticMonthlyPress,1994)andReagan’sWar:TheEpicStoryofHis Forty-Year Struggle and Final Triumph over Communism (NewYork: Doubleday, 2002),280–285;AnnH.Coulter,Slander:LiberalLiesAbouttheAmericanRight(New York:Crown,2002)andTreason:LiberalTreacheryfromtheColdWartotheWaron Terrorism(NewYork:Crown,2003),190;formorenuancedconservativeanalysisof Reagan’sdiplomaticachievements,seeGeorgeP.Shultz,TurmoilandTriumph:My YearsasSecretaryofState(NewYork:Scribner,1993)andJohnL.Gaddis,TheUnited StatesandtheEndoftheColdWar(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1992);foran insightfulanalysisbytheleadingSovietexpertinReagan’sNationalSecurityCouncil from1983to1987,seeJackF.Matlock,ReaganandGorbachev:HowtheColdWar Ended (NewYork: Random House, 2004). Ronald Reagan’s ghostwritten memoir ofhispresidency,AnAmericanLife(NewYork:PocketBooks,1990),sayslittleof substanceonforeignpolicy. 2.KironSkinner,AnneliseAnderson,andMartinAnderson,eds.,Reagan,InHisOwn Hand:TheWritingsofRonaldReaganThatRevealHisRevolutionaryVisionforAmerica (NewYork:FreePress,2001),121,60;RonaldReagan,PublicPapersofthePresidents oftheUnitedStates:RonaldReagan,1981–1989,8vols.(Washington,DC:Government PrintingOffice,1982–1989),57.Asof2004,relativelylittleprimarydocumentationexists forReagan’sforeignpolicy.ThemostextensiveandreliablestudiesofReagan-eraforeign policyincludeRaymondL.Garthoff,TheGreatTransition:American-SovietRelationsand theEndoftheColdWar(Washington,DC:BrookingsInstitutionPress,1994),andDon Oberdorfer,FromtheColdWartoaNewEra:TheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnion, 1983–1991(Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1998).SeealsoBethA.Fischer, TheReaganReversal:ForeignPolicyandtheEndoftheColdWar(Columbia:University ofMissouriPress,1997),andMatlock,ReaganandGorbachev. 3.NewYorkTimes,October20,1980;PublicPapers,Reagan,1983,262–264. 4.PublicPapers,Reagan,1982,744–747;RobertM.Gates,FromtheShadows: TheUltimateInsider’sStoryofFivePresidentsandHowTheyWontheColdWar(New York:SimonandSchuster,1996),194. 5.Carter,ofcourse,notReagan,hadnegotiatedthehostagereleaseduringhisfinal daysinoffice.Formonths,Reaganandhisaidesfearedtheincumbentmightpullan “Octobersurprise”andspringthehostagesasanelectionploy.SeeGarySick,AllFall Down:America’sFatefulEncounterwithIran(NewYork:I.B.Tauris,1985). 6.PublicPapers,Reagan,1981,57.Unlikeconservativecriticsofdétente,many careerdiplomatsandacademicexpertsbelievedthatthestrategyhad,indeed,undermined theSovietsystembyexposingitspopulationtotheoutsideworld.Onthispoint,see Garthoff,GreatTransition,andJackF.Matlock,AutopsyonanEmpire:TheAmerican Ambassador’sAccountoftheCollapseoftheSovietUnion(NewYork:RandomHouse, 1995).SeealsoMatlock,ReaganandGorbachev. 7.ThispointisstressedbyGates,FromtheShadows,andbySchweizerinboth VictoryandReagan’sWar. 8.Alexander Haig, Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy (NewYork: Macmillan,1984),85. 9.JaneMayerandDoyleMcManus,Landslide:TheUnmakingofthePresident, 1984–1988(Boston:HoughtonMifflin,1988),28,52,98–99.
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10.JamesA.Baker,ThePoliticsofDiplomacy:Revolution,WarandPeace,1989–1992 (NewYork: G.P. Putnam, 1995), 26–27; Colin L. Powell and Joseph E. Persico, My AmericanJourney(NewYork:RandomHouse,1995),334. 11. MartinAnderson, Revolution (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1988), 289–291;JohnUpdike,RabbitatRest(NewYork:Knopf,1990). 12.Shultz,TurmoilandTriumph;RobertC.McFarlaneandZofiaSmardz,Special Trust(NewYork:CadellandDavies,1994). 13.ChesterPatch,“StickingtoHisGuns:ReaganandNationalSecurity,”inThe ReaganPresidency:PragmaticConservatismandItsLegacies,ed.W.ElliotBrownlee andHughDavis-Graham(Lawrence:UniversityPressofKansas,2003),85–112. 14.DavidStockman,TheTriumphofPolitics:HowtheReaganRevolutionFailed (NewYork:HarperandRow,1986),105–110. 15.MargaretThatcher,TheDowningStreetYears(NewYork:HarperCollins,1993), 463. 16.Anderson,Revolution,81–97;RobertScheer,WithEnoughShovels:Reagan,Bush andNuclearWar(NewYork:RandomHouse,1982). 17.TheevolutionandpoliticsofSDIarediscussedinthreeexcellentbooks.See FrancesFitzgerald,WayOutThereintheBlue:Reagan,StarWars,andtheEndofthe ColdWar(NewYork:SimonandSchuster,2000);WilliamBroad,Teller’sWar:TheTop SecretStoryBehindtheStarWarsDeception(NewYork:SimonandSchuster,1992); MichaelRogin,RonaldReagan,TheMovie:AndOtherEpisodesinPoliticalDemonology(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1987). 18. Public Papers, Reagan, 1983, March 23, 1983; Fitzgerald, Way Out There, 255–254;Pemberton,ExitwithHonor,131–132. 19.Gates,FromtheShadows,263–266. 20.Gates,FromtheShadows,263–266;RownyandMcFarlanearequotedinOral HistoryConference,BrownUniversity,May7–10,1998,citedinBethFischer,“ReaganandtheSoviets:WinningtheColdWar,”inBrownleeandDavis-Graham,Reagan Presidency,113–132;Matlock,ReaganandGorbachev. 21.Reagan,AmericanLife,237–238;Schweizer,Victory,20–21,102–106,205–215; Gates,FromtheShadows,200–225. 22.Skinneretal.,Reagan,InHisOwnHand,12,63. 23.McFarlaneandMacEachinbothcitedinFischer,“ReaganandtheSoviets”;see alsoPemberton,ExitwithHonor,153–154. 24.Shultz’smemoofJanuary19,1983,iscitedinFischer,“ReaganandtheSoviets”; Matlock’sviewsaredetailedinhismemoircitedearlier,AutopsyonanEmpire,aswell asinhisReaganandGorbachev. 25.OntheSovieteconomy,seeRichardCrockett,TheFifty-YearWar:TheUnited StatesandtheSovietUnioninWorldPolitics,1941–1991(NewYork:Routledge,1995), 210–213;Shultz,TurmoilandTriumph,124;Pemberton,ExitwithHonor,154–155. 26.Schweizer,Victory,24–32,81–82,202–205,219–220,236–243. 27.MartinMayer,TheGreatestEverBankRobbery:TheCollapseoftheSavings andLoanIndustry(NewYork:Scribner,1990). 28.MartinandSusanTolchin,BuyingintoAmerica:HowForeignMoneyIsChanging theFaceofOurNation(NewYork:Crown,1988);ClydePrestowitz,TradingPlaces: HowWeAllowedJapantoTaketheLead(NewYork:BasicBooks,1988). 29.SecretaryofStateShultzpersuadedReagantodropsupportforthesethugsby warning that if they were forcefully toppled, they might be replaced by communist regimes.SeeShultz,TurmoilandTriumph,608–638.SeealsoRaymondBonner,WaltzingwithaDictator:TheMarcosesandtheMakingofAmericanPhilippinePolicy(New York:Crown,1987).
130 NOTESTOPAGES19–27
30. Haig, Caveat, 101–105; Public Papers, Reagan, 1981, 57; Gates, From the Shadows,200–225,239–241,354–356;Garthoff,GreatTransition,92–95.Mostcareer CIAandStateDepartmentanalystsbelievedthattheSovietswerenotbehindtheattack becausetheKremlinsawthepopeasarestrainingforceonanti-SovietgroupsinPoland. However,somepeople,includingmembersoftheItalianparliament,continuetoblame Moscowfortheattack. 31.DavidC.MartinandJohnWalcott,BestLaidPlans:TheInsideStoryofAmerica’s WarAgainstTerrorism(NewYork:HarperCollins,1988). 32.Gates,FromtheShadows,177–178. 33.Gates,FromtheShadows,218–219;MichaelDeaverandMickeyHerskowitz, BehindtheScenes(NewYork:WilliamMorrow,1987). 34. Michael Schaller, Reckoning with Reagan: America and Its President in the 1980s(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1992),152;PublicPapers,Reagan,1982, 581–585.Theso-calledReagandoctrineisdiscussedinNationalSecurityDirectives #32(March1982),#66(November1982),and#75(January1983).Reagandeclaredit nationalpolicytoopposeSovietdominationofPolandandEasternEuropeandtochallengeSovietinitiativesinthethirdworld.SeeSchweizer,Victory,130–133;McFarlane, SpecialTrust,219–222;ChristopherSimpson,NationalSecurityDirectivesoftheReagan andBushAdministrations:TheDeclassifiedHistoryofU.S.PoliticalandMilitaryPolicy, 1981–1991(Boulder,CO:WestviewPress,1995). 35.Reagan,AnAmericanLife,448–458;andShultz,TurmoilandTriumph,323– 345. 36.Reagannewsconference,NewYorkTimes,April10,1986. 37.Shultz,TurmoilandTriumph,677. 38.Shultz,TurmoilandTriumph,677–688. 39.Gates,FromtheShadows,251–252,348–350.TwoespeciallyinsightfulstudiesofU.S.involvementinAfghanistanareSteveColl,GhostWars:TheSecretHistoryoftheCIA,Afghanistan,andBinLaden,fromtheSovietInvasiontoSeptember 10,2001(NewYork:Penguin,2004),andGeorgeCrile,CharlieWilson’sWar:The ExtraordinaryStoryoftheLargestCovertOperationinHistory(NewYork:Grove Press,2003). 40.ReaganAddresstoNation,NewYorkTimes,March17,1986. 41.MayerandMcManus,Landslide,71,85–88. 42.DavidFromkinandJamesChace,“Vietnam:TheRetrospect:WhatAretheLessonsofVietnam?”ForeignAffairs(Spring1965). 43.ForthebackgroundofeventsinElSalvador,seeRaymondBonner,Weaknessand Deceit:U.S.PolicyinElSalvador(NewYork:Crown,1984);MarkDanner,Massacre atElMozote:AParableoftheColdWar(NewYork:Vintage,1994). 44.MayerandMcManus,Landslide,85–88;Schaller,ReckoningwithReagan,152; Gates,FromtheShadows,242–249.AmongthemostreliableaccountsofU.S.policy in Nicaragua and of the Iran-contra scandal are Banana Diplomacy: The Making of AmericanPolicyinNicaragua,1981–87(NewYork:RoyGutmanTouchstoneBooks, 1988);TheodoreDraper,AVeryThinLine:TheIranContraAffairs(NewYork:Hilland Wang,1991).Asympatheticfirst-personaccountofReagan’sefforttoplacatecriticsof theIran-contradebacleispresentedbyDavidAbshire,SavingtheReaganPresidency (CollegeStation:TexasA&MPress,2005). 45.PublicPapers,Reagan,1985,228–229,537;McFarlane,SpecialTrust,68;Ben Bradlee,GutsandGlory:TheRiseandFallofOliverNorth(NewYork:HarperCollins, 1988),551. 46.JohnDinges,OurManinPanama:TheShrewdRiseandBrutalFallofManuel Noriega(NewYork:RandomHouse,1991).
NOTESTOPAGES28–43 131
47.FredGreenstein,“RonaldReagan:AnotherHiddenHandIke?”PoliticalScience andPolitics(March1990):7–13. 48.PublicPapers,Reagan,1986,352–356. 49.MayerandMcManus,Landslide,189–208. 50.AnatolyDobrynin,InConfidence:Moscow’sAmbassadortoAmerica’sSixCold WarPresidents,1962–1986(NewYork:TimesBooks,1995),484–485. 51. Reagan, American Life, 256–258, 269–273, 567, 580, 586; Oberdorfer, From theColdWar,21. 52.SeymourM.Hersh,TheTargetIsDestroyed:WhatReallyHappenedtoFlight 007andWhatAmericaKnewAboutIt(NewYork:Vintage,1987). 53.Oberdorfer,FromtheColdWar,50–70. 54.Oberdorfer,FromtheColdWar,70–74. 55.Garthoff,GreatTransition,167. 56. Oberdorfer, From the ColdWar, 123–148; Garthoff, Great Transition, 220, 257–261,520–221,551,554,583,592,728,767. 57.Matlock,AutopsyonanEmpire,121–123;Gartoff,GreatTransition,753–754, 759,775. 58.Oberdorfer,FromtheColdWar,189–209;Garthoff,GreatTransition,252,283, 285–300,524–525,555,593,767;Matlock,ReaganandGorbachev. 59.Oberdorfer,FromtheColdWar,212–225. 60.Oberdorfer,FromtheColdWar,263. 61.Oberdorfer,FromtheColdWar,280. 62.PowellandPersico,MyAmericanJourney,375. 63.JohnLeCarré,TheSecretPilgrim(NewYork:Knopf,1991),12.
Chapter2 1.AlanDundes,ed.,SacredNarrative:ReadingsintheTheoryofMyth(Berkeley: UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1984). 2.PeterRobinson,HowReaganChangedMyLife(NewYork:ReganBooks,2003), 132,242,260;DineshD’Souza,RonaldReagan:HowanOrdinaryManBecamean ExtraordinaryLeader(NewYork:FreePress,1997),29,33,264;PeggyNoonan,“Thanks fromaGratefulCountry,”WallStreetJournal,June7,2004;WilliamKristol,“Reagan’s Greatness:GivingaPresidentHisDue,”WeeklyStandard,November10,1997,33–34; GeorgeWill,“HisGreatestRole,”WallStreetJournal,June7,2004;CharlesKrauthammer,“ReaganasOptimist?JustaLiberalSlight,”Time,June14,2004. 3. John W. Sloan, The Reagan Effect: Economics and Presidential Leadership (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999). The material on Reagan’s economic policymakinghasbeenadaptedfromTheReaganEffect:EconomicsandPresidential Leadership,byJohnW.Sloan,copyright©1999bytheUniversityPressofKansas, chapters6and9.Usedbypermissionofthepublisher. 4.LouCannon,PresidentReagan:TheRoleofaLifetime(NewYork:Simonand Schuster,1991),90–92. 5.BettyGlad,“Reagan’sMidlifeCrisisandtheTurntotheRight,”PoliticalPsychology10(December1983):613. 6.HaynesJohnson,SleepwalkingThroughHistory:AmericaintheReaganYears (NewYork:W.W.Norton,1991),67. 7.W.ElliotBrownleeandC.EugeneSteuerle,“Taxation,”inTheReaganPresidency: Pragmatic Conservatism and Its Legacies, ed.W. Elliot Brownlee and Hugh DavisGraham(Lawrence:UniversityPressofKansas,2003),157. 8.BrownleeandSteuerle,“Taxation,”167–168.
132 NOTESTOPAGES43–54
9.BrownleeandSteuerle,“Taxation,”156. 10.ThomasEdsall,TheNewPoliticsofInequality(NewYork:W.W.Norton,1984), 210–211. 11.BrownleeandSteuerle,“Taxation,”156. 12.JohnF.Witte,ThePoliticsandDevelopmentoftheFederalIncomeTax(Madison: UniversityofWisconsinPress,1985),232–233. 13.BrownleeandSteuerle,“Taxation,”159. 14.BrownleeandSteuerle,“Taxation,”158. 15.C.EugeneSteuerle,TheTaxDecade:HowTaxesCametoDominatethePublic Agenda(Washington,DC:UrbanInstitutePress,1992),50. 16.Steuerle,TaxDecade,43. 17.Steuerle,TaxDecade,58. 18.BrownleeandSteuerle,“Taxation,”163. 19.BrownleeandSteuerle,“Taxation,”168. 20.BrownleeandSteuerle,“Taxation,”167. 21.JohnF.Witte,“The1986TaxReform:ANewErainPolitics?”AmericanPolitics Quarterly19(October1991):445. 22.MichaelJ.Boskin,ReaganandtheEconomy:TheSuccess,Failures,andUnfinishedAgenda(SanFrancisco:InstituteforContemporaryStudies,1981),158. 23.DavidE.Rosenbaum,“Senate,74–23,VotesTaxBill,”NewYorkTimes,September 18,1986.SeealsoRonaldF.King,“Introduction:TaxReformandAmericanPolitics,” AmericanPoliticsQuarterly19(October1991):417–425. 24.Witte,“1986TaxReform,”444. 25.Boskin,ReaganandtheEconomy,122. 26.Witte,“1986TaxReform,”447. 27.Steuerle,TaxDecade,121. 28.JeffreyH.BirnbaumandAllanS.Murray,ShowdownatGucciGulch:Lawmakers, Lobbyists and the Unlikely Triumph of Tax Reform (NewYork:Vintage, 1988),286. 29. Birnbaum and Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch, 73. See also Timothy J. Conlan,MargaretT.Wrightson,andDavidR.Beam,TaxingChoices(Washington,DC: CQPress,1990),71. 30.AlbertS.Hunt,“Introduction,”inBirnbaumandMurray,ShowdownatGucci Gulch,xiv. 31.Witte,“1986TaxReform,”443. 32.HistoricalTables,FiscalYear1991(Washington,DC:U.S.GovernmentPrinting Office,1998),21–22. 33. DavidWessel and Gerald F. Seib, “How Reagan Recast Debate on Markets, Taxes—andDeficits,”WallStreetJournal,June7,2004.SeealsoAndrewE.Busch, RonaldReaganandthePoliticsofFreedom(Lanham,MD:RowmanandLittlefield, 2001),90. 34.SidneyBlumenthal,“LetterfromWashington,”NewYorker,July19,1983,30. 35.CouncilofEconomicAdvisers,EconomicReportofthePresident,January1982 (Washington,DC:U.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice,1982),9–10. 36.JohnHerbers,“PresidentAssertsEconomicPoliciesProveEffective,”NewYork Times,October14,1982. 37.MarkPeffeyandJ.T.Williams,“AttributingPresidentialResponsibilityforNationalEconomicProblems,”AmericanPoliticsQuarterly13(October1985):414. 38.AlonzoL.Hamby,LiberalismandItsChallengers:FromFDRtoBush,2ded. (NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1992),368. 39.Cannon,PresidentReagan,275.
NOTESTOPAGES55–64 133
40.MartinAnderson,“TheReaganRevolution,”NewYorkTimes,January17,1990. SeealsoRobertL.Bartley,TheSevenFatYears:AndHowtoDoItAgain(NewYork: FreePress,1992),4,6,144. 41. Louis Uchitelle, “107 Months, and Counting,” NewYork Times, January 30, 2000. 42.JohnLiscio,“APresidentialReportCard,”Barron’s,August12,1996,30. 43.CouncilofEconomicAdvisers,EconomicReportofthePresident,January1991 (Washington,DC:U.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice,1991),322. 44.DavidLeonhardt,“Bush’sRecordonJobs,”NewYorkTimes,July3,2003. 45.America’sNewBeginning:AProgramforEconomicRecovery(Washington,DC: WhiteHouse,1981),10.SeealsoEdwardCowan,“EconomistsatTaxHearinginHouse SplitonCuts,”NewYorkTimes,May3,1981. 46.CharlesL.Schultze,MemostothePresident:AGuideThroughMacroeconomics fortheBusyPolicymaker(Washington,DC:BrookingsInstitutionPress,1992),259;Paul Krugman,PeddlingProsperity:EconomicSenseandNonsenseintheAgeofDiminished Expectations(NewYork:W.W.Norton,1994),262. 47.AndrewDean,MartinDurand,JohnFallon,andPeterHoeller,“SavingTrendsand BehaviorinOECDCountries,”OECDEconomicStudies14(Spring1990):9. 48.LeonardSilk,“BehindtheGloomofConsumers,”NewYorkTimes,November 29,1991. 49.GeorgeWill,“TheThreatofInflation,”HoustonChronicle,May23,1999. 50.Cannon,PresidentReagan,278. 51. Cited by Jonathan Fuerbringer, “Volcker Says Fed to Continue Tight Money Stand,”NewYorkTimes,February11,1982. 52.AlbertRees,StrikingaBalance:MakingNationalEconomicPolicy(Chicago: UniversityofChicagoPress,1984),71. 53.PaulCraigRoberts,“IsaDepressionBrewing?”WallStreetJournal,March3, 1982. 54.MiltonFriedman,“TheFederalReserveandMonetaryInstability,”WallStreet Journal,February1,1982. 55.PaulVolckerandToyooGyohten,ChangingFortunes:TheWorld’sMoneyand theThreattoAmericanLeadership(NewYork:RandomHouse,1992),175. 56. Quoted in Kenneth Bacon, “Is a Depression Brewing?” Wall Street Journal, April19,1982. 57.AlexanderHommer,“DowSoarsby38.81,”NewYorkTimes,August18,1982. 58.JamesE.Alt,“LeaningintotheWindorDuckingOutoftheStorm?U.S.Monetary Policyinthe1980s,”inPoliticsandEconomicsintheEighties,ed.AlbertoAlesinaand GeoffreyCarliner(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1991),46. 59.AlfredL.Malabre,LostProphets:AnInsider’sHistoryofModernEconomists (Cambridge:HarvardBusinessSchoolPress,1994),163. 60.BenjaminFriedman,“Comment,”inPoliticsandEconomicsintheEighties, ed.Alesina and Geoffrey Carliner (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 82–83. 61.Arthur Schlesinger Jr., “American Politics on a Darkling Plain,” Wall Street Journal,March16,1982. 62. JamesTobin, “How toThinkAbout the Deficit,” NewYork Review of Books, September25,1986,44. 63.QuotedbyRobertRubin,InanUncertainWorld:ToughChoicesfromWallStreet toWashington(NewYork:RandomHouse,2003),125.SeealsoBillClinton,MyLife (NewYork:AlfredA.Knopf,2004),537. 64.Rubin,InanUncertainWorld,356.
134 NOTESTOPAGES65–76
65. Paul Krugman, “The Dishonest Truth,” NewYork Times, February 23, 2000; RichardStevenson,“Reaganomicsvs.ClintonomicsIsaCentralIssuein2000,”New YorkTimes,February8,2000. 66.RonSuskind,ThePriceofLoyalty:GeorgeW.Bush,theWhiteHouse,andthe EducationofPaulO’Neill(NewYork:SimonandSchuster,2004),291. 67.DennisS.Ippolito,“TaxPolicyandSpendingPolicy,”AmericanPoliticsQuarterly 19(October1991):463. 68.RobertPear,“RichGotRicherin80s,”NewYorkTimes,January11,1991. 69.AndrewHacker,“TheRich:WhoTheyAre,”NewYorkTimesMagazine,November19,1995,70.SeealsoKeithBrasher,“GapinWealthinU.S.CalledWidest inWest,”NewYorkTimes,April17,1995;EdwardN.Wolff,TopHeavy:AStudyof IncreasingInequalityofWealthinAmerica(NewYork:TwentiethCenturyFundPress, 1995),7. 70.MichaelLewis,“TheRich,”NewYorkTimesMagazine,November19,1995. 71.SylviaNasar,“TheRichGetRicher,”NewYorkTimes,August16,1992. 72.SylviaNasar,“FedReportGivesNewDataonGainsbyRichestin80s,”NewYork Times,April21,1992.SeealsoJamesT.Patterson,RestlessGiant:TheUnitedStates fromWatergatetoBushv.Gore(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2005),351–352. 73.WalterWilliams,ReaganismandtheDeathofRepresentativeDemocracy(Washington,DC:GeorgetownUniversityPress,2003),9–10.
Chapter3 1.DineshD’Souza,RonaldReagan:HowanOrdinaryManBecameanExtraordinaryLeader(NewYork:FreePress,1997),245. 2. Peggy Noonan, When CharacterWas King:A Story of Ronald Reagan (New York:Viking,2003),248–249. 3.EdwinMeeseIII.WithReagan:TheInsideStory(Washington,DC:Regnery, 1992),51. 4.AnneEdwards,EarlyReagan(NewYork:WilliamMorrow,1987),54. 5.KironK.Skinner,AnneliseAnderson,andMartinAnderson,eds.,Reagan:ALife inLetters(NewYork:FreePress,2003),337–338. 6.Edwards,EarlyReagan,53. 7.EdmundMorris,Dutch(NewYork:RandomHouse,1999),90. 8.Morris,Dutch,89. 9.MarkShields,“ReaganHadSympathybutLittleEmpathy,”Creator’sSyndicate, June16,2004. 10.Skinner,Anderson,andAnderson,Reagan,335. 11.Skinner,Anderson,andAnderson,Reagan,337–338. 12.RobertDallek,RonaldReagan:ThePoliticsofSymbolism(Cambridge:Harvard UniversityPress,1984),34. 13.JeremyD.Mayer,RunningonRace:RacialPoliticsinPresidentialCampaigns, 1960–2000(NewYork:RandomHouse,2002),165;“PoliticalNewsSummary,”May 22,1968,HubertHumphreyPapers,MinnesotaHistoricalSociety. 14.Mayer,RunningonRace,164–165. 15.Inonespeechinthe1970s,hereferredtoayoungblackmanas“youngbuck,” whichwasseenasaraciallyderogatoryreferencetoayoungblackmale.Reaganpleaded ignoranceoftheterm’soffensivetoneandapologized. 16.Mayer,RunningonRace,155. 17.Mayer,RunningonRace,153. 18.Mayer,RunningonRace,153
NOTESTOPAGES76–91 135
19.Mayer,RunningonRace,82. 20.Mayer,RunningonRace,82. 21.Mayer,RunningonRace,153. 22.MalcolmD.MacDougall,WeAlmostMadeIt(NewYork:Crown,1977),48. 23.“TestofGovernorRonaldReagan’sNationwideTelevisionAddress,NBC,”March 31,1976,1976CampaignFiles,GeraldFordLibrary;“ReaganandBusing,”noauthor, nodate,1976CampaignFiles,GeraldFordLibrary. 24.Mayer,RunningonRace,135. 25.Mayer,RunningonRace,134. 26.Mayer,RunningonRace,136. 27.LouCannon,PresidentReagan:TheRoleofaLifetime(NewYork:Simonand Schuster,1991),518–519. 28.Mayer,RunningonRace,134. 29.Mayer,RunningonRace,134. 30.AuthorinterviewwithRichardBond,September6,2000;authorinterviewwith DougBailey,November13,2000;authorinterviewwithRichardWirthlin,November 20,2000. 31.Mayer,RunningonRace,154. 32.Wirthlininterview. 33.Mayer,RunningonRace,164–165. 34.Mayer,RunningonRace,158. 35.Mayer,RunningonRace,169–170. 36.Wirthlininterview. 37.Mayer,RunningonRace,194. 38.Skinner,Anderson,andAnderson,Reagan,208. 39.StephenL.Carter,ReflectionsofanAffirmativeActionBaby(NewYork:Basic Books,1991),155. 40.Mayer,RunningonRace,175. 41.Carter,ReflectionsofanAffirmativeActionBaby,157. 42.Dallek,RonaldReagan,80. 43.Dallek,RonaldReagan,81. 44.Mayer,RunningonRace,177. 45.Mayer,RunningonRace,153. 46.Skinner,Anderson,andAnderson,Reagan,634. 47.Mayer,RunningonRace,176. 48.EdwinL.HarpertoRonaldReagan,March5,1983,RonaldReaganPresidential Library. 49.Dallek,RonaldReagan,82. 50.JerryFalwelltoRonaldReagan,March15,1983,RonaldReaganPresidential Library. 51.Mayer,RunningonRace,202. 52.StephenR.Graubard,CommandofOffice(NewYork:BasicBooks,2004).
Chapter4 1. Peggy Noonan, When CharacterWas King:A Story of Ronald Reagan (New York:Viking,2001),14,325. 2.“Character,”WordReference.comDictionary,www.wordreference.com/definition/ character. 3.DineshD’Souza,RonaldReagan:HowanOrdinaryManBecameanExtraordinaryLeader(NewYork:FreePress,1997),259.
136 NOTESTOPAGES92–102
4.BillyGraham,JustAsIAm:TheAutobiographyofBillyGraham(NewYork: HarperCollins,1997),589–590. 5.JimmyCarter,LivingFaith(NewYork:ThreeRiversPress,1998). 6.PaulKengor,GodandRonaldReagan:ASpiritualLife(NewYork:ReganBooks, 2004),ii. 7.Kengor,GodandRonaldReagan,x. 8.JimmyCarter,TurningPoint:ACandidate,aState,andaNationComeofAge (NewYork:TimesBooks,1992),21–27. 9.AscitedinGaddisSmith,Morality,Reason,andPower:AmericanDiplomacyin theCarterYears(NewYork:HillandWang,1986),28. 10.DouglasBrinkley,TheUnfinishedPresidency:JimmyCarter’sJourneyBeyond theWhiteHouse(NewYork:Viking,1998). 11.Brinkley,UnfinishedPresidency,412–436. 12.BostonGlobeMagazine,April12,1990. 13.Brinkley,UnfinishedPresidency,xvi–xvii. 14.StevenF.Hayward,TheRealJimmyCarter:HowOurWorstEx-PresidentUnderminesAmericanForeignPolicy,CoddlesDictators,andCreatedthePartyofClinton andKerry(Lanham,MD:Regnery,2004),2,195. 15.PeggyNoonan,WhatISawattheRevolution:APoliticalLifeintheReaganEra (NewYork:RandomHouse,1990),166. 16.Noonan,WhenCharacterWasKing,100. 17.D’Souza,RonaldReagan,212. 18.LouCannon,GovernorReagan:HisRisetoPower(NewYork:PublicAffairs, 2003),208–209. 19.Cannon,GovernorReagan,211–212. 20.Cannon,GovernorReagan,212–214. 21.Cannon,GovernorReagan,214.KironK.Skinner,AnneliseAnderson,andMartin Anderson,eds.,Reagan,InHisOwnHand:TheWritingsofRonaldReaganThatReveal HisRevolutionaryVisionforAmerica(NewYork:FreePress,2001),222. 22.Cannon,GovernorReagan,214. 23.DonaldT.Critchlow,“MobilizingWomen:The‘SocialIssues,’”inTheReagan Presidency:PragmaticConservatismandItsLegacies,ed.W.ElliotBrownleeandHugh DavisGraham(Lawrence:UniversityPressofKansas,2003),300. 24.LouCannon,PresidentReagan:TheRoleofaLifetime(NewYork:Simonand Schuster,1991),804;Critchlow,“MobilizingWomen,”306. 25.KironK.Skinner,AnneliseAnderson,andMartinAnderson,eds.,Reagan:ALife inLetters(NewYork:FreePress,2003),364. 26.RonaldReagan,AnAmericanLife(NewYork:SimonandSchuster,1990),280. 27.DavidM.O’Brien,“FederalJudgeshipsinRetrospect,”inReaganPresidency, BrownleeandGraham,345. 28.O’Brien,“FederalJudgeshipsinRetrospect,”347–348. 29.Cannon,PresidentReagan,808. 30. Edwin Meese III, With Reagan:The Inside Story (Washington, DC: Regnery 1992),321. 31. Bork considered Roe “an unconstitutional decision, a serious and wholly unjustifiablejudicialusurpationofstatelegislativeauthority.”AscitedinEthanBonner, BattleforJustice:HowtheBorkNominationShookAmerica(NewYork:W.W.Norton, 1989),92. 32.Cannon,PresidentReagan,812. 33.William E. Pemberton, Exit with Honor: The Life and Presidency of Ronald Reagan(Armonk,NY:M.E.Sharpe,1997),137.
NOTESTOPAGES102–112 137
34.DonaldT.Regan,FortheRecord:FromWallStreettoWashington(NewYork: HarcourtBraceJovanovich,1988),77. 35.PatrickJ.Buchanan,RightfromtheBeginning(Boston:Little,Brown,1988), 356. 36.NancyReaganwithWilliamNovak,MyTurn:TheMemoirsofNancyReagan (NewYork:RandomHouse,1989),177. 37.Pemberton,ExitwithHonor,137. 38.Critchlow,“MobilizingWomen,”313. 39.Cannon,PresidentReagan,590. 40.D’Souza,RonaldReagan,53. 41.Cannon,PresidentReagan,59–60. 42.Cannon,PresidentReagan,487–489. 43.HaynesJohnson,SleepwalkingThroughHistory:AmericaintheReaganYears (NewYork:W.W.Norton,1991),184. 44.Johnson,SleepwalkingThroughHistory,183–184. 45.Johnson,SleepwalkingThroughHistory,183–184. 46.Johnson,SleepwalkingThroughHistory,184. 47.Johnson,SleepwalkingThroughHistory,184–185. 48.Cannon,PresidentReagan,801. 49.Cannon,PresidentReagan,795. 50.Cannon,PresidentReagan,800–801. 51.Pemberton,ExitwithHonor,146. 52.Cannon,PresidentReagan,801–802. 53.Johnson,SleepwalkingThroughHistory,185. 54.Cannon,PresidentReagan,802. 55.Johnson,SleepwalkingThroughHistory,185. 56.WilburEdel,TheReaganPresidency:AnActor’sFinestPerformance(NewYork: HippocreneBooks,1992),296. 57.PeterJ.Wallison,RonaldReagan:ThePowerofConvictionandtheSuccessof HisPresidency(Boulder,CO:WestviewPress,2003),168–169. 58.ElliottAbrams,UndueProcess:AStoryofHowPoliticalDifferencesAreTurned IntoCrimes(NewYork:FreePress,1993). 59.Noonan,WhenCharacterWasKing,279. 60.AscitedinMichaelSchaller,ReckoningwithReagan:AmericaandItsPresident inthe1980s(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1992),155–156. 61. Kyle Longley, In the Eagle’s Shadow: The United States and Latin America (Wheeling,IL:HarlanDavidson,2002),288–291. 62.Cannon,PresidentReagan,385. 63.AscitedinLawrenceE.Walsh,Firewall:TheIran-ContraConspiracyandCoverUp(NewYork:W.W.Norton,1997),4. 64.WilliamS.CohenandGeorgeJ.Mitchell,MenofZeal:ACandidInsideStoryof theIran-ContraHearings(NewYork:Viking,1988),xx. 65.RobertC.McFarlanewithZofiaSmardz,SpecialTrust(NewYork:Cadelland Davis,1994),31. 66.McFarlane,SpecialTrust,34. 67.Pemberton,ExitwithHonor,181–183. 68.Cannon,PresidentReagan,638. 69.Cannon,PresidentReagan,683. 70.Cannon,PresidentReagan,689–690. 71.Cannon,PresidentReagan,702. 72.Pemberton,ExitwithHonor,188.
138 NOTESTOPAGES112–125
73.Cannon,PresidentReagan,708–709. 74.Cannon,PresidentReagan,710–711. 75.Cannon,PresidentReagan,712. 76.Cannon,GovernorReagan,103–105. 77.AnneEdwards,EarlyReagan(NewYork:WilliamMorrow,1987),439. 78.Cannon,PresidentReagan,713. 79.Cannon,PresidentReagan,711. 80.AscitedinSchaller,ReckoningwithReagan,154. 81.AscitedinCannon,PresidentReagan,714. 82.AscitedinCannon,PresidentReagan,653. 83.AscitedinCannon,PresidentReagan,738. 84.AscitedinPemberton,ExitwithHonor,191. 85.AscitedinPemberton,ExitwithHonor,191–192. 86.AscitedinNoonan,WhenCharacterWasKing,272–273. 87.MartinAnderson,Revolution:TheReaganLegacy(Stanford,CA:HooverInstitutionPress,1990),289–291. 88.NewYorkTimes,January26,2003.
Epilogue 1.NewYorkTimes,January26,2003. 2.WallStreetJournal,June9,2004. 3.NewYorkTimes,January26,2003. 4.NewYorkTimes,January26,2003. 5.HowardFineman,“HowReagan’sPassingHelpsBush:It’sEasierNowtoInvoke AuraofanIcon—andIt’sVerySafe,”June7,2004,MSNBC.com,www.msnbc.msn .com/id/5164981/site/newsweek. 6.RonaldReaganJr.,“RonReaganJr.’sEulogyforRonaldReagan,”June14,2004, NewsMax.com,www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2004/6/14/125156.shtml. 7.DavidTalbot,“ReaganBlastsBush,”August14,2003,Salon.com,www.salon .com/news/feature/2003/04/14/ron_reagan/index_np.html.Reaganaddedthathismother sharedhis“distrustofsomeofthese[Bush]people.Shegetsthatthey’retroubleinall kindsofways.Shedoesn’tliketheirreligiousfervor,theiraggression.” 8.RonReagan,“TheCaseAgainstGeorgeW.Bush,”Esquire,September2004, 56,57. 9.PatrickJ.Buchanan,WheretheRightWentWrong:HowNeoconservativesSubvertedtheReaganRevolutionandHijackedtheBushPresidency(NewYork:Thomas DunneBooks,2004),6,9. 10.JonahGoldberg,“GeorgeW.Bush,Preservative:HasGovernmentBecomethe Answer?”NationalReviewOnline,January21,2004,www.nationalreview.com/goldberg/ goldberg200401211053.asp. 11.Goldberg,“GeorgeW.Bush,Preservative.” 12.NewYorkTimes,January26,2003. 13.WashingtonPost,June11,2004.
AbouttheAuthors
Kyle Longley is the Snell Family Dean’s Distinguished Professor of historyatArizonaStateUniversity.HisworksincludeSenatorAlbert A.GoreSr.:TennesseeMaverick;IntheEagle’sShadow:TheUnited StatesandLatinAmerica;andTheSparrowandtheHawk:CostaRica andtheUnitedStatesDuringtheRiseofJoseFigueres. JeremyD.MayerisanassociateprofessorattheGeorgeMasonSchool ofPublicPolicy.Hespecializesinpresidentialelections,publicopinion, racialpolitics,andforeignpolicy.HehaspublishedwidelyonAmerican politicsandhisbookRunningonRace:RacialPoliticsinPresidential Campaigns1960–2000wasselectedbyWashingtonMonthlyasoneof thebestpoliticalbooksof2002.Heistheauthoroftheforthcoming WiredPolitics:JournalismandGovernance. MichaelSchallerisRegent’sProfessorofHistoryattheUniversityof Arizona.Hisresearchinterestsincludetwentieth-centuryUnitedStates, foreignpolicy,andtheUnitedStatesandAsia.Amonghismanybooksare RightTurn:AmericanLifeintheReagan-BushEra1980–1992;Present Tense:TheUnitedStatesSince1945,withRobertD.Schulzingerand KarenAnderson;TheUnitedStatesandChina:IntotheTwentieth-first Century;DouglasMacArthur:TheFarEasternGeneral;andAltered States:TheUnitedStatesandJapanSincetheOccupation. JohnW.SloanisaprofessorofpoliticalscienceattheUniversityof Houston.Hehasconductedresearchatseveralpresidentiallibrariesand writtenbooksontheEisenhowerandReaganpresidencies.Amonghis booksareTheReaganEffect:EconomicsandPresidentialLeadership; Eisenhower and the Management of Prosperity; and Public Policy in LatinAmerica:AComparativeStudy. 139
Index
Abernathy,Ralph,71,80 Abortion,vii–viii,xi,xiii,xvi,92, 97–103,136n31 AbortionandtheConscienceofthe Nation(Uhlmann),101–2 Abrams,Elliott,39–40,108,115 Abshire,David,29 Adarandv.Pena,88 Affirmativeaction,71,78,79,82,85–86, 88 Afghanistan,4,6,7,17,19–20,21, 23–24,37,38,39 Africa apartheid,78,80,86,95 U.S.foreignpolicy,4,6,7,19–20,22, 24,25,27,39 Seealsospecificcountry AfricanAmericans.SeeRacialpolicy Aikman,David,118 Alabama,xi,76–77 Alaska,15,30 Ali,Muhammad,81 Allen,Richard,9 Alt,James,60 Alzheimer’sdisease,5–6,97,102,117 AManofFaith(Aikman),118 AmericansforTaxReform,viii AnAmericanLife(Reagan),102–3 Anderson,Martin,xiii,9,55 Andropov,Yuri,31–33 Angola,7,24 Anti-BallisticMissile(ABM)Treaty (1972),14–15,34–35,36
Anticommunism,ix,x,xi,xii,3–8,10, 19–30,36 Apartheid,78,80,86,95 Aristide,Jean-Bertrand,96 Arizona,vii,viii,xi–xii,99 Arkansas,x Ashcroft,John,viii AsianAmericans,81 Baker,Howard economicpolicy,59 foreignpolicy,35–36,37,114 Baker,James economicpolicy,47–48 foreignpolicy,9,20–21 moralcharacter,105 Barnes,Fred,117–18 Bartlett,Bruce,125 Bentsen,Lloyd,64 Berry,MaryFrances,84 Boland,EdwardP.,27 BolandAmendment(1982/1984),27,109 Bork,Robert,99,100–1,136n31 Boskin,Michael,49 Brezezinski,Zbigniew,23 Brezhnev,Leonid,31 BrickerAmendment,x Brooke,Edward,78 Brownback,Sam,xiv Brownlee,W.Elliot,43–44,47 Brownv.BoardofEducation,94 Brunei,27 Buchanan,Pat,xiii–xiv,102,103,124 141
142 INDEX
Buckley,WilliamF.,28,109,124 BullMooseParty,ix Burger,Warren,100 Burns,Arnold,107 Burton,Dan,xiii–xiv Bush,GeorgeH.W. conservatism,xii–xiii economicpolicy,xiii,63–64 foreignpolicy,xiii,15,39–40,110, 115 moralcharacter,99,102 Bush,GeorgeW. Bushdoctrine,124 conservatism,xiii,xvi economicpolicy,55,63,65–66,68 foreignpolicy,xvi,4,15,39 moralcharacter,117–19 racialpolicy,88–89 Reaganmythology,121–25 Byrd,Robert,87 California,vii,73–74,76,77,81,82,92, 98–99,101,102,117 Cambodia,24 Cannon,Lou,xiv,54,57,102,104 Caribbean,19,21–22,25,26,28,32,96, 109,110 Seealsospecificcountry Carlucci,Frank,9,35–36 Carter,Jimmy economicpolicy,10,55 foreignpolicy,6,10,11–12,17,19,20, 22,23,25,28,94–95,128n5 moralcharacter,xvi,91–97,99,117 racialpolicy,71–72,80,85 CarterCenter,95–96,97 Casey,William administrativeinfighting,8,9,10 foreignpolicy,7,8,9,10,15,17, 19–21,23,26,27,29,30,35–36, 112,113–14,115 Castro,Fidel,109 Catholicism,98,99,101 CentralAmerica,4,6,7,10,19–20, 24–30,36,39,91,105,108–16,122 Seealsospecificcountry
CentralIntelligenceAgency(CIA) administrativeinfighting,8,9,10 Africa,7,24 CentralAmerica,7,10,24–30,36 covertoperations,4,10,15–16,17, 19–30,36 Iran-contraaffair,10,24–30,36,109, 112 MiddleEast,4,7,10,23,24–30,36 SoutheastAsia,24 SovietUnion,4,6,7,9,10,13–14, 15–16,17,19–21,23,25,130n30 Seealsospecificadministrators Chaney,James,79–80 Cheney,Dick,39–40,65,123 Chernenko,Konstantin,31,33 China,xii,24,39 ChristianCoalition,117 Christianity,xi,91–97,99,102,103, 117,118 Civilrights.SeeRacialpolicy CivilRightsAct(1964),75–76,77,87 CivilRightsCommission,84 Clark,Bill,98 Clark,William,9,32 Clinton,Bill economicpolicy,63–65 foreignpolicy,15,39,96 moralcharacter,vii,xv,xvi,90,91,92, 97,103–4,105,116,117 Clinton,HillaryRodham,91 ColdWar,vii,xv,3–18,30–39 Colombia,27 Communism.SeeAnticommunism Connecticut,25 Conservatism abortion,vii–viii,xi,xiii,xvi anticommunism,ix,x,xi,xii compassionateconservatism,xvi,125 economicpolicy,ix–x,vii,xiii,xv–xvi, 41–42,45–46,50,51–52,55, 62–69 foreignpolicy,vii,x,xi,xii,xiii,xv, xvi,9,35–36,37–38,39–40 governmentintervention,vii–viii,xi homosexuality,vii–viii,xi
INDEX 143
Conservatism(continued) moralcharacter,vii,xv,xvi,90–97,99, 103–4,108,116–18 neoconservatives,9,35–36,39–40 nuclearweapons,x,xi partisanship,vii–viii,xii politicalactivists,vii–ix,xiii–xiv politicalleadership,ix–xiv,vii–viii racialpolicy,ix,x,xi,xii,xvi,71–72, 75–77,83,84–85,86–87 Reaganmythology,vii–xvii,121–25, 127n12 religion,vii,xi,92,99,102,103 southernDemocrats,ix Coolidge,Calvin conservatism,ix–x economicpolicy,ix–x Coors,Joseph,27 Cuba,22,24–25,26,28,109,110 Darman,Richard,47–48 Davis,Angela,74 Davis,Royal,98 Deaver,Michael foreignpolicy,9,20–21,32 moralcharacter,102,103,106 Reaganmythology,xiii,121 DeConaini,Dennis,xi–xii DeficitReductionAct(DEFRA)(1984), 47 DeLay,Tom,xiii–xiv,3 DemocraticParty conservatism,ix,xi–xii economicpolicy,47–48,49,52,53–54, 63–67 moderates,64 moralcharacter,91,99,100,117, 118–19 politicalleadership,ix,x,xiii racialpolicy,75–82,86–89 southernDemocrats,ix SeealsoPoliticalelections;specific administration Détente,xii,7,128n6 Dewey,Thomas,x Dobrynin,Anatoly,30–31
Dobson,James,xiii–xiv Dodd,Christopher,25 Dole,Robert,47 Duvalier,JeanClaude,19,129n29 Eastland,Terry,107 Economicpolicy ColdWar,7,14,15–18 conservatism,ix–x,vii,xiii,xv–xvi, 41–42,50,51–52,55,62–69 economicgrowth,42,54–63,65,66–67 federalbudget balancedbudget,42,64 budgetdeficit,18,43,44–45, 46–47,51t,52,60,62,63–66 budgetsurplus,65 programexpenditures,42,44,45, 46–47,65,66–67,68–69 grossdomesticproduct(GDP),52,55, 56,64 grossnationalproduct(GNP),43,51t, 54 income incomegap,66–67,68 medianincome,44,55 incometax capitalgains,45–46,49 corporatetaxrate,45,49 estatetax,45 flattax,44,50 legislation,44–51,60,64,68 personalexemptions,45,46,49 progressivetax,42–44,50 taxcredits,45,49 taxexpenditures(loopholes),44–46, 47–51,68 taxincrease,47,49,55,60,63–65,68 taxratestructure,42–51 taxreduction,42,43,44–48,50, 51–52,53,62–64,65–66,68 inflation,42,44,46,52,55–63,64 interestrate,53,56–57,58–59,60, 61–62,64,65 Keynesianeconomics,55,59,60–61,62 legacyof,51–69 liberalism,42,45,66,67
144 INDEX
Economicpolicy(continued) monetarypolicy,53–63 nationaldebt,18,52 personalsavings,45,55–56 privateinvestment,45,49,51t,55–56 racism,78,80–81,82–83,85,86 Reaganmythology,vii,xv–xvi,41–51, 53,55–56,59,63–69 recession,46,52–55,57,58–59,60, 62–63,64–65 savingsandloan(S&L)industry,18, 45,64,65,68 stagflation,42,44–51,63,68 stockmarket,54,60 supply-sideeconomics,42–44,45–46, 51–52,53,55–56,59,63–64 unemploymentrate,46,51t,52,55, 58–59,61,64 wealthgap,66–67 Seealsospecificpolitical administration EconomicRecoveryTaxAct(ERTA) (1981),44–47 Edsall,Thomas,44 Eisenhower,Dwight conservatism,x,xiii economicpolicy,x foreignpolicy,x,3,8 ElSalvador,7,25,26,27 EnvironmentalProtectionAgency(EPA), xii Esquire,123 EthicsinGovernmentAct(1978),106 FaithofGeorgeW.Bush(Mansfield), 118 Fall,Albert,106 Falwell,Jerry,xi,85,87,92,99 FateoftheEarth,The(Schell),12 Federalbudget.SeeEconomicpolicy FederalBureauofInvestigation(FBI), 35–36,84–85 FederalOpenMarketCommittee (FOMC),58,60 FederalReserveBank,58 FederalReserveBankofNewYork,58
FederalReserveBoard,53–63 Feldstein,Martin,43 Fineman,Howard,122 FirstAmendment,100–1 Ford,Gerald,74,78,79,96 Ford,John,xvii Foreignpolicy administrativeinfighting,8–10 Africa,4,6,7,19–20,22,24,25,27,39 anticommunism,3–8,10,19–30,36 Caribbean,19,21–22,25,26,28,32 CentralAmerica,4,6,7,10,19–20, 24–30,36,39,91,105,108–16, 122 conservatism,ix,vii,x,xi,xii,xiii,xv, xvi,9,35–36,37–38,39–40 covertoperations,4,10,15–16,17, 18–30,36,91,105,108–16,122 EasternEurope,7,24,39 foreigntrade,7,15–18,31 humanrights,19,95,96,97 initiationpassivity,8–10,37–38 legacyof,38–40 MiddleEast,4,6,7,10,17–30,36, 37,38–40,91,105,108–16,122, 128n5 militaryaid,23–30,91,105,108–16, 122 moralcharacter,91,94–96,97,105, 108–16,122 oil,15–18 Reagandoctrine,6–7,21,130n34 Reaganmythology,vii,xv,3–4 SoutheastAsia,6,24 SovietUnion,vii,xv,3–18,30–39 terrorism,4,18–24,28–30,31–32, 39–40,108–10 SeealsoCentralIntelligenceAgency (CIA);specificcountry/political administration FourteenthAmendment,100–1 France,17,21 Frazier,Joe,81 Friedman,Benjamin,60 Friedman,Milton,57,58,59,60 Frum,David,117–18
INDEX 145
Gates,Robert,6,13–14,19–20,26 GeneralElectric,77 GeorgeW.Bush(Hughes),117–18 Georgia,xi,92,94,96 Germany,17,18 Ghorbanifar,Manucher,110 Gingrich,Newt,xiii–xiv,64 Ginsburg,Douglas,101 Giuliani,Rudolph,107 GodandGeorgeW.Bush(Kengor), 118 GodandRonaldReagan(Kengor),93 Goldberg,Jonah,124–25 Goldwater,Barry conservatism,vii–viii,xi–xii,124 economicpolicy,43 foreignpolicy,xi moralcharacter,103 racialpolicy,75–76,86–87,88 Goldwater,Peggy,xi Goldwater,Susan,xi Goodman,Andrew,79–80 Gorbachev,Mikhail,5–6,30,31,33–38 Gore,Al,xvi,99,105 Graham,Billy,92 Graham,Daniel,12–13 Gramm-RudmanAct(1985),63–64 GreatBritain,3,12,13,14,17,33 GreatDepression,ix–x,4–5 GreatSociety,42 Greenspan,Alan,46–47,62,64 Grenada,7,21–22,32 Grossdomesticproduct(GDP),52,55, 56,64 Grossnationalproduct(GNP),43,51t,54 Guatemala,26 HabitatforHumanity,95,97 Haig,Alexander,6,8,9,19–20,21,30–31 Haiti,19,96,129n29 Hatch,Orin,99 Hayward,StevenF.,93,96–97 Helms,Jesse,xiii–xiv,84–85,99,124 HighFrontier,12–13 Holocaust,105 Homosexuality,vii–viii,xi
Honduras,26 Hughes,Karen,117–18 HumanLifeReview,101–2 Humanrights foreignpolicy,19,95,96,97 moralcharacter,94–97 Hunt,Albert,50 Hunt,NelsonBunker,27 Hussein,Saddam,23,40 Hyde,Henry,99 Illinois,72–73 Imposter(Bartlett),125 Incometax.SeeEconomicpolicy India,23 Inflation,42,44,46,52,55–63,64 Interestrate,53,56–57,58–59,60, 61–62,64,65 Intermediate-rangenuclearforces(INF), 37–38 IntheEagle’sShadow(Langley),xvi Iran Iran-contraaffair,10,24–30,36,91, 105,108–16,122 U.S.foreignpolicy,6,7,10,19–20, 21,23,24–30,36,39,91,105, 108–16,122,128n5 Iraq,19–20,21,23,39–40,124 Islam,21,24,38–39,108–9 Israel,21,27,39,109,111–12 Italy,21 Jackson,Jesse,71,80,81 Japan,16–17,18,31 Jeffords,James,xiv JohnPaul,II,Pope,19,130n30 Johnson,Haynes,107–8 Johnson,Lyndon,xi,xii,42,55,67,124 Jones,T.K.,12 Jordan,Vernon,80 Kansas,xiv Keller,Bill,121 Kemp,Jack,59 Kengor,Paul,93,118 Kennan,George,38
146 INDEX
Kennedy,Anthony,101 Kennedy,JohnF. economicpolicy,55 politicalmythology,xiii,127n4 Kennedy,Ted,59 Kentucky,79 Kessler,Ronald,117–18 Keyes,Robert,74 Keynesianeconomics,55,59,60–61,62 Khomeini,AyatollahRuhollaMussaui, 28,110 Kilpatrick,JamesJ.,106 King,MartinLuther,Jr.,71,80,82, 84–85,87–88 Kirkpatrick,Jeane,9,19,25,95 Kissinger,Henry,9,25 Knowland,William,x,xiii–xiv KoreanAirlines,31–32 Kosovo,39 KuKluxKlan(KKK),72–73,80 Laden,Osamabin,4,24 LatinAmericans,81,85,88 Lebanon,7,19–20,21,24,28,109,110, 111,124 Lewinsky,Monica,91 Liberalism economicpolicy,42,45,66,67 foreignpolicy,4–5 moralcharacter,99,102,103 racialpolicy,75,78 Libya,22,24,110 Limbaugh,Rush,xiii–xiv Lincoln,Abraham,ix,xiii LivingFaith(Carter),92 Longley,Kyle,xvi Lott,Trent,xiii–xiv,83,87 Louisiana,xi MacEachin,Douglas,15–16 Mansfield,Stephen,118 Marcos,Ferdinand,19,129n29 Marxism,16,21–22,26 Massachusetts,107 Matlock,Jack,16 MatterofCharacter(Kessler),117–18
Mayer,Jeremy,xvi McCarthy,Joseph,x,xii McFarlane,Robert,3,9,10,14,15–16, 27,28,32,110–12,115 McIntyre,Francis,Cardinal,98 McKay,James,107 Medicare,46–47,69,124 Meese,Edwin foreignpolicy,9,20–21 moralcharacter,98,99,103,106–7 racialpolicy,71 Mellon,Andrew,ix Michigan,78 MiddleEast terrorism,4,18–24,28–30,39–40,108–9 U.S.foreignpolicy,4,6,7,10,17–30, 36,37,38–40,91,105,108–16, 122,124,128n5 Seealsospecificcountry Military-industrialcomplex,x Militaryweapons antimissileresearch,10–15 armsagreements,7,11–12,14–15, 34–35,36–38 armscontrol,7,9,11–12,13,14–15, 31–32,34–38 armsrace,7,12,34,38–39 B-1intercontinentalbomber,11 defensespending,8,10–15,36 foreignaid,23–30,91,105,108–16,122 intermediate-rangecruisemissile,11, 32,36,37–38 militarybuild-up,4,10–15,18,31,32 militarysuperiority,6–8 mutualassureddestruction(MAD),12, 14–15 MXintercontinentalmissile,11 neutronbomb,11 nuclearweapons,x,xi,11–15,31,32, 35,36–39 PershingIImissile,11,32 stealthbomber,11 StrategicDefenseInitiative(SDI), 12–15,34–35,36–37 submarine-launchedmissile,11 Mississippi,xi,79–80
INDEX 147
Mondale,Walter,47–48,81 Monetarypolicy,53–63 Moralcharacter abortion,92,97–103,136n31 administrativecorruption,105–8 charactercomparison,91–97 conservatism,vii,xv,xvi,90–97,99, 103–4,108,116–18 foreignpolicy,91,94–96,97,105, 108–16,122 humanrights,94–97 liberalism,99,102,103 racialpolicy,72–75 Reaganmythology,117–18 religiousfaith,91–97,98,99,101,102, 103,117,118 truthfulness,103–5 MoralMajority,92,99,102 MountRushmore,vii–viii,xiv Mozambique,7,24 Murdoch,Rupert,xiii–xiv MusicCorporationofAmerica(MCA), 113 Muskie,Edmund,113 Mutualassureddestruction(MAD),12, 14–15 NationalAssociationforthe AdvancementofColoredPeople (NAACP),71,73,80,81 Nationaldebt,18,52 NationalRighttoLifeCommittee,99 NationalSecurityCouncil(NSC),16,20, 28,29,36,110,114 NationalUrbanLeague,80 Negraponte,John,39–40 Neoconservatives,9,35–36,39–40 NewDeal,x,4–5,42,87 NewYorkTimes,121 Nicaragua,7,10,19,24–30,36,39,91, 105,108–16,122 Nixon,Richard conservatism,xii foreignpolicy,xii,3,7 racialpolicy,74,76–77,82,86,88 Watergate,xii,106
Nofziger,Lyn,98,106 Noonan,Peggy,xvi,71,90–91,97,117 Noriega,Manuel,27 Norquist,Grover,viii–ix,125 North,Oliver conservatism,xiii–xiv foreignpolicy,27,29,111–12,114,115 NorthCarolina,78,80–81 NorthKorea,15,24,39,110 Nuclearweapons.SeeMilitaryweapons Nunn,Sam,96 O’Connor,SandraDay,xi,99–100,101 Oil,15–18 O’Neill,Paul,65 Pakistan,23,24 Palestine,21,39,109 Panama,27,28 PanAmAirlines,20,22 Partisanship,vii–viii,xii Patterson,Floyd,81 Pendleton,Clarence,71 Perle,Richard,9,16,39–40 Personalsavings,45,55–56 Philippines,19,129n29 Pierce,SamuelR.,Jr.,106 Pipes,Richard,16 Plame,Valerie,118–19 Poindexter,John foreignpolicy,9,27,35–36,111–12, 113–14,115 moralcharacter,106,111–12,113–14,115 Polad,7,24 Politicalelections campaigncontributions,49 congressional,viii,35–36,53–54 gubernatorial,viii,73–74,76,82 presidential 1960,86 1964,75–76,77,81,82,86–87 1968,76–77,78,81,82,87 1972,82 1976,78–80,82,87 1980,71–72,74,79–80,81,82, 83,87
148 INDEX
Politicalelections presidential(continued) 1984,70,80–81,82,87 2000,viii,88–89 2004,88–89 2008,xiv racialpolicy,70,71–72,74,75–82, 86–87,88–89 Powell,Colin,9,36,38,96 Privateinvestment,45,49,51t,55–56 Qaddafi,Muammar,22 Racialpolicy affirmativeaction,71,78,79,82, 85–86,88 civilrightslegislation,71–72,75–76, 77,78,79–80,82–89 conservatism,ix,x,xi,xii,xvi,71–72, 75–77,83,84–85,86–87 discrimination,75,76,84 economicpolicy,78,80–81,82–83, 85,86 foreignpolicy,78,80,86,95 judiciarynominations,88 legacyof,86–89 liberalism,75,78 moralcharacter,72–75 politicalelections,70,71–72,74, 75–82,86–87,88–89 prejudice,74–75 raceriots,77–78,82 racism,70–89,134n15 schoolbusing,78,79,80,82,85 schoolintegration,78,83,85,94 stereotypes,74–75 welfare,78,82 Seealsospecificpoliticaladministration Reagan,Jack,72–73 Reagan,Nancy foreignpolicy,9,21,29,32,33 moralcharacter,102,103,116–17 Reaganmythology,xiii Reagan,Nell,72–73 Reagan,Ron,Jr.,123–24 Reagandoctrine,6–7,21,130n34
ReaganEffect,The(Sloan),xv–xvi,42 Reaganmythology ColdWar,vii,xv,3–4 conservatism,vii–xvii,121–25,127n12 contemporarypolitics,121–25 economicpolicy,vii,xv–xvi,41–51, 53,55–56,59,63–69 foreignpolicy,vii,xv,3–4 GreatCommunicator,5–6 memorials,vii–viii,xiii–xiv moralcharacter,117–18 symbolism,ix,xiii–xiv Reaganomics.SeeEconomicpolicy RealJimmyCarter,The(Hayward), 96–97 Rebel-in-Chief(Barnes),117–18 Recession,46,52–55,57,58–59,60, 62–63,64–65 ReckoningwithReagan(Schaller),xv Rees,Albert,58 Regan,Donald,35–36,47–48,59,112–13 Religion Catholicism,98,99,101 Christianity,xi,91–97,99,102,103, 117,118 conservatism,vii,xi,92,99,102,103 fundamentalism,vii,xi,21,24,38–39, 92,99,102,103,108–9 Islam,21,24,38–39,108–9 moralcharacter,91–97,98,99,101, 102,103,117,118 ReligiousRight,92,103 RepublicanParty economicpolicy,49,53–54,63–67 moderates,ix,viii,x,xiii,35–36,78 moralcharacter,91,98,101,103, 105–16 politicalleadership,ix–xiv,vii–viii progressives,ix racialpolicy,73–74,75–82,83,86–89 SeealsoConservatismPolitical elections;specificadministration Rhodesia,78 Rice,Condoleezza,89,118 RightMan,The(Frum),117–18 RightTurn(Schaller),xv
INDEX 149
Robertson,Pat,xiii–xiv Roev.Wade(1973),99,100,101 RonaldReaganLegacyProject,viii Roosevelt,Franklin conservatism,x,xiii,25 economicpolicy,x,4–5,42 foreignpolicy,x,8 moralcharacter,115 Roosevelt,Theodore conservatism,ix foreignpolicy,ix Rostenkowski,Dan,50 Rove,Karl,viii Rowny,EdwardL.,14 Rubin,Robert,64 Rumsfeld,Donald,23,39–40 RunningonRace(Mayer),xvi Rwanda,39 Sakharov,Andrei,36 Salmon,Matt,vii–viii,xiv Sandinistamovement(Nicaragua),10, 24–30,36,39,108–16 SaudiArabia,17,18,24,27,110,114 Savingsandloan(S&L)industry,18,45, 64,65,68 Scaife,RichardMellon,xiii–xiv Scalia,Antonin,99,100 Schaller,Michael,xv Schell,Jonathan,12 Schlesinger,Arthur,Jr.,xiii,61 Schoolbusing,78,79,80,82,85 Schoolintegration,78,83,85,94 Schweizer,Peter,3–4 Schwerner,Michael,79–80 Scotland,20,22 Scowcroft,Brent,113–14 ScreenActor’sGuild,113 Secord,Richard,111 SenatorAlbertGore,Sr.(Langley),xvi Shamir,Yitzhak,105 Shawv.Reno,88 Shevardnadze,Eduard,34–35 Shultz,GeorgeP.,9,10,16,21,28, 31,32,33,35,36,37,110,111, 115
Skinner,Kiron,xiii Sloan,JohnW.,xv–xvi,42 SocialSecurity,46–47,65,69 Somalia,39 Somoza,Anastasio,25,27,108,109 Sorenson,Theodore,xiii SourcesofFaith(Carter),92 SouthAfrica,27,78,80,86,95 SouthCarolina,xi SouthernCitizens’Council,94 SouthKorea,27,31–32 SovietUnion armsagreements,7,11–12,14–15, 34–35,36–38 armscontrol,7,9,11–12,13,14–15, 31–32,34–38 armsrace,7,12,34,38–39 ColdWar,vii,xv,3–18,30–39 détente,xii,7,128n6 dissolution(1991),5–6,30 mutualassureddestruction(MAD),12, 14–15 nuclearweapons,x,xi,11–15,31,32, 35,36–39 StrategicDefenseInitiative(SDI), 12–15,34–35,36–37 U.S.economicstrategy,7,14,15–18 U.S.militarybuild-up,4,10–15,18, 31,32 U.S.militaryspending,8,10–15,36 U.S.militarysuperiority,6–8 Spencer,Stuart,114 Sprinkel,Beryl,59 Stagflation,42,44–51,63,68 Steuerle,C.Eugene,43–44,46–47,50 Stevens,Ted,30 Stockman,David,10,11,43 Stockmarket,54,60 StrategicArmsLimitationsTreatyII (SALT),11–12 StrategicDefenseInitiative(SDI),12–15, 34–35,36–37 Supply-sideeconomics.SeeEconomic policy Symington,Fyfe,xi Syria,21,109
150 INDEX
Taft,Robert,x,xiii–xiv,124 Taiwan,xii,24,27,114 Taxation.SeeEconomicpolicy TaxEquityandFiscalResponsibilityAct (TEFRA)(1982),47 TaxReformAct(TRA)(1986),44–45, 48–51,68 TeapotDomescandal,106 Teller,Edward,12–13 Tennessee,79,99 Terrorism Islamistfundamentalists,21,24,38–39, 108–9 September11,2001,39–40,122 U.S.foreignpolicy,4,18–24,28–30, 31–32,39–40,108–10 Texas,3,23,78,112,124–25 Thatcher,Margaret,3,12,13,14,33 TherapeuticAbortionAct(1967),98 Thomas,Clarence,71,83 Thurmond,Strom,xiii–xiv,81 Tower,John,29–30,112–16 TowerCommission(1987),29–30, 112–16 TreasuryI/II,48,50 Trudeau,Garry,25 Truman,Harry conservatism,x,xiii,125 economicpolicy,55 Ture,Norman,56 Udall,M.,xi–xii Uhlmann,Michael,101–2 UndueProcess(Abrams),108 Unemploymentrate,46,51t,52,55, 58–59,61,64 UnitedNations(UN),9,19,25,40,95 UnitedStatesSupremeCourt nominations,xi,88,99–101 rulings,xi,88,94,99,100,101 USAPatriotAct,125 Vermont,xiv Vesey,JohnW.,13 Vietnam,6,24–25
Volcker,Paul,53–63 VotingRightsAct(1965/82),76,77, 79–80,84,85–86,87–88 Walker,Charles,45–46 Wallace,George,74,76–77,78,79,81, 86–87 Wallison,Peter,xiii,112 WallStreetJournal,121–22 Walsh,Lawrence,112,114–15 WalshReport(1994),115 Warren,Earl,100 Washington,George,xiii,104 WashingtonPost,114 WashingtonTimes,112 Wasserman,Lew,113 Watergate,xii,106 Webster,William,35–36 Wedtech,106–7 Weidenbaum,Murray,53 Weinberger,Caspar,9,10–11,17,35–36, 110,115 Weir,Benjamin,111 Weld,William,107 Welfare,78,82 WhenCharacterWasKing(Noonan), 90–91 WheretheRightWentWrong(Buchanan), 124 Wiesenthal,Simon,105 Wilkie,Wendell,x Will,George,xiv–xv,56 Williams,Walter,68 Wilson,Charlie,23 Wilson,Woodrow,ix,xiii,94 Witte,John,48 Wolfowitz,Paul,39–40 WorldWarII,x,16,43,104–5 Wright,Jim,59 Yeltsin,Boris,5 Young,Andrew,80 Yugoslavia,39 Ziaul-Haq,Mohammed,23