Debordering Europe: Migration and Control Across the Ventimiglia Region [1st ed.] 9783030565176, 9783030565183

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MIGRATION, DIASPORAS AND CITIZENSHIP

Debordering Europe Migration and Control Across the Ventimiglia Region Edited by Livio Amigoni · Silvia Aru Ivan Bonnin · Gabriele Proglio Cecilia Vergnano

Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship

Series Editors Olga Jubany Department of Social Anthropology Universitat de Barcelona Barcelona, Spain Saskia Sassen Department of Sociology Columbia University New York, NY, USA

For over twenty years, the Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship series has contributed to cross-disciplinary empirical and theoretical debates on migration processes, serving as a critical forum for and problematising the main issues around the global movement and circulation of people. Grounded in both local and global accounts, the Series firstly focuses on the conceptualisation and dynamics of complex contemporary national and transnational drivers behind movements and forced displacements. Secondly, it explores the nexus of migration, diversity and identity, incorporating considerations of intersectionality, super-diversity, social polarization and identification processes to examine migration through the various intersections of racialized identities, ethnicity, class, gender, age, disability and other oppressions. Thirdly, the Series critically engages the emerging challenges presented by reconfigured borders and boundaries: state politicization of migration, sovereignty, security, transborder regulations, human trade and ecology, and other imperatives that transgress geopolitical territorial borders to raise dilemmas about contemporary movements and social drivers. Editorial Board: Brenda Yeoh Saw Ai (National University of Singapore, Singapore); Fabio Perocco (Università Ca’Foscari Venezia, Italy); Rita Segato (Universidade de Brasília, Brazil); Carlos Vargas (University of Oxford, UK).

More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14044

Livio Amigoni · Silvia Aru · Ivan Bonnin · Gabriele Proglio · Cecilia Vergnano Editors

Debordering Europe Migration and Control Across the Ventimiglia Region

Editors Livio Amigoni University of Genoa Genova, Italy Ivan Bonnin Political Science Roma Tre University Rome, Italy

Silvia Aru Politecnico di Torino Turin, Italy Gabriele Proglio University of Gastronomic Sciences Pollenzo, Italy

Cecilia Vergnano Department of Anthropology University of Amsterdam Amsterdam, The Netherlands

ISSN 2662-2602 ISSN 2662-2610 (electronic) Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship ISBN 978-3-030-56517-6 ISBN 978-3-030-56518-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56518-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: © Gino’s Premium Images/Alamy Stock Photo This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Writing this book has only been possible thanks to the efforts of all the people who struggle against the border regime, individually or collectively, then and now. It’s to them (and especially to those less privileged) that this book is dedicated.

Foreword

The book you are about to read tells stories of abjection and resistance, and it pits practices and struggles of mobility against technologies of control, which also means a multifarious humanity on the move against the shifting geography of a multi-layered border regime. The stakes are high, as it is often the case at the border. Hatred and anger, violence and exploitation are the prominent features of many borderlands, as we know at least since the publication of Gloria Anzaldúa’s Borderland/La frontera (1987). But that book also taught us to look at the border as a site of often unexpected encounters, political and cultural inventions, emerging forms of life. Such an ambivalence of the border is brilliantly explored in the pages that follow, from multiple disciplinary angles and employing a wide array of narrative techniques and theoretical frameworks. The focus of the book is a single border, the French-Italian border observed from the coastal town of Ventimiglia. This town is perhaps less well known than other sites in or at the margins of Europe that compose a specific geography of abjection, bordering and migrant resistance. One thinks here, for instance, of islands, like Lesvos in Greece or Lampedusa in Italy, of Spanish enclaves in North Africa, like Ceuta and Melilla, or of the infamous ‘Jungle’, the migrant camp in Calais. Nevertheless, the position of Ventimiglia within this geography is prominent. Since 2015, the Italian border town has indeed become a crucial bottleneck in the map of migrant routes across Europe. There is definitely a need to know more about it.

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As the editors of the book explain in their introduction, ‘many geographies are at work’ in the making (and unmaking) of the borderscape and border regime in Ventimiglia. Focusing on the juncture (and tensions) between European policies and national measures provides one important angle for the analysis, which nevertheless must be supplemented by other gazes to make sense of the multiscalar operations of the border, involving both human actors and environmental elements. Above all, the geography of border control clashes and intermingles with the spatial practices of migrants, which connect Ventimiglia with the multiple routes into and across Europe traced by their movements—with the map of what Luca Queirolo Palmas and Federico Rahola call ‘underground Europe’. The seeming stability of the border, a ‘line in the sand’, vanishes, while its effects continue to be no less concrete, violent and even lethal. While from a historical point of view there is no shortage of tensions surrounding the French-Italian border in Ventimiglia, in the wake of the Second World War it became quite a ‘normal’ intra-European border, and even more so in the framework of the implementation of the Schengen Agreement. Things began to change in 2011 with the arrival in Ventimiglia of thousands of Tunisian migrants, who had crossed the Mediterranean after the revolution up to Lampedusa and were trying to reach France. French authorities closed the border, while tense negotiations were going on between the Italian and the French government. But the situation really escalated in 2015, in the middle of what critical scholars and activists call ‘the long summer of migration’. The uncontainable movement of hundreds, thousands of migrants and refugees across the Aegean Sea and the so-called Balkan route in the summer of 2015 was indeed a moment of insurgent politics of migration (although at a tremendous cost), an opening that invited a radical rethinking of the European border and migration regime, as well as of the very relation of Europe with its multiple outsides. As we know, after an initial moment characterised by widespread solidarity in welcoming refugees from Greece to Germany, the European response to the challenge of the ‘long summer of migration’ was not characterised by opening and democratic inventiveness. The opposite was rather the case. Walls and fences proliferated along borders in many parts of the continent, and even free movement within the Schengen zone was restricted in several instances in the framework of a re-nationalisation of border controls and politics. This is what repeatedly happened since June 2015 in Ventimiglia, transforming the Italian border town into a bottleneck for thousands of

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migrants and into a crucial site in the geography of European border and migration control as well as of migrants’ routes across Europe. ‘Secondary movements’ is the governmental notion employed to grasp and stigmatise the movements within the European space of migrants and refugees after crossing an ‘external frontier’ of the EU. In the wake of the ‘long summer of migration’, a complex system of control was deployed to control and stop ‘secondary movements’. That system includes the reinstatement of border control at Schengen borders, like, for instance, in Ventimiglia, selective police interventions on trains, at railway stations, and specific sites of gathering of migrants (with the inevitable use of technologies of racial profiling), as well as the establishment of ‘hotspots’ as institutional spaces of containment and detention. From the latter point of view, the geography of the border regime in Ventimiglia is stretched once again, to include, for instance, the ‘hotspot’ of Taranto, in the South of Italy, where migrants apprehended in Ventimiglia are regularly deported. While the ‘hotspot approach’ introduced by the European Commission in 2015 specifically targets countries like Greece and Italy, prompting the proliferation of border zones within their territory, an analysis like the one pursued in this book allows to critically grasp the articulation of the operations of the border regime in Europe and at the maritime as well as at the land ‘external frontiers’ of the EU. The steady closure of legal entry channel to the EU has been accompanied over the last years by a reinforcement of border control both across the so-called Balkan route and in the Mediterranean, where the EU-Turkey deal in March 2016 has made passage across the Eastern Mediterranean almost impossible and the Civil War in Libya has cast a bloody shadow on Central Mediterranean crossings. Moreover, ‘external frontiers’ of the EU have been increasingly ‘de-humanitarised’ as a result of a process of criminalisation of NGOs pursued by several national governments (including the Italian). The border regime in Ventimiglia is in many ways articulated with such processes, which shape in particular the border experiences and biography of migrants and refugees who happened to gather in the Italian coastal town since 2015. While the book offers a grounded and detailed analysis of the operations of a single border, it also provides readers with a mirror, with a lens that enables reading wider operations and transformations of the border regime, at the ‘external frontiers’ of the EU and within its space. Even more generally, the border is not merely a research object in the pages that

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follow. It also becomes a methodic perspective on the tense and conflictridden constitution of the European space, better still on the multiple spaces contained by the signifier ‘Europe’ as well as on the political stakes surrounding the frictions and clashes among them. Something remains to be said regarding this book. All authors, despite their different disciplinary backgrounds, share an approach to the analysis of borders and migration that could be defined in terms of a primacy of movement. This is an approach that considers the challenge to borders posited by migrants and refugees as the primary factor to understand the operations and mutations of border regimes (that in a way take on ‘reactive’ characters). From this point of view, the book joins the lively international discussion on the ‘autonomy of migration’, which is embodied by the many stories of border crossing and resistance that readers will find in the following pages. Needless to say, taking the ‘autonomy of migration’ as a point of view on the border regime in Ventimiglia implies a clear political stance and a specific politics of knowledge. Most authors of the book are involved as activists in the multifarious forms and practices of contestation of the border regime in Ventimiglia. They can therefore narrate in first person the wide fabric of solidarity with migrants that includes the organisation of demonstrations and border camps, advisory and help in border crossing, monitoring of technologies and actors of control. Moreover, they have engaged as activists in sustained discussions with the local populations. The participation in such activities and in particular the ensuing relations with migrants have built invaluable ‘sources of knowledge’. The rigorous deployment of more traditional ethnographic research techniques in several chapters takes those sources of knowledge as a basis and leads to pieces of writing that are no less academically accurate than politically committed. Such a combination of research and activism on borders and migration nurtures many projects as well as collective and individual endeavours in Europe and elsewhere. This book is part of what could be called a collective attempt to translate into writing the challenge to borders posited by

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movements and struggles of migration. The stage of that challenge is here Ventimiglia. But it is more generally Europe and ultimately the world. Sandro Mezzadra University of Bologna Bologna, Italy

References Anzaldúa, G. (1987). Borderlands/La frontera. Aunt Lute Books. Queirolo Palmas, L. & Rahola F. (2020). UndergroundEurope. Lungo le rotte migranti. Meltemi.

Acknowledgements

Foremost, we wish to express our sincere gratitude to all informants and people interviewed. We would like to express our sincere gratitude to who shared with us some fragments of their personal experience, knowledge and spirit, giving so the most essential contribution to the realisation of this work. All these people—individuals and more or less organised groups, people from the borderland and people who came from outside of it—are the ones who truly know what this border is… and how to fight it. In order not to forget anyone, we choose to mention no one. You know who you are. Keep up the resistance. Thank you for everything. We express our gratitude to Andrea Caio for his accurate English proofreading. Last but not the least, we thank Maurizio Memoli (University of Cagliari), Barak Kalir and Darshan Vigneswaran (University of Amsterdam) for their support and suggestions during the preparation of the book.

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Contents

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Introduction Livio Amigoni, Silvia Aru, Ivan Bonnin, Gabriele Proglio, and Cecilia Vergnano References

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Part I Historical Reading of Ventimiglia as a Border Town 2

The Path of Hope. Illegal Border Crossings and Reflections on Historical Subjectivities, Stories and the Archive (1861–2019) Gabriele Proglio 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Methodological Approach 2.3 Stories of Border Crossings 2.4 Stories, Subjectivities and the Archive References

17 17 19 23 30 33

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The French-Italian Border at Menton-Ventimiglia: A Site of Perennial Conflict, Brotherhood, and Mediatisation Sandro Rinauro 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Between National and Niçois Identities, Events at the Border Up to 1860 3.3 The Delicate Integration of the County of Nice with France and the Protracted Identity Dispute 3.4 Intensifying Cross-Border Communications and Military Litigation at the Border 3.5 The Migratory Flow Amid Hostility and Hospitality 3.6 Border Mediatisation: From the Strengthening of National Identity to the Exorcising of Conflict References

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The Maritime Alps: A Cross-Border Region Between Traditional Transalpine Mobility and International Migratory Chains Marina Marengo 4.1 Introduction 4.2 “ MaConGranPenaLeReCaGiù”: Matters of “Alpine” Semantics 4.3 The Maritime Alps: Archetype of Frontier Lands 4.4 Traditional Economic Activities: A Model Focused on Mobility and Circular Migration 4.5 From Circular Mobility to Internal and International Migration 4.6 Conclusions: Questions of Thresholds, Doors and Ubiquitous Liminality References

37 37 39 42 45 48 50 51

55 55 56 59 60 62 65 66

Part II Borderland Infrastructures 5

The Infrastructure Environment of the Ventimiglia Borderland and Underground Border Crossings Ivan Bonnin 5.1 Introduction

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5.2 5.3

Non-Human Agency The Infrastructure Environment Channels Migratory Flow 5.4 Infrastructural Opportunities for Underground Border Crossings 5.5 Conclusion References

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The Moral Economy of a Transit Camp: Life and Control on the Italian-French Border Marta Menghi 6.1 Introduction 6.2 A Laboratory 6.3 Circular Government 6.4 Dealing with Life 6.5 Conclusion References The Irregular Border: Theory and Praxis at the Border of Ventimiglia in the Schengen Age Giacomo Donadio 7.1 Introduction 7.2 The Reintroduction of Border Control in the Schengen Borders Code (SBC) and French Legislation on Identity Checks 7.3 Bilateral Agreements on Police Cooperation and the Readmission of “Irregulars” 7.4 The refus d’entrée (Refusal of Entry) 7.5 Conclusions References

Part III 8

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75 79 82 89 90

93 93 94 99 103 105 106

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112 118 122 129 130

Social Actors on the Ground

Smugglers and Smuggled Migrants: Amid Sudanese Passeurs in the Border Regime of Ventimiglia Livio Amigoni, Chiara Molinero, and Cecilia Vergnano 8.1 Introduction

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8.2 8.3 8.4

Methodology Brief Overview on Smuggling Controls and Border-Crossing Strategies in Ventimiglia 8.5 The Heterogeneous Cosmos of Passeurs 8.6 Price and Reputation in the Smuggling Business 8.7 Shabab on the River: Among Sudanese Smugglers and the Surrounding Community 8.8 The “Sudanese Conscience” 8.9 Contentious Visions on Freedom of Movement 8.10 Conclusions References 9

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Migrants “at Stake”: Agency and Autonomy in Ventimiglia Silvia Aru 9.1 Introduction 9.2 Close to the Border Control: Tactics and Counter-Conducts 9.3 A Geography of Good and Bad Countries: Journeys to Ventimiglia and Beyond 9.4 Control of Spaces/Action of Bodies 9.5 “Do You Want to Return Home?” 9.6 Conclusions References (Un)Politicising a European Border: No Border and Solidarity Mobilisations in Ventimiglia after 2015 Daniela Trucco 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Ventimiglia’s Space of Solidarity 10.3 Unpoliticising Activism, Politicising Humanitarianism? 10.4 Conclusion References

138 140 142 145 148 149 150 152 154 156

159 159 161 165 167 171 174 174

179 179 184 196 199 200

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Support for Migrants as a Form of Territorial Struggle: Endogenous Solidarity in the Roya Valley Luca Giliberti 11.1 A Valley Crossed by the Border 11.2 Practices of Hospitality and Transit Support 11.3 Endogenous Solidarity for a Territorial Struggle References At the Border Between Italy and France: When Policemen Appear in the Landscape Francesco Migliaccio

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Postface: The Work of Knotting

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Index

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List of Contributors

Livio Amigoni University of Genoa, Genoa, Italy Silvia Aru Politecnico di Torino, Turin, Italy Ivan Bonnin Political Science, Roma Tre University, Rome, Italy; University of Roma 3, Rome, Italy Giacomo Donadio Department of Administrative Law, Constitutional Law, and Philosophy of Law, University of the Basque Country (UPVEHU), Bilbao, Spain Luca Giliberti University of Genoa-DISFOR, Genoa, Italy Marina Marengo University of Genoa, Genoa, Italy Marta Menghi University of Genoa, Genoa, Italy Francesco Migliaccio Torino, Italy Chiara Molinero Isrec Bg, Bergamo, Italy Gabriele Proglio University of Gastronomic Sciences, Pollenzo, Italy Sandro Rinauro Dipartimento di Studi Internazionali, Giuridici e Storico-Politici, Facoltà di Scienze Politiche Economiche e Sociali, Università degli Studi di Milano, Milan, Italy

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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Daniela Trucco Université Côte d’Azur, ERMES/URMIS, Nice, France Cecilia Vergnano Department of Anthropology, Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

University

of

List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 Fig. 1.2 Fig. 1.3 Fig. 4.1

Ventimiglia city map (Authors: Chiara Molinero and Michele Zatelli) The French-Italian border area (Authors: Chiara Molinero and Michele Zatelli) Migrants routes to Ventimiglia (Authors: Chiara Molinero and Michele Zatelli) Signage of the local action group of the Mongioie Le Alpi del Mare (Source Photo by Marina Marengo)

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction Livio Amigoni, Silvia Aru, Ivan Bonnin, Gabriele Proglio, and Cecilia Vergnano

During the months spent here, I tried to cross the border many times. […] Every time I met new people. I tried many times by walking on the mountains before succeeding. Some people try by train, but there is no chance… […]. We used to sleep before the first French village and the guards always arrested us on the way down to Menton, and directly pushed us back to Italy.

L. Amigoni University of Genoa, Genoa, Italy e-mail: [email protected] S. Aru (B) Politecnico di Torino, Turin, Italy I. Bonnin Political Science, Roma Tre University, Rome, Italy G. Proglio University of Gastronomic Sciences, Pollenzo, Italy C. Vergnano Department of Anthropology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands © The Author(s) 2021 L. Amigoni et al. (eds.), Debordering Europe, Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56518-3_1

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Fig. 1.1 Ventimiglia city map (Authors: Chiara Molinero and Michele Zatelli)

The words of M., a Sudanese migrant man we met in Ventimiglia, the last Italian town before the French border (Figs. 1.1 and 1.2), capture the story of hundreds of thousands of migrant people who have transited across this place on their way out Italy in recent years. Indeed, since June 2015, France reintroduced border controls with the declared aim of impeding unauthorised migrants from accessing its territory. The effects of this selective closure became especially evident in this small Italian border town located along the route towards France and the rest of Western and Northern Europe (Figs. 1.2 and 1.3). In Ventimiglia, during the period since 2015, more than twenty people have died in the attempt of crossing the border, while an incalculable number of others suffered physical and psychological consequences from the violence of the border regime. At the same time, citizens who have provided shelter, subsistence, and transportation to illegalised foreigners are increasingly being criminalised, and a local industry of illegal smuggling is proliferating. This book originates from our encounter in Ventimiglia, where we— the editors—spent a significant part of our time and energies on the

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Fig. 1.2 The French-Italian border area (Authors: Chiara Molinero and Michele Zatelli)

ground over the last years, not only for research purposes, but also to participate in the struggle against the various local manifestations of the border regime and to advance the right to free movement for all people. Our prolonged stay in the city drove us into the materiality of the border, allowing us to observe how border devices operate in this border area on a day-to-day basis, as well as how migrants attempt to appropriate mobility within increasingly violent border regimes. In this context, we decided to adopt a ‘performative’, ‘participatory’ and ‘political’ approach (Brambilla 2015, p. 28), which places our work at the point of intersection between academic field research and political engagement. Having different subjectivities and cultural backgrounds, our engagement in the Ventimiglia context was characterised by a spontaneous attempt to face the complex—and often contradictory—border context. Conducting research without questioning our positionalities would not have been

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Fig. 1.3 Migrants routes to Ventimiglia (Authors: Chiara Molinero and Michele Zatelli)

possible in a setting marked by such extensive and daily violence. In this sense, our different roles as researchers, and at the same time European citizens, pushed us to move our action beyond and outside of the habitual scope of an investigation. We do not consider academic work as a natural development of political engagement. On the contrary, these pages arise from a reflection on the need and urgency to reconsider our methodological approaches, theoretical frameworks and practices in being, ourselves, part of the border context. Ventimiglia is located on the Ligurian coast just 6 km from the FrenchItalian border (Fig. 1.2). The 20,000 inhabitants strong town, being at the core of an historically porous borderland, displays an important tradition of commerce, custom, and smuggling activities. The 2015 reintroduction of border controls has radically reshaped the social landscape of the place as it had become after Schengen liberalisation of circulation. In fact, migrants arriving in the city via Central Mediterranean and Balkan routes, with the hope of smoothly crossing the border and reaching

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France or other European countries, are often blocked here and forced to temporarily settle in urban spaces of precarious conditions. Coexistence with local inhabitants does not always prove easy, and, in some occasions, tensions have indeed bubbled to the surface. Thus, for many illegalised migrant people Ventimiglia has become a compulsory stop along the route towards France or other European destinations, a bottleneck in the underground network of circulation (Queirolo Palmas and Rahola 2020) where transit slows down and temporarily solidifies into a ‘long-lasting’ present. The border closure firstly triggered strong demonstrations in support of freedom of movement. In spring 2015, at the very beginning of the ‘Long Summer of Migration’, a group of African migrants organised a protest at the border post of Ponte San Ludovico, which developed into a worldwide famous encampment and inaugurated a new phase of the local history. The brave people on the rocks proximate to the borderline reclaimed the ‘freedom to pass the border’, as appeared on a banner in writing. Viewed on a larger scale, this event took place at the onset of the so-called migration crisis which, according to the epistemological scheme of the autonomy of migration approach, we have chosen to interpret rather as the crisis of the European border regime. Since then, solidarity practices, as well as clandestine border-crossings and police pushbacks, have never stopped. The area surrounding Ventimiglia has been militarised by the activation of constant checkpoints and control devices, including the use of drones to intercept migrant people transiting to France. Ongoing events at Ventimiglia illustrate, on the one hand, the complexity of the overlaying border regime (Queirolo Palmas and Rahola 2018) and, on the other hand, its site-specific spatial and material outcomes (Garelli and Tazzioli 2016). Indeed, like every other border, Ventimiglia reproduces global historical conditions and, at the same time, co-constitutes, invents, and produces the global border regime. Using Cuttitta’s words (2012, p. 14), Ventimiglia has “everything that makes a ‘place’ a ‘borderland’”. Indeed, beyond its geopolitical position (on the line between different States), the town is characterised by infrastructures, devices, and procedures of control linked to the securitisation of borders and the management of mobility. Among these, the most significant are military-humanitarian dispositifs like the Red Cross Camp (Fig. 1.1), which work in parallel with police clearance operations of informal camps; deportations of migrant people to Southern Italian

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reception centres in order to ‘decompress’ the border town (so-called decompression strategy); the criminalisation of solidarity networks and the associated expulsion of a large number of activists through preventive measures provided for by Italian law (expulsion orders called fogli di via). The border dimension of Ventimiglia is also visible in its intense social, cultural, and political dimension on the international stage. In effect, the border town not only attracts migrants but also NGO operators, activists and solidarity movements, researchers and journalists from all around the world. Furthermore, taking a closer look at the urban level, micro-geographies of migrants emerge inside the city. The border regime activates a process of exclusion and differential inclusion of people (migrants and non-migrants) and produces differentiated forms of access and ‘rights’. The difference—in terms of status, places of arrival, age, class, gender, ‘skin colours’—is dislocated in space. Each space acts a norm, an order, to which the body must conform and, of course, against which it could transgress. The case of Ventimiglia reveals how the ‘migration crisis’ is not so much related to the quantitative increase of migrants in and of itself, as to the ‘EU politics of the crisis ’ (De Genova et al. 2016). The French reintroduction of border controls along the national border with Italy in the area of Ventimiglia must be gauged within this wider European context of ‘crisis’ triggered by the Long Summer of Migration. Indeed, it is not only France but also other Member States (Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway) have decided to selectively close their national borders as a response to the challenge represented by the force of migration within the Schengen Area. Yet, considering the overall volume of human mobility between Italy and France as well as among other European States, and wider still in a global perspective, it is questionable whether the increase of illegalised migrant arrivals—an extremely small percentage of the total flow—can be considered as capable of triggering an actual crisis. On the one hand, we cannot deny that the postcolonial difference embodied by racialised subjects of migration represents an element of concern, fear and hostility within European societies, and, to a certain extent, States are forced to respond to it. On the other hand, when reversing the perspective, it is worth noting that institutional policies themselves also play an active role in the production of insecurity at the societal level by treating social dynamics as security issues (Huysmans 2006). It appears as though the EU and national States’ treatment of migrant movements as an element of destabilisation to be securitised

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is a governance tool used strategically by national stakeholders to reinforce the sentiment of fear and intervene productively in the economy of power. Indeed, both EU and national discourses on the migratory emergency have had a very concrete output in terms of shaping new, harsher, forms of mobility control policies. At the European level, the political answer to ‘the crisis’ has been wholly addressed in 2015 via a new communitarian document, the European Agenda on Migration. The Agenda launched in the EU the so-called hotspot approach (Vradis et al. 2019). Through this approach, Italian and Greek authorities, supported by the representatives of the European agencies (EASO, Frontex, Europol), must take migrants’ photo-identification and fingerprints within a maximum of 72 hours from the moment of entry, in specific frontline reception centres also known as ‘hotspots’. Migrants’ identification is crucial within the EU framework because according to the Dublin Regulation, ratified by all EU countries, the first country in which the asylum seeker arrives and is identified is then responsible for examining the asylum application. Although the Dublin Convention clearly places the responsibility for examining asylum applications disproportionately on frontline countries, several EU Member States considered this legal framework insufficient for “protecting” their reception systems from undesired migrants. As Bernt Kasparek notes, the hotspot approach was in fact “a massive vote of ‘no confidence’ concerning the ability and even willingness of these states [Italy and Greece] to conform to the European rules” (2016). The unilateral reintroduction of border controls by some Member States demonstrates that neither the Dublin System nor the hotspot approach were enough to satisfy national States’ aspirations of control over migrants’ movements. If it is true that the effective biometric registration of fingerprints at the moment of arrival in the EU is essential to guarantee the possibility of legally deporting migrants back to the first country of entry (as prescribed by the Dublin Convention), it is also true that such spatial order enforcement mechanisms can be effective only a posteriori, via large and complex procedures. On the contrary, States seek to control secondary mobility a priori, before its realisation, with the aim of exercising their sovereignty in trying to contain migrants’ movements. Once emergency measures—such are the reintroduction of border controls—are adopted, it becomes hard to lift them. Indeed, the aforementioned States have continued to exercise control along their national borders up until the present day. However, as the reader will have the

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chance to appreciate in the course of this book, thanks to the creativity of migrants and their human and non-human allies, borders remain porous (although the dangers of clandestine crossings have increased significantly in several locations). In most cases, the result obtained is one of slowing down secondary movements rather than completely blocking them. But there is another aspect to keep in consideration: the spectacle of border enforcement (De Genova 2002; Brown 2010; Cuttitta 2007, 2012). From the authorities’ perspective, the reintroduction of border controls within the Schengen Area is not seen as a negative measure exclusively taken to the detriment of illegalised migrants. On the contrary, it also performs positive functions; firstly, it reassures public opinion, and secondly, it reproduces hierarchies and stratifications among the labour force in the capitalist world-system, through the creation of an illegalised labour force (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991). Viewed from this standpoint, the Ventimiglia case-study calls into question the European Union (EU) itself by showing its ‘productive dimension’ in terms of material effects (proliferation of borders and other control strategies) and political ones (struggles over mobility between different actors) (De Genova et al. 2016, ibidem). While the hotspot approach (Garelli and Tazzioli 2016; Painter et al. 2017) and the externalisation of control outside Europe (Lemberg-Pedersen 2015; Hess and Kasparek 2017; McMahon and Sigona 2018) have been extensively analysed and criticised in academic literature, less attention has been paid to the parallel measures introduced by some Member States in order to ‘defend’ their national borders from migrants’ movements at the intra-EU level. Our work seeks to fill this gap by viewing the border of Ventimiglia as a “field of struggle” (Tazzioli 2015) or “battlefield” (Mezzadra and Stierl 2019) between bordering practices (Yuval-Davis, Wemyss and Cassidy 2019), on the one hand, and migrants’ autonomy and right to mobility, on the other (Mezzadra 2013). Through a critical border studies perspective, we aim to emphasise two key elements of our work. First, we do not conceptualise the FrenchItalian border as a geographical given but rather as a historical and performative process (Walters 2002; Cassidy et al. 2018) “constructed by law and regulated by force” (Le Espiritu 2017). Second, we consider the role played by migrant people, which proves to be pivotal in co-producing the EU’s migration and border regime. The conflictual dialectic between border reinforcing and border crossing reveals the impossibility of total control over migration and highlights, at the same time, the role of

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migrants as “subjects who find gaps to subvert or resist the migration regime” (Eule et al. 2019, p. 65). As many theoretical perspectives point out (Mezzadra and Neilson 2014; Mezzadra 2013; De Genova 2010), the border is a device working by imposing forms of subjectivisation (Foucault 2002 [1973]) and extracting profit from bodies through exclusion and differential inclusion (Castles and Miller 2003; Mezzadra and Neilson 2014). However, the process of subjectivisation and its implications—as pointed out by Michel Foucault (1982)—is only one part of the game. The other one, in contrast, relies on the role of migrant people with their own ways to elaborate strategies in order to gain access to Europe. This does not mean that migrant people can be automatically considered ‘political subjects’ (in the sense of class recomposition and conflict). However, we would like to adopt an outlook that primarily focuses on the tension between control techniques and mobility practices. To this end, we believe it is key to emphasise the role of migrant subjectivities, with their “subjective practices, desires, expectations, and the behaviours of migrants themselves” (Mezzadra 2010, p. 121). Assuming this approach means evaluating the border as a range of possible case combinations, amid the force of subjectivisation by border devices and the resistance of migrant people. Migrant mobility, although not intended to openly challenge sovereign authority, demonstrates “ways of seeing, knowing, and being” alternatively to the modern geopolitical imaginary of state borders (Mainwaring 2019, p. 17). While border devices attempt to control mobility through a fixed and static idea of space, the diasporic movement of people is based on the kinetic imagination of a space to be crossed thanks to a constellation of voices dislocated across the world. Progressing from these theoretical and methodological coordinates, the book provides an in-depth analysis of how the Ventimiglia border is constantly reshaped as migration policies harden, and what kind of social, political, and economic impacts are produced at the local level. The book adopts a multi-disciplinary approach, including contributions of scholars from History, Geography, Sociology, Political Sciences, Law, and Anthropology, among other fields. Before outlining the contents of each chapter, it is worth informing the reader as to our motivation in organising this volume. We decided to collect contributions around three main topics in order to include as many views as possible in the overall analysis of the Ventimiglia border, accounting for its historical, political, and social complexity. The first section focuses on the historical dimension of the

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border and border-crossings: discovering an archaeology of the conflict— amid border controls and the desires to obtain a new life in Europe—that seems to unpack the struggle as a set of practices that were played by different actors during extended historical periods and for multiple and diverse reasons. There is, in other words, an overlapping and a stratification of practices in both migration control and border-crossings. The themes of subjectivisation and subjectivity, thus, are relevant in observing the past and, at times, in interpreting a legacy that continues to the present day. The second section, then, is dedicated to the analysis of the border infrastructure in the present day. Far from an aseptic description of each device—in particular non-human protagonists, transit camps, police geography, and law—our intention is to focus on the ongoing attempt to recalibrate means of impeding migrant mobility and aim to go ‘beyond’. Finally, the third section aims to highlight the prominent role of social actors on the borderland, namely passeurs , irregular moving subjects, activists, volunteers, and even citizens. By considering this perspective, we wish to bring back our collective attention to a myriad of subjectivities operating at the border and, indeed, to the level of contextual complexity. The three sections are preceded by a foreword written by Sandro Mezzadra (University of Bologna) and followed by a postface of Luca Queirolo Palmas and Federico Rahola (University of Genoa). The first section, Historical reading of Ventimiglia as a border town, includes three chapters. Chapter 2, by Gabriele Proglio, explores illegal border-crossings from the end of the nineteenth century, analysing migrants’ social, economic, and political motivations for leaving their homelands, the evolution of Italian laws aimed at preventing illegal border-crossing, and the typologies of flows and subjects that crossed the border during the studied period. Chapter 3, by Sandro Rinauro, analyses the evolution of French-Italian relations through the lens of media representations of the border from 1860 until the present day, through postcards, documentaries, newsreels, and television broadcasts. Chapter 4, by Marina Marengo, focuses on the dynamics of transalpine mobility in the Maritime Alps, using historical-geographical and geo-literary methods to identify some of the cultural and socio-economic peculiarities of this border region. The second section, Borderland infrastructures, includes three parts. Chapter 5, by Ivan Bonnin, extends the concept of agency to non-humans and thereby explores how the borderland’s infrastructural environment

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decisively influences the struggle for the freedom/control of movement, favouring the edge of migrants over border power. In Chapter 6, Marta Menghi interrogates the ‘moral economy’ of the transit camp for migrants, situated in the outskirts of Ventimiglia and managed by the Italian Red Cross. Finally, if the law and the legal regulations may also be considered as a kind of infrastructure (according to an extended conception of infrastructures), Giacomo Donadio offers in Chapter 7, an in-depth examination of the normative framework behind the reintroduction of internal border controls, focusing on the mismatch between formal readmission proceedings and factual practices of refoulement . The third section, Social actors on the ground, includes four contributions. Chapter 8, by Livio Amigoni, Chiara Molinero, and Cecilia Vergnano, focuses on the smuggling phenomenon in Ventimiglia, with the aim of presenting an alternative viewpoint by focusing on the symbolic and material role of Sudanese passeurs at the border. In Chapter 9, Silvia Aru explores the tensions between migrants’ autonomy element of migration and the inherent violence of the migration system, within a policy framework increasingly hostile towards irregular moving subjects. Chapter 10, by Daniela Trucco, analyses the variety of actions and legitimisation processes of the most important pro-migrant mobilisations and solidarity practices staged in Ventimiglia since the beginning of the ‘Long Summer of Migration’ in 2015. Chapter 11, by Luca Giliberti, examines the social consequences of the militarisation of the Roya Valley, as well as the different actions and reactions of the population of this rural valley. Finally, Chapter 12 differs from the preceding chapters in its narrative and analytical development. By means of a first-person account, Francesco Migliaccio experiments a literary register, with reminiscence from the classic works on the border area of Ventimiglia by Francesco Biamonti, to describe the militarisation process in the Roja Valley, focusing in particular on checkpoints and police behaviour and attitudes. From this very specific perspective emerges a kind of ‘intimate diary’ of the days spent by the author in the area, witnessing the changes of the natural as well as ‘anthropic’ environment.

References Balibar, É., & Wallerstein, I. (1991). Race, Nation and Class. London and New York: Verso.

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Brambilla, C. (2015). Exploring the Critical Potential of the Borderscapes Concept. Geopolitics, 20(1), 14–34. Brown, W. (2010). Walled States, Waning Sovereignty. New York: Zone Books. Cassidy, K., Yuval-Davis, N., & Wemyss, G. (2018). Debordering and Everyday (re) Bordering in and of Dover: Post-borderland Borderscapes. Political Geography, 66, 171–179. Castles, S., & Miller, M. J. (2003) Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Cuttitta, P. (2007). Segnali di confine. Il controllo dell’immigrazione nel mondofrontiera. Milano: Mimesis. Cuttitta, P. (2012). Lo spettacolo del confine. Lampedusa tra produzione e messa in scena della frontiera. Milano: Mimesis. De Genova, N. (2002). Migrant ‘Illegality’ and Deportability in Everyday Life. Annual Review of Anthropology, 31, 419–447. De Genova, N. (2010). Migration and Race in Europe: The Trans-Atlantic Metastases of a Post-Colonial Cancer. European Journal of Social Theory, 13(3), 405–419. De Genova, N., Tazzioli, M., & Álvarez-Velasco, S. (2016). Europe/Crisis: New Keywords of “the Crisis” in and of “Europe”. Near Futures Online, 1, 1–16. Eule, T. G., Borrelli, L. M., Lindberg, A., & Wyss, A. (2019). Migrants Before the Law: Contested Migration Control in Europe. Cham: Springer. Foucault, M. (1982). The Subject and Power. Critical Inquiry, 8(4), 777–795. Foucault, M. (2002 [1973]). The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. London: Routledge. Garelli, G., & Tazzioli, M. (2016). The EU Hotspot Approach at Lampedusa. Open Democracy, 26, 2016. Hess, S., & Kasparek, B. (2017). De- and Restabilising Schengen: The European Border Regime After the Summer of Migration. Cuadernos Europeos de Deusto, 56, 47–77. Huysmans, J. (2006). The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU . London and New York: Routledge. Kasparek, B. (2016). Routes, Corridors, and Spaces of Exception: Governing Migration and Europe. Accessible at: http://nearfuturesonline.org/routes-cor ridors-and-spaces-of-exception-governing-migration-and-europe/. Le Espiritu, Y. (2017). A Critical Refugee Studies Approach to the ‘Refugee Crisis’. Political Power & Social Theory. Accessible at: https://www.political powerandsocialtheory.com/the-refugee-crisis. Lemberg-Pedersen, M. (2015). Losing the Right to Have Rights: EU Externalization of Border Control. In Europe and the Americas (pp. 393–417). Brill Nijhoff. ˙ (2019). At Europe’s Edge: Migration and Crisis in the MediterMainwaring, C. ranean. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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McMahon, S., & Sigona, N. (2018). Navigating the Central Mediterranean in a Time of ‘Crisis’: Disentangling Migration Governance and Migrant Journeys. Sociology, 52(3), 497–514. Mezzadra, S. (2010). The gaze of autonomy: Capitalism, migration and social struggles. In The Contested Politics of Mobility (pp. 141–162). Routledge. Mezzadra, S. (2013). Moltiplicazione dei confini e pratiche di mobilità. Ragion Pratica, 2, 413–432. Mezzadra, S., & Neilson, B. (2014). Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor. Durham: Duke University Press. Mezzadra, S., & Stierl, M. (2019, April 12). The Mediterranean Battlefield of Migration. Open Democracy. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-eur ope-make-it/mediterranean-battlefield-migration/. Painter, J., Papada, E., Papoutsi, A., & Vradis, A. (2017). Hotspot Politics—Or, When the EU State Gets Real. Political Geography, 60, 259–260. Queirolo Palmas, L. Q., & Rahola, F. (2018). Il guinzaglio e lo strappo. Mondi Migranti. Queirolo Palmas, L., & Rahola, F. (2020). Underground Europe. Milano: Meltemi. Tazzioli, M. (2015). Troubling Mobilities: Foucault and the Hold over ‘Unruly’ Movements and Life-Time. In Foucault and the History of Our Present (pp. 159–175). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Vradis, A., Papada, E., Painter, J., & Papoutsi, A. (2019). New Borders: Hotspots and the European Migration Regime. London: Pluto Press. Walters, W. (2002). De-naturalising the Border: The Politics of Schengenland. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 5, 561–580. Yuval-Davis, N., Wemyss, G., & Cassidy, K. (2019). Bordering. Cambridge: Polity Press.

PART I

Historical Reading of Ventimiglia as a Border Town

CHAPTER 2

The Path of Hope. Illegal Border Crossings and Reflections on Historical Subjectivities, Stories and the Archive (1861–2019) Gabriele Proglio

2.1

Introduction

There is a path connecting Italy and France that is approximately 5 kilometres long and less than 1 metre wide. This path runs along a mountain ridge overlooking the vast expanse of the Mediterranean. On the left side of the walkway is a vista of a stunningly beautiful seascape and on the right, the Ligurian hinterland forms a contrasting landscape, as portrayed in “Genova per noi”, a song made famous by the Italian singer, Paolo Conte. This path has featured prominently in danger-fraught national and international migrations over the last half century, giving rise to the name

FCT Fellowship, grant agreement No. SFRH/BPD/124165/2016 (host institution Centre for Social Studies, University of Coimbra). G. Proglio (B) University of Gastronomic Sciences, Pollenzo, Italy © The Author(s) 2021 L. Amigoni et al. (eds.), Debordering Europe, Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56518-3_2

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“Path of death”. However, it was once known as “the path of hope” because thousands of people walked it attempting to cross the ItaloFrench border illegally to get to France and seize the opportunity to live a new and better life. As the scholar Enzo Barnabà has pointed out in his book Il passo della morte (2018), the name of the path was changed after some migrants travelling from North Africa fell off an overhang and died during the crossing. In this paper, adopting a historical perspective on illegal crossings, I discuss the key role of this route during the last century, considering similarities and differences among various typologies of migration and kind of mobilities. In doing so, I draw on several archival sources retrieved from the Italian State Archive of Imperia in Ventimiglia that sheds light on processes of illegal border crossings during the Fascist era. I will examine these documents in conjunction with some films portraying Italian migration in the post-war period. In addition, I will draw on secondary sources, such as newspaper articles, videos or historical works since, according to the Italian law, archival sources cannot be consulted before 70 years from the illegal border crossing. My aim is twofold. First, I will attempt to trace the outlines of a general history of illegal border crossings of this portion of the ItaloFrench frontier from the time of Fascism to the present. Second, my goal is to reflect on the epistemological role of history in narrating this kind of crossing. My focal interest lies in exploring the question of whether history is part of the border device, in the sense that if border controls generate sources—such as police reports—these sources are the base for the historic making process. Accordingly, my goal is to explore whether the device applied in border control—that organises the human geography between Europe—plays a role in the reproduction of a narrative of the past that is centred on the role of power. If history is based, predominantly, on archival sources, it seems not possible to document, write and narrate a history of illegal border crossings. And using oral history methods, scholars can deal with the illegal movements across the border from in the field of memory. In other words, there is a similarity between the border’s work as a device of subjunctivisation of migrant people and history as a discipline with is proper epistemology. In consequence of this, the impossibility, unwillingness, and deliberate design decision of making an history of illegal border crossing signs a threshold in the canonised representation of the past as a knowable field of investigation. If the past is knowable through a codified language (history) and working on storage

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power devices (archives), stories of illegal border crossings are confined to the shade. Natalie Zamon Davis, in her Fiction and Archive (1987), focuses on lettres de rémissions , namely letters sent by people accused of murders to the king asking clemency. Zamon Davis focuses on the narrative ways adopted by prisoners to explain—in a convincing and plausible manner—their innocence. Zamon Davis connects these requests for grace and literary creations. Her work is based on the relationship between people accused of a crime and the power which is impersonated by the king. Taking into account this important suggestion, does the production of knowledge (archival sources and literary creation) become visible only when connected, in dialogue or related to the power? This question seems to be central in removing from the shadow produced by the European history many stories of illegal crossings, as well as labour exploitation and racial discrimination. In other words, the European privilege of the so-called knowledge is based on a systemic practice of hiding, making invisible, forgetting some bodies and silencing some voices. In the first part of the chapter, I will outline the methodology that I applied to explore this question. I used a cultural-historical method— using archival sources and cultural productions—in conjunction with a “global gaze” on migration flows and border crossings, which means to pay attention with a diachronic perspective to illegal border crossings. The second section explores how illegal migration has changed over time, beginning with the Fascist era and ending in the present. In this section, I identify the different typologies developed to categorise migrants, tracing their evolution and highlighting continuities and changes. I will contextualise this outline of the evolution of illegal border crossings at the national, European, and global scales, providing some concluding remarks about the relationship between subjectivities, stories, and the archive in the history-making process.

2.2

Methodological Approach

My intention is to examine mobility from a qualitative perspective. Other books and articles have presented quantitative data on internal migration from southern Italy (Boero 1967; Ferro 1958, 1973). From the onset of the nation-building project—and possibly even before that time—the Italo-French border was of critical significance first for reaching France and second for extending the gaze to central Europe. Paolo Veziano (2014) discussed the migration of Jews during Fascism and World War

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II, drawing on archival sources, including documentation on lawsuits brought against individuals accused of migrating illegally. A seminal essay by Matteo Sanfilippo (2014) on sources accessed from the Ventimiglia section of the Italian State Archive of Imperia provides valuable inputs for the study of different kinds of working migration from Italy to France. Another valuable resource is a volume containing a number of essays on migrations for working issues from Piedmont and Liguria to France from the end of the twentieth century to the years of Fascism on Italians in France edited by Paola Corti and Ralph Schor (1995). Other works have focused on the other side of the Italo-French frontier. For example, Laurent Dornel (2003) analysed an identity game of migrant people, focusing on the recognition of the self and Other on the Azure Coast. Applying a different perspective, a special issue of Migrations Sociéte, edited by Yvan Gastaut (2012), focused on Italian people of the borderland, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Many other scholars have written about present-day transit of migrants from Africa and the Middle East across the border area of Ventimiglia. Some works have focused on the Schengen system, such as that of Emanuela Pistoia (2018), pointing out changes and strategies connected to the border device. Others have explored different topics, such as the impacts of the Arab Uprisings on migration flows towards Italy (Zupi 2012). Ivan Bonnin (2017) investigated the unfolding of the relationship between tourism and border devices since the summer of 2015, after the closure of the French border. Salvatore Palidda and Francesca Martini (2018) analysed continuities and discontinuities in migration flows between Italy and France. Simoneta TombacciniVillefranque studied the illegal migrations in the Val Roya, from 1920 to 1940 (1999). Many works argued on irregular migrations across the ItaloFrench border (Colucci 2008; Rinauro 2009a, b, 2012; De Clementi 2010; Morandi 2011). As I have noted above, the goal of the present contribution is to provide a general overview on the mobility control, viewed specifically as an assemblage of border devices composed as historical stratifications. By “historical stratification”, I mean the heritage of practices and methods for controlling migration flows. It is possible to observe how a certain mode of knowledge used in the governance of mobility during a specific historical moment—for instance during the Fascist era—and against particular subjects (Jews, partisans, anarchists, socialists, border-crossing facilitators, passeurs, contrabandists, etc.) was redeployed during subsequent periods

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and against other subjects. In other words, it is possible to study the border as a historical object with its continuities and changes in the longue durée, as proposed by Fernand Braudel and Sarah Matthews (1982) and with its proper memory—exactly as an archive which includes, among other things, practices, narratives, representations, but also behaviours, rules, knowledge and emotions (Wekker 2016); as an archive with its proper internal organisation (Stoler 2008). In his important essay that marked a turning point in the discipline of history, Braudel and Matthews (1982) proposed a historiographic approach within the Annales school, entailing a reading of history as a social affair relating to various individuals with multiple temporalities that unfolds within a particular time span. His approach privileges economic and social history over political history. In his discussion of the structure of this new historical approach, he clarified that it was a construct: Some structures, because of their long life, become stable elements for an infinite number of generations: they get in the way of history, hinder its flow, and in hindering it [they] shape it. Others wear themselves out more quickly. But all of them provide both support and hindrance. As hindrances they stand as limits (“envelopes,” in the mathematical sense) beyond which man and his experiences cannot go. (Braudel & Matthews 1982, 29)

Some aspects of this approach, such as the idea of social structures, are of particular interest. However, an important question remains to be addressed. Is it possible to write a history of those subjects who are moving or moved between the folds of the present? Being “between the folds of the present” refers to the state of being invisible in relation to— or it is better to say that they are invisibilised from—power structures and devices, such as the police, courts, and institutions in general; or, conversely, to individuals becoming visible only because of their illegal actions and breaking of the rules. It refers, additionally, to the symbolic and metadiscoursive role of hidden, invisibilised and silenced stories in the present in shading light on other similar stories in the past. From a methodological perspective, there are two main ways to make a history of illegal crossings: the first is one proper of the (subject in the) archive, and the second focuses on representations of these subjects. In both cases, history, including the use of a critical approach, is based on institutional data, facts, and sources: it is based on a process in which many structures of power (police, courts and tribunals, institutions) are

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at work, producing records in the archives as outputs. In both cases, the subject of these stories became visible for history in consequence of his/her illegal actions. Accordingly, the subject is reduced to his/her crime story in the archives. Similarly, the treatment meted out to prisoners accords with the crimes they have committed and the penalties imposed. As pointed out by Michel Foucault, there is a close relationship between power and production of historical knowledge in European societies in terms of discursive formations, objects, concepts and enunciative modalities (1969). In addition, as observed by Gayatri Chakravory Spivak (1999), many individuals remain external to the history-making process; through an act of forclusion, they are rendered invisible individually or as part of a group or category of national belonging (Moroccan, Tunisian, Afghan, etc.) or citizenship (illegal, refugee, asylum seeker, etc.). In the famous essay Can the Subaltern Speak?, Spivak introduces the concept of epistemic violence with these words: The clearest available example of such epistemic violence is the remotely orchestrated, far-flung, and heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial subject as Other. This project is also asymmetrical obliteration of the trace that Other in its precarious Subjectivity. It is well known that Foucault locates epistemic violence, a complete overhaul of the episteme, in the redefinition of sanity at the end of the European eighteenth century. But what if that particular redefinition was only a part of the narrative of history in Europe as well as in the colonies? What if the two projects of epistemic overhaul worked as dislocated and unacknowledged parts of a vast two-handed engine? (Spivak 1988, pp. 24–25)

Therefore, the main question to be addressed is whether it is possible to forge history with—and not for—subjects outside of the “institutional nomenclature” by deploying the same documents produced by powerful institutions to formulate definitions relating to the law and jurisdiction of an authority/institution. “Institutional nomenclature” refers to what Michel Foucault described as the l’orde du discours (language of power) produced by an institution. Different terms can be deployed for talking about people who are in this condition. One such term is subaltern that entails a lexicon and a genealogy of meanings derived from a Gramscian vocabulary and adopted by all of the scholars within the Subaltern Studies group, among others. In all cases, certain questions arise: if history is to be made through the archives, what remains

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outside the history-making process? This “what” comprises individuals, groups, facts, and interpretations. From an archival and historical perspective, there are two main “historical objects” to be interrogated: silence and absence. Both of these objects can be investigated outside of the regime of what is true or false, right or wrong. This approach has two different sub-approaches. First, attention should focus primarily on what is not written in archives. This requires a shift from sources to those rules that have produced a record in the archive and towards a focus on investigating their inter-relationships. Second, there are stories that are excluded from the history-making process. Consequently, an understanding of the role of these stories confined to the darkness and shadows in relation to history and its contours becomes pertinent. In other words, if history has a specific geometry and architecture that relates to an organisation in space (the writing, source, and archive), and in relation to time, the question to be answered is what shapes can undocumented stories take? A large debate on epistemic violence has arisen in the last 20 years. In this context about the testimonial, Fricker and Dotson argued on the prejudice used (also in history) to discredit the Other (Fricker 2013) and, on the contrary, on the speaker’s opportunity (as well as the scholar) to engage a successful linguistic exchange finding reciprocity in his/her audience (Dotson 2011). In addition to that, epistemic violence can provoke “ignorance produced by the construction of epistemically disadvantaged identities” (Dotson 2011, p. 243). Fricker problematised the role of epistemic violence from the point of view of a lack of intellectual courage (2013). Patricia Hill Collins, on her hand, argued that epistemic violence impacted negatively on the scientific debate (Dotson 2011).

2.3

Stories of Border Crossings

The State Archive in Ventimiglia is located close to the Hobbit Bar, which is an important resource for migrants where they can avail of assistance provided by Delia, the owner, and by many other volunteers and activists. This proximity is both intriguing and fascinating. Similarly, different stories of migration unfold not far from the railway station. They are not connected to each other and appear to relate to different temporalities and to be stored over time. While conducting archival research, I began to reflect on this strange proximity. I experienced the same feeling when I met individuals from different countries and asked them to explain their journeys and compulsions to cross borders in order to reach their

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destinations. Despite their evident differences, I perceived connections between these stories stemming from the role and functions of the border. I was struck by the astonishment expressed by archivists. The main question at the centre of our dialogue was: “Why are you trying to compare the past and present and to bring them into dialogue?” The conversation subsequently shifted to what sources could be used to investigate the Fascist period. After a discussion with archivists, whose help and valuable suggestions I am deeply grateful for, I began to examine papers and documents stored in large ring binder files pertaining to criminal proceedings initiated with regard to illegal migration. Many stories resurfaced from oblivion, such as one recounting charges made against a group of Italian smugglers known as passeurs, who were accused of trying to lead many people across the frontier. The first source for this story is dated 18 February 1922. Albertini Giuseppe, a passeur, was born in Ventimiglia on 15 January 1896 and was 26 years old at the time of his arrest. He was accused of contravening Article 68 of the law on migration because he brought two individuals to France.1 Bromio Mario was born in Casseria (Genoa) on 8 September 1904. He was arrested in Olivetta San Michele, which is in the Ligurian countryside, on 30 August 1921 by the Carabineri (Italian police) while attempting to cross the frontier without permission.2 Tassitro Luigi, who was born in Ventimiglia on 26 December 1901, was implicated as a passeur by Albertini and charged with contravening Article 68.3 Similarly, Perra Salvatore, born in Cagliari on 8 February 1883, and Occurri Domenico, born in Verbicano (Cosenza) on 15 December 1869, were arrested for violating the same article by aiding and abetting the illegal migration of Carrari Vittorio and Vittorio Bernardini from Bei Ciolti, a hamlet in the vicinity of the town of Ventimiglia. On the police charge sheet, Occurri was categorised as a habitual criminal and was arrested on 23 February 1922.4 By adopting a wider lens, it becomes possible to observe some common traits in the papers associated with this judgement. First, Article 68 of Law no. 2205 that was approved on 13 November 1919 was applied to punish the

1 ACS-Imperia, sezione Ventimiglia, Prefettura, Reg. Gen. N. 15, Sentenza 2 ACS-Imperia, sezione Ventimiglia, Prefettura, Reg. Gen., Sentenza n. 27, 3 ACS-Imperia, sezione Ventimiglia, Prefettura, Reg. Gen., Sentenza n. 40, 4 ACS-Imperia, sezione Ventimiglia, Prefettura, Reg. Gen., Sentenza n. 42,

n. 10. anno 1922. anno 1922. anno 1922.

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passeurs. Second, the individuals accused of being smugglers were all Italians. Some of them were young and were natives of Ventimiglia or the surrounding towns while others were from southern Italy and were most probably immigrants themselves. It is possible now to focus our attention on the process of illegal migration through a reading of some of the judgements, such as that pronounced against Lorenzi Roberto, born on 16 November 1883 in Ventimiglia, and another against Orsi Luigi, born on 12 February 1863 in Bormida (a town near Savona) and living in Ventimiglia. Both of these individuals were charged with abetting illegal migration (Article 68) and for trying to bring Lingalone Pasquale into France. In the first case, Lorenzi, was the person who directly led Lingalone into France, and in the second, Orsi was responsible for arranging the monetary agreement. A reading of the judgment’s device enables other important information to be gleaned: On May 20, Lingalone Pasquale comes from his town to Ventimiglia in order to reach France in search of work. The day before, he went to Osteria Lebri and expressed his intention to go to France. Luigi Roberto promised to find him a guide. In fact, he took him to the other accused, Orri Luigi, who offered to help him cross the border upon payment of 110 lire. Lingalone provided 10 lire in advance and [an additional] 50 [lire] when Orri requested more money. At this point they left Ventimiglia. They walked for about an hour, after which Orri, claiming to have crossed the border, left Lingalone alone. Lingalone travelled on the same route and found himself in an Italian town. The day before, he crossed the border [and entered] France.5

Considering all of the above information, it can be surmised that an illegal but stable system existed for individuals attempting to reach France without permission; a system, entailing diverse protagonists with different roles that was rooted in social contexts and public spaces. One example was the Osteria Lebri system in which deceptive strategies were deployed to elicit advance payments from individuals who wanted to cross the frontier. The authorities used a specific tactic, the foglio di via (warrant paper), produced and dispensed by the police and judges in order to remove 5 ACS-Imperia, sezione Ventimiglia, Prefettura, Reg. Gen. N. 129, Sentenza n. 112, anno 1922.

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from the frontier individuals who had committed a crime or were considered dangerous. Traces of this device have been evident since the very beginning of the Fascist period. For instance, Iunghino Orlando was arrested on 7 January 1922 for violating the restriction that banned him from being in Ventimiglia and the borderland. During the same year, many individuals, for example, Belli Sante,6 Brumi Antonio,7 Nuvolari Francesco,8 Perra Salvatore,9 Di Luca Raffaele10 and Rossi Erminio were sentenced for violating this restriction,11 with the punishment for this category of crime varying from three to five days of imprisonment. The following broad conclusions emerge from a reading of these sources. First, at the onset of the Fascist era, the legal device that was deployed to control illegal migration was the same one that was elaborated during the liberal era, namely Law no. 2205 that was approved on 13 November 1919. Of particular salience is Article 68 of this law. Second, passeurs were generally based in Ventimiglia, or in the borderland region, but many of them were originally from other Italian regions. Third, the police and judges deployed a number of devices to control Italy’s frontier with France, some of which were laws while others, such as foglio di via, were public security measures. Last, the migration flow comprised people from both northern and southern Italy. However, in this section, my intention is not to determine the reasons for the border crossings or the composition of the migration flows. Rather, it is to focus on changes and transformations in the devices deployed to control the borders, a notable example of which was the transformation and replacement of the legal device comprising Law no. 2205 by Law no. 437 enacted by the Fascist regime on 17 April 1925.

6 ACS-Imperia, sezione Ventimiglia, Prefettura, Reg. Gen. N. 2, Sentenza n. 2, anno 1922. 7 ACS-Imperia, sezione Ventimiglia, Prefettura, Reg. Gen. N. 3, Sentenza n. 3, anno 1922. 8 ACS-Imperia, sezione Ventimiglia, Prefettura, Reg. Gen. N. 108, Sentenza n. 124, anno 1922. 9 ACS-Imperia, sezione Ventimiglia, Prefettura, Reg. Gen. N.88, Sentenza n. 99, anno 1922. 10 ACS-Imperia, sezione Ventimiglia, Prefettura, Reg. Gen. N. 257, Sentenza n. 214, anno 1922. 11 ACS-Imperia, sezione Ventimiglia, Prefettura, Reg. Gen. N. 237, Sentenza n. 196, anno 1922.

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Before proceeding further, it is pertinent to note that various categories of people were under surveillance by the border control police. Political and social events in Europe were instrumental in providing the Italian police and other institutions with the profiles of potentially dangerous subjects. Commencing from the end of the nineteenth century, anarchists were the prime suspects implicated in a long list of attacks and bombings against the heads of European monarchies. Gypsies were another targeted migrant category. Gypsy culture has been intrinsically associated with mobility by European institutions, and thefts in which non-gypsies were the victims prompted conflicts with residents of the places where they stayed (Barbagli 1998). During the period of liberal rule, these and other “foreign” subjects were vulnerable to expulsions from the national territory for legal reasons, such as convictions or their categorisation as social threats. Prior to the outbreak of World War I for Italy, in 1915, the foreigner registry office was created with the objective of surveilling migrant people in Italy (Capogreco 2004). At the beginning of the 1920s, migrant communities expanded, accounting for 138,000 people. In 1926, the Fascist regime introduced Testo Unico Leggi di Pubblica Sicurezza (TULPS),12 entailing the creation of local offices commissioned to handle subversives and migrants. Then in 1929, the Ufficio Centrale per la Registrazione degli Stranieri (Central Office for the Registration of Foreigners) was assigned the task of compiling statistics on migrants (Pastore 1998). In 1931, a new law on public security was introduced in Italy,13 according to which a foreign person had to declare his/her stay in the country within 72 hours of crossing the border. The same scheme elaborated in Law no. 2205 was applied, disallowing the entry of individuals categorised as subversives and lacking economic possibilities. The structure of this law remained unchanged up to 1986. During the period of the war with Ethiopia (1935–1936), border control was heightened because of Italy’s isolation internationally and as a consequence of sanctions imposed by the League of Nations. From this moment onwards, the border police controlled those subjects who were considered enemies for various reasons, notably their race (Jews, in

12 Public Security Law; my translation. 13 RD 18 giugno 1931, n. 773, Testo unico delle leggi di pubblica sicurezza, in

Gazzetta Ufficiale, n. 146, 26 giugno 1931.

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particular, but also Gipsies), nationality (French, Russian or British) or their relationships with the Italian people (i.e. those individuals who were deemed spies or political enemies). In other words, there were two main periods that are of interest in this study; the first was pre-1931 and the second was post-1935. In Ombre al confine (Shadows on the Border), Veziano (2014) analysed the illegal migration of Jews across the Italo-French border in Ventimiglia between 1938 and 1940. In the epilogue, there is a description of Italians walking on the Path of Hope and crossing the frontier, seeking jobs in France and Belgium. This situation arose as a result of the wartime destruction of the Italian economy as well as agreements signed between Italy and other European countries (such as Belgium) concerning the labour force for raw materials, such as steel, iron, and coal. In a famous film, Il cammino della speranza (The path of hope), film-maker Pietro Germi (1950) narrated the story of an Italian family from Sicily who decided to migrate illegally to France after that the father became unemployed (Germi 1950). In a 1958 French-Italian film La legge è legge (Law is Law), directed by Christian-Jaque, Giuseppe La Paglia (Totò)—Neapolitan smuggler Fernand Pastorelli (Fernandel)—and French customs officer Fernand Pastorelli (Fernandel) are the main actors of a comedy based on smuggling (objects and people) and border control. The film takes place in the invented village of Assola, which is, in reality, Briga Marittina, a small town in the Val Roya which was passed on to France after 1947. The 1980s and 1990s marked a peak period of illegal migration of Italian subjects who were involved in the political protests and armed movements to France. The Mitterand doctrine, a policy introduced in France in 1985 declaring that far-left Italian militants who had been involved in the “Year of Lead” would not be extradited to Italy, prompted a considerable outflow of communists from every part of Italy to France. The Path of Hope was also traversed by others following a different trajectory. In the timeline of migrant flows from former communist countries to Europe, two key years are foregrounded: 1989, when the Berlin Wall came down and 1991, which marked the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Once again, Ventimiglia was foregrounded as an internal European border that separated Italy from France and a shared imaginary of freedom and peace. During that period, many Albanians, Romanians, and Bulgarians arrived in the Italian city closest to the border with France. According to some oral histories, they lived under bridges in the

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same places that were and are occupied by contemporary migrant people (Proglio 2020; Barnabà 2018). Coincidentally, from 1995 to 1998, many Kurds arrived in Ventimiglia following two assaults by Turkey on PKK groups based in the Qandil Mountains. Their arrival in Ventimiglia was described in the media as an emergenza; an Italian term that means “crisis”,14 thus conveying a situation deemed to be out of control. The first contemporary “crisis” occurred in 2011 following the Arab Uprising in Tunisia. After crossing the Mediterranean to reach Lampedusa, many Tunisians made the decision to travel onwards to the ItaloFrench frontier in order to get to France. On that occasion, the French police turned thousands of migrants back. More than 1200 Tunisians congregated in Ventimiglia over a period of several days of this stalemate, and a camp was set up in the “Ex Parco merci” (the railway goods depot) by the national railway company to accommodate them. Following some weeks of the diplomatic wrangle that ensued between Rome and Paris, Silvio Berlusconi, the Premier at the time, decided to grant citizenship to those people seeking to reach France. Thus, the Schengen agreement suspension by France was obviated by an act that opened the doors of Europe to all of these people. Finally, in 2014, a protest erupted when France decided to resume police patrols on the two frontiers.15 Similar to what had happened three years earlier to Tunisian migrants, many Sudanese people who were trying to cross the border were stopped in Italy. Close to the frontier, a group of people—both migrants and activists—protested against the unfair decision to push back thousands of people. A group of demonstrators who organised a permanent sit-in at the border decided to create the “Ventimiglia no-border camp”. During the time that the camp remained in place from 13 June to 30 September 2015, several hundred people reached France thanks to independently organised illegal border crossings. According to recent statistics released by Oxfam, Asgi and Diaconia Valdese, the situation of migrant people in Ventimiglia is and continues 14 In a video broadcast in the media, a camp for refugees or displaced people equipped by the Red Cross in Ventimiglia can be seen: https://vimeo.com/195510419. 15 France reintroduced border controls after the terrorist attack in Paris from 14 December 2015 to 26 May 2016, for the Euro 2016 and Tour de France events (27 May–26 July 2016), and after the terrorist attack in Nice (27 January 2017–31 October 2017).

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to be difficult. The majority of migrants are from Sudan and Eritrea; countries that have been devastated by domestic turmoil (an internal civil war in the first case and a dictatorship in the second). Unaccompanied minors account for 25% of these migrants.16 According to Asgi’s estimation,17 their proportions by nationality are Eritrean: 34%, Sudanese: 30%, Ethiopian: 11%, Libyan: 6%, and Somalian: 5%. Between 1% and 2% of migrants are from Palestine, Chad, Afghanistan, Cameron, Morocco, Iran, Tunisia, Egypt and Mali, respectively.

2.4

Stories, Subjectivities and the Archive

At this point, an examination of some of the continuities in border control processes is pertinent. Since the onset of the Italian nation-building project, Ventimiglia has constituted an important “gate” for people from southern Italy, the Balkans, former communist republics, North Africa and the Middle East, completing their migration route to Europe. France has served as a portal for entry into other countries, such as Belgium for Italians in the immediate post-World War II period or Germany for Afghans escaping from the repressive Taliban regime. Ventimiglia is both an internal European border and a gateway for transnational migration from the Global South, to borrow a term denoting a decolonising concept introduced by Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2014). In this sense, “Global South” does not simply denote a geographical position in relation to Europe; it is also a condition—from an intersectional point of view—for those trying to move from a condition of poverty and an absence of rights to another supposedly better situation in Europe. Hence, mobility has to do both with the journey and the social conditions. This is a common theme in all of the stories portrayed in this article commencing from the Fascist era and continuing to the present. A consideration of the work of the border device reveals that police controls are based on two different typologies of norms: laws on migration ranging from Law no. 2205/1919 to recent security acts passed in 2018 and 2019 on the one hand and a genealogy of those subjects who are considered unwelcome (anarchists, communists, partisans and 16 Oxfam briefing paper, June 2018; see https://www-cdn.oxfam.org/s3fs-public/file_a ttachments/bp-nowhere-but-out-refugees-migrants-ventimiglia-150618-it.pdf. 17 See https://www.asgi.it/famiglia-minori/se-questa-e-europa-minori-stranieri-respintidalla-francia-allitalia/ (Access to the webpage: June 18, 2020).

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migrants, but also passeurs, smugglers, gunrunners, etc.) on the other hand. Applied in conjunction, these two parts serve to control, identify and categorise each body attempting to cross the border, with its mobility expressing its positionality within society. At this point, individuals are assigned a subjectivity through the border device that constitutes a sort of “second skin”, rendering them visible or invisible to society and establishing a clear positionality of individuals and groups in relation to society that is based on differential inclusion or expulsion. This process was evident in many of the cases discussed in the article, although the authorities’ decisions differed. There is another fundamental question raised in this essay that concerns the role of stories of illegal migration in the making of history. The sources analysed in the context of the Fascist period provide information about the people who did not make history; who were blocked by police and charged with illegal migration. However, many other people did manage to get to France. This typology of story, which is common to people from different nations and across multiple temporalities, can be investigated through the compilation of oral histories that invoke, for example, personal and collective memories of the journey. Another possibility entails scrutinising public registers in Europe that reveal the citizenship status of subjects. Adopting this research path, the historian is able to trace the stories of those subjects who acquired citizenship or another status (such as refugees or asylum seekers). It is not, however, possible to study the period during which they were considered illegal people. In other words, the history-making process is closely aligned with scientific sources; their legitimacy is derived from expressions of power and institutions within the archives. Some theoretical approaches in oral history focus on history making from below while others centre on the role of intersubjectivity in producing a source that is generated through exchanges between at least two people. In the case of oral history, the source is an evoked memory that is elaborated on during the interview. After compiling oral interviews, the historian will use sources found in the archives or, alternatively, will draw on a portion of historiography, which is an accepted group of texts written by the scientific community, to measure the distance between history and memory, between what emerges from sources and what is part of a personal or collective remembering. History thus remains a central point of reference even if one of the main aims of oral history is to accord significance to other stories.

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The question, then, is not only and primarily whether the subaltern can speak (Spivak 1988), but what is the role of history starting from its epistemological status. A historian can study various forms of illegal acts, such as that of crossing borders without permission through the institutional production of knowledge, namely the archive. Under this gaze, history is always written as a text in relation to a power, both as descriptions of all of its dimensions (laws, political and social organisations, etc.) and as attempts to break, infringe, and violate its rules. This does not mean that history serves directly and consequently as a tool for strengthening the position of those subjects who enjoy a hegemonic position. The historian is aware that each history is produced within epistemological boundaries and can focus his or her attention not on what contradicts the source but what lies over the range of action of history conceived as a border device. A conception of history as a border device conveys the ability of history to recognise, classify, and assign a subjectivity to each body. This does not mean that beyond the border of evidence—the source and archive—there are stories that barely become history. The border between story and history is marked by epistemic violence. In this sense, the idea of autonomy of migration—as pointed out in the introduction of this volume—has relevant reverberation in the history-making process, and more generally, in the production of knowledge. Those who attempt to escape from the archiving process, described above, which is usually implemented by the bureaucracy, are not necessarily opposing the institution or power more generally. Reflecting on all of the cases considered in this article, it appears that in terms of the archival categories, only anarchists and partisans can be considered as opposing forces. The majority of people crossing the border are first and foremost searching for freedom and for new possibilities in France. In other words, they become enemies because they have transgressed a rule. Their subjectivities reveal other geographies of the world which conflict with the official and recognised one by laws, archives and structures of discipline with their production of knowledge. Studying their subjectivities in the folds of archives—and outside archives, in the field of memory—can problematise a unique vision of Europe. Epistemic violence works on bodies, and thus forbids some stories to become history. If history is mainly based on archival sources, then the methodology of conducting oral histories mobilises a field of knowledge that encompasses myths and imaginaries, silences and things unspoken, and emotions and

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desires. Thus, this approach opens up the possibility of a historical investigation of a set of topics that are not foregrounded in the archive. These topics are at the heart of the migration process and can be expressed through other media, such as novels, art and speech. Illegal migration from the time of Fascism to the present constitutes a liminal topic—because history can argue and supply interpretations on people stopped at the frontier, not on those subjects able to reach France illegally—that highlights a notion of history as a language that is textually framed according to specific rules. As discussed in this article, to “reverse the historical gaze” means to scrutinise stories confined to the darkness and the shadows. If history is used in support of national and populist tales, these stories—born in the folds of the archives—can illuminate the presence of stereotypes, enabling the deconstruction of categories and revealing a complex past wherein different subjects and subjectivities living in different temporalities undergo a similar experience. This new and unexpected “geography of history” entails a transnational approach in which the border is deployed—from push backs to production of knowledge—as a process that discloses differences, continuities and synchronisms among many subjects and places. Stories outside histories show forms of resistance and strategies to crossover the border as device in producing knowledge.

References Barbagli, M. (1998). Immigrazione e criminalità in Italia. Bologna: Il Mulino. Barnabà, E. (2018). Il passo della morte. Storie e immagini di passaggio lungo la frontiera tra Italia e Francia. Modena: Infinito. Boero, G. (1967). L’assistenza sociale e il fenomeno della ‘migrazione interna’ interessante Ventimiglia e comuni vicini. Rassegna Di Servizi Sociali, VIII (1), 3–13. Bonnin, I. (2017). Ventimiglia, città di frontiera: perturbazione migratoria del turismo e dispositive di potere confinario. Futuribili – Rivista Di Studi Sul Future E Di Previsione Sociale, XXII (2), 129–143. Braudel, F., & Matthews, S. (1982). On History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Capogreco, C. S. (2004). I campi del Duce. L’internamento civile nell’Italia fascista. Torino: Einaudi. Corti, P., & Schor, R. (Eds.). (1995). L’esodo frontaliero: gli italiani nella Francia meridionale (Côte d’Azur et contrées limitrophes, vol. 132). Recherches Régionales.

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Colucci, M. (2008). Lavoro in movimento. L’emigrazione italiana in Europa, 1945–57 . Roma: Donzelli. De Clementi, A. (2010). Il prezzo della ricostruzione L’emigrazione italiana nel secondo dopoguerra. Roma-Bari: Laterza. Dornel, L. (2003). La frontière (le voisin) et l’étranger. Les enjeux identitaires d’un conflit frontalier. Revue d’Histoire du XIXe siècle, 24(1), 111–124. Dotson, K. (2011). Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing. Hypatia, 26(2), 236–257. Ferro, G. (1958). L’immigrazione calabrese nelle valli occidentali della Liguria. Quaderni Di Geografia Umana Per La Sicilia E La Calabria, 3, 137–152. Ferro, G. (1973). Movimenti di popolazione nella regione ligure (1951–1971). Genova: Agis. Fricker, M. (2013). Epistemic Justice as a Condition of Political Freedom? Synthese, 190(7), 1317–1332. Foucault, M. (1969). L’archeologie du savoir. Paris: Gallimard. Foucault, M. (2008). Le gouvernement de soi et des autres. Paris: Seuil/Gallimard. Gastaut, Y. (2012). Terres et gens de frontière: le cas exemplaire des migrations dans l’espace frontalier des Alpes du Sud, XIXe et XXe siècle. Migrations Sociéte, 140, 51–298. Palidda, S., & Martini, F. (2018). Continuità e mutamenti delle migrazioni nel confine tra l’Italia e la Francia. Altreitalie, 56, 117–129. Morandi, E. (2011). Governare l’emigrazione. Lavoratori italiani verso la Germania nel secondo dopoguerra. Torino: Rosenberg & Sellier. Pistoia, E. (2018). Il muro invisibile ma impervio di Ventimiglia. Federalism, 3, 1–16. Pastore F. (1998). Migrazioni internazionali e ordinamento giuridico. In L. Violante (Ed.), Legge Diritto Giustizia, Storia d’Italia. Torino: Einaudi. Proglio, G. (2020). Bucare il confine. Storie dalla frontiera di Ventimiglia. Milano: Mondadori. Rinauro, S. (2009a). Il cammino della speranza. L’emigrazione clandestina degli italiani nel secondo dopoguerra. Torino: Einaudi. Rinauro, S. (2009b). La frontière irrésistible: l’immigration irrégulière des Italiens en France après la Deuxième Guerre mondiale. Migrations Société, 141–142, 13–25. Rinauro, S. (2012). La frontière irrésistible: l’immigration irrégulière des Italiens en France après la Deuxième Guerre mondiale. Migrations Société, 141–142, 13–25. Sanfilippo, M. (2014). Studiare il frontalierato nell’archivio di Stato di Imperia, sezione Ventimiglia (Asei – Archivio dell’emigrazione italiana, No. 10/14, pp. 89–92). Viterbo: Edizioni Sette città. Santos, B. (2014). Epistemologies of the South: Justice Against Epistemicide. London: Routledge.

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Spivak, G. (1988). Can the Subaltern Speak? In C. Nelson & L. Grossberg (Eds.), Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture. London: Macmillan. Spivak, G. (1999). A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Towards a History of the Vanishing Present. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Stoler, A. L. (2008). Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Tombaccini-Villefranque, S. (1999). La frontière bafouée: migrants clandestins et passeurs dans la vallée du Roja (1920–1940). Cahiers de La Mediterranee, 58, 79–95. Veziano, P. (2014). Ombre di confine. L’espatrio clandestine degli ebrei stranieri dalla Riviera dei Fiori alla Costa Azzurra 1938–1940. Saluzzo: Fusta Editore. Wekker, G. (2016). White Innocence: Paradoxes of Colonialism and Race. Durham and London: Duke University Press. Zupi, M. (2012). L’impatto delle primavera arabe sui flussi migratori regionali e verso l’Italia, in Osservatorio di politica internazionale (pp. 93–35). CeSPI. Zamon Davis, N. (1987). Fiction and Archive: Pardon Tales and Their Tellers in Sixteenth-century France. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Filmography Germi, P. (1950). Il cammino della speranza. Jacques, C. (1958). La legge è legge.

CHAPTER 3

The French-Italian Border at Menton-Ventimiglia: A Site of Perennial Conflict, Brotherhood, and Mediatisation Sandro Rinauro

3.1

Introduction

The border between Menton and Ventimiglia, established by Italy and France in 1860, is less incumbent in Italy, both in collective consciousness and as an object of study, compared to the “eastern border” between the Peninsula and Slovenia. This is the result of the former being initially defined peacefully by the two “Latin cousins”, and because of the particularly painful events that characterised the eastern border, among which: the fascist aggression of Yugoslavia, the massacres perpetrated by titanic forces through the foibe, the exodus of the Dalmatian and Julian Italian populations, and the erection of the Iron Curtain. However, not only was the Maritime Alps border highly disputed until 1947, but, due to its

S. Rinauro (B) Dipartimento di Studi Internazionali, Giuridici e Storico-Politici, Facoltà di Scienze Politiche Economiche e Sociali, Università degli Studi di Milano, Milan, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 L. Amigoni et al. (eds.), Debordering Europe, Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56518-3_3

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perennial porosity to international migration, it is especially in this last decade that it has become the setting of diplomatic and social conflict, as well as the focus of media attention. Past and present fascination aroused by the Menton-Ventimiglia border derive from at least three of its main characteristics. Firstly, as the ancient Savoy county of Nice1 overlooks the sea, it has never been divided by any natural barrier, despite the alpine chains and valleys that furrow its land. Secondly, its openness and territorial accessibility and, above all, its historical vicissitudes have long made it a place of convergence and an ethno-cultural melting pot that has always rendered the border between the two nations questionable and controversial. However (and finally), in spite of the mixture of families, customs, and habits to its western and eastern sides, since 1860 it has constituted a rather clear economic, political, and social border between France, a richer and— at certain times—freer and more democratic nation; and Italy, poorer and less liberal. Thus, the very fact of it being an economic, social, and political border has been the cause of perennial cross-currents of migrants and refugees. In the past, these were predominantly Italian flows; later, with the democratisation and economic development of the Peninsula, it was migrants and refugees from the other side of that great social and rights-defining border that marks the southern and eastern Mediterranean. These three conflict-inducing elements—geographical and historical cross-border connections, political and economic cleavage along the border—have been and are simultaneously the cause of encounters. Indeed, cross-border mobility of people (such as tourists or workers) and freights is necessary for local economies. Furthermore, cross-border mobility of migrants and refugees is not only a source of conflict; it also generates movements of support and solidarity. This ambivalence of the border between Menton and Ventimiglia is, of course, common to all borders across the world. However, a multi-scale approach is required to analyse the specific dynamics of hostility and solidarity that have characterised this particular border; at the local, national, and international level. For instance, while a national border was drawn and militarised in 1860 (and subsequently trespassed during the fascist aggression of France in 1940 and the Gaullist military invasion of far western Liguria

1 The territory of the Maritime Alps from Menton to the river Var.

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in 1945), regional treaties allowed local populations to ignore its effects on their property rights and commercial interests, thereby preserving the functional, social, and family unity that had always characterised those territories. To take another example, while Schengen and Maastricht Treaties effectively erased the border between Italy and France (also in terms of customs and police infrastructure), shortly afterwards, as a result of unwanted migration, that border became one of the most militarised in western Europe and one of the most popular for French political leaders in search of a new symbol of the alleged inviolability of national sovereignty. Therefore, the border, though abolished by international law, still very much exists in terms of national law, administrative practices, and symbolic identity value. While Lampedusa (the other border dominating media coverage in the Mediterranean) highlights the disturbing and long-term ambiguities in the relationship between Europe (and its alleged values) and the rest of the world, the Menton-Ventimiglia border that is internal from a European point of view, highlights the weakness of the European project and its reversibility. Nothing is more stimulating for the study of this territory’s past and present. The first section illustrates the frequent changes of the Maritime Alps border with France, Liguria and the Kingdom of Savoy until 1860. The second section illustrates the process of progressive cultural and political nationalisation of the inhabitants of the Maritime Alps by France since 1860, and the long-lasting identity and international conflicts that ensued. The third section illustrates the contradiction between cross-border transport, economic, and social integration and the progressive militarisation of the Menton-Ventimiglia border. The fourth paragraph describes the migratory flows across the French-Italian border of the Maritime Alps from the Second Empire to the present day, and the attitudes of hostility and solidarity these flows have aroused. The fourth paragraph recalls how, at least since 1860, that border has always been a highly symbolic place and, consequently, the object to intense media coverage.

3.2 Between National and Niçois Identities, Events at the Border Up to 1860 The functional, administrative, and cultural integration that characterised the region from western Liguria up to the Var River since the times of the Ligurian tribes and Romanisation (early second century BC-tenth century AD), was partially severed by the eastward advance of the Provençal

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lineage of the Anjou. With the Aix-en-Provence Treaty of 1262, this lineage obtained some of the main Alpine municipalities, while the coast remained under the influence of the Republic of Genoa. In order to avoid falling under Provençal influence, Nice entrusted itself to the protection of the Savoys, under whom it remained from the Atto di dedizione of 1388 until 1860. The region of Nice (including its eastern coast and Alpine hinterland) was declared Administrative County in 1526 and then Administrative Division of the Kingdom of Sardinia in 1818. Thus, it was during these long centuries of Savoy rule that the cultural character of Nice and its eastern coast definitively distinguished itself from the area of Provence west of the Var (Gandolfo 2007). The original Occitan dialect was enriched with Genoese and Piedmontese influences. From 1561 (Edict of Rivoli), Italian became the official language of the county and, over time, also the language of daily life alongside the local dialect. Meanwhile, the decimation caused by the Black Plague in the mid-fourteenth century was mitigated by the arrival of new inhabitants from Italy, precursors of successive waves of immigrants from Liguria, Piedmont, and the rest of the Peninsula (Gastaut et al. 2016, p. 15). The architectural style of downtown Nice also assumed its definitive aspect: the oldest area adopted the typically Ligurian urban structure (the carruggi) and the surrounding area assumed the appearance of the Piedmontese towns of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, with its wider squares and streets protected by the arches of buildings. The recurring military attacks and the temporary French occupations contributed to the rise of local patriotic symbolism, embodied by the legendary figure of the commoner Caterina Segurana, who in 1543 stirred up the people to their successful resistance against the Turks that besieged the city on behalf of Paris. Despite these Italianisation factors, cultural and commercial contacts with Provence remained key, while the difficulties of Alpine communications with Piedmont and the non-insignificant distance from the Savoy administration fuelled a feeling of relative independence in the Nice population, primarily based on the predominantly local origin of the administrative staff and on the diverse cultural composition of the population (Gandolfo 2007; Gastaut et al. 2016). The advent of international resident tourism in the early nineteenth century markedly accentuated the cosmopolitan character of the city (Schor et al. 2010). With the conclusion of the Spanish War of Succession, the Peace of Utrecht (1713) for the first time officially defined the border between

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the Duchy of Savoy, the Republic of Genoa, and France, while the Nice agreements (1748, 1749) following the Austrian War of Succession definitively handed over the Nice territories to the Savoys following the two French occupations of 1691–1697 and 1707–1713. Finally, the Treaty of Turin in 1760 rationalised the border both with respect to the subdivision of the most fortifiable points between Paris and Turin, and with respect to the organicity and continuity of the respective municipal territories, while the Alpine watersheds and the Var delimited a growingly ambiguous allocation of national territories. These frequent border changes induced disputes over water, pasture, and property access rights between the adjacent communities that had been so frequently separated by them, as demonstrated by the frequent illegal movement of physical boundary markers by the two populations. However, such disputes also testified to the permanence of the functional and human homogeneity of the separated communities (Gastaut et al. 2016). The most traumatic and radical border change was caused by the invasion of revolutionary and Napoleonic France: in September 1792 the French occupied Nice and created the Department of the Maritime Alps. In the spring of 1794, especially by the hand of the Niçois general, Andrea Massena, they conquered the county of Ventimiglia (annexed to France), arrived in Savona, and occupied strategic points east of the Roya River. Finally, Napoleon’s victories against the Austro-Piedmontese between 1796 and 1798 imposed the annexation of the entire Roya Valley to France. In June 1797, the centuries-old sovereignty of Genoa over Liguria was abolished and replaced by the Ligurian Republic as a satellite of Paris, while in 1805 and until 1814 the whole of Liguria was directly annexed to France, with the region of Ventimiglia and Taggia included in the Department of the Maritime Alps (Gandolfo 2007). The Restoration annexed Liguria to the Savoy crown, while the border with France was brought back to the Var according to the layout of the Treaty of Turin of 1760, once again including La Birgue and Tende in the Sardinian Kingdom. From 1818, Nice became the capital of the Division, which included the provinces of Nice, Oneglia, and Sanremo, thus renewing its ancient ties with western Liguria through their apical position (hosting the central offices and military cornerstones of the Division). Even the Grimaldi princes of Monaco recovered their independence from Paris, but due to the reactionary orientation of the Principality, in 1848 the Monegasque protectorates of Menton and Roccabruna rebelled and submitted to Savoy protection. In 1861, after the transfer of Nice

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to France, Piedmont also renounced these two protectorates to Paris (Gandolfo 2007).

3.3 The Delicate Integration of the County of Nice with France and the Protracted Identity Dispute Previous periods of subjection to Paris and further still the persistence of legal and illegal cross-border contacts across the Var did not diminish the frontier character of the county of Nice even during the Restoration, as demonstrated by the almost total bilingualism of its population. However, alongside the highly popular Garibaldi, the important presence of Niçois patriots supporting the Risorgimento united the county from an identity perspective with neighbouring Liguria Piedmont. Indeed, when French agents surveyed the orientation of Nice’s county inhabitants at the beginning of 1860 regarding the imminent annexation decided by the Plombières Agreements, the great majority of the notables and the population turned out to be hostile to Paris and favourable to Turin, perhaps more out of dynastic loyalty than any feeling of national belonging, which was then only incipient. Nevertheless, pro-French public opinion supported the annexation because of the economic advantages that would result from commercial integration with France, while pro-Italian public opinion supported the permanence in the Kingdom of Sardinia due to cultural, historical, and dynastic ties (Courrière 2014). These alignments quickly changed, however, following the proclamation of Vittorio Emanuele II of Savoy on April 1, 1860, which not only released the county’s subjects from their oath of allegiance, but presented their annexation to France as an inevitable and dutiful sacrifice to advance the cause of Italian unification. Cavour himself declared the cultural affiliation of Nice to France in order to support the commitments made with Napoleon III as a sacrifice on the altar of Italy’s unification. Despite this, Piedmont asked for a popular plebiscite of consent for the county of Nice to validate the annexation, and Napoleon III willingly granted it, since plebiscites were not only organic customs to the authoritarian and personalistic character of the Empire, but a pure formality in this case, given that the outcome would effectively have no influence on the diplomatic decision. In short, it was a question of allowing, not of

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choosing one’s national destiny. In fact, the annexation assumed the character of a traditional border decision imposed by diplomacy, according to the custom of the Ancien règime, despite the incipient principles of the nation-state and of the ethnic border. Thus, having been abandoned by their sovereign and aware of the inevitability of the annexation, the notables of Nice and a large part of the clergy decided to consent to it so as not to compromise their social status in the new state context. With the county already occupied by the French army, the notables then accompanied their fellow citizens to the polling stations in a collective electoral demonstration that had nothing to do with the confidentiality of individual voting. The outcome was therefore taken for granted: over 99% of votes resulted in favour of annexation (Courrière 2014; Rainero 2011; Nardi 1959; Gandolfo 2011; Candeloro 1980). The new border was established to coincide with that which, under the First Empire, separated the province of Menton from Ventimiglia in 1808; that is the Saint Louis stream that flowed under the homonymous coastal road bridge. Further inland, the border almost always coincided with that between the Savoy provinces of Nice and Sanremo, while Piedmont just about managed to preserve Tende, the Pass of Tende, and La Brigue for the benefit of the Val Roya’s defensive capability. Indeed, Italy obtained defensive superiority at the Alpine border since, instead of the water shedding ridges, the border was often located along the French side, a situation hardly tolerated by Paris and that was ultimately resolved in its favour with the annexation of La Brigue and Tende in 1947 (Courrière 2014; Gandolfo 2007). On the other hand, in spite of the rift between communities and military disputes, treaties were stipulated as early as February and March 1861 to regulate property rights of the respective subjects on properties that were now on foreign soil, while a customs exemption was granted to inhabitants each side of the border up to 5 km from it, effectively creating a free zone that widely benefited the included municipalities, particularly La Brigue and Tende (Gandolfo 2007; Gastaut et al. 2016; Ortolani 1992). Despite the outcome of the plebiscite, the identity question remained a concern for Paris. Five centuries of annexation to Turin could not erase the numerous Italian characteristics of the populations, while the delay of promised economic improvements, the Bonapartist authoritarianism poorly tolerated by the liberal and “garibaldina” attitudes of the Niçois population—combined with the arrival of French officials, immediately

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revived an autonomist and pro-Italian spirit. The loss of the administrative institutions of the Savoy period also left many officials on the ropes. As a result, around 1500 Niçois exiled themselves to Italy over the course of a few months, exceeding 10,000 (out of a town population of 44,000 inhabitants) during the following decade, in demonstration that dissent around annexation was far greater than the slender minority having emerged from the plebiscite. In 1863, the prefect of the Alpes-Maritimes lamented that around 3000 Niçois had gained Italian citizenship, while during the whole decade and especially during the Third War of Independence, Niçois public opinion emotionally participated in favour of Italian unification (Courrière 2014). It was for these reasons that even earlier, in the legislative elections of December 1860, the level of abstention in Nice had touched 77.3% of those entitled to vote (50.1% in the former county as whole), thus offering little representation to 70.9% of votes in favour of the government-backed candidate, while the candidate unwelcomed by Paris and supported by many pro-Italians had obtained the approval of 28.9% of the voters. The election of the cantonal councillors in December 1860– January 1861 continued to record a very high abstention rate and, in any case, most of the elected councillors turned out to be composed by those who had already held them during the Savoy period. The municipal elections of February 1861 also sparked controversy against the election of French candidates of non-Niçois origin. More than a question of pro-Italian revival, it was therefore a question of reviving continuity and “municipal spirit”. However, a persistent mistrust of the Maritime Alps towards Paris was emerging. The expulsion of supporters for the return of the former county to Italy, the Frenchification of the toponymy, and above all the replacement of local school teachers with teachers from other French departments, were the most effective tools adopted by Paris to counter the proItalian sentiment and separatist tendencies of a part of the inhabitants. Despite this, Italian was still used in primary schools until the mid-1880s (Courrière 2014; Lucarno 2005). It was, however, the shock of defeat by the Prussians between 1870 and 1871 and the anxiety over France’s future that triggered the peak of dissent in the Maritime Alps towards the annexation of 1860 and made eyes turn towards Italy. The advent of the Third Republic and the decline of imperial authoritarianism itself strengthened the position of pro-Italians who, as followers of Garibaldi, naturally leaned towards

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republican, liberal, and socialist ideals. It was thus that in the political elections of February 1871, of the four deputies elected by the Department of the Maritime Alps, three were of pro-Italian tendency (Garibaldi was the most voted), while in the Nice district the four most voted candidates were all pro-Italian. Paris’s subsequent attempt to crack down on proItalian sentiment sparked three days of anti-French uprisings in Nice (the so-called Vespers of Nice, February 8–10, 1871). In reality, pro-Italian leaders never officially asked for the return of the Department to Italy, but only for a new referendum on the annexation, considering that the 1860 referendum was born out of Bonapartist despotism. Furthermore, it is likely that many voters had voted for the pro-Italian candidates due to Garibaldi’s prestige and because those candidates favoured peace with Prussia, rather than due to their favour towards the Kingdom of Italy. In any case, the authoritarian repression of the Vespers and the prohibition imposed on Garibaldi to speak as deputy to the National Assembly of Bordeaux (February 13, 1871) led the liberals, municipalists, and proItalians of the Department to become wary of the Third Republic as well. Ultimately, the particularistic sentiment and hostility of many Niçois towards officials from beyond the Var intensified (Courrière 2007, 2014). The French-Italian diplomatic crisis triggered by France’s occupation of Tunisia (1881) and the entry of Italy into the Triple Alliance (1882), led Paris to a more intense policy of Frenchification of the Department by prohibiting use of the Italian language in different contexts (in 1888, for example, Italian theatrical and lyrical performances were banned in Nice). The cultural Frenchification imposed by Paris, the economic benefits deriving from annexation, and the passing of the years hastened the process of assimilating the population of the Maritime Alps (Gastaut et al. 2016).

3.4

Intensifying Cross-Border Communications and Military Litigation at the Border

In spite of the local identity conflict and the diplomatic tensions between “Latin cousins”, the transnational communication routes infrastructure began in earnest, resulting in greater integration of the Maritime Alps both with beyond Var France and with Italy. Between 1862 and 1872, the Nice-Genoa railway line was built collaboratively by both nations; between 1877 and 1884 the road from Breil to Liguria, then connected to the Italian roads leading to Ventimiglia; from 1879 the Cuneo-Nice

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railway (via the railway tunnel of the Pass of Tende in 1898) which entered France towards Fontan, Saorge, and Breil, returned to Italy and then definitively to France in the direction of Nice. Between the 1860s and 1890s, the controversies regarding the administrative boundaries of various mountain municipalities resumed, as did the related requests for rectification of the border by the Italian side, without reaching a solution. In 1892, the dispute over the maritime border, sparked by the reciprocal trespassings of French and Italian fishermen, was resolved by delimiting it with a large signal on the rock face at the Saint Louis bridge and a corresponding one on the seashore below (Collidà et al. 1982; Gandolfo 2007; Lucarno 1992; Schiavazzi 1979). In 1871, the Kingdom of Italy began to fortify the Roya Valley with the entrenched field of Tende and the numerous artillery batteries aimed at all the Alpine passes towards France, placed in position to control the underlying French paths, as well as being potentially offensive to the Maritime Alps hinterland. On the other hand, French territory surpassed the Roya River around Breil, Saorge, and Sospel in the east, providing Paris with military superiority along those stretches (Castellano 1984; Gabriele 2005; Bagnaschino 2002). In contrast, transnational integration continued at the local level: the agreements of 1894 and 1897 offered exemption from customs duties for agricultural and pastoral products to the respective neighbouring national communities. These were followed by the agreements in 1913 and 1914 on cross-border grazing and the use of the Roya’s waters, a key fact given the construction of Italian and French hydroelectric plants in the upper Roya Valley from 1910 (Ortolani 1992; Gandolfo 2007). However, the border debate simultaneously resumed at a diplomatic level: Italy’s entry into World War I alongside France gave Rome the pretext to request, almost as a means of compensation, the rectification of the border as per 1860 for defensive purposes. The Italian goal was to eliminate the “French block”, that is, to annex the territory of Fontan, Breil, and Saorge that included the mid-Roya Valley in France. Rome’s most ambitious options were to request the entire Roya water reservoir and the entire cross-border watershed, which would have included Menton and Roquebrune in Italy, rewarding France with the proposal to shift the border to the Alpine ridges of the province of Cuneo (Gandolfo 2007). The proposal was firmly rejected by Paris both before and after the end of the war, however, the issue underlined the dangerous persistence of

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the dispute which, ultimately, would explode as one of the pretexts of the Italian occupation of 1940. The other pretext, Nice’s alleged Italian character, was unsustainable on international rights and above all anachronistic grounds: despite a certain permanence of particularism, the population of the Maritime Alps was now deeply assimilated into French identity, as its Italo-phobia amply demonstrated both during the Great Depression, the Italian occupation, and in the immediate post-World War II period (Gastaut 1996; Rinauro 2016). The 14 June 1940 marked the beginning of the Italian attack on the Maritime Alps, but military operations immediately demonstrated France’s defensive superiority and the disorganised nature of the Duce’s army, whose successful occupation of Menton was almost entirely a side-effect of the signed armistice (June 24). The new border was placed in Carnolès, a hamlet of Roquebrune, and the territory annexed to Italy was very limited: only 13 municipalities, of which the most important were Menton and Fontan, comprising an overall population of 28,000 inhabitants. The landing of the Allies in North Africa provided the pretext for Italy’s occupation of South-East France beginning in November 1942. The Italian army along the coast advanced just beyond Toulon, but the ultimate goal was to bring the border to the river Var. Following the armistice of 8 September 1943, the Italians abandoned the Maritime Alps, to be replaced by the Germans (Schipsi 2007; Panicacci 2004, 2010). Menton was freed on 6 September 1944 and the border was brought back to the Saint Louis bridge, but in November 1943 (Algiers Memorandum) the French National Liberation Committee had already requested the annexation of the “hunting lands”, i.e. the high valleys of the Tinée, the Vésubie, and the Roya, including La Brigue and Tende, while the Gaullist General Staff also demanded Ventimiglia. Between 25 and 26 April 1945, the army of liberated France occupied Ventimiglia and reached Sanremo and Imperia (the latter two abandoned immediately thereafter) as well as the internal valleys up to the Bordighera-Piaggia line. Only subsequently to Truman’s ultimatum (7 June 1945) did De Gaulle withdraw his army from Ventimiglia (18 July) and from the other occupied municipalities, though French agents who propagandised French annexation to the local populations continued to operate, especially at La Brigue and Tende. In the former municipality, the population was mostly in favour of France; the latter leaned towards Italy. An additional drive in favour of permanence in Italy was the issue around hydroelectric plants. Nonetheless, the Peace Treaty of Paris conclusively handed over the two municipalities to France, thereby

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resolving its alpine ridge aspiration in its favour, satisfying the defensive purposes raised by the 1860 border (Rainero 2001; Giovana 1996).

3.5 The Migratory Flow Amid Hostility and Hospitality At the social level, already since the end of the Second Empire, the ItalianFrench border in the Maritime Alps became the most important for the supply of foreign labour. The departments of the Maritime Alps, the Var, the Bouches-du-Rhône, and Savoy became, until the 1960s, those with the highest density of Italians in France. Public works, floriculture, agriculture, construction, fishing, industrialisation, and the continuous development of tourism in the Maritime Alps required more and more (often female) workers. The Italians in the Department were, therefore, 15,848 in 1872, 51,867 in 1891, 87,556 in 1911, not to mention the seasonal workers mostly employed in construction and the many circular workers not recorded from the areas near the border. By 1914, Italians represented 30% of the Department’s residents. After 1918, the flow intensely resumed and in 1950 Italian residents were still as high as 54,297, equalling 72% of the foreigners in the Department and 12% of the total resident population. Paris feared that their presence would become a further pretext for Rome’s annexationist claims, so much so that even in 1948 their enrolment was temporarily blocked in favour of other foreigners. From the beginning of the 1900s, Germans and Swiss—though in far lower numbers than Italians—also arrived to deal in commerce, the hospitality sector, and horticulture. Despite the episodic competition with locals for employment in tourism, at the beginning of the century the Chamber of Commerce of Nice hoped that the flow of Italian seasonal workers would increase considerably and evolve into a permanent presence, on pain of collapse of the agriculture and floriculture sectors. Nevertheless, the contradiction between the need for labour and the fear of the fifth internal Italian column persisted, to the point that, between the 1880s and First World War I, the transalpine military authorities planned the expulsion or transfer to departments far removed from the border of those tagged as “useless mouths”, i.e. the section of Italians less productive in the labour market, children, women, and the elderly. World War I also increased fear of foreigners and potential spies. As a result, since 1917 identity cards were imposed for permanent immigrants, with a photo obligation, as well as frontier cards, to

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be approval stamped every three months. These obligations, alongside increased border controls, and above all the Great Depression, caused the explosion of illegal immigration of Italians in the Maritime Alps in the inter-war period, also due to the greater controls by the fascist regime against the workers and the “fuorusciti” (anti-fascist exiles). For the latter, France was the main destination (receiving at least 28,000 of the approximately 60,000 Italian political exiles of the twenty years of fascist regime), and the Maritime Alps hosted at least a thousand of them, counting only the most active anti-fascist militants. As for illegal immigrant workers, their numbers swelled to the point that by 1930 they represented almost a third of total national arrivals from abroad: they were mainly Italians, Spaniards, and Belgians (Kronenberger 2016; Rinauro 2009; Tombaccini 1988, 1993; Tombaccini-Villefranque 1999). Beside them, between 1938 and 1940, at least 2500 Jews from central and eastern Europe came to the Maritime Alps from Italy. Being persecuted at home and expelled from Italy, they often were not able to obtain a passport and, therefore, frequently became illegal immigrants. Paris suspected that it was the Fascist government itself organising their illegal expatriation, in addition to the Jewish aid committees in Genoa and Nice. In any case, from May 1940 this flow almost completely ceased, since they were poorly tolerated in France and subject to internment and expulsions (Veziano 2001; Ben Khalifa 2011, 2016). Post-World War II, labour immigration to France resumed intensely and Italy remained the dominant country of origin until the early 1960s. Universal suffrage and the strength of the social-communist parties in France required, for reasons of consensus, the preservation of full employment for native workers. To this end, Paris adopted very restrictive selection and employment legislation for foreigners that often hindered the necessary recruitment. The consequence was an explosion of illegal immigration from Italy which, during favourable times, was tolerated and even urged by the transalpine authorities themselves. Thus, many were the clandestine Italians who lost their lives on the alpine trails. In the Maritime Alps, the most tragically renowned place was the so-called jump of death, a narrow passage on the path that ran over the rocky crag overlooking Garavan, the suburb of Menton just west of the Italian border where, between 1945 and 1961, at least 87 (mostly Italian and Yugoslav) illegal immigrants had perished (Rinauro 2009, 2016). With the advent of free movement for Community workers (from 1961) Italian immigration no longer suffered the restrictions that had led to the decade-long

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clandestine movement. Moreover, the exodus from the Peninsula was wavering. From the sixties and seventies, therefore, it was especially the Pieds noir, Maghrebis, and refugees from eastern Europe that arrived in the Maritime Alps and, accordingly, often illegally crossed the border suffering the familiar “jump of death” toll. The “Arab Spring” of 2011 inaugurated the last and current significant phase of influx into the Maritime Alps and, being predominantly refugees arriving from Italy, their flow between Ventimiglia and Menton has led Paris to repeatedly arm that border in the name of the Dublin protocols. Once again, therefore, the traditional diplomatic confrontation with Rome around the Italian-French border has exploded. Having often endowed such refugees with a humanitarian residence permit, Rome believes that this permit should allow free movement within the Schengen area; Paris is of the opposite opinion and this has more than ever highlighted—in a material, mediatic, and symbolic sense—an intra-European border that seemed to have been erased by the Treaties of Schengen and Maastricht (Gastaut 2016).

3.6 Border Mediatisation: From the Strengthening of National Identity to the Exorcising of Conflict Given the frequent and controversial border changes, particularly since the Peace of Utrecht (1713), the affirmation of the Westphalian concept of border has produced a large amount of cartography and physical territorial boundaries on account of French, Savoy, Monegasque, Ligurian, and Italian diplomacies and state institutions. However, the advent of the new border in 1860 also witnessed the emergence of an intense iconography of the border, spontaneously produced by the respective communities. These included prints, watercolours, popular paintings of picturesque inspiration, and above all postcards. The primary purpose was tourist propaganda as from 1860, in spite of the diplomatic and identity dispute—or perhaps also as a consequence of it—the border became a topical place of the imagery and identity not only pertaining to the respective communities on either side of it, but also to international tourists. The excursion up to the border became a classic for tourists of western Liguria and those staying in the Maritime Alps even before the Belle Époque. Yet the message that emerged from that popular iconography was

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itself contradictory. On the one hand, the cliché of the images of the Saint Louis bridge consisted in the respective border guards, the road barrier, the conspicuous delimitation signs painted on the rocky cliff face, and the border stones firmly planted on the road, and the respective flags and uniforms of the police forces, all of which symbolised the impermeability and intangibility of the border and the respective national identities. On the other hand, though, the most frequent cliché was the raised barrier and the respective border agents who, smiling and good-natured, fraternised among themselves, images that became notably frequent during the years of peak mutual tension, as during the fascist regime. This too was, of course, a security message that intended to affirm the protective nature of the border, while at the same time representing a way of exorcising the mutual conflict that divided diplomacies, but not local communities—not even those in uniform. Alongside to the fraternising agents, the inevitable tourists appeared, the restaurants and souvenir shops, against a systematic bright blue background of the Mediterranean Sea without a sign of national delimitation (Gastaut 2016). After all, even the extreme mediatisation of the border instigated by the current dispute over asylum seekers presents the same contradiction: on the one hand, French police forces preventing migrant entries, vociferous refugees camped on the Italian cliff near the border, and customary apparitions of the French Interior Minister and politicians (especially of the Front National), all of which symbolise a site of security and identity values; on the other hand, the movements of solidarity towards migrants on both sides of the border that contest the permanence of internal borders within the European Union.

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Nardi, C. (1959). Per la cessione di Nizza alla Francia. Dibattito GaribaldiCavour-Mazzini. Biblioteca dell’Eloquenza. Ortolani, M. (1992). Les franchises douanières de la commune de Tende 1861– 1940, un exemple de relations frontalières. In M. Carlin & P. L. Malaussena (Eds.), La frontière des Alpes-Maritimes de 1860 à nos jours. Ruptures et contacts. Actes du colloque de Nice, 11–12 janvier 1992 (pp. 61–74). Nice: Serre. Panicacci, J.-L. (2004). Menton dans la tourmente 1939–1945. Menton: Société d’art et d’histoire du Mentonnais. Panicacci, J.-L. (2010). L’occupation italienne. Sud Est de la France, juin 1940septembre 1943. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes. Rainero, R. H. (2001). L’opinion publique italienne et l’annexion de La Brigue et de Tende à la France. Cahiers de La Méditerranée, 1, 215–232. Rainero, R. H. (2011). ‘De biens tristes nécessités’: Cavour et la discussion au Parlement de Turin sur l’annexion de Nice à la France. In R. Schor & H. Courrière (Eds.), Le comté de Nice, la France et l’Italie. Regards sur le rattachement de 1860 (pp. 41–60). Nice: Serre. Rinauro, S. (2009). Il cammino della speranza. L’emigrazione clandestina degli italiani nel secondo dopoguerra. Turin: Einaudi. Rinauro, S. (2016). Les franchissements illégaux de la frontière entre l’Italie et les Alpes-Maritimes par les migrants italiens après la Seconde Guerre mondiale (1945–1956). In Y. Gastaut, Y. Kinossian, M. Ortolani, & R. Schor (Eds.), Fixer et franchir la frontière. Alpes Maritimes 1760–1947. Actes du colloque international de Nice (9–11 juin 2016) (pp. 265–273). Milano: Silvana Editoriale. Schiavazzi, G. (1979). Ferrovia Cuneo-Ventimiglia. Una storia di prodezze tecniche, battaglie politiche, fatti di guerra, tenacia. Pinerolo: Alzani. Schipsi, D. (2007). L’occupazione italiana dei territori metropolitani francesi (1940–1942). Roma: Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito. Schor, R., Mourlane, S., & Gastaut, Y. (2010). Nice cosmopolite 1860–2010. Paris: Autrement. Tombaccini, S. (1988). Storia dei fuorusciti italiani in Francia. Milan: Mursia. Tombaccini, S. (1993). Gli antifascisti nel dipartimento delle Alpi Marittime (1938–1946). In G. Perona (Ed.), Gli italiani in Francia, 1938–1946 (pp. 281–294). Milano: Franco Angeli. Tombaccini-Villefranque, S. (1999). La frontière bafouée: migrants clandestins et passeurs dans la vallée de la Roya (1920–1940). Cahiers de La Méditerranée, 1, 79–95. Veziano, P. (2001). Ombre di confine. L’emigrazione clandestina degli ebrei stranieri dalla Riviera dei Fiori verso la Costa Azzurra (1938–1940). Pinerolo: Alzani.

CHAPTER 4

The Maritime Alps: A Cross-Border Region Between Traditional Transalpine Mobility and International Migratory Chains Marina Marengo

4.1

Introduction

The analysis of past and present migratory chains of the Maritime Alps cannot disregard a series of geographical definitions and constitutive conceptual categories of identity and mobility present in this mountainous area. For the purpose of discussing such definitions and concepts, and in addition to past and present scientific and encyclopaedic research, this chapter will use literary texts by Francesco Biamonti, Max Gallo and Jean Giono, as well as ethnographic collections by Nuto Revelli. Their stories, biographic and fictional, have been chosen since their specific and meaningful descriptions clarify many aspects of the conceptual categories of “border” and “frontier”; the first is intended primarily as a linear boundary and the second as an area of contact and spatial relation (Cuttitta 2007). Their different depictions help us to reconstruct the

M. Marengo (B) University of Genoa, Genoa, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 L. Amigoni et al. (eds.), Debordering Europe, Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56518-3_4

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territorial and socio-economic processes that have contributed to the definition of a specific identity for this cross-border region, regardless of the exercise of power that over time has transformed these mountains from “smooth” to “striated” (Deleuze and Guattari 1980; Marengo 2011). Therefore, the present study will be carried out by starting from a historical-geographical and geo-literary approach, with the aim of revealing the complexity of the socio-economic and cultural dynamics of this Alpine area.

4.2

“MaConGranPenaLeReCaGiu` ”1 : Matters of “Alpine” Semantics

The process of re-semanticising individual portions of the Alpine chain and, more specifically, the first part of the south-western Alps, has been an open question since the end of the twentieth century. Some scholars—not necessarily academics or territorial experts—have “superimposed” their choices on appellations that have been shared and documented since ancient times, particularly in this area of the Alpine arc. Such denominations often reflected the specific geographical location and the actions of its inhabitants over thousands of years. As underlined by Luc Bureau, “[…] to name, or evoke a name, belongs to the most spiritual faculties of man: imagination, sensibility, memory […]. The mere evocation of a name opens more fertile configurations on our inner screen than those which can be offered by the direct and rigid perception of things” (Bureau 1991, pp. 236–237). Croce and Pase have added that every territory “[…] asks to be denominated, to be given a name: it is the name to which the identification of the territorial actor is linked” (Bureau 1991, p. 42). In the first half of the nineteenth century, Davide Bertolotti named— or rather “baptised”—the Maritime Alps. In explaining the reasons, he defined certain and uncertain borders, clearly conveying the idea of the transitory and transitional function of the Maritime Alps in their entirety. According to Bertolotti, they originate “[…] as Polybius well noted, above Marseilles and from the gentle hills near the Rhone, rising up to 1 The tongue twister “ma con gran pena le reca giù” was long learnt by schoolchildren and inhabitants of the region to remember the subdivision of the Alps: Ma (Maritime), con (Cozie), gran (Graie), pena (Pennine), le (Lepontine), re-ca (Retiche e Carniche), giù (Giulie).

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steep cliffs and crags, they reach to where the Var, cutting them with its course, separates rustic France from the region of the Maritime Alps belonging to Italy. From the sources of the Var these Alps extend up to Monviso (Mons Vesulus), where the Cottian Alps begin […] And they run eastwards with badly marked borders to the coast of Genoa. They are called Maritime because they reside above the Ligurian sea from Toulon to Oneglia, indeed from Toulon to Savona […] And therefore they were also sometimes called Ligurian or Littoral” (Bertolotti 1834, pp. 219–220). A few years later, Attilio Zuccagni Orlandini also motivated the denomination of this portion of the Alps in his scientific encyclopaedia, conferring similar “birthplaces” to them: “The Maritime Alps pertaining to Italy begin between the sources of the Tanaro and the Bormida; the name that distinguishes them indicates their proximity to the shores of the sea. Initially, they turn west to the valley of Barcellonetta; then northwards up to Monte Viso, where they terminate” (Zuccagni Orlandini 1837, v. I- p. II, p. 10). As for Giotto Dainelli, more recently, the Maritime Alps extend “[…] from the Cadibona Pass (460 m) to the Maddalena Pass (1996 m) through which one transits from the Stura valley on the Piedmontese slope into the Ubaye, a tributary of the Durance, on the French side. The entire internal slope of the chain, the Italian one, is included in the Maritime Alps up to where, in other words, the foot of the mountain plunges into the Po Valley […] The Argentera (3390 m) is the highest peak of these Maritime Alps, whose name evidently draws from the fact that their external slopes, between Savona and Nice, plunge directly into the Tyrrhenian Sea” (Dainelli 1963, v. I, p. 42). This frontier region seems to find no peace, owing less to political events than to an external superimposed resolve, which does not consider it as a complex and plural entity from either an orographic or even less so human point of view. This mountainous area has experienced a complex series of regulatory and deregulatory measures. Over time, it has seen its territory open to external impulses, becoming a place of aggregation, meeting and exchange. The first major communication route that connected Nice to Turin testifies this process: “[…] the countless mules plodding along the road all had bells around their necks as was the local custom, ding dong, so that the caravan of pack animals passing just meters from my home gave us real jangling concerts […] Because this was the most important road in the country for centuries. When there was no coastal route, this highway, ‘salt road’, this sonorous and difficult road

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was the only way to connect Nice to Turin and everywhere else beyond” (Desbiolles 2012, p. 40). However, at other times in its history, a desire for seclusion and a refusal to interact with others prevailed: out of fear, to protect the interests of individuals or powerful groups, and occasionally due to an inability to define new territorial strategies (House 1979). The current revival of the root of the historical name that now refers to “The Alps of the Sea”, evoked by individuals and public entities alike (e.g. local and international commercial associations and companies), bears witness to a desire to overcome the identity crisis that resulted from the “disappearance” of the “Maritime” of yesteryear (Fig 4.1).

Fig. 4.1 Signage of the local action group of the Mongioie Le Alpi del Mare (Source Photo by Marina Marengo)

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4.3 The Maritime Alps: Archetype of Frontier Lands The Maritime Alps are a typical example of a mountainous area where liminality has played a central role in the construction processes of the territory since ancient times. For example, the conquest of the Alps by the Romans did not coincide with the demarcation of a clear boundary but rather with control of “[…] a large sensitive area with numerous routes essential for free circulation on all sides […] Acting as a gigantic commutator in Europe, the Alps are indeed ‘frontier lands’, in the sense of the word frontier and not in the sense of the word boundary” (Raffestin 1992, p. 371). Paola Guglielmotti, when referring to the Middle Ages, stressed how fundamental it was to have a “[…] coexistence of linear and zonal borders […] that declared their function as an element of ‘transmissive and non-restrictive’ contact rather than of separation, and for this reason they appear frayed, complex, fluid, intermittent, articulated, grey, permeable, porous” (Gugliemotti 2006, p. 1). Although the Alps have become a “borderland” in the modern age, they were long before a “frontier land”. At first read the differentiation may seem pedantic, but on the contrary, it is fundamental in order to understand the notion of separation focused on encounter, exchange and complementarity that typically characterises frontier lands. Claude Raffestin offers a particularly meaningful insight in reference to frontier lands. Given that separating lines do not pass through them, “[…] and owing to their marginal location, they allow for complementary areas of contact, which are mere promises of exchange between people, goods and ideas” (Claude Raffestin 1992, p. 372). The singularity of the Maritime Alps as a cross-border region is due to “[…] practical and jurisdictional ambiguity relating to France and Italy […] [Indeed] there is also abundant documentation arising from agreements and territorial demarcation, which divides alps and pastures dating back to at least 1250 A.D” (Palmero 2007, p. 145). This conceptual category tells the story of a mixture of people and cultures, nowadays Italians and French, Savoyards and Genoese in the past, who bitterly contested and subsequently made pacts to share the coveted highland pastures, as well as other agricultural practices linked to these steep lands—lands that are mainly terraced out of necessity, wild and rugged, fascinating and inexorable. By examining the available documentation, Beatrice Palmero identifies the following definition: “territorial border

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concentric to the alpine ridges” (Palmero 2007, p. 151). It is not her conceptualisation, but rather a mutation of a description, “[…] that Senate Dean Braida of Nice made regarding another territorial enclave, that of the Viozene, which he described as ‘[…] concentric mountains within States’” (Palmero 2007, p. 151). While the then Savoy government tried to define its strategic “Marenca Road”2 by insinuating itself on the modern-day border between Piedmont and Genoa, “[…] the lords of the pasture of the Genovese Triora pasture identified their own border alps. The entire Brigascan mountains were undivided, the importance of their identity reaffirmed by the forms of possession and transmission of the land, to which the land register of 1702 had given further legitimacy of collective ownership” (Palmero 2007, p. 151). Traces of these strategies of resistance, survival and maintenance of an ancient and essential territorial power in these “undivided” mountains can still be found today throughout the whole Maritime arc.

4.4 Traditional Economic Activities: A Model Focused on Mobility and Circular Migration The Maritime Alps, as previously mentioned, are an unusual crossborder region consisting of: “Mobile frontiers, slowly swallowed up by the Savoy war machine. An intricate geography of customs, exemptions and privileges, levelled little by little by the steamroller of the central administration” (Albera 1995, p. 24). The mountain people inhabiting this portion of the Alps learned to adapt to the redefinition or disappearance of borders and frontiers. They actuated precise strategies to avoid the border obstacles and continue to feel a part of a single and vast cultural, as well as geographical, region (Sanguin 1989; Marengo 1996, 1997; Palmero 2008, 2009). For centuries, these mountains were trodden by the routes of great mercenary captains, numerous armies, exiles and fugitives, but also by circular migrants (Tarrius 1989) whose movements originated from the specific economic activities of the area, such as transhumance and (more or less legal) itinerant and seasonal trades (Vovelle 1988; Tirabassi and Audenino

2 The “Marenca Road” served the transport and trade of salt from the coastal areas to further inland for millennia.

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2008). It is important to remember that, “[f]or those living in the mountains mobility was widely practiced and ramified in a plurality of trades, balanced between commerce, trade, handicrafts, wage labour, pastoralism, vagrancy, begging” (Albera 1995, p. 31). In some cases, transalpine mobility was a veritable “rite of initiation”, as one of Nuto Revelli’s informants declares: “The ones who didn’t go to France weren’t real people […] the ones who didn’t go to France weren’t valuable […] many stopped there” (Michele Giuseppe Lucchese - in Revelli 2016, p. 72). France, and earlier still the Comté de Nice, “[…] represents a familiar universe, where the migratory paths of the inhabitants of these valleys have unravelled for centuries”. “‘So, then you go to France’ often the first words a child learns to pronounce […] society considers those who do not cross the mountain to be incapable” (Albera 1995, p. 35). The south-east of France was the preferred destination of Maritime mountain people, because of its inclusion in the Alpine cross-border mobility network since ancient times (Giorcelli-Bersani 2000; Marengo 2012). Seasonal workers and itinerant craftsmen “[…] moved towards the French South-East at the end of haymaking” (Imbert 1946). Francesco Biamonti underlines the importance of this mobility for the local community: “Never speak badly of France: this was one of his principles. Entire generations of Luvaira and Aùrno had sated their hunger, among other things, in the port of Marseilles. Longshoremen at the docks, loading and unloading in the mistral wind” (Biamonti 1994, pp. 88–89). Mobility so habitual as to generate names relating to specific places, things and people, so much so as to evoke thoughts thoughts of endless and remote exchanges, as well as centuries-old toil. Such names resulted in intense, licit and illicit, métissages between the two sides, this time on the ItalianFrench border: “The vineyard is up there, too far away, abandoned. –Where is it? –On the summit, at the posatoio.3 Do you know where I mean? There is a long ridge, where those who pass can put down their load and rest, catch their breath” (Biamonti 1994, p. 72). For centuries, the economy of the frontier area has centred on activities typical of this Mediterranean mountainous region, poor and relatively infertile, yet able to guarantee a subsistence to the native population on both sides of the Alps: “In the summer we would scythe the hay

3 TN: the resting place.

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on the mountains and collect a few bunches of lavender. –We set off on our mules with our alembic, we crossed all the Maritime Alps and at every stop we would distil. One man came from Grasse to buy our essences. –And in the winter? We made coal in the years when there were no olives. We cut down the holly oak woods” (Biamonti 1994, p. 22). The unusual practice of mountain pasture grazing still characterises part of the Maritime Alps today: “That man, quite old and almost sacred, explained how he had walked through the night to come down, to escape the snow in the air (l’auro de nèu), the enemy for those having all their possessions in blood, the blood of God. He spoke in Provencal, a strange sing-song lilt of the Maritime Alps; high trebles like hiccoughs followed by low, drawn-out sounds […] The clouds from the high seas (dis auti mar) had not arrived in autumn so freezing ice now replaced the scorching heat” (Biamonti 1995, p. 53). Peddling, another frontier trade often “dubbed” by smugglers, has intensified exchanges of not necessarily valuable, but often essential or contingent, goods (e.g. oil, salt or tobacco). Francesco Biamonti affectionately describes the smugglers’ outfits of western Liguria: “They wore white cloaks to look like monks” (Biamonti 1998, p. 78). With the help of Biamonti, a further evaluation of what Claude Raffestin wrote about the Western Alps has been possible. Raffestin considers them “[…] frontier lands, but not separated lands. This is because they have been shaped by transhumance for thousands of years […] the pace of these alternating (or alternate) movements has been set by climatic conditions and these give us an insight into the ecological function of the frontier” (Raffestin 1992, p. 371). This rhythmic, circular and almost ritual alternation powerfully emphasises the fact that these lines have a directional and not a separating function. In most cases, they refer to externalities full of a promise of exchange and innovation as a consequence of “curious” internalities, or in any case, an openness to interaction and hybridisation.

4.5 From Circular Mobility to Internal and International Migration The circulatory movements of mountain people towards the Ligurian and Nice coasts meant that those who practised “[…] a craft trade […] were able to save enough to buy a cow with five month’s work” (Revelli 2013, p. 82). The traditional mobility of the inhabitants of these mountain areas

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was progressively accompanied by mass migratory movements—temporary and permanent—starting from the second half of the nineteenth century (Acher 1955; Sanna 2011; Gastaut 2012). These transalpine and cross-border population movements have long been studied from a historical and geographical point of view, as well as through the lens of social science (Rossi 1903; Faidutti-Rudolph 1964; Sori 1979; Allio 1984). As Nuto Revelli points out, emigration, for the mountain people of the Maritime Alps, “[…] was the only way out, the only road to hope, the only choice for civilization […] It was as if the mountains separating them from France did not exist […] Every autumn after the chestnut harvest, long lines of seasonal emigrants trod through the valleys on their way to the border, towards France […] A significant amount of seasonal emigration tended to become permanent, with thousands of people from Cuneo choosing to make France their homeland” (Revelli 2013, pp. 81– 82). The migratory choice could be defined as originating from aspirations of life and work that differed from those offered by the place of origin: “They all go down there, maybe there’s enough for everyone” (Gallo 1975, pp. 12-13). The migratory chains created in the second half of the nineteenth century pushed people to leave, particularly those who wanted to realise their dreams or ambitions: “The ten or so youngsters sitting shoulder to shoulder had known each other since childhood, and one after the other they disappeared. They left for France, Argentina, America […] one of them returned from Nice: ‘There is all the work you could want, there are roads, a station, the Palace they are building in the sea and the houses of the English” (Gallo 1975, p. 32). Dionigi Albera highlights that, on the whole, “[…] the mountain of southern Piemonte has contributed decisively to the repopulation of the coastal area […] It is part of a large migratory hinterland that also includes the valleys, currently French, as well as the Ligurian hinterland” (Dionigi Albera 1995, p. 17). Many of those who chose permanent emigration did not have a clear migratory plan when they left. Nevertheless, they were determined to improve their living conditions and try to “make a success of it”. Integration of the Maritime mountain people, and immigrants from the border area in general, took place over a generation. Cultural proximity certainly accelerated this process. Ambition, combined with a desire for social redemption, also helped some to achieve the success they had desperately sought at the time of emigration. Their desire for social ascension was initially denigrated by the French, who considered the newcomers

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to be crude and ignorant, only suited for heavy manual work: “You’re young, he said, you come from the mountains and know nothing, you Piedmonts don’t know anything, you know how to work though, this you do know. We give you a hammer and you break rocks, a trowel and you mix plaster, oh yes, you know how to sweat, and you know how to work” (Gallo 1975, p. 23). In the space of just a few decades, this attitude had changed to such an extent that the newcomers’ ability to work and desire for social redemption soon came to be considered “intrinsic” qualities of the Maritime mountain people: “He is a perfect example of professional success, one of the biggest business owners in the city. He is living proof that when you want to work everything is possible, Merani told Ritzen, who was asking about Carlo Revelli” (Gallo 1975, p. 201). The transformation from traditional border mobility to transalpine migratory movements was also accompanied by political migrations; some were declared while others were undercurrents. Alongside labourers, masons and carpenters, there were also political refugees on the French coast. Jean le Bleu, Jean Giono’s anarchic cobbler, was one such political refugee, as were many of the labourers arriving in the Bay of Angels between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: “So, are you one of those stirring up conversations and making a big fuss about hiding away in the forest on the other side of the Alps?” (Giono 2009, 446). In more recent times, there were those who escaped the “obligations” of the fascist regime: “As he took the coffee pot off the tripod, Edoardo said something about destiny; then he added openly that even he had taken refuge in France at the time of the dictatorship” (Biamonti 1995, p. 41). Revolutionaries, anarchists and socialists came to Nice and its environs, depending on the historical period and political events occurring in Europe (Schor 1975). These new arrivals easily blended in with other immigrants: “In the Department of Maritime Alps, these refugees mingled with the mass of their countrymen. According to the 1901 census, there were 22,228 Italians in Nice. While neighbouring municipalities, such as La Turbie, counted 3,220 out of its 6,680 inhabitants, almost 50% of the population. This numerical presence provided the new arrivals with the human means for their actions, as did the precarious social conditions of the Italian immigrants in that period” (Tombaccini-Villefranque 1995, p. 222).

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Conclusions: Questions of Thresholds, Doors and Ubiquitous Liminality

The reflections developed in this study have on several occasions evoked— while hardly ever explicitly naming—concepts that provide some of the essential tools for unravelling the dense and intricate bundle of narratives (scientific or other). Limit, threshold and door are the principal concepts; added to these are more articulated and specific ones arising from a deeper analysis of the former, such as interstice, contact area and transition space (Remy 1986). Although a certain reluctance remains in admitting that limits and thresholds are part of our individual and collective daily lives, and that creativity and innovation do truly emerge in the “smooth” space, these “rough” concepts are, nonetheless, equally internalised and necessary for our societies today as they were for those of yesterday (Marengo 2011). Indeed, the limit is “[…] the drawn line which establishes an order, not only of a spatial nature, but also temporal, in the sense that this line not only separates an ‘on this side’ from an ‘on the other side’, but also a ‘before’ and an ‘after’ […] The limit is the expression of a power in place; it is the first form of exercise of a power of which work is the foundation. In other words, that which is capable of transforming the physical and social environment […] The notion of limit is ubiquitous, and it is neither conceivable nor possible to escape from it. It belongs to the category that we could qualify as invariant. And yet, it pays for the evidence of its necessity with the indifference in which it is held, and the way it is brushed off and drawn with arbitrariness” (Raffestin 1987, pp. 21–22). The transition from limit to threshold is not painless, neither conceptually nor practically. In fact, there is “[…] a conceptual difference between the two: the former indicates the necessity of a new beginning, while the second indicates an inevitable change” (Deleuze, Guattari 1980, p. 546). The definition of a threshold is therefore a clear indication that the interest in and desire for exchange and interaction have disappeared. However, the presence of a threshold does not always or necessarily give rise to a new beginning. The concept of the alpine “zipper” referred to by Michele Cassandro, which “[…] unites more than it divides” (Michele Cassandro 1996, p. 27), is a clear illustration. As a logical consequence, the concept of threshold is ensued by that of door, understood as a “[…] place of passage that opens onto an exterior, which is frightening, but can only exert attraction, and which closes itself

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in defence of its territory and inhabitants” (Bozonnet 1979, p. 48). When considering the concept of door, we must “go back to the origins”, that is: back to Georg Simmel. He maintained that, “[…] the door illustrates in the clearest possible manner, to what extent separation and connection are actually only two aspects of the same act […] The door, by creating a meeting place between human space and all that is outside it, in a certain sense, eliminates the separation between internal and external” (Georg Simmel 1988, pp. 164–165). Over time, the Maritime Alps have played a substantive role as the commutator of people and cultures, near and far. As Lucien Febvre wrote, while also citing Paul Vidal de la Blache, “[…] No country creates itself; a country cannot be created, grow and establish itself without external influences. ‘The impact comes from outside. No civilized region is the exclusive maker of its own civilization. At the very least, it can only produce a limited civilization, like a clock that, after ticking for a while, stops abruptly’” (Febvre 1980, p. 392). Liminalities are inherently mobile; doors open allowing intense exchanges, but at other times close, allowing for redefinitions that are necessary for territorial identities, rather than for defending themselves from “impacts”. In any case, as Michel Butor points out, “Fortunately, little by little, all territories touch at some extremity or another: we all become frontier people […] In this way, even the most impenetrable borders slowly become transparent and these buffer regions, transit areas, gateways, gaps, are transformed into new centres. The multitudes converge on them and then spread out from them and are more sensitive to a new way of listening to things” (Butor 1987, p. 412).

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Bertolotti, D. (1834). Viaggio nella Liguria Marittima. Torino: Tipografi Eredi Botta. Biamonti, F. (1994). Vento largo. Turin: Einaudi. Biamonti, F. (1995). L’angelo di Avrigue. Turin: Einaudi. Biamonti, F. (1998). Le parole la notte. Turin: Einaudi. Bozonnet, J.-P. (1979). La montagne initiatique. In A. Vv. (Ed.), Espaces et imaginaires (pp. 47–68). Grenoble: PUG. Bureau, L. (1991). La Terre et moi. Montréal: Boréal. Butor, M. (1987). Meditazione sulla frontiera. In C. Ossola, C. Raffestin, M. Ricciardi, (Eds.), La frontiera da Stato a Nazione. Il caso del Piemonte (pp. 407–413). Roma: Bulzoni. Cassandro, M. (1996). Jean-Francois Bergier e la storia delle Alpi. In M. Körner & F. Walter (Eds.), Quand la montagne a aussi une histoire (pp. 27–36). Bern: Haupt. Croce, D., & Pase, A. (1995). Il confine di Stato come misura della modernità. Geotema, 1, 39–47. Cuttitta, P. (2007). Segnali di confine. Milano: Mimesis. Dainelli, G. (1963). Le Alpi. v. I e II . Milan: Utet. Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (1980). Mille Plateaux. Paris: Les Editions de Minuit. Desbiolles, M. (2012). Dans la route. Paris: Seuil. Faidutti-Rudolph, A. M. (1964). L’immigration italienne dans le sud-est de la France. Paris: Editions Ophrys. Febvre, L., (1980, ed. or 1922) La Terra e l’evoluzione umana. Turin: Einaudi. Gallo, M. (1975). La baie des Anges v.1. Paris: Laffont. Gastaut, Y. (2012). Frontières: des espaces décisifs entre passé et présent. Migrations Société, 140, 53–59. Giono, J. (2009). Le Hussard sur le toit. Paris: Gallimard. Giorcelli Bersani, S. (2000). La montagna violata: il sistema alpino in età romana come barriera geografica e ideologica. Boll. Storico-Bibliografico Subalpino, 2, 425–449. Gugliemotti, P. (2006). Introduzione. In P. Gugliemotti (Ed.), Distinguere, separare, condividere. Confini nelle campagne dell’Italia medievale. Reti Medievali Rivista (1). http://www.dssg.unifi.it/_RM/rivista/saggi/Con fini_Guglielmotti.htm. House, J. W. (1979). The Franco-Italian Boundary in the Alpes Maritimes. In Kasperon, R.E., Minghi, J.V. (Eds.), The Structure of Political Geography (pp. 258–272). Chicago: Aldine Publishing. Imbert, L. (1946). L’émigration temporaire dans l’ancien Comté de Nice. Nice historique (pp. 66–73).

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Marengo, M. (1996). Le Alpi Marittime quale spazio di transizione fra il sistema mediterraneo e quello alpino. In G. Scaramellini (Ed.), Montagne mediterranee, montagne continentali. Problemi e prospettive di sviluppo sostenibile nelle comunità e nei territori montani (pp. 91–98). Milan: Guerini Scientifica. Marengo, M. (1997). Les frontières culturelles dans les Alpes Maritimes. In Actes du Séminaire CO.TR.A.O «Recomposition des territoires des Alpes Occidentales» (pp. 75–78). Grenoble: CNRS LAMAESA 5038. Marengo, M. (2011). L’Alta Val Tanaro. Modalità e percorsi di costruzione di un territorio montano. I processi “fondativi” v. 1. Pisa: Pacini. Marengo, M. (2012). Liminal Questions Between Sharp Borders and Encircling Frontiers: The Case of ‘Common Lands’ in the South-Western Alps. Plurimondi, 195–206. Marengo, M. (2016a). Geografia e letteratura. Piccolo manuale d’uso. Bologna: Patron. Marengo, M. (2016b). Sguardi letterari sulle ‘terre di frontiera’: le rappresentazioni delle Alpi sud-occidentali nelle opere di Francesco Biamonti e Jean Giono. Intemelion, 22, 89–104. Marengo, M. (2018a). Percorsi migratori transfrontalieri: i piemontesi “di” Nizza nella saga letteraria La baie des Anges di Max Gallo. Intemelion, 4, 61–85. Marengo, M. (2018b). Le “Marittime” di Francesco Biamonti: identità in progress di una terra di frontiera. In J.-I. Ghidina (Ed.), Mosaïque des frontières dans la littérature italienne contemporaine (pp. 23–40). Clermont-Ferrand: Presses Universitaires Blaise Pascal. Palmero, B. (2007). Montagne indivisibili e pascoli di confine. Le alpi del Tanarello tra XV e XVIII secolo. In R. Bordone, P. Guglielmotti, S. Lombardini, A. Torre (Eds.), Lo spazio politico locale in età medievale, moderna e contemporanea (pp. 145–153). Alessandria: Edizioni dell’Orso. Palmero, B. (2008). La réglementation de la conflictualité champêtre en milieu pastoral: le cas des pâturages intercommunaux (Ligurie-Comté de Nice). Patrimoines Du Haut Pays, 9, 82–105. Palmero, B. (2009). Le “alpi di prossimità” e la costruzione dello spazio locale. Memoria e uso dei pascoli di Tanarello e Marta (1250–1939). In Percorsi di Ricerca (Working papers). Laboratorio di Storia delle Alpi. Raffestin, C. (1987). Elementi per una teoria della frontiera. In C. Ossola, C. Raffestin, & M. Ricciardi, M. (Eds.), La frontiera da Stato a Nazione. Il caso del Piemonte (pp. 21–37). Roma: Bulzoni. Raffestin, C. (1992). Les Alpes occidentales, terres de frontières? In CO.TR.A.O. (Ed.), L’Homme et les Alpes (pp. 371–375). Grenoble: Glénat. Remy, J. (1986). La limite et l’interstice: la structuration spatiale comme ressource sociale. In A.Vv. (Ed.), La théorie de l’espace humain. Transformations globales et structures locales (pp. 219–227). Bruxelles: CRAAL-FNSRS UNESCO. Revelli, N. (2013). Il popolo che manca. Turin: Einaudi.

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Revelli, N. (2016). Il mondo dei vinti. Turin: Einaudi. Rossi, G. B. (1903). Gli Italiani in Provenza e nelle Alpi Marittime, note ed impressioni. Marsiglia. Sanguin, A. L. (1989). La bordure franco-italienne des Alpes Maritimes ou les conséquences de la modification d’une frontière internationale. Méditerranée, 1, 17–25. Sanna, G. (2011). Il riscatto dei lavoratori. Storia dell’emigrazione italiana nel Sud-Est francese (1880–1914). Rome: Ediesse. Schor, R. (1975). Les étrangers dans la ville: le péril italien dans les agglomérations des Alpes-Maritimes, 1919–1939. Annales de faculté de lettres et sciences humaines (pp. 75–108). Simmel, G. (1988). La Tragédie de la culture et autres essais. Paris: Ed. Rivages. Sori, E. (1979). L’emigrazione italiana dall’Unità alla seconda guerra mondiale. Bologna: II Mulino. Tarrius, A. (1989). Anthropologie du mouvement. Caen: Paradigme. Tirabassi, M., & Audenino, P. (2008). Migrazioni italiane. Mondadori: Storia e storie dell’Ancien régime a oggi. Milano: Mondadori. Tombaccini-Villefranque, S. (1995). Une famille de socialistes italiens entre expulsion et intégration. In P. Corti, & R. Schor (Eds.), L’esodo frontaliero: gli italiani nella Francia meridionale/L’émigration transfrontalière: les italiens dans la France méridionale [Recherches régionales, 3e trimestre] (pp. 222–228). Vovelle, M. (1988). Les piémontais en Provence Occidentale au XVIIIe siècle. In Migrazioni attraverso le Alpi occidentali (pp. 73–91). Regione Piemonte. Zuccagni Orlandini, A. (1837). Corografia fisica, storica e statistica dell’Italia e delle sue Isole- Stati Sardi italiani di Terraferma. v. I- Parte I e II . Branchi.

PART II

Borderland Infrastructures

CHAPTER 5

The Infrastructure Environment of the Ventimiglia Borderland and Underground Border Crossings Ivan Bonnin

5.1

Introduction

The Ventimiglia region acts as a protagonist in the local manifestation of the social and inherently political struggle between the social movement of migration (Papastergiadis 2000; Mezzadra 2006; Papastadopoulos et al. 2008) and the French State’s border power. Indeed, far from the consolidated humanist tradition of the social sciences, we are arguing that a place—to be intended in its sheer materiality and not figuratively as the community of people living there—is a socially relevant f -actor, a factor that acts and produces social effects, and also a very important one. After all, if we agree to interpret borderlands as battlefields (Mezzadra and Stierl 2019), then the terrain should be accorded the relevance it deserves. In his masterpiece On War, the most famous Western military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, argued that the “importance [of the relationship between warfare and terrain] is decisive in the highest

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degree, for it affects the operations of all forces, and at times entirely alters them” (2007, p. 56). Similarly, in The Art of War, the Chinese sage Sun Tzu, long before than Clausewitz, maintained that “the natural formation of the country is the soldier’s best ally; but a power of […] shrewdly calculating difficulties, dangers and distances, constitutes the test of a great general” (2003, p. 72). Both insisted on the strategic relevance of the terrain. Our thesis is that the mediation of the Ventimiglia terrain also is crucial in defining the balance of social forces facing each other on the borderland/battlefield. Let us be less generic when referring to the terrain. In this context of border conflict, which obviously is not warfare in its strictest sense, what is fundamentally at stake is the possibility of accessing French territory in spite of police controls. Thus, what will be of interest in our analysis are the physical elements allowing underground border crossings1 to take place, namely the set of infrastructures and vehicles of transportation, which we will refer to as the “infrastructure environment”. Roads, cars, lorries, railway lines, trains, the sea, boats, mountain trails and all existing non-human entities enable the movement of people at the very material level. One could imagine looking down on the examined region as through X-ray glasses highlighting only its infrastructural components. An important point to clarify straightaway is that in the context of this chapter the infrastructural dimension is conceived beyond any anthropocentrism and nature-culture divide. Far from the conventional representation of an entirely artificial network predisposed by man, we rather choose to conceive the infrastructure environment in more generic terms, that is as any physical ground via which movement can take place. To quote the minimalist definition of Larkin, what we are dealing with is “matter that enables the movement of other matter” (2013, p. 329). In this way, the whole terrain of the borderland can be considered regardless of the human or natural derivation of its specific components. The argument we will be putting forward is the following: by virtue of its disposition, the infrastructure environment, on the one hand, tends to

1 In line with the approach chosen by Rahola and Palmas in the book Underground

Europe (2020), we also choose to resort to the term “underground” in resonance with the American Underground Railroad of nineteenth century utilized by enslaved AfricanAmericans as an escape route. The expression should not be intended in its literal sense, but metaphorically. It fundamentally indicates human movements undetected by State authorities.

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attract fleeing migrants to the Ventimiglia region and, on the other, allows them to cross the borderland undetected. Disposition is a crucial concept in order to appreciate how the infrastructure environment can condition human actions. Architect and philosopher Keller Easterling puts it thus: “while beyond complete comprehension, disposition describes something of what the organization is doing […], an unfolding relationship between potentials. It describes a tendency, activity, faculty or property in either beings or objects – a propensity within a context” (2016, p. 72). In other words, disposition illuminates the too often neglected fact that, when inserted within an infrastructure environment, human subjects are far from being totally free and, on the contrary, they are always at least partly conditioned by non-human factors that often tend to push the course of actions and events in a particular direction. The chapter is organised as follows. The first section is dedicated to a philosophical discussion around the concept of non-human agency, with the scope of establishing a consistent theoretical ground for arguing that infrastructural entities can play a socially relevant role. In the following sections, we explore the mediation of the infrastructure environment on social dynamics between migrants and border agents, supported by empirical evidence collected via direct observations in the field. A conclusion follows, summarising the main arguments of the chapter.

5.2

Non-Human Agency

Until recently, social science accounts—with the fecund exception of those realised within the “spatial” subfields of human geography, geopolitics and military strategy (Braun and Whatmore 2010, p. xii)—have tended to interpret border dynamics in a relatively abstract way, where human beings appeared as the only true actors, while their physical surroundings remained an irrelevant contour or backdrop to their deeds. In general, it seems fair to maintain that not much attention has been accorded to the conditioning influence exerted by the physical context. And border studies make no exception. To a certain extent, it could be said that the discipline, despite its geographical roots, lost contact with the very material ground of social reality. A lack of attention towards the non-human world should not come as a surprise if one considers the anthropocentric matrix of Western epistemology. Since the dawn of study of the social in the nineteenth century, interhuman relations have methodologically been separated from their

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physical environment, in blatant disregard of the evidence that social interaction is necessarily and always carried out in synergy with nonhuman entities, be they natural or technical. Such separation reflects what might be the most fundamental partition of reality as experienced by the Western subject of knowledge: the nature-culture divide, which fundamentally is a dual system of interpretation of facts made up by “the social level of interpersonal, intersubjective relations and the natural ecological level of organism-environment interaction” (Ingold 2000, p. 48). In the light of this approach, it is normal that communication between the two domains tends to become difficult. In the last decade, for a plurality of reasons—amongst which we would like to stress the growing “ecological awareness” induced by the deterioration of life conditions on our planet (Morton 2013)—increasing attention has been paid to how non-human entities can and do affect social reality, both in academia and beyond. In the age of the Anthropocene, so intrinsically characterised by the interconnection between the social and material dimensions, an overly severe analytical isolation of interhuman relations is no longer pertinent nor appropriate, if it ever was. On the contrary, consensus is being gained by the methodological proposition whereby non-human entities should be included in the domain of sociological investigations, insofar as they make a difference to how social life is conducted. To this regard, it is worth to mention the “non-human turn” of social sciences and humanities (Grusin 2015) and the wave of “new materialist” modes of analysis (Coole and Forst 2010). In any case, beyond more or less arbitrary definitions, the relevance lies in a new, widespread tendency of social theory to fully embrace materiality. This undoubtedly represents an important rupture with the “human, too human” past of the sociological discipline, as famously evoked by Nietzsche. When it comes to observing the socially relevant influence exerted by non-human entities, the theoretical theme par excellence is “agency”, namely the capability of producing a particular effect. Before reaching the notoriety it enjoys today, the concept was employed almost exclusively by philosophers of action in order to stress the supposedly causal link subsisting between the rational and self-reflective mind of a person and his/her bodily behaviour. In short, agency was conceived as the peculiar human capacity to perform actions that qualify as “intentional under some description” (Davidson 1980). This obviously presupposed the empirical

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unity of the subject or actor. The most important ground of contestation of such an individualistic view of agency was the structuralist thesis, whereby individual persons cannot be said to be entirely free to act as they are somehow always constrained or induced to behave in a certain way by their social milieu (Archer 1995). The debate was framed in the terms of “agency-vs-structure” and was essentially a reprise of the classical sociological controversy on how society is constituted: whether the power to act is to be found at the level of individuals and individual actions or at of the level of collective aggregates and impersonal forces. The structuralist argument was certainly useful to expand the notion of agency beyond the human as an individual; however, it still gave little credit to non-human entities. As philosopher Jane Bennett (2010) rightly points out, “the productive power of structures derives from the human wills of intention within them. There is no agency proper to assemblages, only the effervescence of the agency of individuals acting alone or in concert with each other” (p. 29). Despite these important conceptual advances, the discourse on agency remained deeply anthropocentric. Following the lessons of the non-human turn and neomaterialism, two crucial theoretical operations should be performed in order to illuminate socially relevant non-human agencies. First, the concept of agency must be decoupled from that of intentionality. If the latter ceases from totalising the former, then the involvement of non-human entities into social dynamics can finally emerge. Knappett and Malafouris explicitly argue that “a recognition that agency need not be coterminous with intentionality […] releases nonhumans into the process of agency” (2008, p. xii). Put it in this way, agency becomes the generic capacity of producing effects, beyond intentionality. An agent becomes “anything that does modify a state of affairs by making a difference” (Latour 2006, p. 71), no matter what its nature, human or non-human, may be. After all, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, “the earliest use of ‘agent’ in English can be found in a treatise on alchemy, written in 1471, where it was used not in reference to a person but to denote ‘a force capable of acting on matter’” (Schlosser 2019). Once the distinction between (conscious and rational) actions and (causal) events is blurred, agency ceases to appear as a property belonging to mankind or alike moral creatures, and reveals its processual nature where both humans and non-human entities are entangled, in interaction and synergy. Second, in addition to intentionality, the concept of agency should be decoupled from that of motility—i.e. the capability of motion. Usually,

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only entities capable of autonomous movement tend to be considered as true agents, even within the non-anthropocentric field of social theory. In this sense, infrastructures and vehicles of transportation, for example, could not be included in the domain of socially relevant actors. The bond between agency and motility is a strong one and reflects another archetypal dualism of Western thought: the one between subject and object. In brief, the epistemological scheme goes as follows: on one side, there are motile entities, which qualify as active subjects and agents insofar as they can move autonomously and can therefore truly act; on the other, there are inert entities, passive objects at the mercy of external forces, not qualifying as actors, but at best resources to be exploited. In order to challenge this vision, let us draw from François Jullien’s Treatise on Efficacy (2004). The philosopher explains how Chinese thought circumvents the dichotomy subject-object through the category of process that harmonises them within their ecological unity. There is no truly personal action, as, to a certain degree, it is always deeply affected by the environment. There is rather a trans-individual transformation, determined by the overall state of a given situation or configuration. Accordingly, agency is not to be found much in moving entities, the motile Western subjects of action, but in static ones. Even though we do not fully embrace the holistic vision proposed, which in our opinion risks to fall in a determinism blind to human creativity, we nonetheless find it useful in order to move beyond a movement-centred conception of agency and to put in evidence how all entities, motile and not, co-participate in the process of agency. In the light of these theoretical considerations, the infrastructure environment, which is composed by heterogeneous non-human entities that generally are neither intentional nor motile, can emerge as a socially relevant f -actor. Borrowing again from Keller Easterling: “like an operating system, the medium of infrastructure space makes certain things possible and other things impossible” (2016, p. 15). Recent trends in border studies literature indicate that increasing relevance is being accorded to the environmental, physical conditions of migration and border dynamics. In particular, building upon methodologies mainly developed in transport and mobility studies (Urry 2006; Cresswell 2006), scholars have been starting to focus more carefully on how migratory movements relate to

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infrastructures within bordered contexts.2 Prominent border studies theorist William Walters was one of the first to call for greater analytical focus towards the physical dimension of transport in relation to migration and more specifically to underground border crossings. In the author’s own words: “the critical politics of migration would benefit from paying closer attention to the cars, trains, boats, tunnels, and roads, which constitute the materials of any journey” (2012, p. 7); “vehicles, roads, and routes merit a much more prominent place in critical thinking about migration politics” (2015, p. 471). With Walters, we definitely share the same sense of analytical urgency in paying greater attention to the material conditions of migrants’ journeys, particularly those happening without State permission. We believe that the present case study may be especially appropriate to this purpose.

5.3

The Infrastructure Environment Channels Migratory Flow

Having established the theoretical framework of the analysis, we are now ready to focus on the empirical dimension of our case study. In this section, we firstly describe the infrastructure environment of the examined borderland and, secondly, explain its decisive role in the formation of the Ventimiglia route within the European space of underground circulation (Palmas and Rahola 2020). Let us focus on the transportation system of the borderland. The Ventimiglia region is highly infrastructured. From ancient times up to the present, the favourable disposition of the natural environment has led humans to realise here key infrastructures of transportation in order to sustain the development of flows of both people and goods across the Alps. As a matter of fact, the Italian and French territories are separated by the physical barrier embodied by the Alpine mountain chain and few points of smooth transit exist. By virtue of its geomorphological (low terrain altitude) and climatic (no snow precipitations during the winter period) characteristics, Ventimiglia is one of the most apt. The first 2 To this regard, we would like to signal to our readers the important workshop Infrastructures of Injustice: Migration and Border Mobilities held on similar subjects at Nayang Technological University in Singapore in January 2019. More information can be accessed at: http://www.sss.ntu.edu.sg/NewsnEvents/Pages/Events-Detail.aspx?news= 03a49692-e178-46b8-8ac9-75dbb399058b.

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great infrastructural work in the area dates back more than two thousand years. It was the construction of the Via Iulia Augusta in ancient Roman times. On its backbone, we find the current interurban coastal road and, running parallel to it, lie the railway (completed in 1871) and the highway (completed in 1969). These lines of communication have been key in affirming the prevalence of the coastal axis over the north-south one.3 Thus, Ventimiglia qualifies as the most important passage point between Italy and France. Even though in Europe there are borderlands with a much higher volume of cross-border traffic, the local level of international flows can still be considered elevated. On the highway, this is manifested as a significant daily transit of lorries transporting goods (almost 20 million tons of freight per year) along the trade route linking the Iberian Peninsula with the Balkans through the South of France and the North of Italy (Consortium “Observatory”: Sigmaplan 2018). Another important component of the stream, in this case distributed across all channels of communication, is embodied by around five thousand commuting workers residing in Italy and working in the French Côte d’Azur and in the city-state of Monaco (Mission Opérationnelle Transfrontalière 2019). Significant numbers of international tourists moving across the two Rivieras must then be added, as well as flows of local shoppers mobilised by the opportunity of price differentials across the border. Such a high mobility rate not only demonstrates the porosity of the border and the effectiveness of transnational push-pull factors, but also that the logistical conditions of this tract are good. As a matter of fact, the connection between the main urban centres of the region (Sanremo, Ventimiglia, Menton, Monaco and Nice) either by car or train is quite fast (no more than an hour) and relatively cheap (no more than 15 euros per person). Thus, it can be said that the transportation network in itself provides its users with an easy trip from one side of the border to the other. It is within this highly infrastructured context of dense human circulation where underground border crossings also take place. These latter are not such easy trips. Firstly, we remind the reader how, in quantitative terms, the component of illegalised (De Genova and Roy 2020) migrants represents a very small percentage of overall cross-border flow. As a rough indicator: the catholic association “Caritas”, a key actor in the 3 The infrastructural connection with Piedmont through the steep Roja Valley is guaranteed only via the tortuous SS20 and a minor railway line.

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local solidarity scene providing free food and medical aid (see Trucco in this volume), registered at its facilities in Ventimiglia 15.640 migrant users in 2016 (Caritas Intemelia 2017) and 23.314 in 2017 (Caritas Intemelia 2018). Accordingly, the daily average of people trying to illicitly access French territory would have been around 42.8 in 2016 and 63.8 in 2017. Although the actual figure was likely larger on account of migrants not utilising Caritas services, we are nonetheless dealing with a “drop in the ocean” with respect to overall numbers. When considering cross-border circulation as a whole, unauthorised travellers make up an infinitesimal part of it. Does it make sense to relate the existence, development and consolidation of a migratory route passing through Ventimiglia with its infrastructure environment? Our answer is: definitely yes. In order to grasp the causal link between the two, we must only explain why illegalised migrants choose—or, better said, are inclined to choose—to access French territory through Ventimiglia rather than via alternative crossing points. The hypothesis we propose is twofold. On the one hand, unauthorised travellers make their way to Ventimiglia because the spatial disposition of the Italian transportation network channels them there. Indeed, despite its peripheral position from the largest urban agglomerations of the Italian territory, and unlike most other sections of the Italo-French border, the Ventimiglia region can be easily reached by public transport. In particular, the train represents the most suitable means of transportation for migrants. There is no need to carry a valid passport and the journey can be completed without even getting tickets.4 Sooner or later, people will reach the border town. Thus, the Ligurian railway corridor, especially the links with Rome and Milan through Genoa, plays a key role in routing and directing the fragmented yet continuous exodus of illegalised migrants towards the small border town. But that is not all. The agency of the infrastructure environment probably manifests itself even more powerfully when it comes to deciding how to access the French territory in a clandestine way. In fact, unauthorised travellers are almost always located within communitarian networks where information concerning underground logistics circulates quickly (see Amigoni et al. in this volume). Therefore, the choice to go to Ventimiglia is influenced by the knowledge and experience that the region constitutes a relatively 4 Train controllers, when present and active on a train, typically make ticketless passengers alight at the next stop and these are later free to catch the next train.

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favourable spot from which to cross the border undetected. A migrant friend met on the field once told us: “we came here because we heard that here it is easy to pass”. We believe that he and his group of friends were not the only ones to believe it. We believe that migrants primarily come to this section of the Italian-French border because they have the perception—and hope—that here underground border crossing will be easier than elsewhere. In the next section, we will explore the infrastructural dynamics of illegalised cross-border journeys in more detail. In sum, this is how the infrastructure environment “acts”: by inducing illegalised migrants into making particular spatial patterns rather than others.

5.4 Infrastructural Opportunities for Underground Border Crossings This section considers how the infrastructure environment of the Ventimiglia region tends to enable underground border crossings, thus favouring the social movement of migration to the detriment of border power. As an objective starting point, let us assume that the border in question has never been an insurmountable barrier and certainly remains so, as demonstrated by empirical evidence of various kinds— newspaper articles, institutional reports, migrants’ accounts, etc. Many people do move forward through this passage point. Thanks to their determination and creativity, migrants have always managed to keep it open, at least to a certain degree. Historically, the Ventimiglia region has been a porous borderland where the circulation of illegalised people (as well as the contraband of prohibited and/or taxed goods) has always been a concrete possibility notwithstanding the various and continuing attempts to suppress it. The most eloquent episode of mass “infiltration” of undesired people into French territory was probably the flight of Jews in 1938–1940 (Veziano 2014). But one could also mention the waves of Italians (Rinauro 2009), Slavs (Ben Khalifa 2012), Kurds, Tunisians (Garelli 2012) and the imperceptible multitude of individuals without history (see Proglio in this same volume), who have transited this borderland in search of improved life conditions. At present, most transiting migrants come from Africa and the Middle East via the socalled Central Mediterranean Corridor and the Balkan Route. People on the move have—in one way or another and with varying levels of cost and loss—managed to continue their journey through Ventimiglia and

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we believe that this is also thanks to the disposition of the infrastructure environment, a precious non-human ally on the side of illegalised migration. There are two main strategies for underground border crossings: camouflage and invisibility. This chapter exclusively focuses on the latter, but let us say just a few words on the former, too. The logic of camouflage (see Aru in this same volume) is visual rather than infrastructural: it essentially consists in the attempt of the unauthorised traveller to appear just like any other ordinary commuting worker or tourist and, by appearing as a component of the permitted flow, the hope is to pass unchecked. In this regard, it should be known that under normal circumstances, authorised travellers—who are the vast majority—are not subject to controls here. In fact, border controls are extremely selective in this borderland. One could say, quoting Erving Goffman, that migrants behave as dramaturgical performers playing strategically with their own “personal front” (1959, p. 14), which is the expressive equipment carried by all persons in the constant recital that is social life. In the case described, a deliberately deceiving representation of the self is staged by migrants in order to fool the audience of border agents. However, there are severe limitations to this practice. Indeed, “some of these vehicles for conveying signs, such as racial characteristics, are relatively fixed” (1959, p. 15) and this relative lack of fluidity makes camouflage successful prevailingly to those who are racially proximate to the standard European whiteness. For most migrants, who are non-White, camouflage is not an easy strategy to apply. The chromatic sign of skin, inexorably inscribed on the body, operates as a risk indicator that, unlike other removable signs such as the backpack, the poor look, etc., cannot be concealed. But there are other ways. As far as our case study is concerned, most underground border crossings take place when migrants manage to become invisible to the sight of border control. While camouflage, as we have just seen, consists in fooling border agents right before their eyes, invisibility implies instead that the subject is not seen at all. In this latter case, a creative interaction with the infrastructure environment that is absent in the former is key. In this borderland, multiple opportunities of “invisibilization” are offered by the infrastructure environment; it is then a question of seizing them. In summary, two main options exist: moving along unpatrolled infrastructures of transportation, or hiding within circulating vehicles—or a combination of both.

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The Ventimiglia region comprises plenty of routes allowing unauthorised travellers to access French territory invisibly. This possibility subsists because here, as well as in several other border zones, border enforcement is neither linear nor ubiquitous, but rather operates in the form of a finite number of checkpoints and patrols covering only limited portions of space. Borders, in fact, do not necessarily and always manifest as physical barriers (walls, fences, barbed wire, etc.) erected along a continuous and uninterrupted line, contrarily to what is typically conceived by the classical Euclidean geographical imagination. Moreover, even though borders could potentially be almost everywhere, in practice they are not. This counters what many contemporary theorists have been arguing in their oversimplification of the famous Balibar’s claim on the “ubiquity” of contemporary borders (Balibar 2002). On the contrary, we once again agree with Walters in asserting that contemporary borders tend to “materialize [especially] within strategic zones of the transportation system” (2015, p. 478). As a matter of fact, in this borderland at least, checkpoints and patrols are deployed almost exclusively where flows of people are expected to occur, usually in correspondence with hubs and junctures. Only the interurban road, the highway and the railway are systematically controlled by use of “barriers at the access points of the network” (Cuttitta 2006, p. 38). Border enforcement clearly operates according to an infrastructural logic. If systematic border controls are deployed only within the regular system of transportation, it follows that what lies outside this circuit stays relatively unpatrolled. In effect, with some important exceptions, surveillance is more sporadic and less intense. Thus, migrants have the opportunity to move invisibly through informal routes, through “natural” infrastructures of transportation to be found externally to the “artificial” system of circulation. As clearly emerges from historical records and from the chronicles of the present, moving up through the mountains or taking the sea have always represented almost intuitive alternatives for those blocked in Ventimiglia. It is some sort of popular wisdom: if you want to elude the sight of control and cross the border invisibly, then take the wild routes. The Ventimiglia region offers a plethora of more or less beaten mountain trails stretching across the beautiful mountains at the western tip of the Alpine chain. One of the most utilised and popularised is the famous “path of hope” (see Proglio in this same volume) (Barnabà and Trentin 2019), but several others can be found further North, too. Alongside

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all these, material traces of clandestine circulation are palpable. Abandoned on the ground lies a huge variety of clothes, shoes, toothbrushes, documents and any kind of removable items forming, once in France, hypothetical indicators that the person is travelling from Italy. There are also ruins of countryside houses employed as logistical bases. Though the idea of taking the way of the mountains may be instinctive, its realisation is not so immediate and it may even be dangerous. Some degree of local territorial knowledge is required. This is why aspiring border crossers are usually guided or even accompanied by passeurs , who supposedly have better knowledge of the territory. In any case, invisibility is not fully guaranteed even in the mountains. Controls are not systematic— with the significant exception since 2016 of the trails leading to Val Roya (see Giliberti in this same volume)—but neither are they nonexistent. In particular, small groups of well-equipped military forces may be present on the ridge, especially at night-time, when secret journeys are more frequent. As such, several migrants have reported to have been captured in the mountains; some even to have been threatened with patrol dogs. Still, the degree of militarisation of the ridge is on the whole not so high, so passage remains attainable. Taking the sea is another attractive opportunity to become invisible and elude controls. The potential for underground circulation across this natural infrastructure of transportation is enormous. As famously theorised by Deleuze and Guattari (1988), the sea is a “smooth space”: on its surface travellers can move freely in all directions and, unlike striated spaces, are not constrained to follow preordered paths. In practice, the spatialisation of flows by sea is effectively less foreseeable and controllable. Patrolling maritime borders and surveilling coastlines are always very complex and costly operations. However, very few migrants are currently taking the way of the sea in the Ventimiglia region. The reason is that apt water vehicles are not easily available to illegalised migrants as the social connection with local fishermen and other small boat owners is missing. On the contrary, during the aforementioned flight of the Jews, the most common way of reaching France was precisely via the sea, with the indispensable help of more or less professional sea passeurs (Veziano 2014). Besides “natural” routes such as mountain trails and the sea, it should be stressed that regular infrastructures of transportation can also be utilised to access the French territory undetected. But in order to succeed, these latter must be utilised in an anomalous way. For instance, both the

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railway and highway networks, though planned as mono-modal networks, are not impermeable to infiltrations as they can be walked by migrants as if they were footpaths. Since border controls are prevailingly located at specific points (stations, tolls, junctions), certain segments of these infrastructures innervating the border zone are unpatrolled and therefore are suitable for undetected movements. But that is not all. The infrastructure environment provides an even bigger opportunity for underground border crossings. The other infrastructural strategy employed to invisibly surpass the border is to hide within circulating vehicles. In normal circumstances, people travelling on cars, buses and trains are easily discernible by border agents during control procedures at checkpoints. However, the very physical structure of certain vehicles may allow unauthorised travellers to become invisible. Wannabe invisible passengers need gain access to a regularly circulating vehicle and find an effective hiding spot, somewhere where controllers do not usually watch. For instance, one could lay in the boot of a car, or in the back of vans or lorries, or in the toilets, rooftops and cavity walls of trains, and so forth. Other passengers onboard may or may not be aware of the presence of unauthorised travellers; in some cases, complicity with someone is essential. Border agents are obviously well aware of the possibility that migrants might be hiding inside vehicles. In recent years, border enforcement operations and related findings have received ample coverage on the local news, especially when the conditions of the covert “human cargo” were particularly harsh or even lethal. The dynamic of surveillance is essentially the following: when the presence of clandestine passengers onboard is suspected, the vehicle is stopped and an inspection carried out. However—and this is a big however—inspecting a vehicle is an operation that inevitably takes time. The more thorough the control, the longer the time required. And this represents a problematic issue, in economical and social terms. As we have seen, the region is characterised by a significant flux of vehicles transporting goods and people across the border. In a similar context, inspections are likely to generate bottleneck effects slowing down and potentially even disrupting the flow of authorised entities, which, we shall not forget, are the great majority. This means that the fluidity of the logistical network would be put at risk. As argued by Deborah Cowen, “for a system based not simply on connectivity but on the speed of connectivity, border security can itself be a source of insecurity for the supply chain” (2014, p. 78).

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That said, the dilemma between “the conflicting imperatives of the control of territory and the speed of supply chains” (p. 76) is not without solution. Some sort of “logistical compromise” between controls and fluidity can—and must—be found. As far as our case study is concerned, it fundamentally consists in accelerating control operations through a reduction in the quantity of entities to be controlled. As for private vehicles, normally visual checks through the windows are implemented and only suspects are asked to show their documents. Larger-sized vehicles (SUVs, caravans, vans and lorries) tend to be stopped and checked more thoroughly. Besides the attitude of individuals onboard, also the physical structure of their means of transportation operates as a risk indicator determining a higher probability of thorough inspection. Whereas the procedure is quite systematic in interurban roads, inspections are instead far less frequent on the highway. The reason is that the economic cost of congestion of the high-speed network would be much higher.5 Such difference makes the highway the privileged corridor for wannabe invisible migrants. We must now examine buses and trains connecting Italy with France. Unlike in the case of private vehicles, public means of transportation are systematically stopped at border checkpoints. While all bus passengers are identified, who are mostly travellers, the same does not happen with train users, who are mostly commuting workers. As these latter are concerned, only racially profiled suspects are asked to show passport or ID. A generalised document control would take too much time and would be unwelcomed by regular commuters. On the contrary, vehicle inspections are more severe on trains rather than on buses. The reason is the following: to get on a public bus, passengers must necessarily go through the procedure of ticket control carried out at the entrance door, while train embarkation is free. Advance knowledge of how many people are supposed to be onboard greatly simplifies the job of border agents, who need only search the vehicle if the figure of passengers checked does not correspond with that on the list provided to them by the personnel. On the contrary, in the absence of advance knowledge, all trains require

5 Lorries circulate almost exclusively on the highway. These vehicles transporting goods are integrated into a territorially disarticulated system of just-in-time production whereby the delay of a single component may generate catastrophic effects on the whole process of assembly. The fact that very few lorries are inspected therefore should come as no surprise, despite representing a very suitable vector of underground movement.

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an inspection. Moreover, hiding places are also more plentiful as the vehicle is bigger and articulated into various carriages. Still, the logistical compromise imposes that the average time of controls should not exceed a certain critical threshold, the more so because at the station of Menton Garavan, the first checkpoint within the French territory, the railway is only double-tracked and congestions are likely to happen. For this reason, agents usually limit their inspections to a quick check at public restrooms, where wannabe invisible migrants are often found locked in and sometimes even try to resist. Police agents do not have enough time to control other possible hiding spots. Thus, invisibility is a concrete possibility on the train vector, too.6 In the light of what has been reported—and there is much more that is both intentionally unreported and unknown to the author—the terrain of the Ventimiglia borderland/battlefield appears to be on the side of underground border crossings. Thanks to the disposition, or better said, the various dispositions of the infrastructure environment, illegalised migrants can take advantage of various opportunities to become invisible and advance in their journey. It is also clear, on the other hand, that if the investment on control resources and technologies were to be augmented, the level of difficulty in undertaking underground border crossings would also increase. The dramatic surge in injuries and deaths since 2016 confirms that there is a direct correlation between the intensification of bordering activities and number of casualties: when safer paths are barred, migrants are forced to try more dangerous ones at their own risk and peril. Moreover, we also suppose that the perception of a disproportionate danger would discourage several migrants from continuing their journey through this passage point, while only the most motivated would decide not to give up. Luckily, as things stand, conditions of border enforcement are dictated by the logistical compromise and the will of local populations to live without hard borders. This means there are some important economical and social limits to the application of border power. It thereby seems to us that the margin for underground movement is still ample. Undoubtedly, a strong element of physical and psychological suffering also ensues, made all the worse in moral and ethical terms 6 After reiterated discoveries of electrified dead corpses on train carriage rooftops, private security agents hired by SNCF (the French train service company) have been deployed in the station of Ventimiglia to ensure that illegalized migrants cannot infiltrate carriages and find apt hiding spots before departure, especially when vehicles are parked at night-time.

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because avoidable by means of political change. Nevertheless, thanks to the synergy between the creativity of the social movement of migration and the infrastructure environment, Ventimiglia has always been and still remains a land of passage. The French barrier is definitely not insurmountable. Any effort to render it more impermeable would require greater levels of efficacy from border enforcement.

5.5

Conclusion

This chapter aimed to demonstrate that the infrastructure environment of the Ventimiglia region plays a key role in the realisation of illegalised migrants’ underground journeys. Once established a wider conception of agency including non-human entities as socially relevant agents, it was easy to appreciate the powerful influence exerted by the terrain of the borderland/battlefield on the struggle between migrants and border power. In the first place, we have tried to show how the very same migratory route is codetermined by the spatial disposition of the transportation network channelling the flow, on the one hand, and by the informal knowledge available to migrants that clandestine border crossings are feasible here, on the other. Thus, the infrastructure environment appears to be to a large extent accountable for the fact that Ventimiglia is widely utilised as a passage point across the Italian-French border. In the second place, we have analysed the contribution of actually existing infrastructures and vehicles of transportation, both “natural” and “artificial”, and come up to the assumption that, thanks to some of their less obvious dispositions, they offer a wide range of feasible opportunities for underground movement. Thus, as the local infrastructure environment allows illegalised migrants to become invisible and elude the sight of surveillance, we believe it is legitimate to consider it as a f -actor favouring the social movement of migration to the detriment of border power. Last but not least, we should emphasise that the socially relevant non-human agency of the infrastructure environment reveals itself only in synergy with the activities of human beings. Agency is not a property belonging to someone or something, but a process codetermined by both humans and non-humans. It follows that the set of infrastructures and vehicles of transportation innervating the Ventimiglia region can become an ally of the social movement of migration only insofar as migrants are creative agents capable of acting strategically in the borderland/battlefield.

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CHAPTER 6

The Moral Economy of a Transit Camp: Life and Control on the Italian-French Border Marta Menghi

6.1

Introduction

Located about an hour and a half’s walk from the city centre of Ventimiglia (Italy), the Roya Camp was born as a temporary reception structure for migrants and informally defined as a ‘transit camp’. Situated 5 km away from the central station, it occupies an abandoned area, crossed by the dead tracks of a disused railway line. For the town folk, it conveniently remains out of sight. The management of the structure is entrusted to the Italian Red Cross. Active since 16 July 2016, the camp was hurriedly set up in order to avoid the emergence of illegal camps and mitigate the overcrowding that had occurred in the parish of St. Antonio, long since a place of hospitality for migrants. Within the normative vacuum created by the so-called hotspot model, the camp does not fully assume the profile of a detention centre, nor does it properly follow the form of a temporary reception centre. This kind of indeterminacy, combined with the emergency nature it has assumed

M. Menghi (B) University of Genoa, Genoa, Italy © The Author(s) 2021 L. Amigoni et al. (eds.), Debordering Europe, Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56518-3_6

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since the outset, makes the camp an expression of a particular economy of containment beyond detention. The function of this camp, therefore, lies at the junction between measures of administrative detention and the pre-border containment of migrants in transit. Thus, the camp marks a distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ conducts of migrants (Foucault, Sécurité, Territoire, Population 1978) in order to optimise control over the erratic geographies of the subjects. The creation of the camp is therefore not only functional to the discipline of migrant conducts, regulating the spatial-temporal dimension of waiting (Fontanari 2016), but also able to turn management into value, within the context of an overall economy of control: mobilising bodies to relieve the pressure on the border, arranging a surveillance apparatus aimed at slowing down and subverting individual trajectories, installing structures to manage a condition of ‘structural emergency’. The following chapter focuses on the moral economy of the ItalianFrench frontier and the mechanisms it adopts for legitimising its existence. In fact, it could be assumed that the space itself becomes a form of regulation: a manifestation of that widespread practice of controlling ‘mobility through mobility’ (Tazzioli 2016). The fieldwork was conducted between December 2017 and October 2018 through an intense and active presence in the area, using qualitative research methodologies, such as ethnography, participatory observation and dialogue with the actors involved. The data collected in the field were then cross-referenced with the quantitative apparatus and narratives provided by institutional representatives. During the research activity, I collected 32 pre-structured interviews with migrants present on the territory and with various territorial actors, NGO operators and institutional representatives, and conducted several monitoring activities—night and day—relying on the support of militants and activists living and crossing the numerous borders of Ventimiglia.

6.2

A Laboratory

Although the attention of the majority of sociologists, anthropologists, urban planners and political scientists has focused rather on the more paradigmatic conformations of the raging space in the logistic paradigm, in recent years an increasing awareness has been paid to the increasing role gained from the effects that this rationality has produced in the optimising of the underlying logics of humanitarian governance (Cuppini and Peano

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2019). If we consider logistical space both as a generalising trend that pushes its horizon of integration beyond and as a logic that develops on circumscribed ‘laboratory’ spaces, enclaves with watertight compartments and quarantine territories, it is possible to notice how the alternation of a certain circulatory rationality allows in an increasingly marked way to integrate with the urban spaces and technological imperatives that can provide a solution to ‘repetitive and modular problems’ (Cowen 2014). At present, Ventimiglia’s border is a ‘police laboratory for joint patrols’1 a highly militarised area with large number of police forces and private surveillance personnel. In addition to the Dublin Regulation, customary cross-border control activity is regulated by a bilateral cooperation agreement for the control of the French-Italian border area: the so-called Chambery Agreement, dating back to 1997.2 It provides for close cooperation between the two respective national police forces and the possibility of readmitting citizens who cross the border without a valid travel document back into Italian territory. According to data released by the Prefecture of Imperia, 23,834 people were readmitted from France in the year 2017 alone. During the summer of 2016, in the area of the former railway station used before the Schengen Agreement to carry out customs control activities, the Roya Camp was installed: a temporary reception facility informally defined as ‘transit camp’. The camp is located about 5 km from the station and about an hour and a half’s walk from the city centre, in a barren, disused area, far from public eye. It is landmarked by old sheds, several abandoned buildings and the dead tracks of a disused railway line. The Roya Camp is invisible to the eyes of those who cross the town of Ventimiglia and can only be reached by passing through the hamlet of Roverino and continuing for several miles without pavement or roadside protection, ultimately requiring the crossing of the junction leading to the motorway entrance. The camp’s land area is partly state property and partly owned by Rete Ferroviaria Italiana S.p.a. and is currently subject to a process of speculative exploitation. The management of the structure 1 See http://www.lastampa.it/2018/02/14/imperia/polizia-di-frontiera-di-ventimiglianumeri-da-record-nel-bilancio-rPwCi1vgdBxPL664NwvUiM/pagina.html. 2 Agreement between the Government of the Italian Republic and the Government of the French Republic on cross-border cooperation in police and customs matters of 3 October 1997. See http://www.camera.it/_bicamerali/schengen/docinte/ACCITFR. htm.

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has been entrusted to the Italian Red Cross by the prefectural authority. Active since 16 July 2016, the camp was originally installed in order to avoid the emergence of illegal camps and reduce overcrowding that had been determined in the parish of St. Anthony, long since a place of hospitality for migrants. The camp’s inception follows the dismantling of a first reception centre, managed by the local committee of the same entity and located in the former railway staff dormitory adjacent to the station. As confirmed by the former camp director: ‘An area other than where the previous camp was located was found, no longer adjacent to the railway station. A much larger place, a little more isolated from the city, the Roya Camp was established. The land where the new location was scoped, was a former abandoned freight park also owned by the State Railways, partly by the Municipality. It was an open area where there was talk of positioning the housing modules: initially 30 modules containing 6 accommodations each, equipped with air conditioning for the summer and heating for the winter. The Prefecture of Imperia took care of the material needed for the accommodation modules’. The camp consists of 79 dormitory containers, a tent dedicated to the function of canteen, three containers devoted to educational activities and a medical clinic, one dedicated to the play area for children housed in the camp (donated by the Monegasque Red Cross) and an office building for the administrative activities of operators and managers. Next to the large entrance gate there are two additional modular structures dedicated to the control and monitoring of attendance. One is occupied by the police and the other by Red Cross operators. Access is guarded around the clock by army officers, who are responsible for security checks on every guest entering and leaving the camp. The part of the structure dedicated to controls is separated from the camp access area by a turnstile and a series of metal barriers. During an interview, one of the camp’s operators pointed out that this measure had been introduced in order to guarantee the security of migrants. The rules of procedure provide for access to the camp from 7 a.m. to 10 p.m., with exception of women and minors on first entry. No white weapons or alcohol may be introduced inside, no smoking or eating is permitted in the accommodation blocks, and external persons not accredited by the prefectural authorities are forbidden entry. Most of the containers are arranged in two parallel rows and intended for the reception of adult men; 16 are instead aimed at accommodating women, families and unaccompanied minors. The latter containers are found in the first division of the area, where access is forbidden for other guests of the camp. Each guest

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is issued with a magnetic badge, which, once active, allows them to enter and exit. If the guest is absent for a period exceeding 48 hours, access is immediately suspended, and the registration process must be repeated by re-submitting to security checks. Several respondents testify that those who do not enter by 10 p.m. lose their right to reception. If one does not come back after 10 p.m., he or she does not sleep. There are some people who climb over, from behind: if they notice they take your card away, on the first day if you arrive late you sleep outside, then you can talk to them and they make you a new card. The police sometimes provoke people. (F., February 2018)

Almost all guests report the absence of hot water in the showers for the most part of the day and the lack of functioning toilets. Upon arrival, each person is subject to photo signalling and identification procedures using S.P.A.I.D. (Peripheral Digital Footprint Acquisition System), receiving a magnetic identification card (including a photo) that allows access to the structure and canteen spaces at the scheduled times. As the interviewed officials state, the Prefecture of Imperia can constantly monitor the number of entries, exits and access to meals. Many guests also report that access is not allowed to those with criminal precedents: Sometimes, while I was going out, I saw the police check some guys, because if you have a criminal record you can’t enter the Red Cross and if they find out from the prints that you have a criminal record they call the police to look for you, and take you away. (F., February 2018)

The photo-dactyloscopic recognition takes place via instruments capable of acquiring images of papillary fingerprints, which, after being processed through an algorithm, are quickly compared with those present in the AFIS (Automatic Fingerprint Identification System for the Central State Police Register) database. According to officials and operators, the camp can accommodate up to 500 people, but during the summer of 2017 it hosted up to 700–800 migrants, thanks to the installation of additional tensile structures. An average of about six or seven people sleep on camping cots inside each container. Each container is a standard 20 feet unit that measures 14.64 square metres internally. All containers are equipped with a door and a small square window on the front side. Each migrant therefore has, on average, less than 3 square metres of

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habitable space, despite the sales manager of the company Fae-Technifor S.p.a.—in charge of the rental of the emergency housing modules— stating that a structure of about 15 square metres is designed to ensure good habitability for a maximum of two people. In short, the camp does not fully assume the profile of a detention centre, nor does it take the form of a temporary reception centre. And yet it is precisely this indeterminacy, along with its fundamentally emergency nature, that defines a particular economy of containment beyond detention, where the space itself becomes a form of regulation, a manifestation of government of ‘mobility through mobility’ (Garelli and Tazzioli 2018). It is not well framed in any one of the usual categories of reception centers. It is a structure for foreigners in transit and exists only in this province and in Como. It was born out of the need to provide an answer to the territory of Ventimiglia in a moment of particular [migratory] flow. The structure was activated after an agreement with the central offices of the Ministry of the Interior. It was born out of a need that emerged from the massive influx of foreign citizens who were in Ventimiglia, forced in the funnel of the border and trying to pass without succeeding, or sometimes succeeding after several attempts. There were camps everywhere in Ventimiglia: in the city centre, along the Roya, on the riverbank, near the railway station, in the various areas of aggregation. So, in order to give a minimum response to the need to contain this phenomenon, the activation of a reception center was conceived, to at least provide food and sleep, the possibility to take a shower, to wash clothes. (C. M., Head of Immigration Office, February 2018)

Despite not being a detention centre, the organisation of the structure reduces the movement space of the people who live there, forcing them to submit to a certain disciplinary regime. The Roya Camp is at the same time the ‘not completely open’ and ‘not completely closed’ place of a governance that exploits the ambiguities of the absence of a specific regulatory provision. As the National Guarantor of the rights of detained persons always reports in a further parliamentary report3 :

3 See Garante Nazionale dei diritti delle persone detenute o private della libertà, “Norme e Normalità, standard per la privazione della libertà delle persone migranti. Raccolta delle Raccomandazioni 2016-2018”, http://www.garantenazionaleprivatiliberta.it/gnpl/resour ces/cms/documents/ef9c34b393cd0cb6960fd724d590f062.pdf.

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Without a clear normative definition of the hotspots and considering the extreme variety of activities that take place within them and the heterogeneity of vocations and tasks of the various actors, hotspots risk generating grey areas by becoming open or closed structures depending on the needs of the Public Security Authority and the procedures put in place. The legal ambiguity of these places thus ends up affecting the personal freedom of the guests, who, moreover, cannot enjoy judicial protection.

6.3

Circular Government

Such a response, via the institution of a camp, is therefore not only functional to the regulation of transits, regulating the spatiotemporal dimension of waiting (Fontanari 2016), but is also able to enhance an overall economy of management and control. As reported in the document addressed to the Head of Cabinet of the Ministry of the Interior, following the first visit in December 2016 by the National Guarantor of the rights of persons detained or deprived of their personal liberty, ‘the structure, which is not one of the reception centres for asylum seekers, is of a strictly emergency nature and despite the great work carried out by operators working in extremely critical and difficult situations, it appears to be an inadequate response both in material and functional terms’.4 The words of one of the former officials of the camp underline the decidedly strategic position of the camp, since Ventimiglia is a crucial junction for accessing French territory and more generally for migration routes towards northern Europe: And then it’s not that they are just standing there, they are people who are moving, their will is not to stay there, the Ventimiglia area is a border area, a door, and so we think that 80% of people cross this border. In spite of myself, it is not an emergency, but a structural phenomenon, and therefore the camp has adapted not to face an emergency, but a structural phenomenon, which is this. It was managed in an emergency, as it was in 2015 at the station, but one camp was closed, another camp was opened, and already back then it was understood that the phenomenon was continuous, that this is a structural phenomenon. And then the field was modified, everything was re-evaluated, the whole circuit, and so, it

4 See Garante Nazionale dei diritti delle persone detenute o private della libertà personale, “Visita al campo di accoglienza sito a Ventimiglia presso lo scalo merci di proprietà di Rete Ferroviaria Italiana - Campo Roya”, 26 December 2016, prot. 5/2016.

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changes from day to day. (W.M., Former Red Cross manager of the Roya camp, March 2018)

The mechanism of control of migratory movements is in fact inscribed within the constitution of a governmental apparatus aimed at the creation of ‘logistical spaces’ (Cowen 2014) closely related to the management of mobility. In this sense, the processes of blocking and obstruction are part of a broader logic of selection and control that does not directly feed a real economy of deportation (De Genova 2002) and is rather oriented towards the definition of a system of channelling, re-direction and reversal of the autonomous routes of people in transit (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013). It is essentially in this dimension of circular or circulatory government that the use of an ambiguous formula such as ‘transit centre’ is justified. The Roya Camp, in fact, lacks a precise juridical definition: the normative formalisation of the destination of the structure resides in the constraint of Law No. 563 of 1995, the so-called Puglia Law; in nuce this lays the foundations that led to the installation of the present reception centres5 and in the following conversion of Legislative Decree No. 142 of 18 August 2015 to Legislative Decree No. 13 of 17 February 2017, the so-called Minniti-Orlando Decree. The latter contains urgent provisions to speed up international protection procedures and to combat illegal immigration (converted into Law No. 103 of 23 June 2017). However, it cannot be classified, let’s say, in the usual categories, it is not a Hub, a Sprar, it is not a Cas, it is nothing of the sort. But it collects the peculiarities of some of these, because what is the objective? That, as I was saying, to ensure an adequate stay. It’s for foreigners in transit. Centre for foreigners in transit. […] To deal with migrants who are not necessarily asylum seekers, who arrive for the purpose of transfer, of crossing the border and therefore this centre was built, we can say, by analogical reference. Here, we have made an analogical reference to the rules and criteria governing reception centres in Italy, and we have made reference to everything that can be applied to all this - let’s say anomalous - type of centre. […] What are the peculiarities? First of all, a much faster flow, that is, people stay much less than in the Cas. This is a peculiarity. So, we had 5 Decreed the opening for the years 1995, 1996 and 1997, of receptive structures along the Adriatic border in order to face the needs of first reception and rescue of refugees landing from the Balkan coast.

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to size and regulate this convention precisely because of the short time. (C.M., Head of Immigration Office, February 2018)

As one of the officials interviewed pointed out, the Roya Camp was set up in order to govern a condition of structural and repeated instability, to manage an emergency ‘that is not an emergency’, and that it is absurd to continue calling ‘emergency’ at this stage. However, like a temporary reception structure, it follows the emergency typologies of the humanitarian model: within the camp, migrants have the possibility to be examined by a doctor, to receive clothes, to obtain all the information useful for their stay. As one of the operators of the structure confirms: ‘If they want to stay in Italy, we have three possibilities: the application for political asylum, the assisted repatriation managed by the International Organization for Migration, and the relocation for the people who have the right to it’. Despite this, access to the camp is also guaranteed to those who do not show the will to adhere to any of the channels described above, whose stay may last several months. ‘We had specified in the regulation that people could stay within the structure for ten days if they did not choose to apply for political asylum. So, during these ten days the guests had to think, reflect, if they wanted to apply. We never applied it. And we never applied it because people stay as long as they want, they come and go when they want, they leave, they try to go to France and they come back, and they are reactivated with a badge’, says one of the camp workers. In the overall economy of the Ventimiglia border, which in 2015/2016 was a crucial transit point to French territory for tens of thousands of people, the establishment of the transit camp coincides with a new phase. On the Italian side, in fact, the development of a ‘flow decompression strategy’ began to take shape in the summer of 2016, through the adoption of a model of intervention that the current Chief of Police, Franco Gabrielli, has defined as ‘easing and reducing migratory pressure on the border’. The logic is always to avoid overcrowding, because imagine what happens, what has happened in recent years with this constant influx to a single point, because nowhere else in the national territory this happens, perhaps in other northern borders, it seems to me that in Como there is a center, or even in the eastern border … Imagine what happens if there was not this, say. […] It’s a sort of recall, I don’t know if you’ve seen it, then the

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numbers show it. […] And this could only be done by creating a system of police vigilance and both with these transports, movements, necessary by … it is obvious that once they are brought to these centers, people if they want to return, they must return, if they want to try again to cross the border they return with their means, and this is a phenomenon that unfortunately we have recorded and … But consider that they are not inmates, they are placed in special centers where they should stay. (M.G., Deputy Prefect of Imperia, January 2018)

As the interview shows, the normalisation of detentions that unlocks the implementation of forced transfer procedures to the hotspots of Taranto and Crotone (defined ‘crisis points’ in the Minniti-Orlando decree) represents a crucial tool for the governmental-sovereign machine (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013). What emerges from the words of the Vice Prefect of Imperia is confirmed by numerous published reports.6 There is a double motivation that officially accompanies the operations: if, on the one hand, there is a logistical rationality for the transfers, motivated by the need to relieve the migratory pressure on the ‘hottest’ borders; on the other hand, the securitarian nexus of the operations is recalled, underlining the disciplinary nature of interventions of ‘protection of the public space’. Evidently, the political significance of such transfers can be traced well beyond the mere needs mentioned thus far. As confirmed by the prefectural authorities and on the basis of the testimonies of numerous activists, members of NGOs, and migrants met on the territory, the transfers from Ventimiglia entrusted by the Prefecture of Imperia to Riviera Trasporti S.p.A. take place almost on a weekly basis: Once I was walking with a Togolese coming from Germany, they stopped me two kilometers from the camp and took us to the barracks. […] That card [the magnetic card issued at the time of the first access to Camp Roya, Editor’s note] is not needed outside the Red Cross: that day I showed them that card and they told me “it is not needed outside the camp”. They make you sleep first at the Carabinieri, there’s a big room there, you sleep there until morning and then they put you all together and take you to Taranto. (K. April 2018)

6 Further information can be accessed at: http://www.lastampa.it/2016/08/09/edi zioni/imperia/cura-decompressione-per-i-migranti-al-confine-BK085LGShijn006klZfvlL/ pagina.html and http://www.euronomade.info/?p=9649.

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Dealing with Life

In this regard, it seems appropriate to reflect on the particular temporality of a jurisdictional regime which, as Enrica Rigo (2017) points out, is modelled on the pace and rhythms of different actors: on the one hand, the time taken by the police apparatus to act; on the other hand, that of the detained subjects. Similarly, the ambiguity of this type of structure is consistent with the regulatory logic of emergency management: the rules are gradually introduced, and the disciplinary device is progressively improved in relation to the movements of the subjects themselves. This circular process can be observed if we focus on the administration of the temporality of the stay, on the progressive modifications of the border areas, on the improvement of the racial profiling measures aimed at the rejection of those passing through France, on the introduction of more and more accurate identification measures within the camp, etc. The need to introduce such measures is substantiated by a progressive functionalisation of the ‘trapping’ apparatus. As testified by the On the frontline report: the hotspot approach to migration management introduced for the first time by the European Agenda on Migration of 2015. Advocated by the JURI Commission of the European Parliament7 in May 2016 (Cuttitta 2017) (Kasparek and Hess 2017) was not formalised until February 2017, although implemented in practice for over a year. The emergency nature of the adopted measures, as framed by Iside Gjergji (2013a) in the definition of ‘government by circulars’, shows in fact how much ‘a power that has the task of dealing with life’ needs ‘continuous, regulatory and corrective mechanisms’ and responds to a distribution criterion ‘in a broad domain of value and utility’ (Foucault 1976, p. 128). As of January 2018, the camp recorded a large presence of migrants from Bangladesh and Pakistan, as well as from West, East and Central Africa, the Maghreb and the Middle East. For many asylum seekers, the stay lasted several months. With the tightening of the control procedures at the French border (Giliberti 2018), Ventimiglia has thus become the last landing place or the unexpected stopover of a crossing trajectory decided after a long stay on the territory. In so doing, many migrants

7 See European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, “On the Frontline: The Hotspot Approach to Managing Migration”, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/it/document.html?reference=IPOL_STU(201 6)556942, 2016.

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become prisoners of the contradictions of the European asylum system and decide to leave after many years in the country, to avoid ‘the risk of the road’. Those who do not meet the criteria for access to the formal camp scatter throughout the city. Until April 2018, the date when the informal camp was cleared, they are hosted along the bank of the Roya River. In this way, a line of separation that distinguishes the ‘good’ from the ‘bad’ conducts is a response to the imposition of a pastoral, mixed and governmental power which attempts to level and channel the temporality of the subjects, in order to fit and frame the existence of selective redistribution within predefined trajectories (Mountz et al. 2013; Tazzioli 2016): They don’t want to leave footprints. They say that if they go to Germany or France with those footprints taken in Italy they do not let them pass. They are afraid to go to the camp and some stay there under the bridge. (K., March 2018)

The informal camp was a space next to the city centre which, not without margins of ambiguity, was constantly reconstituting itself, beyond the numerous attempts at eviction imposed by the administration. Inside, the control measures, the rules of permanence and the resulting protection regimes were continually being renegotiated. The faint external boundary that surrounds the informal camp then overlaps through racially motivated measures. So that, ‘under the bridge’ brought to light the desire to at least partially escape the selective needs of such a trapping apparatus that catalogues and controls: reclaiming the urban centre and there claiming—paradoxically—the right to a shadowy zone is a manifestation of an implicit refusal of traceability. As pointed out by Didier Bigo (2006, pp. 5–49), refugees and asylum seekers are part of a securitisation process in which the game of differentiating ‘real’ asylum seekers from ‘illegal’ migrants is played. This helps the former by condemning the latter and thus justifying the tightening of border control. Bigo highlights how the process of securitisation and border control is able to reverse the relationship between norm and exception, activating emergency normalisation practices that make forms of limitation of rights ordinary. These are associated with the necessity of prevention from a state of generalised threat, in order to govern social dangerousness at a distance, in time and space. According to the author, the control practices activated by the security machine are not so much the generalisation of a panoptic model that

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exposes all individuals to arbitrary power, but rather a ‘distributive’ issue of bodies in space. The effect of a project whose primary objective is the selection of people. In fact, this process of selective inclusiveness is particularly addressed to the minorities identified as undesirable on the basis of the prediction of their potential future behaviour. Within the production of this truth regime and the battle to establish the legitimacy of the causes of fear and uncertainty, there is a long list of (in)security professionals who form professional corporate alliances to reinforce the credibility of their claims.

6.5

Conclusion

First of all, in these pages, we tried to show how the presence of the Roya ‘transit‘ camp demonstrates continuity with respect to a form of management of border spaces that mobilises bodies to relieve border pressure. This manifests in surveillance apparatus aimed at slowing down and subverting individual trajectories, alongside the installation of structures to manage and regain control over the erratic geography of subjects. Both informal and camps are surrounded by faint and imprecise borders. In one, there are containers and in the other (there were) shacks: forms whose analogous temporary nature suggests different ways of inhabiting a space and passing time. The daily practices of both the migrants who cross the border area and the operators who administer it show how the presence of the first camp does not exclude that of the second, suggesting, on the contrary, how one reaffirms and projects its legitimacy and shadow on the other. Taking up the distinction made by Zinganel (2019, p. 55) between ‘nodes and knots’, in which the former come from institutional strategies that operate through logistical networks and mobility corridors, while the latter are related to the tactics operated by subjects that must meet their daily needs in transit, the spaces of the formal and informal camp can be perceived as ‘polyrhythmic’ sets of (post-)urban architecture, mobile objects that challenge the traditional notion of public space. More generally, Ventimiglia represents a unique observation point to understand how, starting from the adoption of the so-called hotspot model, the lockout measures implemented on the internal borders of Europe are inscribed in a wider management logic.

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References Bigo, D. (2006). Globalized (In)Security: The Field and the Ban-Opticon—Illiberal Practices of Liberal Regimes; the (In)Security Games. Paris: L’Harmattan. Cowen, D. (2014). The Deadly Life of Logistics: A Genealogy of Logistics, Tracing the Link Between Markets and Militaries, Territory and Government. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Cuppini, N., & Peano, I. (2019). Un mondo logistico, sguardi critici su lavoro, migrazioni, politica e globalizzazione. Milano: Ledizioni. Cuttitta, P. (2016). The Way to the Italian Hotspots: The Space of the Sea Between Reception and Containment. Society & Space. Cuttitta, P. (2017). Delocalization, Humanitarianism and Human Rights: The Mediterranean Border between Exclusion and Inclusion. Antipode: A radical Journal of Geography, 50, 1–21. De Genova, N. (2002). Migrant “Illegality” and Deportability in Everyday life. Annual Review of Anthropology, 31, 419–447. Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (1980). Mille Plateaux. Paris: Minuit. Fontanari, E. (2016). Subjectivity in Transit: Refugees’ Immobility in Europe Between Systems of Control and Daily Practices of Border Crossing. Etnografia e Ricerca Qualitativa, 1, 39–60. Foucault, M. (1976). La volontà di sapere. Milano: Feltrinelli. Foucault, M. (1978). Sécurité, Territoire, Population. Paris: Gallimard. Garelli, G., & Tazzioli, M. (2018). Containment Beyond Detention: The Hotspot System and Disrupted Migration Movements Across Europe. Society and Space, 0, 1–19. Giliberti, L. (2018). La militarisation de la frontière franco-italienne et le réseau de solidarité avec les migrantes dans la Vallée de la Roya. Mouvements, 1, 149–155. Gjergji, I. (2013a). Circolari amministrative e immigrazione. Milano: Franco Angeli. Gjergji, I. (2013b). L’infradroit des étrangers: le gouvernement par circulaires et la gestion administrative des mouvements migratoires en Italie. Migration Societé, 3–4(147–148), 53–70. Kasparek, B., & Hess, S. (2017). De- and Restabilising Schengen: The European Border Regime After the Summer of Migration. Cuadernos Europeos de Duesto, 56, 47–77. Mezzadra, S. (2016). What’s at Stake in the Mobility of Labour? Borders, Migration, Contemporary Capitalism. Migration, Mobility & Displacement, 2(1), 30–43. Mezzadra, S., & Neilson, B. (2013). Border as Method, or the Multiplication of Labor. Durham: Duke University Press.

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Mountz, A., Coddington, K., Catania, R. T., & Loyd, J. M. (2013). Conceptualizing Detention: Mobility, Containment, Bordering, and Exclusion. Progress in Human Geography, 37, 522–541. Pallister-Wilkins, P. (2018). Hotspots and the geographies of humanitarianism. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 36, 114–138. Rahola, F. (2015). As We Go Along. Spazi, tempi e soggetti delle controcondotte. Materiali Foucaltiani, 4(7–8), 275–294. Rigo, E. (2017). Spazi di trattenimento, spazi di giurisdizione: Note a margine di materiali di ricerca sulla detenzione amministrativa dei migranti. Materiali Per Una Storia Della Cultura Giuridica, 67 (2), 457–494. Tazzioli, M. (2016). Identify, Label, and Divide: The Temporality of Control and Temporal Borders in the Hotspots. Society and Space, 30, 445–464. Zinganel, M. (2019). Stop and Go: Nodes of Transformation and Transition. Berlin: Sternberg Press.

CHAPTER 7

The Irregular Border: Theory and Praxis at the Border of Ventimiglia in the Schengen Age Giacomo Donadio

7.1

Introduction

The internal borders of the European Union (EU) have witnessed multiple tensions develop over recent years. These are the visible manifestation of a Europe highly polarised between north and south (Balibar 2015; Heller and Pezzani 2016; Kasparek 2016) and call into question the process of border dissolution that some analysts—as well as a sizeable portion of public opinion—have long considered to be definitively underway.

Parts of the considerations made in this chapter have been published in the review of international affairs Cidob d’Afers Internacionals (Barbero and Donadio 2019), although formulated from a comparative angle and a different perspective. G. Donadio (B) Department of Administrative Law, Constitutional Law, and Philosophy of Law, University of the Basque Country (UPV-EHU), Bilbao, Spain © The Author(s) 2021 L. Amigoni et al. (eds.), Debordering Europe, Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56518-3_7

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Such dynamics confirm that the existence of an area of free movement within the EU, far from being an unconditional fact, actually depends on the effectiveness of the fortification processes that characterise the EU’s external borders (Léonard 2010; Campesi 2015; López-Sala 2015; Monar 2017), as well as the externalisation strategies applied in order to control migration (Zapata Barrero 2013; Zaiotti 2016; Akkermann 2018). It is growingly evident that the incomplete fulfilment of such processes and strategies has severe implications on the functioning of the Schengen Area. Ventimiglia’s recent history can be viewed as a paradigm of this problematic relationship between external and internal dimensions of EU border control. During the first months of 2011, the arrival of thousands of young Tunisians in Italy (Malmström 2011) after the fall of the Ben Ali regime led to the unilateral reintroduction of border control by the French authorities at the French-Italian border (Anafé-Gisti 2011; Carrera et al. 2011; La Cimade 2018; Bosson and Etzold 2018). Such controls gradually faded following the rise of strong tensions between the two countries (Zaiotti 2011). Four years later, in June 2015 (in the midst of the so-called “migration crisis”), a border control regime was reintroduced by France (at first unilaterally, and applying relevant procedures formally required by Schengen legislation only after November 2015). Since then, border controls have never been lifted (European Commission 2020), contributing to a systematic humanitarian crisis that has never ceased since. As a consequence of persistent and increasingly strict border controls, as well as threats and abuses from police officers (La Cimade 2018; Oxfam 2018; Anafé 2019), migrants found alternative and riskier paths of border crossing.1 More than 20 deaths have been registered in recent years as a result of failed border-crossing attempts (United 2019).

1 It is worth noting cases of border-crossing attempts undertaken by covert travelling on the roof of trains or in the electrical cabins of wagons, by walking along the highway or on railway tracks or by walking through mountain passes such as the dangerous “Passo della Morte” in the Maritime Alps.

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Similar dynamics have long affected the northernmost part of the French-Italian border.2 This became most evident around the Susa Valley, where attempts to cross the border on foot intensified considerably, particularly since summer 2017. This produced much preoccupation due to the high risks associated with crossing these mountainous areas during what had been a long, snowy, winter season. Several cases of hypothermia (in some cases resulting in limb amputations) and the death of six people have been registered in recent years. All the above cases reflect a European immigration and asylum policy consisting, right from its outset, in the selective control of immigration, executed via a series of regulatory and physical instruments applied at different locations along the migration route (Huysmans 2000; Guiraudon 2003; Solanes 2005; Barbero 2012; Mezzadra and Neilson 2013). One aspect that begs particular attention is the tangible way in which these policies have recently characterised reciprocal relations between certain Member States. Internal borders reflect a complex— and often conflicting—relational dimension, coded in a series of legal instruments. Many of these instruments find a strong correspondence with those typically used to externalise border control operations to third countries, such that the dynamics currently in place between European Member States effectively appear as the “internal externalisation” of such controls (Heller and Pezzani 2016; Barbero and Donadio 2019). In this chapter, we aim to explore the legal framework that regulates and shapes the management of the French-Italian border. To this end, the object of the review will focus on the most significant attributes of: (i) the Schengen legislation, in relation to the temporary reintroduction of border controls at internal borders, and French legislation on identity checks (as recently amended) (§2); (ii) the bilateral agreements between France and Italy of 1997, on police cooperation and on readmission of foreign people in irregular status condition (§3); and (iii) the CESEDA rules applicable to refus d’entrée proceedings in France (§4). As will be argued, the legal and practical consequences deriving from the application and the violation of the above norms underscore the glaring existence of an internal border regime, which leaves much room for discretionary law enforcement. These paragraphs shall therefore be read as an attempt to 2 Regarding the dynamics characterising the northern area of the border, it is worth noting a recent article of Maurizio Pagliassotti (2019) and the documentary “The Milky Way” of Luigi D’Alife (2019).

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shed light on the structural dimension of an “irregularity” condition that seems to be coessential to the border regime itself.

7.2

The Reintroduction of Border Control in the Schengen Borders Code (SBC)3 and French Legislation on Identity Checks 7.2.1

The Schengen Legal Framework

The general rule that prohibits controls on internal borders—the core of the Schengen legislation—is relaxed not only by a certain degree of uncertainty around what exactly qualifies as “border controls”4 (as opposed to “admitted controls”5 ), but also by the provision of three distinct procedures by which the reintroduction of such controls is permitted. The first, regulated by Articles 25–27 of the SBC, allows, as a last resort, reintroduction of border control during renewable periods of up to thirty days each (and six months overall), when a serious threat to public policy or internal security arises in a Member State. Article 26 calls for the need to evaluate the adequacy and proportionality of the measure when confronted with the existing threat, taking into account the likely impact on public policy, internal security, and the free movement of persons. Article 27 lays out the applicable procedure, including the obligation to notify other Member States and the Commission, which provide consultation and may additionally issue advice. The second, regulated by Article 28 of the SBC, applies to instances in which immediate action is required. In this case, internal border controls can be reintroduced for renewable periods of up to ten to twenty days each and two months. In this instance, too, the initiative must be notified to the other Member States and the Commission (and analogous consultation procedures and adequacy-proportionality criteria applied). 3 Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the Movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code). 4 This uncertainty is reflected in the underlying case law. See, in this sense: Judgment of the Court of Justice of 22 June 2010, Melki and Abdeli, joined cases C-188/10 and C-189/10, ECLI:EU:C:2010:363; Judgement of the Court of Justice of 19 July 2012, Adil, Case C-278/12 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2012:508; Judgment of the Court of Justice of 21 June 2017, Criminal proceedings against A, Case C-9/16, ECLI:EU:C:2017:483. 5 This is the kind of control referred to under Article 23 SBC.

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The third, regulated by Article 29 of the SBC, concerns cases in which the overall functioning of an area surrounding internal borders is put at risk as a result of serious and persistent external border control deficiencies on the part of one or more Member States. Here, internal border controls may be reintroduced, as a last resort, for longer renewable periods of up to six months each and two years overall. In this case, however, the measure must be taken pursuant to the initiative of the European Council (and not the Member States themselves). The Council’s recommendation must itself be based on a proposal from the Commission, to which Member States may address their request. The criteria for the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders in this case are laid out under Article 30, and essentially relate to the adequacy and proportionality of the measure in relation to the threat, taking into account: (a) the availability of technical and financial support measures; (b) the current and likely future impact of external border control deficiencies; and (c) the likely impact of the measure on the free movement of persons within Schengen Area. 7.2.2

Recent Practice

As emerges from the aforementioned facts, the contrast between the legal framework and recent practices of Member States is rather stark. In particular, despite the temporary limitations imposed under the SBC, in some countries internal border control has been reinstated for periods exceeding four consecutive years. Excluding some isolated interpretations, according to which “the time limits laid down in the Schengen Borders Code refer to each individual new order for the temporary reintroduction of internal border control”,6 these systematic and consecutive instances must be considered as evident violations of SBC provisions.7 Nevertheless, neither the European Commission nor any Member State has thus

6 Views expressed by a representative of the German Ministry of Internal Affairs, to Deutsche Welle (DW) [Accessed on 15 June 2020], here: https://www.dw.com/en/bor der-checks-in-eu-countries-challenge-schengen-agreement/a-51033603. 7 Indeed, it is worth mentioning that the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs appears to confirm the latter interpretation, having evidenced in its annual report on the functioning of the Schengen area (2017/2256(INI)) that “many of the prolongations are not in line with the existing rules as to their extensions necessity or proportionality and are therefore unlawful”.

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far ever appealed to the European Court of Justice in order to resolve this issue. In 2016, the European Commission addressed a Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council, and the Council entitled “Back to Schengen - A Roadmap”,8 stating the need to “lift all internal border controls as quickly as possible and with a clear target date of December 2016”. Four years on, normal border operating conditions within the Schengen Area are far from restored. In order to better understand the impact of recent practices, it is worth observing the quantitative evolution of border control reintroduction cases over the last few years. In fact, although these procedures had been used on several prior occasions (European Commission 2020), it is only since the “migration crisis” that the phenomenon has ballooned in size, becoming a semi-permanent mechanism between non-peripheral EU countries. Between 2006 and 2014, Member States resorted to this measure 35 times (in most cases only for a few days or weeks, without prolongation). On the other hand, between the end of 2015 and the beginning of 2020 (just a little over 4 years), it was applied 87 times9 (European Commission 2020). In the face of such rampant use of these instruments, the Council10 and the European Commission11 appealed to Member States, asking them to evaluate whether the same results could be obtained through “police checks”, before reinstating or prolonging “internal border controls”.

8 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL Back to Schengen—A Roadmap (COM/2016/0120 final). 9 It should be noted, however, that this count does not include reintroductions and prolongations carried out in the context of the recent COVID-19 pandemic. From around mid-March of 2020 to about mid-June of 2020 (the delivery date of this chapter), these measures have been in fact implemented ninety times. 10 Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/246 of 7 February 2017 setting out a Recommendation for prolonging temporary internal border control in exceptional circumstances putting the overall functioning of the Schengen area at risk. 11 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/820 of 12 May 2017 on proportionate police checks and police cooperation in the Schengen area.

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Furthermore, in September 2017, the Commission proposed to amend the SBC12 in order to extend the maximum duration for temporary reinstatements of internal borders between Member States. Conversely, the Parliament chose to reduce the existing terms13 with the objective of defending the principle of free movement, at least formally. However, an agreement on this issue seems distant and inter-institutional negotiations between Parliament and Council (in order to formulate a shared text to address the Commission’s proposal) are currently in standby. 7.2.3

The Case of France

In France, controls were formally reintroduced for a one-month period starting on November 13th, 2015,14 and, since then, have been systematically renewed without ever being lifted (European Commission 2020), through the application of the procedure regulated by Articles 25–27 of the SBC.15 The motivation for these measures has been linked to the state of emergency declared on November 14th, 2015 (later confirmed and extended six times, until November 1st, 2017), in facing the “persistent terrorist threat”. It is only since the reintroduction of controls on October 1st, 2018, and October 31st, 2019, that French institutions respectively referred to the “situation at the external border” and to the “secondary movements” to motivate their decision (European Commission 2020). 12 Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 as regard the rules applicable to the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders, COM/2017/0571 final—2017/0245 (COD). 13 Amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 29 November 2018 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 as regard the rules applicable to the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders (COM (2017)0571 – C8-0326/2017 – 2017/0245(COD); European Parliament legislative resolution of 4 April 2019 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 as regard the rules applicable to the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders (COM (2017)0571 – C8-0326/2017 – 2017/0245(COD)). 14 On the occasion of COP21 (21st Conference of the Parties). 15 To be precise, the procedure used was that provided for in Articles 23 and 24 of

Regulation (EC) 562/2006, until the codified version of the SBC (Regulation (EU) 2016/399) came into force.

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However, actual measures and implementing practices displayed by French authorities suggest motivations that, since the very beginning, relate to the issue of migration control and the insufficiency of barriers at external borders more than with the terrorist threat. Indeed, during the course of recent years, borders with Spain and Italy have been subject to particularly strict controls, whereas borders with Switzerland, Germany, Luxemburg, and Belgium have very sporadically been the object of similar attention (La Cimade 2018). Furthermore, observations and witness evidence all point to discriminatory and directed interventions, alleging that policemen controlling trains in the PPA (Points de Passages Autorisés —authorised border-crossing points) between Italy and France act on racial profile patterns (Ibidem). The situation is equivalent to the low-cost bus that crosses the border.16 It should also be pointed out that, in response to the breaching of thresholds set out by the Schengen legislation, on October 26th, 2017, Anafé, La Cimade and Gisti applied to the Conseil d’Etat for the annulment and the immediate suspension of a decision by which the French authorities had extended internal border controls within Schengen until April 30th, 2018 (they should have ceased on October 31st, 2017).17 On November 21st, 2017, the juge des référés rejected the immediate suspension request due to a “lack of urgency”. Further, on December 28th, 2017, the Conseil d’Etat rejected the request for annulment in support of the decisions of the French government, judging the gravity of the terrorist threat in France to be a sufficient reason to justify the reintroduction of internal border controls. The Court also stated that identity and provenance checks on individuals entering France were a measure both necessary and proportional to the level of the threat. A brief look at current French legislation on identity checks may help shed additional light on the operation of France’s borders. Considering

16 It should be noted that the Justice Court of the European Union, within the sentence of 13 December 2018, Bundesrepublik Deutschland vs Touring Tours und Travel GmbH and Sociedad de Transportes SA, joined cases C-412/17 and C474/17, ECLI:EU:C:2018:1005, stated that European Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 610/2013) opposes the checks executed by the transportation companies by bus, which offer regular cross-border services within the Schengen area, since they can be equated with border checks. 17 https://www.gisti.org/spip.php?article5756 [Accessed on: 15 June 2020].

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the reforms introduced by Law No. 2017-151018 (and, to a lesser extent, by Law No. 2018-77819 ), one might legitimately wonder whether France might be preparing for a future in which internal border controls will have been permanently reinstated, in clear disregard of applicable SBC regulations (Barbero and Donadio 2019). In fact, through Article 19 of the new Loi renforçant la sécurité intérieure et la lutte contre le terrorisme, some aspects related to “border area” controls have been intensified, as regulated by Article 78-2 Penal Code and 67c of the Customs Code. According to the new regulation, police can ask individuals for documents in order to prevent and detect cross-border crime. The new regulation includes the possibility of verifying the identity at the border for 12 hours (formerly, 6) and of extending such controls to the surroundings of 373 train stations, ports and airports, as well as within a radius of 20 km of the 118 border-crossing points. In such a way, it is not just geographical borders themselves that can be considered “border areas”, but also territories situated further away, such as Toulouse, Marseilles or even Paris. Once again, current French legislation seems to represent a de facto attempt to maintain the current internal border control regime, without the need to formally renew measures under the SBC, since these would eventually likely be censored by the European Court of Justice. Only time will reveal the applicability limits of the cited legislation on identity checks, or the legitimacy of any umpteenth renewal of border controls. Thus far, however, the large discretionary spaces allowed under the current regime appear increasingly problematic. This ample discretion applies not only to police acts at “street level”, but also to States in their adoption of legal tools that, even were they justified on internal security or terrorism prevention grounds, in practice lend themselves to being used arbitrarily for purposes of migration control.

18 Loi n o 2017 -1510 du 30 octobre 2017 renforçant la sécurité intérieure et la lutte contre le terrorisme. 19 Loi n° 2018-778 du 10 septembre 2018 pour une immigration maîtrisée, un droit d’asile effectif et une intégration réussie.

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Bilateral Agreements on Police Cooperation and the Readmission of “Irregulars”

In addition to the aforementioned European regulations, our understanding of the configuration of border areas analysed in this article also depends on other juridical tools. These are, in the first instance, a bilateral agreement on police cooperation and, secondly, an agreement concerning the readmission of foreign people in irregular status conditions. 7.3.1

Bilateral Cross-Border Agreement on Police and Customs Cooperation

As well as generating a reinforcement of external borders and the externalisation of border controls to countries outside the EU, the suppression of internal border controls envisioned by Schengen has given rise to a certain degree of police cooperation between Member States. In fact, the Schengen Agreement of 1985 provided that parties should “reinforce cooperation between their customs and police authorities, notably in combating crime, particularly illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and arms, the unauthorised entry and residence of persons, customs and tax fraud, and smuggling” (Article 9). Obligations and political agreements related to police and customs cooperation in the EU can also be found in different regulations adopted in the 1990s, such as the Vienna Action Plan of December 1998 and the Conclusions of the Tampere Council of October 1999. It is therefore not coincidental that, precisely in those years, France signed cross-border cooperation agreements on police and customs matters with Italy (in Chambéry, on October 3rd, 1997),20 as with other countries (among which Germany in 1997 and Spain in July of 1998). The Chambéry Agreement puts forth, among its main objectives: the fight against irregular immigration and border crime, and the prevention of threats against public order and smuggling (Article 6); the collection and exchange of information in customs and police matters (Articles 20 “Accordo fra il Governo della Repubblica italiana e il Governo della Repubblica

francese sulla cooperazione transfrontaliera in materia di polizia e dogana”, translated into French law by Decree no. 2000-923 of September 18th, 2000, in force in both countries as of April 1st, 2000, and published in the Italian Official Journal under no. 90 of April 18th, 2001, and, in France, as J.O.R.F. no. 221 of September 23rd, 2000, p. 14964.

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6 and 7); the consignment of foreign people in irregular status conditions provided for by the bilateral agreement of readmission (discussed in greater detail below); assistance for the preparation and support of surveillance; and the coordination of joint surveillance measures at border areas (Article 8). In order to achieve these goals, two Police and Customs Cooperation Centres (PCCC) were set up: one in the town of Ventimiglia, on Italian territory, and the other in Modane, on French territory (Articles 4 and 5). Different police corps designated by each country jointly operate within these PCCCs. The Chambéry Agreement (Article 2) establishes that the bodies entrusted on behalf of the Italian State are Polizia di Stato, l’Arma dei Carabinieri, Corpo della Guardia di Finanza, and Dipartimento delle Dogane, whereas French operations are led by Police aux Frontieres, Gendarmerie National, and Douane. The agents assigned to the PCCCs by each neighbouring State are under the same protection and infringement regime as those from the host country (Article 9(5)). Agents shall each wear their own uniform and use their own official weapons “with the sole purpose of acting, upon necessity, in self-defence” (Article 9(6)). Perhaps one of the most characteristic devices of cross-border cooperation are mixed or joint patrols, where (potentially armed) agents of one State participate in police operations within the territory of the other party State. Italy and France are joined by an agreement for the execution of joint police operations (signed in 201221 ), that is born from and complementary to other cooperation tools such as the Prüm Treaty of 2005 and the European Union Council Decision No. 2008/616 GAI. 7.3.2

Bilateral Agreement for the Readmission of Foreign “Irregulars”

The issue concerning readmissions of detained foreign people in irregular status conditions is one of the cornerstones of current EU border control strategy. However, while these agreements have been the object of extensive analyses regarding their implications vis-à-vis States outside 21 “Accordo tra il Ministro dell’interno della Repubblica italiana e il Ministro dell’interno della Repubblica francese in materia di cooperazione bilaterale per l’esecuzione di operazioni congiunte di polizia”, ratified in Italy through Law no. 215/2015 of December 1st, 2015 (G.U. no. 5 of 08/01/2016), in force as of January 9th, 2016.

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of the European Union (Schieffer 2003; Strik 2010), their effects among Member States have so far attracted much less scrutiny. The agreement between France and Italy centring on the readmission of foreign people in irregular status conditions22 was signed on October 3rd, 1997, in the French city of Chambéry (in the same place and at same time as cross-border agreement on police and customs cooperation). The first part of the agreement regulates the readmissions of citizens of the signatory States. The second part regulates the readmission of thirdcountry citizens. The third part focuses on transits linked to expulsion procedures and transits that follow a decision denying entry into State territories. The fourth part relates to the protection of personal data, and a fifth part includes the Agreement’s general and final dispositions. The Agreement also includes an annex and three attachments, which discipline the police’s bureaucratic obligations and procedures. One of the crucial portions of this legislation concerns the rules that discipline the readmission of third-country citizens. These occur upon request by a Member State and “without formalities”, when the citizen of a third country has irregular status and in cases where the concerned person has been certified to reside or to have passed through the other State (Article 5 (1)). The request of readmission must be sent within three months after the discovery of the migrant’s irregular presence (Article 5 (3)). Article 6 establishes that the obligation of readmission does not subsist in cases where third-country citizens either: (a) come from countries having a shared border with the requesting State; (b) are already in possession of a residence permit in the requesting State; (c) have been residing in requesting State for more than 6 months; (d) have been awarded refugee status by requesting State; (e) are subject to the Dublin Convention that determines which State of the EU is responsible for processing the migrant’s asylum request; (f) have already been expelled by the requested State to their country of origin or to a third country; (g) hold a residence permit issued by another country belonging to Schengen.

22 “Accordo tra la Repubblica italiana e la Repubblica francese sulla riammissione delle persone in situazione irregolare, con annesso e tre allegati”, translated into French law under Decree no. 2000-652 of 07/04/2000, in force in both countries on January 12th, 1999, and published in Italy at G.U. suppl. ord. no. 164 of July 15th, 2000, p. 29 and, in France, on J.O.R.F. n.160 of December 7th, 2000, p. 10571.

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Article 7 establishes that, in the application of Article 5, States must try to return foreign people in irregular status conditions back to their country of origin. Article 8 details a series of documents that can be used as proof that the detained individual comes from another State, as a prior requirement to readmission. This makes up a long list that includes, among many others: hotel bills, medical consultation cards, the exchange of residual currency, statements from official agents, witness statements and verifiable data confirming that the individual used the services of a travel agency or a smuggler. Among all these procedures, one of the most problematic elements of the readmission agreement is perhaps the lack of “formalities”, prescribed under Article 5. Although this kind of written formula is commonly used in similar agreements, its detriment to the rights of the individual subject to such a procedure demands particular attention. The superficiality of any assessment based on “evidence and clues”, as required under Article 3 (1)(2) of the Annex, seems overall inappropriate for purposes of guaranteeing an accurate analysis of the personal situation of the individual who faces readmission (especially where the individual is, as is often the case, in a situation of particular vulnerability). Further, in the light of the absence of sufficient scrutiny of an individual’s case,23 these procedures must be considered analogous to collective expulsions, which are prohibited under Article 4 of Protocol 4 of the ECHR and Article 19(1) of the CFREU. The additional lack of guarantees with respect to linguistic interpretation and legal defence is in open violation of the right to an effective remedy, guaranteed under Article 13 of ECHR and Article 47 of CFREU. This clash most often brings with it the impossibility of acquiring useful information from the subject, necessary to obtain potential access to asylum request procedures; this also violates Articles 3 and 4 for EU Regulation 604/2013 (the so-called “Dublin Regulation”). Note, in addition, that the above would appear to violate the right of every person to leave a country, including their own, as sanctioned under Article 12 (2) of Protocol 4 of the ECHR. It also raises doubts regarding the violation of the right to consular assistance regulated by Article 36 of the Vienna Convention of 1963 on consular relations.

23 Preventing individuals from being able to illustrate and argue their case.

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Going back to French law, it should be emphasised that Article L531-1 (2) CESEDA provides that any foreigner entering France, who is in breach of the applicable regulations, and who is subject to the application of any readmission agreement, must be notified with a written, motivated decision, by account of the relevant administrative authority indicated by governmental decree. Several observations carried out at the camp managed by the independent authority CGLPL (Contrôleur Général des Lieux de Privation de Liberté) exposed how such prescriptions are consistently disregarded (CGLPL 2018). Lastly, it should be pointed out that the establishment of a readmission procedure that lacks “formalities” also seems to violate national Italian law and, specifically, the necessity to obtain validation by a judge of any restriction on personal freedom (such as the forced expulsion of an individual), regardless of the issuing procedure. This obligatory jurisdictional intervention is mandated under Article 13 of the Italian Constitution.

7.4

´ (Refusal of Entry) The refus d ’entree

One of the dominant legal and practical repercussions of the current internal border regime between France and Italy is the thousands of people detained by police within French territory, who are ultimately sent back to the Italian side of the border. The following paragraphs reflect on the juridical qualification and the scope of the refus d’entrée procedure, with the objective of illustrating the magnitude of the phenomenon as well as related breaches of migrants’ guarantees.

7.4.1

Procedure

The procedure most commonly used to reject irregular migrants at the border is called refus d’entrée (i.e. Refusal of entry); it is regulated by Article L213-1 and subsequent articles of the Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile (CESEDA). This regulation establishes that access to France and to the Schengen Area can be denied to any foreigner whose presence might result in a threat to public order, or to any individual subject to an expulsion decree or similar administrative prohibition to enter or circulate within

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the French territory. According to Article L213-2, any of the above decisions must be motivated and written in a language that the individual addressee can understand, and must also explicitly mention the right to request assistance from a lawyer of choice, together with the competent consulate and the indicated contact person. In the case of an asylum application at the border, the refusal decision must be taken by the Minister responsible for immigration, except in cases where: (a) the examination of the asylum application falls within the competence of another Member State pursuant to Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 (the so-called “Dublin Regulation”); (b) the asylum application is inadmissible under article L723-11; or (c) the asylum application is manifestly unfounded. Except in cases where the examination of the asylum application falls within the competence of another State, the decision to refuse entry can only be taken after consulting the OFPRA (Office Français de Protection des Réfugiés et Apatrides —French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons). The refusal decision must also specify the migrant’s right to file an annulment request under Article L213-9 and indicate the conditions and deadlines applicable to said procedure. The annulment request has suspensive effect and the applicant cannot be repatriate during this period. If no asylum application is filed, the decision of the refus d’entrée can be taken by an officer who fulfils the requirements set out under Article R213-1. The refus d’entrée must be signed by the competent authority specifying the identity of the signatory and their rank. Article L213-2 specifies that the foreign person can oppose repatriation before the deadline of the “jour franc” (i.e. a right to a 24-hour period before expulsion, in order to understand the relevant procedure, contact relatives, consulates and lawyers, and consider the possibility of applying for asylum). In any case, unaccompanied minors cannot be expelled before the jour franc expiration. Despite the above, French Loi n° 2018-778 of September 10th, 2018, has limited the scope of the right to a jour franc, which no longer applies in case of a refus d’entrée notified at Mayotte or at the French land borders. 7.4.2

Scope and Contrast with Directive 2008/115/UE

Regarding the scope of the above-outlined refus d’entrée regulation, note that Article L213-3 establishes that its provisions are also applicable to foreign persons who are not citizens of a European Member State, whose

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entry to Schengen has been rejected based on Article 6 of the SBC. This inclusion, by reference to the SBC, extends the French norm well beyond the case of the foreign person whose presence represents a threat to public order or who is subject to a sentence of judicial prohibition or an expulsion order (Article L213-1). In practice, it stretches to include cases such as individuals not in possession of a valid travel document, or holding (or able to acquire) insufficient means of subsistence covering the duration of the intended stay and the return to their country of origin (see Article 6(1), letters (a) to (e)). Since January 1st, 2019, through the aforementioned French Law No. 2018-778, Article L213-3-1 also came into force, thereby adding the possibility to refuse entry to any foreigner who: (a) arrived directly from the territory of a State subscribing to the Convention signed in Schengen on June 19th, 1990; (b) entered the metropolitan territory by crossing an internal land border without authorisation; and (c) was stopped within an area extending to ten kilometres beyond the border. These entry refusal decisions can only be taken in case of temporary reintroduction of internal border controls. We are witnessing, therefore, a mechanism created ad hoc for the current situation. It seems evident that the refus d’entrée can be applied in situations that are similar to those targeted by the readmission agreement, which may result in a certain degree of uncertainty and ambiguity regarding the circumstances that effectively oversee the application of either procedure. In considering this potential procedural overlap, one should also bear in mind that Article 6(1) of Directive 2008/115/EC sets an obligation for Member States to issue a return decision to any third-country national illegally residing in their territory. The same Article 6(3) also allows a Member State to refrain from issuing such a return decision if the individual in question is readmitted by another Member State under bilateral agreements (or other arrangements) existing on the date of entry into force of the Directive. In such cases, the Member State that has readmitted the third-country national concerned shall apply Article 6(1). Therefore, the obligation to issue a return decision is not terminated, but rather transferred to the counterparty of the bilateral agreement.24

24 In this regard, see the Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 7 June 2016, Sélina Affum v. Préfet du Pas-de-Calais and Procureur général de la Cour d’appel de Douai, case C-47/15, ECLI:EU:C:2016:408, paragraphs 84–86.

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Lastly, Article 6(4) also establishes that Member States may at any time decide to autonomously grant irregular foreign persons a residence permit or other authorisation offering a right to stay due to compassionate, humanitarian or other reasons. In such an event, no return decision must be issued (or, if one already has been, it may be revoked or suspended for the duration of the allowed stay). According to Directive 2008/115/EC, Member States can take three kinds of measures vis-à-vis an irregular status condition foreign person on their territory: issue a return decision, apply a readmission agreement (with the consequent transfer of the return obligation upon the counterparty of such agreement) or allow the foreigner’s permanence for charitable, humanitarian or other reasons. What is not permitted, on the other hand, is the application of other forms of refoulement outside of those just listed. Measures provided under the refus d’entrée legislation would feature among these. Note that asylum applicants fall under distinct criteria, given that no readmission procedure may be applied to them (see above references to Article 6 of the Readmission Agreement), in favour of the procedures laid out in the Dublin Regulation (which considers, among other factors, the identification of the foreign person). In a recent ruling dated March 19th, 2019 (case C 444/17, Préfet des Pyrénées-Orientales e Abdelaziz Arib), the European Court of Justice considered the applicability of some derogations provided for under Article 2(2) of Directive 2008/115/EC to internal state borders. We note that, under the Directive, such derogations formally apply to external borders. Faced with such a case, the Court ruled that an internal border where a Member State had reintroduced the controls does not amount to an external border in the proper sense of the Code, arguing that “the concepts of ‘internal borders’ and ‘external borders’ are mutually exclusive” (Argument 62). Crucially, the Court also ruled that the reintroduction of internal border controls does not, in and of itself, imply a derogation from the Directive. We can conclude that Directive 2008/115/EC and the refus d’entrée regulation (let alone any expulsion carried out without explicit reference and recourse to any regulation whatsoever) are incompatible with each other. However, one must be cautious when arguing for the strict abidance to the Directive, given its literal implications (i.e. the repatriation of migrants).

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This in many ways leaves the author of this paper perplexed and cautious in making conclusive statements, as any other person sensitive to the material effects that regulatory devices have on the lives of subjected individuals. Thus, the preceding remarks are not intended as a formal critique concerning rights and procedures, but rather as an attempt to shed light on the contradictions that inhabit a regime of border control that, although expressly stemming from the so-called “irregularity” of migrants, actually produces irregularity and illegality itself, thereby opening up ample and arbitrary margins of uncertainty and discretion. 7.4.3

Statistical Comparison of Different Procedures

Statistically, it should be noted that, according to the Italian Ministry of Interior, the readmissions carried out by France, through the Chambéry Agreement, were 737 in 2016, 289 in 2017,—in 2018,—in 2019. Such data refer the entire French territory. By contrast, the data relating to the refus d’entrée procedure provided by French frontier police (Police aux frontières, PAF) show that, just at “Department 6” (Alpes-Maritimes, primarily concerning the border crossing of Ventimiglia-Menton), amounted to a total of 31.285 in 2016, 44.433 in 2017, 24.427 in 2018 and 8.938 in the first six months of 2019. These figures stand to show that the number of people sent back to Italy from France via readmission procedures is almost insignificant compared to the thousands of cases carried out through channels not suitable to a migrant’s referral, such as the refus d’entrée. In fact, unlike the readmission procedure, the refus d’entrée is enshrined in a national regulation and therefore is not, in practice, legally binding for the authorities of countries other than France. 7.4.4

Breaches of Migrants’ Guarantees

In analysing violations of refus d’entrée guarantees and basic fundamental rights, a crucial characteristic is the absolute lack of information about entitled rights that should theoretically be provided to those subject to the procedure (Cncdh 2018; Anafé 2019). These omissions start from the right of asylum, for which migrants are often not told that they could

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apply in France and, even when they express the will to do so, are not given due consideration by the police (Cglpl 2018; Anafé 2019). As stated on February 23rd, 2012, by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, in the case Hirsi Jamaa et al. v. Italy (Application No. 27765/09), all States must guarantee foreign persons the right to be sufficiently informed, so as to be able to effectively access the asylum procedure, and duly articulate their requests (paragraph 204). In addition, the inability to request asylum is in breach of Articles 3 and 4 of the SBC and Article 3 of the Dublin Regulation, which regulate international protection applications. Regardless of Articles L213-2 and L221-4, the right to legal and linguistic translation support is systematically left unattended, as is the right to contact one’s own consulate (Anafé 2019). Similarly to the case of readmissions, these omissions are in open violation not only of the aforementioned CESEDA legislation, but also of the fundamental right to an effective judicial remedy laid out under Article 13 of the ECHR, Article 47 of the CFREU and Article 36 of the Vienna Convention of 1963 on the right to received consular assistance. These forms of procedural implementations, and in particular the absence of any detailed analysis of the individual case, appear incompatible with Article 4 of Protocol 4 of the ECHR and Article 19 (1) of CFREU, which prohibit collective expulsions. Regarding general violations of the cited French legislation, and in particular with respect to Article L213-2, refus d’entrée decisions are, in most cases, signed directly by the agents responsible for the control, and not by the staff indicated under Article R213-1 (Anafé 2019). In addition, the mass pre-compilation or printing of refus d’entrée application forms with the pre-selected answer “I want to depart as soon as possible” (Cncdh 2018; Anafé 2019) has tended to prevent the free exercise of the right to a jour franc, even before recent reforms barred such right from being applied at Mayotte and at French land borders. Child’s “best interest” does not receive any better consideration. Unaccompanied minors are in fact regularly rejected and as a consequence entirely deprived of judicial protection. No guardian, no mediation services and no evaluation of risks are performed for them, and the chance of obtaining family reunification is not even taken into consideration (Intersos 2018). All procedures and shortcomings cited thus far represent a serious violation of Article 6 of the Dublin Regulation and Articles 3, 20, 22 of the UN 1989 Convention on the Rights of Child.

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To conclude, restrictions of freedom at borders are carried out in areas that lack a clear juridical framework (as they do not, for instance, formally qualify as a “zone d’attente”) and in absolutely inadequate conditions, frequently lacking food, water, mattresses or blankets (Oxfam 2018; Anafé 2019), all of which appear to violate Article 3 of the ECHR, which prohibits inhumane and degrading treatment. The above context is rendered all the more worrisome by the severe flaws of reception and registration procedures in Italy (the country to which rejected migrants are typically sent). In Ventimiglia, for example, these migrants are largely abandoned to their own devices. Furthermore, since 2017, access to the Roja “transit camp”25 (created in 2016 by the prefecture of the town of Imperia and managed by the Italian Red Cross) is conditional on the release of fingerprints. This, together with the camp’s significant distance from the city, perpetual police presence and fear of forced relocation, often results in migrants opting for informal settlements, which in turn implies poor safety and hygienic conditions as well as the constant risk of forced evacuation (see Menghi, infra). Organisations that operate in Ventimiglia regularly raise issues on the inadequacy and insufficiency of structures dedicated to unaccompanied minors and, more generally, the utter lack of structures to support their transit, who are regularly left to share resources and spaces with adult migrants.26 No referral of minors nor other specialised assistance is provided (Intersos 2018; Oxfam 2018). Inadequate reception procedures should be considered alongside the reality of forced transfer operations from Ventimiglia to the hotspot of Taranto (in the south of the country, 1.188 km away) or the CARA of Crotone (1.239 km). These are the result of the policies imposed by the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs with the objective of “alleviating” the presence of migrants on the national territory.27 Such policies are enforced at regular time intervals by the police department of Ponte San Luigi, often with the assistance (in addition to other recently rejected migrants) of people intercepted in the course of (evidently racially 25 This is a definition not provided for by either European or Italian regulations, which determines many problems in identifying the applicable regulation. 26 In open violation of the obligations to establish structures specifically intended for unaccompanied minors, provided for by the Italian legislation (Article 19 of Legislative Decree no. 142/2015, modified by Article 4 of Law no. 47/2017). 27 For an analysis of these operations, see Ferri (2017).

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oriented) occasional roundups carried out by Italian police forces in Ventimiglia. Any effective contextual analysis beyond these brief mentions would require a dedicated and thorough study (see Menghi, infra). Nevertheless, the author has deemed it worthwhile to at least mention the existence of these realities, if nothing else to counter the commonplace rhetoric that tends to attribute responsibility for border control practices exclusively to part of the countries involved (in this case, France); in reality, this is widely distributed across the EU.

7.5

Conclusions

The management of European internal borders is characterised by numerous violations of both national and EU-wide regulations, and the widespread denial of the fundamental rights of migrants. The reintroduction of border controls has often been applied beyond four consecutive years despite the temporal limitations established by the applicable regulations, thus disregarding temporal limits set by relevant regulations and violating the principles of adequacy, proportionality and residuality provided under the SBC. Member State Agreements regarding migrant readmissions, though rarely applied, are crafted in response to needs for simplification and celerity of the relevant procedures, a circumstance that appears incompatible with the prescribed right to an effective remedy. The refoulements regulated by French legislation are performed without the intervention and mediation of attorneys, linguistic interpreters and doctors, and without providing sufficient information to right-holders. International protection requests, when these are issued, are systematically ignored. Sites used for the detention of migrants are inadequate and often lacking a clear juridical framework. Rights of minors are consistently left unattended in all these cases. Frequent abuse by agents and the material conditions in which migrants are detained directly contrast the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment. These failures are stacked on the ample discretionary spaces left for agents throughout control operations, as well as for States in their approval of practices and procedures that, even when formally justified for the sake of internal security and terrorism, are widely abused in the service of border control.

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These all result in a rather dark picture, which continues to encourage migrant searches for alternative, increasingly dangerous, border-crossing pathways. Its persistence represents a deep negation of the humanitarian philosophy promoted and publicly adopted by state, European and international institutions. We believe that, given the overall scenario that we have endeavoured to assemble, in which legality seems too often conditioned by rationales of the “other”—and even susceptible to being revoked—the issue of migrant irregularity should not only be viewed as an accidental (albeit widely occurring) element. It is rather the reflection of a regime that renders access to rights conditional, and whose pursuit of border management is not limited to the organisation of space, evolving instead into a device for the articulation of the social sphere (Pérez et al. 2019). To conclude, the intention of this chapter is to disinter the structural dimension of an irregularity that seems to be parasitic to the border itself, thereby contributing to define diversified juridical statuses and individual hierarchies. This is the conceptual lens that should inform the reading of these pages. At the same time, it is precisely by conceiving the condition of “irregularity” in a wider sense (i.e. as a device for governing inequality and inequalities ) that we intend to avoid referring to these multiple rights violations as mere instances of “legality”, exclusively informed by formalisms on the rights and procedures. Their informal nature and effects run much deeper. No one can predict what will happen in the next few years, nor how both formal and informal practices will shape the management of the internal border system of a European Union that seems to be increasingly breaking apart. Ventimiglia is one instance where this fragmentation, subject to continuous and “irregular” mutations, is particularly visible.

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2017–2018. https://drive.google.com/file/d/15HEFqA01_aSkKgw05g_vfr cP1SpmDAtV/view. 15 June 2020. Anafé-Gisti. (2011). L’Europe vacille sous le fantasme de l’invasion tunisienne. Vers une remise en cause du principe de libre circulation dans l’espace “Schengen”? http://www.anafe.org/IMG/pdf/hc_2011-06-17_rapport_vintimille_ anafe-gisti.pdf. 15 June 2020. Balibar, É. (2015). Borderland Europe and the Challenge of Migration. Open Democracy. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-makeit/borderland-europe-and-challenge-of-migration/. 15 June 2020. Barbero, I. (2012). Orientalising Citizenship: The Legitimation of Immigration Regimes in the European Union. Citizenship Studies, 165(6), 751–768. Barbero, I., & Donadio, G. (2019). La externalización interna de las fronteras en el control migratorio en la UE. Revista CIDOB D’Afers Internacionals, 122, 137–162. Bossong, R., & Etzold, T. (2018). The Future of Schengen Internal Border Controls as a Growing Challenge to the EU and the Nordics. SWP Comment 2018/C 44. https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/pro ducts/comments/2018C44_Bsg_Etz.pdf. 15 June 2020. Campesi, G. (2015). Polizia della frontiera: Frontex e la produzione dello spazio europeo. DeriveApprodi. Carrera, S., Guild, E., Merlino, M., & Parkin, J. (2011). A Race Against Solidarity. The Schengen Regime and the Franco-Italian Affair (CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe). https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-public ations/race-against-solidarity-schengen-regime-and-franco-italian-affair/. 15 June 2020. Cglpl. (2018). Rapport de visite: 4 au 8 septembre 2017 - Rapport de visite des locaux de la police aux frontières de Menton (Alpes- Maritimes) - 2ème visite. Contrôle des personnes migrantes à la frontière franco-italienne. https://www. cglpl.fr/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Rapport-de-la-deuxi%C3%A8me-vis ite-des-services-de-la-police-aux-fronti%C3%A8res-de-Menton-Alpes-Mariti mes_web.pdf. 15 June 2020. Cncdh. (2018). L’Avis sur la situation des personnes migrantes à la frontière franco-italienne: missions dans les Hautes-Alpes et les AlpesMaritimes. https://www.cncdh.fr/sites/default/files/180619_avis_situation_ des_migrants_a_la_frontiere_italienne.pdf. 15 June 2020. D’Alife, L. (Dir.). (2019). The Milky Way [documentary]. Smk Videofactory. European Commission. (2020). Member States’ Notifications of the Temporary Reintroduction of Border Control at Internal Borders Pursuant to Article 25 et seq. of the Schengen Borders Code, 2018. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/ sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/rei ntroduction-border-control/docs/ms_notifications_-_reintroduction_of_bor der_control_en.pdf. 15 June 2020.

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Ferri, F. (2017). I confini della mobilità forzata lungo l’asse Ventimiglia/Taranto. trasferimenti coatti ed esercizi di libertà. Euronomade. http://www.eurono made.info/?p=9649. 15 June 2020. Guiraudon, V. (2000). European Courts and Foreigners’ Rights: A Comparative Study of Norms Diffusion. International Migration Review, 34(4), 1088– 1125. Guiraudon, V (2003). The Constitution of a European Immigration Policy Domain: A Political Sociology Approach. Journal of European Public Policy, 10(2), 263–282. Heller, C., & Pezzani, L. (2016). Ebbing and Flowing: The EU’s Shifting Practices of Non-assistance and Bordering in a Time of Crisis. Near Futures Online 1 “Europe at a Crossroads”. http://nearfuturesonline.org/ebbingand-flowing-the-eus-shifting-practices-of-non-assistance-and-bordering-in-atime-of-crisis/. 15 June 2020. Huysmans, J. (2000). The European Union and the securitization of migration. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 38(5), 751–777. Huysmans, J. (2006). The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU . New International Relations Series. London: Routledge. Intersos. (2018). Unaccompanied and Separated Children Along Italy’s Northern Borders. https://www.intersos.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/ 02/UASC-along-Italys-northern-borders.compressed.pdf. 15 June 2020. Kasparek, B. (2016). Complementing Schengen: The Dublin System and the European Border and Migration Regime. In H. Bauder & C. Matheis (Eds.), Migration Policy and Practice. Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. La Cimade. (2018). Schengen: frontières intérieures et extérieures Dedans, dehors: une Europe qui s’enferme Observations des dispositifs de surveillance et de tri aux frontières de la France, de la Hongrie et en Méditerranée. https://www.lacimade.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/ 06/La_Cimade_Schengen_Frontieres.pdf. 15 June 2020. Léonard, S. (2010). EU Border Security and Migration into the European Union: FRONTEX and Securitisation Through Practices. European Security, 192, 231–254. López-Sala, A. (2015). Exploring Dissuasion as a Geo Political Instrument in Irregular Migration Control at the Southern Spanish Maritime Border. Geopolitics, 203, 513–534. Malmström, C. (2011, February 15). Immigration Flows—Tunisia Situation. SPEECH 11/106, EP Plenary Session, Strasbourg. Mezzadra, S., & Neilson, B. (2013). Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor. Durham: Duke University Press.

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Monar, J. (2017). The European Union’s ‘Integrated Management’ of External Borders. In J. DeBardeleben (Ed.), Soft or Hard Borders? Managing the Divide in an Enlarged Europe. New York: Routledge. Oxfam. (2018). Se questa è Europa. La situazione dei migranti al confine italo francese di Ventimiglia (Oxfam Briefing Paper). https://www.oxfamitalia. org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Se-questa-è-Europa_BP_15giugno2 018.pdf. 15 June 2020. Pagliassotti, M. (2019). Ancora dodici chilometri: Migranti in fuga sulla rotta alpina. Bollati Boringhieri. Pérez, M., Ayala Rubio, A., Ávila, D., & García García, S. (2019). Fronteras interiores: las prácticas informales en el gobierno de la desigualdad en España. Revista CIDOB D’Afers Internacionals, 122, 111–135. Schieffer, M. (2003). Community Readmission Agreements with Third Countries-Objectives, Substance and Current State of Negotiations. European Journal of Migration and Law, 53, 343–357. Solanes, A. (2005). La política de inmigración en la Unión Europea. Desde tres claves. Arbor, 181(713), 81–100. Strik, T. (2010, March 16). Readmission Agreements: A Mechanism for Returning Irregular Migrants (Doc. 12168). Strasbourg: Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. United. (2019). List of 36,570 Documented Deaths of Refugees and Migrants Due to the Restrictive Policies of “Fortress Europe”. http://unitedagainstrefug eedeaths.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/ListofDeathsActual.pdf. 15 June 2020. Zaiotti, R. (2011). The Beginning of the End? The Italo-French Row over Schengen and the Lessons of Past ‘Crises’ for the Future of Border Free Europe (Occasional Paper No. 12). European Union Centre of Excellence. Zaiotti, R. (2016). Externalizing Migration Management: Europe, North America and the Spread of ‘Remote Control’ Practices. New York: Routledge. Zapata-Barrero, R. (2013). La dimensión exterior de las políticas migratorias en el área mediterránea: premisas para un debate normativo. Revista Del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, 2, 1–37.

PART III

Social Actors on the Ground

CHAPTER 8

Smugglers and Smuggled Migrants: Amid Sudanese Passeurs in the Border Regime of Ventimiglia Livio Amigoni, Chiara Molinero, and Cecilia Vergnano

8.1

Introduction

This chapter presents an empirical study on the phenomenon commonly referred to as “migrant smuggling”, with a specific focus on Sudanese border-crossing facilitators operating in Ventimiglia. The aim is not to focus on strategies used to facilitate border crossings of migrants into France, but rather to shed light on the norms and values that guide these kinds of practices. To this end, the chapter is structured as follows.

L. Amigoni (B) University of Genoa, Genoa, Italy e-mail: [email protected] C. Molinero Isrec Bg, Bergamo, Italy C. Vergnano Department of Anthropology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands © The Author(s) 2021 L. Amigoni et al. (eds.), Debordering Europe, Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56518-3_8

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First, we present our adopted research methodology, which primarily draws on participant observations carried out from a specific position in the field—namely, as activists. Second, we contextualise smuggling in the international and national legal frameworks, as well as briefly outlining relevant scholarly state of the art. Next, we present an overview of recurring dynamics and patterns related to migration control and mobility facilitation in the border town of Ventimiglia. Finally, we describe the ways in which members of the Sudanese community in Ventimiglia carry out their border-crossing facilitation practices in the context of a broader political struggle for freedom of movement, grounded in a solidarity framework. By building close relationships with members of the Sudanese community, we had the opportunity to better understand their conception of border-crossing support and to discuss with them the kind of moralities that underpin their practices. We challenge the categorisation of people involved in border-crossing facilitation practices as that of “exploiter” and “deceiver” by exploring the smuggling moral economy (Belloni 2019). Their stories, those of migrants in transit and those of the people around them, are especially significant in the understanding of smuggling routines at the border and in appreciating why migrants continue to resort to smugglers to overcome territorial barriers. While governmental and media narratives describe passeurs (emic term) as unscrupulous criminal gang members preying on passive migrants, our ethnographic fieldwork at the border area of Ventimiglia revealed a much more complex and diversified social process. As such, we elected to diversify the use of terms related to border-crossing facilitation. Therefore, we decided to use the term “smuggler” when we refer to the phenomenon in abstract and theoretical way and the term “border-crossing facilitators” when we refer to Sudanese people interviewed because they expressly told us not to call each other smugglers and in order not to fuel processes of criminalisation.

8.2

Methodology

This collaborative ethnography on border-crossing facilitation is based on our activism1 and long-term fieldwork at the French-Italian border 1 We all participate in the “Progetto20 k”, which is defined as “a collective of women and men believing in the universal right to free movement” [https://www.facebook.com/ progetto20k/]. The project started in July 2016 and is currently ongoing. Beyond our

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between 2016 and 2020. We carried out monitoring and support activities for transiting migrants in Ventimiglia, including the management of a multifunctional space called “Eufemia Info&Legal Point”,2 where we provided free access to the Internet, electrical battery charging, clothing, and legal advice. During the cumulative period spent in Ventimiglia, we had daily interactions with migrants, smugglers, local citizens, and people working in governmental and non-governmental organisations related to migrant rights. The empirical data on migrant smuggling are obtained from participant observations in several settings of migrants’ daily life at the border. For instance, it was frequent to share meals with transiting migrants, to facilitate their access to money-transfer services, to accompany somebody to the train station or the Red Cross camp (see Menghi Chapter 5 in this volume), or to share with them the waiting time ahead of a border crossing. Our engagement allowed us to witness negotiations, movements, survival strategies, planning, and—of course—border crossings. We engaged in informal conversations with people having different levels of involvement and knowledge about smuggling on a daily basis. We carried out retrospective interviews with two Sudanese border-crossing facilitators and eight migrants (all men) familiar with the smuggling phenomena in order to explore their interpretations of it. We note that such observations were not always straightforward. Since border-crossing facilitation practices are condemned by public authorities and are therefore usually prevented from being observed, conducting this type of fieldwork required propensity for accessing hidden networks and skilfulness so as to earn facilitators’ trust. Our role in supporting migrant rights was crucial in order to gain trust and confidence from the Sudanese

participation in the collective, our methodological approach as researchers is inspired by Antonio Gramsci’s theories exposed in “Prison Notebooks” [(2011) 1948] and Ernesto de Martino’s concept of “critical ethnocentrism” (1961, 1977). Also, our activism draws on Camus’s proposal that political involvement starts from the assumptions that there is no isolated suffering and that tragedy is collective (1946). 2 Eufemia info& legal Point was an independent project of logistical and legal support to migrants in transit, supported by Progetto 20k, Melting Pot Europe and Popoli in Arte. The Info Point was designed to be a safe and welcoming contact point with migrants, but also as a meeting point between citizens and people passing through Ventimiglia. Eufemia was entirely self-financed and remained open 18 months from July 2017 thanks to the work of numerous activists, volunteers, and migrants [https://www.facebook.com/ EufemiaVentimiglia/].

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community. Personal relationships built with key informants have been fundamental in order to access the facilitators’ group and to be accepted by its members. In particular, our relationship with M., whom the facilitators’ group members recognised as holding a leading role, allowed us to gain a privileged insight and the possibility to access his network. Informants interviewed had known us for a long time. They were aware of our political engagement in the struggle for migrants’ rights as well as of the nature of our research. Most of the time, our research activities were carried out with the help of trustworthy and fluent speakers of Arabic. The conversations were held in Arabic, English, or Italian, depending on the language proficiency of informants and researchers. It is important to state that the information presented in this chapter represents only part of the wide and diversified smuggling environment, which we only partially discovered in Ventimiglia during the last four years. Among the limits of our research, we wish to highlight that we collected little information about facilitation practices specifically addressed towards migrant women. Furthermore, we have not been able to prove the existence of transnational smuggling groups that operate through that particular migratory route, even though there is evidence to suggest their presence. Therefore, the conclusions that we draw from our ethnographic study should not be interpreted as comprehensive, or as applicable to all smuggling networks and all migratory careers in Ventimiglia, but rather as one piece of a more complex mosaic.

8.3

Brief Overview on Smuggling

While the fight against smuggling is defined as a priority in the EU agenda on migration, the definition of “smuggling” remains unclear. According to the UN Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants, smuggling is a practice that takes place in exchange for a financial or other material benefits. However, according to the EU Directive that follows the UN Protocol, as well as financial gain, intentionality is also considered as a condition for the offence of “aid to illegal immigration” (Council Directive 2002/90/EC, art. 1a and 1b). Finally, in several national legislations that follow the EU directive, the condition of financial gain has been removed altogether: this is the case in France, where the omission of the financial gain condition was originally intended to prevent border-crossing facilitation practices in the framework of terrorist

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networks—practices motivated by ideological reasons rather than material gain. However, this definition also enables legal action against mobility facilitation practices motivated by other ideological reasons, such as moral or humanitarian ones. At the same time, media and political discourses increasingly tend to represent the figure of the smuggler as an evil and opportunistic profiteer, taking advantage of the vulnerability of desperate migrants. Scholars have pointed out the main limitations of such discourses; in particular: (1) The confusion between causes, as for instance militarisation of borders and tougher migration policies, and related consequences, as proliferation of border-crossing facilitation practices and smuggler organisations. Indeed, the request for smugglers derives from the mismatch between limited supply of legal entry slots in receiving countries and the growing demand for admission (Van Liempt 2016) (2) The incorrect representation of migrants as passive victims, without agency, lost in the hand of unscrupulous smugglers that would force them to expose themselves to danger and exploitation (Andrijasevic, 2007; Aradau, 2004) (3) The use of the juridical category of “trafficking” as synonymous to “smuggling” (Plambech 2016; Wong 2005). It is worth remembering that trafficking, unlike smuggling, always involves an element of coercion and harm to the transported person. On the other hand, smuggling is a one-off transport transaction that does not involve violation of human rights and it requires consent to it and to the payment. (4) The representation of smugglers and migrants as separate categories, failing to appreciate that it is not rare for people on the move to perform both roles during time. For instance, they may provide help or services to compatriots and family members by relaying their past experience, local knowledge, resources, and tools to facilitate movements. However, studies that consider migrants’ perspectives reveal that there is usually “very little stigma attached to the smuggling business from migrants’ point of view” (Van Liempt and Sersli 2013, p. 13), and that the relationship between smuggler and smuggled migrant may vary from

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mere exploitation to cooperation and trust (Biner 2018; Doomernik and Kyle 2004; Zhang et al. 2018). The perspective of border-crossing facilitators themselves is rarely taken into account in scholarly literature with some exceptions (Zhang 2008; Sanchez 2015; Belloni 2019). Taking stock of these considerations, this chapter aims to start bridging this research gap by providing an insight into mobility facilitation practices of Sudanese passeurs in Ventimiglia based on participant observations and interviews with facilitators themselves.

8.4

Controls and Border-Crossing Strategies in Ventimiglia

Ventimiglia has been a historical crossing point for different social groups such as cross-border workers, traders, consumers, travellers, tourists, and refugees who transit the border area for different purposes and via different routes. The scenario of the border town, set between sea and mountains and crossed by the Roya River, has been characterised by recurrent patterns during the last century. Border controls have been present here for decades, increasing or reducing according to evolving political constraints (both national and supranational). Here, the transnational trade, embodied in the Ventimiglia markets, which gathers visitors and merchants from various countries (Hily and Rinaudo 2003, 2004), coexists with criminal businesses that move merchandise, drugs, weapons, and human beings. Moreover, (irregular) cross-border mobilities include transiting people fleeing their country, among which Italians, Jews (Veziano 2015), Soviet citizens, Kurds, Tunisians (see Proglio Chapter 1), and more recent refugees during the so-called migration crisis. In many cases such mobilities were (and are) facilitated by smugglers (so-called passeurs). Following the reintroduction of systematic border controls implemented by France in June 2015, the mobility of migrants seeking to cross the border has been restricted. According to the Italian Ministry of Interior, between 2016 and 2018 more than 62,000 pushbacks have been registered at the Cross-Border Centre for Police Cooperation of Ventimiglia.3 Migration controls take place in public spaces, such as the

3 Ministero dell´Interno - Dipartimento della Polizia di Stato. Direzione Centrale Immigrazione e Polizia delle Frontiere. Register 0028579 of 18 February 2019.

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fixed checkpoint in Menton-Garavan train station, where most of the migrants are stopped and directly pushed back to Italy. Random controls occur in other stations and even in on-board transport vehicles. Drivers of cross-border buses are forced to verify the validity of passenger documents and French entry permits before the departure, while police check passengers’ documents again at fixed checkpoints along the highways (police inspections include the luggage cabin). Cars are randomly checked on the highway and along provincial roads crossing the border (see Bonnin and Migliaccio in this volume). At the same time, mountain paths are patrolled by the army and foreign legions,4 while a highly sophisticated camera system that includes human heat detectors has been installed along the most travelled passages. Indeed, all the border areas have been increasingly securitised and militarised in recent years, through the allocation of increasing budgetary provision in security items and staff. In parallel, a so-called lifting pressure strategy (Parole sul Confine 2019) has been implemented in Ventimiglia, consisting in forced returns of migrants to several hotspots in southern Italy.5 Border controls considerably diminish the chances of entering France for people without valid permits, forcing them to develop different border-crossing strategies or to rely on smuggler services. On trains, migrants have to blend into the crowd of tourists and legal travellers, acting so as not to be noticed during racial profiling controls6 carried out by the French National Police (CRS) (Anafé 2019). Failed attempts lead to more dangerous strategies, such as travelling hidden in switch cabinets or on roofs of trains. Lives have been lost in this way (Luppi and Quadroni 2017). Other strategies include border crossing by walking through mountain paths, on the side of the highway, or even along railways tracks.

4 The French Foreign Legion is a military service branch of the French Army established in 1831. Legionnaires are highly trained infantry soldiers and the Legion is unique in that it is open to foreign recruits willing to serve in the French Armed Forces. 5 This practice has been the cause of doubts and concerns from a legal point of view: see De Monte (2017). Moreover, it is scarcely effective, since migrants forcibly transferred to the south of Italy often go back to Ventimiglia within a few days. 6 Balibar (2007) proposes the concept of “racial line” while Khosravi (2019) uses “border look”.

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As I., a Sudanese informant who crossed the border in 2017, explains, there are many cases of self-organisation of migrants with the aim of evading controls by walking towards the French border in small groups: Those who know the way are always those who have already tried many times or have a friend that already passed and explained the way… If you want to go without a smuggler, you call just your close friend, because big groups are visible and easy to detect… We were a group of fifteen and we had to split in two. I was one of the people that knew the way, because I had already tried many times. We managed to pass by walking without having to pay anyone.

Among the majority of migrants encountered, it was common to hear accounts of multiple crossing attempts undertaken before succeeding, with consequent arrests and pushbacks. It is in this way that migrants accumulate a wealth of informal knowledge and experiences, forming a cultural and social capital in the bourdiean sense (1986), which add to existing capitals comprising social networks and extensive knowledge about crossing routes. Gaining access to specific knowledge—e.g. social contacts and expertise—necessary to cross a particular border, allows some migrants to facilitate the border crossing of others. That is to say, that the boundaries between smugglers and migrants are shifting and evanescent, given that migrants themselves are in most cases also facilitators. Practices of bordercrossing facilitation do become a temporary source of income for migrants on the move, who decide to temporarily stop in strategic border locations along their migratory route. This acknowledgement is especially significant because it contributes to deconstruct mainstream narratives about predatory smugglers and victimised migrants. On the contrary, so-called smugglers and migrants share common capitals and networks, while the specific expertise of the facilitator is recognised by migrants who wittingly choose to rely on him in exchange of payment. After three years working as cultural mediator in Ventimiglia, A. describes border-crossing dynamics in the following way: Those who try to pass and maybe fail two or more times turn to smugglers as a last solution, there are a lot of different groups… Some are going with cars, others with trucks or by walking over mountains… If you don’t have documents, you don’t want to stay in Italy, the idea is to pay and go, because it is worse to stay.

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Migrants evaluate their options and decide to trust migrants with more expertise in order to continue the journey. In these transactions, they are active players evaluating the best choice depending on their resources, prior information, contacts on the territory, and their own perception. Smugglers de facto represent a precious option that migrants use in cases where the obstacle is too difficult to overcome alone. As other authors suggest (Belloni 2016; Khosravi 2019; Palmas 2019), a migrant’s decision-making process that spurs them to keep trying to move can be interpreted through the lens of gambling studies. Investing some money in order to have the chance to arrive in France or other EU countries is considered worthwhile, accounting for the amount of money already spent, the expected outcomes, and the perception of having come too far to give up.

8.5

The Heterogeneous Cosmos of Passeurs

Heterogeneity characterises smuggling practices, forms of organisation, and underlying values. The size of smuggler groups may vary from a single person, who personally recruits his clients at the border and leads them into France, to transnational groups with split tasks and a vast network. However, in the border area of Ventimiglia, we detected some prevalent patterns of border crossing and typologies of actors involved. It is important to consider that for this kind of organisation it is fundamental to operate in an environment where sufficient trust among buyers and sellers exists, in order to complete the transaction (Achilli et al. 2018). In fact, although smuggling services take place outside of a regulated market, they follow cultural and local norms. In Ventimiglia, many smugglers (single persons or groups) recruit migrants according to their national or regional community. At the same time, migrants tend to privilege compatriots in their search for reliable smugglers. Z. and S., migrants who lived at the border area for an extended period, close to people involved in smuggling, describe this pattern in the following way: Pakistanis, Afghans and Iranians are almost from the same region and go together; Sudanese with Sudanese of course; the rest of the Arabs go with Tunisians, Moroccans, and Sudanese. Eritreans used to try with Sudanese smugglers, because they don’t like Afghanistan. Somalis and Ethiopians go together. Often these people don’t speak Arabic, there is always one who speaks a little bit of French, or English, or Italian. He does the negotiation.

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People feel comfortable when the smuggler speaks their same language. Somehow it’s better, you can explain more, you trust him.

People of different nationalities are involved in facilitating border crossings: citizens of Sudan, Senegal, Gambia, Chad, Mali, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Eritrea, Bangladesh, Kurdistan, Afghanistan, Tunisian, Morocco, and Egypt. Italian, French, and other communitarian citizens are involved in the smuggling business too, especially when it includes the use of vehicles.7 At the same time, there have also been people who have supported and facilitated border crossings for ideological reasons, such as solidarity and the political struggle for freedom of movement.8 Over time, the smuggling phenomenon has evolved and reformed itself according to the volume of migrants arriving at the border and as a result of the implementation of border controls. As many informants reveal, after the reintroduction of systematic police checks in 2015, the request for “professionals of passage” and the number of people involved in smuggling increased, while the strategies involved diversified. Later, in 2018, with the partial blocking of Mediterranean routes, a sensible reduction of the number of transiting migrants was registered, thus downsizing the smuggling business. Due to this trend, several smugglers left the border town, while those who remained had to reshape their organisations, sometimes cooperating among different nationalities and splitting tasks. Z. explains: 7 See, among others, Spagnolo (2020, 13 February) “Ventimiglia, operazione “Sciarun”: arrestati 10 passeur”, Riviera24 (https://www.riviera24.it/2020/02/ventimiglia-operaz ione-sciarun-arrestati-10-passeur-616783/); Riviera24 (2019, 23 October) “Ventimiglia, arrestati coniugi passeur: trasportavano sette migranti in una macchina” (https://www.riv iera24.it/2019/10/ventimiglia-arrestati-coniugi-passeur-trasportavano-sette-migranti-inuna-macchina-606775/); Secolo d’Italia (2019, 27 September) “Ventimiglia, facevano sconfinare i clandestini con vedette e passeur: arrestati 7 bengalesi” (https://www.sec oloditalia.it/2018/09/ventimiglia-facevano-sconfinare-i-clandestini-con-vedette-e-passeurarrestati-7-bengalesi/); Ansa (2019, 15 October) “Migranti: 15 da Slovenia a Francia in rimorchio cavalli” (http://www.ansamed.info/ansamed/it/notizie/rubriche/cronaca/ 2018/10/15/migranti-15-da-slovenia-a-francia-in-rimorchio-cavalli_a0de2675-d7ff-4dacb933-c7e2185d2289.html); Spagnolo (2016, 28 January) “Ventimiglia, 5 clandestini stipati in un tir: arrestato un passeur romeno” (https://www.riviera24.it/2016/01/ven timiglia-5-clandestini-stipati-un-tir-arrestato-un-passeur-romeno-214456/). 8 Barabino (2019, 10 July) “Migranti, Francesca Peirotti a processo in Francia: ‘Bufale su di me. Attenti a personalizzare, creare eroi è rischioso’”, Il Fatto Quotidiano (https:// www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2019/07/10/migranti-parla-francesca-peirotti-a-processo-in-fra ncia-bufale-su-di-me-attenti-a-personalizzare-creare-eroi-e-rischio/5307197/).

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In 2017 there were between 7 and 12 people for each group of smugglers, but in that time there were many migrants. Over time, numbers of migrants were decreasing and some smugglers left Ventimiglia and applied for asylum in France. Money is shared among the group, if the group is too big, the gain becomes too little.

Informants’ considerations about the relatively small local size of smuggler groups significantly contribute to deconstruct mainstream narratives about the influence of large transnational organisations. According to literature about smuggling organisations, groups are relatively small, flexible, and keen to re-organise themselves depending on the local situation, police border management, and fluctuation in the number of migrants (Monzini et al. 2006; Achilli 2018). The aforementioned characteristics correspond to our observations in Ventimiglia: local groups are formed of few members and rely on their local knowledge of the border area rather than on an overly structured organisation. Language competencies, regular objects and skills, as well as normal cellphones and vehicles, rather than sophisticated technology, are the main work tools. Strategies are based on regular monitoring of police checkpoints, due to the impossibility of ubiquitous control by police forces on all crossing points and on all vehicles transiting the border area every day. There are different tasks performed by people generally referred to as smugglers. Some of them monitor the city in order to make contact with potential clients. The station is the first and most common place where smugglers or information about them can be found, but indeed there are several sites where this business takes place. Other people conduct the negotiation, sometimes this is the same person who will then accompany someone to France, sometimes a broker who negotiates with the facilitators in exchange for a percentage payment for each recruited person. Finally, others facilitate the border crossing itself: drivers, guides, or someone who provides clandestine access to a truck or a train. Due to the high number of people transiting Ventimiglia and due to the sensitivity of the topic, we had the opportunity to access only a limited part of the facilitator networks, although our participant observation and informants reveal the presence of other groups. Therefore, we do

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not exclude the presence of large-scale criminal groups and transnational organisations, especially with regard to women and children trafficking.9

8.6 Price and Reputation in the Smuggling Business All along migratory routes, economic resources determine levels of risk to which migrants are exposed, as well as their destinations and chances of success (Khosravi 2019). This logic applies to the border of Ventimiglia too, where people with enough resources can afford to safely cross the border by car, while others are forced to walk through more dangerous pathways or be massed in trucks. The price of passage depends on several factors but primarily on the means of transport (car, small van, truck, train, foot), the community of reference, and the specific period of the year. Indeed, contextual factors such as variation in the presence of migrants and smugglers, tightness of border controls, and information circulating among migrant networks also influence the price, which may vary from e50 up to e400 per person. Informants reveal that other means of payment are required in case migrants cannot afford the price of the passage, like bartering valuable items, prostituting (Save the Children 2018), or providing other kinds of services. In order to provide a sort of guarantee to customers, trusted people can occasionally keep the customer’s money and deliver it to the smuggler only once the border crossing has succeeded. The reputation of smugglers is an essential feature in understanding border-crossing dynamics. In fact, the social capital that each migrant community has accumulated over time is made available to other migrants in the form of word of mouth in order to share valuable information about reliable passeurs and thus reduce the risks (Spencer 2004). For smugglers, a good reputation, built up from reviews of past customers, assures new clients and the continuation of their business. In this sense, most of the informants in Ventimiglia share Z.’s insights about smugglers:

9 During the periods spent at the border, we got several signs of the presence of

the women and children trafficking. In the interview, we asked about smuggled women and no one was comfortable in talking about that, just M. declared that they smuggled “intellectual” women and that over time a specific way has been established. We think that this question needs a specific analysis through the lens of gender studies and, above all, through the voices and witnessed accounts of transiting women themselves.

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They are honest, mostly because they need people, and they need migrants to trust them. They don’t want to ruin their image for a few hundred euros. They want to preserve their business. If someone fails they assure to bring them again.

Over the years, we have witnessed how dishonest smugglers, who deceived or didn’t respect agreements made with customers, did not remain long in Ventimiglia, while the most trustworthy are still present in the town.

8.7 Shabab10 on the River: Among Sudanese Smugglers and the Surrounding Community 90% of Sudanese that arrived by sea passed through Ventimiglia with a Sudanese guide. They enter in France with a Sudanese passeur.11 I don’t call them smugglers, I call them collaborators.12

The first time we met M. was in the summer of 2016 in Ventimiglia. He was well known in the migrant community and in the solidarity movement. M., originally from Sudan, was secretly facilitating the border crossing of Sudanese people into France as part of his activities. Due to his relational skills and linguistic competence (he spoke Italian, English, Arabic), he could access various actors and sources of information. At that time, there were different informal encampments in the outskirts of the town. He helped migrants with their daily necessities and monitored the evolution of migrant flows and police controls. Due to our common engagement in supporting migrants transiting the border area, mainly encamped along the banks of the Roya River while waiting to move to France, we developed a relationship of mutual trust. With the time and the sponsorship of M., we were accepted at the “Sudanese place”, a small area close to the camp equipped with mattresses, carpets, curtains, and a central fireplace for cooking. About seven people, all male, were living there on a regular basis, while every day new Shabab arrived, staying just long enough to organise their border 10 The term Shabab (‫ )الشباب‬is the Arab word to refer to a “guy” or “guys”. 11 Translation from the Italian “guida passorica sudanese”. 12 Translation from the Italian “collaboratori”.

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crossing. Collaborators used to monitor the strategic spots in Ventimiglia, take care of the newcomers, and guide them along the mountain paths. The group was led by M., who explains: Shabab don’t have our contact, they just know where Ventimiglia is, they arrive at the train station and there they find collaborators. We don’t know them but by hearing their accent we recognise each other as Sudanese, then they trust us.13

Official data show that since 2015 around 30,00014 Sudanese arrived in Italy by crossing the Mediterranean Sea. Most of them passed through Ventimiglia and continued their journey towards other EU countries. Some managed to move autonomously and others through smuggling services or solidarity networks operating at the border. Along the interview we carried out, M. described their own smuggling activity with pride: We are intellectual smugglers, we study the physiognomy of the territory and police checks, we know the mountain paths, we move in small groups, the head of every group knows the way… we are not a threat to security, actually we are solving the situation of Ventimiglia, otherwise there would be chaos and clashes with local population.

In our conversations with M. and his collaborators about their role at the French-Italian border, they frequently claimed the merit of solving social and political issues at the local and national levels, by diminishing tensions arising from the border closure imposed by France. Indeed, they played a major role in facilitating border -crossing for thousands of Sudanese, who would have been otherwise stuck in Ventimiglia, representing a potential source of tension for local inhabitants and authorities.

8.8

The “Sudanese Conscience”

On several occasions, M. referred to the “Sudanese conscience”, which he defined as a morality-based form of solidarity among Sudanese migrants,

13 Among the Sudanese group, the newcomer is called the sarukh (‫)صاروخ‬, i.e. someone who has just arrived, and who has limited contacts or information. 14 Fonte UNHCR. https://www.unhcr.it/.

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opposed to the morality of both Sudanese and European governments, which reproduced colonial relations of domination based on capitalist exploitation and white supremacy. He especially highlighted the collective behaviour that characterised their activities at the border: Beyond organising border crossings, we live together with Shabab, we share information useful for people on the move, we provide food and a safe place to rest, we share fraternal chatter, we open our minds. All these are tools to make the [migrant] subject autonomous of which we take care. Sometimes they are pushed back and we encourage them to continue, they have to remember why they left their home, we have the same motivations, the same mentality, we obtain this with collective effort.

Indeed, the sense of community they create among the group and the social proximity with newcomers (Maher 2018) are key factors that should be taken into account in better understanding mobility facilitation and the moral obligation that these facilitators feel towards the people they transport. Most of the time they share similar migratory careers and difficulties, such as the condition of irregularity and the uncertainties that characterise the process of asylum application. Diving deeper into the complex morality of the group, we notice how the Sudanese community has established its own system in order to pass the border. Beyond the mere act of crossing, the circulation of specific information is crucial for surviving and moving both within and across the border area. Indeed, shared knowledge and mutual help are fundamental tools among people forced to move in illegal ways, who challenge restrictive migration policies. On the issue of payment, often depicted in political and media discourses as a form of migrant exploitation, M. argued: The facilitators ask from fifty euros downwards, they make you reach up Monaco or Nice. They take a risk, too. It’s not a fixed price, if you can’t afford it you can pay less.. the costs are high for collaborators, they have to return to Ventimiglia by train, stay around one or two days, when they come back they have to buy food, you’ve seen how we live. We work, we make people ‘win’, we share the money we earn for the expenses of the group and the Shabab… I monitor the money that collaborators make and that money must be shared.

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Our close informants in Ventimiglia also reported cases of collaborators facilitating border crossings for free, when migrants could not afford to pay for their services. Indeed, among Sudanese facilitators, the moral economy paradigm (intended as “the production, distribution, circulation, and use of moral sentiments, emotions and values, and norms and obligations in social space”: see Fassin 2009) seems to explain the smuggling phenomena more representatively than a business approach. In this sense, our observations about the smuggling economy in Ventimiglia are coherent with other scholars’ remarks (Achilli 2016; Belloni 2019). The common struggle for movement experienced along the journey and the hostility of France that pushes them back, denying their right to apply for asylum, create social proximity among actors that boost solidarity and a form of fraternal help. In order to support his argument about collective behaviour, M. stated: If you have tried three times without succeeding to pass in France, this means that now you know the way and therefore you have to work with us to help others to pass, it is your turn to guide a small group, because we have already risked three times for you… you have to save your life and make all the group win, your goal is to pass, not to get stuck here.

According to M.’s explanation, risks are shared among newcomers and collaborators in order to succeed in the border crossing. He highlights the common endeavour of evading border controls and the collective effort they put on it. During the interview, M. also clarified that once migrants succeed, they have to pursue their travel rather than remaining in the border area and try to obtain benefits by working themselves as border-crossing facilitators. Indeed, the group of collaborators deliberately remained under the control of M., who was the head of the group for a finite period only.

8.9 Contentious Visions on Freedom of Movement During the time spent at the “Sudanese place”, drinking tea and playing cards, politics and the unfair migration system were recurring topics of conversation. Most of the members of the group held anti-government positions and accused their political leader of serving the interests of the European colonial system still operating in Africa. According to M.,

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the injustices suffered by migrants are crucial in order to understand the smuggling phenomenon. For M. and his group members, smuggling was just one of their activities. They were in contact with different actors supporting migrant rights and cooperating with them, helping people in understanding documents released by public authorities, bringing injured and ill people to the hospital, and organising social activities such as shared meals and chats with migrants in Ventimiglia, especially during Muslim feast days. They often described their acting as a kind of mission, a moral obligation to cooperate in order to survive along the route. We have this kind of organisation, we put our lives at risk to solve the problem of our Sudanese brothers, we didn’t come to see the beauty, we came because we were forced to. The collaborators are always the same, they are soldiers, they fight against borders, this is how we interpret our struggle.

In M.’s descriptions, smugglers are represented as intellectuals (see the previous quote) or soldiers, who face the same difficulties of their “brothers”. Their commitment to the “Sudanese conscience” is strong to the extent that they are willing to put their life “at risk”: the risk of being arrested, imprisoned, and eventually deported to Sudan. The use of the term “soldier” overturns the classic military meaning. They claim to fight the devices of control imposed by states and international regulations in order to prevent their movement. Among the Sudanese informants, we also collected different interpretations of collaborators’ activity, far removed from the idea of morality proposed by M. F., for instance, expressed his disagreement to the fact that his brothers from Sudan have to pay, as they had to do many times along their journey, in order to pass to France. However, he lay the blame on police controls rather than on collaborators themselves: On the other hand, migrants have no other solution, they want to pass, first they try on their own, if they can’t make it, they pay and continue… due to increasing controls, there are less chances and the need of smugglers became unavoidable.

Conversely, other migrants directly question the supposed morality of M. and his collaborators. I., a Sudanese refugee who lives in France after

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spending seven months in Ventimiglia, reports different perceptions about border-crossing facilitation practices: It was really violent, difficult, painful, and they do it as a job, for money, not as help […] Among Sudanese migrants there were a lot of people doing this job […] Sometimes a person who tried many times and didn’t get the chance, as he knows the way, started to do the same job because it was an easy way to make money […] They [the group of M.] were controlling people who did this […] Anyway, inside the group there were also more reliable persons, such as A., who used to do this job in a more professional way. There is also another guy who has a good reputation too, indeed his prices were a bit higher, because with him you were 100% sure to get to Nice at least.

Thus, Sudanese migrants do not always share the narrative that the facilitators’ group claim about the “Sudanese conscience” and supposed morality. Indeed, our ethnography reveals forms of solidarity and cooperation among migrants, but also different visions and interpretations of how to conceive it.

8.10

Conclusions

The nature and characteristics of the smuggling phenomenon in the border area of Ventimiglia should be interpreted in the light of different and evolving dynamics during the last four years, which have determined a growing precariousness for both smugglers and migrants. Indeed, smuggling has changed over the years depending on both contextual factors and people involved. The militarisation of the border has increased and most of the informal settlements have been evicted. At the same time, due to reducing numbers of migrants and the resulting downsizing of smuggling demand, some Sudanese smugglers have left Ventimiglia while others have re-organised themselves, occasionally cooperating in groups. New strategies have been implemented, like using cars and trucks, and new hidden shelters created in order to avoid police patrols. In addition, the mobility of many migrants has been forcefully restricted in the very area of Ventimiglia, due to pushbacks and the so-called decompression strategy (see Introduction and Menghi in this volume). Those who were returned to Italy and decided to try crossing the border again can count

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on the knowledge and contacts accumulated during their past bordercrossing experience to support their subsequent attempts. Based on our empirical observations, we would like to highlight three main conclusions: – We have observed how police controls implemented from 2015 have hardened borders and slowed down autonomous border crossings. As a direct effect, the phenomenon of migrant smuggling has increased, in terms of both the numbers of people involved and the migrants’ dependency on them. Other authors (Khosravi 2019; Maher 2018; Spencer 2004; Triandafyllidou 2018) have also claimed that human smuggling is positively correlated with greater border control. As border controls increase, strategies to elude these become more sophisticated while the range of possibilities to cross the border autonomously diminish. One outcome is migrants’ growing tendency to resort to smugglers, for those who can afford to pay. The risks migrants are subject to, in most cases, are not generated by smugglers themselves but are rather the outcome of restrictive migratory policies and law enforcement at the border. As other authors have highlighted, violence in smuggling should be interpreted in the context of global migration systems that criminalise irregular travellers, also referred to as “structural violence of the border regime” (Gonzalez 2018; Maher 2018; Sanchez 2017). – The two categories, migrants and smugglers, are typically conceived as being independent and fixed, but in reality are much more blurred (Triandafyllidou 2018). Migrants and smugglers often share same struggles, routes, services, and networks of people being transported. Some of them were still without documents or in the process of obtaining international protection, struggling to regularise their status in Italy or France. Moreover, the “occupation” of smugglers is often limited in time and it is not seen as a long-term job. Most Sudanese facilitators we met had first experienced the border of Ventimiglia as migrants attempting to cross it and only later started working in facilitating border crossing. Indeed, deception and exploitation seem to be less prevalent than media and popular accounts suggest. – Sudanese smugglers describe and refer to their smuggling activity as a practice grounded in solidarity and in the common fight against the border regime. They refer to it as a form of resistance embodied by their community abroad, which they call “Sudanese conscience”.

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They explain their action as motivated by the goal of enabling their con-nationals to reach their desired destinations. They share frameworks of morality with those whom they help to pass in France and they claim it politically. The moral economy approach seems to better frame the smuggling phenomenon than a criminal or business approach. Nevertheless, conflicts and different interpretations are certainly present among Sudanese migrants, especially in regard to the monetary transactions that facilitators require and the centralised control of smuggling activity.

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CHAPTER 9

Migrants “at Stake”: Agency and Autonomy in Ventimiglia Silvia Aru

9.1

Introduction

During the conference on Ventimiglia and the Val Roja “S/confini”, held in Genoa on 8 November 2018, an academic and activist speaker declared that he had stopped believing in the “teleology” of migrant struggles. There are well-known examples such as Australia, he continued, that show that movements of migrants can be stopped, at the cost of horrifying violence: “it’s not a given that migrants will always succeed in crossing borders”. As he was speaking, I made a note in my notebook that I agreed with his pessimism (or is it realism?). Now that I am experiencing the border in person and collecting statements from migrants, activists and NGO workers, or just simply observing them, there are two elements that I cannot stop thinking about. The first is that most migrants live in a state

EU Horizon 2020, Marie Sklodowska-Curie Grant Agreement No 752021 (Host Institution: University of Amsterdam). S. Aru (B) Politecnico di Torino, Turin, Italy © The Author(s) 2021 L. Amigoni et al. (eds.), Debordering Europe, Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56518-3_9

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of extreme psychological and physical vulnerability connected with the constant battle between desires, expectations and behaviours (Mezzadra 2010), on the one hand, and what the policies for the control of movement attempt to impose on the other. The second thing is how since 2015 the “time variable” has led to an increase in the violence of control strategies (in this case from both the French and the Italians). Alongside this increase, the frustration and weariness of many migrants who find themselves in Ventimiglia have also increased. By speaking about the frustrations of migrants and the violence of the system, I do not wish to adopt an “apocalyptic tone” (Mezzadra 2011). Of course, the border at Ventimiglia is not impermeable, but crossing it, for those without permission, has ever higher psycho-physical costs. This happens partly because in very many cases the attempt to do so is being made by those whose bodies and minds have been stressed by previous traumatic experiences such as crossing the desert, Libya and the Mediterranean Sea, as well as by repeated previous failed attempts to cross the EU internal border. The aim of this essay is to understand how the border regime “shapes the subjective experience of migrants” (Mezzadra 2010, p. 240). The methods of subjection have already been fully dealt with by other contributors to the volume (see Bonnin, Menghi); here, while not ignoring them, I shall attempt to focus attention on the tactics and processes of the migrants’ subjectivisation, one of the two faces of the “border struggles” (Mezzadra 2013). By doing so, this paper responds to the invitation from Kuusisto-Arponen and Gilmartin to give greater centrality to the “experiences of migrants” for the purpose of “understanding the politics of migration” (2015, p. 144). Neither solely victims, nor “pioneers of a new ‘bottom-up cosmopolitanism’” (Mezzadra 2011), migrants are seen here as subjects whose autonomy is of necessity “limited, compromised, contradictory, and tactical” (Tazzioli et al. 2018, p. 243). The possible tactics (De Certeau 2001) and counter-conducts used by migrants should therefore be seen in a context of “asymmetrical negotiations” (Eule et al. 2018) that is becoming ever more unequal and violent (Casas-Cortes et al. 2015). Where there is power there must be resistance (Foucault 1990; Edkins and Pin-Fat 2005), and this is one of the underlying assumptions of this essay. The second—based on empirical investigation—is that there are active and inactive forms of violence operating in Ventimiglia (Tyner 2015), some of which can lead directly to the “catastrophe of death”

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(Mezzadra 2007, p. 104) that we are witnessing systematically on the EU’s external borders (Squire 2017). The chapter is based on interviews carried out with migrants, volunteers and activists, and participant observation, conducted in the centre of Ventimiglia and at Roya Camp between September and December 2018. After analysing some of the tactics and counter-conducts used by the migrants, using real-life examples, I will describe some of the routes by which interviewees arrived in the border city. Given the centrality of the Camp mechanism, a whole section is dedicated to life inside the Camp, while the final two sections look at the relationship between agency and migration policy.

9.2 Close to the Border Control: Tactics and Counter-Conducts The tactics used by migrants are inevitably linked to the possibilities for action available in a migration system that has become ever more restrictive. In Ventimiglia, this “restrictiveness” is based on three main drivers: the suspension of existing regulations (the suspension by France of the Schengen Agreement), the deterioration of Italian asylum rules (see, for example, the Law 840/2018) and the systematisation of police actions that in some cases violate current national and international law. In this context, the timescales of changes in the law or in the worsening of the situation during their implementation phase play a fundamental role. Indeed, information on the migration network—which is essential for those seeking to achieve a good outcome for their own migration project—often becomes obsolete before the migrants have reached their first destination. There are two main control mechanisms operating on the Italian side and, while they appear antithetical, they are in fact complementary and their aim is to provide 360° coverage of “the spatial disarray enacted by migrants” (Tazzioli 2015, p. 10). The first is containment, by means of Roya Camp (see Menghi), while the second is forced mobility— through the removal of migrants from Ventimiglia, roughly twice a week (in 2018), to the hotspots of southern Italy and the repatriation centre (CPR) in Turin. On the French side, the systematic reintroduction of border controls has led not only to a series of arrangements for physical spatial control and a significant increase in the numbers turned back

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at the border,1 but to increased violence and arbitrariness in the controls themselves. Numerous violations of the rules governing refusal of permission to cross the border2 have been reported by activists and lawyers’ groups, both in France and in Italy. The main accusation is that the EU anti-discrimination directive3 is being systematically violated, given that the checks carried out on the border—and especially on buses and trains arriving in France from Italy—are clearly based on the racial profiling of those who are stopped and identified. The presence of a “colour line” (Du Bois, Banton 2012) used to differentiate migrants from other passengers is an illegal practice that has become so normalised that even this Italian border police officer speaks of it as though it was a legal requirement: [The French police] have to obey the law… If the government passes a law saying ‘You must check all the people of colour coming in from Italy’ [it’s] because they know that they are landing in Italy and Europe wants them all to stay in Italy […]. ‘So, you must check them all and send them back to Italy’. (Interview with a border police officer in Ventimiglia, 2 December 2018)

At risk of being pushed back at the border, deported to southern Italy, or forced to return under the Dublin Regulation,4 migrants inevitably resort to ever more complex and disjointed intra-European journeys. The different routes depend both on the individual’s capacity to mobilise a social and economic support network from the moment they leave (Interview with Jimale, 20 November 2018) (Belloni 2016) and on the intrinsic unpredictability of the asylum system (Eule et al. 2018). The latter contains numerous flaws that can in certain cases lead to a good outcome for the migrant’s journey. In addition to the use of private vehicles provided by the smugglers (see Amigoni & Co), or crossing the area 1 https://www.agi.it/fact-checking/migranti_francia_respingimenti_macron_salvini-432 8311/news/2018-08-31/. 2 Violation by Italy and France of Article 4 of protocol IV of the EHCR which states that “Collective expulsion of aliens is prohibited”. 3 ASGI (2015), Readmissions of foreign citizens to Ventimiglia (June 2015), profiles of illegitimacy. See https://www.asgi.it/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Documento-Ventim iglia.pdf. 4 The Dublin Regulation establishes (Brekke and Brochmann 2015) through the criterion of the “country of first entry” that—as a rule—migrants must claim asylum in the country in which they first enter the EU.

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between Ventimiglia and Menton by various routes on foot, a number of camouflage tactics are used, above all by those travelling by train. These include “splitting up family groups when on the train” (Interview with C., Social worker at Oxfam, 18 September 2018); not taking too much luggage; travelling with a white person; wearing the best clothes you have—all in order to slip through unobserved. The important thing is to avoid looking like a migrant or a poor person (the two are virtually synonymous) in order not to attract the attention of the French police who carry out stringent controls at the station in Menton. Even the choice of the day on which to travel can play a decisive role in the success or otherwise of the border crossing, as explained by the Mayor of Ventimiglia: They are incredibly well informed. I don’t know if it’s the migrants themselves or those who are organizing them, but they are incredibly well informed. They know that on Fridays, Saturdays and Sundays there are football matches in Italy so the police have other things [to think about], or that there are times of the year when there are more police officers around […]. It’s physically impossible to check everyone and everything. […] So the easiest thing to do is to watch the main arterial routes, that is the railway or the high and low borders. (Interview with the Mayor, 20 September 2018)

The tactics are not always and only openly antagonistic to legal constraints. The more or less conflictual nature of the dynamic depends naturally both on the individual’s migratory project, regardless of what the law says, and on the extent to which a certain kind of action is limited and opposed by the system of control. In this context, we can consider various statements from those who are pursuing the asylum process from inside Roya Camp: I don’t have many problems, my only problem is that they haven’t given me a date for the hearing, which I need in order to get a residence permit. […] Now I want to register in Italy to go through the asylum process here. I tried to go through France to get to Spain but I failed, so I changed my mind… […] Because you know everyone has their own idea about what to do. Their own idea about how to sort out their situation. (Interview with Jimale,5 20 November 2018)

5 The chapter uses pseudonyms to preserve anonymity.

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Obeying the law and trying to follow the correct procedures, having completely ignored them the first time around, can be interpreted as one of the disciplinary effects of the migration regime. Thus, in the case of Ventimiglia too, we can use the categories of “secondary adaptations” (Goffman 1968) and of “good recipients” (Dubois 2016) recently used by Eule et al. (2018) with reference to the behaviour of rejected asylum seekers. If secondary movements are the action that in practice establishes the autonomy of the individual’s migratory choice (Palmas and Rahola 2018), the decision to proceed with making a formal request for asylum in the country of first entry may be the result of the time lost trying to pursue one’s aim in the ways that were hoped for in the first place. Naturally, these cases are not being read here as a genuine renunciation or (still less) a defeat, but as a further tactic related to the system and the ways in which it changes. However—and this is a crucial point—the adaptability of the responses is not always without consequences. In many cases, what we see is the constant deconstruction of the lives of individuals, not least because in many cases these are people who believed that once in Europe they would not have to “fight” any longer. The forced waiting, the complexity of Italian bureaucracy and the lack of clarity about how long its procedures take pose great problems for migrants, also as regards deciding what counter-conduct to adopt: “It feels like your head is going to explode because you think and think and think, you think all day about what is the best thing to do” (Interview with Adom, 30 October 2018). And, furthermore, the Dublin system hangs like a sword of Damocles over the heads of those who have crossed the border illegally. They are, in fact, exposed to be transferred back to Italy several times, even if they had already found a job and/or learned the language in another member state: I want to stay in Italy only for the document. I stayed three years not in Ventimiglia, but in Genoa and then I got to Germany. […] I had to come back for Dublin, Dublin, Dublin [in an exasperated voice]…I had Dublin problems. I stayed 1 year in Germany, Switzerland three months, Austria two months, Luxemburg two months, Poland two months, Holland six months, Belgium eight months, France one month. Now I’m in Italy 1 year and half to take the Commission. It takes too much. (Interview with Ihaab, 16 November 2018)

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In this context, having at least a temporary permission becomes essential also for those who had thought of Italy simply as a place of (rapid) transit. The difficulty of facing the new challenges posed by internal borders, which some knew nothing about, along with the lack of physical and mental energy (Interview with Reis, 17 October 2018), leads many to revise their initial plans: “I thought I would go to Spain, but I’d be happy to stay in Italy, if I could manage to sleep and have a normal life and a job” (Interview with Darya, 21 September 2018). The mental and above all the physical changes are clear to see and are visible on the bodies themselves of the migrants. Some who have come via the Balkan route, often after years of travelling, given the distances involved and the blocks in place in many countries (especially Greece and Bosnia) were keen to show me their “before photos”. The way they point to the evidence of severe weight loss, or the appearance of the first white hairs, constitutes both an act of denunciation and, at the same time, a plea for emotional and human contact on as equal terms as possible (“I was in good shape too, before”, Interview with Reis, 1 October 2018). The traumas of the reception system itself are thus added to those connected with the crossing of the external border (Beneduce 2015).

9.3

A Geography of Good and Bad Countries: Journeys to Ventimiglia and Beyond

The migrants I interviewed did not always have a clear plan for their migration. In some cases, this is structured and defined over time partly in relation to the place where the migrant can feel OK and build a life, maybe start a family. The accounts of the various journeys, which come mainly through the Balkans or the central Mediterranean, are many, but they are generally very painful for those who make them and they speak of “a geography of good and bad countries” not only in relation to the countries that have been crossed (Minca 2019), but also those which are potential final destinations. Many of those interviewed who have come from sub-Saharan Africa recount that their arrival in Europe was the result of the deteriorating situation in Libya, which they describe as a kind of “Wild West” (Field notes, 20 October 2018). The decision to make the crossing into Europe is thus frequently the result of a change in the original migration plan:

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My original idea was to stay in Libya, but then when I got there, I saw how the Libyans behaved. They enslaved me, they put you in prison there. At that point I changed my mind and my behaviour completely, I was scared so I decided to come straight to Italy. I worked in some places in Libya, but they never paid me. So, I found myself on route for Italy. I couldn’t go back home, and I couldn’t stay in Libya any longer. (Interview with Mamadou, 21 November 2018)

As regards the choice of EU country, frequently France and other northern European countries are preferred because of the presence there of existing “significant connections” (Field notes, 18 November 2018), understanding of the language, or the presence of networks of friends and relations, not to mention the fact that the situation in countries other than Italy is often preferable in terms of welfare and employment opportunities (Interview with J., Socio-legal worker, 1 December 2018). It is not even necessarily the case that those who cross the border do so with a particular destination in mind; many of those interviewed speak simply of a desire to escape from the Italian situation. I’m in Ventimiglia because I have to cross the border and go somewhere else, because I’ve been in Italy a year and half without getting a date for an asylum hearing, without even getting an appointment and so I decided to try and leave Italy…. (Interview with Jimale, 20 November 2018) Before, I said to myself “Yes, if I find somewhere to live, somewhere I can live well, behave well, get to know people then I can stay here in Italy”, but without these things I can’t, so I’m trying to get to France. If I can find a place in France then I’ll stay there, if not I’ll go somewhere else. (Interview with Kamau, 20 November 2018)

In the overall picture of the EU asylum system, Italy is a safer place than others for some nationalities. Many Pakistanis, Bengalis and Iraqis arrive in Ventimiglia via the Balkans or directly from other EU member states and they are here because they think they stand a greater chance of obtaining a residence permit (e.g. Reis, Shabir, Devang, Omar). Some of them have already been rejected in other European countries and so they start the process again in Italy, with the legal support available at Roya Camp.

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I contacted my friends, my brothers in Italy and other friends. They told me to go to and apply for refugees there. It’s a good country, they give you proper documents after some months…in one month, Italy two three years you will complete your procedure, you should apply there, in Ventimiglia. (Interview with Reis, 1 October 2018) If I apply in France, I would never pass. It’s not a good country so now I apply in Italy. (Interview with Devang, 1 October 2018)

It is a fact that compared to other countries “Italy, with the slowness of its procedures, for better or worse does not always succeed in transferring or repatriating people” (Interview with J., Socio-legal worker, 1 December 2018). In other countries, not only are the authorities more efficient in the way they reject people and send them back to the state of first entry, they also have specific agreements with third countries that Italy does not have. These are the words of Ahmad, an Afghan refugee who has been in Italy for 5 years: They told me that if you are Afghan and come here to Italy, they give you a visa for 5 years. […] In other countries it’s difficult, they send you straight back to Afghanistan. I arrived here in 2014, and after 8 months I had all the documents I needed and it was all OK. (Interview with Ahmad, 21 November 2018)

Anyone who decides to request asylum in Italy is moved to a reception centre (CAS) in the area which, much more than the Camp, is able to insert migrants into a local network that allows them to become better integrated, as regards both work and socially (Interview with Lamin, 21 November 2018). Those who are no longer inside the asylum process and have settled in Ventimiglia mostly work in mediation roles at the Caritas charity, at the Red Cross centre, or for NGOs operating in the city (Interview with Ahmad, 21 November 2018).

9.4

Control of Spaces/Action of Bodies

One of the mechanisms through which the presence of migrants in Ventimiglia has been managed is, as has already been noted (see Menghi), the creation of Roya Camp. Designed as an initial reception centre for migrants with various different legal statuses (Second interview with I., head of the Roja Camp, 22 November 2018), Roya Camp was

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created to be a “legitimate space” for their stay in the city. One of its implicit purposes was (and continues to be) the preservation of “urban hygiene”, achieved through the destruction of informal settlements that were present in a more structured way since 2015, the year when border controls were reinstated, up until April 2018. The camp-space, as has already been discussed in depth elsewhere (Aru, under review), does not in itself cancel all possible actions, but may be included in the tactics of the migrants themselves, as a stage in their own migration projects. It is certainly the case that the Camp mechanism and the systematic destruction of the makeshift camps between 2015 and 2018 were tools that the authorities explicitly used to calm the border conflict situations to their own advantage. Similar results were achieved by the numerous expulsion orders handed out to activists (in particular to those associated with the No Border movement) who personally supported the struggles of migrants at the border in the name of the right to free movement for all (see Trucco). This change in the situation at the border made the struggle less explicit in its methods and often more “individualistic” in practice (Interview with Mugahid, 2 December 2018). The Camp, which is open to various types of migrants, responds to a whole series of individuals who are making this space a part of their own tactics. Many people come to the Camp in order to speed up their access to the Italian reception system; many of them come straight from Sicily. The advice of friends and relations is often the deciding factor that attracts people to this place: Someone advised me to come to the border in Ventimiglia because here there’s a cooperative called the Italian Red Cross. [They told me that] if I ask for asylum at the Red Cross, then the Red Cross will send me to a reception centre. (Interview with Mamadou, 21 November 2018)

Although this place of containment is an open one, and people can come and go, daily life there is approached differently by diverse individuals, not only with regard to their personal aims and desires, but also in relation to their previous experiences (Kreichauf 2018). Some migrants from sub-Saharan Africa tell of places that are a lot more brutal and squalid, especially in the countryside in southern Italy: Saami: This Camp is very different from the Ghetto. This place is much better…In the Ghetto there’s not a single spot that’s clean, it’s very hard

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to live there. Silvia: You call it the Ghetto? Saami: Everyone calls it the Ghetto, even the Italians… Silvia: How many people are in the Ghetto? Saami: I don’t know, more than a thousand…[…] We couldn’t believe that a place like that existed in Italy. Now we know there can be places like that in Europe, before we didn’t. (Interview with Saami, 29 November 2018)

The Camp is anything but a paradise, especially for women. Their tiny numbers and the militarisation of the place do nothing to make their lives easier or more peaceful, as is shown by the numerous “situations of abuse, violence, and threats to their liberty and autonomy” (Iacometti 2018). If the Camp’s female residents complain about the poor hygiene and sanitary conditions, as well as the feeling of constantly being in danger, the main concerns for the men relate to their relations with the structure and its internal organisation. In particular, their accounts reveal an atmosphere of subordination and infantilisation that are hard to tolerate: We are not used to having to constantly ask for things “Can I have a phone, can I have something to eat, can I have this or that”. […] We need to work and get food and clothes for ourselves. Having to ask for things all the time makes you feel strange, because we are not used to this at home: “I need this, please can I have some water”. If I have my own money, I can do what I want, without having to ask anyone for favours. (Interview with Kamau, 20 November 2018)

While the migrants’ agency is sorely tested by their subordinate relationship to those managing the Camp, we can witness it in the attempts to take over some of the Camp’s spaces (e.g. by creating an open-air prayer space, or by finding ways of shutting off the rooms to gain a measure of privacy). Psychological problems and mental illness are also increasing at Roya Camp, connected with what the Camp director describes as problems linked to “desperation and disappointment” (Second interview with I., head of the Roja Camp, 22 November 2018). We are now seeing an increase in the numbers of people who are psychologically vulnerable. What we are seeing is some people who perhaps had some psychological problems when they were at home, and being here has reactivated them. Perhaps they already had some condition, but they managed to keep everything under control. [As well] what we also have is an increase in those who perhaps were OK, but who are victims of

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the system. And it’s the application of the law that is leading to situations of this type. […] We have cases of individuals who need to be seen, to be seen as people, and to have a route, a life project; they need to be supported. People like this feel they have been abandoned, and they sink into depression. (Interview with E., legal aide at the Roja Camp, 1 November 2018)

The problems of Roya Camp are also growing in relation to those who are not there in order to cross the border, but because they have nowhere else to go. These are the people who have been expelled from the reception system—the “destitute” (Darling 2009) because they have finished the asylum process and have either reached a negative outcome (rejection), or a positive one (some form of protection). In both cases—either refusal or the granting of protection—Italian law requires that the person must leave the initial reception centre within seven days. As a result, many people come to Ventimiglia not to cross the border but to obtain a minimum level of shelter. Many talks of periods—some short, some long—spent on the street in the main cities of Italy, especially Rome, and of bits and pieces of work undertaken just to survive. The only place to sleep was the street. Someone told me about the situation here in Ventimiglia, that there’s the Red Cross…. (Interview with Abayomi, 29 November 2018) They chucked me out [of the centre] and it’s here in Ventimiglia that they help you. I’ve been here a year and 4 months. (Interview with Asad, 29 November 2018) They said to me “You’ve left the reception centre, what do you want? Goodbye! Fuck off!”. (Interview with Ahmad, November 2018)

The Camp has therefore perforce become part of the tactics of some migrants, although still today some prefer informal arrangements, whether because they have no intention of remaining in Ventimiglia any longer than it takes to get across the border (one or two days) or because they don’t want to deposit their fingerprints at the Camp because of

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the Dublin Regulation. The constant exposure to “deportability”6 (De Genova and Peutz 2010; Kalir and Wissink 2016) makes the situation of those living in makeshift camps even more precarious and stressful. In recent months, even the Camp authorities have started to show increasing hostility towards those who decide not to (or can no longer) request asylum. The regulation provides for a maximum stay of one week; but this time limit has never been respected till now (First interview with I., head of the Roja Camp, 30 October 2018). Non-access to the Camp is increasing the number of cases of abandonment, the ultimate form of violence of migration control (Leshem 2017). Small groups of migrants stay without any purpose on the public beach and among the bushes along the River Roja. They lack any form of support, apart from what is provided by the local Caritas and by French volunteers who provide a daily hot meal opposite the cemetery. Situations of extreme socio-spatial marginality are increasingly common both in Italy (MSF 2018) and in other countries (Darling 2009). They too should be seen as “a direct result of government policy (Lewis 2007)” (cited in Darling 2009, p. 649).

9.5

“Do You Want to Return Home?”

The migration crisis in the EU is a crisis of migration management. The greater the crisis in the system of control, the more it uses violence to bring the situation back to an optimum level for the system itself. The actions put in place by various member states against irregular movement following arrival, as well as the EU’s efforts to discourage migrants from arriving in the first place (by externalising borders through agreements with third countries), should be viewed from this perspective. For migrants, these actions on the part of the migration system have led to growing difficulties, both in continuing to pursue the plan they decided on before leaving and in remaining in the EU, especially in a legally recognised position. The latter, in contrast to illegal status, guarantees access to minimal forms of assistance, as well as the possibility of claiming legally guaranteed rights more easily. Constant forced transfers— both within Italy (Interview with Talib, 29 November 2018) and between 6 Italy seems to have adjusted (at least on the level of political discourse) to the “deportation turn” previously identified in other European contexts (Drotbohm and Hasselberg 2015; Gibney 2008; De Genova and Peutz 2010; Nicholas and Peutz 2010).

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other EU states and Italy—systematic evictions from makeshift camps and the lack of any reception system worthy of the name have all crushed migrants, not in identical ways, but across all the different categories identified by the law. Repeated attempts to cross this or other borders result in an exhausting search for a way out, and for some, in diminishing faith in future (Interview with catholic voluntaries, 6 November 2018). Unlike Lampedusa or other disembarkation points, Ventimiglia appears as the place where “dreams are shattered” (Oxfam, 18 September 2018), not least because the situation of “existential immobility” is the opposite of that of “going somewhere” (Hage 2009, p. 97) which lies behind all migratory choices. Silvia: Have you already tried to cross on the train? Saami: Yes, but they won’t let me through. I’ve been to Turin three times to cross the other border, but they won’t let me…Here too [in Ventimiglia], they wouldn’t let me through. It’s easier here than at Clavier, though, because it’s snowing there now. (Interview with Saami, 29 November 2018)

Various metaphors have been used to describe this unequal force field that sets the migrants’ desires on one side against measures designed to oppose mobility on the other, some of which relate to games and to the realm of “possibility”. The most apt of these is the metaphor of the game of snakes and ladders [gioco dell’oca], in which the risk is that of having to try again to cross (“climb the ladder”) having been previously sent back (“fallen down the snake”); but also the game of chance, which pushes the migrant gambler (Belloni 2016) to try their luck in any case. The metaphor of the game, like that of the lottery (ClanteBendixen 2017; ECRE 2017), evokes the possibility (which cannot be eliminated) of escaping even the most rigorous controls, and that procedures can be got round or manipulated to one’s advantage, given that they are often implemented in an arbitrary manner (Eule et al. 2018). Within this “game”, a clear motivation not to give in may come from an individual’s faith, or from the principle that “if at first you don’t succeed, try and try again”. The constant limitation of migrants’ autonomy, as we have seen, and the processes of heteronomy are a fundamental part of the asylum system. Overt protests and group protests have been reduced to a minimum, while we are seeing a greater fragmentation of tactics. For Mugahid—who arrived in Italy in 2014—the individual, rather than

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collective, response to the border regime can be explained in part by the problems caused by the worsening situation in Libya: In 2015 there weren’t so many problems in Libya as there are now, there wasn’t the same level of violence. Now, if you want to cross, they put you on the vessel [barcone] then you get to the sea, then they take you back, then they put you in prison. Obviously, this messes with people’s heads. When you get here, you only think about yourself. That is, you say: “Look, I’ve seen so many problems […] Now I’m going to look out for myself”. This is why so many people have problems now, we weren’t like that back in 2015. (Interview with Mugahid, 2 December 2018)

In this situation, a system that deports and obstructs does, however, include one form of mobility, the only one that is described as “voluntary”: that of returning home, an act based on the “mantra” states that “there’s no place like home” (Lê Espiritu 2017).7 On the walls of the offices of Roya Camp, as well as in the prefecture in Imperia, blue posters, similar because they are both produced by the IOM (International Organisation for Migration), ask “Do you want to come back home?”, a question which is followed by the steps which, if followed, lead to a return to the country of origin. Very few of the migrants I met replied to the question in the affirmative, voluntarily starting the process of returning home, even though in other member states it seems to be one of the outcomes encouraged by a climate that is ever more hostile to migrants’ presence (Clante-Bendixen 2017; Suarez-Krabbe et al. 2018). The fear of repatriation is common to most migrants. It is related above all to the economic investment made by the migrants themselves and their families in order to make the journey (Interview with Mamadou, 19 November 2018), to which must be added the anxiety over failure linked to the “waste” of time and—in some case—the fear of possible political persecutions. Some migrants cling to the hope that the problem is Italy itself: “they don’t know that there are rules in other countries, and that the situation there is far from idyllic anywhere” (First interview with I., head of the Roja Camp, 30 October 2018).

7 https://www.politicalpowerandsocialtheory.com/the-refugee-crisis.

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9.6

Conclusions

The tactics of the migrants on one side and the strategies for managing their presence on the other change constantly, adapting to each other in an endless and ever more tense redefinition of the power balance, and of what is at stake. This paper has attempted to use the accounts of migrants, volunteers and NGO workers not as an object of observation but as a lens through which to view the border. The people you meet in Ventimiglia are varied, not only in terms of their legal categorisation: asylum seekers, destitute people, “dubliners”, irregular migrants, refugees, those who have been granted humanitarian protection and so on. Ventimiglia presents an interesting case because the migrants’ agency is realised on the basis of the varied objectives and the related tactics adopted by individuals. While revealing the role of migrants as active agents capable of developing their own strategies (Brun 2001; Papadopoulos et al. 2008; Ataç et al. 2016), this essay has nevertheless sought to underline the human costs of policies that are ever more restrictive and violent (Schuster 2005). The difficulty of understanding the law and its implementation often leads to a state of confusion over what best to do, while the fragmentation of different legal statuses may make the creation of a united front to oppose the controls difficult and, along with the expulsion of activists, has placed time restrictions on the migrants’ counter-conducts. The waiting in the Camp, the continual rebuffs, what we might call “the repetitiveness of experiences” (Eule et al. 2018, p. 153), in the end takes a heavy psycho-physical toll. The greater or lesser freedom of action available on the basis of policies and their implementation provides a better explanation of the situation of migrants and asylum seekers in Ventimiglia than a simple (subject-object) dichotomy. The less flexible the system, the greater the difficulty of penetrating its cracks and above all, the greater the risk of harm that results from attempts to do so.

References Ataç, I., Rygiel, K., & Stierl, M. (2016). Introduction: The Contentious Politics of Refugee and Migrant Protest and Solidarity Movements: Remaking Citizenship from the Margins. Citizenship Studies, 5, 527–544. Banton, M. (2012). The Colour Line and the Colour Scale in the Twentieth Century. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 7, 1109–1131.

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Belloni, M. (2016). Refugees as Gamblers: Eritreans Seeking to Migrate Through Italy. Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies, 1, 104–119. Beneduce, R. (2015). The Moral Economy of Lying: Subjectcraft, Narrative Capital, and Uncertainty in the Politics of Asylum. Medical Anthropology, 6, 551–571. Brekke, J. P., & Brochmann, G. (2015). Stuck in Transit: Secondary Migration of Asylum Seekers in Europe, National Differences, and the Dublin Regulation. Journal of Refugee Studies, 28(2), 145–162. Brun, C. (2001). Reterritorilizing the Relationship Between People and Place in Refugee Studies. Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography, 1, 15–25. Casas-Cortes, M., Cobarrubias, S., & Pickles, J. (2015). Riding Routes and Itinerant Borders: Autonomy of Migration and Border Externalization. Antipode, 4, 894–914. Clante-Bendixen, M. (2017). En barndom i ingenmandsland. refugees.dk. http://refugees.dk/fokus/2017/oktober/en-barndom-i-ingenmandsland/. Darling, J. (2009). Becoming Bare Life: Asylum, Hospitality, and the Politics of Encampment. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 4, 649–665. De Certeau, M. (2001). L’invenzione del quotidiano. Edizioni Lavoro. De Genova, N., & Peutz, N. (2010). The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement. Durham: Duke University Press. Drotbohm, H., & Hasselberg, I. (2015). Deportation, Anxiety, Justice: New Ethnographic Perspectives. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 4, 551– 562. Dubois, V. (2016). The Bureaucrat and the Poor: Encounters in French Welfare Offices. Abingdon: Routledge. ECRE. (2017). ‘Asylum Lottery’ Made in Germany. ECRE. https://www.ecre. org/asylum-lottery-made-in-germany/. Edkins, J., & Pin-Fat, V. (2005). Through the Wire: Relations of Power and Relations of Violence. Millennium, 1, 1–24. Eule, T. G., Borrelli, L. M., Lindberg, A., & Wyss, A. (2018). Migrants Before the Law: Contested Migration Control in Europe. Cham: Springer. Foucault, M. (1990). The History of Sexuality: An Introduction. New York: Vintage. Gibney, M. J. (2008). Asylum and the Expansion of Deportation in the United Kingdom 1. Government and Opposition, 2, 146–167. Goffman, E. (1968). Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates. New York: Aldine Transaction. Hage, G. (2009). Waiting Out the Crisis: On Stuckedness and Governmentality. In G. Hage (Ed.), Waiting (pp. 97–106). Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. Iacometti, A. (2018, November 8). Passaggi/Racconti di ricerca azione tra Ventimiglia e la Val Roja. Conference Genoa.

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Kalir, B., & Wissink, L. (2016). The Deportation Continuum: Convergences Between State Agents and NGO Workers in the Dutch Deportation Field. Citizenship Studies, 1, 34–49. Kreichauf, R. (2018). From Forced Migration to Forced Arrival: The Campization of Refugee Accommodation in European Cities. Comparative Migration Studies, 1, 7. Kuusisto-Arponen, A. K., & Gilmartin, M. (2015). The Politics of Migration. Elsevier. Lê Espiritu, Y. (2017). Critical Refugee Studies and Native Pacific Studies: A Transpacific Critique. American Quarterly, 3, 483–490. Leshem, N. (2017). Spaces of Abandonment: Genealogies, Lives and Critical Horizons. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 4, 620–636. Mezzadra, S. (2007). Confini, migrazioni, cittadinanza. Papers: revista de sociologia, 85, 31–41. Mezzadra, S. (2010). The Gaze of Autonomy: Capitalism, Migration and Social Struggles. In The Contested Politics of Mobility (pp. 141–162). Abingdon: Routledge. Mezzadra, S. (2011). Autonomia delle migrazioni. Lineamenti di un approccio teorico. Outis. Rivista di filosofia (post) europea, 1, 27–49. http://www.eur onomade.info/?p=9803. Mezzadra, S. (2013). Moltiplicazione dei confini e pratiche di mobilità. Ragion pratica, 2, 413–432. Minca, C., & Umek D. (2019). Makeshift camps in Velika Kladusa. http://soc ietyandspace.org/2019/02/18/makeshift-camps-in-velika-kladusa/. MSF-Medici Senza Frontiere. (2018). Fuori campo. Insediamenti informali. Marginalità sociale, ostacoli all’accesso alle cure e ai beni essenziali per migranti e rifugiati. http://fuoricampo.medicisenzafrontiere.it/Fuoricampo2018.pdf. Nicholas, D. G., & Peutz, N. (2010). The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement. In The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement (pp. 44–76). Durham: Duke University Press. Palmas, L. Q., & Rahola, F. (2018). Il guinzaglio e lo strappo. Mondi Migranti. Papadopoulous, D., Stephenson, N., & Tsianos, V. (2008). Escape Routes: Control and Subversion in the Twenty First Century. Ann Arbor: Pluto Press. Schuster, L. (2005). The Continuing Mobility of Migrants in Italy: Shifting Between Places and Statuses. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 4, 757–774. Squire, V. (2017). Governing Migration Through Death in Europe and the US: Identification, Burial and the Crisis of Modern Humanism. European Journal of International Relations, 3, 513–532. Suarez-Krabbe, J., Lindberg, A., Arce-Bayona, J., & Freedom of Movement. (2018). Stop Killing Us Slowly: A Research Report on the Motivation

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Enhancement Measures and the Criminalisation of Rejected Asylum Seekers in Denmark. Freedom of Movement Research Collective. Tazzioli, M. (2015). Which Europe? Migrants’ Uneven Geographies and Counter-Mapping at the Limits of Representation. Movements. Journal for Critical Migration and Border Regime Studies, 1(2). https://movements-journal.org/issues/02.kaempfe/04.tazzioli--europe -migrants-geographies-counter-mappingrepresentation. html. Tazzioli, M., Garelli, G., & De Genova, N. (2018). Autonomy of Asylum? The Autonomy of Migration Undoing the Refugee Crisis Script. South Atlantic Quarterly, 2, 239–265. Tyner, J. (2015). Violence. In J. A. Agnew, V. Mamadouh, A. J. Secor, & J. P. Sharp (Eds.), The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Political Geography (pp. 115– 126). Chichester: Wiley Blackwell.

CHAPTER 10

(Un)Politicising a European Border: No Border and Solidarity Mobilisations in Ventimiglia after 2015 Daniela Trucco

10.1

Introduction

Since 2015, the reinforcement of the control and rejection practices at the French border has generated a constrained, precarious and therefore more visible presence of migrants in the urban space of Ventimiglia. Around this issue, and while construing it as a public problem, different kinds of mobilisations arose: demonstrations for the freedom of movement, Catholic and interreligious engagements, feminist chains of aid, but also far-right groups’ parades and different kind of mobilisations of the local population against the presence of migrants in town (Bonnin 2017; Trucco 2018, 2019, 2020). Thus, as a place of waiting and forced immobilities (Tazzioli 2020), Ventimiglia has also become a battleground (Ambrosini 2020) in which public place is at the same time a tool, a key issue and the scene (De Genova 2012) on which different conceptions of society are staged. Indeed, borders are a very evocative place offering a

D. Trucco (B) Université Côte d’Azur, ERMES/URMIS, Nice, France © The Author(s) 2021 L. Amigoni et al. (eds.), Debordering Europe, Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56518-3_10

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scenography on which the nation state’s policies regarding mobility and migration can be contested, for instance through collective trespassing or through diverted uses of border symbols such as posts or wires (Cuttitta 2012; Monforte 2016). The presence of hundreds of “illegalised” persons within the urban space of a mid-sized town such as Ventimiglia let appear, as in a microscope, all kinds of concerns over migrant assistance, the security of local population , city decorum, and struggles over the place (Lussault 2009) that should or should not be given to migrants within the town (Trucco 2018). Grounding from the analysis of in-depth interviews, field observations and documentary sources,1 this chapter aims to draw a portrait of the complex area of mobilisations “in solidarity with” migrants, focusing on two main movements and trying to analyse their action repertoires (Tilly 1984) and legitimation registers (Boltanski and Thevenot 1991). The article raises—more than it answers—the crucial question of the politicisation of issues related to migrations and border regime at a local level. We argue that, far from being a stable parameter that distinguishes “political” from “humanitarian” movements, politicisation and unpoliticisation are observable processes on the field that result in more or less public, oppositional and institutionally oriented ways of framing the issue of human mobility at the border. This chapter puts into light how Ventimiglia’s border area provides a set of opportunities and obstacles to collective action, influencing the available action repertoires and leading to unique dilemmas when it comes to strategic choices. Combining an interactional apprehension of (un)politicising processes, with a long-term ethnographic approach, it shows how, within a context of hardening repression, the politicisation of an already highly polarised subject such as migration is not without problems and leads to strategic questions as

1 The analysis is grounded on the evidences of a four-year ethnography, including twenty in-depth interviews with activists and volunteers (eight with “No Border” activists, twelve with Caritas and St. Anthony’s church volunteers), participant observation in meaningful places and times (No Border Presidio, informal camps, St. Anthony church, Eufemia Info&Legal Point, Caritas drop-in, Delia’s café, demonstrations, food distributions) and collecting of various written materials on the field (associations, committees and movements’ flyers, informative materials and blogs). Besides, the analysis is nourished with the (twenty-five) interviews made with other crucial field actors (mayor and delegates, town councillors, Red Cross and other NGOs coordinators, neighbourhood committees’ presidents and spokespersons, inhabitants, prefecture civil servants) as well as on institutional documents (town council’s reports, mayor decrees) and local media coverage.

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well as moral dilemmas. Old and new repertoires mix, actors circulate and cooperate, and the dynamics of both politicisation and unpoliticisation are to be seen. Even more than elsewhere, the field of solidarity of Ventimiglia’s borderland defies sharp distinctions between categories of actors and enables “improbable” bridges and unexpected alliances. 10.1.1

No Border and Solidarity Mobilisations

In the last decades, and more intensely since 2015, border territories have been the scene of multiple forms of mobilisation denouncing the harmful effects of restrictive migration policies and coming to the aid of the people whom these policies illegalise and make vulnerable (Rygiel 2011; Ataç et al. 2016; Youkhana and Sutter 2017; della Porta 2018; Agustín and Jørgensen 2019). In Europe, new collective actors have emerged to denounce the violence of the new internal “border regime” and/or bring support to migrants in their journey through the continent. According to William Walters (2006) “No Border can be characterized as a loose alliance encompassing groups from Germany, Italy, the UK and several other European countries. It was created in 1999 as a means of linking various pro-migrant and anti-capitalist protests against restrictive border controls, anti-migrant policies and deportations. No Border calls for the free movement for all persons. Its vision of mobility is not the restrictive version so often propagated by international agencies in the name of ‘migration management’. Instead, it imagines a democratised mobility that encompasses autonomous movements of flight, circulation, settlement and unsettlement. Anarchists, feminists, green, civil liberties groups, refugees and migrants’ organisations, and tactical media initiatives are among the active political forces that make up the network”. Bridget Anderson, Nandita Sharma and Cynthia Wright (2011) also consider that, more than a slogan, No Border is a coherent political project based on the rejection of the notions of citizenship and statehood, that clarifies the centrality of borders to capitalism and refuses to ask for better migration policies while questioning the very legitimacy of states, or regional institutions such as the EU, to establish the conditions for the mobility of people. Proposing a wider vision than Walters’, the authors include within No Border mobilisations a wide variety of individuals and groups, some of which may not be involved in the abolition of borders, nation states or capitalism, but provide an extremely valuable daily aid in terms of information, shelter and food.

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Both ideological and material components are thus present in No Border mobilisations alongside migrants, together with a methodological concern for putting migrants’ political subjectivity at the core of the action. Any dichotomic distinction between humanitarian and political is therefore blurred and what is to be seen on the field is more a tension between two goals—radical political contestation and material aid—sometimes difficult to reconcile. Scholars have thus stressed the importance within the No Border politics of safe spaces like self-run camps (Monforte 2014), where the logics of the repressive-humanitarian migration policies can be temporaly suspended and the conditions provided in which to create and transfer “mobile commons” such as legal and logistical information (Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2013). The term solidarity has been increasingly adopted by anti-border movements, not without causing debate (Tazzioli and Walters 2019). If on the one hand the solidarity register can be used to flatten or hide the asymmetries between caregivers and assisted persons (Mezzadra and Neumann 2017) and to round off the angles of dialogue and cooperation between actors, on the other hand it also provides a new framework for encounters with migrants, placing them within social and political struggles: solidarity thus refers to the recognition of the subjectivity of the other (Mohanty 2003), to the desire to build a new “we” rather than to replicate a “me-you” logic (Laitinen and Pessi 2014). Meeting illegalised people and trying to build relationships of aid that leave room for selfdetermination are therefore at the core of these mobilisations and of their dilemmas (Coppola 2018). Solidarity seems to have become unacceptable to states (Fekete 2018), to the point that practices that were discredited by some activists as being charity have even become controversial. The term “solidarity crime”, used by activists and human rights organisations, refers to the criminalisation of acts in favour of foreigners, illegalised by restrictive migration policies (Fekete 2009; Baudet and Carrere 2014; Bontempelli 2017; Maccanico et al. 2018). The French and Italian governments refer to the 2002 European directive which penalises “the facilitation of unauthorized entry, transit and stay” of migrants. In France, the “solidarity” clause, providing that assistance to migrants cannot give rise to criminal proceedings when

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not accompanied by any direct counterpart,2 has been the object of political and legal conflicts, with the Maritime Alps department as their main stage (Giliberti 2018; Lendaro 2018; ObsMigAM 2020).3 In Italy, citizens who help migrants to cross national borders can be prosecuted under the same law which punishes smugglers;4 other legal tools, such as the ban from a municipal territory for disturbing public order (foglio di via), are also used to discourage such practices. Besides, distribution of food outside authorised structures was banned in Ventimiglia from August 2016 to April 2017 by a city ordinance.5 10.1.2

An Interactional Approach to (Un)Politicisation

Within the transnational literature of political sociology, (un)politicisation of social issues is a main concern. If it is well established that no social fact is in itself political or non-political, and that any social phenomenon can be (un)politicised, there is no consensus over a common definition of the process of (un)politicisation. A narrower conception of politicisation will define it as a “process of requalification of the most diverse social activities, requalification which results from a practical agreement between social agents inclined, for multiple reasons, to transgress or to question the differentiation of the spaces of activity” (Lagroye 2003, p. 360): in other words, an action is a politicisation when it aims and manages to allow a social problem to enter the specialised sphere of institutional politics. Broader conceptions of politicisation include any call for an external arbitrage of a social conflict, and therefore a call to political institutions for a public action, based on central values of the society (Leca 1971), or any attempt to de-individualise an issue and to ascribe it to a more general public concern tied to a general principle governing the society (Boltanski 1990). Thus, Camille Hamidi proposes an interactionist conception of politicisation, and considers that an act or discourse is politicising when two elements are united: reference to a general principle that should 2 Art. 662-4 Entry and Residence Code for Foreigners and the Right to Asylum, as modified by law 1560/20122. 3 On August 8, 2017, the Aix-en-Provence Court of Appeal sentenced Cédric Herrou to a four-month suspended prison sentence, considering that his actions of assistance subscribed to activism more than solidarity, thus raising a sort of counterpart. 4 Art. 12 Migration Law, D.lgs 286/1998 as modified by law 189/2002. 5 Ventimiglia city ordinances 129/2016 and 85/2017.

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govern society (like “solidarity”, “equality”, “security” and so on) and the acknowledgement of the conflictual and cleaving dimension of the issue, not necessarily involving a conflictual register (Hamidi 2006).6 Conversely, an act or discourse is unpoliticising when it calls for individual rather than collective or institutional responsibility and lowers or denies the conflictual dimension of the issue. Grounding from this broad understanding, we will observe the multiple dynamics of (un)politicisation of the issue of border reinforcement, starting with a few aspects such as calls to public action or to individual responsibility, references to general principles or individual cases, publicity or discretion around actions, use of public or private space, opposition or cooperation with public institutions, and more or less conflictual registers. Moreover, referring to several definitions of (un)politicisation with respect to individual trajectories and relationships with politics (Aït-Aoudia et al. 2011), we will argue that there is a politicisation when the actions and discourses of ordinary citizens tend to generalise individual experiences and to acknowledge their cleaving or conflictual dimension. According to these criteria, long-term ethnography allows us to observe how the space of solidarity is crossed by both dynamics of politicisation and unpoliticisation, resulting from strategic choices when faced with a repressive context, but also from ethical concerns and the transformation of individual trajectories on the field. Ethnography also shows to which extent these dynamics span the different components of the solidarity field, and reveal greater distinctions between temporary phases or individuals within a same collective, than between one collective and the other. Thus, far from drawing oppositions or sharp distinctions between political and unpolitical movements based on their goals, compositions, registers or repertoires, the ethnographic analysis provides a more complex view of mobilisations and conflicts at European internal borders, where boundaries between “humanitarian” and “political” mobilisations are blurred.

10.2

Ventimiglia’s Space of Solidarity

Acting in a territory that is at the same time a symbolic place and a very concrete and complex, though small, urban space, Ventimiglia’s field 6 See also Bassi (2018) considering politisation as generalisation, polarisation of positionings and the belief in public authorities’ responsibility in solving a problem.

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of solidarity mixes more and less structured forms of solidarity going from national or even international activist networks and professionalised NGOs,7 to “spontaneous” acts of assistance by local individuals witnessing migrants’ living conditions in their very own neighbourhood, street, business… It thus creates a unique local, transnational and international field of action, blurring all possible distinction between endogenous and exogenous movements, and causing multiple jumps in scales, from local to (inter)national levels, while providing a pertinent place in which and from which to address European institutions. From No Border activists to Catholic parishioners, to NGO health or legal workers and the “marauders” of the hinterland,8 Ventimiglia’s field of solidarity comprises local, cross-border, but also national (both Italian and French) and international networks, without forgetting the very autonomous political subjectivity of migrants and their own political struggles and mobilisations (Nyers and Rygiel 2012). It is hard to establish a typology of all these actors: if differences in composition, repertoire and register are undeniable, what distinguishes these groups is more often the result of interactional strategies, discourses of distinction, and institutional and media coverage—sometimes building boundaries only a posteriori—more than objective factors and sociological evidences observable on the field. Distinctions, cooperation strategies, imitations and circulations are to be seen and investigated on the ground, and are necessarily contextual, interactional and changing. Without any desire to reduce this complexity by classifying it in an exhaustive catalogue, this chapter will focus on two main “galaxies” of mobilisations—“No Border” mobilisations and “Catholic” mobilisations—often well distinguished in actors and media discourse (opposing political to humanitarian, and global to local) but as a matter of fact quite connected on the ground, and sharing a variety of action modes as well as some crucial dilemmas.

7 The chapter does not focus on NGOs even if they fully participate in the local space of solidarity and involve in the processes of cooperation, distinction and circulation discussed in this chapter. It is also important to notice that NGOs are often at the origin of attempts of coordination: for instance, the French CAFI Coordination of Actors at Interior Borders, born at this border at the end of 2017. 8 Inhabitants from the French Roya Valley organized in 2016 and 2017 to provide food to migrants in some public spaces like car parks, despite the municipal ban.

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10.2.1

The No Border Galaxy: Continuity and Evolutions in Action Repertoires

In borderlands, among field actors, the “No border” label has been variably used as a federative slogan and as a deprecatory label. In Ventimiglia, the label “No Border” was first adopted9 by the activists— mainly belonging to the Italian autonomous and anarchist circles but also to more structured left-wing associations and other local Italian or French civic associations—that led to the Presidio No Border created in the summer of 2015, together with protesting migrants.10 10.2.1.1

No Border Camps and the Foundational Experience of the Presidio In June 2015, when hundreds of migrants got “stuck” in different train stations and informal camps all over the Italian peninsula as a consequence of a temporary suspension of Schengen agreements, controls at the Menton-Ventimiglia border were already well established. To protest against the violent “carrousel”—controls at the Menton Garavan railway station, transfer and temporary detention at the border patrol station of Menton Saint Louis, pushback to Ventimiglia—preventing them from continuing their journey, around eighty pushed back persons occupied the Italian side of the Saint Ludovique’s checkpoint area. After having declined the offer of being transferred in a humanitarian shelter, and resisted police attempts to drive them away by taking refuge on the bare sea rocks along the coast road, they managed to give high visibility to their struggle. In the days that followed, local citizens as well as Italian and French activists started to bring their aid and support. Two days of mobilisations in solidarity with demonstrators were organised on June 25 and 26, after which a camp was settled and given the name of “No Border Presidium”. Before it was dismantled, on September 30, some three hundred persons had been sheltered at the camp over the entire period, assisted by some thirty semi-residential activists, and a larger

9 In April 2011, some Tunisian migrants occupied the railways as a protest, and then, a manifestation ‘against borders’ was held in the centre of Ventimiglia, organised by a committee called ‘Welcome’, with an attempt to reach the French consulate. At this moment, the label No Border did not seem to be effective on the field, as protesters do not use it and local media talk about “migrants and protesters”. 10 On the experience of the Presidio, its origins and methods see also: Trucco 2016.

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number of local, national and transnational supporters involved in the camp’s activities. In addition to providing a safe shelter, food, hygiene services and clothes, the Presidio offered migrants language courses, legal information, geographical indications and other logistics aid for border-trespassing, as well as contacts with activists, lawyers and associations on the other side of the border. They also denounced the establishment of a network of smugglers, linked to local organised crime, and prevented them from entering the camp. Beyond these solidarity actions, three activities formed the basis of daily life in the camp during its three months of existence: street demonstrations at the border crossing, cop-watching activities11 and communication activities to spread awareness on the migrants’ situation at the border.12 The goal of this experience was twofold. On the one hand, the aim was to provide support and visibility to the migrants’ struggle, to denounce inconsistencies in the management of internal borders and to demand a response from the European Union, which enabled the migrants’ struggle to endure in time. On the other hand, the goal was to organise a self-run shelter, alternative and critical with regard to the existing institutional reception system,13 which places the migrants’ subjectivity and self-determination at its core. “Within the ‘bubble’, the rules of this Europe do not enter. Because the bubble is at the same time a means of struggle and material support for those who migrate […]: it is a place to breathe on the journey” (Giacopetti 2015). This dual approach has not always been easy to manage: it has proved very complex to combine the imperatives of reception and protest, the first requiring discretion and the second visibility. Activists often found themselves torn between the desire to not limit their role to “material” solidarity, and risk reproducing the dynamics of assistance or charity, and the fear of not harming migrants, already exposed to border police and

11 Providing some first figures over the rejection, detention and deportation operations, and documenting the illegal conditions in which they were undertaken. 12 A certain number of activities (film screenings, concerts, meals, “open weekends”) were organized on the presidio’s site, and a public meeting was also held at the Ventimiglia station. Activists opened a blog and several meetings were held in different Italian towns after the dismantling of the camp. 13 From June 2015, a sheltering centre was open by the prefecture at the railway station, ran by the Italian Red Cross..

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administrative violence. For instance, highly visible and oppositional tools, such as street demonstrations blocking circulation at the checkpoint (thus directly affecting cross-border workers and other locals), were widely debated within assemblies and were eventually held less frequently.14 This is to be understood in a wider context of hostility against the camp, especially coming from neighbourhood committees, local authorities, the media and local representations of cross-border workers and retailers. After repeatedly asking for the camp to be dismantled, Ventimiglia’s mayor declared, on the 30th of September: At the beginning the Presidio had good reasons for existing, but then it became useless, self-centered and has been damaging the entire community in Ventimiglia, a community that was already responding with solidarity and hospitality to migrants’ needs. […] We are not displacing migrants, we are dismantling the Presidio, that’s a different thing15

This first wave of the “No Border” movement in Ventimiglia faced a sharp repression that started with the Presidio experience,16 and reached its highest levels in the middle of 2016, when the movement was almost eradicated. The massive use of town banishment (fogli di via) as a measure of repression,17 mainly in concomitance with the dismantling of self-run camps,18 and with the dispersion of unauthorised demonstrations, forced the movement to significantly transform both its composition, on the one hand, and its methods and registers on the other hand. A few activists were nevertheless able to continue their action throughout the entire period considered here, and elements of continuity cound be maintained between the two waves.

14 Demonstrations, regularly blocking the crossing of the border, were staged on a daily basis for several weeks and then reduced to once a week. 15 Source: Imperiapost.it (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nd-0CviqwQc). 16 Some twenty persons were identified, or put under police custody, and eight of them

were temporary (three years) banned from Ventimiglia. 17 More than sixty temporary bans were raised against activists. Some of them have later been nullified by the court and the State Council. 18 Two other main experiences of camps have followed, in May and July 2016, the first on Roya pebbly riverbed and the second adjacent to the Red Cross Camp.

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10.2.1.2

Going Beyond Camps: The Second Wave of No Border Collectives Emerging in a peculiar context of sharp repression, and following a reflexive stage on the results and limits of the first wave’s actions, the second wave of “No Border” movements have endeavoured to maintain their presence locally by avoiding practices likely to encourage direct repression (occupations, squats, unauthorised demonstrations, etc.) and by trying to plant deeper roots within the local civil society. From the summer of 2016, a new mobilisation took shape around a nucleus of activists who came mainly from the cities of the north and northeast of Italy, called the Progetto 20k. Defining itself as a group of women and men who believe in free movement for all human beings and in everyone’s responsibility to be an active subject so that this can be guaranteed,19

this collective notably organised short stays of generally two weeks for volunteers, mainly students, who came to provide support activities for migrants in Ventimiglia. Several hundred young people were thus able to gain experience of the field before carrying out awareness-raising activities in their own communities or becoming more permanent activists on site. One of the first actions of the collective was a food distribution, in the context of the mayoral ban, along with cop-watching actions to produce written and video reports of police violence, to shed light on frequent forced deportations and to prevent migrants from being arrested. The opening of a Legal-Info Point in July 2017 (infra Amigoni, Molinero and Vergnano: 151) in rented commercial facilities, a few metres away from the access to the informal camp on the riverbed, was a significant step in this “second wave” of the No Border movement.20 In spite of the proponents’ desire to reach a dialogue with both local institutions and neighbourhood representatives, this initiative was received with suspicion and hostility by the town government, fearing for its policy of

19 Source: Progetto 20K presentation documents (https://www.facebook.com/proget to20k/). 20 At the initiative of a coalition of two associations, Iris and Popoli in Arte, and the network Melting Pot Europe.

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avoiding migrant gatherings within the urban space.21 A local newspaper covering the event titled: “We are not No Borders”, and stressed that the Info Point contained “orderly storage, computers, and a separate room to receive legal information”.22 During our interview, one of the Info Point’s spokespersons explained: We do not want to interfere or act against local municipal or prefectural institutions, but we would like to have a voice within the political debate on the issue of migrants in Ventimiglia, as others do, such as Caritas. We want to have a local anchorage, we want to be involved in the neighbourhood, we are offering activities for the neighbours such us IT courses for the elderly or small parties for children. […] We have opened this office to provide a complementary service, not in the purpose of keeping migrants on the riverbed and preventing them from going to the Red Cross camp as the mayor says […] We just want to give migrants full and true information so that they can make a choice, this is crucial for us, and even if we don’t say it publicly, this is already effectively a political act

The Legal-Info Point, called Eufemia after one of Italo Calvino’s invisible cities, provided migrants with legal support, IT tools to get in touch with their families and border information. Up to one hundred persons a day visited the office and benefited from its services, and migrants were involved in running the place. Thus, moving away from the centrality of “camps” in No Border movements, it still provided a safe place23 that supported migrants’ self-determination, and was able to produce and share “mobile commons”. A 20K activist recalls the experience in these terms: The Infopoint was created to provide a safe space to meet and share material and information that helps people to be autonomous. Recharge your phone, use the internet, find a pair of shoes or a sleeping bag, find maps of

21 As reported by local media. Source: Rivera24 (http://www.riviera24.it/2017/ 07/ventimiglia-info-legal-point-per-migranti-no-grazie-il-disappunto-del-comitato-di-viatenda-e-gianchette-260214/). 22 Source: Riviera24 (http://www.riviera24.it/2017/07/ventimiglia-non-siamo-no-bor ders-apre-oggi-linfo-point-di-via-tenda-ecco-come-funzionera-260894/). 23 Timeslots and spaces within Eufemia were also reserved to women with activities, called the “sister group”, ran by feminist activists relied to the national network Non Una Di Meno.

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France, or contacts in Nice, Marseille, Paris etc. All these things increase the chances of those who want to cross the border

Besides this place, 20K activists continued to provide support for people settled on the riverbed (bringing tents, blankets, soap, clothes, wood for the winter, etc.), sharing time and building relationships with them, without participating in the management of the informal camps which followed one another until April 2018, when the camp was dismantled for the last time. No new informal settlements have formed in Ventimiglia since, and in July 2018, a concrete barrier was erected to try to restrict access to the riverbed. At the end of the same year, the Info-Legal Point Eufemia also had to close due to the growing hostility of neighbours and local institutions. Another collective has been active on Ventimiglia’s territory. This one originates from France and enrolls volunteers mainly in other European countries but also in the US and Canada. Born in 2016 within a camp in northern France, the collective Kesha Niya24 Kitchen brings together activists from all over Europe and enjoys the support of the solidarity networks of Ventimiglia and the French Roya Valley. Specialised in preparing and distributing food in border areas, they first intervened in providing dinners—in rotation with French associations, mainly of Islamic background—in the carpark facing Ventimiglia’s cemetery starting in April 2017. From October 2018, Kesha Niya’s activists organised a daily reception point in Ventimiglia’s hamlet of Grimaldi, just a few hundred metres from the Saint Louis border crossing. Here, they offer a place of respite to people who have just been pushed back by French authorities, where they can eat, rest and be directed to the various local solidarity groups. Activists also report on the situation, by collecting and disseminating data on pushbacks, police practices, violence and abuses.25 Their growing connection and cooperation with French lawyers and Human Rights Associations also led to several contentious and strategic litigations (Israël 2001; Sarat and Scheingold 2006) on illegitimate pushbacks. Mixing radical criticism of the border with repertoires of humanitarian and legal action, Kesha Niya Kitchen thus confirms the

24 Kurdish for “No Problem” and a clear reference to the slogan “No Border, No Problem”. 25 See Kesha Niya’ s regular reports on their website: http://keshaniya.org/.

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general practice of cooperation and contamination of the different types of action in the local field of solidarity with migrants. 10.2.2

A Plural “Local” Civil Society and the Hegemonic Position of the Local Catholic Church

Far from a simplistic vision of the solidarity in Ventimiglia as a totally exogen phenomenon, or of Ventimiglia’s local community as entirely hostile to migrants and those helping them, it is important to point out the commitment of several hundred of local citizens in individual or collective acts of solidarity with migrants, also within No Border movements. As Tazzioli and Walters pointed out (2019), if space is certainly a crucial aspect to understand activism in border areas, time is often a neglected dimension that needs to be taken into account, each territory having a peculiar history of social and political struggles. In Ventimiglia, a plural local civil society preexisted. It included anti-mafia organisations, associations for popular education using Freire’s methodologies, scout movements and charitable associations. Even though their core issue was not related to human mobility, they have been actively engaged in actions of solidarity with migrants. Within this local civil society, religious actors played a major role, confirming the hegemonic position of the Italian Catholic Church when it comes to migration issues (Zincone and Di Gregorio 2002; Frisina 2010; Mioli 2012) but also opening an interreligious space in which other religious organisations—mainly Islamic and Protestant—intervened. It is important to note that Catholic actors, such as the local Caritas, are heavily involved in the local welfare system and had also intervened in previous “border crises”—namely with respect to Kurdish exiles in the middle of the 1990s and Tunisian exiles in 2010 and 2011—and were thus recognised as legitimate and competent actors on the field. The relationship between this local civil society, led by the church, and the No Border movements is complex: if criticism and distinctions can be seen, cooperation and circulation are frequent between the two spheres. The local Bishop had opened a dialogue with Presidio’s activists and intervened with a lawyer during negotiations with the police at its dismantling. At the end of May 2016, after the first Red Cross aid centre at the railway station was closed and the informal camp on the riverbed was dismantled, a large police operation was launched to seek to hunt down and

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deport the entire population of migrants still in town. Some activists, who were distraught, asked and obtained shelter from the rector of St Nicola Church in order to protect migrants from deportation. Caritas then intervened as a mediator between the police and a group of migrants that left the church to stage a protest demonstration at the border checkpoint, and obtained the authorisation to shelter them on its own premises. Since these were unfit for sheltering dozens of people, the decision was made to open the doors of St Anthony’s Church. The sheltering experience within St Anthony’s Church shows not only the extent of solidarity among locals but more widely challenges the boundaries between charitable, humanitarian and political mobilisations, by providing the context for individual and collective trajectories of politicisation, and for “improbable alliances” (Zolberg 2006). 10.2.2.1 The Sheltering Experience at St Anthony’s Church Located north of the city centre, near the Roya River and on the main road that leads to the French part of its valley, in one of the poorest neighbourhoods of Ventimiglia—mainly inhabited by border workers of immigrant descent from southern Italy and their families—this small Catholic Church dedicated to Saint Anthony of Padua opened its doors to migrants on 31 May 2016, and quickly became a landmark for people in transit in the region. Until its closure on 14 August 2017, it accommodated around thirteen thousand people, with peaks of one thousand people a day, especially in June and July 2016, and mobilised more than a hundred volunteers. The church also functioned as operational headquarters for various NGOs and other militant networks. This project called Con-fine solidale (a play on words meaning both “solidarity border” and “solidarity goal”) was born of the initiative of the Bishop of the Ventimiglia-Sanremo diocese and the parish priest of Roverino-Gianchette, and then continued under the coordination of the local Caritas, with the support of many citizens and local, national and international associations. The profile, trajectory and status of volunteers and others involved in the experiment vary considerably. There are active parishioners (catechists, choristers, etc.) without previous experience of migration issues or particular interest in them; Caritas employees and volunteers; worshippers involved in other religious movements (Catholic scouts, Focolarini, members of the Vaud Protestant minority, active members of the local Muslim community); non-religious citizens of very diverse profiles,

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variably involved in charitable and health associations, sports or civic associations. If the experience was born under peculiar and “urgent” circumstances, as summarised earlier, it was nevertheless the opportunity for the local church to pursue its policy of solidarity with migrant populations, using a new repertoire of action: hospitality on a larger scale towards these “illegalised” people. Indeed, the Bishop of Ventimiglia as well as the leaders of local Caritas regularly intervened in the public debate to ask local institutions for more structural and sustainable accommodation solutions, in order to guarantee a dignified reception for migrants, and to thus reduce the possible nuisance for the town’s residents. Faced with the refusal of the institutions to adopt a long-term solution which, according to them, would have encouraged arrivals in Ventimiglia, the possibility of opening churches’ doors to migrants had been discussed within the diocese. The institutional ecclesiastical context, with the sermons delivered by Pope Francis on the duty of help and hospitality, on 16 April 2016, and on the duty of the churches to “always keep their doors open”, on 29 May 2016, also provided legitimisation for this project. For almost four hundred and forty days, the basement, the forecourt, the courtyard and the church itself were transformed into an emergency reception centre, first open to all and then limited to women, families and minors, after the opening of the Roya Camp in mid-July 2016. A certain number of volunteers then left the experience, sometimes in disagreement with its new established “rules”, summarised with the image of the “closed gate”. As a result of the new role of the church as a refuge for the most vulnerable and the agreements regarding the maximum reception capacity tolerated by the public authorities the portal of the court, until then wide open, was closed and access to reception was filtered. Since priority was given to small children, minors aged 14–17 years were then excluded from both the church and the Roya Camp, reserved for adults and found themselves with no other choice than to camp on the pebbly riverbed in very precarious conditions. Outraged by this situation, some volunteers left the church and refocused their action on these young people, getting closer to militant networks active on the riverbed. One of them, during our interview, explained:

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I basically no longer go for a reason. I’m not a diplomat and I’m not a politician. Don Rito’s decision to refuse to let minors enter to keep the numbers down, because the situation is tolerated but not too much, is a decision that I can understand with my brain but not with my heart […] I’ve also been unlucky because one evening I did not let a boy in, I just gave him a blanket and… [sighs] that night there was an eviction from the riverbed and … I saw the police taking that boy to whom I had said “no you cannot come in” [sighs] … maybe now he is in France, who knows [smiles] but for me it was very painful.

Others, often local parishioners, continued their service. Among these volunteers, real trajectories of politicisation appear as they are made aware, through daily contacts, of the violations and abuses suffered by migrants, especially women. Thus, rapprochements also take place with the networks of passeurs solidaires (“solidarity smugglers”) and the No Border movements from which they felt distant at the beginning of the reception experience. One of the long-term volunteers, a catechist from the neighbourhood, explained in the interview: The perception of “No Borders” among the volunteers has changed a little […] personally, I didn’t really know what they were doing, I knew that they also had confrontations with the police and all that stuff, and we never wanted this kind of thing nor we want it now … But after having met and talked for example with ***, we understand it better […] now, if there’s something we need to know, if we need to meet, we have their number, we call each other, we see each other and we understand each other very well […] They have all my consideration, compared to what they do, we don’t do anything, we just cook pasta. They are the ones who push, who change things. Their priority is really the good of these young people, without profit, without anything […] At the beginning some volunteers didn’t want them to get in [the church]. I let them in, they establish the contact. When they are ready, they call and help them pass … After I discovered that there were many of us [among the volunteers] doing so, even parishioners I have known for decades and from whom I never would have imagined such behaviour, so much support, so much unconditional help! For me it’s wonderful, it’s fully practicing the gospel.

Contested by some of its neighbours, who organised a committee in July 2016, the shelter was eventually closed in August 2017. Women, children and families were then transferred to the Roya Camp, which

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remained the only legal, legitimate and tolerated sheltering facility in Ventimiglia, until its closure in July 2020. After the end of the sheltering experience at St. Anthony’s Church, the dismantling of the informal camp and the closing of the Eufemia Info& Legal Point , actions in solidarity with migrants in Ventimiglia did not completely disappear but were faced with the main difficulty of finding places in which to provide such solidarity, especially within the urban space. Besides the Kesha Niya’s “breakfasts”26 provided at the checkpoint, the only receiving desk that remained open in town was the Caritas drop-in. Here, food, clothes and other essential goods are provided, as well as medical and legal assistance in cooperation with health and volunteer legal professionals. “Legalised” migrants with different, generally precarious, legal status also volunteer as translators and consultants. The other landmark in the city is the solidarity café run by Delia Bonuomo: this commercial activity, which paid a high price in terms of loss of regular customers, and even received threats for having opened its doors to migrants, now provides a respite for them and also for the volunteers and activists still present in Ventimiglia.27 Besides this facility, a few local associations have pursued actions of solidarity within a wider frame of street education actions in low-income neighbourhoods which are also particularly concerned by the presence of migrants.

10.3 Unpoliticising Activism, Politicising Humanitarianism? The longitudinal dimension of the analysis, together with a broad and interactional acceptation of the processes of (de)politicisation, highlights both a general trend of depoliticisation of the field and non-negligible signals of re- or new politicisations in which boundaries between “political” and “humanitarian” actions are more and more blurred. A few elements go in the direction of a depoliticisation of the action field. First, repression had direct and undirect effects in weakening the basis of the No Border movement, reducing its components, delegitimising 26 Breakfast is the name given to the action, providing an all-day long possibility of restoring. 27 On Delia’s experience, see the document of Doctors Without Borders https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=18VbxuO-oYQ.

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its original repertoires and registers and eventually preventing their use. The “second wave” of the movement using less oppositional repertoires and registers, placed more emphasis on cooperation, complementarity and individual responsibility. Second, the experience of personal encounters with migrants on the field raised questions and dilemmas that led to a progressive dilution of political arguments into humanitarian actions: since the experience of the Presidio, activists were torn between a more general and political goal of denouncing the border’s effects and therefore trying to use repertoires of denunciation and communication, and a more pragmatic and individualised desire to help the persons they met, which required discretion and protection from the risks associated with activism. Third, the synergies created on the field and the need for unity considering the harsh political context in which these actors operated also led activists to favour more discrete and humanitarian repertoires and registers as a result of the need for compromise to achieve a wider consent. Finally, the decline in the migrants’ own activism in protesting the border regime as a result of the strengthened repression, constraints and injunctions surrounding them, of their deteriorated living conditions in Ventimiglia and their growing isolation all contributed to this general trend of depoliticisation. Conversely, a few elements plead for a reconsideration of this onedirectional analysis and point to certain politicisation or re-politicisation processes operating within the frame, or under the cover, of “humanitarian” actions and discourses. Firstly, some action repertoires, especially in the context of borderlands, remain difficult to categorise as more or less humanitarian or political, and their adoption can lead to both politicisation and depoliticisation effects. For instance, legal support as an action repertoire has both depoliticising effects, since it reduces a general issue to an individual situation to be dealt with, and politicising effects since it provides a stronger basis for advocacy and public denunciation (Agrikoliansky 2003; Lochak 2016); also, with consideration to the person who is helped, legal support is not only a humanitarian aid but also a form of empowerment, providing a basis for informed choices and the tools for recognition as a subject of right. In the same way, hospitality is depicted in literature as a repertoire half-way between the humanitarian and the political (Dorangricchia and Itçaina 2005) since it integrates the recognition of the “other” as a political subject vested with rights and initiative (Boudou 2017; Tassin 2017). The experience of St. Anthony’s Church pushed

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the Catholic Church a little further in the direction of contesting and challenging migration and border policies, since it adopted this repertoire with “illegalised” migrants. It also provided a significant experience (in a pragmatical sense) in which unexpected trajectories of politicisation as well as improbable coalitions between “strange bedfellows” (Zolberg 2006) took shape. Even “giving rides” and being directly involved in helping migrants trespass the border is neither a distinguishing nor a clearly oriented repertoire. On the one hand, it is not distinctive of one group or another. As a matter of fact, all collectives, from the Presidio to 20K activists, to the St Anthony’s volunteers, were involved in actions directly supporting “solidarity smugglers” (passeurs solidaires ). On the other hand, as with other repertoires, this was also the subject of debate and differences within the collectives. As an example, a 20k activist explained in our interview: I really felt that I was “on the right side” and finally acting, doing something […] What kept me there is also this perception of a political project, maybe confused, not structured, because there are so many different people, but a sort of idea of life in common, of res publica […] even if there were also things that I did not share 100%, I mean that I can support but that I won’t personally do, like the “rides” […] I don’t say it’s wrong, but for me it’s too risky and since it is not possible to do it for everybody, at the end of the day it’s not very helpful. It’s better to give information on how to autonomously cross the border, so that people can also share this knowledge with others, and create something, and not to bring to the other side the person you choose.

Also, the effects of “rides”’ are both politicising—as they directly defeat mobility laws by ignoring and violating them—and unpoliticising—as they focus more on individuals, both the migrant and his/her helper, than institutions. In order to maintain their action, Ventimiglia’s collectives have generally been critical towards advertising “rides” in the media, as was done by French farmer Cédric Herrou for instance as a form of self-denunciation together with a call for institutions to fullfill their responsibilities, and have avoided this kind of politicisation. However, the fact that dozens of activists and volunteers adopted this very costly repertoire proves a clear positioning and a high level of consciousness of the political issue of borders.

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Secondly, repression has widened its scope and has targeted less “political”, in the sense of oppositional and visible, actions of solidarity— such as providing food or shelter—thus transforming them into subversive actions (Tazzioli and Walters 2019). Also, persecution of the so-called passeurs solidaires depicts them as activists and political actors, in a deprecatory way, with no reference to their personal motivation or register used to justify their acts. Some therefore found themselves opposed to public authorities, against their will; others considered their action as highly political. The increased criminalisation of solidarity practices, while making them more costly for the citizens who undertake them, has also contributed to politicising them (Fekete 2018). As the repressive context broadens the boundaries of its scope to include humanitarian actions, humanitarianism becomes subversive. Finally, if field experience as well as interactions and cooperation among actors can lead to less visible and oppositional modes of action, they also allow specific knowledges about border and migration issues to circulate, and awareness to spread beyond the narrow circles of specialised activists. Trajectories of politicisation are then to be seen for instance among the St Anthony’s church parishioners and other Ventimiglia residents who somehow found themselves in the situation of knowing more about migration laws and policies, witnessing their effects and consequentially willing to become active beyond the mere charitable actions they were providing, and eventually providing support to No Border networks, intervening in the public space to advocate for migrants, and participating in street demonstrations. Thus, the pragmatic experience of hospitality or material solidarity also generated political awareness and activism.

10.4

Conclusion

Ventimiglia’s borderland provides peculiar opportunities for and obstacles to collective action. The criminalisation of solidarity and the local policy of migrants’ encampment (Trucco 2018; Menghi 2018) are key factors to understand limitations in action repertoires and strategic choices. For instance, a typical and crucial action repertoire such as street demonstrations encounters specific obstacles in a border town that

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needs “good press” and fluid circulation for both cross-border workers and customers to survive economically.28 Field observation of the solidarity towards migrants and of the opposition to migration and border politics in Ventimiglia leads us to rethink traditional distinctions between political and humanitarian actions. These categories do not apply as classificatory principles to distinguish collective actors on the field, since repertoires and dilemmas seem to be shared by all field actors, and a variety of positionings can be seen within each of them. For instance, the relationship to legality is not a criterion of classification but is rather an inner variant: in their public discourse, both the No Border movements and the church-led local civil society mix oppositional and cooperative registers, in variable doses, positioning themselves sometimes for respect of the law and sometimes for disobedience; also, within each group, the relationship to legality is a dilemma to which all individuals are confronted and respond in many different ways. Within a context of increasing criminalisation of both undesired mobilities and solidarity to illegalised people in movement, Ventimiglia’s borderland provides a complicated space for solidarity in which boundaries between local, national and global activism as well as between humanitarian, civic or political engagements are blurred and in which original, often unexpected, paths to rethink politics are traced.

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Monforte, P. (2016). The Border as a Space of Contention: The Spatial Strategies of Protest Against Border Controls in Europe. Citizenship Studies, 20(3–4), 411–426. Nyers, P., & Rygiel, K. (Eds.). (2012). Citizenship, Migrant Activism and the Politics of Movement. London: Routledge. ObsMigAM. (2020). Le manège des frontières. Criminalisation des migrations et solidarités dans les Alpes Maritimes. Paris: Le Passager Clandestin. Papadopoulos, D., & Tsianos, V. (2013). After Citizenship: Autonomy of Migration, Organisational Ontology and Mobile Commons. Citizenship Studies, 17 (2), 178–196. Rygiel, K. (2011). Bordering Solidarities: Migrant Activism and the Politics of Movement and Camps at Calais. Citizenship Studies, 15, 1–19. Sarat, A., & Scheingold, S. (Eds.). (2006). Cause Lawyering and Social Movement. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Tassin, E. (2017). Exil, hospitalité et… Politique. Mediapart, Published online 8 July 2017. Tazzioli, M. (2020). Governing Migrant Mobility Through Mobility: Containment and Dispersal at the Internal Frontiers of Europe. Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space, 38(1), 3–19. Tazzioli, M., & Walters, W. (2019). Migration, Solidarity and the Limits of Europe. Global Discourse, 9(1), 175–190. Tilly, C. (1984). Les origines du répertoire d’action collective contemporaine en France et en Grande-Bretagne. Vingtième Siècle. Revue D’histoire, 4, 89–108. Trucco, D. (2016). L’expérience du Presidio No Border à Vintimille, été 2015. Mouvements. http://mouvements.info/lexperience-du-presidio-no-borders-avintimille-ete-2015/. Trucco, D. (2018). Prendre en charge et mettre à l’écart. La ville, la frontière et le camp à Vintimille (2015–2017). In F. Dubet (Ed.), Politiques des frontières (pp. 145–160). Paris: La Découverte. Trucco, D. (2019). La (re)frontiérisation de la ville de Vintimille dans le contexte de l’actuelle «crise migratoire européenne» (2015-aujourd’hui). In Actes du colloque Pridaes VI. L’intégration des étrangers et des migrants dans les États de Savoie depuis l’époque moderne (pp. 329–342). Editions Serre. Trucco, D. (2020). Ora basta! Mobiliser les ‘habitants’ en temps de ‘crise migratoire’. Répertoires d’action et registres de légitimation dans la ville frontalière de Vintimille. Champ Pénal/Penal Field, accepted for publication. Walters, W. (2006). No Border: Games With(out) Frontiers. Social Justice, 33(1), 21–39. Youkhana, E., & Sutter, O. (2017). Perspectives on the European Border Regime: Mobilization, Contestation and the Role of Civil Society. Social Inclusion, 5(3), 1–6.

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Zincone, G., & Di Gregorio, L. (2002). Il processo delle politiche di immigrazione in Italia: uno schema interpretativo integrato. Stato E Mercato, 66(3), 433–465. Zolberg, A. R. (2006). A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

CHAPTER 11

Support for Migrants as a Form of Territorial Struggle: Endogenous Solidarity in the Roya Valley Luca Giliberti

11.1

A Valley Crossed by the Border1

Two-thirds of the Roya Valley, a relatively small area crossed by the Franco-Italian border, today belongs to France.2 The valley starts and 1 This chapter, resulting from the author’s Doctoral Thesis (University of GenoaDISFOR / University of Côte d’Azur-URMIS), it is a product of the PRIN Project (Research Project of National Relevance) “De-bordering activities and citizenship from below of asylum seekers in Italy. Policies, practices, people” (ASIT), in which the author is post-doctoral researcher (Genoa Research Unit). 2 This configuration is recent; the border has moved twice over the last 160 years, revealing its mobile and temporary nature, and more generally debunking the notion of “natural” borders. In 1860, before Italy’s unification, the currently French villages of the Roya Valley belonged to the Savoy Kingdom of Piedmont and Sardinia, together with Nice. In 1860, Breil-Sur-Roya, Saorge, and what is now Fontan—an independent municipality since 1871—became French; after the Second World War, in 1947, Tende and La Brigue were also transferred to France’s jurisdiction.

L. Giliberti (B) University of Genoa-DISFOR, Genoa, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 L. Amigoni et al. (eds.), Debordering Europe, Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56518-3_11

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ends in Italy, stretching along the 59 km of the Roya River; from the Col de Tende—a 1871 m high alpine pass that separates the Ligurian Alps from the Maritime Alps—all the way to the sea at Ventimiglia. The valley’s five French villages (Breil, Saorge, Fontan, Brigue, and Tende) are home to a rough total of 6000 inhabitants; protagonists in the welcoming of migrants after the border closure in June 2015. These are surrounded by Italian territory, to the north, south and east. To reach Nice or, more generally, France, the shortest and quickest route is the motorway. The nearest junction is Ventimiglia. Dwellers of the valley frequently travel to the Italian city, for example, to do their shopping. For the valley’s French inhabitants, passing through Italy is also a very familiar occurrence; from the mid-1990s, with the introduction of Schengen, until before 2015,3 there were no controls and the border could be crossed without even realising it. From 2015, with the introduction of systematic controls and territorial militarisation, the border has generated a structural blockade to transiting migrants: thousands of persons from Eritrea, Sudan, Ethiopia, the Ivory Coast, and many other locations, have come to a standstill in situations of marginality while waiting for an opportunity to cross the border. Although the Roya Valley had already hosted a series of mobile checkpoints and controls of various nature since 2015, the actual militarisation process—with border forces and military personnel of all kinds spreading throughout the territory—materialised from summer 20164 (GachetDieuzeide 2018; Giliberti 2020). This process occurred just as the flow of migrants crossing the valley became growingly visible. At the same time, the reaction from local inhabitants, many of whom hosting the migrants in their own homes and supporting them in the continuation of their journey, consolidated in response to the emerging problem affecting their territory.

3 In 2011, during the Arab Spring, a short period of systematic checks at the FrancoItalian border occurred, blocking escaping Tunisians. At this time, several Roya Valley inhabitants had already intervened with their support. 4 Figures released by solidarity networks and mediated by the European parliamentarian José Bové (https://www.franceinter.fr/emissions/l-invite-de-8h20/l-invite-de-8h20-25-jui llet-2017) speak of a cost of 60,000 Euro per day for the militarisation of the Roya Valley—i.e. 420,000 Euro per week, 1,800,000 Euro per month, 21,900,000 Euro per year; totalling tens of millions of Euros.

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In an attempt to cross the border, shebab 5 crossed mountains and rural territories, developing new prohibited transit routes into Europe (Queirolo Palmas 2017). In this way, counter-maps took shape, facilitated in the various territories by actions of hospitality and support to the migrants. One of the key elements of the contemporary crisis of migratory policies is the burgeoning involvement of civil society, making its stand (Fontanari and Borri 2017) in the political-migratory battlefield (Ambrosini 2018). Solidarity networks towards those who cross the border are not a historical novelty in these territories. On the contrary, they involve descendants of open and supportive households that have, over the centuries, helped heretics, deserters, Jews, and partisans in their clandestine mountain crossings between Italy and France (Tombaccini-Villefranque 1999). In the contemporary context of the “reception crisis” (Lendaro et al. 2019), we define “solidarity” as the varied set of actions aimed at supporting migrants in transit, based on different motivations, registers, and reference practices, are not provided an economic counterpart, and extraneous to the formal reception system (Giliberti and Queirolo Palmas 2020). Some authors, in referring to solidarity—a concept strongly used also in emic terms—and to its heterogeneity, propose the expression “umbrella notion”, because the term covers a wide spectrum of registers of action, actors, and practices (Birey et al. 2019). Solidaires can be private citizens, who organise themselves into informal groups or associations, and place themselves between the poles of a more humanitarian or more political approach, through practices of civil disobedience (Lendaro 2018). This paper arises from ethnographic research based on field immersion and participation in local life, facilitating the construction of a “common action” (Queirolo Palmas and Stagi 2017) with the different players in the field.6 The main techniques used are participant observations in multiple contexts of valley life and the collection of oral sources,

5 The term shebab, with which Ventimiglia’s solidarity groups refer to transient peoples, meaning “young” in Arabic, proposes a generational identity that counters a crystallised identity on migratory movement. 6 The immersions in the field were carried out assiduously and continuously from January 2017 to June 2018, although after that I went back and continued to go back to the valley for research purposes.

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made up of twenty-nine semi-structured interviews, along with countless informal conversations reported in the field diaries. The research also generated a short documentary on solidarity practices.7 This paper covers the fundamental elements of the valley’s solidarity experiences and the characteristics of the endogenous networks that help migrants and contribute to other territorial struggles, which, generally speaking, form part of a dimension of resistance to neoliberal policies (Giliberti 2020).

11.2

Practices of Hospitality and Transit Support

Even when the border has been crossed, in the French territory, systematic controls in French territory are carried out within 20 km of the border (Gachet-Dieuzeide 2018). Once stopped, illegal migrants generally face express deportation on account of border authorities (Aris Escarcena 2018). Most aspiring crossers experience several times before an eventual successful crossing. This is a sort of game of the goose,8 where a migrant enters France, is deported to Ventimiglia, they try again, are deported again, and so on, until the majority eventually succeed in their attempt. Territorial monitoring data from Anafé (2019) reveals that people attempt to cross the border up to fifteen times before succeeding. Philippe, a Solidaire from the valley who is very active in multiple mobilisations, reports: Here in the Roya Valley we are seeing this continuous rotation of people who arrive in the valley but are then blocked by the authorities and are deported to Ventimiglia… We have met people like this who have tried a lot of times before managing to pass. Several hundreds of soldiers from many corps, with all sorts of different weapons, night vision goggles, motion detectors… an invasion of the forces of order, drones, helicopters… we are witnessing a rather nonsensical story in this rural valley…. (Philippe,9 33 years old, mountain guide, October 2017)

7 The documentary “Transiti. Una valle solidale”, that arises from this research, made with Massimo Cannarella and produced by the Visual Sociology Laboratory of the University of Genoa, can be viewed gratis at the link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YyR ToR6j5_4. 8 Similar in scope to the popular game of “snakes and ladders”. 9 The names of the interviewees are fictitious, in order to guarantee their anonymity.

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Some valley’s Solidaires have been active in their support to migrants who have been stuck on the Italian side of the border since June 2015 (Giliberti and Queirolo Palmas 2020). Anne, who immediately became one of the key persons in the valley’s solidarity movement, upon returning from holiday, found a message on her mobile phone from a friend, stating: “I want to speak to you to see what we can do for the migrants…”. Like her, other people in the valley had realised that some days earlier systematic border controls had been re-established. This is an event that has deeply affected the territory achieving longterm stability following the declaration of état d’urgence by the French State in November 2015. The subsequent translation of its main features into common law as part of the 2017-1510 anti-terrorism law passed by President Macron’s Government has rendered border controls even more structural. A series of inhabitants felt the need to respond, firstly in Ventimiglia, considered part of their valley, and then in their own villages, as Anne herself tells us. For me, the Roya Valley goes as far as Ventimiglia… and France is the country to which I belong, in which I pay my taxes, which decides how… this situation is a direct consequence of my country’s decisions. For me, it is therefore completely logical to be at the Balzi Rossi, to hold assemblies with the Italian No-Borders, to support people blocked at the border, even though the true crossing of migrants in our valley started later…. (Anne, 57 years old, employee, April 2018)

An activity based in Ventimiglia, which has attracted strong participation from the valley’s inhabitants, is that of food preparation and distribution, despite a municipal order prohibiting this activity, formally for healthhygiene reasons, but in practice representing a criminalisation of humanitarian action.10 Depending on the historical period, between one hundred to several hundreds of meals were prepared, up to a peak of 800–900 meals per day in summer 2017. The Roya Valley Solidaires , coordinated through the association Roya Citoyenne—which receives donations and 10 This municipal order is similar to orders prohibiting the distribution of basic neces-

sities (Aris Escarcena and Da Silva 2018), which, in the hyper-prohibitionist context of recent years, have featured in other locations, such as Calais and Paris (Queirolo Palmas 2017). In Ventimiglia, that measure was introduced in August 2015 and initially revoked in May 2016 following widespread criticism; it was reintroduced in August 2016 to be then definitively revoked in April 2017, remaining in force for a total of 19 months.

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finances the purchase of ingredients—continuously provided meals for about a year. This was implemented via a rotating structure of village groups: one weekday fixed for each village, helped by support groups from neighbouring valleys (Vallée de la Bevéra, Vallée de la Vesubie, among others). The data collected by Roya Citoyenne points to 150,000 meals being prepared and served by the valley dwellers in 2017 alone, when they were then replaced by the international solidarity supporters of Kesha Niya.11 From summer 2016, transiting migrants stuck at the border started to pass through the valley with great intensity. At this time, many inhabitants felt compelled to address the situation in their territory; indeed, on their way home, they would see injured shebab at the roadside and would spontaneously intervene. Sensing a sort of moral obligation in not being able to leave people in distress lying in the road, some of them started to take the migrants home (Lendaro 2018; Giliberti 2017). People felt obliged to take a stand… when you’re in the car, you’re driving and you see someone walking for two days, at the height of summer when it is scorching hot or in the middle of winter when it’s snowing and all he’s wearing is sandals and shorts, you can’t just watch and do nothing… (Jeff, 61 years old, operator for disabled people, June 2017) If there are people in great difficulty at the roadside, you have to stop and take them home… this is spontaneous, you can’t do anything else…. (Michel, 33 years old, farmer, April 2018)

In the valley, part of the population thinks in these terms and so began the practice of widespread hospitality in private homes and on agricultural land made available by an alternative farmer of the valley, Cédric Herrou, who became the media’s protagonist of the cause. This hospitality endeavour is coordinated by the association Roya Citoyenne,12 11 Kesha Niya Kitchen—meaning No problem Kitchen in Kurdish—is formed by members known in the valley as the Vikings, since the majority are German. The Vikings — who, together with other migrant support groups, specialise in food preparation and distribution in locations of border struggles—worked in the field of Grande-Synthe, near Calais, before collaborating with Roya Citoyenne at the Franco-Italian border. 12 Roya Citoyenne (https://www.roya-citoyenne.fr/) is an association established in 2011 around the principle of mobilisation against the absorption of the valley by CARF (Communauté d’agglomération de la Riviera française) and for the defence of the Roya

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with the aim of liaising supporters and crystallising the sense of solidarity that was starting to build in the valley. A significant portion of the valley’s solidarity is expressed through this association. However, several other experiences of migrant support—similarly and spontaneously took shape in the territory without being linked to the association platform—predominantly smaller, informal networks that remain actively unpublished13 (Giliberti 2020). The valley, originally a marginal and peripheral rural location, became a focal place for migratory routes towards France and Northern Europe. In particular, from spring until the end of summer 2017, dozens of migrants entered the valley every day.14 It is impossible to establish exactly how many migrants passed through and stopped in the valley, staying in private homes and at the Breil campsite, but the figure is likely in the 1000s. The agricultural land of Breil alone—where a hospitality record was established—witnessed about 2500 people pass through, with peaks of 250 migrants at the same time in summer 2017. In addition, more than a hundred homes of Solidaires , spread across all villages, accommodated dozens of migrants over time—in some cases even a few hundred. In January 2017, in the village of Saorge that is home to around 400 inhabitants, roughly sixty people were accommodated simultaneously in private homes, thus involving almost 20% of the population present in the village at that time. These are surprising numbers, particularly when considered in relation to a total valley population of about 6000. Anne, who was

Valley community. In May 2016, its statutes were modified so as to be dedicated to the migrant issue, when a series of citizens already active in support to migrants, decided to work together to collectively organise solidarity action. 13 The issue of media coverage, discussed in detail in other contributions (Giliberti 2020), was subject to debate and division within the solidarity networks. On the one hand, it implies political pressure and thus enables certain results to be obtained in support of the cause, but, on the other, it facilitates the increase of militarisation processes and hinders border crossing for transient peoples. 14 Following the first conviction of the Maritime Alps prefect issued by the Court of Nice—there would be four in total—in spring 2017, the Solidaires obtained an unwritten protocol that temporarily ratified the right to allow migrants to pass through police checkpoints or railway station. This was subject to sending a named list, and would allow migrants to file an asylum application in Nice. That legal corridor facilitated the substantial increase in migrant numbers along that route and involved thousands of people using Cédric Herrou’s campsite as a logistical base. In the space of a few months, the State denounced the agreement it had reached and once again denied the right of passage towards France, and with it the prospects of filing an asylum application in Nice.

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very active in organising hospitality in the local area, told me with wide eyes: “there came a time when we no longer knew where to put them… and we looked everywhere for people who were willing to accommodate them…”. The solidarity network was well coordinated and, if someone spotted migrants in the valley, someone else near the location was swiftly contacted by telephone to pick them up before the police intercepted them. Migrants would then be accommodated. In a militarised territory, Solidaires intercept arriving migrants in an attempt to take them under their wing before police forces are able to find them and return them to Ventimiglia with a refus d’entrée. Migrants arrive on foot, by mountain paths or by railroad tracks, in some cases on buses or trains, or accompanied by passeurs or Solidaires themselves. Yesterday morning, while we were interviewing Christian, his telephone rang continuously; all the calls were about the issue of transiting migrants, in particular, people who had seen them and were calling someone to intervene. Sometimes, it was the migrants themselves, calling to agree on what to do; some Solidaires ’ telephone numbers are in fact, by word of mouth, spreading to Ventimiglia. A very effective system of sympathisers has been created; they contact each other by telephone so that those who live closest to the location of interception can intervene and accommodate the migrants in their homes before deciding what to do, avoiding their rejection to Ventimiglia. The majority of migrants remain in the valley for a few days, sometimes several weeks; sporadically, some of them stay longer, before leaving again (…) Yesterday evening, while walking through the valley, at the church in Breil, we came across a completely helpless Eritrean boy who had some wounds on his feet and had no idea where to go. He spoke to us in Tigrinya and the only thing we could understand is that he had come on foot from Ventimiglia and that he wanted to go to Paris. The church warden was about to throw him out but, on the streets in Breil, he would have been seen by the police and taken back to Ventimiglia. We telephoned Christian and explained the situation to him; barely five minutes went by and a girl with her little daughter seemed to take the boy in. “For the time being, I will prepare a hot meal for him, she said, then we will figure out what to do with him and how we can get him to Paris. We will contact people who are in places along the journey to see if we can get him there gradually”, the girl told us; we wished the Eritrean boy good luck, pleased that he would be spending the night in a warm house in Breil and not on the cold streets of Ventimiglia. We were also pleased that his path could

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continue, also thanks to the contacts of the Solidaires that are steadily growing alongside their actions. (Extract from the field diary, February 2017)

A transit infrastructure is generated, consisting of scattered territorial networks in connection with each other—like that of Ventimiglia, the Loup Valley, Marseille or Paris—reminiscent of the United States nineteenth-century “Underground Railroad” (Foner 2015). An underground network of solidarity houses and safe havens—which allowed the black slaves fleeing the plantations to travel up the American continent towards the north until reaching Canada—is arising again today in Europe, where people and networks of crossed territories are facilitating the propagation of migrant routes (Queirolo Palmas and Rahola 2020). The actions of American abolitionists of the past echo those of European solidarity groups of the present.

11.3 Endogenous Solidarity for a Territorial Struggle The solidarity taking shape in the valley is, at its core, an expression of part of its inhabitants; persons who have chosen to live in that place. It is an endogenous solidarity, enacted by about 150–200 families, around 10% of the population of the Roya Valley. These Solidaires are coordinated collectively and participate in different activities: they host migrants in their own homes, help transportation in support of migrant routes, distribute basic necessities, collaborate in actions of political and legal reporting of border violence, and accuse public powers when they fail to apply standing laws on the right to asylum and on the acceptance of unaccompanied minors (Giliberti 2017). The valley’s endogenous solidarity—which, in some cases, defines itself as humanitarian—is expressed intimately, by hosting people in their own homes, but also politically, by demanding new migration policies and new societal models (Babels 2019). The heated and unresolved debate between humanitarian action and political action, as analysed in-depth in other contributions (Giliberti 2020), forms the basis of the valley’s solidarity. A dominant presence within the solidarity networks is that of the neorurals, characterised by a well-defined political and ideological choice, inspired by the principles of de-growth and the search for alternative realities (Latouche 2011; Rahbi 2014). Almost all people who form part of

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the solidarity networks were not born in the Roya Valley from indigenous families, but arrived there voluntarily as part of their own biographical journey. They mostly came in the late 1970s, choosing an alternative rural life, and in a series of cases inspired by “paths of anti-capitalist utopia” (Fréméaux and Jordan 2012). When you look at the members of the Roya Citoyenne or even our more informal and less media-publicised networks, except in some cases, you will see that the majority of these people are neorurals or descendants of neorurals, essentially… They are people who came here with values, which they have safeguarded and conveyed to their children… They are people who are rooted in the Roya Valley and have consolidated certain values, who are at the foundation of the support in favour of migrants. It is primarily an issue of values and beliefs. Here, in the valley, people who express these values have relationships and connections between them that are stronger than in other places, as they are less numerous; we see each other often, generating socio-cultural and friendship networks which are perhaps stronger than those of urban contexts…. (Marcel, 55 years old, botanist and mountain guide, April 2018)

Marcel told us about networks consisting of people who have chosen to live in this context and who have become its main players, participating in the affairs and in the construction of the territory’s identity, with which they strongly identify. They are the same people who participate actively in civil struggles for the defence of the territory. From the demand for maintenance of the local railway line and public services, such as the valley’s post office and schools, to mobilisations against the huge work with strong environmental impact of the double tunnel of Tende, or that against the imposed membership of CARF—an administrative intercommunality of the coast and not of the valley, designed for tourism and not for sustainable rural life—as analysed in-depth in other contributions (Giliberti 2020). The life choice inspired by community and alternative values of neorurals is undoubtedly a key element for understanding the solidarity approach towards migrants. A question of values, therefore, as Marcel suggested earlier, of lifestyle and alternative approaches. These are crucial in understanding the social composition of the people of the valley, as explained by Marta and Filippo.

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Certainly, the neorural composition influences … people who have chosen to come and live here because it is a naturalistically interesting valley, there is little tourism… people who have chosen a lifestyle … this determines a great opening of solidarity … to say: no one is left behind. The composition of the population seems to me the clearest explanation …. (Marta, 30 years old, unemployed, April 2018) Growing up in alternative lifestyle clearly produces a different society… fortunately that in certain campaigns, with certain alternative lifestyles, something moves … I too have often wondered why the campaign in certain cases produces greater solidarity… this seems to me the clearest track …. (Filippo, 34 years old, operator for disabled people, April 2018)

The Solidaires of the territory want to ensure no people of the valley are in danger, or in a situation of extreme marginality, forced to sleep on the streets. Hospitality constitutes the primary part of this sensitivity towards the defence of the territory and becomes a form of territorial struggle in which citizens want to have a say in the decisions effecting and affecting their valley. The solidarity action of the Roya Valley, which takes shape in response to a territorial crisis that obliges its inhabitants to take some form of a stand, presents specificities linked to the rural context. A key element is the autonomy generated by this alternative campaign, in which people are used to taking care of themselves to solve concrete problems related to their daily lives, and do the same when the territory starts being crossed by migrants in adversity. In other words, if there is a problem on their territory, this group of people tend to take care of it. The characteristics of this context facilitate the endogenous dimension: everyone knows one another, from frequently meeting during daily village life. Coordinating and fuelling solidarity action is facilitated by the dimension of friendship. The various solidarity networks—expressed in the plural, with different registers of action, from Roya Citoyenne, to Défends ta Citoyenneté,15 to non-mediatic groups (Giliberti 2020)—are all composed of people who have made a choice of de-growth linked to a community spirit. The life choice inspired by communal and alternative values of neorurals is undoubtedly a key element for understanding the solidarity approach towards migrants (Mollard 2017). A question of values, then, as different local actors suggested, conceived in terms of “defence of the territory”.

15 The behind-the-scenes player in the experience of the Breil campsite.

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The expression “defence of the territory”—at the centre of the mobilisations that take shape in the valley—is problematic as it is claimed by ideologically opposed parties that hold opposing views. From what and with what aims should the territory be defended? Answers can differ significantly. On one side, the neorural alternative perspective aims to defend the territory from dominant neoliberal policies that, following Bourdieu (1998), produce an attack on the collective civil dimension due to the imposition of the logic of capital, which generates intensive exploitation and marring of the territory itself, as well as employment insecurity and global enslavement. On the other side, the opposite view claims a defence of the territory precisely against the action of alternative movements, seeking to preserve it, for example, from the reception of migrants in recent years. The association Defendre la Roya whose name is emblematic with respect to the territorial defence paradigm, close to the local Front National, was established with the sole aim of obtaining the dissolution of Roya Citoyenne, accused of being an organised gang trying to aid illegal immigration.16 Those positions, opposed to hospitality and hostile towards migrants and their support, in some cases involve reporting the actions of sympathisers to the police, and are generally close to the conservative perspectives of the native families—the so-called familles de souche. They demand an exclusive autochthony, as opposed to those who have arrived in recent decades, and hold a significant portion of power over the territories. Conflicts thereby arise within the valley population, revealing the existing social boundaries internal to the population, which are further marked by the border-crossing practices and their consequences. Neorurals are typically defined by the familles de souche as hippies or Indians. The socio-cultural border between those who claim to be natives and those who arrived during recent decades suffers the direct consequences of the closure of State borders. The historic distance between autochthones and neorurals thus constitutes a fault line for interpreting the positioning of the valley’s inhabitants on the issue of migration. From autumn 2017, very few migrants arrived in the valley due to the increasing militarisation of the territory and the repression strategies implemented by authority forces. In addition, sympathisers have been criminalised; at least thirty people have been arrested and there are a 16 The application, submitted to the Administrative Court of Nice in November 2017, was unsuccessful.

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dozen trials underway relating to the facilitation of illegal immigration (Giliberti 2017; Gachet-Dieuzeide 2018). In this context, heading to the valley is no longer convenient for migrants. The criminalisation of solidarity underlines the vulnerability of the networks and effects a decrease in migrants’ confidence in this migratory route. It seems that information is spreading among the migrants that crossing the Roya Valley in order to reach France is no longer an effective tactic: “No, it is best not to go to Roya. It will end badly there”, an Eritrean boy stuck in Ventimiglia told me in winter 2017. Since the passage through the valley has become residual, Roya Citoyenne has been engaged more in the activity of legal reporting of border violence, in collaboration with a pool of lawyers, as well as a progressive struggle for the State to respect its laws on the right to asylum and the acceptance of unaccompanied minors. The activities have always characterised it, being carried out in networks with national and international associations. Part of the Solidaires continues its activity of political, legal, as well as media and cultural lobbying.17 The future of this migratory route, just as that of territorial struggles, remains undetermined. It is through territorial struggles—which fully include solidarity towards migrants, that new models of society have been promoted in recent years in a rural context such as the Roya Valley.

References Ambrosini, M. (2018). Irregular Immigration in Southern Europe: Actors, Dynamics and Governance. Cham: Springer International Publishing. Anafé. (2019). Persona non grata. Conséquences des politiques sécuritaires et migratoires à la frontière franco-italienne. Paris: Anafé. Aris Escarcena, J. P. (2018). La paradoja del taxista: Ventimiglia como frontera selectiva. Mondi Migranti, 2, 99–114.

17 A clear example in this sense is the summer Festival “Passeurs d’Humanité” (https:// passeursdhumanite.com/), already carried out twice (2018 and 2019)—when the passage in the valley was already residual—organised during the course of four days in the valley’s villages by the association Les ami.e.s de la Roya from Paris, in collaboration with the sympathisers of the territory. A multitudinous event which attracts hundreds of people to the valley, drawn by issues of hospitality but also of food self-determination and rural sustainability. It offers academic conferences that host specialists of various types, round tables for collective debate, theatre shows, and concerts.

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Aris Escarcena, J. P., & Da Silva, A. C. (2018). Deterring Solidarity on Border Spaces: A Comparative Analysis of Food Distribution Bans in Ventimiglia and Calais. In J. Howell, D. R. Altamirano, F. M. Totah, & F. Keles (Eds.), Porous Borders, Invisible Boundaries? Ethnographic Perspectives on the Vicissitudes of Contemporary Migration (pp. 11–14). Committee on Refugees and Immigrants; Society for Urban, National, and Transnational/Global Anthropology; American Anthropological Association. Babels. (2019). Hospitalité en France: mobilisations intimes et politiques. Paris: Le passager clandestin. Birey, T., Cantat, C., Maczynska, E., & Sevinin, E. (2019). Challenging the Political Across Borders: Migrants’ and Solidarity Struggles. Budapest: Center for Policy Studies. Bourdieu, P. (1998). L’essence du néoliberalisme. Le Monde Diplomatique: https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/1998/03/BOURDIEU/3609. Foner, E. (2015). Gateway To Freedom: The Hidden History of the Underground Railroad. New York: Norton. Fontanari, E., & Borri, G. (2017). Introduction: Civil Society on the Edge: Actions in Support and Against Refugees in Italy and Germany. Mondi Migranti, 3, 23–51. Fréméaux, I., & Jordan, J. (2012). Les sentiers de l’utopie. Paris: La Découverte. Gachet-Dieuzeide, M. (2018). Les conséquences du rétablissement des contrôles policiers à la frontière franco-italienne sud. Bruxelles: Les Verts-Ale / Les ami.e.s de la Roya. Giliberti, L. (2017). La criminalizzazione della solidarietà ai migranti in Val Roja: note dal campo. Mondi Migranti, 3, 161–181. Giliberti, L. (2020). Abitare la frontiera. Lotte neorurali e solidarietà ai migranti sul confine franco-italiano. Verona: Ombre Corte. Giliberti, L., & Queirolo Palmas, L. (2020). Solidarities in Transit on the FrenchItalian Border. Ethnographic Accounts from Ventimiglia and the Roya Valley. In M. Ambrosini, M. Cinalli, & D. Jacobson (Eds.), Migration, Borders and Citizenship. Between Policy and Public Spheres (pp. 109–140). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Latouche, S. (2011). Come si esce dalla società dei consumi. Corsi e percorsi della decrescita. Torino: Bollati Boringhieri. Lendaro, A. (2018). Désobéir en faveur des migrants. Répertoires d’action à la frontière franco-italienne. Journal Des Anthropologues, 152–153, 171–192. Lendaro, A., Rodier, C., & Vertongen, Y. L. (2019). La crise de l’accueil. Frontières, droits, rèsistances. Paris: La Dècouverte. Mollard, C. (2017). L’accueil des migrants dans la Vallée de la Roya: Hospitalité privée en contexte d’inhospitalité politique (Master’s thesis). Université Nice Sophia Antipolis.

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Queirolo Palmas, L. (2017). Nuit debout. Transiti, connessioni e contestazioni negli accampamenti urbani dei rifugiati a Parigi. Mondi Migranti, 2, 207–227. Queirolo Palmas, L., & Rahola, F. (2020). Underground Europe. Lungo le rotte migranti. Milano: Meltemi. Queirolo Palmas, L., & Stagi, L. (2017). Dopo la rivoluzione. Paesaggi giovanili e sguardi di genere nella Tunisia contemporanea. Verona: Ombre Corte. Rahbi, P. (2014). La parte del colibrì. La specie umana e il suo futuro. Torino: Lindau Edizioni. Tombaccini-Villefranque, S. (1999). La frontière bafouée: migrants clandestins et passeurs dans la vallée de la Roya (1920–1940). Cahiers de La Mediterranée, 58, 79–95.

CHAPTER 12

At the Border Between Italy and France: When Policemen Appear in the Landscape Francesco Migliaccio

Human artefacts are imitations of nature, I thought as the sun was setting behind the French mountains. The Roja river traces the original layout of the valley: from its source above Tende, it flows through the small town, brushing past Saint Dalmas, Fontan, Breil-sur-Roya, Piène Basse, Fanghetto, San Michele and, at last, meets the sea at Ventimiglia. The road, too, with its coves, seems to follow the waterway. The bed of asphalt, just like the river, has its own tributaries: the road going from Saint Dalmas to La Brigue; the one from Fontan to Saorge; the bends through the olive trees meandering from a deserted Piène to Libre; the steep section joining San Michele to the quiet village of Olivetta. The road spills into the grey industrial area of Ventimiglia, among supermarket storage sheds, an abandoned cargo, the Red Cross camp. Even the tracks seem iron versions of the river: they run through the stations of Tende, La Brigue, Saint Dalmas-de-Tende, Fontan Saorge, Breil-sur-Roya, Olivetta San Michele, Airole and ultimately Ventimiglia, under the watchful eye of the Italian army. All these lines cut through the border, but only the river

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changes both name and gender: from “la Roya” in French to “il Roja” in Italian. From this border valley, we tell stories of wandering men and women, of the fields and camps they inhabit; we outline their faces and desires. I have been wondering about the reasons behind this obsession for representation. Their steps are actually silent and stealthy: movements of those not seeking attention. In contrast, the guards seldom feature in our portraits, save on special occasions: arrests, repression, and imprisonment. As I look away from the walking shadows, I notice the guards’ small gestures, their slow hours made of nothing, the habits and customs of the police forces keeping watch in this autumn landscape. When the train from Cuneo pulls in at Breil-sur-Roya station, three gendarmes approach the coaches. They are holding guns and wearing bulletproof vests, one of them is carrying an assault rifle. The one with the rifle is waiting on the platform while the others enter the last coach to check documents. These two move slowly; the third, poker-faced, follows them through the windowpanes while slowly walking up to the engine. Breil-sur-Roya is the last French station, after which the train stops in San Michele. Why does the French gendarmerie inspect the trains about to enter Italy? And why are these inspections held in Breil and not in Tende, Saorge, La Brigue? The reasons are so obscure that I sometimes believe there are no real explanations. I therefore try to translate scenes of landscape into sentences, just as the photographer in Blow up captures images in the park. It is October, the Scotch brooms have by now withered; infesting goldenrods spread yellow colour along the ditches. On the road between Breil-sur-Roya and the border, in a lay-by over the river, sits a police car. An officer strokes his weapon and absent-mindedly observes the dry shore. A few metres down I see the Pont de Rogne, now a disused passageway. A gendarmerie car is waiting at the entrance of the bridge, an officer sitting behind the steering wheel, another standing and looking around. A third appears in the background, wearing camouflage trousers: he has just patrolled the path by the Roya. Across the bridge, the southwesterly sunrays bless the olive trees with fruit despite their state of abandonment (Everyone keeps telling me this is a most fortunate year for the olive harvest). The leaves of a gaunt fig tree have turned yellow, the car leaves. Beyond the olive trees grows a small wood of maritime pines. I take the path and follow it up the valley, a “peas and tuna” tin is suspended on

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some pine needles. The brand is Italian. I am seeking an optimal stakeout spot to observe the picket set up in the lay-by beyond the Roya. No guard is inspecting the river now. Why are they there then? Are they watching over this path? The woods above their heads morph into nuances of red and silver, a section of railway appears at mid-coast. The officer in the van seems to be asleep. It is now hot; the sun has finally risen from behind the ridge. I hide behind a holm oak to avoid disturbing the officer; the river flowing between us hides the sound of my footsteps. The smell of resin from rockroses and mastics reminds me that I am walking upwind. The officer is now holding a mobile phone; he seems focused on the screen. Towards the valley’s trough, before the Fanghetto border, French police has set up a checkpoint for cars approaching from Italy. I am positioned on the eastern slope where the old path splits Fanghetto and Libre. I am sitting among the pine trees covered in ivy, thorny bushes are entangled in the undergrowth. The path—a strip of precarious land—used to be the old salt road back when the main road did not exist. Lower in my view line, the river roars, while cars hum further in the distance. There, in a broad widening of the road, the cars approach the police checkpoint, slow down, and then move on. From here I cannot see the guards’ moves, but I can glimpse a white police bus under a pine tree. I look up at the hills above: the drystone walls are still visible among the expanding wood. A white car, blue and red striped, is parked beside the bus and a thistle grows along my path. I have walked down to the river and reached the road. In front of the checkpoint held by the French police, starts a path leading to Piène Haute. From there, among the holm oaks spreading acorns, I have a clearer view of the outpost. They have set up a big tent in front of the bus, two policemen are sitting below it on canvas chairs; beside them a small table topped with plastic cups and water bottles. A car arrives; it slows down before the traffic cones and pulls into the checkpoint. The two men rise to their feet, look at the driver and at the back seats, and the car moves on. I got distracted. Someone is walking on my right, on the tracks: a blue moving figure. Another one there. They are two gendarmes monitoring the railway tracks. In spring, I used to travel the road by car. After some coffee at Marisa, a café by the border, I would drive to the checkpoint past Fanghetto. It often rained; the road was quite desolate on working days. The police officers would examine me with a glance, and then invite me to move on with a lazy gesture of the hand. At the weekend, however, traffic was dense

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and the officers checked every car boot. Due to the controls, I recollect a ten-minute queue on the day France played Argentina. Why were the inspections so thorough at times of heavy traffic or on festive days? Why were they lenient on quiet afternoons? All I can note down are the visible shapes, I can trace on the map what is illuminated by the light—restricted information remains classified. Back in those days, I was reading Ombre sul Confine, by Paolo Veziano. It is an historical analysis of the frontier at the time of the clandestine migration of the Jews. Veziano, by copying documents released by the Public Prosecutor’s Office in Ventimiglia, managed to show that the Fascist police—in some cases—supported Jewish illegal migration. For public order and safety purposes, the guards made agreements with the transiting passeurs . The historian can access the north face, hidden documents, to try reconstructing the motives, peering in on the outline of an overlooked strategy. As an observer, constrained by the visibility of events at the surface, I can but collect shards of broken images: each theory is splintered, inadequate, and the answers are scarce. From San Michele, in Italy, a diversion leads up to Olivetta. Beyond the last Italian village, the old house on the border is abandoned. I am immersed in olive trees against a mountainous landscape, I notice that the mastic bushes are turning red. The road is free of police patrols, I come to a crossroad exposed to the mountain winds: on the right the road to Piène Haute, but I go on towards Sospel. The road becomes sloped ground and I cross a déchèterie and the converted old church of Saint Gervais, now a shelter home for tourists. Soon I spot a junction occupied by the police, a strategic position indeed. It is the meeting point of the roads from Olivetta and Breil-sur-Roya: any car coming from Italy—be it from Olivetta or the Colle di Tenda—inevitably comes through this point if it is to reach Sospel and enter France. The phony eyes of the guards monitor the passing cars. There are three gendarmes and a van, some lights for the night, a coffee table with water bottles on top. Whenever it gets quiet, one begins writing on the table, the others entertain themselves with their phone screens. On the road to Sospel, I saw two vans crammed with military men belonging to the Armée française. Then, a white Berlingo packed with officers wearing camo gear went by. Soldiers belong to a strange species, always on the move. It is said that they run along paths in the moonlight, a rumble of boots and flashing of torches. One night they were in Libre, patrolling the path from Fanghetto. Back then, during a celebration held at the end of June, the men of the Armée were also on shift in the small

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village square: they watched over a crowded warehouse, beer from the tap, a roasting pork, and dance music resounding all around. I left the party at midnight to reach the house where I was staying, in Garavan. I came back to Italy from Fanghetto, I went through Ventimiglia and on through the Balzi Rossi: the upper border just below Garavan was free from checkpoints so I passed through without slowing down. While the army appeared in a small village inland, the checkpoint on the coast was left unattended. I lived among terraces overlooking the sea in Garavan, an area of Menton that leaned against the border. It was June and I worked in a fig orchard under the sun. I watered avocado, kiwi, banana, and artichoke plants. In the terraces below, olive trees grew even if no one looked after them. The drystone walls were slowly rebuilt by Mario, born eighty years ago in Latina. Mario would turn up at eight in the morning; he would greet me in his own dialect and then drag himself up to the terraces. He did not speak French, despite having arrived from Lazio in the 50s. “Back in the south I had no job, I came over here with my brother. I worked in Menton, Paris, in Germany – always on the go, we were young”. The ancient stone walls were dry, but Mario would restore them with lime: “it holds better, did you know that?”. In those days, he was working on the first terrace, close to the road leading to our gate. It was an tarmacked narrow road by the highway. A steep rock wall kept a watchful eye: we lived in the shadow of the Passo della Morte. Mario had a twin brother who was no longer able to work, after suffering a light stroke five years prior. The migrant patrol would pass by Mario’s tiny building site, I would pick the figs and the sea would shine below. At mid-morning, Mario’s brother would join us, suited and booted, wearing polished shoes. He would sit under a big fig tree and say: “A breath of fresh air can only do good”. Mario recount the story of his divorce, of the daughter he rarely saw, of his life sharing the same single studio with his brother. “I’ll work as long as I can. My pension is one thousand euros; working allows me to buy an extra slice of meat and a bottle of wine. You know why I am still working? I’m saving money for when I won’t be able to work anymore. Then I’ll go to the rest home. That is why you work: to pay the rest home afterwards, understand?”. We knew Mario had a passion for bets, I smiled as I listened to him while cutting fig shoots and the police patrolled the road under the Passo della Morte. “Let’s get some fresh air, it’s good for the head”, his brother would say. One day the soldiers stopped me

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on the road mistaking me for a migrant. Some others, further away, were pointing their guns and yelling at someone. I replied in French, showing my passport, and they apologised: “Excusez-nous, monsieur”. The patrol of the Armée walked back and forth up to Castellar to check all the paths that linked to the Passo della Morte. Mario kept lugging stones with the hand-cart and telling me about his life to come at the rest home; his brother a constant presence with his polished shoes and combed hair. The breeze chilled our sun-exposed heads. The highway runs between Ventimiglia and Nice and hugs the coastline. Two unenthusiastic gendarmes holding guns manned the toll before Nice. Thousands of cars go through this checkpoint every day and no one would be able to search them all. Why perform such minute inspections on the main road when the highway controls are so permeable? Let me put it another way: the checkpoint does not aim to control, but rather to discourage. There is a possibility—however remote—that the gendarmes might stop a car on the highway: chaos is indeed at the core of control management. By looking at the map, I realise that in the Roja valley there is no chance of crossing the border with absolute certainty of slipping past unhindered. At the same time, this does not mean that it is impossible to pass or that no other ways to cross without risks are available. The French law 2017-1510 was passed on October 30, 2017, in order “to reinforce internal security and the fight against terrorism”. This law transforms special anti-terrorism measures into common norms. A sort of permanent extension of the status of exception. The third chapter regulates “the control of border areas” and the third clause of article 19 legitimates identity inspections “in a maximum range of ten kilometres around ports and airports considered to be crossing zones”. If a highway goes through the specified area, controls can be extended to the closest tolls even beyond the range of ten kilometres. The frontier is an exceptional territory, now in expansion. It propagates not only along the borders, but also in a discontinuous pattern across France. Perhaps in the future the whole territory will be a spreading frontier. If the frontier is no longer a place, but rather a protocol of actions scattered across the territory, the linear border, traced on the map, becomes an outdated representation. Still, controls are frequent by the river Roja: the valley is a bottleneck where inspections are intensifying. I cannot find either words or models to describe this tension between the expanded fluidity of the frontier and its concentration in specific places such as the borders. Maybe the Roja valley is a border funnel not because the French

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border begins, but rather because the Italian one ends. Maybe the French force is here to control the boundaries of Italy, to grant the desire to expand beyond. I have imagined expansion as a natural impulse permeating all control systems: it is the police itself to dream of a borderless world. According to El Pais, Juncker wanted to announce—during his speech on 12 September 2018—a communal frontier police force. A European police force should avoid the conflicts originating from the different national competences, making the controls and pushbacks more effective. As long as the current norms are in force, the conflicts between governments are useful to those trying to cross the border: the lack of harmony among the national police systems generates openings. This is certainly one of the paradoxes of the frontier. October has come; at the station of Menton Garavan summer seems very distant. The French police searches the trains arriving from Ventimiglia; there are six officers in action. Two policemen alight from the first coach and catch their colleagues’ attention by tracing a two in the air “Deux ici!”. Then they gather and begin naming faraway countries: “Maroc, Iraq, Tunisie, Algerie, Maroc encore”. A new officer arrives in a van, he opens the doors and yells cheerfully: “Allez-y, l’Italie est jolie!”. The other police officers hang around a second van: one in the driver’s seat, one with his hands on his head, one jangling some keys, another resting elbows on the van door. Back in 2015, I was also here, at the station of Menton Garavan, observing similar behaviours. I have been exploring the valley for three years so I can now try to draw a recent history of the inspections. 2015 was the year when people camped on the rocks at the Balzi Rossi, and the French checkpoints had been set along both the higher and the lower frontiers; the trains coming from Ventimiglia were searched in Menton Garavan. The trains travelling along the Ventimiglia-Cuneo line were not under scrutiny and the roads in the valley were free. Even in 2016, the checkpoints were located along the coastline only; the San Luigi bridge, too, was left unpatrolled. Back then, I thought that the border inspections were a sort of spectacle: a blatant demonstration of institutional power, more of a symbolic act than an actual hindrance. Why were defences and checkpoints set in the upper Roja valley in 2017? And why only two years after the Paris attacks and the subsequent special laws? I wonder if the exacerbation of surveillance might depend on the Cedric Herrou’s case, a French farmer from Breil-sur-Roya who

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hosts migrants in his olive grove and supports them. Herrou was first arrested in August 2016 and later on, in October, he occupied the Saint Dalmas-de-Tende station. 2017 was the year in which the trials against Herrou took place and news articles were published, reawakening collective awareness and sparking the debate. Since then, Breil-sur-Roya has become the epicentre of police inspections. Last summer a friend of mine told me how the guards having lunch in the village had become a blessing for local caterers. It could be that Herrou’s actions—intended to shine a new light on the contradictions of the frontier by using impressive, public, and visible actions—have attracted attention and, therefore, controls. The frontier becomes an ambiguous mix of inhibiting practices and spectacular demonstrations. Those who want to oppose frontier mechanisms can favour the violation of inspections, or publicly reporting the injustices of the system itself. These two practices—secret violation and public antagonism—are both consistent with the development of critical thought. However, on a pragmatic level, they are in contrast: while opposing the frontier system draws the media’s attention, the support of secret transfers has to be covert. These two practices cannot coexist in the same space-time interval, and this is the second paradox of the frontier. In a land of transitions—where even the river changes its name and gender from Roya to Roja—one must carefully ponder actions and words to find one’s bearings between the slopes of visible and invisible, noise and silence, light and darkness. This landscape prompts me to explore the possibilities of allusions, of figurative speech, and of cryptography. Back in school we used to be asked: What is the author trying to say here? Now my question is flipped: What is the author trying not to say? The gendarmes are still patrolling the lower checkpoint by the seashore. I can smell fermenting seaweed and the autumnal discomfort seems to taste less bitter. Cars pass by before the officers’ tired eyes. Beyond the checkpoint, on the Italian side, three soldiers and two police officers crowd around someone. “Either Ventimiglia, or jail. Do you want jail?”, a military voice stands out. I am moving towards the upper frontier now. French police is patrolling the Ponte San Luigi, but today I notice something strange. There are barriers in the middle of the road, a noentry sign. Access is forbidden because a rock fell off the mountain onto the carriageway. Biamonti’s first novel, L’angelo di Avrigue, comes to

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mind: it is a story in which the whole creation—the living and the unanimated—falls and collapses. “Have you heard? A young man fell from the Crairora rocks”, a voice says in the opening. Today’s Europe seems to me a land of ruin and sentries.

Postface: The Work of Knotting

Luca Queirolo Palmas and Federico Rahola It happens sometimes that places and territories are in a way ripped and tugged-off by violent processes that, in the majority of the cases, are triggered out elsewhere. It is the case of Ventimiglia, a small historical fortress-town placed at 6 km from the national border between Italy and France. For a long time, particularly after the improvement of the Schengen acquis, the town has been a kind of ghost place, an invisible and unnoticed transit place for different flows: it used to work, regularly and invisibly, mainly as a logistical node Yet, recent events, occurred in the last 5/6 years, have in a way lightened up that place, transforming Ventimiglia into a (in)visible scene of passage and capture (as a creep, a kind of battleground) and often projecting it almost at the core of Italian political debate, as well as at the core of the border relations between Italy and France. The book we have just read describes and recapitulates this kind of violent processes and this specific story. They are both a series of processes and a story characterising other internal and external EU border zones. Yet, if compared for instance with Calais, Lesvos, the Balkan and other border situations, they are still under-scrutinised, at least at international level. This book firstly tells us that the “unauthorised” persons, whether as migrants or asylum seekers, who in the last years have reached Ventimiglia, © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Amigoni et al. (eds.), Debordering Europe, Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56518-3

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were and still are following a specific pathway. And that they did and still do it by drawing a particular geography of movement. It is a pathway and a geography (that the jargon of the EU migration governance subsumes within the category of “secondary movements”) that is both forced and chosen. In the first case, Ventimiglia appears to be as a halt or a stop of an imposed way, one that goes back and forth from/to the southern Italian shores, passing through a scattered hotspot placed in Trapani, Taranto, Pozzallo or Lampedusa, into a kind of cruel circularity. This cruel circular logics reflects what could be defined as a way of governing (unauthorised) mobility through mobility. And it directly embodies a logistic rationale, one made up of regulated, synchronised and imposed flows across as many corridors, buffers, platforms and bottlenecks. Ventimiglia, from this point of view, represents precisely this kind of bottleneck. In the second case, and at the same time, Ventimiglia appears to be and work as a stage or a passage along a specific, hidden, “underground” and dwelled route “to Europe”, one that runs along forced corridors and exceeds them. On behalf of this double, almost “bipolar” and conflicting dimension, Ventimiglia ends up condensing and blending a heterogeneous and kaleidoscopic set of situated and conflicting gazes: those of the persons in transit, stuck on the border, waiting for and organising “a passage” to the other side; but also the different and often conflicting gazes of the citizens (whether “natives”, tourists, national and international solidarity actors), as well as the gazes of those (human or not) involved in the national and European apparatuses charged to govern, filter and confine people in transit. This kind of kaleidoscope further complicates itself if considered from both the sides of the border, the Italian and the French. Each of those gazes is further internally splintered and coalesce in producing a border situation. The book and its different contributions follow the specific clash or entanglement produced by all those gazes, by multiplying them through the lens of a set of disciplines: sociology and anthropology, history and geography, law and literature. It is therefore a multi- and trans-disciplinary and a multi-scalar approach to a specific and entangled border situation. On the one hand, it is nurtured by theory and research; on the other, it is powered by hidden knowledges that come from activism. Research thus becomes a transformative gesture: in recognising the agency of the subjects it encounters, it also enacts and elicits the researchers’ agency.

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Nodes/Knots The deep and multifaceted exploration of a place gives back a sort of “thick description” of a specific border situation. One that, as stressed by Clifford Geertz, allows to detect and capture “big histories from small situations” (Geertz 1973): by intensively focusing on the dense historical, geographical, social and political plot or texture producing a place as a border; and by implicitly associating that specific situation with others, thus providing us with an image that projects Ventimiglia into a broader, interconnected and splintered space—a contested space indeed. Actually, in a kind of isomorphic relation, the specific border scene produced in Ventimiglia during the last years is more or less the same occurring in other places such as Patras or Calais, all situated along a specific corridor and/or a hidden route. Yet, the isomorphic relation linking all these border zones could be further examined, extended and complicated, to the extent that it implies and describes also the one between the two main “actors” or “subjects” at stake—that is, the states’ border apparatuses and migrants (secondary) movements. By borrowing an image from Gilles Deleuze’ and Felix Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus (1980), we could describe almost literally this relation as the one between an “apparatus of capture” and a “nomadic machine”, both working on by adapting and morphing each other. In this relentless “game”—one that reveals itself to be increasingly violent, cruel and thus increasingly fatal—we could therefore detect an ongoing bordering and debordering process. And someone will remember how, in Deleuze and Guattari’s own view, while suggesting to conceive an isomorphic relation as a continuous production of differences, the accent was eventually on the specific primacy of movement (“resistance first”), as something that always anticipates and exceeds the state capacity to definitely govern and master it, by forcing the latter to de-territorialise itself (i.e. to governing mobility through mobility). It is probably on behalf of this specific primacy, one that we could define as “autonomy”, that the different contributions collected in this book, while disentangling or unpacking the peculiar border assemblage characterising Ventimiglia (and reading Ventimiglia through the lens of this peculiar assemblage), provide us with a specific methodological and political angle: one according to which any process of bordering is always a re-bordering of something that has already been exceeded—that is, debordered and violated. In other terms, if the processes involved in

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the making of a (internal) border zone may be represented through the lens of an assemblage (agencement ), it is up to the research and the researchers to choose where to start with and try to disentangle it. And this is a methodological as well as a political choice, insofar as it allows to de-naturalise and politicise the border. But the process of politicisation of the research and the researchers does not arrest itself with such a methodological choice, and it goes further. As we have suggested above, in this double process of bordering/debordering, corridor and routes emerge as the two respective spatial polarities. In order to detect the specific inner functioning characterising the logics of the two polarities, Martin Zinganel (2019) suggests to adopt the notion of nodes and knots. While nodes are constituted by strategies of government essentially through logistics networks and the functioning of corridors, knots are established by the tactics adopted by individuals and groups in their everyday practices of transit. Accordingly, they are mainly relational, and they produce specific spaces of representations opposed to the violent representation of space imposed by corridors and underpinned by knots—by triggering it. Both nodes and knots can be independent from one another, but they are not always distinct and they often overlap, insofar as existing nodes are used for the individuals’ practice of knotting and knots end up triggering the imposition of as many nodes. Indeed, the specific (and small) border zone of Ventimiglia can be conceived at the same time as a node within a corridor and as a knot along a route. And the same goes for any other specific border zones across Europe, whether it is Calais, Bihac, Patras, Briançon, etc. In each one of these places, it is possible to detect the same isomorphic dimension—one made up of frictions and tensions—proper of an assemblage. As described by several contributions collected in this book, Ventimiglia can be conceived as a node in terms of a violent bottleneck or a wall. But it is also a knot, insofar as it reflects the relational spheres and the multiple encounters enacted on the ground between “unauthorised” movements and other subjects and actors at different level supporting them. This specific “knot” sheds or gives light to a kind of heterogeneous “coalition”, built on a specific and practical solidarity and made up of migrants, asylum seekers, national and international activists, but also private citizens, parishioners, etc.. We could therefore figure out and theorise “solidarity” as the situated, tactical, often ephemeral and multifarious set of practices and forms of cooperation enacted by different actors and

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aimed at transforming a forced corridor into a dwelled or inhabited route. The fact is that, while assigning a primacy to this latter specific dimension or moment, the research and the researchers involved in this book end up positioning themselves and directly intervening in the battleground. Accordingly the main methodological and political effort of this book consists precisely in focusing on and directly contributing to this “work of knotting”.

References Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (1980). A Thousand Plateaus. Castelvecchi. Geertz, C. (1973). The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic books. Zinganel, M. (2019). Rhythms of Post-Urbanity: Road-Corridors, Nodes, and Networked Archipelagos. Lo Squaderno.

Index

A Abandonment, 171, 222 Actions, 11, 21, 22, 56, 64, 75–77, 161, 168, 171, 183, 184, 187, 189, 196–199, 207, 213, 216, 226, 228 Activism, 2, 138, 139, 183, 192, 197, 199, 200, 232 activists, 4, 6, 10, 23, 29, 94, 102, 138, 139, 159, 161, 162, 168, 174, 180, 182, 185–193, 196–200, 234 Kesha Niya, 191, 196 Progetto20K, 138 Afghanistan, 30, 145, 146, 167 Afghans, 30, 145 Africa, 20, 82, 103, 152 sub-Saharan Africa, 165, 168 Agency, 2, 7, 10, 76–78, 81, 89, 121, 141, 161, 169, 174, 181, 232 non-human agency, 75, 77, 89 Agenda on Migration, 7, 103, 140 Albanians, 28

Algerie, 227 Alps, 56, 57, 59–62, 64, 79, 206 Alpine area, 56 Alps of the Sea, 58 Anarchists, 20, 27, 30, 32, 64, 181, 186 Ancien règime, 43 Annales , 21 Anthropocene, 76 anthropocentric, 75, 77, 78 Apparatus of capture, 3, 233 Arab Spring, 50, 206 Arabic, 140, 145, 149, 207 Archive archival sources, 18–20, 32 Italian State Archive, 18, 20 Asgi, 29, 30 Assemblage, 3, 4, 20, 77, 233, 234 Association Defendre la Roya, 216 Association Roya Citoyenne, 209, 210 Asylum, 1, 4, 7, 22, 31, 51, 99–101, 103, 104, 123, 125–127, 147, 151, 152, 161–164, 166–168,

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Amigoni et al. (eds.), Debordering Europe, Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56518-3

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238

INDEX

170, 171, 174, 183, 211, 213, 217, 231, 234 asylum policy, 111 asylum procedure, 127 asylum request, 120, 121 asylum system, 104, 162, 166, 172 Austria, 6, 164 Authorities, 7–9, 22, 25, 31, 48, 49, 74, 96, 102, 118, 122, 123, 126, 150, 167, 168, 171, 208, 216 local authorities, 188 Automatic Fingerprint Identification System for the Central State Police Register (AFIS), 97 Autonomy, 3, 8, 11, 160, 164, 169, 172, 215, 233 Autonomy of migration, 5, 32

B Balkans, 30, 80, 165, 166 Balkan route, 4, 82, 165 Bangladesh, 103, 146 Barnabà, Enzo, 18, 29, 84 Basse, 221 Battlefield(s), 8, 73, 74, 88, 89, 207 Battleground, 1, 5, 179, 231, 235 Belgium, 28, 30, 116, 164 Belgians, 49 Belle Époque, 50 Ben Ali, 110 Bengalis, 166 Berlin Wall, 28 Biamonti, Francesco, 11, 55, 61, 62, 64, 228 Bihac, 4, 234 Bilateral agreements, 111, 118, 119, 124 Biometric registration, 7 Bodies, 6, 9, 19, 31, 32, 83, 94, 105, 119, 160, 165, 167 Border/Borderscape

Alpine border, 43 border agents, 51, 75, 83, 86, 87 border control, 2, 4, 6–8, 10, 11, 18, 27–30, 49, 83, 84, 86, 95, 104, 110–119, 124–126, 129, 142, 143, 146, 148, 152, 155, 161, 168, 181, 209 border crossing, 5, 8, 10, 18–20, 23, 26, 29, 74, 79, 80, 82, 83, 86, 88, 89, 110, 116, 117, 126, 130, 137–152, 154, 155, 163, 211, 216 border deaths, 50, 88, 110 border devices, 3, 9, 18, 20, 30–32 border enforcement, 8, 84, 86, 88 bordering, 3, 4, 8, 88, 233, 234 borderland, 4, 5, 10, 20, 26, 59, 73–75, 79, 80, 82–84, 88, 89, 186, 197, 199, 200 border mediatisation, 50, 51 border reinforcing, 8 border situation, 1–3, 116, 168, 187, 231–233 crossing borders, 32, 159 debordering process, 3, 4, 233, 234 european border, 5, 28, 30, 50, 129, 184 external borders, 110, 113, 115, 116, 118, 125, 161, 165 internal border(s), 11, 51, 105, 109, 111–118, 122, 124, 125, 129, 130, 160, 165, 184, 187 irregular border, 10, 20, 111, 118 Italo-French border, 18–20, 28, 81 physical barriers, 79, 84 reintroduction of border, 4, 6–8, 110–113, 115, 116, 124, 125, 129, 142, 161 spectacle of border, 8 Boundary, 41, 55, 59, 104 Breil, 45, 46, 206, 211, 212, 215, 222

INDEX

Breil-sur-Roya, 205, 221, 222, 224, 227, 228 Briançon, 4, 234 Bulgarians, 28 Bureaucracy, 32, 164

C Calais, 1, 3, 4, 209, 210, 231, 233, 234 Cameron, 30 Camouflage, 83, 163, 222 Camp(s) border camp, 186 camp mechanism, 161, 168 illegal camp, 93, 96 informal camp, 5, 104, 105, 180, 186, 189, 191, 192, 196 makeshift camp, 168, 171, 172 migrant camp, 11, 93, 101, 103, 168, 170 no-border camp, 29 Red Cross, 188 Red Cross Camp, 5, 139, 190, 221 Roya Camp, 93, 95, 96, 98, 100, 101, 161, 163, 166, 167, 169, 170, 173, 194, 195 transit camp, 10, 11, 93, 95, 101, 128 Capitalism, 8, 151, 181 anti-capitalist utopia, 214 Carabinieri, 102 Caritas, 80, 81, 167, 171, 180, 190, 192–194, 196 Category, 2, 22, 26, 27, 32, 33, 55, 59, 65, 78, 98, 100, 141, 155, 164, 172, 181, 200, 232 categorisation, 27, 174 Chad, 30, 146 Chambéry Agreement, 95, 118, 119, 126

239

Checkpoints, 5, 11, 84, 86–88, 143, 147, 188, 196, 206, 211, 223, 225–228 Circulation, 4, 5, 59, 79–82, 84, 85, 151, 152, 181, 185, 188, 192, 200 Citizenship, 22, 29, 31, 44, 181 Civic associations, 186, 194 Civil disobedience, 207 Civil society, 192, 207 Clandestine, 5, 8, 49, 50, 81, 85, 89, 147, 207, 224 clandestine passengers, 86 Col de Tende, 206 Colonial, 22, 151, 152 Commission (European), 110, 112–115, 164 Community, 27, 31, 41, 43, 46, 50, 51, 61, 73, 138, 140, 145, 148, 149, 151, 155, 188, 192, 211, 214, 215 Muslim community, 193 Conducts, 94, 104, 147 Conflicts, 9, 10, 27, 32, 38, 39, 45, 51, 74, 156, 183, 184, 216, 227 legal conflicts, 183 Conseil d’Etat , 116 Containment, 94, 98, 161, 168 Conte, Paolo, 17 Control, 5, 7–9, 11, 26, 29–31, 46, 59, 74, 83–88, 94–96, 99, 100, 103–105, 110–112, 115–117, 125, 127, 129, 143, 144, 147, 149, 152, 153, 155, 156, 160–163, 169, 171, 172, 174, 179, 186, 206, 208, 224, 226–228 migration control, 10, 116, 117, 138, 142, 171 mobility control, 7, 20 practice of controlling, 94 technologies of control, 88

240

INDEX

Cooperation, 4, 95, 111, 114, 118–120, 142, 154, 182, 184, 185, 191, 192, 196, 197, 199, 234 Cooperation Agreements, 95, 118 Corridor, 2–5, 81, 87, 211, 232–235 Corti, Paola, 20 Cosmopolitan, 40 Cosmopolitanism, 160 Côte d’Azur, 80 Council (European), 112–115 Counter-conducts, 160, 161, 164, 174 Court of Justice (European), 112, 114, 117, 125 COVID-19, 114 Criminalisation, 6, 209, 217 Crisis, 5, 6, 29, 45, 58, 171, 207, 215 humanitarian crisis, 110 migration crisis, 5, 6, 110, 114, 142, 171 Critical approach, 21 Cuneo, 45, 46, 63, 222, 227

D De Gaulle, Charles, 47 Deleuze, Gilles, 3, 56, 65, 85, 233 Delia Bonuomo, 196 Denmark, 6 Deportation(s), 5, 100, 181, 187, 189, 193 deportability, 171 Desire, 9, 10, 33, 58, 63–65, 104, 160, 166, 168, 172, 182, 187, 197, 222, 227 Detention centre, 93 Diaconia Valdese, 29 Dictatorship, 30, 64 Disciplinary regime, 98 Discourses, 7, 77, 141, 183–185, 197, 200

media discourses, 151, 185 political discourses, 141, 171 Dispositifs , 5 Dornel, Laurent, 20 Dublin (Regulation, System), 7, 50, 95, 121, 123, 125, 127, 162, 164, 171 E Effects, 2, 6, 39, 73, 76, 77, 84, 86, 87, 94, 105, 120, 123, 130, 155, 164, 181, 196, 197, 199, 217 material effects, 8, 126 Egypt, 30, 146 Emergency, 7, 93, 94, 98, 99, 101, 103, 104, 115, 194 emergenza, 29 Encounters, 2, 4, 38, 59, 197, 199, 200, 232, 234 Eritrea, 30, 146, 206 Eritrean(s), 30, 145, 212, 217 Ethiopia, 27, 206 Ethiopian(s), 30, 145 Ethnographic research, 207 ethnography, 94, 138, 154, 180, 184 Euclidean, 84 Eufemia Info&Legal Point, 139, 180, 196 Europe, 2, 4, 8–10, 18, 19, 22, 27–32, 39, 49, 50, 59, 64, 80, 105, 109, 162, 164, 165, 169, 181, 187, 191, 207, 213, 229, 232, 234 European, 2, 4–7, 19, 22, 27, 28, 39, 79, 83, 104, 111, 118, 128, 130, 151, 152, 162, 166, 171, 181, 182, 185, 191, 213, 227, 232 Northern Europe, 2, 99, 109, 211 Southern Europe, 109 Western Europe, 2, 39

INDEX

European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), 121, 127, 128 Grand Chamber, 127 Exploitation, 19, 95, 141, 142, 151, 155, 216 Expulsion(s), 6, 27, 31, 44, 48, 49, 120–125, 127, 168, 174 Externalisation, 8, 110, 111, 118 F Fanghetto, 221, 223–225 Fascism, 18–20, 33 antifascist exiles, 49 Fascist era, 18–20, 26, 30 Fear, 6, 7, 48, 58, 105, 128, 173, 187 Fingerprints, 7, 97, 128, 170 Flow, 1, 2, 6, 10, 19–21, 26, 28, 38, 39, 48–50, 79, 80, 83–86, 89, 98, 100, 101, 149, 206, 221, 231, 232 Foglio di via, 25, 26, 183 Fontan, 46, 47, 205, 206, 221 Foucault, Michel, 9, 22, 94, 103, 160 France, 1, 2, 5, 6, 17–20, 24–26, 28–33, 37–39, 41, 42, 44–49, 57, 59, 61, 63, 64, 80, 85, 87, 95, 101, 103, 110, 111, 115–120, 122, 126, 127, 129, 137, 140, 142, 143, 145, 147, 149, 150, 152, 153, 155, 156, 161–164, 166, 167, 182, 191, 195, 205–209, 211, 217, 224, 226, 231 French army, 43, 143 French authorities, 110, 116, 191 French legislation, 111, 116, 117, 127, 129 Freedom of movement, 5, 138, 146, 179 free movement, 3, 49, 50, 110, 112, 113, 115, 138, 168, 181, 189

241

Frontier, 18, 20, 24–26, 28, 29, 33, 42, 48, 55, 57, 59–62, 66, 94, 126, 224, 226–228 G Gabrielli, Franco, 101 Gallo, Max, 46, 55, 63, 64 Gambler, 172 Game, 3, 9, 20, 104, 172, 208, 233 Garibaldi, 42, 44, 45 garibaldina, 43 Gastaut, Yvan, 20, 40, 41, 43, 45, 47, 50, 51, 63 Genealogy, 22, 30 Genoa, 10, 24, 40, 41, 45, 49, 57, 60, 81, 159, 164 Germany, 6, 30, 102, 104, 116, 118, 164, 181, 225 Germans, 47, 48 Giono, Jean, 55, 64 Governance, 7, 20, 94, 98 Gramsci, A., 22, 139 Great Depression, 47, 49 Greece, 7, 165 Guattari, Felix, 3, 56, 65, 85, 233 Gypsy, 27 H Herrou, Cédric, 183, 210, 211, 227, 228 Hospitality, 48, 93, 96, 188, 194, 197, 199, 207, 210–212, 215–217 Hotspot(s), 2, 7, 8, 99, 102, 103, 128, 143, 161, 232 hotspot model, 105 Human actors, 8, 75 Humanitarian, 5, 50, 94, 101, 125, 130, 141, 180, 182, 184, 185, 191, 193, 196, 197, 200, 207, 213

242

INDEX

humanitarian actions, 197, 199, 200, 209, 213 I Identification, 7, 56, 97, 103, 125 identification card, 97 Identity, 20, 23, 39, 42, 43, 45, 47, 48, 50, 51, 55, 56, 58, 60, 66, 111, 116, 117, 123, 207, 214, 226 Illegal, 2, 10, 18–22, 24–26, 28, 29, 31–33, 41, 42, 49, 100, 104, 140, 151, 162, 171, 187, 208, 216, 217, 224 illegalised foreigners, 2 Informal, 84, 89, 105, 130, 139, 144, 149, 207, 208, 211, 214 informal arrangements, 170 informal settlements, 128, 154, 168, 191 Infrastructures, 5, 10, 11, 39, 45, 74, 78, 79, 83–86, 89, 213 infrastructure environment, 74, 75, 78, 79, 81–83, 86, 88, 89 Inhuman and degrading treatment, 128, 129 International, 1, 2, 4, 6, 17, 38–40, 47, 58, 80, 101, 109, 130, 138, 153, 161, 181, 185, 193, 210, 217, 231, 232, 234 international protection, 100, 127, 129, 155 Invisible, 1, 19, 21, 22, 31, 83, 85–89, 95, 190, 228, 231 invisibility, 83, 85, 88 invisibilization, 83 Iran, 30 Iraq Iraqis, 166 Iron Curtain, 37 Irregular, 11, 120, 122, 125, 130, 155, 174

irregularity, 112, 126, 130, 151 irregular movement, 171 irregular status, 118–121, 125 Italy, 1, 2, 6, 7, 17, 20, 26–29, 37–40, 42–47, 49, 50, 57, 59, 80, 85, 87, 93, 100, 101, 104, 110, 111, 116, 118–120, 122, 126–128, 143, 144, 150, 154, 155, 162–167, 169–173, 181, 183, 189, 205–207, 222–225, 227, 231 Italians, 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 17, 18, 20, 24–30, 37–40, 42–51, 57, 59, 61, 64, 79, 81, 82, 89, 93–96, 101, 110, 111, 119, 122, 126, 128, 129, 138, 140, 142, 145, 146, 149, 150, 160–162, 164, 166, 168, 169, 182, 185, 186, 192, 205, 206, 209, 221–224, 227, 228, 231, 232 southern Italy, 19, 25, 26, 30, 143, 161, 162, 168, 193 Ivory Coast, 146, 206 J Jews, 19, 20, 27, 28, 49, 82, 85, 207, 224 Jewish, 49, 224 Journey, 23, 30, 31, 79, 81, 82, 85, 88, 89, 145, 150, 152, 153, 162, 165, 173, 181, 186, 206, 212, 214 K Kaleidoscope, 2, 232 Kingdom of Italy, 45, 46 Kingdom of Sardinia, 40, 42 Kingdom of Savoy, 39 Knots, 4, 105, 234 Kurdistan, 146

INDEX

Kurds, 29, 82, 142

L Lampedusa, 2, 29, 39, 172, 232 Law, 2, 8–11, 22, 24, 26, 27, 30, 32, 39, 111, 112, 118–120, 122, 155, 161–164, 170, 172, 174, 183, 198–200, 209, 213, 217, 226, 227, 232 Italian law, 6, 10, 18, 122, 170 Legal frameworks, 7, 111, 113, 138 Legal statuses, 167, 174 Legitimacy, 31, 60, 105, 117, 181 Lesvos, 1, 231 Lettres de rémissions , 19 Libre, 221, 223, 224 Libya, 160, 165, 166, 173 Libyan, 30, 166 Liguria, 20, 38–42, 45, 50, 62 Ligurian, 4, 17, 24, 39–41, 50, 57, 62, 63, 81, 206 Local, 2, 3, 5, 9, 27, 38–40, 44–48, 51, 57, 58, 61, 73, 80, 81, 85, 86, 88, 89, 96, 141, 145, 147, 150, 167, 171, 180, 185–196, 199, 200, 207, 212, 214–216, 228 local citizens, 139, 186 local civil society, 189, 192, 200 local inhabitants, 5, 150, 206 Longue durée, 21 l’orde du discours , 22 Loup Valley, 213 Luxemburg, 116, 164

M Maastricht, 39, 50 Maghreb, 103 Maghrebis, 50 Mali, 30, 146

243

Management, 5, 93–95, 99, 100, 103, 105, 111, 129, 130, 139, 147, 171, 181, 187, 226 Margin(s), 88, 104, 126 marginality, 171, 206, 215 Maritime Alps, 10, 37–39, 41, 44–50, 55–57, 59, 60, 62–64, 66, 110, 183, 206, 211 Maritime arc, 60 Marseilles, 56, 61, 117 Martini, Francesca, 20 Material conditions, 79, 129 Mediterranean, 17, 29, 38, 39, 51, 61, 146, 150, 160 Central Mediterranean, 4, 82, 165 Member State(s), 6–8, 111–115, 118, 120, 123–125, 129, 164, 166, 171, 173 Memory, 18, 21, 31, 32, 56 Menton, 37–39, 41, 43, 46, 47, 49, 50, 80, 126, 163, 186, 225 Garavan, 49, 88, 143, 186, 225, 227 Middle Ages, 59 Middle East, 20, 30, 82, 103 Migrants, 1–11, 18–20, 23, 27–31, 38, 51, 60, 75, 79–89, 93, 94, 96, 97, 100, 102–105, 110, 120, 122, 123, 125, 126, 128–130, 137–156, 159–165, 167–169, 171–174, 179–183, 185–190, 192–200, 206–217, 225, 226, 228, 231, 233, 234 illegalised migrants, 81, 82, 85, 88, 89 illegalised people, 82, 182, 200 Migration, 5, 6, 8, 11, 17–20, 23–26, 28, 30, 31, 33, 38, 39, 60, 64, 73, 78, 79, 82, 83, 89, 99, 103, 110, 111, 152, 155, 160, 161, 165, 168, 171, 180, 181, 192, 193, 198–200, 216, 224

244

INDEX

‘the long summer of migration’, 6, 11 migration governance, 2, 232 migration policies, 9, 141, 151, 161, 181, 182, 213 migration regime, 9, 164 Militants, 28, 49, 94, 193, 194 Militarisation, 11, 39, 141, 154, 206, 211, 216 Ministry of the Interior, 98, 99 Minniti-Orlando Decree, 100, 102 Mitterand doctrine, 28 Mobilities, 2, 3, 5–10, 18–20, 27, 30, 31, 38, 55, 61, 62, 64, 80, 94, 98, 100, 138, 141, 142, 151, 154, 161, 172, 173, 180, 181, 192, 198, 200, 232, 233 autonomous movement, 78, 181 mobility corridors, 105 mobility practices, 9 mobility studies, 78 Monaco, 41, 80, 151 Moral economy, 11, 94, 138, 152, 156 Morocco, 30, 146 Moroccan, 22, 145 Movement(s), 3, 4, 6–9, 11, 18, 28, 38, 41, 50, 51, 60, 62–64, 74, 78, 86, 98, 100, 102, 103, 112, 139, 141, 152, 153, 159, 160, 180, 184, 185, 188–190, 192, 193, 195–197, 200, 207, 216, 222, 233, 234 anti-border movements, 182 free movement, 3, 49, 50, 110, 112, 113, 115, 138, 168, 181, 189 geography of movement, 2, 232 underground movements, 88, 89 N Napoleon III, 42

Narratives, 11, 18, 19, 21, 22, 65, 94, 138, 144, 147, 154 Negotiation, 115, 139, 145, 147, 160, 192 NGOs, 102, 167, 180, 185, 193 Nice, 29, 38, 40–49, 57, 58, 60, 62–64, 80, 151, 154, 191, 205, 206, 211, 226 Nietzsche, 76 Nigeria, 146 No Border movement, 168 Nodes, 1, 4, 105, 231, 234 Nomadic machine, 3, 233 Non-human actors, 8 Normative framework. See Law North Africa, 18, 30, 47 Northern Europe, 2, 99, 211 Norway, 6

O Office Français de Protection des Réfugiés et Apatrides (OFPRA), 123 Ordinance, 183 Oxfam, 29, 30, 110, 128, 163, 172

P Pakistan, 103 Pakistanis, 145, 166 Palestine, 30 Palidda, Salvatore, 20 Paris, 29, 40–46, 48–50, 117, 209, 212, 213, 217, 225, 227 Treaty of Paris, 47 Parliament (European), 103, 112, 114, 115 Passeur(s), 10, 11, 20, 26, 85, 138, 142, 148, 195, 212, 224 smugglers, 24, 31, 198 Pass of Tende, 43, 46

INDEX

Path, 17, 18, 31, 46, 49, 61, 85, 88, 110, 143, 150, 200, 212, 214, 222–224, 226 Path of death, 18 Path of hope, 18, 28, 84 Patras, 3, 4, 233, 234 Peripheral Digital Footprint Acquisition System (S.P.A.I.D.), 97 Permission, 24, 25, 32, 79, 160, 162 temporary permission, 165 Piedmont, 20, 40, 42, 43, 60, 64, 80, 205 Piène, 221 Pistoia, Emanuela, 20 Police and Customs Cooperation Centres (PCCC), 119 Political debate, 1, 190, 231 Political engagement, 3, 4, 140, 200 Politicisation, 183, 198 Pont de Rogne, 222 Positionalities, 3, 31 Postcolonial, 6 Post-war, 18 Post-World War II, 49 Power, 7, 11, 18, 19, 21, 22, 31, 32, 56, 60, 65, 73, 74, 77, 82, 88, 89, 103, 104, 160, 213, 216, 227 panoptic model, 104 power balance, 174 power devices, 19 power structures, 21 Pozzallo, 2, 232 Prefecture of Imperia, 95–97, 102 Protection, 40, 41, 95, 99, 102, 104, 119, 120, 127, 170, 197 humanitarian protection, 174 Protests, 5, 28, 172, 181, 186, 187, 193 Prussians, 44

245

Public authorities, 139, 153, 184, 194, 199 Public order, 118, 122, 124, 183, 224 Push backs, 29, 33 R Race, 27 racial discrimination, 19 racial profile, 116 racial profiling, 103, 143, 162 Railway, 23, 29, 45, 46, 74, 80, 81, 84, 86, 88, 93, 95, 96, 98, 110, 143, 163, 186, 187, 192, 211, 214, 223 Readmission, 11, 111, 119–122, 125–127, 129 agreement of readmission, 118, 119, 121, 122, 124, 125 Reception centres, 6, 7, 98–100, 167, 168, 170 Red Cross, 11, 29, 93, 96, 97, 102, 128, 167, 168, 170, 180, 187, 192 Refoulement , 11, 125, 129 Refugees, 22, 29, 31, 38, 50, 51, 64, 100, 104, 120, 142, 153, 167, 174, 181 Refus d’entrée (i.e. Refusal of entry), 111, 122–127, 212 Repatriation, 101, 123, 125, 161, 173 Representation(s), 4, 18, 21, 44, 74, 83, 141, 222, 226, 234 media representations, 10 Resistance, 3, 9, 33, 40, 60, 155, 160, 208, 233 Responsibility, 7, 129, 184, 189 Return, 44, 45, 102, 121, 124, 125, 143, 151, 162, 173, 212 Revelli, Nuto, 55, 61–63 Rights, 6, 30, 38, 39, 41, 43, 47, 98, 99, 104, 121, 126, 129, 130, 139–141, 153, 171, 182, 197

246

INDEX

Convention on the Rights of Child, 127 fundamental rights of migrants, 129 Risk, 78, 83, 86–88, 99, 104, 111, 113, 114, 127, 128, 148, 151–153, 155, 162, 172, 174, 187, 197, 226 Romanians, 28 Romanisation, 39 Rome, 29, 46, 48, 50, 81, 170 Route(s), 2–5, 18, 25, 30, 45, 57, 59, 60, 74, 79–81, 84, 85, 89, 99, 100, 111, 140, 142, 144, 146, 148, 153, 155, 161–163, 166, 170, 206, 207, 211, 213, 217, 232–235 Roya Valley, 11, 41, 46, 185, 191, 205, 206, 208, 209, 211, 213–215, 217

S Saint Dalmas, 221, 228 Sanfilippo, Matteo, 20 San Michele, 24, 221, 222, 224 Sanremo, 41, 43, 47, 80, 193 Sardinian Kingdom, 41 Savoy, 38, 40–44, 48, 50, 60 Schengen SBC regulations, 117 Schengen agreement, 95, 118, 161, 186 Schengen area, 6, 8, 50, 110, 113, 114, 116, 122 Schengen Borders, 112, 113 Schengen legislation, 110–112, 116 Schengen system, 20 Schor, Ralph, 20, 40, 41, 43, 45, 64 Secondary movements, 2, 8, 115, 164, 232 Second World War, 205

Security, 6, 26, 27, 30, 51, 86, 88, 96, 97, 104, 112, 117, 129, 143, 150, 180, 184, 226 securitisation, 104 Self-determination, 182, 187, 190 Shelter(s), 2, 154, 170, 181, 186, 187, 193, 195, 199, 224 humanitarian shelter, 186 Silvio Berlusconi, 29 Smugglers, 25, 28, 62, 121, 138, 139, 141, 143–150, 153–155, 162, 183, 187 migrant smuggling, 137, 139, 140, 155 Social milieu, 77 Social movement, 73, 82, 89 Social structure, 21 Solidarity, 2, 4–6, 11, 38, 39, 51, 81, 138, 146, 150, 152, 154, 155, 182–188, 191–194, 196, 198–200, 206–208, 210–215, 217, 232, 234 caritative associations, 192 Solidaires , 195, 198, 199, 207, 209, 211–213, 215, 217 solidarity movements, 6, 149, 209 Somalian, 30 Somalis, 145 Sospel, 46, 224 Spain, 116, 118, 163, 165 Spaniards, 49 Spatial patterns, 82 Spivak, Gayatri Chakravory, 22, 32 Stereotypes, 33 Strategy, 6, 75, 83, 86, 101, 119, 143, 154, 224 acting strategically, 89 strategies, 4, 8, 9, 20, 25, 33, 58, 60, 83, 105, 110, 137, 139, 143, 146, 147, 154, 155, 160, 174, 185, 216, 234

INDEX

Struggle(s), 3, 8, 10, 11, 73, 138, 146, 152, 153, 155, 160, 168, 180, 182, 185–187, 192, 208, 210, 214, 215, 217 struggles of migration, 89, 140, 159, 168, 187 Subaltern/Subalternity, 22, 32 Subject(s) intersubjectivity, 31 racialised subjects, 6 subjective experience, 160 subjectivisation, 160 subjectivities, 3, 9, 10, 19, 32, 33 subjunctivisation, 18 Subversive actions, 199 Sudan, 30, 146, 149, 153, 206 Sudanese, 2, 11, 29, 30, 137–139, 142, 144, 145, 149–156 Surveillance, 27, 84, 86, 89, 94, 95, 105, 119, 227 Susa Valley, 111 Sweden, 6 Swiss, 48 Switzerland, 116, 164

T Tactics, 4, 105, 160, 161, 163, 168, 170, 172, 174, 234 Tampere Council, 118 Taranto, 2, 102, 128, 232 Temporalities, 21, 23, 31, 33, 103, 104 Terrorism, 117, 129, 226 anti-terrorism law, 209 terrorist, 115, 116, 140 Third countries, 111, 120, 167, 171 Threat, 27, 104, 110, 112, 113, 115, 116, 118, 122, 124, 150, 169, 196 Toulouse, 117 Tourism, 20, 40, 48, 214, 215

247

international tourists, 2, 50, 80, 232 Trafficking, 118, 141, 148 Transfers, 102, 228 forced transfers, 102, 128, 171 Transformative, 2, 232 Transgress, 6, 32, 183 Transit, 1, 2, 5, 20, 57, 66, 79, 80, 94, 98–101, 105, 120, 128, 138, 139, 142, 165, 182, 193, 207, 213, 231, 232 practices of transit, 4, 234 Transnational, 30, 33, 45, 46, 80, 140, 142, 145, 147, 148, 183, 185, 187 Trapani, 2, 232 Travel document, 95, 124 Truman, 47 Tunisia, 29, 30, 45 Tunisian(s), 22, 29, 82, 110, 142, 145, 146, 186, 192, 206 Turin, 41–43, 57, 58, 161, 172 U Unaccompanied minors, 30, 96, 123, 127, 128, 213, 217 United Nations (UN), 127, 140 V Vaud Protestant minority, 193 Ventimiglia Grimaldi, 41, 191 Ponte San Ludovico, 5 Ponte San Luigi, 128, 228 river Roja, 171, 226 Roverino-Gianchette, 193 St Anthony’s church, 193, 199 Tende, 41, 43, 46, 47, 205, 206, 214, 221, 222 Veziano, Paolo, 19, 28, 49, 82, 142, 224

248

INDEX

Village of Saorge, 211 Violation(s), 111, 113, 121, 126, 127, 129, 130, 141, 162, 195, 228 Violence, 2, 4, 11, 155, 159, 160, 162, 169, 171, 173, 181, 188, 189, 191, 213, 217 epistemic violence, 22, 23, 32 violent processes, 1, 231 Visible, 6, 19, 21, 22, 31, 109, 130, 144, 165, 188, 199, 206, 223, 224, 228 Vittorio Emanuele II, 42

Voluntary, 173 Volunteers, 10, 23, 139, 161, 171, 174, 180, 189, 191, 193–196, 198 Vulnerability, 121, 141, 160, 217 W Walkway, 17 Westphalia, 50 Z Zamon Davis, Natalie, 19