Dealing With Regional Conflicts of Global Importance 1668494671, 9781668494677

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Dealing With Regional Conflicts of Global Importance Piotr Pietrzak Sofia University, Bulgaria

A volume in the Advances in Human Services and Public Health (AHSPH) Book Series

Published in the United States of America by IGI Global Information Science Reference (an imprint of IGI Global) 701 E. Chocolate Avenue Hershey PA, USA 17033 Tel: 717-533-8845 Fax: 717-533-8661 E-mail: [email protected] Web site: http://www.igi-global.com Copyright © 2024 by IGI Global. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored or distributed in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, without written permission from the publisher. Product or company names used in this set are for identification purposes only. Inclusion of the names of the products or companies does not indicate a claim of ownership by IGI Global of the trademark or registered trademark. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Pietrzak, Piotr, editor. Title: Dealing with regional conflicts of global importance / edited by Piotr Pietrzak. Description: Hershey, PA : Information Science Reference, [2024] | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Summary: “In this book, policymakers and professionals in the fields of current affairs and security studies can find essential tools for understanding and addressing violent conflicts since 1991. Drawing on geoeconomics, geopolitics, security studies, and humanitarian perspectives, Dr. Piotr Pietrzak as an expert in International Relations theory, geopolitics, conflict resolution strategies, and international law delves into the roots of competition and cooperation among states. He explores influential concepts and debates, including Francis Fukuyama’s “The End of History,” Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations,” and Joseph Nye’s notion of Soft Power, to provide a theoretical and analytical framework for comprehending the complexities of global power dynamics”-Provided by publisher. Identifiers: LCCN 2023030250 (print) | LCCN 2023030251 (ebook) | ISBN 9781668494677 (h/c) | ISBN 9781668494714 (s/c) | ISBN 9781668494684 (eISBN) Subjects: LCSH: Politics and war. | Political violence. | Peace-building. | Communication--Political aspects. | Conflict management. | Nuclear disarmament. | Security, International. Classification: LCC JZ6385 .D425 2023 (print) | LCC JZ6385 (ebook) | DDC 327--dc23/eng/20230801 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023030250 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023030251 This book is published in the IGI Global book series Advances in Human Services and Public Health (AHSPH) (ISSN: 2475-6571; eISSN: 2475-658X) British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library. All work contributed to this book is new, previously-unpublished material. The views expressed in this book are those of the authors, but not necessarily of the publisher. For electronic access to this publication, please contact: [email protected].

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Titles in this Series

For a list of additional titles in this series, please visit: www.igi-global.com/book-series/advances-human-services-public-health/102256

The Role of Health Literacy in Major Healthcare Crises Vassilios Papalois (Hammersmith Hospital, UK) and Kyriaki Papalois (Hammersmith Hospita, UK) Information Science Reference • © 2024 • 300pp • H/C (ISBN: 9781799896524) • US $235.00 Analyzing Global Responses to Contemporary Regional Conflicts Piotr Pietrzak (Sofia University, Bularia) Information Science Reference • © 2024 • 350pp • H/C (ISBN: 9798369328378) • US $245.00 Ecological and Evolutionary Perspectives on Infections and Morbidity P.A. Azeez (Salim Ali Centre for Ornithology and Natural History, Coimbatore, India) P.P. Nikhil Raj (Amrita School of Engineering, Amrita Vishwa Vidyapeetham, India) and R. Mohanraj (Bharathidasan University, India) Medical Information Science Reference • © 2023 • 331pp • H/C (ISBN: 9781799894148) • US $325.00 Transformation and Efficiency Enhancement of Public Utilities Systems Multidimensional Aspects and Perspectives Jordan Gjorchev (International Slavic University, North Macedonia) Samoil Malcheski (International Slavic University, North Macedonia) Tamara Rađenović (University of Niš, Serbia) Dejan Vasović (University of Niš, Serbia) and Snežana Živković (University of Niš, Serbia) Information Science Reference • © 2023 • 457pp • H/C (ISBN: 9781668477304) • US $215.00 Regulating Human Rights, Social Security, and Socio-Economic Structures in a Global Perspective Emilia Alaverdov (Georgian Technical University, Georgia) and Muhammad Waseem Bari (Government College University, Faisalabad, Pakistan) Information Science Reference • © 2022 • 327pp • H/C (ISBN: 9781668446201) • US $215.00 Assessing the Effects of Emerging Plastics on the Environment and Public Health Sung Hee Joo (University of Seoul, South Korea) Engineering Science Reference • © 2022 • 441pp • H/C (ISBN: 9781799897231) • US $240.00 Global Dimensions of Democracy and Human Rights Problems and Perspectives Nika Chitadze (International Black Sea University, Georgia) Information Science Reference • © 2022 • 345pp • H/C (ISBN: 9781668445433) • US $215.00

701 East Chocolate Avenue, Hershey, PA 17033, USA Tel: 717-533-8845 x100 • Fax: 717-533-8661 E-Mail: [email protected] • www.igi-global.com

To my wife, Delyana, for my brain is hard-wired to be yours. For my son, Victor Pietrzak, to empower him in shaping tomorrow’s world. Yes, you can! I dedicate this book to the enduring and vibrant memory of Mirosław Andrysiak. Coach Andrysiak embodied the essence of a true grassroots organizer, consistently radiating energy—a hero whose pivotal role in shaping the characters of countless young individuals cannot be overstated. He lifted numerous young athletes from poverty in Łęczyca and the entire region. Some of his protégés proudly represented Poland on the grand stages of the Olympic Games and World Championships. His famous life mantra was ‘Never stop fighting till the fight is done,’ and he embodied it until his last breath, striving to overcome a formidable disease. While the coach may no longer be physically present among us as of October 2023, the enduring strength of his spirit will undoubtedly leave an indelible mark.



Editorial Advisory Board Akash Bag, Adamas University, Kolkata, India Emilia Alaverdov, Georgian Technical University, Georgia Liza Amiilakhvari, Georgian Technical University, Georgia Goran Ilik, University St Kliment Ohridski Bitola, North Macedonia Iskren Ivanov, Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski”, Bulgaria Krzysztof Karwowski, SGH Warsaw School of Economics, Poland Evangelos Ioannis Koumparoudis, Sofia University, “St. Kliment Ohridski”, Greece Neli V. Kirilova, School on CSDP/CFSP, European Security and Defence College & School of Political Science and International Relations, Corvinus University of Budapest, Bulgaria Joseph Thomas Milburn, Rochester Independent College, UK Stavros S. Panayiotou, National and Kapodistrian, University of Athens, Cyprus Bálint Tóth, Mathias Corvinus Collegium, Hungary Sureyya Yigit, New Vision University, Georgia Krzysztof Żęgota, University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn, Poland

 

Table of Contents

Foreword............................................................................................................................................. xvii Preface.................................................................................................................................................. xix Chapter 1 The Sixth Great Debate in International Relations Theory Revolves Around Clarity: Ontology in Statu Nascendi as a Cutting-Edge Tool for Conflict Management.......................................................... 1 Piotr Pietrzak, Airlangga University, Indonesia Chapter 2 The Role of the International Community in Turning Afghanistan Into a Failed State and Its Impact on International and Regional Security..................................................................................... 28 Emilia Alaverdov, Georgian Technical University, Georgia Zurabi Tchabashvili, Georgian American University, Georgia Chapter 3 The Role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the Afghan Crisis........................................... 44 Muhammad Naveed Akhtar, Federal Urdu University of Arts Sciences and Techonology, Pakistan Faisal Javaid, Federal Urdu University of Arts, Sciences and Technology, Pakistan Chapter 4 Can the European Union’s Global Gateway Challenge China’s Belt and Road Initiative?................... 63 Sureyya Yigit, New Vision University, Georgia Chapter 5 China’s Belt and Road Initiative: An Instrument for Regional Conflict Mitigation and Global Power Shifts........................................................................................................................................... 84 Mohamad Zreik, Sun Yat-sen University, China Chapter 6 Decoding the US-NATO Dynamics: A Thorough Analysis of Donald Trump and Joe Biden’s Foreign Policy Approaches.................................................................................................................. 104 Akash Bag, Adamas University, India Souvik Roy, Adamas University, India Asif Iqubal Shah, St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata, India 



Chapter 7 Poland, a Benign but Not a Naïve Power in Its Response to Russia’s War in Ukraine (2022-Present): Assertive Pursuit of Enlightened Self-Interest – Forging New Alliances and Strengthening Existing Ones................................................................................................................ 124 Piotr Pietrzak, Sofia University, Bulgaria Chapter 8 Russia’s Militaristic Rhetoric, Imperialism, and Expansion: Wars in Georgia and Ukraine............... 161 Liza Amilakhvari, Georgian Technical University, Georgia Otar Baghaturia, Georgian Technical University, Georgia Chapter 9 Neutrality: Engaged, Credible, and Useful.......................................................................................... 182 Heinz Gärtner, University of Vienna, Austria Chapter 10 Global Economic Consequences of Russian Invasion of Ukraine....................................................... 195 Peterson K. Ozili, Central Bank of Nigeria, Nigeria Chapter 11 The European Parliament’s Activities in European Union Foreign Policy: Is This the Mediatization of Conflict Management?............................................................................................. 224 Marta Witkowska, University of Warsaw, Poland Artur Koldomasov, Media Research Center, Ottawa, Canada Chapter 12 X-Raying Digital Activism in Selected Countries: New Frontiers for Mobilization........................... 244 Collence T. Chisita, University of South Africa, South Africa Alexander Madana Rusero, Africa University, Zimbabwe Vusi W. Tsabedze, University of Eswatini, Eswatini Amahle Khumalo, Durban University of Technology, South Africa Chapter 13 Decolonization and Peacebuilding: The Case of Timor Leste and Kashmir....................................... 262 Tamanna M. Shah, Ohio University, USA Chapter 14 Relocation of the Rohingya Refugees to Bhasan Char: Human Rights, Government Policy, and the Refugee Crisis in Bangladesh........................................................................................................ 279 M. Mahruf C. Shohel, University of Roehampton, UK SM Rashedujjaman, International Rescue Committee, Bangladesh Tahmina Akter, Norwegian Refugee Council, Bangladesh Chapter 15 Thou Shall Not Kill: The Ethics of AI in Contemporary Warfare....................................................... 299 Evangelos Ioannis Koumparoudis, Sofia University, Bulgaria



Chapter 16 The Competition Among Stars: Case Studies of American-Russian-Chinese Rivalry in Space Exploration........................................................................................................................................... 314 Krzysztof Jan Karwowski, SGH Warsaw School of Economics, Poland Chapter 17 America’s Squid Game: Why the Korean Conflict Is a Prisoner’s Dilemma...................................... 331 Iskren Ivanov, Sofia University, Bulgaria Compilation of References................................................................................................................ 352 About the Contributors..................................................................................................................... 401 Index.................................................................................................................................................... 408

Detailed Table of Contents

Foreword............................................................................................................................................. xvii Preface.................................................................................................................................................. xix Chapter 1 The Sixth Great Debate in International Relations Theory Revolves Around Clarity: Ontology in Statu Nascendi as a Cutting-Edge Tool for Conflict Management.......................................................... 1 Piotr Pietrzak, Airlangga University, Indonesia As we anticipate the emergence of the sixth great debate in IR theory, ontology in statu nascendi stands ready to guide IR theorists in addressing pressing issues such as new technologies, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, pandemics, and the evolving nature of conflicts. Its relevance extends to the forefront of contemporary concerns, including autonomous weapons systems, asymmetric warfare, climate change, and societal inequalities. Ontology in statu nascendi has evolved into a mature framework, uniquely structured to navigate the complexities of our dynamic global landscape. Its integration signifies a pivotal step in the advancement of international relations (IR) theory, offering a robust foundation for collaboration to address the challenges of the 21st century. Chapter 2 The Role of the International Community in Turning Afghanistan Into a Failed State and Its Impact on International and Regional Security..................................................................................... 28 Emilia Alaverdov, Georgian Technical University, Georgia Zurabi Tchabashvili, Georgian American University, Georgia Afghanistan has long been a country that is easy to enter by external forces, but then very difficult to leave. As a result of the struggle with various conquerors, in the minds of the Afghans, the idea of any foreign troops as occupiers, with whom it remains only to fight, has firmly established itself. The invasion of the Soviet Union turned it into a Cold War battlefield, and the end of that war and the collapse of the Soviet Union turned Afghanistan into the arena of a new rivalry, this time between regional actors. Approximately 50 years before the communist takeover, Afghanistan was perhaps the most peaceful country on the Asian continent. The consequences of international and regional rivalry and inaction of the international community turned the country into a failed state, which poses a threat to international security.

 



Chapter 3 The Role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the Afghan Crisis........................................... 44 Muhammad Naveed Akhtar, Federal Urdu University of Arts Sciences and Techonology, Pakistan Faisal Javaid, Federal Urdu University of Arts, Sciences and Technology, Pakistan Shanghai cooperation organization (SCO) is the largest regional organization in the world, holding 42% of the world’s population, 20% of its area, and 25% of the GDP. Afghanistan has been the least peaceful country for eight consecutive years. The SCO countries surround Afghanistan, and Afghanistan is an observer in the organization. Afghanistan is in crisis due to internal and external factors. Millions of people are internally displaced; many fled to other countries, and two-thirds of the Afghan population need humanitarian assistance to survive. Afghanistan remained a source of cross-border terrorism and drug trafficking. The hasty withdrawal of the U.S. forces, the non-recognization status of the Taliban government, and the sanctions have complexed the matter. Neighbouring countries are worried about the spillover effect. If the Afghan issues are not addressed, it would worsen the security situation in the region. Can SCO play an active role in solving Afghan problems? This chapter examines the potential role of the SCO, its limitations, and challenges in resolving the Afghan issues. Chapter 4 Can the European Union’s Global Gateway Challenge China’s Belt and Road Initiative?................... 63 Sureyya Yigit, New Vision University, Georgia This chapter examines China’s technological advance and its relevance to European strategic sovereignty. The following sections deal with the shifting paradigms and how they reshape a key concept in this context: interdependence. The chapter then turns its attention towards China’s innovation capacity, explaining how it has become an innovation powerhouse from an unlikely candidate for digital innovation and why its future success is still being determined. The next section explores how China’s technological advance translates into a global power and how the EU’s Global Gateway can become a rival to the Belt and Road Initiative. The chapter concludes with a broad research agenda to understand the EU’s and China’s future technological trajectories. This will be a prerequisite for developing adequate and effective European policies so that the Union retains its freedom of action in world affairs. Chapter 5 China’s Belt and Road Initiative: An Instrument for Regional Conflict Mitigation and Global Power Shifts........................................................................................................................................... 84 Mohamad Zreik, Sun Yat-sen University, China This chapter explores the geopolitical and geoeconomic implications of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a massive project initiated in 2013 that could potentially reshape global power dynamics. The BRI, viewed as a manifestation of China’s soft power, holds potential to alleviate international conflicts, foster international collaboration, and expedite global transformations. It aims to strengthen international relations, bolster economies, and instill peace in conflict-ridden regions like the Middle East, Afghanistan, and certain parts of Africa. By broadening infrastructure, generating new economic prospects, and integrating regions, the BRI could herald an era of peace. It also hints at the emergence of a multipolar world with China’s increasing influence. By potentially decreasing conflict likelihood and forming new global governance systems, the BRI might enhance economic interdependence and diplomatic relations. This chapter begins a dialogue on how such economic initiatives can mitigate regional turbulence and influence future global order.



Chapter 6 Decoding the US-NATO Dynamics: A Thorough Analysis of Donald Trump and Joe Biden’s Foreign Policy Approaches.................................................................................................................. 104 Akash Bag, Adamas University, India Souvik Roy, Adamas University, India Asif Iqubal Shah, St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata, India The ripples of the shift in power in the USA were felt worldwide, not least in international security policy, where the USA has often chosen to be at the forefront throughout history. The country’s involvement in most international organizations had changed during the four years with Trump as president, and his mottos “America First” and “Make America Great Again.” The tone and fortunes surrounding NATO changed on January 20, 2021. This chapter has researched the national role conceptions of two American presidents, Donald Trump and Joe Biden, to see how their national role conception of the USA could affect the relationship between the USA and NATO with the help of the national role conception theory employed in this paper. It concludes that the presidents have partly different national role conceptions, with one role being the same and two being different. This chapter also concludes that different national role conceptions could affect the relationship between the USA and NATO. Chapter 7 Poland, a Benign but Not a Naïve Power in Its Response to Russia’s War in Ukraine (2022-Present): Assertive Pursuit of Enlightened Self-Interest – Forging New Alliances and Strengthening Existing Ones................................................................................................................ 124 Piotr Pietrzak, Sofia University, Bulgaria The chapter investigates an interesting twist in the bilateral relations between Ukraine and Poland under the Morawiecki Government. It discusses the main reasons that led Morawiecki to drastically change from a very generous response to Russia’s invasion to an openly hostile stance after Zelensky’s UN Speech. The chapter explores the rationale that led Morawiecki to impose an embargo on Ukrainian grain and other agricultural commodities during the summer of 2023. It deliberates on the post-2023 improvement of these relations after the formation of the Tusk government. It exemplifies that even if certain disagreements over the scale of the offered assistance arise in the countries that eagerly helped Ukraine since February 2022, those disagreements can be appropriately dealt with. The ferocity of Putin’s war against Ukraine failed to discourage Ukraine’s most loyal friends from stepping up their support. Paradoxically for Putin, despite all his efforts to turn such a scenario into an undesirable one, Ukraine today is much closer to becoming a full EU and NATO member than ever. Chapter 8 Russia’s Militaristic Rhetoric, Imperialism, and Expansion: Wars in Georgia and Ukraine............... 161 Liza Amilakhvari, Georgian Technical University, Georgia Otar Baghaturia, Georgian Technical University, Georgia Throughout history, Russia’s narrative of being a “sieged fortress” persists despite contemporary absence of external threats. This narrative justifies expansion as a cultural necessity, compensating for perceived existential threats and unsatisfactory living conditions. While historically rooted, this narrative serves as a psychological justification for expansionist policies. Throughout history, Muscovy has established dominance, notably in subjugating elites. This historical trend of overpowering local authorities reflects in Russia’s modern aggressive foreign policy. The purpose of the study is to determine the socio-cultural



and psycho-social foundations of its modern aggressive expansionist foreign policy based on the analysis of Russian history. Revealing the foreign and domestic reasons for its aggression against Georgia and Ukraine. Showing the importance of local actors in global politics on the example of the international significance of Russia’s war against Georgia and Ukraine. Chapter 9 Neutrality: Engaged, Credible, and Useful.......................................................................................... 182 Heinz Gärtner, University of Vienna, Austria The concept of neutrality has evolved over time, with various definitions emerging since the 19th century. Initially, neutrality was associated with non-participation in foreign wars and military conflicts. However, after the onset of the Cold War, the focus shifted towards non-participation in military alliances. In the context of “engaged neutrality,” neutral states should also take principled positions. Neutrality does not imply value-neutrality, and in times of conflict, neutral states must condemn serious human rights violations, genocide, and warfare. However, neutral states are not compelled to adopt the stances of great powers or alliances. Unlike alliances, they do not pose a threat to major powers. Engaged neutrality, therefore, stands in contrast to mere detachment. It signifies active involvement whenever feasible and abstention when necessary. This approach can constitute a valuable contribution to mediation and deescalation during periods of escalating international tensions. Chapter 10 Global Economic Consequences of Russian Invasion of Ukraine....................................................... 195 Peterson K. Ozili, Central Bank of Nigeria, Nigeria This chapter investigates the global economic consequence of the Russia-Ukraine war over a four-month period from December 2021 to March 2022. Russia invaded Ukraine on the 24th of February 2022. The study used the Pearson correlation and two-stage least square regression methods to assess the impact of Russian invasion of Ukraine on the global economy. It was observed that stock prices plunged on the day of the invasion. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the COVID-19 pandemic jointly led to a significant increase in the world price of food and crude oil. The rise in the world food price index after the invasion was driven by a significant increase in the price of dairy and oils. The rise in inflation in Russia and Ukraine after the invasion was followed by a rise in inflation in countries that imposed severe sanctions on Russia, and in countries that were not involved in the conflict in any way. Chapter 11 The European Parliament’s Activities in European Union Foreign Policy: Is This the Mediatization of Conflict Management?............................................................................................. 224 Marta Witkowska, University of Warsaw, Poland Artur Koldomasov, Media Research Center, Ottawa, Canada Despite the restricted formal role of the European Parliament (EP) in foreign policy decision-making, the aim of this research is to demonstrate that the EP tries and can actively influence conflict management. Though this influence can only be informal, and cannot take the form of decisions with binding legal effects. In connection with the research goal thus defined, the authors hypothesize that the EP creates political discourse in order to mediatize the conflict using goal-framing and agenda-setting in social media. The research material includes, in addition to documents published in the EP’s Public Register of Documents, primarily posts on the EP’s social media. The European Parliament’s aspirations to expand



the scope of its powers in EU foreign policy and the EP’s participation in managing the analyzed conflict through mediatization is especially evident in social media communication targeted towards citizens, related to the PE’s activity in the field of rhetorical diplomacy. Chapter 12 X-Raying Digital Activism in Selected Countries: New Frontiers for Mobilization........................... 244 Collence T. Chisita, University of South Africa, South Africa Alexander Madana Rusero, Africa University, Zimbabwe Vusi W. Tsabedze, University of Eswatini, Eswatini Amahle Khumalo, Durban University of Technology, South Africa The spectacle of digital activism has taken the world by storm as silent voices manipulate the advantages or opportunities provided by social networking sites (SNSs) to organise protests by engaging their audiences using a panoply of digital technologies. The efficacy of such novel engagement as part of social action movements has become common worldwide, and Africa is no exception. The proliferation of digital media spaces has often made authoritarian resilience costly, but it continues to oil the surveillance economy, data capitalism, and global information manipulation. The chapter presents classical case studies reflecting how this phenomenon has engulfed African states. A qualitative research approach unpacks this phenomenon, as it has become deeply rooted in Africa’s drive for social change. The chapter enquires about epistemological reasons such platforms have become a threat to the legacy media. Chapter 13 Decolonization and Peacebuilding: The Case of Timor Leste and Kashmir....................................... 262 Tamanna M. Shah, Ohio University, USA Nations that fail to achieve independence at decolonization seek recognition and support from the international community. The United Nations peacebuilding activities significantly influence conflicts over statehood and self-determination. This chapter examines United Nations peacebuilding and conflict resolution through the successful independence of Timor Leste with the ongoing conflict in Kashmir since the moment of decolonization. It argues that the patterns of decolonization are critical in explaining initial UN positions, which then shape future peacebuilding operations. Decolonial designs determine the primacy of either territorial integrity or the right to self-determination. In Kashmir, partition made the new territorial boundaries geopolitically significant, which had to be maintained for international peace and security. Annexation made the right to self-determination more salient in generating support for independence since the UN understood the right within the context of decolonization rather than geopolitics. Chapter 14 Relocation of the Rohingya Refugees to Bhasan Char: Human Rights, Government Policy, and the Refugee Crisis in Bangladesh........................................................................................................ 279 M. Mahruf C. Shohel, University of Roehampton, UK SM Rashedujjaman, International Rescue Committee, Bangladesh Tahmina Akter, Norwegian Refugee Council, Bangladesh This chapter explores the government policy of relocating the Rohingya refugees from Cox’s Bazar to Bhasan Char from the perspectives of human rights and refugee rights. Drawing from existing literature and diverse discourses, it explores the complexities surrounding this issue. The transfer of some Rohingya



refugees to Bhasan Char by the government of Bangladesh has raised concerns among human rights activists and development workers about potential human rights violations and the safety of these displaced individuals. This chapter aims to critically analyse the issues related to the Rohingya refugee crisis, like mass political asylum, the policy of non-refoulement, violence against humanity, and the impact of the Bangladeshi government’s decision to relocate the Rohingya refugees on their human rights, in light of the concepts involved in international law. Chapter 15 Thou Shall Not Kill: The Ethics of AI in Contemporary Warfare....................................................... 299 Evangelos Ioannis Koumparoudis, Sofia University, Bulgaria This chapter aims in the presentation of the evolution of AI and robotic technologies with emphasis on those for military use and the main strategic agendas of various superpowers like USA, China, and Russia, as well as peripheral powers. The authors also refer to the uses of such technologies in the battlefield. The chapter also reveals the ethical dimensions of the current military AI technologies. It starts with the Mark Coeckelberg paper, to emphasize his call for a new approach to technoethics. Then, the authors will strive towards the ethical theory Neil C. Rowe, and his propositions for ethical improvement of algorithms. Finally, the authors pose the notions of electronic personhood proposed by Avila Negri, also touching upon the fact the legal debate tends to face an anthropomorphic fallacy. To conclude, Thou Shall Not Kill, the highest ‘‘Levinasian Imperative’’ closes the gap of the anthropomorphic fallacy, so our relationship with the killer machines be viewed as asymmetric, non-anthropomorphic, and non-zoomorphic. Chapter 16 The Competition Among Stars: Case Studies of American-Russian-Chinese Rivalry in Space Exploration........................................................................................................................................... 314 Krzysztof Jan Karwowski, SGH Warsaw School of Economics, Poland The creation of long-range missile technology in the late 1940s was a milestone where a new domain of activity – Earth orbit and outer space – emerged. These extremely expensive research and development programs were strictly limited only to a small club of the most developed and innovative countries, but even almost seven decades after the launch of the first satellite, only a few players could independently participate in the exploration of space. Three of them: the United States, the Russian Federation as political and technological heir of the Soviet Union, and the People’s Republic of China mastered all the most important milestones of space technology to take full part in both the Cold War- and the new space race. The aim of this chapter is to explain and understand the areas of competition between the three superpowers in space, what are the most important events where the competition-management was applied and what are the perspectives/consequences of the new countries joining the space competition area within the current decade. Chapter 17 America’s Squid Game: Why the Korean Conflict Is a Prisoner’s Dilemma...................................... 331 Iskren Ivanov, Sofia University, Bulgaria The Korean Conflict has been among the most powerful pillars of the balance of power in Northeast Asia. Yet, that balance changed after North Korea launched its nuclear program. The American presence in the region, on the other side, has had considerable implications for South Korea’s national security and its capabilities to defend. The purpose of this chapter is two-fold. First, it theorizes the security dilemma



between North and South Korea and calculates the probability of nuclear escalation. Second, the chapter explores the effects of North Korea’s nuclear program on the bilateral relations between Washington and Seoul, particularly regarding Pyongyang’s consistent rapprochement with Russia. The most important point of this study is to challenge the statement that South Korea can effectively deter the North without achieving nuclear parity with Pyongyang. Finally, the chapter stresses the difference between the Korean Peninsula’s old and new realities. Compilation of References................................................................................................................ 352 About the Contributors..................................................................................................................... 401 Index.................................................................................................................................................... 408

xvii

Foreword

When Piotr Pietrzak, editor of this book, Dealing with Regional Conflicts of Global Importance, requested that I write its foreword, I was surprised that the title recalls to me one of the important questions that came up very often in classes when I first became an assistant lecturer in 1991, the year many international relations scholars consider the end of the Cold War. This question was whether the end of the Cold War would make the world safer or rather would security remain a global problem due to the emergence of various regional and local conflicts. As we have seen since the end of the Cold War, the number of local and regional conflicts around the world has indeed been increasing. Something worth noting in these increasing regional conflicts is that their causes and dimensions are increasingly varied. While during the Cold War era local and regional conflicts were generally an extension of global conflicts with communist and liberal ideologies clashing as the main dimension, after the Cold War the causes and dimensions of conflicts have increasingly exposed other dimensions such as ethnicity, religion, economics, politics, culture, and identities. It should be underlined that these regional conflicts have had far-reaching implications. We have also witnessed that as the nature of post-Cold War regional conflicts has become more complex, studies related to security and conflict have also become increasingly important in universities and research institutions around the world. Scholars, researchers, and policymakers are vying to offer theories and explanations for the causes of conflicts, as well as offering thoughts and instruments on conflict resolution. Globalization, in which the vast population of the world has come to share a collective consciousness by means of transportation and communication technologies, has had further influence on the nature of local and regional conflicts. Globalization’s various instruments that facilitate interaction across national borders increasingly give “global color” to local and regional conflicts. Many argue that the interaction between globalization and conflict has become complex. Indeed, the notion of globalization of local and regional conflicts can be easily found in the titles of many journal articles, book chapters, and books. In the beginning, many hoped that a global collective consciousness under globalization world would open many avenues to finding wise ways to resolve conflicts. However, the reality does not always seem to correspond to that hope. With advanced transportation and communication technologies, not only are local and regional conflicts rapidly becoming conflicts with a global dimension, but the cross-dimensional nexus of existing conflicts is becoming more and more easily established. Many view globalization as a source of or contributing factor to conflict. Some argue, for example, that globalization has exacerbated ethnic conflicts, for example, in the Balkans, Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan, Indonesia, Myanmar, the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Northern Ireland. Furthermore, with the help of communication technologies, various internal security crises, be they 

Foreword

environmental disaster, extreme poverty, armed conflicts, ethnic conflicts, or religious conflicts, can be taken advantage of by those seeking to internationalize conflicts. Various conflicts in Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia have started as internal problems. However, as parties to each conflict and their sympathetic external forces have joined forces for mutual gain, these conflicts then take on regional and international dimensions. As a result, the character of local and regional conflicts in this era of globalization is increasingly complicated, and ways to resolve them are also getting harder to find. It is within this context described previously that the publication of this book is important, as it offers a comprehensive examination of one feature of the world we are now living in, the outbreak and escalation of various local and regional conflicts that have various further implications. The book reminds us that the current global landscape continues to pose significant challenges to global stability, and every chapter of the book provides supporting evidence for these ongoing global challenges. Various examples of causes of conflicts are presented in these chapters, including how in the current globalizing world one dimension of local or regional conflict can easily be interlinked with other dimensions, making conflicts complex and subtle. Furthermore, the chapters in this book also reveal the importance of what I call conflict resolution mechanisms in a globalizing world. As globalization continues to accelerate social change, and as such, may catalyze conflict, aggravating the tensions in any given society and even creating new local and regional conflicts, there is an urgent need that globalization catalyze and accelerate conflict resolution mechanisms. As local and regional conflicts become more easily globalized, there must be a conflict resolution mechanism where states, non-state actors, and various forms of civil society participate. The various academic areas covered in this book are proof of the need for conflict resolution that involves various parties. Creating new means and motivation for dialogue among contending parties can also happen during globalization, which we can call internationalizing conflict resolutions. Vinsensio Dugis Faculty of Social & Political Sciences, Airlangga University, Indonesia

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The publication of Dealing with Regional Conflicts of Global Importance (2024) coincides with the second anniversary of the outbreak of the full-blown war in Ukraine on February 24, 2022, and marks the somber ten-year anniversary of the events that led to the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014. The latter started the Ukrainian war without the members of the Russian Spetsnaz (special operations forces), the so-called “Little Green People,” equipped with military-style uniforms that did not display any visible identifying insignia, firing a single bullet. The former was not so sophisticated, as more than 600,000 people have already perished in this senseless conflict. Possibly, if we were to ask Kenneth Waltz for some of his structuralist suggestions in this regard, he might speculate on the casus belli for both situations. If he were alive, he might have suggested that both “anomalies” could have been averted with a slightly firmer response from the EU and NATO in 2008, 2014, 2015, and 2022. Undoubtedly, Western leaders such as Obama, Trump, Biden, Schröder, Merkel, Sarkozy, Hollande, and Macron might have to address uncomfortable questions regarding their policy of concessions that led to a failure to prevent those escalations. Surely, George W. Bush and Tony Blair’s adventurist expedition to Iraq in 2003 created a precedent for more assertive way of shaping the global architecture of power - not with soft power but predominantly with sharp power and hard power. It makes perfect sense to use the Newton’s Third Law to this explanation (that suggests that for every action (force) in nature (in the same structure of power), there is an equal and opposite reaction expected so we would plausibly assert that if object A (the US government) exerts a force on object B (Iraq in 2003), it automatically motivates object C (Russia) to exert an equal and opposite force on object D (Ukraine in 2014, 2022)). Still, the real-life case scenarios are far more complicated than such simplified explanations. There are at least 204 independent countries in the global architecture of power. When considering such cases, it is essential to acknowledge that, for instance, countries in Central Europe, such as Poland, organized a series of interventions in the form of friendly suggestions for the Ukrainian authorities before 2014, suggesting that corruption and lack of strategic thinking would inevitably produce a set of negative consequences for this country. The Ukrainian authorities were not keen to listen to those suggestions. It is easy to speculate from the perspective of hindsight, but ultimately, Vladimir Putin bears sole responsibility for waging this war in 2014 and escalating it in 2022 – two developments that have left a permanent mark on the way both theorists and practitioners’ approach regional conflicts of global importance. Putin, like a predatory animal, unsurprisingly and ruthlessly decided to exploit Ukraine’s weaknesses to his advantage. Yet, as much as today’s situation in Eastern Europe challenges the general landscape of awareness about modern conflict, resembling the Balkan peninsula of the 1990s, by no means does the war in 

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Ukraine deserve to be the sole focus of our attention. The last decade has changed the way we approach conflict management in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, the Caucasus, Southeast Asia, Africa, Latin America, Oceania, and many other places in the contemporary world. This publication touches upon recent developments in conflict management, geoeconomics, strategy, IR theory, diplomacy, and new technologies across multiple domains, reminding us that we inhabit an increasingly interdependent world where events in one region can trigger reactions in distant zones. Conflicts in Ukraine, Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Middle East illustrate the potential to escalate tensions in the South China Sea, prompting more assertive postures by China towards Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Taiwan. These conflicts have reignited in recent months and years but account for just the tip of the iceberg. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union more than three decades ago, we have witnessed hundreds, if not thousands, of escalations and armed conflicts of various scale and intensity that pose a challenge to the global architecture of power every year. Focusing on just one of them may lead us astray. This publication delves into the roots of competition and cooperation among states, exploring influential concepts and interlinking those concepts and events in a broader debate to understand the reasons behind the particular outbreak and escalation of local and regional conflicts that have far-reaching implications. Approaching any ongoing conflict presents a challenge that requires patience, perseverance, and attention to detail. Still, if we hope to find more effective ways of resolving such conflicts, we need to learn to identify the patterns, reasons, and hidden dimensions of various aspects of those conflicts swiftly. Those eager to wage wars seem to be always a few steps ahead of us, as the dreadful events of 2023 tend to exemplify, and it is our role as scientists to change this situation. Dealing with Regional Conflicts of Global Importance (2024) approaches modern conflicts in a holistic manner, showing various hidden dimensions of this conflict to better prevent them in the first place. It challenges readers to broaden their explanatory horizons and rethink preconceived notions, offering insights into the evolving multipolar world, alliances, competition, and changing rules of competition. The book aims to empower readers with the knowledge needed to navigate the complexities of the global stage and contribute to a more peaceful and stable future. The text is designed for use in a wide variety of courses, including international relations theory, conflict management, geoeconomics, geopolitics, applied ethics, moral philosophy, and experimental philosophy. It aspires to provide a valuable new contribution to these rapidly developing fields of research. This project is dedicated to everyone interested in expanding their explanatory horizons and challenging their preconceived notions of truth in the realm of international relations. This represents the collaborative, contemplative effort of a group of some of the most reliable, inspirational, and professional individuals I have ever had the privilege of working with – future leaders in their respective fields who dwell longer on the problem, follow a different path, challenge us intellectually, and are determined to stay on the road of self-discovery as long as it takes. Most of these scholars are associated with leading academic institutions, non-profit organizations, think tanks, and research institutes around the world. That is perhaps why this publication could encapsulate so many important findings in diverse branches of social science such as geoeconomics, geopolitics, security studies, and humanitarian perspectives. This allows us to delve into the roots of state competition and cooperation. This publication also addresses critical issues such as human rights, genocide, and wartime sexual violence and treats the Western intervention on behalf of Ukraine as an interesting case study of humanitarian intervention. This publication consists of seventeen chapters, covering a diverse and broad range of regional conflicts of global importance: xx

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Chapter 1, “Envisioning the Sixth Great Debate in International Relations Theory: Ontology in statu nascendi as a Cutting-Edge Tool for Conflict Management,” authored by myself, invites everyone on a journey to significantly improve how we approach contemporary world conflict management strategies. It proposes that IR theory should take a leading role in these efforts. The chapter emphasizes the importance of acknowledging and comprehending the existing five great debates in IR theory to participate in future great IR debates. The chapter suggests reconceptualizing some of the best ideas, concepts, and theories to utilize their full potential. Ontology in statu nascendi serves as a platform connecting existing debates with emerging ones and assumes a role as a friendly hybrid that sets the direction for the upcoming sixth great IR debate. Chapter 2, “The Role of the International Community in Turning Afghanistan into a Failed State and its Impact on International and Regional Security,” authored by Emilia Alaverdov and Zurabi Tchabashvili, delves into the problems related to the regional and global implications of the Afghan conflict. It explores how international and regional rivalry, along with the inaction of the international community, turned Afghanistan into a failed state, posing a threat to international security. Chapter 3, titled “The Role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in the Afghan Crisis,” authored by Muhammad Naveed Akhtar and Faisal Javaid, emphasizes the importance of approaching the Afghan conflict from the perspective of the SCO. The chapter discusses how the SCO, as the world’s largest regional organization, can play an active role in addressing the challenges faced by Afghan society. Chapter 4, “Can the European Union’s Global Gateway Challenge China’s Belt and Road Initiative?”, by Sureyya Yigit, examines China’s technological advances and their relevance to European strategic sovereignty. The chapter explores shifting paradigms and their impact on interdependence, China’s innovation capacity, and how the EU’s Global Gateway can become a rival to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Chapter 5, titled “China’s Belt and Road Initiative: An Instrument for Regional Conflict Mitigation and Global Power Shifts,” by Mohamad Zreik, explores the geopolitical and geoeconomic implications of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The chapter discusses how the BRI has the potential to reshape global power dynamics, alleviate international conflicts, and foster collaboration. This project is depicted as a manifestation of China’s soft power and has the potential to alleviate international conflicts, foster international collaboration, and expedite global transformations. It aims to strengthen international relations, bolster economies, and instill peace in conflict-ridden regions such as the Middle East, Afghanistan, and certain parts of Africa. The author explains in this case that by improving infrastructure, generating new economic prospects, and integrating regions, the Belt and Road Initiative could herald an era of peace. It also hints at the emergence of a multipolar world with China’s increasing influence. Chapter 6, “Decoding the US-NATO Dynamics: A Thorough Analysis of Donald Trump and Joe Biden’s Foreign Policy Approaches,” by Akash Bag, Souvik Roy, and Asif Shah, scrutinizes the shift in power in the US between two administrations. The authors analyze the national role conceptions of Presidents Donald Trump and Joe Biden and how these conceptions affect the relationship between the US and NATO. Chapter 7 “Poland, a Benign but Not a Naïve Power in Its Response to Russia’s War in Ukraine (2022-present): Assertive Pursuit of Enlightened Self-Interest – Forging New Alliances & Strengthening Existing Ones,” authored by myself, is dedicated to exploring the shifts in tradixxi

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tional Prometheist geostrategic choices to more pragmatic ones in Polish foreign policy during Mateusz Morawiecki’s time in office as the prime minister of Poland. The chapter investigates an interesting twist in the bilateral relations between Ukraine and Poland under the Morawiecki Government. It discusses the main reasons that led Morawiecki to drastically change from a very generous response to Russia’s invasion to an openly hostile stance after Zelensky’s UN Speech. The chapter explores the rationale that led Morawiecki to impose an embargo on Ukrainian grain and other agricultural commodities during the summer of 2023. It also deliberates on the post2023 improvement of these relations after the formation of the Tusk government (December 2023-present). This chapter also exemplifies a very important finding suggesting that even if certain disagreements over the scale of the offered assistance arise in the countries that eagerly helped Ukraine since February 2022, those disagreements can be either escalated or appropriately dealt with. The ferocity of Putin’s war against Ukraine failed to discourage Ukraine’s most loyal friends from stepping up their support. Also, paradoxically for Putin, despite all his efforts to turn such a scenario into an undesirable one, Ukraine today is much closer to becoming a full EU and NATO member than ever, as the members of those organizations started to slowly but surely come to terms with the fact that negotiating with Russia yields no positive long-term results, and such moves are perceived in the Kremlin as a sign of weakness. Subsequently, Chapter 8 titled “Russia’s Militaristic Rhetoric, Imperialism, and Expansion: Wars in Georgia and Ukraine,” authored by Liza Amilakhvari and Otar Baghaturia, deconstructs Russia’s dangerous narrative of being a “Sieged Fortress,” persisting despite the contemporary absence of external threats. This narrative justifies expansion as a cultural necessity, compensating for perceived existential threats and unsatisfactory living conditions. While historically rooted, this narrative serves as a psychological justification for expansionist policies. Throughout history, Muscovy has established dominance, notably by subjugating elites. This historical trend of overpowering local authorities is reflected in Russia’s aggressive modern foreign policy. The purpose of the study is to determine the socio-cultural and psycho-social foundations of its modern aggressive expansionist foreign policy based on the analysis of Russian history, revealing the foreign and domestic reasons for its aggression against Georgia and Ukraine and showing the importance of local actors in global politics through the example of Russia’s war against Georgia and Ukraine. Chapter 9, titled “Neutrality, Engaged, Credible, and Useful,” authored by Heinz Gärtner, delves into how the concept of neutrality has evolved over time, with various definitions emerging since the 19th century. Neutrality was initially associated with non-participation in foreign wars and military conflicts, but after the onset of the Cold War, the focus shifted towards non-participation in military alliances. In the context of “engaged neutrality,” neutral states should also take principled positions. Neutrality does not imply value-neutrality, and in times of conflict, neutral states must condemn serious human rights violations, genocide, and warfare. Engaged neutrality stands in contrast to mere detachment, signifying active involvement whenever feasible and abstention when necessary. This approach can constitute a valuable contribution to mediation and de-escalation during periods of escalating international tensions. This is followed by Chapter 10, dedicated to the “Global Economic Consequences of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine,” by Peterson Ozil. This economist investigates the global economic consequences of the Russia-Ukraine war over the four-month period from December 2021 to March 2022. Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The study uses the Pearson correlation and two-stage least square regression methods to assess the impact of the invasion on the global econ-

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omy. Stock prices plunged on the day of the invasion. The invasion and the COVID-19 pandemic jointly led to a significant increase in the world price of food and crude oil. The rise in the world food price index after the invasion was driven by a significant increase in the price of dairy and oils. The rise in inflation in Russia and Ukraine after the invasion was followed by a rise in inflation in countries that imposed severe sanctions on Russia and in countries that were not involved in the conflict. The next, Chapter 11, is titled “The European Parliament’s Activities in European Union Foreign Policy: Is This the Mediatization of Conflict Management?” Authored by Marta Witkowska and Artur Koldomasov, it suggests that despite the restricted formal role of the European Parliament (EP) in foreign policy decision-making, it tries to and does actively influence conflict management. However, this influence can only be informal and cannot take the form of decisions with binding legal effects. The authors hypothesize that the EP creates a political discourse to mediatize the conflict using goal-framing and agenda-setting in social media. The research material includes posts on the EP’s social media in addition to documents published in its Public Register of Documents. Its aspirations to expand the scope of its powers in EU foreign policy and its participation in managing the analyzed conflict through mediatization are especially evident in social media communication targeted to citizens, which is related to its rhetorical diplomacy. Subsequently, Chapter 12, titled “X-Raying Digital Activism in Selected Countries: New Frontiers for Mobilization,” by Collence Chisita, Alexander Rusero, Vusi Tsabedze, and Amahle Khumalo, approaches the new phenomenon of digital activism that has taken the world by storm as silent voices manipulate the opportunities provided by social networking sites to organize protests by engaging their audiences using a panoply of digital technologies. The efficacy of such novel engagement as part of social movements has become common worldwide, and Africa is no exception. The proliferation of digital media spaces has often made authoritarian resilience costly, but it continues to oil the surveillance economy, data capitalism, and global information manipulation. The article presents case studies reflecting how this phenomenon has engulfed African states. A qualitative research approach analyzes this phenomenon, as it has become deeply rooted in Africa’s drive for social change. The article inquiries about epistemological reasons such platforms have become a threat to the legacy media. Chapter 13, titled “Decolonization and Peacebuilding: The Case of Timor Leste and Kashmir,” authored by Tamanna Shah, suggests that nations that fail to achieve independence during decolonization seek recognition and support from the international community. UN peacebuilding activities significantly influence conflicts over statehood and self-determination. This chapter examines UN peacebuilding and conflict resolution through the successful independence of Timor Leste and the ongoing conflict in Kashmir since decolonization. Subsequently, it also argues that the patterns of decolonization are critical in explaining initial UN positions, which then shape future peacebuilding operations. Decolonial designs determine the primacy of either territorial integrity or the right to self-determination. In Kashmir, partition made the new territorial boundaries geopolitically significant, which had to be maintained for international peace and security. Annexation made the right to self-determination more salient in generating support for independence since the UN understood the right within the context of decolonization rather than geopolitics. Chapter 14, titled “Relocation of the Rohingya Refugees to Bhasan Char – Human Rights, Government Policy and the Refugee Crisis in Bangladesh,” authored by M. Mahruf C. Shohel, SM Rashedujjaman, and Tahmina Akter, explores the government policy of relocating the Rohingya xxiii

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refugees from Cox’s Bazar to Bhasan Char from the perspectives of human rights and refugee rights. Drawing from existing literature and diverse discourses, it delves into the complexities surrounding this issue. The transferring of some Rohingya refugees to Bhasan Char by the government of Bangladesh has raised concerns among human rights activists and development workers about potential human rights violations and the safety of these displaced individuals. This chapter aims to critically analyze the issues related to the Rohingya refugee crisis, such as mass political asylum, the policy of non-refoulement, violence against humanity, and the impact of the Bangladeshi government’s decision to relocate the Rohingya refugees on their human rights, in light of the concepts involved in international law. Subsequently, Chapter 15, titled “Thou Shall Not Kill: The Ethics of AI in Contemporary Warfare,” authored by Evangelos Koumparoudis, offers us a brief account of the evolution of AI and robotic technologies with an emphasis on those for military use and the main strategic agendas of various superpowers such as the US, China, and Russia, as well as peripheral powers. It also explores the uses of such technologies in the battlefield. The chapter reveals the ethical dimensions of current military AI technologies. It starts by addressing Mark Coeckelberg’s 2011 paper’s call for a new approach to technoethics. It then explores Neil C. Rowe’s 2022 propositions for the ethical improvement of algorithms. Finally, it examines the notion of electronic personhood, proposed by Avila Negri in 2021, also touching upon the fact that the legal debate tends to face an anthropomorphic fallacy. To conclude, “thou shall not kill,” the highest Levinasian imperative, closes the gap of the anthropomorphic fallacy, so our relationship with killer machines can be viewed as asymmetric, non-anthropomorphic, and non-zoomorphic. This is followed by Chapter 16, titled “The Competition Among Stars: Case Studies of AmericanRussian-Chinese Rivalry in Space Exploration,” authored by Krzysztof Karwowski, explaining that the creation of long-range missile technology in the late 1940s was a milestone where a new domain of activity – Earth orbit and outer space – emerged. These extremely expensive research and development programs were strictly limited to a small club of the most developed and innovative countries, but even almost seven decades after the launch of the first satellite, only a few players could independently participate in the exploration of space. Three of them: the United States, the Russian Federation as the political and technological heir of the Soviet Union, and the People’s Republic of China have mastered all the most important space technology to take full part in both the Cold War and the new space race. The aim of this chapter is to explain and understand the areas of competition between the three superpowers in space, what the most important events where competition management was applied were, and what the consequences of new countries joining the space competition will be this decade. Chapter 17, titled “America’s Squid Game: Why the Korean Conflict is a Prisoner’s Dilemma?”, authored by Iskren Ivanov, suggests that the Korean conflict has been among the most powerful pillars of the balance of power in Northeast Asia. Yet, that balance changed after North Korea launched its nuclear program. The American presence in the region, on the other side, has had considerable implications for South Korea’s national security and its defense capabilities. The purpose of this chapter is two-fold. First, it theorizes the security dilemma between North and South Korea and calculates the probability of nuclear escalation. Second, it explores the effects of North Korea’s nuclear program on the bilateral relations between Washington and Seoul, particularly regarding Pyongyang’s consistent rapprochement with Russia. The most important point of this study is to challenge the notion that South Korea can effectively deter the North without

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achieving nuclear parity with Pyongyang. Finally, the chapter stresses the difference between the Korean Peninsula’s old and new realities. All these chapters are unique in their own way, as each one is written in a specific manner. I am truly humbled and honored by the enthusiasm of all of the scholars who contributed their work to this collection because collaborating with these successful individuals was a highlight of my 2023. Thanks to their dedication to this project, I have learned a great deal about different ways of approaching regional conflicts of global importance. Each scholar works day and night to attain greater clarity, adding a certain X-factor to our methodological investigations. In this respect, I want to share with you what attracted me to this project with IGI Global. Each chapter includes a compulsory methodological section, which makes it extremely fascinating by giving us a glimpse into the analytical minds of these successful academics who can capture something as elusive as an ongoing conflict. Collecting more insights into seventeen different methodologies, different ways of approaching literature review, and different ways of investigating contemporary conflict gives us a unique opportunity to build a truly robust interdisciplinary approach to contemporary conflict. All these methodological developments can open our eyes to an entirely new world of concepts, fascinating ideas, paradigms, and a vast portfolio of extraordinary methods. This, in turn, is essential to allow us to verify and evaluate our process of investigation, collecting data, and verifying data, and our relationship with the ideas that we present. I would like to take this opportunity to extend my sincere gratitude to everyone who contributed to the final version of this publication, either directly or indirectly. Although I am just the editor of this edition, I received a great deal of help along the way from a small army of individuals and institutions, especially Airlangga University in Indonesia, specifically Prof. Vinsensio Dugis and Prof. Emilia Alaverdov from Georgian Technical University, who supported this project from the very beginning. This project would never have materialized without the support of the professionals associated with In Statu Nascendi Think Tank, which is by the people, for the people, and of the people. That is why we hope to attract more leading experts in their respective fields, as we aspire to be the first point of reference. My next thank you is reserved for Matthew Gill for his exceptional support with various proofreading jobs over the last eight years. Thank you for his professionalism, his honest opinions, and most importantly for the breathtaking speed with which he normally responds. I am deeply grateful to all the participants on this journey of discovery: all the authors, contributors, reviewers, and the dedicated and highly supportive team of IGI Global Publishers, who have made this book possible. My special thanks go to Nina Eddinger, Jocelynn Hessler, Melissa Wagner, and all the other people responsible for printing and promoting this publication, who have helped us to reach out to our readers. Thank you for your unyielding support – you have been great. Finally, thank you for purchasing this edition. I hope that you enjoy it! Piotr Pietrzak Sofia University, Bulgaria

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Chapter 1

The Sixth Great Debate in International Relations Theory Revolves Around Clarity:

Ontology in Statu Nascendi as a CuttingEdge Tool for Conflict Management Piotr Pietrzak https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0464-1991 Airlangga University, Indonesia

ABSTRACT As we anticipate the emergence of the sixth great debate in IR theory, ontology in statu nascendi stands ready to guide IR theorists in addressing pressing issues such as new technologies, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, pandemics, and the evolving nature of conflicts. Its relevance extends to the forefront of contemporary concerns, including autonomous weapons systems, asymmetric warfare, climate change, and societal inequalities. Ontology in statu nascendi has evolved into a mature framework, uniquely structured to navigate the complexities of our dynamic global landscape. Its integration signifies a pivotal step in the advancement of international relations (IR) theory, offering a robust foundation for collaboration to address the challenges of the 21st century.

INTRODUCTION This chapter argues that International Relations (IR) theory must revamp its methodology to increase accessibility for everyone, regardless of their background. While our discipline wasn’t explicitly designed for resolving international conflicts, the development and application of IR theories have profound implications for both the sub-disciplines of conflict management and, if it still exists, conflict resolution, as the new rule of thumb suggests that managing international conflicts is good enough (Byman, 2022). Still, the inseparable link between theory and practice remains evident, with policymakers, diplomats, DOI: 10.4018/978-1-6684-9467-7.ch001

Copyright © 2024, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

 The Sixth Debate in International Relations Theory Revolves Around Clarity

and various field practitioners relying on our theoretical approaches and paradigms. Over the past 105 years since the inception of our discipline in 1919 at the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, five great theories have been instrumental in shaping responses to conflicts. Consequently, we should anticipate that the field of conflict management will witness debates that are as impactful as those ongoing within IR theory. Moreover, IR theory is undeniably influenced and enriched by the surging interest in metaontology—a self-reflexive approach and critical examination of the ontological foundations that underpin various theoretical approaches within our tradition (Berto & Plebani, 2015, pp. 2-3). As of December 2023, the emergence of the seventh, eighth, or ninth great debates in international relations is still ahead of us. However, this study projects that the introduction of ontology in statu nascendi, the new compartmentalization of IR theory, can trigger the sixth great debate. Several theoretical and practical reasons support this claim. Firstly, despite collective efforts to prevent war from recurring, we repeatedly find ourselves in a situation where the global architecture of power exhibits a genuinely anarchic structure. In this structure, international actors, such as the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, appointed to protect global peace and security, tend to behave like uncontrollable bullies, projecting their hard power and engaging in hybrid warfare at all costs to achieve their political goals and objectives. Under such circumstances, our theory, which overlays static, positivist, and predefined mega-compartmentalization, fails to describe or adequately predict such anomalies. It also struggles to define the potential consequences of the absence of a global authority capable of resolving contemporary regional conflicts of global importance. In the end, we inhabit an increasingly interdependent world where events in one region can trigger reactions in distant zones. Under such conditions, conflicts in Ukraine, Ethiopia, Nagorno Karabakh, and the Middle East have the potential to escalate tensions in the South China Sea, prompting more assertive postures by China towards Taiwan and other countries in the region, such as Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines (Pietrzak, 2024b). This may drive countries like France to actively maintain assertive postures towards African states striving to liberate themselves from still-existing French imperialism (Sylla & Pigeaud & Dite, 2021), and, paradoxically, accidentally fall into the orbit of the Kremlin (Ramdani, 2023). Naturally, this is just one layer of the current debate; other aspects under consideration relate to the way our discipline responds to the profound impact of new technologies, artificial intelligence (AI), and challenges in cybersecurity. The debate touches on critical topics such as the rapid development of autonomous weapons systems, potential post-COVID-19 pandemics, challenges related to climate change, deforestation, water shortages, environmental degradation, increasing inequality, the militarization of space, insecurity, the rise of non-state actors, asymmetric warfare, and matters related to evolving conflict dynamics, including the utilization of hybrid tactics. Therefore, we need to have a clear and reliable methodology applicable under every circumstance. In this context, ontology in statu nascendi is put forward as a study that can help supplement existing IR theory with tools that can help bridge the division between the main conceptual, methodological, and analytical differences among a collection of rival paradigms, approaches, theories, traditions, and schools of thought. The primary goal of this new ontology is to address modern conflicts of regional and global importance by reinforcing empirical bridges of mutual understanding between our sub-disciplines and multiplying approaches, providing essential tools to attain this objective. This new compartmentalization aims to embrace a more inclusive, systematic, interdisciplinary, and contemplative mode of IR-related deliberations concerning those existing and emerging new paradigms, approaches, theories, and schools of thought (Pietrzak, 2021a, p. 64-66, 147, 179, 223).

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 The Sixth Debate in International Relations Theory Revolves Around Clarity

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY This chapter advocates for embarking on a captivating journey that promises a more sophisticated application of ontological diversity within our discipline and a new way of compartmentalizing the existing theory to prepare for a crucial debate that will transform our discipline. This project is dedicated to everyone interested in broadening their explanatory horizons and challenging their preconceived notions of truth in the realm of international relations. This study draws on diverse theoretical foundations, methodologies, and interdisciplinary fields, including international relations theory, international law, geopolitics, conflict resolution, and political philosophy. Its objective is to present a clear and unbiased analytical language, adopting a contemplative and adaptable investigative approach for the ever-changing dynamics of modern conflict zones. The study heavily relies on systematic data collection and analysis, ensuring credibility through verifiable sources. The findings are rigorously tested, linking the debate to discussions on the international community’s responsibility in restoring peace and security to significant local and regional conflict zones (Pietrzak, 2021a, p. 43-76, Pietrzak, 2021b, p 101-154).

LITERATURE REVIEW: WHY DO WE THINK IF THINKING BRINGS US TO THE WRONG CONCLUSIONS? As a collective humanity, we persist in allowing the initiation of wars, despite their inherent immorality. With fewer exceptions, the international community struggles not only to prevent wars but also to encourage the parties involved in hostilities to adhere to jus in bello principles (justice in war). Moreover, once the war concludes, we fail to motivate the parties to rectify the damages or restore normality to the affected side in accordance with jus post bellum principles. The primary objective of this chapter is to invigorate and actualize ideas and concepts, challenging entrenched dogmas. To embark on this profound journey, we must dig deeper into questions already posed Roy Bhaskar, Alexander Wendt, Anthony Giddens, and Jacques Derrida, representing diverse philosophical perspectives strongly interlinked with contemporary IR theory as well as ontology. Roy Bhaskar’s critical realism postulates a far-reaching incorporation of ontology into the human sciences. His project distinguishes between the real world and the observable world. It suggests that for science as a body of knowledge and methodology to work or be intelligible, epistemology and ontology need to be separated, and we must distinguish between the transitive and intransitive bodies of knowledge or dimensions. In this respect Bhaskar’s critical realism posits an independent, objective reality that exists beyond human perceptions. He argues for the existence of a stratified reality with different levels, including the empirical, actual, and real. Bhaskar emphasizes the causal powers and mechanisms that underlie events. He argues that events are not just empirical regularities but manifestations of deeper structures and mechanisms (Bhaskar, 1975, pp. 6-9, Pietrzak, 2021, pp. 147-153). Thanks to Bhaskar, it is easier to differentiate between transitive (that refer to the dimension of the social in the production of knowledge, such as inherited discourses, scientific training, institutions, and so on) and intransitive (that refer to the domain of being that would exist regardless of whether or not humans know of them) bodies of knowledge. (Bryant, 2011). So intransitive choices would be concerned with the reasoning underlying choices behind any given approaches that would indicate the individual being that would be inclined to make categorical choices regarding the specific options for the scholars 3

 The Sixth Debate in International Relations Theory Revolves Around Clarity

would prefer (i.e. an individual scholar would always prefer a liberal approach to a realist approach, prefer a realist approach to a liberal approach, or be indifferent to both and adhere to constructivism). In this respect, transitivity would suggest the situation with less predetermined choices and would imply a far-reaching unpredictability where the individual scholar would weakly prefer the liberal approach to the realist or would weakly prefer realist methodology to liberal methods but would keep an open mind, and the initial preferences would not affect their preferences in similar case scenarios. The added benefit of this type of investigation would be the unknown direction of its investigations. Each scientist would have to do his own cost-benefit analysis using a variety of criteria and approaches to perform self-determined best choices but embracing a far-reaching interdisciplinary mode of analysis that offers a far-reaching benefit in comparison to the complete or partial approach (Baskar, 1979; Pietrzak 2021a, pp. 147-153; Pietrzak, 2023, p. 112-113). This research is a reaction to the earlier work of Alexander Wendt and his constructivism that challenges the objectivity of reality, asserting that reality is socially constructed. Regarding this scholar we need to distinguish between anarchy (a social construct) and hierarchy (which could be constructed differently). Wendt argues that the meanings assigned to material structures shape behavior, and social constructions influence the way actors perceive and interact with the world. From his perspective, “a deeper understanding of the nature of existence can help us to better understand and navigate the complex social world in which we live.” Wendt’s constructivism is one of the most successful IR-related ontologies ever articulated; he proposes that the literature on the subject should adapt to the realities of structuration theory that are a relational solution to the agent-structure problem, conceptualizing agents and structures as mutually constituted or codetermined entities. According to his Social Theory of International Politics (1999), “the way we perceive the world around us shapes the way we interact with it” simply because “the nature of the world is not pre-given or objective, but rather is constructed through social interactions and relationships.” In this sense, the study of the nature of existence or being is an essential aspect of understanding how the world works, for there are many factors that impact the way states interact with each other, starting with material factors such as power or resources and ending with the ideas and beliefs that shape their perceptions of the world. Wendt also reminds us that ontology belongs to metaphysics, which scrutinizes the place and the essence of entities that exist in the broader context of similar and different entities in the universe or any other broader structure, and that is exactly what we should aim for (Wendt, 1987, pp. 335-370; Wendt, 1999). Subsequently, this project is also partly influenced by Anthony Giddens, his structuration theory, and his concept of the duality of structure, which suggests that structure and agency are intertwined and mutually constitutive. According to this scholar, structure refers to the enduring patterns of social relations and institutions while agency represents the capacity of individuals to act within those structures. Giddens asserts that individuals can reproduce and transform social structures through their actions, making structure and agency mutually constitutive and significantly impacting global power dynamics (Giddens 1993, pp. 1-10; Giddens 1979). He also introduces the concept of ontological security, rooted in the idea that individuals seek a stable environment to maintain a coherent sense of self and identity, involving confidence and trust in the world’s continuity. Key elements include routine and repetition, trust in social institutions, temporal continuity, and narrative coherence. Narratives constructed by individuals contribute to ontological security by making sense of experiences and establishing meaningful connections between different aspects of their lives (Giddens, 1991). Grasping this distinction provides us with crucial insight into the root causes of emerging conflicts of regional or even global significance. This understanding has the potential to empower us to prevent unwarranted escalations, given that the 4

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interplay between structure and agency, shaping various facets of social life, can exert a profound influence on multiple layers of regional or global security. Finally, and most importantly, this research is profoundly influenced by the philosophy of Jacques Derrida, whose work demonstrates a complex and critical engagement with various philosophical traditions, including phenomenology, existentialism, and post-structuralism. While there is no direct indication that Derrida aimed to reform IR theory, his major works, such as Of Grammatology (1967) and Writing and Difference (1967), are well known for their critical exploration of language, metaphysics, and the notion of undecidability. In the broader context of Western philosophy, these works could significantly contribute to this endeavor. Utilizing those insights becomes particularly advantageous due to his foundational belief that opposes the idea of fixed, stable meanings that can be definitively grasped. Derrida rejection of binary oppositions, absolute moral categories, and the certainty associated with more static conceptual frameworks opens our discussion to constant reinterpretation and rearticulation. Throughout his career, Derrida critically evaluated the fluidity and indeterminacy of language and concepts, challenging the notion of stable, singular meaning. He was concerned with the nature of language and argued that it should be seen as a flexible tool subjected to open-ended interpretation (Derrida, 2013; Derrida, 2021; Banerjee, 2021, pp. 105-120). Derrida’s work highlights the play of differences in language and the impossibility of reaching a fixed, determinate meaning. In essence, Derrida sought to destabilize binary oppositions and hierarchies by demonstrating how terms in a pair rely on each other, leading to a continuous play of differences. He viewed oppositions as inherently unstable, fostering endless interplay and reconfigurations. It is crucial to note that Derrida incorporated the concept of plasticity into his deconstructive project, closely associated with his approach to language, meaning, and interpretation. Plasticity implies that texts are pliable, allowing for multiple and potentially contradictory interpretations. Derrida’s concept of différance is also linked to plasticity, involving the twin ideas of deferral (postponing meaning) and difference (the play of distinctions between terms). Postponing meaning suggests that full understanding is deferred and may require further consideration or contextual information. While Derrida did not systematically examine international conflict or its ontological dimension, his work raises questions about language, ethics, and politics surrounding conflict and the concept of just war theory. Through his critiques of political philosophy and the nature of violence, one can surmise that his approach involves challenging the stability of concepts such as justice and war since meanings are context-dependent and subject to interpretation.

THE NATURE OF THE CONTROVERSY To succeed in our endeavors, we need to clearly define the rules of engagement between various IR schools of thought, such as realism, liberalism, constructivism, Marxism, feminism, postcolonialism, poststructuralism, and the English school, for they all appear to be engaged in a self-inflicted war between all of those ‘isms that causes great uncertainty rather than confidence. Mitigating the negative aspects of this situation could surely be seen as a step in the right direction, as clarity for all is the paramount means to accomplish this goal. The various approaches of IR theory could be compared to the largely fragmented Italian peninsula of the early Renaissance where each principality and city-state was engaged in a bellum omnium contra omnes (war of everyone against everyone).

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In contemplating the evolution of contemporary IR theory, one might posit a distinct principality dedicated to realism, spearheaded by luminaries such as Machiavelli, Hobbes, and modern scholars including Morgenthau, Waltz, Mearsheimer, Kissinger, and Brzezinski. This intellectual enclave perceives politics as a realm of brutal power dynamics, where stronger states wield authority over the weaker, asserting that the global power structure is inherently anarchic and unpredictable. Following our journey will ultimately lead us to the principality of liberalism. Here, proponents such as Kant, Locke, Mill, Grotius, Keohane, and Nye challenge realism and advocate for global governance. They argue that the global power structure is increasingly interdependent, encompassing not only states but also international organizations driven by cooperation and mutually beneficial initiatives. Further on, the principality of the English school of IR emerges as a potential alternative, with scholars such as Bull, Wight, and Buzan offering a middle ground between realism’s power politics and the idealism of liberalism, despite the prevailing anarchic environment. Though criticized in the postcolonial palatinate, this school navigates biases and challenges miscomprehensions rooted in Western scholarship. Subsequently, our journey presses on to the duchy of feminism, governed by Enloe, Mohanty, and Robinson, fostering a dedicated group of feminists addressing the plight of women and children in conflicts and humanitarian emergencies. While feminist scholars may differ in their paths in this discipline, they collectively advocate for substantial improvements in the portrayal of women’s roles in society in IR approaches. The next step on our journey is the so-called house of neo-Marxism, often linked to Karl Marx’s philosophy. Still more contemporary Marxist IR scholars prefer to associate themselves with Wallerstein or Harvey and would show a far-reaching reluctance to uncritically follow Marxism associated with Antonio Gramsci, the Frankfurt School, or some other more dysfunctional Lennisist or Stalinist interpretations of Marxism that failed to liberate the people from various regimes. Our next stop is the principality of constructivism, where we can learn from James Fearon and Alexander Wendt about the structure-agency debate that offers the potential to translate it into totally different patterns of interaction, for it never takes anything about the world for granted; it takes pride in challenging the rationalist, positivist, and static foundation of the global environment and fights against any presupposed assumptions about the given state of affairs. Indeed, constructivism is proud to present a vast portfolio of techniques and methods that portray both realism and liberalism as far too state-centric, static, and positivist. According to constructivist scholars, classical IR approaches are slowly but surely becoming the slaves of their single-dimensional methodologies that lead them astray and a schematic, binary way of approaching social reality that frames world politics in presupposed constructions of good and bad, moral and immoral, decent and wicked, etc. This principality is heavily intertwined with that of rationalism, the next on our journey, which offers an approachable tool for capturing situations from an unconstrained perspective. Challenging the static foundation of the global environment, both rationalism and constructivism introduce a variety of techniques and methods that question the state-centric views of realism and liberalism. Concluding this intellectual journey, we reach the forbidden gardens of post-structuralism, where thinkers like Foucault, Derrida, Baudrillard, Bourdieu, and Wittgenstein have profoundly shaped IR theory. As we step into this intellectual haven, we brace ourselves for the most stimulating conceptual work, recognizing the lasting impact of these philosophical trailblazers on the field. Still, even if we disagree about anything else, we need to admit that IR theory is inherently anthropocentric, placing humans at the center of the universe and positioning us as pivotal entities with intrinsic value. This means that as humans, the architects of IR theory, we can change it, for IR theory was not preordained but elaborated by many human intellects. Still, we need to recognize that considering all the schools and traditions within IR theory is also quite time-consuming and may resemble Homer’s 6

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Odyssey, where the protagonist, Odysseus, faces retribution and unpredictable challenges. Like Odysseus navigating treacherous waters, IR theorists strive to unravel our discipline. While it remains unclear if IR theorists have offended ancient gods, on our journey, it appears that the gods have made us forget our ontological destination. Lack of consistency impedes progress as scholars succumb to the charm of realists, liberalists, Marxists, and other Sirens, leading to intellectual entrapment and methodological simplicity. Identifying with specific IR branches leads to bias, hindering the pursuit of academic clarity and truth. The maxim attributed to Aristotle (as a paraphrase of the Nicomachean Ethics 1096 11–15) “Amicus Plato, sed magis amica veritas” (Plato is my friend, but truth is a better friend) underscores the importance of prioritizing truth over comfort and challenging prevailing assumptions in the pursuit of knowledge, for since any potential issues within the theory are of human origin, they must be solvable by humans themselves (Pietrzak, 2021; Aristotle, 1984). An ontologist in such settings is a seeker of truth by default, for he or she can never settle for the more straightforward or approachable answers that only touch the surface of the problem. He or she is always inclined to be excited to dig deeper to uncover the hidden truth about any given phenomenon with clarity, integrity, and an open-minded attitude. Ontology deals with questions concerning what entities exist or can be said to exist, and how such entities can be grouped, related within a hierarchy, and subdivided according to similarities and differences (McCarthy, 2018, pp. 76-77; Griswold, 2001, pp. 233-239). IR theory is treated in this publication from a holistic perspective, not as a collection of some random approaches but as a sum of all its parts, a highly sophisticated, holistic megastructure, a highly hybridized scientific ontology, and an increasingly non-positivist yet robust compartmentalization of various approaches, studies, methods, and theories. It should be supplemented with carefully selected para-philosophical approaches, paradigms, and ontologies that assign extraordinary transformative importance to various self-reflexive evolutionary and revolutionary reformulations, keen for better compartmentalization. The primary objective of this chapter is to assist in making it even clearer, more approachable, and much more reliable for those who require it the most, for the accessibility of cohesion within our tradition proves challenging not only for scholars engaged in conflict management but also for a broader audience. This difficulty becomes particularly pronounced when confronting matters of acute urgency, such as contemporary conflicts characterized by their multidimensional, evolving, and unpredictable nature. Indeed, as Elman and Elman (2003, p. 202) argue, exploring the nature of being and the existence of things can lead us to make universal claims across a wide domain, which is why this project encourages utilizing the tools we have at our disposal. In this respect, I assert that the most effective approach involves wholeheartedly adopting an ontological mindset to directly confront these challenges. By integrating ontology in statu nascendi within the broader context of the great IR debates, we can discern their relevance to various conflict resolution mechanisms developed in recent decades. Moreover, I contend that, from the standpoint of these debates, refuting the intrinsic interconnectedness of IR theory and philosophy is counterproductive. It is in the best interest of IR theorists to strengthen and broaden this link, fostering a more robust, reliable, and inclusive connection that creates a more robust interdisciplinary link between paradigms, approaches, theories, and schools of thought to revitalize the pursuit of truth in IR, facilitating access to traditionally uncharted and neglected scientific territories (Albertini & Pietrzak, 2020, pp. 3-18).

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WHAT IS ONTOLOGY IN STATU NASCENDI? Ontology in statu nascendi accounts for new largely hybridized compartmentalization of IR theory that recognizes its inherent fluidity as a project that was never meant to be finalized. It is a perpetual and exciting journey that aims to always find a better way of providing more adequate frameworks for understanding, explaining, and predicting interactions among states, international organizations, and non-state actors within the broader matrix of an international system that can be, human-based,artificial, state-centric and organizational (Pietrzak 2021a). Ontology in statu nascendi hopes to serve several supplementary roles and supportive evolutionary functions for each IR approach that ultimately arranges some of the biggest chunks of IR theory in a far more approachable manner than ever before, by focusing our attention on the analysis of social structures and interactions within them, both preexistent and emerging-imaginary ones. Ontology in statu nascendi suggests that IR theory should not be used as a catalog for the cherry-picking of the most popular ideas, theories, paradigms, and approaches but rather should be used in a much more comprehensive, holistic, and contemplative manner that includes the element of constant change in the circular stream of becoming. It embraces the spirit of interdisciplinary collaboration, truth, and respect. It is open to embracing a new horizon of investigation. It shows our passion for academic excellence, knowledge, wisdom, and humanity. It recognizes that nothing happens without a reason, suggests that quality should be prioritized over quantity, and aims to apply this new rigor of thinking in different spheres of our social life. Still, it will not carry water or make excuses for those who cannot rise above their biases, prejudices, and misconstrued rationality. There is enough room here for those who hope to combine, synthesize, encapsulate, create a new paradigm, and test old dogmas and theories, and those who procrastinate and hesitate to embrace the Bhaskarian critical realism (Bhaskar 1978) that can change the trajectory of our research by emphasizing causal mechanisms within structures that underlie developments. We should also not be afraid to incorporate Giddensian ontological security or his idea of the duality of structure, or also broader sociological theory into our approach. In this respect, we surely can try to employ Wendt’s work to formulate a more constructive relational solution to the agent-structure problem in the world of politics, which is constructed through social interactions and relationships. Finally, we shouldn’t hesitate to use Derridean plasticity or his deconstructive powers to destabilize binary oppositions of pre-given structures and agency in a more existential manner, for we increasingly deal with various elusive and new post-positivist perspectives. Ontology in statu nascendi excels in conflict management by fostering interdisciplinary discourse and a pursuit of clarity. When genuinely applied, it has the potential to transform awareness by acknowledging various dichotomies and differences while also focusing on similarities and patterns. To achieve this, proponents advocate for respectful engagement with other IR scholars, fostering a more flexible theoretical foundation. This approach facilitates the formulation of precise and relevant questions, enabling scholars to examine ideas, concepts, processes, and patterns with multiple simultaneous approaches. It hopes to become a platform for a new type of dialogue about the IR theory of the future, which will always seek clarity and hope to ascertain the causes of things, test drive all theories, approach all paradigms to distinguish good from bad ones, and acknowledge the main limitations of our discipline. This research recognizes that science creation is an evolutionary process and should recognize the limitations of time-space, location, background, kinds, modes, and attributes of any scientific and philosophical ontology or concept. 8

 The Sixth Debate in International Relations Theory Revolves Around Clarity

ONTOLOGY IN STATU NASCENDI AS A MATURE CANDIDATE FOR A NEW ONTOLOGY Naturally, the ontology in statu nascendi hopes to evolve into a more mature ontology that clearly exhibits unique and properly defined characteristics (Pietrzak, 2023a; Pinto & Mamede, 2003). It can help scholars deal more effectively with multidimensional structures, fluid environments, and ongoing events that exhibit the characteristics of an ever-changing environment. On a conceptual level, during investigation, the use of ontology in statu nascendi should help researchers deal with various unexpected limitations, shortcomings, and concepts in a nascent or still vague, not adequately defined stage of becoming. We could postulate that the acquisition of this or any similar ontology will be a sign of maturity in the development of IR theory, for we need a slightly better framework of cooperation to move our discipline forward and equip it to meet the challenges of the 21st century global environment. But this is a relatively passive way of doing things. To achieve the desired effect, one should investigate the process of building a new ontology from the perspective of its inevitable integration into IR theory (Pietrzak, 2021). In this respect, H. Sofia Pinto and Nuno J. Mamede (2003) highlight the intricate nature of ontology merging and integration, emphasizing the pivotal roles of operations like inclusion, polymorphic refinement, and restriction (specialization). They assert that, despite ongoing efforts, “ontology building is still more of an art than an engineering task,” and the absence of a widely accepted methodology for creating ontologies from scratch persists. The general suggestion is that it is pragmatic and cost-effective to reuse ontologies if they have proven effective in the past. According to Pinto, it is common practice to reuse parts of older ontologies to build new ones. This process involves navigating intricate subprocesses, including knowledge acquisition, requirement specification using natural language techniques, reverse engineering, knowledge representation translation, and technical evaluation (Pinto, 1999, pp. 67-73). In this regard, this suggestion aligns seamlessly with the ethos of ontology in statu nascendi, urging us to scrutinize assumptions and apprehend frequently neglected facets of our intricate global environment. While full collaboration between traditionally distinct schools of thought may seem improbable, it is still essential to work towards improving the means of interdepartmental communication within our discipline to ultimately strengthen our tradition. In essence, maturing ontology in statu nascendi involves evolving into a dialogue-based ontology that hopes to address global conflicts with flexibility while striving for a comprehensive understanding among diverse parties to encourage everyone to seek clarity, objectivity, and restraint from simplistic explanations, contributing to a hospitable global environment for all. As a follower of Józef Tischner’s philosophy of dialogue that emphasizes the importance of interpersonal dialogue as a fundamental aspect of human existence, I also argue that the best way to solve these problems is to discuss them with with every IR approach or scholar who is ready to take part in this discussion (Karoń-Ostrowska, 2017; Manikowski, 2021, pp. 7-28, Pietrzak, 2022c, pp. 3-4; Tischner 1999). In this respect, Skorulski asserts that dialogue philosophers like Ferdinand Ebner and Józef Tischner prioritize reaching dialogue over the dialogue itself. They perceive dialogue as a targeted situation inevitably accompanied by challenges. In today’s context, proposing dialogue might even seem naive, as there’s no specific action guaranteeing a dialogue situation due to the uncontrollable intentions of the other party. Retaining an element of freedom, grace, and hope may lead to dialogue based on mutual respect or the lack of it, an “interplay between avoiding drama (in this sense the drama of particular isms could be avoided for the benefit of our entire traditions) and prioritizing the journey to dialogue” (Skorulski, 2018, p. 165-179). 9

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In this respect, I assert that in order to fully evolve into a mature ontology supplementing conflicting IR traditions, the research area must embrace and apply an ontology in statu nascendi in theoretical and practical settings that involves testing with various empirical methods. Using existing literature as a reference and gaining acceptance from scholars are crucial steps. This project aims to expand preexisting ontological debates in IR theory, relating them more effectively to contemporary debates and reinforcing their relevance in the present day within the broader context of the five great IR debates (Pietrzak, 2023a, pp. 134-142). The best way to realize this potential is to dedicate our efforts to constant evolution and self-perfection, seeking wisdom by evolving into a dialogue-centric ontology, addressing regional problems of global importance with ontological curiosity.

THE FIRST GREAT DEBATE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS The first debate significantly impacted the development of IR as an academic discipline. It helped shape many key debates and themes that continue to influence our perception of social reality. In the United States, it is portrayed as a starting point for the discipline of IR. It is understood as a series of debates between realist and traditional scholars (such as Hans Morgenthau, E. H. Carr, and Reinhold Niebuhr) and idealist scholars (such as Norman Angell and Edward H. Carrington, as well as Woodrow Wilson and others who played a pivotal role in shaping the idealistic perspective) (Carr 1939, pp. 12-34; Knock 1992, p. 239; Morgenthau, 1952, pp. 961-988). This debate began at the end of the 1920s, persisted throughout the 1930s and 1940s, and, in a way, is still relevant today. On one side of the debate were the idealists who believed that the new era of increased economic interdependence would make states more rational international actors and war very unlikely. The benefits of this state of affairs would be evenly spread and universally beneficial, inevitably leading to lasting global peace and security. The idealists asserted that the international architecture of power could be transformed through the creation of institutions like the League of Nations, which would protect international law, institutions, and norms. They emphasized the possibility of a more substantial role for international institutions and actors capable of strict obedience to international law and norms. They suggested that states be seen as rational actors that can benefit more from economic cooperation and collective action than military conquest. Therefore, it is only natural that they would not resort to war and instead choose diplomatic and cooperative approaches. On the other side of the debate were the realists, who were very skeptical about the strength and applicability of international law and international institutions, which, from their perspective, could not prevent rogue nations from behaving like uncontrollable power maximizers, for there was no one who could act as a global policeman to effectively enforce acceptable behavior of nation-states. From their perspective, states were the only important actors in the international system, for they had to cope with the anarchical nature of international politics that forced all political actors to be national interest-driven maximizers who first and foremost had to secure political survival. That is why they had to engage only in the initiatives that would guarantee the expansion or preservation of their power at the expense of other political players, for, from their perspective, the only way to ensure stability and peace was through the skillful balance of power and of threat. After the Second World War, the realists seemed to win this debate, for many idealists’ ideas were perceived as somewhat naïve. Subsequently, this debate shifted

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towards exploring the reasons for the marginalization of liberal and normative thinking in international relations (Benneyworth, 2011; Bull 1981; p. 188-199). In this respect, we need to admit that the debate between idealists and realists in international relations clearly informs contemporary discussions on conflict management by offering diverse perspectives on the role of international cooperation, the behavior of state actors, the dynamics of power, and the evolution of ideas within the field of international relations. Revisiting these ideas can contribute to conflict management by exploring alternative frameworks and approaches that prioritize values, ethics, and human rights.

THE SECOND GREAT DEBATE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS The second great debate was truly exceptional, marking a significant shift toward greater methodological diversity within the field. It shook the very foundation of our discipline, given that it focused on determining appropriate methods and theories for studying international relations. In the initial phase of these academic deliberations, behavioralist scholars, such as Joseph S. Nye and Robert Keohane, advocated a scientific, empirical approach, emphasizing more diversified means of data collection and analysis for scientific verifiability. They aimed to challenge the dominance of traditional and historical methods. Scholars associated with traditionalist-classical approaches, such as Hans J. Morgenthau and, initially, Kenneth N. Waltz, defended more traditional historical approaches (Waltz, 1979). This debate, initiated in the late 1960s and early 1970s, prompted scholars to reconsider how we approach states in the anarchic architecture of power, rethink the sources of states’ power, and embrace sociological superstructures to explain actions within the structure of global interactions. These interactions compel assertive actions for survival while encouraging mutual and bilateral cooperation. Behaviorists not only persevered but successfully persuaded Kenneth Waltz, initially aligned with the traditionalist or classical realist camp, to undergo a significant shift and align himself with the behaviorist camp. This transformation had a profound impact on our discipline, liberating realism from the constraints of Machiavellian consequentialism and Morgenthauian human nature (Kaplan 1966, pp. 379-393). It played a decisive role in shaping the landscape of international relations, making a substantial contribution to methodological diversity within the field. In his influential work Theory of International Politics (1979), Waltz assertively articulated the key tenets of neorealism. He emphasized the dynamic nature of the distribution of power among states within the global structure, no longer static but responsive to diverse signals from both nearby and distant environments, thereby influencing everyone’s behavior. Another notable outcome was that it pushed Joseph S. Nye and Robert Keohane into deeper collaboration, resulting in the influential book Power and Interdependence (1977), where they presented a convincing case for embracing the concept of complex interdependence, which reformulated our understanding of power in international relations. This led to the emergence of the neoliberal institutionalist approach, which stressed the significance of international institutions in managing and mitigating conflicts among states. These developments have had a tangible impact on the way we approach conflict resolution and management. The integration of scientific methodologies contributes to a more effective understanding and handling of international conflicts, fostering alternative scientific inquiry, the reevaluation of statecentric perspectives, the incorporation of sociological considerations, and the pursuit of objective norms.

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THE THIRD GREAT DEBATE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS The third great debate in IR unfolded in the 1980s, marked by the clash between neorealism and neoliberalism. It involved prominent figures such as Keohane, Nye, Mearsheimer, Wendt, and Ruggie engaging in discussions on state sovereignty, international institutions, and the impact of ideas on global politics. While recognizing the anarchic nature of the international system, the debate expanded to incorporate various non-classical approaches, such as IR Marxism, which enriched the discourse with heterodox observations. This inclusivity led to a more nuanced understanding of global politics that considered multiple factors and perspectives. The debate’s contributions extended to policy recommendations, the integration of various theoretical perspectives, and advances in conflict management. Neorealists prioritize survival and power, contrasting with neoliberalists, who stress economic welfare and civil issues. Analyzing modern conflicts through this debate provides valuable insights, unraveling hidden perspectives and elucidating the dynamics of conflict and cooperation in the anarchic international system. This inclusiveness also led to conflict between positivist and non-positivist approaches, resulting in the launch of the fourth debate in IR theory. Interestingly, the third debate also marked the ascent of John Mearsheimer (Mearsheimer, 1990), who later established his own strand of realism known as offensive realism due to his claims about the epiphenomenal nature of institutions. However, these assertions faced robust challenges from scholars such as Schweller and Priess (1997), who argued that recent developments in the study of international institutions in the 1980s offered an opportunity to reassess the traditional realist perspective. They pointed out that, surprisingly, Mearsheimer’s extreme stance was incompatible with traditional realist concerns about the origins and influence of international institutions, yet it was deeply rooted in Waltzian neorealism. Additionally, they noted the disparities between Mearsheimer’s position and the insights of modified structural realists influenced by neoliberal institutionalism. Subsequently, these observations led them to highlight valuable insights of pre-Waltzian realists and their impact on the way we perceive institutions in an interesting interplay within the neorealist-neoliberal debate, allowing for the distinction between various characteristics and properties shared by those approaches. These endeavors further encouraged other scholars, such as Grieco, to follow suit (Grieco, 2009), leading our discipline to redefine the global structure of the international system of power, reinterpret global order, and more accurately evaluate the actual level of global institutionalization. (Schweller, 1997, pp. 1-32; Grieco, 2009, pp. 118–19.

THE FOURTH GREAT DEBATE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS The emergence of the fourth great debate in the early 2000s centers around a profound philosophical discussion between positivism and post-positivism (also known as reflectivism). Robert Keohane (1988, p. 392) instigated this debate with his provocative assertion that “the greatest weakness of the reflective school of international relations lies not in deficiencies in their critical arguments but in the lack of a clear reflective program that could be employed by students of world politics.” Expanding on this argument, Cagla Luleci-Sula and Ismail Erkam Sula (2016, p. 45), drawing from Kurki and Wight (2013, p. 24), suggested that, from Keohane’s perspective,” reflective scholarship encompasses Critical Theory, constructivism, post-structuralism, post-modernism, and feminism.” These approaches inherently embody reflectivism through their outright rejection of positivism and rationalism. Despite their shared commitment to challenging the positivist and rationalist understanding of IR, they 12

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resist easy categorization due to significant differences in their empirical focus. If we delve deeper into the reflectivist-post-positivist debate, we can uncover the richness these approaches bring even though their primary contention with positivism centers around the process of knowledge creation. Within this framework, those who accept theory and science as given are labeled positivists while post-positivists, with their rebellious spirit, question everything about the world. In essence, the positivist era was characterized as relatively static, marked by clearly defined domesticforeign policy distinctions and disciplinary boundaries, allowing knowledge to be taken for granted. However, this scenario has undergone a significant shift, as post-positivism (reflectivism) emerged to critique the unwavering trust in knowledge during the positivist period. The post-positivist era is identified by its efforts to dissolve borders between concepts, fostering increased transmittance and fluidity across various ideas and boundaries (Luleci & Sula, 2016, pp. 44-53). There is another way of approaching this debate from the perspective of critical realism. However, in this respect, it is good to clarify that post-positivism is highly diversified; there is a massive difference between Foucauldian biopolitics and the post-positivist settings that underpin the constructivist approaches in Gramscian post-hegemony (Emerson, 2013) and the post-positivism related to the Bordieuan nation of labeling and habitat (Claussen & Osborne, 2012, pp. 58-79). In this respect, post-structuralists may seem quite complicated because they have dedicated great effort to knowledge-creation. Regarding the Foucauldian IR post-positivist settings, knowledge is under control of power, and the primary goal of critical theory is to reveal the relationship between knowledge and power to demolish status quo explanations and liberate the people. We can also focus in this instance on the debate between Roy Bhaskar and Alexander Wendt. Bhaskar suggests critical realism triggered a strong demand for incorporating ontology in the human sciences. This ontology is essential within a particular structure. His critical realism in the philosophical approach to understanding science and social science is vital because it opposes traditional empiricism and positivism by viewing science as concerned with identifying causal mechanisms. He presents the idea that all learning comes only from experience and observations from a localized perspective; there is a difference between transitive and inter-transitive bodies of knowledge (Bhaskar 1979; Wendt 1999). In such a setting, one’s choices are consistent with a preference for IR theories. You will always apply realism if you are liberal. You will always use liberal theories to describe the social reality at hand. Or, if you are a feminist scholar, you will suggest that theory has the responsibility to bring more female voices to the IR debates. This means that when it comes to approaching an issue, you can sometimes be realist, sometimes liberal, sometimes feminist, and you can mix and match, so such an option would be concerned with the reasoning of underlying choices behind any given approaches that would indicate the individual being that would be inclined to make definite choices of preferred specific options. Another interpretation of the fourth debate suggests that it is centered on responding to global terrorism and the threat of weapons of mass destruction. On one side of the debate are the neoconservatives, such as Bremer, Cheney, Horowitz, Kagan, Pipes, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz, who argue that the United States should take a more aggressive approach to dealing with these threats, including using military force to remove rogue regimes and terrorist groups. Neoconservatives believe that military power is necessary to protect national security and spread democracy and freedom around the world (Mahabir, 2018). On the other side of the debate are the liberals and constructivists, who argue that the use of military force should be a last resort and that greater emphasis should be placed on diplomacy, cooperation, and the development of international institutions and norms. Liberals, such as Biden, Kerry, and Clinton, and constructivists, such as Wendt and Finnemore, believe that using force can often be counterproductive 13

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and that greater attention should be paid to addressing the root causes of terrorism, such as poverty, inequality, and political repression. The fourth great debate is particularly valuable from the perspective of global security, and global governance for it sparks fresh inquiries into the interplay of military power, diplomacy, and human rights promotion. Beyond its exploration of positivism and post-positivism, this debate is pivotal for conflict management. Its dynamic post-debate considerations equip us to engage in complex discussions on global terrorism and the potential threats posed by weapons of mass destruction. By emphasizing diverse knowledge creation and flexible theoretical choices, it empowers policymakers and practitioners from all backgrounds to adopt a holistic and dynamic approach to comprehend and address conflicts in today’s global landscape.

THE FIFTH GREAT DEBATE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS The notion of the fifth debate in International Relations is still largely underdefined in the literature on the subject, but it is undoubtedly taking place as we speak. Its main initiator, Emilian Kavalski, not only clearly disagrees with Lake (2013, but pp. Also 567-587), who claims that traditional great debates in IR have lost relevance, giving way to a more eclectic approach, but he also convincingly manages to attract global attention with his take on complexity theory (CT), intended to serve as a powerful dialogic principle that will set this debate in motion (Kavalski, 2007, p. 442). In this respect, Kavalski emphasizes the importance of defining CT as, from his perspective, this concept can help us understand the complexity of the contemporary world of politics, where complexity has become a defining characteristic. From his standpoint, this interdisciplinary field of study provides a valuable framework for understanding the challenges of global governance in a rapidly changing world, and that is why it is important to focus on comprehending complex systems and the emergence of new forms of governance composed of multiple interacting elements exhibiting non-linear and unpredictable behavior (Kavalski, 2007, p. 436). Kavalski is correct in arguing that complex systems are generally defined either objectively or subjectively. From his perspective, objectively, complex systems are identified by the multitude of their components, numerous feedback loops between those components, and numerous connections among the subsystems of a complex system (Kavalski, 2007, p. 438). Meanwhile, if we approach a complex system subjectively, it implies, by default, unknown or unplanned and unexpected sequences that are not immediately visible or comprehensible. In this context, complexity is typically identified by its relationships rather than by its constituent parts (Kavalski, 2007, p. 438). Indeed, approaching the world of politics through the prism of CT also allows us to evaluate how to respond to the challenges posed by global inequality, climate change, and other transnational issues that require collective action. CT adds a totally different dimension to the IR deliberations of the globalized environment thanks to a smooth integration of diverse theoretical frameworks that can prove particularly useful in the areas of global governance and the decentralization of international relations theory and practice, which relates to the growing prominence of non-Western international actors. In contrast to evidence that supports the view that there can be a clear distinction between objective and subjective definitions, Kovalski maintains that complex systems are not uniform; there are relationships of differing strengths between their components, and those with especially tight connections form subsystems. He also suggests that any component in such a system can participate in multiple subsystems simultaneously. Therefore, even inherently homogeneous components can support internal 14

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diversity by rearranging relationships to create non-identical sub-subsystems. In this respect, Kavalski emphasizes that complexity may be identified by relationships, not just constituent parts. This implies non-uniformity and the ability of components to participate in multiple subsystems, supporting internal diversity (Kavalski, 2007, p. 438). This observation is crucial from the perspective of conflict management, given the undeniable demand for CT. It clearly possesses a distinctive characteristic that can help shape a more mature discourse, with the potential benefit of employing a very rare conceptual toolbox that leads to a better understanding of various complex concepts, ideas, and important occurrences in social science in general. However, its practical application in the subfield of conflict management remains to be determined. CT has the potential to compartmentalize complex modern conflicts that show a substantial proportion of seemingly chaotic relations, patterned in nonlinear ways. Nevertheless, a more meticulous examination of those patterns indicates that complexity theory cannot serve as a sole tool or methodology capable of revealing clearer patterns in the initial stages of investigations. CT may struggle to approach conflicts that are still emerging or evolving into different forms simply because it is too inherently static and too self-preoccupied to embrace more methodologically holistic endeavors aimed at conceptualizing the constantly changing character of modern conflict. CT could be used as a mechanism to approach a complex war zone, but only from the perspective of hindsight, after we have gathered enough empirical evidence and data to evaluate the conflict. Take, for instance, the conflict in Syria ongoing since 2011. Initially, it had two main actors driven by various political goals and objectives, supported by various coalitions and regional actors. However, the nature of the conflict and the number of parties involved underwent major changes in 2013, 2015, and 2018 (as described in my previous work on the Syrian conflict published between 2019 and 2023—Pietrzak, 2019a, pp. 34–98; Pietrzak, 2019b; Pietrzak, 2019b, pp. 125-141; Pietrzak, 2023d, pp. 173-187) and further deteriorated into a drug war after 2021. In this phase, the local pro-Assad militia resorted to drug smuggling operations, turning Syria into the most important transit zone for their narcotrafficking business and the expansion of smuggling operations to extend Assad’s rule in Syria indefinitely (Mohnblatt, 2022). In this respect, this is not a criticism shown to discredit this theory; on the contrary, I clearly acknowledge that CT was devised to capture a certain momentum within the relation between the existing structure and existent agency that are entangled within the inherently dynamic web of internal self-defining relations. Clearly, the above-mentioned example suggests that there is a massive opportunity for CT to become a useful tool that is more functional, approachable, and accountable when approaching modern conflict. However, from my personal (perhaps quite subjective) experience as someone who has dealt with regional conflicts from a global perspective for the last twenty years, I must express my reservations about the scope of practical application of the results of this debate in conflict management per se. The above-mentioned observations were possible only from the perspective of hindsight, as the entire analysis of the above-mentioned conflict was undertaken retrospectively. So, in essence, it is not complexity theory that led me to these observations, but a careful examination of the chronology of the evolving conflict, examination of the main characteristics of all parties involved, and acknowledging that goals and objectives of those parties change over time in a constantly evolving environment that cannot be properly compartmentalized without acknowledging that certain aspects of this conflict are indeed in the process of creation (in statu nascendi), not to mention that it was necessary to acknowledge that our discipline also happens to be in statu nascendi. Still, I am quite confident that conflict management can leverage this theory at the final stage of any investigations simply because modern conflicts tend to be notably multilayered and, at times, exces15

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sively complex. Therefore, integrating CT (as well as other aspects and dimensions of the fifth debate) into our broader deliberations on the nature of modern conflict holds significant promise, providing a fresh perspective. While it seems that CT clearly encourages us to focus on complex megastructures in each scenario, it is clear to me that it often overlooks simpler properties, entities, and dimensions of our global reality that play a crucial role in defining the main characteristics of any given conflict. If we are faced with dynamic international conflicts that constantly evolve and transition to something else, we cannot approach them with static, state-centric, pre-given megastructures that rely on binary oppositions, for that methodology would lead us astray. Under such conditions, we need to adopt more flexible, adaptive, and fluid metodhology that is inherently in the process of creation. That is why we need better tools to construct and deconstruct the structure and agency that predefines and defines the nature of the modern conflict zone that has an inherently complex nature, in which mutually interrelated and uniquely composed relations form a megastructure constructed in a seemingly chaotic collection of blocks, essential properties, and various substances, creating a different non-linear and non-positivist reality where rational behavior cannot be expected from all actors in a conflict. That is why we need clarity more than we need complexity.

THE SIXTH GREAT DEBATE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS In this context, there is a divergence from Lake’s (2013, pp. 567-587) proposition that scholars should transcend rigid theoretical divides and adopt a more flexible and diverse methodological toolkit for a nuanced comprehension of international relations complexities. Kavalski’s perspective (Kavalski, 2007) stands out as more persuasive than Lake’s counterarguments (Lake, 2013), for Kavalski clearly suggests the need to persist in the tradition of discussing significant issues within the confines of the great IR debates. Though I completely agree with Kavalski in this respect, I disagree concerning the excessive emphasis on the complexity of world politics. The contention is that the focus should pivot towards achieving a broader clarity in academic pursuits. This contention underlies the advocacy for initiating the sixth great debate in international relations, exclusively dedicated to gaining a more comprehensive understanding of the challenges at hand. The significance of these challenges is monumental, particularly in light of the seismic shift in the global architecture of power observed on February 24, 2022, and for the last 650 days, for the Russia’s war against Ukraine is an instance of an epochal momentum openly challenging the very nature of international law, the principle of noninterference in the domestic affairs of independent nations. This conflict has led to turbulent changes in the global economy (Ozili 2023) and sparked a new momentum in a new Cold War between NATO and Russia, contributing to further instability not confined to Eastern Europe but resonating globally. Indeed, the events of February 24, 2022, unequivocally marked the onset of a new Cold War, necessitating a redefinition of the future international order (Amilakhvari & Baghaturia, 2023; Pietrzak 2024c). However, a comprehensive analysis demands a retrospective examination of antecedent occurrences: Russia’s war against Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Donbas war, Russia’s intervention in Syria on behalf of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, and the persistent hybrid war against Ukraine that in accordance with Yevgeny Primakov’s doctrine includes, but is not limited to, the weaponization of fossil fuels and transportation routes, the use of drones and AI in the increasingly software-defined warfare of the future, various acts of political sabotage and patronage, weaponizing minority groups 16

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of Russian speakers in post-Soviet republics to attain the Kremlin’s political goals and objectives, cyberattacks, interference in local elections, interference in political elections, and encouraging friendly regimes such as Erdogan’s Turkey and Orban’s Hungary within and outside NATO and the EU to stop or unnecessarily delay the enlargement process of potential new members in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the Caucasus, as observed during the Finnish and Swedish accession processes. We can only expect that this tactic will be used again in the future. If we combine our efforts to reassess Russia’s policies towards its neighbors and juxtapose them with attempts to perceive Russia as a rational actor, we are faced with a formidable challenge to our approach to the current global reality. Engaging in such a debate is extremely important and necessary, considering that the very foundations of the global power structure are profoundly undermined by the actions of various hawkish actors including Russia. These actors hold significant influence in the global architecture of power, and this state of affairs also has a massive impact on the functionality of our theories, approaches, and paradigms, which struggle to encapsulate the dynamic nature of the global reality at hand. To illustrate one possible approach to this dilemma, it would be beneficial to explore the broader debate on how this conflict might be resolved, specifically, by examining Henry Kissinger’s peace plan for Ukraine, presented in 2022 (The National, 2022) along with his later shift on Ukraine presented in Davos, suggesting the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO. In this respect, meticulously assessing its potential advantages and drawbacks of such an outcome could provide valuable insights. This analysis would delve into the potential benefits of ceasing hostilities between Russia and Ukraine within the wider context of policymaking discourse, conflict management, and a significant shift in the global balance of power, which does not favor Russia. We anticipate that this critical analysis would sharply contrast with any suggestions presented by scholars driven by Mearsheimer’s take on offensive realism (Mearsheimer 2014, pp. 77–89). Meanwhile, scholars who prefer to invoke the Giedroyć-Mieroszewski standpoint (Pietrzak, 2023e) would assert under such circumstances that an independent Europe is contingent on an independent Ukraine, so no concessions could be offered to Russia as it would only encourage its neo-imperial policy in the not-so-distant future. Additionally, a more pragmatic stance associated with scholars keen to embrace the Brzezinski doctrine (Brzezinski, 1997, p. 46; Pietrzak, 2023f) would probably vehemently support Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity at any cost but would have to give its transatlantic aspirations further thought. In these deliberations, it is essential to recognize multiple dilemmas and potential theoretical departures of the parties involved in such a debate. Clearly, NATO is still not guided by a single doctrine, geopolitical standpoint, or broader geostrategic imperative in this respect, so we need to continue this debate in the future (Pietrzak; 2024b). Still, the magnitude and intricacy of the challenges ahead may surpass even our boldest expectations, but these deliberations need to be more contemplative on this occasion. We need to delve deeper into the problem and scrutinize it from the perspective of new technological developments. It is essential to examine this problem through the prism of the issues related to software-defined warfare (Mulchandani & Shanahan, 2022), the ethics of the weaponization of AI, (Koumparoudis, 2020, pp. 41-58, Koumparoudis 2023); cybersecurity, the changing nature of hybrid threats (Shalamanov & Bankov, 2022, pp. 1-18)), potential uncontrollable pandemics of the future (Ivanov, 2020, pp. 46-74), the militarization of space (Karwowski 2023), climate change (Czamy & Tomala & Wrońska, 2021), the future of the concept of neutrality (Gärtner, 2023), and the dynamic evolution of the global architecture of power. Under such circumstances, ontology in statu nascendi emerges as a platform for the discussion on our internal clarity and an invisible hand that will connect the main discoveries from the existing great debates in international relations with the upcoming sixth to ninth debates. The main purpose of this 17

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exercise is to learn from our mistakes and start practicing what we preach in our discipline. In this respect, ontology in statu nascndi aspires not only to take part in this debate but to lead it, to offer a practical blueprint to address the intricate challenges and opportunities of the 21st century. Its primary objective under such conditions is to supplement our discipline in those endeavors by ensuring it is highly accessible and exceptionally reliable for those who require it the most. It will surely aim for broader clarity, accountability, and transparency, but it will also try to simplify what we can so as to not overcomplicate the most complicated matters at hand. That is why it is good to focus on explaining the benefits of revisiting Bhaskar’s critical realism in this context of conflict management, for it could allow us to assert the existence of an independent reality beyond human perceptions, with different levels such as the empirical, actual, and the real, emphasizing causal powers and mechanisms. It is asserted that IR theory is likely to benefit from embracing such a pursuit because it initiates a much broader interdisciplinary debate that might help us achieve a qualitative change in how our discipline progresses. That is why it would advocate scrutinizing those developments in the context of Alexander Wendt to incorporate more effectively matters related to the role of ideas, norms, and social constructions, highlighting the influence of social and cultural factors in shaping international politics. One should keep in mind Anthony Giddens’ duality of structure and try to intertwine them in an even more effective manner. In our endeavors to strengthen accountability and the scope of our debate, we need to embrace a Derridean exploration of language, undecidability, and his deconstructive plasticity that aims at liberation from the constraints of fixed, stable meanings to attain a broader comprehensive understanding of the dilemmas and processes that we investigate, very often encapsulated in the broader debate within the constraints of Kantian deontology and Machiavellian consequentialism. Finally, those efforts have started so as to ensure that we will outsmart AI before it can cause any serious harm to us, preventing apocalyptic visions like the 2030 singularity momentum, in which machines dictate the terms and conditions of peace treaties. That is why we need to try to avoid fully outsourcing our responsibility for global governance to autonomous systems that are fully artificial intelligence-controlled and designed to police our architecture of power. On the one hand, we can hope that those scenarios are not reached by humanity, or we can try to actively prevent such a scenario from happening by competing with those very robots so that artificial intelligence will always work for us and not against us. Subsequently, the proper use of ontology in statu nascendi can allow us to understand various forms of ideological struggle, from that against fascism to the ongoing ones against Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Boko Haram. To significantly bolster the integrity of our disciplines, it is imperative that we actively embrace Tamara Albertin’s insightful advocacy for discovering a more effective approach to navigating the landscape and unraveling the nuances between political, scientific, and metaphysical ontology, which resonates deeply in this respect, for it promises to bring about broader clarity and is key to bridging profound philosophical divides. The East-West Philosophers’ Conference is positioned as a crucial element in this endeavor. Given the evident parallels with the divisions in IR theory, this example can serve to guide us (Albertini & Pietrzak, 2020, pp. 3-18). In this regard, I also propose drawing on experiences from the field of conflict management to bring peace, stability, and tranquility to our theoretical deliberations. Indeed, faced with an inter-paradigmatic war in our discipline, we must actively seek to employ mediating techniques such as Track 1, Track 1.5, Track 2, and Track 3 Diplomacy. Engaging in such a reversed tactic can assist scholars associated with realist, liberal, constructivist, Marxist, feminist, postcolonial, and poststructuralist approaches in finding an appropriate modus vivendi, enabling us to work more effectively as one discipline. As Philip Gamaghelyan 18

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asserts in his influential publication Conflict Resolution Beyond the International Relations Paradigm: Evolving Designs as a Transformative Practice in Nagorno-Karabakh and Syria (2017), the use of such unconventional strategies often yields expected results due to the effect of surprise (Gamaghelyan, 2017). Indeed, Gamaghelyan’s transformative approach challenges traditional framings, advocating for a more inclusive and flexible strategy in approaching conflict situations. We can observe his dedication to individualizing conflict resolution and addressing the complexities of conflicts in real time. This is evident in his use of diverse methodologies, including problem-solving workshops, participatory action research, and dialogue initiatives (Gamaghelyan, 2017; Pietrzak, 2021b, p. 141-148).

UNLOCKING THE PRACTICAL DYNAMICS OF ONTOLOGY IN STATU NASCENDI To truly assess the robustness of an ontology, we must move beyond abstract academic deliberations and put it to the test in real-world conflict scenarios. As Michael Oakeshott astutely pointed out, the convergence of theory and practice is an indispensable consideration in scholarly pursuits. I am proud to affirm that this ontology has not only endured but excelled in concrete applications, undergoing successful field testing in a substantial body of work, including six recent publications examining conflicts in Georgia, Syria, Ukraine, and Ethiopia. Through the consistent application of this inherently flexible ontology, we have achieved multiple victories while investigating various stages of those conflicts. The results of the studies strongly suggest that the use of ontology in statu nascendi adds significant value to the analytical approach in these contexts. In this respect, we need to start with my publication On the Idea of Humanitarian Intervention: A New Compartmentalization of IR Theories (2021), which utilized ontology in statu nascendi to provide a systematic inquiry into the concept of humanitarian intervention. This study allowed a more holistic account of this rather vague concept in relation to a broader debate on the boundaries of state sovereignty and the international community’s reaction to severe human rights abuses worldwide. In hindsight, I need to admit that that use of this ontology did not expand beyond selected chapters, but it was my first attempt at supplementing IR theory in this important endeavor of compartmentalizing the modern conflict to expose a very fluid character. It helped capture the moment of adjusting or not adjusting to the ever-changing circumstances of very elusive contemporary conflict zones in rather elusive and fluid circumstances. This attempt led to two later publications, which helped to achieve much better conceptual results – “Introducing the Idea of Ontology in statu nascendi to the Broader International Relations Theory,” published in 2022 as part of the International Conference Proceeding Series after the Conference called the International Conference on Economics and Social Sciences in Serik, Turkey, and “Approaching Regional Conflicts through the Prism of Ontology in statu nascendi – The New Compartmentalization of IR Theory,” published in 2023 in In Statu Nascendi – Journal of Political Philosophy and International Relations, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2023, p. 93-148. This theoretical work coincided with the practical application of ontology in statu nascendi to provide the readers with “A Comparative Study of Russia’s War in Ukraine (2014-, including its 2022 escalation), Russia’s Aggression in Georgia (2008), and Russia’s Military Operations in Syria (2015-),” the work that was later published as part of the International Conference Proceeding Series – VII. International Middle East Symposium: Political and Social Stability in the Middle East.

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The most recent publications that benefited from this reformulation addressed conflicts in Ethiopia and Ukraine (Pietrzak, 2023b) and then “The Putinization of the Situation of Women and Children During the 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine” in In Statu Nascendi, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2022), Journal of Political Philosophy and International Relations, pp. 19-76. This was followed by the paper titled “Exploring Conflicts in Ethiopia (2020-2022) and Ukraine (2014-, 2022-)” in Modern World Challenges: Regulating Human Rights, Social Security, and Welfare in Contemporary Multicultural World, edited by Aytekin Demircioğlu, Emilia Alaverdov. The use of ontology in statu nascendi in the above-mentioned examples allowed us to draw from the experiences of various approaches in our arsenal. At times, this ontology was employed as a new compartmentalization of IR theory, offering the most recent interpretation of any given conflict from the perspective of carefully selected IR approaches. This, combined with comparative studies, could be seen as a qualitative change, fostering a more comprehensive examination of conflicts by inviting various paradigms, schools of thought, and traditions to the decision-making table. I also want to point out that in most of those cases, ontology in statu nascendi was used as an ad hoc tool, in conjunction with the comparative method, offering a new recalibrated way of approaching any given conflict through a more holistic prism that is already available in our literature, predating the existence of some branches within our traditions. This, in turn, allowed me to deal with the selected contemporary conflicts in a slightly more efficient manner by comparing them with other ongoing conflict zones. In all the discussed scenarios, this tool was used by placing a very special ontological emphasis on investigating the nature of those conflicts. This endeavor was strengthened by focusing on the main assumptions of various IR theories and, secondly, by embarking on the mission of navigating between diverse and conflicted approaches, addressing conceptual, methodological, and analytical challenges to show certain patterns, repetitions, and anomalies in the behaviors of the actors involved, their choices, and the reaction of the international community to events. In essence, by embracing so many different approaches as part of this semi-scientific semi-philosophical megaproject that is inherently inclusive, we signal to the outside world that our tradition will always be ready to face the world out there from a different perspective. As emphasized in the previously mentioned works, the development of ontology in statu nascendi is an ongoing and never truly finished process. It is intended to be continuously evolving, requiring a commitment to constant self-improvement for the sake of academic excellence and clarity. This ontology cannot be exclusively attributed to any single scholar, inventor, or originator, for serious scholars forge their own ontologies, leading to more advanced scientific discoveries in their respective fields. My ontology in statu nascendi would naturally differ from the ontological perspectives of other IR thinkers and political philosophers, as each individual is entitled to cultivate their own evolving processes of onto-epistemo-methodological formation. Each compartmentalization will have its own unique proportion of in statu nascendi-ness that will be truly unique in the way it approaches various ideas, concepts, processes, and, finally, international conflicts.

CONCLUSION This study draws inspiration from influential figures such as Bhaskar, Wendt, Giddens, and Derrida. It positions ontology in statu nascendi as an evolving platform for dialogue on the future of IR theorizing, in the context of conflict management encompassing diverse perspectives and approaches. Navigating 20

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the complex global reality of the 21st century may not be easy, but the spirit of this ontology encourages scholars to follow their intellectual curiosity and dedicate their efforts to attaining broader academic clarity, leading them closer to the truth about international relations to encourage interdisciplinary collaboration, truth-seeking, and academic excellence, aiming to foster scientific collaboration, flexibility, and openness to interdisciplinary traditions while providing a perpetual methodological self-improvement mechanism. Ontology in statu nascendi aspires to lead these efforts and passionately urges scholars to initiate the sixth great debate in international relations. In a determined effort to fortify these initiatives, it formulates a practical blueprint empowering us to adeptly respond to intricate challenges and opportunities. This chapter boldly asserts that contemporary IR theory is poised to extract substantial value from heightened engagement with current philosophical debates. It strongly acknowledges the inherent challenges of modern conflict zones, championing a more comprehensive and collaborative approach within the field. In preparation for such a debate, ontology in statu nascendi emphasizes the need for more clarity, truth, transparency, and respect in ontological matters; the study aims to address preexisting limitations in IR theory. It also highlights the changing global landscape and contends that IR theorizing must adapt to this new reality. While acknowledging the pluralistic nature of IR theory, the project urges a transition into an ontology of dialogue, fostering a methodological, open-minded discourse that will benefit the field of conflict management and IR theory itself. It proposes cultivating intellectual openness and enhancing theoretical debates. This undertaking serves as a guiding force for research and theory-building initiatives, aiming to fortify the existing body of literature concerning conflict management and diverse resolution strategies. Delving into the nature and status of ontological claims within the field, this inquiry scrutinizes fundamental assumptions about the social and political world, political existence, reality, and the nature of being in the ever-evolving landscape of local and regional conflicts of global importance (Pietrzak, 2021a, p. 226; Pietrzak, 2023a, pp. 99-119). Our discipline urgently requires substantial assistance to adapt to the ever-shifting dynamics of contemporary conflicts and conflict zones, and it must embrace all available support. The elusive and fluid sociopolitical dimensions inherent in these conflicts demand a thorough investigation, confronting adversity and navigating the myriad conceptual challenges that lie ahead. It is imperative, however, to steadfastly resist any tendencies toward homogenization. We must explicitly recognize the necessity of preserving a broader pluralism within our discipline. Ontology in statu nascendi stands as a guardian of this uniqueness, advocating for an even more extensive interdisciplinary and inter-paradigmatic diversity in our theoretical frameworks. This approach aims to enhance the richness of our semi-scientific, semi-philosophical megaproject, emphasizing its inherent inclusivity. In doing so, we convey a robust message to the external world, signaling that our tradition is consistently ready to engage with external realities, offering a unique perspective.

REFERENCES Albertini, T & Pietrzak, P. (2020) Clarity is what I seek first: An interview with Professor Tamara Albertini by Piotr Pietrzak, In Statu Nascendi Journal of Political Philosophy and International Relations, 3(2), 3-18.

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Zbigniew, B. (1997). The Grand Chessboard, American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperative. Basic Books.

KEYWORDS AND TERMS USED In statu nascendi:: This can be translated to “in the process of creation.” Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO):: OOO emphasizes the existence and importance of non-human entities and objects in the world, treating them as equal actors alongside humans. Metaontology:: This is the metatheory of ontology that launches the discussion of what ontology is about, and what its methods are. Non-Philosophical Ontology:: In this context, the incorporation of a non-philosophical ontology emerges as a robust and intellectually enriching contribution to the scientific ontologies that dominate the dynamic landscape of the free market of ideas. Philosophical Ontology:: In philosophical ontology, substances and properties are fundamental concepts that help to analyze and understand the nature of existence and reality. Substances are entities that have independent existence. They are the basic building blocks or foundational elements of reality. Substances are what exist in themselves and are not dependent on other things for their existence. Properties are attributes or qualities that are associated with substances. These attributes describe the characteristics or features of substances.

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Chapter 2

The Role of the International Community in Turning Afghanistan Into a Failed State and Its Impact on International and Regional Security Emilia Alaverdov https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3282-172X Georgian Technical University, Georgia Zurabi Tchabashvili Georgian American University, Georgia

ABSTRACT Afghanistan has long been a country that is easy to enter by external forces, but then very difficult to leave. As a result of the struggle with various conquerors, in the minds of the Afghans, the idea of any foreign troops as occupiers, with whom it remains only to fight, has firmly established itself. The invasion of the Soviet Union turned it into a Cold War battlefield, and the end of that war and the collapse of the Soviet Union turned Afghanistan into the arena of a new rivalry, this time between regional actors. Approximately 50 years before the communist takeover, Afghanistan was perhaps the most peaceful country on the Asian continent. The consequences of international and regional rivalry and inaction of the international community turned the country into a failed state, which poses a threat to international security.

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-6684-9467-7.ch002

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 Role of International Community in Turning Afghanistan Into a Failed State

INTRODUCTION Afghanistan, due to the events taking place in and around it, continues to be the center of attention of the world community. Moreover, it causes not only interest but also an understandable concern: the high hopes that were placed on the new authorities, foreign friends, and sponsors of Afghanistan, due to several reasons, have not yet been justified. According to many Western political scientists, the country is sliding down to the level of a “failed nation” in many respects. The role and place of Afghanistan in the modern system of international relations are determined primarily by the armed conflict that was going on for more than two decades, which is accompanied by the most acute political and ideological confrontation. This has deprived the country of political subjectivity in the international arena, does not allow it to pursue any clear foreign policy course, and threatens with a complete loss of statehood. All these pose the greatest danger to the international situation. The crisis of power that has been going on in Afghanistan for decades, the civil war that is subsiding and flaring up in the country is associated by many domestic and foreign researchers with the Soviet military presence in this country. Research shows that it is asserted that the USSR was directly involved in the commission of a military coup by left-wing radicals. Such categorical assessments form ideas about the decisive role of the Soviet Union in the origin of the crisis in Afghanistan and its escalation (Toporkov, 2014). Afghanistan became a “black hole” of the world community since the 1973 coup d’état. Since the 1973 coup d’état, Afghanistan has turned into an arena of bloody clashes between opposing internal political forces that have caused chaos in the country. Control over state territory was no longer concentrated on one hand; the economic system became a machine for serving the international drug business (Niland, 2010). Here it is worthy to highlight that the drug business was and still is one of the complex and acute problems of Afghanistan. With the rapid growth of drug production in Afghanistan most of the Afghan drugs are transported through the countries of Central Asia to Russia, and then a large part of it goes to the West (Korgun, 2004). We have to say that drug production in Afghanistan is the most important economic and political factor, both within the country and at the regional and even planetary levels. Afghanistan, as the main world center of drug production, is a powerful springboard for the global drug business, which causes thousands of deaths every year around the world. Furthermore, drug trafficking at the regional level is not only ruining human lives but also is a tool for promoting geopolitical interests. Another significant fact is drug production in Afghanistan which destroyed the country’s economy: the existing ugly model of the drug economy is viable only as a mechanism to stimulate the production and processing of drug raw materials. Weak, and completely dependent on external forces, Afghanistan became a weak-willed territory, a source of regional instability and heroin expansion (Alaverdov, 2022). The task of the world community is to prevent Afghanistan from turning into such a “black hole” that threatens not only its closest neighbors but also through heroin trafficking and terrorist acts the whole world. Unfortunately, so far we are witnessing a lack of coordination of the international community and, what is worse, a visible interest and purposefulness in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. The great share in this area is the restoration and construction of economic and social facilities, which is carried out by the efforts of donor countries - mainly the USA, Germany, Japan, France, India, Iran, China, and the UK. They have the largest objects of economic infrastructure - roads, energy, and irrigation. So far, the recovery process is mainly due to the efforts of the international community (Malashenko, 2011). However, countries that assist Afghanistan are more often guided by their interests to the detriment of the common goal of building a peaceful, democratic Afghanistan. The United States is the most involved 29

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in the process of rebuilding the country, which, together with the European Union, allocates an immense share of funds for this purpose.

THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK The chapter is based on the main theories of international relations and security such as The Paris School of Security, Copenhagen School, The Critical Security Studies of the Welsh School, and Human Security. It analyzes the impact of these theories on the existing world situation and the chapter itself. In the second half of the twentieth century, studies began, the subject of which for the first time became the “security of states”, reflected in the concept of the “security dilemma”, which studies the process of building up armaments among the warring parties (Gvenetadze, 2017). Here it should be mentioned that the main components of national security are the security of the individual, the security of society, and the security of the state (Topchiev, 2023). The Strategy identifies the following areas: domestic political, economic, social, science and education, international, military, information, military, military-industrial, and environmental spheres, as well as the sphere of public security. In the system of scientific knowledge, the general theory of national security plays an important integrating role (Ovchinnikov, 2014). One of the main Schools of Regional Security Studies is The Paris School of Security and its founders and representatives Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault. It states that, if security is understood as a form of social practice, then no such theory of practice is possible, as long as it is not constructed, as it were, through the eyes of the participants in the situation and from their point of view, that is, practically. In the context of the theory of securitization, what has been said means that the reference object of security in bio-politics is not sovereignty, not territory, not people, but life itself, embodied in the form of a human population and evaluated in terms of its economic productivity and opportunities for profitable exploitation (Gaidaev, 2022). Another school that has had a great impact on the theories of securitization is The Copenhagen School. Its representatives Barry Busan, and Ole Wever state that securitization theory studies security as a form of social practice in which an actor (most often the state) elevates a problem to the rank of an existential security threat and reserves the right to take emergency actions bypassing standard political procedures (Stritzel, 2014). The concept of securitization includes 2 aspects: it is both the highest degree of assessment of the threat to society or its part, directly related to survival, determined through the analysis of political discourse and the politicization of the problem, i.e. sustainable process of reproduction of the state of threat through discourse (Tambovtseva, 2017). The Copenhagen school is the foundation for a new, most adequate to nowadays political realities, understanding of international security as human security. According to the constructivist theory, international security is achieved within the framework of the interaction of social groups, namely through peaceful discourse (argument in dialogue), which determines the identity of this community, between them (Hough et al., 2021). On this issue, critical schools go further, finally moving to the “micro-level”: representatives of the Welsh and Paris schools believe that international security is ensured through mechanisms rooted in the being and interaction of individuals themselves, and not their groups (Topchiev, 2023).

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The Critical Security Studies of the Welsh School The founders of the Welsh (according to other sources - Welsh) school were Ken Booth, who published scientific articles on this topic since the early 1990s and comprehensively outlined his concept of security in the book Theory of World Security (Booth, 2007), and Richard Wyn Jones, who presented his views in Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory (Wyn, 1999). From the point of this theory view, we can judge that the state does not always protect the freedom and life of its citizens. In this case, we can give as an example Afghanistan since its population is unprotected and insecure. Representatives of this school consider security in a philosophical paradigm. In the context of security, they are talking not only about physical survival but also about the possibility of fulfilling human needs. It also concerns Afghani people as their needs are not simply fulfilled. From the point of view of Welsh theory, the main goal of security should be a person, as for states they are only means, not goals of security (Iroshnikov, 2021). Researchers see their task as understanding how best to protect people from all these threats. They claim to speak on behalf of the “voiceless, disenfranchised, and helpless.” Ken Booth and Wyn Jones do not offer an equal approach for all cases, each requires a separate study (Gaan, 2010). But the general direction is drawn - this is a critical attitude towards the existing order, the legitimation of alternative positions, and support for those social movements that deal with security issues since security is threatened by everything that prevents you from building a life on your own (Bakrania & Haider, 2016).

Human Security Armed conflicts and natural disasters cause human suffering on a colossal scale. Addressing the scale and complexity of these challenges and delivering on the global promise of leaving no one behind depends on addressing the root causes of current and emerging crises, taking steps to prevent their recurrence, and strengthening the resilience of those who are most vulnerable (UNTFHS, n.d.). Conflict arose as a threat to human security and there is a strong requirement for the protection of human rights, security, and life from internal and external violence (Annan, n.d.). The human security approach is relatively new in security studies that have argued that the state-centric view of realism has ignored states and in particular their citizens, who have suffered the most from various wars (Alaverdov et al., 2023). Thus, human security considers people as the main object, in contrast to the traditional concept of security, which puts the state as the main object and concentrates on how best to protect it. The emphasis is on ensuring the well-being of people and responding to people’s needs in dealing with sources of threats. Human security is aimed at protecting humans from any kind of threats, such as military, poverty, and disease, and providing peace, stability, and human welfare, and the main guarantor for human security should be the state. The concept of human security has been hotly discussed in academic circles since 1990 (Gregoratti, 2018).

Study Methods In the studies of national security, conflicts, international relations, and human rights is very important a kind of systematic multidisciplinary approach, since it applies various methods of historical, political, comparative, legal, and other analysis of the above-mentioned spheres. Also one of the key methods is methods of observation since it is a kind of primary data collection associated with the object of research, worked out by the researcher personally through direct perception (Alaverdov, 2022). In modern 31

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epistemology, there are different ideas about multidisciplinarity in scientific knowledge. Within one of them, multidisciplinary is seen as the interaction of scientific disciplines. At the same time, attention is focused on the fact that multidisciplinary interaction consists of the application of research tools taken from related social sciences. An interdisciplinary approach associated with the formation of new scientific fields of research leads to the formation of hybrid disciplines such as political science, international relations, sociology, history, ethnology, geography, psychology, etc. A multidisciplinary approach, the cognitive strategy of which is aimed at obtaining new synthetic knowledge about a particular reality, opens up great prospects for conducting comparative scientific research. This is a way to expand the horizon of the scientific worldview within the framework of the natural picture of the world, through the implementation of integrative tendencies of disciplinary, interdisciplinary, and multidisciplinary knowledge and object models.

LITERATURE REVIEW The chapter is based on certain works and materials of field experts and international organizations, such as books, research, reports, articles, charters, and legal documents. Out of numerous literature, it would be good to point out the following books and reports. The chapter mostly analyzes the works of experts in the following directions: all kinds of security, state building, regional and international interests, the work of the international community, conflict, and peacebuilding.

The Notion and Essence of Failed State The end of the Cold War undermined the economic and political forces of several countries in the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and Central and South Asia. The destruction or significant weakening of the state in the 1990s. already led to civil rights problems in Somalia, Cambodia, Bosnia; Kosovo, and East Timor. The international community somehow got involved in conflicts within these countries, sometimes too late, with insufficient funds, and in some cases, it ended up taking the reins of power there into its own hands. In the US National Security Strategy of 1999, “failed” countries were already treated as a threat to the interests of the United States (The White House, 1999) and in the 2002 Strategy, such states were classified as direct threats to US national security (The White House, 2002). This issue is covered in more detail in the message of George Bush devoted to the presentation of this Strategy. It states that the events of September 11, 2001, demonstrated that weak countries like Afghanistan can threaten the national interests of the USA. In his speech, he highlighted that the weakness of state institutions and corruption can turn the territory of a weak country into easy prey for networks of terrorism and drug mafia (Daalder, et al., 2002). Failed countries are treated in the same vein in the 2006 Strategy (The White House, 2006). US President Barack Obama, speaking on December 1, 2009, at the US Military Academy at West Point, said that Afghanistan and Pakistan threaten US security since these countries represented the center of the bloody extremism of al-Qaeda and that the attack plan of September 11, 2001, was developed from there (The White House, 2009). In the 2003 EU Security Strategy, the transformation of states into failed states is called an alarming phenomenon (European Communities, 2009). Similar motifs are heard in the speeches of representatives of the leadership of Canada, Great Britain, Canada, and other Western countries. NATO Secretary General Rasmussen adheres to the same logic. 32

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In an interview with Der Spiegel on December 21, 2009, he stated that NATO’s troops must prevent Afghanistan from becoming a haven safe for terrorists since it was very dangerous for the whole world (Rasmussen, 2009). Even though such concepts as “failed” and “fragile” states have become firmly established in the political agenda, there is no universally accepted interpretation of this phenomenon yet. There is no consensus on which countries are classified as “failed” and which are not. At present, speaking of the “failure” of states, as a rule, “by default” means the inability of the central government to control a significant part of the country’s territory and provide for the primary needs of the population (Khutorskaya, 2012). At the same time, the United States and other countries naively believed that these problems were rather local until September 9/11 showed that the weakness of the state led to huge strategic problems. The power in Afghanistan was so weak that anyone, including the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda, could seize it, turning it into a base for terrorism on a global scale. The well-known American political scientist F. Fukuyama noted that the violence in the country has become virtually a ubiquitous phenomenon. The possibility of combining radical Islamism with weapons of mass destruction unexpectedly showed that events in the far corners of the planet can directly affect not only small countries but superpowers as well (Fukuyama, 2004). Traditional forms of deterrence do not work against individual criminals, and the problem of security in this case requires solving problems within weak states, requiring a change in their regimes to prevent further threats from them. The terrorism of radical Islamists, combined with the capabilities of weapons of mass destruction, has added to the burden of problems created by weak governance as a major aspect of security. The United States must take full responsibility for nation-state building in Afghanistan and Iraq by initiating military action there. The ability to enhance or create previously completely unaccounted capabilities of the state and state institutions has suddenly become the main issue of the global agenda and, apparently, the main condition for security in critical parts of the world. Thus, state weakness is both a national and an international source of first-order problems (Gvenetadze, 2017). The concept of state is an organization of public authority in a certain territory, which has a special apparatus and regulates public relations by issuing legal norms. This concept covers anybody in the state who performs legislative, executive, judicial, or any other functions that operate at any level, be it central, federal, regional, provincial, or local level. The state includes, for example, public services, armed forces, law enforcement agencies, police, etc. In some cases, the power of the state is granted to private entities and, therefore, they may be considered a state actor of persecution or serious harm. Parties or organizations exercising control over state structures, or over a significant part of the territory of the state, can assume two possible scenarios: 1) Parties or organizations that are de facto state actors insofar as they exercise certain functions of public authority; 2) Parties or organizations that control a significant part of the territory of the state in the context of an armed conflict. In Afghanistan, a wide range of different groups and individuals can be considered actors of persecution or serious harm, and it is often difficult to distinguish clearly between different types of actors. International and foreign actors present in Afghanistan may also, in some cases, be considered subjects of persecution or serious harm. The following subsections discuss the main actors of persecution and serious harm in Afghanistan, but the list is not exhaustive (European Asylum Office, 2018). For a long time, Afghanistan has consistently been in the top ten countries of the Failed States Index, which has been published by the independent public organization The Fund for Peace since 2005. Particular interest in the problems of state building in Afghanistan appeared after the tragic event of September 11, 2001. The US, which had previously not been very interested in the problem of broken political institu33

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tions in countries that, as they believed, did not influence the US, radically changed its position. In the national security strategy in 2002, George W. Bush declared international terrorism the primary threat to international security and determined the duty of the United States to combat it. It was then that the world political community turned its attention to the “failed” states, which, due to poorly functioning political institutions of power, the lack of a competitive economy, and the presence of opposing groups that are fighting for power, were a “favorable” stronghold for basing their terrorist centers by groups. Afghanistan emerged as a classic buffer state that not only found itself between the British and Russian empires but was partly shaped by the rivalry of these powers in the 19th century (Szuhai, 2015). The British gained a foothold in India, and Russia expanded into Central Asia through the creation of a series of protectorates, this turned Russia and Britain into potential rivals in what came to be called the “Great Game”. However, it was not in the interests of both sides to turn their rivalry into a real war, and therefore the existence of a buffer state between the two great powers suited everyone. As a result, by the end of the 19th century, the boundaries of what we now call Afghanistan were largely established, although not always in a way that was satisfactory to everyone. In the political and administrative sense, the Afghan state had some distinctive features. First of all, it was a dynastic state (ModrzejewskaLeśniewska, 2019). Over time, the Afghan state became a “rentier” state, whose budget was completely dependent on such unstable sources of income as foreign aid and proceeds from the sale of limited natural resources. The Afghan state appeared to be essentially weak. On the one hand, his presence was universally felt in many parts of the country; on the other hand, it was a passive and distant presence. Most often, there was a considerable distance between the state and its subjects. Afghanistan was the state to some extent due to the difficult geopolitical situation of Afghanistan. The Durand Line of 1893 divided the ethnic Pashtuns of Southwest Asia between Afghanistan and British India (Maley, 2010). When the division of the subcontinent occurred in 1947, no one heard the demands of Afghanistan for the “self-determination” of the Pashtuns of India. As a result, Afghanistan was the only state that voted against the admission of Pakistan to the United Nations, which caused tensions between these states over the next three decades. For the Pakistani military, the worst nightmare was to see their country between a hostile India and a hostile Afghanistan, and they were ready to seize any opportunity to change this situation (Leake, 2022). It seemed to them that the overthrow of the pro-Pashtun President Daoud and even the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan provided such an opportunity (Leake & Haines, 2017). Thus Afghanistan gradually became a weak state since Afghanistan has endowed its new political institutions with its weaknesses. The December 2001 Bonn Agreement provided for up to 29 government institutions, although six to eight would have been sufficient, and this created conditions for rivalry between institutions controlled by different political factions. Moreover, the 2004 Afghan constitution, by establishing a strong presidential system, created an overburdened office at the center of the executive branch and ensured that major issues were not considered until the president addressed them. In addition, the US decision not to extend the presence of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) outside of Kabul in 2002 more or less forced the new Afghan leader, Hamid Karzai, to offer power in the provinces and districts to armed actors who might otherwise prevent him from consolidating his position. This led to the marginalization of legitimate local leaders, especially in the Pashtun tribal structures, ultimately tarnished the reputation of the new state, and also caused serious problems related to nepotism and poor governance. The United States, shifting its attention to Iraq in late 2002, deprived Afghanistan of oxygen at a vital moment, and this contributed to the renewal of active support for the Taliban from Pakistan. The leaders of the US rashly assumed that stability could be achieved in a

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country like Afghanistan, which has been in chaos for decades, within a few months. The consequences of shifting attention to Iraq have been serious and long-lasting (Maley, 2010).

Russia’s Fear and Interest in Central Asia Russia has the following fundamental interests in Afghanistan, it is worth mentioning that many of them are intertwined with Moscow’s interests in the Central Asian region. Thus three Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). As an ally in the CSTO, Russia thinks that it is a guarantor of security of all three states, and also has military bases and military installations on their territory. The possible invasion of international terrorist groups from the territory of Afghanistan is considered in the CSTO system as a serious threat. The activities of the CSTO in the Central Asian direction come down to the organization of exercises aimed at possible reflection incursions of militants across the borders with Afghanistan. The two Central Asian states, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, are, like Russia, members of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Since the EAEU member states have open borders, which facilitates the free movement of goods and people, any destabilization in the Central Asian countries caused by the aggravation of the situation in Afghanistan could lead to a large number of refugees and other serious problems for Russia. Also, destabilization in Afghanistan, the activities of various post-Soviet terrorist organizations located in the northern part of Afghanistan, as well as the recruitment and radicalization of Central Asian labor migrants in Russia, can lead to a serious deterioration in the security situation on the territory of the Russian Federation (Kirchner & Kazantsev, 2020). In this case, we have to refer to the years 2017-2019, since there has been an influx of Russianspeaking fighters from Central Asia moving from Syria and Iraq to northern Afghanistan. Representatives of terrorist groups from the North Caucasus also arrived in Afghanistan. There is also a concern in Russia about the possible connection between the activities of post-Soviet terrorist organizations based in northern Afghanistan and the drug trade along the so-called northern route (through Central Asia to Russia, and on to Eastern, Central, and Northern Europe). Russia assumes that there is a possibility of a direct invasion of international terrorist groups from Afghanistan into the territory of border states. Also, Russia fears that international terrorist groups from Afghanistan can enter the territory of other states, especially Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Iran, and Pakistan. It is known that Afghanistan is a haven for terrorist groups from many states, including those located in post-Soviet Eurasia. Terrorist threats in Afghanistan itself can also negatively affect the security particularly, the drug smuggling and uncontrolled migration flows, as well as the geopolitical, regulatory, and economic interests of many countries, including Russia, China, and even the states of the European Union (Alaverdov, 2020). Today Russia looks at Afghanistan mainly through the prism of threats to its security and the security of its neighbors in Central Asia, where Moscow is seeking “soft hegemony.” The Afghan issue is also one of the elements representing a whole complex of difficult relations between Russia the US and NATO. The Afghan-Pakistani situation also affects relations between Russia with major powers outside the West such as China, India, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. Here we can refer to the painful experience of the USSR in Afghanistan called the “Afghan syndrome” and the experience gained by post-Soviet Russia in Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Tajikistan. Among the alleged threats, the most vital for Russia is that there is the possibility of destabilization of Central Asia. In this case, it is worth mentioning that when the Taliban was in power in Afghanistan, it encouraged the Central Asian Islamists and provided training camps for the Chechen rebels. Thus Russia fears a wave of Islamist radicalism across the region 35

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and renewed rebel activity in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan (Ziegler, 2014). Not less important is that Moscow lacks sufficient confidence in either the stability of the Central Asian regimes or in its ability to isolate the region from the influence of the Taliban. Russia is also alarmed and concerned by Afghan drug trafficking since Russia has turned from a mostly transit country into one of the largest consumers of Afghan heroin and opiates. Russia’s interests in Afghanistan primarily concern the north of the country, since it is mainly populated by Tajiks and Uzbeks. There, Moscow continues to maintain close contacts that it once established with the Northern Alliance. The northern regions of Afghanistan are directly connected to Central Asia, which Russia is trying to keep in its orbit. This is precisely the main goal of Moscow in the region. However, in this case, its ambitions exceed the real possibilities. Russia is not an attractive point for its neighbors. In turn, the Central Asian states do not want to look like satellites of Moscow. A clear evidence of this is their refusal to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Stronski & Ng, 2018). At the same time, Russia skillfully plays on the fears of the Central Asian countries that do not want Afghanistan to become a base for their radicals. The goal of Russia’s efforts is to expand the presence of the Russian military and intelligence services in the region and strengthen the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization. Moscow also thinks that the United States poses a threat to its position in Central Asia. This fact demonstrates the main contradiction in Russia’s approach. On the one hand, the US/NATO operation in Afghanistan is directed against a very serious threat to the security of Russia, on the other hand, it has turned the United States into an influential player in Central Asia to the detriment of Russia, according to Moscow (Laruelle, 2008). When Putin agreed in 2001 to grant the United States the right to use air bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, he clearly stated that this military presence should be temporary, until the situation in Afghanistan stabilizes. To counter and contain American influence in the region, Moscow, together with Beijing, is turning the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) into a major international forum. Along with China, Russia, and the Central Asian states, it includes such major players as India, Pakistan, and Iran. It is worth clarifying that the SCO is an intergovernmental organization that was founded in 2001 by the leaders of 6 states - China, Russia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan in Shanghai. Taking into account the latest expansion of the membership of the SCO, its permanent members for 2023 are 9 states, and another three countries, Iran, India, and Pakistan joined the organization, in 2017 in Astana Summit. For the moment Belarus, Mongolia, and Afghanistan are permanent observers and apply for membership in the SCO. The organization holds regional summits, and in this capacity, does its best to serve as a platform for contacts on the Afghan issue (Trenin & Malashenko, 2010). We have to admit that the arena of geopolitical rivalry between Russia and the United States for the moment is not Afghanistan, but the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, as well as the Caspian and Caucasus region. In this case, we have to say that the new states in the region are striving for their real independence from the former hegemon and are learning to act in the international arena, choosing an orientation and balancing between the great powers. Moscow’s dream of soft domination in Central Asia and in some of the Caucasus countries remains a dream (Moskalenko, 2004).

The Concern of International Community Afghanistan faces very different challenges. Afghanistan has never been a state in the modern sense. Under a monarchy that lasted until the 1970s, when political unrest broke out, the country was a tribal confederation with minimal public institutions outside of Kabul. In the following years of communist rule (and civil war), everything that remained of even a weak state was destroyed. Building a strong 36

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state after the overthrow of the Taliban had to start from scratch with funds coming from outside and with external support. Given the enormity of the task and the stinginess of the United States and other donors, the prospect of building a modern state in place of the old one looks almost hopeless (Harpviken et al., 2002). If the international community has had modest success in organizing the reconstruction of states after the end of conflicts, then its achievements in the second stage of building a strong state, when it sought to create or strengthen legitimate independent political institutions that can help local government to act independently without outside help, are much less impressive. Since statehood is either weak or non-existent in many “failed” countries, it is not entirely clear that there is an alternative to a quasi-permanent quasi-colonial relationship between a “vassal” recipient country and the international community. In a sense, the international community is restoring the former mandate system of the League of Nations of that period, when certain colonial authorities received privileges to govern a certain territory in their interests. According to modern norms of international relations, only state selfgovernment is considered legal, and this forces us to adhere to this principle: no matter what power we establish in the country, it must be temporary and transitional (Fukuyama, 2004). The European Commission is trying to expand programs together with EU member states. For example, in cooperation with Sweden, a project is being implemented to build the Kabul-JalalabadTorkham road; the energy system of Kabul is being reconstructed jointly with Germany; together with Finland and Sweden, a civil-military cooperation program is being funded. The European Union has allocated more than 10 million euros to the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Working with the World Bank and the US Agency for International Development, the EU has helped build or renovate more than 200 healthcare facilities, funded equipment and medicines for more than 1,200 clinics, and made medical services available to a quarter of the Afghan population. European countries spent $1 billion a year on the reconstruction of Afghanistan. However, the paradox is that the socio-economic situation is not improving. It has not improved over the past decades. The presence of the EU in Afghanistan will be long-term and linked to the tasks of socio-economic development, which cannot be achieved without solving the problem of stabilization. Here are considered governance, the rule of law, security sector reform, and the creation of conditions for building a civil society (Novikova, 2010). The main contribution of the EU as a body to the stabilization of Afghanistan is the reform of the security sector. Proponents of security sector reform believe that since personal security and development are as important as repelling internal and external threats (both military and non-military), the armed forces themselves are unable to counter these threats. The security sector includes all those organizations that are authorized to use force, or to order the use of force, or the threat of its use, to protect the state and its citizens, as well as those civilian structures that are responsible for commanding and controlling them. In addition, the security sector includes military non-state groups that play a (sometimes negative) role in security matters. In reforming the Afghan security sector, the EU member states should take into account two circumstances. Firstly, despite investments in the economy made by the European Union, socio-economic indicators are steadily declining, and the security situation continues to degrade. Secondly, Europeans must realize that a long-term solution to the Afghan crisis is possible only if the country is reconstructed, poverty is eliminated, the drug business is destroyed and Afghanistan is integrated into the world community (UNODC, 2021). Since a well-functioning security and justice sector is essential to maintaining stability, security reform is key to building governance in post-conflict countries. A properly functioning security and law enforcement system is the main condition for achieving stability. Unlike other countries where the EU has undertaken security reforms, Afghanistan is a country where the ef-

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fectiveness of this reform is being questioned because institution-building efforts are being undertaken in the context of combat operations. The dynamic development of events in Afghanistan in the summer of 2021 sharpens the issue of adjusting the EU strategy towards this country and the crisis response models as part of it. As you know, the previous EU strategy towards Afghanistan, implemented by it in a package with a large-scale assistance program was based on several key provisions: support for peace, stability, and security in the region; strengthening democracy, law and order, human rights, exercising good governance, and promoting social and economic development. The EU was engaged in a limited range of support tasks related to police training and reforms in the security forces sector and the national army. Brussels, in implementing this strategy, emphasized the priority use of investment instruments, the concept of democratization, and the provision of economic assistance for the political stabilization of Afghanistan and crisis management (Scherbak, 2021). The importance of the European Union developing a comprehensive strategy for cooperation with Afghanistan after the withdrawal of NATO troops was indicated in the resolution of the European Parliament on the situation in that country (2021/2712(RSP)) of 10 June 2021 (European Parliament, 2021). The same document contains some elements that are either already integrated into the de facto new EU strategy for Afghanistan or will be taken into account when developing its final parameters. In this context, the resolution highlighted the following issues such as the development of a road map for the post-conflict reconstruction of the country; the development of dialogue and constructive cooperation with neighboring countries; the continuation of a resolute fight against terrorism in Afghanistan, and the financing of extremist groups in cooperation with the UN and interested countries; provide technical and financial assistance to Afghanistan in strengthening the national armed and security forces; carrying out economic reforms aimed at strengthening democracy, ensuring human rights, law and order. We have to point out that after the withdrawal of the US and NATO contingents from Afghanistan, the situation is rapidly degrading, and the degree of uncertainty in the military-political plan is sharply increasing. There are risks of a spillover of instability to neighboring states, as well as an unprecedented level of terrorist threat and the scale of illegal drug trafficking. As a result of this withdrawal, the country appeared totally in the hands of the Taliban. Indeed, the international community has not accepted the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. However, if we refer to the speech of Secretary of State Antony Blinken on August 15, 2021, if an Afghan government complies with its international obligations and protects the human rights of its people can be a government that the international community can recognize and work with. Indeed, we did not mention the word “Taliban” but still the speech has a vague context (Blinken, 2021). If we analyze the speeches of a few big states like Russia and China we can conclude that there is a possibility from their sides to recognize Taliban as well. Thus it seems that many states are monitoring the Taliban’s action to come up with the recognition (Clayton, 2023). Also, another fact that can make the international community recognize the Taliban is that only the recognition is the presupposition to establish diplomatic relations between countries. Without diplomatic relations, there is no possibility to talk and issue any kind of assistance. In this case, we have to admit that the international community is in a very difficult position, either to recognize the new so-called government of Afghanistan and continue to assist, or not recognize it and leave the Afghani people in the bare hands of the Taliban.

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CONCLUSION Analyzing the current state of affairs in Afghanistan, one can say that the country is considered a failed state due to • • • • •

the interests of superpowers and inaction of international communities and has much to do to overcome the situation; the Taliban group operating in the country significantly impedes development, moreover, they carry out the work of drug trafficking in the country, which has a very negative impact on the economy; to improve the functioning of political institutions, they have to choose certain ways of their formation, as practice has already shown, Western models of government do not meet all the features of the historical and cultural development of Afghanistan; it is necessary to develop some kind of special model of government for Afghanistan; the institutions of state power that have not yet been formed, without the support of international actors, can collapse and the consequences will be catastrophic.

In this case, we have to agree with the words of the President of the Republic of Latvia Valdis Zatlers, where in his speech at the sixty-second session of the General Assembly he said that Afghanistan can overcome the existing situation only by cooperating with the international organizations and that the European Union, the United Nations, NATO need to develop a comprehensive and long-term approach (Zatlers, 2007). Thus, the problem of weak countries, previously considered a humanitarian or human rights problem, is now directly linked to the security of other countries. In addition to the problems of such unfortunate countries, “failed” countries like Somalia or Afghanistan, the inability of other weak countries to manage their economy also leads to international instability. So-called state building in Afghanistan, with the help of the international community, began in the early 2000s. and continued before Taliban seized the power, involving about 50 countries that have assisted in the creation of state institutions, the establishment of systems of good governance and the rule of law, respect for human rights (and, in particular, the protection of women’s rights), economic recovery, security, fight against corruption and drug trafficking, which was accompanied by significant international donor assistance (European Communities, 2009). Lastly, we have to say that the Afghan state is a fragile structure, torn apart by various internal and external forces, and changing that dynamic is a long process, and the state should not be left completely without the support of the world community.

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Stritzel, H. (2014). Securitization Theory and the Copenhagen School. In H. Stritzel (Ed.), In Security in Translation. New Security Challenges Series (pp. 11–37). Palgrave Macmillan. Stronski, P., & Ng, N. (2018). Cooperation and Competition, Russia and China in Central Asia, the Russian Far East, and the Arctic. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Szuhai, I. (2015). Rethinking the Concept of Failed State. Central European Papers, 99-110. Tambovtseva, M. (2017). The Theoretical Approach of Copenhagen School to Ensuring International Security: The Basic Provisions of Securitization Theory. Gramota, 185-187. The White House. (1999, December). A National Security Strategy for a New Century. The White House. https://clintonwhitehouse4.archives.gov/media/pdf/nssr-1299.pdf The White House. (2002, September). The National Security Strategy. The White House. https:// georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/ The White House. (2006, March). The National Security Strategy. The White House. https://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/ The White House. (2009, December 1). The New Way Forward - The President’s Address. The White House. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2009/12/01/new-way-forward-presidents-address Topchiev, M. (2023). Theoretical Approaches to the Study of Security in Social Research. Philosophical Thought, 21-32. Toporkov, M. (2014). Afghanistan: The Soviet Factor at the Origins of the Crisis. Interactive +. Trenin, D., & Malashenko, A. (2010). Afghanistan: A View from the North. Carnegie Center. United Nations Office on Drug And Crime. (2021). Drug Situation in Afghanistan 2021. Latest findings and emerging threats. UNODC. Wyn, J. R. (1999). Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory. Lynne Reinner Publishers. Zatlers, V. (2007, September 26). World leaders striving to rebuild war-torn nations champion gains, seek broad global support, as General Assembly wraps up second day of general debate. Relief Web. https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/world-leaders-striving-rebuild-war-torn-nations-champion-gainsseek-broad-global Ziegler, C. E. (2014). Russia in Central Asia: The Dynamics of Great-Power Politics in a Volatile Region. Asian Perspective, 38(4), 589–617. doi:10.1353/apr.2014.0026

KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Afghanistan: The official name of the country is the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. It is one of the poorest Islamic countries in the world, located in Central and South Asia. It borders Iran in the west, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan in the north, and Pakistan in the south and east. Afghanistan

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receives international assistance since due to internal political instability and hostilities, the only successful market remains black - drugs and weapons. Armed Conflict: A type of military conflict, is a form of resolving socio-political, territorial, nationalethnic, religious, and other contradictions using means of armed struggle on a limited scale, in which private military-political goals are pursued and the state does not go into a state of war. International Community: A political term used as a general description, to denote some hypothetical community of citizens of all countries of the world united in a common impulse of internationalism in a united front. International Organization: An association of an interstate or non-state nature created based on agreements. There are two types of international organizations: international intergovernmental (interstate) organizations and international non-governmental (non-state, public) organizations. Pakistan: The official name is - the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, located in South Asia, is a federal republic of mixed type, consisting of 4 provinces, two disputed territories, and one federal territory, with a developing economy. It borders with Afghanistan, Iran, and India, and has access to the Arabian Sea. The capital of the country is Islamabad. Russia: The Russian Federation is one of the world’s largest states. Located in the north of the Eurasian continent, occupies most of Eastern Europe and the entire north of Asia. It borders with many countries. Security: The state of protection of the vital interests of the individual, society, and state from internal and external threats, or the ability of an object, phenomenon, or process to persist under destructive influences. Superpower: A very powerful state with huge cultural, political, economic, and military potentials, having superiority over most other states, which allows it to exercise hegemony not only in its region but also in the most remote parts of the planet. Terrorism: A generalized concept denoting a complex phenomenon that includes fear and horror as the goal of certain terrorist acts aimed at intimidating the population or social groups to directly or indirectly influence the adoption of any decision or reject it in the interests of terrorists. There are many types of terrorism such as political, religious, information, Economic, Social (domestic), etc. Threat: Verbal, written, or otherwise expressed intent to cause military, physical, material, or any other harm to any person, society, or state.

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Chapter 3

The Role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the Afghan Crisis Muhammad Naveed Akhtar Federal Urdu University of Arts Sciences and Techonology, Pakistan Faisal Javaid https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3417-5656 Federal Urdu University of Arts, Sciences and Technology, Pakistan

ABSTRACT Shanghai cooperation organization (SCO) is the largest regional organization in the world, holding 42% of the world’s population, 20% of its area, and 25% of the GDP. Afghanistan has been the least peaceful country for eight consecutive years. The SCO countries surround Afghanistan, and Afghanistan is an observer in the organization. Afghanistan is in crisis due to internal and external factors. Millions of people are internally displaced; many fled to other countries, and two-thirds of the Afghan population need humanitarian assistance to survive. Afghanistan remained a source of cross-border terrorism and drug trafficking. The hasty withdrawal of the U.S. forces, the non-recognization status of the Taliban government, and the sanctions have complexed the matter. Neighbouring countries are worried about the spillover effect. If the Afghan issues are not addressed, it would worsen the security situation in the region. Can SCO play an active role in solving Afghan problems? This chapter examines the potential role of the SCO, its limitations, and challenges in resolving the Afghan issues.

INTRODUCTION Afghanistan contains multi-ethnic, multi-faith and multi-linguistic groups. These groups are in a contest to achieve political might. Afghanistan is the hub of terrorist organizations and groups. Afghanistan is notorious for opium cultivation. Drug trafficking is the major source of income for warlords. Afghanistan has been a battleground of proxy wars between major powers. In the past major powers (Great Britain, DOI: 10.4018/978-1-6684-9467-7.ch003

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 The Role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the Afghan Crisis

U.S.S.R and the U.S.A.) invaded Afghanistan. Internal polarization and external interference of regional and global powers made Afghanistan an unstable and fragile state. Internal and external factors have caused severe problems in Afghanistan. Unplanned Withdrawal of the U.S. forces has created a power vacuum and worsened the situation in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is facing a severe multidimensional crisis after the hasty withdrawal of the U.S. forces. According to the reports Afghanistan is the least peaceful country in the world. Millions of Afghans have fled to neighbouring countries. Millions of Afghans are internally displaced and need food and health services to survive. If political, social, economic and security issues in Afghanistan are not solved it could lead to a disaster. International organizations and major powers have failed to obtain political stability in Afghanistan. An unstable Afghanistan is a serious threat to the world especially for the neighbouring countries. Shanghai Cooperation (SCO) is the largest regional organization in terms of population and area. Russia and China are co-founders of the Organization. Afghanistan shares borders with SCO members. Afghanistan is also an observer state of the SCO. SCO members share some common objectives relating to Afghanistan including, cross-border terrorist activities, drug trade and regional economic development. Afghanistan holds significance in the security calculus of the SCO. A stable and peaceful Afghanistan is essential for regional stability and economic development. The SCO provides hope for the settlement of Afghan issues. This chapter deals with the potential role of the SCO in resolving Afghan problems. This chapter addresses the following questions. How SCO could play a role in resolving the Afghan Crisis? What are the Challenges for the SCO in resolving the Afghan issues? What are the limitations of the SCO for dealing with regional conflicts? Why SCO is a better option for resolving Afghan problems? This chapter examines the role of the SCO in resolving the Afghan Crisis.

Research Methodology The study is Descriptive and Qualitative. Afghanistan has been the source of cross-border terrorism and drug trafficking. An unstable Afghanistan poses a direct threat to its neighbouring countries. Shanghai Cooperation Organization is the largest regional organization and Afghanistan is its observer. Neorealism provides theoretical foundations for this study. Secondary data is used for this study. Data is collected through reliable resources. Journal articles, books, newspapers, reports of international organizations, reports of non-governmental organizations, conference proceedings and research papers are the sources of data collection for this study.

Literature Review There is a plethora of literature available regarding the topic of this chapter. The chapter is descriptive. Historical events and facts are cited from different reliable sources. Kenneth Waltz explained “Realism” with new features when he wrote “Theory of International Politics (1979)” and laid the foundation of “Neorealism” in International Relations. According to the theory of Neorealism international structure determines the state’s behaviour. Waltz (1979) says that security is the basic goal of a state. States make alliances for security. Multiple reports and indices formulated by International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) such as Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) (2021,2023), International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) (2023), Reporters Without Borders (RSF) (2023), Transparency International(TI) (2023), UN Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs (OCHA) 45

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(2023) and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2023) provide data to estimate the impact of the Afghan Crises. Official documents from the official website of the SCO like the SCO Charter (2002) and SCO Summit Decelerations (2002-2023) describe the structure, goals, limitations and plans of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Alexander Cooley, Dr. Shirin Akiner and Thomas Bartfield are prominent experts in the Central Asian Region and Afghanistan. Cooley wrote multiple articles and chapters regarding the SCO and Central Asia. Cooley (2010) explains the evolution of the SCO and its perception in the West and recommends guidelines for U.S. policy. Akiner (2010) examines the structure, aims, and capabilities of the SCO. Barfield (2018) points out that lust for power and authority is the major hurdle to the formation of a peaceful political system in Afghanistan and peaceful incorporation of the insurgents is necessary to tackle Afghan conflict.

A Review of Afghanistan’s Political History Ahmed Shah Durrani (also known as Ahmed Shah Abdali) is regarded as the founder of Afghanistan. In 1747, After the murder of Nadir Shah, Afghan Loya Jirga (Grand Council) assembled in Kandahar and appointed Ahmed Shah a new ruler of Afghanistan (Shah, 2012). After Ahmed Shah, the empire was divided into smaller units. Dost Muhammad Khan became Emir (Ruler) of “Emarat of Afghanistan” in 1826 and continued to fight a civil war for the unification of units. Dost Muhammad Khan was exiled in 1839, he came back in 1842 and again ruled Afghanistan till 1863. In 1926, Amanullah Khan converted the emirate into a monarchy and “Emirate Afghanistan” converted to the “Kingdom of Afghanistan” and he became the first king of Afghanistan (“A Historical Timeline”, 2011). In 1973, Muhammad Daud Khan overthrew Zahir Shah, he converted the “Kingdom of Afghanistan” into “Republic of Afghanistan” and became the first president of Afghanistan (Barfield, 2018). A communist revolution occurred in 1978, Muhammad Daud Khan was killed in a coup d’état, the Republic of Afghanistan turned into the “Democratic Republic of Afghanistan” and Nur Muhammad Tarakai formed the government (Barfield, 2018). In 1979, Russia invaded Afghanistan and a war continued between the US-led Mujahadeen and the Soviet-backed Government of Afghanistan. The U.S.A., United Kingdom, Arab States and Pakistan helped and supported Mujahadeen against the Soviet Union. In 1989, Pakistan and Afghanistan signed the Geneva Accord, and the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. served as guarantors. According to the Accord, the independence of Afghanistan and the safe exit of Soviet troops were guaranteed. Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989. Najibullah remained in power till 1992. After the withdrawal of Soviet forces, a civil war erupted between mujahedeen groups for power. In 1994, a new religious group “The Taliban” emerged in southern areas of Afghanistan. Taliban took over the control of Afghanistan in 1996. In 1997, Taliban commander Mulla Umer renamed the country as “Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan”. Taliban declared Afghanistan an Islamic state and imposed Islamic laws according to their interpretations. Taliban faced criticism due to their strict actions. Ahmad Shah Massoud formed the “Northern Alliance” by uniting different ethnic groups to fight against the Taliban. In 1998, the U.S.A. bombed Afghanistan after attacks on U.S. embassies in Nairobi (Kenya) and Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania) for which Al Qaeda was blamed (“East African Embassy”, n.d). The U.S.A. demanded Afghanistan to hand over Usama bin Laden but the Taliban refused to do so without proof. The U.N. imposed sanctions on the Taliban in 1999 for not handing over Bin Laden. After 9/11 the U.S. and NATO forces attacked the Taliban and toppled the Taliban government in 2001. Hamid Karzai, a US-backed leader became 46

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president of Afghanistan and remained in power till 2014. In 2014, Again a US-backed leader Ashraf Ghani became president of Afghanistan. Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani were considered American stooges by opponents and Afghan people didn’t accept them as leaders. The Afghan government failed to control the Taliban, the Taliban organized themselves with more strength and the U.S.A. started negotiations with the Taliban for a peaceful solution. The U.S.A. and the Taliban signed the Doha Agreement in 2020. According to the Doha Agreement, the new Afghan government should be an inclusive government and the Taliban would help the safe withdrawal of the U.S. forces. In 2021, the U.S. troops withdrew from Afghanistan and the Taliban succeeded in conquering Kabul. Taliban did not comply with the promise of intra-Afghan dialogue for the formation of an inclusive government (Wani, 2022). The U.S. withdrawal has been termed a strategic failure (Borger, 2021). The Taliban government is not recognized by the UNO.

Nature and Background of the Afghan Crisis Afghanistan is a country containing diverse ethnic, religious and linguistic groups. There is no reliable fresh data available showing the exact population percentage of different groups. Muslims are the largest religious community (99.7%), the Sunni sect is 84.7-89.7%, and Shia is 10-15% (CIA, 2023). Pushtoon is the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan. Major ethnolinguistic groups of Afghanistan are Pushtoon 42%, Tajik 27%, Uzbek 9%, Hazara 8%, Aimak 4%, Turkmen 3%, Baluch 2%, other 5% (“The Ethnic Groups”, n.d). Ethnic groups in Afghanistan are in the hegemonic mood to dominate others and desire strength by linking up with ethnic kin outside Afghanistan (Balkhi, 2023). Superpowers and neighbouring countries of Afghanistan have their interests in Afghanistan; to accomplish their interests, interested countries influence Afghanistan by supporting their favoured groups. During the war between the Sovietbacked government and mujahadeen, the U.S.A. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia supported mujahedeen and the Soviet Union supported the government of Afghanistan. Taliban are mostly Pushtoon and belong to the Sunni sect of Islam. Taliban have links in Pakistan on ethnic and religious bases. Northern Alliance (1996-2001) was supported by Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Iran, Russia, India and the U.S.A. In Afghanistan, neighbouring countries have aligned as well as colliding interests. To control cross-border terrorism, and drug trafficking and a stable and peaceful Afghanistan for trade and energy pipelines are aligned interests of neighbouring countries. Getting an influential position in Afghanistan’s government is a major conflicting issue among countries. There are many reasons for conflict in Afghanistan for example ethnic conflict, religious conflict, control of opium cultivation and drug trade and lust for power of warlords.

Impact of the Afghan Crisis The Afghan crisis leaves severe and horrific impacts on Afghan society and economy. According to the Global Peace Index 2023, for eight consecutive years, Afghanistan has been the least peaceful country in the world: Afghanistan suffered a substantial economic cost of violence, the economic cost of violence in Afghanistan was 46.5% of its GDP in 2022, the second largest country after Ukraine (IEP, 2023). A link between ecological degradation and conflict could be observed through reports. Eleven out of fifteen countries facing the worst ecological degradation are in conflict and Afghanistan is one of eleven countries (IEP, 2021). Till January 2023, 28.3 million people (about two-thirds of the total population of Afghanistan) needed humanitarian assistance on an urgent basis to survive, as the country is facing drought-like conditions, and 2023 is the third consecutive year of drought-like conditions, 17 47

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million people were facing acute hunger including 6 million those who were facing food insecurity at emergence level (one step away from famine) (OCHA, 2023a). OCHA reports indicate a progressive increase in the number of “people in need”, in January 2021 the number was 18.4 million, in 2022 was 24.4 million, in January 2023 was 28.3 and in June 2023 the number increased to 29.2 million (OCHA, 2023a; OCHA, 2023b). Afghanistan has been dependent on foreign aid for decades, according to the World Bank Report 2019, 75% of Afghanistan’s public expenditures were covered by foreign assistance and the aid was suspended after the Taliban’s takeover; in 2022 donors provided over 2.6 $ billion, the amount was short to country’s humanitarian need (Maizland, 2023). Afghanistan is facing an economic crisis and the reasons are instability, political situation, security and sanctions imposed by the U.S.A. and European Union. The UN Security Council and European Union imposed sanctions on the Taliban in 1999, expanded sanctions after 9/11 and the U.S. has also blocked Afghanistan’s assets to access by the Taliban; these actions hindered the aid deliverance process to Afghanistan after the Taliban takeover in 2021 (Maizland, 2023). Due to war, millions of people left their homes and migrated to safe areas within the country and also fled to neighbouring countries. As of December 2022, nearly 6.6 million people were displaced internally, the largest number in South Asia and the second largest in the world after Syria (IDMC, 2023). The return to home of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Refugees is a big challenge. Afghan diaspora is also a challenge to neighbouring countries. Regional Refugee Plan Programme (2023) for Afghanistan indicates that more than eight million (documented and non-documented) Afghans are residing in neighbouring countries and the most affected countries are Pakistan and Iran: Iran hosts an estimated 4,500,000 Afghans including 820,700 registered refugees, Pakistan 3,700,000 including 1,500,000 registered refugees, Uzbekistan11,700 registered refugees, Tajikistan 11,000 total and 9,700 registered refugees and Turkmenistan total 5,000 and 2,000 registered refugees (UNHCR, 2023). Financial requirements for this programme in US Dollars are as for Iran are 198,981,998, Pakistan 383,764,416, Tajikistan 17,487,628, Turkmenistan 2,007,199 and Uzbekistan 10,771,746 (UNHCR, 2023).

Significance of Afghanistan Afghanistan is very important for its geopolitical, geostrategic and geographical location. Afghanistan links Central Asia, the Middle East and South Asia. Afghanistan is a landlocked country. Afghanistan shares borders with Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Iran, China and Tajikistan. Afghanistan provides a trade route from Central Asia to South Asia. Neighbours and SCO countries have interests in Afghanistan. Pakistan is the most affected country by the Afghan conflict. Pakistan wants a stable and peaceful Afghanistan because stability in Pakistan is linked with stability in Afghanistan. Pakistan has been involved in the Soviet-Afghan war. Pakistan has a large number of Pushtoon and Sunni Muslims. In the previous tenure of the Taliban Pakistan was one of three countries that recognized Afghanistan. This time after 2021 Pakistan supported the Taliban government on diplomatic and economic fronts but has not recognized the Taliban government following the international community. Pakistan has lost thousands of lives and billions of dollars after attacks by militant groups originated and organized on Afghan soil. Pakistan is worried about Indian-backed and Indian-financed terrorist groups in Afghanistan. Pakistan is more comfortable with the Taliban regime compared to previous governments. India has no border with Afghanistan but has its strategic and economic interests. Indian strategic interests in Afghanistan are Pakistan-centric. India wants an anti-Pakistan government that can also control and cut links between Afghanistan and fighters in Kashmir. India perceived the Taliban’s triumph as a strategic 48

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gain for Pakistan because India favoured the anti-Taliban alliance and invested over 3 billion US dollars and about $750 million in aid since 2001 (Chatterjee, 2022). China wants to implement its Belt and Road initiative and seeks a guarantee from the Afghan government to stop supporting the Uyghur separatist movement in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region borders Afghanistan Uzbekistan and Pakistan. Uyghurs are Muslims and ethnically Turk and have ethnical and religious support from neighbouring countries. Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region is the largest Chinese province and China has concerns about cross-border support to Uyghurs from neighbouring countries. Central Asian states faced cross-border terrorism exported from Afghanistan. The groups behind the five-year Tajik Civil War (1990s), the invasion of militants in Kyrgyzstan (1999-2000), and the car bomb series in Uzbekistan (1999) were linked with Afghanistan (Pantucci, 2021). Uzbekistan has ethnic ties with the Uzbek people in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan has faced a problem of religious extremist militant groups like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) operating from Afghanistan. Turkmenistan has economic interests in Afghanistan and wants safety for its pipelines to South Asia. Tajiks are the second largest community, about 25% of Afghanistan. Tajikistan has ties with the Tajik community in Afghanistan. After the Taliban’s takeover in 2021, Tajikistan offered and provided its land to anti-Taliban leaders in government including Ashraf Ghani (the then-president of Afghanistan). Dostum, an Uzbek leader fled to Uzbekistan. Iran has a soft corner for the Hazara community on a religious basis, Hazaras are predominantly Shia Muslims and the third largest community in Afghanistan. Iran favoured anti-Taliban alliances in Afghanistan. Iran has also contacted the Taliban to safeguard its interests in Afghanistan. Iran is worried about the Islamic State-Khurasan Province (ISKP). In 2015, Iran concluded that the then-Afghan government was not capable of combating ISKP and expanded engagement with the Taliban to counter ISKP (Aman, 2022). Cross-border terrorism, drug trafficking and the safety of energy roots are matters of serious concern for neighbouring countries. Pakistan and India need energy for domestic and industrial use. Pakistan and India want energy from Central Asian countries and Iran to meet their needs. Different projects of energy transfer were planned from Central Asia and Iran to Pakistan and India via Afghanistan. These projects are uncompleted for security reasons in Afghanistan. Regional countries want a stable and peaceful Afghanistan.

Shanghai Cooperation Organization Shanghai Cooperation Organization is the largest regional organization in the world that holds approximately 42% of the world’s population, 20% area and 25% of GDP (Dimitropoulou, 2022.; “Countries in the World”, 2023). Shanghai Cooperation Organization was formed in 2001 by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Shanghai Cooperation Organization was transformed from the Shanghai Five (China, Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan). During the Soviet-Afghan war (1979-1989) Afghanistan was divided between two major camps, Pro-Soviet and Pro-Mujahedeen, superpowers and interested countries were interfering and supporting their favoured groups. After the Soviet withdrawal, interference further increased; interference during the Soviet invasion was due to the split of the world into two blocks (pro-Soviet and pro-Mujahedeen) and after withdrawal, the war took new dimensions and converted to a war of proxy groups of regional countries that dragged the country into a civil war and Afghanistan was associated with extremism, terrorism and separatism, in this situation, Central Asian countries China and Russia formed Shanghai Five in 1996 (“Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit”, 2022). After Uzbekistan’s addition, Shanghai Five changed into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. After the Soviet withdrawal, a civil war erupted in Afghanistan and the internal 49

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situation of Afghanistan alarmed the Central Asian and neighbouring countries for export of terrorism and extremism. Shanghai Five was the first international mechanism called for cooperation against terrorism in the Central Asian Region, in 2001, the SCO members arranged a convention on combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism and signed the first anti-terrorism international treaty of the 21st Century (Guang, 2007). Fighting against Three Evils (Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism) is the main goal of the organization. Economic development through regional integration is also a major goal of the organization. The organization holds regular meetings and exercises to achieve its goals. Pakistan and India joined SCO as permanent members in 2017. Iran became a member on 4th July 2023 and Belarus will become in 2024. Decision-making in the organization is based on consensus. The Organization is based on principles of non-interference and non-aggression. Shanghai Cooperation also conducts antiterror joint military exercises. SCO has proved itself an effective mechanism for solving regional issues relating to stability and security. SCO meetings of different levels have helped to address issues relating to counter-terrorism, SCO conducts meetings and exercises regularly to overcome terrorism and significant achievements can be seen in the development of a system against threats to regional security (Sokol & Ratushnyak, 2019). The Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation was signed in 2022 at the Heads of State meeting held in St. Petersburg. The Charter comprises 16 articles. Article 1 explains the goals and tasks of the organization; to combat terrorism, extremism and separatism, to fight against illicit drugs are included in the main goals and tasks of the SCO (SCO Charter, 2002). Article 2 explains the principles of the SCO; respect for sovereignty, non-interference, non-aggression, no use of force, and equality are leading principles of the Organization (SCO Charter, 2002). Article 3 explains areas of cooperation within SCO; maintaining peace and enhancing security and confidence in the region is the foremost area of cooperation (SCO Charter, 2002). Article 13 of the SCO Charter (2002) describes prerequisites for membership; membership is open for other states in the region, and the interested state should respect the objectives and principles of the SCO Charter and must comply with all international treaties and documents adopted in the Organization’s framework. Article 16 explains the decision-making process in the SCO; decisions are made by consensus not by voting. Article 22 guides dispute settlement; states shall settle disputes through negotiations and consultations (SCO Charter, 2002). Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) is the permanent body of the SCO. RATS was established to counter-terrorism. RATS conducts anti-terror joint military exercises at a larger scale and also arranges training sessions. RATS collects and organizes information about terrorists and terrorist organizations. RATS coordinates with SCO members for anti-terror activities.

Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Afghanistan Afghanistan is very important for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Afghanistan is surrounded by Pakistan, China, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Iran. All neighbouring countries except Turkmenistan are SCO members. All SCO members are worried about cross-border terrorism emanating from Afghanistan. An unstable Afghanistan poses serious threats to neighbouring countries. The creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is directly linked with the situation in Afghanistan. Nursultan Nazarbayev (former Kazakh President) characterized Afghanistan as “the cradle of terrorism, separatism and extremism” in his opening comments in 2001(Pantucci, 2021). Zhan Ming (SecretaryGeneral of the SCO) stated that SCO has paid great attention and importance to the Afghan issue, SCO has made fruitful efforts to mediate and resolve the Afghan issue, SCO will make efforts for the establishment of a peaceful stable country free of terrorism and drug, to turn Afghanistan into a constructive 50

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factor for regional peace, security and development is our goal (“Afghanistan: Life Beyond Scars”, 2022). Afghanistan has historical and economic relations with SCO countries. According to 2017-18 statistics, more than 60% of Afghanistan’s trade was with SCO countries, 150 ethnic groups are living in the SCO region 30 out of 150 are living in Afghanistan, the statistics indicate significance of the Afghanistan for the SCO countries (Khalil, 2021). Afghanistan remains a focal point in every annual meeting of the councils of Heads of State and Foreign Ministers. SCO Heads of State Council is the apex body of the SCO. SCO conducts Heads of State Council meetings in which important issues are discussed and decisions are taken. Afghanistan remains a priority in every meeting. Taliban’s first tenure ended in 2001 after the invasion of the U.S. and NATO forces. At that time China, Russia and Central Asian states were in line with the U.S.A. against the war on terror. SCO countries were worried about cross-border terrorist activities from Afghanistan and were not satisfied with the strict views and actions of the Taliban government. In June 2002, at St Peterburg, the SCO Heads of State meeting was held. The SCO members wished to welcome the creation of a new Afghanistan free from terror, war, poverty and drugs; they declared that the security of the Central Asian Region is inextricably linked to the peace process in Afghanistan and showed respect for cultures and traditions of all peoples and showed readiness for facilitation of the process for the formation of a broadly representative government. On September 23, 2003, the Summit was held in Moscow. SCO Members stressed multilateral cooperation to counter drug threat arising from Afghanistan and expressed their support to efforts for stabilization in Afghanistan; the SCO 2004 summit was held in Tashkent, and SCO members agreed that SCO would strive to promote international cooperation in the fight against terrorism extremism and drug trafficking to achieve security and peace and create conditions for peaceful reconstruction of Afghanistan. SCO states welcomed and facilitated the U.S. and NATO forces for operations in Afghanistan. After a series of Colour Revolutions (allegedly backed by the West) in the region and the U.S. and the Western interference in internal affairs of the Central Asian region annoyed Central Asian governments and voices for eviction of foreign forces from Central Asian region began to rise. The prolonged presence of the U.S. forces in Central Asia, in proximity to China and Russia was alarming for regional powers (China and Russia). During the war in Afghanistan and the use of the Central Asian bases, the SCO remained silent and after Astana in 2005 officially demanded the withdrawal of the U.S. forces from Central Asian bases. SCO was perceived as a strategic challenge to the U.S.A. and the presence of NATO in Central Asia and this view gained currency when the SCO issued a communiqué declaring a timetable for withdrawal (Cooley, 2010). Astana Deceleration of the SCO summit 2005 was very important and alarming for the foreign forces stationed in Central Asia, SCO officially declared setting a date for evacuation from military bases of Central Asia, and the SCO members showed willingness for active participation in international efforts for building anti-drug belts around Afghanistan and for stabilization in Afghanistan. On 16 August 2007, the SCO Summit was held in Bishkek and SCO Summit 2008 was held on 28 August in Dushanbe, SCO members expressed concerns over the drug threat and its negative impact on the Central Asian region; in 2007, SCO members urged for the revitalization of SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group, in 2008 members were agreed for a joint mechanism of analyzing, prevention and response to the threats and challenges (drug trafficking and organized crimes) and preparation of a special conference on Afghanistan for the joint struggle was discussed. On 27 March 2009, a special conference on Afghanistan was organized by the SCO in Moscow. The conference was held just before the international conference on Afghanistan held in the Hague. Delegates from more than 30 countries and organizations including the U.S.A, United Nations, NATO, European Union and Commonwealth of Independent States attended the meeting and deceleration was passed, participants of the Conference stressed 51

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a concreted and combined effort to counter terrorism, illicit narcotics and organized crimes, the role of international organizations (CSTO, UN, OIC) was appreciated and the SCO was found an appropriate forum for dialogue relating Afghan issues (China Embassy Timor-Leste, 2009). On June 15-16, 2009, the SCO summit was held in Yekaterinburg, SCO members declared concerns about Afghanistan’s situation and urged for cooperative actions of concerned countries and international organizations. On June 10-11, 2010, the 10th meeting of the Heads of State Council of the SCO was held in Tashkent. Members of the SCO discussed regional issues and Afghanistan was given special consideration. According to the deceleration of the meeting, terrorism, drug trafficking and transnational organized crimes originating from Afghanistan posed a threat to the region, members reaffirmed their support for the United Nation’s leading role in mediating the situation in Afghanistan and the negotiation process led by UN with participation of Afghan people, members also stated that traditional religious and ethnic values of all ethnic groups should be valued, members associated long-term economic and social development of the region with security, peace and stability (MFA China, 2010). On, June 15, 2011, the 10th anniversary of the SCO founding was held in Astana. SCO members agreed to support efforts for a stable and peaceful country and a stable Afghanistan was considered the main factor for international and national security (SCO Astana Deceleration, 2011). SCO members signed a five-year (2011- 2016) anti-narcotics strategy to counter the negative impact of drug threats (SCO Astana Deceleration 2011). On June 6-7, 2012, a Heads of State meeting was held in Beijing, the meeting was important for Afghanistan. In the meeting, Afghanistan was approved as an observer country in the SCO (SCO Beijing Deceleration, 2012). SCO members supported efforts to make a stable, independent and peaceful Afghanistan and suggested an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned national reconciliation process in Afghanistan. On September 13, 2013, the SCO summit was held in Bishkek. Members again offered support for making a neutral and peaceful Afghanistan free from war, drugs and terrorism and stressed the need for an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned national reconciliation to achieve stability and security (SCO Bishkek Deceleration, 2013). On September 11-12, 2014, the SCO Heads of State meeting was held in Dushanbe. Members emphasized respect for Afghanistan’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and supported efforts for a peaceful and stable country, members supported the efforts of Afghan people for peace and revival of Afghanistan under Afghan leadership, members favoured a strengthened UN coordinating role in settlement of Afghanistan (SCO Dushanbe Deceleration, 2014). On 9-10 July 2015, the SCO summit was held in Ufa, members supported the vision for the establishment of a stable, neutral, peaceful and prosperous nation free from terror, war and drugs and recognized the central role of the United Nations (SCO Ufa Deceleration, 2015). On June 24, 2016, the SCO summit connected with the 15th anniversary of the SCO was held in Tashkent. SCO members supported the resolution of the intra-Afghan conflict through an inclusive peace process led by Afghans themselves, SCO also recognized the United Nations’ role in Afghan settlement, and members interlinked regional security with peace and stability in Afghanistan (SCO Tashkent Deceleration, 2016). On June 9, 2017, the SCO summit was held in Astana. Astana Deceleration 2017 stated the willingness of the SCO to support the efforts to build a peaceful, stable and prosperous state free from terrorism extremism and drugs, and also to the continuous efforts of SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group for restoration of peace (SCO Astana Deceleration, 2017). On June 9-10, 2018, the SCO summit was held in Qingdao. At Qingdao Summit 2018, a protocol was signed by the SCO members and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on the SCOAfghanistan Contact Group (SCO Qingdao Deceleration, 2018). On June 14, 2019, the SCO Summit was held in Bishkek. SCO members reaffirmed their support for a stable and secure Afghanistan free from drugs and war, members recognized the United Nation’s central role in the Afghanistan situation, 52

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members also praised outcomes of the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group (SCO Bishkek Deceleration, 2019). On November 10, 2020, the SCO summit was conducted via videoconference hosted by Moscow. SCO urged for the soonest possible settlement of Afghanistan for stability and security in the SCO space, SCO members again expressed their support for the efforts of the Afghanistan government and people for the restoration of peace, and members stressed the need for a political dialogue and peace process by Afghans themselves and the role of international organizations with central United Nation’s role for stabilization. Members also attached the importance of multilateral formats including SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group, Moscow format and others. SCO Summit also expressed concerns about threats to national and international stability and security posed by narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and their precursors and the use of drug profit in terrorism financing, the SCO declared firm intention to facilitate of existing international system of drug enforcement based on UN Conventions on Narcotic Drug (1961), Psychotropic Substances (1971) and UN Convention against illicit traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988) (SCO Moscow Deceleration, 2020). On September 16, 2022, the SCO summit was held in Samarkand. According to the deceleration of the meeting, the settlement of Afghanistan is the key factor for stabilization and security in the SCO space, SCO favoured a neutral, unified, democratic free from terrorism, war and drugs and an independent state, SCO urged the establishment of an inclusive government representing all ethnic, political and religious groups of the Afghan society. After the withdrawal of the U.S. forces and control of the Taliban, many Afghans left the country and fled to neighbouring countries. The settlement of refugees is also an important factor in the Afghan crisis. In SCO Summit 2022, the importance of hospitality and effective assistance of refugees by neighbouring countries was felt, SCO members urged the international community to make efforts to a dignified, safe and sustainable return of refugees to their homeland (SCO Samarkand Deceleration, 2022). On July 4, 2023, the SCO Summit was held via videoconference hosted by India, the SCO members stressed a stable, neutral, democratic and peaceful Afghanistan free from terrorism and drugs, members considered an inclusive government of all groups, considered an active role of the international community for helping refugees return to home and supported efforts to assist Afghan people (SCO New Delhi Deceleration, 2023). Afghanistan and SCO RATS signed a protocol in 2015 to counter-terrorism and in 2018 signed a protocol with SCO to fight against terrorism and political issues. SCO did not invite Afghanistan to its official meetings for its non-recognition status in the international community.

SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group The SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group was established in Beijing in November 2005 (Omelicheva, 2021). SCO Afghanistan-Contact Group was established between SCO and Afghanistan to elaborate proposals and recommendations for cooperation between SCO and Afghanistan for mutual interests; Chinese, Russian and English languages were accepted as official languages of the Contact Group (“Protocol on Establishment”, 2006). The Group was rendered irrelevant and dysfunctional in 2009 because the Global Security focus was shifted to West Asia (Syria and Iraq) to counter ISIS and the Contact Group ceased defunct (Stopdan, 2021). SCO Afghan-Contact Group was resumed in 2017. Generally, the Group functions at the deputy foreign ministerial level. The first meeting of the Contact Group after resuming was held on October 11, 2017, in Moscow. The second meeting was held on May 28, 2018, in Beijing. The third meeting was held on April 19, 2019, in Bishkek. The fourth meeting was held on July 14, 2021, in Dushanbe just one month before the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan. In 2018, a protocol was signed 53

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between the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group and the SCO. The fourth meeting was the last meeting of the Contact Group attended by all SCO members, The Secretary-General of the SCO, the Director of the Executive Committee of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure and the Afghan foreign minister attended the meeting, during meeting Afghanistan’s situation after the U.S withdrawal was discussed and all parties were committed strengthening cooperation and coordination at regional and international level for peace and sustainable development in Afghanistan (MFA China, 2021). The Group comprises all stakeholders of the region. The Group could provide amicable solutions to Afghanistan’s related issues. Again SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group is dysfunctional because of Afghanistan’s non-recognition status.

Taliban’s Second Term Taliban’s takeover in 2021 affected Afghanistan positively and negatively. The Taliban government is facing criticism for its strict laws, especially for jeopardizing women’s rights. Afghanistan is the only country in the world where girls are prohibited from secondary education: in September 2021, from 2002-2021, before the Taliban’s takeover, 3,816,793 girls were enrolled in schools, over 100,000 were enrolled in universities, 80,554 were female teachers, 2,439 were female lecturers, 63 women were in Afghan parliament, 280 women were Judges, over 500 women were prosecutors and over 2,000 women were owned small and medium business, the role of women was increasing in patriarchal society of Afghanistan, Taliban erased the progress.(Ahmadi & Sultan, 2023). Afghan Ministry of Women Affairs was established in 2001 after the fall of the Taliban and when the Taliban took over the control of Afghanistan in 2021 the Ministry of Women Affairs was replaced by the Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice. In 2023 Taliban banned women from working for the U.N. (Thomas, 2023). Taliban are criticized for not forming an inclusive government representing all groups. Taliban has denied this allegation and claimed that they have an inclusive government representing all ethnic groups including Tajiks, Uzbeks, Baloch, Turkmens, Nuristanis and others (Sajid, 2021). Afghanistan is at 152nd position in Press Freedom in 2023, the position was 156th in 2022, 122nd in 2021, 122nd in 2020 and 121st in 2019 (RSF, 2023). Afghanistan was producing drugs for the world and was the biggest country in opium cultivation and drug production till 2022 (The Associated Press, 2022). Drug trafficking is the major concern of SCO countries and the rest world. Previous governments failed to control it even though the U.S.A. has spent eight billion US dollars to eradicate poppy production, instead, it was increased (The Associated Press, 2022). In, April 2022, the Taliban decreed a ban on poppy cultivation. Taliban succeeded in dropping 80% of poppy cultivation in 2023 as compared to last year (Limaye, 2023). Afghanistan has continuously ranked among the first and tenth most corrupt governments till 2021; according to the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) by Transparency International (TI), Afghanistan was at 174th position out of 180 in 2017, 172nd in 2018, 173rd in 2019, 165th in 2020 and 174th in 2021, After Taliban Afghanistan is at 150th in 2022 that indicates an improvement in this field (Transparency International, 2023). After the Taliban’s takeover, law and order situation improved. For human rights, women’s education and, press freedom Afghan government is criticized and in the fields of security, governance and drug control an improvement could be observed.

SCO’s Relevance to Afghan Issues Why does SCO seem the most effective mechanism among available regional and international options to solve the Afghan issues? 54

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First, Geographical location makes Afghanistan a natural ally and partner of the SCO. Afghanistan borders with SCO countries except for Turkmenistan. Second, China and Russia, two regional powers are its members. Russia and China are cofounders of the SCO. China and Russia both do not want to fill the power vacuum left after the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan unilaterally; Russia does not want due to the bad experience of its embarrassing withdrawal from Afghanistan and is hesitant to get tangled once again especially when it has opened other fronts (Arctic and European), Chines leadership do not want to become a dominant force by getting awareness from British, Soviet and American mistakes in Afghanistan, a common approach of Shanghai Cooperation Organization can ease the situation for both heavyweights to participate in stabilization process of the Afghanistan (Khorrami, 2021). There is no other regional security organization having Russia and China as its members. Third, Pakistan and India, two rivals of South Asia are also SCO members. Pakistan is the most affected country due to Afghanistan’s situation. India has no geographical link with Afghanistan but has strategic interests in Afghanistan. Pakistan and India blame each other for backing cross-border terrorist activities planned and organized on Afghan soil. Pakistan has concerns about Indian extraordinary presence and involvement in Afghanistan and according to Pakistan, most terror activities in the country were organized by Indian-sponsored “Tahreek e Taliban Pakistan” (TTP). Pakistan was not happy with the Indian influence in anti-Pakistan political forces in Afghanistan. Pakistan accused India of training camps for terrorists and also provided irrefutable and uncontrivable evidence, Pakistan provided proof of Indian financial and material sponsorship to terrorist organizations including Jamaat ul Ahrar, Bloch Liberation Army and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (Gul, 2020). India blames Pakistan for sponsoring and training groups involved in insurgency in Kashmir. Pakistan is considered pro-Taliban and India supports anti-Taliban and anti-Pakistan forces in Afghanistan. Pakistan and India are hostile nations and have contradictory views about terrorism. There is no other regional organization that can provide a conducive environment for dialogue between Pakistan and India on Afghan issues. During the presidency of Ashraf Ghani India was comfortable and influential in Afghanistan while Pakistan was uneasy due to repeated statements of Ashraf Ghani blaming Pakistan for involvement in Afghanistan. After the Taliban’s control India took it as a strategic defeat and for Pakistan it was a strategic gain. Pakistan isolated India and separated it from Afghan-related conferences and mechanisms. Due to the anti-Taliban stance and bad relations with Pakistan, India has no way to be involved in the process relating to Afghanistan. SCO is the only organization that can provide India with diplomatic opportunities to be involved in the peace process in Afghanistan. SCO is the only option where both countries can discuss Afghan issues. Fourth, Indian involvement and participation in the SCO-led peace process will help to make SCO’s decision acceptable to the U.S. and the Western world. SCO is perceived as an anti-West organization led by Russia and China and Iran as a member (anti-US forces) and Indian participation will lessen this perception. Fifth, stability and peace in directly linked with regional integration and economic development for the SCO countries. All SCO countries are stakeholders in this regard. China wants stability and peace in Afghanistan for its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); Central Asian countries, Pakistan, and India want the safety of routes, transmission lines and pipelines. SCO being the most powerful and united mechanism at the regional level has the potential to improve the security of energy resources for both energy-producing and energy-consuming countries (Koolaee & Tisheyar, 2015). All other mechanisms have failed to solve the Afghan problem. In the current scenario, it seems that the SCO presents the only viable option to ensure a relative degree of predictability and normalcy in the 55

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state’s behaviour of Afghanistan, regardless of the main power broker group in the post-US-Afghanistan (Khorrami, 2021). SCO is the most relevant organization to solve Afghan Issues.

SCO’s Anticipated Role in Afghanistan To what extent would SCO help resolve Afghanistan’s problems is hard to predict. Stability and peace in Afghanistan are directly linked to political turmoil, deteriorated economy, weak infrastructure and weak institutions. SCO can help Afghanistan to strengthen and improve its weak institutions. The unified and combined support of the SCO could help Afghanistan in different fields. Political: The establishment of an inclusive government that represents all ethnic, political and religious groups is the major factor in attaining stability and peace in Afghanistan. The government should represent all groups. Ethnic and religious groups have links with SCO countries and SCO countries can play their role in providing good office to solve political, ethnic and religious issues. NATO and the U.S. forces failed due to their coercive approach and the use of force is not a viable solution to Afghan problems. Afghanistan never accepted foreigners. Afghanistan is called “A Graveyard of Empires”. SCO is based on the principle of non-interference, for Afghanistan the same principle applies but noninterference does not mean non-engagement, in past, engagement was relatively low level and the major factor was the U.S. antipathy to this organization (Akiner, 2010). Now, the U.S.A. has left Afghanistan. SCO follows the policy of non-interference and denies the use of force. SCO suggests and supports an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned national reconciliation process that would be acceptable to everyone. Economic: SCO desires economic development and regional integration. SCO has established different institutions and mechanisms for regional integration and economic development. SCO Interbank Consortium and SCO Business Council were created in 2005 and 2006 respectively to facilitate and improve trade and economy. SCO has also signed multiple treaties to remove legal constraints hindering regional integration. SCO signed the “International Road Transport Facilitation” agreement in 2014 and the agreement has been enforced since 2017. China is implementing its Belt and Road Initiatives. SCO and BRI are envisaging development through easy access and links. The development of infrastructures and regional integration could help Afghanistan’s economy and stability. Security: Afghanistan requires strong institutions to maintain security in the country. Afghanistan lacks this field. SCO RATS can provide assistance and support in this regard. RATS was established to collect, arrange and manage data of terrorist and terrorist organizations and to coordinate between members. RATS conducts training sessions and joint military exercises regularly. RATS can be helpful in two dimensions. First, RATS can provide important information about thousands of terrorists for preemptive actions. Second, RATS can help in the training of security agencies in Afghanistan.

Limitations and Challenges Although SCO is the most effective regional setup to solve regional issues as compared to other organizations and mechanisms, it has some limitations and structural constraints also. Divergent stances of the stakeholders are a challenge for the SCO in solving Afghan issues. Pakistan and India two rival states are a potential hurdle for consensus because both countries have their interpretations of terrorism. Russia prioritizes the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) for security in the region. Divergent interests of the SCO states are hurdles for multilateral solutions. The Charter of the SCO is based on non-interference and non-intervention principles. SCO Charter limits the organization not to interfere 56

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in domestic affairs. The SCO has no structural capability to use force and has no Rapid Response Force like NATO or CSTO. NATO forces carried out operations and controlled Kabul by applying force, SCO cannot use force. Afghanistan is facing problems due to its non-recognition status. The U.S.A. and the European Union have imposed sanctions on the Taliban. Taliban have failed to form an inclusive government and the government is working without a constitution. Taliban have banned girls’ 2nd-grade education; Taliban are blamed for violations of human rights. These factors obstruct Afghanistan’s recognition from the United States. Recognition of Afghanistan is beyond the sphere of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Afghanistan needs billions of dollars to save the lives of people. SCO has no mutual fund or a setup for providing financial assistance to regional countries.

CONCLUSION Afghanistan is facing a multidimensional crisis created by internal and external conflicts and the crisis has worsened after the unplanned withdrawal of the U.S. and NATO forces. The Afghan crisis also affects neighbouring countries. Afghanistan has been a battleground of proxies and a hub of terrorist and extremist groups. Afghanistan is called heaven for terrorists. Afghanistan’s government has no efficient structure to control terrorist groups. Weak governments, porous borders and poverty are suitable for terrorists to use Afghanistan’s soil for cross-border activities. Neighbouring countries are worried about transnational terrorism and the spillover effect of Afghanistan’s internal situation. Superpowers have failed to resolve the Afghan Issues. Afghanistan has never accepted interference and invasion by foreign forces. The governments formed with the support of external powers have proved weak and corrupt governments as recently the previous government of Ashraf Ghani surrendered to the Taliban within hours and fled abroad. There is a dire need for an intra-Afghan dialogue for national reconciliation led by Afghans themselves. Afghanistan’s economy needs external support. The Taliban government is not recognized by the United Nations. The U.S.A. and the European Union imposed sanctions on the Taliban, the U.S.A. froze the assets of Afghanistan. Millions of Afghans are internally displaced and many have fled to neighbouring countries. Afghan people are facing an acute shortage of food. If Afghan problems are not addressed it would create a serious threat to peace and stability within and beyond the country’s borders. Shanghai Cooperation Organization is the largest regional organization in the world. SCO comprises nine members including China and Russia which makes SCO the most effective regional organization among other organizations. Afghanistan’s neighbours except Turkmenistan are all SCO members. SCO provides a relatively effective mechanism to address the Afghan crisis. Afghanistan is an observer in the SCO and has applied for permanent membership. SCO can help and support Afghanistan in many fields. SCO favours an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned national reconciliation and peace process. SCO favours the formation of an inclusive government that represents all ethnic religious and linguistic groups. SCO countries have strong ties and relations with ethnic and religious groups in Afghanistan and they can use their influence for the formation of an inclusive and acceptable government. SCO Interbank Consortium and SCO Business Council can assist and support Afghanistan’s economy. SCO countries especially China and Russia can help in infrastructure development. SCO RATS would be effective in maintaining security and peace. RATS will also support in training of Afghanistan’s security forces. RATS would help to protect transnational energy pipelines. Although the SCO can play an effective role in Afghanistan, its structure and charter limit its proactive role. SCO is against the use of force, interference and non-intervention in domestic affairs. SCO has no combined forces and no treaty provision 57

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for conflict resolution. In terms of insurgency or for implementation of decisions, it has no force like NATO or CSTO. It has no mechanism to fill the power vacuum in Afghanistan. SCO decision-making is based on consensus, the presence of rivals such as Pakistan and India would impede joint decisions about Afghanistan. SCO cannot address some special issues like recognition of the Taliban regime as it is beyond its domain. Shanghai Cooperation Organization can help to resolve Afghan conflicts and issues in many fields but with some limitations. If we probe the situation, we come to know that all major powers and international organizations have failed in Afghanistan to achieve peace and stability. The other international setups lack the presence and participation of all stakeholders. SCO is the only Organization containing all stakeholders. Among available regional and international organizations and mechanisms, SCO seems the most effective, natural, viable and relative mechanism to address the Afghan Crisis.

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Limaye, Y. (2023, June 6). Inside the Taliban’s war on drugs-opium poppy crops slashed. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-65787391 Maizland, L. (2023, January 19). The Taliban in Afghanistan. Backgrounder. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/taliban-afghanistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (MFA). (2010, June 10). Deceleration of the 10th meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the SCO member states Tashkent. FMPRC. https:// www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/201006/t20100625_679309.html Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (MFA). (2021, July 14). The Shanghai Cooperation Organization holds meeting of foreign ministers on Afghan Issue. FMPRC. https://www.fmprc. gov.cn/eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/dozys_664276/xwlb_664278/202107/t20210715_9169113.html Omelicheva, M. Y. (2021, August 26). The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Afghanistan: old fears, old barriers to counterterrorism cooperation. Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI). https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/shanghai-cooperation-organization-and-afghanistanold-fears-old-barriers-counterterrorism-cooperation-31398#:~:text=In%202005%2C%20the%20 SCO%20established,agenda%20for%20the%20SCO%20members Pantucci, R. (2021, July 27). Central Asia and Afghanistan: old fears, old actors, new games. Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/centralasia-and-afghanistan-old-fears-old-actors-new-games Protocol on Establishment of SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group between Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. (2006). Institute of International Relations. https:// www.iri.edu.ar/publicaciones_iri/anuario/CD%20Anuario%202006/Asia/grupo2.pdf Reporters Without Borders (RSF). (2023). Press Freedom Index Global Score. https://rsf.org/en/ index?year=2023 Sajid, I. (2021 November 12). Taliban have all-inclusive government in Afghanistan, claims acting foreign minister. Acting Foreign Minister Muttaqi asks global community to engage with Taliban to discuss reforms they want to see in country. Anadolu Agency. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/ taliban-have-all-inclusive-government-in-afghanistan-claims-acting-foreign-minister/2419061 SCO Astana Deceleration. (2011). Shanghai Cooperation Organization https://eng.sectsco.org/load/199300/ SCO Astana Deceleration. (2017). Shanghai Cooperation Organization. https://eng.sectsco.org/ load/297146/ SCO Beijing Deceleration. (2012). Shanghai Cooperation Organization. https://eng.sectsco.org/ load/199515/ SCO Bishkek Deceleration. (2013). Shanghai Cooperation Organization https://eng.sectsco.org/ load/199687/ SCO Bishkek Deceleration. (2019). Shanghai Cooperation Organization https://eng.sectsco.org/ load/550977/

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SCO Dushanbe Deceleration. (2014). Shanghai Cooperation Organization https://eng.sectsco.org/ load/199902/ SCO Moscow Deceleration. (2020). Shanghai Cooperation Organization https://eng.sectsco.org/ load/690349/ SCO New Delhi Deceleration. (2023). Shanghai Cooperation Organization https://eng.sectsco.org/ load/948725/ SCO Qingdao Deceleration. (2018). https://www.jukkarannila.fi/docs/SCO_Qingdao_Declaration_2018. pdf SCO Samarkand Deceleration. (2022). Shanghai Cooperation Organization https://eng.sectsco.org/ load/914622/ SCO Tashkent Deceleration. (2016). Shanghai Cooperation Organization https://eng.sectsco.org/ load/207886/ SCO Ufa Deceleration. (2015). Shanghai Cooperation Organization https://eng.sectsco.org/load/200119/ Shah, A. (2012). The post 9/11 democratization in Afghanistan: Challenges and expectations. International Journal of Social Sciences and Humanity Studies, 4(1), 19–32. https://dergipark.org.tr/en/ download/article-file/257234 Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit and its Impact on Afghanistan and the Region. (2022, September 10-16). Center for Strategic and Regional Studies (CSRS). https://csrskabul.com/en/wp-content/ uploads/sites/2/2022/09/WeeklyAnalysisEn-394.pdf Sokol, V., & Ratushnyak, O. (2019). Shanghai Cooperation Organization: The evolution of counterterrorism at a regional level. In D. K.S. Bataev, S. A. Gapurov, A.D. Osmaev, V. K. Akaev, L. M. Idigova, M. R. Ovhadov, A. R. Salgiriev, & M. M. Betilmerzaeva (Eds.), Social and Cultural Transformations in the Context of Modern Globalism, vol 76. European Proceedings of Social and Behavioural Sciences, (pp. 2649-2656). Future Academy. doi:10.15405/epsbs.2019.12.04.356 Stopdan, P. (2021, July 15). What role can India play to decide on the Afghan future at the SCO meeting? Financial Express. https://www.financialexpress.com/business/defence-what-role-can-india-playto-decide-on-the-afghan-future-at-the-sco-meeting-2290709/ The Associated Press. (2022, June 2). Afghanistan dominates global opium production. The Taliban is shutting that down. National Public Radio. https://www.npr.org/2022/06/02/1102586941/afghanistan-opiumheroin-taliban-poppy-farmers-ban#:~:text=Afghanistan%20is%20the%20world’s%20biggest,heroin%20 in%20Europe%20and%20Asia The Ethnic Groups of Afghanistan (n. d). WorldAtlas. https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/ethnic-groupsof-afghanistan.html Thomas, C. (2023). Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy. CRS Report/R45122. Congressional Research Service. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R45122.pdf

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Transparency International. (2023). Corruption Perceptions Indices (2017-2022). TI. https://www. transparency.org/en/cpi/2022 UN Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs (OCHA). (2023a). Humanitarian needs review Afghanistan. Humanitarian Programme Cycle 2023. UN. https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/afghanistanhumanitarian-needs-overview-2023-january-2023 UN Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs (OCHA). (2023b). Revised humanitarian response plan Afghanistan (2023, Jun-Dec). The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Needs (OCHA). https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-revised-humanitarian-response-plan-jun-dec-2023 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). (2023, March 9). Regional Refugee Response Plan for Afghanistan Situation 2023. UN. https://reporting.unhcr.org/afghanistan-situation-regionalrefugee-response-plan-2023 Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of International Politics. Addison-Wesley. Wani, A. (2022). A house divided: The SCO’s Afghanistan Conundrum. Observer Research Foundation. https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/ORF_IB-520_SCOs-Afghanistan-Conundrum. pdf

KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Central Asian Region: The Central Asian Region comprises five countries, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The Central Asian Region stretches from the Caspian Sea in the west to Western China and Magnolia in the east. Global Peace Index (GPI): The Global Peace Index shows the relative position of a country’s peacefulness in the world. The Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) produces this report yearly. GPI uses 23 qualitative and quantitative indicators to measure the state of peace. Humanitarian Assistance: Humanitarian assistance means to give aid and do actions to save lives and maintain human dignity during and after disasters and crises. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs): The persons who leave their hometown forcibly to save their lives in disaster, conflict or crises and live within borders are known as Internally Displaced Persons. People in Need (PiN): The People who do not have enough money, food and health facilities to live. They need urgent humanitarian assistance to survive. Refugees: The people who leave their country due to conflict or war and enter another country for safety are termed as refugees. Taliban: The word “Taliban” is the plural of “Talib” in the Pushto language, “Talib” means student. Here student means student of Islamic law. Taliban emerged in 1994 in Afghanistan as a powerful religious group. Taliban ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001 and has been in power for the second time since August 2021 after the withdrawal of the U.S. forces from Afghanistan. Three Evils: Terrorism, Extremism and Separatism are termed as three evils by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

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Chapter 4

Can the European Union’s Global Gateway Challenge China’s Belt and Road Initiative? Sureyya Yigit https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8025-5147 New Vision University, Georgia

ABSTRACT This chapter examines China’s technological advance and its relevance to European strategic sovereignty. The following sections deal with the shifting paradigms and how they reshape a key concept in this context: interdependence. The chapter then turns its attention towards China’s innovation capacity, explaining how it has become an innovation powerhouse from an unlikely candidate for digital innovation and why its future success is still being determined. The next section explores how China’s technological advance translates into a global power and how the EU’s Global Gateway can become a rival to the Belt and Road Initiative. The chapter concludes with a broad research agenda to understand the EU’s and China’s future technological trajectories. This will be a prerequisite for developing adequate and effective European policies so that the Union retains its freedom of action in world affairs.

INTRODUCTION The world is currently witnessing a moment of geopolitical transition of global hegemony with a shift of its axis from the West to the East, an unprecedented event in the history of the capitalist international system. This explained not only the dynamics of the trade wars between the United States and the People’s Republic of China and the struggles for global dominance, but until Russia invaded Ukraine, the softening of the Atlantic alliance of North Americans and Europeans, their respective internal challenges, the resurgence of neo-fascist and ultra-conservative forces within, and the aggravation of regional political conflict in the areas of influence of first and second order powers in full ascendancy. There is, however, no direct causality between the re-emergence of East Asia and the beginning of the decline of American DOI: 10.4018/978-1-6684-9467-7.ch004

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 Can EU’s Global Gateway Challenge China’s Belt and Road Initiative?

hegemony. Rather, this response to a global crisis of capitalism has become known as the “great turbulence” encouraging a conservative search for a resolution in the West (Arrighi, 2003). The re-emergence of China minimises the space for projections of unipolarity in all its forms, and that is where windows of possibility open up on the periphery of the world. The old order born from Bretton Woods no longer exists with the same impact and has lost power compared to previous years. However, the Bretton Woods institutions still function as tools for exercising the post-war order, even if they cannot contain new emerging and revisionist poles of power. They attempt to deepen the alignment to some of the versions of unipolarity through several financial measures, such as the application of commercial and financial sanctions for rogue states (Specia, 2019). In the 1970s, when the crisis of great global turbulence that affected the West began to be felt, China required a turnaround that would allow it to increase both its productive capacity and its technological capacity and, at the same time, include a good portion of its urban population that had increased significantly since the late 1940s. Thus, the Deng Xiaoping government advanced a series of significant reforms: opening up the economy to a market economy (i.e., non-centralised pricing), openness to foreign investment with clear state control over the destination of these investments, modifications in the use of land by the peasantry (which allowed the increase in the scale of production without causing a setback towards forms of latifundia), among other weighty aspects (Wang & Wang, 2021). Ten years ago China unveiled a remarkable One Belt One Road Project to improve trans-continental transport networks and infrastructure. Over time this was renamed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The project had a strategic and geopolitical dimension related to developments in Chinese domestic policy. Given the less than ideal relations with Southeast Asia which had not improved since Xi Jinping’s ascendance to power, the first objective fitted into a strategy of periphery stabilisation, or damage control. For China, it became a question of relaunching a new strategy of influence based on the attractiveness of the Chinese economy, which needed new markets. Towards Central and South Asia, stabilising the periphery became part of initiatives that developed since the mid-1990s around the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (Yigit, 2012). It also constituted an extension of the control policy of the Autonomous Region of Xinjiang, which experienced endemic tensions since the end of the 1980s, with the Chinese fearing tendencies to recall the short-lived independent state it had become in the 1940s (Dabphet, 2020). Hence, China flexed its economic muscles and wanted to create an enormous zone of attraction and authority utilising its excess foreign currency reserves. It desired to translate its technological and economic prowess into a tangible political sphere of influence. Viewing such an imperative, one must reiterate that technical knowledge has been a power source for all states throughout history. The competition for technological leadership is closely linked to the rivalry for power (Yigit, 2023b). Indeed, power, defined as the ability to force or persuade others to follow a course of action that they would not have chosen otherwise, depends on national resources and capacities. However, technological progress can strengthen economic power, military capabilities or political influence. This does not mean, however, that technological advance automatically confers power. The driving variables are multiple and range from political strategy to organisational structure, including market power and the particular skills of individual leaders (Yiğit, 2023a). However, to the extent that the research and development of new technologies - and their application - create real economic benefits and increase military capabilities, innovation is correlated with the state’s power. This is all the truer today as digital transformation penetrates all political, military, economic and societal spheres (Yigit, 2022). Societal transformation is driven by a new industrial revolution incorporating connectivity and digital technologies. Technological progress is not limited to competition in 64

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the economic ephere; as it is at the centre of the emerging United States-China power rivalry. At a time when the European Union (EU) is generally dependent on American software and East Asian hardware, including Chinese, the exploitation of technological dependencies for power politics purposes is likely to limit the ability of the EU to act in complete autonomy. In other words, the development of technological rivalry will inevitably significantly impact the Union’s freedom of action. Given the economic rivalry witnessed between China and the United States through the tariff wars during the Trump Presidency, one needs to underline the fact that technological progress lies at the heart of this intense bilateral competition (Yigit, 2021). The Union’s challenge is learning to find a path through this maze quickly. To do this, it will be necessary to understand China well and adopt a strategy towards it. China has a significant and rapidly growing weight in infrastructure and digital technologies and unlike the United States, it is not have an alliance with the EU nor its Member States. Furthermore, fundamentally different economic and political systems shape the European and Chinese digital technology and transport infrastructure ecosystems. In security, China raises multiple concerns, ranging from espionage to influence operations based on social media to security problems related to hardware suppliers or manufacturing chains based on its territory (Mulvenon, 2020). A common understanding of security and formal cooperation is needed to alleviate these concerns. In addition, incorporating Chinese digital equipment could lead to greater cyber threats allowing sabotage and espionage by a state which the Union regards as a systemic rival (Chen & Gao, 2022). Ideologically, China’s technological stranglehold challenges the principles of governance of Western societies which are primarily identified by their adherence to democratic and liberal values. Therefore, the three areas where Europe and China differ most can be identified as: i. Data governance; ii. Technical standards; iii. Effective environmental protection.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY The research undertaken in this chapter rests on a spectrum of methodologies, paradigms, fields of inquiry and theoretical foundations. They find their academic homes in varying disciplines encompassing primarily international relations, strategic studies, political thought, international law, geopolitics and area studies alongside economics. The central aim is to provide a clear and objective analysis with a capacity to cater for a comprehensive contemplative, comprehensive yet reflective and an evolutionary manner of investigation which is flexible enough o adjust to the ever-changing circumstances in Eurasia and beyond. This chapter depends heavily upon a commitment towards collecting and analysing data, ensuring a synthesis through verifying the utilised sources. The gathered results are compared to the ongoing debates and discussions relating to the scope and scale of both the European Union and China’s actions in the past decade with their respective policies of the BRI and the Global Gateway in extending their reach and influence on the international community (Fallon 2015; Gehrke 2022; Gurol 2020; Liu 2023; Johnston 2023; Richardson 2021; Umbach 2021; Yiğit 2021; Yigit 2021b; Yigit 2022b; Yiğit 2023a; Yiğit 2023b).

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LITERATURE REVIEW This chapter is of interest to those who have an interest in increasing their knowledge within the field of international relations and current affairs. The main aim for the findings is for them to be used in multiple courses ranging from: geopolitics, area studies, globalisation, international relations theory, conflict management and foreign policy analysis, with the intention to contribute to these rapidly developing research fields. The EU research dimension relies on Karjalainen’s article which acknowledges that it cannot match the BRI in terms of the number of projects and investments as well as Panda’s which focuses on the long-term strategy employed by the EU towards China. The chapter is a natural extension of my recent publications “The Geopolitical Role of the European Union in the Post-Cold War Order” and the “European Union’s Strategy in the Far North: Arctic Rivalry”. As for research concerning China’s BRI, Van Noort’s book provides a detailed account of the China’s Dream manifested with the BRI particularly emphasising the infrastructure narrative pursued by Beijing as well as Carrai and Defraigne’s edited book which emphasises geoeconomics and connectivity providing rationales of the BRI from a Chinese perspective. This chapter also extends and develops the theoretical arguments I have put forth recently in two publications “Power, Polarity and the Present” and “2022: Unipolar Delusion, Bipolar Illusion and Multipolar Aspiration” whereby an assessment of the impact and possibility of China becoming a polar power is undertaken.

Belt and Road Initiative In January 2017, President Xi Jinping at the Davos World Economic Forum took the opposite view of the protectionist discourse of the newly invested Trump administration and made himself the champion of free trade and international cooperation. Six years later, a third of a billion Chinese are subject to various forms of regularly reinforced confinement: industrial activity is idling; ports, container ships and supply chains are paralysed; international delivery times are getting longer; with a fear of reduction in supply on international markets accelerating already galloping inflation. Furthermore, one may argue that this situation risks upsetting the so-called “New Silk Roads” initiative, launched less than a decade ago, an initiative shaken up by the Covid-19 pandemic by the recurring accusations that it traps partner nations in debt, and finally by the international isolation of Russia – the centrepiece of the bridge with Europe – in reaction to its invasion of Ukraine (Liu, 2023). Nevertheless, it is important to focus on the aims and goals of this initiative, proposed by Xi Jinping in two speeches for the first time in 2013, first in Astana in Kazakhstan on September 7 and then in Jakarta in Indonesia on October 3 (Johnston, 2023). As the analysis of Xi Jinping’s speeches demonstrate: they serve, first, a plurality of long-term objectives of which the economy is only one concern among others; second, they aim to reorganise the rules of governance of the international system not only to China’s advantage but to make them gravitate around it; thirdly, they are also part of an imperative of economic transition towards a new model of growth to escape the “middle income trap” (Glawe & Wagner, 2020). However, too often, the New Silk Roads are approached only from the point of view of its impacts outside China and mainly from an economic angle. Hence they are seen as being, on the one hand, an immense grid of transport and energy connections reaching towards Europe and East Africa. In short, a set of service, transport, investment projects – mainly through loans provided by state banks in China - and infrastructure projects intended to facilitate international trade and economic integration with neighbouring countries participating in these projects (Xiangzhang, 2019). 66

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One of the flagship policies of Xi Jinping’s presidency, have been the New Silk Roads which were enshrined in the 2017 revised Party Constitution (Hayes, 2020). Nevertheless, the ultimate goals and details of this initiative remain vague, to say the least: Is it based on an overall plan, or is it an aggregate of isolated projects, some of which are more coordinated than others? Many observers often focus on material achievements, hence their particular attention paid to infrastructure and statistics (Sarwar, 2018). The initiative is actually an extension of Hu Jintao’s presidency (2002-2013) following the accession of China to the World Trade Organization in late 2001. One cannot ignore this background when it comes to analysing the underlying official aims, which, in the Chinese political context, cannot be reduced to the economic dimension, often the only one retained by most observers. Moreover, some critics see in these projects only the manifestation of geopolitical ambitions concealed by China (Richardson, 2021). Xi Jinping’s public statements on the New Silk Roads express less a personal vision than the position of the Party-State, which, going beyond the sole economic dimension, openly promotes a reconfiguration of the rules of the international political game. Admittedly, because political speeches aim to persuade, conceal, rally, or at the extreme, be nothing more than a propaganda exercise, their scope is limited. This is true both in democracies and in dictatorships. However, in China, since Deng Xiaoping, political speeches, particularly those intended for an internal audience and even more for regime officials, stand out for their programmatic aspect (Esherick & Wasserstrom, 2018). Thus, they frame and prioritise both the priorities of the moment and the elements of language to adopt. This is why it is important to classify Xi Jinping’s speeches according to the audiences for which they are intended: a speech delivered at the Politburo, at the Central Committee, or a meeting of a small leading group is of quite a different importance than that of a speech delivered to an audience of students during a trip abroad. That said, the repetitive mode of Chinese official speeches, whatever the public for which they are intended, erases the inflexions that one would like to anticipate at first sight.

Global Aim and Complementary Initiatives Xi Jinping officially pronounced the BRI soon after he became the unquestioned leader of China comprising the roles of both state President and Communist Party General Secretary. There were two complementary announcements of the Belt and Road with the difference in audiences being noticeable both in tone and in purpose. In Astana, Xi Jinping recounted a simplified version of the history of the Silk Road and the good neighbourly relations that would unite China and Central Asia, with a call to strengthen them economically, politically and securely. In Jakarta, he specifically linked his intention to strengthen ties between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China to more specific objectives ranging from increasing trade volume to regular meetings between defence ministers. At this point, the speeches seemed to demonstrate wishful thinking (Beeson, 2022). However, in neither of the two speeches, did Xi Jinping specifically address the host country, but rather groups of more or less integrated countries: Central Asia - associated with the SCO and ASEAN.1 Nevertheless, it would be wrong to believe that China only planned the new Silk Roads in well-defined geographical areas. Thus, in his speech on May 14, 2017, on the occasion of the opening of the International Cooperation Forum for the New Silk Roads, Xi Jinping pointed out that nearly a hundred countries from all continents had expressed interest in such a project, which in his eyes was already a victory (Xi, 2017). Moreover, he pointed to ongoing achievements: such as the China-Laos and JakartaBandung, Addis Ababa-Djibouti and Hungary-Serbia rail connections (Rencz, 2019). Of course, these were intended to increase trade and involved a vast infrastructure development program. However, as 67

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Xi Jinping himself affirmed on this occasion, they were not limited to this because they did not only have a purely economic vocation.

Regional Cooperation & Policy Harmonisation One might think that the more countries subscribe to the initial economic goals, the more China broadens its objectives. However, these multiple aims were affirmed from the speeches in Astana and Jakarta, where Xi Jinping called for the strengthening of cultural, educational, touristic and medical links, but also between young people, think tanks, parliaments, non-governmental organisations and civil organisations in order to deepen mutual understanding to strengthen the friendship between nations. China pursued two complementary goals in Astana and Jakarta: deeper economic ties and security collaboration. On the other hand, because ASEAN is primarily based on economic ties in Southeast Asia, and the SCO, primarily based on security issues in Central Asia, China had to convince the countries of these two regions to expand their collaboration to new areas despite their probable reluctance. Thus, the speeches of Astana and Jakarta aimed to present the new Silk Roads as the natural extension of the collaborations already established, but pointing out that more than their reinforcement in the existing fields would be needed to achieve the objectives pursued by this same reinforcement. In either case, as Xi Jinping explained in May 2014, that sustainable security implied emphasising both security and development, hence the former would become sustainable and vice versa concerning sustainable development which synthesised the Chinese vision (Jinping, 2014). In the same speech from Astana, he stated that China and the Central Asian countries had in terms of economic development set longer term objectives which were relevant to their specific situation. Ensuring stable and sustainable economic development alongside establishing a strong and prosperous nation, achieving national regeneration were China’s main strategi objectives. Hence the necessity to deepen collaboration in all fields, take advantage of beneficial political relations alongside close vicinity and economic complementarity in order to stimulate sustainable economic growth and form a community of shared interest and mutual benefit. Furthermore, at the International Cooperation Forum for the New Silk Roads press conference, Xi Jinping announced that this community was on the way to realisation, China having signed several collaboration agreements during the Forum and dozens of countries and international organisations having already finalised such agreements with China since the launch of the initiative (Fallon, 2015). At the end of the Forum, the Xinhua news agency published the list of 76 agreements signed since 2013 (Hara & Trihartono 2019). Most were memorandums of understanding, in other words, declarations of intent, while others deviated from the raison d’être of the conference. For example, the agreement with Thailand concerned the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and the protocol with Cambodia concerned the construction of a jointly managed ocean observation station (Chheang & Heng, 2021). From the speeches in Astana and Jakarta, Xi Jinping presented his vision for enhanced regional cooperation, and formal agreements certainly played an important role, but more secondary than one might think. Thus, not only did he call for strengthening cooperation with Russia and the Central Asian states but also for strengthening coordination with them. Specifically, a call for strengthening policy consultation. In practice, it invited countries to engage in comprehensive discussions around strategies of development and policies, adopt plans to advance regional cooperation through consultations driven by the desire to find a common ground. Such an endeavour was translated into the multiplication of meetings between national officials responsible for specific issues, preferably through their flexible institutionalisation in the form of platforms 68

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and permanent mechanisms for consultation and dialogue. On the other hand, it was in his speech in Jakarta before the lower house of parliament that Xi Jinping specified the objective pursued by these consultations whereby China hoped for far closer relations with the ASEAN member states. He had already expressed the same idea six months earlier, on April 7, during the Boao Forum for the Asia Annual Conference emphasising that all countries were linked and shared convergent interests (Zongze, 2013). When defending the national interests, a country had to pay attention to the genuine interests of others and ought to promote all dimensions when pursuing economic development. In practice, as he stated in his speech on March 27, 2013, during a meeting of the BRICS, this resulted, on the one hand, in the coordination of policies at the macro level, but also, on the other hand, as he specified on June 5, 2014, before the representatives of the Arab countries, by common objectives, strategies and policies at the meso and micro levels, as well as by the sharing of resources on both sides within the framework of specific projects. Moreover, on June 10, 2018, during the meeting of the SCO Heads of State, he was more assertive underlining implying the complementarity of their development strategies (Lu, 2019).

China: Revisionist Power Hence, China seeks to shape its near and far exports to rebalance the regional system to its advantage and thereby indirectly influence the international system. Moreover, this is not hidden. Thus, in his speech on April 7, 2013, after having sung the praises of an Asia that had become both one of the leading, most vibrant regions of the world, he insisted that Asia must transform and improve its development model in order to stay in step with the current dynamics. Pursuing this line of thought this meant that if China could not develop while being cut off from the region in particular, nor could the region or the world achieve a stable and prosperous state of affairs without China. Basically, the faster China grew, the more it would create development opportunities for the rest of Asia and the world. In other words, China was emerging as the engine of global development and the main actor of global peace – as the country most in tune with current dynamics – inviting countries that wanted to continue to benefit from this situation to align themselves, to adapt their policies, their strategies and their objectives. One should also underline the particular conception of multilateralism espoused by China. First, as the aforementioned list of 76 agreements highlights, it only recognises as projects under the Belt and Road Initiative those in which it has itself become involved. In other words, China seeks to forge an everincreasing number of deeper bilateral relations, forming the spokes of a wheel of which it would occupy the centre. On the other hand, faithful to the line enacted since Deng Xiaoping, China categorically refuses to transform its relations into formal alliances. That being said, through its bilateral relations, it does not only seek to link states but also subnational, transnational and supranational public and private entities. This last level is particularly significant because, as demonstrated, China addresses itself less to countries than groups of countries. Moreover, Xi Jinping repeats tirelessly that the unipolar moment, dominated by the United States, is gradually fading, with the world returning to a multipolar equilibrium, a transition that China seeks to accelerate (Kumar, 2020). Interestingly, Xi Jinping does not speak of an inter-state but inter-civilisational multipolar order (Kuhrt, 2014). Whatever the meaning of this position, there is no doubt that China perceives the international system in its existing form as not only unfavourable but also unfair. Hence Xi Jinping’s incessant calls to reform the international system’s governance rules to reflect its current reality better. Furthermore, the financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent liquidity and insecurity crisis during the 2010s were the breaches through which China was able not only to offer an alternative solution to the existing order but also try to put it into practice. The new silk 69

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roads contribute to this objective, though Chinese diplomacy is guided by, and should serve, the Two Centenary Goals and national regeneration which were formulated upon Xi Jinping’s accession to power and first mentioned in a speech delivered on November 29, 2012 (Wang, 2014). This, then, is what the Chinese Dream consists of, unquestionably the flagship project of his presidency, and thanks to which he seeks to distinguish himself from his predecessor Hu Jintao in radical fashion. Nevertheless, Xi attempts to erase the humiliation of the Opium Wars which not only contributed to China’s decline but robbed it of its status as a dominant power, a model to emulate, at the centre of the Asian world, as well as the feeling of having been the centre of the world. In speeches aimed at senior Party-State cadres, the New Silk Roads initiative had a more pragmatic and immediate aim. The report taking stock of the previous five years, presented on October 18, 2017, to the 19th Party Congress – which reappointed Xi Jinping to office – praised the progress of this initiative. However, surprisingly, this was only mentioned as one amongst other achievements referring to regional developments becoming more balanced; the coordinated development of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region, and the development of the Yangzi Economic Belt having all made significant progress. Since then, these projects have always been associated with further developments such as the Greater Bay of Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao being added to this list. However, these regional integration projects have far more national scope than one would expect in the case of the new Silk Roads. Xi Jinping affirmed that these three projects were not only part of a desire to modernise the economy but of a desire to accelerate modernisation (Hailiang, 2018). By modernisation, he meant broadening supply-side structural reform, developing advanced manufacturing, and the full integration of the real economy with internet technology, big data and artificial intelligence. The Party-State wanted to use its powers of intervention to ensure the rapid transition from an economy dominated by companies relying on an abundant workforce but producing goods and services with lowadded value towards an economy dominated by high-tech companies creating high-value-added goods and services by 2025. This was the objective of the Fourteenth Five-Year Plan (2021-2025). Although proclaiming the success of building a moderately prosperous society, the Covid-19 pandemic led the Party-State to revise its objectives, the fourteenth five-year plan effectively pushing back its construction to 2035 (Zakić, 2021). The challenge nevertheless remains unresolved: if it is by becoming the workshop of the world that China has risen to the rank of the second world economic power, it remains, on the one hand, dependent on foreign countries for technologies while exporting economies are increasingly wary of the use it can make of it, and, on the other hand, since the 2010s its growth, while in double digits, has slowed down and thus increased the risk of falling into the ‘middle-income trap’, from which only a handful of countries have managed to escape (Yao, 2015). The fear that any slowdown in improving living conditions could potentially challenge the regime is constant. One can, therefore, understand Xi Jinping’s insistence during his October 24, 2013, speech at the Party-State seminar on neighbourhood diplomacy work in that China must cooperate with neighbouring countries to accelerate infrastructural connections, establishing the Belt and Road which would meet the demands of the 21st century (Lampton, 2018). China had to hasten the pace of implementing the free trade areas strategy with nearby countries, expand investment and trade collaboration, and establish a new model of regional economic integration.

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EU Global Gateway EU Member States can only be expected to meet such Chinese challenges with assistance: a united approach is essential. The EU must cooperate closely with like-minded partners to meet China’s quadruple challenge. While the Biden presidency has strengthened transatlantic cooperation one cannot say that there is a complete convergence of strategies, emphasis and interests between the two parties. Therefore, the Union has engaged in an internal debate concerning “open strategic autonomy”, which needs an assessment of the digital ambitions of China in order to elaborate a well-founded European position concerning these developments (Gehrke, 2022). The EU’s response to the BRI was quite late, as other regions, such as the Arctic, needed to be revised (Yigit, 2022b). The Global Gateway strategy was announced at the end of 2021 by the French Presidency as an initiative by the European Commission which would assist the development of emerging market and EU partner developing countries, focusing primarily in digital technology, energy and the environment, supported by the private sector. Hence, this European strategy aims to accelerate emerging markets and developing countries digital, energy and ecological transitions. The Global Gateway initiative plans to invest 300 billion euros by 2027 in financing sustainable and quality infrastructure while respecting the EU’s social, environmental and good governance standards (Furness & Keijzer, 2022). Global Gateway having been established by the Commission was funded by “Team Europe”, a team that brings together various community development financial institutions (Jones & Teevan, 2021). Its focus is on creating physical infrastructure – namely fibre optic cables and energy and transport networks – to strengthen digital systems, as well as standardisation, regulatory uniformity and integration of supply chains. The Global Gateway partnerships are based on six principles: I. II. III. IV. V. VI.

Democratic values and high standards Good Governance and Transparency Equal partnerships Green and Environmentally Friendly Security-focused Catalysing private sector investment

Furthermore, this strategy concentrates on five priority sectors: i. ii. iii. iv. v.

Digital Technology - Digital infrastructure access, protective regulatory framework and skills development. It includes thirteen projects as identified in Table 1. Climate and Energy - Management of critical minerals and renewables, sustainable agri-food systems, waste management and the preservation of ecosystems and water and sanitation. It includes thirty-four projects as identified in Table 2. Transport – Port, airport, road and rail networks, multimodal platforms and logistical centres, regulatory convergence and agreements. It includes fourteen projects as identified in Table 3. Healthcare – Securing supply chains of the pharmaceutical sector and the development of local production capacities. It includes five projects as identified in Table 4. Education and Research - Access to vocational training and quality education, creation of research and academic networks. It includes nine projects as identified in Table 5. 71

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Table 1. Digital technology 1

Africa Europe Digital Innovation Bridge

2

Black Sea Digital Connectivity

3

Central Asia Digital Connectivity

4

Digital for Development (D4D) Hub for the Caribbean and Latin America

5

Digital Interoperability in Central America

6

Digital Jamaica

7

Digital Transformation and Connectivity Initiative in the Philippines

8

EU-AU Data Flagship

9

EU-Latin America and Caribbean Digital Alliance

10

EurAfrica Gateway cable

11

Human-Centred Digitalisation Initiative in Kenya

12

Medusa Optical Fibre Cable

13

Team Europe Initiative on Data Governance in Africa

Source: European Commission (2022). Digital. Retrieved: 18.07.2023 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway/digital_en

Table 2. Climate and energy 1

Africa-Europe Green Energy

18

Green Economic Growth in Mongolia

2

Amazon Basin

19

Green Energy Transition in Bangladesh

3

ASEAN Green Initiative

20

Green hydrogen in Namibia

4

ASEAN Team Europe Initiative on Sustainable Connectivity

21

Green Paraguay

5

Bac Ai pumped hydro storage project in Vietnam

22

Green Recovery in Nepal

6

Bio2Watt

23

Green Transition Latin America and Caribbean - Climate and energy

7

Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience in Africa

24

Green-Blue Alliance for the Pacific

8

Developing Chile’s Green Hydrogen potential

25

Growing the Great Green Wall

9

Ecuador Team Europe Initiative: ‘A Green Deal for Ecuador’

26

Inclusive Green Growth with Namibia

10

Electricity Corridor in Western Balkans

27

Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) with Indonesia

11

Electricity in Rural Areas in Madagascar

28

Just Energy Transition Partnership with South Africa

12

ELMED Interconnector Electricity Transmission Project

29

NaturAfrica

13

Euroclima

30

Papua New Guinea Rabaul Port Rehabilitation and Infrastructure Greening

14

Five Great Forests of Mesoamerica

31

Strategic Partnership on Critical Raw Materials in Democratic Republic of Congo

15

Floating solar photovoltaic power plant in Albania

32

Strategic partnership with Kazakhstan on renewable hydrogen, batteries and raw materials

16

Forests Partnerships with Mongolia, Zambia, Uganda, the Republic of Congo, Suriname and Guyana

33

Tra Vinh Nearshore Wind

17

Global Green Bond Initiative

34

Water, climate change and energy in Central Asia

Source: European Commission (2022b). Retrieved: 18.07.2023 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway/climate-and-energy_en

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Table 3. Transport 1

Caribbean Maritime Intra-Regional Transport

2

Connected Economy and Society in Egypt

3

Djibouti second airport development project

4

Global Maritime Green Corridor

5

Green and Digital logistics Corridor in Angola

6

Northern Strategic Transport Corridor

7

Port of Pointe-Noire Infrastructure, Republic of Congo

8

Railway Corridor VIII: North Macedonia-Bulgaria

9

Regional Railway Surabaya

10

Rehabilitation of the Allada-Dassa Road

11

Southeast Asia Regional Economic Corridor and Connectivity

12

Strategic Transport Corridor: Libreville-Kibi/Doyala N’Djamena

13

Tramway Rabat III

14

West Africa Strategic Transport Corridor

Source: European Commission (2022c). Retrieved: 18.07.2023 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway/transport_en

Table 4. Healthcare 1

Drinking Water and Sewerage Programmes in Ecuador

2

Partnership on manufacturing vaccines, medicines and health technologies and strengthening health systems in Latin America

3

Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights in Africa

4

Team Europe Initiative on manufacturing and access to vaccines, medicines and health technologies in Africa

5

Water sanitation in Guatemala

Source: European Commission (2022d). Retrieved: 18.07.2023 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway/health_en

Table 5. Education and research 1

AU-EU Innovation Agenda

2

e-Youth in Mozambique

3

EU-Africa partnership in Space and Earth Observation

4

Global Partnership for Education

5

Investing in Young Businesses in Africa

6

Regional Centres of Excellence

7

Regional Teacher Programme for Africa

8

Social Cohesion and Tackling Inequalities in Latin America and the Caribbean

9

Youth Mobility for Africa

Source: European Commission. (2022e). Retrieved: 18.07.2023 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway/education-and-research_en

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Throughout the identification, co-financing and conducting of tangible projects, the private sector in Europe plays a vital role. The strategy focuses on multiple regions which include the Caribbean, Latin America, Asia, Ukraine as well as the Western Balkans. This strategy relies on various European Union financial tools, particularly the NDICI, with significant leverage on the private sector. Technical support for the preparation of projects is offered via two multilateral tools (IMF and multilateral banks): - a multilateral platform for the preparation of sustainable infrastructure projects, which makes it possible to filter out projects that are not aligned with sustainability or good governance criteria (Greve, 2015). The Global Gateway includes a vital economic dimension which foresees the European Union as a vital actor concerning the economic development of partner countries. It brings together the European Commission, Member States and their development operators, and European donors such as the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Hodson & Howarth, 2023). Global Gateway is an important contribution by the European Union in the context of increasing global systemic competition intended to demonstrate to partner countries the advantages of closer cooperation with liberal democracies. Germany proposed several goals for the Global Gateway which can be seen in Table 6. Bearing these suggestions in mind and in order to give due attention to ensure success of the strategy, one must promptly translate announcements into concrete projects and communicate these actively and strategically to the partner countries. Table 6. German proposals to strengthen the global gateway 1

Actively work closely with the Global Infrastructure and Investment Partnership, focusing on sustainable infrastructure projects

2

Push for new trade agreements with other economic areas within the framework of Global Gateway, which can be quickly negotiated and ratified

3

Ensure a financially strong technology-based pillar created as part of the Global Gateway

4

Advocate Global Gateway is closely linked to EU trade policy initiatives

5

Work to ensure that geostrategic considerations in the distribution of projects play an important role

6

Initiative is based on partnership based on shared values and sustainable development in the partner country

7

Close coordination with transatlantic partners

8

Strengthen regional integration between developing countries and also systematically plan cross-border projects and to flank this with a political dialogue between the participating countries

9

Active and extensive media strategy and public relations work to show the added value of the program for decision-makers as well as to clearly represent the broader population

10

Focus on flagship projects that are important to the public and important for development

11

Optimally integrate the private sector in the partnership for global infrastructure and achieve investment

12

Develop proposals on how to mitigate high investment risks for private sector investors and identify strategically relevant fields of investment

13

Work towards ensuring participation of SME’s

14

Ensure that funds do not go to Russian or Chinese state-owned companies or companies otherwise subsidized and/or controlled by these governments

15

Provide infrastructure to develop sustainable and resilient supply chains for raw materials

Source: Merz, F., & Dobrindt, A. (2022). Retrieved from https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/20/024/2002405.pdf

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European consumers and infrastructure providers depend on Chinese production capacity for most of the digital devices they buy. Relocating the production facilities outside of China would need time and money which has led to a discussion of de-coupling leading to considerations being given to the changing perception of mutual interdependence (Umbach, 2021). In the recent past what was considered a source of stability and security; today, is perceived as a threat and a risk. Whilst that is a truism, it is important to keep in mind the destabilising effects of further decoupling, as fewer stakeholders are interested in maintaining at least cordial relations. To gain an insight into what the Global Gateway caters for, five projects may be highlighted:

1. Kenyan Motorway Project The Kenyan authorities had launched numerous strategic infrastructure reinforcement projects, such as developing the road network via logistics corridors towards the country’s interior and the hinterland countries. This involved the construction of a 175 km toll highway on the Nairobi-Nakuru-Mau Summit axis. This strategic axis connects the capital with the country’s West and with Kampala in Uganda. This will be the largest public-private partnership ever in East Africa, spanning 30 years. This project is fully financed by a French consortium with the support of French, European and African banks and donors, considerably reducing the strain on Kenyan public finances.

2. Dakar Regional Vaccine Production Centre The European Union is Africa’s leading partner in terms of vaccination solidarity. The European initiative MAV+ (Manufacturing and Access to Vaccines) responds precisely to the objective of health sovereignty of the African continent and will make it possible to develop regional hubs for the production of vaccines. As part of this initiative, France supported the project for a regional vaccine production centre at the Pasteur Institute of Dakar. Initially, the Senegalese authorities aimed to focus on vaccines against COVID-19 with a production target of 300 million to 1 billion doses per year in the long term. Ultimately, the structure will aim to develop a complete portfolio of relevant vaccines for Africa.

3. Medusa Submarine Communications Cable Project This involves the construction of an undersea communication cable (fibre optics) which will cross the Mediterranean basin, from Portugal to Egypt, with branches linking southern Europe (Portugal, Spain, Italy, France, Greece, Southern Cyprus) with the countries of North Africa (Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Egypt). This innovation and research support project will allow better connectivity between nearly 500 universities (4.5 million students) and research centres. The Franco-Finnish company ASN (Alcatel Submarine Networks) oversees the project. Commissioning in phases is planned for 2024-2025. The EIB is subsidising the project upto 40 million euros and should also provide 100 million euros through loans.

4. Namibia Green Hydrogen Power Plant Green hydrogen is an exportable future resource for Namibia - solar and wind resources, signingd a strategic partnership with the European Union on green hydrogen at COP 27 in Sharm el-Sheikh. The Global Gateway strategy aims to make this partnership operational. Hydrogène de France intends to rely 75

 Can EU’s Global Gateway Challenge China’s Belt and Road Initiative?

on funding from the European Union to build the first green hydrogen power plant in Namibia and Africa with entry into service expected to be in 2024). The Swakopmund project, worth 180 million euros, provides for construction of a solar park with a capacity of 85 MW. This park will supply electrolysers to produce hydrogen, which can be stored to deliver carbon-free electricity, catering for the consumption of more than 140,000 Namibians. This project is a tangible sign of the European Union’s commitment to energy transition in Africa.

5. Benin Budget Support The latest example of the EU’s Global Gateway investment strategy was highlighted in July 2023 in Benin through a budget support program. The central features focused on transition, ensuring it would be environmentally friendly and include a digital dimension, ensuring growth which would lead to higher standards of living for the people of Benin. The program aims through better economic and financial governance to bolster democratic governance, targeting inclusive growth and reducing poverty and inequality. Hence, it foresees a contribution to the establishment of stronger institutions and assistance in the creation of a sustainable infrastructure which would provide trusted services to the public.

EU-China Competition and Multiple Long-Term Objectives Economically, the uneven playing field favours Chinese tech companies, which enjoy preferential treatment and environmental standards and lower data protection. This situation jeopardises the competitiveness of the Union’s digital industry. Furthermore, technological decoupling poses a high risk of economic spillovers for the Union. Politically, China can obtain political concessions from highly technology-dependent third countries, including EU member states. Beijing’s intention to maximise its power through changing institutional processes results in an active engagement in global digital governance (Kang & Wang, 2018). In the last analysis, one must recall that the EU, in its 2019 strategic outlook, referred to China as a cooperation partner, economic competitor and systemic rival (Gurol, 2020). Today, it is a systemic rivalry that requires the most attention, not because it should predominate over other roles but because the coexistence of partnership and competition is common in foreign policy development. The Union faces a four-dimensional “Chinese challenge” in digital technologies, whose economic, political, security and ideological characteristics overlap. Comparing, contrasting and evaluating the Belt and Road Initiative with the Global Gateway is necessary to shed light on the geopolitical competition primarily in Asia and beyond. European Union can be regarded as a potential regional pole in a multipolar labyrinth. Viewed through the prism of concentric circles, one finds the states of its closest environment in the first circle. These states have the vocation to become of the bloc. A second circle comprises countries affected by the “neighbourhood policy”, a policy whose geographical and material contours are relatively fluid, and it is unclear whether such neighbours will be admitted to the bloc (Yigit, 2021b). The logic of this policy rests on attraction and not on domination. If the beneficiary countries comply with certain conditions, they will obtain advantages following a mechanism of supposed reciprocity for the parties. One can also add the Mediterranean Union project promoted by France as a transformation of the Barcelona process to strengthen the European Union’s influence in an area where cultural, political and economic characters are diverse and stand in stark contrast to European principles, values and methods (Yigit, 2020). 76

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Every enterprise of world influence in the European Union is limited by its diminished size of military power. The European Union is not in a position to ensure international security, even at the level of the whole “old continent”. On its own, it cannot intervene successfully in the operational environment. Moreover, its security is maintained under a nuclear protectorate of the United States institutionalised in NATO, which makes it quite dependent and partially subordinate to American military strategy. One continues to ponder whether a more autonomous European defence could be developed within the Atlantic alliance, as traditional French foreign policy has aspired towards. Even so, the states of the European Union have the independence to express their views on international politics. At the UN, for example, the European Union member countries present their political positions, which only sometimes converges. Despite this weakness, the European Union could not be disintegrated from the outside. However, it could be fragmented within itself due to the divisions of its Member States, as evidenced by Brexit. In any case, the European Union remains a potential pole of an unlikely multipolarity of the international system of the twenty-first century because, by opposing the unilateralism of US foreign policy, it is also opposed to the hegemony of the unipolar power, even if it does not do so openly. Without reaching a rupture with the United States, in recent years, the contradictions between the two parties became visible over the United States use of force against Iraq, the commitment of European countries to the preservation of the environment and the limitation of the consequences of climate change through multilateral action, reaching its nadir under the Trump presidency. In this respect, the future redefinition of links with the United States is essential for the European Union (Pietrzak, 2010). At the economic and financial levels, the sensitivity and competitiveness of the European countries are very strong, hence the idea promoted by Germany of a free trade area between the European Union and the United States that would strengthen their economic interdependencies. If it occurs, it would be the construction of an economic NATO that could stoke competition and rivalries between capitalist economies (Pietrzak, 2023). In the security field, very little should change since cooperation exists in the war against terrorism and the ongoing support to Ukraine to regain its territorial integrity (Yigit, 2022c). All this indicates that in the current globalisation of international relations, the interdependence between the new configurations of power could work to the benefit of the EU and China as the weakening of the power of the United States offers opportunities for greater influence and room for action for both.

CONCLUSION The New Silk Roads initiative, as the Chinese conceive it, pursues concurrent objectives that go far beyond the economic dimension, while the deliberately chosen expression masks them by reifying the imagination of the historic Silk Roads: caravans of camels crossing deserts from oasis to oasis and transporting a myriad of rare and exotic products. These objectives are of three closely intertwined orders: geopolitical, symbolic, and pragmatic. They have one aspect in common: planning for the long term. First: geopolitically, China is seeking new forms of bilateral relations based on consultation to foster greater integration and harmonisation of policies in several areas, the two central ones being economic development and security – which are two complementary issues for China. The objective is as much to propose as to update a counter-model to American hegemony, the decline of which China anticipates while seeking to accelerate it. However, it presents itself as the economic engine and the guarantor of

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peace, not only in Asia but on a global scale: it, therefore, enjoins the countries to modulate their development plans according to their own just as much as their policies, in a word to emulate it. Second: it seeks to link states and public and private entities, both subnational and supranational as the multipolarity it calls for is not international but inter-civilisational. Furthermore, it does not see itself as a nation like the others but as a politically organised civilisation and consequently seeks to influence the rules of the international political game to reflect better the perception it projects of itself. This is why, on a symbolic level, the new silk roads serve the Chinese Dream, that of the great regeneration of the Chinese nation, which will erase the humiliation of the Opium Wars by refocusing Asia, if not the world, on China. Third: pragmatically, China realises that it is reaching the limits of its growth model, based on industrial development, mobilising an abundant workforce, which produces goods and services in large numbers, but with low added value. It accepts its dependence on advanced technology imports to continue its development while exporting countries are increasingly wary and reluctant towards it. Furthermore, at the same time, because it also sees its growth rate falling, it fears being caught in the middle-income trap. Thus, the new silk roads represent only one strategic plan component that seeks to associate foreign countries with its desire for economic transition and an attempt to rebalance geopolitics to its advantage. In the specific case of the European Union, it would be worth asking whether it will be able to equip itself with the indispensable instruments that will enable it to become a polar power in the twenty-first century, an integral actor in international relations, leaving behind the era when it stood out as the clear junior partner of the US. Examining China’s technological advance and its relevance to European strategic sovereignty, one generally deals with the shifting paradigms and how they reshape a key concept in this context: interdependence. Turning attention towards China’s innovation capacity, explaining how it has become an innovation powerhouse from an unlikely candidate for digital innovation and why its future success is still being determined and exploring how China’s technological advance translates into a global power raises major concerns relating to how the EU’s Global Gateway can become a rival to the Belt and Road Initiative. One may peruse the results of a broad research agenda to understand the EU’s and China’s future technological trajectories which is a prerequisite for developing an adequate and effective set of European policies so that the Union retains its freedom of action in world affairs. Looking ahead to the coming decades of the twenty-first-century international system, the central challenge lies partially in a European Union that at times often dissents with the USA in terms of its exaggerated militarism and policies in general and advancing its influence through its Global Gateway strategy, but also in the great emerging power of China aspiring to be another pole - possibly dominant - in a multipolar system and utilising its BRI to that end. So far, China has progressed further as it has acquired a decade of accomplishments with its policy. The EU’s strategy is fairly recent, with objectives to contribute to local development in developing partner countries by mobilising the private sector and accelerating digital, energy and ecological transitions. However, its results are less substantial than China’s. Ultimately, Global Gateway cannot compete with the BRI in terms of quantity in terms of projects and investments but in quality, providing more transparent, democratic, ecologically friendly and sustainable alternatives to lesser developed partners. Moreover, there is an identifiable preference for regionalism, attaining high standards of connections, and a strong emphasis and definition of the values to be applied in such projects. In the final analysis, certainly, BRI is a major challenge for the EU. So far, it has failed to meet that challenge, and the signs indicating it will change soon are less than encouraging.

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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Belt and Road Initiative: China’s major international strategy heavily focused on infrastructural investments announced in 2013 to establish a dual trade route connecting itself with the rest of the world. Geopolitics: The effect of geography on the conduct of international politics. Global Gateway: A European Union strategy focusing on sustainable connections that benefit the environment, people, and the planet. Globalisation: A concept which describes and accounts for increasing global interdependence in terms of economics, society and culture through flows and exchanges in technology, goods and services, investment, information and people. Multilateralism: The participation of three or more actors, usually governments of different countries. Normative: An approach basing itself on a standard of behaviour. Polarity: Describing and identifying the dominant great powers within the international system. Revisionist Power: A state unhappy with the current international system that desires change. Silk Road: A vast trade network of paths connecting civilisations in North Africa and Eurasia through both land and sea routes.

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He had the same aim in his speech in Dar es Salaam in Tanzania the same year when he then addressed Africa; also, before the Mexican Senate on June 5, encompassing Latin America and the Caribbean; on 1 April 2014 in Brussels, assimilating Europe and the European Union interchangeably; and June 5, 2014, where he spoke to the Arab world as a whole. In his speech on April 1, 2014, he symbolically called for the construction of a Eurasian land bridge; and that on June 5, 2014, to strengthen Sino-Arab cooperation by promoting the spirit of the Silk Road.

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China’s Belt and Road Initiative: An Instrument for Regional Conflict Mitigation and Global Power Shifts Mohamad Zreik https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6812-6529 Sun Yat-sen University, China

ABSTRACT This chapter explores the geopolitical and geoeconomic implications of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a massive project initiated in 2013 that could potentially reshape global power dynamics. The BRI, viewed as a manifestation of China’s soft power, holds potential to alleviate international conflicts, foster international collaboration, and expedite global transformations. It aims to strengthen international relations, bolster economies, and instill peace in conflict-ridden regions like the Middle East, Afghanistan, and certain parts of Africa. By broadening infrastructure, generating new economic prospects, and integrating regions, the BRI could herald an era of peace. It also hints at the emergence of a multipolar world with China’s increasing influence. By potentially decreasing conflict likelihood and forming new global governance systems, the BRI might enhance economic interdependence and diplomatic relations. This chapter begins a dialogue on how such economic initiatives can mitigate regional turbulence and influence future global order.

INTRODUCTION In the era of globalization, few initiatives have captured attention as prominently as China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Envisioned as an expansive network of land and maritime routes to bolster trade, economic cooperation, and infrastructure development, the BRI signifies China’s strategic push into the global arena. As it spans across continents, touching numerous economies, the BRI doesn’t only influence trade and investment but also reshapes political dynamics, environmental considerations, and the larger narrative of global governance. This chapter delves into the multifaceted implications of the BRI, highlighting China’s soft power exertion, the shift in global economic dependencies, the evolution of new governance mechanisms, and the paramount environmental concerns surrounding this colossal project. DOI: 10.4018/978-1-6684-9467-7.ch005

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This chapter will examine the BRI in further detail, looking at how it may help reduce the likelihood of conflict and how it may affect the balance of power throughout the world. China’s BRI is a massive undertaking with far-reaching effects on the established regional and global order. It was first proposed in 2013. Despite the initiative’s emphasis on the economy, it will have far-reaching effects on the geopolitical and strategic spheres as well (Jiang, 2021). To better understand how the BRI is changing the global landscape, this chapter will go into these topics. This chapter examines the BRI from a variety of perspectives, including those of geopolitics and economics. The first part of the chapter focuses on the BRI’s potential as a means of reducing tensions in the region. The initiative’s potential to promote peace through infrastructure development, economic growth, and regional integration will be highlighted through an examination of several case studies with an emphasis on regions including the Middle East, Afghanistan, and sections of Africa. The influence of the BRI on international order is the topic of the next section. The initiative’s impact on the development of a multipolar world and the expansion of China’s soft power will be analyzed. This chapter will also examine how the BRI improves economic interdependence and diplomatic ties among member nations, which may lessen the likelihood of conflict and alter the structure of global governance. This chapter seeks to encourage discussion among policymakers, security experts, and academics regarding the role of economic enterprises in mitigating regional conflicts and altering the global order by examining the strategic impacts of the BRI. In addition, this chapter’s analysis is meant to add to the larger conversation on the BRI, broadening the grasp and inspiring to dig deeper into its myriad implications.

Theoretical Framework The theoretical foundation of this study primarily draws from Joseph Nye’s theory of “Soft Power,” which emphasizes the significance of attraction and persuasion in international relations, as opposed to the conventional use of coercion or payment. Nye’s conceptualization provides a compelling framework to understand China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), particularly when scrutinizing its non-economic dimensions. At its core, Nye’s theory posits that countries can exert influence not just through military might or economic incentives but also through the appeal of their culture, political values, and foreign policies. This form of power is “soft” because it shapes the preferences of others through allure rather than force. Applying this lens to the BRI, one could argue that China is not only aiming for economic expansion but also to enhance its global appeal, fostering a sense of partnership and shared prosperity. Such a theoretical approach allows for a nuanced examination of China’s global strategy. For instance, while infrastructure projects under the BRI can be viewed through a purely economic or strategic lens, the soft power theory sheds light on China’s efforts to bolster its image as a global leader in development, forging deeper cultural and diplomatic ties with partner countries. This chapter is anchored in Nye’s soft power theory, offering a fresh perspective on China’s BRI.

Methodology This chapter will use a thorough research technique to assess the impact of China’s Belt and Road Initiative on reducing regional violence and shifting global influence. The used approach combines several different types of qualitative research to provide a thorough analysis of the initiative’s consequences, both positive and negative. 85

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The first approach emphasizes thorough examination of relevant documents. This requires looking into a wide variety of documents, from scholarly papers to policy reports to news accounts to official statements, all of which pertain to the BRI. The goals, implementation techniques, triumphs, obstacles, and criticisms of the BRI may all be gleaned from these texts. The initiative’s impact on regional conflicts and the shifting balance of global power will be studied in depth. The second approach involves looking at specific cases in greater detail. The chapter will take a close look at a few crucial BRI nations and locations. Specifically, these case studies will examine how the BRI has affected the resolution of local conflicts and the distribution of global power in these areas. Particular focus will be placed on the Middle East, Afghanistan, and other areas of Africa that have experienced significant war in recent years. In addition, the chapter will assess the larger strategic implications of the BRI via the lens of geopolitical and geoeconomic analysis. Finally, predictive modeling approaches with be used to speculate on the BRI’s future effects. This method will attempt to foretell the BRI’s future implications on conflict prevention and global power changes by assessing existing patterns and projecting probable results. Triangulating the results from these many approaches will yield a comprehensive analysis of the BRI’s effects. The goal of this analytical framework is to contribute to the policy debate and academic discussions by providing a thorough and informative analysis of the effects of the BRI.

Literature review The study of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been extensively addressed by several eminent scholars in the field. Key texts that have provided foundational understanding for this research include Liang & Zhang’s seminal book titled “The theoretical system of Belt and Road Initiative” and Callahan’s comprehensive analysis in “China’s belt and road initiative and the new Eurasian order.” Both works shed light on the strategic and economic motivations underlying the BRI, offering a nuanced perspective on China’s global ambitions. While Li argues that the BRI primarily serves as a tool for economic diplomacy, drawing countries into China’s economic sphere of influence, Gong approaches the initiative from a geopolitical standpoint, asserting that the BRI is an extension of China’s quest for global dominance. These perspectives were invaluable in framing the discussion and understanding the broader implications of the BRI in this research. The views presented by Liang & Zhang and Callahan are further corroborated by Pepermans’ article titled ” China’s 16+ 1 and Belt and Road Initiative in Central and Eastern Europe: economic and political influence at a cheap price”, which emphasizes the interplay between economics and politics in the BRI’s framework. Additionally, several research articles have provided more granular insights into specific aspects of the BRI. Notably, Cuiyun & Chazhong’s research in “Green development assessment for countries along the belt and road” and Ploberger’s findings in “One belt, one road–China’s new grand strategy” have informed the sections discussing environmental considerations and regional political dynamics respectively. These works offer a well-rounded understanding, with some arguments aligning with the thesis of this research, while others pose insightful counterarguments. Furthermore, this research has benefited from examining key documents such as “China Belt and Road Initiative” and “Public procurement in the Belt and Road Initiative”. These documents, issued by RAND Corporation and World Bank, provide a factual backdrop against which the implications of the

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BRI can be critically assessed. They serve as instrumental references in discerning the practical ramifications of the initiative on the ground. In synthesizing these diverse sources, this research engages with and builds upon the established literature. It endeavors to offer a fresh perspective while duly acknowledging the foundational works that have shaped the discourse around the BRI.

UNDERSTANDING THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE Historical Context and Development of the BRI In the fall of 2013, while visiting Kazakhstan and Indonesia, Chinese President Xi Jinping first suggested the Belt and Road Initiative. The BRI was developed to improve communication and cooperation between Asia, Europe, and Africa, and it takes its cues from the old Silk Road, a network of trade routes that linked the East and the West (Ali, 2020). The global economic climate was unstable, and new development engines were seen as necessary, at the time the BRI was conceived. China’s economy was undergoing a major shift at the time (Zou et al., 2022). China wanted to export its industrial capacity and technology standards to other parts of the world as it transitioned from an export-led, labor-intensive economic model to one based on domestic consumption, services, and high-tech sectors (Wang & Zeng, 2020). At the same time, China’s geopolitical goals mirrored those of the BRI’s expansion. China was able to increase its geopolitical power and showcase its leadership on the international stage because to this initiative, which strengthened its economic relations with neighboring regions (Stronski & Sokolsky, 2020). The scope and ambition of the BRI have grown rapidly since its start. Although the BRI’s initial focus was on the Asian, European, and African continents, it has subsequently expanded to encompass the Latin American and Caribbean regions, making it truly global in scope (Myers, 2018). Railways, roads, and ports were only some of the many infrastructure projects that the effort expanded into, but it also included digital infrastructure and even cultural exchanges. The original intent of the BRI was to build infrastructure, but now it encompasses much more. A change from a strictly infrastructural approach to a more all-encompassing platform for international collaboration, it now incorporates broader sectors such as policy coordination, financial integration, trade facilitation, and people-to-people ties. The creation of the BRI, however, has not been without criticism. There have been raised concerns about the lack of transparency in financing arrangements, the long-term viability of debt, environmental deterioration, and the possible undermining of local economies (Wang, 2021). These factors, together with the geopolitical tensions that the BRI’s expansion has sparked, are shaping the narrative and future trajectory of the initiative.

Key Principles and Objectives of the BRI The BRI is guided by a few core ideas and objectives with the end goal of establishing a new Silk Road based on cooperative economic growth. To encourage greater levels of government-to-government cooperation and policy alignment across BRI countries, policy coordination is one of the initiative’s

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guiding principles (Rabena, 2018). The goal of this cooperation is to create a policy climate conducive to the successful completion of projects and the effective operation of the BRI framework. The BRI also aims to improve communication between various types of infrastructure. To achieve this objective, built infrastructure is intended to improve local, national, and international connections. Globalization, economic integration, and interpersonal interactions are all aided by a well-connected infrastructure, which does more than just link countries together. The BRI places a premium on monetary cohesion as well. The initiative’s overarching goals are to strengthen financial cooperation across Asia, enhance financial services, and establish a unified framework for the region’s currencies, investments, and financing (Yu, 2017). The goal of this guiding principle is to facilitate economic cooperation and long-term growth by providing funding for BRI infrastructure and other projects. One of the main goals of the BRI is to open up trade between countries. The goal of the initiative is to promote economic growth and development across the BRI’s reach by lowering trade and investment restrictions (Jones, 2020). One more tenet of the BRI is the promotion of interpersonal connections between its participants. The initiative’s goal is to improve human connections such as travel, trade, and education. To further strengthen the cooperative relations under the BRI, this principle is meant to promote mutual understanding, peace, and goodwill among people of different countries (Zreik, 2021). The BRI’s guiding principles and stated goals aren’t, however, universally accepted. Critical issues that need to be addressed for the BRI’s successful development and acceptance on a global scale are concerns over the implementation of these principles, particularly regarding transparency, debt sustainability, environmental protection, and the respect for local economies and societies.

Geographic and Sectoral Coverage of the BRI The BRI is one of the largest infrastructure initiatives in recent times, spanning multiple continents and a wide range of economic sectors. The BRI spans three distinct continents, including Asia, Africa, and Europe. However, as time went on, it spread its influence even further, including regions of Latin America and the Caribbean, making it a truly global endeavor (Myers, 2018). A large percentage of the world’s population is represented by the more than 100 countries and international organizations that are directly or indirectly involved in the BRI (Huang, 2016). There are two main parts to the BRI. The Silk Road Economic Belt is a land-based network that would eventually link China to Central Asia, Russia, and Europe. The second is a proposed maritime route called the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, which would connect China’s coastal areas to those of Southeast and South Asia, the Middle East, Eastern Africa, and Europe (Bitabarova, 2018). These parts work together to facilitate unprecedented levels of commerce, economic integration, and crosscultural interaction. The BRI prioritizes infrastructure development in the transportation, energy, and telecommunications sectors, among others, when it comes to its sectoral coverage. To improve communication and trade, the transportation industry builds things like railroads, highways, and harbors. The goal of the energy sector is to ensure energy security and to promote sustainable development through the construction of power plants, transmission lines, and the development of renewable energy projects (Majid, 2020). The initiative seeks to improve digital connectivity and the digital economy by constructing digital infrastructure in telecommunications, such as fiber-optic cables and satellite networks (Shen, 2018). 88

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But the BRI’s reach goes well beyond those industries. Free trade zones and economic corridors are promoted, as are cultural exchanges and cooperation in education, science, and technology. Other areas of focus include finance, with the establishment of financial institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Silk Road Fund (Rahman, 2022). The breadth and depth of the BRI’s reach across regions and industries speak to the initiative’s complexity and scope. Significant difficulties arise, however, including the necessity for substantial cooperation among numerous stakeholders, the management of various risks, and the coordination of activities across different locations and industries. Therefore, the future success of the BRI is dependent on careful preparation, execution, and management of its comprehensive scope.

BRI AS A TOOL FOR CONFLICT MITIGATION Conceptual Framework: Infrastructure, Economic Growth, and Conflict Resolution With its emphasis on connection and cooperation, the BRI has been proposed as a means of reducing the likelihood of violent conflict. The primary idea underlying this notion is that the development of infrastructure and economic growth can aid in conflict resolution and promote peace by creating common interests and economic interdependences (Yu, 2017). Building up infrastructure is one of the BRI’s main tenets, and it plays an important role in easing tensions. For starters, it helps the economy expand and thrive (Zreik, 2023). Infrastructure initiatives can help alleviate some of the socio-economic grievances that underlie wars by generating new jobs, raising incomes, and raising standards of life. Second, international cooperation and communication can be facilitated by the development of a sense of common interest as a result of the use of common infrastructure. Last but not least, enhancing connectedness through infrastructure development can encourage contact, cultural exchanges, and mutual understanding amongst people, thereby bridging gaps and lowering tensions. Economic growth, another BRI priority, is also crucial in reducing the likelihood of war. Poverty, inequality, and unemployment are typically the root causes of conflict, although these issues can be ameliorated if the economy improves. More commerce and investment can also help reduce the likelihood of war by increasing the cost of fighting and providing strong incentives for peaceful ties. The BRI has the potential to foster conditions favorable to peace and stability by fostering economic growth (Ly, 2020). The liberal philosophy of peace, which advocates for economic interdependence, democratic governance, and international institutions to generate incentives for peace and disincentives for conflict, underpins the use of economic initiatives like the BRI as instruments for conflict mitigation (Zhao, 2021). While the BRI can play a role in reducing the likelihood of violence, it is not a silver bullet. Respect for sovereignty and local circumstances, as well as political will and diplomatic involvement, are also essential for conflict resolution. Furthermore, BRI projects must be implemented in a transparent, inclusive, and sustainable manner to avoid exacerbating or creating new tensions (Patey, 2021).

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Case Studies of BRI Projects in Post-Conflict Countries and Their Potential Impact on Development Middle East An intriguing case study of the BRI’s potential impact on regional conflicts may be found in the Middle East, a region marked by its abundant natural riches and longstanding geopolitical tensions. In this context, China’s BRI plays a complex role in a region beset by violence and religious strife. The China-Egypt Suez Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone is a model BRI initiative in the region. Since its founding in 2008, this industrial zone in Egypt has attracted hundreds of Chinese enterprises, helping to boost Egypt’s economy, employment rates, and overall sense of calm. The project has helped reduce the likelihood of conflict in a country where social and political conditions have been unstable by creating jobs (Bu et al., 2023). The investments in Egypt, like the New Administrative Capital, aim at economic upliftment. However, linking them directly to conflict mitigation is a stretch, given that Egypt’s primary conflicts are internal and socio-political (Sharma, 2019). China has become a major investor in the oil industry of Iraq, a country ravaged by years of conflict and turmoil (Salman & Geeraerts, 2015). Rebuilding Iraq’s oil infrastructure with Chinese assistance through the BRI might pave the road for the country’s economic revival and political stability. The BRI has the potential to promote regional cooperation and integration in the Middle East as a whole. Building common infrastructure could increase economic interdependence between nations, reducing tensions and paving the way for stability. One example of a transnational railway project that could improve regional connectivity and develop a feeling of shared interests is the one proposed to connect the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (Almujeem, 2021). While these initiatives can help advance regional economic growth and cooperation, they cannot end the region’s protracted political disputes or bridge its many sectarian schisms. Furthermore, China has typically avoided directly interfering in conflicts due to its non-interference stance. Therefore, while the BRI may play a small part in conflict mitigation through economic means, this role should not be exaggerated, and its effects should be studied in conjunction with those of other conflict resolution initiatives.

Afghanistan Another compelling case study for examining the possible impact of the BRI in conflict mitigation is Afghanistan, a country plagued by conflict and instability on a regular basis. The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is one of the largest BRI projects in that region. Through improvements in infrastructure, building, and energy resources, this project hopes to improve communication between China and Afghanistan by way of Pakistan. CPEC has the potential to indirectly contribute to Afghanistan’s stability by enhancing the country’s infrastructure and boosting economic growth (Khan, 2019). Another such project is the Mes Aynak copper mine, which is being developed by Chinese state-owned firms (Curvers, 2017). If completed, the project has the potential to greatly contribute to Afghanistan’s economy by providing jobs and generating cash, although being impeded by security challenges and archaeological concerns. This growth in industry has the potential to reduce violence in a troubled area.

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The Wakhan Corridor Fiber Optic Cable project aims to lay a fiber-optic cable through the rough, mountainous region connecting China and Afghanistan, which may provide much-needed digital connectivity to Afghanistan’s outlying regions, thereby promoting economic opportunities and possibly contributing to stability (Patey, 2021). The potential for these BRI initiatives to reduce violence in Afghanistan depends on a number of variables, though. The issue of safety must be addressed first and foremost. Significant difficulties, like as operational delays and cost overruns, could befall BRI projects in the absence of a secure security environment. Furthermore, the success of these projects in contributing to conflict prevention would depend on their inclusiveness, making sure that benefits are spread widely and not exacerbating existing disparities, which could fuel conflict. Although the BRI can help improve Afghanistan’s economy and make peace more likely, it cannot solve the political problems at the root of the country’s war. The BRI should be viewed as one instrument among several, including diplomatic and political initiatives, for reducing the risk of conflict in Afghanistan.

Africa Africa’s varied economies, wealth of natural resources, and intricate conflict dynamics make it an ideal testing ground for hypotheses about the BRI’s impact on regional strife in China. Several BRI projects in Africa have shown promise in reducing the region’s recurring conflicts by fostering economic growth and closer ties between countries. Kenya’s capital, Nairobi, and Kenya’s largest port city, Mombasa, are connected by the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) project, with intentions to expand the line to other East African countries. Indirectly, the SGR may help maintain peace and stability by increasing economic growth and the number of available jobs (Ehizuelen & Abdi, 2018). The SGR project, though promising enhanced connectivity for Kenya, has been scrutinized for its economic feasibility. Current debt associated with the project stands at around $4.9 billion, with doubts over its return on investment (Githaiga & Bing, 2019). The BRI-sponsored Kribi Deep Sea Port project in Cameroon, together with its related industrial park, has improved the country’s economic prospects by expanding its capacity for trade and encouraging the growth of industry in West Africa (Dzekashu & Anyu, 2020). These projects have the ability to reduce socio-economic issues that could fuel conflict by providing jobs and boosting economic growth. Gwadar, a port city in Pakistan, is strategically important in the BRI framework. Its development has not only increased tensions due to the Kashmir issue but has also highlighted broader geopolitical concerns, particularly the growing apprehensions between India and China (Sharma, 2019). Hambantota port’s leasing to China raised concerns about Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and potential militarization (Singh, 2020). In contrast, the development of the Colombo Port, with participation from India and Japan, is seen as a counterweight to China’s influence (Yu, 2020). The Melakka Gateway project, despite being a significant BRI project, faced skepticism due to its viability concerns and environmental implications (Connolly, 2023). Malaysia’s engagement with China over this project underpins the complexities and challenges inherent in the BRI (Kuik, 2021). The new administrative capital and the Egypt-China Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone are two examples of how the BRI has shaped Egypt’s economy, which is a major player in the region of North Africa. Thousands of jobs have been created thanks to these initiatives, boosting economic security and possibly reducing the likelihood of war in the long run (Sun & Xu, 2022). 91

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The BRI’s contribution to reducing violence in Africa is, however, intricate and complicated. While expansion in infrastructure and the economy can help maintain peace and order, unchecked development can increase social inequalities, promote corruption, and damage the environment, all of which can lead to unrest. Projects under the BRI must be implemented in a way that is sustainable, inclusive, and respectful of local settings if they are to effectively contribute to conflict mitigation (Mark, Overland, & Vakulchuk, 2020). Furthermore, the BRI is unable to resolve the systemic political and ethnic issues that plague a number of African nations. To effectively alleviate conflicts, it must be combined with other factors, such as diplomatic efforts, inclusive government, and conflict resolution systems.

Analysis of the BRI’s Role in Fostering International Cooperation China’s BRI is a key mechanism for international cooperation, especially in the areas of policy coordination, infrastructure connectivity, unfettered trade, financial integration, and people-to-people bonds, as well as for economic development and regional integration. The BRI has facilitated numerous dialogues, such as the Belt and Road Forum, where nations align development strategies. For instance, in the 2019 forum, 37 countries participated, resulting in 283 deliverable outcomes across various fields (Ghossein, Hoekman, & Shingal, 2021). The BRI promotes communication and consensus-building among participating nations in terms of policy coordination by encouraging the exchange of ideas and alignment of development strategies. The initiative also encourages macro-policy coordination, making it more likely that the countries’ economic policies will be compatible with one another and allowing them to work together more effectively. One of the BRI’s guiding principles is making it easier to build and maintain intercity connections, which can lead to the development of cooperative international initiatives and interdependencies. Countries work together to build physical and virtual infrastructure like roads, railways, and ports, and this fosters a sense of shared ownership and mutual benefit (Chen, Miao, & Li, 2021). The BRI has also helped facilitate international collaboration in the sphere of free trade. By establishing free trade zones and lowering trade barriers, the BRI fosters a framework for regional economic cooperation that is open, inclusive, and well-balanced. The BRI is a cooperative framework that also includes financial integration. The BRI strengthens economic linkages and mutual trust between nations in Asia by supporting joint efforts to develop a currency stability system, investment and financing system, and credit information system (Huang, 2016). Last but not least, the BRI encourages personal and cultural forms of international cooperation. The BRI promotes international understanding and goodwill through activities like as educational exchanges, cultural tourism, and scientific and technological partnerships. There are valid concerns and complaints that need to be addressed, notwithstanding the fact that the BRI offers a potent platform for international cooperation. Key aspects that need careful attention for the BRI to effectively develop cooperation include debt sustainability, transparency, and respect for local norms and legislation (Carrai, 2021). It is essential that the BRI continually adjust and fine-tune its procedures to better conform to global norms and the requirements of member countries.

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Criticisms and Limitations in the BRI’s Conflict Mitigation Efforts The BRI’s efforts to reduce the likelihood of conflict are not perfect, despite their promise. Concerns raised include the inability to pay off debt, a lack of transparency, a failure to adhere to local customs and rules, and the potential for current regional disputes to escalate (Carrai, 2021; Russel & Berger, 2019). The ability to keep paying off debt is a huge worry. There are fears that the BRI, especially in countries with weaker economies, can lead to excessive levels of debt, despite the fact that it delivers much-needed infrastructure investment to many developing countries. These debt loads have the potential to amplify economic precarity, raise nations’ reliance on China, and spark domestic and international strife (Lai, Lin, & Sidaway, 2020). Another major issue is the perceived lack of openness. Opponents of the BRI say that many of the agreements are negotiated behind closed doors, without locals having a chance to review the terms or provide feedback. Corruption, environmental deterioration, and the uprooting of local populations due to a lack of information sharing all contribute to the risk of civil unrest and armed conflict (Wang & Zhao, 2021). Some people are worried that BRI projects don’t take into account regional laws and customs. Critics believe that BRI projects might have severe effects on local communities, contributing to social and environmental problems in areas ranging from environmental standards to workers’ rights (Hillman, 2020). Some have also voiced concerns that preexisting regional tensions could be exacerbated by the BRI. For instance, in South Asia, India’s worries over China’s ties to Pakistan and the construction of the CPEC have exacerbated existing tensions in the region. Similar concerns have been made regarding the potential for BRI investments in Africa to worsen economic inequality or resource conflicts (Ahmed, 2019). China needs to respond to these criticisms and limits if it wants to succeed. For example, this may entail taking into account the potential effects of BRI projects on regional dynamics and working to increase transparency, respect local legislation and norms, and guarantee debt sustainability. Furthermore, diplomatic and political measures should be reinforced by the BRI to successfully reduce conflicts, even though the BRI can contribute to conflict reduction indirectly through economic development.

BRI AND THE SHIFT IN GLOBAL POWER DYNAMICS The BRI as an Extension of China’s Soft Power China’s BRI can be understood as a major expansion of the country’s “soft power,” a term first developed by Joseph Nye to describe the ability to influence the attitudes and behaviors of others via persuasion rather than force (Zreik, 2022b). Through its emphasis on economic growth, infrastructure connectivity, and international cooperation, the BRI acts as a concrete representation of China’s soft power. China presents itself as a dependable partner committed to mutual growth and prosperity by providing much-needed infrastructure development and economic opportunities to participating countries. The BRI also helps spread Chinese language and culture, which demonstrates its soft power. For instance, the BRI promotes cultural exchanges, tourism, and academic partnerships through its ‘people-topeople linkages’ philosophy. Many nations along the BRI have Confucius Institutes, whose mission is to promote Chinese language and culture in order to increase China’s cultural clout abroad (Winter, 2021). 93

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In addition, China’s promotion of a “community of shared future for mankind,” as exemplified by the BRI, portrays the country as a leader in multilateralism and international collaboration (Ly, 2021). China’s soft power is strengthened by this narrative since it increases the country’s attraction and attractiveness around the world. China also uses the BRI to influence international norms and standards. China can help shape how other countries approach infrastructure development by serving as a role model in funding, project management, and digital connection.

The BRI’s Influence on Global Economic Dependencies Global economic dependencies are changing as a result of the BRI, a massive infrastructure and economic project led by China. It’s altering global commerce and investment patterns by forging new connections and strengthening old ones. Direct economic dependencies are being created as a result of China’s substantial investment in infrastructure development through the BRI. The lack of adequate infrastructure has kept many developing countries from participating in global trade. These countries now rely on Chinese investment to improve their infrastructure. As a result, more money, technology, and knowledge will need to come from China (Zou et al., 2022). The construction of BRI trade corridors is also influencing shifts in international commerce. As of 2019, trade between China and other BRI countries exceeded $7.8 trillion (Zhang & James, 2023). However, these gains should be contrasted with the investments made and the loans extended, ensuring a comprehensive understanding (Horn, Reinhart, & Trebesch, 2021). The BRI is helping China and other participating countries strengthen their trade ties by paving the way for faster, more direct routes. In addition to improving China’s access to other markets, these new trade routes are also increasing the dependence of other countries on China’s exports. As a corollary, the BRI is making countries more reliant on Chinese technology exports, especially in the field of digital infrastructure. China is using the BRI to spread its state-of-the-art digital infrastructure to other countries. This includes 5G networks, fiber-optic connections, and e-commerce platforms (Ly, 2020). This increases China’s sway in the digital economy and fosters reliance on Chinese-developed infrastructure and industry norms. There are international security issues stemming from the BRI’s impact on international economic dependencies. Countries that benefit economically from the BRI may also choose to take a political stance that is favorable to China. Also, they might be more inclined to back China’s position in global forums. Concerns regarding debt sustainability, loss of sovereignty, and economic overdependence on China are also raised by this heightened reliance on China. It also adds fuel to the fire of those who say the BRI reflects China’s neocolonial intentions in disguise (Conrad & Kostka, 2017). Because of this, it is crucial to watch out for unmanageable debt, economic fragility, and political pressure as the BRI reshapes global economic dependencies.

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Analysis of the BRI’s Role in Establishing New Global Governance Mechanisms The BRI has far-reaching ramifications for global governance beyond the construction of transportation infrastructure. China is advocating for a new model of global governance through the BRI, one that places greater emphasis on inclusion, practical cooperation, and a multipolar world order. First, a cooperative, realistic governance paradigm is promoted by the BRI. Instead of attempting to impose ideological standards and principles, it concentrates on producing practical benefits through infrastructural development and economic integration. Many emerging nations, which place a premium on economic growth and poverty alleviation, agree with this emphasis on doing rather than talking. Second, the BRI encourages people to be accepting of others. The BRI is not limited to or dominated by any single country, unlike some other international organizations. China regularly stresses the ‘winwin’ character of the BRI, arguing that all participating countries will gain. Third, the BRI is evidence of the rise of a multipolar world order in which many countries have a say in international policymaking. China is threatening the supremacy of established countries like the United States and Europe by taking the lead in the BRI (Clarke, 2018). In addition, China is taking the lead in establishing new funding structures through the BRI, including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Silk Road Fund, both of which have the potential to radically alter the structure of global financial governance. BRI’s role in global governance isn’t just about creating infrastructure but about influencing international norms. The AIIB, for instance, operates differently from the IMF or the World Bank, emphasizing non-interference (Yuan, 2018). While the BRI could pave the way for innovative approaches to global governance, it also confronts serious obstacles. Several BRI partner countries have governance issues, from corruption to a lack of transparency, which could hinder the long-term success of BRI projects (Weng et al., 2021). The BRI’s management structure has been accused for creating unsustainable debt, a lack of transparency, and a disdain for environmental and social standards. Some traditional nations see China’s rise to global governance leadership through the BRI as a threat to the status quo and have spoken out against it (Lai, Lin, & Sidaway, 2020).

Environmental Impacts of the BRI: Sustainability Concerns and Strategies The BRI, while championed as a landmark economic and infrastructure project, comes with significant environmental considerations. Given the massive scale of the BRI, understanding its ecological implications is critical to ensuring long-term sustainability. Large-scale infrastructure developments typically disturb natural habitats, potentially leading to fragmentation or loss of biodiversity. For instance, the construction of roads, railways, and ports can disrupt local ecosystems, posing threats to endangered species and altering the natural balance of habitats (Wu & Li, 2022). In addition, these developments often accelerate deforestation, soil erosion, and water resource depletion. Another concern is the carbon footprint resulting from the construction phase and subsequent operation of these infrastructures. The utilization of heavy machinery, transportation, and the sheer scale of construction activities emits a significant volume of greenhouse gases, potentially exacerbating the challenges of climate change (Kibert, 2016). Many BRI projects, due to their scale and scope, run the

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risk of becoming financially non-viable. Countries like Djibouti have public debt soaring over 80% of their GDP due to BRI projects (Ameyaw-Brobbey, 2018). To address these challenges, it’s imperative to integrate sustainability into the core of BRI’s planning and execution. Before the commencement of any project, a comprehensive EIA should be made mandatory. This would identify potential ecological threats and guide mitigation strategies (Khalid, Ahmad, & Ullah, 2022; Ozigci, 2022). Adopting green building standards, utilizing renewable energy sources, and ensuring efficient waste management can significantly reduce the environmental footprint of infrastructure projects. By designating ecological corridors and buffer zones around construction areas, the adverse effects on local flora and fauna can be minimized. Engaging local communities in conservation efforts can also ensure the safeguarding of endemic species (Carrai, 2021). Investments in renewable energy projects or afforestation can help counterbalance the carbon emissions from BRI projects. Emphasizing a shift towards clean energy in BRI projects can also contribute to long-term sustainability (Li & Taube, 2019).

Discussion on the Shift Towards a Multipolar World Order and China’s Rising Influence A more multipolar international order is evolving as a result of ongoing developments in the global power landscape, characterized by the relative loss of traditional Western countries and the rise of emerging nations like China, India, and Brazil. Particularly influential in this shift has been China, thanks to its booming economy and global efforts like the BRI. The BRI is a visible sign of China’s growing power, as it includes infrastructure projects and trade routes that connect China with many nations. China’s leadership in this massive international effort is altering international trade, investment, and growth, and thereby shifting the balance of global power (Yu, 2017). The growing importance of China in global institutions is another indication of the country’s growing might. The New Development Bank (NDB), formerly known as the BRICS Bank, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) both count China as their main stakeholder. China is competing Western financial organizations like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund through these mechanisms (Chan, 2017). Furthermore, China’s commitment to multilateralism is exemplified by the BRI’s openness and the country’s constant advocacy for a “community of shared future for mankind,” both of which establish China as a leading proponent of the multipolar international order. It offers a new vision for world leadership that is based on mutual respect, shared prosperity, and independent nation states. The rise of China and the trend toward a multipolar world order, however, bring both advantages and disadvantages. Emerging nations have the potential to create a more equitable and inclusive international order, giving them a larger voice in global affairs. However, there are challenges and constraints that might hinder their full participation and impact. The norms, regulations, and institutions of the present order are challenged, and new ones have not yet been fully formed, which can lead to uncertainty and instability (Sidaway et al., 2020). It will be important for China to strike a balance between its national interests and its global duties if it is to successfully navigate this shift. It must show that it is a responsible global actor by complying with international rules, respecting the interests of other countries, and making meaningful contributions to global public goods. The BRI is an important part of China’s overall global strategy. 96

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FUTURE IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS The BRI is one of the most extensive infrastructure initiatives ever proposed, and it promises to alter regional and international dynamics in significant ways. The BRI has the potential to spur a change in global trade patterns and the composition of economic power blocs. The BRI has the potential to change the global trade landscape by opening up new trade routes and markets through strengthening connections between Asia, Africa, and Europe. Politically, the BRI has the potential to increase China’s global leadership and presence. China’s diplomatic clout is anticipated to grow as the BRI brings more countries into its economic orbit. The world’s power structure may change as a result, with emerging nations like China taking their rightful place alongside the old guard. The BRI could change the nature of regional conflicts and the balance of power. The BRI’s emphasis on economic cooperation and integration has the potential to reduce regional tensions and strengthen security. However, if seen as a tool for China’s geopolitical objectives, it might further inflame the situation. The BRI is a one-of-a-kind example of how economic initiatives can help defuse regional disputes. The BRI is an initiative with the stated goal of fostering economic growth and integration by increasing infrastructure connectivity, unrestricted trade, and relationships between people. For instance, the BRI has been encouraging infrastructure development and economic prospects in conflict-ridden countries like the Middle East. By encouraging interdependence and the development of common objectives, these economic incentives may help reduce regional tensions. However, the implementation of such initiatives and the larger political context determine whether or not they are successful in creating peace. The BRI has been the subject of increasing study, although there are still many unexplored questions. The effect of the BRI on the economy and society around it is an important factor. Despite the BRI’s seeming potential for monetary expansion, questions remain about how it may affect existing patterns of economic and social inequality. Research into the environmental effects of the BRI is also crucial, in particular into whether or not it meets sustainability criteria and how it will affect global warming. There also needs to be more study on how the BRI affects institutional and governmental frameworks in countries along the route. Policymakers, security experts, and academics need to give the BRI their full attention since it is a reflection of the altering global power dynamics and an extension of China’s rising influence. It is essential, as the globe enters a more linked and multipolar period, to grasp the significance of projects like the BRI. The goal of such a discussion should be to find ways in which all parties can benefit from the BRI, despite its inherent dangers and difficulties. To this end, it will be beneficial addressing ways to make BRI projects more sustainable, more transparent and accountable, and more in tune with local needs and international standards. Exploring the role of economic endeavors in fostering peace is also important, and the BRI’s potential as a tool for conflict reduction highlights this need. To achieve this goal, a detailed knowledge of the interplay between economic growth, political stability, and peace-building is required.

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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): An ambitious infrastructure development and investment project launched by the Chinese government aiming to enhance regional connectivity between Asia, Europe, and Africa. Connectivity Diplomacy: Refers to diplomatic efforts to enhance transportation, communication, and other linkages between countries to promote trade, understanding, and cooperation. Debt Diplomacy: Often used as a critical term, it refers to one country extending excessive credit to another country with the intent of extracting economic or political concessions when the debtor country is unable to repay its loans. Development Diplomacy: The use of aid and other types of socio-economic development assistance as a means to further a country’s diplomatic objectives. Economic Corridor: A network of pathways – which could be roads, railways, pipelines, and more – created for the purpose of stimulating economic development and trade. Geostrategic: Relating to the geopolitical and strategic factors of a region’s geography, especially regarding international politics and planning.

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Hard Power: The use of military and economic means to influence the behavior or interests of other political entities. Multilateralism: The practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states, in contrast to unilateralism or bilateralism where states act alone or in pairs. Neo-Colonialism: A term used to describe the indirect control or influence by powerful countries over weaker ones, especially in terms of economic and cultural dominance. Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The process of rebuilding a community after a conflict. This can encompass both physical infrastructure and societal trust. Regional Hegemony: A situation where one country is the dominant power within its geographical or regional area. Soft Power: Coined by Joseph Nye, this refers to the ability of a country to persuade others to do what it wants without force or coercion. It often involves cultural influence, diplomacy, and economic incentives. Stakeholder Engagement: The process by which an organization involves individuals, groups, or entities that have an interest in a project or issue. Sustainable Development: Economic development that is conducted without the depletion of natural resources, ensuring that the needs of the present are met without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. Trade Imbalance: A situation where the value of a country’s imports significantly differs from the value of its exports.

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Chapter 6

Decoding the USNATO Dynamics:

A Thorough Analysis of Donald Trump and Joe Biden’s Foreign Policy Approaches Akash Bag https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8820-171X Adamas University, India Souvik Roy Adamas University, India Asif Iqubal Shah St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata, India

ABSTRACT The ripples of the shift in power in the USA were felt worldwide, not least in international security policy, where the USA has often chosen to be at the forefront throughout history. The country’s involvement in most international organizations had changed during the four years with Trump as president, and his mottos “America First” and “Make America Great Again.” The tone and fortunes surrounding NATO changed on January 20, 2021. This chapter has researched the national role conceptions of two American presidents, Donald Trump and Joe Biden, to see how their national role conception of the USA could affect the relationship between the USA and NATO with the help of the national role conception theory employed in this paper. It concludes that the presidents have partly different national role conceptions, with one role being the same and two being different. This chapter also concludes that different national role conceptions could affect the relationship between the USA and NATO.

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-6684-9467-7.ch006

Copyright © 2024, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

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INTRODUCTION Trump was particularly critical of the security policy organization NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and said that, among other things, the USA was “exploited” by the EU, as NATO favored Europe more than the USA. He also claimed that the organization was “unfair”(Clark, 2018). Even from NATO’s side, the relationship with the United States during Trump’s term of office has been described as difficult. Jens Stoltenberg (Secretary General of NATO) stated in a 2021 interview that the alliance had a challenging relationship with the Trump administration and that he had some difficult personal conversations with Donald Trump (Birnbaum, 2021). But since Joe Bidden took oath as the President of the United States with his slogan “America is back” (Al Jazeera Staff, 2021). For example, he signed the Paris Agreement the day he took office as President (McGrath, 2021). During the 2021 NATO summit in Brussels, Biden addressed the remaining leaders and said that America’s commitment to the transatlantic alliance is unwavering (Garamone, 2021). The paper aims to explain the difference in the USA’s relationship with NATO during the Trump administration and the Biden administration using the theory of “national role conception” (NRC). With the purpose as a basis, we have formulated the following question: Can the difference in the USA’s relationship with NATO under Donald Trump and Joe Biden be explained by the national role perceptions of the presidents? The theory is based on IR (International Relations) and FPA (Foreign Policy Analysis). It is of the utmost importance that leaders’ decisions and national perceptions of roles are examined to understand the past, how international security policy should be managed, and what should be avoided.

LITERATURE REVIEW To justify this chapter’s contribution to already existing research, here is a section that takes a closer look at previous research on the USA’s relationship with NATO, previous comparisons between Donald Trump and Joe Biden, as well as examples of how the theory NRC has been used in previous studies. To get a good starting point in previous research, we intend to look closely at what we know about the relationship between the US and NATO. In his article “NATO Enlargement and US Foreign Policy: The Origins, durability, and Impact of an Idea” (Shifrinson, 2020, p. 342). Shifrinson examined how and why NATO has become an accepted and central part of US foreign policy. Using a mixture of congruence procedures and process tracing, Shifrinson concludes that NATO’s role in US foreign policy can be explained, among other things, by unipolarity, effect maximization for the US, and socialization. As Shifrinson writes in his article, NATO now has an obvious part in US foreign policy, which motivates this chapter about how a president (Donald Trump) can go against this obviousness in foreign policy statements. In their article “NATO Enlargement and US Grand Strategy: A Net Assessment” (Menon & Ruger, 2020, p. 371). Menon and Ruger have also examined how NATO’s enlargement relates to the US’s strategy after the Cold War and how Russia has been affected by the cooperation. They write that the USA and NATO went hand in hand in their global security strategies after the Cold War, for example, when NATO allowed the USA and the leaders in Washington DC to influence Europe. According to the authors, Europe partially depends on protection from the United States through NATO. In the article, the authors emphasize that NATO’s continued existence ensures that Europe is a strategic subordinate to the US, but also tell how this has been and still is provocative for Russia. 105

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“What do we know about the US-NATO relationship?” They have a close bond, where they have been a central part of each other’s policies and strategies since the end of the Cold War, and NATO has an obvious place in US foreign policy. NATO is a large part of US security policy dealings in Europe. This shows the importance of research between the US and NATO, as both actors greatly impact the rest of the world in matters of security policy, as described with Europe in Menon and Ruger’s article. There are numerous comparisons between Donald Trump and Joe Biden. For example, Johnson writes in her article “Feeling Protected: protective masculinity and femininity from Donald Trump and Joe Biden to Jacinda Ardern”(Johnson, 2022, p. 7) about the competition between two forms of protective masculinity during the 2020 presidential election. The analysis is in the discourse; she concludes that Trump lost voters when, despite his protective masculinity, he could not handle the COVID-19 pandemic, and voters felt safer under Biden’s inclusive and empathetic masculinity, which differed from Trump’s. R. Körner, J. R. Overbeck, E. Körner, and A. Schütz have also compared Trump and Biden’s linguistic styles. They ask in their article “How the Linguistic Styles of Donald Trump and Joe Biden Reflect Different Forms of Power” (Körner et al., 2022, p. 631) about how particular linguistic variables typical of a form of power differ in the communication between Biden and Trump. They used tweets and speeches from the two presidents during the 2020 presidential campaign as material. The method was quantitative, as based on coding, they looked at which words were used, how often in which tweets, and what percentage of words belonged to a specific category in the presidents’ transcripts for the speeches. The result of the chapter was that different languages characterize different forms of power, and Trump and Biden’s language styles were remarkably different. Trump uses a more “coercive power,” and Biden uses a “collaborative power.” In summary, it is shown in this previous research that Trump and Biden use both different forms of power and language styles. Applying role perceptions to a comparison between the presidents can give new thoughts about their discourse and form of executive power. This previous research also creates certain expectations for this chapter. The chapter intends to compare the two presidents; as a result of the comparison, the presidents may differ in terms of power and argumentation. National Role Conception is a well-established theory used in most studies within FPA. The theory is used to understand the decisionmaker’s perception of the national role in understanding foreign policy actions from the nation then. For example, Cameron G. Thies has investigated how role theory can be applied to foreign policy in Latin America and Venezuela’s former President Hugo Chávez in his article “Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis in Latin America”(Thies, 2017, p. 662). The author finds that Chávez emphasized an active foreign policy for Venezuela, which differs from, for example, a preliminary chapter of Venezuela that K. J. Holsti carried out in 1970. These also describe how Venezuela’s roles are more and more nuanced compared to what was expected. He also emphasizes that research based on role theory can be difficult in Latin America due to the difficulties in obtaining material from leaders in the countries. Obtaining material about presidents can be easier for a chapter around the United States, which, for example, has freedom of the press and freedom of expression. Lisbeth Aggestam also has several studies based on the NRC theory. In 2018, she wrote a chapter for the book “Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy” with the title “Role Identity and the Europeanisation of Foreign Policy,” where she examines national role perceptions in England, France, and Germany concerning the EU and the EU’s security policy organization CFSP (Tonra & Christiansen, 2004). One national role perception can be worked out in different ways; here, Aggestam chooses from the beginning to only look at three different types of national roles, leader, partner, and independent, and then discuss whether nations fit into these different roles depending on how they see their role. She summarizes at 106

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the end that there has been a contradictory trend in the countries, as the EU’s role as an ethical power has grown while the role of independence has decreased, but the CFSP acts intergovernmental, which means that the countries still see their actions through self-interest. The countries think they are acting strategically for themselves when the national role perception of independence has declined. This means that national role perceptions can be contradictory and are more complex than one might think at first glance. These two studies show examples of roles within NRC, such as active, independent, leader, and partner. They also show that some decision-makers can hold more roles, such as Thies’ result in his chapter, which may happen in this chapter. Aggestam shows in his article that national role perceptions can help understand relationships between countries and organizations, which this paper intends to do.

THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS This paper uses the theory of “national role conception” (NRC) to explain Joe Biden’s and Donald Trump’s different national role conceptions, which in turn can explain the different relations the US had with NATO under Biden and Trump, respectively. The NRC is described in K. J. Holsti’s article “National Role Conceptions in the Chapter of Foreign Policy”(Holsti, 1970, p. 233). In the article, he examines how decision-makers’ national role perceptions can look and explain how the perceptions then influence the nation’s foreign policy decisions. Holsti describes in the article how a definition of role perception, or an empirical reference, does not exist. Much research regarding NRC has taken place around understanding the concept; for example, it has been researched and emphasized that role is a normative concept, as a role is a behavior rather than a position. Hence, this investigation intends to use the theory of NRC practically. Figure 1 shows how role theory works from an international perspective. In the analysis, four different concepts are used: (A) foreign policy role performance/role performance, which means decisions and measures where the State takes. (B) nation’s status/a country’s status, a system of role prescriptions where the action takes place. (C) alter’s role prescription, a prescription/expectation of a nation’s actions and decisions from external sources and actors. (D) policymakers’ national role conceptions/the decision-maker’s national role conceptions, the decisionmaker’s self-defined national role conception for the nation. Holsti describes in detail in his article how role theory works within FPA. In theory, the decisionmaker’s national role perception, the nation’s international status, and the rest of the world’s regulations on a specific role. The regulations of the rest of the world lead to the nation’s international status, which then, together with the decision-maker’s national role perception, results in foreign policy decisions and efforts by the State. In the framework, it is the box at the top (A) with the name “Foreign policy role performance (decisions and actions)” (Holsti, 1970). This square in the chapter represents the United States’ foreign policy within NATO. Foreign policy actions from Donald Trump and Joe Biden about and within NATO are “decisions and actions.” In the model, this means that the national role perception of both presidents greatly impacts the actual decisions made in US foreign policy. In the article, Holsti defines 107

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national role performance as the decision-makers’ general foreign policy behavior, including patterns in decisions, attitudes, functions, and commitments toward other states (Holsti, 1970). He also believes that from an observer’s point of view, these typical patterns of decisions can be called national roles. Figure 1. National role perceptions and regulations as independent variables (Holsti, 1970, p. 245)

Holsti presents several sources from which the perceptions can be derived and understood through the boxes under E and C in the model to understand the decision-makers national and world role perceptions. These sources are, for example, for a decision maker’s national role perception, ideology, national values and norms, personality, and socio-economic needs of the State (see Figure 1). Holsti emphasizes that a national role perception contains the decision maker’s thoughts about how the State should generally act in international politics, regional systems, and organizations (Holsti, 1970, pp. 245–246). This chapter means that the presidents’ general perceptions about how the USA as a state should act internationally carry a lot of weight. This does not mean only thoughts about international security policy or political decisions within NATO but general international and national politics. For the world’s role regulations for a national role, Holsti believes that, for example, general legal principles, treaty commitments, world opinion, and system-wide values can explain a national role in the world and the world’s valuation and view of that role. The paper intends to understand the difference with the help of two decision-makers’ national role perceptions. From this, only the part of the NRC theory based on decision-makers national role perception will be used as an analysis tool. Figure 1 is the part in the model under the letter E. As shown in the model and previously mentioned, it is a mixture of the decision-maker’s national role perception and the world’s role regulations that lead to the current State’s foreign policy. Using only one part in the model

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is justified because the two comparison points (Donald Trump and Joe Biden) have held the presidency within a short time each other. Biden was the next President after Trump, which means that the rest of the world’s general role prescription of the United States as an international actor, as well as the United States international status, has not changed significantly during that period. Holsti also uses society’s role prescriptions as a constant in his research, which can be found in his article, but simultaneously emphasizes that role prescriptions are still an important part of foreign policy analysis. Holsti presents various examples of national roles in his article. Three of them are presented here to clarify exactly what a national role might be. Holsti’s list is not exhaustive but gives a good view of a national role. Holsti created these roles after his research, which was done with 972 sources. The first example is called by Holsti “Active Independent” (Holsti, 1970, p. 262). This national role avoids permanent ideological and military commitments. Political decisions are made with one’s own country in mind, not to serve or help any other nation, but efforts are made to have individual diplomatic relations with countries. The second example is the “Mediator-integrator”(Holsti, 1970, p. 265). This role is applied to governments that see themselves as capable of undertaking specific tasks to resolve conflicts between other states. The governments themselves see themselves as able to help. The third example of a national role is “Regional protector”(Holsti, 1970, pp. 261–262) This role involves a sense of responsibility for one or more specific regions. This does not have to mean its territory, but it can be regions in other countries that the role is responsible for protecting. There are more roles than these three presented; roles can be formed based on individual nations. In Appendix 1, you will find all 17 roles Holsti presents in his article, with a short, self-written explanation for each role. In my analysis, we intend to find the role(s) of Holsti that best fits Donald Trump and the role(s) that best fits Joe Biden, to then be able to use that role(s) to explain the presidents’ actions towards NATO. The next section describes how we will achieve this.

METHODOLOGY This qualitative, comparative case chapter aims to answer the research question; “Can the difference in the USA’s relationship with NATO under Donald Trump and Joe Biden be explained by the national role perceptions of the presidents?” This section presents method choices and materials, with detailed descriptions of how the analysis will proceed. The chapter can more closely be classified as a mixture of idea and discourse analysis. We will investigate and compare two presidents’ political ideas, thoughts, and communication. We choose to do an intensive comparative case chapter to understand on a deeper level the political ideas that may lie behind the US’s different relationship with NATO under the two presidents. As this chapter will investigate the political messages of two presidents and then analyze the presidents’ perception of the role of the United States, this method is better suited than, for example, a quantitative method. If such an investigation had been carried out, an analysis on a deeper level with an understanding of a specific case would not have been carried out; this chapter requires a deeper understanding with fewer cases than a quantitative investigation. Conclusions must be drawn from the material, aiming to contribute to existing research on the relationship between the US and NATO. An idea analysis does not intend to take a position on the material being analyzed but only on how the material should be analyzed to understand the material differently from previous analyses. For this chapter, this means that no normative position regarding Donald Trump’s and Joe Biden’s respective political messages will be 109

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taken. This chapter intends to describe the presidents’ respective political messages, then explain their actions towards NATO using the theory of “national role conception,” not evaluate the political messages. This chapter aims to explain the difference in the US relationship with NATO under two different presidents and their administrations, Donald Trump and Joe Biden, using the theory of “national role conception.” To achieve this, four speeches and a debate between the presidents will be analyzed to understand the two presidents’ different perceptions of national roles. During the analysis of the speeches and the debate, several analysis questions will be asked of the material, questions linked to the theory of the NRC, to thoroughly understand the national role perception of the presidents. The goal of idea analysis, which this research uses, is to discuss political messages scientifically. The presidents’ political messages will be examined here with the help of their speeches, a debate, and analysis questions. The main research question is RQ- Can the difference in the USA’s relationship with NATO under Donald Trump and Joe Biden be explained by the national role perceptions of the presidents? Hypothesis under RQ- The difference in the USA’s relationship with NATO during the Trump administration and the Biden administration can be attributed to variations in ideological orientations, national values, socio-economic needs, perceptions of the traditional role, and approaches to international diplomacy. Specifically, Trump’s nationalist ideology, emphasis on economic interests, and self-reliant role may have led to a more transactional and skeptical stance towards NATO, while Biden’s internationalist ideology, commitment to democratic values, security-focused approach, and traditional diplomatic style may have fostered a more cooperative and engaged partnership with the alliance.

ANALYSIS The Presidential Debate in Nashville The initial analysis was done on the final debate before the 2020 presidential election held on October 22 in Nashville, Tennessee. In this format, the presidential candidates were asked the same questions in the same environment with the same reflection time. Both presidential candidates were given two minutes to answer each question continuously and then argue against each other. It lays the foundation for a factual political comparison between the candidates (Lakshman, 2020). The debate was held during the COVID-19 pandemic, something the presidents get many questions about. The first question revolves around how the President will lead the United States through the waves of the pandemic. Trump emphasizes that he and his administration have done very well and prevented spikes in disease cases in several cities. Several other national leaders have congratulated him on his fight against COVID-19. Biden presents substantive proposals for reducing deaths, such as rapid testing, mouthguard requirements, and national rules for safely opening schools. The topic of the second part of the debate is national security. Welker tells how American authorities have confirmed that Russia and Iran are working to influence the American election and wonders how the presidential candidates will remedy this. Biden begins with a strong statement in which he believes that if any country, any country, tries to meddle in the American election, they will have to pay the price for it as they try to interfere with American sovereignty. Trump responds that Biden’s family received approximately $3.5 million from a mayor’s wife in Moscow (note that this comment is not proven). Then follows slandering each other rather than a debate on the subject.

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The third part of the debate revolves around healthcare and jobs in the United States. Biden explains that if he becomes President, he will be a Democrat, but above all, an American and fight for everyone who lives in the USA. He also argues for raising minimum wages in the country and supporting smaller companies. Trump counters that each State is so different that they should manage the rules around business and wages themselves. Among the last topics in the debate are climate and climate change. Welker emphasizes that the two presidential candidates have different views on climate change. The candidates are asked how they will support job growth and stop changes in the climate. Biden emphasizes that climate change is a major threat that must be taken seriously. Biden believes in wind power, but Trump claims wind power kills birds and disagrees with Biden.

Installation Numbers The inaugural address is the first opportunity a US president has to speak directly to the American people as President. Many presidents use the speech to describe their overall goals for the presidency. Donald Trump’s inauguration speech was held on January 20, 2017 (Vox Staff, 2017). It revolved around how Donald Trump will “make America great again.” The speech begins with Trump describing how the entire American people participate in a national effort to rebuild the United States. He describes how the power is now, finally, once again in the hands of the people and points out that Washington has flourished in recent years without the people getting a share of the riches. The President emphasizes talking about those who are worse off in the country when foreign countries and organizations buy up companies and take jobs and describe how he, his administration, and the rest of the American people will work for them. Trump also speaks about the United States from an international perspective when he addresses the American people. He presents the United States as having fought for other countries but now must put itself first. During the speech, Trump emphasized that the United States as a nation will begin to win like never before during his administration and also talked about the importance of a united country. He paints a picture of the American people united, steering the country in a direction that benefits everyone, as the country’s infrastructure, factories, jobs, and education must be improved. Joe Biden delivered his inaugural address on January 20, 2021, in front of the Capitol in Washington, DC, a speech that differs from Donald Trump’s (Thrush, 2021). Probably due to the storming of the Capitol only 14 days earlier, on January 6, 2021, Biden began his speech with a tribute to democracy and a reminder of how fragile it can be (Hsu, 2013). He emphasizes that one of the most difficult parts of democracy is unity and asks the American people to join him in uniting the United States. The speech ends with a promise from Biden that he would personally fight for the United States. He will defend the Constitution, defend democracy, and give everything for “the public good.” Joe Biden’s inauguration speech follows a common thread of a unification of the United States and a people who together lift each other. In the middle of the speech, the President stops and holds a short silence for the Americans who have died in the COVID-19 pandemic. Democracy and peaceful alliances are two clear goals Biden has with his speech and, thus, his presidency.

State of the Union Speeches A president usually gives a State of the Union speech every year, where the President must describe precisely “the state of the union” State of the Union. Donald Trump delivered his first State of the Union address on January 30, 2018 (CNN Politics, 2018). The President starts the speech by describing his 111

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first year in office and how he now has the mission to “make America great again” for all Americans. He spends some time with another colorful description of how the President and his administration have lowered unemployment and taxes and benefited the stock market. The spirit of the speech is that there has never been a better time to live in the United States and that all hard-working residents can come together under one flag. Trump also discusses the United States internationally. Several difficulties are enumerated, including terrorism and rivals such as China and Russia, as well as how they negatively affect the US economy and values. He is talking about the US military and nuclear weapons program when he declares it must be modernized despite hopes of never using it. The President spends a significant portion of the speech discussing terrorism and how to stop it and highlights his administration as strong against undemocratic countries such as Cuba, Venezuela, and North Korea. Joe Biden delivered his first (and so far, only) State of the Union address on March 1, 2022 (The White House, 2023). The President begins his speech by being happy that Congress can finally gather again after the COVID-19 pandemic. In the first sentence, the President mentions Russia’s invasion of Ukraine only six days before the speech. He explains that the USA stands behind Ukraine and at the same time introduces Ukraine’s American ambassador, who sat in the gallery in Congress during the speech and received applause. Likely due to the tense security situation that followed the invasion of Ukraine, Biden spent part of the speech discussing NATO and the ensuing sanctions on Russia and its President Vladimir Putin. The President then moves on to talk about the United States. He believes that the infrastructure in the country has only gotten worse but must change. When he profoundly described how products must be made in the United States and that the nation must rely on itself in the product development chain, the entire Congress exclaimed in a rhythmic shout, “USA! USA! USA!”. Biden’s speech focuses on support for ordinary Americans and how to simplify the lives of those who do not earn multi-millions every year. He mentions that the minimum wage should be raised and “community colleges” should be invested. The President also discusses the concept of democracy in his speech and emphasizes its significant role in the nation.

Donald Trump’s National Role Perception of The United States How Does the President Describe his Ideology? In his speeches, Donald Trump focuses on how the USA as a nation is the most important thing to him. He often emphasizes that the US needs to bring back its jobs and businesses. According to Trump, the nation will begin to win like never before. He also emphasizes that it is not meant to impose the nation’s lifestyle on anyone but “rather let it shine as an example for everyone to follow”(Vox Staff, 2017). Gathering the entire American people under the same flag, helping each other, and making the United States a better country is a common thread throughout his inaugural and State of the Union addresses. The President also talks about how the United States should have a strong nuclear weapons program that deters aggression from other nations. They are making it so strong that it will deter any acts of aggression by any other nation or anyone else. Perhaps someday, there will be a magical moment when countries will get together to eliminate their nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, we are not there yet (CNN Politics, 2018). During the presidential election debate, Trump argued that, for example, minimum wages are not something that the State should determine. Instead, he believes that each State in the United States is so different that they should take care of rules around business and wages. The President speaks in his State of the Union address about 112

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terrorism. He is talking about individuals the United States had captured, then released, and returned to a terrorist group. He says that prisoners will end up at Guantánamo Bay from now on and tells us that, just before he stepped into the Capitol and began to address Congress, he signed an order to keep the detention facilities at Guantánamo open. In the same speech, he also mentions that protecting Americans is important and something he talks about often, for example, when he talks about how open borders have affected the United States; “for decades open borders have allowed drugs and gangs to pour in our most vulnerable communities”(CNN Politics, 2018). This is the bridge to the administration’s proposal for amended immigration laws. The President’s proposal is bipartisan reform with four different pillars, for example, constructing a wall on the US’s southern border with Mexico and tougher regulations against chain migration. For the second time in his speech, Trump calls on Democrats and Republicans to work together for the good of the American people and work together when he says, “Most importantly, these four pillars will produce legislation that fulfills my ironclad pledge to sign a bill that puts America first”(CNN Politics, 2018).

How Does the President Present the National Values of The United States? Donald Trump uses the American people as a common thread throughout the material analyzed. He talks about how the people must rule the nation, how a united people make the nation unstoppable, and how he will make life better for all Americans. From the material, Trump’s view of the US’s national values, such as community and a united people, can be read. For example, he ends his installation speech with; Together we will make America strong again, we will make America wealthy again, we will make America proud again, we will make America safe again, and, yes, we will make America great again) (Vox Staff, 2017). Concluding his State of the Union address, Trump focuses on ordinary Americans. He enumerates paramedics, police officers, firefighters, and marines, emphasizing that Washington DC, the Capitol, and the entire nation belong to them; “the people dreamed this country. The people built this country, and it is the people who are making America great again”(CNN Politics, 2018).

How does the President Present America’s Socio-Economic Needs? In his inaugural address, Trump vividly describes how rusting factories lie in ruins across America, that students are not getting the education they pay for, and that drugs, gangs, and crime have taken too many lives. He sums up that this bloodbath ends on this day when all Americans now “share one heart, one home, and one glorious destiny”(Vox Staff, 2017). Central to this part of his installation speech is relating to worse-off American residents and telling how he and the rest of the US will actively work for them. He points out that; “when America is united, America is unstoppable”(Vox Staff, 2017). In his State of the Union speech, Trump gives an example of how the car industry will come back to the United States simultaneously as he points out that he and his administration have lowered unemployment, lowered taxes, and benefited the stock market. Auto and other plants will soon open up throughout our country. This is all news Americans are unaccustomed to hearing. For many years, companies and jobs were only leaving us. But now, they are roaring back; they are coming back; they want to be where the action is; they want to be in the United States of America; that’s where they want to be (CNN Politics, 2018). At the end of the presidential debate, he said, in response to how he would address Americans who did not vote for him if he won the

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election, that We have to make a country as successful as before the plague came in from China. We are quickly rebuilding it and doing record numbers of 11.4 million jobs (Breuninger, 2020).

How Are the President’s Personality/Personal Needs Shown? Donald Trump generally uses a harsh tone in his speeches. He talks about international actors from the point of view that they are unfair to the United States and emphasizes several times that the United States must be prioritized first. In the presidential debate, Trump spent much of his response time telling why one should not vote for Joe Biden and giving examples of how the United States would decline if Biden became President instead of presenting his policies.

How Does the President Present the Traditional Role of The United States In The World? Donald Trump says in his inauguration speech that the US must protect its jobs from foreign factors, start winning like never before, and then act as an example that other nations can follow. The President generally describes foreign actors negatively. When he talks about the outside world, he takes examples such as Cuba, North Korea, and Venezuela, emphasizing that the US does not support these regimes. In the presidential election debate, however, he emphasizes that his relationship with North Korea is fantastic. When Trump mentions alliances or organizations in the US have an active role, it is in a problematic context. During his State of the Union address, Trump detailed how he recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, which prompted several countries in the United Nations to vote against the US’s sovereign right to implement. This leads to Trump’s statement that, in 2016, American taxpayers generously sent those same countries more than twenty billion dollars in aid. “That is why, tonight, I am asking Congress to pass legislation to help ensure American foreign assistance dollars always serve American interests and only go to friends of America, not enemies of America” (CNN Politics, 2018). In the same speech, he describes how the nation has finally ended unfair trade agreements that caused companies, jobs, and money to leave and how the country now expects honest and reciprocal agreements. He emphasizes that the most important thing is to protect American workers. Even in his inaugural address, he portrays a United States that has fought for other countries but now must put itself first. We’ve defended other nation’s borders while refusing to defend our own and spent trillions and trillions of dollars overseas while America’s infrastructure has fallen into disrepair and decay (Vox Staff, 2017). To solve this, he believes that We assembled here today are issuing a new decree to be heard in every city, foreign capital, and hall of power. From this day forward, a new vision will govern our country. From this day forward, it’s going to be only America first! (Vox Staff, 2017)

Joe Biden’s National Role Perception of The United States How Does the President Describe His Ideology? Joe Biden argues in his speeches that the United States must unite and help each other. In both the inaugural speech and the State of the Union speech, Biden discusses democracy and how important democracy is to the nation. During the debate in Nashville, he also emphasized that he would be a president for the entire American people, not just for Democrats. He opens his inaugural address with a 114

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tribute to democracy and a reminder of its fragility. He emphasizes that one of the most difficult parts of democracy is unity and asks the American people to unite the United States with him. He tells us that; “we can reward work, rebuild the middle class, and make healthcare secure for all. We can deliver racial justice”(Thrush, 2021). and concludes with an example of the United States’ place in the world; “we can make America, once again, the leading force for good in the world”(Thrush, 2021). During the presidential election debate, Biden answered many policy questions; for example, he emphasized wind power as a good alternative to renewable energy and that climate change is a real, dangerous threat to the world. The presidents are also asked questions about other international actors during the debate. The moderator, Welker, explains how American authorities have confirmed that Russia and Iran are working to influence the American election and wonders how the presidential candidates shall remedy this. Biden then says that a country must pay the price if it tries to lay down on American sovereignty. The President also argues in the debate to raise minimum wages in the country and to let children and parents migrate into the US together, then not separating families at the border. In his State of the Union speech, the President emphasizes a lesson about COVID-19: to stop seeing the disease as a dividing line, to stop seeing each other as enemies, but instead see each other as “fellow Americans”(The White House, 2023). He also mentions most reforms he considers important for certain groups in society. He talks about “Roe v. Wade,” he talks about the “Equality Act” for LGBTQ+ Americans, and a bill that protects women, the “Violence Against Women Act.” He also talks about America’s veterans and how they should be protected.

How Does the President Present the National Values of The United States? In his speeches, Joe Biden emphasizes how important democracy is and says that the nation must protect “freedom and liberty” and expand opportunities and justice. Biden presents freedom, justice, and opportunity as fundamental to the United States when he says, “Well, I know this nation. We’ll meet for the test. Protect freedom and liberty to expand fairness and opportunity. And we will save democracy” (The White House, 2023). The President also emphasizes how important it is that the US provides its residents with jobs, as well as being able to support themselves in the product development chain. He also emphasizes the word opportunity during his State of the Union speech and says that that word can define the United States; “We’re the only nation on earth that has always turned every crisis into an opportunity. The only nation that can be defined by a single word: possibilities. So, on this night, in our 245th year as a nation, I have come to report on the State of the Nation, the State of the Union, and my report is this: the State of the Union is strong because you, the American people, are strong” (The White House, 2023).

How Does the President Present America’s Socio-Economic Needs? Biden talks about how the nation must improve in several areas, for example, racism (to eliminate racism in the country) and extremism. He points out, like Trump, that jobs and American companies are important to the country. In his State of the Union speech, Biden believes that the infrastructure must be improved and emphasizes that the country must focus on buying/consuming American goods. He says, “When we use taxpayers’ dollars to rebuild America, we will do it by buying American. Buy American products. Support American jobs”(The White House, 2023).

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How Are the President’s Personality/Personal Needs Shown? During the final presidential debate, the two presidential candidates are asked how each candidate would lead the United States for everyone, not just those who voted for them. Biden then replies that he would be a president for the entire American people and explains that We have enormous opportunities, enormous opportunities, to make things better. We can grow this economy, we can deal with systemic racism, and at the same time, we can make sure that our economy is being run and moved and motivated by clean energy. He then concludes with; What is on the ballot here is the character of this country, decency, honor, respect, treating people with dignity, making sure that everyone has an even chance, and I’m going to make sure you get that. In his inaugural address, Joe Biden emphasizes that the temperature in the political climate must be lowered, the shouting must stop, and the country must instead come together; “we can treat each other with dignity and respect. We can join forces, stop shouting, and lower the temperature. Without unity, there is no peace, only bitterness, and fury”(Thrush, 2021). The President used both in his installation speech and during the presidential candidate debate: “dignity” and “respect.” During a description of various bills that support various social groups in the United States, the President gets personal when he talks about veterans. He mentions his son, Major Beau Biden, a soldier in the US Army who later got brain cancer. He promises to investigate why so many soldiers get sick in different ways when they return from war.

How Does the President Present the Traditional Role of The United States in The World? Joe Biden spends a significant portion of his inaugural and State of the Union addresses discussing and recounting America’s actions worldwide. When Biden brings up international collaborations in the material analyzed, it emphasizes how important they are for the United States and how the nation will try to be a safe partner in the international arena. He sends a clear message to the world’s remaining nations during his installation speech. So here is my message to those beyond our borders: America has been tested, and we have come out stronger for it. We will repair our alliances and engage with the world once again. Not to meet yesterday’s challenges but today’s and tomorrow’s challenges. And we’ll lead not merely by the example of our power but by the power of our example. We will be a strong, trusted peace, progress, and security partner (Thrush, 2021). Biden’s State of the Union speech was delivered close after Russia invaded Ukraine; in that context, Biden speaks about the importance of NATO and the USA as security actors worldwide. The NATO Alliance was created to secure peace and stability in Europe after World War II. The United States is a member, along with 29 other nations. It matters, American diplomacy matters. American resolve matters (The White House, 2023). Biden also condemns Vladimir Putin (President of Russia) and tells how the US and other countries tried to use diplomacy to resolve the situation in Ukraine before it escalated. He uses the word “we” when he explains that the rest of the world has shut Russia out of many parts of the world, such as technology and banking, creating an “us versus them” feeling. The feeling is reinforced when the President says, As I’ve made crystal clear, the United States and our Allies will defend every inch of territory that is NATO territory with the full force of our collective power. Every single inch (The White House, 2023). Other international actors are discussed during the presidential election debate. Welker asks both presidential candidates how they reason about China and 116

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their non-transparent communication about COVID-19. Biden then replies that international rules and regulations should be used for the world to be truthful with each other. According to Biden, there will be economic consequences if China does not follow these rules. During the State of the Union speech, Biden discussed the United States’ global role in the COVID-19 pandemic. The President emphasizes how he and his administration have ordered more vaccines than anyone else. He believes no one will be left behind when testing for the disease, and new vaccines are constantly being developed. Once again, the President points out that the USA has contributed to the rest of the world. Fourth, we will continue vaccinating the world. We’ve sent 475 million vaccine doses to 112 countries, more than any nation. We won’t stop because you can’t build a wall high enough to keep out a vaccine; the vaccine can stop the spread of these diseases (The White House, 2023).

COMPARISON OF THE PRESIDENTS’ NATIONAL ROLE PERCEPTION Donald Trump and Joe Biden differ in some of the answers presented in the previous chapter. Here, differences and similarities in the presidents’ speeches and answers to the analysis questions are presented. There are clear differences in the presidential inauguration speeches. One difference is how much of the speech revolves around dissatisfaction with how the United States was previously governed and the portrayal of societal problems. Trump points out how badly managed the US was in the past and how almost all parts of society now must and will improve. He portrays the United States as a country of low socio-economic status with many improvement needs. Biden also talks in his speech about how the United States has certain problematic parts in its history, such as racism, extremism, and resentment, but rather looks forward to a bright future compared to Trump. Biden mentions societal problems, but not as vividly or widely as Trump. He does not focus as much on improving the USA from the perspective that the USA would deteriorate as Trump does. Another point of comparison in the installation speeches is how the United States is portrayed worldwide in international relations. Biden talks about how the US should repair its relations with the outside world (and simultaneously implies that someone has destroyed the US’s relations with the outside world) and will be a strong and trusted alliance partner. In his speech, Trump paints a different picture about how the US has spent too much money abroad and how it should only be the US first from that day on, a message he believes should be heard by all foreign states and all corridors of power. His attitude toward the outside world is significantly more hostile than Biden’s. Even Biden’s and Trump’s State of the Union speeches differ. Where Biden argues for a united NATO and cooperation across national borders, Trump claims that other nations take too much from the United States and that agreements with other countries must move from unfair to fair. Putting Americans and American jobs first, on the other hand, the presidents agree and make similar arguments. Both presidents believe that the USA must “bring back” jobs and companies to the USA’s territory, which they believe should benefit the working class in the country. In the presidential candidate debate, clear differences are shown in Trump and Biden’s fundamental views of the United States and how the nation should be led. When Biden believes that China should follow international rules and regulations regarding transparency of COVID-19 reporting and that the nation may otherwise have financial consequences, Trump believes that he has already made China pay money to the United States. Where Biden argues that the US should cooperate with South Korea to stop legitimizing North Korea and its

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actions, Trump believes that he has a very good relationship with North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-Un, which prevents a war between North Korea and the US. The presidents agreed that a united American people fighting for each other would be the best thing for the United States. Biden emphasizes that Americans should buy products made in the USA, while Trump talks a lot about the auto industry returning to the country. Both presidents also emphasize that the more vulnerable in society must receive help from the rest of the country. Both presidents also agree that the United States is a country that should or can lead the way for other nations. Trump says in his inaugural address that the United States should let its good example light the way for other nations to follow if they choose. Biden points out in his State of the Union speech that the people together, once again, can create a country that is a leading force for good in the world.

RESULTS OF THE CHAPTER After the analysis, it can be concluded that Joe Biden and Donald Trump have different perceptions of the USA’s national role in the world. Where Biden is drawn towards a calmer, cooperative spirit, Trump stops and believes that the United States should be put first. The presidents have similar views on certain parts of the United States, such as the importance of having a high employment rate, owning many American companies, and uniting the American people. Joe Biden’s national role perception is centralized around cooperation, security, and democracy. This can be seen through his arguments for US involvement in NATO and his statement that all member states must be protected. Biden values democracy and considers it an important part of the foundation of the United States. Biden leans in his argumentation and policy towards three different role perceptions that Holsti presents in his article; Regional leader “Regional leader,” Regional defender “Regional protector,” and Faithful ally “Faithful ally” (Holsti, 1970, pp. 261, 267). Donald Trump’s national role perception revolves around security, independence, and cohesion. This can be read from his negative attitude towards international collaborations that do not primarily benefit the USA, his focus on modernizing the USA’s nuclear weapons program, his fight against terrorism, and the signed decree to keep Guantánamo Bay open. From Trump’s motivations and policy, two role perceptions can be deduced from Holsti’s article: Regional leader and Independent (Holsti, 1970, pp. 261, 268). Both presidents hold the role of Regional Leader because of their vision that the United States can lead other nations. Trump mentions in his inauguration speech that America can let its lifestyle shine for others to follow. During his inauguration speech, Biden said that US diplomacy and solutions mean a lot globally and emphasized the country’s major role in NATO. He also talks about the USA leading with its strength as an example. Only on this point do the presidents have a similar national role perception for the United States. Joe Biden also holds the roles of regional defender and Loyal ally. Regional defender means that the leader emphasizes the contribution of protection in nearby regions or other areas, something Biden talked about in his State of the Union speech when he emphasized that the United States and its allies will defend “every inch of territory that is NATO territory.” A loyal Ally denotes the leader or regime’s commitment to supporting another regime’s policies. Biden is clear in his speeches and the debate that NATO is an important part of US foreign policy and that, as President, he will ensure that the country is a stable partner within the organization. Donald Trump holds the role concept of independence and being a regional leader. Remarkable for this role is the leader’s willingness to make political decisions 118

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based on the State’s good instead of making decisions that support other states. Trump has been clear about this, for example, in his State of the Union speech when he emphasized the importance of American taxpayers’ money going to purposes that support the United States and America’s friends, not enemies, as well as his slogan “America first.” The purpose of this paper was to investigate whether the US’s different relationship with NATO under Donald Trump and Joe Biden can be explained with the help of the presidents’ national role perception. The paper has found that Joe Biden and Donald Trump have role perceptions that differ on certain points and are similar on one point. The fact that their role perception differs between two roles that revolve around the US’s role in the world leads to the conclusion that the US’s different relationship with NATO under Donald Trump and Joe Biden can, to some extent, be explained with the help of the presidents’ different national role perception. This means that the presidents have had different views of what role the United States should play in international security policy and have acted accordingly. Joe Biden has understood that the USA should have an important and stable role in NATO. Hence, he has acted strongly regarding foreign policy with numerous statements about how the USA supports and works within the organization. He has also emphasized that NATO must protect all its members and that the US is a stable partner in the alliance. Donald Trump’s perception of the USA’s international role is that the country should be more independent and independent, focusing on agreements that primarily benefit the USA. As a result, he has acted differently within NATO and made several foreign policy statements that do not favor the cooperation between NATO and the US, such as that NATO benefits Europe more than it benefits the US. In summary, the relationship between the USA and NATO can somewhat be explained by the fact that Joe Biden and Donald Trump have partly different national role perceptions for the USA in the material presented in this chapter.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION The results of this chapter have been prepared using idea analysis and discourse analysis as tools. The material consisted of two speeches and a debate from the respective President, and the theory has been based on K. J. Holsti’s article “National Role Conceptions in the Chapter of Foreign Policy” (1970). The chapter has found that the USA’s relationship with NATO under Donald Trump and Joe Biden can be partly explained with the help of the NRC theory, which means that the presidents’ national role perception has differed on certain points, leading to different actions as President towards NATO. The chapter is qualitative, so generalizations and applications of the results to other cases are impossible. The results have been prepared using the material. The material consisted of both presidents’ inauguration speeches, State of the Union speeches, and a presidential candidate debate from the 2020 US election. From a critical point of view, the material may have influenced the outcome when a speech by Joe Biden was delivered after Russia invaded Ukraine, which increased the relevance of international security policy, highlighting Biden’s desire to emphasize NATO and international security policy cooperation. At the same time, Russia has acted aggressively against sovereign states since before, so security policy has been on the agenda. The material is limited to a time around the actual term of office of the President. To get a larger picture of the presidents’ perception of their national role, a chapter can be carried out with material from a longer period, for example, during the entire adult life of the President. Then, one

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could have also answered why the presidents’ national role perception looks like they do, contributing to the research about the presidents. To build on this chapter and contribute knowledge about the USA’s relationship with NATO, studies that implement Holsti’s entire theory can be carried out. This means that one also considers the role prescriptions of the rest of the world for the United States (“alter’s role prescription,” see Figure 1) and studies whether these may have changed and thereby changed the nation’s foreign policy. Such a chapter could potentially give different answers compared to this chapter, which chose to set role regulations as a constant and only used the decision maker’s national role perception as an independent variable. In the section with previous research, the chapter found that there should be differences in the language and expressions of the presidents. In the analysis, the chapter has found that Biden and Trump express themselves differently in their arguments and that the presidents have different views on the role of the United States in the world. The chapter has found that the President has more than one national role perception. The chapter has also found that national role conceptions can partly influence how a president behaves towards an organization such as NATO, which adds knowledge about the theory of “national role conception” and the relationship between the USA and NATO. It also means a stronger justification for research specifically about the NRC and the relationship between the USA and NATO because the perception of the role of an American president can partly change the nation’s foreign policy actions towards NATO. As stated in the section with previous research, the relationship between the USA and NATO partly supports security and political stability in the world when, for example, Europe is partly dependent on protection from the USA through NATO (Menon & Ruger, 2020). With the chapter’s specific material, method, and theory, this paper has thus found that an American president’s national role perception could partly contribute to an upheaval of security policy stability around the USA, NATO, and Europe.

REFERENCES Al Jazeera Staff. (2021). Five key takeaways from Biden’s National Security Strategy. Al Jazeera. https:// www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/12/five-key-takeaways-from-bidens-national-security-strategy Birnbaum, M. (2021, January 21). NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg says ‘need to rebuild trust’ after Trump. Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/nato-stoltenberg-trumpbiden/2021/01/21/e9bb2dae-5b5e-11eb-a849-6f9423a75ffd_story.html Breuninger, K. (2020, October 23). Here are the key moments from the final Trump-Biden presidential debate. CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/22/final-presidential-debate-highlights-trump-vs-biden. html Clark, D. (2018, July 10). Trump blasts NATO ahead of European visit, accuses allies of shortchanging U.S. NBC News. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/trump-blasts-nato-ahead-europeanvisit-accuses-allies-shortchanging-u-n890141

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Garamone, J. (2021, June 15). NATO Stands Together as Biden Reaffirms U.S. Commitment to Alliance. U.S. Department of Defense. https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2658794/ nato-stands-together-as-biden-reaffirms-us-commitment-to-alliance/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.defense. gov%2FNews%2FNews-Stories%2FArticle%2FArticle%2F2658794%2Fnato-stands-together-as-bidenreaffirms-us-commitment-to-alliance%2F Holsti, K. J. (1970). National Role Conceptions in the Chapter of Foreign Policy. International Studies Quarterly, 14(3), 233–309. doi:10.2307/3013584 Hsu, J. L. (2013). A brief history of vaccines: Smallpox to the present. South Dakota Medicine: The Journal of the South Dakota State Medical Association, (Spec no), 33–37. PMID:23444589 Johnson, C. (2022). Feeling protected: Protective masculinity and femininity from Donald Trump and Joe Biden to Jacinda Ardern. Emotions and Society, 4(1), 7–26. doi:10.1332/263169021X16310949038420 Körner, R., Overbeck, J. R., Körner, E., & Schütz, A. (2022). How the Linguistic Styles of Donald Trump and Joe Biden Reflect Different Forms of Power. Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 41(6), 631–658. doi:10.1177/0261927X221085309 Lakshman, S. (2020, October 23). Final presidential debate: Donald Trump, Joe Biden discuss contrasting realities and plans. The Hindu. https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/final-presidential-debatebetween-trump-and-biden-us-election-2020/article61714799.ece McGrath, M. (2021, January 20). US rejoins Paris accord: Biden’s first act sets tone for ambitious approach. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-55732386 Menon, R., & Ruger, W. (2020). NATO enlargement and US grand strategy: A net assessment. International Politics, 57(3), 371–400. doi:10.1057/s41311-020-00235-7 Politics, C. N. N. (2018, January 31). State of the Union 2018: Read the full transcript. CNN. https:// www.cnn.com/2018/01/30/politics/2018-state-of-the-union-transcript/index.html Shifrinson, J. R. (2020). NATO enlargement and US foreign policy: The origins, durability, and impact of an idea. International Politics, 57(3), 342–370. doi:10.1057/s41311-020-00224-w The White House. (2023, February 8). Remarks of President Joe Biden – State of the Union Address as Prepared for Delivery. The White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speechesremarks/2023/02/07/remarks-of-president-joe-biden-state-of-the-union-address-as-prepared-for-delivery/ Thies, C. G. (2017). Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis in Latin America1. Foreign Policy Analysis, 13(3), 662–681. doi:10.1111/fpa.12072 Thrush, G. (2021, January 20). President Biden’s Full Inauguration Speech, Annotated. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/20/us/politics/biden-inauguration-speech-transcript.html Tonra, B., & Christiansen, T. (Eds.). (2004). Rethinking European Union foreign policy. Manchester University Press., doi:10.7228/manchester/9780719060014 Vox Staff. (2017, January 20). President Trump’s inauguration speech, annotated. Vox.Com. https:// www.vox.com/a/president-trump-inauguration-speech-transcript-annotations

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ADDITIONAL READING Benitez, J. (2019). U.S. NATO Policy in the Age of Trump: Controversy and Consistency. The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 43(1), 179–200. https://www.jstor.org/stable/45289836 Greenwood, S. (2022, June 22). International Attitudes Toward the U.S., NATO and Russia in a Time of Crisis. Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2022/06/22/ international-attitudes-toward-the-u-s-nato-and-russia-in-a-time-of-crisis/ Lee, K. S., & Goidel, K. (2022). U.S. Public Support for the U.S.-NATO Alliance. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 34(2), edac011. doi:10.1093/ijpor/edac011 Menon, R., & Ruger, W. (2020). NATO enlargement and US grand strategy: A net assessment. International Politics, 57(3), 371–400. doi:10.1057/s41311-020-00235-7 Olsen, J. A. (2020). Understanding NATO. RUSI Journal, 165(3), 60–72. doi:10.1080/03071847.202 0.1777772 Schuette, L. A. (2021). Why NATO survived Trump: The neglected role of Secretary-General Stoltenberg. International Affairs, 97(6), 1863–1881. doi:10.1093/ia/iiab167 Sloan, S. R. (2018). 17. Donald Trump and NATO: Historic Alliance Meets A-historic President. In 17. Donald Trump and NATO: Historic Alliance Meets A-historic President (pp. 221–234). Columbia University Press. doi:10.7312/jerv18834-018 The Hindu. (2023, February 21). Biden to rally NATO allies as Ukraine war gets more complicated. The Hindu. https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/biden-to-rally-nato-allies-as-ukraine-war-getsmore-complicated/article66535295.ece

KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Faithful Ally: A role perception that denotes a leader or regime’s commitment to supporting the policies and interests of another nation or regime. It involves being a reliable and steadfast partner in international affairs. Joe Biden aligns with the role perception of a faithful ally by emphasizing the importance of the United States as a stable and supportive partner within NATO. Independent: A role perception characterized by a leader’s focus on promoting the interests and wellbeing of their own country without being overly influenced by the concerns or benefits of other states. Donald Trump’s national role perception reflects his emphasis on independence, prioritizing agreements and decisions that primarily benefit the United States rather than other nations. This perception is evident in his speeches and policy actions during his term as President. National Role Perception: The individual perspective or conception held by a nation’s leader regarding the role and responsibilities of their country on the international stage. It encompasses the leader’s views on cooperation, security, independence, and alliances. In this context, the national role perception of Joe Biden and Donald Trump refers to their differing perspectives on the United States’ position and engagement with NATO and its role in global affairs.

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Regional Defender: A role perception wherein a leader emphasizes protecting nearby regions or areas. It entails a commitment to safeguarding the interests and territorial integrity of the nation and its allies within a specific geographic region. Joe Biden exhibits the role perception of a regional defender, as seen in his emphasis on defending NATO territories and his commitment to protecting every inch of NATO territory. Regional Leader: A role perception characterized by a leader’s belief that their country should lead and guide other nations within a specific region. This role entails asserting influence, providing guidance, and setting an example for other regional nations. As mentioned in their speeches and policy positions, both Joe Biden and Donald Trump hold the role perception of a regional leader in terms of the United States’ capacity to lead other nations.

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Chapter 7

Poland, a Benign but Not a Naïve Power in Its Response to Russia’s War in Ukraine (2022-Present):

Assertive Pursuit of Enlightened SelfInterest – Forging New Alliances and Strengthening Existing Ones Piotr Pietrzak https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0464-1991 Sofia University, Bulgaria

ABSTRACT The chapter investigates an interesting twist in the bilateral relations between Ukraine and Poland under the Morawiecki Government. It discusses the main reasons that led Morawiecki to drastically change from a very generous response to Russia’s invasion to an openly hostile stance after Zelensky’s UN Speech. The chapter explores the rationale that led Morawiecki to impose an embargo on Ukrainian grain and other agricultural commodities during the summer of 2023. It deliberates on the post-2023 improvement of these relations after the formation of the Tusk government. It exemplifies that even if certain disagreements over the scale of the offered assistance arise in the countries that eagerly helped Ukraine since February 2022, those disagreements can be appropriately dealt with. The ferocity of Putin’s war against Ukraine failed to discourage Ukraine’s most loyal friends from stepping up their support. Paradoxically for Putin, despite all his efforts to turn such a scenario into an undesirable one, Ukraine today is much closer to becoming a full EU and NATO member than ever.

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-6684-9467-7.ch007

Copyright © 2024, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

 Poland in Its Response to Russia’s War in Ukraine

“Geography has made us neighbors. History has made us friends. Economics has made us partners, and necessity has made us allies. Those whom God has so joined together, let no man put asunder.” — John F. Kennedy May 17, 1961, in an address before the Canadian parliament, on the Canada-US relationship.

INTRODUCTION The chapter aims to enhance the ongoing discourse regarding Poland’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine by clarifying a specific case that necessitates a more rigorous evaluation, untainted by typical media sensationalism, exaggeration, and unfounded conclusions. While the chronology of NATO’s and the EU’s responses to this conflict is well covered by both the media and various valuable academic accounts, Poland’s response to the latest outbreak of Russia’s neoimperialist war in Ukraine is still relatively undercovered and insufficiently integrated into the literature describing the global response to this conflict. Without delving into Poland’s role in Ukraine’s defense strategy, we miss the broader picture, as the internal dynamics of Poland’s response to various stages of this conflict have had a considerable impact on the way the war has evolved into a regional conflict of global importance. Three main stages of this response have been identified: the first started on February 24, 2022, and lasted for at least 18 months until Zelensky’s UN Speech in September 2023, which triggered a considerable change in Poland’s attitudes towards Ukraine. Subsequently, this short period of open hostility between both governments ended on December 13, 2023, when the Tusk replaced Morawiecki at the head of Poland’s government and adopted a more pragmatic response towards Ukraine (which will be covered in a separate chapter in a forthcoming book published by IGI Global (Pietrzak, 2024b)). In February 2022, Poland demonstrated unwavering Giedroycian commitment to the Ukrainian authorities and people, which extended to providing arms for their defense, safe havens for millions of Ukrainian refugees, and logistical, material, and financial support for the embattled regime. The swift and determined response from Poland in those early days of the conflict was considered relatively risky at the time, yet it set off a significant momentum that spurred an even more generous global response to support Ukraine during that challenging period. This generous assistance from Poland played a crucial role in boosting and maintaining Ukrainian morale, which assisted Ukraine in securing its survival as an independent state. Poland’s proactive humanitarian response during this conflict set a standard that provided other parties with a stronger rationale to offer even more generous logistical, military, political, and diplomatic assistance to Ukraine (Pietrzak, 2024a). While there is no way to discuss all the determinants that shaped the current situation in the Ukrainian war, we can recognize that there was a considerable change in Morawiecki’s attitudes towards Ukraine in the last six months of his government. His positions drifted from one of Poland’s total and unwavering support in 2022 to one of considerably less enthusiasm after the UN Speech in which Zelensky insinuated that Poland was secretly supporting Russia because of its embargo on Ukrainian agricultural commodities and its categorical refusal to incur the costs of Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative (Kokcharov et al., 2023).

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During this time, the idea of protecting Ukraine at all costs was secondary due to a series of undesirable economic effects on two important sectors of the Polish economy, farming and transport. The government could not afford to offset the costs of both of those sectors while it suffered a harsh EU sanctions regime that penalized the government for a ruling by its highest court that some parts of EU law are incompatible with the Polish constitution. After pressure from Ukraine, the EU attempted to force the Polish government to lift the embargo, but Poland refused to comply, explaining that lifting the embargo would not result in Ukranian products reaching its traditional destinations in the developing world, but rather they would oversaturate the Central European market (Ilie & Strzelecki, 2023). Even his biggest critics suggested that Zelensky left Morawiecki’s government with very limited options as accusing Poland of secretly hoping for Russia’s success was a great insult not only to the government but also to all of the people who volunteered to help the Ukrainians since February 2022. Poland had provided Ukraine with the most military equipment and backed its transatlantic aspirations consistently since 2003, so the accusations were clearly unsubstantiated. But Morawiecki failed to respond to Zelensky’s accusations in the most dignified manner and expressed various anti-Ukrainian sentiments during the parliamentary elections of 2023, which is one of the reasons why the Law and Justice Party is no longer in power. This also suggests that Polish society was more inclined to forgive the embattled Zelensky regime for insulting the government than to flag in their efforts to maintain Ukrainian independence (Easton, 2023). Ultimately, the change of power in Poland and the formation of the Tusk government temporarily ended the extended period of tensions between Ukraine and Poland, but it must be properly analyzed to prevent such escalations in the future. This is important because Ukraine is still somewhat a prisoner of its geography. While Russia and Belarus remain hostile to it, many of its neighbors, such as Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Moldova, Hungary, and the “Black Sea adjacent countries” such as Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Georgia provide Ukraine with a crucial lifeline that might allow it to win the war. This chapter hopes to compartmentalize the inherent complexity of this matrix of doctrinal modi operandi, offering the modern policymaker with a more comprehensive account of the situation in Ukraine up to the end of 2023, when Morawiecki was replaced by Tusk. It evaluates the first 659 days of Russia’s latest escalation of the war during Morawiecki’s second and third governments, from February 24, 2022, to December 13, 2023. The chapter calls for an assessment firmly rooted in meticulous, contemplative day-to-day investigations, involving immersion in the historical background, geopolitical doctrines, and the shared values of Polish and Ukrainian societies—both of which have persistently confronted Russian aggression throughout their histories as independent nations. This chapter has seven main parts: Part One discusses the notion of Poland as a benign but not naïve power in the realm of international relations. Part Two evaluates Poland’s response to Russia’s war against Ukraine, providing a brief historiographical account of the situation in Ukraine since 1991. Part Three approaches the problem from the perspective of Poland’s role in the Visegrad Group, NATO, the European Union, the Three Seas Initiative, the Bucharest Nine, and the OSCE. Part Four offers a geopolitical and doctrinal account of the situation. Part Five examines Poland’s role in providing military assistance to Ukraine after February 2022 and initiates a debate on the role of the conflict in triggering a far-reaching modernization of the Polish army. Part Six addresses issues related to the increasing bilateral tensions between Ukraine and Poland, specifically focusing on agricultural commodities exports. Part Seven of this chapter investigates Poland’s attitudes towards Ukraine’s transatlantic aspirations.

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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY The study’s methodology is properly defined in Chapter One in this edition. It aims to be inclusive, interdisciplinary, and flexible in facing future challenges by relying on a robust range of theoretical foundations, methodologies, fields of inquiry, and paradigms from various disciplines such as the theory of international relations, international law, geopolitics, conflict resolution strategies, and political philosophy in order to integrate various empirical inquiries into the main conceptual, methodological, and analytical differences between different approaches, theories, and traditions within and related to IR theory (Pietrzak 2022, pp. 570-585; Pietrzak 2021, pp. 43-76; Pietrzak 2021, pp. 101-154; Tóth, 2021).

LITERATURE REVIEW This research is supported by a wide range of publications listed in the References section that relate to the geostrategic, geopolitical, and geoeconomic literature that addresses the increasingly dynamic confrontation between Russia and Ukraine from various classical and non-classical perspectives. This research relies on the author’s commitment to systematic collection, analysis, and synthesis of data from verifiable sources and relating this debate to discussions of the international community’s responsibility to bring peace and security to Ukraine after Russia’s 2022 invasion.

POLAND’S RESPONSE TO RUSSIA’S WAR IN UKRAINE Russia’s invasion of Ukraine heralds a tectonic shift in the way the global architecture of power is constructed and perceived, which is not favorable for Russia. From Poland’s perspective, Russia’s actions in Ukraine constitute an illegal war of aggression against an independent state. Furthermore, this assault confirms that Russia is unable to become a peaceful nation that would abandon its neo-imperialist past. Ukraine’s will to defend itself was significantly strengthened by NATO and the EU’s diplomatic, political, military, logistic, humanitarian, and technological support. Despite strong declarations from various European capitals, the support offered to Ukraine in the first months of the war varied significantly and largely depended on geographical proximity to the conflict. Poland rapidly emerged as one of the most generous contributors, donating a multitude of military assets. In the first two months of the war, Poland established itself as one of Ukraine’s firmest allies, supplying it with various military assets, including over 230 Soviet-style T-72 tanks, an undisclosed number of PT-91 Twardy Tanks, 14 Leopard tanks, a significant portion of its MiG-29 fighter jets, armored vehicles, howitzers, short-range man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), and munitions. Unofficially, the military assistance of the last two years is more extensive, consisting of more than 1000 pieces of sophisticated military equipment of varying usefulness. According to local calculations, the value of Polish military aid to Ukraine has now exceeded 4 billion euros and consisted of 350 tanks (including 280 T-72s in two versions, 60 upgraded PT-91s, and 14 Leopard 2s), more than 300 armored BWP-1 personnel carriers, more than 70 Krab self-propelled howitzers (16 of which were donated), several dozen to over a hundred 2S1 Goździk self-propelled howitzers, several dozen BM-21 Grad rocket launchers, 20 Dzik-2 armored vehicles, 20 BRDM-2 reconnaissance vehicles, at least several dozen Star 266/266M2 trucks, 14 MiG-29 aircraft, 12 Mi-24 helicopters, Fly Eye and Warmate combat drones, upgraded S-125 Neva, S-200 Vega, 9K33 127

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OSA anti-aircraft systems, upgraded S-60 and ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns (several dozen each), and ten or more self-propelled ZSU-23-4MP Biała (Dickinson, 2023; Globalna Gra 2023). On many levels, Poland essentially disarmed itself to provide Ukraine with the necessary equipment. In those early months of the war, Poland considered these donations not as a loss but as an investment in the future of good relations between Poland and an independent Ukraine, a full member of the transatlantic community. It was also time to either decommission or donate that outdated Soviet-designed gear and replace it with more modern equipment. Donating it to an embattled Ukraine seemed to be a win-win scenario. The Polish prime minister at the time, Mateusz Morawiecki, stated that “Today, our weapons are used to defend our independence, but 500 kilometers from the Polish border.” He suggested that by helping Ukraine today, Poland is forging a more successful and robust transatlantic alliance for the future. Poland took a considerable risk by providing Ukraine with military equipment because Poland can thereby be seen as directly supporting Ukraine. This risk was worth taking as it resulted in strong partnerships in several domains, contributing to building trust and mutual respect across Central Europe and triggering a similarly generous reaction all over the world. Ukraine received similar support from Western countries in the middle of 2023, significantly bolstering its defense capabilities and making it more resilient in this uneven confrontation. The collective strength of Ukraine and its allies played a significant role in thwarting the operation’s swift success (Pietrzak, 2024a). Poland may be a benign power, but it is not a naïve one, as it consistently took Vegetius’ quote to heart: “If you want peace, prepare for war” (si vis pacem, para bellum), a creed known by every Polish minister of foreign affairs and of defense. In line with this principle, the donations made to embattled Ukraine in 2022 and 2023 also created temporary gaps in the Polish military’s capacities. However, the Morawiecki government declared that Poland could quickly replenish its capabilities with brand-new equipment purchased from South Korea and the United States. During all of 2022 and into 2023, Poland was on a mission to become Europe’s arsenal. Its most recent shopping spree includes over 1300 Abrams and K2 Panther tanks, 1400 infantry fighting vehicles, nearly 700 self-propelled howitzers, 486 High Mars, 218 Chanmo launchers, over 100 South Korean FA-50 fighter jets, 96 Apache helicopters, and eight Patriot batteries, as well as frigates and submarines, while also aiming to bring its defense budget to four percent of GDP and double its military personnel to 300,000 (Harper 2023; Jones, 2023). By giving aid in the first months of this new wave of the conflict, Poland has maintained a good track record of being a reliable ally that actively supports its democratic neighbors against those who pursue neo-imperialist policies. Poland has consistently supported Ukraine’s struggle to preserve its independence during the last three decades. For Poland, this commitment goes beyond establishing a buffer zone to protect itself from Russia’s neo-imperial ambitions; it has deep historical roots dating back to medieval times. Despite some difficult chapters in their history, Poland started to actively assisting Ukrainian society on its pro-Western path since Ukraine’s independence in 1991. Poland was the first country in the world to recognize Ukraine’s independence and supported Ukrainian opposition leaders during the Kuchma and Yanukovich regimes (d’Istria. 2023; Prokip, 2023). In more recent history, Poland played a crucial role in mediating during the Orange Revolution, leading to the repeat of the second round of the presidential elections and the victory of President Yushchenko in 2004. Despite subsequent political shifts that saw Yanukovich regain power, Poland continued to support the Ukrainian democratic opposition in the winter of 2013-2014. Polish authorities sought a reasonable solution to prevent a civil war in Ukraine, but tensions escalated, and a filmed statement by Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski emphasized the potential consequences if a deal was not supported. The events that unfolded after President Yanukovych fled the country left Ukraine vulnerable 128

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Russia’s annexation of Crimea, causing political instability. While traditional European actors saw little change in their relations with Russia after the 2014 events, Poland’s perspective shifted significantly (Pietrzak, 2023d). The assault on Ukraine in 2014 reinforced Poland’s realization that Russia cannot be trusted again, leading it to a more realistic approach to international relations, emphasizing power, national interest, and geopolitics. Poland’s stance has been consistent over the last 25 years since its accession to NATO and the EU in 2004. Active during the Orange Revolution of 2004, the Georgian War of 2008, and the fall of the Yanukovich regime in 2013-2014, Poland has faced economic sanctions and retaliation from Russia for promoting a more democratic, transparent, and pluralistic future for Eastern Europe. Any suggestion of a Minsk 2/3 type of solution is viewed by Poland as inadvisable, as it could encourage Russia to retreat, regroup, and attack Ukraine again in the future. Poland remains committed to its consistent approach in supporting Ukraine and standing against Russian aggression (Pietrzak, 2022a). The Polish response to Russia’s full-blown war against Ukraine in 2022 has been portrayed by the media as hawkish, risky, Russophobic, and irresponsible. Despite these opinions, Poland has stood firm, rejecting suggestions to appease Russia and emphasizing the importance of not conceding to territorial demands. Poland vehemently opposed negotiations that could lead to concessions, comparing such actions to negotiating with Hitler. It has been consistent in its refusal to endorse neutrality for Ukraine, considering it detrimental and dysfunctional. From a humanitarian perspective, advocating for peaceful solutions such as the Kissinger peace deal or other proposals makes sense, emphasizing the importance of considering the human rights of civilians in conflict zones. However, Poland argues that Russia’s genocidal activities in occupied territories make these proposals less viable, as they could lead to even deadlier campaigns. Poland remains committed to supporting Ukraine’s fight for every inch of its territory against Russian aggression (Amnesty International Report, 2022; Garner, 2022; Pietrzak, 2022c; Slovenia Times, 2022; The Economist, 2023; TASS, 2023; Tyshchenko, 2023; Wintour, 2022). The war in Ukraine is viewed by Poland as an escalation of earlier tensions that began in 2014 with the illegal annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas. Poland assumed an active role in supporting Ukrainian sovereignty before Ukraine became a conflict zone and has advocated a united front of NATO and EU members against Russia. While other countries exhibited caution, Poland swiftly emerged as one of the first countries to extend military support to Ukraine, showcasing a commitment to regional stability and stopping Russian neo-imperialist ambitions. Over the last two years, Poland has benefited from a transformative period in Europe’s architecture of power. Rejecting hawkish behavior, Poland has become a significant political actor in the transatlantic community, with one of the largest and most dynamic economies in Central Europe. Poland categorically rejects hawkish actions, advocating for far-reaching peace with neighbors and partners who respect international law and human rights (Pawluszko, 2024). Poland’s rise is characterized as that of a benign regional hegemon with a pragmatic standpoint. While actively participating in diverse European and transatlantic initiatives, Poland aims to strengthen regional resolve against Russian aggression. The country recognizes the need for a robust coalition with other Central and Eastern European states to deter potential attacks and protect Ukraine, Armenia, and Georgia. Poland stands firm against Russian aggression but emphasizes the importance of a unified front and pragmatic responses in the realm of geoeconomics. The experiences of the past suggest that resisting Russia’s expansionism by upholding the principle of territorial integrity is the only way to halt Russian expansion. Poland is determined to push for a united front against Russia, driven by enlightened self-interest rather than short-sighted neo-imperialist greed. In the face of Russia’s projection of power, Poland aims to reassure its neighbors, emphasizing the stark contrast between the direct consequences 129

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of Poland’s rise and Russia’s policy of unconstrained expansionism; still, Russia should not be underestimated (Brzezinski, 1997; Kitzen & Marnix, 2022; Peterson 2024).

HISTORIA MAGISTRA VITA EST: SHAPING POLISH FOREIGN POLICY THROUGH A HISTORICAL LENS – POLAND, A RELIABLE ALLY THROUGHOUT HISTORY. Poland’s geostrategic position is significantly better than Ukraine’s, yet it remains an indisputable historical fact that Poland needed substantial time to liberate itself fully from Soviet influence, achieving this milestone in 1989. Throughout the 20th century, Poland endured occupation by various nations, including the Soviets and Nazis. The nation, having freed itself from Soviet influence in 1989, is determined not to repeat the challenges of the 20th century in the 21st. After World War II, the Polish Communist Party served as a tool of Moscow’s power, lacking authentic roots. Despite this history, Poland became a NATO member in 1999 and joined the EU in 2004, showcasing its active role in regional stability. The path to NATO and EU membership was arduous, involving challenging reforms and addressing corruption. The nation’s achievements are attributed to its rejection of essentially imperialist Prometheism for the last 25-30 years. This approach appeared unsuitable for a nation that rapidly replaced its 19th-century nationalism with more cosmopolitan and communitarian views, aligning better with the era of globalization. While Poland has partly succeeded in aligning itself with the right trajectory of history, the nation, proud of its democratic values and having adopted one of the world’s first constitutions, still grapples with the cold, pragmatic approaches seen in British, German, and French political doctrines. These pragmatic viewpoints sometimes appear incompatible with the historical narrative of the First and Second Republic of Poland (Kornat, 2012; Libera, 2013; Mikulicz, 1971). One of the most prominent Polish political thinkers of the 20th century, Stanisław Cat-Mackiewicz, suggested that Polish policymakers should emulate Britain and heed the words of one of its statesmen, Lord Palmerston (1784–1865), who suggested that “Britain has no eternal allies, has no perpetual enemies. British interests are eternal and perpetual” (Cat-Mackiewicz, 2020). While a self-centered approach in international relations can surely yield significant benefits, such as the ability to project hard power and influence across seas and oceans, the Polish political establishment was clearly of the opinion that Poland has a reputation to uphold, and a defining characteristic of our national interests is Poland’s typically commendable role as a trustworthy, reliable ally that keeps its word. As a matter of principle, considering our history in this instance, I am inclined to concur with Mackiewicz, for some important foreign policy decisions in the last 1000 years of the country’s existence were influenced by an unhealthy dose of emotions, adventures, and misconstrued bravery for which Poles, as a nation, paid heavily. One of Poland’s greatest statesmen of all times, Władysław Bartoszewski, used to say, “It’s worth being decent even in the realm of foreign policy” and emphasized that “Europe means above all else freedom of the individual and human rights” (Pochron, 2022). This policy might be seen as rather naïve, for, to some extent, nations are prisoners of their geography. Tim Marshall, in this respect suggests that the behavior of nations is always determined by geographical constraints. Poland’s location between Western and Eastern Europe has led to several challenges. Nevertheless, Poland has a commendable track record in maintaining alliances and supporting its allies. Polish kings such as Władysław III of Varna (Władysław III Warnenczyk) and John III Sobieski proved 130

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to be reliable allies who were ready to assist allies in need. In 1443, Władysław launched a military expedition to support the crusade initiated by Pope Eugene IV against the Ottomans. Although he died at the Battle of Varna in 1444, his efforts to relieve pressure on Christian states in the Balkans, particularly Bulgaria, are remembered as significant. In 1683, John III Sobieski, the king of Poland, defended Vienna from the Ottoman army during the Battle of Vienna. Recognizing the strategic importance of Vienna and understanding the broader implications for the region, Sobieski responded to a call for help from Holy Roman Emperor Leopold I, facing the imminent threat of the Ottoman forces (Davies, 1982/2005). Another example of a consistent alliance is the union between Poland and Lithuania, lasting for more than four hundred years (1386-1795). The marriage of Polish Queen Jadwiga and Grand Duke of Lithuania Władysław II Jagiełło created a robust confederation that made Polish and Lithuanian nobility some of the most influential figures in Central Europe. This union ensured a long period of political stability known as the Golden Liberty, characterized by a system where nobles held considerable power in governing the state. Despite external threats from Prussia, the Czech Republic, Muscovy, the Ottoman Empire, and Sweden, the commonwealth successfully defended its territories. The strategic location of Poland-Lithuania between Western and Eastern Europe fostered trade, economic growth, and significant cultural, economic, and political developments, leading to the development of a unique form of parliamentary governance with the Sejm (parliament) playing a crucial role in the decision-making process. There were also very negative experiences with democracy at the end of the kingdom, as a liberum veto (free veto in Latin) was adopted, whose defining feature was a hard veto—a misguided rule that allowed any single deputy to derail any important decision and nullify all the legislation that had been passed during a particular session of parliament. Ultimately, Polish nobility was allowed too many rights and given too few responsibilities, which ultimately destabilized the country and led three neighboring powers—Prussia, Austria, and Russia—to tear the commonwealth apart. By the end of 1795, the commonwealth ceased to exist. It took another 123 years of hard work and immense efforts to bring Poland back to life, but even though Poland regained its independence in 1918, it has never managed to regain its former glory (Davies, 1982/2005). The twentieth century marks a period where Poland fervently sought to define its geography, yet valuable lessons from the past were ignored, leading to alliances with France and Britain that proved detrimental. In essence, its supposed allies did not provide their promised military assistance to the Second Republic, and Poland ended up being exposed to the Fourth Partition of Poland by Germany and the Soviet Union in accordance with the Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement signed on August 24, 1939. The consequences of this agreement have had profound and far-reaching effects, significantly altering the course of history, contributing to the outbreak of World War II, the division of Poland, and the expansion of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union into Eastern Europe. These consequences reverberated throughout the war and had lasting impacts on the geopolitical landscape of Central and Eastern Europe for decades to come (Brzezinski, 2010; Carter & Gati, 2013). In essence, despite aligning with the Allies during World War II—a morally justified move—Poland faced severe challenges, enduring the Nazi regime and its Holocaust and genocide. Subsequently, Poland suffered Soviet oppression marked by ethnic cleansing, mass murders, and political indoctrination. The communist regime specifically targeted politically active segments of society. The scale of destruction brought upon Poland during these periods is staggering, with an estimated six million Poles perishing during Nazi occupation (1939-1944) and hundreds of thousands falling victim to political repression, ethnic cleansing, mass murders, and political violence and indoctrination during the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland (1939-1941). In the territories captured by the Soviets, the NKVD – the Soviet secret 131

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police – initiated a massive campaign of ethnic cleansing, selecting the most educated and influential members of society, sending them, along with POWs, to death camps in Katyn, Charkow, Starobielsk, Kalinin, Minsk, and Kozielsk, from where most never returned alive. The paradox lies in both the Soviet and British governments refusing to assist the Polish government in exile in determining the whereabouts of some 22,000 missing Polish officers, with Nazi Germany ultimately uncovering the mass graves (Maresch, 2020; Utracka 2020). Following the defeat of Nazi Germany after the failed Operation Barbarossa, the Soviets blamed Nazi Germany for the Katyn forest massacre and extended direct Soviet rule from eastern Poland to indirect control over the entire territory of central and western Poland, facilitated by the imposition of the Polish Communist Party. This party lacked any authentic Polish roots and acted as a naked instrument of Moscow’s power and influence (Deutscher, 1958). At times, the Polish Communist Party acted as the Soviets’ henchman, abusing ordinary men and women if they challenged the legitimacy of this fake regime. Another paradox is evident in the fact that although some parts of Polish society formed the Polish Army in the USSR, supporting Soviet war efforts after its ally, Nazi Germany, became an enemy in 1941, the massive sacrifices of Polish soldiers fighting alongside the Red Army against the Nazi system (1942-1945) unintentionally supported a political system based on Leninist-Stalinist oppression. In the process of forming Polish forces in the Soviet Union, two groups emerged: one formed by General Anders, who escaped the Soviet Union through Iran to join British forces in North Africa, and the other commanded by General Berling. The latter went through the entire combat route from Lenino to Berlin but was deliberately stopped by the Soviets on the eastern bank of the Vistula River at the outbreak of the Warsaw Uprising. Berling was forbidden from helping the Home Army, leading to more senseless shedding of Polish blood. Under a quiet, unwritten agreement between Hitler and Stalin, Warsaw was leveled. The Red Army’s continued presence in Poland after 1944 stifled political opposition in the Socialist Republic of Poland, consolidating power in the hands of imported Soviet proxies who usurped governance rights through autocratic means. This oppression lasted long after Stalin’s death in 1953. From 1956 to 1983, the communist regime in Poland maintained a slightly milder but still oppressive nature, urging restraint from showing disillusionment (de Graaf, 2019). Despite these experiences, the Polish people resisted Soviet and Russian domination in 1956, 1970, 1974, 1980, 1981, and 1989, contributing to the efforts of all freedom fighters in Central Europe who hoped for a rapid disolution of Soviet influence. However, it was only after the complete failure of the centrally planned economy, Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost, and the Chernobyl nuclear disaster that Soviet rule of Poland ended in 1989. The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact were influenced by the actions of the Solidarity trade movement led by Lech Walesa and the Catholic Church. Supported by the Polish government in exile in London, figures such as Giedroyc, Brzezinski, and Nowak-Jeziorański, who either voluntarily emigrated or were forced to do so, played crucial roles (Davies, 2005). Despite the communist regime’s interference and control extending to every sphere of life in Poland, the Polish people managed to maintain a strong sense of national identity and cultural distinctiveness, resisting the adoption of the Soviet mentality. However, by the end of the twentieth century, a positive turn of events occurred for Poland, as by 1999, Poland joined NATO, and, in 2004, the European Union, resulting in greater stability and prosperity within broader pan-national transatlantic institutions. The prevailing idea was that, through embracing more cosmopolitan and less nationalistic attitudes, the countries of the union could escape their geographical constraints. Poland, along with its neighbors, was no longer relegated to the position of fighting for survival against much stronger neighbors. The 132

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world of simmering political tensions was replaced one of unconstrained economic collaboration, where historic enemies turned into allies, and economic competitors respected their differences, resolving them peacefully. By embracing this mindset, Poland sought to cease being a prisoner of its own geography, joining the decision-making process that allowed the political leadership of a fully independent country to embrace and enjoy the perks of the liberal agenda. This agenda favored independently choosing geostrategic alliances and improving relations with all neighbors, including Germany. During this period, Poland also managed to normalize its relations with Russia to a large extent (Stadtmuller, 2001). Still, it can be argued that Poland was actively contradicting Russia’s policy of dragging Ukraine into its sphere of interest by embracing a policy of enlightened self-interest—a standpoint that suggests that by acting to further the interests of our allies (in this case pro-Western members of the Ukrainian establishment), Poland ultimately serves its own self-interest. In this respect, Poland adopts policies based on smart power considerations, hoping to attract geostrategic benefits in a peaceful manner, actively acting on behalf of its values, not short-term interests. In this respect, I also argue that countries that act to further the interests of other countries ultimately serve their self-interest, and this is ultimately true for Poland. The support offered to Ukraine over the last decades has inadvertently transformed Poland into a force to be reckoned with—with more modernized, abler, and better funded military forces than ever in its long history (Marshall, 2015).

COMPARING APPLES AND ORANGES: POLAND’S DETERMINATION TO BE A PART OF THE TRANSATLANTIC COMMUNITY VS. UKRAINE’S INDECISIVENESS If there was one thing that the Polish political establishment agreed about after 1989, it was that Poland should never consider any alliance with Russia. Not a single openly pro-Russian party was elected to the Polish parliament after 1989. Of course, in the comfort of their homes, they may have harbored different opinions, but even social democrats such as Aleksander Kwasniewski and Leszek Miller would never have publicly endorsed Russia or any idea that remotely suggested military or political collaboration. They knew perfectly well that such a political program was incoherent and would be politically detrimental. Indeed, not a single minister of foreign affairs of Poland after 1989 would endorse an alliance with Russia. Such an idea would be considered delusional and detrimental to Poland’s national interest. This has nothing to do with Russophobia; it has everything to do with the fact that Russia simply cannot be trusted. The pro-Russian political agenda in Poland exists on the margin of the serious foreign policy debate, within the margin of statistical error, and it is difficult to find any mention of it in local history books. The only openly pro-Russian attitudes recorded in the history of Polish foreign policy belong to Roman Dmowski, who, with Ignacy Paderewski, represented Poland at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and signed the Versailles Treaty. Dmowski served as minister of foreign affairs under Wincenty Witos from October until December 1923. The only reason why Dmowski entertained such the outlandish idea of encouraging broader Polish-Russian collaboration was that he feared Germany more than Russia. He died before the outbreak of the Second World War, and the six years following his death validated some of his claims (Walicki, 2011). However, his political concept did not survive the test of time, as he also endorsed many contradictory and seemingly dangerous concepts that were sympathetic to Italian fascism and openly anti-Ukrainian. For these reasons, to this very day, Dmowski remains an eccentric anomaly used as a propaganda tool 133

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to influence fringe audiences in contemporary Poland. Notably, the only people who wish to entertain his political view also seem to praise the literary efforts of Alexander Dugin (Lucas & Pomeranzev, 2016; Walicki, 2011). Poland today is a West-oriented nation and a member of the European Union (since 2004) and NATO (since 1999). The geostrategic inclinations of the mainstream Polish political leadership, irrespective of their political or ideological affiliations, exhibit a consistent orientation towards the West. Whether emanating from politicians affiliated with Solidarity Electoral Actions (AWS), Civic Platform (PO), Law and Justice (PiS), or Social Democrats associated with the SLD/Spring/Together (Lewica) bloc, endorsing pro-Russian policy in Poland is universally equated with imprudence or, in some serious cases, perceived as indicative of a serious mental health condition or historical illiteracy. Polish society, which is ethnically quite homogenous, is also determined to follow the westward path of Polish foreign policy. While supportive of pro-Western parties in Ukraine, Polish policymakers never tried to impose their will on Ukraine but rather attempted to attract Ukrainians to follow the westward path. Meanwhile, Ukraine lacked such a consistency for the last three decades and pursued various contradictory political choices, especially in the 1990s and early 2000s. Under the Kuchma and Yanukovich presidencies, Ukraine prioritized its relations with Russia over the West. While some NATO members approached eastern enlargement cautiously, fearing repercussions from Russia, Poland has decisively supported Ukraine’s transatlantic aspirations since 2003, if not earlier. Meanwhile, the situation in Ukraine was totally different. Ukraine’s relations with the West and its transatlantic aspirations could not be properly articulated or pushed for not only because of the leaders in power but also because of the ethnic diversity of post-1991 Ukraine. Pro-Russian Russian speakers became Ukrainian citizens in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union. At that time, this seemed a painless divorce, but over time, some members of the Russian minority came to imagine a different, more pro-Russian political future for Ukraine (Karantnycky, 2015; Pietrzak, 2019, pp. 137-172). According to some research, there were 12 million ethnic Russians in Ukraine in 1991. Not all those ethnic Russians wanted to incorporate Ukraine into Russia or turn it into Russia’s fiefdom. But even if some elections in Ukraine in the post-1991 period were falsified, one has to admit that there was a substantial number of pro-Russian votes cast for the Party of Regions led by Yanukovich in 2006 (32% of the votes, 8,148,745 voters), 2007 (34%, 8,913,895), 2012 (30%, 6,116,815). Most of those votes came from Simferopol, Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kherson, and the situation in the western part of Ukraine around cities such as Lviv, Rivne, Zhytomyr, Lutsk, Ivano-Frankovsk, Odessa, Vinnytsia, and Kiev was completely different and more favorable to the pro-Western parties. Still, the Ukrainian society was divided over its orientation (Harasymiw, 2007; Hodge & Berlinger, 2018; Pietrzak, 2019, pp. 137-172).

POLAND, IN NATO, THE EU, AND OTHER REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Poland recognizes that its EU and NATO memberships offer significant benefits to its geostrategic position. But joining NATO in 1999 and the EU in 2004 never meant that Poland would become complacent. On the contrary, Polish officials considered membership in those organizations as an ongoing structural commitment aimed at improving the geostrategic position of the entire Central and Eastern European region by recalibrating geostrategic circumstances so that its countries can work together to achieve a greater convergence. Poland, as a member of the European Union (EU) and NATO, aligns its foreign policy with the broader goals of these organizations. This often involves maintaining a pragmatic 134

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approach aimed at enhancing collective security, economic cooperation, and political stability in the broader region. However, Poland does not wish to be a spectator of the regional show but rather has every intention to pursue its enlightened self-interest by reassuring its neighbors that it will dedicate considerable attention and resources to dealing with Russia’s clumsy neo-imperialist ambitions which instill fear in and threaten the survival of Russia’s neighbors. From the Polish perspective, Russia’s actions in 2008, 2014, 2015, and 2022 have repeatedly demonstrated its interest in threatening the status quo and challenging the established power architecture in the post-1991 environment. That is why within Poland’s intellectual and academic circles, there is a widespread consensus that doing nothing in response to Russia’s neo-imperialist acts of aggression against Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014-present) was not an option. From the Polish viewpoint, Russia’s intervention in Syria starting in 2015 is believed to have had a non-humanitarian character, serving as preparation for its neo-imperialist policies unleashed against Ukraine in 2022. Under such circumstances, Poland sees no other choice but to be an active international player in the region because this is the only way to deal with Russia – a revisionist state in the realm of international relations. From Poland’s perspective, Russia’s actions are not meant to undermine NATO or the EU or build an alternative security system. Instead, they aim to supplement their actions in the military, political, economic, and diplomatic domains. Members of the Polish establishment and ordinary citizens agree that both Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine since 2014 have deserved support in their defensive wars against Russia, which are widely regarded as unjust. While opinions may differ on the extent of support, the Polish government has shown a far-reaching commitment to promoting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in both countries (Pietrzak, 2022c). Further reinforcing NATO’s eastern flank following the new defensive doctrine, it aims to support parties that prevent Russia from gaining contested territory and forge new alliances and strengthen existing ones to work together to constrain Russia within its borders of after the Soviet collapse. To achieve this goal, Poland aims to act as a smart power, skillfully forging different ad hoc alliances such as the Visegrad Group, Three Seas Initiative, and Bucharest Nine and actively participate in the OSCE to ensure security for all. In this regard, Polish decision-makers are driven by the enlightened self-interest principle, advocating a policy based on the awareness that what is in the interest of its allies is in the interest of Poland (Pawłuszko, 2023).

THE MAIN DETERMINANTS SHAPING NATO’S POLICY CHOICES It is often suggested that NATO works as an extension of US interests and projects American power around the world. That is why many scholars believe that NATO is predominantly driven by the US’s foreign policy choices, and four traditional presidential viewpoints have shaped four leadership types: Hamiltonians, who prioritize economic development and business interests globally; Wilsonians, who emphasize democracy and human rights; Jeffersonians, who focus on democracy at home and limit international involvement; and Jacksonians, who advocate isolationism and the pursuit of a cynical national interest at the expense of other nations, rather than assisting other nations in resolving their own issues. This accounts for many historical aspects of US foreign policy, which shapes some important aspects of NATO’s operational response to conflicts around the world. However, it’s crucial to acknowledge that there are other more conceptual influences shaping NATO’s policy choices in such situations as the conflict in Ukraine, and not all of them are US-based (Mead, 2010). 135

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Among the most prominent figures holding significant sway in NATO countries is John Mearsheimer. His offensive realism can be viewed as controversial, but his suggestions are increasingly popular among high-profile academics and non-academics alike. His YouTube videos, challenging the mainstream narrative that calls for assistance at all costs, are widely viewed by global audiences. Mearsheimer attributes the Ukraine crisis to Western promises made to Ukraine between 2014 and 2022. He argues that these promises enraged Russia, leading to its aggressive actions. A Mearsheimer doctrine would suggest NATO show far-reaching restraint regarding intervention on behalf of Ukraine. For instance, Britain, France and Germany may be driven by a semi-Palmersonian policy suggesting that they have no eternal allies or enemies, but rather eternal interests, or a more cosmopolitan policy that would suggest that by engaging countries such as Russia in mutually beneficial trading initiatives they may be inclined to collaborate or provide some security guaranties with the counties that are affected by Russian neo-imperialist ambitions, if their geostrategic location is important from the perspective of their security as well (Mearsheimer, 1990, pp. 5-56; Mearsheimer, 1993 pp. 50-66; Mearsheimer, 2014, pp. 77-89; Tooze, 2023). Another distinguished public figure who had an impact on NATO’s policy choices was Henry Kissinger, who recently passed away at the age of 100. This is particularly true in respect of a 2022 suggested peace deal for Ukraine suggesting a return to its pre-2022 borders. In the plan, Kissinger suggested that the Ukrainian conflict requires a multifaceted approach that considers historical, cultural, and international factors. Adopting a more pragmatic and diplomatic approach rooted in the principles of compromise and dialogue can serve as a guiding light in the pursuit of peace. In this regard, Kissinger suggests focusing on practical considerations and tangible outcomes rather than ideological or moral principles. If necessary, he even proposes considering the possibility of a return to the pre-2022 borders between Russia and Ukraine to bring an end to the hostilities. Still, neither side is willing to embrace this plan, with Russia having already annexed territories and Ukraine seeking to regain full territorial integrity. Still, in his last public appearance in Davos in 2023, Kissinger reconsidered this position and even endorsed the idea of Ukraine’s admission to NATO, which made many NATO’s policymakers seriously consider such an outcome (Gold, 2023; Pietrzak, 2024f; Radio Free Europe, 2023; France 24, 2023). On some level, Kenneth Waltz’s structuralism also can help us understand the situation from the perspective of the anarchic nature of the global architecture of power and the hardwired structure of the interdependent interactions that involve certain policymaking decisions affecting the political choices of individual policymakers, and it “hopes of explaining the recurrence of a central and general dynamic observable in international politics: the balance of power” (Waltz, 1979; Yiğit, 2023a, p. 147). Another policymaking suggestion belongs to George Kennan’s containment policy, rooted in the Truman Doctrine, which emphasizes halting communism, or in this case, Russia, by creating blockades in strategic areas and preventing expansion. This policy has been extended to counter Russia’s actions in Ukraine (Kennan, 1954; Kennan, 2022). Similarly, Zbigniew Brzezinski’s doctrine supports civil societies resisting Russian expansion, combining soft and hard power approaches. This perspective essentially underpins Biden’s strategy, supporting Ukraine militarily to halt Russian advances (Pietrzak, 2024f; Pietrzak, 2023b; Pietrzak, 2023c;). Additionally, it is essential to point our attention to political thinker Jerzy Giedroyc, who believes in the interconnectedness of independent nations, asserting that without an independent Ukraine, there can’t be an independent Poland, reinforcing the need for a united Europe (Pietrzak, 2023a).

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SHAPING POLAND’S FOREIGN POLICY CHOICES Poland’s foreign policy choices in respect of the war in Ukraine are influenced by various factors, including geopolitical considerations, economic interests, and domestic political dynamics. Two of the most important determinants are shared historic experiences and geopolitical doctrines—restraint and pragmatism. By taking such an active role in those organizations, Poland aims to signal to its enemies that it will not allow the principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity to be violated. There are rules that civilized nations must abide by. Moreover, to strengthen its defense capabilities, Poland’s military leaders are doing their utmost to navigate NATO’s multi-domain escalation management more effectively, decentralize command, and help the Polish army face new challenges in software-defined warfare more efficiently (Koumparoudis, 2020, pp. 41-58; Koumparoudis 2023; Mulchandani & Shanahan, 2022). As mentioned earlier, Polish decision-makers, in their relations with Ukraine and other partners, try to adhere to the enlightened self-interest principle that advocates forging bilateral and multilateral relations with multiple partners. By default, those relations cannot intentionally be based on a zero-sum game but rather on a win-win strategy that benefits multiple partners through compromise rather than dictates. Policies should be based on pursuing common mutually beneficial goals and aspirations. Naturally, it would be naïve to always pursue such a policy, especially with parties driven by other more Machiavellian considerations. Indeed, policymaking practice exemplifies that at times, the cosmopolitan mindset must be supplemented with other more realistic approaches, especially when faced with blatant aggression in the realm of international relations. Indeed, Russia’s war in Ukraine caught Poland in the middle of an unresolved internal debate between idealism and cynicism; liberalism and realism; Eurocentrism and transnationalism; communitarianism and cosmopolitanism. The main reason for this state of affairs is the tension between Prometheism and pragmatism. Indeed, Piłsudski also suggested the creation of the Intermarium federation, a geopolitical plan to unite Poland with the nations that formerly constituted the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This new-old state would encompass the territories between the Baltic, Black, and Adriatic seas. In this imaginary federation (deeply inspired by Czartoryski’s plan), Poland would again play the leading role. This essentially meant that the rights of other nations within the commonwealth could not be fully respected for strategic reasons, especially considering that in the first half of the twentieth century, a large swath of land in the east could be seen as the best defense strategy against an unpredictable Russia. This modus operandi was very present in the political doctrines of Poland and Germany as well (Paczkowski, 2002, p. 10). The Second World War changed the nature of Polish Prometheism. Effectively, the beginning of the war meant a fourth partition for Poland and the need to find a way to protect the existence of the nation against Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Again, the political leadership who fled to Paris and London decided that instead of trying to preserve the vital spirits of the nation, Polish serviceman should be taking part in some of the bloodiest battles of the Second World War such as the Battle of Monte Cassino, where they were used as cannon fodder. Polish soldiers from Berling’s Army fought in the major battles from Lenino to Berlin but were forbidden by Stalin to help during the Warsaw Uprising to liberate the capital from Nazi Germany and welcome the fast-approaching Soviet Troops in the liberated capital. This totally backfired on the Polish government in exile because of their Prometheism. Some 200,000 Polish men, women, and children were killed for no strategic reason. These men could have resisted the Soviet occupation in Poland from 1944 to 1989. There were many delusional elements in the Prometheist thinking that could be averted, some of the most dangerous actions that were taken during this period could be prevented to save the nation, and that was the true cost of this legacy. At least Piłsudski knew 137

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when to put an end to delusions and embrace more pragmatic thinking after the Battle of Warsaw in 1920, but Piłsudski way of strategizing has also proven to be inconsistent with the historic tradition, for he ultimately felt as if he had every right to fight democratically elected officials and imprison them only because he disagreed with them, especially after 1926 (Davies, 1982; Davies, 2021; Popowycz, 2022). Another delusion of the Polish government in exile was the fact that it still hoped for Poland’s borders after 1944 to stretch from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea and used the bravery of ordinary men to chase this delusional aspiration. This contradicted with the spirit of the highly pluralistic nature of nations in the Intermarium region: Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Belarusians, Ukrainians, Tatars, Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Croats, Bosniaks, Herzegovinians, Romanians, Moldovans, and perhaps Serbs and Bulgarians. All these nations had their own political identity, their own language, and their own aspirations that were far different than joining some utopian commonwealth in which one country would decide the future of the others. Historians may be right to suggest that Piłsudski may have once or twice suggested that without independent Ukraine there can be no independent Poland, but the gathered historic data suggests that he did not practice what he preached. Those who said it and meant it were Giedroyc and Mieroszewski, who stressed the link between a free Ukraine and a free Poland in so many ways that it turned into a very appealing geostrategic project that inspired confidence not only in Poland but across Central and Eastern Europe. This doctrine is rather straightforward, stating that without an independent Ukraine, there cannot be an independent Poland, recognizing potential high costs for Poland but emphasizing the need to incur those costs to prevent the spread of the neo-imperialist Russian world (Russkiy mir) extending Russia’s sphere of influence beyond Belarus to Ukraine and other countries such as Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and the Baltic states, which would be an even bigger detriment to Poland’s state sovereignty, or undermining broader European security by whatever means necessary, without consideration for any broader consequences of such actions. By invoking the Giedroyc-Mieroszewski Doctrine in this scenario, we suggest that Poland and its allies in the transatlantic community had no choice but to support Ukraine in 2022. Failure to do so might have led to a domino effect, with Russia potentially targeting Moldova, Georgia, and NATO members such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland (Yiğit, 2022; Amilakhvari & Baghaturia, 2024; Pietrzak, 2023). The Giedroyc-Mieroszewski Doctrine is structuralist in a Waltzian or Giddensian sense, highlighting the importance of an independent Ukraine in a very structural manner for all of Central and Eastern Europe. From this perspective, an independent Ukraine is crucial for realizing the dream of an independent and peaceful Europe, as Ukraine is an independent country, and its borders should be protected. Supporting Ukraine will come with possibly high costs for Poland, but they are worth incurring because, in a broader sense, it contributes to securing not only Poland but the entire Intermarium/CEE region. However, the support is highly emotional, on the verge of almost a Promethean project, for it invokes lots of high-flown sentimentalism, romanticism, and pro-patria narratives, stressing the need to follow a romantic patriotic agenda that suggests an indispensable link between Ukraine and the rest of Central Europe. Some of those inclinations surely have certain undeniable truths. By following the logic suggesting that there is an objective, undeniable, and indispensable link between Polish independence and Ukrainian independence, one could arrive at the idea that it is for the first time in Polish history that there has been someone who would fight its battles for it (Tóth, 2021). In any case, those considerations fall within the romanticized Prometheist mindset suggesting “it is sweet and fitting to die for one’s country” (Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori). But there is nothing romantic about the war, which is why pragmatists suggest that “War is sweet to those who have never 138

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experienced it”, so one should do everything one can to avoid engaging in a war. Naturally, when the conflict has already started, one cannot act naïvely, so in this respect the Giedroyc-Mieroszewski Doctrine would highlight the importance of an independent Ukraine in a very structural manner. It explicitly suggests that from the Polish and Central European perspective, an independent Ukraine is crucial for realizing the dream of an independent and peaceful Europe, as Ukraine is an independent country, and its borders should be protected. But dovish offensive realists, such as John Mearsheimer, would suggest that the notion of responsibility to protect Ukraine’s independence should not be taken at face value. Mearsheimer’s work in this case suggests that Ukraine does not need to fight Polish or European battles, just its own. To Mearsheimer, Russia did not threaten NATO’s existence; it just threatened its neighbor, and its security position is rather undefined (Chotiner, 2022). Mearsheimer would suggest that NATO countries can sleep tight. So, essentially, by following Mearsheimerian logic, the so-called Giedroyc doctrine is too naïve to be taken into consideration, and even if there was some relevance to it, in 2024 it is clearly outdated. Mearsheimer, or anyone who applies the logic of offensive realism, would suggest that with or without an independent Ukraine, Poland, as well as the rest of Europe, is capable of defending itself from Russian imperialist ambitions on its own. Russia would not dare attack a NATO member state out of fear of retaliation from its 30 allies. In response, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who served as the national security advisor to US President Jimmy Carter from 1977 to 1981, would suggest that the strong historical-cultural and political bond between Central and Eastern European countries is undeniable. This is especially true for Poland-Ukrainian relations. Essentially, even if we leave those considerations aside, it is still essentially beneficial for both Poland and other NATO countries to embrace the Giedroycian logic (Pietrzak, 2024e). In this respect, it is worth considering that the Brzezinski doctrine is not an official foreign policy doctrine or document that could be published on the White House’s website. Simply put, it is often used to refer to the geopolitical and foreign policy strategies associated with the foreign policy-related work produced throughout his life. It was not summarized in some easily memorable phrase or a traditionally suggested blueprint for an acting president or head of state, but, rather, it was carefully crafted to have a more universal character, like the geostrategic projects of Mackinder and Retzel, to warn us that Putin is not the only ruler of Russia who has emphasized the necessity of conquering neighboring states because of a sense of external threat. The reason for this inherent predictability is that Russia as a typical land empire is driven by the drive for expansion to the west and south (Mironov, 1998). Brzezinski’s work suggests that geopolitics, in this context, aligns with Hans Morgenthau’s considerations of national interest. It can be characterized as more instrumental, suggesting NATO refrain from openly engaging in an open-ended conflict with Russia on behalf of Ukraine but still doing everything it can to ensure Russia not conquer this strategically important country. Brzezinski’s writings suggest that in cases such as this one, the United States and its allies should support the integration of Europe and the promotion of democracy and market economies in Asia. At the same time, the United States should seek to prevent the emergence of any potential rival powers in the region, such as China or Russia. To achieve this, Brzezinski argued that the United States should maintain a military presence in key regions around the world, such as the Middle East, to protect its interests and prevent the emergence of any threats to its global dominance (Leffler, 1983). The extended understanding of this policy suggests that NATO members, especially countries such as Poland and others that border Russia, also have responsibilities to support the overall NATO agenda. NATO’s strength depends on supporting the benign hegemon—the first and the last superpower—in its objective of providing security for all NATO members. According to his view, European countries can139

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not just rely on the US’s willingness to act as a global policeman and should take more responsibility for common security initiatives. Brzezinski’s ideas had a significant influence on US policy during the late 1970s and early 1980s, particularly in dealing with the Soviet Union and the Cold War, but they remain relevant today. Essentially, he was one of the most influential American public figures whose stature could be compared to Kissinger, Mearsheimer, and Kennan, and the most successful political advisor in the history of Poland, even though he never lived there (Immerwahr, 2020). Brzezinski was essentially a pragmatist who, in most cases, would suggest far-reaching restraint from openly engaging in an open-ended conflict with Russia on behalf of Ukraine. We don’t know for certain what he would have suggested after 2022, but his writings and various ad hoc political commentaries suggest that under any circumstances Brzezinski would have stressed the importance of not acting unilaterally but as part of a robust transatlantic coalition relying on conventional warfare and nuclear deterrence to make it unequivocally clear to Russia that NATO sees Ukraine as a potential member state and will do its utmost to prevent it from slipping back into the Russian sphere of influence. He would have suggested that security and independence cannot be taken for granted. The only way to preserve them is to adopt one distinctive feature of the Prometheist project of the Second Republic of Poland that suggests accepting and embracing a constant struggle that should continue irrespective of the fact that Poland is a member of NATO and the EU. Essentially, for Poland to be a successful NATO member, it should be more active in pursuing its geostrategic objectives and clearly aspire to make the region a prosperous, free, and liberated land of equal opportunities for all, where the value of the life and human rights of every human being are protected (Pietrzak, 2024f). Some interpretations of his work would suggest supporting Ukraine and other countries that belong to the so-called Rimland, which encompasses the Heartland as far as military assistance is concerned. This means that Brzezinski acknowledges that to successfully derail Russia’s neo-imperialist ambitions, Western countries should act together and play a more active role in their commitment to promoting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, with a particular focus on Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, the Balkans, North Africa, and the Middle East—virtually everywhere Russia is trying to project its power. NATO should staunchly oppose every manifestation of Russia’s neo-imperialist ambitions. Supporting democratic opposition and employing peaceful means to thwart Russia’s attempts to exert control should be accelerated in Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, and other Rimland nations. Only by applying such a structural approach can we succeed in securing our future as an independent political player (Pietrzak, 2024f). This policy can be characterized as more instrumental, suggesting refraining from openly engaging in an open-ended conflict with Russia on behalf of Ukraine. However, it advocates comprehensive support to Ukraine across various dimensions—military, political, logistical, diplomatic, and material. The doctrine strongly emphasizes avoiding irresponsible actions leading to military involvement unless necessary. If military action becomes necessary, it stresses the importance of acting not unilaterally but as part of a robust transatlantic coalition relying on conventional warfare and nuclear deterrence. The primary goal is to convey unequivocally to Russia that NATO sees Ukraine as a potential member state and is committed to using Article 5 if necessary for the protection of its allies. Still, under current circumstances, as much as the Brzezinski doctrine may seem very hawkish and assertive, there is a reason for it. This posture is adopted to preserve NATO and the US’s integrity and reassure its primacy in the Western Hemisphere. Ultimately, NATO cannot afford to ignore Russia’s hawkish acts of aggression affecting the countries that want to join NATO. These actions are defensive, defending peaceful nations from the hawkish acts of aggression authorized by Putin, who wants to drag NATO to the brink of confrontation. 140

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Brzezinski’s work suggests in this case that it is in the West’s interest to prevent the rise of any Eurasian player. So, the same policy could be used against China if China follows Russia’s route. Brzezinski, the pragmatist, would still suggest treating Russia respectfully and never unnecessarily or openly provoke it. He would advocate comprehensive but rather clandestine support to Ukraine across various domains— military, political, logistical, diplomatic, and material. In this respect, Brzezinski would suggest the parties who support Ukraine exercise far-reaching caution, so it is not used against them. Engaging in any open-ended aggression or stepping into the conflict zone at this stage would be counterproductive. In essence, if Brzezinski were alive, he would criticize anyone trying to persuade Ukraine to accept any of Russia’s demands. He saw Putin as a homo sovieticus man, the product of Soviet indoctrination, so suggesting Ukraine capitulate in the face of Russian threats would only encourage Putin and his successors to continue their aggression (Tyszkiewicz, 2022, p. 92-95). The doctrine advocates comprehensive support to Ukraine across various dimensions, treating this conflict as a proxy war—military, political, logistical, diplomatic, and material. The doctrine strongly emphasizes the avoidance of irresponsible actions leading to military involvement unless absolutely necessary. One can plausibly claim that on some level an executive decision was taken to extend Article 5 protection voluntarily, inadvertently, and secretly to Ukraine—a country that was not even a candidate for NATO membership at that time (Kim, 2023; Pietrzak, 2024f; Pifer, 2023; Taylor, 2022). In the broader sense, by committing themselves beyond November 2024 to the Brzezinski doctrine and Giedroyc-Mieroszewski Doctrine, Poland as well as other NATO members could make it extremely costly for Russia to attack its ally Ukraine by creating a stronger union that leads to broader security by making it prohibitively expensive for Russia to pursue its neo-imperial policies to its west and assisting Georgia and Ukraine in their efforts to join NATO and the EU. In this respect, we need to admit that there are a lot of similarities between these doctrines. It was in accordance with the Giedroyc-Mieroszewski Doctrine that then-Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki emphasized that Poland’s weapons defended independence not only locally but also 500 kilometers from its border. He also stated, “Today, our weapons are used to defend our independence, but 500 kilometers from the Polish border.” It was also in accordance with the Brzezinski doctrine that Poland did not openly intervene on behalf of Ukraine but rather refrained from sending its boots on the ground and supported the Ukrainian resistance from afar. In essence, both doctrines call for comprehensive support to Ukraine against aggression, categorically advocating caution in military involvement unless absolutely necessary. They suggest that it is necessary to act on behalf of our values and our geostrategic vision of forging safe and prosperous neighborhoods for all and stabilizing the regional architecture of power based on a smart power policy. It is a win-win situation for Poland and Ukraine, for it allows Poland as well as other countries to modernize their military forces, avoiding the costs of utilizing the post-Soviet weaponry that should have been replaced with modern weapons long ago. Finally, this strategy also allows Poland to replenish its military with high-tech modern equipment that is more likely to be capable of facing the challenges of the future software-defined warzone. By showing such a strong commitment, Polish authorities make it clear that Putin has overstayed his welcome in power in Russia (Karwowski & Pietrzak, 2023). Some may say that the reasons that there are so many similarities account for the fact that they are more neatly delineated. This short chapter may not point out all of the differences, but there are some striking differences that cannot be missed: The Giedroyc-Mieroszewski Doctrine is more Promethean, and Brzezinski suggests a far-reaching pragmatism, restraint, and strategic approach. Giedroyc suggested that an independent Ukraine is crucial for realizing the dream of an independent and peaceful Europe; Brzezinski partly agrees but looks at this problem from the perspective of the global architecture of 141

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power, particularly the territories that encompass today’s Russia. In this sense, Giedroyc-Mieroszewski’s approach is more communitarian, for it emphasizes the special bond between both countries.

MULTIDIMENSIONAL ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF RUSSIA’S WAR IN UKRAINE There is ample evidence suggesting that even if a regional conflict of global importance starts as a onedimensional confrontation between two parties, after a time, it very often deteriorates into a vicious circle of violence that inadvertently starts producing more negative consequences for more and more people, including those in neighboring counties and distant places, even other continents. This was the case with the wars in Afghanistan (2001-2021), Iraq (2003-present), Syria (2011-present), Ethiopia (2020-present), and many others. The confrontation between Russia and Ukraine that escalated in 2022 is no different, as it has already produced skyrocketing inflation in Europe, the United States, Russia, and even such distant places as China, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Yemen, Nigeria, and Tunisia because these countries rely heavily on wheat imports and other agricultural commodities produced in Russia and Ukraine. Agriculture-related inflation skyrocketed once it became clear that the traditional route for commercial vessels used by both countries to export their produce through the Black Sea had been severely destabilized by this conflict (Pietrzak, 2019a; Pietrzak, 2022a; Pietrzak, 2023d). Despite this issue having been temporarily solved by the UN-struck deal in 2022, the deal has an expiration date, and the markets are still likely to react negatively to any deterioration of the situation in the region. This, in turn, is likely to produce broader negative economic consequences, and the end consumer is likely to be overcharged for any actual and supposed transport-related price hikes during this temporary solution. Naturally, the longer the conflict lasts, the more likely it is to produce even more harmful and inherently uncontrollable spillovers that will further destabilize the world’s sociopolitical situation and affect the least privileged. Some of those spillovers are completely unexpected and can affect even such strong and friendly relations such as those between Ukraine and other countries that border Russia that share common interests. The tensions between Ukraine and Poland related to agricultural commodities exports are a textbook example of such escalation (Easton, 2023; Peterson 2024). Throughout the second half of 2023, tensions rose in Central Europe, for the countries of the region (except Romania and Lithuania) have shown a far-reaching reluctance to accept the economic spillover produced by the Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) and extended the EU ban on grain imports from Ukraine. Ukrainian agricultural products destined for the developing world ended up in Central Europe, causing a lot of distress to local farmers who were forced to compete with much lower priced Ukrainian products. Poland and its EU allies put an embargo on Ukrainian products because instead of using their territories for transit, Ukrainians started selling their grain, wheat, and sunflower oil to third parties that speculated with those much cheaper products, eventually flooding the local markets with Ukrainian products. The conflict over agricultural imports has escalated, and Ukraine decided to file a complaint against Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia to the World Trade Organization for their continued import bans on certain agricultural products, including grains, from Ukraine on September 21, 2023. (al-Jazeera, 2023; World Trade Organization, 2023). The dispute escalated further after Ukrainian President Zelensky accused Poland at the UN meeting of benefiting Moscow by hindering Ukraine’s efforts to preserve land routes for grain exports. He implied that Poland played into Russia’s hands by imposing restrictions on Ukrainian grain imports and suggested that some European countries “feign solidarity while indirectly supporting Russia,” which 142

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clearly referred to Poland as well as other member states that refused to lift their embargos and comply with Ukrainian demands (Ricard et al., 2023).

ZELENSKY AND THE SPIRIT OF THE GIEDROYC DOCTRINE In essence, it must be admitted that most of his UN speech of September 19, 2023, was very well received, as global audiences were already accustomed to Zelensky’s direct, rough method of persuasion. Everyone expected a statesman-like speech that would update the international community on the progress of Ukraine’s defensive efforts. He delivered on the promise, pointing out that Russia should be seen as a terrorist state and employing various emotional techniques to seek further military, logistic, financial, and diplomatic assistance. He did not mention Poland, but when he suggested that “They may seem to play their own role, but in fact, they are helping set the stage for a Moscow actor,” political commentators immediately associated this with Poland. Whoever wrote the speech knew exactly how this would be received and of what detriment this single sentence would be to Polish-Ukrainian relations (Prokip, 2023). It is difficult to determine what rationale was driving Zelensky at that moment. Possibly, it was disappointment that despite securing Kissinger’s endorsement, Ukraine was ultimately not accepted into NATO while Sweden and Finland were. But all of those frustrations were now taken out on Poland, which, according to Zelensky, is complicit with Russia in refusing Ukrainian agricultural products, Ukrainian contraband, and the unrestrained access of Ukrainian transport companies to the European market (Yiğit, 2023b; Yiğit, 2024). Clearly, no one in Poland expected gratitude from Ukraine for Poland’s military, logistic, diplomatic, and humanitarian assistance to the Ukrainian people since 2022, 2014, and even 2004. However, accusing Poland of secretly supporting Russia was a step too far. Trying to bully Poland into providing Ukraine with weapons by using emotional blackmail and demanding concessions that harm Polish farmers and transport companies completely backfired on Zelensky. Even if this sentence referred to Morawiecki’s or Duda’s administration, it was inflammatory to the entire nation, which had made partly disarmed itself to provide Ukraine with essential military assistance in its hour of greatest danger. Poland has transferred almost all its arms reserves to Ukraine, essentially sending around 40% of the equipment of the Land Forces to the east. Zelensky insulted Ukraine’s most reliable neighbors, so, naturally, serious diplomats suggested to Ukraine that it would be wise for him to take some time off. His accusations were quickly criticized by a number of unsympathetic media outlets that focused on the popular theme of the deterioration of relations between Poland and Ukraine. These reports were often spiced up with details of Ukrainian crimes committed against Polish civilians during the Volyn massacre in 1943. All of those disagreements were reported in soap opera style, especially in Russia and other BRICS countries. Zelensky was depicted as irrational, erratic, irresponsible, and unstable. In this respect, Ben Wallace, the UK defense secretary at that time, said that “whether we like it or not, people want to see a bit of gratitude.” Zelensky’s UN speech, akin to Khrushchev’s shoe situation, had one sentence that insulted the entire nation. Less sympathetic political commentators suggested that Zelensky suffers from prima donna syndrome and pointed out that, in fact, it was Zelensky’s speech that would encourage someone at the Kremlin to open a champagne bottle. Thanks to the Ukrainian president’s disrespectful and ungrateful insinuation, Ukraine had lost an ally. By showing such an attitude to Poland, the Ukrainians also basically asked others to question their policies toward Ukraine. Zelensky made a choice that might have cost Ukraine massive reputational damage. Even Russian state media ended up confused on how 143

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to report this failed attempt at emotional blackmail because suggesting Polish complicity with Russia made no sense. The insinuation that Morawiecki or Duda was secretly supporting Russia was absurd; they were just trying to protect local farmers and other civilians from the consequences of the conflict. Surely, when asking for military assistance, or when asking to lift economic sanctions, it is important to follow basic rules of savoir-vivre. Demands, threats, insults, and emotional blackmail are counterproductive. The problem was that Zelensky had every reason to complain about the Polish government. In the first months of the war, Poland and other countries that border Russia were the unquestionable leaders in providing Ukraine with necessary military assistance. By late 2023, this support had significantly decreased, an embargo on Ukrainian agricultural produce was still in place, and the Morawiecki government insisted that Poland’s support for Ukraine would persist no matter what. Clearly, Morawiecki and his team were sending mixed messages that oscillated between extremes, and, ultimately, Morawiecki joined a strong group of European leaders who overpromised and underdelivered. Even if its resources were indeed depleted, Poland’s response could have been more refined, and its timing could have been different.

ON THE FUTURE OF POLISH-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS Zelensky’s remarks caused considerable damage to fragile Polish-Ukrainian relations, negatively affecting future prospects. However, this damage was not irreparable. On the contrary, Poland should read between the lines here and appreciate that Zelensky, unlike his corrupted predecessors, pursued the interests of his people, even if it meant speaking out against his closest partners. Surely, the choice of venue was disrespectful, and the way this speech was delivered left a lot to be desired, but he was clearly trying to protect the most important aspect of Ukraine’s national interest – national survival (Morgenthau, 1948). Meanwhile, Morawiecki responded like a second-class economist who failed to use his imagination to embrace more geo-economic aspects of the situation. The response was well-crafted, clear, and decisive, but it did not have any intention of de-escalating the conflict. On the contrary, on September 20, 2023, in an interview with local broadcaster Polsat News, Morawiecki declared that, while maintaining support for Ukraine’s fight against Russia’s invasion, his government had halted weapons supplies to Ukraine to focus on arming Poland’s armed forces. “Ukraine is defending itself against a savage Russian attack, and we understand that this attack creates an extraordinary situation,” he said, “We don’t intend to donate any arms to Ukraine anymore because we are now arming ourselves with the most modern weapons.” His response clearly showed that he did not practice what he preached. Instead of embracing the Giedroyc Doctrine, Morawiecki followed Cat-Mackiewicz’s recommendations, which are very unfamiliar to the Polish historic tradition. By changing the narrative and suggesting that there would be no more deliveries of military equipment, Morawiecki clearly wanted to show he was in a dominant position in this spat. Essentially, this response was the most Palmerstonian response in the modern history of the Third Republic of Poland, for it suggested that Poland really had no eternal allies and no perpetual enemies but rather just interests that are eternal and perpetual. Most importantly, such hawkish shade of pragmatism is very foreign to the policymaking culture of Poland. Over the last 100 years, a more distinctive local pragmatism has been developed that should forbid going from one extreme to another in a split second, for it simply sends an incoherent message to Poland’s allies and enemies alike. By suggesting that anyone who insults Poland would face consequences, he weaponized the use of

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humanitarian assistance and contradicted everything that he declared about his previous commitment to Ukraine. Those suggestions were simply not dignified and were uttered in the most despicable manner. Since February 2022, Morawiecki has consistently conveyed the message that his government is guided by enlightened self-interest, seeking to be perceived as a reliable ally in international affairs and expressing a willingness to do everything possible to assist Ukraine. However, following minor tensions in bilateral relations and unsympathetic remarks from the Ukrainian leader, he opted to unequivocally prioritize the interests of the Law and Justice party, using Ukrainians as scapegoats in this agenda. This decision transformed the stronger project of his administration, rooted in solid doctrinal and historical foundations, into an object of ridicule. Morawiecki had previously asserted that it was thanks to the decision-makers in Warsaw that the voice of Ukraine was heard in February 2022, successfully convincing their transatlantic partners to provide stronger support to Ukraine. However, after Zelensky’s UN Speech, he completely reneged on his earlier promises, suggesting that his government would refrain from any further support. This revealed that even in 2023, despite the lessons of Polish history advising against such actions, Morawiecki’s long-term geostrategic decisions impacting Poland’s neighborhood could be altered abruptly. The fact that this strategic shift might be driven by emotions, resulting in a rapid transition from full support to complete withdrawal and hostility within hours, shows one of the worst aspects of his Prometheist mindset. Urging the electorate to compromise Poland’s core national interest of fostering a safer regional environment, solely on behalf of one party, jeopardizes the very foundation of Poland’s independence, based on popular sovereignty and civic virtue. In essence, Morawiecki’s response contradicted the principles of creating a more just and effective political order, as warned by Rousseau (1782). These failed policies, supported by a campaign of fake news, were pursued both domestically and internationally, standing in stark contrast to these principles. Why would such a minor disagreement be escalated to such massive proportions? Surely, this situation shows some of the most negative features of Polish character: a penchant for revenge, hawkish behavior, an inherent eagerness to get drunk and “seize the sabres” to fight both real and imaginary enemies. These impulsive, unpredictable, and erratic features of Polish character were used for centuries by Poland’s enemies to divide it. The broader picture was that both parties in this standoff have clearly developed competing economic interests but very aligned geostrategic interests, and this spat would overshadow this fact (Orzeł, 2015; Instytut Polski w Tel Avivie, 2023). As a matter of fact, Morawiecki’s response to the accusation that his government was supporting Russia was not diplomatic, for it essentially implied that without Poland, Ukraine had no chance of joining NATO or the EU or winning the war against Russia. His response to Zelensky’s UN speech inadvertently used the same disrespectful rhetoric as Jacques Chirac against Poland in 2003 after fully embracing George W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq of 2003. As much as Zelensky’s UN Speech attempted to assassinate the spirit of the Giedroyc Doctrine, Morawiecki’s response clearly suggested that Zelensky lost his chance to stay silent about the direction of Polish foreign policy. In essence, Morawiecki formulated something that resembled a reversed Giedroys Doctrine, for it clearly suggested that without Poland’s willingness to support Ukraine during this war, it could not win or become a member of the EU or NATO. Morawiecki suggested that by insulting Poland and its authorities, Ukraine would shoot itself in its feet, irrespective of the government that currently governs Poland. Morawiecki’s response was essentially a reprimand that suggested, “Control your emotions! Or you will get no weapons, money, or logistical support.” But again, it was completely unnecessary for Morawiecki to make any statements suggesting some unimaginable halt of Polish military assistance to Ukraine. Poland was still able to provide Ukraine with some of the old military equipment that was about to be decommissioned anyway. It would have been 145

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a win-win situation for Poland and Ukraine. The former did not have to incur the costs of utilization of those old post-Soviet tanks and planes, and the latter was able to use this equipment to fight its enemies. Zelensky’s September 19, 2023, UN speech should have no bearing on Poland’s decision in this respect. Still, Morawiecki chose the wrong moment to clarify that Poland was unwilling to donate any more weapons. Poland has never promised (and it should not change this now) to donate to Ukraine any of its F-16s or any of its newly acquired weaponry from South Korea, for donating them would undermine the country’s security (The Kyiv Independent, 2023). As a matter of fact, Duda stated that in May 2023 that there was a staunch liberum veto concerning the donation of Polish F-16s and any other modern weaponry that had just been purchased from South Korea and the United States to Ukraine, for at that point Poland could not afford such donations. Repeating those statements just added more fuel to the fire. Poland still borders the Kaliningrad Oblast and must be prepared to protect the Suwalki Gap, not only for the sake of Poland but also the Baltic states (Seguin, 2007; Żęgota, 2024; Żęgota, 2021; Żęgota, 2018). If anything, at that point, the government still had to buy more F-35 fighter jets to replace our wornout MiGs that should have been scrapped long ago. So, F-16s were not even for sale. Poland needed them to protect its airspace and the airspace of its allies in other areas. To understand the seriousness of the situation, one should ask, for instance, Bulgarian authorities how long they waited for their F-16s (Gigov, 2022). Depending on the configuration, the cost of a used F-16 is between $12 million and $35 million. If Ukraine wishes to acquire additional fighter jets for enhanced security, it must join the waiting list, as these aircraft are currently in high demand. Instead of appealing to global decision-makers with bullet-proof doctrines and sound strategies crafted by Brzezinski and Giedroyc that contributed to making NATO stronger, Morawiecki’s government did not understand the difference between them and did not even attempt to clarify them. Morawiecki’s policy towards Ukraine ended up completely inconsistent and went down a route that had no return. The route had marks of going down the Hungarian or Slovakian path that was particularly bad for our bilateral relations. Indeed, Poland under Morawiecki could have been much more effective if it had not been so Euroskeptic. The European Union had also expressed more general concerns over civil liberties and other rule of law issues of the ruling party, Still, Morawiecki will go down in history not as the first leader to visit Kiev or the one who sent the biggest amount of military equipment to Ukraine in the first part of the war; not the one who offered tanks and fighter jets in the time of the greater need, but the leader who in one of his last acts as a prime minister of Poland irresponsibly tried to assassinate the spirt of the Giedroyc doctrine to benefit his own political party. He saw himself as someone to lecture Ukrainians on the way they should arrange their demo-liberal system, but ultimately it was the EU that raised the concern at the European Court of Justice that Poland’s disciplinary system, implemented by Law and Justice lawmakers, imposing on the judges an additional body that would offer an “independent” evaluation, was incompatible with EU law. While the government initially sought to oppose the EU’s efforts to implement changes, some financial penalties and fines were imposed, and EU funding was halted, eventually leading the government to retract those reforms. The way in which Zelensky tried to humiliate Polish leaders was clearly inappropriate, and some reaction was justified but Morawiecki clearly forgot that Poland had much more important issues than to deal with the unstable emotions of one politician. Leaders go, countries stay, and Poland’s support for Ukrainian independence remains unwavering and will survive unnecessary escalation of emotions of the Ukrainian leader. As a matter of fact, there was no reason for this escalation of the situation with Ukraine in 2023. As a matter of fact, de-escalation was advisable. Morawiecki personally had every right to be frustrated with Zelensky’s blame game caused most probably by the delays in delivering donated 146

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military equipment from other European countries, various situations in which crucially important pieces of military hardware were promised and never delivered, but Morawiecki, the leader, had no right to add more fuel to the fire at that point. Clearly, he failed to deal with controversies as they arose, allowing Russia’s state-financed propaganda machine to take advantage of the bilateral tensions that had escalated in Central Europe because of the problems with Ukrainian agricultural exports. Indeed, this escalation shows that it is easy to support a rational partner who respectfully shows gratitude for the assistance that was already provided and knows when it is appropriate to stop demanding something that simply cannot be done. It is easy to support an ally who is not disrespectful and driven by emotions, and it is certainly easy to support an ally that shows that they have an actual plan on how to win the war, or is keen to negotiate the reasonable terms and conditions of a temporary ceasefire. The problem starts when a seemingly rational partner accuses one of feigning solidarity while indirectly supporting Russia in a high-profile speech at the UN, which everyone is listening to. And yet as much as Zelensky’s UN Speech was disrespectful, misguided, and demanding, Morawiecki’s response to this situation was even more immature, misguided, emotional, and misplaced.

MORAWIECKI’S EUROSKEPTICISM AFFECTED HIS ABILITY TO ACT IN THE GEOSTRATEGIC INTERESTS OF POLAND Despite Morawiecki clearly articulating his desire to be at the forefront of European and transatlantic politics, instead of approaching the objective in a pragmatic manner, he and the Law and Justice Party decided to grab their sabers and charge against an imaginary or a real enemy. Particularly banning any future deliveries of military equipment to the embattled regime was not a dignified response; it was disproportional, populist, and irresponsible. Morawiecki’s claim that he was acting on behalf of Poland’s national interest when he criticized Zelensky’s highly provocative UN speech is not convincing, and focusing on it during the parliamentary election campaign ultimately discouraged more liberal voters from supporting Law and Justice. It was an extremely ugly form of politics to politicize Polish-Ukrainian relations just to gain a few nationalist votes (Rettman, 2023). His actions showed a complete dependence on Kaczynski, who often, in internal and external politics, added gasoline to the fire to attain his party’s political objectives. By responding in a very hawkish manner, Morawiecki’s wanted to show that certain immature behaviors in the realm of bilateral relations with Poland will not be tolerated, suggesting that Poland has to be respected. But this was not the message that was received in Ukraine or elsewhere. The message that was received was a total contradiction of what Morawiecki had declared countless times, that Poland under his government stands firmly behind Ukraine’s transatlantic aspirations and pledges additional security guarantees in the event of future conflicts with Russia. Now he was eager to withdraw this support only because he was not able to handle someone who, unlike his predecessors, was willing to fight for the better future of Ukraine, even with his allies. Unlike Morawiecki, Zelensky’s rudeness was triggered by a strong pro-European commitment and a strong belief that the Western world, Poland included, should fulfill the moral and political obligations they promised Ukraine; otherwise the country would be go down a slippery slope. Instead of reassuring Zelensky and the global audience that Poland wants to see Ukraine succeed and Putin fail, Morawiecki took the Ukrainian reprimand personally and failed to act pragmatically within reason. Being decent and pragmatic in that situation would have meant helping Ukraine no matter what, even at Poland’s own expense. But Morawiecki, Duda, and Kaczynski failed to comprehend this, and 147

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the last part of their rule was marked by an unsympathetic and unnecessary verbal retaliation against the Zelensky administration. Thus far, the adoption of the combination of the Giedroyc-Mieroszewski and Brzezinski doctrines has not driven Russians away from Ukraine; it has not exhausted Russian resources and has not weakened Putin’s political position in Russia, for he still comfortably enjoys the role of local despot with full control of the country’s socio-political system. But thanks to the skillful application of this geostrategic mindset, which has proven to be more attractive for NATO and the political leadership in the United States, Putin ultimately failed to attain an easy victory in Ukraine. Russia under his leadership is still the largest country in the world with vast resources and remains resilient despite the harshest-ever sanctions regime. It is not only due to the delayed response of other NATO members that Poland had its share of political inconsistencies during this period. In this respect, Morawiecki did not act within the confines of the Polish geostrategic tradition. Ultimately, Polish society also did not appreciate how the Morawiecki government responded to Zelensky’s UN speech. Indeed, Polish society has shown a strong commitment to regional security and efforts to enhance military capabilities and partnerships within NATO and the European Union. It delves into the core of Poland’s foreign policy choices, meticulously dissecting the profound interplay between the historic decision to be the first country in the world to unequivocally recognize Ukraine’s independence in 1991 and the offer of substantial military, political, diplomatic, and logistical support in the first days of the invasion. Poland was the only EU country that kept its ambassador in Ukraine’s capital when the Russian Army was fast approaching Kiev’s city gates in 2022. It was also one of the first countries to unequivocally state that Ukraine should join the European Union by 2030. In this respect, the pragmatist political observer would confirm that unfortunate remarks by Zelensky triggered a massive change in political opinion about Ukraine and the Ukrainians. It continued for months after his speech and triggered an increase in anti-Ukraine rhetoric in the heat of the political campaign, but leaders come and go, while nations stay. It would be ill-advised to base the long-term geo-economic relations of the Third Republic of Poland, which just experienced eight years of dreadful populist government, on the response to one unfortunate speech by a politician who clearly struggles with post-traumatic stress disorder. Zelensky is not an enemy; as a matter of fact, he is the most mature Ukrainian politician of the last thirty years, who may struggle with controlling the corrupted officials within his cabinet, but he is doing a far better job than all of his predecessors combined. During such a difficult time, Poland’s relations with Ukraine should resemble the relations between the US and Canada on many levels, for both countries share some common values. They share some historical experiences, and in most cases, they share common interests. Yet, Morawiecki failed to understand that if Ukraine is admitted to the EU, both countries will profit immensely. This would necessitate negotiating better bilateral relations based on mutual understanding, respect, and support. Trade can make both nations safer and more prosperous. It would be a win-win situation for both parties. Poland has the advantage of being able to advise the Ukrainian political establishment on how it can accelerate its accession to both the EU and NATO. Poland can advise Ukraine on how to avoid a few traps that Germany and France set when Poland was joining the EU in 2004. Poland should support Ukraine on its road to NATO as well. This could be done not only because it is a decent thing to do but because they share a common interest. Luckily for Ukraine, for Zelensky, and for Poland, there was a parliamentary election in Poland in October 2023, which changed the political landscape in the country. As much as Polish society did not appreciate Zelensky’s insinuations, disrespect, and bullying attitudes, most Polish voters essentially rejected the Euroscepticism of the Morawiecki government and ultimately voted his party out of power. 148

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THE RESISTANCE OF THE POLISH PRAGMATIC PROEUROPEAN SCHOOL OF GEOPOLITICS Tusk’s government clearly signals the rebirth of the Polish pragmatic school of geopolitics. This is a different type of pragmatism, one that suggests that Poland has no choice but to take a more active role in its neighborhood. It is strongly connected to the Skubiszewski doctrine, which promotes the idea of Poland having no problems with its neighbors as long as they respect international law, the territorial integrity of other independent countries, and human rights of their citizens. But Poland will not accept any provocations or open or hidden acts of aggression against its sovereignty or the sovereignty of its NATO and European Union allies, as well as Armenia, Georgia, and Ukraine. This is a very active pragmatic approach that hopes that NATO and the European Union will do their best to expedite the acceptance of both Ukraine and Georgia as full members, as there is little chance for the normalization or improvement of diplomatic ties with Russia under Putin. Even if he is ultimately replaced, there would be no change in Russia’s policy towards its neighbors, which underscores the importance of acting together under such circumstances. This pragmatism understands that Poland can be strong only by forging strong alliances with its partners in Western, Eastern, Southern, and Northern Europe, and by extending this practice to every other partner Poland is working with from around the world. This pragmatism embraces Kissinger’s latest change of heart regarding Ukraine and would gladly ratify Ukraine’s NATO membership, for it would increase this organization’s operational capacity. In the end, Ukraine has the most experience in facing Russia in the open field of battle. Imagine how much stronger NATO and the EU will become when Ukraine fully shares all those experiences on the command level and finally fully enjoys not only all the rights of membership but also fulfills its far-reaching responsibilities (Gramer & Detsch, 2024). This pragmatism understands that admitting Ukraine to NATO and the EU sends Russia a clear message: do not mess with Poland, for you are not calling the shots anymore! You may have some nukes, but Poland has developed a strong network of powerful friends and is currently in the process of turning both China and India against Russia (Pietrzak, 2024c). Instead of creating obstacles, Poland should seek solutions that benefit both sides, for ultimately Poland’s main geostrategic goals in this conflict should be to be a part of the winning anti-Putin coalition that achieves a very ambitious plan to reverse the negative consequences of the Yalta conference for all of Eastern Europe and the Balkans. That is why Poland hopes to see both Ukraine and Georgia in the EU and NATO by the year 2030. Albania, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Albania should also join these organizations by the year 2035. The modern pragmatist clearly acknowledges that the geostrategic positions of Poland and Ukraine are completely different. He also needs to acknowledge that the Giedroyc-Mieroszewski Doctrine is not as valid as before March 12, 1999, when Poland joined NATO, but still Poland and other Central European nations decided to keep it alive to help Ukraine on its transatlantic route in whatever way they can. Indeed, there is no way Poland, a member of NATO and the EU, could be attacked by Russia. Russia clearly attacks only countries that suffer extended periods of political instability, so attacking Poland would be geostrategic suicide for Russia, for the Polish army would drive the aggressor out of its territory within hours. The Brzezinski doctrine is still in play, for now more than ever Poland, along with its allies, has to adopt an active role in promoting a more democratic, more transparent, and more pluralistic alternative future for Eastern Europe in which basic liberties and the rule of law are protected. Still, this Giedroycian way of thinking can be maintained, for there are some pragmatic elements in this project that make it very valuable from the perspective of Poland’s values and dedication to its 149

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neighbors. Still, there is a distinctive difference between Morawiecki-Duda and Tusk-Sikorski pragmatism. Just 30 days into Tusk’s government, Poland managed to unblock the EU funds dedicated to Ukraine and has managed to persuade the Ukrainians to take the demands of Polish farmers and Polish transport companies seriously into consideration. It seems that bilateral relations are finally on the right track (Ostiller, 2023). Zelensky’s UN Speech in 2023 caught many members of the Polish political establishment off guard. It was wrong on many levels to insinuate that Morawiecki’s refusal to accede to Ukrainian economic demands was driven by a hidden Russophilia. Rather, it was fueled by Euroscepticism and a strong bellicose tradition within Polish Prometheism that prevented Morawiecki from finding a resolution to the bilateral conflict between Ukraine and Poland in the first place. By accusing Poland of complicity with Russia, the Ukrainian leader greatly insulted not only the government but also all the people who had eagerly volunteered to help Ukraine and the Ukrainian people since February 2022. Meanwhile, Morawiecki’s response to this blatant provocation stands as a clear example of an immature, emotional, and naïve overreaction that could have been averted. In the end, it caused significant damage to Poland’s reputation as a reliable and benevolent international actor that safeguards regional stability. Because of his ego, Morawiecki forgot about his responsibility to adhere to a strong tradition demonstrating an unwavering commitment to regional peace and stability, one that recommends fostering strong relations with allies no matter what, especially those in need. The cost of betraying Poland’s reputation and values as a steadfast ally was excessively high. Morawiecki missed the opportunity to respond with grace, humility, and understanding to what appeared to be an irresponsible provocation. Instead, he chose to unnecessarily escalate hostilities to the brink of explosion, ultimately harming himself. History will likely remember him not as a leader who unequivocally supported Ukraine, contributing more than 300 tanks when others were overpromising and underdelivering. History will rather remember him as an irresponsible opportunist who added to the injury to benefit politically in the forthcoming parliamentary elections. He did not realize that Polish society was tired of his Euroscepticism, which may have had different origins than Trumpism and Orbanism but had also become dangerously ambivalent to Ukraine’s success and Russia’s failure. The paradox of the situation was that his earlier declarations suggested that Morawiecki’s twist on Euroscepticism would be more consistent with naïve neo-imperialist Prometheism, heavily supplemented by strong anti-Russian sentiments, reinforced with a robust romantic conviction that the Polish army, as in 1612, would be capable of taking Moscow by storm if necessary. Fortunately, Morawiecki did not follow in Pilsudski’s footsteps in deploying Polish troops in Ukraine. Fortunately, Morawiecki recognized that Poland is bound by NATO’s Article 5, so any escalation initiated by Poland would drag NATO into open confrontation with Russia. The only way Poland can assist Ukraine is by rejecting the hawkish, naïve, and bellicose aspects of historic Prometheism and embracing a more pragmatic tradition that opens borders, fosters unrestricted trade with allies in the east, and aligns with the Brzezinski doctrine. By adopting an enlightened self-interest principle and providing Ukraine with everything Poland can donate or sell, Poland could help end this conflict faster. A modern pragmatist would offer comprehensive assistance to Ukraine, surprising Putin, who is accustomed to a lack of determination, resolve, and political loyalty. Ultimately, having Ukraine in both NATO and the EU is a win-win situation for both parties. Therefore, Poland should do its utmost to support Ukraine at this moment, for leaders come and go, but nations connected by common history, common interests, and an unbreakable geostrategic tradition should be able to depend on one another. Even if Giedroyc’s ideas are considered obsolete, it 150

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up to Poland to change this by extending assistance to Ukraine until it catches up, simply because it is a wise and decent thing to do. Once Ukraine is admitted to the EU and NATO, Poland and Ukraine can reinforce their partnership beyond current structural constraints, and determination is needed on both sides to achieve this.

CONCLUSION This chapter examines the Russian war against Ukraine (2022-present) from the perspective of Poland’s historical geopolitical doctrines as influenced by Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki’s policymaking. It is part of a broader discussion on Poland’s role in reinforcing NATO’s eastern flank, its support for Ukraine since 2022 (and before, since 2014), and the overshadowing of this support by a more populist, instrumental, and opportunistic policy marked by the imposition of an embargo on Ukrainian grain imports after the termination of the Black Sea Initiative. There was a rare moment in Polish history that lasted for approximately 18 months when figures like Pilsudski, Giedroyc, Mieroszewski, Jezioranski, Skubiszewski, and Brzezinski would all smile if they were alive, for Poland made a genuine effort to support Ukrainian independence, and this effort was quite successful. This marked a clear message: Poland is no longer a status quo actor in the realm of international relations. It shouldn’t have been one in the first place. The country must take a more active role in its neighborhood. Russia’s open act of aggression against Ukraine sends a strong message to Poland: Putin (or any Russian leader) is unpredictable, and the only way to defeat him is to surprise him. Therefore, Poland cannot afford to be a passive observer but needs to play a much more active, if not leading, role in shaping regional institutions and preparing them for the new set of geostrategic realities after Russia’s war in Ukraine. Ultimately, Poland under Morawiecki failed to realize its full potential and failed to fully adopt an enlightened self-interest principle that should guide Polish decision-makers in various domains. The reason for this is that the Law and Justice government was ultimately driven by a primitive Euroscepticism that undermined all of its major initiatives. Because of the results of the parliamentary elections of 2023, Poland will celebrate its 25th anniversary of joining NATO under a different, more cosmopolitan, and more pragmatist government that is likely to accelerate the efforts of replacing the rest of its postSoviet military equipment with more modern weapons. The Tusk government is also likely to abandon seemingly obsolete Prometheist ideas from the 20th century and replace them with a more pragmatist geostrategic orientation that will be more fitting to the ever-changing Polish reality at the beginning of the 21st century. Still, Morawiecki, Duda, Kaczynski, and the other Eurosceptics did Poland a massive favor by exposing the inefficiency of inconsistencies, obsoleteness, and naïveté and clearly exemplifying that Polish pragmatism must follow a different path than its Western interpretation. This study suggests that Poland is not a hawkish international actor, nor is it naïve or neutral. Throughout its history, Poland has consistently proven to be a reliable ally. There were just a few historical exceptions, and Morawiecki’s embargo on Ukrainian agricultural commodities during the time of the Russia’s war against Ukraine is the most recent example. Still, Poland is no longer relegated to the position of being destined to fight for survival against much stronger neighbors, but it should not take this favorable position for granted. Poland’s foreign policy decisions are influenced by various factors, including geopolitical considerations, economic interests, and domestic political dynamics. Still, the best self-help strategy is to pragmatically protect others from Russian neo-imperialism. Poland was ready for 151

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the 2022 escalation, having started building an anti-Putin league in 2014, shortly after the annexation of Crimea. They aim to consign the Putin regime to the “dustbin of history” and firmly believe that it is necessary to stand with Ukraine. Poland under Morawiecki clearly articulated its desire to be at the forefront of European and transatlantic politics. However, instead of approaching this objective pragmatically, Morawiecki and the Law and Justice party exhibited a Pilsudski-type Prometheism, advocating grabbing sabers and charging against Zelensky only because of a couple unsympathetic indirect remarks. Ego led Morawiecki astray, and the only party that would benefit from escalating bilateral tensions would be Russia. Ukraine and Zelensky were merely asking for the complete support that Morawiecki promised. The escalation of this policy on both sides was reckless and irresponsible and could have led to undesirable developments in the bilateral relations between Ukraine and Poland and Ukraine’s transatlantic future. Morawiecki’s response to Zelensky’s UN provocation was disproportionate, but Zelensky’s choice of words, suggesting that Poland declares support for Ukraine but is a silent supporter of Russia, was a strategic error and an insult to everyone in Poland who provided Ukraine with unwavering support since 2022. This paper argues that it was a strategic mistake of Zelensky’s administration to accuse Poland of supporting Russia in this war. Still, Poland, under Morawiecki, should have shown more understanding, compassion, and forward strategic thinking, as Ukraine is fighting for its survival. A lack of maturity and pragmatism, fueled by a deeply Eurosceptic narrative, saw the Morawiecki government out of power in December 2023. One reason for this was that, unlike Morawiecki, the Polish people already saw Ukraine as a strategic partner and a strong candidate for both NATO and the EU. The Zelensky administration’s tactics of shaming, scaremongering, and demanding political concessions, military assistance, and political endorsements may effectively discourage even the strongest allies from supporting his agenda. The status of the bilateral relations between Poland and Ukraine has much deeper historic and socio-political roots that could be mutually beneficial or mutually destructive. Further deterioration of this important relationship was prevented thanks to internal developments in Poland. Zelensky’s administration was very lucky that Morawiecki was replaced by Tusk, who is far more pragmatic than its predecessor. This chapter serves as a warning to both sides not to go down a very dangerous path.

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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS The Bartoszewski Doctrine: This suggests that “Europe means above all else freedom of the individual and human rights” and suggests that Polish geostrategy above all project decency in the realm of foreign policy, for “it’s worth being decent” (Inspired by: Pochron, 2022). The Brzezinski Doctrine: This recommends avoiding direct involvement in an open-ended conflict with Russia on behalf of Ukraine. Instead, it advocates more comprehensive support for Ukraine and other countries in the so-called Rimland, the region surrounding the Heartland (Russia and China). In this context, Brzezinski’s work proposes expediting covert efforts across various domains—military, political, logistical, diplomatic, humanitarian, and material—against enemies. All these efforts are aimed at supporting these countries on their transatlantic route because only such an outcome can truly bring peace and stability to Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the rest of the world (Inspired by: Pietrzak, 2023b).

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Davutoğlu’s “Zero Problems with Neighbors”: A robust articulation of the geostrategic policies described in Ahmet Davutoğlu’s Strategic Depth, in which he advocates amiable relations with all of Turkey’s neighbors, but his tenure as the country’s foreign policy minister saw a number of failures in implementing these policies primarily due to the adoption of the Erdogan’s hawkish policy of neoOttomanism and the religions indoctrination of Turkish society. The Giedroyc-Mieroszewski Doctrine: Highlights the structural importance of an independent Ukraine, explicitly suggesting that, from the Polish and Central European perspective, an independent Ukraine is crucial to realizing the dream of an independent and peaceful Europe. As an independent country, Ukraine’s borders should be protected (Source: Pietrzak, 2024a/b/c/d/e/f). The Jaishankar Doctrine: This suggests that under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India is able to reclaim its rightful place among today’s global leaders. Jaishankar advocates collaboration with the West, Russia, and China on an equal basis and without following Western advice to downgrade Indian-Russian relations (Source: Pietrzak, 2024c). The Mearsheimer Doctrine: This suggests for NATO a far-reaching restraint as far as Ukraine is concerned to avoid any escalations, for, in the end, the Ukraine war of 2022 and the previous annexation of Crimea in 2014 happened because of Western promises made to this country (Source: Pietrzak 2024a/b/c/d/e/f). The Revised Kissinger Doctrine: This, announced at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2023, pragmatically suggests that a neutral Ukraine is no longer meaningful or viable; therefore, the only way to end the war in Ukraine is to offer it full NATO membership (Source: Pietrzak, 2024a/b/c/d/e/f). The Skubiszewski Doctrine of Zero Problems with Neighbors: This stands as a strategic blueprint crafted by Krzysztof Skubiszewski, the first foreign policy minister of the Third Republic of Poland. He not only envisioned but successfully realized a geostrategic framework for ensuring a secure neighborhood. Skubiszewski’s proactive approach involved active dialogue with all seven neighbors of Poland since 1989. His enduring achievements were fortified by a determined push for the renewal of mutually and bilaterally recognized treaties, solidifying Poland’s status as a regional leader in peacemaking initiatives. During his tenure, Poland earned the distinction of being the first country to recognize several postSoviet republics, including Ukraine. Despite evolving into the policy of No Problems with International Actors who Respect the Rule of International Law and Territorial Integrity after 2008, 2014, 2015, and 2022, Skubiszewski’s doctrine retained its core principles. Successors such as Geremek, Bartoszewski, and Sikorski diligently continued this vital project. However, given recent challenges and the rapid deterioration of regional stability, it is crucial to reaffirm and uphold the principles of the Skubiszewski Doctrine to safeguard Poland’s interests and regional peace.

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Russia’s Militaristic Rhetoric, Imperialism, and Expansion: Wars in Georgia and Ukraine Liza Amilakhvari https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3076-7213 Georgian Technical University, Georgia Otar Baghaturia https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6008-9703 Georgian Technical University, Georgia

ABSTRACT Throughout history, Russia’s narrative of being a “sieged fortress” persists despite contemporary absence of external threats. This narrative justifies expansion as a cultural necessity, compensating for perceived existential threats and unsatisfactory living conditions. While historically rooted, this narrative serves as a psychological justification for expansionist policies. Throughout history, Muscovy has established dominance, notably in subjugating elites. This historical trend of overpowering local authorities reflects in Russia’s modern aggressive foreign policy. The purpose of the study is to determine the socio-cultural and psycho-social foundations of its modern aggressive expansionist foreign policy based on the analysis of Russian history. Revealing the foreign and domestic reasons for its aggression against Georgia and Ukraine. Showing the importance of local actors in global politics on the example of the international significance of Russia’s war against Georgia and Ukraine.

INTRODUCTION Relevance of the Topic (The Black Swan and the Gray Rhino) As a result of Russia’s full-scale open aggression against Ukraine, the relevance of the analysis of the internal political foundations and historical roots of Russia’s foreign policy suddenly increased sharply. At first glance, the war in Ukraine appears to civilized society as a “Black Swan,” (Source: EncycloDOI: 10.4018/978-1-6684-9467-7.ch008

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pedia Britannica), (what is meant behind this term generally is known, but still, its semantics should be emphasized in this specific case. It’s meant here that a full-scale operation and overt aggression in Europe, even coming from Russia, was an absolutely unimaginable and thus unpredictable event) in fact, it appiars to be a “Grey Rhino” (Wucker, 2016) (In this particular case, both from the point of view of post-Soviet Russia as a whole, and from the other side, the current moment, the danger was inevitable). The fact is that, not seeing the “Gray Rhino” is a phenomenon characteristic of human psychology, especially for developed, sivilized societies. There are events that are so foreign and unacceptable, so threatening, that accepting them psychologically requires getting out of the comfort zone, psychological self-compulsion to move from a familiar, safe, comfortable situation to an unfamiliar, dangerous zone. It can be said that, in one way or another Russian aggression was absolutely predictable, both at the current moment as well as throughout the entire previous period, starting with the proxy wars against Georgia and Ukraine and ending with open aggression against Georgia in August 2008. Although aggression and expansion have been a characteristic tool of all humanity throughout its history, Russia, unlike modern civilized humanity, is characterized by anachronism (based on historical experience, legitimation of the use of a tool currently rejected by modern developed humanity) and a deeper historical socio-cultural characteristic that has distinguished it from Western civilization throughout its existence. The purpose of the study is to determine the socio-cultural and psycho-social foundations of Russia’s modern aggressive expansionist foreign policy based on the analysis of its history. Revealing the foreign and domestic reasons for its aggression against Georgia and Ukraine. Showing the importance of local actors in global politics on the example of the international significance of Russia’s war against Georgia and Ukraine.

RESEARCH METHODS AND METHODOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS Based on the object of research (aggression and expansion in Russian foreign policy) and the subject of research (historical, cultural and psycho-social reasons for the specified object and the goals of the regime), taking into account the purpose of the research (to determine the socio-cultural and psycho-social foundations of Russia’s modern aggressive expansionist foreign policy based on the analysis of history), the selection of the methodological bases of the research is on the one hand quite difficult, since it covers a rather wide area, on the other hand, it is rather scarce, as it involves phenomena that are difficult to grasp from the point of view of formalization, such as, for example: social psychology, declared and hidden interests of the regime, real and imaginary foundations of expansionist policy. The selection of research methods is also complicated by the fact that it refers to currently ongoing processes, the causes, progress, and assessment of probable results depend to a significant extent on the position of the observer. Thus, mainly historical analogy, parallel analysis, comparative analysis and content analysis methods were applied as research methods.

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LITERATURE REVIEW The chapter covers crucial topics such as the socio-cultural and psycho-social foundations of Russia’s modern aggressive and unpredictable foreign policy and foreign and domestic reasons for its aggression against Georgia and Ukraine. Due to the high interest in these themes, the choice of literature is quite diverse. It includes works of a complex nature - political, legal, as well as historical publications. Since the research concerns current and recent past processes, in many cases, internet resources, information spread in the media, video materials, memories of actors and authors, etc., are used as sources and proofs.

SOCIO-CULTURAL AND PSYCHO-SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE KREMLIN’S FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY Russian political psychology stems from and is based on three main phenomena that may have been objective in the past, but are now completely mythologized: 1. “The Besieged Fortress Concept,” which has been the refrain of Russia’s foreign and domestic policy throughout history, regardless of changes in formations. Historical Muscovy did not have clearly defined geographical boundaries, thus ensuring its defense capability consisted in expansion. Despite the fact that today no one claims the sovereign territory of Russia and there are practically no external threats, among the “nation of deep” (glubinny narod - глубинный народ, the very Kremlin ideomatic constract, which explains that real people support state power and strong government, which is countered by the liberal “anti-Russian,” Western narrative), the Kremlins narrative about “The Besieged Fortress” is still popular and the need for expansion socio-culturally and psycho-politically is still relevant. Moreover, on the one hand, external enemies justify the unsatisfactory existence of the population, and on the other hand, they represent psychological compensation for this unbearable existence. 2. Accumulation of resources - at the dawn of Moscow’s statehood, in the conditions of an agrarian society, poor soil of saline quality, in conditions of extensive agriculture, to mobilize the resources necessary for defense, the Kremlin finds a way to maximize the accumulation of resources through the subordination of both the population and the elites, which gave the government the privilege sole management. In the current situation, state control over energy sources created similar conditions for the Kremlin - the independence from elites and taxpayers. 3. Since the government is independent of the elites and the people, it has the ability to keep the people in unconditional obedience, and people adapt to obedience and intolerable existence, which is justified by the phantom pain of the lost empire and the desire to restore the old glory, as well as by the belief in the uniqueness of Russia’s “Third Rome” (Source: Arzamas Academy) that is, Velikoros - Velikoderzhav chauvinism.

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EXPANSION AS A HISTORICAL PHENOMENON OF RUSSIA The history of modern Russia, according to the interpretation of Russian propaganda, sometimes starts from Kievan Rus, sometimes from Novgorod, but in both cases from the invitation of the Varyags (Norman theory), but in reality it starts from the Moscow Ulus of the Golden Horde (Kuen, 1976). It was preceded by Slavic-speaking expansion and colonization of Finno-Ugric lands under the leadership of Russian princes. It should be clarified here that the origin of the Russian princes (which is debatable) does not matter today. The only thing that matters is that the native population is subjugated and subjugated by military force. In fact, from a modern point of view, this is similar to the distribution of spheres of influence of criminal groups typical of the initial stage of feudalism. The influence of Byzantine statehood also plays a role. Unlike feudalism (which presupposes a dynamic balance of power and law, characterized by the struggle for rights and privileges, patronage and the primacy of personal dignity), unlike Western Europe and Georgia, the Byzantine and Russian systems are characterized by bureaucracy, behind-the-scenes intrigues more than overt patronage, and the primacy of submission to superiors. Russia, like Byzantium, had to solve a difficult dilemma - for defense capability and external expansion, it needs a strong army, staffed by motivated fighters and proactive commanders, but proactive commanders of a strong army pose a threat to the state. During the reign of the Horde, factions trying to resist are being destroyed, and those loyal to the Horde are strengthened. In such a situation, the princes of Moscow and the Metropolis found a way to increase the taxation of their population and grow their resources at the expense of Mongol tribute. And in order to “protect the country” from Mongol punitive expeditions, they established an extremely authoritarian regime, which implied the unconditional submission of both the people and the elites. These distinguishes it from the development of feudal Europe. Another distinguishing feature between Russia and Europe is expressed simultaneously in the methods of expansion and the Kremlin’s attitude to the treaties. In feudal Europe, the agreements concluded between owners of different ranks included the rights of the parties, which meant, among other things, the preservation of status and autonomy, and, in the case of the Kremlin, sooner or later, it ended in unconditional submission to the Kremlin, annexation and assimilation. During the era of Vasily III, Muscovy rapidly expanded due to the neighboring principalities destroyed by the Mongols. Of course, this period is distinguished by many diverse and absorbing events, which we will not focus on and will highlight only the main result, which is that Moscow manages to simultaneously pay tribute to all the remaining khanates of the disbanded Golden Horde, and, at the same time turn fighting serfs (boevie holopi - боевые холопы) into slaves. Ivan IV (the Terrible) creates the “oprichnina,” thereby separating from each other his class of servants and the still surviving traditional institutions (boyar duma, zemshchina). His reign was entirely based on terror, state will, and disregard for traditional institutions, which led to chaos after his death. Significantly, Moscovy was brought out of chaos by the spontaneous revival of traditional institutions, but these institutions were dissolved again after the establishment of the state government. Thus, the only moral and legal basis for the functioning of the Russian state throughout its history is violence, leading to the possibility of an illegitimate struggle for power, or “imposture,” as a specifically Russian phenomenon that distinguishes Russia with a high-frequency pretender to the throne and coups d’etat. Violent power and universal obedience have historically been legitimized in Russia by expansive foreign policy chimeras (Suny, 1997). 164

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Against the background of the socio-cultural and historical-political experience described above, it is not surprising that the form arose as a Russian interpretation of Marxist theory and the socialist revolution. That is, in essence, the transformation of the first Marxist experiment into a fascist state against the background of rhetorical confrontation with it.

RADICAL MORALITY, INTERPRETATIONS, AND TRANSFORMATIONS OF FASCISM, SOVIET FASCISM AND THE MYTHOLOGY OF THE GREAT WAR Throughout its history, complexes of moral-ethical norms necessary for a comfortable, peaceful coexistence were created and developed in the heart of the entire humanity, ethno-confessional groups of individual territories, as well as subcultural societies of any society. Despite great diversity, the basic principles, moral absolutes, are ultimately common to all humanity. The fundamental, not-so-noticeable difference is manifested in three main aspects: 1. Norms of a given group apply only to members of the group, or they are universal; 2. Whether the mentioned norms apply to the violators or not; 3. What is the attitude of the group towards them (flexible or rigid, relativism and dogmatism)? The first two are indicators of civilization, and the third, from a certain point of view, of belonging to civilization. In the latter, the difference between Western and Eastern civilizations is revealed. Particulary: it is the norm for Western civilization to perceive virtues and crimes independently of the distinction between actor and perceiver, or, subject and object. In Eastern civilization, the perception of virtues and crimes depends on the interdependence of the actor and the perceiver, the subject and the object. The same action can be encouraged for one and prohibited for another.

Denial of Morality At different stages of the development of statehood, this or that society or actor was faced with a dilemma, when the situation demanded the violation or revision of the existing norms, while the tradition demanded their preservation or protection. Without a revision of traditional norms, humanity couldn’t develop and progress. Somewhere, it happened in a consistent evolutionary way, and somewhere through the forced adoption of new revolutionary doctrines to replace the old ones. However, in some places, there was an alternative, intermediate method, when the traditional norms were not rejected or replaced by new ones, they were violated, to achieve the pragmatic goals of the current moment. As a result, there was a reaction, the rejection of innovations and the tightening of the violated norms. From this point of view, the totalitarian ideologies of the 20th century have a special place, as they reject morality in general.

Bolsheviks The Bolshevik red terror slogan is well known to former Soviets “I will strangle my mother and kill my father if the party orders me to do it.” Lenin’s attitude towards “bourgeois” morality is also well known. According to him, the world revolution took place (or should take place) not only in the political, social, and economic spheres but also in the cultural and, first of all, in the moral sphere. In particular, bourgeois 165

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morality had to ensure the oppression of the oppressed classes by the oppressing classes. In particular, bourgeois morality was designed to ensure the oppression of the oppressed classes by the oppressing classes, while the revolution demanded the liberation of the new man from the outdated morality, Ever since Oliver Cromwell liked to repeat the Latin saying - “Necessity Hath no Law” (Balushkina, 2012). In a broader sense, the new society of the new man required a new morality to build a new world. It was necessary to destroy the old world and for this to reject the old morality. Only rational political (party) interests should be the determinant of morality. In this way, a new Bolshevik morality was established. In general, the basis of this kind of attitude should still be found in Freud’s psychoanalysis, according to which human morality is based on the feeling of shame, that is, the fear of social condemnation. In other words, shame is a form of fear that society instills to control its members (in Lenin’s interpretation, the ruling classes instill in order to exploit and subjugate the oppressed). But one thing is to reject morality on the part of political leaders, and quite another for the public to share and accept such a narrative. Here again, we have to touch on the historical peculiarity of Russia, namely: If the ancient, feudal, and modern West was based, and is based, on the idea of the inherent dignity of man, in which a person was valued for his human (individual or collective, corporate or rank) virtues independently of which side and for which side he showed it, Russia, like the eastern despotisms, Byzantium and the Horde, historically recognizes only the side and denies personal merit. That is, the same action can be approved or condemned not depending on how the said action fits into the abstract moral picture but depending on whether the said person commits the indicated action in favor of the master, or against him, or in many cases even independently of him. At the same time, the unconditional and unlimited power of the ruler, the despot, the necessity and demand for the absolute obedience of the social classes and their representatives frees the latter from moral dilemmas and reflections. The word of the Lord is both a law an d an indicator of morality. If you serve the master and please him, you behave decently, and vice versa, you don’t or can’t, you misbehave. A striking example is the confrontation between Ivan the Terrible and Metropolitan Philip of Moscow, famous for exposing Ivan the Terrible and his Oprichniks to cruelty and recklessness. These epistles were popularly called “Filkina Gramota” (“Filkas Certificate”) and today have become an idiomatic synonym for a useless document in the Russian language (Faktrum, 2019). Under such a moral standards, where even the highest aristocracy was equated with the serfs and peasants whom the king appealed to not otherwise than “Holop” (In Ancient Rus’ - a slave; in serf Russia - a peasant, a servant), are not surprising the forms that the Bolshevik interpretation of the Marxist social experiment acquired. The Bolsheviks repressed the idealists to carry out the decrees and thus tried to produce a new obedient man, a bio-robot devoid of all individualism.

Nazis It is noteworthy that the Nazis also rejected “Bourgeois Morality,” and in this, they based the opinions expressed in Nccolò Machiavelli’s - “The Prince,” but they did it mostly in disguise. Unlike Soviet Russia, which violated the laws and norms established by it, Nazi Germany adhered to the norms. The evil dictated by Nazi morality and the needs of the Reich were disguised as much as possible so as not to cause shock and rejection in society. Unlike them, the Bolsheviks did it openly and demonstratively. For example, in the twenties, In the bosom of the Communist Party, there was a movement called “Goloy 166

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Stid” (долой стыд -Down the Shame) whose participants on May Day, with red flags and banners, organized nudist marches not only in large cities but also in rural areas, purposefully provoking protests from marginalized classes and used terror against them under the pretext of this protest (Source: Dzen.ru). As noted, Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist Party rejected bourgeois morality but did not demand the same from German society as a whole. They planned to establish a new Nazi morality in the Third Reich and to replace the existing, gradually in the indefinite future, although adhering to the new morality was mandatory for the members of the party and the structures included in it.

Modern Russia (Rashism) Deniers of morality, just like hooligans and thugs, petty bandits, bulliers and sadists, emerging from the depths of marginal societies of the dark, narrow streets of depressed industrial districts, blame the outside world and/or the victim in particular for their malevolence and villainy, their failures. They are always upset and offended. They deny not only morality but also the existence of morality. In their positioning, their actions are due to the fact that something was taken from them (which in reality they never had and never belonged to), they were denied something (which they thought belonged to them but in reality was not), they were humiliated (usually by the very fact of existence or success). All of the above is manifested in the narratives of petty criminals, Bolsheviks, Nazis, terrorist groups, and contemporary and historical Russia. All of the above may seem like lame excuses or feeble self-righteousness, but on such narratives, generations are being formed, and they become a natural part of not only their ideology but their character as well. Regarding the peculiarities of Russia’s attitude towards Georgia and Ukraine, we can look for pragmatic interests and seek compromises or consensuses. The problem, however, is that no one can say certainty what the role and contribution of pragmatic interests and self-absorbed idiologems, imperial ambitions, aggressive instincts, historical “knowledge,” phantom pains, and the narratives they propagate.

Soviet Fascism As contradictory as it may sound, the Soviet Union rapidly transformed from a Marxist international experiment into a machine for world domination (Kuen, 1976). From a historical point of view, the 70-year existence of the USSR is a very short period. However, from the point of view of the analysis of its internal transformations, it is contradictory, saturated, and enthralling. If, at the very beginning, it was a bold Marxist experiment with left-wing ideas, such as the Emancipation Act, social equality, internationalism, and many others, which seemed to coexist with the “Red Terror” for temporary, tactical reasons, it later developed into a full-fledged instrument of universal terror. If we analyze, on the one hand, the differences between the practice of the Soviet Union and its declared ideas, and on the other hand, the practice of the Soviet Union and the generally recognized signs of fascism, the fascist nature of both the Soviet Union and the current Russian regime will become clear. As a result of the failure of the attempt to start a world revolution, Stalin abandons the idea of exporting the revolution and enters into a long-term confrontation of the systems, characterized by militaristic rhetoric of preparation to repel an existential threat to a country surrounded by enemies. And in condi167

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tions of World War II, the reptilian instincts of Great Russian chauvinism come to the fore. Despite the declared Marxist ideology, the Soviet Union, in essence, was formed as a fascist state (Plokhy, 2017). In 1995, Umberto Eco, in his essay “Eternal Fascism,” outlined a list of 14 signs of ur-fascism, while pointing out that even one indicator out of 14 is enough to talk about the “condensation of the fascist fog” (Eko, 1995). Also, in a letter published in June 2003, Lawrence Britt compared “classic” fascist regimes to what he calls proto-fascist regimes (in the following sense: “a political movement or regime that imitates or aspires to fascism”), and he found several principled similarities. Britt studied the experiences of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Franco’s Spain, Salazar’s Portugal, Papadopoulos’ Greece (the period of the “Black Colonels”), Pinochet’s Chile, and Sukarto’s Indonesia, and formulated in 14 points what connects them (Britt, 2003). Like the Stalinist Soviet Union, modern Russia meets not one but most of these signs.

Postmodern Fascism The term “Postmodern Fascism” could be interpreted in different ways, and it might refer to attempts to blend elements of postmodern thought with fascist or authoritarian ideologies. However, it’s important to note that these two ideologies are often seen as incompatible because postmodernism tends to reject totalizing ideologies like fascism. However, if we break down the components of the term, it could be interpreted in a few ways: •

Postmodernism with Authoritarianism:

It might refer to an authoritarian political system that adopts postmodern elements in its propaganda, communication strategies, or manipulation of information. In this context, the regime might use postmodern tactics to control narratives, manipulate perceptions, and undermine objective truth. •

Postmodern Critique of Fascism:

Alternatively, it could describe a critical or deconstructive approach to fascism from a postmodern perspective. This might involve challenging or subverting traditional fascist narratives and symbols through postmodern methods of deconstruction and reinterpretation. The narrative in ultra-conservative circles that has no credible evidence, as Winston Churchill stated that in the future, fascists would call themselves anti-fascists, is essentially directed against liberals. Although this narrative sometimes appears to have merit due to the radicalism of individual activists on the liberal fringe, it is fundamentally false except in the case of modern Russia, as itself represents the so-called “sovereign democracy” fascism, which at the same time manages to unite in itself the mantle of the main victim of fascism, the main participant (sometimes even the only one) in the victory over fascism, as well as the mantle of the main ideologist of the fight against “liberal fascism”. The mantle of the main victim of the German Nasizm, in Russian interpretation of the Facizm, and the only fighter against fascism determines the feeling of uniqueness and superiority that characterizes fascist ideology. Thus, Russia more and more is becoming a carrier of fascist ideology. We can call this the Russian “karmic triangular boomerang” or “hton” effect.

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The term “hton” must be explained. The term itself entered the Old Russian language from Greek in the sense of the darkness of the past (or/that is, the dark souls of unbaptized ancestors and their abode), then gradually acquired the meaning of the archaic, primitive Valor-barbaric darkness, which from time to time reaches the light in modern civilized life, poisons, modernity and destroys everything, rejects and/or opposes what human civilization has created. “Hton” effect lies in the fact that being on the side of the victors over unconditional evil freed it from reflection on their guilt, legitimized the paradigms of Bolshevik fascism in the Russian collective political consciousness, and that is the rhetoric of confronting the previous darkness making it the bearer of the same darkness.

THE TRADITIONAL NARRATIVE OF RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICS Even though propaganda is an ancient Greek term, its purpose and methods have been proven since the Bronze Age civilizations. Since time immemorial, state power has been based not only on undisguised strength but also on voluntary obedience and certain enthusiasm (psychological conditioning of the position). It remains a debatable question whether any case of dissemination of one or another ideology or agenda in society with the help of information media should be considered propaganda, or in conditions of information pluralism, advertising, and propaganda are significantly different from each other. And again, according to some opinions, the presence of a repressive apparatus supporting it is considered a necessary condition for propaganda. As is characteristic of all totalitarian ideologies, imperialism, and expansionism, for the Russian political class and, using its propaganda influence, for the „nation of deep,” extreme ingratitude (complete ignorance of the importance of the Allies in World War II and denial of their role) and mediocrity have become the historical-cultural norm. Modern dictatorships and informational autocracies are characterized by the myth of universal support of the regime. In particular, the information autocracy, including Putin’s regime, together with the rigging of elections and the use of incorrect sociology, propaganda, and repressive methods, creates the illusion of universal support in a large part of the population that presents even the passive-neutral majority as its support and demotivates the opposition forces. At the same time, a similar illusion spreads abroad, which creates a consensus about the “slave or evil nature” of Russia and the Russian people, imposes collective responsibility on Russians, causes nihilism in opponents, and a sense of inevitability in the passive mass. Thus, a narrative is being spread, as the opposition to the regime in the name of society is carried out by marginal groups financed from abroad, which is also the result of propaganda carried out by the Russian political class. In the international arena, Russian propaganda has to compete in the information flow, but it manages to gain a monopoly inside the country. Russian propaganda within the country has been growing stronger for the past 20 years and intensifying pressure in both informational and repressive directions. By methodically monopolizing the information space inside the country and strengthening the repressive apparatus, the Kremlin regime

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gradually atomizes society and creates the illusion of universal support. Well, those with questions feel like isolated black sheep. To put it bluntly: “Do you support Putin, or would you rather be in prison?” Corruption outside the country performs the function of a repressive tool inside the country. Thus, corruption is one of the most important tools of Russia’s foreign policy. In the conditions of competition in the pluralistic information flow outside the country, Russian propaganda manages to consolidate a certain part of those dissatisfied with the system in the West, around the pro-Russian agenda. And to arouse suspicion in the part - “not everything is so clear” (Russian Wothebautism in the political science and public circles) and to restrain “Russophobic” politics. The function performed by the repressive tool inside the country is performed by corruption outside the country. Thus, corruption is one of the important tools of Russia’s foreign policy. The “expansion” of liberal democracy generates some opposition from a part of the European conservative society, and Russian propaganda manages to ride the wave of public discontent. In procedure-based liberal democracies, there is a nostalgia for personal charismatic leadership engendered by real or ostensible bureaucratization. For part of the society, informal, non-systemic, or originated within the system “enemies of the system” - Nigel Farage, Viktor Orbán, Marie Le Pen, Donald Trump, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Vladimir Putin are associated as leaders fighting against the global system and corruption created by international capital. Marginal radical groups, dissatisfied with the status quo and blaming the existing system for everything, also fall into the flow of the Russian propaganda narrative in the context of criticism of the West.

PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF RUSSIAN IDIOLOGEMES AND STRATEGIES ON THE EXAMPLE OF GEORGIA AND UKRAINE (WARS AND INTERBELLUM) Traditionally, international relations theorists distinguish two types of power: hard power and soft power. In other words, states use these two levers to influence other states. Hard power refers to a nation’s or political entity’s ability to influence others through coercive or forceful means. It involves the use of military and economic tools to achieve strategic objectives and enforce policies. Key elements of hard power include: Military Strength, Economic Coercion, Diplomatic Pressure, Technological Superiority (While hard power is often associated with military strength, it also encompasses economic and diplomatic tools that can be used to assert influence and achieve strategic goals, etc. Nations may use a combination of hard and soft power to navigate complex geopolitical challenges and pursue their national interests. The effectiveness of hard power depends on a variety of factors, including the international context, the legitimacy of actions, and the willingness of other nations to cooperate or acquiesce to the exerting entity’s demands. Soft power refers to the ability of a country or entity to influence others through non-coercive and non-military means. Unlike hard power, which relies on force and coercion, soft power is based on attraction and persuasion. The concept was coined by political scientist Joseph Nye (Nye, 2005). Soft power is often associated with a country’s cultural influence, diplomatic initiatives, educational exchanges, and the appeal of its political values and institutions. It involves the ability to shape preferences, build alliances, and garner support through attraction rather than coercion. Soft power is considered an essential element of a comprehensive foreign policy strategy. Countries with strong soft power are often more capable of achieving their objectives through cooperation and 170

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collaboration rather than confrontation. The concept is particularly relevant in an interconnected world where information flows rapidly, and global perceptions can significantly impact a nation’s standing and influence. Both hard and soft power are key components of a nation’s overall foreign policy and influence on the global stage. Russia has historically exerted both - Soft Power and Hard Power in various ways, Not as a different method of realization of its idiologemes and strategies, but as a different stage, that is, in the interbellum, it tries to cover the negative background of the war and moral “preparation” of the society for a new war (The object of expansion is the preparation of society for the capitulation of the state). If we look back for just 20 years and don’t go further, we will see that Russia has repeatedly tried “Hard power” against Georgia. Sometimes to satisfy its’ interests, and sometimes to punish its “disobedient neighbor.” In addition to the “traditional methods” of expressing aggression, Russia often uses methods, the real purpose of which is disguised by various declared, as the Kremlin calls it, “legitimate” reasons. For example, we can recall the economic embargo imposed on Georgia (full or partial) and the mass deportation of Georgian citizens. In 2005-2006, Kremlin gradually imposed a complete economic embargo on Georgia. It was when Russia was the main trading partner of Georgia, and half of the total foreign trade was coming to Russia (Gitashvili, 2019). Soon, in the fall of 2006, Russia carried out a mass deportation of Georgian citizens under the pretext of violating immigration laws (Human Rights Watch, 2007). In 2008, the Kremlin carried out armed aggression and waged several days of war. Following the conflict, Russia recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. International community, including the European Union and the United States, condemned Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states. There have been ongoing diplomatic efforts to address the situation and find a resolution, but the status of these regions remains a source of tension between Russia and Georgia. The 2008 war between Russia and Georgia was fueled by longstanding tensions over the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russia’s intervention was seen by many as a display of its military capabilities. The Kremlin, in turn, argued that this was “an operation to force Georgia tо peace” and to protect ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking populations outside its borders (Sisoev, 2022). The conflict in Ukraine, particularly the annexation of Crimea in 2014, following Ukraine’s political shift away from closer ties with Russia toward the European Union, Eastern Ukraine conflict (20142022) in the Donetsk and the Luhansk regions, where pro-Russian separatist movements emerged and ongoing full-scale war, the largest attack on a European country since World War II reflects Russia’s assertiveness in pursuing its geopolitical interests. Russia’s actions were widely condemned by international community, calling it an unprecedented act in this modern era. Six United Nations General Assembly resolutions have confirmed the international condemnation and isolation of Russia (EEAS, 2023)[REMOVED HYPERLINK FIELD], but Russian authorities and media still ridicule this conflict and call it a “special military operation” to protect the Russian-speaking populations in Ukraine, instead of a war (UN News, 2022). In 2022, to legitimize the launch of a full-scale military campaign in Ukraine, the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, approved a new foreign policy doctrine based on the concept of a “Russian World,” a conceptual framework used by hardliners, to justify intervention in foreign countries with significant Russian speakers (Amilakhvari, L, Baghaturia, O., 2023). 171

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Russia’s actions in both Georgia and Ukraine have been criticized for violating the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. The incidents have also led to increased tensions between Russia and the West, with sanctions imposed on Russia by various nations and organizations. The above one more time illustrates Russia’s Ideological affiliation and its nature. Quoting Prof. Piotr Pietrzak –“ Today’s Russia is the Russia of Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, who decided to unleash a fullscale war on neighboring countries, kill the nation’s curiosity, enslave the Russian soul, and replace the last shreds of the westward-oriented political project of his predecessor with the so-called “Russkij mir” which probably comprises the worst elements of its national identity: a mixture of all Russian ideologies of neo-imperialistic expansionist inclinations combined with Ivan the Terrible’s autocratic ruthlessness, nostalgia for the USSR, Putinism that feeds on the example of Joseph Stalin’s cult of personality underpinned by a policy of a casually inflicted system of repression, and indoctrination projected by the media that remains in the hands of the one man – Vladimir Putin”(Pietrzak, 2022). Due to the 2008 war in Georgia and other factors that preceded and followed this war, Russia’s leverage was very weak. Breaking of diplomatic ties, rhetorical tone of conversation by politicians of both countries, reduction of human contact by complicating border traffic, lack of cultural and educational exchange programs, and limited business relationships, all this has brought about estrangement not only between the governments but also between the people of the two countries. That is why Russian policy has changed. The main front of Russian “soft power” is propaganda, in which it spends a lot of money. The method involves the access of the Russian-speaking population to Russian television channels. The goal of this information war is to change the perception of reality in the thinking of each resident so that he cannot act in the interest of protecting his family and country. As a result of this information war, the desired economic, diplomatic, or military background is created. One of the main components of Russia’s “soft power” strategy concerning Georgia and Ukraine is to strengthen relations through the Orthodox Church. It should stressed that the relationship between the Georgian and Russian churches was maintained even after the 2008 war. In contrast to the unifying influence of the two autocephalous churches of Georgia and Russia, the conflict in Ukraine between the Kyiv Metropolitanate of the Moscow Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Church contributed to the division of the congregation and society as a whole. It is significant that in the conditions of the ongoing war in Ukraine, the Russian Church in Ukraine was discredited, and one of the Kremlin’s traditional propaganda tools became useless. The rhetoric of Putin’s government focuses on protecting Orthodox principles and traditions. Such an ideological foundation justifies the rejection of Western liberal democracy within the country and, at the same time, contributes to the ideological justification of foreign-political confrontation with the USA and other Western states. Kremlin propaganda portrays the West and Putin’s liberal opponents as enemies of “traditions” who want to introduce “foreign values” into Russia. He does not miss the opportunity to portray the West as an unfavorable partner through propaganda channels. To convince the public that the West is weakened, that it is a “nest of depravity” and corrupts the younger generations, etc. That is why the Kremlin is deliberately instrumentalizing homophobia to create anti-European sentiment in Russia’s neighboring countries. In order to prevent Ukraine from initialing the 2013 Association Agreement with the European Union, pro-Russian activists in Ukraine launched a large-scale campaign against “Eurosodom.” Organizations funded by pro-Russian oligarchs used billboards for propaganda, warning Ukrainians that signing the association agreement with the European Union would lead to gay parades and the legalization of same172

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sex marriage in their country. Former Prime Minister of Ukraine Azarov also considered the association agreement from the point of view of gay marriages (Gusharashvili, 2014). It is also symptomatic of the proliferation of statements of homophobic content expressed by Georgian politicians and other public figures, which may be an attempt to implement the method tested in Ukraine. Kremlin ideologues consider homophobia as a tool that should turn post-Soviet countries against the West and support their mobilization around Russia (Waszczykowski, 2015). With both Georgia and Ukraine, Russia constantly bargained with the issue of the occupied territories as bait. Moreover, it might even try to “reintegrate” the mentioned territories as cancerous formations, which could be more dangerous for Georgia and Ukraine than their occupation by Russia. One of the reasons for the current war in Ukraine was that Ukraine refused to reintegrate these territories on the Kremlin’s conditions. And, as cynical as it sounds, any possible outcome of the ongoing war would be better than what Russia had planned. Through the “soft power” in Georgia, Russia managed to achieve the goals, it could not through war. The Kremlin made the government of Georgia change its rhetoric. They no longer call Russia an enemy and hardly mention the occupation anymore. In an interview given to the BBC in July 2014, the Prime Minister of Georgia, Irakli Gharibashvili, once again noted the success of the “reset” policy implemented by his government and stated that, unlike Crimea, Russia was not interested in the annexation of the separatist regions of Georgia - South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Civil Georgia, 2014). However, in just five months, on November 24, after the signing of the “alliance and strategic partnership” agreement by Russia and the separatist Abkhazia, in a written statement, Prime Minister Gharibashvili was forced to take back his own words and admitted that this was “a step towards the actual annexation of Abkhazia by Russia” (FOR.GE, 2014) The Georgian authorities practically shared the Russian version of the beginning of the 2008 RussiaGeorgia war when they declared that “nothing was happening there. Only one wall had collapsed when Saakashvili started bombing.” The position of the Georgian government has also changed regarding the disputed territories. The previous government of Georgia considered it a conflict between two countries - Georgia and Russia, and the new ruler decided to include the representatives of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the negotiations as parties to this conflict, thereby returning legitimacy to the imperial cliché of the existence of “ethnic-conflicts” in Georgia. Thus, potentially nullified the great effort Georgia made to show the world that the problem was Russian imperial policy, not “ethno-conflicts” (Bibilashvili, 2014). The Russian government is trying to remove the topic of Georgia from the international agenda “so that Georgia does not become the cause of confrontation between Russia and the West.” The thesis voiced by Prime Minister Gharibashvili in Munich that Russia and the European Union should negotiate on the issue of Ukraine, to some extent, means that the Georgian authorities gave Russia the blessing to negotiate with Europe on the future of Georgia (Bibilashvili, 2014). The Kremlin spares no resources to spread propaganda ideas. If we judge by the example of Georgia, we will see that recently, pro-Russian and anti-Western, ultra-right organizations and media outlets, fed with neo-Nazi ideas, have increased significantly. It is worth noting that public opinion and sociological surveys show that the percentage of the population of Georgia who wants integration into NATO and the European Union does not change, sometimes even increases. However, the number of people who want to get closer to Russia and warm relations is also rising.

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Russian soft power in Ukraine operates through a variety of channels, leveraging cultural, economic, media, educational, and political means to shape perceptions and influence public opinion. It’s important to note that the effectiveness and reception of Russian soft power in Ukraine can vary among different segments of the population. It’s important to note that Ukraine is a diverse country with a complex history, and opinions regarding Russian soft power can vary widely. The Kremlin’s modern methods, are somewhat based on Soviet “active actions” aimed at destabilizing political processes in other countries. In this respect, the Russian hybrid war implies not only the instrumentalization of historical methods but also of historical narratives. The conflict between Ukrainian and Russian historical narratives and collective memories has been for many years. Russian nationalists generally do not consider Ukraine as an independent state and the Ukrainian people as unrelated to Russia nation and reject the idea of Ukrainian independence. In recent years, the Kremlin has been actively manipulating the recent history of Ukraine to incite discord and conflict among the Ukrainian people. In September 2019, the European Parliament even issued a resolution condemning Russia’s efforts to encourage polarization in neighboring countries by glorifying the Soviet past through information operations (European Parliamen, 2019). In Ukraine, the mentioned disinformation campaign, built on historical narratives, became more active during 2013-2014 in the context of “Euromaidan.” Kremlin-affiliated media referred to Euromaidan demonstrators as “Banderovts,” a Soviet-Russian term for Ukrainian nationalists who fought alongside the Nazis in World War II. Also, in the background of the annexation of Crimea, Soviet and Russian imperialist narratives were actively spread, thus justifying the annexation of the Crimean peninsula by Russia, and the battles in the east of Ukraine were presented not as a battle between Russia and Ukraine, but as a battle against Ukrainian fascists. Manipulative narratives about Ukraine’s recent history are being spread through both - traditional and social media. It is possible to outline several main narratives that are actively used by actors associated with the Kremlin: • •

•

Portraying Ukrainians as neo-Nazis and interpreting the hostilities in Donbas as a continuation of World War II - separatists were fighting against Ukrainian “fascists.” Presenting southern and eastern Ukraine as a historical part of Russia. Also, the claim that the Crimean peninsula is an ancient Russian land and the cradle of Russian Orthodoxy (all this against the background that the Russian historical narrative about Crimea completely ignores the heritage of Crimean Tatars and other ethnic or religious minorities). Narratives focused on portraying the Soviet Union as a superpower and inciting Soviet nostalgia among the Ukrainian population. These narratives are usually accompanied by the claim that the creation of the Ukrainian state is the merit of the Bolsheviks.

Narratives spread by Kremlin-affiliated pages and accounts also included claims that the Ukrainian and Russian peoples were historically one nation that was later artificially divided; Ukrainian nationalists are the ideological heirs of war criminals, fascists, and Nazis; Life was better in the Soviet Union. Through the methods and narratives reviewed, Russia has been preparing an ideological basis and a corresponding historical narrative for years to legitimize its invasion of Ukraine. The case of Ukraine is, naturally, particularly exemplary and relevant for the rest of the post-Soviet countries, which have set democratic transformation and Western integration as a strategic goal, especially for Georgia. 174

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As we mentioned previously, “soft power” is one of the key components of a nation’s overall foreign policy and influence on the global stage and is used by Russia in various ways. Therefore, it’s worth mentioning, a new global ranking of “soft power” published by research organization - Brand Finance. According to this research, in 2023, the Russian Federation is the only state that lost “soft power” due to a sharp deterioration in its reputation. Before the beginning of the war with Ukraine, Russia was in ninth place in the “soft power” global ranking due to its colossal influence in the post-Soviet space, although now it has been reduced to the 13th position. Ukraine under attack has the sharpest rise in the ranking, which has advanced from the 51st place to the 37th position (Tolordava, 2023)

EXPANSION Primakov Doctrine Blocking the deterrent decisions of the Russian expansionist policy in the collective West at the decisionmaking stage or torpedoing it at the implementation stage serves the idea inherited from the Primakov doctrine for modern Russia that Russia has exclusive spheres of influence and the realization of this idea (Amilakhvari, L, Baghaturia, O., 2023). In “its exclusive spheres of influence,” Russia considers post-Soviet countries, as well as Warsaw Pact, Slavic, Orthodox countries, and traditional partners of the Soviet Union in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, depending on where, how and to what extent it manages to protect its “exclusive” interests (Deyermond, 2016). In the above-mentioned areas, the countries of Eastern Europe, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia are at the center of Russia’s special attention for different reasons. First of all, Georgia and Ukraine. These countries have become a symbolic arena for the protection of Russia’s interests from the collective West. Russia is trying to satisfy its imperial ambitions and realize its expansionist plans, for which it has so far used three methods: corruption, information warfare, and hybrid warfare. It should be said here that informational and hybrid wars were essentially effective and safe tools for the regime in the hands of Russia in the background of corruption accompanied by the propaganda of local and Western elites since it is practically impossible to lose an informational and hybrid war. That is why Russia’s open war in Ukraine turned out to be completely unexpected. A full-scale invasion of Ukraine was perhaps naively viewed by the Kremlin as a blitzkrieg similar to the war with Georgia in 2008, as part of a global information war against the “paper tiger” represented by the “collective West.” The Kremlin became a victim of its propaganda as it successfully neutralized alternative sources of information and became captive to its propaganda narrative. It should be noted here, that the “collective West”, for its part, at its time, did not notice that a seemingly insignificant war on the periphery of civilization - in Georgia - marked a tectonic shift in global politics. In particular: •

Russia has changed the paradigm of dependence on the West in international relations and issues of former satellites - if since the Velvet Revolutions Russia has been surrendering its “allies,” the 2008 war with Georgia (“US proxy - Saakashvili”) was a message to the West, its satellites and the Russian population that Russia “is no longer surrendering its allies” (We don’t abandon our own). 175

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• • •

Russia challenged the West and took a closer look at its reaction. Russia has broken the rules of the game and forced the West to play by new rules. Russia has “prevented Western expansion” into her own “space of exclusive influence.”

Thus, Russia’s armed aggression against Georgia and the West’s reaction to it represented the “legitimization” of Primakov’s doctrine and guaranteed the further actualization of the Ukrainian issue and, ultimately, the ongoing war in Ukraine. On the other hand, the war in Ukraine was conceived from the beginning as the culmination of a certain stage of the great geostrategy (“great game”). It is significant that Russia, which is presented as the initiator and active player of the war, aimed to discredit the West on a global scale and was a tool in China’s geostrategy. • •

Georgia is the key to the Caucasus, and the Caucasus is the springboard to Central Asia (the Soft Underbelly of Russia) - the right flank of Brzezinski’s “grand chessboard.” Ukraine - the cornerstone of Russian imperialism, the left wing of Brzezinski’s “grand chessboard” (Brzezinski, 2016).

Russia’s Ultimate Goal (Ukraine or USSR 2.0)? Attempting to find a common language with Russia based on predicting the aspirations of modern Russia and the ways of their realization, the purpose of which would be to obtain some guarantees from Russia in return by rendering an account to Russia and ensuring not only security but also mutually beneficial cooperation is completely futile and counterproductive, as recent past and current events have clearly shown us. Modern international outcasts and Putin perceive a kind attitude as a weakness of the counterparty, which encourages them to be even more arrogant and aggressive. Putin’s similarity to Hitler (albeit a caricature) has already become quite obvious, as the policy of politeness and appeasement turned a very promising partner into an “international bandit.” The only difference is that Putin has not yet passed the path of Adolf Hitler, which he went through in two years, from the voluntary annexation of territories to the world war. Obviously, if Poland had given the Gdansk Corridor to Nazi Germany, Hitler would have demanded something else, and this would have continued until Poland was captured or resisted. Putin’s evolution From the attempt to annex an island in the Kerch Strait to an open attack on Ukraine took twenty years. In the case of Hitler, his appeasers soon came to their senses, not just because he attacked them, but also because new operations (peaceful, relatively peaceful, and aggressive) took place in short periods, and with each new episode, the previous one, was not yet forgotten. In the case of Putin, the gap between episodes is much longer. During new episodes the old ones are already forgotten, and governments are changed. One should not expect that Russia will be satisfied and stop at some stage. Each new success increases the regime’s dependence on the euphoria caused by success (Crimean Consensus).

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The Return of the State In modern Russian political science, to characterize the political trend of the second half of the nineties, the term “return of the state” appeared, which describes the subsequent reversal of the vector that arose during the collapse of the Soviet Union. In particular, as a result of the crisis of the totalitarian state, the longed-for freedom broke away, which was later perceived not only in Russia but in many (if not universally) post-socialist countries as a crisis and anarchy, simultaneously a period of dangers and opportunities, which during the late Putin period was called “Dashing Nineties” (Lihie devyanostie Лихие девяностые). This period was characterized by freedom and a thirst for new freedoms. In the subsequent period, the already mentioned period of The Return of the State begins. The state is gaining functions, and the government is gaining power. However, the Kremlin, even when there was an existential threat to its existence, when there was a “parade of sovereignties,” when not only the national republics but also the Russian regions were talking about sovereignty, openly or secretly opposed the center and each other, the branches of the central government were mired in discord and competed with each other, even then Russia did not forget to harm (mostly covertly and hypocritically) the former Soviet republics, financed, and in different ways supported the separatists, for example in Georgia. Whatever the condition of Russia, unless there are real fundamental changes in it, unless it is transformed into a democratic federation, and unless its civilized counterparts put firm barriers in the way of “restoring the former glory of the empire,” Russia will always be a threat to its neighbors and for humanity.

CONCLUSION Throughout history, Russia’s narrative of being a “sieged fortress” persists despite contemporary absence of external threats. This narrative justifies expansion as a cultural necessity, compensating for perceived existential threats and unsatisfactory living conditions. While historically rooted, this narrative serves as a psychological justification for expansionist policies. Russia’s historical roots in authoritarianism established the government’s independence from both elites and the populace. This autonomy fosters a culture of obedience, legitimizing violent power struggles and expansive foreign policy. The government’s autonomy has historically led to a populace conditioned for unquestioning obedience. Throughout history, Muscovy has established dominance, notably in subjugating elites. This historical trend of overpowering local authorities reflects in Russia’s modern aggressive foreign policy. Analyzing these historical roots sheds light on Russia’s aggression against Georgia and Ukraine. The impact of Byzantine despotic bureaucratic empire tradition on Russia’s political structure remains significant. Unlike Western Europe’s feudalism, Russia’s system emphasizes bureaucracy over open fringes, promoting obedience to superiors. This historical backdrop shapes Russia’s current bureaucratic and hierarchical structures, impacting its approach to power dynamics and expansionist policies. In light of Russia’s socio-cultural and historical experiences, the emergence of Marxist theory and the socialist revolution took an unexpected turn. What began as a Marxist experiment swiftly transformed into a state reminiscent of fascism despite ideological contradiction.

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The Soviet Union’s evolution from a Marxist international experiment to a potential global dominator, juxtaposed against its declared ideals, marked a complex transformation. The nation’s rhetoric during World War II masked its underlying fascistic tendencies, contrary to its Marxist stance. While the notion that future fascists would dub themselves anti-fascists is often dismissed, modern Russia portrays a unique form of fascism. By positioning itself as a victim of fascism while championing victory over it, Russia embodies fascist ideologies under the guise of a “sovereign democracy.” Propagating the myth of universal support aids modern dictatorships in consolidating power through propaganda and misinformation. Russia’s regime utilizes these methods to project a facade of unanimous backing while undermining opposition through orchestrated narratives Russian propaganda capitalizes on dissatisfaction within pluralistic democracies, harnessing nostalgia for charismatic leadership and railing against perceived global corruption. Marginal radical groups disenchanted with the status quo fall prey to Russian narratives, critiquing the West and lending credence to Russian propaganda. Sociological assessments challenge the regime’s narrative of universal support, scrutinizing elections and public sentiment for dissenting voices. The critical eye on Putin’s electoral victories attempts to uncover societal dissent amidst a constructed facade of widespread backing. Examining historical instances of moral rejection by various regimes, this section illustrates how modern Russia’s actions echo past instances. It concludes by questioning Russia’s ultimate ambition: whether it seeks dominance akin to the USSR or pursues a different geopolitical agenda. We can search for pragmatic interests and try to work out compromises or consensuses regarding the peculiarities of Russia’s attitude towards Georgia and Ukraine. The problem, however, is that no one can say with certainty what the role and contribution of pragmatic interests and self-absorbed idiologems, imperial ambitions, aggressive instincts, historical “knowledge,” phantom pains, and the role and contribution of the narratives they disseminate. Wars in the post-Soviet space, including the war in the Tskhinvali region and Abkhazia, the August war of 2008 between Russia and Georgia, the conflict in the east of Ukraine, are perceived by civilized humanity (even now, despite the full-scale attack on Ukraine and the resulting awakening - consolidation of the civilized West), as regional conflicts, which is why they do not lead to (and even more so it did not cause) the same reaction as the attack on Ukraine caused. These conflicts, regardless of the local scale, were of global importance, since, it was the Kremlins’ attempt to hinder the progress of its former satellites and their aspiration towards the West, towards Western structures and value systems. It was also the basis of the resentment caused by the termination of Russian patronage in the former allied republics, which was supposed to lead to their return to the Russian orbit or prepare the ground for it. Thus, even when the West was friendly with Russia, Russia was at war with it (the West). In a certain sense, it can be said, that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Third World Cold War ended and the Fourth World Hybrid War began, the paradox of which is that one side is fighting the other, and the other side does not know about it. Thus, local conflicts in the post-Soviet space were of global importance and demanded an immediate and strict reaction from civilized societies. Then, the evolution of Russia would go in the direction of civilization and not the savagery that we faced.

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REFERENCES Amilakhvari, L., & Baghaturia, O. (2023). The Kremlin’s Annexation Policy and Provoked Migration as a Russian Political Pressure Tool: Cases of Georgia and Ukraine. In Handbook of Research on the Regulation of the Modern Global Migration and Economic Crisis (pp. 139–157). IGI Global. doi:10.4018/978-1-6684-6334-5.ch009 Balushkina, E. (2012). Cyberleninka. Oliver Cromwell’s Political Dictionary. Cyber Leninka. https:// cyberleninka.ru/article/n/politicheskiy-slovar-olivera-kromvelya-1 Bibilashvili, Z. (2014). Tabula. Potato Soup to Elite Potato Seeds, or Collaborationism as State Policy. https://tabula.ge/ge/news/561639-kartopilis-cvnianidan-kartopilis-elitur Britt, L. W. (2003). Fascism Anyone? Free Inquiry Magazine, Volume 23, No. 2. Brzezinski, Z. (2016). THE GRAND CHESSBOARD, American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives. Basic Books, A Member of the Perseus Books Group. Civil Georgia. (2014). PM: ‘Russia Not Interested in Annexing’ Abkhazia, S.Ossetia: https://civil.ge/ archives/187036 Deyermond, R. M. (2016). The uses of sovereignty in 21st century Russian foreign policy. KCL Pure. https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/files/55333117/The_Uses_of_Sovereignty_in_21st_Century_Russian_Foreign_Policy.pdf Dzen. (2023). “Down the shame.” USSR in the 1920s. Dzen. https://dzen.ru/a/Y9kNhPDnhAO-yr97 Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified full-scale invasion and war in Ukraine one year later…. (2023). EEAS. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/trinidad-and-tobago/february-24-2023-russias-unprovoked-and-unjustified-full-scale-invasion-and-war-ukraine-one-year_en?s=156 Eko, U. (1995). Ur-Fascism. Freedom and liberation are an unending task. The New York Review. https:// www.nybooks.com/articles/1995/06/22/ur-fascism/ Black Swan Event. (2023). Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/topic/black-swan-even Euronews. (2018). The Besieged Fortress Concept. Euronews. https://ru.euronews.com/2018/03/19/ russia-elex-expert European Parliament. (2019). Resolution on the importance of European remembrance for the future of Europe. EP. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RC-9-2019-0097_EN.html Factroom. (2019). Where did the expression “Filkina’s Gramota” come from? Factroom. https://www. factroom.ru/kultura/otkuda-poshlo-vyrazhenie-filkina-gramota FOR.GE. (2014). Gharibashvili: The Government of Georgia condemns this illegal step taken by the Russian Federation. FOR. GE. Informational, Analytical Portal. https://for.ge/view/85293/RaribaSvilisaqarTvelos-mTavroba-gmobs-ruseTis-federaciis-mier-gadadgmul-am-ukanono-nabijs.html

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Gitashvili, G. (2019). Russian sanctions against Georgia: How dangerous are they for country’s economy? Emerging Europe. https://emerging-europe.com/voices/russian-sanctions-against-georgia-how-dangerousare-they-for-countrys-economy/ Gusharashvili, G. (2014). Tabula. An Old Instrument of the Russian Empire. Tabula. https://tabula.ge/ en/news/561943-putinis-ideologia Human Rights Watch. (2007). Singled Out: Russia’s Detention and Expulsion of Georgians. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/09/30/singled-out/russias-detention-and-expulsion-georgians Kuen, I. W. (1976, July 2). Soviet Social Imperialism and the International Situation Today. Encyclopedia of Anti-Revisionism On-Line. Marxists. https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/ncm-3/iwk-ussr.htm Nye, J. S. (2005). Soft Power: The Means To Success. In World Politics. Center of International Affairs at Harvard University. Pietrzak, P. (2022). The Putinization of the situation of women and children during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Journal of Political Philosophy and International Relations: Special Issue: Gender Equality in Politics and International Relations, 5(2). Plokhy, S. (2017). Lost Kingdom: The Quest for Empire and the Making of the Russian Nation. Basic Books. Sisoev, I. (2022). Russkaia Gazeta. 14 years ago, Russia launched an operation to force Georgia to peacean operation to force Georgia to peace, which attacked South Ossetia. RU. https://rg.ru/2022/08/08/14-letnazad-rossiia-nachala-operaciiu-po-prinuzhdeniiu-k-miru-gruzii-napavshej-na-iuzhnuiu-osetiiu.html Suny, R. G. (1997). Dartmouth College. The Empire Strikes Out: Imperial Russia, “National” Identity, and Theories of Empire. Dartmouth. https://www.dartmouth.edu/~crn/crn_papers/Suny4.pdf Tolordava, G. (2023). Russia is rapidly losing its soft power, while Ukraine’s is growing sharply - Brand Finance. Business Media. https://bm.ge/news/ruseti-rbil-dzalas-swrafad-kargavs-ukrainis-ki---mkvetradizrdeba---brand-finance/128252 Waszczykowski, W. (2015). The Battle for the Hearts and Minds: Countering Propaganda Attacks Against the Euro-Atlantic Community. NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security. Wucker, M. (2016). The Grey Rhino, How to Recognize and Act on the Obvious Danger We Ignore. St. Martin’s Press.

KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Expansion: The term broadly refers to the act of growing, extending, or increasing in size, scope, influence, or territory. The context in which the term is used can vary significantly, encompassing economic, territorial, cultural, or organizational expansion

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Fascism: A political ideology and form of government that emerged in Europe during the early-tomid 20th century. It is characterized by authoritarianism, extreme nationalism, dictatorial power, and strong control over the economy and society. Hard Power: A concept in international relations that refers to a nation’s ability to influence others through coercive or forceful means. This includes military strength, economic pressure, and other forms of direct influence. Military Invasion: A military invasion occurs when armed forces of one geopolitical entity cross borders into another territory, usually with the intent of conquest, occupation, or the establishment of control. Muscovy: Historically known as the Grand Duchy of Moscow or Muscovy Rus, refers to a medieval state that played a crucial role in the development of the Russian statehood. Propaganda: This refers to information, often biased or misleading, that is used to promote a particular political cause, ideology, or perspective. It is a form of communication aimed at influencing the attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors of a target audience. The Return of the State: This term typically refers to a renewed emphasis on the role of the state in governance, economic policy, and social affairs. This concept has gained attention in recent years as some governments around the world have taken steps to assert greater control and influence in various aspects of public life. Soft Power: A concept in international relations that refers to a nation’s ability to influence others through non-coercive means. Soft power relies on attraction and persuasion. The term was coined by political scientist Joseph Nye in the late 1980s.

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Chapter 9

Neutrality:

Engaged, Credible, and Useful Heinz Gärtner https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6238-114X University of Vienna, Austria

ABSTRACT The concept of neutrality has evolved over time, with various definitions emerging since the 19th century. Initially, neutrality was associated with non-participation in foreign wars and military conflicts. However, after the onset of the Cold War, the focus shifted towards non-participation in military alliances. In the context of “engaged neutrality,” neutral states should also take principled positions. Neutrality does not imply value-neutrality, and in times of conflict, neutral states must condemn serious human rights violations, genocide, and warfare. However, neutral states are not compelled to adopt the stances of great powers or alliances. Unlike alliances, they do not pose a threat to major powers. Engaged neutrality, therefore, stands in contrast to mere detachment. It signifies active involvement whenever feasible and abstention when necessary. This approach can constitute a valuable contribution to mediation and de-escalation during periods of escalating international tensions.

INTRODUCTION: EXPLORING THE MEANING OF NEUTRALITY What does neutrality actually mean? There are many definitions for them that have evolved since the 19th century. This article provides eighteen different definitions of neutrality that have developed over history. The demise of neutrality has been much exaggerated. Although some neutral states disappear in some historical periods, this paper demonstrates that new types emerge. Neutrality was always a response to both conflict and polarization. This paper also discusses the historical cases when neutral states emerged and have been created. This article shows that the demise of neutrality has been much exaggerated. Principled stances of neutrality, always and everywhere, are reactions to conflict and polarization. As long as those conditions exist, so, too, will neutrals. one point has been lost in the debate. Historical examples are bipolarity during East-West Conflict and Cold War, unipolarity after the end of the Cold War DOI: 10.4018/978-1-6684-9467-7.ch009

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Great Power competition or multipolarity between US, China, Russia, multipolarity before World War I. The new double polarizations between US and China on the one hand and West-Europe and Russia on the other show the ongoing relevance of neutrality. The concept of neutrality has evolved over time, with various definitions emerging since the 19th century. Initially, neutrality was associated with non-participation in foreign wars and military conflicts. However, after the onset of the Cold War, the focus shifted towards non-participation in military alliances. (see Gärtner, 2023a) Neutrality, while not a prerequisite for peace, has historically served as a means to avoid involvement in wars triggered by military alliances. This includes refraining from making promises to aid other states in times of external threats or attacks. Consequently, neutral states cannot join alliances like NATO, which require explicit obligations to provide assistance. Neutrality encompasses three key aspects: non-participation in military alliances, absence of foreign troops on neutralized territory, and refraining from involvement in foreign wars. Switzerland (1815) and Belgium (1839) are well-known examples of neutral states, with several Great Powers recognizing their neutrality and territorial integrity. The legal definition of neutrality was further established through the Hague Peace Conferences in the early 20th century (1899,1907), which codified customary neutrality practices. It’s important to note that neutrality does not exclude defensive security arrangements and guarantees. While Switzerland relied solely on its own defense, Belgium had “hard” security guarantees. Striking a double-agreement in 1870, the British government signed two treaties, one with France, promising military support to Paris (and Brussels) should Belgium be invaded by Prussia, and in turn, with Prussia, promising aide to Berlin (and Brussels), in the case of a French breach of Belgian neutrality. This two-way security agreement played a crucial role in maintaining Belgium’s territorial integrity during the Franco-Prussian war and influenced Britain’s entry into the First World War. (Gärtner and Lottaz, 2023) Neutrality also could have had a significant impact on international relations, as demonstrated by King Edward VII’s advice to Austria-Hungary 1907 to adopt neutrality and prevent the outbreak of World War I. (Abbenhuis, 2014, p.172) If Austria had accepted this offer, World War I most likely would not have happened. It is highly improbable that Germany had gone to war against Russia without Austria’s backing. Although classic neutrality declined during the Second World War and the establishment of global collective security under the UN, new forms of neutral behavior emerged during the Cold War. Decolonized states in Asia and Africa distanced themselves from the bloc mentality through the Nonaligned Movement, while countries like Finland and Austria declared their neutrality under the consent of the military blocks. While neutrality was proposed but ultimately abandoned by Japan and Germany, they opted for tight military integrations instead. Despite Berlin’s initial negative reaction to the Stalin note of 1952, which proposed an alliance-free Germany, suggestions for a neutral Central Europe, including Germany, persisted for many years (see Gärtner, 2018). George F. Kennan, in 1956–57, advocated for a neutral Central Europe as the only viable way to reunify Germany and referred to Central Europe as the “in-between zone.” Additional proposals came from US Senators Hubert H. Humphrey and William F. Knowland, who initiated a bipartisan effort during the same years to establish a European buffer zone, coinciding with the withdrawal of US and Soviet troops from Germany and the Warsaw Pact countries. Over time, this buffer zone could have integrated with the existing neutral states of Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland. Similar ideas were put forth by Hugh Gaitskell, the chairman of the British Labour Party. Unfortunately, the plans were thwarted by the Cold War’s conclusion. In a classified meeting in 1958, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles asserted that the US and the Soviet Union concurred that a unified, neutral Germany 183

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could not be controlled, and thus, unification should not be a US policy objective (Gärtner, 2017a, pp. 173-182. See also Gehler, 2015). In contrast to this, Austria swiftly emerged as a model for the concept of a Central European Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ), an idea that gained traction through the Rapacki Plan (named after a Polish foreign minister). This plan called for military disengagement from the blocs and the prohibition of nuclear weapons within the participating states. It envisioned Poland, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, and the FRG as neutral states, mirroring the terms of the Austrian State Treaty, which reinstated Austrian independence and prohibited the country from possessing or experimenting with atomic or major weapons. However, due to the concept of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), the plan remained unimplemented, though it was never fully shelved. The conclusion of the Cold War brought about a decline in global alliance formation. The Warsaw Pact transformed into the smaller and weaker Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), while NATO grappled with an identity crisis well into the 2000s. Nonetheless, today, we witness a reversal of this trend with a growing polarization in security policy. In these circumstances, Balance of Power concepts are regaining relevance. According to realist theory, smaller and medium-sized states face three options: they can join an alliance and align with a Great Power (bandwagoning), opt for “balancing” (typically reserved for major powers), or adopt a more effective strategy of neutrality. Neutrality serves as a realist tool for managing military conflicts in an imperfect world where universal peace remains an aspiration rather than a reality, and the security dilemma persists. Choosing between bandwagoning and neutrality comes with concerns of entrapment in a great power conflict or abandonment in case of an attack by a Great Power. When the specter of a great power conflict looms, neutrality may be the more rational choice, offering greater maneuverability. During periods of détente or when no great power conflict is anticipated, neutrality allows neutral states to play a role in offering good offices, mediation, peacekeeping, and acting as diplomatic meeting places for the international community. Mutual defense obligations stand as the cornerstone of any alliance, making them a pivotal aspect. Neutrality and alliances share an inverse relationship. As the significance of collective defense obligations, activated in response to an attack on a member state’s territory, intensifies, the relevance of neutrality diminishes. Conversely, when alliance commitments become obsolete, neutrality loses its imperative status. Neutrality, essentially, signifies non-membership in an alliance, adhering to both constitutional and international laws. For neutrality to garner respect from major powers, a neutral state must fulfill two critical conditions. First, the status of neutrality must exude credibility and predictability. This implies that a neutral state should unequivocally communicate its neutrality, even during peacetime. It should not pose any threat, such as aligning with an alliance perceived as hostile by one side or indicating such an intention. Credibility is also bolstered by the fact that the neutral state maintains an armed capability. For instance, US President Dwight Eisenhower only accepted Austria’s neutrality on the condition that Austria could defend itself with its armed forces. Second, a neutral state must demonstrate its utility, either by acting as a buffer state or by offering valuable services and functioning as an intermediary in the broadest sense. By fulfilling these criteria, a neutral state can secure robust security guarantees. Notably, no neutral state in Europe has faced an attack except during the aftermath of the World Wars when non-neutral states were also victims of aggression.

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Since the Cold War era, neutral states have undertaken both roles. On one hand, they have served as buffer states. With Finland and Sweden’s announcement in 2022 of their intent to join NATO, they opted for alliance membership over neutrality. This transition relinquished their buffer state status vis-à-vis NATO, which was recognized by both the Soviet Union and Russia. Consequently, Russia categorizes them as potential adversaries. Upon joining NATO, Finland will be considered part of NATO’s eastern flank, effectively becoming a frontline state with forward-deployed military assets. As Finland and Sweden abandon their buffer state roles, Russia has already indicated its perception of them as potential threats, designating them as frontline states in the event of a NATO-Russian conflict. Former Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky astutely grasped this dynamic during the Cold War, intensively working to host numerous international organizations in Vienna. This strategic move showcased Austria’s utility and served as a practical deterrent against nuclear attacks (Lottaz and Gärtner, 2023). NATO sometimes portrays neutral states as “free-riders” relying on NATO’s defense. However, this argument often overlooks or dismisses the significant contributions of Austrian peacekeepers in conflict zones. Proportionally, Austria deploys more peacekeeping troops than most NATO countries, including Finland and Sweden. On the other hand, neutral states play a pivotal role in providing “good offices.” They offer their territory and mediation services to prevent and resolve conflicts, serving as facilitators or intermediaries to maintain economic and diplomatic interactions. Austria currently stands as the sole non-aligned, nuclear-weapon-free state in the European Union, possibly alongside Ireland, enabling it to engage on an equal footing with non-nuclear weapon states and non-aligned states in the global South. Historically, the neutral and non-aligned states of Europe have assumed this role within the framework of the CSCE process since the 1970s. Great powers indeed desire established neutrality to be respected by other major powers. In the context of “engaged neutrality,” neutral states should also take principled positions. Neutrality does not imply value-neutrality, and in times of conflict, neutral states must condemn serious human rights violations, genocide, and warfare. However, neutral states are not compelled to adopt the stances of great powers or alliances. Unlike alliances, they do not pose a threat to major powers. Engaged neutrality, therefore, stands in contrast to mere detachment. It signifies active involvement whenever feasible and abstention when necessary. This approach can constitute a valuable contribution to mediation and de-escalation during periods of escalating international tensions.

Definitions of Neutrality As a political concept, there is no universally accepted definition of what neutrality actually means. It is most commonly understood as not taking sides in international conflicts—albeit this shallow definition is also the root of the misperception that neutrals are politically apathetic, which they are not. Neutrality has been defined under international law before World War I, but only as the relationship of third parties to belligerents during hot shooting wars. This understanding, too, is often quite invalid for political analysis because it leaves out peace-time neutrality and creates a binary world in which a state is either a belligerent, or a neutral, and nothing in-between, which rarely aligns with reality, as visible in Switzerland’s support of EU sanctions against Russia while refraining from sending Weapons to Ukraine. During the Cold War, the common understanding of neutrality shifted: from non-participation in foreign wars to non-participation in military alliances, spurred most prominently by the foreign policies of Sweden, Finland, Austria, Switzerland, Ireland, and Yugoslavia—and to some degree the nonaligned 185

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movement. States that mention neutrality in their foreign-policy principles or even constitutions, such as Switzerland, Austria, Ireland or more recently Turkmenistan, Serbia, Moldova, and Mongolia, simply promise to always keep to the basic laws of neutrality in any future conflict, especially when it pertains to active military involvement. Beyond what neutrality is, there are deep, pervasive misunderstandings about what it does and why various states embrace the strategy. Most widespread is the allegation that neutrals are passive and lethargic in their foreign policies. The opposite is true. Maintaining an independent policy that does not align with the wishes of belligerents (be it in a shooting war or a trade war) is exceedingly difficult and requires constant engagement with all conflict parties. This was true for Spain, Sweden and Switzerland during WWII, and it is true today for countries like India, South Africa, or Latin America which are in exchange with Russia, Ukraine, and the West to balance their nonaligned way through this war. (Lottaz and Gärtner, 2023) From the vantage point of the belligerents, neutrality looks wrong-headed, short-sighted, selfish, and sometimes outright evil. After all, they are willing to fight a war for what they believe is right. For instance, what cause could be more noble and just than halting the spread of communism in Vietnam, or finding and destroying these Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq? If the cause of war is viewed in moral terms, neutrals come under immense pressure to cave to belligerents’ demands, just as George W. Bush argued during the war on terror: “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.” This logic is not much different from the argumentation of the Athenians in the Peloponnesian wars, over 2000 years ago, who told the neutral Melians that not becoming their military ally was tantamount to being an enemy to Athenian power and had therefore to be destroyed (which they indeed were). A second assumption is that neutrality equals weakness and pacifism. However, a functioning neutrality policy is usually a sign of strength, as it was for the United States during its 150 years of neutrality. Neutrals have to be strong enough—militarily and ideologically—to withstand the criticism and threat from all sides of a conflict to maintain their independent positions, as the pressure on India to take sides shows. In sum, neutrality means non-participation of the state in a war or armed conflict (conflict, armed) between states or recognized parties in a civil war as well as the non-membership of a state in a military alliance; it includes the prohibition for a neutral state to place its territory at the disposal of foreign troops for stationing or for carrying out acts of war. In particular, the permanently neutral state may not enter into military alliances military alliances (also not with other permanently neutral states) or, as a matter of principle, enter into any agreements on collective defense or collective security with defense obligations. (see Neuhold/Hummer/Schreuer, 1991, p. 477). Neutrality has never been a necessary condition for peace, but it has historically avoided one of the possible causes of war, namely participation in military alliances ready for war. Liberal thinkers such as Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Paine, Immanuel Kant, and Woodrow Wilson saw the existence of military alliances as a threat peace and a potential precursor to war. Theorists of realism on the one hand tend to regard alliances as part of the balance of powers to maintain peace. Liberals (liberalism), on the other hand, have always pointed to the danger of escalation of the polarity of military alliances. Neutrality enables a state to remain neutral at the moment when a war between other states does not take sides and does not intervene militarily. In this way, it prevents that a small war turns into a conflagration - as in the Balkans in 1914, and it prevents what Pascal Lottaz (2022) calls “joining the wrong side”.

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Narrow definitions of neutrality under international law see merely the “impartiality between belligerents” (Oppenheim, 1912, Vol. I, para. 293. See also Lottaz, 1922a). This traditional definition sees neutrality as merely the non-participation in wars or in a particular war. This occasional neutrality is therefore the (legal) status of a state between third states, where the state takes an impartial attitude towards the belligerent (warring) parties. If joining military alliances is not included in the definition, in peacetime all states are neutral. One goal of this type of neutrality is to reduce the uncertainty about the behavior of a state over a longer period of time or in an occasion. Since the beginning of the Cold War the emphasis of the definition of neutrality shifted from the view of neutrality as non-participation in foreign wars and military conflicts to the non-participation in military alliances. The member states of an alliance pledge, individually and collectively, not to allow members, if they are threatened by states outside the alliance threatened or attacked by states outside the alliance, to come to their aid, including by military means. It is precisely the provisions on nonparticipation in a military alliance that prohibit a neutral state from membership in NATO, since its founding treaty contains an explicit obligation to provide assistance (Article V). (Article V). Just as neutrality means non-alignment, non-alignment means the renunciation of alliance membership. Neutral states take an uncompromising position between rival alliances which do not necessarily have to be involved in open hostilities, but have a conflict- and tension-laden relationship to each other. Neutrality seeks to avoid involvement in wars of alliances (“entrapment”), but risks being left alone in an emergency (“abandonment”). The power of the neutral states thus also consists in not having to submit to instructions from alliances. alliances. In order to avoid abandonment, a neutral state must meet two conditions. The status of neutrality must first be credible and predictable. Second, the neutral state must be useful. Credibility means that a neutral state can must communicate its neutrality unambiguously even in peacetime. In order to demonstrate usefulness, a neutral state may fulfill the function of a buffer state or offer good offices in a liberal sense and act as a mediator in the broadest sense.

Neutrality Was the Anomaly of the Cold War Blocs Often neutrality is described as a child of the Cold War. This assumption is not historically or politically correct.1 The neutrality has its historical roots in the Thirty Years’ War, in the Napoleonic Wars and even partly in the 16th century (Battle of Marignano in in 1515). The Swedish neutrality policy dates back to the 19th century. The beginning of the neutral status of Finland and Austria falls in the time of the Cold War, which was not constitutive for their neutrality. It eluded the formation of the bloc. Finland concluded a so-called friendship and cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union in 1948. It was intended to avoid unforeseen conflicts with Moscow through a variety of contacts with Moscow. Some opponents of neutrality sometimes pejoratively referred to the cooperation agreement as Finlandization, which was meant to express a dependence of Finland on the Soviet Union. In fact, the emphasis on neutrality after 1955 was a means for Finland to gain more leeway within the Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union. After the Prague Spring of 1968, the Soviet Union deleted the term neutrality from all bilateral treaties. from all bilateral treaties because it was afraid of setting an example. (Rainio-Niemi, 2017, pp. 21-25) Austria’s Neutrality Law of 1955 guaranteed Austria’s independence and brought about the withdrawal of all occupation troops of the victorious powers.2The legal origin of Swiss and Austrian neutrality lies in the Hague Conventions V and XIII of 1907, which explicitly contain another point: non-participation in war. At the outbreak of war non-participating states should be able to declare themselves neutral - from which a right to territorial integrity is derived, because “the territory of the neutral powers is inviolable”. 187

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From a political point of view, neutrality was not part of the Cold War but its anomaly. The Cold War was characterized in Europe by the formation of blocs, and neutrality was the exception. The formation of blocs was connected with the affiliation to an alliance, neutrality meant freedom from alliances. The idea of neutrality, of not participating in future confrontations in a divided Europe, found great support among the population of those states. During the early years of the Cold War bloc formation the superpowers (Great Powers) showed strong reservations about the principle of neutrality. Despite these initial reservations about neutrality the two superpowers became in the course of the Cold War more flexible towards their understanding of neutrality. Eventually, both were looking for pragmatic case-by-case solutions within the framework of bipolarity. Therefore, they were also interested in not losing the opportunity to cooperate with any of the established or emerging neutral states. This eventually gave rise to two different interpretations of neutrality: one of the West and one of the East. These were based on informal checklists that defined what a “genuine” neutral state characterized. Key points on the U.S. list were that a neutral state should be armed, democratic, and free-market oriented. The advantages of neutrality from the Soviet point of view consisted in the central requirement that neutral states spend less on defense and should spend more on social concerns. (See Rainio-Niemi, 2017) Credibility is also underscored by the fact that the neutral state is armed. U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower, for example, agreed to Austrian neutrality only on the condition that it be defended by Austria “with all means at its disposal,” i.e., also armed. (Gärtner 2017a, pp. 155-161) The neutrals were able to contribute to conflict mitigation by offering good offices, mediation, but also peacekeeping troops (peacekeeping). Within the framework of the CSCE process the so-called N+N states formed a loose a loose association of neutral and non-aligned states countries that did not belong to any of the two alliances NATO or the Warsaw Pact. They then also took on a mediating and bridging function between the blocs. Neutrality was also explicitly included as an option in the chapter on the principles of intergovernmental relations of CSCE members. Participating States “also have the right to belong or not to belong to international organizations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties, including the right to be or not to be a party to an alliance or not to be a party to an alliance; likewise, they have the right to neutrality”. Not belonging to one of the blocs during the East-West conflict had a realistic as well as an idealistic dimension. It was realistic in that it wanted to preserve its political independence in a bipolar environment. Moreover, Switzerland and Austria, together or separately, formed a neutral bar between the two blocs. Sweden, as a non-NATO member, maintained the Nordic balance. The neutral states acted idealistically because they wanted to reduce tensions between the two blocs by acting as mediators and offering good offices. For this purpose, the neutral and non-aligned states found an excellent framework in the CSCE. The neutral states rejected violent conflict resolution and pledged not to participate in them unless they themselves were the target of a violent attack become. They actively participated in peacekeeping operations of the United Nations. With both the realistic and idealistic dimensions, the neutral states moved outside the security dilemma and also tried to reduce it. They acted as buffer zones which, however, could have only limited effect in view of the highly armed military alliances. Through their mediation activities (mediation; third party), they tried to establish more trust between the blocs and thus to reduce the security dilemma Their existence in itself permanently signaled the possibility that an order in Europe was also conceivable without blocs. It was precisely this visible alternative that was not always pleasant for the leading states of the alliances, since they wanted, indeed had to present membership in their own bloc as the best option. 188

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After the Austrian Neutrality Law3 in Article I, Paragraph (1) has made a commitment to neutrality it defines neutrality in paragraph (2): (1) “For the purpose of permanently asserting its independence vis-à-vis the outside world and for the purpose of maintaining the inviolability of its territory, Austria declares of its own free will its perpetual neutrality. Austria will maintain and defend this neutrality with all means at her disposal. (2) In order to safeguard these purposes, Austria will not in the future enter into any military alliances and will not permit the establishment of military bases of foreign states on its territory.” The Neutrality Law thus contains the prohibition of joining a military alliance and forbids the permanent stationing of foreign troops on Austrian territory. It is precisely paragraph two on non-participation in a military alliance that prohibits neutral states from membership in NATO, since its founding treaty contains an explicit defense obligation. Likewise, the European Union (EU) would turn into a military alliance if it demanded obligatory military assistance from its members, which would no longer be compatible with neutrality The Lisbon Treaty of the European Union4 does oblige Member States to provide a Member State with “all the assistance and support in their power in the event of an armed attack on it.” It does not affect “the specific character of the security and defense policy” of individual member states, however. (Article 42/7)

Engaged Neutrality Neutrality has a traditional and a modern face. A traditional understanding of neutrality of staying out or sitting still no longer meets modern challenges of security and peace and peace. Was the deliberate keeping out of conflicts between the pacts by neutral states during the Cold War was often a successful policy during the Cold War, it seems downright anachronistic in the 21st century. Critics rightly point this out. But they are only hitting at the backward-looking traditional interpretation of neutrality. Traditional notions of neutrality advocated not only equidistance between the blocs, but occasionally neutrality in economic matters as well, and they even emphasized an incompatibility of neutrality with membership and cooperation in the United Nations. Modern neutrality has long since emancipated itself from such positions. A modern understanding of committed neutrality must not, of course, mean sitting still in the sense of passively staying out of the conflicts of the present conflicts, but it also means maintaining relations with all parties to the conflict with all parties to the conflict. This is all the more true because this behavior could not prevent adverse security consequences for the neutral state occur, the effect of which could even be intensified by “sitting still.” Neutrality, if it is to continue to have meaning and generate peace and security policy benefits, must orient itself to the new peace and security policy requirements and thereby prove its political appropriateness and flexibility. Having said this, the concept of neutrality has indeed already undergone a tremendous process of change in recent years. Engaged neutrality does not mean staying out where possible and interfering where necessary, but the other way around: interfering where possible and staying out only where necessary. (Gärtner, 2016, 2017ab) “Engaged neutrality means active participation in international security policy in general and in international peace operations in particular.”5 Neutrality in this understanding, requires engaged participation in international crisis management and in cooperative security. In this way, engaged neutrality distinguishes itself from an understanding that confuses neutrality with doing nothing and staying out of it. 189

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Neither neutrality defined in terms of international law nor neutrality defined in terms of security policy means an impartial position between democracy and dictatorship and dictatorship, between the rule of law and arbitrariness, between the observance of human rights and their violation, and between right and wrong. For opponents of neutrality however, this attitude is too little. It is only “for us or against us”. Therefore, the phase of unipolarity of the USA after 1990 until about 2010 was difficult for neutral states. In a hegemonic unipolar system (hegemony) there is little room for neutrality. Thucydides already observed in the description of the Melier dialogue during the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta that the attitude of the Melians “friend with you, but enemy with no one” was too little for the Athenians. They destroyed Melos.

Types of Neutrality From the idea of neutrality developed into different types (see Gärtner, 2023b, 49-57): •

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Neutrality in political-historical tradition is a very strong version of neutrality, but it is not based on international law. Sweden’s neutrality originated in 1814, but Sweden was not sovereign prior to its separation from Norway in 1905. The Soviet Union accepted Finnish neutrality after 1955 because it had negotiated a 1948 friendship treaty with Finland. Permanent neutrality mostly based on international law. It is the strongest version of neutrality. The neutrality of Switzerland has a long tradition and was established with the recognition by the victorious powers after the Napoleonic Wars 1815 under international law. Austria’s neutrality is based on the Neutrality Law of 1955. Austria has declared its neutrality to vis-à-vis the United Nations and all states with which Austria has had diplomatic relations. On top of that, Austria’s neutrality is constitutional law. Permanently neutral states must prove their credibility and usefulness even in peacetime. Turkmenistan’s neutrality was confirmed by the UN General Assembly in 1995. In this sense permanent neutrality is a technical term alluding to the external element of a permanent neutrality having the consent and blessing of (a part of) the international community in contrast to self-declared permanent neutralities that lack explicit international recognition. In contrast to permanent neutrality occasional neutrality applies only in military conflicts. This type of neutrality is for other states not reliable and predictable. Therefore, neutrality in peacetime is a condition for reliable neutrality. One also speaks of the pre-effect of neutrality. This includes a declaration that the neutral state will not be a party to war in the future. There are forms of neutrality based on bilateral treaties. In 1980, for example, Malta and Italy signed a bilateral neutrality treaty that has permitted the presence of Italian troops since 1983. The Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1938 paved the way for Irish neutrality after the civil wars. Self-declared neutrality is weak because it is based on a national constitutional or parliamentary decision. This can be changed again domestically, as happened in Ukraine in 2014. The neutrality of Moldova and Serbia also fall into this category. Integral Neutrality is the most comprehensive version of neutrality. It includes not only the military, but also the economic and ideological dimensions. In Switzerland, this is called “sitting still.” This passive neutrality has never prevailed in its ideal form. The interpretation and implementation of neutrality of Turkmenistan as positive neutrality comes close to integral neutrality Turkmenistan was also supported by a UN General Assembly resolu-

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• • • • • •

• • •

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tion in 1995; it is a member of loose organizations such as ECO, OIS, CIS. Ireland also occasionally refers to its neutrality as “positive.” To hide in case of war (hiding), is the most common form of neutrality. It is similar to the occasional neutrality. Hedging is a policy of protecting vital interests in order to gain more independence from the influence of large and major powers. Differential neutrality is in contrast to integral neutrality selective, with the exception of, for example, economics, values, or war in the neighborhood. Even participation in the imposition of sanctions can be optional. Qualified neutrality was used by the United States during World War II as an argument against strict impartiality by neutral states. Non-alignment does not mean membership in a military alliance. The Non-Aligned Movement was more flexible in its relations with the great powers in terms of their support, in contrast to the neutral states Neutrality without sovereignty is possible in individual cases. This is a neutral political entity without full jurisdiction over its territory. Examples include Luxembourg in the 19th century, when it was ruled by the King of the Netherlands. Norway was under Swedish rule after 1814 until its separation in 1905 neutral. Another example is Portuguese Macau during World War II.6 Neutralism is often used synonymously with neutrality. However, it is not a legal term. Active neutrality is in contrast to a passive integral neutrality a policy that pursues a strong commitment in international organizations and in the Middle East. It was a policy of Austria during the 1970s. Engaged neutrality means political and military engagement whenever possible, and staying out of it only when necessary. Engaged neutrality lies at the other end of the spectrum, which begins with integral neutrality Engagement includes peacekeeping missions within the framework of the UN, but also EU and NATO partnerships with a UN mandate for Chapter VII. Neutral states not only host international organizations, but also host international negotiations and of summit meetings. They engage in disarmament initiatives (for example, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons).7 Neutral zones would bind neutral states to a common treaty based on international law. Historical analogies were the proposals by George Kennan (and others) in the 1950s that would have included Germany and the Central European ” states in between” of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Austria, which was already neutral. These neutral zones can be linked to nuclear-weapon-free zones. Here there are existing treaties that could serve as models. Again, Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki made such a proposal for the Central European states as early as 1957.

For Pascal Lottaz (2023, 4), “neutrality is always and everywhere a reaction to conflicts be they hot wars, cold structural conflicts or potential future wars.”8 Potential future foreign wars are also the basis for the commitment to “permanent neutrality”. “Occasional neutrality” would apply to both current wars as well as for a frozen cold war This does not mean that a neutrality policy of countries or institutions would be solely determined by conflicts alone, but external conflicts are decisive for such a policy. Lottaz (1922b) defines neutrality thus “as the military non-interference of an actor in a conflict of third parties, especially as regards interstate conflicts “9 Therefore, neutrality policy means coordinated international activities of those actors who wish to remain or remain outside of third parties. 191

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CONCLUSION The persistence of neutrality as a diplomatic stance has been consistently underscored throughout history. Neutrality is not a mere ideological choice but an intrinsic response to conflicts that persist across the globe. Not even the two World Wars or the forty years of the Cold War could get rid of neutrality, nor did the thirty years of US-unipolarity. On the contrary, although wars usually terminate some neutrals, they always generate new ones: The Napoleonic wars and the Congress of Vienna of 1815 created Switzerland’s and Belgium’s neutrality. The First World War destroyed the latter but, in turn, created Denmark and Norway as neutral states. The Second World War destroyed those (and many more) but gave birth to Irish, Spanish, Portuguese, and Turkish neutrality. The Cold War did away with the last three, but gave rise to the neutrality of Austria, Finland, and Yugoslavia—and the entire nonaligned movement, too. The current one war over Ukraine is no exception; it has given rise to neutral policies in roughly two-thirds of the world. (Lottaz and Gärtner, 2023) It is worth noting, that neutrality is a pretty good security guarantee. There were almost no attacks on neutral states: e.g. Belgium since 1839 until World War I, Sweden and Switzerland since 1815. Neutrality was violated almost only during big wars: e.g. Belgium in World War I and II, Laos and Cambodia in the Vietnam War. The targets of the attacks were not the neutral states but hostile alliances or big powers. Neutral states would stand in the way of the attacker. Exceptions are e.g.: Mexico 1847, Hawaii 1895 that have been assaulted by the US. Ukraine before the Russian attack in February 2022 was not credibly neutral. It was not a NATO-member but had since 2014 NATO-membership in its constitution. Also the NATO summit in Bucharest of 2008 promised Georgia and Ukraine membership, without a time frame, however. There can be no neutrality between democracy and dictatorship, between a constitutional state and despotism, between the adherence to human rights and their violation. There can be no neutrality between the condemnation and the tolerance of human rights violations, between right and wrong, or between democratic and authoritarian forms of government. Even during the Cold War, Austria remained firmly grounded in the community of western values. Nonetheless, neutrality allows for a crucial advantage in the debate on these values. It releases neutral states from geopolitical and alliance-related considerations. Western democratic constitutional states need to detract from their values time and again due to pragmatic considerations. Neutral states have no global geopolitical interest that would lead it to establish military bases in or deliver weapons to authoritarian states that neglect human rights and constitutional values. They are also not limited by alliance obligations in its fight for democracy, human rights, and constitutional states everywhere. The CSCE during the Cold War could be a model, as it helped, through its commitment to human rights and civil liberties in its documents, conferences, and statements, to bring about the softening and eventual elimination of totalitarian communism after fifteen years. However, a reassessment of neutrality is necessary. The old Swiss concept of “sitting still” should definitely become a thing of the past. Neutrality must be engaged. This means engagement as much as possible and staying out as much as necessary. Neutrality cannot mean “staying out of it”, but rather demands an intense involvement in international crisis management. Neutral states have the advantage that they do not have global geopolitical interests or close obligations of alliance. Neutral state need to take utilize these advantages and possibilities which result from its engaged neutrality policy. The state of neutrality itself already implies that from the outset neutral states do not maintain a hostile attitude during conflicts. Successful neutrality is anything but “fence-sitting.” Engaged neutrality means taking an active role for one’s own interests and the interests of all conflict parties—being omnipartial, as Pascal Lottaz puts 192

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it, rather than impartial. (Lottaz and Gärtner, 2023) Today, the question of whether nonalignment is long gone or having a resurgence is moot. When it comes to neutrality, there are really only two questions that matter: First, which neutrals will leave the stage, and which ones will be born? Second, will the neutrals play a constructive role in the new global conflict, or will they be relegated to the margins? For better or worse, if history is of any guidance, neutrality is here to stay. Multilateralism, readiness to talk, and global partnership have priority for the neutrals. The use of force must remain the exception. Priority setting is important. There is a significant difference between a policy, which orients itself along the lines of the abovementioned principles, and one that primarily supports military intervention, arms build-up, military alliances or sanctions outside the United Nations. Neutrality and nonalignment was always the attempt to stay out of great power competition and geopolitical blocs. This behavior is based on the idea that the thinking in blocs, blocs the thinking!

REFERENCES Abbenhuis, M. (2014). An Age of Neutrals: Great power politics, 1815–1914. Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139794695 Birnbaum, K. E., & Neuhold, H. (Eds.). (1981). Neutrality and Non-Alignment in Europe, The Laxenburg Papers. Wilhelm Braumüller. Fischer, T., Aunesluoma, J., & Makko, A. (2016, Fall). Introduction: Neutrality and Nonalignment in World Politics during the Cold War. Journal of Cold War Studies, 18(4), 4–11. doi:10.1162/JCWS_a_00677 Gärtner, H. Austria: Engaged Neutrality, Cottey, Andrew (ed.), The European Neutrals and NATO: Nonalignment, Partnership, Membership? (Palgrave: London, 2018, pp. 129-150). Gärtner, H. Austria: The Reality of Neutrality, iGloebnews (13 March 2023a) https://www.iglobenews. org/austria-the-reality-of-neutrality/ Gärtner, H., & Janik, M. Ukraine: Overcoming Geopolitical Insecurity, Lottaz, Pascal and Heinz Gärtner and Herbert Reginbogin (eds.), Neutral Beyond the Cold (Lexington: New York, 2022), 169-194. Gärtner, H., & Krieg, D. K. (marixwissen: Wiesbaden, 2017a). Gärtner, Heinz and Lottaz, Pascal, Dual Neutralization as a Pathway to a Denuclearized Korea, The Diplomat (August 03, 2023). Gärtner, H., Neutralität, E., Roithner, T., & Gamauf-Eberhardt, U. (Eds.). (2016). Am Anfang war die Vision vom Frieden. Wegweiser in eine Zukunft jenseits von Gewalt und Krieg. Festschrift zum 90. Geburtstag von Gerald Mader (pp. 357–371). Kremayr & Scheriau-K&S. Gärtner, H., & Neutrality, E. An evolved Approach to the Cold War, Heinz Gärtner, (ed.), (Lexington/ Rowman & Littlefield: Lanham, Maryland, 2017b). Gärtner, Heinz, Internationale Sicherheit und Frieden: Definitionen von A – Z, 4., revised and extended edition (Nomos: Baden-Baden, 2023b).

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Gehler, M. Modellfall für Deutschland: Die Österreichlösung mit Staatsvertrag und Neutralität 1945-1955 (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2015. Lottaz, Pascal, Neutrality Studies, Paper, Waseda University (1922a). Lottaz, Pascal and Gärtner, Heinz and, Reginbogin, Herbert, Neutral Beyond the Cold (eds.) (Lexington: New York, 2022). Lottaz, Pascal, The Politics and Diplomacy of Neutrality, Oxford Bibliographies (January 2022b). Lottaz, Pascal, The Future of Neutrality, GCSP Policy Brief No.4, (Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 20 March 2023). Lottaz, P., & Gärtner, H. (2023, June 6). In Defense of Neutrals Why they’re more than just fence sitters. Foreign Policy. Neuhold, H., Hummer, W., Schreuer, C., & des Völkerrechts, Ö. H. (1991). Textteil (Vol. 1). Manz. Neuhold, H., & Thalberg, H. (Eds.). (1984). The European Neutrals in International Affairs, The Laxenburg Papers. Westview Press. Oppenheim, L. F. L. International law: A treatise—Peace (Vol. I) (London: Longmans/Green & Co, 1955, 1912). Rainio-Niemi, J. Cold War Neutrality in Europe: Lessons to be Learned? Heinz Gärtner, (ed.), Neutrality: from the Cold War to Engaged Neutrality (Lexington Books: London, 2017), 15−36. Ruggenthaler, Peter, The Concept of Neutrality in Stalin’s Foreign Policy, 1945-1953. (2015). Lexington Books.

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Grimm’s dictionary of 1889 defines neutrality as follows: “neutrality means such a performance that between two warring parties the third behaves in such a way that he lives at peace with both and does not accede to either before the other, nor does he concede any favor or advantage. Agreement Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in the Event of a Land War, concluded at The Hague, October 18, 1907. Austrian Neutrality Act, Federal Constitutional Act on the Neutrality of Austria, 26 Oct. 1955 (BGBL 1955/211). Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, 2007. Summary: “Austrian Security Strategy: Security in a New Decade - Shaping Security,” 2011. This idea comes from Pascal Lottaz. Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) The original version reads: “Neutrality is always and everywhere a reaction to conflicts, be they hot shooting wars, cold structural conflicts or potential future warfare”. The original version reads: Neutrality is “an actor’s military noninvolvement in third-party conflicts, especially in interstate wars”.

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Global Economic Consequences of Russian Invasion of Ukraine Peterson K. Ozili https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6292-1161 Central Bank of Nigeria, Nigeria

ABSTRACT This chapter investigates the global economic consequence of the Russia-Ukraine war over a four-month period from December 2021 to March 2022. Russia invaded Ukraine on the 24th of February 2022. The study used the Pearson correlation and two-stage least square regression methods to assess the impact of Russian invasion of Ukraine on the global economy. It was observed that stock prices plunged on the day of the invasion. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the COVID-19 pandemic jointly led to a significant increase in the world price of food and crude oil. The rise in the world food price index after the invasion was driven by a significant increase in the price of dairy and oils. The rise in inflation in Russia and Ukraine after the invasion was followed by a rise in inflation in countries that imposed severe sanctions on Russia, and in countries that were not involved in the conflict in any way.

INTRODUCTION This paper investigates the global economic consequence of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. There is a need to determine the effect of the invasion on global business activities, global food prices and inflation. The need arises from the multiplicity of economic sanctions imposed on Russia, making the Russia-Ukraine war quite different from past wars such as World War I, World War II and the Iraq war. The study begins by providing a background on the events leading to the Russian invasion of Ukraine or the Russia-Ukraine war. Since the 2000s, Ukraine has been wavering between the West and Russia. This means that Ukraine has not been able to fully join a Western alliance and has not accepted to be fully under Russian influence. In 2008, Ukraine planned to formally join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a move supported by the United States but opposed by France and Germany after Russia announced its opposition to Ukraine’s membership of NATO. Subsequently, the plan to join Ukraine was postponed to a later time. In February 2010, a new Ukrainian president was elected who promised DOI: 10.4018/978-1-6684-9467-7.ch010

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that Ukraine will be a ‘neutral state’ which will cooperate with Russia and Western alliances like the European Union (EU) and NATO. Soon after, Crimea was annexed by Russia in 2014. The annexation led to violence in Donbas and led to intense fighting and violence along the border regions that separated Russia and Ukraine to the east of Europe. Since then, Ukrainian public sentiment has been towards the West with calls for Ukraine to join NATO and the EU to reduce the influence of Russia on Ukraine. But Russia’s opposition of Ukraine’s membership of NATO since 2010 has caused escalation between the two countries. Russia invaded Ukraine on the 24th of February 2022. Before the 2022 invasion, the world witnessed the COVID-19 pandemic which began in 2020. The COVID-19 pandemic disrupted economic activities globally (Ozili and Arun, 2020; Ozili, 2021, 2022). Many countries began to recover from the negative effects of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2022. The significant decline in the number of reported COVID infections and death cases in many countries led to the removal of COVID-19-era restrictions in many countries. At the start of 2022, there was great optimism about post-COVID-19 economic growth. Many countries intensified efforts to spur economic growth and to control the COVID-induced inflation. This led to a positive outlook for global GDP growth which was predicted to increase to 4.4 percent or 4.9 percent in 2022, according to the IMF World Economic Outlook. During the same period, Russia unexpectedly invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022 (IMF, 2022). The invasion led to geopolitical tensions between the West and Russia, and it diminished global growth forecast due to uncertainty about the effect of the invasion on global supply chain. The study focuses on the first four months after the invasion and investigate the immediate global economic consequence of the Russia-Ukraine war. Data were obtained from multiple source such as central banks, world bank and trading economics. Graphical analysis, correlations and two-stage least square regression methods were used to analyse the data. The findings reveal that stock prices plunged on the invasion date. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the COVID-19 pandemic jointly led to a significant increase in the world price of food and crude oil. The rise in the world food price index after the invasion was driven by a significant increase in the price of dairy and oils. The rise in inflation in Russia and Ukraine after the invasion was followed by a rise in inflation in countries that imposed severe sanctions on Russia, and in countries that were not involved in the conflict in any way. The study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this study presents the first evidence of the immediate impact of the Russia-Ukraine War on the global economy. Second, it contributes to the literature by analysing how the violent actions of combatant countries affect shared prosperity, especially the prosperity of non-combatant countries. The findings showed that the actions of combatants, e.g., Russia, exacerbated inflationary pressure in many European countries, and led to a rise in the world price of food and oil, which negatively affected countries that were not involved in the conflict. Third, the study contributes to the literature that examines the economic consequence of past wars such as World War I, World War II, Korea wars and the Iraq war (e.g. Kang and Meernik, 2005; Heydemann, 2018; Chassang and Miquel, 2009; Koubi, 2005; Collier, 1999; Nordhaus, 2002; Glick and Taylor, 2010; Bluszcz and Valente, 2019; Ganegodage and Rambaldi, 2014; and Kesternich et al, 2014). However, these studies did not examine the economic consequence of war in a modern European society, and the spillover effect to other countries. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review. Section 3 presents a discussion of Russian invasion of Ukraine. It discusses the cause of Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the international response to Russian invasion during the war, the multilateral support for Ukraine, and Russia’s response to international sanctions. Section 4 presents the research methodology. Sections 5 and 6 presents the empirical results. Section 7 concludes. 196

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LITERATURE REVIEW Studies on the General Economic Effects of War Existing studies on the economic effects of war show that wars have economic consequences. For instance, Kang and Meernik (2005) showed that there are two schools of thought on the effects of war. The first school of thought is the ‘war renewal’ school of thought while the second school of thought is the ‘war ruin’ school of thought. The ‘war renewal’ school of thought argued that wars can produce beneficial effects as they improve efficiency in the economy by reducing the power of special interests, bringing technological innovation, and increasing human capital while the ‘war ruin’ school of thought view wars as destructive events with no benefit on the economy (Kang and Meernik, 2005). Heydemann (2018) argued that civil wars, such as the civil wars in the Middle East, did not create conditions conducive to re-conceptualizing sovereignty or decoupling sovereignty and governance; rather, parties involved in the conflict compete to capture and monopolize the benefits that flow from international recognition. Under these conditions, civil wars in the Middle East will not yield easily to negotiated solutions. Chassang and Miquel (2009) stated that poor countries have a higher propensity to suffer from civil war especially when poor countries suffer from negative income shocks. Several studies empirically estimated the economic effects of wars. Koubi (2005) studied the consequences of interstate wars for economic growth in a large cross-section of countries from 1960 to 1989. The study found that cross-country differences in economic growth is systematically related to the occurrence and the characteristics of war. The study observed that post-war economic performance is positively related to the severity and the duration of war. But the growth-enhancing effects vary negatively with a country’s level of economic development. Kang and Meernik (2005) examined the effects of civil wars on many countries from 1960 to 2002. They found that wars have a negative effect on economic fundamentals, and that the response by the international community to civil wars exerts powerful effects on economic growth. Collier (1999) developed a model to evaluate the economic effects of all civil wars since 1960. Collier (1999) observed that after long civil wars, the economy recovers rapidly, whereas after short wars the economy continues to decline. Nordhaus (2002) showed that wars are very costly, and the estimated cost of the Iraq war to the United States over the decade ranged from $100 billion to $1.9 trillion. Glick and Taylor (2010) studied the effects of war on bilateral trade with available data extending back to 1870. They used the gravity model to estimate the effects of wars on international trade while controlling for other determinants of trade as well as the possible effects of reverse causality. They found a large and persistent impact of wars on trade, national income and global economic welfare. Bluszcz and Valente (2019) quantified the short-term causal effects of the Donbass War on Ukraine’s GDP from 1995 to 2017. They found that Ukraine’s per capita GDP declined by 15.1% because of the war from 2013 to 2017. Ganegodage and Rambaldi (2014) found that the war in Sri Lanka had a significant negative effect on GDP. They also showed that high returns from investment in physical capital did not translate into sizable positive externalities. Kesternich et al (2014) investigated the long-run effects of World War II on the socioeconomic status and health of older individuals in Europe. They analysed data from SHARELIFE, a retrospective survey conducted as part of SHARE in Europe in 2009. SHARELIFE provides detailed data on events in childhood during and after the war for over 20,000 individuals in thirteen European countries. They constructed several measures of war exposure: experience of dispossession, persecution, combat in local areas, and hunger periods. They found that exposure to war and to individual-level shocks caused by the war significantly predict economic and health outcomes at older ages. 197

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Studies on the Ukraine and Russian Conflict Existing studies analysed the effect of the 2014 Ukraine-Russia crisis. Shelest (2015) explained that the protests in Ukraine in the winter of 2014 resulted in the annexation of Crimea by Russia. Ukraine considered the conflict to be a Russia–Ukrainian conflict. Meanwhile, Russia considered the crisis to be a Russia–West confrontation, claiming that the crisis was provoked by NATO’s desire to enlarge into the region where Russia has strong interests. Samokhvalov (2015) argued that the conflict in the EU-Ukraine-Russia triangle was affected by the combination of choices made by the Ukrainian political class, business elites and broader society in three major dimensions: internal political practices, economic international politics, and ideological dimension. Hoffmann and Neuenkirch (2017) analysed the impact of the pro‐Russian conflict on stock returns in Russia and Ukraine from November 21, 2013, to September 29, 2014. They found that the conflict reduced Russian and Ukrainian stock returns. Wang (2015) showed that the 2014 Ukraine crisis and Russia’s Crimea annexation pushed Russian-Western relations to near the freezing point, and despite the international sanctions imposed on Russia led by the US and the European Union, Russia remained politically stable, diplomatically stable, and its population is united. Liefert et al. (2019) examined how Russia’s economic crisis and ban on agricultural imports from the United States and other Western countries that began in 2014 affected its agricultural and food sector. They documented that the import ban affected Russian consumers by reducing Russia’s import of agricultural and food products, substantially raising food prices, and lowering consumption. But the import ban did not affect Russia’s basic food availability. Rather, the import ban stimulated agricultural production within Russia thereby ensuring food sufficiency during the ban. Dreger et al (2016) showed that, during the aftermath of the 2014 conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the Russian Ruble lost 50% of its value against the US dollar. Havlik (2014) showed that the cost of the conflict for Russia was estimated to be in the tune of 1% of Russia’s GDP from 2014 to 2016 because of increased investment risks. Recent studies also examined the effect of the 2022 Russia-Ukraine war. Abakah et al. (2022) examined the effect of the Russia-Ukraine war on the global financial technology industry and blockchain markets. They developed a Russia-Ukraine War Economic Sanctions News Sentiment Index (RUWESsent) that reflects the public sentiment and reaction to economic sanction news using media coverage, panic, sentiment and media hype based on Twitter sentiments, Google Trend, Wikipedia Trend, and News Sentiments. They found that the negative sentiments about the war negatively impacted FinTech and blockchain market stocks. Alam, Chowdhury, Abdullah and Masih (2023) investigated the return and volatility spillovers among financial assets from January 2019 to November 2022 using connectedness approaches. They found that the total return and volatility connectedness increased during the COVID-19 and the Russia–Ukraine war. Qureshi, Rizwan, Ahmad and Ashraf (2022) investigated the systemic risk implications of the conflict in Russia, Ukraine, France, Germany, Italy, the UK, the USA, and China. They showed that the systemic instability costs of the conflict go beyond Russia and Ukraine. Chortane and Pandey (2022) examined the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on the value of global currencies against the US dollar (USD). They showed that the Russia-Ukraine conflict had a negative impact on the value of the global currencies; meanwhile, a region-by-region analysis showed that while European currencies (particularly the Russian rouble, Czech koruna, and Polish zloty) depreciated against the USD, Pacific currencies appreciated significantly, and the currencies of the Middle East and Africa (ME&A) are insignificant. Boungou and Yatié (2022) investigated the impact of the Ukraine–Russia war on the world stock market returns of 94 countries from 22 January to 24 March 2022. They found a negative relationship between the Ukraine–Russia war and world stock market returns. Lo, Marcelin, Bassène and 198

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Sène (2022) investigated the influence of the Russia-Ukraine war on financial markets in 73 countries. They found that financial markets reacted to the war-induced shock significantly, with a weaker effect on asset prices than volatility, and the markets perceived the dependence on Russian commodities as a significant risk factor.

Studies on the Consequence of War in Combatant Countries Several studies showed that war affects combatant countries i.e., countries directly involved in the war. Leigh et al (2003) showed that the US-Iraq war raised oil prices in the US by around $10 per barrel, and the war lowered the value of U.S. equities by around 15 percent. However, the war boosted the gold and energy sectors in the U.S. The findings of Leigh et al (2003) suggest that countries that are net oil importers are most likely to experience adverse effects from war. Simeunovic (2016) analysed the effect of the Iraq war on stock returns in U.S. financial markets. They focused on the quarterly prices of the Dow Jones Industrial Average index from October 1960 to September 2015, and found that the war had a positive effect on the quarterly returns from the Dow Jones Industrial Average index. In a related study, Cortes et al. (2022) analysed the effect of the US war on stock volatility after U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the Iraq war in 2003. They found that defence spending reduced stock volatility for firms that produce military goods. An explanation for Cortes et al (2022)’s findings is that the profit of defence firms becomes easier to forecast during wartime due to massive government military spending. Furthermore, Fan et al (2022) investigated whether US trade war against China in 2018 to 2019 enhanced or diminished the US soft power in China during the period of the Trump tariffs. In the study, US soft power in China was measured by the viewership of US movies in China. They found a significant reduction in US movie revenue in regions more exposed to the Trump tariffs, but there was no corresponding reduction in non-US movie revenue. They also observed that online search for US movies, US tourist destinations, and US branded sports shoes declined during the period of the Trump tariffs. The findings of Fan et al (2022) suggest that one of the consequences of the US-China trade war was a decline in US soft power in China during the Trump tariff era.

Studies on the Effect of War on Non-Combatant Countries Other studies showed that a war can have external unintended positive and negative consequences on the economy of non-combatant countries, i.e., countries who are not involved in the war in any way. A non-combatant country may be a neighbouring country or a distant country. Regarding the positive effect of war on non-combatants, Sanyal (2021) examined the impact of the US-China trade war on India. They noted that India had significant trade ties with both the US and China. They found that the high import tariffs which the US and China imposed on each other led to significant trade diversion to India from China. The trade diversion had significant benefits for the Indian economy. Regarding the negative effect of war on non-combatants, Jordi van (2022) showed that the Ukraine war had negative consequences for the economic growth of neighbouring countries. Federle et al (2022) argued that major geopolitical events have global repercussions. They analysed stock market reactions to the Ukraine war. Federle et al (2022) found a large “proximity penalty” effect, which means that neighbouring countries close to Ukraine witnessed an abnormal decline in equity indices of 23.1% within four weeks from the start of the Ukraine war. The implication is that countries who are neighbours to a combatant country often face some sort of economic repercussion when their neighbours go to war. Boungou and Yatié 199

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(2022) investigated the effect of the Ukraine–Russia war on world stock market returns. They analysed 94 countries from 22 January to 24 March 2022 and found that the war had a negative impact on the world’s stock indices, and the effect was more significant after the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. Also, neighbouring countries including Ukraine and Russia who were not involved in the war were the most affected. Carvalho et al. (2019) investigated the effects of the US–China trade war on both countries and some emerging economies. They used the global trade analysis project (GTAP) computable general equilibrium model and showed that the US-China trade war would benefit emerging countries by shifting demand to sectors where they have a comparative advantage.

UNDERSTANDING WHY RUSSIA INVADED UKRAINE The Cause of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 Many agreements have been reached to resolve the conflict between Russia and Ukraine (Matveeva, 2022; Bharti, 2022; Hebert and Krasnozhon, 2023). The earliest agreement is the Budapest memorandum in 1994 which prohibited Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States from threatening or using military force or economic coercion against Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan except in self-defence or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. There is also the Minsk agreement. The Minsk I and II agreements were international agreements which sought to end the war in the Donbas region of Ukraine. The first Minsk agreement was reached in 2014. The parties to the agreement were Ukraine, Russia and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. The mediators were the leaders of France and Germany. The Minsk 1 agreement failed to stop the fighting and was consequently revised to become the Minsk II agreement which was signed in February 2015. The Minsk II agreement consisted of a ceasefire, withdrawal of heavy weapons from the front line, release of prisoners of war, constitutional reform in Ukraine, and restoring control of the state border to the Ukrainian government. Although the fighting diminished in effect after the Minsk II agreement was reached, it did not end the fighting completely. In 2022, Russia officially recognized the Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics and declared that the Minsk agreements no longer existed. This move by Russia further escalated the tensions between Ukraine and Russia. After the Minsk agreements failed to end the war in the Donbas region of Ukraine in 2015, there have been heightened tensions between Ukraine and Russia. Ukraine’s desire to join NATO as well as Russia’s opposition to NATO coming close to its borders escalated the conflict between the two countries. Consequently, Russia invaded Ukraine on the 24 February 2022. There are different accounts of what caused the 2022 Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. There is the proRussian account of what caused the invasion. There is also the pro-West or Western account of what caused the invasion. The pro-Russian reason for invading Ukraine is that Ukraine is being controlled by Western powers, and Ukraine was using its military to oppress citizens in the separatist regions who are loyal to the Russian government and is committing genocide against its own people1. The Russian government also claimed that Ukraine’s ambition to join a military alliance with NATO posed a threat to Russia’s national security, and such ambition would expand NATO eastward and bring NATO closer to Russia’s border thereby posing an existential threat to Russia. It will allow the West to infiltrate Russia and undermine Russia’s national security. Russia further claimed that Ukraine refused to comply with the Minsk Agreements that offered a peaceful solution to the conflict and accused the Ukrainian government of turning Ukraine into an anti-Russian parade ground. Russia stated that these concerns gave 200

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it a motivation to act militarily against Ukraine. Russia also claimed that it considered many options to resolve the issue including negotiation or invasion. But with Ukraine refusing to negotiate before the invasion occurred, the Russian government claimed that it chose the least dangerous option which was to invade Ukraine to remove the pro-West government in Kyiv, install a new government, and sign a peace deal with the newly installed government. The peace deal will include a ban from joining NATO and the European Union. The pro-West or Western account of what caused the invasion, as reported by multiple Western media2, is that Russia feels threatened that Ukraine wants to be a democratic nation, free from Russian influence, and seek collaboration with the West in politics, security and trade which includes the possibility of joining NATO and the European Union. The pro-West media reports that Russia opposed Ukraine’s decision to adopt Western democracy and alliance because Ukraine’s western alliance with the European Union and NATO could threaten the national security of Russia. Western media also believes that the Russian ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine was aimed at removing the Ukrainian president and the incumbent government in Kyiv and installing a new pro-Russian government in Ukraine.

International Sanctions Imposed on Russia for Invading Ukraine Many countries in the West imposed sanctions on Russia for invading Ukraine, according to S&P Global’s timeline of sanctions against Russia3. These countries include the United States, United Kingdom, the European Union, France, Japan, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Taiwan and others. The purpose of the international sanctions was to launch an economic warfare against Russia, inflict economic pain on the Russian economy, and significantly reduce Russia’s ability to fund its military operations in Ukraine, in order to force Russia to end its military invasion of Ukraine. Some of the sanctions imposed on Russia during the February 2022 invasion are listed below. Western countries blocked some Russian banks from using the SWIFT4 global payment system. SWIFT is a high-security network that facilitates payments among 11,000 financial institutions in 200 countries. Germany halted the certification of Russia’s Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project intended to distribute energy to European countries. New Zealand prohibited the export of goods to Russian military and security forces in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The United States banned the export of war technology to Russia to severely limit Russia’s ability to advance its military and aerospace sector. The ban will limit US export of semiconductors, telecommunication, encryption security, lasers, sensors, navigation, avionics and maritime technologies to Russia. The United States also barred Russian financial institutions and the Russian Central Bank from accessing their dollar external reserves held in the United States. This means that Russian financial institutions and the Russian Central Bank could not make transactions in American dollars. The United States also banned all Russian oil and gas imports. The European Union imposed financial sanctions on Russia, targeting 70% of the Russian banking market and key state-owned companies. The EU banned Russian deposits above €100,000 in EU banks on Russian accounts held by EU central securities depositories. The EU banned the selling of euro-denominated securities to Russian clients. The EU banned the listing of the shares of Russian state-owned entities on EU trading venues. The European Union banned the sale, supply, transfer or export of technologies in oil refining to Russia. The EU banned Russia’s biggest banks from SWIFT. The European Union imposed an export ban on all aircraft, spare parts and equipment to Russian airlines, as well as to the Russian space industry. The European Union halted visa agreements with notable Russian persons. This means that Russian diplomats, officials and businesspeople were no longer able to benefit from visa facilitation 201

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provisions which allow privileged access to EU countries.5 The European Union removed Russia from all cultural events and sporting events such as the Eurovision and the UEFA champions league. Russia was also suspended from many sporting events such as the Wimbledon Tennis Championship, World Rugby and the Olympics. Canada cancelled all valid export permits associated with Russia. Switzerland and Japan freeze the assets of certain Russian individuals held in Swiss and Japanese banks. Australia imposed travel bans and financial sanctions on eight members of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. Japan suspended visas for individuals from the “Donetsk People’s Republic” and the “Luhansk People’s Republic”. Japan also prohibited the issuance and transaction of new Russian sovereign debt in the primary and secondary market. Switzerland partially suspended a visa agreement that made it easier for Russians to enter Switzerland since 2009, including for diplomats. It also imposed travel bans on five unnamed oligarchs close to Vladmir Putin who have ties with Switzerland. The United Kingdom (UK) imposed financial sanctions on Russian banks by freezing the assets of Russian oligarchs held in UK banks. The UK also barred Russia’s largest bank ‘Sberbank’ from clearing payments in Pound Sterling. The UK announced that it will phase out Russian oil by the end of 2022. The UK banned Russian airline ‘Aeroflot’ from operating in the UK airspace. South Korea banned exports of strategic items to Russia and joined other countries in blocking some Russian banks from accessing the SWIFT international payments system. The ban exports include electronics, semiconductors, computers, information and communications, sensors and lasers, navigation and avionics, and marine and aerospace equipment. South Korea also halted transactions with the Russian Central Bank, the Bank Rossiya, and Sovereign Wealth Funds associated with Russia. Finland, Belgium, Latvia, Ireland, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, Slovenia and Czech Republic also banned Russian planes from flying into their airspace. European countries expelled at least 43 Russian diplomats and at least 45 Russian citizens. The number of expelled diplomats was 17 in Netherland, 1 diplomat in Czech, 21 diplomats in Belgium, and 10 diplomats in Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania. The United States and EU countries imposed sanctions on Putin’s family members, including Putin’s daughters, on suspicion that his family members or his daughter were hiding his wealth. The EU further imposed (i) an import ban on all forms of Russian coal, (ii) a full ban on Russian and Belarusian freight road operators working in the EU, (iii) a full prohibition on the participation of Russian nationals and entities in procurement contracts in the EU. The United Nations expelled Russia from the United Nations Human Rights Council for its alleged human rights violations in Ukraine. The expulsion took place in a United Nations general assembly in which 93 members voted in favour of expelling Russia while 24 members voted against expelling Russia and 58 members abstained from voting. These international sanctions imposed on Russia were severe and affected the Russian economy in many ways. But there were concerns that Russia would retaliate and the effect could be devastating for the global economy.6

Support for Ukraine Ukraine received overwhelming support during the invasion according to the Kiel Institute’s Ukraine Support Tracker7. The United States offered over $1billion aid in security assistance to Ukraine to enable Ukraine to defend itself against Russia. The aid was used to purchase stinger anti-aircraft systems, military javelins, light anti-armour weapons, anti-armour systems; tactical unmanned aerial systems, grenade launchers, rifles, pistols, machine guns, shotguns; grenade launcher, body armour, and helmets. Other countries offered military assistance to Ukraine such as the United Kingdom, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland Germany and Italy. Some countries offered only 202

 Global Economic Consequences of Russian Invasion of Ukraine

humanitarian aid to Ukraine in the form of food, clothing and emergency medical supplies. These countries include Argentina, Hungary, India, Pakistan and Thailand. Multilateral organizations also supported Ukraine by offering financial assistance to Ukraine. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) approved a “War on Ukraine – EBRD Resilience Package” valued at EUR 2 billion. The fund will be used to meet the immediate needs of the people affected by the war and to support the substantial reconstruction of Ukraine. The European Investment Bank (EIB) offered an emergency solidarity package for Ukraine of EUR 2 billion, including the provision of EUR 668 million in immediate liquidity assistance to the Ukrainian government. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) disbursed emergency assistance of US$1.4 billion to Ukraine in March 2022 under the Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) to help meet the urgent financing needs of Ukraine including to mitigate the economic impact of the war. The World Bank offered more than US$925 million for Ukraine.

Russia’s Response to the International Sanctions Many economists anticipated Russia’s reaction to the international sanctions and warned that retaliatory sanctions could start a global economic war. Russia reacted to the international sanctions by taking some calculated measures according to Reuters8 . For instance, Russia forced countries that rely on Russia’s energy import to pay for Russia’s energy export in Ruble rather than the US dollar. This measure helped the Ruble to appreciate in value to preinvasion levels after previous weeks of multiple depreciation of the Ruble. Russia pegged the Russian Ruble to gold. This action by Russia was remarkable because it was a bold step to weaken the dominance of the US dollar as the ultimate reserve currency. Pegging the Russian Ruble to gold helped to insulate Russia’s economy from the negative economic effects of the dollar-based multilateral financial sanctions. Russia banned Russian export of more than 200 products until the end of 2022. The banned exports include telecoms, medical, vehicle, agricultural, electrical equipment and timber. Russia increased the key interest rate to stop the decline of the value of the Ruble which is the Russian currency. Russia barred the payment of interest to foreign investors who held Russian government bonds. Russia banned Russian firms from paying dividends in US dollars to overseas shareholders. The purpose of this ban was to reduce Russia’s demand for US dollars, and to mitigate the effect of the dollar-based financial sanctions imposed on Russia by the United States. Russia banned foreign investors who held billions of dollars’ worth of Russian stocks and bonds from selling them. The purpose of this ban was to reduce Russia’s demand for US dollars, and to mitigate the effect of the dollar-based financial sanctions imposed by the United States on Russia. Russia retaliated by expelling foreign diplomats from Russia. Russia offered to buy back its $2billion Eurobonds in Ruble rather than US dollars when it matured in April 2022. This was to reduce the overall amount of foreign currency the Russian government had to pay out. Russia nationalised foreign companies in Russia that closed their operations to show their opposition to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Russia cut off food and fertilizer exports to “hostile” countries. This led to food and fertilizer shortage, thereby leading to food price inflation in hostile countries.

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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY Data were collected from multiple sources, as shown in Table 1. Global data, Euro Area data and countryspecific data for Ukraine and Russia were collected. The data were collected for a four-month period beginning from December 2021 to March 2022. February 2022 was the month of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Trend analysis was used to analyse the impact of the invasion on relevant macroeconomic variables. The Pearson correlation method was used to assess the correlation between relevant macroeconomic variables during the period. The two-stage least square regression was used to analyse the effect of the invasion on selected global economic indicators including the rate of inflation. Table 1. Variables and data source Symbol

Variables

PMI

Source

Global Composite PMI

JP Morgan Markit Economics

Global Manufacturing PMI

JP Morgan Markit Economics

FOOD

World Food Price Index

Food and Agriculture Organization database

WCP

World Cereals Price Index

Food and Agriculture Organization database

WOP

World Oils Price Index

Food and Agriculture Organization database

WDP

World Dairy Price Index

Food and Agriculture Organization database

BRENT

Brent crude oil price

MPMIE

Manufacturing PMI for the Euro Area

IEA The S&P Global Eurozone PMI

MPMIE

Service PMI for the Euro Area

The S&P Global Eurozone PMI

PMIE

Composite PMI for the Euro Area

The S&P Global Eurozone PMI

CPI

Transportation CPI for the Euro Area

INFM

Inflation rate (MoM) for Russia and Ukraine

INFY

Inflation rate (YoY) for Russia and Ukraine

COVID

Number of world coronavirus cases

WAR

Binary variable representing the months of Russian invasion of Ukraine

Eurostat Trading economics Trading economics World health organization Author’s construction

CPI=Consumer price index. PMI = Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI). YoY=Year-on-year. MoM = Month-on-month. S&P = Standards and Poor Source: Multiple databases

RESULTS Potential Impact on the Global Economy Global Supply Chain Disruption Military operations during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine affected operations in multiple sectors through global supply chain disruption. The ban on Russian exports and a retaliatory ban on imports by Russia, including Russia’s refusal to allow foreign cargoes to pass through its waterways and airspace during the

204

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early phase of the invasion, disrupted the global supply chain. It created scarcity and led to an increase in the price of imported goods. Companies anticipated that the disruption caused by cross-border blockades and cross-trade bans would lead to hoarding of supplies thereby leading to high prices. Furthermore, restrictions to commercial flights around the Ukraine-Russia border and the increased security checks at refugee camps in neighbouring countries led to further disruption in cargo flow as many cross-border goods and supplies were halted or delayed due to border officials processing refugees before attending to cross-border goods. It worsened the disruption in global supply chain and increased the price of imports.

Rising Oil and Gas Prices Prior to the invasion, energy prices were rising9 due to multiple factors such as the COVID pandemic, limited energy supplies and growing tensions between Russia and Ukraine. During this time, oil prices were stable within the price band of US$80 to US$95 before the invasion, as shown in figure 1. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, oil prices exceeded USD$100 a barrel. The invasion made it difficult for European oil marketers and oil companies to receive energy supplies from Russia, as Russia is the world’s second-largest oil producer and sells most of its crude to European refineries. The oil import ban placed on Russia during the invasion led to energy shortage in Europe and a sustained rise in energy prices. Gas prices for household use also increased due to fears of a disruption to global energy supplies as shown in figure 2. There were concerns that a retaliatory export ban on energy supplies to Europe and the rest of the world by Russia would plunge the world into a lasting energy crisis and could make oil price exceed $150 a barrel. This expectation reduced global economic growth forecast. Figure 1. Trend in crude oil WTI

(Trading economics)

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 Global Economic Consequences of Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Figure 2. Trend in gasoline price (Trading economics)

Effect on the Global Banking System The effect of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on the global banking system was minimal because the international financial sanctions targeted mostly Russian banks. The sanctions, including the ban of selected Russian banks from SWIFT, did not affect the global banking system in a significant way. It only affected foreign banks with large operations in Russia. Many foreign banks recorded losses after several Western countries imposed financial sanctions on Russian banks, the Russian Central Bank and Russian wealthy individuals. The most affected banks were Austria’s Raiffeisenbank, Italy’s Unicredit and France’s Société Générale. Many more foreign banks recorded huge losses when they discontinued their operations in Russia. The resulting losses were significant for small foreign banks and insignificant for large foreign banks. Also, banks with large operations in Russia recorded significant loss in investment profit from their discontinued Russian subsidiary.

Rising Global Inflation and Cost of Living Monthly inflation rate increased in many countries due to the invasion (see figure 3). The rise in inflation increased the cost of living. In the UK, for instance, the inflation rate rose to 5.5%,10 implying that consumers spent more money on fewer goods. The invasion led to a further hike in the price of oil, gas, food and food ingredients. It increased the cost of living as the cost of mortgage deductibles, cars and lighting increased significantly. It generated spillover effects to developing countries that rely on energy import from European countries. Developing countries paid a higher price for energy imports which translated to a rise in the local pump price of fuel, a rise in food prices and a general rise in merchandise imports despite income levels remaining unchanged. The combined effect for developed countries and developing countries is that it led to a significant rise in global inflation and higher cost of living.

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Table 2. Unilateral effect of Russian invasion on global economic indicators: Analysis based on twostage least square regression (2SLS) (1)

(2)

(3)

Dependent variable: Brent crude oil (BRENT)

Dependent variable: Food price index (FOOD)

Dependent variable: Global PMI (PMI)

Coefficient (t-statistic)

Coefficient (t-statistic)

Coefficient (t-statistic)

c

80.350** (11.67)

134.650*** (22.31)

52.800** (49.00)

WAR

25.97* (2.92)

18.450* (2.36)

-0.433 (-0.31)

R-square

74.01

65.14

3.13

Adjusted R-square

65.35

53.53

-2.91

F-statistic

8.546

5.61

0.097

Prob (F-statistic)

0.06

0.09

0.77

***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. The 2SLS instruments are the WAR and COVID variables. WAR variable = a binary variable representing the months of Russian invasion of Ukraine. COVID variable = the logarithm of the total of number of world coronavirus cases Source: Author’s computation

Figure 3. Month-on-month inflation rate since Russian invasion (Trading economics)

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 Global Economic Consequences of Russian Invasion of Ukraine

FURTHER RESULTS: REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC EFFECT OF THE INVASION Two-stage least square (2SLS) regression analysis Unilateral Effect of Russian Invasion of Ukraine on Some Global Economic Indicators Table 2 reports the 2SLS regression result for the unilateral effect of Russian invasion of Ukraine on some global economic indicators. Table 2 shows that the WAR coefficient is statistically significant and positively related to the world food price index and the price of brent crude oil. The result indicates that world food price and the price of brent crude oil increased significantly during the period of Russian invasion of Ukraine. Meanwhile, the WAR coefficient is not significantly related to global PMI in column 3.

The Separate Effect of Russia’s Invasion and the COVID Pandemic on Global Economic Indicators Table 3 reports the 2SLS regression result for the separate effect of Russian invasion of Ukraine and the COVID pandemic on some global economic indicators. Table 3 shows that the WAR coefficient is statistically significant and positively related to the global PMI in column 3. This indicates that sentiments about global business activities increased during the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In contrast, the COVID coefficient is statistically significant and negatively related to the global PMI in column 3. This indicates that the number of COVID cases increased during the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The WAR coefficient is not significantly related to the BRENT and the FOOD variables in columns 1 and 2 of table 3. Similarly, the COVID coefficient is not significantly related to the BRENT and the FOOD variables in columns 1 and 2 in Table 3. Table 3. Effect of Russia-Ukraine War and COVID on global economic indicators: Analysis based on two-stage least square regression (2SLS) (1)

(2)

(3)

Dependent variable: Brent crude oil (BRENT)

Dependent variable: Food price index (FOOD)

Dependent variable: Global PMI (PMI)

Coefficient (t-statistic)

Coefficient (t-statistic)

Coefficient (t-statistic)

C

-937.665 (-3.41)

-598.452 (-0.95)

275.004** (9.71)

WAR

6.659 (5.90)

4.539 (0.42)

3.783** (8.76)

COVID

119.542 (3.71)

86.085 (1.16)

-26.092** (-7.84)

R-square

86.15

76.13

91.08

Adjusted R-square

72.31

52.25

82.17

F-statistic

6.223

3.189

10.220

Prob (F-statistic)

0.138

0.239

0.089

***, ** denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level. The 2SLS instruments are the WAR and COVID variables. WAR variable = a binary variable representing the months of Russian invasion of Ukraine. COVID variable = the logarithm of the total of number of world coronavirus cases

Source: Author’s computation

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 Global Economic Consequences of Russian Invasion of Ukraine

The Combined Effect of Russian Invasion and COVID Pandemic Table 4 reports the 2SLS regression result for the combined effect of Russian invasion of Ukraine and the COVID pandemic on some global economic indicators. Table 4 shows that the WAR*COVID coefficient is statistically significant and positively related to the price of Brent crude oil in column 1 of table 4. Also, the WAR*COVID coefficient is statistically significant and positively related to the world food price index in column 2 of Table 4. The two results indicate that the combined effect of Russian invasion of Ukraine and the COVID pandemic led to a rise in world food price and a rise in global oil price. The COVID*WAR coefficient is not significantly related to the PMI variable in column 3 of Table 4. Table 4. Combined effect of Russian invasion and the COVID pandemic on global economic indicators: Analysis based on two-stage least square regression (2SLS) (1)

(2)

(3)

Dependent variable: Brent crude oil (BRENT)

Dependent variable: Food price index (FOOD)

Dependent variable: Global PMI (PMI)

Coefficient (t-statistic)

Coefficient (t-statistic)

Coefficient (t-statistic)

c

80.327*** (11.71)

134.611*** (22.46)

52.805** (49.03)

COVID*WAR

2.997* (2.94)

2.134* (2.39)

-0.051 (-0.32)

R-square

74.23

65.61

3.24

Adj. R-square

65.64

54.15

-2.90

F-statistic

8.64

5.72

0.101

Prob (F-statistic)

0.06

0.09

0.77

***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. The 2SLS instrument is the COVID*WAR variable. The COVID*WAR variable = a binary variable that represents the combined effect of Russian invasion of Ukraine and the COVID pandemic. COVID variable = the logarithm of the total of number of world coronavirus cases Source: Author’s computation

The Combined Effect of Russian Invasion and COVID Pandemic on the Components of the World Food Price Index The world food price index is made up of five components, namely, the cereal price index, meat price index, oils price index, dairy price index and sugar price index. Table 5 estimates the combined effect of Russian invasion and COVID pandemic on the five components of the world food price index. Table 5 shows that the WAR*COVID coefficient is statistically significant and positively related to WDP and WOD in columns 3 and 5. This suggests that the increase in the world food price index was driven by the rise in oils and dairy prices.

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 Global Economic Consequences of Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Table 5. Combined effect of Russian invasion and the COVID pandemic on the components of the world food price index (1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Dependent variable: Food price index (FOOD)

Dependent variable: cereal price index (WCP)

Dependent variable: dairy price index (WDP)

Dependent variable: meat price index (WMP)

Dependent variable: oils price index (WOP)

Dependent variable: sugar price index (WSP)

Coefficient (t-statistic)

Coefficient (t-statistic)

Coefficient (t-statistic)

Coefficient (t-statistic)

Coefficient (t-statistic)

Coefficient (t-statistic)

c

134.611*** (22.46)

140.496*** (17.29)

130.788*** (66.81)

111.532*** (44.84)

182.134*** (12.17)

114.526*** (12.17)

COVID*WAR

2.134* (2.39)

2.440 (2.02)

1.616** (5.55)

0.774 (2.09)

5.564* (2.49)

0.256 (0.49)

R-square

65.61

57.62

91.12

59.29

67.55

7.56

Adjusted R-square

54.15

43.49

88.16

45.73

56.75

-0.23

F-statistic

5.72

4.08

30.77

4.37

6.24

0.24

Prob (F-statistic)

0.09

0.14

0.01

0.13

0.08

0.65

***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. The 2SLS instrument is the COVID*WAR variable. The COVID*WAR variable = a binary variable that represents the combined effect of Russian invasion of Ukraine and the COVID pandemic. COVID variable = the logarithm of the total of number of world coronavirus cases Source: Author’s computation

Correlation Analysis for the Global Economic Indicators The variable of interest in the correlation analysis is the correlation of the WAR variable with the global economic variables in table 6. The correlation result is reported in table 6 below. There is a significant and positive correlation between the WAR variable and the BRENT variable. The correlation is high at 86 percent. This suggests that oil prices were high during the invasion. Similarly, there is a significant and positive correlation between the WAR variable and the FOOD variable. The correlation is high at 80.7 percent. This suggests that food prices were high during the invasion. Meanwhile, there is a negative correlation between the WAR variable and the PMI variable, but the correlation coefficient is not significant. The correlation result implies that the world food price index and oil price were significantly higher during Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Pre-Invasion vs. Post-Invasion Trend Analysis of the Global Economic Variables Global economic data show that Russian invasion of Ukraine had far reaching effect on the global economy. Data collected from FOA11 shows that world food prices were affected during the invasion. Figure 4 shows that the world price of food, cereals, oils, meat and dairy products increased significantly in February and March 2022 compared to December 2021 and January 2022. The increase in global food prices in February and March 2022 was caused by the Russia-Ukraine war, the sanctions imposed on Russian import (including food ingredients) by Western countries, and the retaliatory food export ban imposed by Russia. In the global business sector, the JP Morgan global composite purchasing managers’ index (PMI) decreased from 52.7 points in March to 51 points in April 2022. This indicates that

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sentiments about global business performance worsened during the invasion. The decline in the global composite PMI index was due to disruption in global supply chain as a result of the sanctions imposed on Russia. The sanctions disrupted the movement of goods and commodities that usually pass through Ukraine and Russia before reaching other European and non-European countries. Table 6. Correlation between the global economic variables Variables

WAR

WAR

1.000

BRENT

FOOD

PMI

COVID

--------BRENT

FOOD

PMI

COVID

0.860*

1.000

(2.92)

-----

((0.06))

-----

0.807*

0.918**

1.000

(2.36)

(4.01)

-----

((0.09))

((0.03))

-----

-0.177

-0.385

-0.444

1.000

(-0.31)

(-0.72)

(-0.85)

-----

((0.77))

((0.52))

((0.45))

-----

0.878**

0.922**

0.867*

-0.603

1.000

(3.18)

(4.12)

(3.01)

(-1.31)

-----

((0.05))

((0.03))

(0.06)

((0.28))

-----

***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. T-statistic is reported in single parenthesis. P-value is reported in double parenthesis. Source: Author’s computation

Effect on Global Stock Markets Data collected from major stock markets showed that share prices plunged in value across global stock markets after Russian invasion of Ukraine. Investors fled for safety after the announcement of Russian invasion of Ukraine. Table 7 shows the lowest price at which stock was traded in major stock exchanges during the invasion period. It shows that the lowest drop in share price within a 5-day period (from February 18 to February 25) was on the day of the invasion on 24th February 2022. The Dow-Jones industrial average fell by more than 100 points. The S&P500 index fell by more than 250 points. The EuropeNext 100 index fell by more than 400 points. The Shanghai composite index fell by more than 150 points. However, stocks rebounded the day after the invasion following the announcement of severe international sanctions imposed on Russia by multiple countries

211

 Global Economic Consequences of Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Figure 4. Selected global economic indicators: pre- vs. post- invasion (Trading economics)

Table 7. Global stock markets (the lowest price at which stocks were traded during the time period) United States

United States

Australia

Europe

United Kingdom

South Africa

China

Dow Jones Industrial Average

S&P 500 Index

S&P/ASX 200 Index

Europe Next 100 Index

FTSE 100 Index

JSE

SSE Composite Index

Lowest price

Lowest price

Lowest price

Lowest price

Lowest price

Lowest price

Lowest price

Year 2022

% change (Basis points)

% change (Basis points)

% change (Basis points)

% change (Basis points)

% change (Basis points)

% change (Basis points)

% change (Basis points)

Feb 25

3.11 (311)

4.18 (418)

2.242 (224.2)

1.12 (112)

1.12 (112)

1.27 (127)

1.20 (120)

Feb 24

-1.08 (108)

-2.53 (-253)

-2.604 (-260.4)

-4.27 (-427)

-4.45 (-445)

-1.69 (-169)

-1.68 (-168)

Feb 23

-0.84 (-84)

-1.07 (-107)

0.515 (51.5)

1.93 (193)

2.42 (242)

1.74 (174)

0.597 (59.7)

Feb 22

-1.80 (-180)

-1.38 (-138)

-0.664 (-66.4)

-1.55 (-155)

-1.73 (-173)

-0.403 (-40.3)

-0.979 (-97.9)

Feb 21

-

-

-0.633 (-63.3)

-2.19 (-219)

-2.15 (-215)

-1.63 (-163)

0.715 (71.5)

Feb 18

-0.79 (-79)

-1.07 (-107)

-1.104 (-110.4)

-0.63 (63)

-1.70 (-170)

0.817 (81.7)

-0.209 (-20.9)

Source: Bloomberg & Author’s computation

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 Global Economic Consequences of Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Effect of the Invasion on Combatant Countries This section analyses the effect of the invasion on the inflation rate in combatant countries. The combatant countries are Ukraine, Russia, the Euro Area countries and other non-European countries particularly the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and Japan which imposed huge sanctions on Russia. Euro Area countries and some non-European countries were included in this category because they imposed significant sanctions on Russia which made them indirectly involved in the conflict during the invasion.

Trend Analysis: Impact on the Euro Area Figure 5 shows that the S&P Global Euro Area Manufacturing PMI decreased to 56.5 points in March from 58.2 points in February 2022. The decline in manufacturing performance indicates that the invasion affected manufacturing activities in the Euro Area. This was due to supply chain disruption which led to the shortage of input inventory during the invasion. Also, the Euro Area composite PMI decreased to 54.9 points in March from 55.5 points in February 2022. This indicates that sentiment about business performance in the Euro Area worsened during the invasion. Also, the transportation component of the consumer price index increased significantly in February and March 2022 compared to the pre-invasion month of January 2022 and December 2021. This was due to shortage of energy and fuel supplies due to the energy import ban imposed on Russia which led to a rise in the price of gasoline for transportation in the Euro Area. Figure 5. The Euro area countries (trading economics)

Trend Analysis: Inflation Rate in the Combatant Countries Figure 6 shows the annual inflation rate in the combatant countries. The data shows that the annual inflation rate in some combatant countries increased in February and increased in March 2022. The countries that imposed heavy sanctions on Russia e.g., the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, and Japan, witnessed a rise in rate of inflation in February and March. Also, figure 6 shows that Russia

213

 Global Economic Consequences of Russian Invasion of Ukraine

witnessed the highest rate of inflation compared to Ukraine and the Euro Area countries. Annual inflation rate in March was relatively higher in Russia at 16.7% than in Ukraine (13.7%) and the Euro Area (7.5%) during the invasion. The rise in Russia’s annual inflation in March indicates that the international sanctions imposed on Russia affected the Russian economy through a rise in the general price level in Russia, although Russia’s inflation rate was much lower at 9.17% and lower than the annual inflation rate in Ukraine at 10.7% in the month of invasion in February. The inflation effect is amplified when the month-on-month (MoM) inflation rate is analysed in Figure 7. Figure 7 shows that MoM inflation rate is larger in Russia, followed by Ukraine and the Euro Area countries. Meanwhile, the countries that imposed sanctions on Russia (e.g., US, UK, Canada, and Japan) also witnessed a rise in MoM inflation rate but at a lesser rate compared to Ukraine and Russia. Figure 6. Annual inflation rate in combatant countries (Trading economics)

Figure 7. Monthly inflation rate in combatant countries (Trading economics)

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 Global Economic Consequences of Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Correlation of Inflation Rate in Combatant Countries Table 8 shows the correlation of MoM inflation rate in the combatant countries from December 2021 to March 2022. The reason for selecting the December 2021 to March 2022 sample period is to take into account the fact that inflation rate was already rising before the invasion. Table 8 shows that there is a high correlation between the MoM inflation rate in Russia and the MoM inflation rate in the combatant countries, and the correlation is above 60% in all cases. This suggests that the increase in monthly inflation in Russia was followed by increase in monthly inflation in Ukraine, the Euro Area countries and in countries that imposed the most sanctions on Russia. Similarly, there is a high correlation between the MoM inflation rate in Ukraine and the MoM inflation rate in the combatant countries and the correlation is above 65 percent in all cases. This suggests that the increase in monthly inflation in Ukraine was followed by increase in monthly inflation in Russia, the Euro Area countries and in countries that imposed the most sanctions on Russia. Also, the MoM inflation rate correlation coefficient is significant between: Russia and Ukraine; the Euro Area countries and Ukraine; the US and Ukraine; Russia and the US; and the US and Euro Area countries. Overall, the correlation result in table 8 confirms that the high inflation rate in Ukraine and Russia is correlated with a rise in inflation in countries that sanctioned Russia. Table 8. Month-on-month inflation rate for combatant countries from Dec 2021 to March 2022 Countries

UKRAINE

UKRAINE

1.000

Euro Area

RUSSIA

UK

US

CANADA

JAPAN

----Euro Area RUSSIA UK US CANADA JAPAN

0.974**

1.000

(0.02)

-----

0.979**

0.971**

1.000

(0.02)

(0.02)

-----

0.681

0.825

0.694

1.000

(0.31)

(0.17)

(0.31)

-----

0.973**

0.996***

0.955*

0.828

1.000

(0.02)

(0.00)

(0.04)

(0.17)

-----

0.793

0.695

0.659

0.367

0.739

1.000

(0.21)

(0.30)

(0.34)

(0.63)

(0.26)

-----

0.705

0.774

0.610

0.845

0.816

0.724

1.000

(0.29)

(0.22)

(0.38)

(0.15)

(0.18)

(0.27)

-----

P-value is reported in parenthesis. **, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Source: Author’s computation

Effect of the Invasion on Inflation Rate in Non-Combatant Countries This section analyses the effect of the invasion on the inflation rate of in non-combatant countries. Non-combatant countries refer to countries that do not want to impose sanctions on Russia because

215

 Global Economic Consequences of Russian Invasion of Ukraine

they do not want to be involved directly or indirectly in the conflict between Ukraine and Russia. The non-combatant countries in the sample are Indonesia, Vietnam, Brazil, Jamaica, Egypt, Kenya, Rwanda, South Africa, Nigeria and Mexico.

Trend Analysis: Inflation Rate Trend in Non-Combatant Countries Figure 8 shows the annual inflation rate in non-combatant countries. The inflation data in figure 8 shows that the annual inflation rate in some non-combatant countries increased in February and increased in March 2022. These countries did not impose sanctions on Russia, but they witnessed rising inflation. For instance, the annual inflation rate rose sharply in Rwanda, Egypt, Brazil and Jamaica. Also, the monthon-month inflation rate, in figure 9, increased significantly in non-combatant countries. Countries like Egypt, Brazil, Jamaica and South Africa witnessed a significant increase in MoM inflation rate during the invasion even though they were not involved in the conflict in any way. This shows that the invasion had spillover effects to other countries who were not involved in the war between Russia and Ukraine.

Correlation of Inflation Rate in Non-Combatant Countries Table 9 shows the correlation of MoM inflation rate in the non-combatant countries from December 2021 to March 2022. The reason for selecting the December 2021 to March 2022 sample period is to take into account the argument that inflation rate was already rising before the invasion. Table 9 shows that there is a high correlation between the MoM inflation rate in Russia and the MoM inflation rate in some non-combatant countries such as Mexico, South Africa, Egypt, Jamaica, and Brazil, and the correlation is above 70% in all cases. This suggests that the increase in monthly inflation in Russia was followed by increase in monthly inflation in countries that were not involved in the Ukraine-Russia conflict. Figure 8. Annual inflation rate in non-combatant countries (Trading economics)

216

 Global Economic Consequences of Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Figure 9. Monthly inflation rate in non-combatant countries (Trading economics)

Similarly, there is a high correlation between the MoM inflation rate in Ukraine and the MoM inflation rate in some non-combatant countries such as Mexico, South Africa, Egypt, Jamaica, and Brazil, and the correlation is above 70% in all cases. This suggests that the increase in monthly inflation in Ukraine was followed by increase in monthly inflation in countries that were not involved in the Ukraine-Russia conflict.

CONCLUSION This paper explored the global economic consequence of the Russia-Ukraine war over a four-month period from December 2021 to March 2022. The global economic consequence of the invasion was a global supply chain disruption. This manifested through rising prices including rising energy prices and commodity prices and a rise in food prices, thereby leading to a rise in global inflation. The empirical results in the paper showed that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the COVID-19 pandemic jointly led to a significant increase in the world price of food and crude oil. The rise in the world food price index after the invasion was driven by a significant increase in the price of dairy and oils. Stock prices plunged on the invasion date. The rise in inflation in Russia and Ukraine after the invasion was followed by a rise in inflation in countries that imposed severe sanctions on Russia, and in countries that were not involved in the conflict in any way. Overall, the invasion had spillover effects on combatant and non-combatant countries.

217

218 0.31 (0.69)

(0.24)

(0.84)

(0.13)

0.75

0.15

(0.79)

(0.79)

0.86

0.21

(0.80)

(0.11)

-0.21

-0.19

(0.56)

(0.17)

0.88

0.43

(0.51)

(0.29)

0.83

0.49

(0.83)

(0.00)

0.70

-0.16

(0.06)

(0.89)

0.99***

0.93*

(0.41)

(0.15)

-0.10

-0.58

(0.27)

(0.41)

0.84

0.72

0.59

-----

(0.88)

Source: Author’s computation

RUSSIA

UKRAINE

INDONESIA

VIETNAM

BRAZIL

JAMAICA

EGYPT

KENYA

RWANDA

SOUTH AFRICA

1.00

(0.18)

0.81

(0.23)

0.76

(0.86)

0.13

(0.60)

0.39

(0.06)

0.93*

(0.08)

0.92*

(0.44)

0.55

(0.28)

0.71

(0.91)

0.08

-----

1.00

SOUTH AFRICA

(0.66)

0.33

(0.48)

0.51

(0.54)

-0.45

(0.10)

0.89*

(0.59)

0.40

(0.77)

0.22

(0.13)

0.86

(0.38)

-0.61

-----

1.00

RWANDA

(0.52)

0.47

(0.69)

0.30

(0.46)

0.53

(0.65)

-0.34

(0.52)

0.47

(0.39)

0.61

(0.86)

-0.13

-----

1.00

KENYA

(0.25)

0.74

(0.13)

0.86

(0.81)

-0.18

(0.12)

0.87

(0.19)

0.80

(0.31)

0.68

-----

1.00

EGYPT

(0.02)

0.97**

(0.06)

0.93*

(0.63)

0.36

(0.62)

0.37

(0.03)

0.96**

-----

1.00

JAMAICA

(0.07)

0.92*

(0.07)

0.92*

(0.91)

0.09

(0.39)

0.60

-----

1.00

BRAZIL

(0.61)

0.38

(0.45)

0.54

(0.36)

-0.63

-----

1.00

VIETNAM

(0.57)

0.42

(0.70)

0.29

-----

1.00

INDONESIA

P-value is reported in parenthesis. **, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.

NIGERIA

-0.11

-----

1.00

MEXICO

NIGERIA

MEXICO

Countries

Table 9. Month-on-month inflation rate for non-combatant countries from Dec 2021 to March 2022

(0.02)

0.97**

-----

1.00

UKRAINE

-----

1.000

RUSSIA

 Global Economic Consequences of Russian Invasion of Ukraine

 Global Economic Consequences of Russian Invasion of Ukraine

The policy implication of the results is that policy makers should be careful when using economic sanctions during wars because geopolitical conflicts, such as the Russia-Ukraine war, can have widereaching economic effects to other countries. Imposing sanctions to force Russia to withdraw its military operations in Ukraine was a necessary action. But the sanctions did not have isolated economic effects on the sanctioned country. Rather, it affected other countries through economic spillovers, reflected in the price in world food price. The Russia-Ukraine invasion has shown that sanctions against a warring country is not an optimal solution because it produces spillover effects to other countries who are not part of the conflict, especially when the warring countries are trade partners of other countries who are not involved in the war. It is recommended that political leaders should put in effort to discourage conflicts like the UkraineRussia conflict due to its spillover effects to other countries. They should use negotiation as an optimal conflict resolution option. National authorities should also put in place measures to mitigate inflationary pressures caused by global supply chain disruption especially when trade partners are at war. National authorities should use fiscal and monetary policy measures to shield their economies from the negative effects of war, particularly, rising inflation. Future studies can examine the impact of Russia-Ukraine war sentiment on global economic indicators using data from the Russia-Ukraine War Economic Sanctions News Sentiment Index. Future studies can also assess whether conflict resolution through negotiations is very effective in pacifying countries that go to war to protect their own interests. Future studies can also examine whether the economic consequence of war during a pandemic year is more severe than the economic consequence of war in a non-pandemic year. Future studies can revisit the topic of this paper and use the Autoregressive (VAR) framework, impulse response function, and causality analysis to examine the effect of the Russia-Ukraine war on the global economy.

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KEY TERMS AND DEFINTIONS Brent Crude Oil: Brent crude oil is the most traded of all of the oil benchmarks. It is mostly drilled from the North Sea oilfields: Brent, Forties, Oseberg and Ekofisk (collectively known as BFOE). This oil type is widely used as it is both sweet and light, making it easy to refine into diesel fuel and gasoline. Combatant Countries: It refers to the countries who are actively involved in war. COVID-19 Pandemic: The COVID-19 pandemic is the global pandemic of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). It was caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). CPI: Composite price index is a statistical tool that aggregates different equities, securities, or indexes in order to create a representation of overall market or sector performance. Crude oil WTI: It is a grade or mix of crude oil. Dow-Jones Industrial Average: The Dow Jones industrial average groups together the prices of 30 of the most traded stocks on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the Nasdaq. Euro Area: The euro area consists of those Member States of the European Union that have adopted the euro as their currency. Eurobond: A Eurobond is a bond issued offshore by governments or corporates denominated in a currency other than that of the issuer’s country. FAO: It is the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations GDP Per Capita: GDP per capita is economic output per person. GDP per capita is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy divided by the population of the country. Inflation: Inflation is the persistent increase in the general price level. MoM: MoM refers to month-on-month Nominal GDP: GDP at current prices. Nominal GDP is not adjusted for inflation. Nord Stream 2 Gas Pipeline Project: Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project is a natural gas pipeline from Russia to Germany running through the Baltic Sea and is financed by Gazprom and several European energy companies. PMI: The Purchasing Managers Index (PMI) is a measure of the prevailing direction of economic trends in manufacturing. Real GDP: Real GDP is GDP expressed in base-year prices. Real GDP is adjusted to account for inflation. Ruble: The national currency of Russia S&P500 Index: The Standard and Poor’s 500 is a stock market index in the United States that tracks 500 publicly traded domestic companies. Sanction: a threatened punishment or penalty for disobeying a law or rule. Shanghai Composite Index: Shanghai composite index is a stock market composite made up of all the A-shares and B-shares that trade on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. SWIFT: SWIFT means “Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications”. It is a global member-owned cooperative that functions as a huge messaging system which members can use to send and receive money transfer instructions quickly, accurately, and securely. The EuropeNext 100 Index: The Euronext 100 Index is the blue-chip index of the pan-European exchange, Euronex NV. Two-Stage Least Squares Method: Two-stage least square regression is a type of regression that uses instrumental variables that are uncorrelated with the error terms to compute estimated values of

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 Global Economic Consequences of Russian Invasion of Ukraine

the problematic predictor(s) in the first stage, and then uses those computed values to estimate a linear regression model of the dependent variable in the second stage. World Food Price Index: It is a measure of the monthly change in international prices of a basket of food commodities. YoY: YoY refers to year-on-year.

ENDNOTES 1 2



3



4



5

6



9 7 8

10 11



Many western commentators say that this claim by the Russia government is false and baseless. Al Jazeera - https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/24/explainer-russias-invasion-of-ukrainewhat-we-know-so-far Reuters - https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/events-leading-up-russiasinvasion-ukraine-2022-02-28/ https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/sanctionsagainst-russia-8211-a-timeline-69602559 SWIFT means ‘Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication’ According to a report by the Financial Times https://www.ft.com/content/6f3ce193-ab7d-4449ac1b-751d49b1aaf8 Moscow Times Media - https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/02/23/russia-promises-strongresponse-to-us-sanctions-over-ukraine-a76539 https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker/ https://www.reuters.com/world/russias-response-western-sanctions-2022-05-13/ According to https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics According to the UK Office for National Statistics FAO means the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

223

224

Chapter 11

The European Parliament’s Activities in European Union Foreign Policy: Is This the Mediatization of Conflict Management? Marta Witkowska https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3202-486X University of Warsaw, Poland Artur Koldomasov Media Research Center, Ottawa, Canada

ABSTRACT Despite the restricted formal role of the European Parliament (EP) in foreign policy decision-making, the aim of this research is to demonstrate that the EP tries and can actively influence conflict management. Though this influence can only be informal, and cannot take the form of decisions with binding legal effects. In connection with the research goal thus defined, the authors hypothesize that the EP creates political discourse in order to mediatize the conflict using goal-framing and agenda-setting in social media. The research material includes, in addition to documents published in the EP’s Public Register of Documents, primarily posts on the EP’s social media. The European Parliament’s aspirations to expand the scope of its powers in EU foreign policy and the EP’s participation in managing the analyzed conflict through mediatization is especially evident in social media communication targeted towards citizens, related to the PE’s activity in the field of rhetorical diplomacy.

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-6684-9467-7.ch011

Copyright © 2024, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

 The European Parliament’s Activities in European Union Foreign Policy

INTRODUCTION The beginning of 2022 has given the continent of Europe a strong jolt in terms of building international peace and ensuring security. On February 24, 2022, Russia launched its unprovoked and unjustified fullscale aggression against Ukraine. This violates Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence. Russia is conducting a military invasion in violation of the principles of international and humanitarian law, the victims of which are civilians and civilian infrastructure. Already in the first hours of the war, Russian aggression against Ukraine was condemned by the European Parliament (EP). The subject of this chapter is an assessment of the European Parliament’s activities in the area of European Union foreign policy actions. Outlined this way, it requires substantial setting of the limitations of the research field. Firstly, the study is based on the assumption of generalization. This means that, based on the conclusions drawn from the collected material regarding a specific period, the function of the studied mechanisms and phenomena in the future will be estimated. Therefore, secondly, empirical material regarding the European Parliament’s reaction to information about Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine from February 24, 2022, to the end of May 2022 was selected for the study. The third limitation of the study results from the analysis tools used. Despite the restricted formal role of the European Parliament in foreign policy decision-making, this research aims to demonstrate that the EP tries and can actively influence conflict management. However, this influence can only be informal and cannot take the form of decisions with binding legal effects. Characterizing the phenomenon and treating it as a case study would only bring new value in terms of complementing the state of research. The authors propose deepening quantitative research through qualitative analysis using the goal-framing and agenda-setting theories. For this reason, it is necessary to limit the study to the material from the period February 24 - May 31, 2022, and use a generalizing approach. The research material includes, in addition to documents published in the Public Register of Documents European Parliament (European Parliament, 2022a), primarily posts on the European Parliament’s social media (European Parliament, 2022b). Social media platform embodies a web of technological and human complexities with different actors, factors, interests, and relations. These actor-networks and the macro social-political context are influential in the mediatization of conflict in the social media era (Zhang, 2021, p. 2618). The analysis of the European Parliament’s involvement in solving the armed conflict near the EU border is a significant research problem. The conclusions drawn from this study may also be helpful for assessing other disputes in which the European Union has been or still is involved and which are taking place on different continents. It was assumed that this conflict, due to, among others, geographical proximity, values, and symbolism reinforced by historical memory and the observed opening of the Union to new countries in the face of this conflict, became a breakthrough moment that should be subjected to scientific assessment. The chapter is divided into four parts. The first section includes a description of research methodology. The second consists of a literature overview. In the third section, limitations have been indicated for the EP’s activity in the field of foreign policy. The last section offers concrete examples of how the EP can use the tools at its disposal to participate in the management of the conflict under study actively. Finally, a discussion and conclusion are presented.

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 The European Parliament’s Activities in European Union Foreign Policy

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY Even though mediatized conflicts as a research field is still at an early stage and is still awaiting theoretical and conceptual development (Mortensen et al., 2015), it is no less critical. More empirical studies are also needed to enrich and deepen the current studies on media and conflict relations. To fill in these research gaps, this study will use the European Parliament’s response in the first three months of Russia’s armed full-scale aggression against Ukraine in 2022 as a case of conflict management in the digital age. This project will contribute to developing the concept of mediatization of conflict by integrating goal-framing theory (GFT) with agenda-setting and providing up-to-date empirical evidence. Framing is one of the non-normative factors leading to a different perception of a decision proposal by the decision-maker. This phenomenon involves placing emphasis on selected information, resulting in the recipient focusing on that particular aspect of the problem. This research draws from goal-framing theory (GFT) to examine the way the problem is formulated and also to create an interpretive framework for a different perception of the action by EU citizens. Goal-frames are defined as morphems that attract responders’ attention to different focal goals and influence their responses (Levin et al., 1998; Lindenberg & Steg, 2007). In particular, goal frames can be constructed by cues (Lindenberg, 2018; Pan & Kosicki, 1993). For example, expressing the importance of contributing to strengthening security, protecting public goods, etc. (Lindenberg & Foss, 2011). Here, rewards emphasize the goal, which is to care about public goods to highlight the collective benefits. Within the framework of this study, the messages published on the EP’s official website and the social reception of messages on social media are the subject of the study. The initial choice was limited only to the European Parliament’s official Facebook profile (European Parliament, 2022b). The selection of this media platform is dictated, on the one hand, by its popularity among the younger generation that the EU institutions are trying to reach and, on the other hand, by its generally wide popularity among the rest of the European population. The starting date for the discourse covered by the study is the date of launch of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The research overviews a time caesura in late May 2022. Hence, a conceptual and analytical model that delineates different actors (levels of analysis) as well as their relations is needed to unpack the complexities of the mediatization of conflict. In order to visualize the innovative nature of the study and define the application of the concept of mediatization of conflict management, the authors prepared Graph 1. Figure 1 presents the limited participation of the European Parliament in the implementation of the European Union’s foreign policy, which is also not the subject of media discourse. The degree of citizens’ interest in EU foreign policy issues, as well as trust in the Union and its decisions, is the subject of separate research, also conducted by the authors (Witkowska et al., 2023). These analyses clearly show that until spring 2022, public interest in matters related to foreign or defense policy fulfilled by the Union was meager. The material and formal limitations of the European Parliament’s activity in the area of foreign policy will be briefly explained in the following parts of the chapter, as they are the basis for concluding that informal activities of the EP combined with media discourse can be considered a type of mediatization of conflict management.

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 The European Parliament’s Activities in European Union Foreign Policy

Figure 1. Fields of influence of the European Parliament, the institutional system of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and recipients in foreign policy

(Own graphic design based on Krotz, 2007, p. 89)

Despite the restricted formal role of the European Parliament in foreign policy decision-making, this research aims to demonstrate that the EP tries and can actively influence conflict management. However, this influence can only be informal and cannot take the form of decisions with binding legal effects. In connection with the research goal thus defined, the authors hypothesize that the EP creates political discourse in order to mediatize the conflict using goal-framing and agenda-setting in social media. Due to the adaptation of the concept of mediatization, firstly, to a supranational actor and secondly, to the deprivation of power/decision-making competencies, the verification of the assumption will be carried out in two stages. At first, the selection process of research materials has been made. We selected those tools that are related to the soft non-legislative powers, EP’s imprint on the EU foreign policy, or rhetorical diplomacy in the Public Register of Documents of the European Parliament (European Parliament, 2022a). Among these materials, there are MEP’s speeches during the debates both in the plenary meetings and thematic commission meetings; EP’s resolutions on topics related to the EU foreign policy; other MEPs and President of the European Parliament actions that were connected with spreading the information about the matters necessary for the EP. Next, the content analysis has been conducted to identify the intensity of goal-framing usage and its exact kind. The second stage of the study is to verify the initial assumption that the EP uses social media to create political discourse in order to mediatize the conflict. We evaluated the empirical material, which is the EP social media posts that communicate the actions made by the EP to the EU citizens, and also the reaction of the audience to these posts (European Parliament, 2022b). The concept of the framing theory will also be used to assess how strongly audiences respond to and to which the EP takes action. The authors propose the following model (Figure 2) The assumptions of agenda-setting theory will be used to see how strongly the issue under study is accentuated in the Union’s discourse. It will be possible to identify which aspects of the EP’s response to Russia’s full-scale aggression were shaped as prioritized and were expected to attract the attention of the audience. Agenda-setting theory will be a complementary theory in this study. The agenda-setting effect

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is more substantial the greater the audience’s need for information. They use the information provided by the media to satisfy their needs while at the same time having a low level of participation in the discussion. Using the concept of this theory, the study will verify the assumption that EP policy discourse serves the development of civil society and deliberative democracy (example: Jas-Koziarkiewicz, 2017; Stasiak-Jazukiewicz, E. et al., 2020). Figure 2. Model of the mediatization of conflict management: The example of the European Parliament (Own graphic design based on Zhang, 2021, p. 2621)

In connection with the aim of the study specified at the beginning, the authors put forward the assumption that the use of the concept of mediatization reveals the European Parliament’s aspirations to expand the scope of its powers in EU foreign policy and thus proves the EP’s participation in managing the analyzed conflict through mediatization. It is especially evident in social media communication targeted towards citizens, related to the PE’s activity in the field of rhetorical diplomacy. The methods used in the study are a basic analytical grid in line with framing theory and agendasetting, which include content analysis, political discourse analysis, and causal analysis. Complementarily, the study will also use the deductive approach, which involves defining a framework on the basis of the literature and existing theories and then finding them in the analyzed material.

LITERATURE REVIEW The concept of mediatization has been debated for a long because it is about changes. It studies the roles of contemporary media and denotes the process of societal transformations driven by communication technologies (Zhang, 2021, p. 2619). Although mediatization is a vague and contested term, there has

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been a growing number of researchers that have adopted the concept of the mediatization of conflicts/ wars in recent years (for example, Cottle, 2006; Kaempf, 2013; Eskjær et al., 2016). In his book Mediatized Conflict, Cottle (2006) used the phrase ‘mediatized conflict’ to ‘emphasize the complex ways in which media are often implicated within conflicts while disseminating ideas and images about them’ (pp. 8–9). Scholars studied media and conflict relationships from different perspectives as a whole. Most researchers choose an entity with effective powers for these analysis subjects – usually states and their military. The conclusions from this research come down to identifying new media as a source of generating impulses in the actual planning and conduct of war. For example, Kaempf (2013) argued that the rise of new media technology has led to a heteropolar global media environment in which the media-war relationship has been altered. Among the literature presenting the research results using the assumptions of framing theory, researchers are primarily concerned about the level of member states and not the European Union as a supranational level. The subject of previous research has been the discourse with national or local politicians on European-wide issues related to the process of European integration in the national or local press. This study instead assumes the use of analogy and includes the analysis of European-wide level politics on a supranational level, meaning the policy discourse in the European Parliament. It is difficult to identify leading studies covering the supranational level. The research conducted indicates that the existing studies are primarily based on a linguistic approach, in which frames are identified by selecting relevant words and word structures and then searching for them in the text under study (example: Carta, 2015; Domalewska & Żakowska, 2019). In addition, the existing literature is dominated by an inductive approach, including the use of quantitative methods, primarily content analysis (example: Itrich-Drabarek & Kisiel, 2020; Itrich-Drabarek, 2022). The analysis presented here deals instead with current developments in foreign policy and security topics in the region. In the available research, the activity of the European Parliament is studied instead in general terms. Occasionally, the subject of analysis is a selected section on Russian aggression against Ukraine. In addition, the analysis is made in normative terms, i.e., their effectiveness, legitimacy or scope of authority to undertake them, sources of funding, and other normative aspects of analyzing EU policies. The present study places the focus on policy discourse conducted in new media. In this sense, it will be both novel and complementary to the state of existing knowledge. The verbal framing of the conducted discourse in the new media is reinforced by accompanying media images. Indeed, an additional instrument of the studied framing techniques, independent of the text, are visualizations of all kinds, such as interactive graphs, animations, or, finally, short films made available on the Web. The results obtained are essential for the general public and politicians, including international and supranational policymakers. The study is innovative and relevant, as it provides new insights into the role of framing and agenda-setting in the European public space and politics. The study should provide answers to questions that have been bothering European-level politicians about how to improve the state of democracy in the EU, how to improve turnout in EP elections, and, most importantly, what factors stimulate the EP’s attractiveness in the eyes of citizens. The European Parliament is fascinating as a research subject and is not applicable for any generalizations. It is strengthening its position in the political system of the European Union with every cadency getting new competencies or deepening the existing ones, at the same time exploring the mechanisms unattached to the Treaties, but rather attached to its ambition and activity, also the field of the EU’s external action. (Curyło, 2019a; Witkowska, 2021) 229

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The European Parliament in EU Foreign Policy The analysis of the EU foreign policy through the lens of international relations currently dominates the research relevant to the topic (example: Piskorska, 2019). For instance, the European Union defines itself as a global actor and tends to identify itself with such specific features as military, economic, or geopolitical power. Regardless of the academic discussion that is still going on about that issue, the official EU documentation reflects the EU’s capability and desire to achieve complete cohesion in current affairs and present itself as a stable and strong actor. Initially, since the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and the Treaty of Lisbon (2007) went into full action, cohesion in the field of foreign policy has been an issue at the level of member states within the Council of the EU. Still, it is guaranteed by the European Commission (EC), the High Representative/VicePresident (HR/VP) of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (CFSP), or both. The creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the upgrade of the EC’s delegations to EU delegations around the world was seen as a solution to establish that cohesion (Smith, 2013; Duke, 2012). In recent years, there has been an increasing focus within international relations research on the significance of parliaments in foreign policy. In this context, extensive attention has been directed towards the European Parliament’s involvement in shaping and executing EU foreign policy. However, existing analyses have not delved into the strategies and activities employed by the European Parliament to bolster its role in foreign policy (Gryz, 2021). It is worth noting that there has been a growing trend of research on the question of democratic deficit, which is the lack of control by the EP on foreign policy, and of the double democratic deficit — the lack of control by member states’ national parliaments of EU foreign policy — existing in Europe (example: Czaputowicz, 2016; Witkowska, 2015; Curyło, 2019b). In the same context, there are many who believe that the gradual empowerment of the EP on EU foreign policy issues is a remedy to the current democratic shortfalls (Rittberger, 2003). Along the same line, the EP’s quest for more substantial involvement in EU foreign policy matters is closely linked to its ambition to revitalize its relationship with EU citizens and to respond to public opinion demands regarding accountability and legitimacy of EU activities (Davor, 2016). It is important to note that foreign policy, as an integral component of the European Union’s external actions, is regulated by the Treaty on European Union (TEU) (Treaty on European Union, 2012). These actions are classified as intergovernmental policies, where member states make decisions, and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP) is responsible for their execution. The European Parliament’s role in this policy primarily revolves around receiving information from the President of the European Council following summit meetings and approving budgetary allocations. Apart from its designated responsibilities, the European Parliament has broadened its scrutiny of the European Union’s external activities through unconventional avenues. These avenues are not directly tied to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), such as budgetary concerns, but they indirectly affect it. Thanks to the Inter-Institutional Agreement among the European Parliament, the European Commission, and the European Council regarding budgetary discipline and prudent financial management, the European Parliament is now involved in CFSP budget matters and possesses the authority to make decisions in areas like crisis management operations, conflict prevention, resolution, stabilization, and monitoring. Additionally, the European Parliament plays a role in the process of appointing the European Commission, which includes the HR/VP as one of its vice presidents. 230

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Regarding the CFSP, Article 36 of the TEU mandates regular consultations by the HR/VP with the European Parliament on critical aspects and decisions related to the CFSP. Communication between the EEAS and the EP has gained growing importance in the post-Lisbon era, as highlighted by Gianniou and Galariotis in 2016. The HR/VP now frequently appears before both the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee and the plenary session, providing regular updates to Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) on CFSP matters. The European Parliament’s approval is also necessary, in a non-legislative process, for the adoption of international agreements within the framework of the CFSP. For instance, concerning association agreements, the treaty specifies that “Unless the agreements pertain solely to the common foreign and security policy, the Council will make the decision to conclude the agreement... after securing the consent of the European Parliament” (Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, 2012, Title V, Article 218). Since the early 20th century, the European Parliament’s role in international affairs has continuously expanded, as pointed out by Stavridis and Irrera in 2015. As Stelios Stavridis highlights, the regionalization of Europe has contributed to an increasing influence of the European Parliament on the global stage, as mentioned in Stavridis’ work from 2006. Over time, MEPs have effectively gained both formal and informal influence in various matters related to the European Union’s external activities. These include aspects such as promoting democracy and the rule of law in non-EU countries, combating global terrorism, and negotiating international agreements and development aid, among others, as discussed by Gianniou in 2016 and Thym in 2006. This gradual empowerment aligns with the growing public demand for parliamentary oversight of EU actions, as the choices made by Europe unquestionably impact the lives of its citizens, a viewpoint articulated by Gianniou in 2016 and Rittberger in 2005. The mentioned positioning of the EP in foreign policy was strengthening, which has been called by numerous authors as “parliamentarisation.” It comes mainly in the context of the actions’ impact made by the EP regarding respect and deep implementation of Treaties articles. Besides this, the EP empowered its position in the EU foreign policy as a result of its informal actions (so-called “out-of-treaties” or “general Treaty” actions). These actions do not shape directly communicated prerogatives, generate opportunities for impact, or create political declarations of cooperation between the EU institutions. This includes, for example, interinstitutional agreements. In the field of foreign policy, there are three interinstitutional agreements, in which: a) the European Commission has a duty to inform the EP about the intention for talks with a third party in a case of making an agreement; b) and c) the European Council regulated the EP’s access to the information related to the field of the EU foreign policy and external action (Kleizen, 2016, p. 19-22). Another note-worthy element in the context of this research, related to the EP’s position strengthening in the realm of foreign policy, is the indirect and informal powers, described by Péter Bajtay as soft, non-legislative powers (2015, p. 28). Meanwhile, Daniel Fiott defines the tools of “rhetorical diplomacy” among these activities (2015, p. 5). Among these tools are speeches by parliamentarians during debates, both in plenary and in thematic committees, proposing and passing EP resolutions on topics related to EU external policy, campaigning, and publicizing issues of importance to the EP. These instruments allow the EP to shape the public debate and contribute to consolidating the image of the EP, which promotes and legitimizes treaty values as the basis of the EU’s soft power resources.

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Participation of the European Parliament in Conflict Management First, we analyzed the materials, which consisted of documents retrieved from the relevant EP databases and adopted by the EP between 24.02 and 31.05.2022 (European Parliament, 2022a). The common denominator linking these documents is the reference to the area of EU foreign policy and to the Russian full-scale aggression against Ukraine. The material collected for the study presents a wide range of indirect and informal instruments that were used by members of the European Parliament to express their position in the face of Russian aggression against Ukraine. Thus, materials from both the area of soft non-legislative powers and instruments of rhetorical diplomacy were selected, and Tables 1 and 2 below present the amount and type of use of tools from both scopes in the analyzed period. Table 1. Amount and type of formal tools regulated by the Rules Of Procedure of the European Parliament, undertaken in the area of foreign policy between February 24 and May 31, 2022

Source: Own data compilation based on European Parliament (2022a)

The summary of EP activity presented in Table 1 above shows that for MEPs, the problem of the conflict has become a critical topic, both in discussions within the institution itself and in the work of the various thematic committees, most notably the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET). First, an extraordinary plenary was convened, where the first resolutions were adopted. Secondly, the topic of the conflict was debated at every EP plenary in the following months, as well as the subject of subsequent resolutions adopted, questions raised by MEPs, and finally, the issue of setting up special committees. The content analysis carried out, moreover, showed that MEPs undertook numerous activities to which no one objected and which did not find their basis in the set of formal tools regulated by the Rules of Procedure. A summary of the amount and type of this activity is made in Table 2. In the summary presented in Table 2 above, it is noteworthy that the listed activities qualify for the area of external relations. The issue of the legal authority and scope of representation of the President of the EP vis-à-vis other entities of international relations is a topic in itself for a separate analysis. This separate Table showcases data displaying the content on another parliamentary activity, called “rhetorical diplomacy” tools in the literature.

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Table 2. Amount and type of activities not regulated by the rules of procedure of the European Parliament, undertaken in the area of foreign policy between February 24 and May 31, 2022

Source: Own data compilation based on European Parliament (2022a)

The study proceeds to verify the primary assumption that the mentioned informal parliamentary activities in the area of foreign policy strengthen Parliament’s participation in conflict management, and this is made possible through mediatization. As mentioned earlier, mediatization of the conflict occurs by including web users. To this end, the analysis should be complemented by a content analysis of these few selected posts. At this stage of the study, the content of posts published on the official Facebook profile of the European Parliament was analyzed (European Parliament, 2022b). At this point, it is necessary to find an answer to the question, what influenced the support for these EP publications on the FB profile, and what selected communications generated additional excitement and engagement among the audience? The scope of the analysis was truncated to material related to the previously indicated EP activity from the months of March to May 2022. An analysis of the content of the posts yielded precise results in the finding that information about the adoption of any EP resolution or recommendation was not published. This confirms the findings of other researchers, especially in the area of new media, that the language of messages should be accessible, clear, not very formalized, and lofty, communicating about issues important to every citizen and not to Parliament as an institution. The lack of simplicity distances the target audience from the EP’s work. Thus, the nominal value of the fact that the resolution was passed was replaced in subsequent communications in social media by a value or expression intended to wake emotion up in the consumer. The study separately presents the results of audience activity for posts delivering content on the merits of parliamentary deliberations, called “plenary highlights.” Examples of recurring phrases in such posts: • • • •

The Parliament has a busy week ahead. Members will discuss topics like (…) Parliament members will be working on a variety of issues in the coming week Parliament will vote next week on a (...) Today, Parliament will be discussing (...)

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Figure 3. The intensity of audience reaction to the posts published on the official EP’s platform on Facebook, related to the: “Plenary highlights” and debates with a link to the “LIVE” broadcast

(Own data compilation based on European Parliament (2022b))

This quantitative comparison aims to answer the following question: Which set of informal instruments performs better in the EP’s relationship with citizens, especially in communicating actions taken in the face of Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine? In order to conclude, it is vital to analyze the content of the compared posts, which were visualized in Figure 3. Visible in this graph, the support for posts from the month of March is very high on this platform. Recipient activity towards posts with content communicating the EP’s debate on problems related to Russia’s full-scale aggression was the highest only in the first month and if the post included “Live” content. In the following months, this activity was much lower and not high enough, even when the post had “Live” content of the debate. Another issue that we subjected to in-depth content analysis is posts about the speech by the President of the EP, reporting on both her visits to Ukraine and the reception of foreign visitors to the EP by the President of the EP. The issue that should be emphasized in the first place is the high amplitude of the scale of recipients’ reactions to messages with these two different contents presented in graphs 3 and 4. Figure 3 on the left vertical axis shows the amount of support given by recipients for posts with information about debates in the European Parliament regarding problems arising in connection with Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine and about the actions taken to counteract the adverse effects of this conflict. In the first

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two days of the conflict, this support reached 1.2 thousand and 700 likes. Then, in the next four weeks, the highest support ranged from 580 to 650 likes. In the following weeks, we observed decreasing support, reaching from 220 to 360 likes. Figure 4. The intensity of audience reaction to the posts published on the official EP’s platform on Facebook, related to the: “Speech by the President of the EP” and “President of EP visits & meetings” (Own data compilation based on European Parliament (2022b))

Posts included “Live” content of the debate received much higher support. In February and March, posts with such content received support ranging from 2.2 thousand up to 22.0 thousand likes. In the following months, the Press Office of the European Parliament modified the EP’s discourse on social media. In April, only one post with such content was published, and in May, two, but they were no longer as popular. Compared to the popularity scale of posts presenting information about the ongoing debate in Parliament, posts containing information about the use of means called “rhetorical diplomacy,” for example, enjoyed a much larger popularity scale. Posts reporting on “Speech by the President of the EP” reached from 1.1 thousand to 16.0 thousand likes. Public opinion activity on such posts continued in an upward trend. Similarly, the support given to posts reporting “President of the EP visits & meetings” was upward. The amplitude of support ranged from 1.0 thousand likes to 17.0 thousand likes. In analyzing the collected material, conclusions should be drawn on two levels. In the first, the conclusions concern the frequency of posts reporting on the topic of parliamentary debates on Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine in March-May 2022. In this aspect, a marked decline is evident. In the month of March, 11 posts were published. In the following months, however, far fewer: in April - 7 and in May - 5. The lower frequency of publications about “rhetorical diplomacy” activity results from the smaller number of activities of this nature actually undertaken (see Table 2). In the month of

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March, six posts were published, in April - 3 and in May - 2. Secondly, it should be clearly emphasized that almost every post in the field of rhetorical diplomacy evoked higher, much higher, or many times higher reactions among the audience than posts communicating about parliamentary work, the scale of reception of which is presented in Figure 4. Here, support and engagement among recipients of the EP’s Facebook post about imposing sanctions against Russia will be analyzed (Figure 5). Figure 5. The scale of outreach of the EP’s Facebook post about imposing the sanctions against Russia, together with several debates in EP during particular months where there was a discussion about these sanctions (Own data compilation based on European Parliament (2022a & b))

As counted with the information in the Documents Registry, the sanctions were debated seven times in March, four times in April, and six times in May. Meanwhile, on Facebook, there was just one post on the topic each month. Comparing the number of likes (a punctured line) with the posts on other topics, this one did not gain an active interaction The above examples of content analysis indicate that only the use of goal-framing will provide an answer to the research question about the source of the recipients’ high response to the content of the post. It is a different kind of framing. Manipulation can be designed to influence the implicit goals that an individual adopts. In particular, the issue may be framed to focus attention on its potential to provide a benefit or gain (positive frame) or on its potential to prevent or avoid a loss (negative frame). Both

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frames should enhance the evaluation of the issue, but the question here is which type of goal is the more powerful enhancer. In a typical example of this type of framing effect, the impact of a persuasive message has been shown to depend on whether the message stresses either the positive consequences of performing an act or the negative consequences of not completing the action. The positive frame focuses attention on the goal of obtaining a positive result (or gain). In contrast, the negative frame focuses attention on avoiding the negative consequence (or loss) (Levin et al., 1998, p. 167). The post, dated 30/05/2022, presented in photo no. 1, which received about 16,000 Likes, 3,000 comments, and 734 shares, is about President of the EP Roberta Metsola’s speech at the opening of the European summit (European Parliament, 2022b). It is an example of positive goal framing. This post is crafted to show the European Union as a robust and reliable actor at the geopolitical stage. By offering its intentions to give up on Russian energy exports, it also shows its moral compass and responds to the critique of the EU. Figure 6. The post on European Parliament’s Facebook, dated 30/05/2022 (European Parliament, 2022b)

Figure 7. The post on European Parliament’s Facebook, dated 19/05/2022 (European Parliament (2022b))

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Figure 7 is an illustration of another example of framing. The first sentence used in the post: “Moldova is strongly determined to stay part of the free world.” (European Parliament, 2022b) is an expression of the use of positive framing. Instead of presenting the difficulties that Moldova is currently struggling with after Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the message begins with a positive message about what they expect, what they are fighting for, and what values are now their goal. This post received about 5,600 Likes, 666 comments, and 460 shares (European Parliament, 2022b). In contrast, we present an example of recipients’ reaction to a message without framing (Figure 8). On the same day, the EP published a post on a similar topic but without the use of framing. He clearly expressed his demand to “confiscate Russian oligarch’s assets, using new EU own resources and fully using the existing EU budget.” (European Parliament, 2022b). This is one of many examples verifying the hypothesis that the use of framing significantly stimulates interaction with recipients. Figure 8. The post on European Parliament’s Facebook, dated 19/05/2022

(European Parliament (2022b))

Figure 9. The posts on European Parliament’s Facebook, dated 18/05/2022 and 4/05/202 (European Parliament (2022b))

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Now, two examples of posts (Photo 4) with a significant number of audience reactions are visible in Figure 5. Visible in Figure 10, support for posts from 4.05. and 18.05 is very high on this platform because it included “Live” debate content. The post dated 4.05. received about 4,700 Likes, 785 comments, and 463 shares (European Parliament, 2022b). The post dated 18.05. received about 4,500 Likes, 1,800 words, and 535 shares (European Parliament, 2022b). Yet another piece of evidence that positively verifies the study’s hypothesis (Figure 10). The post contains a message regarding external activity, called rhetorical diplomacy, a visit of the President of the European Parliament in Kyiv. (European Parliament, 2022b) The post dated 14.04. received about 17,000 Likes, 1,700 comments, and 1,100 shares (European Parliament, 2022b). Figure 10. The posts on European Parliament’s Facebook, dated 14/04/2022 (European Parliament (2022b))

CONCLUSION The research sought a solution to the problem of intensity and kind of activities of the EP that are not regulated formally by Treaties. Nevertheless, they are building the EP’s unique position either via narration or evolutionarily through “parliamentarisation” of the EU’s foreign policy (Curyło, 2019a). The considerations were limited to the foreign policy actions taken by the EP in the first three months after the launch of the Russian full-scale aggression against Ukraine. Despite the restricted formal role of the European Parliament in foreign policy decision-making, this research aimed to demonstrate that the EP tries and can actively influence conflict management. However, as the study showed, this influence can only be informal and cannot take the form of decisions with binding legal effects. In connection with the research goal thus defined, the authors hypothesize that the EP creates political discourse in order to mediatize the conflict using goal-framing and agenda-setting in social media. It is especially evident in social media communication targeted towards citizens, related to the PE’s activity in the field of rhetorical diplomacy. We have positively verified our hypothesis that the EP, by its actions, has strengthened its position in the area of foreign policy, that foreign policy has been “parliamentarized” and the voice

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of the citizens, analyzing the discourse of the policy both on the official website and in the media shows that citizens approve of this trend and thus increase the legitimacy for the EP to take such actions. In the first month, immediately after Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine, the motivation of MEPs to take action was high. It manifests itself, among others, in the following activities that take place in the first weeks of March: a) adoption of three resolutions, b) four Inter-parliamentary meetings, c) extraordinary plenary session, d) double the number of submitted parliamentary questions. This incredibly intense activity was not repeated in the following months. Of particular importance in the area of soft non-legislative powers are resolutions, which constitute an essential instrument for the EP’s presence in the sphere of EU foreign policy and, at the same time, compensate it for the relatively weak scope of “hard” legislative powers (Kleizen, 2015, p. 38-39). This thesis was based on the results of examining the content of the adopted resolutions, which were not only an instrument for expressing the EP’s position to a broader international audience but, above all, a tool for communicating and expressing its position in the EU institutional system. In the study, the indicated manifestations of informal EP activity were assessed using assumptions of goal-framing theory. The support scale among recipients of the posts of the European Parliament Press Office on the official Facebook profile ranged from several hundred likes to approximately 22,000 likes. Posts containing the following content received low support from citizens: a) negative frame, b) no framing, e.g., information about current parliamentary work. On the other hand, posts containing the following content received more extensive or very high support from citizens: a) the activity of the President of the EP: her speeches, the guests she received, her visits and meetings; b) information containing “LIVE” content, and other posts if the content was marked as video material. The fact is that as time passed, there were gradually fewer posts with content regarding Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine. There were 32 such posts in March, 20 in April, and 19 in May. Despite the gradually decreasing number of posts referring to this topic, the study found that the intensity of recipients’ reactions to the published posts remained high.

REFERENCES Bajtay, P. (2015). Shaping and Controlling Foreign Policy: Parliamentary Diplomacy and Oversight, and the Role of the European Parliament. Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/549045/EXPO_STU(2015)549045_EN.pdf Balfour, R., & Ojanen, H. (2011). Does the EEAS Represent a Model for the Challenges of Global Diplomacy? (IAI Working Paper 11). Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome Carta, C. (2015). The swinging “we”: Framing the European Union international discourse. Journal of Language and Politics, 14(1), 65–86. doi:10.1075/jlp.14.1.04car Cottle, S. (2006). Mediatized Conflict. Open University Press. Curyło, B. (2019a). Parlamentaryzacja polityki zewnętrznej Unii Europejskiej: wybrane instrumenty wpływu Parlamentu Europejskiego na aktywność międzynarodową UE. In A. Nitszke & J. J. Węc (Eds.), Podsumowanie VIII kadencji Parlamentu Europejskiego. Wyzwania integracji europejskiej w latach 2014-2019 (pp. 189–206). Księgarnia Akademicka. doi:10.12797/9788381380881.09

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Chapter 12

X-Raying Digital Activism in Selected Countries: New Frontiers for Mobilization Collence T. Chisita https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7375-8627 University of South Africa, South Africa Alexander Madana Rusero Africa University, Zimbabwe Vusi W. Tsabedze https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9223-4266 University of Eswatini, Eswatini Amahle Khumalo https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2001-9919 Durban University of Technology, South Africa

ABSTRACT The spectacle of digital activism has taken the world by storm as silent voices manipulate the advantages or opportunities provided by social networking sites (SNSs) to organise protests by engaging their audiences using a panoply of digital technologies. The efficacy of such novel engagement as part of social action movements has become common worldwide, and Africa is no exception. The proliferation of digital media spaces has often made authoritarian resilience costly, but it continues to oil the surveillance economy, data capitalism, and global information manipulation. The chapter presents classical case studies reflecting how this phenomenon has engulfed African states. A qualitative research approach unpacks this phenomenon, as it has become deeply rooted in Africa’s drive for social change. The chapter enquires about epistemological reasons such platforms have become a threat to the legacy media.

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-6684-9467-7.ch012

Copyright © 2024, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

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INTRODUCTION Fergusson and Molina (2020) argued that increased access to social media and other communication networks characteristically escalates the likelihood of protests. Mwaura (2017) noted that studies on social media in Africa have focused on social media activism and not on the taxonomy of social media dissidence. Suwana (2019) defined digital activism as using digital media to take part in activism to achieve agendas, push for economic, social, and political change, and organize public campaigns (Edwards, Howard, & Joyce, 2013). On a similar note, Hutchinson (2019) viewed digital activism as an amalgamation of several approaches toward protest, visibility, mobilization, and activity. The author associated digital activism with civil disobedience as denial of service attacks, open-source advocacy, and hashtag activism. Joyce, (2010) states that this form of activism constitutes using digital media to engage in hashtag activism, such as hashtag movements and open-source advocacy. Gerbaudo (2017) argues that netizens connected through digital networks can coordinate action, share information, and develop goals for political activism. Digital activism marks a new phase uniquely distinguished from traditional legacy activism, as discussed below.

Research Questions The following questions will guide the study; RQ1. What is digital activism? RQ2. What are the different forms of digital activism? RQ3.How have these forms manifested themselves on digital platforms in selected African countries? RQ4. Why do marginalized groups resort to digital activism?

Research Methodology The researchers used a literature review to analyze content relating to digital activism in selected countries. Singh & Sahu (2020) highlighted that the ability to develop research by referring or connecting it to existing knowledge is a building block of all academic research activities, notwithstanding discipline. According to the authors mentioned above, integrating findings and perspectives from many empirical findings makes it practical for a literature review to address research questions with no single study’s supremacy. The researchers undertook the following activities as a way to accomplish the literature review: • • • •

designing the review, conducting the review, analysis; and writing up the review.

The literature review flowchart is illustrated in Figure 1. This flowchart guided the study concerning digital activism. The literature has been initiated focusing on research in digital activism in selected countries.

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Figure 1. Key questions guiding the literature review

The second figure below (Figure 2) presents the key motifs that guided the study on digital activism in selected countries. These motifs are derived from the key research questions of the survey. The motifs start from the general concept relating to the nature of digital activism and progress to an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the phenomenon of digital activism. It also explores the forms of digital activism and how it manifests itself in the modern era. Furthermore, the motifs enabled the researcher to examine the merits and digital activism within the context of selected countries.

LITERATURE REVIEW The following section will review the literature relating to digital activism guided by the key research questions (Figure 1) and motifs (Figure 2).

On the Notions of Digital Activism George and Leidner (2018b) distinguished between traditional and digital activism because the former was more appealing to older constituencies, required massive resources, and relied on member retention, while the latter depends on digital technologies to share content, relying on digital multi-media content instantly, appeals to young techno-centric demographic groups, promotes minority voices and reaches a broader audience among others. Wang, Wang, & Zhu, (2013) argued that traditional mass media have historically had the authority to regulate and form an opinion on issues. Arguably under the influence of the current elite; Social Networking Sites (SNSs) have weaponized regular citizens to mobilize and share information among themselves and to mobilize the elite and traditional mass media on issues significant to citizens. However, posting content on social media benefits corporations like Meta and Bytedance

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which have gained notoriety, for monetizing and manipulating the data. When digital activists post content online they should be aware that their data is susceptible to surveillance. For various purposes, our daily lives produce data that is collected, aggregated, fed into algorithms, and used to predict our behaviour: to sell advertisements, of course, but also to calibrate technologies, improve search results, contribute to valuable research, and more nefariously, to feed intelligence agencies’ insatiable desire for information on our global communication (West, 2019). Digital activism and digital terrorism risk being exploited for the benefit of surveillance capitalism in the weird and wired world. Figure 2. Key motifs guiding the study on digital activism in selected countries in Africa

Digital Activism and its Manifestations Greijdanus, et.al (2020) noted that the concept of activism, in general, has been associated with physical gatherings characterized by mass behaviours such as demonstrations and disruptive activities. Online activism involves individuals united in their worldviews yet dispersed in time and space. Online activism manifests in myriad forms, from symbolic signalling of one’s stance on a politicized issue to more complex engagement, for example, writing detailed posts about a social problem (Gomez & Kaiser, 2019). A digital activist raises public awareness through social media and facilitates people to engage in activities they would not do online otherwise due to other factors, such as fear of breaking the law (George & Leidner, 2019). Digital activism elevates people from passivity to activism by affording citi-

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zens platforms to create content, share, and mobile. Gomez & Kaiser,(2019) identified three typologies of digital activism, ranging from the following: • • •

digital spectators who include individuals or groups who are involved in clicktivism by either liking or following; metavoicers, namely those who share or re-tweet social activists’ posts and those who produce content on social media; digital transnationalism activists who are involved in political activism, funding and digital petitions, among other activities; and digital gladiator activists who engage in data leaks, digital hacktivism, or data hacktivism.

Mare (2016, 64) likened George and Leidner’s (2019) digital transitional activism to “slacktivism,” supposedly forged, minimalist forms of online political engagement commonly associated with petitions and likes on social media. Shirky (2011) argued that social media provides new outlets for very low-effort action. The term “clicktivism” refers to political actions that are achieved through “liking” and sharing a candidate or political post (Shirkey, 2011). Such actions tend to mislead political actors into believing that they have more supporters, yet on the ground, the popularity might be less than what it appears to be on digital platforms like social media. Closely linked to digital transitional activism is armchair activism which is a non-disruptive act involving the formation of political social media groups, re-tweeting of articles of political interest, and the shareability of politically relevant videos on YouTube. Shulman (2009) viewed clicktivism as a technique of mass-mailing campaigns and rated it as low-quality and low-impact online mobilizations involving the circulation of letters via email, which advocates a certain position or cause. Brassil (2011) noted that the concurrent dispersal of social media and protests around the world has raised questions about the role of social media as a catalyst for dissent, protests, and other forms of contentious politics. According to the author, the discourse on the impact of social media on socio-political protests has coalesced around sceptics and the optimistic camp, the former trivializes social media as an instrument for political change, while the optimistic group views social media as crucial for modern socio-political activism (Howard and Hussain 2011; 2013). Digital activism, including clicktivism, relies on digital technologies, unlike traditional activism, which symbolizes conventional activities, such as voting, attending rallies, or writing letters to officials. This form of activism is similar to digital transnationalism activism highlighted above by George and Leidner (2019). Vamosi (2011) viewed digital hacktivism as the vehicle used to refer to activism or action for political change conducted on digital platforms. Chandler (2016) described digital hacktivism as developing new approaches to securing communities from threats and disruptions based on collective awareness and responsiveness to changes in fluid contexts, often through developing and applying new digital technologies. In traditional approaches to security, the figure of the hacker is a problematic and disruptive one, posing a threat to the computerized networks and high-tech infrastructures essential to the smooth, fixed, and linear running of modern economies (However, the concept of ‘hacking’ is ambiguous (see McCormick, 2013). Van Laer & Van Aelst, (2010) argued that hacktivists, as digital activists, manipulate the Internet’s digital space for hostile activities. They use cyberterrorist activities, including DoS attacks via automated email floods, website defacements altering the source code of targeted websites, or the use of malicious software like viruses and worms. Stewart & Schultze, (2019) noted that the examination of data from several independent studies on digital activism in an endeavour to find out overall trends proffers two assumptions, firstly; technology at the heart of digital activism and secondly, the fluidity and impermanence of digital activism due 248

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to lack of commitment to a specific purpose by targeted audiences. Gil de Zúñiga, Ardèvol-Abreu, & Casero-Ripollés (2021) highlighted that Instant Messaging (I.M.) applications users access news from anywhere, irrespective of time and space through their phones, instantly open a chat window and engage in discourse with partner/s or group/s. According to the authors’ news from social and traditional media sources stimulates political discussion on WhatsApp. Social media, such as WhatsApp, has more significant stimulus on WhatsApp discussion on activism because users may perceive that such platforms offer more security features concerning who can see their messages when compared with other more open online environments and that participation-related information may follow different distribution channels, depending on its content and tone (Gil de Zúñiga, Ardèvol-Abreu, & Casero-Ripollés, 2021). Onslow, (May 2021) analysis of social media’s impact on political discourse in South Africa described the technological impact as a complex, diverse, and dynamic information landscape that engulfs the universe. According to the author, the numerous social media platforms and the mediums they come in, for example, mobile phone applications or internet-based websites, stress the velocity with which such media has changed the provision of news and opinion across the country. Similarly, Mugari (2020) contended that global technological developments revolutionized people’s interactions. The author acknowledged social media as an index of technological advancement and its significant impact on communication. Walsh & O’Connor, 2019) contended that social media have altered media systems, permanently revolutionizing the undercurrents of production, consumption, and dissemination as reflected in social networking (Facebook), photo and video sharing (Instagram, YouTube), or micro-blogging (Twitter) sites There is a correlation between the formation of online and offline activism because the former activism facilitates offline protest by advertising and organizing it (Zhuravskaya, Petrova, & Enikolopov, 2020). Offline activism involves physical participation and engagement with organisations and communities for a common cause. Gomez and Kaiser (2019) argued that the weird and wired world, known as the World Wide Web (WWW) bottom-up mobilization, moves into motion when signals to action cascade through interconnected personal networks. Another form of digital activism was seen during the COVID-19 pandemic when pro-vaxxers and anti-vaxxers clashed over the draconian rules imposed by governments to control the movement of people. Schradie (2020) noted the anti-COVID-19 vaccine protestors in the United States of America used social media to propagate their digital activism against the coronavirus lockdowns or mask mandates. These protestors, drawn from right-wing conservative groups, argued that COVID-19 pandemic rules undermined their constitutional freedom and liberty. The tirades and diatribes between China and the United States of America over the origin of the COVID-19 virus coupled with online campaigns by pro-vaccination and anti-vaccination groups created an avalanche of information that is referred to as “Coroinfodeluge” (Chisita, Rusero, Marutha, Chigwada, & Durodolu, 2022; Chisita, & Ngulube, 2022). The Coroinfodeluge refers to the infodemic characterized by the overabundance of unverified COVID-19 pandemic information that creates psychological uneasiness, anxiety, and cognitive dissonance.

DIGITAL PLATFORMS AND THE EMERGENCE OF DIGITAL ACTIVISM Digital platforms have become critical tools for social activism because they offer great potential for broadly disseminating feminist ideas, shaping new modes of discourse about gender and sexism, connecting to different constituencies, and allowing creative modes of protest to emerge. The example of 249

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hashtag feminism makes clear how the increased use of digital media has altered, influenced, and shaped feminism in the twenty-first century by giving rise to changing modes of communication, different kinds of conversations, and new configurations of activism across the globe, both online and offline. Sebeelo, (2021) argued that digital technologies have impacted the world in fundamental ways over the past 30 years. The author noted that the African continent has not been out of danger from this unescapable technological perplexity. Sebeelo (2021) cited the African political landscape as an arena of contest where emerging digital technologies, especially social media, have significantly made inroads into a space that was traditionally the preserve of legacy media. Otiono, (2021) noted how African leaders had experienced citizens using mobile social media to invigorate demands for but not limited to the following: democratic and fair elections; an end to government corruption; countering rampant human rights abuses; fighting for more excellent civil society representation; and mitigating socio-economic grievances. In 2015–6, in half of the sub-Sahara African (SSA) countries in which presidential or parliamentary national elections were held, the government ordered Internet shutdowns as voters headed to polling stations. (Freyburg, & Garbe, 2018). According to the author, Uganda, Burundi, Ethiopia, Chad, and the Republic of Congo were cited as countries that shut down the internet during national elections. Mugari (2020) chose a social movement theory to analyze the context of the impact of social media on national security by exposing the dynamics of unrest and protest movements. Ghonim (2012) described social movements as collective initiatives to establish a novel order of life with a multi-pronged aim underpinned by dissatisfaction with the status quo and hopefulness in creating a new social order. The social movement theory assumes that collective action is more likely to bear fruit in communities with strong network ties (Mugari, 2020). The proliferation of digital platforms in the form of social media enables digital activists to exploit and bring together individuals who share common interests, attributes, activities, and causes. Cammaerts, (2015, 1) defined a social movement as a collaborative process through which collective actors articulate their interests, voice grievances, and propose solutions to identified problems by engaging in various collective actors. These movements are characterised by immersion in conflictual relations with clearly identified opponents; secondly; their linkage consists of impenetrable informal networks; and thirdly; the members share a distinct collective identity (Della Porta, & Diani, 2006). There are various forms of digital activism, including clicktivism, metavoicing, assertion, e-funding, political consumerism, digital petitions, botivism, data activism, exposure, and hacktivism (George & Leidner, 2019). Studies on the role of social media on the African political landscape are mixed and varied depending on conditions on the ground. Some studies have downplayed the role of social media as a democratization tool (Van Laer & Van Aelst, 2010). Concepts like ‘slacktivism’ (see Cook et al., 2014) have been used to show that an over-reliance on social media to bring about political change in Africa is problematic. Bosch et al. (2020) call these groups of scholars’ techno-pessimists’, who believe that social media cannot solve political engagement. One of the challenges of social media in Africa is that it is mainly based in urban areas and can be accessed by wealthy individuals with internet connections. The digital divide undermines effective participation in social media-based activism. Van Laer & Van Aelst, (2010) argued that many people had been left behind in the digital evolution due to the lack of access to internet connectivity and access and digital literacy skills. There is also the digital divide within cyberspace, for example, the digital divide separating those who can utilize the Internet for political aims and those who are starved of access to digital technologies Ross, et.al. (2019) argued that digital activism is not limited to human beings because bots and other autonomous agents play a significant role in collaborative communication online. It is important to 250

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note that studies on digital activism are becoming more interested in unpacking the substantial part of other types of actors, mainly Bots (Ross et al., 2019). Young, Selander, & Vaast, (2019) contended that Bots have the protentional to distort public discourse as they are used to inflate protests for monetary or political gain. Bots may also be part of a human-bot (cyborg) partnership wherein contributions from one account are made by Bots and human actors at different times or as part of joint construction. The authors above argued that posterity-centric innovations would increase the human-bot imbroglio, making it increasingly difficult to discern where the human ends and the Bot begins concerning social media contexts and beyond. The four waves of digital activism include, the anti-globalization movement, mobilized by the Zapatista movement within Mexico; the anti-Iraq war movements span 2001–2007; and thirdly. Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRICs) between 2007 and 2010 and, fourthly, the Snowden and Wikileaks movements between 2010 and 2013 (Karatzogiani, 2015). These waves provide a basis for understanding the phenomenon of digital activism.

THEORISING DIGITAL ACTIVISM Case 1: Zimbabwe Chitanana (2020) argued that the convergence of technological affluence and a diminishing civil society space at the turn of the 2000s spurred novelties that shaped the practices of digital advocacy groups in Zimbabwe concerning the typologies of platforms used, their relationships with members, and the general nature of their mediations. The organizations involved in digital activism included Kubatana (2001), Sokwanele (2003), #ThisFlag (2016), the #Tajamuka campaign, Occupy Africa Unit Square (OAUS) (2014), Magamba Network, #GenerationalConsensus (2018), and #EDHasMyVote (ZANUPF) (2018). Digital activism has also been adopted in tourism in Zimbabwe, as evidenced by local and global responses to the shooting of Cecil the Lion in 2015 by the American tourist Walter Palmer (Mkono, 2017). According to the author, the incident triggered a global “cyber movement” against trophy hunting, probing its sustainability from a moral-ethical standpoint. Mkono (2017) argued that, while the #CeciltheLion could not end trophy hunting, it emerged as an imperative learning curve, providing various groups and individuals with a whirlwind to petition for change. The activities of these digital activist organizations were shaped by the technologies of their time; for example, Kubatana and Sokwanele emerged in the email, RSS, and Blogs era. Their followership was mainly subscription-based, and they used emailing lists, and RSS feeds to engage their followers. Magamba Network triangulates e digital media and performative culture to challenge the status quo (Chitanana, 2020). Matsilele and Ruhanya (2020) noted that #ThisFlag used online platforms, while #Tajamuka blended online and offline communities to mobilize citizens to protest against state abuses and the exacting economic conditions. A reactionary response from the government has met digital activism. The first major “partial Internet shutdown” on Wednesday, July 6, 2016, when the #ThisFlag campaign and #Tajamuka movement staged protests to pressure the government to fix the economy, respect human rights, and listen to the grievances of ordinary people (Mpofu & Mare, 2020). The series of protests coupled with worsening economic conditions culminated in a coup d’état that ushered in the birth of the Second Republic under President Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa.

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Case 2 The Arab Spring Moldovan, (2020) and Gelivin (2018) noted the spate of popular uprisings across the Middle East, known as the Arab Spring. The uprisings in Tunisia in December 2010 resulted in the ousting of four of the region’s most rooted and long-lasting dictators, namely, Tunisia’s Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi and Yemen’s Ali Abdullah Saleh. Khondker, (2011, 677) noted that during the Arab Spring in Egypt, the protestors confirmed that they used a myriad of social media platforms; for example, Facebook was employed to schedule the protests, Twitter for coordination, and YouTube to inform the world what was going on in the fight against the Mubarak regime. Tudoroiu, (2014) highlighted that novel technology, including the Internet, cell phones, and satellite television played a crucial role in the organization and diffusion of Arab Spring protest. Fuchs, (2012) noted that citizens with an interest in democracy used such technology to develop widespread networks, create social capital, organize political action locally and nationally, and put in place transnational links. Moldovan (2020) argued that the legacy media, namely, the television channel Al Jazeera and social media (mainly Twitter and Facebook), played a crucial role in mobilizing people and creating a sense of shared grievances across many different countries and social classes. Digital technology enabled the establishment of virtual spaces where people could communicate, organize themselves, and voice their anti-government demands, to the point where the events were often referred to, by media professionals and political pundits alike, as a genuine “social media” revolution (Howard, & Hussain, 2013:13). The Tunisian uprising started on December 17, 2010, when a fruit seller Mohammed Bouazizi, set himself on fire in front of a public building. Cassara & Lengel, (2013) argued that social media was critical in spreading the protests over the region, while (Ehrenberg, 2012) contended that the role of social media was subsidiary to the revolt. Lim, (2013) noted that digital activism in Tunisia was organized around the Internet network for many years, and it developed over time as online campaigns against Internet censorship gained momentum. Successful and failed digital campaigns. Anderson (2011) and Khondker (2011) cited the Arab Spring as a successful case because it led to the toppling or destabilization of political regimes in the short term. However, the optimism that characterized the Arab Spring began to fade as reality dawned, for example, the loss of human lives in Syria, instability in Libya, military rule in Egypt, and renewed instability in Algeria (Ogbonnaya, & Femi-Adedayo, 2017).

Case 3 Nigeria #EndSARS Online Dambo, Ersoy, Auwal, Olorunsola, & Saydam, (2021) noted that the #EndSARS online protests against the Special Anti-robbery Squad (SARS) unit of the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) were renewed after a video emerged on October 3, 2020, showed some officers of the NPF bolting away from a scene in a white vehicle that allegedly belonged to an unarmed young man they had just shot in Delta state. According to the authors, the protest received attention from the global community, and this was a welcome development for Nigerian youths who had campaigned against SARS since late 2017. Muchie, & Gumede, 2017) and Omitola, (2017) argued that the nature of policing in Nigeria remained highly centralized, non-responsive, corrupt, ineffective, inept, and dependent on outdated and waning equipment. The author argued that security in Africa can only be successful if it is deeply rooted in the aspirations of the people for peace and stability. People-centric security frameworks will help to guard against Western-driven solutions based on the concept of “one size fits all” solutions that are far removed from local idiosyncrasies and challenges (Omitola, 2017). Clayton (2018) argued that digital activism against police brutality was 252

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a universal phenomenon and that Nigeria was no exception. The author cites the famous and historic “The Black Lives Matter” (BLM) that ascended in response to the frequent killings of unarmed African Americans by white police officers in the United States of America. Through Twitter and WhatsApp, digital activists mobilized young people and shared the locations of the protests. Dambo, Ersoy, Auwal, Olorunsola, Olonode, Arikewuyo, & Joseph, (2020) study on the Nigerian#EndSARS campaign qualitatively analysed 2,682 tweets from the #EndSARS hashtag using the analytical program Leximancer 4.5. These tweets highlighted the key themes emanating from the study, for example, excessive police abuse, human rights abuse, injustice, activism, and corruption. The authors’ scientific research confirmed that while the themes mentioned above ignited massive movements globally, the #EndSARS movement was, to a greater extent, restricted to Twitter without any significant physical activity. Despite the shortfalls above, (Ochi, & Mark, 2021) noted that digital activism through the #EndSARS protest achieved its aims, as evidenced by the government’s disbandment of SARs, confirmation of the potential of digital technologies for social change, drawing global attention to the menace of police brutality in Nigeria and heightened calls for concern for good governance and accountability for a sustainable economy. Freelon, McIlwain, & Clark, (2018) argued that it is crucial to consider the political environment in which social movements operate since securing the buy-in from people in power is a strong force for social change.

Case 4 Fall of the Akaev Regime in Kyrgyzstan in 2004 Two leading ISPs suffered an alleged hacker attack during the unrest before President Akayev was ousted on March 24 and were forced to remove information reporting on the growing instability in the country during the uprising. In addition to claiming that online censorship had been launched by the government, opposition leaders claimed that mobile phones had played an important role in mobilizing protesters and disseminating information during the March “tulip revolution.”

DISCUSSION The case studies highlighted above testify to the extent to which human beings in the era of digital technologies can be utilized for social change. While protestors might have a genuine cause to advance their grievances, digital platforms can be manipulated by fake news peddlers to create confusion. Digital activism case studies from selected countries highlighted above reflect the potential of digital activism in the era of constant change. Lobera & Portos, (2021) noted that the exponential rise and use of digital media had generated a more disjointed and varied media atmosphere in the last decade, resulting in a current of information that is more liquefied and sophisticated to manage. According to Castells (2015) (Wang, Wang, & Zhu, 2013) and Schultz (2014), digital activism enables a wide assortment of political actors to sidestep the legacy media using digital platforms, reducing the influence of the traditional concierges thus managing to produce and disseminate political content. The same point was raised by Sebeelo (2021) and Moldovan (2020) highlighted the potential of digital activism in penetrating areas previously considered a preserve of legacy media. Digital activism through social media exploits the opportunities of networking to develop and sustain social relations for a common cause. Digital platforms are used by digital activists to propel non-conformist views that seek to challenge the status quo as highlighted above (Ghonim, 2012). The case studies highlighted above confirm that the Arab Spring in North Africa in the second decade of the twenty-first century, the Nigeria #EndSARS 253

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online in 2020, and digital activism in Zimbabwe reflect a new era of non-conformism. Onoleye (2020) noted that social media has become part of the trendiest platforms of digital protest and was key to the success of the #EndSARS protest. Matsilele, & Ruhanya, (2021) argued that social media dissidence in Zimbabwe has leveraged the reclamation of citizen voices and spaces that traditional media typically screens out. The proliferation of social media platforms in everyday life has extended the public sphere, by preferring an alternative space for citizens to share information and engage in innovative communication practices with elected and unelected officials (Mhiripiri and Mutsvairo, 2014) Karekwaivanane & Msonza, (2021) in an analysis of the digital landscape in Zimbabwe viewed the phenomenon as, a double-edged sword that weaponizes citizens on the one hand and reinforces state power on the other. This assertion is supported by the reaction of the government in Tunisia in the second decade of the twenty-first century, the Zimbabwean case, and the #EndSars protest that led to the shutdown internet as highlighted above. Hove & Chenzi, (2020) noted that in Zimbabwe, social media platforms’ use brought a new form of politics (online politics) which facilitated the offline street politics of 2016 and caught the state off-guard, at least temporarily.

Pitfalls of Digital Activism Whereas the thrust of this article aims to demonstrate the efficacy of digital activism through indulging in the X-raying of digital activism in selected countries, the authors are pretty conscious of the limitations of digital activism. For example, in the context of Africa, digital activism has been an instrument of democracy as much as it has also been an anachronism to the same effect (Rusero et al., 2020). Since the rise of digital activism in Africa, free speech and internet freedom, as well as other constitutionally protected freedoms, have been restricted more than ever before (Idowu, symp2022). Thus, digital activism has often been hijacked by the same people and groups it is supposed to be fighting against, resulting in its agenda being diluted and its mission remaining elusive. For example, West (2019) highlights the rise of the surveillance economy and data capitalism whereby corporations will manipulate data as part of digital espionage. Moreover, digital activism has resulted in ghostwriting, ghost tweeting, and ghost face-booking, thus limiting authenticity. Platforms that are not authentic are hardly religiously adhered to by the masses (Rusero, 2020). In the case of pseudo-democracies, celebrities, and social media influencers tend to have many followers compared to politicians and activists. Activism that does not get some legitimation from these people is sometimes limited and often ignored. Casting a decolonial lens to the advent of digital media technologies, Benyera (2021) postulated the notion of the coloniality of data. The author argues that Africa and Africa do not own the data they transact daily, thus posing limitations on the extent to which they can effectively use SNN. American companies own all the search engines, for example, Meta, which owns Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. Over the years, Twitter has been notorious for suspending or even banning accounts that tend to contradict its expectations. An attempt to contest the results of the 2020 US presidential election led thousands of protesters to storm the Capitol Building on January 6, 2021 (Alizadeh et al 2022). Following Trump’s support for the protesters, Twitter permanently banned the then-president from the platform, citing a risk of further incitement of violence. Thus, as exemplified above, although SNNs are effective as frontiers of digital activism, it is critical to realize their pitfalls regarding ownership and the resultant effects of data capitalism.

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Grappling With Fake News The world, in general, and the developing world, is reeling under the devastating production and consumption of fake news. This phenomenon has become more pronounced with the massive proliferation of digital information platforms. Almost all African states have become victims of counterfeit reports during electioneering (Rusero, 2020). In the context of this discourse, the term “fake news” refers to stories that are generally false but have enormous popular appeal and are shared far and wide. Also, an essential part of the mix is incorrect information created for financial and political gains (Rusero, 2020). “Fake news” has the corrosive effect of creating misinformed citizens and weakening democratic institutions. It can also destroy the credibility of media institutions, libraries, and all avenues of information repositories, further eroding trust in news and information and plunging society into a labyrinth of information disorder (Fombad et al., 2023). Thus, whereas SNNs are critical conduits to foster mobilization, it is pertinent to be aware of the prospects of the mobilizing instrument being used to misinform, disinform, and become a platform to channel fake news.

CONCLUSION While globally, digital activism continues to gain popularity; it can realize social change encounters threats, such as digital repression. Newton’s (1833) third law, “If an object A exerts a force on object B, then object B must exert a force of equal magnitude and opposite direction back on object A,” helps to illustrate the challenges of digital activism amidst digital repression. Digital repression encompasses using traditional repressive techniques against digital protesters, using digital tools to perform conventional repressive actions, and developing and deploying information strategies designed to weaken protests (Earl, Maher, and Pan, 2022). The 3 case studies highlighted above reflect and confirm that no government institution will tolerate digital activism if its motives are to change the political power dynamics as a regime change. The literature review demonstrates that the digital space is contested, hence the growing calls for digital sovereignty to ensure that the freedom that the Internet was founded upon remains supreme. Physical hygiene is essential in protecting citizens from diseases, and the increasingly techno-centric world requires netizens to practice information hygiene to counter the hazards of misinformation and disinformation in online information. Grimes, (2020) argued that there was an urgent need to conduct more research on the double-edged nature of social media and also enforce legislation that compels social media organizations to fact-check and flag dangerous information. Digital platforms have become the new theatres of war whereby it is not easy to distinguish between antagonists and protagonists hence the need for critical thinking skills to maintain sanity in the post-truth era “Falsehood Flies, and Truth Comes Limping After It.’ (Grimes, 2020 citing Jonathan Swift, 1667-1745).

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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Coroinfodeluge: The avalanche of the COVID-19 pandemic produced daily at an astronomical pace versus the human mind’s limited capacity to analyze, synthesize, and make sense of it. It also refers to the overabundance of COVID-19 pandemic information and its difficulty for users to analyze and decide on it. Digital Activism: Digital activism refers to using digital technologies, particularly the Internet and social media platforms, to organize, promote, and participate in social and political activism. Digital activism can take various forms, including online petitions, viral campaigns, social media advocacy, and cyber-activism (Ozkula, 2021; Sorce and Dumitrica,2022). Digital and Social Media: Digital and social media refer to online platforms that allow users to create, share, and exchange digital content, such as text, images, and videos. Digital and social media can take various forms, such as social networking sites, blogs, microblogs, and video-sharing platforms, and can be used for multiple purposes, such as communication, entertainment, and information sharing (Suwana 2020; Earl, Maher, and Pan 2022)

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Digital Divide: The digital divide is a term used to describe the gap between individuals, communities, and countries that have access to digital technologies, such as the Internet and computers, and those that do not. The divide manifests itself democratically, technologically, and socially. The digital divide can have significant economic, social, and political implications, limiting opportunities for education, employment, and civic engagement (Jamil 2021; Lythreatis, Singh, and El-Kassar 2022). Digital Hacktivism: This refers to the development of new approaches to secure communities from threats and disruptions based on developing collective awareness and responsiveness to changes in fluid contexts, often through developing and applying new digital technologies (Chandler, 2016) Digital Repression: Digital repression refers to using digital technologies, such as internet censorship, surveillance, and cyber-attacks, to suppress free speech, dissent, and oppositional voices. Digital repression can be used by governments, corporations, and other entities to control information and limit individual freedoms, such as freedom of expression and privacy. Digital repression can be defined as “actions directed at a target to raise the target’s costs for digital social movement activity and the use of digital or social media to raise the costs for social movement activity, wherever that contestation takes place” (Earl, Maher, and Pan 2022). Social Movements: Social movements are collective efforts by groups of individuals to bring about social, cultural, or political change. Social movements can take various forms, such as labour movements, civil rights movements, environmental movements, and feminist movements, and are often driven by issues such as inequality, injustice, and discrimination (Mathieu 2021) Social Networking Sites (SNSs): Social Networking Sites (SNSs) are online platforms that allow individuals to create a public or semi-public profile, connect with other users, and share content, such as photos, videos, and messages. Examples of SNSs include Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and LinkedIn (Olelewe et al., 2020). Socio-Political Protests: Socio-political protests refer to collective action taken by citizens to voice their grievances and demand social and political change. These protests can handle various forms, such as peaceful demonstrations, sit-ins, and strikes, and are often driven by issues such as economic inequality, political corruption, human rights abuses, and discrimination. “Social-political protests refer to a type of social sentiment characterized by the dissatisfaction of social groups with the current state of affairs, unjustified expectations, and, at the same time, readiness to take concrete action to change the individual’s situation, which is perceived as unfavourable” (Frants and Keune 2020).

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Chapter 13

Decolonization and Peacebuilding:

The Case of Timor Leste and Kashmir Tamanna M. Shah https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9609-0191 Ohio University, USA

ABSTRACT Nations that fail to achieve independence at decolonization seek recognition and support from the international community. The United Nations peacebuilding activities significantly influence conflicts over statehood and self-determination. This chapter examines United Nations peacebuilding and conflict resolution through the successful independence of Timor Leste with the ongoing conflict in Kashmir since the moment of decolonization. It argues that the patterns of decolonization are critical in explaining initial UN positions, which then shape future peacebuilding operations. Decolonial designs determine the primacy of either territorial integrity or the right to self-determination. In Kashmir, partition made the new territorial boundaries geopolitically significant, which had to be maintained for international peace and security. Annexation made the right to self-determination more salient in generating support for independence since the UN understood the right within the context of decolonization rather than geopolitics.

INTRODUCTION Peacebuilding and reconstruction of conflict-torn nations involve an intricate interaction with historical events such as decolonization. After the Second World War, decolonization worldwide took several forms. Decolonization gave rise to periods of restoration, development, and disruption that set a ‘people’ and their movements on a particular trajectory. The quest for identity and self-rule has reshaped the political landscape in many countries. Self-determination is expressed as a desire for political independence or statehood, or a “right of secession” (Kirgis, 1994, p. 306), joining or integrating with another state, or claiming greater cultural independence and autonomy within a state (Anaya, 1996). Home states, posDOI: 10.4018/978-1-6684-9467-7.ch013

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 Decolonization and Peacebuilding

sessing material advantages over secessionist movements, wield influence as subjects and beneficiaries of international law. These states, as legitimate arbiters of separatist movements and their outcomes, emphasize territorial integrity and are hesitant to recognize acts of unilateral secession (Fierstein, 2008). The interaction between nationalist movements occurs within a broad “regime” that comprises multiple actors - colonial powers, the nation-state, other nation-states, and representatives of the “international community,” for instance, the United Nations (UN), human rights organizations, international financial institutions like International Monetary Fund (IMF), or the World Bank and certain regional and religious blocks like Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC), to name a few. Within this contentious political space, this chapter analyzes the position of the United Nations and its peacebuilding operations in East Timor and Kashmir. As a new nation-state, Timor Leste presents an opportunity to examine the peace agreements for independence and the role of the United Nations to compare it with the attempts at peace made in Kashmir. Analyzing the linkages between the Kashmiri movement for self-determination and the socio-cultural aspects is the foundation of meaningful and lasting peace. Due to the extensive nature of UN operations in Timor Leste, it is an apt “test case” (Suhrke 2001) and an “important marker in the liberal statebuilding [and peacebuilding processes]” (Richmond & Franks, 2008, p. 83). This chapter argues that the patterns of decolonization are critical in explaining international responses and the nature of peacebuilding operations. The decolonial designs - annexation of Timor Leste and partition of British India - and other such designs impart a particular understanding of the conflicts in these regions. Both were mobilizations by ethnic groups with a history of colonial exploitation by their Western colonizers, faced postcolonial state exclusion and repression, and were victims of human rights abuses. Both movements framed their struggles in terms of statehood and self-determination. One would expect the results or the outcome of these self-determination movements – statehood – in each place to be similar, given the strength and longevity of these movements. However, what emerges is that despite the similarity of the claims, East Timor was able to achieve independence through a UN-enforced referendum in 2002, while the Kashmir movement continues with no resolution or recognition (Shah, 2023). The decolonial design of partition made the newly created boundaries geopolitically significant. These territorial boundaries had to be maintained for international peace. Partition imparted a ‘bilateral’ nature to the Kashmir dispute, which became a refuge for the global community to refrain or abstain from recognizing the Kashmiri right to self-determination or pushing for a plebiscite (Shah, 2012). The international reluctance to support Kashmir is linked to the enduring geopolitical stature of India and its rise on the global stage as an economic powerhouse and, therefore, the interest of powerful states to maintain good relations with India. The roots of this dynamic, again, date back to the partition of British India, giving rise to geographic entanglement between India and Pakistan. These patterns were reinforced in the UN resolutions and on-ground activities, where a resolution of the Kashmir conflict was repeatedly mentioned as bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan. In contrast, annexation made the right to self-determination more salient in generating support for independence since the UN understood the right within the context of decolonization rather than geopolitics. The Timorese claims to territory and the right of the people making a claim prevailed since annexation was a continuation of rule by ‘others’ like their colonial predecessors that attempted to weaken their cultural and historical bonds with the land. Independence or secession, therefore, was understood as an extension of decolonization, which was interrupted by the decolonial design of annexation.

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The next section provides a brief overview of how decolonization unfolded in East Timor and the UN’s treatment of the conflict. The second section is dedicated to how decolonization unfolded in British India and an overview of the UN resolutions and peacebuilding activities in Kashmir. The chapter concludes by comparing the UN peacebuilding efforts in two different regions. This comparison highlights how the international community often fails to customize interventions to cater to specific conflict dynamics. These dynamics lead to a situation where the state becomes distant from its citizens and loses its ability to establish a political settlement founded on a strong social contract.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY This chapter employs a comparative historical approach to examine aspects of similarity between East Timor and Kashmir and identify key features of UN intervention and peacebuilding. Case studies help understand the “long-term processes of change” (Voltolini & Eising, 2017, p. 355). This chapter employs archival research and document analysis of historical text such as resolutions, reports, and evaluations of UN engagement in Timor Leste and Kashmir. Froese (2013) argues for the importance of historical narrative to point out that one may “disagree about the relevance of particular facts or the emphasis placed on certain interpretations, but we can be sure that certain events took place…and their consequences continue to influence the present” (p. 120). This is especially true for the argument extended in this chapter, where decolonization is proposed to influence UN decisions and peacebuilding. For the Kashmir dispute, UN Security Council (UNSC) passed eighteen resolutions from 1947 to 1998. Whereas eleven resolutions were passed in UNSC in a comparatively smaller period from 1975 to 2000 on East Timor. For East Timor, I examine the Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of East Timor and UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (14 documents from 1999 to 2002, which provides details into the peacebuilding operations in the region. UN resolutions are formal expressions of approval or disapproval of issues presented before them. They express world opinions and positions that can exert pressure on member states to conform. These documents determine not only nature but also the conditions necessary for intervention as determined by the UN. An analysis of UN documents is clubbed with documents from international organizations, governments, movements, and national reports and legislation to efficiently retrace the history of decolonization and peacebuilding in these two regions.

LITERATURE REVIEW Over the years, UN peacebuilding activities have changed significantly. During the Cold War, UN peace operations were limited to monitoring ceasefires or patrols. They acted as “a buffer between two states” using a small military force (Newman et al., 2009, p. 5). The post-Cold War period saw a greater role of the UN peace operations that involved civilians in implementing peace, security, elections, framing the Constitution, to statebuilding. Scholars identify “long-term” socio-economic and political provisions as attributes of UN peacebuilding that address the causes of conflict, end hostilities, and identify the “root causes” of conflict (Cockell, 2000, p. 16). Moreover, Zeeuw (2001) notes that when peacebuilding activities are effectively coordinated, they can contribute to “peacemaking and peacekeeping operations” (p. 13). While most peacebuilding occurs post-conflict, UN operations during conflict contribute towards peacebuilding tasks. Therefore, 264

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peacebuilding can start during a conflict as a conflict resolution mechanism. Doyle and Sambanis (1999) argue that long-term peacebuilding is possible only after the identification of the “underlying substantive issues” (p. 2) that are precursors to a conflict. Understanding the root of a conflict is crucial for preventing violence and subsequent resolution, especially in divided societies (Lederach & Hampson, 1998). As argued in this chapter, the root of any conflict can be traced back to decolonization. The UN was established as a global watchdog to oversee norms for sovereignty and statehood. PostWorld War II, the United Nations, and the Great Powers refrained from redrawing the map, just as they no longer accepted the continuation of colonial rule over people. The right to self-determination was first expressed during the American and French Revolutions as a principle of “democratic consent” (Griffiths et al., 2023). The principle gained prominence after World War I when President Woodrow Wilson favored the “will of the people” (Griffiths et al., 2023, n.p) in the creation of nation-states. Wilson’s Fourteen Points of January 1918 for World Peace articulated the “civil right of self government, by which he meant participation, by all constituents of a polity, in determining its public affairs” (Throntveit, 2011, p. 446). In his speech, Wilson addressed the freedom of identity and expression: “National aspirations must be respected; people may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent. ‘Self determination’ is not a mere phrase; it is an imperative principle of action” (Wilson, 1918, n.p). Postwar, Wilson’s vision was associated with the calls for “national self-determination that emerged to shape the international discourse over the war [World War I]” (Thorntveit 1918, p. 446). Article 1 (2) of the UN Charter articulates the principle of self-determination as one that develops “friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.” Many scholars have highlighted the lack of clarity in the meaning of what comprises “peoples” in this Article (Thorntveit, 1918; Anaya, 2004; Griffiths et al., 2023). Article 55 further recognizes self-determination as a “principle rather than a right” (Summers, 2007, p. 78). However, it is described as secondary or subordinate to “peaceful and friendly relations among nations” (Article 2): “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state” (Charter of the United Nations, Article 2, paragraph 4). The 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples also placed the right to self-determination as the focus of deliberations. Later it also appeared in the 1966 UN Covenants on Human Rights. The commonly understood and agreed (Kirgis, 1994) application is in the context of colonialism and the freedom from domination, “at least when the domination is of people of color in their homeland by other racial groups” (Kirgis, 2004, p. 305). Such a claim for independence was even considered “legitimate” (A/RES/2105(XX), paragraph 10). Resolution 2621 (XXV) of 20 December 1970 declares the inherent right of the people to “struggle” against colonial powers “by all necessary means” to achieve independence based on the claim of self-determination. Armed struggle was considered a legitimate means of achieving independence but limited to people under “colonial and foreign domination and foreign occupation” (A/RES/33/24). The General Assembly expanded the right after 1970 to apply to contexts other than colonialism. Resolutions 545(VI) of 1952 and 2625(XXV) of 1970 extended the meaning of “all peoples” (paragraph 1) and “all States” (paragraphs 1 and 2) beyond colonial situations to include “any political status freely determined by a people” (Kirgis, 2004, p. 305). While paragraph 7 draws a connection between self-determination to representative governments, it also maintains the primacy of territorial integrity of sovereign units. Kirgis (1994) argues that the 1970 formulation allowed a people “[though] not well defined-to secede from an established state that does not have a fully representative form of govern265

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ment, or at least to secede from a state whose government excludes people of any race, creed or color from political representation when those people are the ones asserting the right, and they have a claim to a defined territory” (306). The new norm preferred territorial integrity, which implied an acceptance of the nationalist ideas of the nation-states. The global response to self-determination was rather mixed. The Great Powers opposed the insertion of self-determination in the UN Charter. The United States sought to narrow its scope and meaning by equating self-determination with popular self-government rather than the natural order of attaining statehood post-colonialism. Britain did not view self-determination as a “right,” demanding a more restrictive application as a principle, which implied that the state had no obligations to uphold individual rights (Thomas & Thompson, 2019). This reflects the ambiguity around the scope of selfdetermination and suggests the guarding of territories by the international community. Statehood achieved by applying the right to self-determination inherently means either giving people the territory or removing a people and territory from an existing nation-state. The international order indicated support for national solidarity and order over the collective claims of a nation. Even with the differences in understanding and application, the cases of East Timor and Kashmir point to a specific position held by the United Nations. East Timor and Kashmir experienced different patterns of decolonization: annexation and partition, respectively. Annexation is the “implied intention to permanently incorporate the occupied territory” (Jaber, 2021, p. 7) using military capacity and the establishment of “administrative functions rather than sovereign rights” (Nicolosi, 2011, p. 171). Partition, on the other hand, was a “politically negotiated secession” (Anderson, 2012, p. 352) that created new nation-states (Dubnov and Robson, 2019). The way decolonization unfolded determined the UN’s response to a question of identities and a nation in each region. Each decolonial design received a particular response, which became the basis of conflict resolution. Vayrynen (1985) identifies the role of the UN as primarily political, especially evidenced by the tasks undertaken to maintain peace and security since its inception. In the postcolonial era, a preference for territorial integrity was grounded in “the principle of uti possidetis,” meaning that upon the withdrawal of the colonial empire, “the boundaries of the new nation-state must match the former administrative boundaries” (Taras & Ganguly, 2006, p. 45). The UN also discourages any alterations of the borders without international agreement between the states involved. This also implies that the UN does not recognize any attempts for secession or irredentism and requires the consent of the existing state (Chandhoke, 2008, p. 2-4). The emphasis on international peace and solidarity over claims for secession or self-determination aligns with the idea of liberalism and liberal peace, which is prominent in global peacemaking and peacebuilding activities. The goal is to incentivize peace-support interventions to produce stable outcomes (Joshi, Lee, & Mac Ginty, 2014) and market-orientated democracies (Fukuyama, 2011) that maintain international peace and stability. Agents of liberal peace comprise powerful nation-states and actors, nationally and internationally, “to make sure that their narrative becomes hegemonic” (Mac Ginty & Firchow, 2016, p. 310). Paris (2002) argues that post-Cold War peacebuilding involved “transplanting liberal democratic values and institutions from the core to peripheral host states” (638). Such a globalizing mission does not “erode” the host state rather, “peacebuilders work to buttress or re-establish effective and functioning government institutions in war-shattered states. Indeed, while peace operations promulgate the principles of liberal market democracy, these principles presuppose the existence of state institutions, and where no such institutions exist, they must first be built” (Paris, 2002, p. 638).

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The mechanism of peacebuilding interventions is only successfully carried out in the presence of an accommodating state. Another factor that does influence peacebuilding processes is the historical context. While decolonization was a welcome turn in human history, leading to the achievement of the value of “liberty,” it also contained seeds of discord in elite agendas that had been the bridge between the masses and the colonizers, which in turn, determined future peacebuilding actions and global positions.

Annexation of East Timor: Peacebuilding From Below While Indonesia gained independence in 1945 from the Dutch, Portuguese Timor had multiple colonial masters - Dutch (1651-1859), Portuguese (1860-1942), and Japanese (1942-1945) and was recolonized by the Portuguese in the 1940s. Conditions for decolonization in Portuguese Timor emerged only with the Armed Forces Movement (MFA) coup in Lisbon, popular as the Carnation Revolution of April 25, 1974. The coup significantly reduced Portugal’s stronghold on its colonies, and a new nationalist organization began to take shape in Portuguese Timor (Ramos-Horta, 1987). The “town-based” political elites (Pinto & Jardine, 1997, p. 13) with distant ideologies organized into three political parties: the Timorese Social Democrats (UDT) demanded “progressive autonomy under the Portuguese flag” (Uniao Democratica Timorense, 1974, p. 12); the pro-independence Associacão Popular Democratica Timorense (ASDT), later to become Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente (FRETILIN); and the pro-Indonesian Timorese Popular Democratic Association (APODETI). APODETI’s ideology provided a basis for Indonesian annexation. FRETILIN made a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) “embodying the supreme aspiration of the people of East Timor and to safeguard their most legitimate rights and interests as a Sovereign Nation” (FRETILIN, 1975) and established the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (DRET) by November 28, 1975. The party adopted the right to self-determination and independence as its sole aim (Campaign for Independent East Timor, 1974, p. 1). The newly formed government opposed the imminent threat (Amaral, 1975) of a “forced incorporation of East Timor with Indonesia” (Campaign for Independent East Timor, 1974, p. 1). However, after only nine days of independence, Indonesia annexed East Timor on December 7, 1975. The assertion of Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor was only bolstered through the direct support it received from within the region. Indonesia actively opposed the formation of East Timor as an independent state while maintaining vocal support for the cause. In a statement, Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik stated that “the independence of every country is the right of every nation, with no exception for the people in Timor” (Malik, 1974), thereby acknowledging Timorese self-determination. The letter also stated that the Indonesian government “had no intention to increase or to expand their territory, or to occupy other territories” (Malik, 1974). Despite the reassurance, Indonesia annexed Portuguese Timor. The United Nations listed East Timor as a non-self-governing territory in 1960, with Portugal as the administering power (A/RES/1542(XV)). The UN recognized the independence of Portuguese colonies as the “legitimate aspirations for immediate self-determination” (A/RES/1807(XVII)) of “peoples under colonial subjugation” (A/RES/1542(XV)). Portugal considered the Indonesian intervention “an act of aggression” that interfered with people’s right to self-determination (S/11899). Since the annexation, the “Question of East Timor” became subject to eight General Assembly Resolutions (1975 to 1982) and two Security Council Resolutions. At the UN, Indonesia emphasized the support of other Timorese political parties like UDT, APODETI, KOTA, and the Labour Party “jointly, on behalf of the people of Portuguese Timor” to integrate with 267

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Indonesia (A/C.4/808) and declared to have a “moral obligation to protect the people in the Territory of Timor so that the process of decolonization can be realized in accordance with the aspirations and wishes of the entire people of Portuguese Timor” (A/C.4/808). Timorese self-determination, as per Indonesia, was achieved through incorporation into Indonesia, even though such incorporation was condemned as the illegal use of force (A/RS/3495 (XXX)) and a violation of the rights of the inhabitants (E/CN.4/ RES/1997/63; A/RES/35/47). The UN rejected the Indonesian claim on East Timor “inasmuch as the people of the Territory have not been able to exercise freely their right to self-determination and independence” (A/RES/31/53) and, in 1978, “reaffirmed the inalienable right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and independence and the legitimacy of their struggle to achieve that right” (A/RES/33/59 A-B). The UN passed Resolution 384 on December 22, 1975, calling for the immediate removal of Indonesian military forces from East Timor. Since 1982, UN peacebuilding missions have been deployed in East Timor, and regular talks have been held with Indonesia and Portugal to resolve the conflict in the region. However, the Suharto regime denied any access to the international community for a long time to keep East Timor off the UN agenda (Calvocoressi 2001). This Indonesian move was carried out by the silent but consistent support of the West (Calvocoressi, 2001). Kissinger (1975) affirmed the US-Indonesia alliance suggesting a “move progressively away from a donor-client relationship and from preoccupation with aid issues toward ties that [safeguard] sea passages between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, oil fields, and [access to] major resources” (pp. 1-3). The US wanted to bolster its capitalist interests with Indonesia and viewed Indonesia as an evolving “major regional power in Southeast Asia” (National Security, 1974: n.p.). While Indonesia was strategically significant for the US as a “nation with the largest number of adherents to the Islamic faith, it [played] a key role in the mutual cooperation and stability of ASEAN” (Holbrooke, 1979: 720). It was only in 1999 that Indonesia proposed limited autonomy, within Indonesia, to the demands of self-determination by the Timorese. Indonesia and Portugal entrusted the UN to organize and conduct popular consultations to determine the Timorese acceptance or rejection of autonomy within Indonesia (A/53/951 and S/1999/513). Under Resolution 1246 (1999), the UN established the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) (S/RES/1246). UNAMET was primarily created to control prointegrationist violence within East Timor. Since 1999, the UN has deployed five peace operations to Timor-Leste: UNAMET (1999), UNTAET (1999-2002), UNMISET (2002-2005), UNOTIL (2005-2006), and UNMIT (2006-2012), along with two multilateral international interventions: INTERFRET (1999-2000) and ISF (2006-2013). East Timor is unique as the only case “with such level of engagement” (Blanco, 2015, p. 46). These peacebuilding operations, collectively, constitute a project that recognizes Indonesia as a “foreign” aggressor “oppressing” East Timor (Richmond & Franks, 2009, p. 83) and gives significance to the Timorese right to self-determination. The UNAMET conducted a referendum that dissolved the CNRT to enable the setting up of multi-party elections. “Seventy-nine percent of East Timorese voted for independence, while 21 percent” supported autonomy within Indonesia (Kingston, 2012, p. 6). The referendum was soon followed by deteriorating security and growing violence instigated by the “pro-autonomy militias and the Indonesian military” (Blanco, 2015, p. 46-47). Following a massive international outrage (Kingsbury, 2009, p. 74) over the atrocities in East Timor, the Security Council passed Resolution 1296/2000 to establish a “multinational force” to execute three tasks: a) “to restore peace and security; b) to protect and support UNAMET, and c) to facilitate humanitarian assistance” (Niner, 2010, p. 219). 268

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In addition, the National Consultative Council (NCC) was established under Regulation 1999/2. The NCC consisted of representatives (7 members) from CNRT, non-CNRT political groups (3 members), a member of the Catholic Church, UNTAET (4 members), and a few representatives from civil society. Portugal and Indonesia had no role to play in the creation of the East Timorese nation-state from here on. The CNRT national congress in August 2000 shaped early Timorese politics, with national unity as the primary concern for Xanana (Niner, 2010). By 2001, East Timor’s Constitutional Assembly was elected, with FRETILIN commanding majority votes. The formation of the Constitution was a critical moment for nation-building in East Timor. The 2002 Constitution enshrined the already popular nationalist values to create the new nation-state of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. The referendum drew support from the British and the US governments. On the other hand, Australia continued to view East Timor’s independence as a threat to their territorial security and ended the Australia-Indonesia agreement on security in September 1999 (Burchill 2000). The British supported with development aid and to pressurize for change through multilateral channels (Hainsworth and McCloskey 2000). They also offered to send troops to help the UN peacekeeping mission in East Timor and encouraged President Clinton to support independence for Timor.

Partition and Kashmir: Peacebuilding From Above Decolonization in Kashmir began in 1947 with the independence of the Indian subcontinent from its British colonizers. The political elites in British India - Indian nationalists and British officials - negotiated terms for a separate nation. At this historical moment, partition emerged as a solution proposed by the Britishers that divided the subcontinent into a Muslim Pakistan and a Hindu-majority India, creating ambiguity around the political status of Kashmir. The excerpt of Lord Mountbatten’s radio broadcast on partition below is evidence of such a collaborative resolution: “To my great regret, it has been impossible to obtain agreement either on the Cabinet mission plan or on any other plan that would preserve the unity of India. But there can be no question of coercing any large areas in which one community has a majority to live against their will under a Government in which another community has a majority - and the only alternative to coercion is partition….But when the Muslim League demanded the partition of India, Congress used the same arguments for demanding in that event the partition of certain provinces….neither side proved willing to leave a substantial area in which their community have a majority under the government of the other” (The Times, 1947, n.p., emphasis added). Partition as a political process served as a base for the sustenance of two different sovereign nations and their territorial boundaries. Partition was a way to “devolve or transfer power” (Schaeffer, 1991, p. 3) to establish separate states based on indigenous identities. Post-Partition, Kashmir chose not to capitulate its sovereignty to either India or Pakistan and remained independent for seventy-three days, only to later sign an accession with India. By 1950, Jammu and Kashmir were given a semi-autonomous status within the Union of India, where the state could have its flag and Constitution and was free to make laws on all aspects except defense, foreign affairs, and communications, which remained with the Union (Summers, 2007). India brought Kashmir to the UN forum in January 1948 by invoking Article 35 to present Kashmir as a dispute with Pakistan. The UN is required to intervene in conflicts that “endanger the maintenance of 269

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international peace and security” and cause “international friction” (Article 35). Kashmir was presented to the UN as a “request” from the “people of Kashmir” (S/628) to consider enforcing the accession. These claims were refuted by Pakistan, calling India’s actions a “campaign of ‘genocide’ against Muslims… by non-Muslim rulers” (S/646). Unlike East Timor, the issue of Kashmir at the UN did not begin as a right to self-determination; instead, it was put on the agenda as a question of accession resulting from the decolonial design of partition. On September 13, 1948, the UN recognized the “will of the people” of Kashmir, though never explicitly stating the term “right to self-determination” (Summers, 2007). The UN temporarily settled the issue by adopting a truce agreement stating that: “The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan reaffirm their wish that the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people and to that end, upon acceptance of the Truce Agreement both Governments agree to enter into consultations with the Commission to determine fair and equitable conditions whereby such free expression will be assured” (S/RES/1995, emphasis added). Kashmiri elites accepted partial sovereignty, restricting their ability to maintain direct foreign relations with other countries, proving detrimental to state sovereignty under Montevideo Convention. The Preamble of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir later acknowledged accession to India and considered the state “an integral part of India” (Jammu and Kashmir Preamble). This gave India the legal right to “occupy” Kashmir with its troops. Such an occupation on the international front is not considered an illegal occupation of the territory compared to the postcolonial Indonesian annexation of East Timor. In 1948, the Indian government and Sheikh Abdullah’s National Conference affirmed accession with India. The Constituent Assembly elections were declared as a reflection of the will of the people, equivalent to holding a plebiscite since the members of the Assembly were directly elected by the people. Resolution 47(1948) makes it clear that the UN did not consider Indian presence in Kashmir as illegal though it set out the condition that: “when the Indian forces have reduced to the minimum strength required for the support of the civil power in the maintenance of law and order…a small number be retained in forward area….and hold a fair and impartial plebiscite [, which never happened] on the question of the accession of the State to India or Pakistan.” The repeated push of both the Indian and National Conference leaders of the Kashmir issue away from an issue of “independence and self-determination” to an issue between India and Pakistan was reflected in the UN meetings and reports. UN initially recognized the “Kashmir question” (S/641) until January 9, 1948, then changed it on January 17, 1948, to the “Kashmir and Jammu question” (S/653), only to subsequently consider it an “India-Pakistan question” (S/675; S/RES/38(1948)) on February 13, 1948. The UN maintained the primacy of “international peace and security” while calling for a “free and impartial plebiscite” (S/RES/39 (1948), 47 (1948), 80 (1950), 91 (1951) and 96 (1951)) on “the question of accession,” which India initially agreed to (S/1196 (1949)). The UN established the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) through Resolution 47(1948). The resolution called for a ceasefire between India and Pakistan and to arrange for a plebiscite. Josef Korbel (1966) considers Resolution 47(1948) of cardinal importance since it reflects the UN stand on the Kashmir conflict, which later became a key reference resolution for other UN members (Alam, 1982). The UN response to Kashmir was to hold a plebiscite to decide accession, not independence or the fulfillment of the right to self-determination. While both countries agreed to the ceasefire under the resolution, the plebiscite remained unresolved. 270

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With the failure of the UNCIP to implement the resolutions, along with the acceptance of autonomy and the “ratification of the state’s accession by the Kashmir assembly members, India was unwilling to accept any further UN mediation” (Ganguly, 1995, p. 174), which is also why the plebiscite never happened in Kashmir. In 1962, India invoked the principle of rebus sic stantibus at the UN to indicate that India was no longer bound or obligated by the UNCIP 1948 and 1949 Resolutions (UNSC 763 Meeting, 1957). The rebus sic stantibus clause describes “an objective rule by which, on the grounds of equity and justice, a fundamental change of circumstances may be invoked as a ground for termination of a treaty” (Kulaga, 2020, p. 477). By 1962, “the Indian Education Minister, Mr. M. C. Chagla [declared in the Security Council that] on behalf of [the Indian] Government that under no circumstances can we agree to the holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir” (UNSC 1088 Meeting, 1964, p. 381). Fearing “a dangerous precedent would be created” (CAB 128/19, p. 3), the British Cabinet, in 1951, suggested, “informal conversations about Kashmir” (CAB 128/19, p. 3) with Pakistan and India. Subsequently, in 1972, both countries signed the Shimla agreement to decide the fate of Kashmir through bilateral talks. Here, a reflection on Indo-UN relations is crucial to understand the broader geopolitical dynamics of that period, which involved an intersection of colonialism with internationalism. Even before its independence, India participated in the creation of the UN in 1945 as a non-sovereign member (Gorman, 2014). India was considered an “autonomous member of the UN even though it was yet to be independent,” enjoying the support of its colonial ruler (Gorman, 2014, p. 476-477). Britain wanted India to be a member of the UN even though it was still a colony. Such support reveals “the anomaly in the UN Charter between reference to “we the peoples of the United Nations” in the Preamble and the definition of UN membership in Chapter II as consisting of “peace-loving states” (Gorman, 2014, p. 478). At the crucial juncture of the laying the foundation of the Charter, India, though yet to be independent, made its intentions clear regarding its sovereign authority over its people and territory: “defense of state sovereignty internally, and the pursuit of the international principles of anti-colonialism, development… political self-determination was a necessary but not sufficient international goal. It would only be given full meaning if the colonized world’s relative impoverishment was alleviated” (Gorman, 2014, p. 478-480). Before partition, the UN put forward an opinion that identified the independent nations of India and Pakistan without any discussion of the aftermath of partition: “From the viewpoint of international law, the situation is one in which a part of an existing state breaks off and becomes a new state. On this analysis, there is no change in the international status of India; it continues as a state with all the treaty rights and obligations, and consequently, with all the rights and obligations of membership in the United Nations. The territory which breaks off, Pakistan, will be a new state; . . . and it will not, of course, have membership in the United Nations.” (Yearbook, 1962, p. 101) This statement also reflects the UN’s position on the partition, which is an agreement to alter colonial boundaries even though the UN argues explicitly against any such change in the colonial boundary. The Kashmir dispute landed on the UN agenda in its third year, when it was still formulating and refining its policies, was much smaller and comparatively less diverse, with only fifty-seven members at that time (Schaffer, 2009, p. 13). India, by then, was considered a “founding member” of the UN (Schaffer, 2009, p. 13). This was a crucial factor in determining the UN’s position at the time of decolonization and for its future peacebuilding activities.

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Comparing Peacebuilding Operations The long-term goal of UN peacebuilding is to address core issues that affect the State-society relationships and to enhance state capacity to “effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions1.” The decolonial designs, as mechanisms, impact the manner of UN observation or supervision. What explains the difference in operations and their intensity is that decolonization took two forms: annexation in Timor Leste and partition in India. These different trajectories led to variations in international responses and, ultimately, different outcomes. From the overview presented above, the UN actively engaged with Timor Leste’s cause for statehood from the beginning. It is no surprise that some scholars argue that the UN “built” Timor Leste from scratch (Blanco, 2015, p. 49) and “invented” it (Traub, 2000, p. 74). The depth of UN involvement in East Timor - resolutions, missions, duration, peacekeeping to peacebuilding - compared to Kashmir determines a positive outcome in the form of independence and statehood for the region. The main argument extended in this chapter holds since the core issue rested upon the determination of a right to self-determination in these cases, which hinged on how decolonization unfolded in these regions. This was the case in East Timor, where the Timorese under Portugal were entitled to statehood. Portugal acknowledged people’s right to self-determination and allowed them to form a government. The annexation of East Timor was a case of external aggression that disrupted the decolonization process. However, the original character and nature of the principle were retained, and so was the right to independent statehood. The UN considered annexation interfering with the Timorese right to self-determination and did not recognize the Indonesian claim over the region. Instead, the UN declared Indonesian annexation as an aggressive act of integration, keeping the Timorese right to self-determination unresolved. In a way, East Timor continued to be a “colony” even after twenty-four years of decolonization. Annexation disrupted the normal course of decolonization. Under international law and in the eyes of the UN, the process of decolonization remained incomplete since the Timorese were unable to freely exercise their right to self-determination and a right to maintain their territorial integrity. As a result, the UN was actively involved in deliberations that led to a UN-administered referendum, the “second major operation by the UN” (Chawla, 2001, n.p), to decide the independence of East Timor. Peacebuilding in the case of East Timor began with the people, rooted in their right to land and a nation. The conflict transformation process involved a dialogue among the international actors and key members of civil society who represented people’s desire for independence. In contrast, Kashmir was only added to the United Nations agenda in 1948 following the first war between India and Pakistan. Partition created new nation-states that made Kashmir an issue of accession rather than one embedded in the right to self-determination. The UN, too, understood the Kashmir issue as a question of territory rather than people’s right to self-determination since partition created new states that had to be supported and defended in maintaining the newly drawn boundaries. At the UN, Kashmir is understood as an issue and “conflict” about “territory” between India and Pakistan, where a peoples right to self-determination is only secondary. As a result, a resolution is always understood in terms of a bilateral negotiation or a plebiscite to decide accession with either India or Pakistan rather than Kashmir as an independent state. The primary purpose of any UN involvement in conflicts is to ensure that the people exercise “their choice in a free and unfettered manner” (United Nations, 1983, p. 2). The UN does this through a referendum or a plebiscite. A referendum is a “popular vote on a policy issue” (Qvortrup, 2017, p. 142), which “allows the people to express themselves freely, [whereas] the plebiscite allows a person…to legitimize 272

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him or herself by posing a question to the people who answer in the affirmative” (Guillaume-Hofnung, 1987, p. 14). Linz (2000) rightfully argues that plebiscites are held to “test the effectiveness of the party and its mass organizations in their success of getting out the vote” (p. 92). Compared to a referendum in Timor Leste that empowered people, a plebiscite for Kashmir empowered the state. What then transpires is a statist narrative of the movement in Kashmir and the delegitimization of the Kashmiri right to selfdetermination. The claims in Kashmir compared to Timor Leste made the claims political since they emanated from statist ideas of a nation. Therefore, the initial position at the time of decolonization and recognition of people’s right to self-determination is vital in determining future outcomes. Peacebuilding activities present a statist narrative of the movement in Kashmir, moving away from the root of the conflict - the claim for a nation and self-determination. There is a need to tailor interventions to specific conflict dynamics to strengthen its capacity to forge a political settlement founded on a robust social contract. International interventions and actions are inseparable from historical events and the local political and socio-economic conditions that result from such events. Decolonization remains a necessary path and an important historical event to understand the success or failure of peacebuilding, which is also why it is at the top of the global agenda. These two pathways to decolonization, annexation and partition, thus offer valuable lessons for other conflicts.

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Relocation of the Rohingya Refugees to Bhasan Char:

Human Rights, Government Policy, and the Refugee Crisis in Bangladesh M. Mahruf C. Shohel https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4048-0577 University of Roehampton, UK SM Rashedujjaman https://orcid.org/0009-0004-0879-5570 International Rescue Committee, Bangladesh Tahmina Akter https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6762-9688 Norwegian Refugee Council, Bangladesh

ABSTRACT This chapter explores the government policy of relocating the Rohingya refugees from Cox’s Bazar to Bhasan Char from the perspectives of human rights and refugee rights. Drawing from existing literature and diverse discourses, it explores the complexities surrounding this issue. The transfer of some Rohingya refugees to Bhasan Char by the government of Bangladesh has raised concerns among human rights activists and development workers about potential human rights violations and the safety of these displaced individuals. This chapter aims to critically analyse the issues related to the Rohingya refugee crisis, like mass political asylum, the policy of non-refoulement, violence against humanity, and the impact of the Bangladeshi government’s decision to relocate the Rohingya refugees on their human rights, in light of the concepts involved in international law.

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-6684-9467-7.ch014

Copyright © 2024, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

 Relocation of the Rohingya Refugees to Bhasan Char

INTRODUCTION The Rohingya have been stateless for more than six generations and constitute one of the most mistreated and persecuted refugee populations globally (Milton et al., 2017). The Rohingya people are one of the ethnic minorities in Myanmar, predominantly residing in Rakhine State. However, they have endured a long history of marginalization and discrimination in Myanmar, which has deprived them of their basic human rights and citizenship. The Rohingyas were denied citizenship under the Myanmar Citizenship Act of 1982 and have suffered a series of horrific abuses, torturous acts, and oppression. As a result, a significant number of the Rohingyas seeks asylum in neighbouring countries such as Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Malaysia, etc. (Ullah, 2011; Parnini et al., 2013; Prodip, 2017; Shohel, 2022; Rahman, 2022). The major influx in 2017 left the global community utterly astonished, as the brutal ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya ethnic minority resulted in the largest displacement and statelessness in recent history (Shohel, 2023). The Rohingya refugee crisis has been one of the most pressing humanitarian challenges for the past few years, although the crisis has been ongoing for decades to varying degrees and reached a horrifying scale in 2017. The crisis escalated in August 2017 when a violent crackdown by the Myanmar military targeted the Rohingya population, resulting in widespread human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, sexual violence, and the burning of the Rohingya villages. This military operation led to a mass exodus of the Rohingya refugees seeking safety and protection in neighbouring countries, particularly Bangladesh. According to the UNHCR (2022), more than 742,000 Rohingyas fled in search of safety on 25 August 2017 and Bangladesh became the site of the largest refugee camp. Approximately 203,431 Rohingyas were already living in the Ukhiya and Teknaf upazilas of Cox’s Bazar district, having entered Bangladesh between July 2005 and August 2017, adding to the already significant population of the Rohingya refugees who had sought refuge in Bangladesh from previous influxes (Khatun, 2017). Due to severe violence and bigotry in their own country, the Rohingya children have become victims of mass displacement, with some of them being domestically or internationally displaced. They have been deprived of their basic human rights, including food, shelter, healthcare, education, freedom of movement and employment (Milton et al., 2017; Moniruzzaman, 2021; Islam et al., 2022). When they ended up as stateless refugees during the period of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which emphasises equality, equity, and social justice, their fundamental human rights were violated. Approximately 961,729, stateless Rohingyas, including 52% of children, currently live in overcrowded and dire conditions in refugee camps (UNHCR population factsheet; June 2023). The Rohingya children in refugee camps in Bangladesh struggle and have limited access to healthcare and formal education. Some of them face serious health issues due to a lack of nourishing food, medical attention, medications, and basic hygiene. Young girls, in particular, are at risk of gender-based abuse, child marriage, and trafficking for manual labour and prostitution (Shohel et al., 2022). In the midst of the overwhelming Rohingya refugee crisis in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, the government took a significant step by relocating 100,000 Rohingya refugees to Bhasan Char, an island in the Bay of Bengal. Relocation to Bhasan Char was presented as a solution to alleviate the overcrowded camps and provide a safer and better living environment for the refugees (Hossain, 2020b).

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METHODOLOGY In this chapter, we have utilised a wide range of literature, encompassing both academic and grey literature sources. As the authors of this chapter, we have meticulously evaluated the credibility and reliability of the grey literature included in this review. To conduct this review, we followed a systematic approach (Jesson, Matheson, & Lacey, 2011) for literature searches using search engines and databases such as ‘Google’, ‘Google Scholar’, ‘Mendeley’, ‘Social Science Research Network’, and ‘Research Gate’. These searches were aimed at collecting documents related to the Rohingya crisis, utilising keywords like ‘Rohingya’, ‘Rohingya Crisis’, ‘Refugee’, ‘Refugee Camps’, ‘Bhasan Char’, ‘Myanmar’, and ‘Bangladesh’. Our objective was to investigate the impact of the Rohingya crisis on the externally displaced Rohingya refugees residing in Bhasan Char refugee camps. This process involved gathering both freely available academic and non-academic documents written in English. Subsequently, we analysed the selected literature to extract secondary data and presented in this chapter.

LITERATURE REVIEW The Rohingya Crisis The well-being of refugees is influenced by various factors discussed here, including pre-migration traumas, post-migration living difficulties, social support, cultural factors, and access to healthcare and education, and other services. Studies have shown that refugees often experience poor mental health and well-being due to the stressors they face before and after migration (Schweitzer et al., 2006; Miller et al., 2022). Additionally, post-migration stressors, such as socioeconomic disadvantages, loss of social support, and challenges in acculturation, have been found to significantly impact the psychological wellbeing of resettled refugees (Nilsen et al., 2023). The biopsychosocial environment in which refugees exist plays a crucial role in their emotional well-being (Schweitzer et al., 2006). Interventions that focus on strengthening familial and community-level social relationships, providing peer mentoring programmes, and improving access to culturally competent healthcare services have been shown to promote positive mental health and psychosocial well-being among refugees (Logie et al., 2020; Chiumento et al., 2020; Gower et al., 2022). Overall, promoting social integration, overcoming barriers to accessing mental health care and social services in the host country, facilitating engagement with other public services, and providing treatment for mental disorders are key areas of intervention for improving the well-being of refugees (Moutsou, 2023).

Historical Background The Rohingya crisis refers to a long-standing conflict and humanitarian issue primarily centred around the Rohingya ethnic minority in Myanmar. The Rohingya people have endured a long history of discrimination, exploitation, and violence, which has contributed to their current precarious situation. The term “Rohingya” gained prominence in the late 1950s and became widely recognised due to reports of human rights abuses against Muslims living in the northern part of Rakhine state, particularly in the

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1990s and after 2012 (Leider, 2018). The Rohingyas are the descendants of some ancient Arab and Persian traders, and some workers brought from Indian sub-continent by the British colonial government. These people have lived in the Arakan kingdom (now called Rakhine) from the ninth to the fifteenth centuries (Ullah, 2011; Rahman, 2022). Beginning in 1824, the British colonised Myanmar (then called Burma) and ruled it for 64 years as a province of India until 1937, when it gained independence as a separate colony (Ullah, 2011). During the British reign, many Rohingyas had returned to Rakhine state, and the British used the Rohingyas against other minority groups during their regime in Myanmar to advance their own rule (Hossain, 2021). Muslim Rohingyas and Buddhist Rakhine used to live in harmony until World War II (Milton et al., 2017; Moniruzzaman, 2021). However, the relationship deteriorated when Japan invaded Myanmar in 1942 (Ullah, 2011), and the Rohingyas continued to support the British, whereas the Rakhine showed loyalty to the Japanese (Milton et al., 2017; Moniruzzaman, 2021). Consequently, rifts grew between the two communities, and the Rohingyas were attacked by the Buddhists as well as the Burmese Independence Army, resulting in the killing of around 100,000 people and the fleeing of an additional 50,000 to neighbouring countries, including Bangladesh (Milton et al., 2017). Following the independence of Myanmar in 1948, the Rohingyas sought recognition as an ethnic group with equal rights. However, tensions between the Rohingya and the Buddhist Rakhine community, which considered the Rohingya illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, continued to escalate. In 1962, a military coup led by General Ne Win in Myanmar resulted in a military dictatorship that lasted for several decades. The military government imposed discriminatory policies against the Rohingya, including denying them citizenship and restricting their rights (Maizland, 2022). Furthermore, the Rohingyas were not registered as Myanmar citizens during a national census in 1977 launched by the military government, titled ‘Operation Nagamin’ (Dragon King) (Ullah, 2011; Prodip, 2017; Rahman, 2022). Such exclusion exacerbated discrimination and exploitation against the Rohingyas, leading to enormous torture, violence, persecution, and killing (Moniruzzaman, 2021; Islam et al., 2022; Rahman, 2022), resulting in a death toll of tens of thousands (Parnini et al., 2013) and the exodus of at least 200,000 Rohingyas to Bangladesh, labelled as the first major post-independence influx (Ullah, 2011; Prodip, 2017). However, the Myanmar government faced pressure from the international community, including the United Nations; hence, the majority of the Rohingyas returned to Myanmar after a successful repatriation pact with Bangladesh (Milton et al., 2017). In 1982, the government enacted the Citizenship Law, which effectively rendered the Rohingya stateless by excluding them from the list of recognised ethnic groups in Myanmar (Ullah, 2021; Shohel et al., 2022). They became without companions and, to some extent, considered illegal immigrants due to the 1982 Citizenship Act in Myanmar, which excluded them from both full and associated citizenships (Moniruzzaman, 2021). The Citizenship Act was based on people’s races and religions, undermining the importance of a person’s identity as defined by their place of birth (Rahman, 2022). Hence, the government does not recognise the Rohingyas as a national race, despite evidence that they were born in Burma (Milton et al., 2017). Ullah (2011) further reported that, to continue their ethnic cleansing attempts, Myanmar purposely established strict citizenship requirements. By neglecting the legal issue, the racist and discriminatory ‘Citizenship Act’ was created to exclude ethnic people, and the Rohingyas were not listed among the 135 constitutionally recognised ethnic communities in the Citizenship Act (Rahman, 2022). Since the Citizenship Law stripped Rohingyas off their citizenship, an estimated 800,000 Rohingyas in northern Rakhine have been declared stateless (Milton et al., 2017). Furthermore, after enforcing the Citizenship Act, the Burmese Junta regime propagated that Myanmar is not a place 282

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for adherents of the Islamic faith (Rahman, 2022). Such propaganda exacerbated ethnic cleansing and religious discrimination, and studies have reported that the Rohingya population was denied citizenship because of their religion (Farzana, 2017). Since the 1970s, waves of violence and displacement have occurred, leading to large-scale Rohingya refugee populations in neighbouring countries. In 1978, the first major wave of violence led to an exodus of the Rohingyas into Bangladesh. A repatriation agreement was signed between Bangladesh and Myanmar, but it was not fully implemented, resulting in further tensions. Tabarak Husain, the Foreign Secretary of Bangladesh, and U Tin Ohn, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Burma, signed the agreement on July 9, 1978, after bilateral negotiations conducted in Dhaka. The agreement was labelled ‘secret’ but released for scholarly use to Princeton University Library in 2014 by the Director General for Southeast Asia of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bangladesh. In the early 1990s, a new wave of violence in Myanmar forced more than 250,000 Rohingya refugees to flee forced labour, rape, and religious persecution at the hands of the Burmese army, creating a significant refugee crisis. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) became involved with the government of Bangladesh (GoB) in providing assistance to the Rohingya refugees (Human Rights Watch, 2000). Following a genocide in Myanmar in which hundreds of the Rohingyas were killed and sexually assaulted, and thousands of homes were set on fire, a large number of the Rohingyas took shelter again in Bangladesh in late 2016 (Milton et al., 2017). The most significant escalation of the Rohingya crisis occurred in August 2017. After an attack on police outposts by a Rohingya insurgent group, the Myanmar military launched a brutal crackdown on the Rohingya population. Reports of widespread human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, mass rape, and the burning of the Rohingya villages, emerged, leading to a massive exodus of the Rohingya refugees into Bangladesh. The United Nations referred to the military’s actions as ethnic cleansing, and various international organisations and governments condemned Myanmar’s government for its handling of the crisis (Shohel, 2022).

Response to the Rohingya Crisis by the Government of Bangladesh Bangladesh and Myanmar share a 270 kilometre long, porous international border that runs along a river called the Naf (Farzana, 2017). The Naf River is an extended creek that separates the southeast of Cox’s Bazar district from Rakhine state, and the right bank of the river is home to Teknaf upazila (subdistrict) in Cox’s Bazar, while the left bank is home to Akyab in Myanmar (Ullah, 2011). In particular, St. Martin Island, Teknaf and Shahpouri Island of Cox’s Bazar were the shores where the Rohingyas fled by boat from Myanmar via the Naf River (Shohel, 2022). Because of the close proximity between the two nations, the Bangladesh border was easily accessible for the Rohingyas (Farzana, 2017; Shohel et al., 2023b); hence, Bangladesh has been the primary and mostly sought-after refugee destination among the other neighbouring countries. Furthermore, the Rohingyas resemble South Asians in terms of appearance, language, religion, and culture (Parnini et al., 2013; Milton et al., 2017) and according to the gravity model of refugee movements, refugee flows are mostly focused on the closest nations with weaker borders (Ullah, 2011). Bangladesh, post-independence encountered the first major Rohingya influx in 1978, and after that, significant influxes occurred, notably in 1991-1992, 2012, 2016, and 2017. The GoB has frequently opened its border to accept the Rohingyas on humanitarian grounds despite having very few resources and has continued to shelter them (Yılmaz & Talukder, 2019; Shohel et al., 2022a). During the influx 283

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of 1991-1992, the GoB, with support from UNHCR, constructed 20 refugee camps, including several temporary shelters in Cox’s Bazar, to shelter the 250,000 Rohingyas. To establish these settlements, forestlands in Ukhia and Teknaf sub-districts of Cox’s Bazar were cleared, and forest resources worth about US$130 million were estimated to have been damaged by the Forest Department of Cox’s Bazar (Parnini et al., 2013). However, a gradual repatriation of the refugees began between 1992 and 1993 after the GoB signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with UNHCR (Ullah, 2011). With the bulk of the Rohingyas repatriating, all camps were shut down except for two registered camps, namely the Nayapara camp near Teknaf and the Kutupalong camp near Ukhia (Ullah, 2011; Shohel et al., 2023b). These two registered camps housed around 34,000 refugees who have been granted official refugee status by the GoB (Milton et al., 2017; Hoque, 2021) and are eligible to receive all services, including education and other essentials (Rahman, 2022). Figure 1. Map locations of the Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh and the Rakhine state in Myanmar (Source: Directorate General of Medical Services, Bangladesh)

Following the massive influx in August 2017, the local Bangladeshi population, along with local and international organisations, extended support to the GoB and UNHCR in order to protect these persecuted Rohingyas (Islam et al., 2022). Compared to the native population in the Cox’s Bazar region, the massive stream of the stateless Rohingyas doubled in size; nevertheless, the locals of Cox’s Bazar provided immediate support, and the Rohingyas were initially housed in the yards of neighbourhoods, schools, and religious buildings (Sajib et al., 2022). Later, an additional 32 unregistered camps were built to shelter the newly arrived substantial Rohingya population in 2017. Such settlements required a

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huge territory; therefore, the GoB provided an extra 2,500 hectares of hill tracts and forest area that had been emptied in the Balukhali region of Kutupalong (Sajib et al., 2022). In total, more than 8,000 acres of forestland, 6,800 tons of firewood, and depleting freshwater supplies were used to settle the Rohingya population, which damaged the environment and harmed wildlife, costing a total of BDT 18,650 million (Islam et al., 2022). The GoB has been very generous, and despite having an overly populated region with limited resources, the GoB did not prevent the Rohingyas from entering and settling in this region (Shohel et al., 2023b). Since the repatriation process began in 1993, the GoB has consistently stopped formally recognising any ‘new arrivals’ of the Rohingyas as refugees (Prodip, 2017; Milton et al., 2017). Bangladesh is neither a signatory member to the 1951 Refugee Convention nor its 1967 Protocol. Hence, it does not recognise many undocumented Rohingyas as refugees and is not mandated to take all necessary measures (Parnini et al., 2013; Hossain, 2021; Islam et al., 2022). Consequently, a significant number of the Rohingya refugees is illegally residing outside of the camps and in surrounding districts of Cox’s Bazar, in addition to those who have been granted refugee status (Prodip, 2017). Moreover, since 1996, thousands of the Rohingyas have slowly flowed back into Bangladesh from Myanmar, and as they were not granted refugee status, they joined these more than 100,000 undocumented Rohingyas (Ullah, 2011). Following the massive exodus in 2017, 32 makeshift camps are home to the newly arrived Rohingya population of around 1 million (Hoque, 2021). As they are not registered refugees, the GoB uses the term ‘Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals (FDMN)’ to refer to these populations, although UN agencies recognise them as refugees in line with international refugee frameworks (UN OCHA, 2023). The GoB and UNHCR have been providing the Rohingyas with food, shelter, and access to basic amenities, as well as maintaining and running separate camps for their temporary residences. The Ministry of Food and Disaster Management has administrative responsibilities, with the Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner (RRRC) serving as the camp’s main administrator (Prodip, 2017), along with several Camp in Charges (CiCs). However, there remains a greater need for humanitarian aid, including housing, clean water, and sanitation, as the newly arrived Rohingyas are residing in improvised settlements (Mahmud et al., 2019). Currently, the total Rohingya population in Bangladesh is 961,729, out of which 52% of residents are children (See Figure 2) (GoB-UNHCR population factsheet, June 2023). The refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar are highly dense, and UNHCR (2022) declared ‘Kutupalong’ as the biggest refugee camp in the world, with nearly one million Rohingya living there, and around 75% of the total refugees arrived in September 2017. Furthermore, the Rohingya population has been increasing day by day due to child marriage, polygamy, religious conservativeness, and mass unawareness of birth control. Because of the crowded living conditions, nearly every facet of a refugee’s right to health, safety, and security has been compromised (Islam, 2023). In response to these circumstances, the GoB worked with the UNHCR, and Bhasan Char, an island of Noakhali district, was prepared to house some of the Rohingyas (Sajib et al., 2022; Islam, 2023). According to UNICEF (2023), about 26,043 migrants were relocated to Bhasan Char island to relieve camp congestion until August 2022, and UNHCR reported about 30,050 refugees who had been relocated as of May 2023 (UNHCR operational database, May 2023). However, humanitarian organisations and human rights groups have criticised and debated this relocation (Islam, 2023).

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Figure 2. The Rohingya refugee population as of June 2023

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SHIFTING THE ROHINGYAS TO THE BHASAN CHAR In the region, involving Australia, Thailand, Malaysia, and other countries that have taken on challenging refugee reception practices, the case of Bhasan Char and the underlying idea of refugee ‘warehousing’ the practice of keeping refugees in situations of limited mobility for an indefinite period of time - need increasing attention. According to current estimates (See Figure 3), there are 32,574 Rohingya refugees on Bhasan Char in Bangladesh (GoB & UNHCR, 2024). The island, which once housed a military installation and is susceptible to potential climatic catastrophes, apparently lacks the infrastructure needed to sustain residents over time. To begin building paths towards resolutions that ensure respect for basic rights, demonstrate collaborative methods, and support the difficulties experienced by Bangladesh as a hosting country, significant national and international action will need to be taken. The Bangladeshi government suggested moving around 32,000 Rohingya with ‘refugee classification’ in 2015, which was when the idea of Bhasan Char serving as a home for the Rohingya refugees was first proposed. The decision was made in response to the belief that the Rohingya were ‘impeding tourism in the coastal resort district’. The UNHCR stated that the relocation would be “logistically challenging” at the time. After the Myanmar Army’s brutal assault on the Rohingyas in August 2017, refugees had to make their way to Bangladesh in large numbers, resulting in what was widely regarded as one of the worst humanitarian catastrophes of twenty-first century. This horrific incident was classified by the UN as an ethnic cleansing by the Myanmar government (Rahman, 2022; Shohel et al., 2023a), and it was further affirmed (Shohel et al., 2022) that it was the largest mass displacement in modern times, causing significant humanitarian devastation since the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Relocation preparations for Bhasan Char accelerated in 2020 (Janmyr, 2022). This new location, near the starting point of the Meghna River, is on an island in the Bay of Bengal, hundreds of kilometres away from the current encampment. It is a flat, deserted patch of land that was created 20 years ago by flowing silt and is known as “Bhasan Char” or “floating island”. The peninsula was one of several movable, fragile islands, or “chars”, that typically exist in the area (Cowper-Smith, , 2020). Janmyr (2022) also added, “Forests were cleared in Bangladesh as new campsites started to emerge”. According to a 2018 research study, Kutupalong and its environs lost more than 2,000 hectares of forest. As everyone depended on the trees for food, fuel, and medicine, the area became increasingly susceptible to landslides, and tensions grew between the Rohingya refugees and locals. Bhasan Char is being considered as a solution by the Bangladeshi government due to the congestion and overcrowding in the 34 camps, which are now home to about a million Rohingya refugees. Several significant issues with the relocation plan have been brought up by observers. First of all, the island is vulnerable to cyclones and flooding caused by natural calamities. Bill Frelick, Chief of the organisation Human Rights Watch’s Refugee Rights Programme, claimed in August 2018 that “Bhasan Char is not sustainable with regard to human settlement and could be severely impacted by rising sea levels and storm surges”. More recently, in January 2019, Bangladeshi officials accompanied Yanghee Lee, the UN Special Rapporteur on the state of human rights in Myanmar, during a visit to Bhasan Char Island (Cowper-Smith, 2020). The UNHCR and human rights organisations urged Bangladeshi authorities to allow an independent expert evaluation of the refugees’ protection needs, as well as the safety and habitability of the island, before relocating hundreds of the Rohingya refugees from Cox’s Bazar to Bhasan Char. The transfer was approved by everyone who was relocated, according to local authorities. However, according to media accounts, many people received little information before moving, and several people felt pressured to do so. Concerns about the island’s inadequate capability for evacuation in the case of storms or other 287

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Figure 3. Bhasan Char Population Factsheet (Adapted from GoB & UNHCR, 2024)

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natural catastrophes have been raised by UNHCR and rights organisations. On Bhasan Char, many Rohingya refugees frequently claim to be living in “prison-like” circumstances with very limited access to healthcare, education, and employment. The global community, including United Nations agencies and human rights organisations, tends to be concerned about how voluntary the relocation of the Rohingya refugees has been, how vulnerable Bhasan Char is to extreme weather, and how the Rohingya people’s freedom of movement has been restricted (Nguyen & Lewis, 2022).

A Controversial Journey to Bhasan Char Bangladesh is currently hosting the world’s largest refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar, where nearly one million Rohingyas who were forcibly displaced from Myanmar have sought refuge since August 2017 (UNHCR 2023). Despite hosting such a large community, over the last five years, the Bangladeshi government has been criticised by human rights organisations for its relocation plan of 100,000 Rohingyas currently living in the refugee camps of Cox’s Bazar to Bhasan Char, a newly developed island in the Bay of Bengal. As a result, the Rohingya relocation to Bhasan Char has gained enormous attention in the international news media (Hossain 2020a, 2020b; Guardian 2020). Concerns about the island’s inadequate capability for evacuation in the case of cyclones or other natural catastrophes have been raised by the UNHCR and rights organisations. The government will, however, transport some 81,000 Rohingya refugees to the island once the 2022 monsoon season is over in order to meet a quota of 100,000, according to the Bangladesh Refugee Commissioner. As the proportion of refugees rises, Bangladesh has taken measures to “clear the way for new homes” in Cox’s Bazar, including the contentious destruction of more than 2,000 stores in the camps (The Diplomat, 2022). In November 2021, Bangladesh announced its plan to voluntarily relocate the Rohingyas from Cox’s Bazar to Bhasan Char Island, located 60km (37 miles) off the coast of Bangladesh. The island emerged less than 20 years ago from the sea and is situated less than 2meters (6feets) above sea level. It is made entirely of silt, Himalayan sediment washed down river and into the sea. This decision was met with strong opposition from the United Nations and other international agencies, citing concerns about the safety, security, and livelihood of the Rohingya population on the island. Bhasan Char has been uninhabited for years and is susceptible to floods, cyclones, and soil erosion. The lack of prior technical assessments by the United Nations raised further doubts about the viability of the relocation plan (Hossain, 2020a). More than 5,000 Rohingya refugees suffered during a health crisis in early July 2021, and at least three children died as a result, according to media sources. As refugees continue to be marginalised, cut off from support networks, and unable to travel, mental health has also been impacted. Positively, Bangladeshi authorities allowed 68 Rohingya to go from Bhasan Char to Cox’s Bazar to see family. Mechanisms of dependence on outside assistance have been developed as a result of hosting refugees on Bhasan Char. While the UNHCR and the government of Bangladesh reached a deal in October 2021 that allows for humanitarian aid to be provided on the island, there are still significant concerns because the agreement makes no guarantees regarding the Rohingya’s freedom to move to the mainland or their ability to conduct business on Bhasan Char or elsewhere. However, the suitability and long-term viability of Bhasan Char as a solution have raised serious concerns among international human rights organisations, including Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and UN agencies expressing apprehension about the island’s susceptibility to cyclones and flooding, which pose significant risks in terms of natural disasters. Moreover, the remote location of Bhasan Char, situated kilometres away

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from the mainland, has raised issues regarding access to essential services, freedom of movement, and the potential isolation faced by the relocated refugees (Reporter, 2022). On the contrary, Bangladesh, not being a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, does not officially recognise the Rohingyas as refugees (Parnini et al., 2013; Hossain, 2021). Consequently, they are deprived of guaranteed access to public services, freedom of movement, and livelihood opportunities. According to the UNHCR operational database from May 2023, the Government of Bangladesh relocated around 30,050 refugees to Bhasan Char in an effort to alleviate overcrowding in the camps (UNHCR operational database, May 2023). The international principles underlying the Rohingya refugee crisis emphasise the rights of refugees and the principle of non-refoulement. While Bangladesh’s decision to relocate Rohingyas to Bhasan Char Island may not be entirely unlawful, it raises concerns about the viability of peaceful human existence on the island. The principle of non-refoulement remains crucial, and the international community should support Bangladesh in resolving the Rohingya crisis and ensuring the protection of human rights.

Conditions in the Bhasan Char Refugee Camp Since December 2020, nearly 30,000 Rohingya refugees have been relocated by the Bangladeshi government to Bhasan Char, an isolated silt island in the Bay of Bengal. Refugees and aid workers alike worry that inadequate storm and flood protection may put people on the island in grave danger as the monsoon season approaches. Many refugees worry they will be confined to “an island jail in the middle of the sea”, as one youngster put it. This is in addition to food shortages, poor water supplies, a lack of education and healthcare, and significant limits on freedom of movement. Bhasan Char has been promoted by the Bangladeshi government as an alternative to the extreme congestion in the Cox’s Bazar refugee camps, where almost one million Rohingya refugees from Myanmar reside (HRW, 2023). On Bhasan Char, a number of refugees said that their freedom of movement was restricted, and that security officers stationed there frequently mistreated them. Others lamented their lack of food and the deaths of sick individuals, especially children, due to inadequate medical care. Many immigrants reported that they were only prescribed paracetamol (acetaminophen) for conditions such as ulcers, chest discomfort, diabetes, and asthma. Emergency medical treatment required travel to the nearest mainland hospital, which was a minimum of five hours away by road and water, and needed to be paid for and authorised by the government. Inclement weather makes such transit by boat or aircraft all but impossible (HRW, 2023). The majority of the Rohingya refugees experience post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and clinical depression. A doctor claimed that many individuals’ health ailments were primarily caused by their mental states. The first-hand experiences involved participants being subjected to torture and abuse by family members. One woman spoke of being tortured before arriving in Bangladesh. Many refugees were influenced by the abuse of some of their close acquaintances, neighbours, and family members (Zaman et al., 2019).

ROLE OF BHASAN CHAR IN REFUGEE RELOCATION Bhasan Char has emerged as a significant player in the relocation efforts of the Rohingya refugees from Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh. The Bangladeshi government has been actively developing Bhasan Char as a potential settlement for a portion of the Rohingya refugee population. The primary objective of 290

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establishing Bhasan Char as a relocation site is to decongest the overcrowded refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar and provide improved living conditions for the Rohingya refugees. The existing camps, which initially served as temporary shelters, have been strained by the increasing refugee population, leading to challenges in providing adequate housing, healthcare, and essential services. The government views Bhasan Char as a solution to address these challenges and create a more sustainable living environment for the refugees (Islam & Siddika, 2021). The role of Bhasan Char can be narrowed down to several areas as follow.

Safety and Sustainability The location of Bhasan Char offers certain advantages for hosting a refugee settlement. The island, formed through sediment deposition, has a relatively higher elevation compared to the low-lying areas prone to flooding in Cox’s Bazar. This geographic advantage makes Bhasan Char potentially less vulnerable to seasonal monsoon rains and cyclones, enhancing the safety and resilience of the refugee population. According to Commodore Abdullah Al Mamun Chowdhury (Hossain, 2020a), a 14 km long seawall has been constructed to protect the island, and “experts” have assessed the risk of the island being hit by a cyclone as “very low”. He added the statement in a presentation to journalists in 2020 that no major cyclone had hit the island in 172 years, and 120 cyclone shelters are being developed capable of withstanding 260 kph winds. However, evidence shows that, in fact, two major cyclones occurred very close to Bhasan Char in 1991 and 1997, and it is well-documented that the damage caused by cyclones frequently occurs many miles from the eye of a storm (Rahaman, 2012). The environmental sustainability and long-term habitability of Bhasan Char have also been subjects of scrutiny. Some experts argue that the island’s susceptibility to erosion, sea-level rise, and cyclones could pose significant risks to the safety and security of the refugees. The remoteness of Bhasan Char from the mainland and limited opportunities for self-reliance add further complexity to the sustainability aspect.

Infrastructure and Livelihood Development In response to escalating violence and security threats in the Cox’s Bazar camps, Bangladesh’s Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, has advocated for the necessity of relocating refugees to Bhasan Char. The new town, constructed at a cost of $350 million, promises a spacious alternative with modern facilities, including hundreds of red-roofed houses and essential amenities such as two schools, two 40-bed hospitals, and two community clinics. These infrastructure developments aim to provide better living conditions and access to services that were limited in the overcrowded camps. The emphasis on ecofriendly infrastructure and electricity availability seeks to provide a better environment for education and livelihood development (Hossain, 2020b).

Cultural and Psychological Aspects The concept of relocation brings forth psychological dilemmas for the Rohingya. For many, proximity to the border with Myanmar offers a sense of connection to their homeland and their roots. Some elders, despite tours and advocacy, resist the idea of moving to Bhasan Char, feeling connected to their identity within the Cox’s Bazar camps. According to a report, by Amnesty International, some of the new residents in Bhasan Char feel that the place is worse than a prison, and the refugees are given two meals a 291

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day, which they lost appetite of due to the frequent repetition. However, the Bangladeshi government authorities have established a mosque in Bhasan Char for practicing their religion and claim to be open to the cultural practices of the Rohingya. It is certain that the island does not reflect the arrangements that ensure openness to the Rohingya culture and often leads to psychological suppression among the relocated Rohingyas. This is also a concerning matter to think about; if the psychological needs are not assessed, the objectives of safety and dignity may be violated, and further tension in Bhasan Char can be anticipated.

Challenges and Controversies Despite efforts to promote Bhasan Char as an ideal relocation destination, concerns persist. Reports from Amnesty International have revealed cramped living conditions, and limited access to food, healthcare, and communication, raising questions about the overall well-being of the Rohingyas who are already settled on the island. The allegations of harassment and extortion, though denied by officials, underscore the complex dynamics of providing adequate protection (Amnesty, 2020). The Bangladeshi government has denied any reasons for concern regarding the relocation. According to Mostafizur Rahman, Bangladesh’s ambassador to the UN office in Geneva, the Rohingyas were relocated voluntarily, and the government has taken steps to improve their quality of life, livelihood, and security. Mohammed Shamsud Douza, the deputy government official in charge of refugees, stated that a 12 km-long embankment was constructed to protect the island from floods, and housing for 100,000 people was provided. He emphasised that the relocation was voluntary, and the new settlement offers improved access to healthcare and education for a better life (Guardian, 2020). Bhasan Char has been given a significant role in the relocation efforts of the Rohingya refugees from Cox’s Bazar. The development of infrastructure and services on the island aims to address the challenges faced in the existing camps and provide improved living conditions. However, concerns regarding human rights, transparency, environmental sustainability, safety and security, and the long-term habitability of Bhasan Char must be carefully addressed. An inclusive approach that involves the refugees, international partners, and relevant stakeholders is crucial to ensuring the well-being and rights of the Rohingya refugees. It is essential to recognise that the relocation of the Rohingya refugees to Bhasan Char should align with international human rights standards and principles. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other international partners have stressed the importance of comprehensive assessments, ensured voluntary and informed decisions, and safeguarded the rights and well-being of the refugees (Guardian, 2020).

BANGLADESH GOVERNMENT POLICY ABOUT ROHINGYA REFUGEES Bangladesh has not ratified either the 1967 Protocol on Refugees or the 1951 Refugee Convention. The 2017–18 refugee crisis in Bangladesh may be categorised into two distinct periods. Despite not being a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, Bangladesh is collaborating with a number of governmental, corporate, and international players to ensure the general safety of its citizens. The initial timeline spans the period from 25 August 2017, when the “third major wave” of the Rohingyas emerged, through 22 August 2019, the day the Rohingya refugees rejected a joint return offer from Bangladesh and Myanmar 292

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for the second time. This unsuccessful attempt at repatriation signalled a substantial shift in Bangladesh’s political atmosphere. As a result, the second period includes alterations that have been taking place since 26 August 2019 (Faruque, 2020). The third year of the refugee crisis began in August 2019, and allegations of criminal activity, including murders, illicit drug trade, and illegal immigration, were increasing close to the Bangladesh-Myanmar border. In response, the Bangladeshi government has implemented a number of security-focused measures that seem to address national security issues while materially reducing refugee security demands. The earliest and most urgent security measures involved reorganising the administrative structure and increasing administrative oversight within the refugee camps. The government’s second security measure involved imposing stringent limits on the refugees’ mobility autonomy. The administration instructed the Bangladesh Army to build barbed-wire walls around refugee camps on “safety grounds”, following the suggestions provided by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence (Faruque, 2020). A request for the worldwide community to defend the rights and meet the needs of the Rohingya was made by 61 worldwide and national non-governmental communities. The major civil society response to the Rohingya refugees has been planned by BRAC, a national NGO in Bangladesh. In addition to meeting these individuals’ immediate needs, this solution emphasises the development of skills, resilience, and awareness that support their long-term well-being when circumstances change. In its efforts to boost humanitarian initiatives in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, BRAC has so far raised over US$37 million from a variety of partners (OPEC Fund, 2018). The NGOs operating in the camps increased their workload and extended their hours of operation during the epidemic to increase awareness among the residents. The GOB unveiled its national strategy for managing Myanmar refugees in 2014, consisting of five components: (i) compiling a list of unregistered refugees; (ii) providing temporary basic humanitarian aid; (iii) enhancing border management; (iv) pursuing diplomatic relations with the government of Myanmar; and (v) enhancing national-level coordination (Milton et al., 2017). In light of this, the UNHCR completed the biometric registration of the Rohingya refugees who are aged 12 years or more and provided them with an identity card. This is considered a noteworthy accomplishment of UNHCR in 2019, which is also UNHCR’s largest biometric registration effort to date (Hossain, 2021).

CONCLUSION Bangladesh is currently hosting nearly one million Rohingya refugees who were forcibly displaced from Myanmar. Despite not being a signatory to international refugee conventions, the Bangladeshi government has been working with various entities to ensure the safety of its citizens amidst the refugee crisis. In an effort to alleviate overcrowding and improve living conditions in refugee camps, the government has established Bhasan Char Island as an alternative settlement or relocation site. However, concerns about the island’s vulnerability to natural disasters, limited infrastructure, and restricted freedoms persist. Bhasan Char’s role in the Rohingya refugee relocation is multifaceted. The island offers potential advantages, such as higher elevation compared to Cox’s Bazar, which provides resilience against flooding and cyclones. The government’s security-focused measures within the refugee camps include administrative restructuring and mobility restrictions. Meanwhile, NGOs are addressing immediate needs and skill development for the Rohingya refugees. Nonetheless, there are significant concerns regarding the suitability of Bhasan Char as a relocation solution. Its susceptibility to environmental risks, limited infrastructure, and psycho293

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logical complexities pose some challenges. Reports indicate cramped living conditions, limited access to resources, and allegations of mistreatment on the island. The voluntary nature of the relocation and the well-being of the Rohingya refugees remain contentious issues. The Bangladeshi government’s efforts to address these challenges are important, but comprehensive evaluations and international cooperation are necessary to ensure the rights and well-being of the Rohingya refugees in their relocation journey.

REFERENCES Amnesty International. (2021, June 1). Bangladesh: Let us speak for our rights: Human rights situation of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. Amnesty International. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ asa13/2884/2020/en/ Chiumento, A., Rutayisire, T., Sarabwe, E., Hasan, M. T., Kasujja, R., Nabirinde, R., Mugarura, J., Kagabo, D. M., Bangirana, P., Jansen, S., Ventevogel, P., Robinson, J., & White, R. (2020b). Exploring the mental health and psychosocial problems of Congolese refugees living in refugee settings in Rwanda and Uganda: A rapid qualitative study. Conflict and Health, 14(1), 77. doi:10.1186/s13031-020-00323-8 PMID:33292363 Cowper-Smith, Y. (2020). The Bhasan Char Relocation Project – Implications for Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh. Reliefweb. https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/bhasan-char-relocation-projectimplications-rohingya-refugees-bangladesh Faruque, T. E. (2020). Bangladesh’s policy on Rohingya refugees: securitization or what? NUST Journal of International Peace and Stability, 28–47. doi:10.37540/njips.v3i2.54 Farzana, K. F. (2017). Memories of Burmese Rohingya refugees. Palgrave Macmillan US eBooks. doi:10.1057/978-1-137-58360-4 Government of Bangladesh & UN High Commissioner for Refugees (GoB & UNHCR). (2024). Rohingya Refugee Response/Bangladesh: Bhasan Char Population Factsheet (as of 31 January 2024). Reliefweb. https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/rohingya-refugee-responsebangladesh-bhasan-char-populationfactsheet-31-january-2024 Hoque, M. (2021b). Forced Labour and access to Education of Rohingya Refugee Children in Bangladesh: Beyond a Humanitarian Crisis. Journal of Modern Slavery, 6(3), 20–35. doi:10.22150/jms/PPJY4309 Hossain, A. N. M. Z. (2021). Preparedness for education to Rohingya refugee children in Bangladeshpotentials and challenges to citizenship education. Journal of Social Science Education, 20(2), 103–129. doi:10.11576/jsse-3980 Hossain, B. A. (2020, October 31). Far from home, Rohingya refugees face a new peril on a remote island. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-54717686 Hossain, B. A. (2020b, December 4). Rohingya relocated to remote island against their will, rights groups say. BBC News. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-55177688 Hossain, M. A., Ullah, A. A., & Mohiuddin, M. (2022). Rohingya refugees in the pandemic: Crisis and policy responses. Global Policy, 14(1), 183–191. doi:10.1111/1758-5899.13156 PMID:36718469 294

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Human Rights Watch. (2000). Burmese Refugees in Bangladesh. Still no Solution, 12(3C). https://www. hrw.org/reports/2000/burma/index.htm Human Rights Watch. (2023). An Island Jail in the Middle of the Sea. HRW. https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/06/07/island-jail-middle-sea/bangladeshs-relocation-rohingya-refugees-bhasan-char Islam, M. D., & Siddika, A. (2021). Implications of the Rohingya Relocation from Cox’s Bazar to Bhasan Char, Bangladesh. The International Migration Review, 56(4), 1195–1205. doi:10.1177/01979183211064829 Islam, R. (2023). The state of social cohesion in the Post-Settlement of Rohingyas in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 1–32. doi:10.1163/15718115-bja10121 Janmyr, M. S. H. M. (2022). Bhasan Char: Prison island or paradise? Are Rohingya refugees being denied their right to freedom of movement? Lacuna Magazine. https://lacuna.org.uk/migration/bhasanchar-rohingya-refugees-right-to-freedom-of-movement/ Joint Government of Bangladesh (GoB). (2023). UNHCR Population Factsheet. GoB. https://data.unhcr. org/en/documents/details/101852 Khatun, F. (2017). Presentation on Implications of the Rohingya Crisis for Bangladesh. Center for Policy Dialogue. Leider, J. (2018). Rohingya: The history of a Muslim identity in Myanmar. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Asian History., doi:10.1093/acrefore/9780190277727.013.115 Logie, C. H., Okumu, M., Mwima, S., Hakiza, R., Abela, H., & Kyambadde, P. (2020). Gender, transactional sex, and HIV prevention cascade engagement among urban refugee and displaced adolescents and youth in Kampala, Uganda. AIDS Care, 33(7), 897–903. doi:10.1080/09540121.2020.1861181 PMID:33345581 Mahmud, Z. H., Islam, S., Imran, K. M., Hakim, S. I., Worth, M., Ahmed, A., Hossan, S., Haider, M., Islam, M. R., Hossain, F., Johnston, D., & Ahmed, N. (2019). Occurrence of Escherichia coli and faecal coliforms in drinking water at source and household point-of-use in Rohingya camps, Bangladesh. Gut Pathogens, 11(1), 52. doi:10.1186/s13099-019-0333-6 PMID:31695751 Maizland, L. (2022, January 31). Myanmar’s troubled history: coups, military rule, and ethnic conflict. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/myanmar-history-coup-military-ruleethnic-conflict-rohingya Milton, A. H., Rahman, M., Hussain, S., Jindal, C., Choudhury, S., Akter, S., Ferdousi, S., Mouly, T. A., Hall, J., & Efird, J. T. (2017). Trapped in statelessness: Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 14(8), 942. doi:10.3390/ijerph14080942 PMID:28825673 Moniruzzaman, H. M. (2021). Education For Rohingya Displaced Children: A case study on providing education at NGO-run Temporary Learning Centres (TLCs) in Bangladeshi Refugee Camps. [Master’s Dissertation, University of Gothenburg]. https://gupea.ub.gu.se/handle/2077/69374 Nguyen, H., & Lewis, T. (2022). Bhasan Char one year on. Mixed Migration Centre. https://mixedmigration.org/articles/bhasan-char-one-year-on/

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Nilsen, M., Olney, J., Maung, K., Kabir, L., Ahmad, S., Haque, N., & Mubarak, H. R. (2023). CommunityLed Education among Rohingya Refugees and the Politics of Refugee Education in Bangladesh. Journal of Refugee Studies, 36(4), 712–735. doi:10.1093/jrs/fead037 OPEC Fund. (2018). Bangladesh NGO supporting Rohingya refugees wins 2018 OFID annual award for development. OPEC Fund. https://opecfund.org/media‐center/press‐releases/2018/bangladesh‐ngo‐ supporting‐rohingya‐refugees‐wins‐2018‐ofid‐annual‐award‐for‐development Parnini, S. N., Othman, M. R., & Ghazali, A. S. (2013). The Rohingya refugee crisis and Bangladesh-Myanmar relations. Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, 22(1), 133–146. doi:10.1177/011719681302200107 Prodip, M. A. (2017). Health and educational status of Rohingya refugee children in Bangladesh. Journal of POPULATION and SOCIAL STUDIES (Online), 25(2), 135–146. doi:10.25133/JPSSv25n2.005 Rahaman, S. U. (2012). Cyclonic track analysis using GIS over the Bay of Bengal. International Journal of Applied Science and Engineering Research, 1(5), 689–701. doi:10.6088/ijaser.0020101070 Rahman, M. M. (2022). Barriers to Providing Basic Education among the Rohingyas Refugee Children: Insights from the Kutupalong Unregistered Camp, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. [Masters dissertation, Lund University]. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/361280537 ReliefWeb. (2020). The Bhasan Char Relocation Project – Implications for Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh - Bangladesh. ReliefWeb. https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/bhasan-char-relocationproject-implications-rohingya-refugees-bangladesh Reporter, G. S. (2022, October 19). Bangladesh moves more Rohingyas to remote island despite rights concerns. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/dec/28/bangladeshmoves-more-rohingyas-to-remote-island-despite-rights-concerns Sajib, S. M. S. A., Islam, S. M., & Sohad, M. K. N. (2022). Rohingya influx and socio-environmental crisis in southeastern Bangladesh. The International Journal of Community and Social Development, 4(1), 89–103. doi:10.1177/25166026211067604 Schweitzer, R., Melville, F., Steel, Z., & Lacherez, P. F. (2006). Trauma, Post-Migration living difficulties, and social support as predictors of psychological adjustment in resettled Sudanese refugees. The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 40(2), 179–187. doi:10.1080/j.1440-1614.2006.01766.x PMID:16476137 Shohel, M. M., Ashrafuzzaman, M., Azim, F., Akter, T., & Tanny, S. F. (2022). Displacement and Trauma: Exploring the Lost Childhood of Rohingya Children in the Refugee Camps in Bangladesh. In R. Throne (Ed.), Social Justice Research Methods for Doctoral Research (pp. 244–272). IGI Global., doi:10.4018/978-1-7998-8479-8.ch012 Shohel, M. M. C. (2023). Education in emergencies: Challenges of providing education for Rohingya children living in refugee camps in Bangladesh. Education Inquiry, 13(1), 104–126. doi:10.1080/2000 4508.2020.1823121

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Shohel, M. M. C. (2023). Lives of the Rohingya children in limbo: Childhood, education, and children’s rights in refugee camps in Bangladesh. Prospects, 53(1–2), 131–149. doi:10.1007/s11125-022-09631-8 PMID:37197308 Shohel, M. M. C., Ashrafuzzaman, M., Babu, R., Akter, T., Tasnim, N., & Bayezid, A. (2023b). Access to Higher Education for Rohingya Refugees: Challenges, Opportunities and Future Directions. In S. Saeed & M. Zhang (Eds.), Global Perspectives on the Difficulties and Opportunities Forced by Migrant and Refugee Students in Higher Education. IGI Global. doi:10.4018/978-1-6684-7781-6.ch005 Shohel, M. M. C., Babu, R., Ashrafuzzaman, M., Azim, F., & Bayezid, A. (2023a). Learning Competency Framework and Approach for the Displaced Rohingya Children Living in Bangladesh: A Critical Review. Continuity in Education, 4(1), 50–66. doi:10.5334/cie.57 Shohel, M. M. C., Roy, G., Ahsan, M. S., & Acharya, D. (2021). Access to Higher Education for Refugees in South Asia. In M. A. Prodip, G. Roy, & D. Nandy (Eds.), Refugee Education in South Asia: Policies and Perspectives (pp. 187–222). Nova Science Publishing House. The Diplomat. (2022, February 8). Bhasan Char and Refugee ‘Warehousing.’ The Diplomat. https:// thediplomat.com/2022/02/bhasan-char-and-refugee-warehousing/ Ullah, A. A. (2011). Rohingya Refugees to Bangladesh: Historical exclusions and contemporary marginalization. Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies, 9(2), 139–161. doi:10.1080/15562948.2011.567149 Ullah, A. A. (2014). Refugee politics in the Middle East and North Africa. In Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks. doi:10.1057/9781137356536 Ullah, S. M. A., Asahiro, K., Moriyama, M., & Tani, M. (2021). Socioeconomic Status Changes of the Host Communities after the Rohingya Refugee Influx in the Southern Coastal Area of Bangladesh. Sustainability (Basel), 13(8), 4240. doi:10.3390/su13084240 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). (2023). Joint Response Plan: Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis (January - December 2023). Reliefweb. https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/2023joint-response-plan-rohingya-humanitarian-crisis-january-december-2023 UNHCR. (2022). Rohingya Emergency. UNHCR. https://www.unhcr.org/rohingya-emergency.html UNICEF. (2023). Humanitarian Action for Children- Bangladesh. UNICEF. https://www.unicef.org/ media/131641/file/2023-HAC-Bangladesh.pdf Yilmaz, M. L., & Talukder, I. A. (2019). Economic impact of Rohingya exodus on Bangladesh. Liberal Düşünce, 24(95), 111–129. doi:10.36484/liberal.592964

KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Bhasan Char: In the Bay of Bengal, close to Bangladesh’s shore, is the island of Bhasan Char. Due to the Bangladeshi government’s development of it as a relocation site for Rohingya refugees who have escaped violence and persecution in Myanmar (Burma), it has drawn attention from all over the world. To

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accommodate a segment of the Rohingya refugee population residing in congested camps in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, the government of Bangladesh has built housing facilities and infrastructure in Bhasan Char. Ethnic Minority: An ethnic minority is a group of people who are different from the majority population in a certain area or nation due to shared cultural, linguistic, or ethnic characteristics. Population Displacement: When a sizable number of people are forcibly removed from their homes or other places of residence owing to a variety of events, such as violence, natural catastrophes, environmental factors, or development projects, this is referred to as population displacement. Refoulement: Refoulement is a phrase that is frequently used in relation to international law and human rights, particularly in the context of refugee protection. The forced return or expulsion of refugees or asylum seekers to a nation where they risk persecutory action, danger, or harm is referred to. Refoulement is against the principle of non-refoulement, which forbids returning people to locations where their life or freedom would be in danger. It is also regarded as a breach of international refugee law and human rights law. Refugees: Refugees are those who have decided to leave their home because of war, conflict, persecution, or fear of persecution. According to international law, a person who resides outside of their country of nationality or normal residence, who can demonstrate a well-founded fear of being persecuted on specified grounds, and who lacks protection from their homeland is considered a refugee. Relocation: Relocation is the process of shifting something or someone from one location to another. It involves moving and relocating to a different destination. According to the European Commission, relocation enables the movement of individuals or refugees who already have international protection status and those who require it to a new place where they will be provided protections and rights similar to those of the initial place. Repatriation: Repatriation is the process of sending someone back to their country of citizenship or origin. Repatriation in the refugee context is the phrase used to describe a refugee’s return to their nation of origin. International refugee law requires that the return of refugees must be voluntary, safe, and done so with respect and the UNHCR is in charge of ensuring that repatriations are allowed and carried out voluntarily. Rohingya Crisis: The Rohingyas, a Muslim and ethnic minority from the Rakhine state of Myanmar are the most persecuted minority group and have been denied citizenship and rendered stateless by the military government of Myanmar in 1982 and consequently forced to flee to neighbouring countries. The Rohingya crisis resulted from human rights abuses and Injustice, brutality, and discrimination committed by the government of Myanmar against the Rohingya people over a long period of time. There has been no progress in the Rohingya refugee situation after years of negotiations and currently an estimated 3.5 million Rohingya refugees are dispersed around the world. Susceptibility: The term susceptibility describes how easily someone or a system can be harmed or impacted by something, like a sickness, outside forces, ideas, or recommendations. It illustrates how quickly certain circumstances or stimuli can have an influence on or affect an entity. For instance, in terms of health, a person with a compromised immune system may be more vulnerable to infections.

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Chapter 15

Thou Shall Not Kill:

The Ethics of AI in Contemporary Warfare Evangelos Ioannis Koumparoudis Sofia University, Bulgaria

ABSTRACT This chapter aims in the presentation of the evolution of AI and robotic technologies with emphasis on those for military use and the main strategic agendas of various superpowers like USA, China, and Russia, as well as peripheral powers. The authors also refer to the uses of such technologies in the battlefield. The chapter also reveals the ethical dimensions of the current military AI technologies. It starts with the Mark Coeckelberg paper, to emphasize his call for a new approach to technoethics. Then, the authors will strive towards the ethical theory Neil C. Rowe, and his propositions for ethical improvement of algorithms. Finally, the authors pose the notions of electronic personhood proposed by Avila Negri, also touching upon the fact the legal debate tends to face an anthropomorphic fallacy. To conclude, Thou Shall Not Kill, the highest ‘’Levinasian Imperative’’ closes the gap of the anthropomorphic fallacy, so our relationship with the killer machines be viewed as asymmetric, non-anthropomorphic, and non-zoomorphic.

INTRODUCTION AI and robotics have progressed over time. After its seminal presentation in the mid-50s, today we can speak about totally different applications both in everyday life, military, and security use. In this chapter, we will first elucidate certain steps in its evolution, to reveal if we can speak about truly autonomous AI. This evolutionary timeline will go in parallel with AI and robotics used for military or security reasons. This is critical because, as it will be shown, there are different views concerning the autonomy of the so-called Autonomous Lethal Weapons, between the superpowers like the USA, China, and Russia as well as peripheral powers such as Israel, North and South Korea. These different views go together with their aspirations to lead the military AI race and provide sociotechnical imaginaries that reflect their meticulous efforts to create such a military status quo, which could be considered as unique and DOI: 10.4018/978-1-6684-9467-7.ch015

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undefeatable. The current progress in military technology is far from these imaginaries, we will expose all the current applications and vulnerabilities of military AI and robotics, as well as the plans for future enhancement in the following 10 years. In the second part of this chapter, we will proceed to an analysis of how the overall stability between the superpowers is affected, due to this military AI race. This is their position between the different ongoing international tensions particularly the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the plans of China to invade Taiwan, as well as some secondary tensions e.g. Palestine and Israel, North and South Korea. In this section we will further, analyze how either private interests or civilians interact with this kind of tension by rejecting cooperation with the army e.g. Google on Project Maven, or by generally being opposed to the war e.g. the mass protests of Ukrainian people against the war. Through this analysis, we will consider if a form of deliberative democracy could stand against the ongoing aspirations of the superpowers to lead the military AI race, and consequently become the leading regulators of global importance. In the third section, we will unravel the different ethical theories around AI and military AI. We will thoroughly present the deontological, utilitarian, normative, and applied aspects of AI ethics with an emphasis on military and security use. We will also, refer to the fact that we tend to anthropomorphise and zoomorphise social mainly robotics and to a greater extent military robotics. These fallacies may create problems that revolve around the attribution of the philosophical and legal personhood of AI. Therefore, we will strive towards all the philosophical and legal dimensions of military AI attribution of responsibility and how the framework of ethical use can be established to avoid illegal or mass killing prospects. In the fourth section we will, come back to the title of this chapter and the Levinasian imperative of ‘’Thou Shall not Kill’’. Although we speak about lethal weapons and even more possibly autonomous lethal Weapons, we will present how AI and robotics could be vulnerable and fragile far from anthropomorphic and zoomorphic fallacies. We will establish a provisional theory based on a radical asymmetry between humans and military AI, ethics as fundamental, and a democracy that aspires to be better and better.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY This research is divided into two main parts. The first describes the evolution of AI technologies with emphasis on the military AI and Robotic technologies. This approach is chronological and also explanatory in relation with the main strategic agendas of various superpowers like USA, China and Russia. Through the analysis which is mostly at the level of politics and political science we can take a deep insight over their tensions and aspirations to lead the AI military race, to become rulers of the world and create an undefeatable status quo. It is also quite important, to highlight how this representation is mediated by mass media, literature and spectacle, creating sociotechnical imaginaries that are far from their real capacities and a real-politik that they can actually impose or support. The second part belongs to applied ethics and moral philosophy and has two sub divisions, the general ethical philosophy of AI and the second a particular type of ethics belonging to the Levinasian philosophy, promoting the ethics of radical asymmetry as applied to techno ethics of military AI.

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LITERATURE REVIEW Information about the AI capacities of the various superpowers as well as their capacities on the battlefield has been collected from sources like: Academic articles, special reports for example CNA report, Microsoft Special Report. Furthermore, governmental and military report for example, the Chinese CEST (Outline of the National Innovation-driven Development Strategy), reports from the American Department of Defense and Finally articles from the press. The part of the applied ethics was based mainly in the papers of Simon Peter van Rysewyk and Matthijs Pontier 2015, Mark Coeckelbergh 2011, Neil C. Rowe 2022 and Sergio Avila Negri 2022. The last part is based on Levinasian moral and political philosophy and is a continuation of my Ethics of AI and Robotics, From a non-Anthropomorphic and non-Zoomorphic Perspective 2023.

AI and Robotics Evolution With Emphasis on Military and Security Use General Evolution of AI Early AI and robotics of the 50-80s with their advanced capacities in algorithmic processing brought the first ethical dilemmas around AI and human acquisition of knowledge and thinking. We should refer to the Turing test as a method of discriminating AI and human intelligence. The Turing test as at least proposed by Alan Turing is a kind of imitation game. We have three participants, a person, a machine, and an interrogator. The interrogator does not know to whom poses the question, the person or the machine. At the end of the game, the interrogator has to show who is the person and the machine. If he fails and shows that the machine is the person, then the machine could pass the Turing test. In 1980 the philosopher John Searle introduced the Chinese room experiment. Through this experiment, he highlighted the impossibility of a computer to understand language or to think. In short, a person who does not speak Chinese is locked in a room with Chinese symbols. The program gives instructions so that the person can pass the Turing test and manipulate the symbols but without any knowledge of Chinese (Graham&Dowe, 2021). Over the years, there have been various attempts at creating intelligent machines, we could name ELIZA in the 60s and the Loebner Prize Competition in which programmers tried to create algorithms that could pass the Turing Test with various variations of the original proposed by Turing. After the 80s there were some remarkable milestones in the evolution of AI technologies that we will enumerate, capable of even more calculating and data combinational capacities and relative autonomous functions (Graham & Dowe, 2021). The first was the creation of the so-called neuronal networks; a system of programming based not on the manipulation of symbols but imitating the neural processes of our brains. The second can be considered IBM’s deep blue computer which managed to defeat the world chess champion, Garri Kasparov. The third is IBM’s computer Watson, created to participate in the quiz show Jeopardy, of course, this demanded more speed in decision-making and more broad knowledge for example in history, sports, etc. IBM Watson won the Jeopardy show and after that, IBM decided to transform it into a medical consultant computer. The patients would pose questions and this powerful computer could consult them. The fourth was AlphaGo, an algorithm that used deep reinforcement learning and managed to defeat

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the world champion in Go Le Sedol. Go is a famous strategy board game in Asia and is much more complicated than Chess. The fifth is Big Data explosion and various methods of analysis and acquisition of knowledge from the correlation of data and data mining. The last is the new generation AI platforms such as Amazon Alexa, Apple Siri, and more recently ChatGPT, DallE, Bard, etc (Fjelland, 2020).

USA USA, China, and Russia are seeking innovative military AI technologies, to lead the military AI race and impose a possible dominance over the overall perplexing dynamics of the current international relations. As Vladimir Putin famously said, the superpower who manages to lead the AI race will be the ruler of the world. The USA, over the years, had a progressive strategy over military weapons and equipment that started with the vision of Eisenhower. His ‘new look’’ strategy after WWII was the main plan of USA military forces against of the Soviet Union and shaped their relationship during the Cold War. The second strategy of the USA was developed during the Vietnam War by Harold Brown. This offset strategy is based on military innovation systems, stealth technologies, intelligent weapons, and space-based communications. These technologies beyond the Vietnam War, were supposed to be used against the Soviet Union, although this has never happened. Their first, mass use was during Operation Desert Storm in Kuwait and Iraq. After the USA victory, two dogmas started to appear the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and the Network Centric Warfare (NCW). These two dogmas, after the disputed invasion in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the various inabilities of the US military forces, lost their initial momentum. In 2009 the National Security Agency established the US Cyber Command to contact full-spectrum cyberspace operations. In the late 2010s the US Department of Defense, to cope with the emerging superpowers mainly Russia and China, proceeded to a third offset strategy. The Department of Defense established the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center to promote, full AI systems in warfare with the cooperation of universities and private interests (Jacobsen & Liebetrau, 2023).

Russia Concerning Russia, over the last 10 years, there has been important progress and emphasis on AI systems for military use. President Putin in December 2018 stated that digital technologies, robotics, and unmanned systems are central to the Russian agenda for the armed forces. Russia’s strategic rocket forces (SRF), attain technologies in decision-making, intelligent on-board weapons, and automation. As for the latter automation, until today remains at a theoretical level since, even for systems like Perimetr, humans are those who are responsible for the decision-making. Serious progress has been made in military logistics and maintenance systems. From 2015 onwards there are systems for automatic control of logistic support for SFR units for intercontinental ballistic missiles (IBM). From 2018 onwards, a specialized neural network-based algorithm can predict in real time the remaining operation time for SRF equipment. Applications of enhanced military missile vehicles are used today in Cruise missiles and an estimated use is on defense penetration aids of missiles. At last, there has been progress in underwater warfare mainly in communication systems like the creation of the Poseidon System (status 6) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV) for use in the Russian Navy (Bendett, 2023).

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China In October 2016 Xin Jinping, former President of the Public Republic of China and former general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, stated that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will become a world-class military. In 2015China, made serious reforms in the PLA mainly through the establishment of SSF, to secure its position in space, cyberspace, and far seas. Today SSF consists of two subunits, the Space Systems Department and the Network System Department (Tagari, 2023). In 2019 China proceeded to a National Innovation-Driven Development Strategy (CEST, 2023). Through this meticulous strategy aspires to be the leading power in AI in the year 2030. This strategy does not only refer to military innovations but also to industry, agriculture, and the creation of smart cities, in short to all the strategic pillars of a new economy based on AI and digital technologies. PLA prioritizes a transition from today’s information warfare to intelligentized warfare, by introducing an aggressive agenda of AI innovations, mainly as counter-superpower of the USA. China aims to surpass the USA’s military technology in the following 5-10 years. Therefore, through the cooperation of public universities and private interest as well as the participation of civilians, proceeds to a series of military innovations in various domains such as cyber-security, cyber-warfare, intelligent and autonomous unmanned swarms of drowns and aerial vehicles, autonomous ground vehicles, UVV technologies for the Chinese navy and intelligent missiles. Furthermore, major emphasis is given to opportunities for big data and information management as well as to the enhancement of human cognitive capacities through AI and a generalized view of the fusion of neuroscience and AI for military technologies (Kania, 2017).

Israel Israel aspires to be an AI superpower, but its general military capacity is restricted to the southeast Mediterranean and Middle East. Its main opponents through the years have been Palestine, Egypt, Lebanon, and Iran. In 2022 Israeli Defense Forces launched a new strategic agenda for military AI. Israel has emphasized the role of AI technologies in target recognition for example civilians and terrorists and also created autonomous vehicles such as drones and new battle tanks. The retired general Eyal Zamir pointed in Reuters (Williams, 2023) that new AI technologies could help in fast decision-making and swarm battles. Furthermore, he said that robotic systems have been used for the surveillance of GazaIsrael territories and also an autonomous submarine has been used for intelligence information gathering with an operation of ‘’thousands of hours’’.

North and South Korea North and South Korea have been in continuous tension for over 50 years. During the last 5 years, major emphasis was given to the enhancement of their military capacity concerning AI and Robotics. In 2019 South Korean army launched an artificial intelligence research and development center, with the same logic the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology in cooperation with Hanwha Group developed 2018 AI systems for unmanned underwater vehicles. Progress has also been made in cybersecurity AI systems to confront cyberattacks. North Korea develops cyber operations through neural networks and genetic algorithms. Neural networks have also been used since 2019 for autonomous robot operations. Over the last 5 years, North Korea also worked on the creation of small-scale autonomous UAV systems, smaller than 1m so as not to be detected by South Korean Radars (Fei, 2019). 303

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The Confluence of Neuroscience and Military Technologies USA since 2099 has been working on opportunities in Neuroscience for future army applications. We will briefly refer to some aspects of the research performed by the committee. Neuroscientific findings have been used for various purposes in military research mainly on sustaining soldier performance and on behavioral patterns in extreme conditions as well as effective decision-making. We will stick more to the confluence of neuroscience with technologies such as biomarkers which are related to brain activity and could be used for monitoring states of awareness when a decision on the battlefield should be taken. EEG-brain computer interfaces through which a battlefield commander could receive some indication that a soldier is approaching maximum mental workload or stress. Haptic feedback technologies and augmented reality technologies are also used in military training. At last, we made some effort for augmented cognition programs from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Augmented Cognition program (the AugCog program), capabilities through the design of interfaces incorporating neuroscience technologies that enable the interface to adapt in real-time to the stress state of the user. Similar DARPA research continues under the rubric of Improving Warfighter Information Intake Under Stress. Army research along the AugCog path is continuing at the Natick Soldier Research, Development, and Engineering Center (Opportunities in Neuroscience 2009; Koumparoudis, 2024). More recently, in May 2023, the Department of Defense announced the award of 10 Million dollars for the establishment of an institute dedicated to the research of artificial intelligence and natural intelligence. From 15 candidates the committee has selected a multi-university team led by Columbia University with a total award of 20 M dollars for the next 5 years (DoD, 2023). China as mentioned above has launched a strategy for informatization not only in its military forces but also in several fields of its economy. Chinese innovation, concerning its military application, is also centered on synergies between brain science, artificial intelligence, and biotechnology. Through its military agenda, China has developed an array of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems and concentrated on advancing capabilities for information operations (including cyber warfare, electronic warfare, and psychological warfare. The PLA has created the CMC steering committee which promotes human-machine fusion together with the progress of biotechnology and quantum technology for the creation of biosensing and biomaterials for human enhancement. LA aspires to pass from ‘’biological dominance’’ to ‘’mental/cognitive and intelligence dominance’’ (Metcalf, 2023).

Aspirations and Sociotechnical Imaginaries As we posed in the introduction, beyond the aspirations of the superpowers at the level of military agendas and strategies for the AI race, they may also rely on the creation of sociotechnical imaginaries, shaping a military status quo that is far from reality. Sociotechnical imaginaries as Jasanoff defines (2015) are: “collectively held, institutionally stabilized, and publicly performed visions of desirable futures, animated by shared understandings of forms of social life and social order attainable through, and supportive of, advances in science and technology.’’ Concerning the imaginaries for autonomous lethal weapons they may be often influenced by literature, cinema, and mass spectacle. They mediate between fact and fiction and allow the actors to move beyond the present reality. Drones, for example, are a typical representation in films, mass media, and the internet, they contribute to a mediated visualization of the war and a ‘’ weaponization of social media’’ (Bächle & Bareis, 2022). 304

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Stability, Ongoing Military Tensions, and Public Disengagement There is a view that the evolution of military AI and robotics will bring no potential offensive operation from any nation and cause no serious harm on national and international levels. The scientific and industrial revolution, as exemplified in the evolution of AI technologies, leads to a military AI race between various superpowers as already has been analyzed above. This race will inevitably affect global stability and may create tensions. Nevertheless, beyond the negative impacts on stability, there are also some positive impacts that we could enumerate. Autonomous weapon systems may replace human soldiers, furthermore, they may be more efficient in decision-making and target recognition. AI technologies could also contribute to intelligence information, for example, may be used in the discovery of illegal weapon smuggling. In the negative effects, there is always the risk of nuclear capability under the emergence of AI technologies. In order a possible stability to be achieved three presuppositions should be followed. First countries shall set up and improve the management mechanism of military AI, second formulate and promulgate management and regulatory guidelines in the field of military AI, and cooperation between the great powers is needed (Yu, 2023). The ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine was a chance for both sides to test and use military AI technologies on a mass scale for the first time. Alex Karp CEO of Palantir, which is involved in the Rusian-Ukrainian war by providing Ukraine with AI geolocating technologies, said that AI is used from the Ukrainian part to confront a larger adversary. Ukraine could be characterized as a living lab for AI (Fontes & Kamminga, 2023). Ukraine has used mass-scale geolocating technologies, mainly through satellite systems. Furthermore, through social media feeds, trained algorithms are used to recognize friendly and enemy targets. Clear-view AI identification has been used for the identification of dead Russian soldiers and the uncovering of Russian assailants. Beyond Palantir, the American company Primer provided Ukraine with AI natural language technologies to identify Russian encrypted signals. Microsoft provided in 2022 a full report on various Russian Cyber-attacks on strategic Ukrainian targets such as consumer retail, defense, nuclear, telecommunications, media, energy, It services, and national government. Ukrainian counter-AI algorithms together with advanced clouding systems managed to confront these Cyber-attacks. Russia on the other hand, emphasized the role of military AI in decision-making and the use of robotic systems, removing the human operator from the battlefield. Although there is little information if these kinds of technologies are used on a large scale during this conflict. Drone technologies like Lancet-3, use neural network algorithms to analyze images and video recordings during flight, this also happens with the cooperation of other drone systems such as ZALA and Orlan-10. Another application is the use of the unmanned vehicle Marker in the operations of Eastern Ukraine (Bennett, 2023). China and Taiwan have been in continuous tension since the independence of Taiwan in 2000, China during these years tried to control Taiwan with economic and commercial means, but during the last year since 2022, a possible military invasion is possible. Chinese air fighters are flying over Taiwan on a regular scale, reaching over 100 in one day this October (2023). Twain has a very important geostrategic location since is near Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, and most of the bulk carriers worldwide pass from its territories. Taiwan is also the greatest producer of microchips and semiconductors in the world. Most computers, cell phones, tablets, etc. use Taiwanese microchips. Although China did not invade Taiwan, uses algorithms and chat boxes similar to ChatGPT to spread misinformation in Taiwan, more particularly due to the forthcoming presidential elections in 2024. Fake news, videos, and trolls are some of the Chinese tactics (Tucker, 2023). 305

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Palestine and Israel have passed different phases of tension, two of the most important were the first Invasion of Israel in 1947 and the second one the invasion of 1967. Palestinian territories since then have shrunk and today, there is only Gaza and West Bank. The only period of let it say tension of less dynamic was during the Afarat Government in Palestine and the victory of Fatah. During the 3 years, since 2021 Hamas came into power, with a dogma of liberation of Palestine. Serious tension and escalation were performed in 2021 with various attacks in Israelian territories with rockets. Iraraelian, Iron-dome anti-aircraft system was determinant for the cease of Palestinian fire. Furthermore, geolocation and satellite systems have been used for precise target location. This could be the first full AI war. Before this ongoing war in October 2023, we still did not have much information about the use of AI and robotic systems, over the last year 2022 and the mid-2023 there have been a plethora of articles referring to the preparation of AI and robotic systems to be used by the Israelian army against targets in West Bank and Gaza (Newman, 2023). North and South Korea on the other hand, are developing strategies with an emphasis on AI and robotic systems mainly unmanned vehicles and drone technologies, which have not been used on a real scale, since their tension remains on a diplomatic regulation and concerns mostly the North Korean Nuclear Program. As briefly mentioned in the first section, beyond the state corporations that are involved in the development of AI military technologies, there are also private interests. Here we will present a case of public disengagement, in which Google refused to develop the military project maven. In 2017, the American Department of Defense in cooperation with Google developed Maven, an AI algorithm used for military purposes. Over 3000 employees of Google with a public letter to Google CEO, refused to develop such a technology. This led to a permanent rejection of the program and a declaration that Google would not be involved in the development of such technologies. Furthermore, the CEOs of Tesla and Starlink (Starlink is involved in the Rusian-Ukrainian war by providing satellite technologies to Ukraine) and Google Deep Mind also signed a similar declaration. Even mass anti-military disengagement practices, we had the first months of the Russian invasion in Ukraine, when we had populous anti-war protests in Kyiv, even though the conflict was ongoing. These disengagement practices reveal the role the public can play in deliberation to the military machine and open the way for democracy of deliberation and levee en masses against military aspirations (Thumfart, 2023).

Ethics of Military AI and Robotics There are various ethical theories such as deontological and utilitarian ethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics. In our case, we will focus on the first two main categories as applied to AI ethics and particularly to military ethics. Deontological ethics seeks to explore the issue of moral agency in AI and robotics. These theories and their supporters usually have a Kantian basis. This basis refers to direct and indirect duties that a machine should have. Direct moral standing is deeply connected with anthropomorphism. In a manner is connected to possible intrinsic properties that robots may have (although they do not exactly have) like speech, cognition, etc., and deserve direct moral standing. Utilitarian ethics are connected with consequelism They seek to explore the consequences of an action. A rule should be followed and then we attain the best results. The results may refer to a general good/harm output and concern members of the ethical community (humans, animals, and non-human entities like AI and robotics, but also corporations, the state, integrations, etc.). Accountability for future consequences should also be part of the rule terminated (Rysewyk & Pontier, 2015). In this type of ethics, if we consider military ethics, we balance between the good result of an unmanned vehicle for example, and the reduction of human 306

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losses, whilst in the case of a lethal machine for the possible harmful result, in case of an autonomous lethal machine, the accountability for future results is even more important, since its function could not be easily controlled or. Mark Coeckelbergh in his 2011 paper highlights because the ethics of military robotics are not necessarily about robots, by analyzing three main points. Firstly, robots—including military robots—are not mere means to ends but shape these ends. This means that their use is also part of political decisions and not taken in a pure vacuum. They also reflect specific military doctrines, the justification of their use and war in general needs more attention. Secondly, military robotics concerns not only autonomous “killer robots” but should be analyzed at various levels, including (larger) systems, networks, and swarms. The atomistic ontologies in military AI, are being gradually replaced by networks and swarms. These networks, for example, need the cooperation of satellite and geolocating technologies if we speak about the use of autonomous or semi-autonomous unmanned vehicles or the cooperation of drone swarms in information intelligence operations. The agency in a military network does not only rely on a single atomistic level but it is diffused to various collective and emergent agencies. Finally, No one develops military robots (or everyone develops military robots). As we pointed out in several points above, the development of military technologies is not only part of national military industries and national strategic agendas. Many private interests, as well as public and private universities and institutes, are involved in the development of such technologies. Consequently, the legal and ethical attribution of responsibility in cases of possible mass killings by military robotics, or harmful use of AI in cyber-attacks and intelligence information collection and clearance, becomes more difficult. Neil C. Rowe in his 2022 paper proposes some ethical regulations that military AI could implement. Testing of AI systems could be performed mainly through fuzzing, unsupervised learning, and crossvalidation systems. Additionally, the developers of military AI could provide explanation facilities through inference and planning. In the first case, if software identified a vehicle as hostile, an automatically generated explanation can show which features of the vehicle were relevant and what inferences supported the conclusion that it was hostile by asking Why Questions to the system. As for the planning, AI methods can be improved by calculating and displaying their ethical factors explicitly, such as possible civilian casualties of a plan or the risk of exerting disproportionate force. As with inference, explanations of plans can enable scrutiny and easier detection of ethical issues, up to some limits of complexity. Finally, the developers should always account for biases for example Biases- an AI system may be trained on U.S. data in which friendly forces were tall, and thus be more inclined to identify short people as combatants; or it may be trained on indicators of aggression seen in one part of the world, like maneuvers along a frontier, that may not occur elsewhere. In February 2020 the American Department of Defense adopted ethical principles for AI in 5 major categories. The first category is the responsibility in their use with the appropriate levels of judgment and care, the second is equitability and the reduction of biases, the third is traceability in which every member of the army should be familiar with those technologies, the fourth is the reliability with emphasis on the security during their use and finally, governability for the elimination of unintended consequences.1 In September 2020 the cooperation of 12 partner nations (USA, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Israel, Japan, Norway, South Korea, and the UK), promoted a framework for responsible use of AI and best practices on Ethics of AI implementation. China is on the way to developing an ethical code for the use of AI, although this code is highly influenced by the political agenda of the Communist Party. Its main points refer to the dangers of the virtual battlefield, the possible rise of terrorism, and the attribution of responsibility, Furthermore, some extra points are discussed such as a possible moral crisis, 307

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possible military security leaks, military law deficiencies, the development of subjective consciousness of a superintelligence through which everything will be controlled by the machines and emergence of machine forces which may supersede the one-sided man warfare (Lopez, 2020). One of the basic ethical fallacies in AI and robotics is the anthropomorphic fallacy. This means that robots may imitate human characteristics, like shape, face, and speech, and have self-moving capacity. Therefore, they could act as moral agents and deserve direct moral standing. The second feature of this fallacy is that people may empathize with robotics, mainly the social ones. The last feature is more anthropocentric rather than anthropomorphic and refers to the fact that humans may have the leading role and non-human entities are under their servitude, somehow equal to a slave. Another equally important fallacy is the zoomorphic fallacy. This means that social robotics are equal to companion species, having characteristics similar to a pet or being exploited not as slaves, but in a way closer to the mass industry of domestic animals. Rossi Braidotti, uses the term zooproletariat for the mass exploitation of domestic animals, the term could be expiated to robotproletariat for the case of robots. Avila Negri, in his 2022 paper asserts that we should pass from the legal personality of corporations to the legal personality of robots. To do that we should distinguish between moral personhood and legal personality, pass from humanoids to full androids, and reject any anthropomorphic rhetoric. Avila Negri points out that: ‘’ The imaginary about robots is intensely marked by the association with anthropomorphic artefacts, such as androids, which appear in films and literature. A particularly dangerous metaphor for the law is to yield to this symbolism, projecting autonomy, consciousness and other human attributes into robotic artefacts. Often the different concepts, originally fused around the metaphor, disappear, so that differences are erased and metaphors and analogies come to life, coming to be thought of in their literal sense’’.

Thou Shall Not Kill-Ethics of Asymmetry Ethics of AI and robotics and consequently military ethics and robotics could overcome this kind of anthropomorphic and zoomorphic fallacies if we follow a radical approach far from the usual utilitarian and deontological views. Levinasian philosophy is the ground for such an approach. Levinas, emphasizes the asymmetry and the formation awakening of the morality of the I, not as the autonomy of the I, but as the radical heteronomy of the Other’s appeal to me. The face of the Other carries importance as itself; it is always seen as exteriority because it is not hidden behind the said, but its saying is always implicit and the encounter with the an-other takes place even in the unspoken lie. Logos are for Levinas an-archic without an arche, because it questions the established order. The Logos recognizes the mystery of primary sociality. At each point of a conversation, the presence of the Other (even when he is absent), transcends every image, statement, or conclusion. The face-to-face is relationship seen as closeness, and this closeness is non-intentional and non-dimensional; it shapes all the distances that are created and defended in general; it is what Levinas finds in his caress and feminine. The feminine as the radically different permits the other subject to get in the maximal horizon of the hidden, of the mystery that can be revealed through the commonplace of caress. Caress cannot be accommodated through language; it is rather a relation that opens a chain of occurring multiple possibilities, of a coming to be of the mystery of the future, without content. But the alterity that Levinas describes is not at the level of “there-is”, but rather at the level of the anonymous existence of being in general. This view is proposed in my Ethics of AI and Robotics from a non-anthropomorphic and zoomorphic perspective, Instatu Nascendi Journal of Political Philosophy and International Relations, Ibidem 2023, where I analyzed that: ‘’According to Levinas there is always an ethical relationship with the Other 308

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which is not symmetrical and reciprocal. Am always more responsible than the Other, I have to respond to the Other’s appeal to me in a responsible way. So, in this case, we do not give moral standing due to the intrinsic properties of the Other (in our case a robot) but the encounter is a kind of experience that creates and appeals to my feelings, the Other always interrupts me, and asks for a response. Thus the relationship turns from other-based (intrinsic properties) to Other-directed.’’ The meeting in Levinas (1968) is based on a radical asymmetry; I am always more responsible than the Other. The face of the Other, as in a manner the I, occupies the position of the Other in his fragility and nudity of the face, is the responsibility for the Other, as “the impossibility for the other man, the impossibility of leaving him alone in the mystery of death”. This relation is based on love; this love is not love or eros in general, nor a reduction to altruism, the goodness of a generous nature, but it is rather an an-archic bond between the subject and the good that comes from the outside. In Levinas (1998), the ultimate ethical imperative is given through the command “Thou shall not kill”. The goodness in our Judeo-Christian tradition is something beyond being. It is the love of one’s fellow man of love without concupiscence on which the congenital meaning of that worn-out word is based.2 The hand in Levinas is connected with our responsibility to the Other, in the support of the Other in his suffering; it comes from the French maintenir that has at least two meanings: a) to support someone with open palm and b) holding, grasping someone with closed hand, which is connected with a) morality as carrying for the Other and b) the politics which in their power and authority need to subjugate the Other. The face plays a central role in Levinas’ philosophy the face of the Other, is seen as exteriority and transcendence that can go beyond being and against the totality and instrumentality of the reason of the state; even a liberal state, for Levinas, can adopt certain totalitarian characteristics, because it obliges people to become in a manner depersonalized in their following the universal laws and norms, even if the liberal state respects the differences among several social groups. The particular I is seen under the universal “we”, which is commonplace for society’s well-being and the common good. Following the Levinasian pathway, military robotics even if this is an oxymoron, could be approached as being fragile and vulnerable. We are responsible for their ethical use, we are always more responsible than them. Their killing capabilities can awaken the morality in us, always having in mind the imperative of ‘’ Thou shall not kill’’ (Dimitrova, 2017). Sociality has started the notion of fraternity. A society that relies only on the principles of do not harm without cultivating the responsibility of the Other cannot assure solidarity. We can always aspire for a better democracy, a democracy that cultivates this kind of responsibility of the Other in our case AI and Robotics even the military. This vulnerable “face’’ of these technologies in their exteriority and transcendence, may go beyond the common conception of goodness and against the instrumentality of the modern state.

CONCLUSION Thus far we exposed the evolution of AI technologies in time, from its seminal attempts up to more recent ones. Then, we referred to the strategic agendas of various superpowers as well as some secondary powers. USA which implements a third offset strategy, China which adopts a plan for general applications of AI in its economy including military AI and at last Russia and its aspirations to lead the AI race. Then we presented the progress of Israel concerning military AI mainly against Palestine. We did not do that much to the ongoing war between them. We closed the section on the peripheral powers, with the tensions between North and South Korea and their development of AI technologies and counter-technologies. Furthermore, the USA and China, promote programs in which neuroscience and 309

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AI technologies are fused, we exposed their attempts and strategies for human enhancement and more accurate decision-making. It was important, to highlight that although there has been quite important progress in military AI over the years, the superpowers still cultivate some kind of sociotechnical imaginaries, and their real operations are infiltrated by the depiction of mass media and spectacle. In the second section, we explored if AI could, promote stability between the various tensions of the superpowers, and if certain rules will be followed, similar to a new cold war. We also explored four, cases in which military AI is used on the battlefield or for misinformation reasons. The cases of the ongoing invasion of Russia in Ukraine, the case of China and Taiwan, the Israeli and Palestinian conflict of 2021, and North and South Korea. Such uses may also bring cases of public disengagement, such as the rejection of Project Maven by Google and the mass anti-military protests in Ukraine, during the first phase of the war. In the following two sections, we explored the ethical dimension of the use of military AI and robotics. First, we presented the various ethical theories around AI and robotics, we separated between their possible direct or indirect moral standing, the reasons why military robotic ethics are not necessarily about robots, and various formulas through which the same AI technologies can be ethically designed. We also exposed the ethical codes of USA armed forces and their partner nations as well as the ethical code for the military use of AI by the PLA of China. We closed this section with the very important anthropomorphic and zoomorphic fallacies that the ethical theory of AI is usually accompanied if AI and robotics deserve direct moral standing in the case of anthropomorphism or indirect in the case of zoomorphism. We tried to expose how through the distinction between moral and legal personhood we can pass from the legal personhood of corporations to the legal personhood of AI and robots and from humanoids to real androids with certain legal responsibilities. To close this gap, of anthropomorphic and zoomorphic fallacies, we strived towards the Levinasian ethics of asymmetry and how robotics and AI can be seen as the vulnerable Other, who demands responsibility and awakes the morality in me not through a reciprocal way, but through the Other’s appeal to me. Therefore, ethical relations cannot be based on the intrinsic properties of an AI technology or a robot a possible case of anthropomorphism or indirect, deontological imperatives, or a case of zoomorphism, but the relationship can be Other-directed. Military technologies can awaken morality in us, to be always responsible for their use, in a democracy that aspires to be better and better, beyond the instrumentality of the state.

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CNA (2022). A biweekly newsletter on AI and autonomy developments in Russia. CNA. https://www. cna.org/Newsletters/Ai%20and%20Autonomy%20in%20Russia/AI-and-Autonomy-in-Russia-SpecialIssue-September-2022.pdf Coeckelbergh, M. (2011). From Killer Machines Doctrines and Swarms, or Why Ethics of Military Robotics Is not (Necessarily) About Robots. Philosophy & Technology, 24(3), 269–278. doi:10.1007/ s13347-011-0019-6 Committee on Opportunities in Neuroscience for Future Army Applications; National Research Council. (2009). Opportunities in Neuroscience for Future Army Applications. The National Academies Press. Dimitrova, M. (2017). Sociality and Justice, Toward Social Phenomenology. Ibidem Press. Fei, S. (2019). Military Developments in Artificial Intelligence and their Impact on the Korean Peninsula. East Asian Perspective, 2. Fjelland, R. (2020). Why general artificial intelligence will not be realized. Humanities & Social Sciences Communications, 10(7), 10. doi:10.1057/s41599-020-0494-4 Fontes, R., & Dr Jorrit, K. (2023). Ukraine A living Lab for AI Warfare. National Defense. https://www. nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2023/3/24/ukraine-a-living-lab-for-ai-warfare Jacobsen, T. J., & Tobias, L. (2023). Artificial Intelligence, and Military Superiority, How the ‘Cyber-AI offensive-defensive arms race’ affects the US vision of the fully integrated battlefield. Routledge. Jasanoff, S., & San-Hyng, K. (2015). Dreamscapes of Modernity Sociotechnical Imaginaries and the Fabrication of Power. University of Chicago Press. doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226276663.001.0001 Kania, B. E. (2017, November). China’s Rise in Artificial Intelligence and Future Military Capabilities. Center for a New American Security. Koumparoudis, E. (2023). Ethics of AI and Robotics from a non-Anthropomorphic and non-Zoomorphic perspective. In Statu Nascendi Journal of Political Philosophy and International Relations, 6, 1-19. Koumparoudis, E. (2024). Medicine in the Post-Consumerist Society: A Philosophical Overview. Studies in Medical Philosophy. Hannover: ibidem-Verlang. Levinas E. (1968). Humanism and An-Archy Revue Internatinal de la Philoso- phie, 85, 65-82. Levinas, E. (1998). Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other (M. B. Smith & B. Harshav, Trans.). Columbia University Press. Lopez, T. (2020). DOD Adopts 5 Principles of Artificial Intelligence Ethics, U.S. Department of Defense. https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2094085/dod-adopts5principles-of-artificialintelligence-ethics/ Malmio, I. (2023). Ethics as an enabler and a constraint – Narratives on technology development and artificial intelligence in military affairs through the case of Project Maven’. Technology in Society, 72, 102193. doi:10.1016/j.techsoc.2022.102193

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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Anthropomorphic fallacy: Central to human creativity is the projection of human qualities upon the external world. On the other hand, so subtle is the latter’s mode of operation and so all-persuasive is human nature, that it persistently generates a mode of thought which, although fallacious, exerts a tremendous hold over us. Several examples - schemas, technologies, stories, evolutionary “ladder”, contingency - reveal the impact of the resulting anthropomorphic fallacy (Source: Coffey E.J. Journal of the British Interplanetary Society, Vol. 45, No. 1, p. 23 – 29). Applied Ethics/ Techno ethics: Technoethics is a term coined in 1974 by the Argentinian Canadian philosopher Mario Bunge to denote the special responsibilities of technologists and engineers to develop ethics as a branch of technology (Source: Technoethics | Encyclopedia.com, n.d.).

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Autonomous Lethal Weapons: A weapon can be said to be “autonomous” in the “critical functions of targeting” if it can do one or more of following without a human operator. If the weapon can decide what classes of object it will engage, then it would be autonomous in terms of defining its targets. No current AWS has this capability. If a weapon can use sensors to select a target without a human operator, it can be said to have autonomy in the selection function of targeting. Many existing weapons can select targets without a human operator (Source: Christoph Bartneck, Christoph Lütge, Alan Wagner, Sean Welsh, An Introduction to Ethics and AI, Charm: Springer, 2021, p. 94). Ethics of Asymmetry: The meeting is based on a radical asymmetry; I am always more responsible than the Other. The face of the Other, as in a manner the I, occupies the position of the Other in his fragility and nudity of the face, is the responsibility for the Other, as “the impossibility for the other man, the impossibility of leaving him alone in the mystery of death”. This relation is based on love; this love is not love or eros in general, nor a reduction to altruism, the goodness of a generous nature, but it is rather an an-archic bond between the subject and the good that comes from the outside (Source: Emmanuel Levinas, “Humanism and An-Archy,” Revue Internatinal de la Philoso- phie, no. 85 (1968): 65-82). Robot: Typically, an artificially intelligent agent is software that operates online or in a simulated world, often generating perceptions and/or acting within this artificial world. A robot, on the other hand, is situated in the real world, meaning that its existence and operation occur in the real world. Robots are also embodied, meaning that they have a physical body. The process of a robot making intelligent decisions is often described as “sense-plan-act” meaning that the robot must first sense the environment, plan what to do, and then act in the world (Source: Christoph Bartneck, Christoph Lütge, Alan Wagner, Sean Welsh, An Introduction to Ethics and AI, Charm: Springer, 2021, p. 12.) Sociotechnical Imaginary: Collectively held, institutionally stabilized, and publicly performed visions of desirable futures, animated by shared understandings of forms of social life and social order attainable through, and supportive of, advances in science and technology (Source: Sheila Jasanoff and San-Hyng Kim, Dreamscapes of Modernity Sociotechnical Imaginaries and the Fabrication of Power, (Danvers: University of Chicago Press, 2015), p. 120). Unmanned Autonomous Vehicles: Fully autonomous vehicles which do not require a driver at all (Source: Christoph Bartneck, Christoph Lütge, Alan Wagner, Sean Welsh, An Introduction to Ethics and AI, Charm: Springer, 2021, p.40).

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The Competition Among Stars: Case Studies of American-RussianChinese Rivalry in Space Exploration Krzysztof Jan Karwowski SGH Warsaw School of Economics, Poland

ABSTRACT The creation of long-range missile technology in the late 1940s was a milestone where a new domain of activity – Earth orbit and outer space – emerged. These extremely expensive research and development programs were strictly limited only to a small club of the most developed and innovative countries, but even almost seven decades after the launch of the first satellite, only a few players could independently participate in the exploration of space. Three of them: the United States, the Russian Federation as political and technological heir of the Soviet Union, and the People’s Republic of China mastered all the most important milestones of space technology to take full part in both the Cold War- and the new space race. The aim of this chapter is to explain and understand the areas of competition between the three superpowers in space, what are the most important events where the competition-management was applied and what are the perspectives/consequences of the new countries joining the space competition area within the current decade.

INTRODUCTION: MORE SCIENCE, LESS FICTION Space constitutes a source of hope for the world sinking in environmental and climate issues but also further problems as a field where crucial economic and strategic infrastructure can be located. With the growing dependence on satellite services, navigation and observation performed in orbit, Humanity reached a sufficient level of technology not only to perform astronomical science but also to use the space domain more comprehensively. The year 2023 – when the anniversary of the first Chinese manned spaceflight occurred – was a perfect time for the analysis of space programs in various fields (Xinhua, 2023). Space exploration is often portrayed as an engineering achievement, however, its implications and challenges in social science and security dimensions, order the analysis not only from the perspective DOI: 10.4018/978-1-6684-9467-7.ch016

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of the history of physics. The strategic importance of space infrastructure and the purpose of devices in Earth orbit raise questions about political calculations, potential collisions of space programs continued by two or more countries, and, if such happened, methods of managing or solving potential conflicts. Currently, the seventy-six governmental and international space agencies are involved in more or less advanced space exploration projects. 102 member countries of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) form on the other hand fora for discussion, information and regulation of space development (COPUOS, 2023). COPUOS established in 1959 within the United Nations Organization (UN) is responsible for managing the utilization of outer space following the principles arising from its special status. The United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) serves as the secretariat for COPUOS (UNOOSA, 2023). What is obvious, the main difference between the programs established by countries and organizations is their level of independence in access to the space. That means possessing their own, space launch capabilities: the vehicles – rockets, the infrastructure to organize independent space launches and also the know-how to design, manufacture and control satellites, instruments and spacecrafts. As of today, only nine countries have their own complete capabilities: the United States, Russia, the People’s Republic of China – PRC, France (independently and also as a part of the European Space Agency – ESA), India, Iran, Israel, Japan, North Korea and South Korea. A few more participate institutionally with huge input including their programs, self-produced spaceships or own space staff: Argentina, Canada, Germany, Italy, Kenya, Sweden, Taiwan and the United Kingdom (Statista Daily Data, 2022). The first space state was the Soviet Union (USSR) in 1957, whose infrastructure, technology and achievements were inherited after the decomposition by the largest of its republics – Russia. However, the current frictions between Russia and Kazakhstan, where key infrastructure (the launch centre in Baikonur) is located, and the change in Russia’s priorities with its involvement in aggression against Ukraine and the economic crisis caused by Western sanctions, position Russia rather as a descending space power. The United States of America, China, and, on a smaller scale, Europe and India, are the players whose influences in space conquest constantly grow, and their financing and future are not at risk. This chapter aims to present how the science-fiction-looking space exploration is seen through the lenses of political studies by addressing the research questions listed below: RQ1. In what way do the main superpowers deal with their opposing interests when supporting the exploration of space? RQ2. How the management of these conflict situations can be extrapolated for future rivalries? In the next section, an overview of the conceptual approach underpinning the discussion in this chapter is briefed, based on a literature review and key term explanations (Section 3). In section 4, the historical background of space exploration is briefly highlighted. Having identified the three sites of the conflict context as the mechanisms influencing the aerospace development strategy, in the following section, the individual case studies of these conflict management are explained. Discussion and conclusions follow.

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Figure 1. The division of the topics within the article

METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH Given the complexity of the subject of the analysis, the general framework of the chapter is a historic analysis of the three dimensions of the conflict – the clashes: American-Russian – the chronologically first example of the space competition, the Chinese-Russian – seen rather as a line of cooperation out of reason between a larger and a smaller player against the US, and American-Chinese – the most contemporary one.

Theories Due to the small representation of space policy in the literature and the constant creation of foundations for research on the topic, the author uses theories on the border of the theory of international relations, international law and the analysis of space law treaties understood as tools of conflict resolution and management.

Methodology and Materials Historical analysis as a methodological axis of the paper is the study of the past to understand events and their significance. The primary sources like documents and secondary sources are used for analysis to aim a consideration of historical context, explore causes and effects, establish a chronology, make comparisons, and examine historiography to provide interpretations. The sources used during the preparation of the paper were chosen and reviewed in the resources of BUW University of Warsaw Library, SGH Warsaw School of Economics Library and the Library of the

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Central European University in Budapest. The secondary sources are represented by around 50 papers downloaded from peer-reviewed journals (e.g., Space Policy) accessible via Scopus. Limitation: The historical data e.g., membership of states in space-related formats was checked on th 28 November 2023.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND KEY TERMS According to the query performed in Scopus, the literature related to competition (and cooperation) in space is mostly focused on the technological and scientific data-processing fields. Applying the optics of political science, we can see the expansion of politics behind the atmosphere, and, with the orbital launch technology progress, the continuous improvement of the new sphere – Astropolitics. Bowen for example describes the current politics in space as “international relations in an anarchic system” (Bowen, 2018). He forecasts similarities of the political activities on Earth such as acting according to fear, interest and honour, and assumes the same framework of motivation in space exploration. Ricca on one side clearly expresses space exploration as an anthropological phenomenon possible to develop in a new, different from the earth-related, way. On the other hand, he pays scientific attention to “compulsive greed for a possessive territorialization of outer space” which guides him to the deeper consideration of the topic of conflict-solving (Ricca, 2007). Dobroš, from the more European, and even central European perspective emphasises the necessity of astropolitics, especially in the world where China-US tandem rules the medial sphere of innovations (Dobroš, 2019). According to Su (Su, 2023) as representative of Chinese political thought, the militarization of space and perspectives on the new conflicts significantly increased within this decade, which caused the dependence of world powers of space services but also created their dangerous vulnerabilities. Heinrich, et al. agree but also broaden the research perspective on the rising space powers of Asia and Africa (Heinrich, et al. 2023). To better understand, how the contemporary space competition may evolve, how to resolve potential crises in the future, and finally to identify legal gaps, the reading of international space law may potentially guide us. The key terms important to define are: Conflict management focuses on applying the insights of theory and research to the understanding and management of actual conflict situations on the international arena in wide spectrum of scales and regional localizations (Oxford, 2011). Containment doctrine is a strategic foreign policy pursued to prevent or delay spread of political, economic, ideological or technical influences of the opponent (Hopkins, 2007). Outer space is the area outside the Earth’s atmosphere where the Moon, all the other planets and stars are. Commonly defined as an area above the Karman line ca. 100 km above the surface of Earth (Oxford Learner’s Dictionary; Lawrence et. Al, 2022). Reforms and opening-up (改革开放) - a wide range of political reforms ordered in China by the Deng Xiaoping administration starting in December 1978. They were related to the emergence of the seeds of entrepreneurship, opening China to financial capital, technologies and trade with the outside world, primarily capitalist countries, and implementation of experimental reforms, e.g. special economic zones (Ray, 2002). The current course of the Chinese economy and economic politics is a direct result of these reform programs.

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Satellite services are all the services provided by the satellite infrastructure located in space i.e. satellite communication, broadcasting, global positioning and navigation, remote sensing (meteorological, intelligence, etc.), scientific research, and developing options such as the future Internet of Things (IoT). Space domain indicates the perception of space as another domain of activity, implicitly strategic and military, in which the services and forces of the state can be used to ensure its security (space domain awareness). Space exploration is defined as the overall shape of human activity in outer space. It includes scientific, military and economic exploration of space resources, spacecraft travels and employment of satellite and space services. Space law is a field of international law regulating duties and laws related to space exploration. Space technology is a field of technology focused on the technical methods of space exploration and providing scientific research and services in space. They include especially the technology of space launch and space travel, e.g., rocket and deep-space engines, systems, and satellites, but also fuelling materials, avionics, software, and space-received data appliances. Liang Dan Yi Xing (Two Bombs and One Satellite 两弹一星) was a top-secret engineering project conducted by the People’s Republic of China in 1956-1970 to acquire a nuclear and thermonuclear weapon and the efficient means of delivering – the intercontinental ballistic missile. The development of missiles provided an additional opportunity to launch a satellite into space.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND The goal of the presented paragraph is a short literature review and synthesis of knowledge about the contributions of the space programs performed by the three superpowers as a strategic interest venture. The Cold War can be seen not only as a chain of historical events but also as a conveyor belt for many crucial technologies developed for military, prestigious and ideological purposes. Experience gained during space travels for example could be used in civilian astronautics but also in the construction of military equipment, especially intercontinental ballistic missile series or orbital observation and navigation systems. Along with other aspects of the US-Soviet arms race, the progress in space has become an indicator of economic and technical potential, demonstrating the superiority of a country’s ideology. Space research therefore had a double purpose: it could be used both for peaceful purposes and to achieve specific military goals in those times. Russians started first by sending Sputnik 1 into orbit in October 1957. They also paved the way in a few other fields like sending the first living organism (Laika dog in 1957) and human (Yuri Gagarin in 1961) – into space, performing a spacewalk (1965) outside the hermetic capsule, successful unmanned landing on the Moon (1966), building the first orbital station Salyut (1971) and even testing weapons in space like shots from the Almaz station cannons in 1975 (Reichl, 2019; Zak, 2022). Moscow’s superiority over the United States as the leader of the West was a moment of surprise and shook faith in American dominance internally and internationally. The establishment of the National Aeronautics & Space Administration commonly known as NASA in 1958 was the activation of an institutional vehicle to catch up Russians on the way into space. Thanks to the commitment of unprecedented resources under the National Defense Education Act (Kosar, 2011), America managed to monitor and repeat the milestones set in the East. The first US citizen was sent into space a month after Gagarin in May 1962. NASA, with the country’s budgetary and scientific support, implemented subsequent 318

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projects such as the Mercury and Gemini crewed space capsules, a massive program of the inner Solar System missions – Mariner to Venus and Mercury, Viking to Mars, scientific flights to the outer planets like Pioneer to Jupiter and Saturn or Voyager researching all the gas giants and travelling further to the edges of our system. The realization of manned missions was also developed within a spectacular Apollo project to the Moon, Skylab – orbital research facility allowing for a long-term, permanent US presence in orbit and SST program under which the space shuttle fleet provided a new quality in space transport: reusability and lifting capacity for increasingly advanced payloads (NASA Timeline, 2023). The 1980s decade brought international détente, but also many opportunities for cooperation between superpowers, also in space. The number of strategic disarmament dialogues increased, and joint missions were planned e.g., mutual visits of American shuttles and personnel on the soviet Mir space station, assistance in the maintenance of this station after its damage in 1997 (ESA, 2001), and over time, an ambitious project to build a new, larger, but above all, common space facility – the International Space Station ISS (NASA, 2023). China on the other hand is a country that for many years was considered a developing state. However, over the last decades, Beijing has undergone an incredible transformation and has become one of the most important players on the international technology stage. Today, China is recognized as a global leader in economics, military, and high-tech. Spectacular and more independent achievements performed by the Chinese nation in the last 20 years raise questions about innovation development and related public policies in the Oriental communist (Maoist) authority structure (Góralczyk, 2018). Nowadays, when there is not a month without high-profile successes in this matter in China, the topic gains momentum. There is also a growing interest in mechanisms of strategy design and implementation supporting the project (Karwowski et al, 2023). The People’s Republic of China sent its first space mission in 1970 but until the early 90s, when the project was rebooted, there were no significant profits from that success (Harvey, 2013). The decomposition of the USSR in 1991 and the financial difficulties of Russia in the following years created a possibility to buy advanced Soviet space technologies, train Chinese technical and flying staff, and copy Russian infrastructure in China. A fresh start happened and this time Chinese engineers but also political stakeholders felt a strong responsibility for achieving success in space exploration. This feeling now translates into China’s innovation policy and is reflected in national development strategies – 5-year and 10-year plans (Kenderdine, 2016). First, the family of efficient and trustworthy launching systems – the Long March missiles – was created and tested in practice. Since 1970, when a modified military ballistic missile has been launched as the Long March 1, almost 20 models have been successfully implemented. Each of them has been designed for a different mission, payload and specification, giving China a fleet of space launchers read to practically all mission scenarios (Ng, 2022). The final level of development was performing a safe human mission. Chinese in this case have continued to surprise the World since 2003, not only by sending single- and multiple-crew-member missions into orbit but also by building in the early 2020s a self-designed orbital station Tiangong (天 宫 – Heavenly Palace) with the rotational, permanent presence of PRC’s astronauts – the taikonauts – in space (Kanawka, 2019; Lu, 2021).

HOW IT LOOKS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT The exponential increase in the number of satellites and artificial objects in space has led to the emergence of a new field of mutual misunderstanding and conflict issues. It also offered new, dangerous opportunities 319

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like weaponization of the orbit or military equipment tests including nuclear weapon experiments, etc. The situation put humankind in need of creating both a legal framework and communication methods to avoid potential conflict. This paragraph – divided into the three clashes - shows how the most spaceactive superpowers dealt with these issues.

Treaties of the Cold War Era: The American-Russian Clash The first analysed clash was dated to the times of the Cold War between Western and Eastern blocks led by the winning states of the II World War. The space technology was in that time also in its beginnings of growth. Potential crises were not dealt with initially because the risk of their occurrence was too low. However, the United States and the USSR have taken many necessary diplomatic and legal steps to create new regulations in the field of the use of outer space. The tense situation on the surface of the Earth – with the Korean War, conflicts in the Middle East between Israel supported by the West, and Arab countries armed by the Soviets, but above all – after the Cuban Missile Crisis, which showed the world how close the superpowers were to the mutual nuclear destruction, forced the creation of crisis lines of communication between Washington and Moscow to ease the war of nerves and ensure the possibility of contact at the highest levels of decision-making at a critical moment (Keefer, 2007). Such contacts also began to concern space flights, as a cargo rocket could easily be confused with a land-based intercontinental ballistic missile. This is easy because many of these machines were created as part of one project e.g., the USSR and its Tsyklon missiles (Encyclopaedia Astronautica, 2019), or demobilized ballistic missiles served as launch vehicles for civilian objects (an example in the USA are series of Atlas and Titan rockets used for civilian space flights still in the 21st century). The risk of a pre-emptive missile attack in accordance with the doctrine of decapitating strike became a particularly important subject of Soviet analyses in the 1970s. It led to work first being undertaken on the construction of a secret GROT centre resistant to nuclear attack, capable of reacting even in the event of the elimination of the entire Soviet supreme leadership by the US, study and test works on anti-missile weaponry, and finally the Perimeter program, sometimes referred to in the literature as the “Dead Hand protocol” – a computerized system capable of issuing a nuclear retaliation procedure after an enemy attack in a fully automated process excluding the human command element (Hoffmann, 2010). The United States on the other hand, confident of its technological advantage, turned to the development of defensive methods and, in the future, the full neutralization of the risk posed by the Soviet nuclear arsenal. This perspective quickly connected to the interest of allocate the fruits of space race in a military basket (Bell, 1979). The Strategic Defence Initiative – SDI (Hulett, 1986) – program, initiated in the 1980s, although overly ambitious even today, was the Reagan administration’s response to the desire to counteract the nuclear threat from Earth’s orbital infrastructure. As the necessity occurred, also an opportunity to regulate space activities internationally was applied. Starting from the 60s, five (HumanDoc, 2022) globally recognized agreements were ratified under the aegis of the United Nations and its specialized bodies created to observe, regulate and support the development of space inventions. The first chronologically prepared document was the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies signed in 1967 and commonly known as the Outer Space Treaty (United Nations, 1963). The Treaty, recalling three General Assembly resolutions from 1947-1963 established a legal and ethical framework for space exploration, emphasising the peaceful principia of space research: status of celestial bodies 320

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as the common “province of mankind”, prohibition of mass destruction installation and usage in space, freedom of research and performed science and also freedom of information and cooperation for the treaty countries. Following its ratification, the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space was formulated. This Agreement committed the contracting parties to immediately take all the necessary steps to rescue and assist the personnel of any spacecraft which suffered an accident and made an emergency or unintended landing on their territories. This agreement imposed also an obligation to inform about any possible issues and landings the launching authority of the spacecraft and the Secretary-General of the United Nations but also regulated the case of a possible crash, obligating the launching party to eliminate possible danger, risk of harm or contamination and all the effects of the damages caused (UNOOSA, 1968). The third important act noted is the so-called Liability Convention – Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects from 1972 (UNOOSA, 1972). Like the previous agreement, the convention stressed the legal and operational responsibility of the launching authority understood as paying compensation for any damages caused by the space objects they launched on the surface of Earth, properties of both states and persons and to the other space objects. The most significant example when the convention applied was the crash of a Soviet nuclear-powered satellite in Canada in 1978. The Kosmos 954 spy satellite scattered radioactive debris of its reactor above the Northwest Territories of Canada, prompting an expensive cleanup action of the Canadian services eventually repaid by the USSR (Raynolds & Merges, 1998; Permanent Representative of Canada to the UN, 1978). Figure 2. The list of international agreements under the aegis of the United Nations (source: Library of the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs)

The next adopted law was the Registration Convention – officially: Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space from 1974 (UNOOSA, 1974) establishing the public catalogue of artificial objects in space. It also provided the procedure of registration and information about all the objects launched by the contracting parties and their duties to register: name of the launching state/states, an appropriate designator or number of the space object, date and place of launching, general functions and basic orbital parameters of the object when it was launched into the orbit or beyond.

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The final signed document was the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies commonly known as the Moon Agreement (UNOOSA, 1979). This treaty, signed in 1979, took into account the necessity “to define and develop the provisions of these international instruments” and interests in relation to the Moon and other celestial bodies. It includes the principles regarding the use of natural resources, prohibits the placement of weapons of mass destruction, and establishes that scientific research on the Moon will be conducted on the basis of international cooperation, ensuring openness and benefits for all nations of the world. This treaty aims to regulate space activities, promoting the peaceful utilization of outer space and the resources available on celestial bodies in the interest of all humankind. All these documents created a solid framework for cross-information and cooperation between space-exploring agencies around the world. Also, some modest, but still important, political instruments were given to the globally-working forum of cooperation which created long-perspective traditions of coexistence between the Cold War superpowers and the basis for the future movements of new political actors. Moreover, some authors postulate, that opening a new domain resulted in the release of tensions in the existing battlefields. Both, the actual increase in research and development expenditure, but also declarations of infrastructure creation in outer space expanded the activities of the superpowers, resulted in the USSR’s involvement in costs that it was unable to bear, and thus indirectly led to the end of the Cold War through the decomposition of the USSR. (Bartosiak & Friedman, 2021).

The Rise of China: The Chinese-Russian Clash Commonly in literature, this case of this “clash” is simply reduced to the story of cooperation in the last three decades. It is necessary to expose more deeply the beginning of the People’s Republic of China and the wide volume of aid donated by the Soviet Union In the PRC’s adolescence. At that time, a key figure was Qian Xuesen (钱学森). An intelligent railway engineer born in Hangzhou took the opportunity to go to the United States for a course at the California Institute of Technology (CalTech) in California. Working under the guidance of the theorist Theodore von Kármán (the conceptualizer of modern aerospace studies), he became part of a select group of specialists who, in the 1940s, founded the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) in Pasadena. A turning point in Qian’s career came during the anti-communist investigations led by McCarthy’s committee. Due to the “witch hunt” that ensued, he was first arrested and then spent five years under house arrest before being deported to China in 1955. The Chinese authorities recognized the value of the expelled scholar from the United States, and he did not hesitate to cooperate, taking positions in the emerging ballistic experiments program. The challenge was significant, involving building a team and equipment from scratch, despite revolutionary shortages and poverty, but initially with Soviet support. In collaboration with the military, a secret program known as Liang Dan Yi Xing (两弹一星 – Two Bombs and a Satellite) was initiated (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 20). Under its agenda, experiments with strategically important ballistic missiles were conducted, initially based on Soviet models, and later on China’s own practical experience after the falling out with Khrushchev. Prominent politicians, including Chairman Mao Zedong (毛泽 东) and Premier Zhou Enlai (周恩来), personally followed the progress, and thanks to the knowledge of Western-educated Chinese, the research advanced. It’s worth mentioning the profile of Marshal Nie Rongzhen (聂荣臻) – a military and politician educated in Belgium, who, as an influential mayor of Beijing, commander of the capital’s garrison, and the most technically trained commander in the Chinese military at the time, served as the military leader of the project (Wilson, 1999). The program started with 322

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very limited aid from the Soviet Union which was not interested in sharing cutting-edge technologies with a much more populated, but military and economically weaker partner. The mutual lack of trust and accusation between Moscow and Beijing increased with time and in 1960 led to a split between the two biggest countries of the Communist Block (Zagoria, 1962). Nikita Khrushchev’s withdrawal from technological cooperation in 1959 proceeding with the evacuation of specialists and equipment in 1960 severely delayed a number of Chinese initiatives e.g., the nuclear program according to Russian standards. Mao’s regime stood in the situation of forced industrialization and modernization based on its own assets and developing the country at the expense of society’s needs (Li, 2012; Xia, 2014). Taking into account the space launching capabilities, the Chinese had to rely solely on their own ingenuity and modest samples of Soviet technology like a few missiles donated during joint cooperation (Helperin & Perkins, 1965). Over 15 years of effort, China succeeded. The test detonations of atomic and hydrogen bombs were performed in the isolated test ranges of the country, and on April 24, 1970, the Dong Fang Hong 1 (东方红 - “The East is Red”) satellite named after a Chinese patriotic song transmitted from its instruments for measurement and propaganda purposes, was placed into Earth’s orbit using the Long March 1 rocket (Helperin, 1967). The further fate of Sino-Soviet cooperation in space is characterized by low intensity related to the development of Sino-American relations after the Shanghai communique of 1972 (Kissinger, 2011), changes in priorities and the USSR’s attitude towards partner countries (followed by the training and launch of the Indian and Vietnamese cosmonauts, not the Chinese, who took part in the Interkosmos project – i.e. a series of joint flights Soviet personnel and friendly countries, e.g. Poland, Czech Republic, Cuba). The lack of interest was also a result of the Cultural Revolution in China which practically stopped all the non-ideological education and scientific progress in the country. After the beginning of the Chinese “Reforms and Opening-up” period after the death of Mao, the Chinese Communist Party pursued a more pragmatically driven foreign policy that enabled a relaxing of tensions with the northern neighbours. In parallel, when the flourishing Chinese economy needed foreign solutions and technologies, the Soviets witnessed the unstoppable collapse of their country and political system. The Russian Federation, as the main heir emerging from the fallen empire, needed resources to oppose the growing chaos and the advanced post-soviet inventions constituted valuable goods to trade. Since 1992 the People’s Republic initiated purchases of Russian solutions, including the core products useful in space travel, technical and medical data and training procedures (Science, 1996). Based on the design of the Soyuz crewed spacecraft, the Chinese Shenzhou (神舟 – Divine Vessel) capsule was created (Chen, 2016). The Chinese and Russians tried also to perform space research together – with varying luck, what 2011 presented. The Fobos-Grunt mission launched that year was jointly prepared with the goal of sending the Russian component mainly performing the landing on the Martian moon Phobos and travelling in tandem with the Chinese orbiter Yinghuo-1 (萤火 – Firely) to Mars as its independent target. Because of the rocket motor failure both probes did not leave the orbit of Earth and burned in the atmosphere in the next year (NASA, 2012). By discussing the contemporary relationship between both parties, we can observe the deepening and tightening of cooperation indicated by the three agreements touching the space sector: a 2017 agreement covering intellectual property rights protection on the transfer of space technologies, an agreement to transfer sensitive missile defence technology opening signed in 2019 opening China the door to the sophisticated field dominated until now by the United States (Pollpeter et al., 2023) and the Memorandum of Understanding about the joint construction of the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) located near the Lunar south magnetic pole (CNSA, 2021). The station is a proposed deep space

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laboratory, centre of comprehensive astrophysical, geological and multidisciplinary science, cis-lunar transportation facility and also a symbol of Chinese (with Russian support) domination on the Moon, declaratively opened to all the other nations on Earth (Wang & Yang, 2023). To summarise, the objectives of China-Russia’s space actions can cover the scientific, diplomatic, economic, and even military areas. These efforts aim to balance against American dominance in the most innovative technologies, reinforce military capabilities, exhibit Chinese rather than Russian space leadership, and represent alternatives to Western technologies for the Global South. While not established as a formalized alliance, the deepening joint actions formed a significant strategic partnership.

The Eagle Resists the Dragon: The American-Chinese Clash The endogenous change of political climate in China favoured investments from abroad and migration of production from the West to the Far East. China emphasized the development of innovations, which allows for maintaining a competitive advantage in many fields – especially in the most advanced technologies seen as milestones in the superpower position-building process China has wanted to achieve since 1976 (Kissinger, 2011). The aerospace industry is a highlighted example pinpointed in almost every major economic development strategy including the dedicated Made in China 2025 document from 2015 (Góralczyk, 2021; 中国制造2025, 2015). That changes, low production costs and the constant progress of the Chinese in the field of launch vehicles have also been noticed by private companies related to space like satellite telecommunication operators. The procedure started in 1992 when companies like Hughes and Loral received a temporary licence for export and launching their satellites using cheaper Chinese rockets (Zinger, K.J., 2014). That was the way the contracts but also technical solutions were transferred to China from the United States (Karwowski, 2022). The controversies emerged from the two accidents in 1995 and 1996 when the Long March missiles with US-manufactured satellites crashed after launch from Xichang Satelite Launch Centre (XSLC) in Sichuan. The risk of obtaining advanced technologies by China from the wrecks of private space objects inclined the US Congress to reclassify the satellite technology as a munition and return the export control to prohibit further launches and flow of aerospace technology to the PRC (Zinger, K.J., 2014). Meanwhile, the geostrategic tensions in Southeastern Asia are increasing. The superpower ambitions of China emerged via a tremendous technological modernization of the armed forces and other neighbouring countries in counterweight. Following, the more modern military systems became, the more precise data they needed. The prestige and strategic opportunities, China established in the last twenty years by sending and securely bringing man from space aim to the new space race with Washington. The Americans pursue a broad-based international policy of containment of Chinese development. The most important instrument in this case is the Entity List – a document providing sanctions trade and cooperation with the undesirable entities listed by the United States Bureau of Industry and Security. For 2023 this list includes approximately 600 Chinese subjects, 129 of them related to space engineering (BIS, 2023). A more explicit example of American containment was the 2011 Wolf Amendment – officially known as Public Law 112-55 (US Congress, 2011) – enforced as a result of the American-Chinese tariff war. This law effectively suspended the use of federal resources in cooperation with the Chinese National Space Administration without the permission of the United States Congress. China therefore does not have the opportunity to implement its own or cooperated projects on the West-supported International Space Station.

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Apart from the mentioned reality of escalation through sanctions and containment, the goals pursued by both the US and Chinese space programs bear notable similarities, hinting at potential areas for further technological and strategic competition down the line. These objectives encompass a range of critical projects: firstly, both nations are intensifying their heavy rocket flight capabilities. NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) or Starship tested independently by SpaceX mirror the heaviest generations of Long March rockets employed by China, with both undergoing testing phases (SCMP, 2022). Secondly, while the US holds greater experience in Outer Solar System ventures, both countries are embarking on new projects exploring the distant reaches with a deeper focus on Mars, gas giant planets and mineral-rich asteroids. Moreover, mutual ambitions include our closest neighbourhood: the lunar exploration and the complete deployment of the orbital presence of men where China efficiently caught up with America servicing the Tiangong station with dedicated unmanned cargo orbiters — Tianzhou (天舟 – Heavenly Ship), engaged in continuous flights. Another media-noticed issue is the series of diplomatic and normative moves the two countries conceived (Larsen P. B., 2019). The US proposal was chronologically first in 2020 when the Artemis Accords was arranged under the administration of Donald Trump. Evolving from the Artemis human and robotic program of the solar system exploration, the arrangement was thought of as a multilateral framework for cooperation under the aegis of the United States to restore the technical opportunities of human flight to the moon and develop them in the direction of next, more distant missions (“Moon, Mars, Comets and Asteroids” as Artemis principles point). In addition to planning and sending spacecraft missions or a plan to build a station in lunar orbit, Artemis offers also a multi-member platform for legal coordination producing and standardising the common set of legal conditions for the commercialization of space (Artemis Accords, 2020). As of the date of writing this chapter, 33 countries have joined the agreement (Foust, 2023). In opposition to the Western Artemis Accords and its initiatives, there is the program of Chinese-led ILRS promoted from 2021 (Xu & Ou, 2023). What is necessary to underline, this project individually and as part Chinese Manned Space Program’s wider view are accompanied by an intensive scientific dialogue and diplomatic narrative of being opened to all the nations of the world, promoting deeper international cooperation through the lunar facility’s endeavour (Lu, 2021). However, there is still a lack of hard evidence of real openness to combined projects. The memorandum was accepted by China and Russia (look at the previous sub-chapter) and at the end of 2023 included eight countries in total (Reuters, 2023). As these examples prove, the construction of block-like formats marks a common ground amid potential future competition. The final, more military-related topic of the current clash should be an application of space-related branches of their armies into the operations in the external layers of the atmosphere and even above. In the last decades, both countries successfully presented their strategic capabilities of tracking and destroying the satellites with dedicated anti-satellite weaponry – ASAT (Gupta & Roy, 2018). Moreover, the establishment of dedicated branches of armed forces shows the aspirations expressed by both parties – the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force was formed in 2016 to cover the field of “information-driven conflict” performed with the latest achievements of technology, including space, electromagnetic domain and cyberspace (Mulverney, 2017). A few years later, the United States Space Force (USSF) was separated from the Air Force to underline the need to operate in a different, new environment (USSF, 2019).

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DISCUSSION Answering RQ1, the three clashes described above show the three different states of affairs performed by the actors in the international arena. The first – and currently historical - clash exemplified the state of crisis solved by the regulated competition. Along with the progress in space research but also the fluctuations in geopolitical tensions, the new international agreements were implemented to provide the functional frameworks of laws and duties. Analysing the second clash, we can see the emergence of the new cooperation expanding under the presence of the external opponent. The more fields of international trade and politics of the Americanized world order are contested, the more the United States react applying its wide arsenal of instruments. The People’s China – understanding the rules of the game which bring it tangible profits, use Russia as the younger partner in crime and source of various sophisticated technologies to buy, copy and update. The current course of the second clash can be also perceived as an effect induced by the third one – the rivalry of China against the US. The recent events in the world, with particular emphasis on the US-China trade war, the COVID-19 pandemic period with its consequences to the global supply chains, and the establishment of China-containment formats by the US e.g., Build Back Better, Together – B3T – Initiative, the AUKUS, Artemis Accords, etc., highlight the acceleration of the global changes catalysed by China-US relationship issues and touching further areas where these two countries remain active. In space exploration, however, the conceptual apparatus and legal sphere have undergone a surprising transformation during the last two decades. It can indicate, that the UN-promoted agreements mentioned before could no longer adapt to the conditions they could regulate. Despite this, no new treaties are being created (Ferreira-Snyman, 2015). States and companies insist on quite a grassroots and informal redefinition of space status as a common domain of activity. In the world order, where the new conceptualization of outer space is forged using the perspectives of security and exclusive economic interests it is hardly possible in the author’s opinion, the new agreements recognized by the significant majority emerge. Although the Artemis Accords can be seen as an inductor of internal regulations for the member states, and probably some of these regulatory patterns will migrate outside the agreement to countries that are less or not involved on its side, this can lead – as in the case of maritime law – to a Global+2 (Russia and China) scheme. Answering RQ2, we can summarise that managing the collision interests in outer space exploration can be perceived as a miniature of dealing with more comprehensive dilemmas of global power struggle. The abilities of actors to balance cooperation and competition, adapt the multilateral formats to the changing political landscape and foundation of platforms to negotiate can be used as solutions to solve the conflict situation in discussed areas.

CONCLUSION More research is necessary to enrich the narrative. The deeper literature review focused on only one of the clashes that could bring new findings and applications from the perspective of newly constructed legal frameworks in the future. The developing scale of other programmes (like Japanese or Indian) can also be taken into account in the future and new clashes can emerge. Dealing with relations in a new complicated domain, which space is, can be definitely recognized as a subject of multilevel governance studies. Especially now, in the 21st century, where the developing technologies overtake the norms and standards which regulate them. The increase in satellite-provided services like microsatellites, navigation and digitalization clearly indicates that the number of actors 326

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will definitely increase within years. The orientation around the most advanced countries with the most effective launch capabilities will also play a role. As the United States National Security Space Strategy published in 2011 defines, an Earth orbit is “increasingly congested, contested and competitive” (Department of Defence, 2011). Hence it will not be a surprise to the author if new fields of potential clashes – especially between states of Asia and multipolar blocks – open up over the next decade.

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Lawrence, A., Rawls, M. L., Jah, M., Boley, A., Di Vruno, F., Garrington, S., Kramer, M., Lawler, S., Lowenthal, J., McDowell, J., & McCaughrean, M. (2022). The case for space environmentalism. Nature Astronomy, 6(4), 428–435. doi:10.1038/s41550-022-01655-6 Li, M. (2012). Mao’s China and the Sino-Soviet Split: Ideological Dilemma. Routledge London. Lu, Y. (2021). Progress and International Cooperation China Manned Space Program. CMSP Overview 2021-8. Mir FAQs—Facts and history. (n.d.). ESA Website. https://www.esa.int/About_Us/Corporate_news/ Mir_FAQs_-_Facts_and_history Mulvaney, B. S. (2017). PLA Aerospace Power: A Primer on Trends in China’s Military Air, Space, and Missile Forces. China Aerospace Studies Institute – Air University Press. [ed.] South China Morning Post. (2022, March 18). Nasa rolls out its mega moon rocket. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/world/united-states-canada/article/3170925/nasa-rolls-out-its-megamoon-rocket-launch-pad 2011 National Security Space Strategy: Unclassified Summary (2011). The U. S. Department of Defence. https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/2011_nationalsecurityspacestrategy.pdf, Pollpeter, K., Barrett, E., Edmonds, J., Kerrigan, A., & Taffer, A. (2023). China-Russia Space Cooperation: The Strategic, Military, Diplomatic, and Economic Implications of a Growing Relationship. China Aerospace Studies Institute – Air University Press. Public Law 112-55, p. 86/ US Congress. https://www.congress.gov/112/plaws/publ55/PLAW-112publ55. pdf Ray, A. (2002). The Chinese economic miracle: Lessons to be learnt. Economic and Political Weekly, 37(37), 3835–3848. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4412606 Reichl, E. (2019). The Soviet Space Program: The Lunar Mission Years: 1959-1976. Atglen. Schiffer Publishing, Limited. Remembering that time the Soviet Union shot a top-secret space cannon while in orbit. (2022, October 24). Popular Mechanics. https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a18187/here-is-thesoviet-unions-secret-space-cannon/ Reynolds, G. H., & Merges, R. P. (1997). Outer space: Problems of law and policy (2nd ed.). Westview Press. Russia to Aid China’s Crewed Space Effort. (18 December 1996). Science. https://www.science.org/ content/article/russia-aid-chinas-crewed-space-effort South China Morning Post. (2022, January 5). Space race heats up as Chinese firm plans over 40 launches this year. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3162196/chinaus-space-race-heats-chinese-firm-plans-over-40-launches

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America’s Squid Game: Why the Korean Conflict Is a Prisoner’s Dilemma Iskren Ivanov https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9967-6251 Sofia University, Bulgaria

ABSTRACT The Korean Conflict has been among the most powerful pillars of the balance of power in Northeast Asia. Yet, that balance changed after North Korea launched its nuclear program. The American presence in the region, on the other side, has had considerable implications for South Korea’s national security and its capabilities to defend. The purpose of this chapter is two-fold. First, it theorizes the security dilemma between North and South Korea and calculates the probability of nuclear escalation. Second, the chapter explores the effects of North Korea’s nuclear program on the bilateral relations between Washington and Seoul, particularly regarding Pyongyang’s consistent rapprochement with Russia. The most important point of this study is to challenge the statement that South Korea can effectively deter the North without achieving nuclear parity with Pyongyang. Finally, the chapter stresses the difference between the Korean Peninsula’s old and new realities.

INTRODUCTION The Korean conflict has existed for more than half a century, and in a sense, the world has merely convened to the status quo on the divided Peninsula. Yet, the security dilemma between South and North Korea shifted after Pyongyang launched its nuclear program. The prospect of military escalation with the United States and its allies remains realistic and – to a certain extent – challenges South Korean attitudes to the deterrent force of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The mere idea of peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas is no longer sufficient to provide their policymakers with political legitimacy for their foreign policies. It would be misleading to believe that Seoul will easily abandon its nuclear free policy, but the fact that the nuclear arsenal of North Korea could inflict critical damage on the South would inevitably DOI: 10.4018/978-1-6684-9467-7.ch017

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change the perceptions and the behavior of both parties. That said, a better understanding of the security dilemma dynamics on the Korean Peninsula could provide us with more empirical knowledge about the future of this conflict and its potential implications for Northeast Asia. The purpose of this chapter is two-fold. First, it theorizes the security dilemma between North and South Korea and calculates the probability of nuclear escalation. Second, the chapter explores the effects of North Korea’s nuclear program on the bilateral relations between Washington and Seoul, particularly regarding Pyongyang’s consistent rapprochement with Russia. The most important point of this study is to challenge the statement that South Korea can effectively deter the North without achieving nuclear parity with Pyongyang. While this argument is still subject to a large political and public dispute, I assume that the Korean Peninsula no longer corresponds to the security architecture of a nuclear-weapons-free zone, and thus – the implications of North Korea’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) program have not been fully appreciated. Therefore, four principal contradictions emerge from the present situation: South Korea possesses one of the most powerful militaries in the world, almost three times that of Pyongyang, yet it cannot protect itself from the North’s nuclear weapons; the prospect of another military confrontation between Seoul and Pyongyang coexists with the natural fear of imminent preemptive strike; what Washington promise Seoul to do in case of North Korean attack would escalate the crisis further; levels of the North’s militarization has disproportionately increased since its rapprochement with Russia. The key to regulating the security dilemma on the Peninsula, thus, requires a reassessment of the nature of the security sources in the changed nuclear environment. Although military success could be achieved at enormous expense, political victory will highly depend on the U.S. support for Seoul. Thus, the central claim of this chapter is that only through nuclear deterrence could the balance of power be sustained to regulate the security dilemma between the two Koreas. The significant challenge for South Korean policymakers in coming to grips with the idea of a fully nuclearized Peninsula would be best predetermined by their ability to respond to the ultimate dilemma – whether the U.S. nuclear umbrella could make South Korea more or less secure with Pyongyang, sophisticating its military program. The well-established reply – that the U.S. military presence in South Korea decreases the chance of another clash with the North and secures the U.S.-ROK alliance – is only a theoretical answer, although it is correct. That said, the ongoing nuclear debate in ROK does not contradict the mutual trust between Seoul and Washington, it instead seeks to explore whether the deterrent force of the U.S. umbrella, under the guise of security guarantees, will be enough to deter the growing nuclear power of North Korea. Finally, the chapter stresses the difference between the Korean Peninsula’s old and new realities. What would be new to the security dilemma is not the probability of mutual reaction by both parties but the present ability of North Korea to inflict as much damage on the other party as the United States could on Pyongyang. Although the political leadership of the North would not be spared in case of a South Korean retaliation, the level of destruction will surpass that expected by America and its allies. Added to those realities is the fact that conventional warfare presumes sufficient time for bargaining, while a nuclear-armed actor is less inclined to negotiate and quicker to act. Since mutual vulnerability is no longer a source of security, deterrence remains the ultimate strategy of both parties to balance each other. That said, while the U.S. umbrella has been designed to prevent a potential conflict or limit the damage, the force, or the threat of it can no longer support ROK’s foreign policy as it did in the past.

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Research Design Research Methods The methodological approach of this chapter combines the existing theoretical knowledge with empirical findings and seeks to: 1. Introduce a theoretical explanation of the security dilemma on the Korean Peninsula and, more particularly – of the way it has been reshaped after North Korea got tactical nuclear weapons. 2. Assess how the sources of security on the Korean Peninsula changed and what would be the strategic impact of that change on U.S. security and political capabilities to support the Republic of Korea. 3. Infer plausible hypotheses and scenarios for the future of the Korean conflict. The methods used to generate empirical findings for this study include: 1. Conducting on-field study and inclusive observation of South Korean attitudes about the United States, North Korea, and the Asia-Pacific region. 2. Constructing a theoretical design to operationalize the variables in the study based on four preeminent theories of the security dilemma concept. 3. Operationalizing the empirical data through several variables.

Intended Contributions This chapter purports to offer three contributions. On a theoretical level, I argue that the security dilemma on the Korean Peninsula operates under several variables that constitute the balance of power between both parties. Since the academic consensus that the offense/defense balance stems from the military postures of the actors and their national interests applies to this case, this article sticks to the definition of the security dilemma, being a situation the means by which a state tries to increase its security and decrease the security of the others (Jervis, 1979, p. 171). In this chapter, however, I have also assessed the conflict of interests between both parties to indicate that although conventional capabilities and hard power matter, the conflict of interests is also central to understanding the transition between nuclear and non-nuclear state of the dilemma. Theory shows that the divergence between national interests does not necessarily presume violence and that confrontation is highly dependent on whether national interests are reconcilable (Tang, 2009, p. 600). Once a security dilemma becomes subject to a conflict of interests, it could either transform into a spiral model due to external influence or remain frozen according to the generally accepted rules of the environment. That said, this chapter does not consider the military clash between South and North Korea imminent. It instead seeks to theorize and position the security dilemma between both parties as an autonomous geopolitical reality from a potential hot conflict. On an empirical level, I introduce a structural model of the nuclearized security dilemma on the Korean Peninsula. I calculate the variables to infer plausible scenarios for the future of the bilateral ties between North and South Korea. The results show that both parties’ postures have consistently changed over time in a way that offense has been increasingly more advantageous than the defense. I try to draw

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a clear line between the stage when the U.S. umbrella can still deter the detrimental influence of the North and the point from which a hot conflict might become likely. On a methodological level, I suggest that theorizing the security dilemma on the Korean Peninsula presumes not merely calculating the parties’ postures. It also requires objective treatment of their national interests. The latter could provide a helpful indicator of whether those interests are genuine. Focusing on the conflict of interests might also contribute to better assessing the U.S. support for ROK, finding the tipping point beyond which the difference between offense and defense blurs. In both cases, I argue, once subject to a security dilemma, a party’s beliefs could easily produce actions that are defensive in their origins but offensive in their consequences.

Literature Review Defensive Realism: Robert Jervis’s Concept of the Security Dilemma A classical theory to offer the theoretical framework for this chapter is defensive realism and, more particularly – Robert Jervis’s explanation of how state actors interact under the security dilemma. Earlier scholars have considered the dilemma an essential cause of war between states, originating from uncertainty over each other’s intentions, fear about others’ reactions, and producing self-defeating tragic results (Herz, 1950; Butterfield, 1951). Jervis’s concept offers an essential contribution: understanding how two states with aligned interests, consistent foreign policy, and the ultimate purpose of achieving security could still end up in competition. Based on his empirical judgments, Jervis defines the security dilemma as a situation in which state actors compete for security (Jervis, 1979, pp. 169-170). What makes this definition central to this chapter is Jervis’s treatment of game theories, employed by the author to illustrate how decision-makers would act if they found themselves locked in a Prisoner’s Dilemma. Given that the concept tests two possibilities of action: “cooperate” or “defect,” the importance of actors’ preferences points firmly towards states, falling into a trap not entirely designed by either. The starting point for Jervis’s concept can be found in the tangible impact of psychological perceptions, such as the states’ fear of being exploited, which triggers subjective security demands. When summarizing his findings, Jervis calculates the security dilemma by operationalizing two central variables: whether defensive weapons and policies can be distinguished from offensive ones and whether the defense or the offense has the advantage (Jervis, 1979, p. 200). In general terms, the author’s arguments for assessing the offense/defense balance derive from empirical observations on whether both parties have first-strike capabilities and how profitable/quick the confrontation would be (Schelling, 2020, p. 135). The same logic applies to offense/defense differentiation: the security dilemma applies only if weapons and policies that protect the state provide the capability to attack. Finally, the theory considers two less important variables that also affect a state’s propensity to attack/defend: geography and technology in the sense of favoring either the attacker or the defender (Brodie, 1959, p. 6).

The Fudan School: Shiping Tang’s Interpretation of the Conflict of Interest Despite its methodological advantages, Jervis’s model is self-limiting because it gives less operationalization to intervening variables, such as conflict interests between state actors, which is particularly important when assessing the post-Cold War balance of power in Northeast Asia. Therefore, although classical international relations theories like defensive realism offer profound contributions and provide 334

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plausible starting points for assessing the security dilemma on the Korean Peninsula, they are, by their very nature, Western-centric and thus – inclined to produce one-sided methodological judgments. The most plausible way to expand the theoretical framework of traditional IR theories would be to employ a concept that originates from Jervis’s approach but expands its scope beyond the realist arguments for the conditions under which the security dilemma operates. In this article, I utilize the concept of Shiping Tang for two variables that provide a better understanding of how the conflict of interest between the United States and North Korea could ameliorate the security dilemma on the Korean Peninsula. First is Tang’s critical treatment of the causal link between the security environment and the inevitable outcome of the war. In his concept, Tang offers a plausible criticism of definitions, stating that one should differentiate between the casual factors that give birth to the security dilemma from the potential intermediatory outcomes that are produced by the former, but at the same time, could reinforce the dilemma through a feedback mechanism (Tang, 2009, pp. 293-294). In other words, when assessing a situation that implies the existence of a security dilemma, one should confuse its nature with the spiral model of psychological perceptions and misperceptions that typically lure state actors to confront each other militarily. Tang clarifies that the security dilemma and the spiral model can be understood separately as a reversible and graduate continuum, in which the dilemma remains dormant and largely benign until it is exacerbated by states’ behavior. Another central variable to this chapter is determining how the conflict of interest affects the security dilemma. Tang defines conflict of interest as a divergence between two states’ national interests, stating that the conflict does not presume violence (Tang, 2009, p. 600). In addition, the author rejects Boulding’s dichotomous understanding of peace (Boulding, 1978), dialectically postulating that conflict of interest has a subjective and objective side and that interests can be reconcilable and irreconcilable (Tang, 2009, p. 599). The objective side refers to the absence of threats to acquired values, while the subjective is expressed in the absence of fear that such values will be attacked (Wolfers, 1952, p. 485). In summary, Tang infers six scenarios depending on whether the conflict of interest is subjectively or objectively genuine.

The Security Dilemma Applied to the Korean Conflict: What do Other Theories Tell Us? To proceed further, it is important to assess works that project Jervis’s or Tang’s approaches with a specific focus on the Korean Peninsula to provide specialized theoretical knowledge for the empirical part of this chapter. Yong-ho Kim’s approach succinctly captures the dilemma’s nature, elucidating that Pyongyang’s behavior originates from a security dilemma based on nuclear diplomacy and personal father-to-son succession that prioritizes political over national survival (Kim, 2010, pp. 5-6). Kim stresses the importance of political succession and North Korea – China relations to indicate that the Korean Peninsula is a strategic theatre of pursuit of security by the United States – a zone where Seoul and Pyongyang are at risk of conflict and have interests that are irreconcilable. The author is explicit in his assumption that the ROK’s interests are determined primarily by the security of its people, while DPRK’s policy is due to its leadership’s struggle for its survival. Another perspective depicts the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula as an asymmetric security dilemma between the United States and North Korea of crisis bargaining, which is a major source of confrontation that could lead to nuclear escalation (Tan & Park, 2020, p. 14). The authors see Washington and Pyongyang as equally inclined to use coercion – primarily under the guise of aggressive brinkmanship and hawkish diplomacy – because 335

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it is the means by which they can secure themselves or merely – pursue the goals that diplomacy failed to achieve. Other scholars challenge the latter statement and claim that the U.S. minilateralism strategy in Asia – such as the U.S.-Japan-ROK exercises south of the Korean Peninsula – is not likely to precipitate a security dilemma although it could further deteriorate Sino-American relations (Wuthnow, 2019, pp. 2-3). Such criticism stems from the presumption that future arms and technological races between Washington and Beijing would reflect their conflict of interests but not to the point of forging an antiChinese coalition. The central importance of military technologies is further highlighted in studies, relying on the assumption that anti-ballistic missile systems like the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), deployed on South Korean soil could ameliorate the security dilemma, causing instability as likely as North Korea’s nuclear arsenal exacerbates it (Adelia & Taarega, 2022, p. 56). In a similar logic, a recent argument postulates that the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula is a product of a more complex security dilemma between the United States and China, highly dependent on three variables: geography, nuclear asymmetry, and the U.S. alliance system (Ekmektsioglu & Lee, 2022, pp. 15-18). Added to the discussion are assertions that seek to explain the security behavior of the United States and China with that of the ROK and DPRK (Jong-ho, Jae-woo & Jang-won, 2013, pp. 395-396). In their most elemental sense, explanations incorporating military capabilities are the most plausible example of the security dilemma operating on the Peninsula and the most reliable empirical argument that Washington and Beijing are directly involved in navigating the dilemma. Despite their differences, however, most approaches stick to the consensus that the Korean conflict stems from objective historical, cultural, and political realities that have become irreconcilable in time. In light of the challenges inherent in the security dilemma, most scholars would expect that policymakers could carefully calculate their strategic postures before acting. The latest trends in the conflict, however, indicate the opposite. While one party is aware that the other’s intentions and behavior are hostile – especially when a major state actor backs them – it is difficult to comprehend the situation through the adversary’s eyes. The same logic applies to actions. If a foreign policy is designed to directly impact the opposite party’s behavior, it is unknown how the latter would react. The uncertainty, thus, creates a security dilemma that – based on both parties’ views on the balance of power – could either transform into confrontation or remain dormant until a major shift in the regional status quo occurs.

The Prisoner’s Dilemma Explained In this chapter, I assess the dilemma on three levels, with variables inferred from the theoretical concepts analyzed above. I begin with cooperation and defection, which are central to state behavior in this conflict. Each level corresponds to different aspects of both parties’ behavior in relation to the security dilemma on the Korean Peninsula.

Level One: Cooperation vs. Defection A central question in defensive realism is, what makes it more or less likely that the parties will cooperate and arrive at the stage of cooperation? Jervis operationalizes three variables that indicate the chances of achieving cooperation: anything that increases incentives to cooperate by increasing the gains of mutual cooperation (CC) and/or decreasing the costs the actor will pay if he cooperates and the other does not (CD); anything that decreases the incentives for defecting by decreasing the gains of taking advantage of the other (DC) and/or increasing the costs of mutual non-cooperation (DD); anything that increases each 336

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side’s expectation that the other will cooperate (Jervis 1978, 190). To understand if the Korean conflict could escalate and how the nuclearization of the security dilemma would impact the balance of power, we should first calculate the cooperation/defection perceptions of the parties. Two essential observations provide a plausible starting point for assessing the cooperation probabilities between ROK and DPRK. One is that Pyongyang’s foreign policy relies on nuclear coercion and the vision of forceful reunification rather than dialogue, which, to a greater extent, precludes cooperation with Seoul (Roehrig, 2020, p. 862). The other traces the dilemma in North Korea’s strategic level of nuclear weapons, assuming that South Korea and the United States need to establish a revised nuclear-shared system in Northeast Asia with a development option for Seoul (Park, 2022, p. 180). That said, the Prisoner’s Dilemma resembles a squid military game of offensive/defensive actions, repeating, although not yet evolving into a spiral model of confrontation. Table 1. Cooperation/confrontation balance in the prisoner’s dilemma Variable/Correlation

South Korea

North Korea

Increasing the gains of mutual cooperation (CC)

Fear of destruction Fear of surprise attack Pressure from third party Rational sense of being vulnerable Prospect of losing sovereignty

Fear of destruction Fear of surprise attack Pressure from third party Rational fear for the regime’s selfpreservation Prospect of losing power

Decreasing the potential cost of defection for one party (CD)

Sacrifice of the national interests of South Korean people Inability to predict the future scenarios for inter-Korean relations Fear that the costs of war will outweigh the benefits

Sacrifice of the interests of Kim Jong-Un’s regime Aversion of predicting the future scenarios for inter-Korean relations Fear that the ultimate cost of war could be the regime’s survival

Increasing the incentives for defecting by decreasing the gains of taking advantage of the other party (DC)

Fear of North Korea, reaching its goals Economic support for North Korea and the Sunshine Policy Gaining international prestige

Fear of South Korea and the U.S., reaching their goals Strategic dialogue with the U.S. and South Korea Loosing international prestige

Increasing the costs of mutual noncooperation (DD)

Opposition to Sunshine Policy Negation of the Kim’s regime

U.S.-ROK alliance Ideology

Increasing each party’s expectation that the other will cooperate

Decreasing of the total sum of all gains (CC + CD + DC +DD) Depending primarily on: convincing North Korea that it is better to cooperate with the U.S. and the South

Decreasing of the total sum of all gains (CC + CD + DC +DD) Depending primarily on: the regime’s interpretation of South Korean behavior in relation to the United States

In a more evident manner, after North Korea’s nuclearization, incentives for cooperation dropped due to the consistent U.S. opposition to Pyongyang’s military policy and its rapprochement with Russia. With only formal channels of communication remaining, and because ROK’s alliance with America threatened to denuclearize the North, Pyongyang’s perceptions of the conflict involved the belief that DPRK must not retreat from its present position and behave like a nuclear power capable of deterring the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Seoul, quite the opposite, considered its strategy applicable to the conflict situation without recognizing the importance of potential circumstances that were not under its control – unexpected shifts in the U.S. Foreign Policy toward the Sino-Russian “friendship without borders” that

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could affect American behavior in the Asia-Pacific. The costs of cooperation, thus, were not present. For North Korea, siding with Russia was merely a necessity for survival that could prevent Washington from using Seoul as a military pivot for direct confrontation with the North. Defecting and confronting, quite the opposite, prevail over incentives for cooperation. The problem arises from the fundamental conviction of both parties that taking advantage of each other is the best way to navigate the security dilemma’s puzzle. Decision-makers in Pyongyang and Seoul consciously hold two different options for solving the conflict. Still, they intentionally reject it due to the native instinct of survival that Kenneth Waltz defines as a prerequisite to achieving any goals that states may have other than the goal of promoting their disappearance as political entities (Waltz, 2010). Therefore, no expectations for cooperation could be inferred with Pyongyang, boosting its nuclear arsenal, to which Seoul is vulnerable even under the U.S. umbrella. Since North Koreans are largely exposed to state propaganda, and as long as their leadership is concerned primarily with the regime’s survival, they would have opposed the demands for a peaceful resolution of the conflict even if an acceptable mediator for both parties was available. To sum up, both actors on the Korean Peninsula deter each other by persuading the opposite party that a proportionate response would outweigh the potential outcome of an expected action. The latter resembles the prisoner’s dilemma that divides South and North Korea and depends on two variables: the perceived damage one party could do to the other and the probability of nuclear escalation. Table 1 summarizes the dilemma by operationalizing the variables based on Jervis’s cooperation/defection model.

Level Two: Cognitive Aspects of the Parties Judging what prevents the ROK and DPRK from cooperating is easier than calculating its cost. What one party considers one action cooperation, the other could perceive it as defection. Only rarely do the interests of Seoul and Pyongyang pursue a unified pattern under the pressure of the United States – a scenario that seems highly unlikely in the future after North Korea obtained tactical nukes. Thus, a detailed analysis of cognitive perceptions is needed to measure the probability of both parties to cooperate. Table 1 summarizes the operationalization of the variables I infer to assess the cognitive postures of the parties, based on the subjective security demands of both actors. Security demands, under the guise of psychological perceptions, could provide a better view of what the parties seek to achieve – or at least preserve. Security demands indicate decision-makers’ actions in terms of the vulnerabilities they feel, the amount of security they desire, and the perception of threats (Wolfers, 1962, p. 10). Those factors that could sharpen the uncertainty of action are easily inferable: misleading perceptions of the other’s hostility, high costs of war, commitments to third parties, and even – the satisfaction of seeing the other’s reaction (Deutsch, 1973, p. 190).

Variable One: Fear Fear resembles the hostile intentions between two parties, stemming from a modern power-security dilemma that could transform mild power struggles into much deeper antagonisms (Buzan, 2008, p. 193). Perceptions of fear emerge because the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has adopted the image of defeat as a natural outcome of a U.S.-led conventional attack or decapitation strike (Narang and Panda, 2020, p. 48). Rejecting the vision of political humiliation, the deepest fear of DPRK is that the United States and ROK could launch a surprise conventional or even – nuclear counterforce strike. Seoul, quite 338

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the opposite, fears what would be the state’s future itself and has increasingly adopted the perspective of developing its nuclear arsenal. Logically, the prime fear of being vulnerable inclines South Korea to side with the United States and its allies rather than bandwagoning with China. It is a foreign policy of balancing that presupposes joining alliances to counter coalitions whose superior resources could pose a threat (Walt 1990, 18). Although balancing does not require unremitting hostility to the other party, Prime Minister Yoon Suk Yeol’s view on Kim’s regime being a fundamental threat to ROK’s national security provoked the opposite party to adopt firmer nuclear rhetoric. That said, both parties act simultaneously and consistently, although their cognitions may differ, while the costs of defection are shared and mutual, although not equally tolerable. Table 2. Cognitive variables of the parties of the prisoner’s dilemma Variable

South Korea

North Korea

Fear

Preemptive strike from North North Korea – Russian rapprochement North Korean nuclear program

Collapse of the regime U.S.-ROK Alliance U.S. nuclear arsenal Fear of political humiliation

Vulnerability

Preservation of national sovereignty and political independence Lack of nuclear arsenal

Kim Jong-Un’s regime stability U.S. support for South Korea

Price

Self-preservation of the Korean nation, human costs of war, living toll

Loss of power, strategic defeat, end of the regime in Pyongyang

Rationality

Rational debate about the need of nuclear weapons and the reliability of the U.S. nuclear umbrella

Nuclear rhetoric, coercive diplomacy, but rational concern with political survival

Charisma

South Korean democracy with a debate on Sunshine Policy, strong emphasis on the crisis management capabilities of the Korean leaders, accurate incentives

Cult of personality, pragmatic authoritarianism, sense of infallibility, coercive behavior, lack of accurate incentives, no compromise policy

Variable Two: Vulnerability Vulnerability indicates the extent to which each party feels threatened enough to acquire more power and enough confidence to attack (Snyder, 1991, p. 108). As noted, Seoul found it futile to bandwagon with third parties like China due to the perspective of being an American ally. The same logic applies to Pyongyang. It is irrational for North Korea to respect the warnings of its historical archenemy – Washington, instead of boosting its nuclear diplomacy. With policymakers unwilling to pay the price of negotiations with the Americans and because vulnerability had a considerable impact on both parties, North Korea’s confidence resulted in a complete revision of Kim’s nuclear policy, while South Korea’s perceptions of the hostile North remained robust and irreconcilable. However, the complex reason behind non-cooperation is that both parties differ in their cognitions. For Seoul, the price of quitting the game would be the sovereignty and existence of its nation, while the Kim’s regime is concerned merely with its survival (Hersman and Peters, 2020, pp. 552 – 553).

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Variable Three: Price Price is the sum of the costs and gains of war (Gilpin, 1981). Just as their decision-makers learned from opposing each other after the Korean War, the ROK and DPRK are trapped in a security dilemma that consists of two aspects. One is that Pyongyang’s military optimism, associated with nuclear diplomacy, could tempt North Korean decision-makers to provoke a protracted and expensive – in terms of living toll – conflict with U.S.-backed South Korea. The other is that Seoul’s choice to resist would be the only rational option, although the chances of victory seem nuclear without second-strike nuclear capabilities. North Korea firmly opposed the ROK’s rapprochement with NATO due to the risk of strategic isolation, while the Yoon administration was unambiguous when calling Russia’s support for the North a provocation. Kim Jong Un’s belief that a preemptive strike on the South in case of a kill chain attack will take little time approves the classical assumption that if each side is aware of the advantages of striking first, even mild crises are more likely to end in war (Jervis, 2017, p. 67). In other words, the conditions under which a potential war would occur and the price both parties would pay are still the driving force of both leaders’ perceptions to avoid confrontation.

Variable Four: Rationality Rationality refers to adjusting a state actor’s policy to power realities (Trachtenberg, 2003, p. 197). The prospect of the United States regularly – or in the near future permanently – deploying nuclear-armed submarines in South Korean waters increases North Korea’s incentives to develop its first strike capabilities. The other aspect of rationality under war laws is that the United States could not launch a preemptive strike on the North unless Pyongyang strikes first (Chang, 2020, p. 174). Although both examples contain strong incentives for actions, perceptions differ depending on how leadership reads the international norms of using preemptive military force. South Korean policymakers are firm in their alliance with Washington, although their statements on Seoul’s capabilities to develop its nuclear program differ. The North Korean leadership seems to believe that the chances of inflicting critical damage to the ROK in a potential conflict are high, at least for nuclear-target areas, but it fails to realize that a leader who finds the regional balance of power unacceptable and sustained only through war, is most likely to lose the fight, facing a larger coalition. However, the fact remains that North Korea can still be defined as a rational actor due to Pyongyang’s consistent struggle to preserve the Kim regime (Kim & Cho, 2023, p. 193).

Variable Five: Charisma Although charisma is believed to be a secondary variable in Western foreign policy decision-making, it is central to Korean politics because Koreans attribute more charisma to their leaders when the latter exhibit greater self-sacrifice and superior competence in times of uncertainty and crisis management (Choi & Yoon, 2005, p. 60). First, it is essential to highlight that the Kim regime gives little place to consider different scenarios about DPRK’s behavior because acquiring nuclear weapons leads a state actor to oppose and undermine elements of nuclear non-proliferation (Fields, 2014). Even if Pyongyang envisions an alternative behavior of appeasement, as a policymaker, Kim Jong Un would hardly realize the implications of his reactions because the consequences of choosing between cooperation and defection would be too significant or even – detrimental to his country. The North Korean leader favors confrontation because, in the face of a U.S.-ROK alliance, he has a clear vision of how he should react to 340

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the emerging security dilemma, although the future will tell whether an image of the situation refracting through the lenses of nuclear diplomacy seems incorrect and misleading. South Korean leadership, on the other side, relies on two sources of cognitive legitimacy: the U.S. support for Seoul as well as South Korea’s public opinion reaction to past national traumas and the presence of an imminent sense of threat. In short, when the U.S.-DPRK tensions escalate, for Pyongyang, the costs of confrontation exceed, not to say – preclude further attempts for cooperation. Seoul, and more notably – the liberal wing, has considered different options for rapprochement, but the actual events proved that the unknowns and the risks of adopting such behavior are greater than the contrary since it could weaken the U.S.-ROK alliance.

Level Three: Assessing the Balance of Power The nature of the ROK-DPRK security dilemma cannot be assessed entirely without calculating the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula. An established axiom postulates that the conflation of peace and stability is too common and that wars occur when the international system is unstable (Waltz, 2010). Conflicts are likely during the transition period to post-unipolarity when global actors like the United States are determined to preserve the status quo in opposition to their peer-competitors. That said, both Seoul and Pyongyang are among the players who need to adjust their policies to the security dilemma on the Korean Peninsula if their policymakers seek to avoid tensions that could escalate into a military conflict. When calculating the offense/defense balance, it is essential to involve another methodological variable – nuclear weapons. The importance of a nuclear arsenal is evident when a cold conflict threatens to escalate. Nuclear consensus typically indicates impossible defense but a triumph of deterrence. In that case, South Korea should be concerned either with developing its nuclear arsenal or at least – needs to ensure that Washington would stick to its commitments under the American-Korean Mutual Defense Treaty. In the former case, maintaining relative second-strike capabilities in Seoul would serve as a powerful deterrent. In the latter case, South Korean decision-makers would be in a position to require further commitments from the United States and its allies under a deeper collective security format. Robert Jervis contends that offense has the advantage when it is easier to destroy the other’s army and take its territory rather than defending one’s own, while the defense has the advantage when it is easier to protect and hold than it is to destroy and take (Jervis, 1978, p. 193). Henceforth, it is essential to highlight that a military confrontation between Pyongyang and Seoul bears the risk of nuclear escalation between North Korea and the United States. The safest way for a nuclear-armed state to perceive its peer competitor is by closely examining the latter’s capabilities without risking a direct conflict. In such cases, the security dilemma tilts in favor of offense when technology and commitments to third parties force one party to increase its security, while the defense has the advantage when armed races between both parties preclude unilateral acts of aggression. South Korean conservatives advocate closer cooperation with Washington and a harder approach towards Pyongyang, while progressives regard North Korea as a nation to embrace and prefer less American influence on inter-Korean relations (Chung, 2023, p. 21). North Korean foreign policy, on the other side, is a strategic amalgam of nuclear diplomacy and rapprochement with Russia, combined with the Kim regime’s struggle for self-preservation (Kwon, 2022, p. 745). Yet, relations between Moscow and Pyongyang are far from a formalized alliance pact. Expansion presupposes that North Korea should act preemptively, but the logic of nuclear deterrence and the U.S. nuclear umbrella over Seoul predetermine the advantage of the defense. If Pyongyang and Seoul remain equally inclined to act/retaliate, they are more likely to keep the security dilemma on the Peninsula cold 341

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and comply with the regional security architecture instead of clashing militarily. The ultimate challenge to the parties, however, remains external factors such as potential preoccupation of the United States with its peer-competitors or falling into the trap of exaggerating each other’s hostility – a situation in which both actors would identify their capabilities with the intention of a party to strike first. In the latter case, the offense could take advantage of the defense since Pyongyang’s nuclear doctrine presupposes a preemptive strike (Pyong, Kim & Xu, 2023, p. 102).

Calculating the Postures A third variable concerns offense-defense differentiation, seeking to measure to what extent weapons and policies that protect the ROK and DPRK also provide the capability for an attack. Here, the security dilemma would apply if Pyongyang and Seoul followed strategies that, although different from each other, set the ultimate purpose of avoiding war. However, the changing world order, particularly Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the Sino-Russian alignment affected North Korean perceptions to the extent beyond which they rely primarily on coercive diplomacy and pursuing a nuclear power status (Ha and Shin, 2022, p. 20). Even if not seeking to provoke the North, the ROK is more likely to worry more about its defense since Washington believes that for Beijing to develop, Chinese technological capabilities would decrease America’s level of security and weaken the U.S. strategic influence in Northeast Asia. Despite the conservatives – progressives cleavage in South Korean politics, Seoul is positioned in a dichotomous situation where offensive postures are distinguishable from defensive ones due to the North’s coercive diplomacy and the South’s opposition to forceful changes in the status quo on the Peninsula. Some would argue that the U.S. nuclear umbrella, in its ability to prevent nuclear escalation or at least – deter Pyongyang, could ameliorate the difference between the postures, but in the context of deterrence, the umbrella simply provides deterrence. In addition, the U.S. Department of Defense considers the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States and its allies (Mount, 2022, p. 10). South Korea also does not possess intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which is a basic precondition to state that offensive/defensive postures of the parties do not differ from each other (Schelling, 2020). Postures can be balanced only if the United States deploys THAAD on ROK’s soil because the latter will provide Seoul with preventive – in addition to its second-strike capabilities, guaranteed by the possession of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and KSS-III class submarines. Alternately, the balance could also be achieved if the ROK launches its nuclear program, being a nuclear-capable state. To conclude, the present situation on the Korean Peninsula qualifies for a security dilemma that operates because offensive postures are distinguishable from the defensive. The dilemma, however, is increasingly unstable due to the strategic shifts in the offense/defense balance stemming from North Korea’s nuclear program. Increasing Pyongyang’s military and technological capabilities could tilt the balance in favor of the offense, which would bring both parties one step closer to the conflict because unilateral aggression becomes easier for North Korea. If the U.S.-ROK alliance maintains the advantage of the defense by deterring North Korean nuclear diplomacy, the security dilemma will continue to operate, although in a doubly safe situation. That said, the security dilemma’s stability will keep operating if the status quo remains unchanged or if the United States sticks to its commitments as it did for the past decades.

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A Genuine Conflict of Interests? Given this picture, it is essential to assess those aspects of the Peninsula’s security dilemma that are supposed to better illustrate South Korea’s position in the security dilemma to clarify whether Seoul could deter the North’s nuclear diplomacy without relying on the United States. Here, it is tenable to employ an approach that is less Western-centric and more focused on the conflict of interests within inter-Korean relations. Shiping Tang’s concept of the security dilemma provides a plausible starting point for such analysis, whereas it operationalizes an essential variable that is less discussed in traditional IR studies – the reconcilability of national interests (Tang, 2009). If there were no genuine conflict of interest between the ROK and DPRK, the argument for the peaceful coexistence of both parties, introduced by some scholars and proponents of the sunshine policy (Kwon and Lim, 2006, p. 134; Son, 2006), would apply either if North Korea and South Korea mistakenly believed that they have a conflict of interest or if they correctly assumed that differences between them were reconcilable. However, a growing body of works suggests that highly consequential foreign policy events like the North Korean nuclear program contradict the messages that influence public opinion at the cost of elites’ ability to shape it (Bae, 2019, p. 420) and that engagement policy with the North should know its limits because economic interdependence does not automatically pacify the interacting partners (Kim, 2017, p. 166; Cha and Kang, 2018). The same logic applies to most American observes who consider nuclear deterrence the best option for regulating inter-Korean relations based on South Korean perceptions of the North and the United States (Sagan, 2017, p. 73; Haworth and Sagan, 2019, p. 3; Einhorn and Rich, 2021, p. 20; Rich, Einhorn & Eliassen, 2023, p. 10). To sum up, even assessed through the lenses of the Sunshine Policy, the conflict between both parties is genuine because – as introduced by Tang’s theory (Tang, 2009, p. 599) – both parties believe that the conflict of interests between them is irreconcilable. Since the conflict of interest between the ROK and DPRK is genuine, tracking the impact of the parties’ intentions on the security dilemma would be easier than tracing the latter’s origins in the status quo. However, defining whether genuine interests are objectively or subjectively reconcilable/irreconcilable is essential. Despite the lack of consensus on the Sunshine Policy, objective geopolitical realities show that the conflict of interests between Pyongyang and Seoul is genuine, whereas the perceptions of both parties originate, even during periods of dialogue, from the rational historical sense of self-preservation, not from mistaken beliefs. The nature of the difference in this debate, thus, stresses the importance of the dialogue to avoid escalation but does not provide a plausible starting point for objectively analyzing the conflict between ROK and DPRK. That said, this conflict is objectively genuine, but its dynamics should not be judged merely based on national interests. Optimism about ROK and DPRK coexisting peacefully is justified as long as the divergence in their foreign policies is objectively reconcilable and subjectively irreconcilable – that said – as long as the latter is a product of a security misperception. Inter-Korean relations are objectively reconcilable due to the deterrence force of the U.S. nuclear umbrella and China’s firm adoption of the no-first-use nuclear policy (Zhenqiang, 2016, p. 53). However, two logical questions emerge from this conclusion – whether the security dilemma on the Korean Peninsula is dormant and whether the spiral model that precedes a potential conflict has been activated after Pyongyang launched its nuclear program. Here, the point is how inter-Korean relations could be judged in terms of perceptions or offensive/defensive postures – that is, whether foreign policies of both parties could be integrated into the spiral model and whether ROK and DPRK have become malign of their intentions to the point of risking a military conflict. Based on the calculations above, I assume that the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula is in a state of a 343

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reverse transition from objectively reconcilable/subjectively irreconcilable to objectively irreconcilable/ subjectively reconcilable conflict of interest between North and South Korea. After Pyongyang’s test of ICBM, the dilemma is far from dormant. However, the spiral model of confrontation could be triggered only if one party adopts the perception that protecting its security requires an attack on the other. A conflict, therefore, is a choice, not a necessity, and as long as the security dilemma applies, even if not in its dormant state, military conflict is unlikely. Figure 1. Balance of national interests and implications for the security dilemma

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Implications for the Korean Peninsula: Four Scenarios In this section, I summarize my arguments, introducing four scenarios for the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula. To infer the chapter’s conclusions, I operationalize the configurations of the models as mentioned earlier, applying them to construct the matrix (Figure 2). Figure 2. Option matrix for the Korean conflict

Option One: It’s Better to Get Beaten by the Whip First The first scenario could be defined as a situation of genuine incompatibility with the offense taking advantage of the defense and with the ROK/DPRK conflict of interests switching to subjectively and objectively irreconcilable. Because both parties will not distinguish between each other’s postures, the Korean Peninsula will be highly unstable with intensive shifts in nuclear deterrence. Decision-makers’ intentions will switch to malign, resulting in a mutual deadlock, where the motivation to attack the adversary will be preferable to deterrence. The fundamental problem arises from a possible escalation on a regional or global level that could trigger the spiral model of confrontation and ameliorate the security dilemma.

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A war between Pyongyang and Seoul will be highly likely because both powers will treat conventional warfare as a tool for preserving or changing the status quo and will be equally inclined to strike first. Under this scenario, the U.S.-ROK alliance would integrate major American allies to retaliate and, at the same time, defend against Pyongyang. However, states such as Japan and South Korea would acquire the ability to also deter China, to the extent of not achieving the ability to coerce or defend against Beijing without relying on the United States. Due to the offense’s advantage, the actions of the United States will be considered an expansionist threat by China and North Korea, triggering the spiral mode that would force Beijing to turn even more malign to the U.S.-ROK alliance, resulting in a complete destabilization of the Peninsula. Once the security dilemma no longer applies to the region, the balance of power will stand as follows: deterrence strategies will be difficult to endorse, while defensive capabilities of the U.S. nuclear umbrella will be easy to achieve but catastrophic to demonstrate due to the risk of military escalation. The only way back to the security dilemma would be for Pyongyang and Seoul to comply with each other’s demands. Such a scenario would be the worst for South Korea because Washington and Pyongyang could not secure the balance of power without directly threatening each other. The foreign policies that Washington chooses to pursue will be central to the U.S.-ROK alliance, as American behavior would vary considerably from case to case. Support from Japan will be strategically important and will be considered of essential use by Washington and Seoul in their alliance to prevent the North from military expansion on the Peninsula.

Option Two: It’s Dark Under the Lamp The second scenario would be a system of illusory compatibility with the offense, taking advantage of the defense but where the interests of Pyongyang and Seoul are subjectively reconcilable. Paradoxically, the Sunshine Policy could trigger a strong sentiment of dialogue between both parties on the security problems they face, leading to a situation where the two actors fix the borders of their competition. Because the offensive postures are distinguishable from the offensive, policymakers on both sides could adopt the false perception that the conflict could be avoided despite the malign intentions of the opposite party. Thus, the ill-understood cooperation would presuppose a conflict because both parties, although unwilling to confront each other, could clash due to external threats, disintegrating the security dilemma on the Peninsula. Even not at risk of war, South and North Korea could be affected by external challenges, such as Pyongyang’s rapprochement with Russia. In contrast to the first scenario, as long as Seoul does not possess nuclear weapons and because Washington still holds the military preponderance in Northeast Asia, the status quo state – America – would be in an initial position to choose whether or how to deter the North. Cooperation under the U.S.-ROK alliance would pursue a two-fold strategy – to deter a potential attack or to minimize the damage to states under the pact if the South is attacked first. The United States and South Korea will rely primarily on their Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs) and THAAD, directing their arsenals against the North for defensive purposes. The dilemma would depend on Washington’s perceptions of Pyongyang’s actions: whether American policymakers recognize their counterparts as potential or actual attackers. In the former case, America would probably deploy more submarines in the Sea of Japan, using them as a nuclear deterrent. However, if perceptions tilt in favor of the actual attacker’s image, U.S. decision-makers could endorse the firm belief that a conflict with North Korea is imminent and inevitable. The presumption of using force would depend on balancing between Washington’s sense of self-preservation and the extent to which Kim’s regime perceives American actions 346

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as an expansionist threat. The former could lead to a preemptive strike on the North, while the reverse logic would presuppose boosting the second-strike capabilities of the South.

Option Three: What Looks Good Tastes Good The third scenario would position the Korean Peninsula in a situation of illusory incompatibility with the defense, holding the advantage over the offense. In contrast to the second scenario, the ROK/DPRK conflict of interests would be objectively reconcilable but subjectively irreconcilable, sustaining the security dilemma. It will be a triumph of the Sunshine Policy because both parties will be much more inclined to cooperate. Because differentiation between offensive and defensive postures is present, tensions between the parties could threaten the balance of power and potentially – trigger the spiral model. However, in contrast to the second option, a war will be less likely because each episode of confrontation will show early signs of whether the situation could escalate to a dangerous level. Although it will be a doubly safe situation, North Korea will be far less inclined to turn malign and seek a confrontation with Seoul. On the other side, the North will expand its interests by non-military means or at least send reliable signs of its intentions if the regime’s military interests are threatened but equally prone to cooperate with South Korea due to the awareness of nuclear escalation. Therefore, the security dilemma, although far from dormant, will apply selectively and only to situations where both parties could compromise. In keeping the status quo, security cooperation within the U.S.-ROK alliance would serve as a powerful deterrent against North Korea, although not to the extent of endorsing an offensive strategy. Pyongyang would rely primarily on acquiring the necessary technologies to deter the United States while maintaining constructive relations with China. However, the ROK and DPRK will fix their perceptions of strategic competition without risking a military conflict. Although the North’s rapprochement with Russia would force the United States to revisit its offset strategy, and a nuclear escalation would be considered theoretically applicable, policymakers on both sides would most likely agree on limiting their postures to deterrence. Maintaining the robust capabilities of the SSBNs and THAAD will be a central concern of the United States and South Korea, but Seoul will be far more prone not to endorse offensive postures as long as the security dilemma on the Peninsula operates. Under this option, the existence of the dilemma would not necessarily lead to a spiral process. Therefore, if the balance of power on the Peninsula is sustained, South Korea should be primarily concerned with tensions and hostilities between the United States and North Korea that could be a dormant reflection of a potential conflict.

Option Four: It Takes Two Hands to Clap The final option envisions the Korean Peninsula as a region of genuine compatibility in the interests of Pyongyang and Seoul. The foreign policies of both parties will presuppose the existence of a security dilemma, but the latter will remain dormant until triggered by a sudden change in perceptions – for example, a regime change in Pyongyang that could lead to de-nuclearization – or a surprising shift in the U.S. Foreign Policy towards the North. Under this scenario, the defense will still have the advantage over the offense, but the dormant security dilemma will create a situation in which offensive postures are not distinguishable from the defensive. The stability of the status quo in Northeast Asia will be considered a shared responsibility because neither party would hold malign intentions for the other. However, even if the conflict of interest between both parties is genuine, the security dilemma presupposes the impulse to compete, and thus – their vision of the United States being a crucial part of the 347

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Peninsula’s security architecture will predetermine the foreign policies of Pyongyang and Seoul. Two eventual outcomes would affect the perceptions of South and North Korea in this scenario, and each is linked to the U.S.-ROK alliance. On the one hand, Pyongyang would consider America an insecure but predictable adversary, and since the dilemma is dormant, a conflict would be likely only if Washington adopts offensive postures that will ameliorate the dilemma. That said, the spiral model of confrontation could be triggered only if either party exaggerates its competitor’s hostility, demonstrating decisively the willingness to endorse compellence and expand.

CONCLUSION The methodological variables noted earlier make it challenging to infer firm generalizations about the future balance of power on the Korean Peninsula. Although a military conflict between South and North Korea could occur in the absence of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, it is also truth that the latter could also trigger a conflict with Pyongyang. The security dilemma is complicated to assess in the light of calculating policymakers’ intentions correctly and their ability to avoid strategic errors. Even if the generalizations of this chapter turn out to be correct, a single case of foreign policy decision can make an exception to the parties’ behavior. However, due to the considerable cost of a potential conflict, and given the rising tensions between the United States and China, sustaining the security dilemma on the Korean Peninsula is the only way out of a military crisis that could lead Pyongyang and Seoul to war. This thus provides the strongest argument in favor of the chapter’s primary conclusion – navigating the inter-Korean security dilemma, even at the cost of continuous arms races, will provide the two parties with the capabilities not merely to affect the balance of power on the Peninsula but also to regulate it and avoid total war.

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Zou, L., Shen, J. H., Zhang, J., & Lee, C. C. (2022). What is the rationale behind China’s infrastructure investment under the Belt and Road Initiative. Journal of Economic Surveys, 36(3), 605–633. doi:10.1111/joes.12427 Zreik, M. (2021). Academic Exchange Programs between China and the Arab Region: A Means of Cultural Harmony or Indirect Chinese Influence? Arab Studies Quarterly, 43(2). doi:10.13169/arabstudquar.43.2.0172 Zreik, M. (2022b). Chinese Soft Power. Journal of Global Politics and Current Diplomacy, 10(1), 19–37. Zreik, M. (2023). Analytical study on Foreign Direct Investment Divestment Inflows and Outflows in Developing Economies: Evidence of China. Chinese Economy, 56(6), 1–16. doi:10.1080/10971475.2023.2193118 国际月球科研站路线图International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) roadmap. (n.d.). CNSA. https://www.cnsa.gov. cn/n6758823/n6758843/c6812151/content.html

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401

About the Contributors

Piotr Pietrzak, Ph.D. specializes in the Middle East & the Islamic World; he looks at his research area through the prism of some of the most exciting developments in the International Relations theory, geopolitics, conflict resolution strategies, and international law. His primary interests relate to relatively recent socio-political developments in Afghanistan, Cyprus, Chechnya, the Former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, Egypt, Mali, Yemen, as well as Georgia, and Ukraine. At times Pietrzak also comments on matters related to the superpower competition during and after the Cold War. Pietrzak is a co-founder and an editor-in-chief of *In Statu Nascendi – Journal of Political Philosophy and International Relations, a non-profit charitable organization based in Sofia, Bulgaria. He holds a Ph.D. Degree in Philosophy in English from Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridiski” (2021), a Master’s Degree in International Politics & International Relations from the University of Manchester (2013), and a Master’s Degree in Politics from the University of Warmia and Mazury (2008). He was awarded an Erasmus Scholarship to the University of Cyprus in 2007. Muhammad Naveed Akhtar is a PhD Scholar in the Department of International Relations, Federal Urdu University of Arts Sciences and Technology, Karachi, Pakistan. He has submitted his PhD Dissertation “An analysis of Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Exploring its anti-West perception”. He got his MS degree in Politics and International Relations from International Islamic University, Islamabad, Pakistan. He has participated in multiple conferences and seminars. He has delivered his papers at two international conferences. His areas of interest are Central Asia, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Political Economy, Regionalization and International Law. *** Tahmina Akter is a Commonwealth Scholar and Humanitarian & Developmental professional having more than 7 years of experiences in the field of Education, Education in Emergency (EiE), Disability and Inclusive Education, Gender Inclusion, Child Protection and Research. Skilled in project management & implementation, training & capacity building, budget phasing & monitoring, concept notes & project proposal development, documentation & donor reporting etc. Possess a remarkable record of working in different donors funded programs with several international and national NGOs i.e., Save the Children, World Vision, JICA, Room to Read etc. Emilia Alaverdov, Ph.D. in Political Science, professor, Faculty of Law and International Relations since 2011. She received her bachelor’s degree in Languages and Literature, has been awarded a qualification of Philologist of English Language and Literature and Spanish Language and Literature, Ilia 

About the Contributors

Chavchavadze State University, Tbilisi, Georgia. Has a master’s degree in International Relations and Politics from the Diplomatic Academy of Georgia. She defended her doctoral thesis, “Islamic Factor in the History and Modern Russia” at Georgian Technical University and was awarded a Ph.D. degree in Political Science in 2013. Her research interests include religion, migration, and European and Russian studies. She is the author of 1 monograph and 1 textbook, an editor of 6 books, has participated in more than 50 international scientific conferences (among them majority abroad) and published more than 30 articles, and 6 book chapters. Liza Amilakhvari obtained her Master’s degree from Greek – Georgian University “Aristotle,” Faculty of Philology, and obtained the qualification of Philologist & Teacher of English Language and Literature. She obtained a Ph.D. in Social Science (Political Science) at Georgian Technical University; Business Engineering Faculty; Department of Social Sciences. Since that time, the field of her research and teaching activities are related to the fields of Political Science, International Relations, and European Studies. Currently, L. Amilakhvari is an affiliated Associate Professor at Georgian Technical University; Faculty of Engineering Economics, Media Technologies, and Social Sciences; Department of Politics and International Relations. Additionally, she is an Associate Professor at New Higher Education Institute, Faculty of Business, Law, and Social Sciences. She is the author of 1 book and several scientific articles; participated in several international scientific conferences and training courses. . Akash Bag has completed his bachelor’s degree from the prestigious Ravenshaw University, followed by his LLB from Utkal University and LLM from KIIT University, Bhubaneswar. He was affiliated with Kalinga University, where he taught for three years. He left his job in 2021 to pursue his Ph.D. He is currently associated with Amity University from where he is pursuing his Ph.D in Digital Forensics and Cyber Security. He is well-versed in subjects such as the IPC, Jurisprudence, and Constitutional Law. He works as a freelancer now, where he helps fellow scholars with research and writing. He has published papers in prestigious journals and conferences such as IEEE, Springer, IGI Global, and AIP, and is currently working on a few projects on an international collaborative basis. Aakash is currently an Assistant Professor of Law at Adamas University, Kolkata, India. Otar Baghaturia has obtained his bachelor’s degree in History of Diplomacy and International Relations at Tbilisi State University, in the Faculty of History. During the whole 90th, he studied at four different universities in different educational programs (finances, anthropology, management, history). He decided to dedicate his life to public and political science. At Tbilisi State University he obtained his master’s degree (“Global History and politics of Georgian Governments”). He obtained his Ph.D. (“The Challenges of State Governance (Public Administration) Considering the Specifics of Democracy in Georgia”) in Social Sciences (Public Administration) at Georgian Technical University, HumanitarianTechnical Faculty (nowadays Faculty of Business-Technologies). He is the author of several academic courses, several publications, and books. He has participated in at least 20 conferences. He has a wide sphere of interests, mostly related to human societies, history, and social-political aspects. Collence Takaingenhamo Chisita (PhD) is a researcher, lecturer, author and editor. He is currently based at the University of South Africa. He has worked with local and international organizations, including LIASA, ZIMLA, LIAZ, AFLIA and IFLA. Currently, he is a Secretary for the IFLA -Indigenous Matters section Chisita has presented papers at local and international conferences in Africa and 402

About the Contributors

abroad. Chisita has and continues to work with many universities inside and outside on matters relating to research, teaching and learning. He has collaborated with other researchers from the different IFLA Special interest groups on issues that affect libraries in the modern era. Chisita has written journal articles and book chapters, produced conference papers and participated in and presented on webinars relating to topical issues on libraries and related institutions and the emerging technologies Heinz Gärtner is lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Vienna and at Danube University. He was academic director of the Austrian Institute for International Affairs. He has held various Fulbright Fellowships and the Austrian Chair at Stanford University. He was Austrian Marshall Plan Foundation Fellow at the Johns Hopkins University in Washington DC. Among other things, he chairs the Strategy and Security advisory board of the Austrian Armed Forces and the Advisory Board of the International Institute for Peace (IIP) in Vienna. Heinz Gärtner published widely on international security, nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, US-Foreign Policy, geopolitics, Iran and the Middle East. Iskren Ivanov is an Associate Professor of International Security at Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski and former Visiting Professor at the Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (2023). Previously, Dr. Ivanov served as a Fulbright Visiting Lecturer at the University of Texas at Austin (2021 - 2022) and postdoctoral scholar at the University of Delaware (2019). Iskren’s work also includes several projects, focused on the U.S. - China and U.S.-Korean relations, in a successful cooperation with the St. Pierre Center of International Security and the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Granada. His latest book: “Pandemics Among Nations: U.S. Foreign Policy and the New Grand Chessboard” assesses the impact of Political Realism on the Sino-American diplomacy. Faisal Javaid is working as an Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, Federal Urdu University of Arts Sciences and Technology, Karachi, Pakistan. He completed his PhD in international relations from the Federal Urdu University of Arts Sciences and Technology, Pakistan and Post Doctorate from Harriman Institute, Columbia University, New York, USA. He edited two books and wrote nearly 30 research papers that have been published in international and national Journals. He has arranged and organized two international conferences successfully. He has participated in several national and international conferences and presented his research work. He is a member of the International Political Science Association (IPSA), Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA), Association for Political Theory (APT) and International Studies Association (ISA). He is working as a Guest Researcher at Eberswalde University for Sustainable Development, Germany in the Project titled “TRANSECT’. He is serving as Non-Resident Fellow at the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS), Islamabad. His areas of interest are Central Asia, Russia, China, Foreign Policy Analysis and International Security. Krzysztof Karwowski is a PhD candidate in political science at SGH Warsaw School of Economics, where explores socioeconomic interdependencies of innovation policies, Chinese Space Exploration Program and the development of space strategies in Southeast Asia. MA in Oriental Studies including one year of Belt and Road fellowship at South China University of Technology in Guangzhou, China.

403

About the Contributors

Amahle Khumalo is a PhD candidate and a Lecturer at the Durban University of Technology, Department of Information Systems. He graduated with a Master of Management Science in Library and Information Science at the Durban University of Technology. Amahle teaches several modules in library science and Information Systems with a strong focus on User Studies and Business Information Systems. His research interest includes Digital literacy, Digital equity and social inclusion, transformation to smart library systems, the use of artificial intelligence technologies for innovative teaching and learning, and the preservation of indigenous knowledge. Artur Koldomasov has a Master’s degree graduate of Journalism and Public Communications at the the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin with a working experience in public, private, diplomatic, and media institutions. He also studied international relations in Ukraine, Poland, and the United States. He is an author of numerous publications, recommendations, and commentaries for Ukrainian and foreign media, related to the U.S., Ukrainian, Russian politics, disinformation, propaganda, international organisations, and informational policy. Evangelos Koumparoudis, Ph.D., is the author of Medicine in the Post-consumerist Society: A Philosophical Overview (2023). He studied veterinary medicine in Uth; later on, he obtained an MA and Ph.D. in philosophy from Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridiski. Since 2022 he is a post-doctoral researcher in the philosophy of medicine and biology at the faculty of philosophy, Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridiski. Previously, he held a visiting scholarship at the Sorbonne Université, Faculté des Lettres. He is co-founder and co-editor of Last Edition of In Statu Nascendi – Journal of Political Philosophy and International Relations. Peterson K. Ozili is a Senior Economist, Central Bank of Nigeria, Nigeria. An economist and researcher in topics of global interest in economics, finance, accounting, and development. He is particularly interested in financial inclusion, economic policy, financial stability, economic growth, the economics of financial regulation, environmental economics, financial reporting practices, forensic accounting and bank behavior. S.M. Rashedujjaman is an accomplished professional specializing in Education in Emergencies (EiE), Early Childhood Development (ECD), and Mental Health and Psychosocial Support (MHPSS) within humanitarian crises. With over five years of humanitarian experiences with several international organizations such as- Save the Children and International Rescue Committee in Bangladesh, he excels in program design, research, implementation, and capacity building. His contributions span curriculum development, material creation, and cross-sectoral integration, making him a valuable advocate for beneficiaries and affected community, especially in crisis contexts. Rashed’s dedication extends to his prestigious Knowledge Fellowship from the global Early Childhood Action Network (ECDAN) and his significant contributions to research papers through literature reviews, data analysis, and narrative writing. Souvik Roy is currently spearheading the Law School at Adamas University as the Associate Dean. He has a track record of successfully helping students achieve greater heights for more than a decade now and counting. Dr Roy completed his Ph.D. in the area of substantive criminal law from KIIT – D.U. not before completing his B.A. LL.B. from University of Calcutta. Subsequently, he pursued LL.M from Queen Mary, University of London (U.K) with Merit including Distinction in two disciplines. He 404

About the Contributors

was the recipient of the University of Calcutta Endowment Scholarship (final year) where he secured a First Class. Prior to his current stint here, Professor Souvik helmed the Law School of Dayananda Sagar University (DSU), Bengaluru and was also looking into admissions outreach programs beyond regular academics and administration. Dr Roy, is an educationist in the legal domain with earlier experiences of working as an Associate Professor with Department of Law-UEM Kolkata not before his prior stints with KIIT D.U., Bhubaneswar and National Law University Odisha (NLUO). Professor Roy also possesses industry experience in the corporate and litigation sector as a lawyer and subsequently as a foreign education counsellor and CLAT mentor, working in places like Mumbai, Bhubaneswar and Kolkata. He is a public speaker who addresses not only matters pertaining to substantive criminal law but also multifarious societal issues at universities, NGOs and online platforms. Prof. Souvik also guides LL.M aspirants for pursuing education abroad. He has participated in more than 30 national/international seminars and conferences with multiple publications in the form of articles and books to his name which are indexed in UGC CARE, Scopus and peer-reviewed journals. Alexander Madanha Rusero is a university lecturer of Politics, International Relations, and Media Studies with over 12 years of experience. He has taught in several institutions in Zimbabwe, including Harare Polytechnic, Africa University and Great Zimbabwe University. Rusero is the author of 8 academic textbooks and several peer-reviewed book chapters and journal articles related to media, democracy and human rights, international relations and foreign policy, regional integration, and emerging discourses of Africa – Asia relations as well as Pan-Africanism and decoloniality. He is also an independent research consultant, having rendered such services to the Government, NGOs, INGOs and private companies. Upon compilation of this text, Rusero had completed a PhD in International Relations with the Africa University (AU) in Zimbabwe. Asif Iqubal Shah is presently working as an Assistant Professor in Law at the Xavier Law School, St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata. Prior to that he was associated with Aligarh Muslim University, Centre Murshidabad as an Assistant Professor in the Department of law. A Graduate and Post-Graduate in Law from the Department of Law, University of Calcutta, Dr. Asif has been awarded Ph.D in Law from KIIT (Deemed to be) University. He has prime interest in Criminology, Penology and Criminal Justice Administration and has published articles in renowned national and international journals including Scopus (UGC-Care Group-II) and other peer-reviewed journals. Tamanna M. Shah is an Assistant Professor of Instruction in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Ohio University. She completed her Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of Utah. She holds a Master’s in Sociology from Kansas State University and a Bachelor’s in Economics. She has an interest in comparative political sociology, gender, and race, social change, and inequality. She has authored journal articles and other publications, notably, “Adjustment to Divorce (Spouses)” for the Wiley Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Family Studies, “Chaos and Fear: Creativity and Hope in an Uncertain World” in International Sociology, and book chapters on innovation, sustainability issues, and job readiness among young people. She has also worked with the Asian Development Bank on water and sanitation policy papers.

405

About the Contributors

M. Mahruf C. Shohel is currently working at the University of Roehampton. He is an academic researcher with special interests in education, childhood studies, international development, technologyenhanced learning and social science research methods. He has written extensively on development issues in the Global South and conducted research on disadvantaged children including socioeconomically deprived children, street children, sex worker’s children and displaced refugee children. Currently, Dr Shohel is engaged in the fields of education in emergencies, education for sustainable development and global citizenship, emerging technologies in education, students’ learning journeys and their engagement, and teaching and learning in higher education. Zurabi Tchabashvili, in 2016, graduated with his Bachelor’s degree in Legal Studies from the Georgian-American University Faculty of Law, School of Law, Social Sciences and Diplomacy. In 2018, obtained a Master’s Degree at the Riga Higher School of Law, the Faculty of International and European Law. 2021 became a doctoral student of the Georgian-American University, the Faculty of Law, School of Law, Social Sciences and Diplomacy. On July 26, 2021, occupied the position of academic assistant at Georgian American University LLC. On February 9, 2022, he completed the preparatory course for the qualification exam of judges (in the field of criminal law) at the High School of Justice of Georgia. In June 2021, he completed a one-year Master’s course in combating corruption conducted by the Institute for the Development of Freedom of Information (IDFI) and Ilya State University (course – fighting corruption - international actors, anti-corruption platforms). On June 25, 2022, occupied the position of academic assistant at “Alte” LLC University. Is a co-author of 2 book chapters, has participated in 6 international conferences, is a Jury member at the institute of Innovation in Politics Awards, Vienna, and European Capital of Democracy, Vienna. Vusi Tsabedze is a lecturer at the Department of Computer Science, University of Eswatini. He holds a PhD information studies from the University of Zululand; MBA (University of Namibia); BA in Library Science (University of Namibia); SMDP and MDP (University of Stellenbosch Business School). Dr Tsabedze has authored books on records management and numerous articles in learned journals. He has conducted a number of consultancies works in records management in Eswatini and Lesotho. Marta Witkowska is a habilitated doctor, university professor at the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, University of Warsaw. PhD and habilitation in the field of political science. Author of over 100 academic articles and chapters on the political system of the European Union, political participation in the European Union, decision making mechanisms in the EU; European political parties; lobbying in the EU; EU law and the process of its application in the Member States; EU policies and institutions. Since 2009 a member of Team Europe Direct, the network of the European Commission. Editor-in-chief of the scientific journal “Przegląd Europejski” (European Studies Quarterly). Research interests include political parties and civil society, EU policies, EU law. Selected publications: Witkowska M., Potorski, et al. (2023).Dylematy systemowe Unii Europejskiej u zarania trzeciej dekady XXI wieku (System Dilemmas of the European Union at the Dawn of the Third Decade of the 21st Century). Warsaw. DOI: 10.31338/uw.9788323561859

406

About the Contributors

Sureyya Yigit received his B.Sc. (Econ) in International Relations from the London School of Economics, his M. Phil in International Relations from Cambridge University, and his Ph.D. from Donetsk National University. He has lectured at several universities in Scandinavia, Turkey, and Central Asia. His research interests focus on the Ukraine crisis, Sustainable Development, Central Asian foreign policy, African development and post-communist transition. He is a consultant at Aeropodium, and the co-founder of the Regional Development Studies Institute based in New York, and senior consultant to ZDS Women’s Democracy Network in the Kyrgyz Republic. He is also a member of the Editorial Board as an Associate Editor for the International Journal of Green Business. His most recent book is “IndiaMongolia Relations: Beyond Greater Central Asia”, which was published in 2023. His forthcoming book is entitled “Africa at Crossroads: Society, Security and Geopolitics”. Mohamad Zreik, a Postdoctoral Fellow at Sun Yat-sen University, is a recognized scholar in International Relations, specializing in China’s Arab-region foreign policy. His recent work in soft power diplomacy compares China’s methods in the Middle East and East Asia. His extensive knowledge spans Middle Eastern Studies, China-Arab relations, East Asian and Asian Affairs, Eurasian geopolitics, and Political Economy, providing him a unique viewpoint in his field. Dr. Zreik is a proud recipient of a PhD from Central China Normal University (Wuhan). He’s written numerous acclaimed papers, many focusing on China’s Belt and Road Initiative and its Arab-region impact. Presently, he furthers his research on China’s soft power diplomacy tactics at Sun Yat-sen University.

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408

Index

A Afghan Conflict 46, 48 Afghan Issue 35-36, 50 agenda-setting 224-229, 239 alliance 36, 46-47, 49, 63, 65, 77, 105, 110, 116-117, 119, 128, 131, 133, 173, 184-189, 192, 195, 200201, 268, 324, 332, 336-337, 340-342, 346-348 Annexation 16, 129, 152, 160, 164, 171, 173-174, 176, 196, 198, 262-263, 266-267, 270, 272-273 Anthropomorphic fallacy 299, 308, 312 Applied Ethics/Techno ethics 300-301, 306, 312 Armed Conflict 29, 33, 43, 93, 186, 225 Artemis accords 325-326 Autonomous Lethal Weapons 299-300, 304, 313

B Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 49, 55, 63-64, 66, 69, 76, 78, 82, 84-87, 102 Bhasan Char 279-281, 285, 287-293, 297-298 Brent Crude Oil 208-209, 222

C Central Asian Region 35, 46, 50-51, 62 Cold War 16, 28, 32, 105-106, 140, 178, 182-185, 187-189, 191-192, 264, 302, 310, 318, 320, 322 Combatant Countries 196, 199, 213-215, 222 Conflict 1-3, 5, 7-8, 11-12, 14-21, 29, 31-33, 43, 46-48, 52, 58, 62-63, 66, 84-86, 89-93, 97, 103, 125-129, 135-136, 139-142, 144, 149-150, 159, 171-174, 178, 182, 184-186, 188-189, 191-193, 195-198, 200, 213, 216-217, 219, 224-230, 232-235, 239, 262-266, 268, 270, 272-273, 281, 298, 305-306, 310, 315-317, 319-320, 325-326, 331-338, 340-348 Connectivity Diplomacy 102 Coroinfodeluge 249, 260  

COVID-19 Pandemic 66, 70, 106, 110-112, 117, 195196, 217, 222, 249, 260, 326 CPI 54, 222 Crude oil WTI 205, 222

D Davutoğlu’s “Zero Problems with Neighbors” 160 Debt Diplomacy 102 Development Diplomacy 102 Development workers 279 Digital Activism 244-255, 260 Digital and Social Media 260 Digital Divide 250, 261 Digital Hacktivism 248, 261 Digital Repression 255, 261 Dilemma 17, 30, 164-165, 184, 188, 331-338, 340-348 Diplomatic Relations 38, 84, 109, 293 Donald Trump 104-107, 109-114, 117-119, 122-123, 170, 325 Dow-Jones Industrial Average 211, 222

E economic consequence 195-196, 217, 219 Economic Corridor 90, 102 Eighth 2 Eisenhower 184, 188, 302 Ethics of Asymmetry 310, 313 Ethnic Minority 280-281, 298 EU citizens 226-227, 230 Euro Area 204, 213-215, 222 Eurobond 222 European Parliament 38, 174, 224-240 European Union 30, 35, 37-39, 48, 51, 57, 63, 65-66, 74-78, 82, 106, 126, 132, 134, 146, 148-149, 171173, 185, 189, 196, 198, 201-202, 222, 224-226, 229-231, 237 Expansion 10, 15, 29, 36, 85, 87, 92-93, 97, 129, 131,

Index

136, 139, 161-164, 170-171, 175, 177, 180, 317, 341, 346

F Faithful Ally 118, 122 FAO 222 Fascism 18, 133, 165, 167-169, 177-178, 181 Foreign Policy 29, 66, 76-77, 104-109, 118-120, 130, 133-135, 137, 139, 145, 148, 151, 159-164, 170171, 175, 177, 224-233, 239-240, 317, 323, 332, 334, 336-337, 339-341, 343, 347-348 framing theory 227-229

G GDP Per Capita 222 Geopolitics 3, 65-66, 78, 82, 85, 127, 129, 139, 149, 262-263 Geostrategic 17, 48, 102, 127, 130, 133-134, 136, 138-141, 145, 147-151, 160, 305, 324 GFT 226 Global Gateway 63, 65, 71, 74-76, 78, 82 Global Peace Index (GPI) 47, 62 Global Power Shifts 84 Globalisation 66, 77, 82 goal-framing theory 226, 240 Government policy 279, 292 Great Powers 34, 36, 82, 182-183, 185, 188, 265-266, 305

H Hard Power 2, 103, 130, 136, 170-171, 181, 333 Human rights 11, 14, 19-20, 31, 38-39, 54, 57, 129130, 135, 140, 149, 159, 171, 182, 185, 190, 192, 202, 250-251, 253, 261, 263, 265, 279-281, 283, 285, 287, 289-290, 292, 298 Humanitarian Assistance 44, 47, 62, 143, 145, 268

I Imperialism 2, 161, 169 In statu nascendi 1-2, 7-10, 15, 17-21, 27 Independent 3, 16-18, 27, 33, 37, 51-53, 64, 96, 106109, 118-120, 122, 125-128, 133, 136, 138-141, 146, 149, 160, 171, 174, 186, 229, 248, 267, 269, 271-272, 287, 315, 319, 323 Inflation 66, 142, 195-196, 203-204, 206-207, 213217, 219, 222 Infrastructure 29, 56-57, 64-67, 71, 74-76, 84-85, 87-

90, 92-97, 102-103, 111-112, 114-115, 225, 287, 291-293, 298, 314-315, 318-320, 322 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) 48, 62 International Community 3, 19-20, 28-29, 32, 36-39, 43, 48, 53, 65, 127, 143, 171, 184, 197, 262-264, 266, 268, 282, 290 International Organization 43 internet connectivity 250 invasion 20, 28, 34-35, 49, 51, 57, 66, 112, 124, 127, 144-145, 148, 174-175, 181, 195-196, 199-217, 219, 225-226, 300, 302, 305-306, 310, 342 IR theory 1-3, 5-10, 12, 18-21, 127

J Joe Biden 104-107, 109-112, 114-119, 122-123

M mediatization 224-229, 233 Metaontology 2, 27 Militaristic Rhetoric 161, 167 Military AI 299-300, 302-303, 305-307, 309-310 Military Invasion 181, 201, 225, 305 MoM 214-217, 222 Multilateralism 69, 82, 94, 96, 103, 193 Multipolar World 84-85, 95-96

N National Role Perception 106-108, 110, 112, 114, 117-120, 122 NATO 16-17, 32-33, 35-36, 38-39, 46, 51, 56-58, 77, 104-110, 112, 116-120, 122-127, 129-130, 132, 134-141, 143, 145-146, 148-152, 160, 173, 183-185, 187-189, 192, 195-196, 198, 200-201, 263, 340 Neo-Colonialism 103 neutral 52-53, 151, 160, 182-190, 192, 196 neutrality 17, 129, 182-193 Nominal GDP 222 non-aligned 185, 188 Non-Philosophical Ontology 27 Nord Stream 2 Gas Pipeline Project 201, 222 Normative 11, 82, 107, 109, 229, 300, 306, 325 Nuclear 68, 77, 112, 118, 132, 140, 184-185, 305-306, 318, 320, 323, 331-333, 335-343, 345-348

O Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO) 27 409

Index

oil price 205, 209-210 Ontology in statu nascendi 1-2, 7-10, 17-21

P parliamentarisation 231, 239 Partition 131, 137, 262-263, 266, 269-273 Peace 2-3, 10, 17-18, 31, 33, 38, 45, 47, 50-58, 62, 69, 78, 84-85, 88-89, 91-92, 97, 116, 127-129, 133, 136, 150, 159-160, 171, 183-184, 186, 189, 201, 225, 252, 262-266, 268, 270, 335, 341 Peacebuilding 32, 262-263, 265-269, 271-273 Peacekeeping 184-185, 188, 264, 269, 272 People in Need (PiN) 48, 62 Philosophical Ontology 8, 27 PMI 208-211, 213, 222 Polarity 66, 82, 186 Population Displacement 298 Post-Conflict Reconstruction 38, 103 Propaganda 67, 133, 147, 164, 168-170, 172-173, 175, 178, 181, 283, 323, 338

R Real GDP 222 Refoulement 298 Refugee camps 205, 280-281, 284-285, 289-291, 293 Refugee crisis 279-280, 283, 290, 292-293 Refugees 35, 46, 48, 53, 62, 125, 205, 279-281, 283285, 287, 289-294, 297-298 Regional Conflict Mitigation 84 Regional Defender 118, 123 Regional Hegemony 103 Regional Leader 118, 123, 160 Relocation 279-280, 285, 287, 289-294, 297-298 Repatriation 282-285, 293, 298 Revisionist Power 69, 82 Robot 303, 309-310, 313 Rohingya Crisis 281, 283, 290, 298 Russian Federation 35, 43, 175, 202, 314, 323 Russian Propaganda 164, 169-170, 178

S Sanction 198, 222 Secession 262-263, 266 Security policy 104-106, 108, 119-120, 184, 189-190, 227, 230-231 Self-Determination 34, 262-263, 265-268, 270-273 Seventh 2 Shanghai Composite Index 211, 222 410

Shanghai Cooperation Organization 36, 44-46, 49-50, 55, 57-58, 62, 64 Silk Road 67, 82, 87-89, 95 Sixth 1-2, 16-17, 21 SnP500 Index 211, 222 social media 65, 174, 224-228, 233, 235, 239, 245-255, 260-261, 304-305 social movement theory 250 Social Movements 31, 250, 253, 261 Social Networking Sites (SNSs) 244, 246, 260-261 Socio-Political Protests 248, 261 Sociotechnical Imaginary 313 Soft Power 84-85, 93-94, 103, 170-175, 181, 199, 231 Soviet Fascism 165, 167 space competition 314, 316-317 space exploration 314-315, 317-320, 326 space law 316-318 Squid Game 331 Stakeholder Engagement 103 Superpowers 33, 47, 49, 57, 188, 299-302, 304-305, 309-310, 314, 318-320, 322 Susceptibility 289, 291, 293, 298 Sustainable Development 54, 68, 88, 103, 280 SWIFT 125, 128, 201-202, 206, 222, 255

T Taliban 34-39, 44, 46-49, 51, 53-55, 57-58, 62 Territorial Integrity 17, 52, 77, 123, 129, 136-137, 149, 160, 172, 183, 187, 225, 262-263, 265-266, 272 Terrorism 13-14, 32-34, 38, 43-45, 47, 49-53, 55-57, 62, 77, 113, 118, 231, 247, 307 The Bartoszewski Doctrine 159 The Brzezinski Doctrine 17, 139-141, 149-150, 159 The EuropeNext 100 Index 211, 222 The Giedroyc-Mieroszewski Doctrine 138-139, 141, 149, 160 The Jaishankar Doctrine 160 The Mearsheimer Doctrine 160 The Return of the State 177, 181 The Revised Kissinger Doctrine 160 The Skubiszewski Doctrine of Zero Problems with Neighbors 160 Threat 10, 13, 28, 30-32, 34-38, 43, 45, 51-52, 57, 75, 95, 111, 115, 131, 139, 164, 167, 177, 182, 184-186, 200, 244, 248, 265, 267, 269, 320, 332, 339, 341, 346-347 Three Evils 50, 62 Timor Leste 262-264, 272-273 Trade Imbalance 103 Two-Stage Least Squares Method 222

Index

U Unmanned Autonomous Vehicles 313

170, 175, 178, 182-187, 191-192, 195-197, 219, 229, 341 World Food Price Index 195-196, 208-210, 217, 223

W

Y

War in Ukraine 19, 124-125, 127-129, 137, 142, 151, 160-161, 172-173, 175-176 Wars 3, 31, 44, 63, 65, 70, 78, 89, 135, 142, 161-162,

YoY 223

411