D P R K strategic capabilities and security on the Ko rean Peninsula

Citation preview

A JOINT STUDY BY THE CENTER FOR ENERGY AND SECURITY STUDIES (CENESS) AND THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES (IISS)

DPRK Strategic Capabilities and Security on the Korean Peninsula: Looking Ahead Dangerous tensions on the Korean Peninsula associated with North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons have been among the world’s most complex and contentious security issues since the end of the Cold War. Notwithstanding instances of effective diplomacy, overall, bilateral and multilateral efforts as well as sanctions and pressure campaigns have thus far failed both to prevent the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) from acquiring the fissile material for nuclear weapons and an extensive array of ballistic missiles capable of delivering them to an increasingly long range, and to solve the region’s security problems. DPRK Strategic Capabilities and Security on the Korean Peninsula: Looking Ahead is a joint

DPRK Strategic Capabilities and Security on the Korean Peninsula: Looking Ahead

endeavour by the Moscow-based Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). This report charts the motivations, pillars and progress of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes over the years, and examines possible international steps towards developing and implementing proposals for denuclearisation and creating lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. At a time of antagonistic superpower relations, the ability of the two think tanks, tapping experts in Russia and the United States, to reach shared conclusions about both the nature of

A joint study by the Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)

the problem and potential solutions stands as an example of the power of fact-based analysis.

The Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS) is an independent, nongovernmental think tank established in 2009 and headquartered in Moscow. The main goal of CENESS is to promote unbiased, systematic, and professional analyses related to nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear energy with a special emphasis on international cooperation of Russia in these areas. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), founded in 1958, is an independent centre for research, information and debate on the problems of conflict, however caused, that have, or potentially have, an important military content.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies – UK Arundel House | 6 Temple Place | London |

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The International Institute for Strategic Studies – Americas 2121 K Street, NW | Suite 600 | Washington, DC 20037 | USA t. +1 202 659 1490 f. +1 202 659 1499 e. [email protected]

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The International Institute for Strategic Studies – Middle East 14th floor, GBCORP Tower | Bahrain Financial Harbour | Manama | Kingdom of Bahrain t. +973 1718 1155 f. +973 1710 0155 e. [email protected]

The International Institute for Strategic Studies

Contents

Acronyms 3 Executive summary

5

Introduction 11 Part One: DPRK Nuclear-Programme Development and Current Capabilities 15 History of nuclear-programme development 15 Current nuclear infrastructure 23 Fissile material and tritium stockpiles 30 Weaponisation and miniaturisation 34 Warheads stockpile 34 Nuclear mission accomplished? 35 Notes 37 Part Two: Ballistic-Missile Development and Current Capabilities 43 History of ballistic-missile development 43 Current missile capabilities 46 North Korea’s ballistic missiles: Key data 62 Notes 63 Part Three: Potential Steps for Tension Reduction, Confidence-Building and Denuclearisation 69 Past diplomatic efforts 69 The 2018–2019 summitry 70 Potential steps 73 Notes 75 Annex One: Russian Working Group

77

Annex Two: US Working Group

79

2 The International Institute for Strategic Studies and Center for Energy and Security Studies

Acronyms

6PT

Six-Party Talks

LWR

light-water reactor

ATacMS Army Tactical Missile System

LEU

low enriched uranium

CENESS Center for Energy and Security Studies

MaRV manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle

CEP

circular error probable

CNC

computer numerical controlled

MRBM medium-range ballistic missile (1,000–5,500 km)

CTBTO Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)



MWe/t megawatt electric/thermal New Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction START and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms NPP

nuclear power plant

ER

extended range

NPT

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

GPS

global positioning satellite

ROK

Republic of Korea (South Korea)

HE

high explosive

SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile

HEU

highly enriched uranium

SLV

IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency

SRBM short-range ballistic missile (5,500 km) IISS

International Institute for Strategic Studies

IMS

International Monitoring System (CTBTO)

INF

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

JCPOA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (aka Iran nuclear deal) JNFL

Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited

KEDO Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization kt

kilotonne

satellite-launch vehicle

SVR

Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation

SWU

separative work units

TBP

tributyl phosphate

TEL

transporter-erector launcher

UF6

uranium hexafluoride

UF4

uranium tetrafluoride



UNSC UN Security Council VVER water-water power reactor (Russian), i.e., water-cooled water-moderated power reactor

Acronyms 3

4 The International Institute for Strategic Studies and Center for Energy and Security Studies

Executive summary

Believing that Russian–US cooperation could play an

the 1950s acquired a distinct military component two

important role in developing and implementing propos-

decades later. In the second phase, in the late 1970s, the

als for denuclearisation and creating lasting peace on the

DPRK launched a major effort to build industrial-scale

Korean Peninsula, the Moscow-based Center for Energy

facilities to support its nuclear-energy programme and

and Security Studies (CENESS) and the International

create the technological capability to produce weapons-

Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) undertook a joint

grade plutonium. In the third phase beginning in the

assessment of North Korea’s progress in developing

early 1990s, the DPRK engaged in diplomatic manoeu-

nuclear and missile capabilities and an examination of

vring. Under the 1994 Agreed Framework with the US,

possible international steps towards a solution.

the DPRK accepted restrictions on its plutonium programme while switching its focus to uranium enrich-

Nuclear programme

ment, utilising gas-centrifuge technology. In the fourth

Four factors have motivated Pyongyang’s interest in

phase, with the Agreed Framework having come

nuclear weapons. The first is rooted in the division of the

undone in late 2002, the state declared a weaponisa-

Korean Peninsula in 1945 and the ensuing North–South

tion intent. Diplomacy under the Six-Party Talks broke

antagonism, highlighted by the devastating Korean

down and from 2006 to 2017, the DPRK conducted six

War, as well as US statements during that war about the

nuclear tests, the last of which had a thermonuclear

potential use of nuclear weapons and the perception

yield. Positive dynamics in 2018–2019, in the shape of a

of a US nuclear threat reinforced by tactical nuclear-

series of US–DPRK and ROK–DPRK summits, had fiz-

weapons deployment in South Korea. Secondly, being

zled out by the end of 2019.

in confrontation with the United States and its allies,

Development of the DPRK’s nuclear infrastructure

the DPRK wanted an ‘insurance policy’ in the event of

was predicated on three key components: highly skilled

a major deterioration in relations with Moscow and/or

and motivated scientists and engineers; extensive use of

Beijing. Thirdly, in the 1970s, Pyongyang became aware

open-source information; and concerted efforts to pro-

of Seoul’s pursuit of a nuclear weapon. Fourthly, some

cure technology, equipment and materials using diver-

experts reckon that North Korea may also see nuclear

sified channels. The key North Korean nuclear facilities

weapons as contributing to its stated goal of unifying

used for the production of weapons-grade materials

the peninsula, assuming that they would deter the US

– plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) –

from coming to South Korea’s assistance in the event of

were built indigenously, using technologies of mostly

resumed hostilities. Today, however, there is one main

West European origin. Today, North Korea’s nuclear-

priority for Pyongyang: strengthening its deterrence

weapons programme is largely self-sufficient. Harsh

capability against the US.

sanctions have probably delayed programme progress

The DPRK’s nuclear efforts over the years can be

and increased programme costs, but have neverthe-

grouped into four phases. What began as a civilian pro-

less failed to prevent the DPRK acquiring a nuclear-

gramme to develop research capability and expertise in

weapons capability.

Executive summary 5

Over the past six decades, the DPRK has built a

stockpiles could range from 180 to 810 kg. It must be

nuclear programme that includes uranium mining and

stressed that these estimates are based on assumptions

enrichment; metallic-uranium and uranium-hexafluoride

for which there is little hard evidence, including opera-

production, reprocessing and plutonium separation;

tional efficiency and the number and size of undisclosed

and special materials, such as extra-pure graphite,

facilities. The estimates do not represent a consensus

lithium-6 and lithium deuteride. The Yongbyon

among the experts who participated in the discussions

Nuclear Scientific Research Centre has played a central

of this study.

role in the programme. It hosts the reactor that makes

There are no confirmed reports on tritium produc-

weapons-grade plutonium and probably tritium.

tion and separation in North Korea. Based on the expe-

It also includes the nuclear fuel-fabrication facility.

rience of the early stages of the major nuclear countries’

This is where the North Koreans have constructed

programmes, we estimate that North Korea has an

a reprocessing facility that extracts plutonium from

estimated tritium stockpile of about 7–8 grams as of

irradiated nuclear fuel, and the location of a uranium-

September 2020. Given its half-life of 12.3 years, stop-

enrichment facility. In recent years, however, the DPRK

ping tritium production in the DPRK would effectively

is likely to have built several important new facilities,

freeze its ability to produce thermonuclear weapons.

including a uranium-enrichment site (or sites), outside

The first three North Korean tests were probably aimed

Yongbyon. DPRK specialists have proved themselves to

at optimising the mass of the plutonium and the energy

be very competent, professional and highly motivated.

yield of the device. Assuming that the average amount

Estimates of Pyongyang’s current stocks of fis-

of plutonium used is about 4 kg, a stockpile of 18–30 kg

sile material vary widely, especially concerning HEU.

of plutonium is enough to build between four and seven

Plutonium production is easier to calculate based on

nuclear warheads. Estimating the number of HEU war-

the heat-energy output of the reactor during observed

heads is more difficult. We conservatively assume 20 kg

periods of operation and of reprocessing campaigns.

of HEU per device. If North Korea has 180–810 kg of

Factoring in estimated production losses of 10% during

HEU, it would be sufficient for about 9–40 warheads. In

plutonium purification and metal fabrication, the total

view of the numerous unknown variables, we can only

amount of the plutonium metal produced is estimated

make a very rough estimate that as of September 2020,

to be between 38 and 50 kilograms. If the six nuclear

the DPRK could be in possession of enough nuclear

tests consumed a total of 20 kg of plutonium, then the

material to make 13–47 nuclear warheads.

DPRK plutonium stockpile as of September 2020 is between 18 and 30 kg.

Since Pyongyang possesses an estimated capacity to make up to 6 kg of plutonium and up to 100 kg of HEU

There is no reliable information as to when industrial-

every year before production losses, we can speculate

scale uranium enrichment began, how many enrich-

that the DPRK may be able to produce enough nuclear

ment facilities the DPRK has or what level of enrichment

material annually for five nuclear warheads. Most of

has been achieved. Thus, it is not possible to estimate

this capacity resides at the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific

North Korean HEU stockpiles with any degree of accu-

Research Centre. We therefore assess that dismantling all

racy or confidence. It is probable that North Korea has

Yongbyon facilities, as discussed at the Hanoi summit in

at least one undisclosed enrichment facility; without

February 2019, would significantly reduce Pyongyang’s

at least a pilot plant, it could not have assembled (and

capability to make weapons-usable fissile materials.

in a space of just 18 months) the 2,000-machine facil-

If only one other enrichment plant is operational, then

ity at Yongbyon that was shown to a delegation from

eliminating the Yongbyon facilities would reduce North

Stanford University in 2010.

Korea’s weapons-production capacity by up to 80%.

Total DPRK production of HEU by September 2020 can be estimated at between 230 and 860 kg. Since up to

Missile programme

50 kg of that HEU may have been used up in the nuclear

Despite the overwhelming pressure of international

tests conducted in 2013–2017, the remaining HEU

sanctions, North Korea has also made impressive

6 The International Institute for Strategic Studies and Center for Energy and Security Studies

progress in the missile field and is improving its ballis-

acquired from Ukraine. The system probably served

tic-missile technology at a fairly rapid pace. In 2016, it

as a technology demonstrator for the first stage of the

conducted launches of 26 ballistic missiles or other sys-

Hwasong-14 ICBM that was flight-tested on 4 and 29

tems using ballistic-missile technology, with a success

July 2017. By some calculations, if the steeply curved

rate over 45%. In 2017, the DPRK conducted 20 launches

trajectory of those tests had been altered to maximise

of eight or nine types of ballistic missiles, at a success

range, the missile could have reached targets lying 6,000

rate of over 75%.

to 8,000 km away. It means that the Hwasong-14 could

North Korea’s quest to acquire an indigenous ballistic-

be capable of striking Alaska and Hawaii, and probably

missile-production capability began in the mid-1970s,

Seattle. These ranges assume that the warhead would

in response to the ROK’s attempt to create a short-range

weigh no more than 300 kg, with re-entry-vehicle over-

missile. Since then, Pyongyang has developed an exten-

all mass being about 500 kg. Such miniaturisation does

sive array of missile systems with an increasingly long

not look very probable today. Carrying a bomb 100 kg

range. Like the nuclear programme, the original moti-

heavier, the Hwasong-14’s maximum reach is just under

vation was to be able both to deter and to coerce. The

6,000 km.

main objectives today most likely include a credible

Given the limited performance of the Hwasong-14, it

capacity to engage targets on the US mainland; greater

was not surprising to see the DPRK introduce a larger,

survivability, precision and lethality of short- and

longer-range missile, the Hwasong-15, launching it on 29

medium-range mobile ballistic missiles; development

November 2017 on a highly lofted trajectory. If a stand-

of a sea-based component; and increasing the ability to

ard trajectory were used, the Hwasong-15 would be able

penetrate US missile defences.

to travel, according to some estimates, about 12,000 km.

The DPRK missile programme was based on the

Some experts concluded that it can deliver a 1,000 kg pay-

same three pillars as the nuclear programme: highly

load to any point on the US mainland. However, DPRK

skilled and motivated scientists and engineers; exten-

claims that it has a usable arsenal of intercontinental bal-

sive use of open-source information; and concerted

listic missiles appear to be premature. The Hwasong-14

efforts to procure technology, equipment and materi-

and Hwasong-15 launches conducted to date were tests

als using diversified channels. Probably the most sig-

involving prototype missiles travelling on inefficient

nificant difference from the nuclear programme was

flight paths that do not reflect the operational condi-

the DPRK’s intergovernmental cooperation with other

tions expected when employed as a weapon system. As

countries interested in developing missile technology,

of September 2020, neither missile has been tested to its

primarily Iran, Pakistan and Libya.

maximum range on a standard trajectory. Based on the

The core of the North Korean missile arsenal con-

North Korean missile industry’s previous record, it will

sists of ground-based mobile short-range (3,000

••

Mobile, six-axle wheeled chassis

Hwasong-11 (Toksa, KN-02)

Single-stage solid fuel

2007

2

HE fragmentation or cluster

480

140

~150

Mobile, three-axle wheeled chassis

Hwasong-12 (KN-17)

Single-stage liquid fuel

2017

••

HE fragmentation, cluster or nuclear

650

>3,700

••

Mobile, six-axle wheeled chassis

Hwasong-13 (KN-08)

Three-stage liquid fuel

No flight tests

••

Nuclear

••

>5,000

••

Mobile, eight-axle wheeled chassis

Hwasong-14 (KN-20)

Two-stage liquid fuel

2 flight tests

••

Nuclear

••

6,000– 8,000

••

Mobile, eight-axle wheeled chassis

Hwasong-15 (KN-22)

Two-stage liquid fuel

1 flight test

••

Nuclear

••

~12,000

••

Mobile, nine-axle wheeled chassis

Pukguksong-2 (KN-15)

Two-stage solid fuel

2 flight tests

••

Nuclear

••

1,200– 1,300

••

Mobile, tracked chassis

KN-23

Single-stage solid fuel

2020

3.8

HE fragmentation or cluster

400

Up to 690

••

Mobile, three-axle wheeled chassis

KN-24

Single-stage solid fuel

2020

2.9

HE fragmentation or cluster

400

~400

••

Mobile, tracked chassis

Pukguksong-1 (KN-11)

Two-stage solid fuel

One successful • • submerged launch

Nuclear

••

1,200– 1,250

••

Submarine launch silo

Pukguksong-3 (KN-26)

Two-stage solid fuel

One flight test • •

Nuclear

••

1,900– 2,000

••

Submarine launch silo

Missile

Type

Land-based

Sea-based

Note: • • = no data or n/a

62 The International Institute for Strategic Studies and Center for Energy and Security Studies

Notes 1 Joseph S. Bermudez, ‘A History of Ballistic Missile Development

in the DPRK’, CNS Occasional Paper, no. 2, November 1999, p. 4, https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/ op2.pdf.

Lieutenant General (retd) Gennady Yevstafiev, Yaderny Klub, 3 June 2014. 7 Total North Korean exports of goods stood at only US$800m

in 1995. See ‘What is the trade balance for North Korea? (1990–

2 The missile system was acquired from the US during the 1960s.

2000)’, Observatory of the Economic Complexity, https://atlas.

See Peter Hayes and Chung-in Moon, ‘Park Chung Hee, the

media.mit.edu/ru/visualize/line/sitc/show/prk/all/all/1990.2000/.

CIA, and the Bomb’, NAPSNet Special Reports, 23 September

8 The US intelligence community named the two systems

2011,

https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/

park-chung-hee-the-cia-and-the-bomb/. 3 ‘South

Korea:

Nuclear

Development

Taepodong-1 and -2 because they were first spotted by spy satellites near the town of Taepodong.

and

Strategic

9 Scott LaFoy, ‘The Hwasong that Never Ends’, Arms Control

Decisionmaking’, National Foreign Assessment Center, CIA,

Wonk, 28 August 2017, https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/

June 1978, p. 4, http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/

archive/1203797/the-hwasong-that-never-ends/;

CIA_ROK_Nuclear_DecisionMaking.pdf. After coming under

Khrustalev, ‘Real Name!’, Northeast Asian Military Studies, 16

US pressure, Seoul agreed to an arrangement that allowed South

July 2017, http://www.neams.ru/real-name/.

Vladimir

Korea to modify the Nike Hercules missiles to create the short-

10 Ralph Savelsberg and James Kiessling, ‘North Korea’s

range two-stage solid-propellant missile in exchange for limiting

Musudan Missile: A Performance Assessment’, 38 North,

its range to 180 km and the payload to 500 kg. Eventually, South

20

Korean specialists managed to launch indigenous production of

musudan122016/.

December

2016,

https://www.38north.org/2016/12/

the NHK-1 (Nike Hercules Korea) and NHK-2 ballistic missiles,

11 The dimensions are not the same, but the relations between the

carried by a four-axle TEL vehicle. The two missiles became

dimensions are very nearly the same. See Uzi Rubin, ‘Assessing

ready for deployment in 1978 and 1987, respectively.

North Korea’s Missile and Space Programs: Implications

4 See, for example, Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A

Memoir (New York: Free Press, 2006), p. 294; Victor Esin,

for Possible Talks’, presentation at the CENESS Workshop, Moscow, 20 April 2018, slides 34–39.

‘Jadernoe oruzhie KNDR: ugroza ili shantazh’ [‘DPRK Nuclear

12 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, ‘North Korean

Weapons: Threat or Blackmail’], Nezavisimoye Voyennoye

Nuclear Capabilities, 2018’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,

Obozreniye, 25 February 2005; Uzi Rubin, ‘What Parades in

vol.

Pyongyang Ends Up in Tehran’, BESA Center Perspectives

north-korean-nuclear-capabilities-2018/.

74,

no.

1,

2018,

https://thebulletin.org/2018/01/

Paper, no. 598, 28 September 2017, https://besacenter.org/

13 See, for example, Anna Fifield, ‘North Korea Has Shown Us

perspectives-papers/parades-pyongyang-ends-up-tehran/;

Its New Missile, and It’s Scarier than We Thought’, Washington

Mark Fitzpatrick, ‘The Worrisome State: Assessing North

Post, 30 November 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/

Korea’s Security Challenges’, CERI Strategy Papers, no.

news/worldviews/wp/2017/11/30/north-korea-has-shown-us-

14, 2012, p. 3, https://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/en/content/

its-new-missile-and-its-scarier-than-we-thought/.

worrisome-state-assessing-north-korea-s-security-challenges.

14 To carry the heavy Hwasong-15, North Korean engineers had to

5 About 80% of those exports were shipped in 1987–1993. See

add an extra axle to the WS51200 truck, making a total of nine

Joshua Pollack, ‘Ballistic Trajectory: The Evolution of North

axles. See Vladimir Khrustalev, ‘Dlinnye ruki KNDR: chto iz sebja

Korea’s Ballistic Missile Market’, Nonproliferation Review, vol. 18,

predstavljaet novaja raketa Kim Chen Yna’ [‘The DPRK’s Long

no. 2, July 2011, p. 412, https://nonproliferation.org/wp-content/

Arm: Kim Jong Un’s New Missile’], Zvezda, 1 December 2017,

uploads/npr/npr_18-2_pollack_ballistic-trajectory.pdf.

https://tvzvezda.ru/news/vstrane_i_mire/content/201712011226-

6 Interview with a former US Department of State official, 19

4zid.htm; Michael Elleman, ‘North Korea’s Army Day Military

March 2019; ‘North Korea’s Annual Missile Export Revenues

Parade: One New Missile System Unveiled’, 38 North, 8 February

Were as High as 400m Dollars’; unpublished interview with

2018, https://www.38north.org/2018/02/melleman020818/.

former Head of the Directorate for Disarmament and WMD

15 Michael Elleman, ‘North Korea’s Newest Ballistic Missile:

Nonproliferation of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service,

A Preliminary Assessment’, 38 North, 8 May 2019, ht t ps:/ /

Part Two: Ballistic-Missile Development and Current Capabilities 63

www.38no rth. o r g/ 2 0 1 9 / 0 5 / m e l le m a n0 5 0 8 1 9 / ; Mikhail

Ministry of Defense classifies missiles into four types: short-

Zhirokhov, ‘Eksportnaya rabota. Kak Saudity pomogli

range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) with a range of less than 1,000

Ukraine sohranit’ proekt rakety “Grom”’ [‘Export Job.

km; medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) with a range of

How Saudis Helped Ukraine to Save Grom Missile Project’],

between 1,000 and 3,000 km; intermediate-range ballistic mis-

DS News, 23 December 2019, https://www.dsnews.ua/

siles (IRBMs) with a range of between 3,000 and 5,500 km;

politics/eksportnaya-rabota-kak-saudity-pomogli-ukraine-

and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) with a range of

sohranit-23122019080000.

more than 5,500 km. The same classification is used in reports

16 The Yuzhmash workforce shrank by a factor of six between 2014

and 2017. See Simon Shuster, ‘How North Korea Built a Nuclear Arsenal on the Ashes of the Soviet Union’, Time, 1 February 2018,

http://time.com/5128398/the-missile-factory/.

Ukraine

released by the UN Panel of Experts established pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009). 20 The 2K6 Luna artillery rocket system entered into service with

the Soviet forces in 1960. The 9K52 Luna-M followed in 1964.

confirmed to the UN Panel of Experts established pursuant to

21 Evgeny Buzhinskiy, ‘(Ne)Realistichnye ugrozy? K voprosu

Resolution 1874 (2009) that it was highly likely that the DPRK’s

o raketnyh programmah KNDR i Irana’ [‘(Un)Realistic

new engine contained separate components of the RD-250 engine

Threats? DPRK’s and Iran’s Missile Programmes’], Russia

and used the same propellant components. See ‘Report of the

Confidential, vol. 15, no. 3, 2016, http://pircenter.org/media/

Panel of Experts established pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)’,

content/files/13/14732635340.pdf; Andrey Kovsh, ‘Nachal’nyj

S/2018/171, 5 March 2018, p. 10, https://undocs.org/S/2018/171.

jetap razvitija raketnoj programmy KNDR (1960-e–nachalo

17 See, for example, Scott Sagan, ‘Armed and Dangerous.

1970-h gg.)’, [‘Initial Stage of the DPRK’s Missile Program

When Dictators Get the Bomb’, Foreign Affairs, November/

Development (the 1960s – early 1970s)’], Obshhestvo: filosofija,

December 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-

istorija, kul’tura [Society: philosophy, history, culture], no. 6,

korea/2018-10-15/armed-and-dangerous; William J. Broad and

2017, http://dom-hors.ru/rus/files/arhiv_zhurnala/fik/2017/6/

David E. Sanger, ‘North Korea’s Missile Success Is Linked to

history/kovsh.pdf.

Ukrainian Plant, Investigators Say’, New York Times, 14 August 2017,

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/14/world/asia/north-

korea-missiles-ukraine-factory.html; Viktor Baranets, ‘Viktor

22 Konstantin Chuprin, Poslednjaja krepost’ Stalina. Voennye sekrety

Severnoj Korei [Stalin’s Last Fortress. North Korea’s Military Secrets] (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2012).

Esin, jeks-nachal’nik Glavnogo shtaba RVSN Rossii: Skoree

23 The R-17 missile was developed by the Soviet Union’s Special

vsego, Ukraina pomogla Severnoj Koree po “chernoj sheme”’

Design Bureau No. 385 (which has since been renamed the

[‘Viktor Esin, former chief of the General Staff of the Russian

Makeyev State Missile Technology Center); the chief designer

Strategic Missile Forces: Ukraine is Likely to Have Helped

was Viktor Makeyev.

North Korea Using “Black Market Channels”’] Komsomolskaya

24 Dogovor o druzhbe, sotrudnichestve i vzaimnoj pomo-

Pravda, 17 August 2017; Dmitriy Kiku, ‘A Ukraine Link to North

shhi mezhdu SSSR i KNDR [The Soviet–DPRK Friendship,

Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Programs Development’, Russian

Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Treaty of 1961], Otnoshenija

International Affairs Council, 18 June 2020, https://russiancouncil.

Sovetskogo Sojuza s narodnoj Koreej, 1945–1980: Dokumenty i mate-

ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/a-ukraine-link-to-

rialy [Soviet Union’s Relations with a People’s Korea, 1945–1980:

north-korea-s-nuclear-and-missile-programs-development/.

Documents and Materials] (Moscow: Nauka, 1981), pp. 196–8.

18 ‘Glava “Juzhmasha” rasskazal prankeram, kak dvigateli

25 According to some reports, about 20 North Korean pilots

mogli popast’ v KNDR’ [‘Yuzhmash CEO Speaks of Engine

fought on the side of Egypt in the Yom Kippur War of 1973.

Smuggling to DPRK’], RIA Novosti, 16 August 2017, https://ria.

26 Open Report of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service,

ru/20170816/1500462281.html.

‘Novyj vyzov posle “holodnoj vojny”: rasprostranenie oruzhija

19 The report uses the missile classification adopted in such

massovogo unichtozhenija’ [‘New Challenges After the

Soviet/Russia-US treaties as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear

Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction’],

Forces Treaty (INF Treaty, 1987) and the Treaty on Measures

1993,

for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic

‘Phen’janskaja bomba’ [‘The Pyongyang Bomb’], Nezavisimoye

Offensive Arms (New START, 2010). There are, however,

Voyennoye

other missile classifications as well. For example, the Japanese

armament/2013-07-26/1_korea.html.

64 The International Institute for Strategic Studies and Center for Energy and Security Studies

http://svr.gov.ru/material/2-13-10.htm;

Obozreniye,

26

July

2013,

Victor

Esin,

http://nvo.ng.ru/

27 North Korea’s success in ‘reverse-engineering’ the Scud-B

Bezopasnosti OON’ [‘Assessment of the Development

(R-17E) missiles provided to it by Egypt is the most common

of the DPRK Missile and Nuclear Programmes Through

explanation in the public domain for how Pyongyang acquired

the Lens of the UN Security Council Sanctions Regime’],

its Scud-type missiles. We have accepted this explanation as

in Alexander Zhebin (ed.), Koreja pered novymi vyzovami

plausible, if not the most likely. However, we also recognise that

[Korea Before New Challenges] (Moscow: Russian Academy

alternative hypotheses exist in the public literature. For details,

of Sciences, 2017), p. 103.

see Mark Fitzpatrick (ed.), North Korean Security Challenges: A Net

33 ‘Report of the UN Panel of Experts established pursuant to

Assessment, International Institute for Strategic Studies Strategic

Resolution 1874 (2009)’, S/2017/150, 27 February 2017, p. 27,

Dossier (London: IISS, 2011), Chapter 6; Michael Elleman (ed.),

https://www.undocs.org/S/2017/150.

Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment, International Institute for Strategic Studies Strategic Dossier (London: IISS, 2010), Chapter Three; and Robert H. Schmucker and Markus Schiller, Raketenbedrohung 2.0: Technische Und Politische Grundlagen [Missile Threat 2.0: Technical and Political Basics] (Hamburg: E.S. Mittler & Son, 2015), pp. 248–56. 28 The first-stage engine of the Unha-3 carrier is an assembly of four

Hwasong-7 (Nodong) engines; the Unha-3 second stage is essentially the Hwasong-7 engine itself, and the Unha-3 third stage is

34 The Russian Security Ministry later became the Federal Security

Service, known as the FSB. 35 Interview with a former senior Russian missile industry man-

ager, 7 May 2018 and 25 February 2019. 36 Aleksandr Likholetov, ‘Ugrozy iz proshlogo veka – real’nye i

mnimye’ [‘Threats of the Past Century, Real and Imaginary’], Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, 8 June 2012, http://nvo. ng.ru/forces/2012-06-08/1_menaces.html. 37 ‘Kak

rossijskie

ballisticheskie

rakety

stali

dostojaniem

a Hwasong-5 (Scud) engine. The Hwasong-7 engine itself is an

Juzhnoj Korei’ [‘How South Korea Gained Access to Russian

assembly of four single-chamber Hwasong-5 engines functioning

Ballistic Missiles’], Voyennoye Obozreniye, 29 July 2011, https://

as a single four-chamber unit. As a result, the first Unha-3 stage

topwar.ru/5835-kak-rossiyskie-ballisticheskie-rakety-stali-

is a 4x4 assembly (16 Hwasong-5/Scud engines in total), the sec-

dostoyaniem-yuzhnoy-korei.html.

ond stage is a single assembly of four Scud engines, and the third

38 ‘Report of the UN Panel of Experts established pursuant to

stage a single Scud engine. See Aleksandr Likholetov, ‘Mistifikacii

Resolution 1874 (2009)’, S/2014/147, 6 March 2014, pp. 22–3,

po obe storony Tihogo okeana’ [‘Mystification on Both Sides of

https://www.undocs.org/S/2014/147.

the Pacific’], Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, 25 October 2013, http://nvo.ng.ru/armament/2013-10-25/1_kndr.html. 29 Report of the UN Panel of Experts established pursuant to

Resolution 1874 (2009), S/2014/147, 6 March 2014, pp. 22–3, https://www.undocs.org/S/2014/147. 30 ‘Swiss-made Component Found in North Korean Missile’, SWI

39 Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr, ‘Ballistic Ambitions Ascendant’, Jane’s

Defence Weekly, 10 April 1993, pp. 20–2. 40 Bermudez, ‘A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the

DPRK’, p. 11. 41 Usually the theatre ballistic-missile category includes missiles

with a range of more than 100 km and below 500 km.

swissinfo.ch, 11 February 2018, https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/

42 Konstantin Chuprin, ‘Raketnye vojska «velikogo naslednika’

politics/swiss-made-component-allegedly-found-in-north-

[‘The Great Successor’s Missile Troops’], Voyenno-promyshlennyj

korean-missile/43892172.

kur’er, 16 May 2012, https://vpk.name/news/69093_raketnyie_

31 ‘Taiwanese Father and Son Arrested for Allegedly Violating U.S.

voiska_velikogo_naslednika.html.

Laws to Prevent Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction’,

43 Victor Esin, ‘Jadernoe oruzhie KNDR: ugroza ili shantazh’

FBI, 6 May 2013, https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/chicago/

[‘DPRK Nuclear Weapons: Threat or Blackmail’], Nezavisimoye

press-releases/2013/taiwanese-father-and-son-arrested-for-

Voyennoye Obozreniye, 25 February 2005; Likholetov, ‘Mistifikacii

allegedly-violating-u.s.-laws-to-prevent-proliferation-of-weap-

po obe storony Tihogo okeana’.

ons-of-mass-destruction; Jack Boureston and James A. Russell, ‘Illicit Nuclear Procurement Networks and Nuclear Proliferation: Challenges for Intelligence, Detection, and Interdiction’, St Antony’s International Review, vol. 4, no. 2, 2009, pp. 38, 40. 32 Dmitry Kiku, ‘Ocenka razvitija raketno/jadernoj programmy

KNDR cherez prizmu sankcionnogo rezhima Soveta

44 Bermudez, ‘A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the

DPRK’, p. 20. 45 Joseph Bermudez, ‘A Silent Partner’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 20

May 1998, pp. 16–17. 46 Elleman, Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment,

Chapter One.

Part Two: Ballistic-Missile Development and Current Capabilities 65

47 Michael Elleman, ‘North Korea–Iran Missile Cooperation’, 38

58 Presentation of General Victor Esin, Leading Researcher, Institute

North, 22 September 2016, https://www.38north.org/2016/09/

for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences,

melleman092216/.

at the workshop ‘Assessment of the DPRK’s Missile Capability’,

48 Victor Esin, ‘Perspektivy razvitija raketno-jadernogo poten-

CENESS, Moscow, 7 May 2018; Defense Intelligence Ballistic

ciala KNDR’ [‘Outlook for the Development of North Korea’s

Missile Analysis Committee, ‘Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat

Nuclear and Missile Capability’], in Alexei Arbatov, Vladimir

2017’, p. 5, https://fas.org/irp/threat/missile/bm-2017.pdf.

Dvorkin and Sergey Oznobishchev (eds), Korejskij jadernyj

59 ‘KNDR za dva goda budet gotova nanesti jadernyj udar v ATR,

krizis: perspektivy dejeskalacii [Korean Nuclear Crisis: Prospects of

zajavil jekspert’ [‘DPRK to Acquire Capability to Deliver Nuclear

De-escalation] (Moscow: IMEMO RAN, 2013), p. 34.

Strike Against Targets in Asia Pacific – Expert’], RIA Novosti, 10

49 Kyle Mizokami, ‘We Now Know Japan’s Masterplan to Stop

October 2017, https://ria.ru/20171010/1506549250.html.

a Chinese or North Korean Missile Strike’, National Interest, 9

60 The two-chamber RD-250 engine was developed for the R-36

June 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/we-now-

ICBM (also known as the 8K67, or the SS-9 Scarp, according to

know-japans-masterplan-stop-chinese-or-north-korean-2618.

the NATO classification). The missile went into production in

50 Tatiana Anichkina and Viktor Esin, ‘Jadernye vozmozhnosti

1966 at the Yuzhmash missile-production plant, which is based

KNDR’ [‘North Korea’s Nuclear Potential’], Rossija i Amerika v

in Dnipropetrovsk, Ukraine. The control systems for the mis-

XXI veke, no. 1, 2016.

sile were designed by NPO Elektronpribor (Kharkiv, Ukraine).

51 ‘Report of the UN Panel of Experts established pursuant to

The R-36 was decommissioned in 1979, but the modification of

Resolution 1874 (2009’), S/2017/150, 27 February 2017, p. 16,

the RD-250 engine remained in production at Yuzhmash until

https://undocs.org/S/2017/150.

2001 for use in the Cyclone family of space launchers. See Yury

52 Aleksandr Zhebin, ‘Raketnaja i kosmicheskie programmy

Yashin (ed.), Oruzhie raketno-jadernogo udara [Nuclear Missile

KNDR: problemy mezhdunarodnogo priznanija [‘DPRK

Strike Weapons] (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo MGTU im. Baumana,

Missile and Space Programmes: Problems of International

2009), p. 24–5; Yuri Alekseyev (ed.), Makarov – patriarh rake-

Recognition’], Nuclear Club Journal, nos. 3–4, 2017, p. 32.

tostroenija [Makarov, a Missile Industry Patriarch] (Kiev: Space

53 ‘Report of the UN Panel of Experts established pursuant to

Inform, 2016), pp. 90–1; ‘Key Specifications of the R-36 Missile

Resolution 1874 (2009)’, S/2017/742, 5 September 2017, p. 9,

Complex’, Yuzhnoye, https://www.yuzhnoye.com/company/

https://undocs.org/S/2017/742.

history/r_36.html; Olga Fandorina, ‘Until 2001, Yuzhmash

54 ‘Supreme Leader Inspects Test-Fire of New Strategic Ballistic

[Made Rocket Engines Only For Russia – Ukrainian Space

Rocket’, Pyongyang Times, 24 June 2016, https://kcnawatch.co/

Agency]’, News of Ukraine, 16 August 2017, https://ukranews.

newstream/1466686000-51116090/supreme-leader-inspects-

com/news/513893-yuzhmash-vypuskal-raketnye-dvygately-

test-fire-of-new-strategic-ballistic-rocket/.

do-2001-goda-tolko-dlya-rossyy-kosmycheskoe-agentstvo-

55 David Wright, ‘Range Estimates for the Musudan Missile’, Union

ukrayny.

of Concerned Scientists, 12 October 2010, https://allthingsnuclear.

61 Broad and Sanger, ‘North Korea’s Missile Success Is Linked

org/dwright/range-estimates-for-the-musudan-missile; David

to Ukrainian Plant, Investigators Say’; Baranets, ‘Viktor Esin,

Wright, ‘More on Musudan Range Estimates’, Union of

jeks-nachal’nik Glavnogo shtaba RVSN Rossii: Skoree vsego,

Concerned Scientists, 12 October 2010, https://allthingsnuclear.

Ukraina pomogla Severnoj Koree po “chernoj sheme”’.

org/dwright/more-on-musudan-range-estimates.

62 Ankit Panda, ‘We Need to Talk About North Korea’s

56 Vladimir Khrustalev, ‘Sredstva dostavki jadernogo oruzhija KNDR:

Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles’, Diplomat, 14 May 2018,

tekushhee sostojanie programm i popytki prognoza [‘Means of

https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/we-need-to-talk-about-north-

Delivery of Nuclear Weapons of North Korea: The Current Status of

koreas-intermediate-range-ballistic-missiles/.

the Programmes and Attempts to Forecast’], in Alexander Zhebin

63 Choe Sang-Hun, ‘North Korea Says Missile It Tested Can Carry

(ed.), Koreja pered novymi vyzovami [Korea Before New Challenges]

Nuclear Warhead’, New York Times, 14 May 2017, https://www.

(Moscow: IDVRAN, 2017), p. 92; Savelsberg and Kiessling, ‘North

nytimes.com/2017/05/14/world/asia/north-korea-missile-

Korea’s Musudan Missile: A Performance Assessment’.

nuclear.html.

57 Jungmin Kang (ed.), Assessment of the Nuclear Programs of Iran

and North Korea (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), p. 120.

64 David Wright, ‘North Korea’s Missile in New Test Would Have

4,500 km Range’, Union of Concerned Scientists, 13 May 2017,

66 The International Institute for Strategic Studies and Center for Energy and Security Studies

https://allthingsnuclear.org/dwright/north-koreas-missilein-new-test-would-have-4500-km-range.

Improvement That May Be Ready as Early as 2018’, 38

65 Alexandr Khramchikhin, ‘Sila Chuchhe’ [‘The Power of the

Juche’], Voyenno-promyshlennyj kur’er, 18 May 2016, https:// www.vpk-news.ru/articles/30660;

‘Raketnaya

74 Michael Elleman, ‘The New Hwasong-15 ICBM: A Significant

Programma

KNDR: Dossie’ [‘The DPRK Missile Programme: A Dossier’], TASS, 29 November 2017, http://www.tass.ru/info/4385973;

North, 30 November 2017, https://www.38north.org/2017/11/ melleman113017/. 75 Khrustalev, ‘Dlinnye ruki KNDR: chto iz sebja predstavljaet

novaja raketa Kim Chen Yna’. 76 Ankit

Panda, a

Big

‘North Deal.

Korea’s

Here Are

2017 the

Military

Major

Parade

Presentation of General Victor Esin, Leading Researcher,

Was

Takeaways’,

Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of

Diplomat, 15 April 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/04/

Sciences, at the workshop ‘Assessment of the DPRK’s Missile

north-koreas-2017-military-parade-was-a-big-deal-here-are-

Capability’, CENESS, Moscow, 7 May 2018.

the-major-takeaways/.

66 Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee,

77 Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr, ‘The KN-02 SRBM’, KPA Journal, vol. 1,

‘Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat 2017’, June 2017, https://fas.

no. 2, February 2010, p. 7, http://www.kpajournal.com/storage/

org/irp/threat/missile/bm-2017.pdf.

KPAJ-1-02.pdf.

67 Jeffrey Lewis and John Schilling, ‘Real Fake Missiles: North Korea’s

78 ‘KN-02 “Toksa”’, Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and

ICBM Mockups Are Getting Scary Good’, 38 North, 4 November

International Studies, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/

2013,

kn-02/.

https://www.38north.org/2013/11/lewis-schilling110513/;

‘KN-08 / Hwasong 13’, Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kn-08/.

79 As previously noted, the Hwasong-3 employs double-base, solid

propellants. The Toksa uses a higher-performance, composite-

68 Michael Elleman, ‘Video Casts Doubt on North Korea’s Ability

type solid propellant, whose production requires very different

to Field an ICBM Re-entry Vehicle’, 38 North, 31 July 2017,

infrastructure. Toksa is the first known missile in North Korea

https://www.38north.org/2017/07/melleman073117/. The avail-

to rely on composite-type solid propellant.

able information (i.e., altitude and timing of the failure) is

80 Vladimir Lodkin, ‘“Podvodnyj kulak” Phen’jana’ [‘Pyongyang’s

consistent with the break-up of a very light re-entry vehicle,

Submarine Fist’], Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, 2 June

though one cannot dismiss the possibility the object seen in the

2017, http://nvo.ng.ru/armament/2017-06-02/1_950_kndr.html.

video was instead the missile’s second stage. 69 Jeffrey Lewis, ‘DPRK RV Video Analysis’, Arms Control

81 Evseev, ‘Ocenka voennogo potenciala KNDR’, p. 118. 82 ‘Eshhe

odna raketa ot Kima’ [‘Another Missile from

Wonk, 9 November 2018, https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/

Kim]’, Gazeta.Ru, 1 August 2017, https://www.gazeta.ru/

archive/1206084/dprk-rv-video-analysis/.

politics/2017/08/01_a_10813345.shtml.

70 Vladimir Evseev, ‘Ocenka voennogo potenciala KNDR’ [‘North

83 China employed a similar progression with the JL-1 SLBM and the

Korean Nuclear Missile Potential: Speculations and Reality’],

land-based DF-21 MRBM. Both are two-stage, solid-fuel missiles.

in Alexander Zhebin (ed.), KNDR i RK – 70 let [The DPRK and

84 Ksenia Naka, ‘Lider KNDR prikazal skoree osnastit’ arm-

the ROK: The 70th Anniversary of Foundation] (Moscow: Russian

iju raketoj “Pukkykson-2” [‘DPRK Leader Orders Army

Academy of Sciences, 2018), p. 121.

to Be Equipped with the Pukguksong-2 Missile as Soon

71 Michael Elleman, ‘North Korea’s Hwasong-14 ICBM: New

Data Indicates Shorter Range Than Many Thought’, 38 North, 29 November 2018, https://www.38north.org/2018/11/ melleman112918/.

as Possible’], RIA Novosti, 22 May 2017, https://ria.ru/ world/20170522/1494764139.html. 85 Vladimir Khrustalev, ‘Sredstva dostavki jadernogo oruzhija

KNDR: tekushhee sostojanie programm i popytki prognoza’

72 Theodore Postol, Markus Schiller and Robert Schmucker, ‘North

[‘Means of Delivery of Nuclear Weapons of North Korea: The

Korea’s “Not Quite” ICBM Can’t Hit the Lower 48 States’, Bulletin

Current Status of the Programs and Attempts to Forecast’],

of the Atomic Scientists, 11 August 2017, http://thebulletin.org/

in Alexander Zhebin (ed.), ‘Koreja pered novymi vyzovami’,

north-korea’s-“not-quite”-icbm-can’t-hit-lower-48-states11012.

(Moscow: Russian Academy of Sciences, 2017), p. 98.

73 David Wright, ‘North Korean ICBM Appears Able to Reach

86 Michael

Elleman,

‘North

Korea’s

New

Pukguksong-3

Major US Cities’, Union of Concerned Scientists, 28 July 2017,

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile’, 38 North, 3 October

https://allthingsnuclear.org/dwright/new-north-korean-icbm.

2019, https://www.38north.org/2019/10/melleman100319/.

Part Two: Ballistic-Missile Development and Current Capabilities 67

87 H.I. Sutton, ‘North Korea Appears to Have Built Its First Real

92 Vann H. Van Diepen and Daniel R. Depetris, ‘Putting North

Ballistic Missile Submarine’, Forbes, 13 August 2019, https://www.

Korea’s New Short-Range Missiles into Perspective’, 38

forbes.com/sites/hisutton/2019/08/13/north-korea-appears-to-

North, 5 September 2019, https://www.38north.org/2019/09/

have-built-its-first-real-ballistic-missile-submarine/#71d4dcf814e2.

vvandiependdepetris090519/.

88 Vann H. Van Diepen, ‘Cutting Through the Hype About the North

Korean Ballistic Missile Submarine Threat’, 38 North, 6 September 2019, https://www.38north.org/2019/09/vvandiepen090619/.

93 Ibid. 94 ‘Report of the UN Panel of Experts established pursuant to

Resolution 1874 (2009)’, S/2017/742, 5 September 2017, p.

89 Ankit Panda, ‘North Korea’s Pre-Olympics Military Parade’,

9, https://undocs.org/S/2017/742; ‘Report of the UN Panel

Diplomat, 9 February 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/

of Experts established pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)’,

north-koreas-pre-olympics-military-parade/.

S/2018/171, 5 March 2018, p. 7, https://undocs.org/S/2018/171.

90 Ankit Panda, ‘North Korea Remains in Compliance With

95 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union

Military Agreement: South Korean Defense Minister’, Diplomat,

of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Elimination Of Their

4 June 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/north-korea-

Intermediate-Range And Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty),

remains-in-compliance-with-military-agreement-south-

Article VII.4, https://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm#text.

korean-defense-minister/; ‘Report of the Panel of Experts

96 Protocol to the Treaty between The United States of America

established pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)’, https://undocs.

and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further

org/S/2020/151.

Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New

91 ‘Report of the UN Panel of Experts established pursuant to

Resolution 1874 (2009)’, https://undocs.org/S/2020/151.

START), Part I, Paragraph 59 (13), https://2009-2017.state.gov/ documents/organization/140047.pdf .

68 The International Institute for Strategic Studies and Center for Energy and Security Studies

Part Three: Potential Steps for Tension Reduction, ConfidenceBuilding and Denuclearisation Ever since its division in 1945, the Korean Peninsula

implemented at all, while other engagement efforts

has been one of the world’s most dangerous flash-

came to naught. The circumstances and reasons for their

points. Following the inconclusive end of the Korean

demise varied. Many in Japan, South Korea and the US

War of 1950–1953, the tense situation has not escalated

lay the blame on Pyongyang for failing to meet com-

to another military conflagration, as South and North

mitments. Others point to policy change in Washington

Korea have been protected and constrained by their

and Seoul (for example, US president George W. Bush’s

respective alliances with the US for the former and

rejection of his predecessor Bill Clinton’s approach and

China and the Soviet Union for the latter. Yet the grow-

ROK president Lee Myung-bak’s abandonment of the

ing nuclear dimensions of confrontation on the Korean

‘engagement policy’ of his two predecessors). The DPRK has a negotiating style of its own, and a set

Peninsula magnify the danger. Despite past diplomatic efforts and the increasingly

of unwavering conditions. Most importantly, the DPRK

stringent sanctions imposed on the DPRK after its

links the nuclear issue to its ‘supreme interests’ (i.e.,

first nuclear test in 2006 by the UNSC, as well as the

survival of the country vis-à-vis the perceived threats

long-standing unilateral sanctions by the US and other

to its security).2 The DPRK has been steadfast in insist-

countries, the DPRK has acquired a capability to pro-

ing that the US should abandon what Pyongyang calls

duce and deliver nuclear weapons, as demonstrated

its ‘hostile policy’ against the North. While the US has

in detail in the first two chapters of this report. As the

regularly denied any hostile intent towards the DPRK

DPRK continues to develop its nuclear strike capabili-

and expressed its readiness to normalise relations if

ties, Northeast Asia faces a security uncertainty and the

and when the latter abandons its nuclear programme,

prospect of further nuclear proliferation.

North Korea has often been called a ‘rogue state’ or a ‘pariah state’, with many officials and experts believing

Past diplomatic efforts

that ‘regime change’ in North Korea is the only way to achieve denuclearisation and a peaceful peninsula.3

There have been many efforts over the past three decades to address the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, both

Figure 40. 6PT lead negotiators, 19 September 2005

bilaterally (including North and South Korea, and DPRK– US) and multilaterally.1 The most successful multilateral effort to date was the Six-Party Talks (6PT) featuring China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea and the US (2003– 2008) that produced the September 2005 Joint Statement. The key points of that agreement – as well as the experience of its implementation up to 2008 – remain relevant. Regretfully, the 6PT Joint Statement and other agreements were at best implemented only partially or not

Source: Getty

Part Three: Potential Steps for Tension Reduction, Confidence-Building and Denuclearisation 69

Figure 41. DPRK Chairman Kim Jong Un and ROK President Moon Jae-in shake hands at the Panmunjom summit, April 2018

Source: Getty

Defying crippling economic sanctions and isola-

Moon Jae-in and DPRK Chairman Kim Jong Un reached

tion, Pyongyang has proved its opponents wrong and

an agreement on concrete measures to ‘completely elimi-

acquired a nuclear deterrent, even though the country

nate the fear of war and the risk of armed conflicts on the

has paid a huge price for it in economic terms. Moreover,

Korean Peninsula’. They also ‘firmly pledged to recon-

North Korea has used the West’s disengagement as an

nect Korea’s arteries and to hasten a future of common

opportunity to step up its nuclear development. In 2015,

prosperity and reunification’ on their own terms.5

former US defense secretary William Perry summed up

President Moon and Chairman Kim seemed to realise

the results of US policy towards North Korea since the

the need to begin building trust. They also knew that this

Clinton administration as ‘perhaps the most unsuccess-

trust should be based on practical and visible actions by

ful exercise of diplomacy in our country’s history’.4

both sides. Learning from the past, the leaders of the two

The 2018–2019 summitry

Koreas agreed on direct and regular interactions between civilian and military representatives at all levels, including the opening of a Joint Liaison Office in Kaesong and the

At the end of 2018, it seemed that the Korean Peninsula

establishment of a joint military committee in late 2018.

might be at a positive turning point. The immediate fear of war had dissipated. Security issues remained unresolved, but the main concerns seemed to focus on

Figure 42. Athletes from North Korea and South Korea walk together during the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics

whether engagement and dialogue were moving either too fast or too slow. The outcomes of the three interKorean summits in 2018, as well as the unprecedented DPRK–US summit in Singapore in June the same year, provided good reason for optimism. It was inter-Korean engagement that had triggered positive developments. It started in early 2018 through sports diplomacy at the Pyeongchang Olympics and the Panmunjom summit in April, followed by the summit in Pyongyang in September. In Pyongyang, ROK President

Source: Getty

70 The International Institute for Strategic Studies and Center for Energy and Security Studies

The results of the September 2018 inter-Korean summit

to note that both in Panmunjom and in Pyongyang, the

in Pyongyang went beyond the expectations of those who

Korean leaders agreed that the Korean Peninsula should

share the belief that Koreans should be in charge of their

be a ‘nuclear-weapon-free zone’ (DPRK language) or ‘free

own destiny. The most important result was an agree-

from nuclear weapons’ (ROK language).6

ment on military measures to reduce tensions. There was

In their Joint Statement at the historic DPRK–US sum-

also hope that the two sides would flesh out their April

mit on 12 June 2018 in Singapore, US president Donald

2018 agreement to create a special zone for peace and

Trump ‘committed to provide security guarantees to the

cooperation in the West Sea. The agreement on economic

DPRK, and Chairman Kim Jong Un reaffirmed his firm

cooperation struck at the September 2018 summit was

and unwavering commitment to a complete denucleari-

also an ambitious one. Given the sanctions and restric-

zation of the Korean Peninsula’.7 The two leaders agreed

tions imposed by the UNSC, parts of that agreement were

to establish new DPRK–US relations and build a lasting

conditional on progress towards denuclearisation and

and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.

improved relations between the DPRK and the US.

In April of the same year, the DPRK announced a mor-

At the April summit in Panmunjom, the two Koreas

atorium on nuclear tests and long-range-missile launches.

emphasised the need to build trust between the DPRK

It also announced steps to shut down the Punggye-ri

and the US; hence the priority they attached to declaring

nuclear test site. In the Pyongyang summit declaration

a formal end to the Korean War, replacing the Armistice

(18–20 September 2018), the DPRK agreed to permanently

that has been in place since 1953.

shut down the Tongchang-ri missile-engine test site and

Another new welcome feature of the inter-Korean

rocket launch pad under the observation of international

engagement at that time was the DPRK’s willingness to

experts, and expressed a willingness to dismantle per-

discuss denuclearisation with the ROK. It was understood

manently – on certain conditions – the nuclear facilities

that the details of any denuclearisation deal would have to

at the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Centre. The

be developed as a result of a process led by the DPRK with

two sides also agreed to cooperate closely in the process

the US, with other countries playing their own roles. The

of pursuing a complete denuclearisation of the Korean

ROK, however, positioned itself to play the role of a bridg-

Peninsula.8 The US and the ROK, for their part, indefi-

ing facilitator and an ‘interested contributor’. It is important

nitely postponed large-scale joint military exercises.

Figure 43. US President Donald Trump and DPRK Chairman Kim Jong Un meet at the Singapore Summit, June 2018

Source: Getty

Part Three: Potential Steps for Tension Reduction, Confidence-Building and Denuclearisation 71

Table 8. Korean Peninsula political developments, 2018–2019 Date

Event

Results

1 January 2018

Kim Jong Un New Year’s speech

Kim said nuclear forces are ‘completed’, underlined importance of improvement of inter-Korean relations and proposed talks over DPRK participation in ROK-hosted Winter Olympics.

9 February 2018

Pyeongchang Winter Olympics opening ceremony

Kim Jong Un’s sister Kim Yo Jong shook hands with Moon Jae-in. ROK and DPRK athletes marched together during the opening ceremony of the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics.

25–28 March 2018

China–DPRK summit in Beijing

Kim Jong Un’s first foreign visit as leader.

20 April 2018

DPRK–ROK hotline

Telephone hotline established between two leaders.

20 April 2018

DPRK unilateral declaration

Kim Jong Un declared a moratorium on nuclear tests and long-range missile launches and closure of Punggye-ri nuclear test site.

27 April 2018

DPRK–ROK Panmunjom summit

Panmunjom Declaration pledged to convert Korean War Armistice into formal peace treaty and confirmed goal of nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.

9 May 2018

DPRK unilateral gesture

Released 3 US detainees.

26 May 2018

2nd Kim–Moon meeting in Panmunjom

Agreed to accelerate the 27 April Panmunjom Declaration and to ensure holding of 12 June DPRK–US summit. 

12 June 2018

DPRK–US Singapore summit

First-ever meeting between DPRK and US leaders. Joint statement pledged to establish new relations, pursue lasting peace and complete denuclearisation of Korean Peninsula, and to recover US war remains. President Trump committed to provide security guarantees to the DPRK.

14 September 2018

DPRK–ROK joint liaison office opened in Kaesong

Established a new full-time person-to-person channel.

18–20 September 2018

DPRK–ROK Pyongyang summit

Pyongyang Joint Declaration pledged denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, improvements in inter-Korean relations and measures to ease military tension. Kim Jong Un agreed to dismantle permanently the Dongchang-ri missile engine test site and launch platform and expressed his willingness to take additional measures, such as the permanent dismantlement of the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, as the United States takes corresponding measures.

27–28 February 2019

DPRK–US Hanoi summit

Kim Jong Un offered to dismantle nuclear facilities at Yongbyon in exchange for relief from UN sanctions. Trump asked for more. They didn’t agree and ended the meeting early.

12 April 2019

Kim speech to Supreme People’s Assembly

Kim Jong Un expressed scepticism about US policy and set end-of-year deadline for US to ‘abandon its current calculation’.

24–25 April 2019

DPRK–Russia Vladivostok summit

Situation on the Korean Peninsula and prospects for sustainable dialogue in the region were the key topics of the meeting. Agreed to forge closer ties.

20–21 June 2019

China–DPRK Pyongyang summit

Xi Jinping praised DPRK efforts to promote denuclearisation. Agreed to strengthen cooperation on building peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. This meeting was the fifth between the two leaders since early 2018.

30 June 2019

DPRK–US Panmunjom meeting, with ROK joining briefly

Trump briefly stepped into North Korea. Agreed to restart working-level talks

4–5 October 2019

DPRK–US working level meeting in Stockholm

No agreement; ended early.

28–31 December 2019

5th Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea

Kim Jong Un announced DPRK would no longer be ‘unilaterally bound’ to the long-range missile and nuclear test moratorium.

During the year 2019, however, engagement came to

hostile policy, the basic way for establishing a new bilat-

an almost complete halt. Following the rupture during

eral relationship; rather it mistakenly believes that if it

the DPRK–US summit in Hanoi (27–28 February 2019)

pressures us to the maximum, it can subdue us’.9

due to differences over the scope of the measures to be

Even the impromptu DPRK–US summit at Panmunjom

taken by both sides, the DPRK leadership became scep-

on 30 June 2019 was not able to re-ignite the sustainable

tical about its engagement with the US and the ROK.

process of engagement, as Pyongyang was looking for a

Chairman Kim said in his policy speech on 12 April

substantive change in the US stance. The long-anticipated

2019 that the talks in Hanoi ‘gave us a sense of caution

working-level meeting in Stockholm on 5 October 2019

about whether the United States is genuinely interested

failed to narrow the gap between the two sides. By the

in improving the bilateral relations’, adding that ‘the

end of the year, the DPRK had virtually shut down its

United States still looks away from the withdrawal of its

communications with the US and the ROK, becoming

72 The International Institute for Strategic Studies and Center for Energy and Security Studies

Figure 44. Negotiations between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un hit a deadlock at the Hanoi summit, February 2019

unresponsive to their attempts to interact and having

Source: Getty

Potential steps

tested multiple projectiles and short-range missiles. At the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers’

Both the ROK and the US continue to try to persuade

Party of Korea in late December 2019, Chairman Kim

Pyongyang of the need to interact. In January 2020,

stated that ‘if the US persists in its hostile policy towards

President Moon expressed his determination to expand

the DPRK, there will never be the denuclearization of the

inter-Korean economic cooperation as much as possible

Korean peninsula, and the DPRK will steadily develop

within the bounds of sanctions restrictions, including by

indispensable and prerequisite strategic weapons for

allowing visits to North Korea by South Korean tourists.

national security until the US rolls back its hostile policy

China and Russia, for their part, introduced in December

and a lasting and durable peace mechanism is in place’.10

2019 a draft resolution on easing the UNSC sanctions

While the outlook for the situation on the Korean

that undermine the welfare of the North Korean people.

Peninsula remains uncertain, it is safe to conclude that the

The two countries also called for further confidence-

engagement and nuclear diplomacy of 2018 and 2019 had

building measures on the peninsula. China and Russia

generated tangible results and proved its value in terms

also strongly support inter-Korean engagement. In 2019

of reducing tensions and addressing security problems

China and Russia shared a draft Action Plan for a com-

in the region. The unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests

prehensive and simultaneous resolution of the problems

and long-range-missile launches that Pyongyang contin-

facing the Korean Peninsula with fellow 6PT members

ues to observe as of September 2020 limits Pyongyang’s

the DPRK, Japan, the ROK and the US.

ability to develop more advanced warheads and mis-

It would appear that the main challenge at the

siles, but measures taken by the DPRK unilaterally do

moment is of a political nature. There is a need to help

not include any limitations on fissile-material or missile

the key parties concerned make strategic policy deci-

production. If the DPRK were to completely and perma-

sions in order to break the vicious cycles of engage-

nently dismantle all its facilities at the Yongbyon Nuclear

ment/disengagement at increasingly dangerous levels of

Scientific Research Centre (as discussed at the Hanoi

stand-off. This would require a fundamental review of

summit), Pyongyang would have reduced its capabil-

the existing approaches in the capitals involved.

ity to make weapons-usable fissile materials, perhaps by

A rapid denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula is

about 80%, and would also essentially freeze its thermo-

not a realistic possibility. Nevertheless, developments

nuclear programme.

in 2018–2019 demonstrated that progress towards

Part Three: Potential Steps for Tension Reduction, Confidence-Building and Denuclearisation 73

denuclearisation is possible. The central principle of

made references to the experience of the Iran nuclear talks.

moving forward is that the parties must adopt a step-by-

The Panmunjom Declaration also emphasises the role of

step and reciprocal approach. The step-by-step approach

international support and cooperation for the cause of

is especially important for the early phase of dialogue as

denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.

an element of confidence-building. The Joint Statement

As part of any future Korean talks in such a format, we

made at the Singapore summit contains a very impor-

could also borrow from the Iran negotiations such princi-

tant concept: mutual confidence-building can promote a

ples as mutual respect, reciprocity, and recognition of state

denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.

sovereignty and security interests of all parties. Another

It is also important to think about what the recipro-

important consideration is that the DPRK’s partners at the

cal measures might be, should the DPRK prove willing

talks should not put forward impossible conditions. They

to move forward. Negotiations are a two-way street,

should not demand things that no sovereign state would

and the reciprocal measures that would offer adequate

ever accept, barring a complete military defeat.

incentives to North Korea should be stepped up. The

The long-term goals of this process should be a complete

lack of such measures was one of the major bottlenecks

denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula and the develop-

for the dialogue process that took place in 2018–2019.

ment of a comprehensive peace and security system in

One of the practical challenges in this context would be

Northeast Asia. One of the immediate goals of the talks

to establish the actual ‘proportionate value’ of such steps

should be to produce an agreed definition of what exactly a

and measures for the individual parties concerned.

‘denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula’ actually means.

Speaking of the format of the dialogue on formulating the next steps to reduce tensions and achieve pro-

The term has often been used in joint documents, but the parties do not interpret the term in the same way.

gress towards denuclearisation, the experience of the Iran

Finally, it would be useful to recall lessons from the 6PT,

nuclear talks, which produced the JCPOA in July 2015,

including the working group that was established to examine

could be put to good use. A multinational approach that

possible peace and security mechanisms in Northeast Asia.

combines bilateral and multilateral tracks, as was the case

There are no public accounts of the work of this group, but

during the Iran negotiations, looks the most promising and

the issue is drawing interest, given the intensifying rivalry

sustainable. Despite the Trump administration’s decision

between the great powers in the region. Obviously, it is a

to withdraw from the JCPOA, and Iran’s reciprocal steps

sensitive issue for the US and its allies, given their respective

since summer 2019 to reduce compliance with the enrich-

treaty obligations. Common sense, however, suggests that

ment limits, the Iran deal remains an exceptional exam-

the evolving security environment in the region might bene-

ple of the art of diplomacy. Distrustful of Washington,

fit from a multilateral understanding and agreement regard-

Pyongyang appears once again to be leaning towards mul-

ing, for example, mutual security guarantees (assurances) to

tinational formats. In informal discussions, representatives

the DPRK and other regional countries, and increased trans-

of the DPRK Foreign Ministry have on several occasions

parency of certain military activities in the region.

Figure 45. Russian President Vladimir Putin and DPRK Chairman Kim Jong Un meet in Vladivostok, April 2019

Figure 46. DPRK Chairman Kim Jong Un and Chinese President Xi Jinping meet with their spouses in Pyongyang, June 2019

Source: Official Website of the Russian President Vladimir Putin

Source: Alamy

74 The International Institute for Strategic Studies and Center for Energy and Security Studies

Notes 1 For a detailed account, see Robert Carlin, ‘Details, Details:

7 ‘Joint Statement of President Donald J. Trump of the United

History Lessons from Negotiating with North Korea’, 38

States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the Democratic

North, 14 October 2016, https://www.38north.org/2016/10/

People’s Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit’, U.S.

rcarlin101416/.

Embassy in Singapore, 12 June 2018, 'https://sg.usembassy.

2 See, for example, ‘Statement of DPRK Government on its

gov/joint-statement-of-president-donald-j-trump-of-the-

Withdrawal from NPT’, KCNA, 10 January 2003, http://www.

united-states-of-america-and-chairman-kim-jong-un-of-the-

kcna.co.jp/item/2003/200301/news01/11.htm.

democratic-peoples-republic-of-korea/.

3 See, for example, Sue Mi Terry, ‘Let North Korea Collapse’, New

8

‘Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un and President Moon Jae In Sign

York Times, 16 June 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/17/

September Pyongyang Joint Declaration’, DPRK Ministry of

opinion/let-north-korea-collapse.html.

Foreign Affairs, 20 September 2018, http://www.mfa.gov.kp/

4 William J. Perry, My Journey at the Nuclear Brink (Stanford, CA:

Stanford University Press, 2015), p. 171.

en/september-pyongyang-joint-declaration/. 9 The National Committee on North Korea, ‘On Socialist

5 ‘Address by President Moon Jae-in at May Day Stadium in

Construction and the Internal and External Policies of the

Pyeongyang’, President of the Republic of Korea Official

Government of the Republic at the Present Stage’, 12 April 2019,

Website, 20 September 2018, https://english1.president.go.kr/

https://www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/kju_april2019_

briefingspeeches/speeches/70.

policy_speech.pdf/file_view.

6 The DPRK and ROK official translations from Korean to English of

10 ‘Report on 5th Plenary Meeting of 7th C.C., WPK’, DPRK

the Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 January 2020, http://www.mfa.

of the Korean Peninsula have some linguistic differences.

gov.kp/en/report-on-5th-plenary-meeting-of-7th-c-c-wpk/.

Part Three: Potential Steps for Tension Reduction, Confidence-Building and Denuclearisation 75

76 The International Institute for Strategic Studies and Center for Energy and Security Studies

Annex One: Russian Working Group Chair:

for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies

Anton KHLOPKOV, CENESS Director

(1989–2011)

Coordinator:

Ilya DYACHKOV, PhD, Associate Professor, Dept.

Dmitry KONUKHOV, CENESS Senior Research

of Japanese, Korean, Indonesian and Mongolian,

Associate,

Vladislav

Dept. of Oriental Studies, Moscow State Institute for

CHERNAVSKIKH and Anastasia SHAVROVA, CENESS

International Relations (MGIMO–University), Ministry

Research Associates

of Foreign Affairs

Members:

Victor ESIN, Col.–Gen. (ret.), Leading Research

Grigory BERDENNIKOV, Ambassador-in-Residence,

Associate, Institute for the U.S. and Canadian Studies,

Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS); former

Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS); former Chief of

Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the

Staff and Vice Commander–in–Chief, Russian Strategic

International Organizations in Vienna (2001–2007) and to

Rocket Forces (RVSN, 1994–1996)

with

assistance

from

the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva (1993–1998); former Deputy Foreign Minister (1992–1993; 1999–2001)

Alexander ILITCHEV, Senior Advisor, Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS); former Principal

Evgeny BUZHINSKIY, Lt.–Gen. (ret.), Chairman of

Adviser to the Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary-

the Executive Board, PIR Center; former Head of the

General for the Korean Peninsula

International Treaty Directorate; Deputy Head of the Main Department of International Military Cooperation,

Alexander LIKHOLETOV, Consultant, Center for

Ministry of Defence (2002–2009)

Energy and Security Studies (CENESS)

Oleg DAVYDOV, Senior Fellow, Center for Asia-

Mikhail

Pacific Studies, Primakov National Research Institute

Professor, Department of International Law, Moscow

for World Economy and International Relations

State Institute for International Relations (MGIMO–

(IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS); for-

University), Ministry of Foreign Affairs; former Director

mer Ambassador-at-Large, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

of the Department for Security and Disarmament,

(2016–2017)

Ministry

LYSENKO, Ambassador,

of

Foreign

Affairs

PhD, Associate

(2001–2004);

former

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to New Anatoly

DIAKOV,

PhD,

Associate

Professor,

Zealand (2004–2008)

Department of General Physics, National Research University – Moscow Institute of Physics and

Alexander MINAEV, Senior Lecturer, Diplomatic

Technology (NRU–MIPT); former Director, Center

Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; former Minister

Annex One: Russian Working Group 77

Counsellor, Embassy of the Russian Federation to the

Center, Institute of Economics, Russian Academy of

DPRK (2015–2018)

Sciences (RAS)

Valery SUKHININ, Ambassador, Associate Professor,

Alexandr

Moscow State Institute for International Relations

for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS); Head,

(MGIMO–University), Ministry of Foreign Affairs; for-

Department for Korean and Mongolian Studies, Institute

mer Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of

of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS)

VORONTSOV,

PhD,

Advisor,

Center

the Russian Federation to the DPRK (2006–2012) Alexandr ZHEBIN, PhD, Director, Center for Korean Georgy TOLORAYA, PhD, Chair, Regional Programs,

Studies (CKS), Institute of Far Eastern Studies (IFES),

'Russkiy Mir' Foundation; Director, Asian Strategy

Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS)

78 The International Institute for Strategic Studies and Center for Energy and Security Studies

Annex Two: US Working Group

Co-chairs: Mark FITZPATRICK, Associate Fellow and former Executive Director, IISS-Americas (2015–18) and Director of IISS Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Policy Programme (2005–18); former Deputy Assistant

Siegfried HECKER, Senior Fellow (emeritus), Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies,  Stanford University; former Director of Los Alamos National Laboratory (1986–97)

Secretary of State for Non-Proliferation (acting) (2003–05)

Susan KOCH, former Director for Proliferation Strategy, National Security Council Staff (2001-05)

Michael ELLEMAN, Director of IISS Non-Proliferation

and Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary of State for

and Nuclear Policy Programme and former Senior

Arms Control (2005–07)

Fellow for Missile Defense Jeffrey LEWIS, Professor, Middlebury Institute of

Members:

International Studies at Monterey and  Director of the

Andrea BERGER, Associate Fellow, Royal United

East Asia Nonproliferation Program, James Martin

Services Institute; former Senior Research Associate,

Center for Nonproliferation Studies

James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies

Ankit PANDA, Stanton Senior Fellow at the Carnegie

Kelsey DAVENPORT, Director for Nonproliferation

Endowment for International Peace; former Adjunct

Policy, Arms Control Association

Senior Fellow at the Federation of American Scientists; author of  Kim Jong Un and the Bomb: Survival and

Robert EINHORN, Senior Fellow in the Arms Control

Deterrence in North Korea (London: Hurst, 2020)

and Non-Proliferation Initiative and the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence,  Brookings

Daniel PINKSTON, Lecturer in International Relations

Institution; former US State Department Special Advisor

with Troy University; former Northeast Asia Deputy

for Nonproliferation and Arms Control (2009–13)

Project Director for the International Crisis Group in Seoul

and Assistant Secretary of State for Non-Proliferation (1999–2001)

Greg THIELMAN, Board member, Arms Control Association; former acting director of the Strategic,

Melissa HANHAM, former Deputy Director of Open

Proliferation, and Military Affairs Office in the Bureau

Nuclear Network and Director of the Datayo Project

of Intelligence and Research at the US State Department

at  One  Earth Future Foundation and former Senior Research Associate, East Asia Nonproliferation Program,

Joel WIT, Senior Fellow with Stimson Center and

James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies

Editor, 38 North; former US State Department official

Annex Two: US Working Group

79

80 The International Institute for Strategic Studies and Center for Energy and Security Studies

A JOINT STUDY BY THE CENTER FOR ENERGY AND SECURITY STUDIES (CENESS) AND THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES (IISS)

DPRK Strategic Capabilities and Security on the Korean Peninsula: Looking Ahead Dangerous tensions on the Korean Peninsula associated with North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons have been among the world’s most complex and contentious security issues since the end of the Cold War. Notwithstanding instances of effective diplomacy, overall, bilateral and multilateral efforts as well as sanctions and pressure campaigns have thus far failed both to prevent the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) from acquiring the fissile material for nuclear weapons and an extensive array of ballistic missiles capable of delivering them to an increasingly long range, and to solve the region’s security problems. DPRK Strategic Capabilities and Security on the Korean Peninsula: Looking Ahead is a joint

DPRK Strategic Capabilities and Security on the Korean Peninsula: Looking Ahead

endeavour by the Moscow-based Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). This report charts the motivations, pillars and progress of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes over the years, and examines possible international steps towards developing and implementing proposals for denuclearisation and creating lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. At a time of antagonistic superpower relations, the ability of the two think tanks, tapping experts in Russia and the United States, to reach shared conclusions about both the nature of

A joint study by the Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)

the problem and potential solutions stands as an example of the power of fact-based analysis.

The Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS) is an independent, nongovernmental think tank established in 2009 and headquartered in Moscow. The main goal of CENESS is to promote unbiased, systematic, and professional analyses related to nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear energy with a special emphasis on international cooperation of Russia in these areas. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), founded in 1958, is an independent centre for research, information and debate on the problems of conflict, however caused, that have, or potentially have, an important military content.

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