Czechoslovakia Past and Present: Volume 1 Political, international, social and economic aspects [Reprint 2019 ed.] 9783111619774, 9783111243177

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA PAST A N D PRESENT Volume I Political, International, Social, and Economic Aspects

CZECHOSLOVAKIA PAST AND PRESENT edited by

M I L O S L A V R E C H C I G L , JR.

VOLUME

I

Political, International, Social, and Economic Aspects

Published under the auspices of the Czechoslovak Society of Arts and Sciences in America, Inc. by

MOUTON THE H A G U E • PARIS

1968

© Copyright 1968 in The Netherlands. Mouton & Co. N.V., Publishers, The Hague. No part of this book may be translated or reproduced in any form by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publishers.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOG CARD NUMBER: 69-16268

Printed in The Netherlands by Mouton & Co., Printers, The Hague.

Preface

This collection of papers in large part comprises the lectures presented at the Second Congress of the Czechoslovak Society of Arts and Sciences in America, Inc., held at Columbia University, September 11-13, 1964. The central theme of the Congress was "Czechoslovakia Past and Present", which is also the title of this collection. Over 110 papers were presented at the Congress by scholars - invited guests, as well as members of the Society - from all parts of the United States, Canada, South America, Australia, and Western Europe. The papers cover most major fields of intellectual endeavor: history, literature and linguistics, music and fine arts, the social sciences, and the biological and physical sciences. A special feature of the program was a symposium, "Czechoslovakia and its Neighbors: Nationalism vs. Federalism", in which distinguished scholars of different national backgrounds debated the issues which lead to nationalistic conflicts in East-Central Europe. Another symposium was organized to evaluate the era of the First Czechoslovak Republic. Finally, the situation in today's Czechoslovakia - cultural, social, economic, political, and international aspects - was examined during three separate sessions. For this publication the papers were carefully selected on the basis of their over-all quality and subject matter. The ideas and opinions expressed are, however, solely those of the authors, and neither the editor nor the Society has any responsibility for these ideas. Our material has been organized in two separate volumes. The first concerns political, international, social, and economic aspects of Czechoslovakia, past and present. The second volume includes essays on the arts and sciences, arranged according to various disciplines. Of the 118 papers which appear in the entire collection, 96 were presented at the Congress of the Society. The remaining 22 papers either arrived too late to appear on the program of the Congress, or their authors were not able to attend the meetings. In addition, several new

6

Preface

manuscripts are included which were subsequently requested in order to fill a gap in a specific area or historical period. A favorable reception by the reviewers of the selective bibliography of publications on Czechoslovakia which appeared in the Society's First Congress Proceedings 1 prompted the editor to add to this collection also a comprehensive bibliography of bibliographies concerning Czechoslovakia - probably the first such bibliography to be published in the Western hemisphere. The evaluation and final selection of papers has been done with the assistance, and under the guidance, of many scholars, experts in their respective fields. They include, in alphabetical order: Prof. Josef Anderle (University of North Carolina), Prof. Antonin Bäsch (University of Michigan), Karel Bednar (Slovensky Sokol), Ing. Pavel Blaho (New York City), Prof. Peter Brock (Columbia University), Prof, Josef Brozek (Lehigh University), Dr. John Wolfgang Briigel (London), Prof. Francis Dvornik (Harvard University), Dr. Jan Ehrenwald (New York City), Dr. Ladislav K. Feierabend (Washington, D.C.), Prof. Stephen A. Fischer-Galati (University of Colorado), Prof. Herman Freudenberger (Tulane University), Prof. Mojmir S. Frinta (State University of New York at Albany), Prof. Zygmunt J. Gasiorowski (University of Hawaii), Prof. George Gibian (Cornell University), Prof. Jan Hajda (University of California, Riverside), Prof. Wiliam E. Harkins (Columbia University), Prof. Ervin P. Hexner (Pennsylvania State University), Prof. Frederick G. Heymann (University of Alberta at Calgary), Prof. Vaclav Hlavaty (Indiana University), Dr. F. S. Hoffmeister (Roswell Park Memorial Institute), Prof. Karel Husa (Cornell University), Prof. Karel B. Jiräk (Roosevelt University), Prof. Howard Kaminsky (University of Washington), Prof. Stephen Denis Kertesz (University of Notre Dame), Prof. Bruno Z. Kisch (Yeshiva University), Prof. Hans Kohn (City College, New York City), Prof. Josef Korbel (University of Denver), Emil Kovtun (University of California, Berkeley), Prof. Henry Kucera (Brown University), Prof. Gregor Lazarcik (Brooklyn College), Prof. Ivo John Lederer (Yale University), Dr. Jan Lowenbach (New York City), Prof. Frank Edward Luksa (Southwestern University), Prof. Josef Macek (University of Pittsburgh), Prof. Otakar R. Machotka (Harpur College), Prof. George Morton (London School of Economics and Political Science), Prof. Philip E. Mosely (Columbia University), Dr. Michael Müdry-Sebik (New York City), Prof. Frank Münk (Port1 Miloslav Rechcigl, Jr., ed., The Czechoslovak Contribution (The Hague-Paris-London, Mouton and Co., 1964).

to World

Culture

Preface

7

land State College), Dr. Zdenka Munzer (Rockefeller Institute), Prof. Jiri Nehnévajsa (University of Pittsburgh), Dr. Jaroslav Némec (National Library of Medicine), Prof. Paul Netti (Indiana University), Dr. Dagmar H. Perman (Washington, D.C.), Prof. Stanley Z. Pech (University of British Columbia), Dr. Jaroslav G. Polach (Resources for the Future), Prof. Ladislav J. Pospisil (Yale University), Prof. Anthony S. Reyner (Howard University), Prof. E. K. J. Reznicek (Rijksuniversiteit, Utrecht), Prof. Jan Rocek (University of Illinois, Chicago), Prof. Ivan L. Rudnitsky (La Salle College), V. Shandor (Peterson, N.J.), Klement Simoncic (Columbia University), Prof. H. Gordon Skilling (University of Toronto), Prof. Robert L. Skrabànek (Texas A. and M. University), Prof. Roman S. Smal-Stocki (Marquette University), Prof. Matthew Spinka (Claremont Graduate School), Dr. Michael Sumichrast (National Association of Home Builders of America), Prof. Edward Tàborsky (University of Texas), Prof. S. H. Thomson (University of Colorado), Prof. Peter A. Toma (University of Arizona), Prof. Jan F. Triska (Stanford University), Prof. Otto Ulé (Harpur College), Dr. Edith VoglGarrett (Brookline, Mass.), Prof. Piotr S. Wandycz (Yale University), Prof. René Wellek (Yale University), Prof. Joseph A. Winn (New York Medical College), Prof. Z. A. B. Zeman (University of St. Andrews), Prof. Paul E. Zinner (University of California, Davis). They have all earned our profound appreciation and gratitude. This collection could hardly exist without the occasion of the Second Congress of the Czechoslovak Society of Arts and Sciences in America. A number of the above-named scholars actively assisted the editor in his earlier capacity as Program Chairman of the Congress. To them and to many others who made the existence of this publication possible, the editor is greatly indebted. He is also obliged to Dr. John G. Lexa, Ernest J. Pories, Emil Royco, Dr. George J. Skvor, Prof. Peter A. Toma, Danica M. Vanék, and, particularly, to Frank C. Steiner for translating several articles into English. Special thanks are extended to Mrs. Ann R. Lindsay who was responsible for editing the manuscripts for English style and idiom. Last, but not least, the editor wants to express his appreciation to the individual authors for their scientific and scholarly devotion and to the publishers for their unending patience. MILOSLAV RECHCIGL, JR.

Rockville, Maryland May 1966

Table of Contents*

MILOSLAV RECHCIGL, JR.

Preface

5

A. CZECHOSLOVAKIA THROUGH THE SECOND WORLD WAR

1. Rise and Fall of the First Czechoslovak

Republic: Historical

Aspects

VICTOR S. MAMATEY

The Role of President Wilson in the Foundation of Czechoslovakia *

19

ANTHONY PALECEK

Formative Years of the First Republic of Czechoslovakia. The Statesmanship of Antonin Svehla

30

J . W . BRUGEL

The Entry of German Parties into the Czechoslovak Government

49

I v o K . FEIERABEND

The Second Czechoslovak Republic, September 1938-March 1939: A Study in Political Change *

65

JOSEF ANDERLE

The Establishment of Slovak Autonomy in 1938 * .

.

.

.

76

Personal Recollection of a Few Episodes in Czecho-Slovak Relations *

98

PAVEL BLAHO

* The papers presented at the Second Congress of the Czechoslovak Society of Arts and Sciences in America are marked with an asterisk.

Table of Contents

10 THEODORE PROCHÄZKA

Some Aspects of Carpatho-Ukrainian History in Post-Munich Czechoslovakia *

2.

107

The First Czechoslovak Republic:

Social and Economic

Aspects

E W A R D TÄBORSY

The Roots of Czechoslovak Democracy *

117

M I L A N E . HAPALA

Political Parties in Czechoslovakia, 1918-1938 *

124

ADOLF PROCHÄZKA

The Normological and Political Bases of the Legal Order of the First Czechoslovak Republic *

141

FRANK M Ü N K

Czechoslovakia and International Organization *

150

A N T O N I N BÄSCH

Economic and Financial Policy of Czechoslovakia, 1918-1938*

158

LADISLAV K . FEIERABEND

Agriculture in the First Republic of Czechoslovakia .

.

170

The Progress of Czechoslovakia's Industrialization and its Effect upon National Unity *

183

VACLAV E . MARES

CESTMIR JE§INA

Social Progress in Czechoslovakia, 1918-1938

190

3. Czechoslovakia and the Second World War KEITH EUBANK

The Role of Czechoslovakia in the Origins of World War I I *

205

JAN PAPANEK

Organization in the United States of the Struglle for Czechoslovakia's Independence, 1938 to 1941 *

214

JAROSLAV DRABEK

The Assassination of Reinhard

Heydrich: A Re-evaluation *

224

Table of Contents

11

ANDREJ ELIAS

The Slovak Uprising of 1944 *

237

KAREL HOLBI'K

The Years of German Occupation, 1939-1945: The First Totalitarian Attack on the Czech Economy *

249

B. C O N T E M P O R A R Y CZECHOSLOVAKIA

1. Political Aspects PETER A . TOMA

The Political Role of the Coup of February 1948 in the History of Socialist Revolutions *

269

VRATISLAV BUSEK

Action Committees: A Case Study of the Application and the Use of Action Committees in the Czechoslovak Nationalist Socialist Party *

296

VLASTISLAV J . CHALUPA

The Power Structure of Today's Czechoslovakia * . . . .

334

CURT F . BECK

Czechoslovakia's Relations with Underdeveloped Countries *

352

JAN F . TftisKA

Czechoslovakia and the World Communist System *

. . .

PAVEL TIGRID

Czechoslovakia Twenty Years After

364 378

M I NEHNEVAJSA

Futures of Czechoslovakia: Some Alternatives - Steps toward an Analytical Model *

393

2. Social and Economic Aspects GREGOR LAZARCIK

Economic Growth of Czechoslovakia Since World War II .

419

V . E . ANDIC

Short- and Long-Term Aspects of Changes in Czechoslovak Agriculture since the Second World War *

436

Table of Contents

12 JAN MICHAL

The New Economic System in Czechoslovakia

447

H U G O M . SKALA

The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance: Its First Fifteen Years *

464

JAROSLAV G . POLACH

Czechoslovak-Polish Cooperation in Peaceful Applications of Nuclear Energy: Foundation and Results *

476

MICHAEL SUMICHRAST

Czechoslovak Postwar Housing: A Case Study of Communist Czechoslovakia Housing Production as Compared to the United States *

494

ALOIS ROZEHNAL

Public Welfare in Today's Czechoslovakia *

524

OTTO U L C

Class Struggle and Civil Law: The Case of Czechoslovakia * .

537

STEFAN KOCVARA

Property Rights of Aliens under the Legal Order of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic *

556

3. Cultural Aspects NIKOLAUS LOBKOWICZ

Contemporary Czechoslovak Philosophy *

577

VACLAV MUDROCH

The Age of John Hus in Recent Czechoslovak Historical Literature (1948-1961) *

581

JOSEPH F . ZÄÖEK

Palacky: A Marxist Portrait *

594

GEORGE KÄRNET

The Literature of De-Stalinization *

607

JANA M . FEIERABEND

Art in Communist Czechoslovakia

615

Table of Contents

13

VLADIMIR SLAMECKA

Total Planning of Science on the National and International Levels *

624

JAN ROCEK

The Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences *

633

C. C Z E C H O S L O V A K I A A N D T H E W O R L D

1. Czechoslovakia

and its Neighbors: Nationalism

versus

Federalism

FELIKS GROSS

Central Eastern Europe at the Mid-Century *

641

ROBERT A . KANN

Czechoslovakia and Austria *

649

STEPHEN BORSODY

Czechoslovakia and Hungary *

661

PIOTR S . WANDYCZ

Attempts at Czechoslovak-Polish Cooperation: Achievements and Failures *

673

R A D U R . FLORESCU

Czechoslovakia and Rumania: A Brief Historical Retrospect

682

JOSEF KORBEL

Czechoslovak-Yugoslav Relations, 1933-1938 *

703

BOGDAN RADITSA

Natonalism versus Federalism in Central and Southeast Europe *

725

JOSEPH HAJDA

Czechoslovakia's Federalist Heritage: A Historical Perspective

GEORGE LISKA

2. Czechoslovakia

736

and Great Powers

Czechoslovak Independence and the Great Powers: Retrospect and Prospect *

747

14

Table of

Contents

GERHARD L . WEINBERG

Czechoslovakia and Germany, 1933-1945 *

760

HARRY HANÄK

Great-Britain and Czechoslovakia, 1918-1948: An Outline of their Relations

770

J . F . N . BRADLEY

Franco-Czechoslovak Relations 1918-1948

801

D. CZECHS AND SLOVAKS ABROAD JOSEPH S . R O U Ö E K

The American Czechs, Slovaks, and Slavs in the Development of America's "Climate of Opinion" *

815

VOJTECH N . D Ü B E N

The Journalistic Endeavors of Czech and Slovak Exiles (1945-1964) *

844

PETR D E N

Czech Poets in Exile *

860

FRANTISEK V N U K

Slovak Exile Literature

869

A CZECHOSLOVAKIA THROUGH THE SECOND WORLD WAR

1 RISE AND FALL OF THE FIRST CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC HISTORICAL ASPECTS

The Role of President Wilson in the Foundation of Czechoslovakia VICTOR S. MAMATEY

Before World War II, the Western traveler arriving by rail in Prague would detrain at the Wilson Station. Coming out of the station, he would face Wilson Square and Wilson Park, with a statue of Woodrow Wilson at its center. In the proclamation of Czechoslovak independence on October 28, 1918, Wilson was mentioned in conjunction with Masaryk as one of Czechoslovakia's liberators.1 In the light of Wilson's background, training, and early career, it is rather surprising that he should have become one of Czechoslovakia's liberators. A son of a Presbyterian minister of recent Scottish origin, Woodrow Wilson was born in Virginia in 1856 and raised in Georgia. Like Masaryk, whose junior he was by six years, he was trained for an academic career at Princeton University, of which he later became president. In 1910, however, he left the academic world for a political career, achieving election to the office of governor of the state of New Jersey. Two years later, in 1912, he was elected twenty-seventh president of the United States. There was little to indicate at that time that he would become a symbol of American internationalism and the patron-saint of Czechoslovakia, as well as of Poland and Yugoslavia. "Three thousand miles of sea", he once said, "roll between us and the elder past of the world. We are isolated here. We cannot see other nations in detail, and looked at in the large they do not seem like ourselves." 2 He was originally a believer in the American isolationist tradition. At the time of his inauguration in 1913, he remarked to a friend: "It would be an irony of fate if my administration had to do chiefly with foreign affairs." 3 Until the outbreak of the European war, 1 For the text of the proclamation, see FrantiSek Soukup, 28. rijen 1918, 2 Vols. (Prague, 1928), II, p. 1007. 2 Ray S. Baker, Wooodrow Wilson: Life and Letters, 8 Vols. (New York, 192739), V, p. 1. 3 Ibid., IV, p. 55.

20

Victor S. Mamatey

a little over a year later, he busied himself with his program of internal reforms, the "New Freedom", and paid scanty attention to world affairs. The outbreak of World War 1 surprised and saddened him. His reaction to it was that, as in the case of past European wars, the United States must stay out of this European conflict. On August 4 he formally proclaimed American neutrality and exhorted the Americans to remain "neutral in fact as well as name" and "impartial in thought as well as in action".4 Observing neutrality and making efforts to mediate between the belligerents were the two guiding principles of his policy until 1917. It was under the slogan, "He kept us out of war", that he was reelected to the presidency in November 1916.5 The United States, however, was inexorably drawn into the war, and Wilson was forced by the logic of his own principles to modify his policies. He changed gradually from a neutralist to an interventionist, and from an isolationist to an internationalist. Once achieved, however, his metamorphosis was complete and sincere. He was too intelligent a man not to learn from experience and intellectually too honest not to admit to a changed point of view. As early as May 27, 1916, in his first public bid to mediate between the belligerents, he put at the head of the list of his peace principles the following: ". . . Every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live." 6 This was the principle of national selfdetermination, which he thereafter consistently advocated as the safest basis for the postwar reorganization of Europe. But he was reluctant to accept its ultimate logic, namely, the dismemberment of the multinational Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman empires. In his famous war address to Congress on April 2, 1917, he spoke eloquently of fighting "to make the world safe for democracy" and of the determination of the Americans to fight for "the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and obedience",7 but he recommended to Congress to declare war on Germany alone and not on her allies - Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. 4

Ray S. Baker and William E. Dodd (eds.), The Public Papers of Wooodrow Wilson: The New Democracy, 2 Vols. (New York, 1926), I, p. 158. 5 On Wilson's policy of neutrality, see especially: Arthur S. Link, Wilson: the Struggle for Neutrality, 1914-1915 (Princeton, 1960) and Wilson: Confusions and Crises, 1915-1916 (Princeton, 1964); Ernest R. May, The World War and American Isolation, 1914-1917 (Cambridge, Mass., 1959). * Baker and Dodd, The New Democracy, II, pp. 184-5. 7 Baker and Dodd (eds.), The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: War and Peace, 2 Vols. (New York, 1927), I, pp. 6-16.

President Wilson and Czechoslovakia

21

In August 1917, in his reply to the peace appeal of Pope Benedict X V , he wrote that "the dismemberment of empires . . . we deem inexpedient".8 On December 4, 1917, when he recommended a declaration of war on Austria-Hungary in his annual message to Congress, he hastened to add: " W e owe it, however, to ourselves to say that we do not wish in any way to impair or rearrange the Austro-Hungarian Empire." 9 And on January 8, 1918, in Point Ten of his celebrated Fourteen Points Address, he called for giving the peoples of Austria-Hungary "the freest opportunity of autonomous development",10 but not yet independence. Wilson's policy toward Austria-Hungary and her people was thus equivocal. The reasons for this were several. First, he hesitated to encourage the aspirations of the Czechs and Slovaks and other subject peoples of the Habsburg monarchy for fear that the destruction of the empire would lead to the "balkanization" of East Central Europe - a belief widespread among the Allies at the time. Secondly, until the arrival of Masaryk in the United States in May 1918, the information available to Wilson about the aims and strengths of the Czechoslovak movement for independence was quite limited.11 From the beginning of the war, it is true, Czech and Slovak immigrant organizations in the United States propagandized in favor of the establishment of an independent Czechoslovak state. As the motto of this propaganda, they used a passage on Czech aspirations in Wilson's book, The State: Elements of Historical and Practical Politics, first published in 1889: " N o lapse of time, no defeat of hopes, seems sufficient to reconcile the Czechs of Bohemia to incorporation with Austria." 12 In 1917, the CzechSlav Press Bureau, under the direction of Charles Pergler, an Iowa lawyer of Czech origin, was established in Washington to centralize and systematize this propaganda.13 However, its influence on American official and public opinion remained limited as long as there was little indication of the actual attitude of the Czechs and Slovaks at home James Brown Scott (ed.), Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals, December 1916 to November 1918 (Washington, 1921), pp. 133-6. 9 Baker and Dodd, War and Peace, I, pp. 132-42. 10 Ibid., pp. 155-62. 11 Victor S. Mamatey, The United States and East Central Europe, 1914-1918: a Study in Wilsonian Diplomacy and Propaganda (Princeton, 1957), pp. 102-8. 12 Woodrow Wilson, The State: Elements of Historical and Practical Politics, rev. ed. (Boston, 1903), p. 336. 13 On Czechoslovak propaganda in the United States, see especially: Charles Pergler, America in the Struggle for Czechoslovak Independence (Philadelphia, 1926) and Vojta BeneS, Ceskoslovenska Amerika v odboji (Prague, 1931).

8

22

Victor S. Mamatey

toward the question of independence. Finally, Wilson withheld his support from the Czechoslovak movement for independence for tactical reasons having to do with the over-all Allied policy in the war. The United States, Britain, and France, though not Italy or Russia, regarded Germany as their principal adversary. Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey were only secondary enemies. The allies were inclined to be reasonable with the allies of Germany if the latter were ready to break with Germany. Such a possibility seemed to arise when the young Emperor Charles succeeded to the Habsburg throne upon the death of the Emperor Francis Joseph in November 1916. Soon after his accession, the Emperor Charles put out peace feelers to the Allies. These convinced the Allied leaders and Wilson that Austria-Hungary was prepared to conclude a separate peace, which would leave Germany isolated. In secret negotiations, conducted intermittently from February 1917 to April 1918, the United States, France, and Britain each tried its hand at luring Vienna away from Berlin by holding out the hope to Austria-Hungary that her territorial integrity might be respected, and even promising her territorial gains.14 Only when these negotiations finally broke down, in April 1918, did American and Allied policy definitely shift from wooing Vienna to threatening her, by openly encouraging her disaffected nationalities to revolt. On May 29, 1918, Secretary of State Robert Lansing announced the new course in a cautious declaration of the "sympathy" of the United States Government for the aspirations to freedom of the Czechoslovaks and Yugoslavs.15 On June 3, the British, French, and Italian premiers associated themselves with Lansing's declaration in a statement of their own, issued at the meeting of the Allied Supreme War Council at Versailles.16 A month later, on June 28, Lansing followed with a more explicit statement calling for the complete liberation of the Slavs from 14

On the secret negotiations between the Allies and Austria, see: G. Manteyer (ed.), Austria's Peace Offer, 1916-1917 (London, 1921); François Charles-Roux, La paix des empires centraux (Paris, 1947); R. Fester, Die Politik Kaiser Karls (Munich, 1925); Heinrich Benedikt (ed.), Die Friedensaktion der Meinlgruppe, 1917-18 (Graz, 1962); and W. Steglich, Die Friedenspolitik der Mittelmächte (Wiesbaden, 1964). ls For the text of the declaration, see: U. S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The World War, 1918, Supplement I, 2 Vols. (Washington, 1933), I, pp. 808-9. For an explanation of its genesis, see Mamatey, op. cit., pp. 252-61, and Robert Lansing, War Memoirs (Indianapolis, 1935), pp. 267-70. U.S. Department of State, The World War, 1918, Suppl. I, I, pp. 809-10.

President Wibon and

Czechoslovakia

23

German and Austrian rule.17 The endorsement of their aspirations by the United States and the Allies was most welcome to the leaders of the Czechoslovak movement for independence, for it came at a time when their previous hopes of achieving independence under the Russian aegis were definitely dashed by the peace of Brest-Litovsk of March 3, 1918. At the beginning of the war, nationalist Czechs and Slovaks naturally looked to Russia for liberation, not only because Russia was a Slav power, but because she was, before the Italian intervention in 1915, the only major Allied power which fought Austria-Hungary directly. From the vantage point of Prague, Vienna, and Budapest alike, Russia was at that time the only Allied power that counted; France was definitely secondary, and insular Britain hardly figured at all. As the notorious Russian "steamroller" moved into Galicia, Czech and Slovak hopes for Russian liberation ran high, as a little popular ditty sung in Prague indicated: "Pecte husy pro ty Rusy, az pfijdou na posviceni" ("Roast geese for the Russians who will be here for the day of consecration", meaning the day of St. Wenceslaus, the patron-saint of Bohemia). The ardently Russophil Karel Kramaf, leader of the Young Czech Party in the Reichsrat in Vienna, later to be the first Czechoslovak prime minister, quietly passed the word to Czech political leaders to sit tight and wait for the Russians, for, as he put it, "the Russians will do it alone". 18 Czech nationalist politicians then adopted and, until the Russian Revolution and American intervention in 1917, maintained a prudent wait-and-see policy. The few politically conscious Slovak leaders likewise remained quite passive.19 Not all Czechs, however, eagerly awaited the Cossack liberators. The Czech Social Democrats, who had emerged from the last Reichsrat elections in 1911 as the largest Czech political party, shared the distrust of European socialists for Tsarist Russia, as a bastion of reaction and the most dangerous foe of socialism. Moreover, in harmony with European socialist thought at the time, which favored large-area economy (Grossraumwirtschaft), they did not wish to break up the great economic unit that the multinational Habsburg Empire constituted, but only to transform it into a socialist federation, for they were convinced "

18

Ibid., p. 816.

ZdenSk Tobolka, Politicke dejiny ceskoslovenskeho naroda, 4 Vols. (Prague, 1937), IV, p. 53. " For a systematic review of the attitude of the Czech and Slovak parties and leaders toward the question of independence at the beginning of the war, see ibid., pp. 47-57.

24

Victor S. Mamatey

that an independent Czech state would be economically unviable. As late as 1913, in their "2ofin program",20 the Czech Social Democrats reaffirmed their loyalty to Austria-Hungary on these grounds. After the outbreak of the war, the Czech socialists were caught between socialist duty, which was to fight the reactionary Russian colossus, and the hopes of Czech nationalism, which looked to Russia for liberation. They did not show the same "social patriotism" toward Austria and hostility toward Russia as did their German-Austrian comrades. In fact, many rank-and-file Czech socialists were unable to resist the call of Slav brotherhood. But the official Czech Social Democratic Party, under the leadership of Dr. Bohumil Smeral, a left-winger and one of the founders of the future Czechoslovak Communist Party, continued until 1917 to adhere to the 2ofin program, and remained aloof from the struggle for national independence. A few Czechs and Slovaks - very few - looked neither to Tsarist Russia nor to a socialized Austria, but to the Western democracies for salvation. They were a handful of intellectuals, influenced by Western thought. Among them in particular was Professor Thomas Masaryk, representative of the Czech Realist Party in the Reichsrat and later the first president of Czechoslovakia. He was a Russophil, just as much as Kramar, but his was, in his own words, an "open-eyed love" 21 for Russia. He had great admiration for Russian culture, of which he was a profound student,22 but, as a convinced democrat and humanitarian, he had no admiration for reactionary Tsarist Russia and no confidence in her capacity or desire to liberate the Czechs and Slovaks. Although he had entertained no idea of Czech independence before the war,23 the great battles on the Marne River and at Tannenberg in August and September 1914 convinced him that, contrary to general belief at the time, the war might prove to be long and arduous; that the Western 20

The Zofin program deemed it necessary, "for the sake of the best conditions of development of the peoples inhabiting Central Europe and their proletariat, not least for the sake of the Czech people and proletariat, to support everything that really and reasonably contributes to the preservation and development of a large economic area in a state in the center of Europe, the historical expression of which is today Austria-Hungary". See ibid., p. 52. 21 Thomas G. Masaryk, The Making of a State, 1914-1918: Memories and Observations (London, 1927), p. 38. 22 See Masaryk, The Spirit of Russia, 2 Vols., rev. ed. (New York, 1955). This book, first published in German in 1911 as Russland und Europa, and translated into English in 1919, is truly a significant study of pre-Marxist Russian thought. 23 See Masaryk's article in Cas, May 18, 1909, reprinted in Evzen Stern, Ndzory T. G. Masaryka (Prague, 1918), p. 60.

President Wilson and Czechoslovakia

25

democracies, with their efficient economic, social, and administrative structures, might play a role in the war more important that the Czechs realized at the time; and that, on the contrary, the conservative, multinational Austrian and Russian empires, with their antiquated and inefficient systems might play a lesser role, that they might, in fact, break up under the strain of total war and make room for a number of relatively small national states in East Central Europe. It was, therefore, important, he thought, to convince the governments of the Western powers of the necessity for Czechoslovak independence, and commit them to its support. After a preliminary trip to Holland to sound out Allied opinion, Masaryk definitely exiled himself in December 1914. In the following year, he established, with his disciple and life-long collaborator, Edvard Benes, and another disciple, the colorful Slovak, Milan Stefanik, a scientist, astronomer, meteorologist, and (since the outbreak of the war) aviator in the French Army Air Force, the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris, which became the headquarters of the Czechoslovak movement for independence. Yet even Masaryk, distasteful though it was to him, shared at this time the general Czech expectation that postwar Czechoslovak would be a monarchy under a Romanov prince.24 Apart from this belief, however, events were to prove Masaryk a pretty accurate prophet. In 1915, the Central Powers defeated Russia and drove her out of Poland. Then began the internal Russian malaise, which steadily deepened until it burst forth in the great Russian Revolution. The fall of the Russian monarchy in March 1917, and the American declaration of war in April caused a gradual reorientation of Czech opinion and of the politically conscious Slovak opinion. The Russophil nationalists were disheartened. Alois Rasin, the future Finance Minister of Czechoslovakia, when he heard of the fall of the Russian monarchy, told Kramar in jail, where both were under sentence of death, "We are finished",25 for he had despaired of Czech liberation. But other Czech politicians, deprived of the hope of Russian liberation, decided to help themselves by claiming self-determination, which both the Russian revolutionaries and the American crusaders for democracy had put on their banner. They abandoned the cautious wait-and-see policy and 24

See Masaryk's memorandum on "Independent Bohemia" of April 1915 to the British Government, in Robert W. Seton-Watson, Masaryk in England (London, 1943), pp. 116-134. 35 Tobolka, op. cit., IV, p. 54.

Victor S. Mamatey

26

used the Reichsrat, which was convoked in May 1917, for the first time since the beginning of hostilities, as a tribune from which to voice their grievances and ambitions. In their ever-bolder manifestoes, they were soon joined by the socialists. The fall of the reactionary Russian autocracy had dissipated the fears of the Czech socialists. On the contrary, Russia now stood in the forefront of the socialist camp. This permitted the Czech socialists to be good nationalists and socialists, all at the same time. In the fall of 1917, the left-winger, Smeral, who had remained loyal to the old Austrophil program of the socialists, was quietly removed from the leadership of the party and replaced by the right-winger, Gustav Habrman, paradoxically, an authentic proletarian and not a bourgois intellectual like Smeral, who put the party in the forefront of the independence movement.26 In London, Masaryk was jubilant over the fall of the Russian monarchy. To Paul N. Miliukov, the Foreign Minister in the Russian Provisional Government and friend of the Czechoslovak cause, he wired: "The solution of Slav questions is now assured. . . . Free Russia means the death of Austria-Hungary." 27 He shared the belief, widespread in Allied circles at the time, that the revolution would rekindle Russia's dying war spirit and that the Russian revolutionaries, like the French in 1792, would go on a revolutionary crusade. The fall of the Russian monarchy naturally buried the plan for a Bohemian monarchy under a Romanov prince, and permitted Masaryk to plan for a Czechoslovak republic. He made plans to leave at once for Russia, the doors of which had been closed to him under the Tsar. However, his hopes in revolutionary Russia proved disappointing. On May 15, the day of his arrival in Petrograd, Miliukov, the most determined advocate of Russia's continued participation in the war, was swept out of office. Alexander Kerensky, the Minister of War and new strong-man of the Provisional Government, was unfriendly to the Czechoslovak cause.28 What was worse, he failed to rekindle the waning spirit of the Russian army. After the collapse of the Russian offensive in July, in which the Czechoslovak Corps was one of the few units that distinguished itself (Battle of Zborov), the Russian army began to disintegrate. In the words of Lenin, whose anti-war propaganda they increasingly heeded, Russian » Ibid., p. 279.

27

Edvard BeneS, Svetova valka a nase revoluce (3 vols., Prague, 1929), III:

Dokumenty, No. 257, pp. 615-6. Josef Kudela, Profesor Masaryk a cs. vojsko na Rusi (Prague, 1923), p. 69.

28

President Wilson and Czechoslovakia

27

soldiers "voted for peace with their feet". On November 8, the morrow of the Bolshevik coup d'état, Lenin issued his famous "peace decree," and Russia sued for peace. The United States, and the ability of its army to reach Europe in time to assure Allied victory, then remained the last hope of the Czechoslovak movement for independence. Its leaders took for granted American support of the Czechoslovak cause. Wilson's advocacy of selfdetermination and his reference to the "proud state of Bohemia" in his Flag Day Address of 1917 29 seemed to bear it out. Therefore, the Fourteen Points address of January 1918, which called only for autonomy, not independence, for the Austrian peoples, caused them great disappointment. It was this revelation that made Masaryk determine to leave Russia for the United States, in order to plead the Czechoslovak cause personally before Wilson.30 After negotiating the transfer of the Czechoslovak army from Russia to France, Masaryk set out through Siberia and Japan to the United States. When he arrived in Washington on May 9, the American shift from a pro- to an anti-Austrian policy was just being decided. Although he did not directly influence this decision,31 his arrival in the United States gave the Czechoslovak movement in this country firm and eloquent leadership and assured its success. On September 3, partly owing to his efforts and partly to the military efforts of the Czechoslovak units in Siberia, Italy, and France, the United States Government recognized the Czechoslovak National Council of Paris as a de facto Allied government and the Czechoslovak armies in Russia, Italy, and France as Allied co-belligerent forces.32 Unlike the earlier American declarations of "sympathy", the recognition of the Czechoslovak National Council as a de facto government constituted a firm commitment on the part of the United States to support Czechoslovak independence. This was presently put to the test when, in September, the Austrian government resumed its peace drive. On October 4, Austria and Germany sued for peace on the basis of the Fourteen Points. Since Point Ten called for the internal reorganization of the Austrian empire, the acceptance of the Fourteen Points by Vienna made Wilson the arbiter Baker and Dodd, War and Peace, I, pp. 60-7. Masaryk, The Making of a State, p. 246. 31 Mamatey, op. cit., pp. 280-6. 32 See text in U.S. Department of State, The World War, 1918, Suppl. 1, I, p. 368. For a description of the origin of the recognition, see Mamatey, op. cit.,. pp. 300-11. 30

28

Victor S. Mamatey

of Austria's internal affairs. On the other hand, since Point Ten envisaged only autonomy, not independence, for the Austrian nationalities, the Austrian peace note put Wilson into the difficult position of having to state openly whether he still considered himself bound by Point Ten or by his subsequent commitment to support Czechoslovak independence. He delayed his answer for two tense weeks, during which the Emperor Charles tried to comply with Point Ten by issuing a manifesto on the federalization of the Austrian half of the empire (owing to Magyar opposition, Hungary was not affected), and Masaryk countered by issuing the Declaration of Czechoslovak Independence in Washington. 33 On October 19, at last, Wilson replied to Vienna that since the issuance of the Fourteen Points in January, he had committed himself to support Czechoslovak and Yugoslav aspirations to freedom, and that, therefore, they, and not he, would have to decide what would satisfy them,34 autonomy or independence. Historians of both pro- and anti-Habsburg persuasion, 35 with the exception of the post-World War II Communist historians in Czechoslovakia,36 are agreed that Wilson's note of October 19 was the point of departure for the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire. The Czech National Committee in Prague interpreted it and its acceptance by Vienna on October 27 as releasing the Czechs and Slovaks from allegiance to the Habsburg Empire. On the following day, October 28, it issued the first Czechoslovak "law", which stated tersely: "The independent Czechoslovak state has come into being." 37 To sum up, Wilson had a strong influence on the Czechoslovak movement for independence and, in turn, was influenced by it. His propaganda stimulated it and led it from conservative monarchist to progressive democratic channels. In turn, he was forced by its demands to modify his policy toward Austria-Hungary. Contrary to allegations often 33

See text of the Manifesto of the Emperor Charles in U.S. Department of State, The World War, 1918, Suppl. 1, I, pp. 367-8, and the text of the Czechoslovak Declaration of Independence in ibid., pp. 847-9. 34 Ibid., p. 368. 35 See Edmund von Glaise-Horstenau, The Collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (London, 1930), p. 221; Count Stephen Burian, Austria in Dissolution (London, 1925), p. 410; Jan OpoCensky, The Collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Rise of the Czechoslovak State (Prague, 1928), pp. 65-75; Friedrich Wieser, Österreichs Ende (Berlin, 1919), pp. 264-6; Soukup, 28, rljen 1918, II, pp. 979-81; Z. A. B. Zeman, The Break-up of the Habsburg Empire, 1914-1918 (London, 1961), p. 233. 36 J. S. Häjek, Wilsonovskd legenda v dejinäch CSR (Prague, 1953), p. 112. 37 Soukup, 28. fijen 1918, II, p. 1007.

President Wilson and Czechoslovakia

29

made by Czechoslovakia's enemies, Masaryk did not hoodwink Wilson and persuade him on the basis of falsehoods to destroy the Austrian empire. He had few personal contacts with the President and no direct personal influence on him. However, his able propaganda did help greatly to convince Wilson that he (Masaryk) and the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris represented the true wishes of the Czechs and Slovaks, and that he (Wilson) had to support them if he were to remain true to his principles. In receiving Charles Pergler, the first diplomatic "agent" of the National Council in Paris accredited to the United States Government, on September 9, 1918, the President told him: "By your conduct throughout the war, especially by your armies, you have demonstrated that you insist upon complete independence. We have merely recognized an accomplished fact." 38

38

Pergler, op. cit., pp. 55-6.

Formative Years of the First Republic of Czechoslovakia The Statesmanship

of Antonin Svehla

ANTHONY PALECEK

The sudden decision of the German war lords at the end of September 1918 to ask for armistice terms came as a surprise not only to the Allied and Associated Powers, but also to the rebellious nationalities of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Following the breakthrough of the German front in August, there was a general belief that although the German army this time was definitely on the retreat, it would still offer resistance for some time and might be finally beaten in the course of the planned offensive in the spring of 1919. When, therefore, early in October, surprised by the speed of events, the National Committees, embryos of future governments of the successor states, arose (the Yugoslav on October 6, the Polish on October 7, the Rumanian early in October,1 the Austrian on October 21, and the Hungarian on October 23), it was more than likely that these ad hoc agreements of the leading parties and personalities would be temporary and particularly in the case of the Yugoslavs and Rumanians, the final character of the government would be determined by the Serbian and Rumanian regimes. Unlike these organizations, the Czechoslovak National Committee was not a newcomer. It had been in existence since November 1916 when it was organized to meet emergencies. Having fulfilled its mission, it dissolved early in 1918, but came to life again in July of that year, thoroughly remodelled as a self-appointed, generally recognized spokesman of the Czech people. The declared objectives of the first and second Committees were as far apart as the causes which had brought them into existence, and there was also a radical change in their personnel. At the end of 1916, when Germany and Austria declared their intention of creating a Polish kingdom or, rather, protectorate, and Austria expressed her readiness to give a new status to its province, Galicia (in1

Victor S. Mamatey, The United States and East Central Europe (Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 323, 327, 336.

1914-1918

Formative Years of the First Republic

31

habited by the Poles), the Czech leaders naturally became alarmed. For two years, their people had been exposed to an unrelenting process of Germanization, much more vigorous than they or their fathers had experienced before, and those administrative measures were now to culminate in the reorganization of the Austrian half of the monarchy, which would reduce the Slav majority in the Imperial Diet and deliver the Czechs and Slovenes to the tender mercies of the Pan-Germans. National self-preservation rather than self-determination was then the objective of the first Committee, whose voice in Vienna was the Czech Parliamentary Union. The odds, however, were against them, as was revealed in the first important declaration of the Union. In reply to President Wilson's peace note of December 1916, the Allied Powers, among others, spoke of the liberation of Czechoslovaks. This was hardly more than a ruse of war, as subsequent secret negotiations between France, Great Britain, and the Austrian Emperor revealed. Wilson's note, however, gave the Austrian government an opportunity to compel the Union to repudiate the Allied declaration. The Union was thus discredited in the eyes of Czech radicals, although it later managed to regain some prestige by its bold declaration at the opening session of the Imperial Diet at the end of May 1917. By that time, however, momentous international developments - the first Russian revolution, the entry of the U.S. into the war, and the liberalization of the Austrian regime - had thoroughly transformed the mood and outlook of the Czech leaders. Within a few months, the earlier depression of the Czech leaders gave way to the rising hope that, in the end, the fate of their people would be settled not in Vienna, but at the peace conference. As a result, the Parliamentary Union, as well as the Committee, receded into the background. What then seemed most important was to prepare the country internally for its coming independence. That meant, first of all, the restriction of the number of political parties inherited from the Austrian misrule. It was believed that, apart from the Social Democrats, Agrarians, and Clericals, who appealed to distinct class or ecclesiastical interests, there should be only one or, at the most, two urban, bourgeois parties (instead of the existing five) which would embody the best Czech traditions, Western political ideals, and those of the emerging, not yet Bolshevik, democratic Russia. Equally important seemed the task to eliminate, in all parties (particularly among the Social Democrats and Young Czechs), those men who, for one reason or another, had too long compromised themselves as "activists", that is, collaborators. Finally, it was thought imperative

32

Anthony

Palecek

to bolster the spirit of the country by organizing manifestations in Prague under the banner of self-determination, democracy, and social progress. This process took place roughly between the time of America's entry into the war and July 1918. In the end there emerged only two major urban parties, the National Democrats (as they were known later) and the Czechoslovak Socialists (later known as National Socialists). Having purged their ranks, the parties and the cultural leaders came out in January 1918 with the Epiphany Declaration, in April with the National Oath, and in May with the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the National Theater. This last manifestation was conceived and carried out as another Congress of Oppressed Austrian Nationalities, the first having been held a month before in Rome. Representatives not only of all Austrian Slav nations, but also of Austrian Italians and Rumanians were present. The galvanization of the Prague population following the May festivities was so successful that the Austrian government took alarm. It proceeded to ban public meetings and the wearing of the Entente colors, and sent the Slovene and Croat guests home.2 Czech leaders became alarmed, too. Their friends in Paris had been prodding them for some time to come out more openly against the Austrian government,3 and Prague manifestations indeed effectively helped the exiles in pleading the Czech cause in Paris.4 Yet, while Prague was on the verge of a revolution, the German offensive on the Western front was in full swing, and the puzzled Czech leaders were told that victory would not come before the spring of 1919.5 The fear that things might be getting out of hand was indeed one of the reasons which led them, in July 1918, to revive the National Committee in a new guise.6 They could not forget that a premature uprising in Prague in 1848, easily put down by the military, had spelled the end of the Czech liberal movement at that time. In their secret correspondence with Dr. Benes in Paris, they there2

Z. Tobolka, Politicke dejiny ceskoslovenske od r. 1848 az do dneSni doby [History of the Czechoslovak Nation from 1848 to the Present] Part IV, (Prague 1937), p. 360. 3 E. BeneS, Svetova valka a nase revoluce [World War and Our Revolution], Vol. Ill, (Prague 1928), pp. 111-113. Masaryk's and BeneS' message to Prague in the first days of April 1917. 4 Dr. BeneS' message to Prague, May 27, 1918. Ibid., p. 142. s Ibid., p. 145. 6 Jan HajSman, Mafie v rozmachu [The Heyday of the Mafia] (Prague 1934), p. 341.

Formative Years of the First Republic

33

fore kept arguing that a general rising in Prague might lead to the occupation of Bohemia by the German troops 7 or even degenerate into a social revolution.8 The establishment of the new central body did indeed have a sedative effect. The new Committee had been in preparation for several months, and the rising tension in the capital only accelerated the process. It was conceived this time as an embryo of the future Czechoslovak parliament. Its 40 members were appointed by the central committees of the reorganized parties in proportion to their respective strengths in the last Austrian elections of 1911. At the same time, the claims of the radical Czech Writers' Union to have a say in the leadership of the country were acknowledged by including nine of their members in the Committee. There were no further manifestations. Keenly aware of the social unrest caused by the food shortage, the Committee proceeded to organize an Economic Council, with branches in all Czech districts. Its purpose was to prevent the shipping of the year's harvest from the starving Czech district into that of the Germans. The Committee also undertook to draft the first laws to be promulgated on the day of liberation and to prepare a list of Czech-speaking Austrian officials who could move over to the Czech administration. In fact, it really behaved like a provisional government, for it even proceeded to raise money by taxing the "Union of Czech Cities" and the "Union of Czech Districts", two ad hoc organizations which it had created for this purpose.8 Having brought to heel the nationalist radicals of the Writers' Union, a month before the war ended the Committee was faced with an autburst of leftist radicalism. The Czech Socialist Council - a loose, antibourgeois organization - made an attempt in mid-October to take the wind out of the sails of the Committee by proclaiming a socialist republic in a number of cities. The plot was discovered in time and crushed before the Austrian military could intervene. The Austrian government, fearing a social revolution even more than the dismemberment of the state, was thus more or less disarmed on October 28 and 29, when the Committee put pressure on the authorities in Prague to surrender, first civil and then military power, insisting that that was the only way to prevent a social revolution. Equally important for the consolidation and authority of the Czech 7

BeneS, op. cit., p. 151. Prague message to Dr. BeneS, Oct. 11, 1918, Ibid. p. 185. » Tobolka, op. cit., p. 369. 8

34

Anthony

Palecek

leadership were its diplomatic victories during the tug-of-war with the Austrian government. They were the fruits of the brilliant Fabian tactics of the Czech agrarian leader Svehla, the secretary of the Committee, who appeared on this occasion, though not for the first time, as the mastermind of the Czech home front. 10 In reviving parliamentary life, the Austrian government was looking forward to professions of loyalty from the leaders of the dissident Czechs. These they received in the morning paper of the leading party, while its afternoon paper, much more widely read, and boldest of all papers, preached the national cause.11 The Declaration of the Parliamentary Union at the opening session of the Imperial Diet advocated nothing more revolutionary than the federalization of the Dual Monarchy, but the same statement advocated the inclusion of Slovaks, not Austrian, but Hungarian subjects, in the projected Czechoslovak member state. Finally, in the summer of 1917, the Czech Union briefly dangled before the eyes of the Austrian Premier the possibility of joining his "cabinet of nationalities," but in the end, the negotiations concerning Czech participation in the work of the Sub-Committee on the Reform of the Constitution were transferred to Prague, and there petered out in Svehla's office.12 In this way, a defenseless national minority led by a shrewd peasant leader managed, not only to sink the differences which divided the parties before the war, build a more or less united front, and tame the irresponsible elements within its ranks, but also to outwit and disarm the Austrian government, which had become its national enemy.13 It may safely be asserted that the common policy, built step by step by the leaders of the Czech home front as they emerged during the last 10 'The formation of the National Committee was arranged in his office. In the same office were edited the proclamations of the Czech Parliamentary Union. . . . There, too, a decision was reached regarding the composition of the Revolutionary National Assembly, and he solved the difficult problem of representation of various political parties in that body." F. Peroutka, Budovani statu [The Building of a State] (Prague, 1934), p. 892. 11 HajSman, op. cit., pp. 52, 53.

12 13

Ibid., pp. 125, 126.

After the war, Svehla's Fabian tactics were criticized in some circles as being of doubtful morality. They were known as his policy of "two irons in the fire". Dr. BeneS went on record, in this respect, when he wrote that he did not know of any country which would succeed in building its future on "false premises, two truths, two irons in the fire, or even fraud". Svehla was indeed reluctant for some time to define his objectives, as was Lincoln under similar circumstances, before he issued his Emancipation Proclamation. He felt that the cause which he was serving would lose rather than gain had he taken an unequivocal stand at the wrong moment.

Formative Years of the First Republic

35

two years of war created a new political climate of a kind which the Czech people had never known before. The prewar years told the story, first, of the Old Czechs, and then of the Young Czechs who, in turn, before the end of the century, disintegrated into a number of ideological and special interest groups almost as hostile toward each other as they were toward the Austrian regime. Now there was a real fellowship which included all the Czech and, later, also Slovak leaders, and which on the day of liberation was ready to accept within its ranks the German minority leaders, had they been willing to accept the Czechoslovak state. There were, then, three causes that produced this new climate which enabled the Czechoslovak democratic government to take root and grow. The first was the realization that Pan-Germanism, with its proclaimed objective of merging the Austrian and German empires after the war, endangered the very existence of all non-German Austrian nationalities. It was a case of national survival which, in 1916, had already brought even Czech Social Democrats, traditionally lukewarm in national matters, into the Union and the Committee. The second was the wise statesmanship of the Czech home front leaders, and the third, the concurrent triumphs of the Czechoslovak cause abroad. Masaryk and Benes went abroad during the first year of the war to plead the Czechoslovak cause. That cause and, indeed, the very word "Czechoslovak", in the first years of the war, was not much better known in the West than the name of some of the African republics in more recent times. It is on record that until May 1918 the word "Czechoslovak" never appeared in an editorial of the New York Times.14 By 1917, the Czech propaganda succeeded in arousing some interest in certain French and British circles, but there were probably many more influential persons turning a cold shoulder to Czech aspirations than there were friends of that cause. Then, in the summer of 1918, something unforeseen and unprecedented happened which put the Czechoslovaks overnight into the limelight. It was the rise of the Czechoslovak Legion in Russia and its brilliant military exploits.15 For a few months, the readers of the Western newspapers regularly saw on front-

14

H. A. Miller, "What Woodrow Wilson and America Meant to Czechoslovakia", in Czechoslovakia, ed. by Robert J. Kerner (University of California Press, 1949), p. 71. 15 The pages of history recall scarcely any parallel episode at once so romantic in character and so extensive in scale. Winston Churchill, The Aftermath (New York, 1929), p. 87.

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Anthony

Palecek

page reports about the victorious march of some 50,000 ragged soldiers, Czech prisoners of war in Russia, who, after the collapse of that country, formed an army and were not only willing but able to hold ground in the Russian and Siberian steppes against the Bolsheviks. The reports about their victories, their occupation of a large section of Eastern Russia, and of the Trans-Siberian railroad were the more welcome in the West because, during the same months, powerful German offensives on the Western front filled many statesmen with despair. There were people who indulged in the wild dream that perhaps this new ally might form the nucleus of a regenerated Eastern front. In the end, the German offensive was brought to a halt in July and an Eastern front was no longer needed. The Czechoslovak legion, too, was brought to a halt and the heyday of its victories was over. This episode, a telling proof of national vitality, more than anything else was responsible for the decision of the Western Powers to recognize Czechoslovakia, break up Austria-Hungary, and create a new central Europe.16 Until May 1918, the New York Times index may not have known of "Czechoslovaks" as a special category; in July and September, two full pages of the index were given to the Czechoslovak Army and a half-page to other aspects of the subject.17 The rise of the Legion baffled Masaryk and Benes, its nominal heads, as much as everybody else. Masaryk had then just arrived in the United States from Russia. Before leaving his army in Russia, he issued an order that the Legion remain neutral in Russian internal affairs. The clashes between the Czechs and the Bolsheviks, and, later, the open warfare, must have struck him as an unfortunate development and an act of disobedience. This was freely admitted by the new Army leaders, who pleaded that they had no choice. During the first months of his stay in America, he hesitated to approve the mission which by that time the Allies had assigned to his Legion, but eventually changed his mind and became its sprokesman.18 This opened the door to President Wilson for him, and, in September, led to the recognition of the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris as a de facto Czechoslovak " This version of events was by no means accepted universally in Czechoslovakia. There was another version which sought to downgrade the role the Legion played and credit the liberation of the country primarily to the foresight, wisdom, and diplomatic skill of Masaryk and BeneS (E. Benes, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 185, 201 and 202). 17 Miller, op. cit., p. 74. 18 Masaryk's vicissitudes in the United States are described in Mamatey, op. cit., pp. 280 ff.

Formative Years of the First Republic

37

Government, and the Czechoslovak army as a co-belligerent. In the spring of 1917, the Czech leaders in Prague had reestablished regular contacts with their spokesmen in the West. Later, they became elated by the successes of the Legion and by the subsequent support given to their cause by the Western Powers. In the last days of October, their delegates met with Dr. Benes at Geneva. They had no difficulty in coming to terms with him and Masaryk concerning the character of the régime and the composition of the first cabinet. There, too, they were luckier than some of the other successor states whose postwar régimes were from the beginning torn between the vested political interests represented by the prewar leaders and parties, and the new forces, territories, and ideas that the war had generated. Apart from the two fortunate circumstances of reaching the day of liberation with tried and trusted leadership at the helm of the new state, and full agreement between the spokesmen of the national cause abroad and at home, the country had the additional advantage of not being burdened initially with any major territorial conflicts. Although the clash with Poland over theTësin region, and another later with Communist Hungary, for a while drew attention to foreign affairs, neither these developments nor those after the Habsburg ruler's two attempts in 1921 to return to his Hungarian throne seriously affected the economy or the character of the régime. Like all its neighbors, the country was intermittently threatened for a few years with social revolution, but unlike them, it was not seriously distracted by foreign issues. Therefore, its leaders could concentrate on internal economic and social problems. In Geneva, the Czech leaders of the home front gave Dr. Benes full power in writing to represent them in Paris. There was then full agreement between the two parties, each of which had for some time played its own role of a provisional government. One might say that the first step was made at Geneva toward that peculiar division of powers which later characterized the Czechoslovak régime. There was a sort of tacit understanding that, while the internal affairs of the country were reserved to the people acting through their elected representatives and the responsible cabinets, the direction of foreign affairs in the first years should remain firmly in the experienced hands of Masaryk and Benes, in recognition of their achievements during the war. Dr. Benes indeed took charge of Czechoslovak foreign policy, and while France and England and the League of Nations dominated the European scene, he was able to preserve the country from harm.

38

Anthony

Palecek

Thus, months before anybody foresaw the end of the war in 1918, Czech people had a sort of shadow cabinet. The heads of the five leading parties (the Agrarians, Social Democrats, National Democrats, National Socialists, and Clericals), the core of the National Committee, who assumed power and, together with Masaryk and Bene§, formed the government of the new state, enjoyed the full trust of Czechs and Slovaks at all levels. They were so sure of their position that in order to avoid the loss of time incumbent on parliamentary elections, by common consent, they created a Revolutionary National Assembly by nominating a preestablished quota of members for each party as they had previously done in creating the National Committee. It was their intention to show the Allies, who had yet to determine the boundaries of their state, that while chaos prevailed in Germany, Austria, and Hungary, and while the other successor states were torn by internal dissension, the government of their country was firmly established. Before the boundaries were fixed by the Peace Treaties, they maintained, elections would have little real purpose anyway, and so it was resolved that the Revolutionary National Assembly should remain in power until a constitution had been drafted and ratified. It was generally understood that this constitution should give the country a democratic form of government and guarantee the rights of national minorities as the Allies prescribed, and that the government should forthwith give a democratic form to all its institutions and tackle without delay the most pressing social problems in both industry and agriculture. In this way, the Revolutionary National Assembly smoothed the road for the elected parliament by enacting laws like those of the eight-hour working day and land reform, and by giving the country a democratic constitution. These enactments would probably have been jeopardized if the requisite political and social legislation had been preceded - as in other countries - by elections which revealed the chaotic disunity of those countries. The plan, however, was fully successful for only a few months. The social revolutionary forces, based partly on prolonged suffering, and partly on the apparent success of socialism in Russia, could not be completely halted by any legislative measures, and a cabinet and parliament whose composition reflected the strength of political parties in the elections of 1911 could not hope to survive in an age which tended to identify democracy with socialism. That new force, or mood, made itself felt during the municipal elections of May 1919, which were called at the behest of the Social Democratic Party. Having won an overwhelming victory, it overthrew the

Formative Years of the First Republic

39

cabinet of "national harmony" from which two bourgeois parties had been excluded (National Democrats and Clericals), and put in power the force representing the original Czech response to the challenge of Marxism, the Red-Green (socialist-agrarian) coalition. This coalition was based on the partnership of the two most populous classes, the workers and peasants. The Social Democrats - still including both moderate and radical Marxists - whose success at municipal election was repeated a year later in parliamentary elections, appeared to be its driving force, while the Agrarians seemed mere subordinates. Yet the strangest thing about this partnership, which was meant to transform a bourgeois country into a socialist one without resorting to a revolution, and which withstood the frequent cabinet shuffles for seven years, was that its real leader was not the socialist Prime Minister, Tusar, but the Acting Prime Minister of the outgoing coalition, Antonin Svehla.19 It should puzzle students of history that so little has been written in Czechoslovakia and, all the more so, abroad about the character and achievements of this man, who subsequently became and, until 1929 when his illness drove him out of office, remained the political boss of Czechoslovakia. That he was not a run-of-the-mill politician was already known before the war.20 His leading role during the last years of the war has been fully acknowledged.21. Masaryk in 1928 told his people openly what some of them in 1919 had only guessed, namely, that Svehla was the real leader of the Red-Green coalition.22 That coalition, instead of introducing creeping socialism, under his leadership enabled Social Democrats in 1920 to purge their ranks of Communists, 19

Dr. Kramar, the Prime Minister, from January 1919 headed the Czechoslovak delegation to the Peace Conference. 20 "Boldy raising the power of the agrarian bourgeoisie by taking advantage of the contemporary social movement, he was already at that time (i.e., in 1906, ed. note) the strongest personality of our bourgeoisie, with the nickname of the "Red Agrarian". Z. Nejedly, O lidovou republiku [People's Republic] II (Prague, 1948), pp. 392-393. 21 "Antonin Svehla was always the great centripetal force of the nation. All the internal forces of national concentration, national revolution and national liberation grouped around him. This mighty unifying force was active during the revolution as well as in the Republic. The chief of the general staff of the revolutionary coalition became the chief of the general staff of the republican parliamentary coalition. "F. Soukup", 28. rijen, October 28 (Prague, 1929). Soukup was a Social Democratic leader. 22 "Those who paid more attention to facts than to words were well aware that the leader of the so-called Red-Green Coalition was Svehla...." T. G. Masaryk, interviewed by Karel tapek, Lidove noviny, Apr. 8, 1928.

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gave the country a progressive government supported by the lower middle class, and thus preserved it (when the reaction in Eastern Europe set in) from the calamities which became the lot of all of Czechoslovakia's neighbors. The land reform, stressing social rather than economic objectives, was chiefly his work, and without his party's support, the parliament would never have been able to pass advanced social legislation for the sole benefit of urban and industrial population. He gave shape to the constitution and secured its unanimous ratification. That constitution was drafted by a group of constitutional lawyers, supervised and directed by a parliamentary committee headed by Svehla. Like most of the new constitutions in Eastern Europe at that time, it mainly followed the French pattern, with some modifications imposed by the age of socialism and prewar experience in Austria. Thanks to Svehla, most of its provisions bearing on controversial issues became a bundle of compromises, enabling him to secure its unanimous ratification. On this as well as on other occasions Svehla seemed to be the only man in the country with the necessary authority, experience, and tact to bridge the gaps between conflicting ideologies and interests. After ratification of the constitution, the Parliament passed a vote of thanks to the ailing Svehla. The bill introducing the constitution names him first among its authors.23 When, in September 1920, Svehla's Social Democratic partners were split by the Communist secession, he did not hurry to form a bourgeois coalition, even though he was urged to do so. He feared that such a coalition would close the growing gap between his friends, the moderate socialists, and the lunatic fringe of their party, which, unfortunately, included the majority of workers. The result was the emergence of the first so-called cabinet of officials, which became the Czech designation for "caretakers' cabinets". Those cabinets did not depend on ad hoc majorities but were supervised, assisted and more or less directed by the "Committee" of "Five" ("Petka"). This was simply the offspring of the old National Committee. In the revolutionary atmosphere which followed the war, this group of trusted, responsible party leaders was revived by Svehla when it became apparent that the cabinet and parliament were not always in effective control, and that the voice of the President was a voice "crying in the wilderness". Even more important was the role of this body when cabinets of officials assumed power in 1921. Some of these officials were experienced administrators, but none 23

Peroutka, op. cit., p. 1442.

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was an experienced political leader. The "Committee of Five", an extraconstitutional body, as Svehla's critics liked to point out, ultimately evolved into the cabinet of political ministers. Svehla could have become Premier in 1919 or 1920. He assumed that office only in October 1922. His first cabinet, which remained in power for three years, had a longer life than any other. In the 1925 elections, his Social Democratic partners lost many votes to the Communists. They tired of governmental responsibility and, with Svehla's best wishes, sought to recover the favor of workers by withdrawing into opposition. 24 By that time, the ground was prepared for the participation of moderate Sudeten German parties - the Agrarians and Christian Socialists - in the government, and it was again due to this man's efforts that these German parties, together with other Czech and Slovak parties, were able to form a bourgeois coalition. For a time, this coalition was also supported by representatives of the Hungarian and Polish minorities, thus providing another proof of the vitality and liberal character of Czechoslovak democracy. 23 This latitudinarian, charismatic Czech leader may be regarded as the majordomo of the First Republic. 26 He was its consolidator and healer. 27 He was the only responsible statesman in Eastern Europe, and indeed, in the whole of Europe, who rose to power during the war and remained in power in fact, if not in name, during the first postwar decade, successfully molding the conflicting ideologies and interests of that age into a living democratic reality. His strategic nurturing of good feelings between the peasants and workers was certainly not shared by all his men nor by all Social Democrats. It was enough for him that it was shared by the leaders of both

24

"I did not stop liking the Socialists when they went into opposition. I liked them in fact so much that I had to be on guard lest my own people become jealous. A good opposition is an equally important guarantee for a democracy as a good majority." Svehla to Karel tapek in Drobty ze Svehlovych hovoru [Gleanings from Talks with Svehla] (Prague 1933). - One could hardly find another bourgeois Prime Minister in the interwar period who expressed similar sentiments about his socialist opposition. 25 "The presence of the German minorities in the Government coalition is mainly the result of Svehla's tact and genius for compromises." Bruce Lockhart, Retreat From Glory, (London, 1934), p. 79. 24 Peroutka, op. cit., p. 892, speaks about this "personal charm which even those who succumbed to it could not explain". 27 "He excelled in the ability to bring different men and trends under the same roof, rather than setting them against each other in the name of some noble idea." Peroutka, op. cit., p. 1472.

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parties. During his lifetime, and even after his death, his authority was so great that the Red-Green coalition was regarded as his legacy. So deep were its roots that it survived even the Munich catastrophe in a disguised form, when, in an effort to appease Hitler and his Munich partners, the Czech Social Democrats, in full agreement, if not in collusion, with the Agrarians, left the cabinet to serve as the National Party of Labor, in a nominal role of opposition.28 Had Svehla joined forces with the doctrinaire, nationalistic, anti-socialist bloc in 1920, Czech internal politics might have followed the Austrian course and ended in civil war or dictatorship. There are several reasons why so little has been written about this man, and why, consequently, there are so few documented historical studies dealing with the origin, nature, and operation of early Czechoslovak government. First, for reasons which he best understood, Svehla himself did not care for publicity and in fact discouraged it.29 He was born in a well-to-do peasant family. One of his brothers became a university professor and another a lawyer; as the youngest, he inherited the farm. He attended only elementary and agricultural schools.30 His father was one of the founders of the Agrarian Party and he thus learned early that his class, striving since the turn of the century for political power, received practically no sympathy from the educated conservative or progressive urban groups, which regarded the peasants as materialistic and culturally sterile. He knew that this centuries-old attitude, inherited from the times when the urban population was largely German, could not be changed overnight and, having organized his peasants as the strongest party 51 28

Most of the members of the other socialist party (National Socialists) joined the Party of National Unity, which formed the short-lived government of the Second Republic. According to the testimony of its premier, Rudolf Beran, all the important decisions of that government were taken after close consultation with the "opposition". 29 "Svehla was the complete antithesis of Benes. He had a horror of publicity, hated public speaking, and kept himself in the background as much as possible, but both in office and out of it his influence in the council chamber and in Parliament was supreme." Lockhart, op. cit., p. 79. 30 In his later years, Svehla became an avid reader of Czech history. He was attracted particularly by the Czech king, Charles IV, the Father of the Country, but he himself reminds one more of King George of PodSbrady (1458-71), whose slogan, "Gird yourself by friends, not by walls", might well have been his own. 31 Svehla's party became strongest only when, in 1922, the Slovak National Peasants Party merged with it. Unlike the Czech Agrarians, whose rank and file were peasants, the Slovak party was led by progressive intellectuals, some of

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and the cornerstone of all coalitions, he was ready to leave positions of honor to socially prominent men, scholars, writers, or orators, reserving to himself and his coalition partners the business of governing the country. Karel Capek, in his obituary, wrote that Svehla cherished power, but spurned acclaim. In the second place, tactful and selfless as he was, and a keen student of human nature as well, he strongly disappeared of what we now call the cult of personality. He was skeptical regarding the ability of the Czechs - in fact, of all Slavs - to build and maintain a republican government. Their two chief defects he identified as a disposition to anarchy, 32 and the cult of personality. His views on the later were forcefully expressed to the editor of the leading agrarian daily, who came to Svehla seeking permission to tell his readers something about Svehla's work on the occasion of his 60th birthday. (Eight months later he died.) The request was refused, and the editor wrote instead a report on their conversation, listing Svehla's arguments against adulation of prominent living men, the cause he hoped to help by the example he had been giving in his own party press from the first days of the Republic. Since his own people fully respected his desire not to publicize himself,33 practically all on record about him in the contemporary press consists of short, casual appraisals of his character and statesmanship by people from other political camps. Yet the profile that we thus obtain is an eloquent testimony to his character, wisdom, and statesmanship, all the more impressive for having come from his political rivals. Svehla and his party, and, to a lesser extent, all his coalition partners, naturally had their share of ill-wishers and detractors. These circles of leftist intellectuals - not all of them Communists or even Marxists held that the principles of 1918 called, not only for a political, but also an "economic democracy". The latter goal, they claimed, had been whom would have preferred to join the National Democrats. The decision of Hodza and his friends to merge with the Agrarians was the single outstanding feat of Slovak statesmanship. 32 Peroutka, op. cit., p. 1472. 33 Svehla's early years were the subject of a book by two Agrarian authors, O. Frankenberger and J. O. Kubiiek, Antonin Svehla (Prague, 1931). Their story ends, no doubt, at Svehla's request, in 1914. In 1955, two Communist authors produced a book entitled, The Agrarian State (E. and Z. Kucerova [O agrarnicky stdt]. As they could not help listing Svehla's achievements, the story, in spite of its Marxist jargon, reads as a grudging tribute to his statesmanship. It was withdrawn from the market and is not mentioned in current Czech bibliographies. The present writer's profile of Svehla appeared in the December 1962 issue of the Slavic Review.

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lost sight of when the Agrarians became the leading power. They blamed the leaders of both socialist parties for their lack of vision and energy and their subservience to Agrarians, who had presumably corrupted them by making them share the loaves and fishes of the office. They also regretted that Masaryk, whom they originally saw as the standard-bearer of democratic socialism, had not shown himself strong enough to hold ground against the Agrarians, and in this sense spoke of Agrarian "dictatorship." 34 In reality, the dominant position of the Agrarians, their stewardship of the state, was not so much due to the number of their voters as to the fact that Svehla's political strategy made their party the vital center. In the Red-Green coalition, they first had only 28 seats as against the 74 held by Social Democrats (40 seats, later, when the Slovak National Peasant Party joined them). Until 1926, Svehla could hold his ground only by directing the efforts of the government to the problems of the industrial and urban sector, while paying only scant attention to the needs of his own constituents. The idea of Agrarian "dictatorship" dates from the era of the bourgeois coalition (1926-29), whose formation came as a shock to Czech leftist intellectuals, who dubbed this coalition "feudal". Thereafter, the presence of the Agrarians in all coalitions was as much an irritant to the leftist intellectuals as the presence of Dr. Benes in all cabinets was to the Czech non-socialists. In 1919, some rightist urban circles, unable to forgive Svehla his partiality to the Social Democrats, sneered at his lack of education, his plain language, and the rustic expressions which he occasionally used in private conversation. The leftist intellectuals, in their turn, whispered among themselves that he was a cynic. This charge, however, described nothing more serious than his disdain of all doctrinaires, particularly when they tried to conceal their cross-objectives behind high-sounding phrases. With all its shortcomings, Czechoslovakia had a good name abroad. Since there was little glamor about its cabinet meetings and parliamentary life, and perhaps also in view of the well-known Prime Minister's aversion to publicity, the people responsible for public relations spread abroad the notion that the two men who had played the leading role abroad during the war, and were known to be in effective

34

Paul E. Zinner, Communist Strategy and Tactics in Czechoslovakia, (New York, 1962) p. 20.

1918-48

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control of foreign policy, had also a decisive word in domestic affairs.35 Yet no Czech or foreign writer has so far explained how Masaryk or Benes built coalitions, made or unmade cabinets, maintained them in power, formed parliamentary majorities, decisively influenced the results of elections, or played the leading role in the formulation or execution of any important internal policy. The Czechoslovak President's role has indeed been compared to that of the French president or the British king, and we have yet to hear of a president of the Third Republic or a modern British king of whom it could be said that they had run the government of their country. In the first years of the Republic, Dr. Benes for a year held the office of Premier. But finding himself unable to mold the government in his own image, he soon grew discouraged and resigned, although not without a sence of frustration.36 Reviewing his career at the end of his life, he wrote that, from the day of his return from the Peace Conference in September 1919, he was always in some kind of opposition to internal policy.37 It should be understood that Svehla did not do his work singlehanded. No democracy, nor any constitutional régime for that matter, ever came to life through the inspiration, wisdom, or energy of a single man - or of two men - nor was its existence assured without ceaseless conflict between opposing personalities, parties, tempers, ideologies, and interests. Svehla's staunchest supporters were his colleagues, leftist as well as rightist, party leaders and ministers 38 - but his most important single supporter was the President. Masaryk knew him from the prewar years and consulted him before going abroad. On his return to Prague after the war, he found Svehla in the office of the Minister of the Interior and a few weeks later as Acting Prime Minister. He soon had an opportunity to be convinced of Svehla's skill in handling men and affairs and of the effectiveness of his original response to the ideological challenge of the day.38 In 1927 he owed him his re-election.40 35

John W. Wheeler-Bennett, Munich: Prologue to Tragedy, (New York, 1948) p. 27. 39 Hary Klepetâf, Seit 1918. ... (Mor. Ostrava, 1937), p. 181. 37 Memoirs of Dr. Eduard Benes, (Boston, 1953), p. 10. 38 "The fact that the public knew very little of Svehla's plans and their motivation explains why he does not enjoy great popularity. . . . He only had the confidence of the people with whom he associated, but these men, though often his political rivals, had an absolute trust in him." Nase doba, 1928. Editorial remarks of the leading moderate Left Wing quarterly. 3 ' Masaryk returned to Prague on December 21, 1918. On Christmas Day, he

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The President thought well of the Prime Minister's statesmanship, generally supported his policy, and regarded him as his successor in the presidency. 41 He described him to Karel Capek as not only a great Czechoslovak, but also a European statesman. A philosopher by training and inclination, he did not think much of Svehla's or perhaps of any other political party. A gad-fly in Czech prewar cultural life, and later a venerated war-hero, he was twice elected before the war on his own ticket to the Imperial Diet, but only with the generous support of the Social Democrats. After the war, he openly declared his sympathies for socialism, stating that in all countries the Left was gaining ground and that he was not shaken in that conviction by any temporary or transient swing to the Right. It seemed to him that Svehla's partiality for Social Democrats supported that vision, which was not original. Svehla, however, had a new vision, applicable only in his part of Europe and realized only in his own country. N o other European thinker or statesman before him gave more than a passing thought to a common front of peasants and industrial workers, with the peasants playing the leading role, which would set up stable democratic governments, break the economic and political power of the feudal class, curb the age-old domination by the upper middle class, and tackle the social and moral

paid his first visit to Svehla in his native village south of Prague. In the stormy months that lay ahead, his Sunday trips to Svehla and Svehla's calls on the President on Thursdays became routine. Testimony of Mrs. H. Cerny, Svehla's daughter. 40 The Czechoslovak President was elected by the National Assembly, i.e., in a joint session of both Houses. The coalition in power at the time of the presidential elections of 1927 was that of Czech, German, and Slovak bourgeois parties. For some time, there was a strong movement in the Cabinet and Parliament to give the country a President who would not be committed to the Left. Since, the Communists excepted, nobody looked upon Masaryk as belonging to the bourgeois camp, and he himself had never made such a claim, Svehla seemed to these people the only logical alternative. For all we know, he would have been elected, had he so desired. His brisk rejection of his own draft and his firm stand in favor of Masaryk settled the matter unequivocally. J. Herben, T. G. Masaryk (Prague, 1946), p. 439. 41 "Until Svehla's serious illness, Masaryk did not conceal that he regarded him, and not Dr. Benes, as his immediate successor in the presidential office." Dr. Jaroslav Stransky in Ceske slovo, December 1958. [Stransky was a leading National Socialist.] Svehla never showed any interest in the presidency. When Masaryk once approached him with this idea, he declined the offer and expressed the view that Masaryk's successor would be neither himself nor Dr. BeneS, but some "president of an Academy". Peroutka, op. cit., p. 1505. In Bagehot's terms, Svehla wanted to keep the "dignified" and the "efficient" parts of Czech democracy strictly apart.

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problems created by industrial society as courageously as the most advanced liberal régimes of the West. All the other Western European countries have reached the democratic form of government only after having learned to govern themselves and to develop parliamentary habits during eras of conservatism and liberalism, dominated by the upper middle class. Czechoslovakia deserves special attention because it took a bold step from the Austrian pseudo-parliamentarism under which the court had always the last word in "national", and the nobility in provincial, matters, to a democratic form of government based on the lower middle class. Its foundations were solid ennough. It had demonstrated its ability to settle social problems by discussion, and had made a successful start in solving its minority problems. It was not on an internal, but on a foreign, issue that the country came to grief. There were altogether sixteen cabinets during the existence of the First Republic. The number, however, is misleading, for several of these cabinets were formed after nothing more serious than a reshuffle of ministerial posts in the same coalition. We may speak of four distinct periods in the political history of the First Republic, if we consider, not only the composition of the cabinets, but also the dominant issues they faced. The close understanding between Svehla and the socialist parties was in one form or another the cornerstone of all cabinets until 1926. There followed the bourgeois coalition whose purpose was the protection of the common interests of Czech and German peasants on one hand, and of Czech, German, and Slovak ecclesiastical interests on the other. As social policy characterized the first period, which started under the threat of a socialist revolution, so economic policy became the chief concern of the country when the Dawes Plan put German industry on its feet, and Canadian and American wheat began to flood the unprotected agricultural market. The participation of the German minority in the government was a courageous action, initiated by the German peasant leaders who were the least doctrinaire in the German camp, as were the Czech peasants in their own. 42 The bourgeois coalition lasted three years. Dissension between Czech Agrarians and Clericals after Svehla's retirement from politics, as well 42

German peasant leaders often spoke of their Czech neighbors as Landesbrueder. W. Jaksch, Europe's Road to Potsdam, (New York, 1963), p. 238. This fact, as well as the circumstance that no German party made its entry into the government contingent on the grant of any national concessions, militates strongly against the view that all or most Sudeten Germans were always rabid nationalists.

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as other causes, led to elections in 1929, followed by the third period. Both Czech socialist parties again felt strong enough to enter the cabinet and so, for the first time, did the German Social Democrats. One combination or another of Czech and German parties thereafter remained in power until the Munich days. Yet there was a profound difference not only between the tasks, but also the role of the cabinets in power before and after 1935. The first coalitions saw their primary tasks in the sphere of domestic affairs. The later coalitions were, from the outset, confronted with issues of foreign policy, which gradually took precedence over all others. Until 1935, foreign policy was reserved, by a decision of Masaryk, to the country's permanent Foreign Minister, Benes.43 In 1935 Benes became President and his old post was filled by a man who was understood to be merely the President's agent. Yet the responsibility for foreign policy in the most crucial period of Czechoslovak history rested upon cabinets which, in regard to foreign policy, were traditionally mere onlookers. Before 1935, the government of Czechoslovakia could be identified with responsible cabinets and, in the hours of crisis, with the "Five". After that year, not by Benes' own deliberate choice nor by any decision of the responsible cabinet, but by the inexorable logic of events, the views, objectives, and policies of the President in both foreign affairs and the dominant internal issue, the Sudeten German problem, as well as his reputation among Czechoslovakia's neighbors and his standing in the French and British chancelleries, mattered more than anything else.

45

The different views regarding the irreplaceability of Dr. BeneS as Foreign Minister was the most important question on which Masaryk and Svehla were far apart. Dr. Bene? was Deputy Chairman of the National Socialist Party, which in 1926 went into opposition. In conformity with the generally accepted constitutional usage. Svehla wanted to replace him with a man from the bourgeois coalition. Masaryk having threatened his own resignation should BeneS have to go, he accepted the inevitable. From that time, Dr. BeneS became - in practice irremovable from office.

The Entry of German Parties into the Czechoslovak Government in 1926*

j. w . BRtlGEL

After the conclusion of the Locarno pact in October 1925, which put the seal on the reconciliation between Germany and the West, cleared the way for Germany to enter the League of Nations, and also included an arbitration treaty between Germany and Czechoslovakia, spokesmen for the official Prague foreign policy became keenly interested in following this up with a kind of "internal Locarno". Dr. Benes, the country's Foreign Minister, who for years had shown hardly any interest in internal affairs, in a speech prior to the parliamentary elections, now publicly advocated the entry of Germans into the Government.1 He explained that he had gone to Locarno in order to conclude an agreement that there must never be a war between Germany and Czechoslovakia, and that he could offer the Germans in Czechoslovakia hardly anything better than the assurance never to drive them into a war with Germany: We wish the Germans to render unto the state what is the state's, and we shall also gladly render unto the Germans what is just and fair. We would like the other countries to realise, once and for all, that we have in our midst three million Germans who are struggling to achieve only what any other opposition is fighting for, namely, to participate in the government, in power, and in influence upon state administration, and not for aims which are those of the minorities in most other countries, i.e., their national and cultural survival.

But even after the decisive defeat at the 1925 elections of German National radicals, hostile to any cooperation with the Czechs, the Activ* Excerpt from the author's book, Tschechen und Deutsche, by kind permission of Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung (Munich). Translated from the German by Ernest J. Pories, London. 1 Prager Presse, 4 Nov. 1925.

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ists,2 led at that time by the Agrarian, Franz Spina, and the ChristianSocialist, Robert Mayr-Harting (to whom the three deputies of the small German Tradesmen's Party, who had been elected in 1925, attached themselves), did not dare to declare themselves unconditionally in favour of participation in the government. Before determining upon any course of action, the Activists tried to gain the backing of Berlin, which meant in the first place an approach to the German Minister in Prague, Dr Walter Koch (1870-1947), whose positive viewpoint concerning cooperation with the Czechs was obviously well known to them.3

APPEAL TO STRESEMANN

Towards the end of February 1926, Spina and Mayr-Harting went to see Koch. The Activists, as they pointed out, had decided to let deeds follow words. They were sure of the support of broad sections of the people, who had become tired of irredentist slogans. However, in order effectively to counter the charge of the Negativists, that they had thus "betrayed" the German nation, they would have to be able to point out to their co-nationals that the Reich government approved their views and intentions. They wanted to make sure of this by a direct approach to the Reich Foreign Minister, Gustav Stresemann.4 Shortly afterwards, the Negativists - Lodgman's successor, Brunar, as spokesman for the German-Nationals, Knirsch for the NationalSocialists, and Mayer, who led the nationalist opposition inside the Agrarian party - also called on Koch.5 They, too, wished to be received by Stresemann, but did not ask for an official declaration of the Reich's

2 Those German bourgeois parties ready to collaborate with or within the Government were called "Activists", while the German Nationalists were - contrariwise - referred to as "Negativists". The German Social Democrats - the strongest German group - were likewise ready to cooperate, first of all with the Czechoslovak Social Democrats, but they used the expression "Activists" for themselves only after 1933. 3 It is clear from Koch's notes that he was constantly harassed by the German deputies of all parties, with the exception of the strongest, i.e., the Social Democrats, who, even in opposition, preferred a direct link with their sister party in Germany. 4 Koch to Foreign Ministry, 27 February, 1926, Auswaertiges Amt, Serial L 437/4, Frame 128385 (This refers to the files of the German Foreign Ministry, accessible in photostat copies). 5 Koch to Foreign Ministry, 18 March 1926, Auswaertiges Amt, Serial L 437/4, Frames 128386-91.

German Parties into the Czechoslovak Government

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intentions (knowing quite well that it would only be unfavourable to their cause) - they merely wanted to be heard. Their opening gambit was very crude: they began by asking for a Reich subsidy to the tune of 100,000 to 200,000 Marks, for the alleged purpose of an "enlightenment campaign", but they soon floundered in embarrassment when Koch guilelessly asked them "why the rich Sudeten Germans did not defray the costs of their own propaganda". Brunar tried to explain to Koch that, basically, there was no disagreement between "Activists" and "Negativists", and that both of them were actually enemies of the Czechoslovak state and Irredentists. It was just a question of divided roles: the German-Nationals could naturally not soften their views, but they would raise no objection if the others tried to improve the position of the Germans in the country in their own way. Koch knew quite well that the Activists were thoroughly serious and sincere, and that they had no intention of playing with the Negativists any game with divided roles. He made it clear to Brunar that any such "political game" presupposed, after all, a common minimum program and a discussion of joint tactics. Brunar had to admit that no attempt had been made to arrive at an understanding with the Activists. His fanciful ideas on Irredentism were deflated by Koch, who pointed out that "the Sudeten German voter, even if he were as Brunar depicted him, was no Irredentist. Irredentism, after all, required something beyond the pious wish that the state ought to go to hell." The GermanNationals, Koch reported to Berlin, were a party of Irredentists who tried to turn the voters into irreconcilables and were ever on the alert to brand any attempt at reconciliation with the Czechs as treason to Germania. Koch subsequently set down his views in a ten-page report which he sent to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin.6 He suggested that the demand of the Activists for political support ought to be rejected: "Sudeten German politics is not made in Berlin". He considered that participation of the Germans in the Czechoslovak Government would represent an enormous advance: The possibility would at long last arise that the Germans might abandon their opposition at any price, and that co-operation within the frame-work of the state could be attempted, and I am convinced that henceforth, in any Cabinet reconstruction, the German group would never again be ignored. ® Koch to Foreign Ministry, 20 March 1926, Auswaertiges Ami, Serial L 437/4, Frames 128392-402.

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Finally, although it is true that in future, the Sudeten-German question will be primarily an internal matter, it remains to be seen whether this really would be a disadvantage. . . . The struggle for the constitutional position of the Sudeten Germans will have to be fought out, not before an international forum, but within the confines of this state. (Italics added)

Negotiations for governmental participation in 1924 had broken down, he said, because the then-Premier, Antonin Svehla (1873-1933) - in contrast to President Masaryk - had insisted on a formal declaration of loyalty to the state. Koch opined that such a declaration ought not to be refused this time: The declaration of loyalty, i.e., the recognition of the state, its constitution, and other laws, is something which, in the eyes of the Czechs and of foreign observers, is absolutely natural. . . . Svehla, with his fine sense for realities, had grasped this in 1924, in contrast to the theoretician, Masaryk.

Eventually, such a declaration was not, after all, required, even by Svehla, before the formation of a new government which included German parties. Should the representatives of the Activists still make an appearance in the German Foreign Ministry, Koch counseled that they be told: The aim of practical politics can only be the attainment of a complete guarantee of the national and cultural heritage of the Sudeten Germans within Czechoslovakia, by achieving that degree of influence in the state which corresponds to their numbers and importance.

They should be shown the "path of wisely adapting themselves to the given conditions", without offering them any detailed suggestions. Any connection with Sudeten German Irredentism, let alone its financial backing, should be firmly rejected by the Reich. Shortly afterwards, Stresemann telegraphed Koch 7 that he could not officially receive representatives of the German parties in the Czechoslovak Republic with reference to "the question of the policy to be pursued by the Sudeten Germans within Czechoslovakia, in order to arbitrate for the Reich government in the conflict of opinion existing between them." The time was equally unpropitious for private discussions, he said. Nor did Stresemann think it advisable to try to teach the German-Nationals in Czechoslovakia to be reasonable. Such a course of action "would not have the desired effect of establishing a 7

Stresemann to Koch, 4 May 1926, Auswaertiges Amt, Serial 4582, Frames 175913-12.

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53

more conciliatory policy among the Sudeten Germans, but simply that of entangling us in their party conflicts." Stresemann's point of view found even stronger expression in a later telegram to Koch 8: "I have never left any doubt that I would welcome an attempt to bring about the collaboration of Germans in Czechoslovakia."

T W O G E R M A N MINISTERS

The formation of a Czech-Slovak-German parliamentary majority was not accompanied by any pomp and circumstance, but, rather, by sober reasoning, in an endeavour to satisfy the material wishes of certain segments of the population. The Czech Agrarians could not obtain parliamentary approval for a protective tariff in the face of opposition from the Left. This led to a break-up of the Slav National Coalition Government, in power since 1922, which was replaced by a "Government of Officials" from March to October 1926. The German Agrarians presented themselves as obvious allies. Thus, the "Customs majority" took shape in Parliament in Spring 1926. The Christian-Socialists (Czechs, Slovaks, and Germans) were won over by the promise to raise the state stipends of the priests (Kongrua). Clearly, no questions relating to "national" demands of the German parties had been discussed beforehand: it would appear that it was the coalition's primary concern to get the country accustomed to parliamentary voting based on socially, rather than nationally, homogeneous groups. The Communists had been returned after the 1925 elections as a very strong group, but neither were they prepared to enter into a left coalition, nor would they have been admitted there by the Social Democrats. With the Left thus weakened by the deadweight of Communist parliamentary strength, the right-wing parties of the various nationalities achieved a small majority. The Agrarian leader, Svehla, was at that time ill and absent from the country. The spiritual father of the "Customs majority" was the former minister and leader of the Slovak wing of

8

Stresemann to Koch, 16 October 1926, Auswaertiges Ami, Serial L 4 3 7 / 5 , Frame 128721. * Dr. Milan Hodza (1878-1944, died as emigrant in Florida). Leader of the Slovak wing of the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party, occupied several ministerial posts, Premier from 1935 through 1938. Koch's judgment on Hodza is remarkable: "Hodza is one of the most talented, as well as one of the most dubious,

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7. W. Brugel

the Agrarians, Dr. Milan Hodza (1878-1944),® a man of moderation as regards national questions, but a capable opportunist. At about this time, he planned to set up a right-wing régime in Prague with the active help of the Berlin Government. President Masaryk was to be replaced by Svehla, Hodza would have become Prime Minister and Benes would have had to vacate the Foreign Ministry. Hodza seems to have thought that his recommendation of German participation in the Government and his activities in general as peace-maker would secure the backing of the Berlin Foreign Ministry for his plans. This, however, was a fundamental miscalculation of the possibilities and the strategy of the Reich's foreign policy, but quite apart from this, the Reich Government would not have been prepared to support Hodza's plans. The State Secretary (the leading official) in the German Foreign Ministry, Carl von Schubert, wrote to Dr Koch on 19 August 1926: 1 0 "On the part of Germany, anything must be avoided which could give rise to the suspicion that we are engaging in a conspiracy against our friend Benes." Hodza's motives may not have been very altruistic, but they did have the effect of creating a common front across all national groups. After Svehla's recovery, the "Government of Officials" was replaced, at the beginning of October 1926, by a parliamentary government under his leadership, in which two German parties - the Farmers' Federation (Bund der Landwirte) and the Christian Social Peoples Party - were each represented by a minister. It was decidedly a rightwing government, which was soon joined by the Slovak People's Party under Andrej Hlinka and the National Democrats, whose leader, Karel Kramâr, had conveniently forgotten his war-cry - "If the Germans enter the government, we'll be on the barricades." The Ministries occupied by Germans were by no means insignificant, but they did not offer figures of Czech public life. Highly educated, fluent in several languages, of great self-assurance and demagogic skill, he remained indispensable to the Agrarian Party even after Masaryk had dismissed him from the Government for certain dubious political and private activities. . . . For his party, but also for the state, his importance should not be underestimated, since it is he who controls the masses of Slovak peasantry as far as they are not in Hlinka's Catholic camp, and he keeps them oriented towards the Centralist idea, in line with the Czech Agrarian Party's outlook" (Koch to Foreign Ministry (31 Oct. 1932), Auswaertiges Ami, Serial L 439/2, Frame 132692). 10 Documents illuminating this affair can be found in the Foreign Ministry's File, "Office of Secretary of State von Schubert. Czechoslovakia. Special folder Hodza", Auswaertiges Amt, Serial 4582, Frames 176032-223. Carl von Schubert (1882-1947) Secretary of State in the German Foreign Ministry from 1924 to 1930, was on close terms with Hodza, as well as Benes.

German Parties into the Czechoslovak

Government

55

much scope for concessions to German demands on the ministerial or administrative level.11 Dr Franz Spina became Minister for Public Works and Dr. Robert Mayr-Harting, who was Professor of Civil Law at the German University in Prague, became Minister of Justice. The government program, instead of concrete promises of concessions to the non-Czech and non-Slovak populations, contained the formula, which was to be often quoted in later years, of "Equals among equals" 12 - evidently designed to dispel any lurking suspicion that the Germans were considered second-class citizens. The German parties in the coalition had accepted President Masaryk's views, which he had outlined the previous June: 13 1 repeat what I have said before: the problem of our German minority is the most important political problem confronting us. It is the duty of those at the helm in this country to solve this problem. A s soon as the Germans abandon their negative attitude towards our state and inform us of their willingness to co-operate, as soon, in other words, as they become potential government partners, they will have the same standing as all other government parties. That is so simple and obvious that it needs no proGerman sentiment to come to this conclusion, only a little political c o m m o n sense and acumen.

"The Germans have not only the right, but also the duty, to participate in the government", said Masaryk shortly afterwards, with even greater succinctness, in a German newspaper.14

THE GERMAN MINISTER SUPPORTS THE ACTIVISTS

The first attempts by the Activists to exert influence on the Government in support of their national aspirations were not outstandingly successful. Dr Mayr-Harting explained 13 that it was, first of all, a question of safeguarding the present status - Besitzstand; afterwards, they would see what further objectives were to be obtained. This en11 Shortly after the assumption of his office, Mayr-Harting issued an instruction enjoining the courts of law to help litigants unable to speak Czech, even where there was no legal obligation to do so (Prager Presse, 23 Dec. 1926). 12 Harry Klepetar, Seit 1918. . .. (Mährisch-Ostrau, 1937), p. 250. 13 Interview with President Masaryk in Ndrodni osvobozeni, 27 June 1927. German text in Prager Tagblatt and Prager Presse of same day. 14 Masaryk talks to his biographer, Dr Ernst Richnowsky, Prager Tagblatt, 7 Sept. 1926. 15 In the Prague weekly, Die Wahrheit, quoted by Prager Presse, 23 Dec. 1926.

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J. W. Briigel

trenchment of the German population in their current position, or, in other words, the abandonment of a Czech national offensive, was achieved by the Activists at that time. True, Hodza, who was Minister of Education in the multi-national coalition government, announced that he was going to introduce legislation to promote national autonomy of the schools by strengthening the existing district and provincial educational authorities, which were already split up into a Czech and a German group. But unanimity could not be reached in the Cabinet, and eventually the matter was dropped when Hodza, more for private than for political reasons, left the Government for several years at the beginning of 1929. The official Activist policy had to defend itself, not only against German-National and National-Socialist demagogy on the right, which accused it, as was to be expected, of opportunism of giving up "just claims", or of betraying the German nation, but also, on the left, against the Social-Democrats, who were rather worried about the socially reactionary tendencies now coming to the fore. In this connection it is, however, worth noting that Wenzel Jaksch,16 who at that time was a Social-Democratic critic of Spina's and Mayr-Harting's policies, exonerated them nearly thirty years later, as follows: 17 Nothing was more natural after 1920 than the attempt to disrupt the coalitions, which were internally riddled with dissensions, between the Czech parties and the Centralist Slovaks, by utilizing the cross-ties existing between the labour movement, the peasant parties, the religious movements, and even the employers' federations. "I am still of the opinion that the twelve-years' cooperation of the German parties in the various Prague governments helped the Sudeten Germans to avoid much loss of standing and even stood them in good stead in safeguarding many valuable national possessions - to think only of our flourishing educational system."

Even if the Activists in this first period did not achieve a great deal in pressing their demands for concessions, their German-National opponents' agitation was an absolute failure. The idea of collaboration in the Government retained its attractiveness and clearly refuted the theory that the mass of Sudeten Germans would always, and under any 1« Wenzel Jaksch, 1896-1966, German Social Democratic member of Parliament since 1929. 17 Wenzel Jaksch, "Der geschichtliche Auftrag der sudetendeutschen Sozialdemokratie", Leitfaden für die Vertriebenen-, Flüchtlings- und Kriegsbeschädigtenausschüsse, Heft 7-8/1955, p. 10.

German Parties into the Czechoslovak

Government

57

circumstances, react in a narrowly nationalist manner. Behind the scenes, Dr. Koch, who for years had recommended the complete integration of the German element in Czechoslovakia as the only sound solution from the Reich point of view, strongly supported the Activists' policies. The first comment on the new phase of Czechoslovak internal policy came from the German chargé d'affaires in Prague, Viktor von Heeren (later Ambassador to Belgrade). He wrote to Berlin that the entry of German parties into the Government was an important event: 18 It would be a valuable precedent for the future of the Germans. It would also fundamentally facilitate the national basis of a possible future Socialist coalition government. The hoary old theory of Czechoslovakia being a "national state" is decisively refuted. And even if no concrete concessions to the Germans have been agreed on as the price for their co-operation, the advantages outlined above which derive from this co-operation would seem to be of great portent. Two days later, Dr Koch wrote that the Czech-Slovak-German government had now shown itself to be viable without detriment to the state: 19 It only confirms what I have been maintaining for years, namely, that the great majority of the Sudeten Germans is willing to try to collaborate with the Czechs. The myth of German enmity towards the Czechoslovak state should be looked upon as exploded. A few months later, Koch thought the time opportune to remind Berlin 20 . . . that I have regarded the unconditional entry of the German Activists into the Government as correct. I have been and still am convinced that, had the Germans stipulated any conditions for their cooperation, they would never have been able to enter into the Government. Consequently, it appeared to me wiser to enter the government first and only then put forward demands. The first major act of legislation of the Svehla Government was an administrative reform, putting an end to the 1920 law which had 18

Heeren to Foreign Ministry, 13 October 1926, Auswaertiges Amt, Serial L 448, Frame 135435-38. 19 Koch to Foreign Ministry, 15 October 1926, Auswaertiges Amt, Serial L 437/5, Frames 128733-37. 20 Koch to Foreign Ministry, 20 February 1927, Auswaertiges Amt, Serial L 437/5, Frames 128962-66.

58

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Brugel

divided the country into regions, but which, in fact, had only been carried out in Slovakia. Its implementation in Bohemia would have meant the creation of two overwhelmingly German administrative units. This plan was now scrapped and an amalgamation of the old (state) administration with the autonomous (elected) one in districts and provinces was substituted. Owing to the right-wing tendencies of the Government, the bureaucratic element in these administrations was strengthened at the expense of the autonomous one. But the whole was primarily a concession to the Slovak Peoples' Party, which represented the strongest political group in the newly-formed land of Slovakia. Most regrettable from the German point of view, though not unjustified as a matter of practical politics, was the abolition of the province of Silesia (the only one where the German minority reached 40 %), on the grounds that it was too small to be able to stand on its own feet (Silesia was merged with Moravia). On this occasion, some German Nationals did manage to contact Dr Stresemann and complain to him about the Activists' alleged betrayal of German interests. Stresemann asked the German Legation in Prague to report to him on the facts.21 With reference to the discussions held here with the Sudeten Germans, I should be grateful if you would communicate to m e your views o n the importance, for the Germans, of the administrative reform in Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, I should be interested to know if you agree with the view expressed to m e that the German members of the Czechoslovak cabinet betrayed German interests and helped Czech influence to gain the upper hand without attempting to obtain compensatory advantages and if, in consequence, the resignation of the German ministers, because of the German voters' indignation, is to be expected.

Dr Heeren replied 22 that the revitalisation of the provinces of Bohemia and Moravia (with Silesia) as administrative units ran counter to the demand of the German parties for autonomy. Nevertheless the admittedly reactionary clause in the reform law, according to which allegedly for the purpose of taking politics out of the administration a third of the members of the district and provincial bodies were to be appointed by the Government, instead of being elected, would not itself be directed against the Germans.23 21

Stresemann to German Legation in Prague, 5 July 1927, Auswaertiges Ami, Serial 4582, Frame E 195913. 22 Heeren to Foreign Ministry, 6 July 1927, Auswaertiges Ami, Serial 4571, Frames E 176460-61. 23 The decision (no doubt, undemocratic) to nominate one-third of the mem-

German Parties into the Czechoslovak Government

59

It appears certain that consideration of the numerical strength of the German population will be loyally given whenever the governmentnominated third of the administration members is to be chosen, as long as German parties belong to the Government coalition. . . Summing up, it can be said that the administrative reform nowhere seriously accords with German wishes, and that its effects will largely depend upon future German participation in the Government, but that even if the German parties had adopted a fundamentally different attitude, the desire for German autonomy and equality of the German language would not have reached its goal. . . "The accusation that the German Ministers had betrayed their conationals' interests and had helped in the drive to subject them to forced Czech assimilation is, in my view, baseless." (This sentence underlined in the original.) Heeren thought it unlikely that Spina and Mayr-Harting would leave the Government to allay the alleged indignation of the German population. As it turned out, this was a remarkably shrewd prophecy. In the municipal elections of 1927, the provincial elections of 1928, and the parliamentary elections a year later, the Activist front held its own against the nationalist right. The Farmers' Union (Bund der Landwirte) suffered no serious losses, even though its nationalist wing with two deputies had seceded. Only the Christian Socialists, whose workingclass wing had been irritated by the socially reactionary course of the Government, lost votes to the Social Democrats, of whose readiness for national reconciliation there could be no doubt. Koch did, later, reduce his support for Spina and Mayr-Harting to some extent, without, however, becoming more sympathetic towards their antagonists' point of view. It would appear that he felt his unexpressed hopes dashed of obtaining, in the persons of the Activists, willing mouthpieces of Berlin in the Prague Government.

NATIONALIST SLOGANS DO NOT CATCH ON

The hullaballoo about an alleged betrayal of the German nation through cooperation with the Czech hereditary arch-enemy failed, at that time, anyway, to make any impact. It was a period of economic prosperity, bers of the provincial and district administrations was, however, not misused to strengthen the Czech element. In other words, Germans, Hungarians, etc., were always included in sufficient numbers.

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which inevitably took the wind out of radicalist, let alone irredentist, sails. The German Nationals naturally remained obdurate and quite openly proclaimed as their aim the destruction of the Czech people's freedom, whose independence was as much a thorn in their flesh as it was to be in Hitler's. How unrepresentative of any sizeable sector of the Sudeten German population this outlook really was is shown in a revealing admission by the leader of the Austrian German-Nationals, who was in close touch with the sister party in Czechoslovakia. When Dr Benes visited Berlin in May 1928, Dr Carl Schubert of the German Foreign Ministry kept the foreign diplomats informed about the discussions that were held. In his notes on his conversations with the Austrian Minister, Felix Frank (who was at the same time leader of the Austrian "Greater German Party"), it is mentioned 24 that Herr Frank now began to discuss the relations between Austria and Czechoslovakia and admitted that, strictly speaking, there were no points of friction between the two countries. As regards the Sudeten Germans, that was a problem all to itself. Quite confidentially - because he would not dare to say so openly, for fear of being lynched by the Sudeten Germans - he could tell me that any desire for frontier rectifications readjustment was just plain lunacy. Replying to my interjection, he agreed that any such plans were now harboured only by a negligible sector of the Sudeten German population.

Frank need not have worried for his safety: it is extremely unlikely that he would have been "lynched" by the average Sudeten German for mentioning what was generally known, namely, that no one at that time thought, let alone acted, in an irredentist manner; at the worst, he would have caused some pain only to his closer party colleagues. Frank merely confirmed what was widely known anyway, but just as stubbornly denied at that time by the nationalist propagandists as by their present-day successors. Sober truth is just not compatible with the fairy tale of the "unbearable yoke" which all Sudeten Germans were allegedly trying so hard to shake off, until Hitler helped them to do so. Oddly enough, in the second half of the twenties, when activism had, in fact, become the white hope of broad sections of the people, even the German National Socialists emphasized their disagreement with the unteachable German Nationals! Collaboration with the National Party would be impossible, apart from all other considerations, as Rudolf Jung, leader 24

Notes by Schubert, 25 May 1928, Auswaertiges 174285/86.

Amt, Serial 4571, Frames

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61

of the German Nazis, said at the Parteitag of 1928, because their parliamentary representatives were imbued with a "purely negative spirit".2' Hans Knirsch, another Nazi leader, proclaimed in all seriousness that "we National Socialists say that participation in the Government should not be rejected out of hand. . . . We maintain that, in certain circumstances, it might even be the duty of a German party to take part in the Government of the state." 26 The National Socialists would merely oppose unconditional collaboration. . . . Needless to say, none of this was taken at face value. But it does show that even the worst of the nationalist demagogues felt compelled to trim their sails to the prevailing Activist winds, if they wanted to avoid joining the German Nationals in their not very splendid isolation. Of greater consequence was the fact that just those elements in the National Party who really had the say in its affairs, i.e., the industrialists, again rejected their party's more extremist tendencies. The spokesman of these moderates was the deputy, Dr Alfred Rosche (1884-1947), who stood above the level of the "Heil"-braying rank-and-file through a certain ability to introduce into the parliamentary debates some more or less constructive criticism. He tried, at first, to persuade the National Party to accept a politically more mature outlook. After some initial success — he was elected parliamentary leader of his party in 1927 he failed in his endeavour, resigned his seat in protest, and left the party 27 to found a sort of "Neo-Activist" group, which soon combined with the Liberals to form the "German Working and Economic Community" (Deutsche Arbeits- und Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, or DAWG). In the provincial elections of 1928, and also in the parliamentary elections of 1929, this group achieved relatively considerable success, thanks to the dissatisfaction of the traditional German National voters with their party's sterile policy.28 25

Prager Tagblatt, 23 Oct. 1928. Dr Dominik Schausberger (Editor), Die sudetendeutsche Politik im Lichte der Parteien, Reichenberg 1931, p. 52. Knirsch had already used similar words in Parliament on 8 Nov. 1927. Schausberger's book reprints a speech by Knirsch in Warnsdorf in 1930. « Bohemia, 12 July 1928. 28 Rosche and his follower, Dr Gustav Peters, were actually rather opportunist. In 1935, they found it expedient to dissociate themselves from the "Jewish Liberals", in order to make sure of a parliamentary mandate each in Henlein's Sudeten German Party - long before the German bourgeoisie was subjected to the intensive Gleichschaltung process. Rosche and Peters did their best in 1938 to make up for their "liberal-capitalist-Masonic" past by posing as "true" National Socialists. 26

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Briigel

THE BELIEF IN SYMBIOSIS

Diametrically opposed to the imperialist creed of the Pan-Germans were the tenets which guided the Activists in the Government, supported as they were by the broad masses of the German people in Czechoslovakia. Spina, especially, never tired of pointing out in innumerable public speeches at that time that collaboration in the affairs of the state was the only way of obtaining political concessions for the Germans. He also coined the well-known phrase of "Czech-German symbiosis," which he elucidated in a press interview:29 We have lived with the Czechs for a thousand years, and through economic, social, cultural, and even racial ties, we are so closely connected with them that we really form one people. T o use a homely metaphor: we form different strands in the same carpet. Of course, it is possible to cut a carpet into pieces, but one cannot take out the woven-in flowers. We have been living with the Czechs in a form of symbiosis: we have entered into a marriage of convenience with them and nothing can separate us.

But the strongest impetus towards a genuine Czech-German union came from President Masaryk, who did not now hesitate to throw overboard many of his more negative postwar concepts (e.g., "Territorial autonomy is not open to discussion"). In an interview which he gave to the paper of one of the German government parties,30 he not only repeated his warning that the German minority problem was the most pressing one in the state, but elaborated this with the avowal that German participation in the Government was only the beginning of what he had always desired. "Speaking as a democrat, I am on principle in favour of autonomy, side by side with the centralist trend inherent in the modern state." He was equally in favour of school autonomy: "I do not need to point out that I see no fundamental antithesis to the concept of the central state in the desire for regional autonomy." No Czech politician before him had been so outspoken. The great message by Masaryk on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Republic, in its rejection of the idea that Czechoslovakia was a single-nation state, went further than any other pronouncement before or after. Besides many wise observations on the nature of de-

29

Le Matin, Paris, 26 Dec. 1926. Deutsche Presse, Prague, 1 Dec. 1926 (This was the mouthpiece of the Christian Socials). 30

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Government

63

mocracy, it contained important statements about the necessity and the limits of self-government within the state: 31 In a democracy . . . the desire for autonomy is natural: if the population of a country is such that, although numerous, its natural and cultural development is not uniform, and yet the whole people is to co-operate in government and administration, then the political power must also be divided according to the natural differences in the people. This is amply shown by our brief constitutional experience. Therefore, I have always quite purposely advocated self-administration, territorial autonomy, and the so-called modified corporate autonomy: I am not unaware of the fact that a state, and particularly a modern state, cannot do without a centralist organisation, but it is the task of a modern democratic state to establish the basis for harmonious development of central and self-government. These words were clearly designed to dispel any lurking fear of the Czechs that concessions toward self-government for the national minorities might weaken, or even destroy, the foundations of the state. Less outspoken, but equally ready for concessions, was the Foreign Minister, Dr Benes, when, speaking a year later during the election campaign, he said: 32 We certainly wish to extend equality and justice to the Germans, but they will have to identify themselves completely with our state and abandon any belief in the efficacy of alien influences to obtain concessions for themselves. . . . The country will gladly accept their co-operation and will solve the German problem with dignity, honesty, and justice. . . . We have now progressed so far that a final settlement of the minority question can no longer affect the basis of our national revolution. . . . The question of the minorities will cease to be a political problem and become merely one of administration. This, after all, was not an address to Germans, but to Czechs: Benes was speaking in Moravska Ostrava to a meeting of the Czech National Socialists, who traditionally reacted with sensitivity to all petit bourgeois and nationalist tendencies. The parliamentary elections of 1929 did lead to the elimination of the German Christian Socialists from the Government coalition, but their place was taken by the German Social Democrats, who entered the Government side by side with their Czech comrades. The idea of German government participation had won. After Hitler's rise to power in 1933, it was to acquire a deeper significance. Despite all propagan31

Prager

Tagblatt,

30 Oct. 1928. Josef Hofbauer, Der Grosse

Bratislava, 1938, p. 164.

32

Vossische Zeitung,

Berlin, 21 Oct. 1929.

Alte

Mann,

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Briigel

dist successes of the Nazi movement, no fewer than a third of the Sudeten German voters - 600,000 - acknowledged, in the 1935 elections, their faith in Czech-German democratic collaboration, in Democracy, and in the Republic.

The Second Czechoslovak Republic, September 1938 - March 1939 A Study in Political

Change

IVO K. FEIERABEND

The Second Czechoslovak Republic was an ephemeral polity lasting about five and a half months. Its beginning coincided with the Munich Agreement of September 1938, and its ending with the Nazi occupation of March 1939. Despite its brief duration and general neglect in the literature, the Republic is an instructive case of swift and complex political change and adjustment to a crisis situation. Furthermore, it represents an important modification of Czechoslovak political culture, a departure which has some bearing on the later political history of the country. The Second Republic as manifested in the politics of its Czech segment is most readily identified as an authoritarian crisis system. This represented an abrupt change from the constitutional democratic norms of the First Republic. Since political developments in Slovakia and Ruthenia were sufficiently divergent from those in Bohemia and Moravia to merit an independent analysis, this brief presentation focuses only on the situation in the Czech provinces. 1. The crisis situation that constituted the environment of the Second Republic can be most accurately associated with the international, psychological, and material aftermath of Munich. During the First Republic, the Czechoslovaks felt their nation to be relatively secure, prosperous, and independent. Suddenly, in September 1938, their status was reduced to one of military helplessness, international isolation, economic uncertainty, and dependence on a hostile Nazi Germany. As a result of the Munich settlement, Czechoslovak territories were ceded primarily to Germany, but also to Hungary and Poland. Czechoslovakia lost approximately one-third of its territory, its citizens, and its industrial capacity. The economy was seriously disrupted. Strategically, the new state became defenseless, while the intricate net of international alliances protecting Czechoslovakia was decimated. The coun-

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Ivo K. Feierabend

try was cast into a satellite mold of Nazi Germany, whose policies were hardly favorably disposed towards Czechoslovakia. These difficulties were compounded by heightened internal tensions between the Czechs and the Slovak separatists. Furthermore - a distinct national psychological humiliation - the era of the First Republic ended by peaceful Czechoslovak capitulation, rather than with defiance of the demands of allies and foes alike: Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Hungary, and Poland.1 The let-down and sense of national frustration was, by all accounts, as profound as it was widespread, showing a high degree of national identification on the part of the Czechoslovaks.2 The Munich settlement was generally regarded as a national disaster. Editorial comments in Czech newspapers spoke of a "disappointment which will stand out . . . for centuries to come, like the torment of our Savior" 3 and of a "disaster that signifies probably the greatest fall in all of our history".4 The Munich settlement was compared to the Battle of the White Mountain. The intensity of the shock was visible to observers, who described Prague as a city in mourning, with people crying in the streets. This perception of national tragedy and crisis exercised a profound influence on the ideological climate of the new Czechoslovakia. The affective and supportive attitudes of the Second Republic were a striking departure from those of the First Republic. They modified its political culture and, at the same time, at least for the duration of the Second Republic, the new ideology exhibited a striking homogeneity.5 2. The First Czechoslovak Republic harbored a wide spectrum of beliefs, ranging from Marxist ideologies on the left to fascism on the right. This diversity in the pre-Munich Republic, however, indicated neither a severe fragmentation of political culture nor profound con1

There is a very extensive literature dealing with the Munich period. Among those sources most often cited are: R. G. D. Laffan, Survey of International Affairs, 1938, Vols. II and III, (London, Oxford University Press, 1951). Hubert Ripka, Munich: Before and After (London, Victor Lollanz Ltd., 1939). J. W. Wheeler-Bennet, Munich: Prologue to Tragedy (London, Macmillan, 1948). 2 The German and Hungarian minorities seemed to experience a wholly contrary mood, as did the Slovak separatists. 3 J. Hora in Lidove noviny, October 2, 1938. 4 Editorial in Ceske slovo, October 6, 1938. 5 Again, it should be pointed out that this was not necessarily the case in Slovakia, where a sharp ideological clash was manifest between the separatists and the pro-Czechoslovaks.

The Second Czechoslovak

Republic

67

flict, as it might have, elsewhere on the continent, in Weimar Germany, for example, or in Italy or France. A political creed that found its most articulate interpreter in T. G. Masaryk and his collaborators provided the framework for a broad ideological consensus among the most important and numerous segments of Czechoslovak entities. In this mold, orderly political processes found expression. The First Czechoslovak Republic possessed a relatively stable system, and its actors manifested a predominantly pragmatic and instrumental orientation toward the political arena. 6 During the Second Republic, both this ideological diversity and the wider consensus which underlay it seemed to have been overwhelmed by a basic call for "sacred national union", for a "community of heart and spirit", for a "nation with closed ranks". The new feeling of intense nationalism could be identified either as a collection of new attitudes previously absent or latent in the polity, or as attitudes reactive to the ideological legacy of the First Republic Among these there figured most prominently a revulsion toward the Western liberal democratic heritage with which the First Republic had been identified. Specifically, France and its institutions, previously the object of uncritical adulation, became the target of scorn and contempt. The revered figure of T. G. Masaryk and, above all, Benes, were similarly attacked, while the entire symbolism of the First Republic was rejected. "We took the slogan, 'Call a Czech and a human being will answer' so seriously that we almost lost the Czechs, remaining human beings only", complained an editorial in Ceske slovo.7 "We were infiltrated through and through with universal humanitarian ideals. The time has come for us to be pure egoists in our national life," advised another typical comment. 8 The emphasis was on national egoism, exclusiveness, purity, intolerance, and collectivism. These were mirrored in prescriptions offered in the press and elsewhere, such as these: "Czech sweat must not provide comfort for alien elements." 9 "We must rid ourselves of foreign elements." 10 "The individual is nothing; the nation is everything", and "The basis of all rights and obligations is what benefits the nation and the state." 11 Indicative of a similar mood was the 6

For a discussion of the political system of the First Czechoslovak Republic in the English language, see Edward Taborsky, Czechoslovak Democracy at Work (London, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1945). 7 Alois Neuman, February 29, 1939. 8 Ceske slovo, November 10, 1938. • Ceske slovo, February 2, 1939. 10 Prime Minister Beran, as reported in Ceske slovo, January 30, 1939. 11 In the Manifesto of the Party of National Unity.

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popular campaign in Prague to eliminate from public places all foreign inscriptions, such as "Restaurant", "Modes Robes", and "Buffet". Many advertisements of the day chose strikingly nationalist themes. A contemporary symptom was the Social Democratic Party's rejection, at its Congress, of Marxism and class struggle as alien elements, harmful to national unity and harmony.12 The spirit of exclusiveness also asserted itself in grassroots anti-Semitism and hostility toward minorities. A gamut of related traits made their appearance within the new ideological syndrome: self-sacrifice; austerity and hard work; egalitarianism ("concentration of disproportionately high incomes or abject poverty must not be tolerated"); 13 and adulation of youth. With the slogan, "Youth forward", came a concern for the stability of the family and for large and patriarchal families, and a pronounced anti-feminist bias. Women were to return to the hearth. A revulsion against democracy in general, and the norms of the First Republic in particular, was mirrored in a contemptuous attitude toward "politics". Politics was considered incompatible with the harmonious will of the nation. Typically, it was asserted that "the nation cannot tolerate divisions into blocs, parties, classes, or interests. . . . The important task is to de-politicize and nationalize all public life." 14 This plea usually ended with another for "concentration and unification of national forces that cannot close their eyes to the many deficiencies of democratic regimes".15 As a result, a strong executive and authoritarian regime was advocated, together with extension of governmental controls into the economic and social spheres. Censorship and curtailment of the rights of association and assembly were endorsed as both necessary and beneficial to the national welfare. Another striking change in attitude during this period was a return to religion and Catholicism. The secular culture of the First Republic was overturned. This trend also altered the entire historical symbolism of the Czech national political and cultural heritage. It was no longer the Protestant, heroic tradition of the Hussite movement. Substituted for it was the more modest tradition of Saint Wenceslas, the saint king who sought accommodation with his country's stronger Germanic neighbors. To all indications, these new attitudes were widely diffused in the 12

Pravo lidu and Ceske slovo, December 13, 1938. Prime Minister Beran: Tesnopisecke zpravy senatu, 125th meeting, December 13, 1938. 14 Editorial in Brazda, as reported in Ceske slovo, December 25, 1938. 15 Ceske slovo, December 5, 1938. 13

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polity, penetrating all important groups and embracing a wide segment of the populace. They seemed to be spontaneously generated during the immediate post-Munich era, apparently without official prompting or coercion. The ideological structure of the First Republic was completely rejected and seemed almost to have vanished, at least for a time. This radical change was remarkably swift and the attainment of a new ideological consensus seemed complete. Homogeneity of ideological outlook and lack of ideological dispute or strife were two striking features of the Second Republic. It would be difficult to find a situation comparable to this Czechoslovak experience in the modern history of government. Another surprising feature of the process was its tenor of moderation. The outburst of new emotion and contributory attitudes was far more sorrowful than passionate, more stoic than supercharged with enthusiasm, tension, or violence. The ideological discussions were seldom flamboyant, but, rather, sober and at times drab. 3. As might be expected, not only ideological change beset Czechoslovakia; the entire political structure, both formal and informal, was altered. As a result of the 2ilina deliberations in early October, the unitary arrangement of the First Republic was exchanged for a federation in which Slovak and Ruthene states enjoyed far-reaching autonomy. Little more than defense, foreign affairs, and common currency remained in the domain of the central government (and sometimes not even these, in the last weeks of the Republic). The centralized polity of the First Republic was constitutionally and practically segmented, and the three sections of the Second Republic pursued largely independent and divergent internal and external policies, developing quite distinct and incompatible political systems. The defeat of the all-Czechoslovak political parties and the emergence of exclusively Czech, Slovak, and Ruthene parties illustrated this trend. The Slovak and Ruthene states came to be increasingly dominated by native totalitarian movements, notably inspired by Nazi and fascist examples. Another important development in the Second Republic was its frank and drastic departure from the parliamentary democracy of the First Republic. Throughout 1938, Czechoslovak cabinets relied on emergency powers, and in September, the executive branch assumed even greater power through the Law for the Defense of the State. These developments culminated in the passage of an enabling act in December

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by the Czechoslovak National Assembly, when it dissolved itself for an indefinite period. Ordinary legislative powers passed into the hands of the Czechoslovak president, his cabinet, and state organs. The president, furthermore, was empowered "upon unanimous recommendation of the cabinet . . . to issue decrees with the validity of constitutional law . . ,".16 The ease with which the enabling act was passed and the overwhelming majority in the Czechoslovak parliament which effected its own dissolution illustrate the spirit of the period. It must be mentioned in this outline of constitutional change, that Slovakia and Ruthenia elected their own legislatures. These elections hardly met the rigorous democratic norms of choice between candidates, secrecy, or freedom of the ballot.17 Bohemia and Moravia did not bother to hold an election and therefore did not even provide themselves with a legislature. The president, together with the Czech members of the central cabinet, constituted the Czech government. The formal democratic institutions of the First Republic were thus replaced during the Second Republic by a dictatorial framework of federal and state authorities. 4. The change in the Czechoslovak polity was far more extensive and subtle than is revealed by an analysis of the new constitution. For example, changes in the pattern of Czechoslovak political associations were particularly pronounced. The situation of the Second Republic could, perhaps, be best characterized as a contraction of the complex pattern of political association and a subsequent atrophy of pluralistic society. (The following analysis again applies to the Czech lands, without comment on the Slovak and Ruthene situations). Modern Western industrial political systems manifest a high degree of differentiation and specialization in political structures. Such specialization creates a profusion of interest and pressure groups in the political arena, and sometimes, especially on the Continent, results in multiparty systems. During the First Republic, Czechoslovakia was no exception to this process. Yet, during the Second Republic, political parties and the myriad of special-interest and other associations which had existed suddenly amalgamated or ceased altogether. The entire party system was overhauled. From the fourteen parties w

Enabling Act, December 5, 1938, No. 330 Sb'trka zakonu a nahzeni republiky Ceskoslovenske (Praha, Statni tiskarna, 1939). 17 For a discussion of Slovakia, see Jozef Lettrich, History of Modern Slovakia (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1955).

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represented in the Chamber of Deputies in 1938, a two-party system emerged in Bohemia and Moravia. In fact, it was a one-party system, since the Party of National Unity dominated the scene. The National Labor Party played the permanent role of a loyal opposition. Both parties formally proclaimed harmony of aims, interests, and policy, and support of the Second Republic and its cabinets. The leadership of both parties, both on paper and informally, consulted on all important issues of policy. Indeed, no conflict or rivalry developed between the two; it is correct to say that they existed in a perfect bipartisanship. The impulse toward party amalgamation came from within the parties immediately upon the conception of the Second Republic. The surprising decision on the part of the leadership to scrap the multiparty system was not considered in the least controversial. The only question discussed at the time by the leaders, in the press, and elsewhere was the relative expediency of a one-, a two-, or a three-party system versus some sort of all-party consortium. The impression received from the tenor of the negotiations is that the often-intense partisanship of the First Republic had been wholly spent by the time of the Second Republic. In this respect, it probably made little difference what new party arrangements were effected. By mid-November, the Party of National Unity included all of the Czech parties with the exception of the Social Democrats, and a small segment of the Czech Socialists who formed the National Labor Party.18 The Communists were excluded from the new coalition and later banned. The trend toward unification was even more striking elsewhere. Trade unions, trade associations, professional associations, farmers' associations, patriotic, civic, and veterans' societies and other interest groups of all complexions disbanded of effected dissolutions and mergers. This process of change was swift, ubiquitous, and, again, apparently spontaneous, involving leadership as well as membership. The Czechoslovak trade union movement affords a good example of the process.19 On October 1, eight powerful union federations allegedly representing some two million people issued a joint proclamation to their members asking for order and discipline, and announcing "a general agreement on a just platform of concerted action". After this initial step, and with additional union federations taking part, a permanent 18

For relevant information on the partisan situation, see the daily Czech press and Dr. Ladislav Feierabend, Ve vladach Druhe republiky (New York, Universum Press Co., 1961). 19 The following account derives from Czech newspapers, particularly from Ceske slovo.

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committee was created later in October to negotiate mergers. Meanwhile, dissolutions and amalgamations of single unions were reported erupting apparently spontaneously at all levels throughout the complex network of union organizations, including the local and factory levels. While loud enthusiasm and announcements of dissolutions and mergers abounded, the pattern of unification seemed confused. Several plans or policies, often contrary, were pursued and then changed within short periods of time. At first, it appeared that one unified movement was being created, including Communist trade unions. Later, it was suggested that three large federations be formed. The moment it was decided to accept a two-party system, the unions followed suit. Complications also arose over the question of union neutrality versus their affiliation with either of the new political parties. Some local and national unions announced their affiliation with the Party of National Unity, or with the National Labor Party, occasionally regardless of the decision taken by their respective federations. Many unions formed special "National Unities", such as The National Unity of Czechoslovak Garment Workers, the National Unity of Czechoslovak Millers' Helpers, etc., and thus joined the Party of National Unity. The parties were, in effect, creating labor federations in their midst. Other voluntary organizations were also overtaken by this sudden fever for dissolution and unification. For example, the Sokol was to concentrate all Czechoslovak gymnastic, physical education, and recreational organizations, such as the Boy Scouts, within itself. The penchant for amalgamation reached such proportions as to engulf even youth hostels, associations of philatelists, and amateur gardeners. The pages of the Czechoslovak Official Gazette, replete with the names of organizations undergoing self-dissolution, offer an impressive chronicle of the depletion of organized life in Czechoslovakia. It may be difficult to evaluate this curious process of unification and simplification, and to estimate its impact upon the Czechoslovak organizational pattern. It undoubtedly had great intensity, but the impulse hardly had a chance to reach its culmination. The process was still continuing and a new associational pattern had not yet emerged by the time the Republic came to an end. An idea of the extent of change may be gathered from data available for the Prague region. 20 At the end of September, there were about eight thousand registered voluntary associations of Czechoslovak citizens in the area. By the end of the year, "

Ceske slovo, January 22, 1939.

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four thousand of these had disappeared and the effort toward unification was still gathering strength. Certain additional features characterized the political history of the Second Republic. Among them, the constant and severe pressures emanating from Nazi Germany played a major role.21 These involved a host of demands, some economic, others for an extra-territorial Autobahn to be built across Moravia for a right of way for the Wehrmacht through Czechoslovakia; others concerned disarmament, political freedom for the German Volksgruppe in Czechoslovakia, repudiation of Czechoslovak international ties, and a purge of Jewish personnel or "Benes elements" from key positions in the Republic. A marked hostility among the three states of Czechoslovakia also characterized Czechoslovak federalism. The conflict between the Czechoslovak and the Slovak separatist leaders became so intense that it led to a successful but short-lived military intervention in Slovakia at the very end of the Republic. These pressures added considerably to the atmosphere of crisis in the Second Republic. The drive toward unified political mobilization found expression elsewhere in other institutions of the Second Republic. Censorship of the press became the rule, while the right of assembly, together with some other civil rights, was curtailed. The strict civil discipline was further emphasized in specific emergency measures taken by the government to remedy the economic dislocations of the year: measures to combat unemployment through compulsory labor camps, retirement policies in the public sector to cut down the extensive Czechoslovak bureaucracy which was now superfluous within the diminishing nation and unwanted in Slovakia and Ruthenia, as well as measures adopted to meet some of the Nazi demands. As with other processes inaugurated by the Republic, these measures were accepted and carried out in a spirit of order, unanimity, and efficiency. 5. It would be too ambitious to try to encompass here all aspects of the political system of the Second Republic.22 This discussion is intended to highlight certain modes of response and adjustment to a crisis situation that was apparently perceived as intensely threatening. 21

See Feierabend, op. cit., and Documents on German Foreign Policy Series D, Vol. IV, October 1938-March 1939 (Washington, U.S. Department of State, 1951). 22 For a detailed discussion of the Second Republic, see Ivo K. Feierabend, The Pattern of a Satellite State: Czechoslovakia 1938-1939, Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, 1960.

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The salient features of this adjustment are obvious in the case of Czechoslovakia. They encompass the suspension of ordinary politics and processes within a democratic constitutional framework, the drive toward unification and the sudden amnesia which the political parties showed toward their intensely partisan past, a homogeneity of ideological outlook, as well as the formal suspension of parliamentary machinery. Actually, such reactions are not unique to the Czechoslovak case. All political systems in crisis show similar tendencies, unless they are overwhelmed with anomic disintegration and instability. The wartime governments of Britain and the United States exhibited comparable impulses, although much weaker, which were sometimes fearfully identified as a trend toward dictatorial garrison states. In similar situations, sectional or vested interests and partisanship are overwhelmed by national exigencies, the bargaining procedure and compromising of interests seem limited or suspended, the community mobilizes individuals rather than protecting their civil rights, and an efficient, ostensibly all-powerful government takes charge. The Czechoslovak case illustrates a very clear, perhaps an extreme, occurrence of such a pattern. The political system of the Second Republic must be understood and analyzed in this context. Accordingly, the Czechoslovak example of an authoritarian crisis government cannot be classified with dictatorial political systems which command a coercive police state dominated by one political elite. All important political elites participated in the political reconstruction of Czechoslovakia following Munich, and no strong man or charismatic leader appeared on the scene, nor can the Czechoslovak president and cabinet, though possessing all formal governing powers, be likened to an arbitrary ruling oligarchy. The cabinets of the Second Republic were manned by "experts"; they were highly differentiated from other structures in the polity, and certainly insulated from partisanship. Also, to all accounts, Czechoslovak cabinets during this period enjoyed a very harmonious relationship with the party leadership. There seems to have been a high correspondence between demands and their translation into policies within the polity, a pattern typical of stable democratic political processes. Furthermore, the birth of the Second Republic was not the result of a coup d'état destroying the First Republic. There is no evidence of violence. Rather, the change was spontaneous. Furthermore, coercive rule was largely absent from the Czech provinces during the Second

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Republic. There were, for example, no political prisoners in Czechoslovakia. If the crisis authoritarian political system cannot be identified with the ordinary notion of dictatorship, neither does totalitarianism serve as an adequate label for the Second Republic. At first glance, the totalitarian passion for unanimity and monolithism, the elimination of autonomous interests and ideological diversity, seem to find their counterpart in the Czechoslovak drive toward unity and ideological homogeneity. Yet, with the spontaneity of change, the synthetic aspects of these totalitarian traits, accompanied by coercion and indoctrination, were lacking in the Czech lands of the Second Republic. The political system of the Second Republic may be considered a highly functional adjustment to a crisis situation, given the goal of the continuation of an independent polity and the extremely pressing problems facing Czechoslovakia. Speed of policy decisions and dictatorial efficiency were easily attained during the Second Republic, unhampered by bargaining, possible deadlock, the immobilization always possible in the democratic process, and cabinet instability. Indeed, the stability of the Czechoslovak régime was as impressive as the smooth, orderly, and swift passage of the Czechoslovak polity from the First to the Second Republic. Public order in Czechoslovakia was never threatened in the Czech provinces; it went uninterrupted by protests, demonstrations, strikes, or similar events. The period of the Second Republic was more impressive for its stability than was that of the First Republic. The pattern of the Second Republic was also of consequence to the future political history of Czechoslovakia. Its impact produced a certain fragmentation of Czechoslovak political culture. As was pointed out, the Second Republic did not make use of the ideological climate of the Masaryk Republic to effect its political mobilization. The political and ideological precepts of the First and Second Republics were in sharp contrast and, in fact, the Second Republic repudiated all the symbols of the First. This impulse toward reactive rejection may be explained as a result of the traumatic experience of Munich. Although spontaneous and sufficiently diffused to give an impression of homogeneity, the new ideological consensus during the Second Republic did not endure. During the subsequent war years of Nazi occupation at home and exile government abroad, the concepts of the First Republic asserted themselves. As a result, the divergent legacies of the First and Second Republics accounted for ideological tensions, especially during the Third Czechoslovak Republic, 1945-1948. They complicated the consolidation of this other, shortlived, and last of the democratic Czechoslovak polities.

The Establishment of Slovak Autonomy in 1938

JOSEF ANDERLE

On October 6, 1938, Slovakia received the status of an autonomous province of the Czechoslovak Republic as a result of a long campaign by the Slovak People's Party ("Slovenská strana l'udová"). The origins of this campaign go back to the first months of the Republic, when the party was founded by Father Andrej Hlinka. The Populists ("l'udáci"), as members of the party were called, based their demands for Slovak autonomy on an agreement that Tomás Garrigue Masaryk, the leader of the Czechoslovak independence movement in World War I, had concluded on May 30, 1918, in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, with representatives of American Czechs and Slovaks. This "Pittsburgh Agreement" expressed approval of his program for a "union of the Czechs and Slovaks in an independent state", but stipulated that Slovakia should have "her own administration, her own diet and her own courts". The agreement concluded with the qualification, however, that "detailed provisions relating to the organization of the Czecho-Slovak state" be left "to the liberated Czechs and Slovaks and their duly accredited representatives". This was certainly a recognition on the part of these American citizens that they were in no way competent to make arrangements for future relationships between their co-nationals in the "old country" with any binding finality, and thus to prejudice their real wishes.1 These wishes seemed to have found their expression on October 30, 1918, in the assembly of a "Slovak National Council" at Turciansky 1

Populist writers have insisted, of course, that the Pittsburgh Agreement was a binding treaty, as was best evidenced in the monograph of KonStantin Culen, Pittsburghská dohoda (Bratislava, Knihtl'aíiareñ Andreja, 1937). For Masaryk's story of the event see his war memoirs Svetová revoluce (Prague, Orbis, 1925), 262-65. A balanced interpretation of the event can be found in Ferdinand Peroutka's Zacátky íesko-slovenského souzití (Paris, Editions Sokolova, 1953), 12329; this is an excerpt from his earlier five-volume work, Budování statu (Prague, F. Borovy, 1934-1936).

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Svaty Martin in Slovakia. Claiming to represent all Slovak parties, the council assumed the right to speak for the Slovak nation as "a part of the Czecho-Slovak nation, united both in language and cultural history" ("ciastka i recove i kulturno-historicky jednotneho cesko-slovenskeho naroda"). At the same time, it called for the creation of a Czechoslovak state by demanding "for this Czecho-Slovak nation . . . an unlimited right to self-determination on the basis of complete independence". The idea of Slovak self-administration was also suggested at this meeting, but a general consensus decided against it. The Slovaks lacked sufficient numbers of educated people and trained administrators, and the members of the Council felt that an autonomous or independent Slovakia would be too weak to withstand Hungarian efforts to regain control of the province. It appeared wiser to call in Czechs and have them administer the province, at least until a new Slovak intelligentsia could be raised.2 Acting on the basis of similar considerations in the name of the "Czechoslovak nation", the National Constituent Assembly of Czechoslovakia approved the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic on February 29, 1920; this left substantial powers in the hands of local governments, but in general gave Czechoslovakia the character of a unitary national state on the model of the Third Republic of France. 3 The Slovak members of the National Assembly, who voted for the Constitution unanimously, explained in a joint declaration addressed to the American Slovaks, that "in the Constitutional Charter, practically everything was guaranteed that the Pittsburgh Agreement had demanded, with the exception of the Diet, which would, however, be to the detriment of Slovakia under the present situation".4 The six Populist representatives in the National Assembly, nevertheless, filed a declaration of reserve in which they expressed the opinion that Slovakia should receive autonomy in the future and that their approval of the Consti-

2

So was the meeting described by Vaclav Chaloupecky in his Zapas o Slovensko (Prague, Gin, 1930). 47-61; cf. Peroutka, Zacatky, 11-24. A somewhat different interpretation, emphasizing the autonomist suggestions, is presented by Martin Gre£o in his Martinska deklaracia, 2nd ed. (Turciansky Svaty Martin, Matica slovenska, 1947). ' Compare the text of the Constitution (Sbirka zdkonu a narizeni statu Ceskoslovenskeho [1920], No. 121) and the Law on Regional Governments passed the same day (Ibid., No. 126). 4 Peroutka, Zacatky, 126-27; cf. Karol Sidor, Slovaci v zahranicnom odboji (Bratislava, 1928), 235-41.

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tution should in no way be interpreted as a renunciation of their work toward that goal.5 In fact, they resumed their campaign immediately. Founded originally as an association of Catholic priests, the party worried about the fate of Slovak Catholicism if the Slovaks remained in too close a union with the Czechs, who were Catholics, too, but of a more liberal bent. The Populists now came also to oppose the idea that Czechs and Slovaks were one nation and expressed fears that, in a unitary state with the Czechs, the Slovaks might lose their national identity ("samobytnost' "). And they complained that Slovakia was not receiving her due share of the state's prosperity, while the influx of Czechs into Slovakia threatened to deprive many Slovaks of their jobs. Establishment of Slovak autonomy appeared to them the only cure for all these ills. The danger of Hungarian subversion no longer seemed so great. And although their leading members had taken active part in the National Council of Turciansky Svàty Martin, and in the National Constituent Assembly of Prague, they now came to dispute the legality of these bodies' actions on the ground that they were revolutionary, and not elected, assemblies and consequently, that they were not representative of Slovak public opinion.6 The opponents of the Populists, Czech and Slovak, resisted the Populist demand for Slovak autonomy on several grounds. First, there was their sincere belief that Czechs and Slovaks were indeed branches of the same nation and should be united as closely as possible. Then there was their continued fear of Hungarian revisionism, which even planted its agents, such as Frantisek Jehlicka and Vojtech Tuka, in the immediate following of Father Hlinka. And, finally, the growing sympathy of Populist radicals for the authoritarian régimes of Italy, Austria, Poland, and Germany continued to raise doubts about democracy's chances for survival in an autonomous Slovakia under Populist leadership, such as the Populists, counting on the strength of the Slovak Catholic population, hoped to achieve. They rejected the Populist 5

Ibid., 245-46; cf. Jozef Lettrich, History of Modern Slovakia (New York, F. A. Praeger, 1955), 73; also, Jozef Mikus, La Slovaquie dans le drame de l'Europe (Paris, Les Isles d'Or, 1955), 41. 6 The best measure of these arguments can be taken from the statements of Populist representatives in the Czechoslovak National Assembly in the subsequent years, as they were recorded in Tësnopisecké zprâvy o schuzich Nârodniho shromâzdëni republiky Ceskoslovenské. They were skillfully excerpted by Karol Sidor in the two volumes of his Slovenskâ politika na pôde prazského snemu, 1918-1938 (Bratislava, Knihtl'aciaren Andreja, 1943).

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charges against the validity of Slovak arrangements established by the Declaration of Trciansky Svaty Martin and the Czechoslovak Constitution, with reference to the fact that in the first parliamentary elections, held in April 1920, the Populist position and program were backed by only 23 percent of the Slovak electorate. The Party doubled its representation in the new National Assembly from six to twelve seats, but remained in the minority in the total representation of the Slovaks there (a total of forty six seats).7 None of the Populist fears had materialized in the twenty years of the Czechoslovak Republic between the two World Wars. Slovak Catholicism suffered no losses, and although the gains of the Slovak economy were only moderate, Slovak culture registered enormous gains. Also, after the administrative reform of 1927, Slovakia - as well as the other provinces of the state - enjoyed a large degree of selfgovernment, and increasing numbers of Slovaks, trained by Czech teachers and instructors, were taking over the direction of their affairs. But all this did not go as quickly or as far as the Populists wished, and the People's Party, as the opposition, had only a limited share in it, anyhow. So the Populists continued their campaign, never missing a chance to take their cause to the polls. However, although they always came out as the largest single party in Slovakia, they succeeded only in 1925 in winning a near-majority of the votes cast by the Slovaks. In other elections, they won less than two-fifths or one-third of the votes, respectively. In the total vote of Slovakia, their share varied from one-fifth to two-fifths.8 1938 was the twentieth anniversary of the conclusion of the Pittsburgh Agreement and the Populists determined to achieve its realiza7 The records of the parliamentary debates again reflect these feelings best. They were forcefully expressed, too, in the memoirs of Dr. Ivan Derer, Slovensky vyvoj a I'udacka zrada (Prague, Kvasnicka a Hampl, 1946), which also reprints a partial confession of Tuka (pp. 24-87). The activities of these and other Hungarian agents have recently been fully exposed in the studies of Juraj Kramer, which are based on materials in Hungarian archives now open to research, Irredenta a separatizmus v slovenskej politike, 1919-1938 (Bratislava, Slovenske vydavatel'stvo politickej literatury, 1957); and Slovenske autonomisticke hnutie v rokoch 1918-1929 (Bratislava, Slovenska akademia vied, 1962). 8 This estimate is based on election and census returns published in Ceskoslovenska statistika, vols. 1, 9, 31, 70, 98, and 134. It is difficult to establish exact figures, because the Populists often campaigned on a joint ticket with other parties, and the Czechoslovak statistics indicate only the joint Czechoslovak ratio in the population and electorate of Slovakia, without giving specific figures for the Czech and Slovak shares.

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tion "even at the price of the Republic". They opened the year with a virulent attack on both their opponents and the Czechoslovak government. On March 29, they rose in the Czechoslovak National Assembly to join the German Nazis, organized in the Sudeten German Party under the leadership of Konrad Henlein, to demand reconstruction of the state into a federation.9 This was a disturbing experience for the Czechoslovak government, for it was generally suspected that the Sudeten German action was instigated by Germany, and had no other purpose than to dismember the Czechoslovak state. The fact that this action was supported also by Hungarian and Polish parties in Czechoslovakia, likewise suspected of acting on instructions from abroad, only strengthened these apprehensions. And coming as it did only two weeks after Hitler's capture of Austria, this demonstration could not but alarm the Czechoslovak government at the possibility of an imminent attack on the integrity of the state.10 This fear increased especially on May 21, on the eve of local elections in Czechoslovakia, when German military moves along the 9

Tesnopisecke zprdvy, March 29, 1938. In their trial before the National Court in 1947, the Populists denied that there had been any agreement between the Sudeten German Party and their party for such cooperation; see the records of this trial, published in part under the title, Pred siidom ndroda (Bratislava, Poverenictvo informäcii, 1947), I, 15 f, 45, 124; II, 129, 199; IV, 28-34, 87-92; cf. Jozef Pauio (ed.), Dr. Jozef Tiso o sebe (Passaic, Slovensky Katolicky Sokol, 1952) [hereinafter referred to as Tiso o sebe], 129 f. But the communications and testimony of the Sudeten German deputy, Karl H. Frank, who had negotiated this agreement, speak rather clearly on this matter; see Zpoved K. H. Franka (Prague, CiL, 1946), 31-33; or his article "Erinnerung an Andrej Hlinka", Böhmen und Mähren (1941), 351; cf. Pred südom, II, 126-29, 296; III, 14-16; also Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, Series D, Vol. II (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949) [hereinafter referred to as German Documents, II], 124 f, 198 f. All that can be conceded to the Populists is that it was only a verbal agreement, not a formal treaty. 10 That these suspicions were not unfounded has been sufficiently demonstrated in the well-known studies of the Munich crisis by lohn Wheeler-Bennett, R. G. D. Laffan, and Boris Celovsky. The work of Helmuth K. G. Rönnefarth, Die Sudetenkrise in der internationalen Politik (Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner, 1961), is largely an unsuccessful, politically inspired attempt to refute these studies. Additional relevant materials have been recently published in Czechoslovakia in collections such as: Mnichov v dokumentech, 2 vols. (Prague, Stätni nakladatelstvi politicke literatury, 1958); Nove dokumenty k historii Mnichova (Prague, Stätni nakladatelstvi politicke literatury, 1958); and Die Deutschen in der Tschechoslowakei, 1933-1947 (Prague, Nakladatelstvi Ceskoslovenske akademie vSd, 1964). Recent studies of the Munich crisis are Keith Eubank's Munich (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1963); and Henri Nogueres' Munich (Paris, R. Laffont, 1963).

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in 1938

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Czechoslovak frontiers and sporadic attempts at rebellion in Sudeten German territory caused the Czechoslovak government to order partial mobilization. The Populist leaders, like the leaders of the Sudeten German Party, denounced the mobilization, but the rank-and-file Slovaks, unlike many Sudeten Germans, joined the colors as loyally as the Czechs.11 The Populists were also disappointed by the results of the polls. Unlike the Sudeten Germans, who gave the Nazis more than eighty percent of their votes, the Slovaks gave the Populists only twofifths of their ballot.12 This was a painful blow to the Populists, who had expected a smashing victory equal to that of the Sudeten German Party. It called for a reappraisal of the People's Party policy, especially since the rapidly declining health of the aged Hlinka forced the Populists to consider the future leadership of the party. In the course of these considerations, however, a deep rift in the party, which had been in the making for some time, became apparent, dividing the leaders into moderates and radicals. The moderates, who were led by Father Jozef Tiso and represented the feelings of the majority of the party's membership, deplored the close cooperation with the national minorities, especially the Nazi Germans. But the radicals, who were led by Karol Sidor and Ferdinand Durcansky, wished to continue the hard-line collision course, gambling with the idea that the Slovaks eventually could stand on their own feet as an independent state, especially if aid could be obtained from a neighboring country. On the latter issue, however, the radicals were sharply divided. While Sidor entertained visions of a link with Poland, Burcansky was inclined toward Germany. Since the spring, both of them had been in frequent contact with official circles in those countries, Sidor through the Polish Consul in Bratislava, Durcansky through the Sudeten German group in Slovakia. Finally, there were a few individuals, as we will see, who still felt that Slovakia would do best to return to Hungary. 13 11

Karol Sidor, then the editor-in-chief of the Populist daily, Slovak, acknowledged it himself - although he divined that in case of war, the Slovaks would behave differently - when he wrote there on July 15: "The mobilization went well, but war is something different, and we will certainly not go to war with gay hearts for those who rule over us." 12 Based on a comparison of the election returns published in Prager Presse, Slovak, and Slovensky denik following the three election days, May 22 and 29, and June 12. "> Derer, Slovensky vyvoj, 175-88, 191-95; cf. Pred sudom, II, 150 f; also Jozef Letrich, History of Modern Slovakia (New York, F. A. Praeger, 1955), 84, 96. Sidor's relations with the Poles were often reported also by the British Ambassa-

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Josef Änderte Hostile to the Czechs, the governments of these three countries had

vied for the sympathy of the Slovaks for years before, and they were only t o o glad to emphasize their interest in the Slovaks now. 1 4 A l t h o u g h Hungary's case s e e m e d m o s t nearly hopeless, the Hungarians

were

m o s t confident that the Slovaks would g o their way, following the "dictates of geography", if nothing else. T o impress them favorably, the Hungarian government instructed the Magyar leaders in Slovakia t o support Populist d e m a n d s for autonomy, rather than to d e m a n d a u t o n o m y of their o w n . A n d it l o o k e d for diplomatic support to Germany, Italy, and Poland. Hitler h a d indicated o n several occasions that h e w o u l d leave Slovakia to Hungary if h e w e n t to war with C z e c h o slovakia and Hungary joined him, but until that time, he wished to leave his hands free and refused to c o m m i t himself m o r e definitely, in spite of continuous pressure f r o m the Hungarian government.

Con-

sequently, while G e r m a n propaganda liberally catered to Hungarian revisionism, it also supported the Slovak Populists in their campaign for autonomy in the Czechoslovak Republic. This w a s similar to Italy's position. Mussolini l o o k e d for a n e w base of Italian influence in C e n tral E u r o p e , to remedy the loss of Austria to Germany, but h e w a s

dor in Warsaw, Sir Howard Kennard; see Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Third Series, Vol. I (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1949) [hereinafer referred to as British Documents, I], 429-31, 464 f, 479-81. 14 This and the following is based on numerous memoirs and diaries by diplomats and officials of all these countries, as well as on a mass of documents published in several volumes of the already-quoted German and British collections. To these has recently been added an extremely revealing collection of Hungarian documents, Diplomäciai iratok Magyarorszdg Külpolitikäjähoz 1936-1945, (Budapest, Akademiai Kiadö, 1962-1965); volumes I-III published, so far. Equally valuable are The Confidential Papers of Admiral Horthy (Budapest, Corvina Press, 1965), which offer us a picture of Hungarian foreign policy and of the admiral which is quite different from the one presented in his memoirs, Ein Leben für Ungarn (Bonn, Athenäum Verlag, 1953). With such materials on hand, it is no longer possible to accept fully the rather apologetic treatment of Hungarian and Polish foreign policy on this matter in such works as C. A. Macartney's October Fifteenth: A History of Modern Hungary, 1929-1945 (Edinburgh, University Press, 1961); or Roman Debicki's Foreign Policy of Poland 1919-1938 (New York, F. A. Praeger, 1962). More useful is Hans Otto Meissner's Polen und Europa: Studien zur polnischen Aussenpolitik, 1931-1938 (Tübingen, J. C. Moher, 1957); or the more recent, though Marxist-oriented, studies of Jerzy Kozenski, Czechosfowacja v polskiej politice zagranicznej w latach 1932-1938 (Poznan: Instytut Zachodni, 1964); and T. I. Berend, Magyarorzag a fasiszta Nemetorszdg elettereben 1933-1939 (Budapest, 1960). From the vast memoir literature, most helpful on this matter are the memoirs of Dr. Juraj Slävik, then the Czechoslovak Minister in Warsaw, Mo]a pamät - zivd kniha, published in New Yorksky Dennik from 1957 to 1959.

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not yet quite sure that Hungary was the right spot, mainly because of the doubts of his son-in-law and foreign minister, Galeazzo Ciano. In contrast to Germany and Italy, Poland was inclined most definitely to support Hungary against Czechoslovakia, but her interests did not coincide entirely with those of Hungary, either. Ever since the SovietPolish war of 1920, when the Czechoslovak government prevented Hungarian troops from crossing Slovakia to help Poland, many Polish officials and private writers dreamed of reestablishing the old PolishHungarian frontier in the Carpathians by allowing Hungary to resume its control over Slovakia and Ruthenia. They envisioned this frontier as the powerful backbone of a grand alliance which Poland hoped to build with all countries lying between Germany and Russia, from Finland to Rumania and Yugoslavia. This huge land-bloc would control the "intermarium" between the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Adriatic Sea, and would serve as a third force, a "Third Europe", in European politics. But many Poles thought that Hungary could be satisfied with Ruthenia and the Magyar territories of Slovakia, leaving the Slovaks themselves under a Polish protectorate. And there were Poles, of course, who wished to leave the Slovaks where they were, because they preferred the friendship of a strong Czechoslovakia to that of a weak Hungary, in the face of a new German "Drang nach Osten" which they saw already at work in the Austrian "Anschluss". At any rate, whatever these considerations seemed to portend for the future, no strong and direct action concerning Slovakia was undertaken in early 1938 by any of these powers in their relations to one another or to the Slovak separatists. Nor did the separatists themselves openly exceed the bounds of the official program of the Populists, which at this time included only the demand for Slovak autonomy in the Czechoslovak Republic. The anniversary of the Pittsburgh Agreement fell on May 30. The Populists had been preparing for it for almost a year. The chief attraction of the numerous celebrations they organized was a delegation of some of the American Slovaks who had signed the Pittsburgh Agreement in 1918. They brought the original document with them and displayed it at meetings throughout Slovakia, pledging their support for the campaign of the People's Party. The most impressive of these meetings was held in the Slovak capital of Bratislava on Whitsunday, June 5. On this occasion, the Slovak People's Party made public a proposal for an amendment to the Czechoslovak Constitution that would establish Slovak autonomy in

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the Czechoslovak Republic according to the terms of the Pittsburgh Agreement, as the Populists interpreted it. The Whitsunday Proposal - as we will refer to it henceforth - called for the establishment of a Slovak diet, a Slovak government and a Slovak supreme court which would have jurisdiction over all matters concerning that province except those of national defense, foreign policy, national finances, and some other economic areas. These matters would be administered by a central parliament, a central government, and a central supreme court common to both Slovakia and the rest of the state.15 The Whitsunday Proposal was prepared with the assistance of lawyers of the Sudeten German Party, which had already announced its own demands on April 23, in the so-called Carlsbad Program. They proposed the establishment of Sudeten German autonomy on the foundation of the National Socialist "Weltanschauung", or - to put it differently - to establish a Nazi German state within the bounds of the Czechoslovak state. Confirmed, rather than assuaged, in its apprehensions, the Czechoslovak government declined to accept both the Carlsbad Program of the Sudeten German Party and the Whitsunday Proposal of the Slovak Populists. But it promised to announce soon its own proposals for new concessions to the national groups of the state, proposals which had been in the making for some time. They were to form a special Nationality Statute that would expand the rights granted to Czechoslovak minorities by the Minority Treaty of Saint-Germain and, at the same time, increase the prerogatives of local government in Slovakia. By the end of July, work on the statute had progressed far enough to allow discussion of its main features. The most remarkable of these was the creation of fully elective provincial diets divided into national sections (curiae), each with the right and duty to administer the particular needs of the nationality it represented.16 15

Text in Slovak, June 5, 1938; reprinted by Robert Nowak in his book, Der künstliche Staat: Ostprobleme der Tschechoslowakei (Oldenburg, G. Stalling, 1938), 312-19. 16 The full text of the proposal has never been made public. Partial text was published in Prager Tageblatt, July 28; cf. Prager Presse, July 29. From these and other sources it was reconstructed by R. G. D. Laffan in his study, The Crisis over Czechoslovakia: January to September 1938. Survey of International Affairs 1938, II (London, Oxford University Press, 1951), 206-11. The thenPrime Minister, Dr. Milan Hodza, described the proposals in a somewhat inflated way in numerous speeches and articles in the United States during World War II; these were published by Michal Müdry under the title, Milan Hodza v Amerike {Chicago, Geringer Press, 1949), 19, 26 f, 31-34, 50 ff, et passim.

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The Nationality Statute was received with satisfaction by democratic Germans and Slovaks, but it fell short of the demands of the Sudeten German Party and the Slovak Populists, and they lost no time in rejecting it. Such parallel actions by the two parties remained a constant feature of their negotiations with the government in August and early September, when President Benes and Prime Minister Hodza offered the Sudeten German Party additional concessions and proposed new adjustments of the Slovak position in the state. Acting on Hitler's instructions to conclude no agreement with the Czechoslovak government, the Sudeten German Party rejected these concessions and the Slovak Populists followed their example. On September 8, the Populists even took part in a meeting of "dissatisfied nationalities" summoned by the Sudeten German Party, to demonstrate their support of demands for the reconstruction of the state along federal lines, whatever that meant.17 This indicates that the radicals continued to play a strong role in the People's Party, despite their differences and despite the fiasco at the polls. It was obvious, also, in the uncertain solution of the question of the future leadership of the party following Hlinka's death on August 16. Dr. Tiso, the vice-chairman of the party and leader of the moderate wing, did assume the leadership, but only as acting chairman, and for only a year, until September 1939, when the question was to be decided by a party congress.18 Although the Nazis, both in and out of Czechoslovakia, continued giving propaganda support to the Populist demands for autonomy in the Czechoslovak Republic, Hitler still held Slovakia as a bait for Hungary. He was by now resolved to crush Czechoslovakia with military force, and in late August, when he met the Hungarian Regent, Admiral Horthy, he promised Hungary, this time in definite terms, the whole of Slovakia and Ruthenia, if Hungary would join him in the war. The 17 Ceske slovo, September 9 and 10; Slovak, September 9, 10 and 11. Before the National Court, the Populists, of course, belittled the significance of this cooperation in general, and of this meeting in particular; see Pred sudom, I, 19 f, 123 f; II, 65-70, 129; IV, 30, 98 f; V, 5, 31-33; and Tiso o sebe, 148, 164 f. Also, Tiso's biography by KonStantin Culen, Po Svatoplukovi druhd nase hlava: Zivot Dr. Jozefa Tisu (Middleton, Prva Katolicka Slovenska Jednota, 1947), 199 f. H o w painful such actions were to the government can best be seen from the bitter words of President Benes when he reminisced about them in his Ovahy o slovanstvi: Hlavni problemy slovanske politiky (Prague, Cin, 1947), 342 f. However, Derer's suspicion that Tiso agreed at this meeting to surrender Slovak borderlands to Hungary (Slovensky vyvoj, 310) was unfounded. 18 Slovdk, September 1; Ceske slovo, September 1. Also, Sidor, Slovenska politika, II, 249 f; and Culen, Po Svatoplukovi, 202.

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Hungarians were pleased with the prospect of the imminent realization of their wildest dreams, but they had become uneasy by this time about the support Czechoslovakia seemed to continue receiving from the Western powers, as well as from the powers of the Little Entente. They did promise to cooperate with Hitler, but in rather uncertain terms.19 Nevertheless, Hitler, on September 12, demanded the immediate surrender of Sudeten German territories to Germany and threatened war if Czechoslovakia did not comply. An armed rebellion broke out in the German borderlands of Czechoslovakia on the following day, and Henlein escaped to Germany, whence he proclaimed the secession of the Sudeten Germans from the Czechoslovak Republic. At the same time, his deputy, Ernst Kundt, tried to persuade the Populists to voice their demands in a more radical manner. But the Czechoslovak government quickly restored order in the German borderlands and made it clear that it would resist German aggression. This did not fail to impress the Populists. In a declaration issued on September 19, they dissociated themselves from the Sudeten German insurrectionists by condemning the use of force in nationality disputes and announcing their willingness to continue negotiations with the government. Kundt, who was asked by Henlein, also on September 19, to urge the Slovaks again to raise their demands on the following day, could only report that the Populist radicals were silenced and that the People's Party apparently wished to uphold the Czechoslovak state.20 Owing to strong pressure from Britain and France, the Czechoslovak government did agree on September 21 to surrender the Sudeten German areas to Germany in return for a Franco-British guarantee of integrity for the rest of the state's territory. But Hitler, still planning the " Horthy turned the experience into an amusing story (Ein Leben, 197-205), and Macartney, too, thought it quite innocent (October Fifteenth, I, 238-48). F r o m official records, however, it is quite clear who called the tune and who danced to it; see German Documents, II, 609-11, 623 f, 628, 651-54; and Diplomaciai iratok, II, 545-62. M This Populist declaration played an important role in the postwar trials; see Pred sudom, I, 7; III, 22 f; V, 5, 35. However, it is incorrect to connect this declaration with Henlein's appeal to Kundt (reprinted in German Documents, II, 841), as the government attorneys did. The Populist declaration was indeed published on September 20 (see Slovak of that date), but it had been issued on September 19, whereas Henlein's message reached Kundt only on the morning of September 20, after the declaration had already appeared in the press, as is clear from a close reading of Kundt's reply (German Documents, II, 852 f). It seems that even the defense attorneys did not get the story straight; see Pred sudom, IV, 3 I f , 9 9 f .

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complete military destruction of Czechoslovakia, tried to eliminate the chances of a peaceful settlement of the dispute by making his demands unacceptable to the Czechoslovak government, and, by persuading Poland and Hungary to make similar demands concerning the Czechoslovak territories inhabited by their co-nationals. For this purpose, he met the Polish Ambassador to Germany, Józef Lipski, and the Hungarian Prime Minister, Béla Imrédy, on September 20 at Berchtesgaden, while Goring entertained Admiral Horthy in East Prussia. He elicited from them statements that their governments demanded for their conationals in Czechoslovakia the same concessions that were contemplated for the Sudeten Germans - which now meant nothing less than the immediate surrender of the Polish and Hungarian borderlands of Czechoslovakia to Poland and Hungary - and he assured them of his support. To Imrédy, he also repeated his offer of the whole of Slovakia and Ruthenia if Hungary would join him in a military action against Czechoslovakia. Imrédy promised Hitler that Hungary would indeed join the war, though not immediately.21 Then, on September 22, when Hitler met British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain in Godesberg, he told him that he could not accept any settlement of his claims against Czechoslovakia, unless the Polish and Hungarian claims were also settled. Defining his claims, he now demanded, not only the German borderlands of Czechoslovakia, but also large sections of wholly Czech territory.22 This was obviously blackmail, to which indeed neither the Czechoslovak nor the British and French governments could submit. All negotiations seemed futile and war appeared imminent. In Czechoslovakia, a general mobilization was declared on September 23 and carried out swiftly throughout the state. There was no unrest in Slovakia despite the efforts of the German, Polish, and Hungarian radio stations. In fact, all Slovak parties rallied behind a new government, headed by General Jan Syrovy, and appealed to the Populists to 21

German Documents, II, 863-65; Diplomàciai iratok, II, 619-36; cf. Macartney, October Fifteenth, I, 261-68. For the Hitler-Lipski meeting and other German-Polish contacts on this matter, see additional German documents released by the Soviet government under the title, Documents and Materials Relating to the Eve of the Second World War (New York, International Publishers, 1948), 176-84; and Józef Chudek, ed., WrzeSniowy kryzys Czechosiowacki 1938 r. w raportach ambasqdora Lipskiego (Warsaw, Polski Instytut Spraw Mifdzynarodowych, 1958), 36, 44, 47-51, 53-66. For a frank discussion of these negotiations, based in additional Polish documents, see Kozenski's Czechosiowacja, 267-76. 22 German Documents, II, 870-79, 887-92, 898-910, and appendix vi; cf. British Documents, II, 463-73, 482-88, 495 f, 499-508, and map I.

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join them. President Benes offered the Populists a seat in the government as well as a proposal for self-government in Slovakia that included a true legislative diet and a share in the state funds, contracts, and jobs that corresponded to the proportion of Slovaks in the population of the state. 23 But these were not the only pressures to which the Populists were exposed. Hitler's and Henlein's actions persuaded even the most naive of them that the German aim was to break up the Czechoslovak state, rather than a genuine federation, while Horthy's and Imredy's visits to Germany made many wonder what the Germans really had in store for Slovakia. At the same time, the success of mobilization in Slovakia made it clear again that the Slovak people wished to stand by the Czechs. And so, on September 24, the Populists accepted the proposals of President Benes, although only as a basis for further negotiations. They also delegated one of their members, Matus Cernak, to represent "the autonomist view", though not the party, in the Czechoslovak government, which already included two other Slovaks, Dr. Vladimir Fajnor and Dr. Imrich Karvas. 24 If Burcansky had any part in these decisions, he was clearly playing a double game. For during the same period, he urged his contacts in Germany to persuade the Germans that the Slovaks wanted independence from both Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and desired German help. He used one of his associates, Eudovit Mutnansky, whom he sent to Vienna in the middle of September as his observer. Mutnansky achieved a distinct success, not so much because of his ability as because of German disappointment over Hungarian reluctance to cooperate more closely with Germany. He was allowed to organize the Viennese Slovaks into a "Slovak Legion" to intervene in Slovakia, in case of war, in favor of Slovak independence under German protection. He was also made director of Slovak broadcasts from Vienna; these now concentrated on the independence theme. 25 On September 26, Hitler himself picked up the theme in his memorable speech in the Berlin Sportpalast, in which he stated that the Czechoslovak nation

23

Text in his Ovahy, 318-22. Ibid., 317 f; cf. Ceske slovo, September 24 and 25; also, the memorial published by Cernak's friends under the title, Wer war Matus Cernak (Munich, P. Belej, 1955) [hereinafter referred to as Cernak], 21 f. 25 See the testimony of Mutnansky and other witnesses, Pred sudom, II, 152-56. Mutnansky also described his adventures, somewhat boastfully, in his book "Tu rissky vysielac Viedeh . .." (Vienna, 1939). 24

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was only an invention of Mr. Benes' and that the Slovaks "did not wish to have anything to do with the Czechs".28 None of these appeals found any echo in Slovakia. Calm prevailed everywhere as the People's Party joined the negotiations between the government and all Slovak parties concerning the best way of implementing the proposals of President Benes. The talks raised some hope that the matter would be settled by a compromise acceptable to all, but new international developments intervened again and destroyed such hopes. Facing a certain war for the sake of a people that lived outside the immediate sphere of British interests, Chamberlain made a last attempt to appease Hitler on September 28, this time through Mussolini. Hitler, who had noticed a remarkable lack of enthusiasm for war among the German people, agreed to abandon his war plans this time, and to setlle the dispute peacefully at a conference of the great powers in Munich. In an agreement concluded there on September 29, England, France, and Italy allowed him to annex the Sudeten German territories and ruled that within three months Czechoslovakia should also satisfy the Polish and Hungarian claims.27 Under the combined pressure of friend and foe alike, the Czechoslovak government accepted the Munich Agreement on September 30 and evacuated the German borderlands, as well as substantial areas of fully Czech territory, between October 1 and October 10. To Poland and Hungary the government proposed bilateral negotiations as soon as the German question had been settled.28 But, unwilling to wait, the Polish government responded by Sep26

Völkischer Beobachter, September 27. Viliam Ries-Javor, a Populist writer, admitted that Hitler already had the benefit of "detailed information from Slovak as well as German sources" about Slovakia; see his Kontinent v prerode (Bratislava, 1943), 30. 27 Text in German Documents, II, 1014-16, and map II. 28 For this and the following on the Czechoslovlak negotiations with Poland and Hungary, see German Documents, IV, 6-9 passim; British Documents, III, 49108, 178-83 passim; Diplomaciai iratok, II, 681-738. It is also quite rewarding at this point to read closely the relevant sections of several memoirs, particularly: Jözef Beck, the Polish foreign minister, Dernier Rapport (Neuchätel, Baconniere, 1951), 165-69; Jan Szembek, his deputy, Journal, 1933-1939 (Paris, Plön, 1952), 342-48; Nicholas Petrescu-Comnene, the Rumanian foreign minister, Preludi del grande dramma (Rome, Lionardo, 1947), 205-33; or Ciano's Diary, 1937-1938 (London, Methuen, 1952), 172 ff. Good discussions with further documentation are offered in Macartney, October Fifteenth, I, 276-84; and Kozenski, Czechoslowacja, 279-86.

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tember 30 with a twelve-hour ultimatum demanding immediate surrender of the area of Tesin in Silesia. Anxious to avoid any conflict with Poland that Germany could use as a new pretext for aggression, the Czechoslovak government yielded and evacuated the territory on October 2 and 3. However, encouraged by this easy success, the Poles called on the Hungarians and the Slovaks to follow their example and offered them their help. Now that the policy of blackmail had become the fashion, the opportunity to realize the Third Europe project seemed indeed close. The Hungarians sharpened their diplomatic language, heightened their propaganda efforts, and took various military measures along the Slovak frontier, but, nevertheless, they agreed to negotiate first. They wished to preserve the good will of the Western powers who advised moderation, and they still worried about the members of the Little Entente, who had been considerably shaken by the Munich verdict over Czechoslovakia, but still seemed faithful to her, Rumania in particular. At the same time, Germany and Italy withdrew their support of Hungarian claims to the whole of Slovakia and Ruthenia. Apart from wishing to chastise Hungary for its lack of cooperation before Munich, Germany assumed this position because it had come to view the project of the common Polish-Hungarian frontier as a potential obstacle, however weak, to future German incursions to the East. The Italians, Ciano in particular, realizing that the obstacle would indeed be too weak to warrant a quarrel with Germany by lending the project strong support, advised Hungary to be satisfied with Ruthenia and the Hungarian borderlands of Slovakia. In spite of the hue and cry, Polish support seemed to be shrinking to the same proportion. The Hungarians themselves, however, had come to believe that negotiations, perhaps in a more desirable way than military effort, offered them, too, a chance to obtain not only the Hungarian borderlands of Slovakia and Ruthenia, but the whole of these provinces, as well. They surmised that the prospect of having the fertile borderlands separated from the rest of these provinces could make the Slovaks and Ruthenians prefer to return to Hungary, too, if they only had a chance to express their preferences. Thus, the Hungarian government agreed not only to enter into negotiations with the Czechoslovak government, but even to postpone the negotiations until October 9, demanding the surrender of the Hungarian borderlands, but also suggesting a plebiscite among the Slovaks and Ruthenians. If the Hungarians did not follow the Polish example, the Slovak

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Populists did. On September 30, they withdrew from their negotiations with the Czechoslovak government and the other Slovak parties, and summoned the executive committee of their party to their stronghold at Zilina on October 5, to reconsider the party's position. Then, on October 3, Minister Cernak submitted to President Benes a twenty-four hour ultimatum in which he demanded immediate autonomy for Slovakia, according to the Whitsunday Proposal of his party, and the immediate surrender of power over Slovakia into the hands of such people as the People's Party would determine. Somehow, the government still found courage to reject this ultimatum. On October 4, Cernak resigned his post in the government, intimating that the late of Slovakia would be decided only at Zilina.29 Alarmed by the action of the Populists, the leaders of the other Slovak parties, with the exception of the Communists, decided to go to 2ilina, too, and challenge the Populist position. To prepare for this, they met in Bratislava on the morning of October 5 and worked out a common platform drafted by Dr. Ivan Derer, the leader of the Slovak Social Democrats. Derer proposed to expand some of the concessions offered by President Benes, but left considerable power in the hands of the central government. The parties also decided to insist on a coalition government in Slovakia, rather than the one-party system that the Populists seemed to be planning.30 But the position of these parties was undermined by a new retreat of the central government. Cernak's resignation added to a crisis in the Czechoslovak government caused by Hitler's demand for the removal from power of all persons responsible for the pre-Munich course of Czechoslovakia, particularly President Benes and Foreign Minister Kamil Krofta. Bowing to this pressure, Krofta resigned on October 4 and was replaced by Dr. Franti§ek Chvalkovsky. On October 5, President Benes submitted his own resignation. In his farewell speech, he admonished the Czech and Slovak leaders to do everything possible to achieve a reconciliation among the contending parties, no matter what that cost.31 89

Slovak, October 2, 4 and 5; cf. Cernak, 27 f; also Culen, Po Sviitopulkovi, 210-12. so Derer, Slovensky vyvoj, 293-99, which includes the text of the agreement, though with a wrong date. 31 Ceske slovo, October 6; see also his Pameti: Od Mnichova k nove vatce a k novemu vitezstvi (Prague, Orbis, 1947), 73 f, 433-37; cf. Ladislav K. Feierabend, Ve vtddach Druhe republiky (New York, Universum, 1961), 37-40, 43-46.

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The matter indeed appeared urgent. The first news from Zilina seemed to indicate that the radicals had taken charge of the People's Party and planned to declare the secession of Slovakia from the state. It appeared that they might succeed in these plans if they received strong backing from Czechoslovakia's neighbors, Germany in particular. Strong pronouncements in their favor, broadcast from Vienna, Warsaw, and Budapest, gave the impression that they would receive such backing if they asked for it. Influenced by these apprehensions, Prime Minister Syrovy followed up the President's speech with an announcement that his government was ready to reconstruct the state into a real federation of Czechs, Slovaks, and Ruthenians.32 In Zilina, things were really not as bad as they looked from Prague.33 The Populists did assume the right to speak in the name of the whole Slovak people, and issued a declaration, drafted by Durcansky, in which they demanded the right to full self-determination for the Slovak people, emphasizing their wish to stand "on the side of those nations which are struggling against the Marxist-Jewish ideology" without any reference to the Czechoslovak Republic. Contacts were also maintained with outside powers - with Germany through Mutnansky, who continued calling for secession under German protection; with Poland through Polish officers who had come down to Zilina to offer the favors of Poland; and with Hungary through a Populist leader who sneaked across the border to promise the Hungarians that he would swing the party in favor of Hungary if the Hungarians would grant Slovakia complete autonomy, which they readily promised.34 32

Text in Ceske slovo, October 6. Unless otherwise indicated, the story of the Zilina conference is based primarily on the following sources: Slovak, Ceske slovo, Slovensky denik, Völkischer Beobachter, and the New York Times, all for October 7-9; German Documents, IV, 32, 38-40; particularly revealing is the testimony of Tiso ond other Populists or non-Populists who took part in the conference, as it appears in Pred südom, I, 23-25, 48 f, 51; II, 4, 7, 9-11, 27, 33-35, 49, 55, 74 f, 130, 131 f, 189 f, 200 f, 246, 297; III, 28 f, 36; IV, 24-27, 103-07, 218; V, 6, 38-40; cf. Tiso o sebe, 64, 136, 167-70; Derer, Slovensky vyvoj, 305-07; Cerndk, 30 f; Lettrich, History, 9597, 111 f, 296 f. Marxist writers described the conference in terms of class struggle: two groups of Slovak bourgeoisie quarrel over the right to exploit the Slovak working people, a right that is slipping from the hands of Czech bourgeoisie, while the interests of the people are defended only by the Communist Party; see Ladislav Lipscher's Ludacka autonomia: Ilüzie a skutocnost' (Bratislava, Slovenske vydavatel'stvo politickej literatury, 1957), 130-143; and Imrich Stanek's Zrada a päd: Hlinkovsti separatiste a tak zvany Slovensky stdt (Prague, Stätni nakladatelstvi politicke literatury, 1958), 111-33. 34 This we know only on the authority of Macartney (October Fifteenth, I, 278), who chose not to identify the man. At the Conference of Zilina, only the Populist 33

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All these possibilities were put before the executive committee of the People's Party and duly considered. But although all found some sponsors, a clear majority argued for the continuation of union with the Czechs in the Czechoslovak Republic. An independent Slovakia seemed unviable, and from all the proposed associations, a federation with the Czechs still appeared preferable for all practical purposes, particularly now that the pronouncements of President Benes and Prime Minister Syrovy seemed to offer the Populists an opportunity to write their own ticket. In the end, this solution was unanimously accepted. The Populists also agreed to form a coalition with other Slovak parties, but only if they recognized the Populist preponderance and accepted the Whitsunday Proposal of the People's Party as their own, without any reservations or conditions. This is what the representatives of the other Slovak parties were told by Tiso, coldly and brutally, when they reached Zilina on October 5. The shock of this confrontation split the ranks of the non-Populist parties. The Social Democrats insisted on the common platform agreed to in Bratislava, but Tiso refused to deal with them, for he considered the "Marxists" a foreign element in Slovakia, unrepresentative of the Slovak people. The Agrarians then presented a more moderate plan, but Tiso rejected it, too, insisting on his own conditions. Bewildered by this treatment, they called up their leaders in Bratislava and Prague, but received no encouragement. In fact, Agrarian leaders Rudolf Beran and former Prime Minister Hodza advised them to accept the Populist conditions. They considered it only a temporary solution dictated by immediate circumstances, a solution which would be changed as soon as these circumstances were gone. Hodza in particular was confident that economic difficulties would soon cause the Populists to modify their conditions and accept a more equitable solution, or else suffer a collapse. Thus, the day ended with the so-called Zilina Agreement between the Populists and the other Slovak parties, with the exception of the Social Democrats and the Communists. The agreement stated that these parties consented to the establishment of Slovak autonomy within the Czechoslovak Republic according to the Whitsunday Proposal of the People's Party. They also agreed that the autonomous government of Senator, Andrej Jancek, once an ardent Magyarophobe, favored the return of Slovakia to Hungary, but he was ignored and ridiculed; see Pred sudom, I, 51; II, 27.

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Slovakia be headed by Dr. Tiso and consist of two other Populists and two members of the Agrarian Party, the second in size in Slovakia. Tiso then communicated the agreement to the Czechoslovak government and obtained its immediate approval. Syrovy also appointed Tiso "Minister for Slovakia" and entrusted him with the formation of the first Slovak government. Thus, on October 6, Slovakia became an autonomous province of the Czechoslovak Republic, which was in this way transformed into a federation, although the pertinent constitutional changes were not carried out until November 22. On October 7, Tiso arrived in Prague with the people who had been chosen as his colleagues in the Slovak government: Cernäk and Durcansky, from his party, and Agrarians Jan Teplansky and Jan Lichner. Syrovy approved their choice and swore them in. They were to take over the administration of Slovakia, but become, at the same time, also members of the central government. It was further decided that they would represent Czechoslovakia in the negotiations with Hungary that were supposed to open at Komärno on October 9. The choice of Durcansky disturbed some observers, but it was expected that his influence would be outweighed by Tiso and the two Agrarians, and perhaps even by Cernäk, who was considered as standing between the moderates and the radicals of his party.35 The Czech and Slovak public accepted the establishment of Slovak autonomy with a certain relief. Although the people were aware that they were submitting to another form of blackmail, it seemed the best of the available alternatives, and many believed, like Hodza, that future developments might bring about a more acceptable arrangement.88 Poland was deeply disappointed by the outcome of the conference at Zilina. For a few weeks, Polish officials tried to persuade the Populists to change their mind, but when they were rebuffed, they took revenge by sending the governments in Prague and Bratislava another ultimatum, on October 31, in which they demanded the immediate 35

See the varying news reports and speculations in Ceske slovo, Slovak, Slovensky denik, Völkischer Beobachter, and the New York Times for October 8-11. Compare the comments in Ceske slovo, Lidove noviny, or Slovensky denik for the days immediately following the agreement; also in the liberal weekly, Pritomnost, October 12, p. 643 f. Other comments were reprinted by Lipscher in his Eudacka autonömia, 135-39, and passim. Particularly outspoken was Professor Jan Blahoslav Kozäk, a pupil of Masaryk and ideologue of the National Socialists, the party of President Benes; see his collection of essays, Veda a duch (Prague, Jan Laichter, 1938), 269 f, 275 f. 38

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surrender of a few villages in northern Slovakia which were inhabited by Poles.37 The two governments gave in, but the sympathies and good will that Poland had enjoyed among many Slovaks in the past were gone. Unable to join the pro-German faction of Burcansky, because of their Slavophile feelings, they abandoned the separatist camp and gave their support to the new union with the Czechs. Symbolic of this development was the attitude of Sidor, who became Deputy Prime Minister in the central government in December, and soon came to be considered more loyal even than Tiso.38 Hungary was disappointed, too, but continued to hope that the "dictates of geography" would force the Slovaks to revise their decision in favor of Hungary. However, all that the Slovaks conceded were the Hungarian borderlands of Slovakia, and those only under the pressure of Germany and Italy, who gave the territory to Hungary in the socalled Viennese Award on November 2.39 Germany and Italy pretended to see, in the establishment of Slovak autonomy in the Czechoslovak Republic, another victory for the principle of self-determination, which, they claimed, was one of the basic tenets of their political philosophy. Consequently, they approved it. But the Germans had an additional reason for being satisfied. They realized that post-Munich Czechoslovakia, delivered to the mercy of Germany, would facilitate the extension of German influence far to the East, along the southern frontier of Poland and close to the Ukranian grain fields on one side, and Rumanian oil wells on the other. If more direct control of the Czechoslovak area seemed desirable in the future, the pro-German separatist faction of Burcansky could be used to break up the Czechoslovak Republic by separating Slovakia from the Czech 37

German Documents, V, 120 f; British Documents, III, 211-13. Cf. memoirs of Beck (Dernier rapport, 170-75), Szembek (Journal, 345-79 passim), and Comnene (Preludi, 247-364 passim). Cf. Kozenski, Czechosiowacja, 287. Also Henryk Batowski, Kryzys dyplomatyczny w Europie, jesien 1938 - wiosna 1939 (Warsaw, 1962), 71-72; or R. G. D. Laffan and Veronica Toynbee, The Crisis over Czechovakia, October 1938 to 15 March 1939, Survey of International Affairs 1938, III (London, Oxford University Press, 1953), 65-67. 88 Feierabend, Ve vldddch, 116f, 120, 122, 144 f, and 158 f. Cf. Kazimierz Piwarski, Polityka europejska w okresei pomonachijskim (Warsaw, Panstwowe wydawnictvo naukowe, 1960), 41-42. 39 German Documents, IV, 117-26. For Hungarian records and related documents see Dimplomaciai iratok, II, 739-885. Other sources of Hungarian origin were exploited by Macartney in his October Fifteenth, I, 279-304. A recent study based on Czechoslovak sources is F. Vavra's Viedehska arbitral (Bratislava, Osveta, 1963).

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provinces, and, through appeals for assistance and protection, enable Germany to turn both sections of the state into German vassals.40 The subsequent history of Slovakia shows that much of the opposition, Czech or Slovak, to the Populist campaign for Slovak autonomy was justified.41 Within a few weeks after Munich, Populist radicals managed to push the moderates into the background, dissolve, or otherwise manoeuver out of existence, the other Slovak parties, and build up a one-party system in Slovakia modelled on Germany and Italy. Only the Populist ticket was admitted for the elections to the Slovak diet on December 15. When the polls closed, the People's Party (which also manned the election boards) proudly announced that it had won 97 percent of the votes. The radicals also continued to work for complete separation of Slovakia from the Czech provinces. Durcansky made a bid for German assistance already on October 12, when he told Goring that "Slovaks want full independence with very close political, economic and military ties with Germany", offering what he apparently considered particularly attractive - that the "Jewish problem would be solved as in Germany".42 Thanks to his collaboration, Germany was able, alone among the neighbors of Czechoslovakia, to realize her plans. In March 1939, Slovakia was separated from the Czech prov40 The development of this thought can be traced through German Documents, IV, 30, 39 f, 46-49, 52, 54-59, 73 ff, et passim. For further evidence, see LaffanToynbee, The Crisis, 41-45, 204 ff. 41 Unless otherwise indicated, the following is based primarily on the remaining materials from the records of the postwar trials published in Pred sudom, and on such works as Letterich, History, 85 ff; and Laffan-Toynbee, The Crisis, 220 ff. The Marxist diatribes of Lipscher and Stanek were as useful as Populist apologies, such as Jozef MikuS, La Slovaquie dans le drame de I'Europe (Paris, Les Isles d'Or, 1955); and OuriSansky's Pravo Slovakov na samostatnost' vo svetle dokumentov, I (Buenos Aires, Slovensky oslobodzovaci vybor, 1954). 42 German Documents, IV, 82 f, Made only six days after the establishment of Slovak autonomy, this statement makes nonsense out of the frequent Populist charges, including fiurcansky's, that the separation of Slovakia from the Czech provinces occurred because the Czechs were hindering materialization of Slovak autonomy, and not because of a Nazi-Populist plot. Alexander Mach, who accompanied Durcansky on this trip, tried to question the authenticity of the quoted document (Pred sudom, IV, 117, 251 f), but Duriansky proudly called it an expression of "the real thinking of the people" (Pravo Slovakov, 38). The document was not dated and the editors of the German Documents erred in guessing that the meeting took place on October 16 or 17. It is now clear that it took place during the suspension of the Czechoslovak-Hungarian negotiations at Komarno on October 11 and 12. In the postwar trials, the date was variably put at October 10, 11, and 12 (Pred sudom, I, 52-54; III, 131; IV, 116 f, 251 f; V, 1, and 43). Durcansky put it at October 12 (Pravo Slovakov, 38). So did Lipscher (Eudacka autonomia, 193); and Stanek, (Zrada, 136).

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inces and turned into a German protectorate, although less directly than the Czech provinces that were occupied by German army. The wisdom of the separatists was revealed all too soon. German "advisers" took the place of Czechs in Slovak administration and instructions were now coming from Berlin instead of Prague, to the point that Hitler even dictated the membership of the Slovak government. Concentration camps were established for opponents of the régime and thousands of Jews were sent to Germany for extermination. The Slovak People's Party was Nazified and Slovakia was dragged into war and misery on the side of the Axis powers. There must have been many days when people like Durcansky had reason to complain in the manner of Goethe's Zauberlehrling: "From the ghosts I have evoked, I cannot now be free!" When he did try to loosen the Nazi grip over his country in July 1940, Hitler ordered him out of the government. "That gypsy, that I no longer want to see", was the Fuhrer's verdict, we are told.43 It was the finale to a career which teaches a bitter lesson never better expressed than through the famous line of Schiller: "The Moor has done his work, the Moor can go".

43

Mikus, La Slovaquie,

163.

Personal Recollection of a Few Episodes in Czecho-Slovak Relations

PAVEL BLAHO

The primary aim of this paper is to examine the past relations between the Czechs and Slovaks, particularly during the years 1938-1939 and during the period of the so-called Slovak State. This is certainly too a wide subject to be dealt with in the course of a brief essay. We can therefore mention, only very briefly, a few important facts and incidents which may become the proper subjects for further historic study. In order to understand our problem, it is necessary to recall, however, the rise of the national movements in Europe. The French Revolution gave impetus to nationalism in Western Europe. The nations of Central and Eastern Europe were awakened during the revolutionary upheaval of 1848. In the Western countries, the states and nations developed along parallel lines. National leaders were also good patriots. Conditions in Central Europe were different. The national concept faced greater difficulties here, because states had both feudal and multinational character; churches constituted a strong foundation for some individual states. In Austria-Hungary, it was Catholicism, in Russia, the Orthodox Church, and in Turkey, Mohammedanism. Genuine patriotism did not develop in these states because of their mixed national composition. Thus, the people of these countries retained religious faith as an integrating factor in the development of their national identity. The influence of religion has been a vital element in national development up to the present. The establishment of a separate Slovak literary language occurred only after a long and bitter struggle. The Western Slovak dialect, adopted as a literary mode by Anton Bernolak, was rejected by Slovak Protestants. Pavel Krizko argued that the choice of the Western dialect was made for religious reasons and advocated by Trnava Jesuits. In 1843, L'udovit Stur adopted the slogan, "Let us write in Slovak", and, after consultation with his friends, Michal Miloslav Hodza and Jozef M. Hurban, chose the dialect of Central Slovakia for his literary language.

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This attempt was again opposed by Slovak Catholics. The disagreement lasted until 1852, the year of the publication of Kratka mluvnica slovenska by a Catholic priest and university professor in Prague, Martin Hattala. In fact, in order that it might testify to national unity, the book was sponsored by three Catholic and three Protestant leaders: M. M Hodza, J. M. Hurban, and, L\ Stur, and J. Palarik, A. Radlinsky, and S. Zavodnik. With the exception of E. Stur, all were either Catholic or Protestant clergymen. This movement for a separate Slovak literary language found little or no interest among the Czechs. F. Palacky and K. H. Borovsky, for instance, opposed the new language because it implied political disunity; others simply ignored it. Only later, during the 1880's, did such individuals as Holecek, Pokorny, Hejduk, and Kalal, to mention a few Czechs, and Karol Salva, among the Slovaks, begin to discuss common problems of the Czech and Slovak nations. Shortly afterwards, Jan Herben ,editor of Cas, and Thomas G. Masaryk dealt with the same problem of Czecho-Slovak relationship. A genuine Czechoslovak movement among the Slovaks started only with the rise of the group "Hlas" in 1898. This movement was instigated by two Czech scholars - Thomas G. Masaryk, then living in Prague, and Frantisek Pastrnek, in Vienna. The Prague group, headed by Vavro Srobar, was more progressive than the Viennese group, headed by Pavel Blaho; the latter was more or less Christian-Socialist in its orientation. The differences between them evidenced differences in approach rather than in basic ideas. Vavro Srobar defined the aims of the "Hlas" movement as follows: Much has been written these days about the Hlasists and the Hlasist movement. The Populist Catholic writers condemn it for its progressive Czechoslovak orientation; the Martinist nationalists condemn it for its apparent opposition to the autonomy of the Slovak language. The first criticism represents an honor to us; the suspicion of the second group is unfounded, superficial, and of low character . . . Until World War I, the Hlasist movement aimed exclusively at the salvation of the Slovak nation and its language. . . . What the future relations between the Czechs and Slovaks will be, remains to be seen. In general, we can say this: According to sociological principles, only the nation that is biologically, culturally, morally, and economically more powerful will survive. However, there are also other possibilities. It is possible that through the synthesis of the two nationalities, a new nation, a strong and developed nation - a Czechoslovak nation, by name - will come into being which will be neither the present Czech nor the present Slovak nation. . . .

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Until World War I, the Hlasists were creating a nation; since the War, now we [the Hlasists] are creating a state. . . . When, a few years ago, the Czechs were lamenting over conditions in Slovakia, over the ingratitude and hatred of Slovaks against the Czechs, I defended the Populist movement and and tried to make it the representative view of individuals in responsible circles by saying: D o not be disturbed over this movement; it is a national movement, the same that was prominent in your lands over half a century ago; a nation must first be awakened by its national feeling and only then can it develop into a state. . . . Sramek's dream is nearing reality: he and his party will decide in our state what can and what cannot be done. His party will be the largest in the Republic and at the helm of the 'Hussite nation' will be Monsignor Sramek. The democratic and progressive line of evolution in our country is stretched, it is bent. Whether it will break, will depend on the decisiveness of the progressive parties. . . . Progressive parties will have to make many sacrifices and exercise self-discipline. 1

Another expert on Czechoslovak politics, Bohdan Pavlu, in his article, "Jan Herben and Slovakia", printed in the magazine "Bratislava" and quoted in "Prudy" in 1927, added the following postcript: "The policy which drove the Czechs and Slovaks apart and which divides them today so that neither Sramek nor Hlinka can live under one roof destroyed all hopes of Czecho-Slovak rapprochement." In 1918, when it was imperative to work hard on Czecho-Slovak harmony, difficulties emerged. The Hungarian government, realizing the influence of the Catholic Church, and trying to disrupt the Czechoslovak cooperation, began to use the representatives of the church in Slovakia to promote the preservation of Great Hungary. My personal recollection of an episode which took place about that time is a typical example of church intervention in the Czecho-Slovak relationship. On October 5, 1918, the Primate of Hungary, Cardinal Csernoch, visisted his native Skalica, where a confirmation ceremony was to take place. While staying at the local parish house of Dr. 11. Okanik, Cardinal Csernoch told Okanik of possible future privileges in return for positive support of the dynasty and Great Hungary. Okanik's response was not only negative, but it emphasized that the Czechoslovak state was a reality and that there was nothing more to be done. Csernoch tried to dissuade the priest by saying that the information originating in Hodonin was unreliable, and declared that the responsible officials were far from pessimistic about the future of the monarchy. The following day, the visiting cardinal held a meeting of all priests of the decanate at Skalica, and in a speech delivered in Hungarian, appealed for loyalty to 1

Vavro Srobar, "Ceskoslovenska otazka a Hlasisti", Prudy, No. 4 (April 1927).

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the King and for support of the dual monarchy. The senior priest of the decanate, Pavel Blaho, from Gbely, delivered a reply in Slovak; Jan Donoval (Tichomir Milkin), Slovak poet, replied in a similar tone; both rejected Csernoch's plea. On October 8, Csernoch, upon the request of Minister A. Weckerle, sent a letter to all bishops in which he pleaded for their support of the integrity of the old Hungary. On October 23, Cardinal Csernoch wrote to the decanates demanding their loyalty to the monarchy. In response to these letters, Hlinka wrote an article entitled "Our Reply", which was published in the very first issue of Slovensky Dennik in Ruzomberok, on November 9, 1918. In his letter, Hlinka stated that "the Slovaks can find protection and security against age-old abuses by Hungarians only in the Czechoslovak state, and therefore [they] firmly reject Csernoch's advice. The Slovaks stand behind the Slovak National Council, which declared [their] unity with the Czechs . . .". Similar action was taken by the Protestant bishops. Bishop Alexander Raffay sent a circular to the Senior's office at Turciansky Svâty Martin, requesting that the status quo be preserved and that the Hungarian Protestant Church remain united. This letter was dated November 5, 1918. In the middle of November, Raffay sent another circular letter which was read to the congregations in the churches of the Mining Districts and contained a statement to the effect that "the sacred heritage of Slovak ancestry should be preserved." On November 21, 1918, another Protestant bishop, Geduly, wrote a letter, in a distorted Czechoslovak biblical language, warning that the Protestant church would perish in the Czech Catholic sea. In the closing paragraphs of the letter, the bishop appealed: "Let the Protestant congregations declare that they wish to remain united with their thousand-year Hungarian homeland." This was the last attempt on the part of the church to thwart the trend of historic events. The proclamation of the new Czechoslovak Republic in 1918 was greeted with general enthusiasm in Slovakia. However, the following year was decisive for later developments. Two disturbing incidents occurred in the Czecho-Slovak relationship. Dr. F. Jehlicka took advantage of Andrej Hlinka's political naïveté by skillfully using him and his Populist party against the new state. On September 22, 1919, Jehlicka and Hlinka undertook a journey to Paris in order to present a memorandum to the Peace Conference. Their attempt, however, failed. Later, on January 25, 1920, the same memorandum was transmitted to the Peace Conference under the title, "Memorandum of A. Hlinka and F.

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Jehlicka for Peace in Central Europe", by the head of the Hungarian delegation, Albert Apponyi. After his unsuccessful trip, Jehlicka remained in Hungary; there were no serious consequences for Hlinka, but his party suffered a loss of confidence among the Czechs. Another, seemingly unimportant, event which unfavorably affected Czecho-Slovak relations occurred in Prague. On July 8, 1919, Vlastimil Tusar was named Czechoslovak Prime Minister. Shortly after his appointment, his former wife paid a visit to the office of Dr. Frantisek Kordâc, editor of the Catholic journal Cech and demanded that he publish a derogatory, scandalous letter fiercely attacking the Prime Minister. Kordâc accepted the letter, but instead of publishing it turned it over to Premier Tusar, who, pleased by this favor, told the editor he would be only too happy to repay this kindness, should the occasion arise.2 On September 16, 1919, Dr. Kordâc was made archbishop of Prague by the Vatican without prior consultation of the Czechoslovak government. VavroSrobâr protested against this appointment and insisted that the Vatican, in doing so, broke its concordat with the state; he demanded that the government take the necessary steps to revoke this appointment. The implication of V. Srobâr's complaint was that Prime Minister Tusar repudiate the appointment of Dr. Kordâc as archbishop, which, of course, would have been a very unpleasant task for him. The problem was finally resolved when the Socialists declared that they had no special interest in the case and were willing to leave the nomination of the archbishop entirely up to the Vatican. This event, however, set a fatal precedent from the point of view of Czecho-Slovak relations. Thereafter the Vatican named also bishops in Slovakia without taking into account the wishes of the Slovak political authorities wishing to nominate such dignitaries who might exert a positive influence in Czecho-Slovak relations. As it happened, many patriotic priests of this character were eliminated from influential posts in the church during the very first years of the new régime, and thus lost political influence as well. This had an unfortunate effect on the future development of Czecho-Slovak relations. It was generally expected that, with the accession to power of Dr. Benes and Dr. Hodza in 1935, the Slovak question would be resolved by agreement or by political power. On the contrary, however, the radical Slovak nationalist magazine, Nàstup, headed by F. Ùurcansky, increased its financial resources and its influence. In fact, Dr. Hadza 2

Told to me by Monsignor Zlâmal of Cleveland, Ohio.

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later used even state funds to finance a new journal called Slovensky hlas, which competed for electoral favor with the nationalistic press. With the increase in international tensions and the unresolved problems at home, the radical separatist movements were very active, often receiving financial support from abroad. In the meantime, VojtechTuka was released from prison in 1938, and began to organize the so-called "Rodobrana" (Home Guard) for action; a meeting was held (in Piestany) in which Tuka declared that action would soon begin. It was intended that action would be undertaken in the interests of Hungary. However, no further meetings were held, because Tuka discovered that it was Hitler, and not the Hungarian government, who would dictate future political development in Central Europe. Consequently, Tuka made his entire organization subservient to Titler.3 The nadir of Czecho-Slovak relations developed in the autumn of 1938. Two new Slovak members of the government - Dr. I. Karvas and Dr. V. Fajnor - were named before the fatal day of Oct 5, 1938. In addition, another member, Mat us Cernak, was given a government post, because he had had good connections with the so-called National Party. Immediately following his appointment, Matus Cernak presented a series of demands to President Benes in the form of an ultimatum. However, in the meantime, Dr. Benes resigned his presidential office on October 5, 1938. At the same time, the Populist Party held its annual convention in Zilina, where a struggle between Tiso's and Tuka's factions was in the making. While Tuka fractions demanded a plebiscite, Tiso and Buday, the vice-chairman of the party, were opposed to the idea. Tiso, facing the members of the Tuka group, declared: "There will be no plebiscite in Slovakia." The Actober Agreement between the Agrarian and the Populist party eliminated Hodza's group from both economic and political influence, despite the fact that the latter party had a strong nationalist slant, thanks to its connection with the Naional Party. Tiso refused to cooperate with them, choosing rather the Catholic Agrarians, who were also of Czechoslovak orientation - Teplansky, Petrovic, and others. The Czech military men inside and outside the government insisted on using radical methods to forestall all eventualities in Slovakia; when radical steps were taken shortly before March 14, 1939, it was too late. The military coup directed from Prague nominated I. Sivak and P. 3

Told to me by Dr. Stefan Mittak, Skalica, Slovakia, who was a member of Tuka's organization working for Horthy's Hungary.

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Teplansky, both members of Parliament, to the leadership of Slovakia, (Sivak was in Rome at the time as an official delegate at the Pope's coronation), but this did not prevent Tiso from making him his Minister of Education. Teplansky was not sent to prison, either, but remained in safety at his country estate near Trnava. It is true that Tiso went to see Hitler before March 14, 1939, where, as he said before the National Tribunal after World War II, he was faced with a prepared declaration of an independent Slovak State which he was to broadcast to his people. Tiso, however, refused to accede to Hitler's wish, objecting that he would first present it to his government and to the Slovak parliament. It is interesting to note that when the question was brought up during the government session, no one was willing to present it to the parliament. Karol Sidor refused, saying that he had not seen Hitler. Tiso refused as well, and thus the responsibility for making the proposition fell to the courageous president of the Slovak Parliament, Martin Sokol. The Parliament finally gave its consent when it was explained that the alternative was the partition of Slovakia. It is my own personal recollection that this was a torturing experience for some members, as, for instance, in the case of the vice-chairman of the Populist Party, Jozef Buday from Nitra. According to a reliable witness, Buday paced the room of his office at Nitra, held his head, and lamented: "I betrayed . . . I betrayed." Soon afterwards, depressed and humiliated, Buday died. The period from October 6, 1938, until September 1939 was the darkest period in the history of Czecho-Slovak relations. In Slovakia, this was a time of anarchy, lawlessness, and agitation. There was opposition against violence from all quarters, but resistance had to be halted in order to prevent open conflict. There was no doubt that the multitude was unaware that this was the twilight of democracy and the end of the Czechoslovak state as a sovereign nation. Nazism was launched upon the stage of international imperialism and totalitarianism. One of its manifestations in Slovakia was the creation of a political internment camp at Ilava for the specific purpose of suppressing any and all political opposition. Only expediency and statemanship on all sides preserved those forces which later found expression in the Slovak uprising in 1944. For instance, even Anton Stefanek, the theoretician of Czechoslovak ideology, was sent to Ilava for several weeks, but he returned to the Slovak university and to his lectures soon afterward. Many leading figures of Czechoslovak orientation were permitted to remain active in the political and economic life of the country. This applies also to the State security personnel and to the gendarmerie; the former paid

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more attention to the followers of Tuka than to the Czechoslovak opposition. The struggle between Tiso and Tuka could be observed in various forms during the entire period of the Slovak State. In 1943, a secret meeting was held between Dr. V. Srobar, M. Sokol, and J. Ursiny, at which Dr. Jurco from the State Security Office was also present. They discussed ways and means to bring the Slovak State in all legality back into the fold of the Czechoslovak Republic. The situation in Slovakia in 1943 was such that in case of a plebiscite, the people of Slovakia would have voted for the Czechoslovak republic by a great majority. This trend was changed with the rising influence of Communists, who, on one hand, flattered Slovak nationalism in order to compete kith the followers of the old Populist party, and on the other hand, competed with the program of the London government. The Slovak National Uprising in 1944 provided a sufficient proof of the true sentiment of the population: mobilization resulted in so great a degree of compliance that older groups of reservists had to be sent home because there were not enough arms for them. In conclusion, I would like to mention that the term "Czechoslovak nation" was first employed by Jozef Miloslav Hurban and that, later, Andrej Hlinka declared in 1907: "We are, with the Czechs, one genre, one culture, one nation." A similar idea was expressed by Thomas G. Masaryk, who said: "Let the Slovaks write any way they want. The main thing is that, in reality, we are the same, because the Slovaks understand Czech and the Czechs understand Slovak." Nobody on the Czech or Slovak side tried to liquidate the Slovak language and nobody among the responsible statesmen tried to deny the existence of the Slovak nation. As proof, I submit for examination the Czechoslovak national anthem, which has a dualistic form, and the Czechoslovak state emblem, which has a symbol of both Czech and Slovak nationality and territorial integrity. The greatest damage to Czechoslovak relations was inflicted by party and personal politics and by religious antagonism. The second serious injury was from the Munich dictate which liquidated the Czechoslovak republic both as a sovereign state and as a socioeconomic entity, and brought internal national destruction. 4 All acts and incidents of a political character after Munich have to be considered with this in mind. This political and moral decay will be difficult to repair, but I still believe with Srobar that "after great sacrifies in prestige and self-discipline, healthy reason will prevail". Without strong 4

Fedor Houdek, Vznik hranic Slovenska

(Bratislava, 1931).

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moral foundation, there can be neither healthy democracy, nor any agreement between the Czechs and Slovaks.

Some Aspects of Carpatho-Ukrainian History in Post-Munich Czechoslovakia THEODORE PROCHÄZKA

The fate of Czechoslovakia's easternmost part after Munich presents multiple interests. It is an episode in the history of the disintegration of post-Munich Czechoslovakia, as well as a part of Ukrainian history, and may even have played a certain role in the German "Drang nach Osten". I propose to deal in my paper especially with the German aspects of the problem. The period between Munich and March 1939 was a crucial chapter in Hitler's diplomacy. In spite of relatively ample documentation, some of its most important aspects are, however, shrouded in mist and open to different interpretations. I do not pretend that my conclusions are the final ones. As an introduction, let me sketch a brief picture of the internal development of Subcarpathian Ruthenia or Carpatho-Ukraine in the short span of time between Munich and the Hungarian occupation. The Carpatho-Ukraine got her first autonomous government on October 11. The Government represented both main political trends then prevalent in Ruthenia - the Russian and the Ukrainian ones. The former was represented by the new Prime Minister, Andrej Brody, and his deputy, Stefan Fencik, the latter by the agrarian senator, Eduard Bacinsky, and the Social-Democratic deputy, Julian Revay. This cooperation of both tendencies was, however, of short duration. As early as October 27, Brody, suspected of collusion with Budapest, was forced to resign and shortly afterwards was arrested. His successor, Monsignor Augustin Volosin, represented the Ukranian trend. When Fencik left the government at the beginning of November, the Ukrainian orientation gained the upper hand. The name of the country, "Sub-Carpathian Russia", as officially introduced by the Treaty of St. Germain, was changed to "Carpathian Ukraine". In December, Ukrainian was proclaimed the official language. The Award of Vienna, on November 2, deprived the country of its fertile plains in the South and of its larger

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cities, Uzhorod Mukacevo and Berehovo, and the capital was transferred to the small country town of Chust. Railroad communications with the Western parts of Czechoslovakia were severed. In January, all existing political parties were dissolved. Only one party was authorized, the government party of the "Ukrainian National Union", which in the elections in February won 93% of the votes. These internal changes in the eastern part of Czechoslovakia acquired a particular flavor through the active interest manifested from the German side. Germany followed the evolution in the Carpatho-Ukraine with special attention. Already on October 7, the Director of the Political Department of the German Foreign Office, Woermann, summed up the German standpoint in two almost identical memoranda. 1 According to Woermann, the most natural solution for the present was an autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine oriented to Slovakia or Czechoslovakia. An independent Carpatho-Ukrainian state without support from the outside was hardly viable. The solution recommended by Woermann suggested that the autonomous status of Carpatho-Ukraine could be "perhaps conceivable as a starting point for the future Greater Ukraine." There were, however, according to this German diplomat, no suitable leaders, and political independence did not, for the time being, come under consideration. On November 11, Goering told the Slovak Minister, Ferdinand Durcansky, that "at the moment, the Slovak and the Ukrainian question could be dealt with only within the framework of the Czechoslovak state, but that the goal was an independent Slovakia and an autonomous Ukraine oriented toward this independent Slovakia." 2 Woermann expressed in his memorandum the opinion that steps could be taken to influence leading persons in Carpatho-Ukraine (Slovakia was mentioned at the same time) to favor the proposed solution. "Preparations for this are already on foot", stated Woermann. 3 These contacts were sought even from the Ukrainian side. On October 10, a Ukrainian delegation not only asked the German State Secretary, Weizsäcker, in a telegram, for protection against Hungarian revisionist aspirations, but, at the same time, also complained that the Prague government was ignoring the self-determination efforts of the Ukrainian people.4 Later in the month, on October 24, Volosin and Revay 1

Documents on German Foreign Policy, IV, N o . 45, Abbr. G. IV.; Microfilmed documents of the German Foreign Ministry (National Archives, Washington, D.C., unpublished), 1004/391050-5 (Abbr. Micro.) 2 G. IV, N o . 112. 3 Ibid., N o . 45, p. 49. 4 Micro 1004/391085.

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asked the German legation in Prague to call Berlin's attention to the fact that Bródy, the Prime Minister of the first autonomous government of the province, and his deputy minister, Fencik, were active in the interests of Hungary and Poland. The Ukrainian leaders asked Berlin to bring pressure to bear on Prague to dismiss Bródy and Fencik and to form a new government consisting exclusively of "trustworthy Carpatho-Ukrainians". 3 On the same day, October 24, a Carpatho-Ukrainian delegation sent a letter to Ribbentrop, signed by Julian Chimenetz, complaining that the composition of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Government did not correspond to the real political situation. 6 A memorandum was sent also to the Chief of the Wehrmacht. 7 These suggestions and complaints did not fall on deaf ears. On October 26, the German ciiargé d'affaires in Prague, Hencke, in a talk with the Cabinet Chief of the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry, Masarik, indicated that the government of Carpatho-Ukraine ought to be headed by a Ukrainian. In the meantime, however, Prague had already nominated Monsignor Volosin, 8 and not only the Ukrainian, but also the German wishes were fulfilled. On October 27, the Oberkommando of the Wehrmacht could state that "the possibility of influencing in every direction the newly-constituted Carpatho-Ukrainian Government was considered as never so favorable." 9 At the beginning of November, Oberführer Behrends of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle was instructed by Ribbentrop to take charge of the underground activities in Carpatho-Ukraine. 10 Germany established a consulate in Chust. At the end of November, Hofmann, the Press Attaché of the German Legation in Prague, was sent on a special mission to Carpatho-Ukraine to report on the situation. He summed up his impressions by stating that the province was viable, especially if foreign help were available for reconstruction. 11 Later, Révay and Wilhelm Keppler, the State Secretary for Special Duties in the German Foreign Ministry, signed a memorandum laying down a program of economic collaboration between Germany and the Carpatho-Ukraine, particularly to develop the production of raw materials, the construction of railways and roads, the conservation of

s 6 7 8 8 10 11

Ibid., 1141/445671-3. Ibid., 1141/445688. Ibid., 916/387135. Ibid., 1141/445718. Ibid., 916/387135. G. IV, No. 109. Ibid., No. 140.

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forests, and the building of a suitable capital for the country.12 At the same time, the Carpatho-Ukrainian Government made over to a German company all the prospecting rights for minerals and their exploitation.13 The Carpatho-Ukrainian territory, though diminished by the Vienna Award, also played an important role in the politics of two neighboring countries, Hungary and Poland. They both strove for a common frontier, which, in their opinion, could have been realized now only by the acquisition of the Carpatho-Ukraine by Hungary. For Hungary, this meant a politically rather uncomplicated question of revisionist aspirations, and the prospects of further breaking the chains of the Trianon Peace Treaty and of advancing the frontiers to the former border of Saint Stephen's Crown. More complicated was the case of Poland. The political and national renaissance of the sub-Carpathian branch of the Ukrainian nation was bound to have repercussions among the large Ukrainian population of neighboring Eastern Galicia. It was in the interest of Warsaw to check this extension of Ukrainian nationalism emanating from Carpatho-Ukraine - and this could happen only through occupation by Hungary. Besides this purely domestic aspect, the fate of Carpatho-Ukraine had for Poland a significance also from the international point of view. If Hungary occupied the province, the last link would have been established connecting the chain of states forming a North-South axis in Eastern Central Europe, a "third Europe", as the Polish diplomats called it, stretching from Finland and Scandinavia to the Balkans via Hungary. This axis was a political concept of the Polish Foreign Minister, Beck. In the complicated maneuvering of Polish diplomacy between Germany and the Soviet Union, this axis was intended to become a bulwark protecting Poland against the two neighboring giants. In Berlin, Beck passed off his plan as a means to keep the Soviet influence at bay, while in the Western capitals, he spoke of it as a barrier to contain the German drive towards the Balkans. For the time being, however, these schemes failed. In spite of considerable diplomatic activity, despite the harassment of the CarpathoUkrainian frontiers by Polish and Hungarian irregulars, and in spite of the benevolent Italian attitude towards Hungarian aspirations, Germany, on November 21, in an energetic note, rudely dispelled any Hungarian hopes regarding the Carpatho-Ukraine. For the time being, Germany 12 13

Ibid., N o . 146, n. 1. Ibid., N o . 146.

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opposed the formation of a common Polish-Hungarian frontier. This line Germany followed until late February of the next year. Only on March 13 did Germany permit the Hungarians to occupy the country. The Hungarian occupation began on the evening of March 14, when the first Hungarian units crossed the border north of Mukacevo, and it was completed at midnight on March 17. Not only Hungary and Poland, however, followed with keen interest the developments in this area. The very name of the Ukraine was able to fire the imagination of political observers everywhere in the world and to turn their attention to the most audacious schemes of the political ambitions of Hitler. The passages of Mein Kampf where Hitler spoke of the "Land in the East" to be conquered for the German nation from Russia suddenly acquired a new significance. Would the tiny Carpatho-Ukraine become the Piedmont of a new East European empire dominated by Germany? Wasn't Hitler turning to his ultimate aim, to resume the German eastward expansion, where the medieval Teutonic order had failed? Contemporary newspapers, magazines, and diplomatic reports were teeming with speculations on this fascinating theme. From London the German Ambassador, Dirksen, reported, "It is regarded here as fairly certain that Germany is playing with the idea of forming a Greater Ukrainian State and will sooner or later implement this aim." 14 A British Foreign Office statesman mentioned, at the beginning of 1939, a "general speculation on the Ukraine", and "the presence of the German agents in that area trying to stir up trouble." 15 Earlier, the American chargé d'affaires in Berlin, Prentiss Gilbert, reported that stories were current that Germany was "getting ready for some action respecting the Ukraine." 10 On the whole, however, the chancelleries evaluated these speculations with a sound reserve. Thus, the Secretary General of the Quai d'Orsay, Alexis Léger, said that "reports that Germany was preparing for an early move to set up an independent Ukraine were simply absurd". 17 According to Prentiss Gilbert, all that was "a pure speculation". "No one knows", added the American diplomat. 18 A pertinent opinion was expressed by the American Ambassador in Warsaw, A. J. Drexel Biddle, Jr.: "While the press outside of Germany is rendering the 14 15

16 17 18

Ibid., No. 287. U.S. Dept. of State Diplomatic Correspondence 751.65/480.

Ibid., 862.00/3806. Ibid., 740.00/546. Ibid., 862.00/3806.

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project [i.e., 'Greater Ukraine'] a steadily increasing play-up and is devoting more and more columns to the various aspects thereof, the press of Germany itself is silent on the subject." 19 Ambassador Biddle was not the only observer who made such a comment. The same remark was made later by the Ukrainian historian, Elie Borschak: "A curious thing which has its importance: The only great capital of Europe which did not witness the éclosion of this kind of article: Berlin." 20 In the German documents, we find only slight mention of any aspiration directed towards the Ukraine. Hitler, in his talk to Polish Foreign Minister Beck on January 5, 1939, referred to the aims imputed to Germany by the world press in connection with the Ukraine and declared that Poland did not have the slightest thing to fear from Germany in this respect. 21 What is, perhaps, more important, Ribbentrop spoke a few days later about a possible German-Polish cooperation in this matter, 22 and repeated his proposition on January 26 in Warsaw. In general, these talks on eventual implementation of German plans in the Ukraine did not go beyond hypothetical deliberations. Hitler's conduct in the case of the Carpatho-Ukraine was parallel to his attitude toward the other parts of post-Munich Czechoslovakia. We now know rather well the state of Hitler's mind after Munich. We know how dismayed he was that the absolute compliance of Great Britain and France in Munich led him to agree to the ethnographic settlement of the problem instead of a "total solution". "But they let everything go", he said to Bormann on February 21, 1945, a few weeks before the final catastrophe. "They fulfilled all our demands like cowards. Under those conditions it was really difficult to start hostilities." According to Hitler, "the Munich solution could be only temporary, because it is apparent that we could not tolerate in the heart of Germany an abscess which was the existence of an independent Czechia, small as it was. We pierced this abscess in March 1939, but under conditions which were psychologically more unfavorable than if we did it by arms in 1938." Moreover, according to Hitler, Poland would then have stood by Germany. 23 This mention of Poland is significant. Hitler probably wished to 19

Ibid., 860E.01/117. E. Borschak, Le lile Reich et I'Ukraine 1939-1945. - Bulletin de 1'Association d'études et d'informations politiques internationales, 1-15 July (Paris, 1951). Supplement to No. 50. 21 G. V, No. 119. 22 Ibid., No. 120. 23 Le testament politique de Hitler, pp. 118-120. 20

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retain Poland as his ally and to gain her for his Eastern expansion plans. After Munich, Berlin did not spare friendly words in the address of Warsaw. In the aftermath of the Munich meeting, on October 1, Ribbentrop spoke of "great sympathy and understanding for the Polish standpoint" 24 and four days later, Hitler, abandoning to the Poles the important junction of Bohumin in the Teschen area, stated in the Polish address that he "would be generous toward those who were modest in their demands".23 On October 13, Ribbentrop, after a conference with Hitler, "fully upheld the instructions pertaining to the treatment of the Polish question, that is, to release nothing unfavorable to Poland".26 However, on October 24, this same Ribbentrop sketched to the surprised Polish Ambassador in Berlin the German demands aimed at the very heart of Polish susceptibilities: the return of Danzig and establishment of an extraterritorial highway across the Corridor. Here Hitler overestimated his possibilities and misjudged the situation. In Warsaw, on January 26, Ribbentrop realized that Poland would not accept the German proposals. Beck declared to him that "he could not view the matter optimistically".27 This was the end of the German reserve. The policy of soundings was over. During these exploratory talks, Hitler respected the Munich and Vienna settlement. During February, he seems to have decided on a new course. When he could not gain Poland for his projects, he encircled her by destruction of Czechoslovakia. His secret service abetted the separatist elements in Slovakia.28 On February 12, he received the leading Slovak separatist, Tuka, and on February 28, he dismissed with contempt the Franco-British notes concerning the guarantees of Czechoslovakia. His attitude toward the Carpatho-Ukraine reflected his changing mood. That small region could have been a link in the Eastern policy of Germany in cooperation with Poland. Only when he became convinced that he was unable to win Poland to his plans did Hitler abandon, temporarily, his larger, though vague, Eastern schemes and limit himself to the settlement of the Danzig and Memel issues. Under these circumstances, the acquisition of Bohemia and Moravia compensated for the loss of the Carpatho-Ukraine and outweighed the disadvantages of the common Polish-Hungarian frontier. This new line not only meant 24

23 20 27 28

G. V, No. 55.

Ibid., No. 62. Ibid., No. 70. Ibid., No. 126. W. Hagen, Die geheime Front, p. 174.

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the occupation of the Carpatho-Ukraine by Hungary, but also led to the destruction of the whole of Czechoslovakia and finally, in the fall of the same year, to the general war.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945. Series D, Vols. IV, V. Le livre jaune français. Documents diplomatiques 1938-1939. Paris, 1939. Beck, Joseph, Dernier rapport. Politique polonaise 1926-1939 (Neuchâtel, 1951). Budurowycz, Bohdan B., "The Ukrainian Problem in International Politics, October 1938 to March 1939", Canadian Slavonic Papers, III (1958) pp. 59-75. Coulondre, Robert, De Staline à Hitler (Paris, 1950). Hagen, Walter, Die geheime Front (Stuttgart, 1952). Le Testament politique de Hitler. Notes récueilles par Martin Bormann (Paris, 1959). Ilnytzkyj, Roman, Deutschland und die Ukraine 1934-1945, 2 vols. (Munich, 1955). Laffan, R. G. D. and others, Survey of International Affairs 1938, Vol. Ill (London, 1953). Markus, V. "Zakarpattja", Enciklopedia ukrainoznavstva, II (Paris, New York, 1959), p. 722. Nëmec, F. and Moudry, V., The Soviet Seizure of Subcarpathian Ruthenia (Toronto, 1955). Picker, Dr. Henry, Hitlers Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier 1941-1942 (Stuttgart, 1963). Robertson, E. M„ Hitler's Pre-war Policy and Military Plans 1933-1939 (Stuttgart, 1963). Roos, Hans, Geschichte der Polnischen Nation 1916-1960 (Stuttgart, 1961). , Polen und Europa (Tübingen, 1957). Scherer, André, "Le problème des 'mains libres à l'est' ", Revue d'histoire de la 2e guerre mondiale, No. 32 (Paris, 1958), pp. 1-25. Stenzel, David B., "Second Thoughts on Prague 1939", Paper read at 74th AHA Annual Meeting in Chicago (December 30, 1959). Szembek, Comte Jean, Journal 1933-1939 (Paris, 1952).

2 THE FIRST CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC

REPUBLIC ASPECTS

The Roots of Czechoslovak Democracy

EDWARD TÀBORSKY

Of all the countries carved out of the defunct Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918, Czechoslovakia alone was fortunate enough to become and remain a full-fledged democracy through the interwar years, 1918-38. While the other countries of Central-Eastern and South-Eastern Europe were succumbing, one after the other, to authoritarianism or semiauthoritarianism, Czechoslovakia managed to preserve the essential elements of democratic rule until the mortal blow administered to her body politic by the Munich diktat. Why was Czechoslovakia successful where her neighbors failed? Obviously, certain factors, or combinations of factors, not present in the other countries of the area were at work in Czechoslovakia. It is the purpose of this paper to endeavor to identify and evaluate these factors. 1. First, mention should be made of the kind of political leadership that the newly reestablished country enjoyed under its first President, Thomas G. Masaryk. Long before he ascended to Czechoslovakia's Presidency, Masaryk was a well-known and colorful public figure: a humble coachman's son who rose to become a sociologist and philosopher of high repute; a professor at Vienna and Prague Universities; the leader of a small, but influential, Czech political party and a deputy in the Austrian Imperial Diet; a staunch defender of truth and of national and social justice, and a trusted friend of the common man. But all his achievements prior to World War One were overshadowed, at least in the eyes of most Czechoslovak people, by his contribution to the restoration of his country's independence. Anyone who stood at the helm of the Czechoslovak liberation movement during World War One would have been hailed as a national hero by the strongly nationalistic Czechs and Slovaks, who regained their independence in 1918 after centuries of foreign domination. This was especially true of Thomas G. Masaryk, a personality of high political and moral caliber who, by 1918, had gained

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wide international repute. His indisputably great merits were further magnified by a process of glorification and heroization that frequently occurs at such times of national rebirth. Thus, Masaryk returned home and assumed the country's Presidency as the Liberator of his people and the Founding Father of the Czechoslovak State. His democratic humanitarianism - a combination of Christian morality, Fabian-like social reformism, enlightened, nonchauvinistic nationalism, and pragmatic political liberalism - became the prevalent ideology of the new state, and Masarykism became the rallying slogan of the dominant progressive majority of the younger Czech intelligentsia. Some opposition to Masaryk and his concepts developed, mainly among conservative Czech, Slovak, and Sudeten German groups on the right, and Communist extremists on the left. The bulk of the population, however, including the broad working masses, continued to view Masaryk as a father-like protector and the sure guarantor of their country's independence and well-being. This implicit trust enabled Masaryk to rise above, and exert influence well beyond, the severe restrictions placed on the Presidency by the Czechoslovak Constitution of 1920, which had been fashioned after the parliamentary system of the Third French Republic, with its weak, figure-head type of Presidency.1 Without interfering unduly with the normal operations of the government, Masaryk could thus use his tremendous prestige and popularity to set the ship of state on the right course and keep it there during the crucial, initial years of its voyage. By forceful advice and cogent persuasion, he helped to mitigate partisan excesses and dissensions, mollify the politicians' personal ambitions, forge working governmental coalitions, and avert harmful decisions. All too often, the role of personalities in shaping history tends to become overimportant. In normal times, when a political leader operates within a well-established governmental framework, marching along welltrodden political ways and guided by time-honored political precedents, his personality may not make too much difference. However, there are situations and periods in the life of a nation when the personality of a leader may be of decisive importance. Such was the situation in which Czechoslovakia found herself upon regaining national independence in 1

This was noted by a number of writers on Czechoslovak politics between the two World Wars. See, for instance, Emile Giraud, Le pouvoir exécutif dans les démocraties d'Europe et d'Amérique (Paris, 1938), pp. 270-71; Eduard Tâborsky, Czechoslovak Democracy at Work (London, 1945), pp. 111-114; Paul E. Zinner, Communist Strategy and Tactics in Czechoslovakia, 1918-1948, p. 9.

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1918. The first decade or so of the life of a new body politic is of crucial significance. In these formative years, the foundations of the new political system are laid, political traditions and precedents initiated, and the entire political modus operandi takes shape. Hence, having at the helm a man of Masaryk's stature and prestige, a man combining in his person all the highest qualities of strong, democratic leadership, yet devoid of any authoritarian leanings, proved to be of the utmost benefit. Though a number of prominent and strong political figures emerged in the other countries of Central-Eastern and South-Eastern Europe after World War One, none of these countries was fortunate enough to have a leader combining all these qualities to so high a degree. 2. However, the leadership of one superbly qualified man, or even of several such men, no matter how brilliant, does not alone suffice. To operate effectively, the supreme leadership must have at its disposal - on all major levels and in all branches of the government - thousands upon thousands of dependable collaborators, who must be well-qualified professionally, endowed with honesty, and favorably inclined toward democracy. In this respect, too, Czechoslovakia seemed more fortunate than most of her neighbors. The partial political liberalization in the Western part of the Hapsburg Empire in and after the 1860's enabled the Czechs gradually to assume more and more positions in the provincial, district, and communal governmental bodies in the historic provinces of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia. A substantial reserve of experienced public servants was thus available to meet the basic administrative needs of the young Republic. Moreover, since most of the old Czech aristocracy had been either Germanized or eliminated during the three hundred years of the Habsburg rule, the new Czechoslovak ruling class had to be recruited mostly from the middle and lower classes; thus, even in its social origin, it gravitated toward democracy.2 These pro-democratic leanings were further enhanced by the fact that the Czechoslovak ruling class gained its position in an uphill struggle against authoritarianism, and rose to still higher levels, thanks to the victory of democracy over autocratism resulting from World War One. Hence, from its very inception, the young Republic had at its disposal a substantial number of public servants who met fairly well the two all-important criteria of 2

This social origin of the Czech ruling group causes some trouble to Czechoslovak Communist historians when they endeavor to prove why and how the Czechoslovak "bourgeoisie" allegedly sold out the Czechoslovak people to Fascism in 1938. See, for instance, Jan Kren, Do Emigrace. Burzoasni zahranicni odboj, 1938-1939 (Praha, 1963).

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political-administrative experience and a commitment to democracy This was not true to the same extent in other countries of the geographic area with which we are here concerned. 3. Another major phenomenon of Czech national life that operated in favor of democracy was the multitude of various voluntary national organizations. Best-known and, undoubtedly, most important was the Sokol Movement, which brought its program of combined all-round physical fitness, moral character building, democratic brotherhood, and patriotism to virtually every Czech community. In addition there were many other organizations dedicated to the promotion of cultural, literary, musical, social, charitable, gymnastic, and other worthwhile purposes. Thus, a healthy pluralism developed in the Czech national community, giving huge numbers of people in all walks of life valuable practical experience in the basic processes of group intercourse and decisionmaking, and accustoming them to cooperation and self-discipline - two of the most indispensable ingredients of political democracy.3 4. Among factors that students of governmental systems deem conducive to democracy, great importance is usually assigned to education. In order to practise successfully a government based on the consent of the governed, on genuine sovereignty of the people, it is held that a higher level of sophistication is required for the general public than is the case in authoritarian systems. In this respect, too, Czechoslovakia had a distinct advantage over most countries of Central-Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Since the Czechoslovaks had been handicapped in politics and, to a considerable extent, in economic life as well, under the Habsburgs, they now channeled their new nationalism mainly into the fields of education and culture. The Czech national revival of the 19th century, in its early stages, had been primarily a linguistic, literary, and cultural movement. Taking fullest advantage of their provincial and local autonomy, the Czechs had succeeded in developing a high-quality system of national education on primary and secondary levels, topped since 1882 by the reestablished Czech branch of the famed Charles University. Moreover, the Czech schoolteachers, most of whom were progressive and democratically inclined, had emerged quickly as the foremost bearers of both cultural enlightenment and national revival in their communities. They thus extended the benefits of education and

3

See Vaclav BeneS, "Background of Czechoslovak Democracy", in Miloslav Rechcigl, Jr., ed., The Czechoslovak Contribution to World Culture (The Hague, 1964), pp. 267-276.

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culture to virtually the remotest hamlets, and frequently became the initiators of many extracurricular cultural activities. 5. Another prerequisite for the successful practice of democracy is a favorable combination of social and economic conditions. If a nation is marked by sharp contrasts between the rich and the poor, with little between, and if the poor, rightly or wrongly, hold the rich responsible for their poverty; if there exists an aristocratic élite separated from the masses and considered by them as a natural enemy; if there is a strong militarist tradition and, in particular, a record of military intervention in civilian affairs; if a dominant church projects itself powerfully into politics, and can command and manipulate the political loyalties of the citizens; if an unsatisfied hunger for land on the part of most of the peasant population creates an explosive social and economic problem: then, fertile ground is provided for social and political extremism, and the chances for the successful implementation of a democratic system of government are gravely impaired. Fortunately, such adverse conditions were much less pronounced in Czechoslovakia than in the other countries of Central-Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. While there certainly existed a substantial variation in economic levels, and while economically and socially underprivileged groups were by no means absent, these disparities were fewer and less acute in Czechoslovakia than elsewhere in the area. Moreover, Czechoslovakia moved quickly toward the adoption of a broadly-based social welfare system and sweeping land reforms, which went a long way toward removing, or at least weakening, the major causes of sociai radicalism. Furthermore, as is pointed out by many students of the area, including Thomas Masaryk himself, the Czechoslovakia of 1918 differed from most of the other countries of the region in several important ways. She did not have a native dynasty and a native aristocracy that could lay claim to political leadership, an established professional military class, nor a politically organized and theocratically inclined church that might pose a serious threat to the young democracy.4 Hence, political leadership was recruited from the middle and lower classes and was thus in a better position to gain the confidence of the broad masses than would have been the case had the leadership been composed of members of the upper social strata. This virtual absence of excessive and unbridgeable political, social, economic, and religious cleavages was instrumental in supplying a basis for agreement on the fundamentals of

4

Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, The Making

of a Slate (New York, 1927), p. 436.

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political, social, and economic life, which is necessary for the maintenance of a democratic regime. 6. Finally, one must include certain significant traits of the Czech national temperament which contributed toward making Czechoslovakia a successful practitioner of democracy. I fully realize that the study of national character - especially of the way it affects the political life of a given nation - is a controversial question. Yet, I am one of those who think that there is a definite and quite important correlation between the governmental pattern and the national temperament, and that there are nations psychologically ready for democracy and nations that are not. Traditional ways of doing things and looking at things, generally accepted standards of social and political behavior, the prevailing pattern of established values and mores which have been shaped often over a long span of time, the degree of emotional or rational approach to politics, the greater or lesser tendency toward dogmatism and empiricism - all these are major ingredients of national temperament which undoubtedly influence, to a large extent, the overall political climate in which a governmental system must operate. As for the Czechs, it is my considered opinion that their national character, as it had evolved by the time of the First Republic, was marked by a predominance of elements favorable to democracy. This elements included a comparatively high level of self-discipline; a willingness to follow chosen leaders and to abide by the rule of the majority; an essentially realistic and pragmatic approach to politics, rather than behavior prompted by emotionalism or based on rigid doctrinaire interpretations; rejection of violence as a means of resolving political, economic, and social conflicts; and a readiness to accept and abide by necessary compromises.5 Furthermore, these pro-democratic features of the Czech national character were buttressed by, and indeed were, to a great extent, a product of, the region's historical developments which pitted the Germans, who then represented autocratic and aristocratic principles and traditions, against the Czechs, whose cause was based upon liberal and democratic principles.6 In this way, the Czech national 5

An excellent discussion of the Czechoslovak political heritage may be found in Hans Kohn, "The Historical Roots of Czechoslovak Democracy", in Robert J. Kerner (ed.), Czechoslovakia (Berkeley, 1940), pp. 91 ff. 6 Unfortunately, there is no adequate, up-to-date, scholarly study of the Czech national temperament, although the subject has been considered in several books, such as Ferdinand Peroutka's Jaci jsme (Praha, 1924); Thomas G. Masaryk's Ceska otazka (Praha, 1908); and E. Chalupny's Narodni filosofie ceskoslovenskd (Praha, 1932), and Narodni povaha ceskoslovenskd (Praha, 1935).

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cause became identified with, and tightly linked to, that of democracy; being antidemocratic became virtually tantamount to being unpatriotic. Thus, six major factors seem to account for the comparative success of democracy in interwar Czechoslovakia: the forceful democratic leadership of T. G. Masaryk; a good reservoir of able and democratically-minded public servants; popular experience in democratic processes gained through the numerous voluntary associations; the high level, the breadth, and the essentially progressive and democratic character of Czech education; the right combination of social and economic conditions marked by few excessive social, economic, cultural, and religious cleavages; and certain pro-democratic features of the Czech national temperament, supported by the identification of the Czech national cause with that of democracy. The factors favorable to democracy greatly outnumbered and outweighed those detrimental to it, such as Czechoslovakia's ethnic heterogeneity and the resulting serious minority problems; the Slovak resentment at the patronizing Czech predominance; the economic and social backwardness of some areas, mainly in Eastern Czechoslovakia; and several grievous pockets of poverty and class inferiority which particularly affected some segments of the urban working class and the rural proletariat. While some of the abovementioned factors favoring democracy were present in varying degrees elsewhere in Central-Eastern and South-Eastern Europe during the twenties and thirties, none of the other countries possessed them to such a potent degree and in such a fortunate combination, just when they were needed most. That is why Czechoslovakia succeeded where other countries of the area failed.

Political Parties in Czechoslovakia, 1918-1938

MILAN E. HAPALA

INTRODUCTION

Political parties play a crucial role in democracies. Political parties link the structure of government and the groupings of society, organize the amorphous public will, educate citizens in public issues, formulate programs, select candidate-leaders for elective offices, contest elections for the purpose of controlling the government and, as opposition parties, alternately offer criticism and leadership. They attempt to organize and represent the many divergent wishes and interests of the electorate and shape agreements that will support stable and effective government. Political parties stand in the middle between the formal governmental machinery and the groupings of society. In consequence, political parties are influenced by both the constitutional and social setting. It may be argued that the formal governmental institutions, for example, the cabinet system or proportional representation, condition the resulting party system. It is also plausible to argue that party systems reflect chiefly the social structure, including its religious, social, economic, ethnic, and racial divisions and the underlying ethos. The soundest conclusion seems to be that both factors, the governmental and societal patterns, as well as the origins and the inner dynamics of party systems, must be studied in order to understand the various types of parties and how they emerge, how they function, and in what way they weaken or strengthen democratic government. A study of political parties in Czechoslovakia, 1918-1938, according to the briefly sketched theoretical framework, should analyze the complex interaction between the parties and the institutional and social forces. The scope of this essay, however, is quite limited. Its aims are: 1) to examine briefly the origins of the multi-party system and to identify the major parties in their historical setting; 2) to suggest some of the features of the governmental structure and the composition of

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1918-1938

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the society that might have conditioned the party system; and finally, 3) to raise a few questions about the performance of the party system.

THE EVOLUTION OF CZECH POLITICAL PARTIES

The origins of party systems shape in a substantial way their subsequent development. The foundations of the multi-party system that developed in Czechoslovakia after 1918 were laid during the formative period between 1890 and 1914. The evolution of modern Czech political parties in this period was conditioned chiefly by the changes in the socioeconomic structure of Czech society taking place in the wake of its rapidly progressing industrialization, the adoption of universal suffrage in 1907, and the sharpening of nationalistic and ideological strivings. The socioeconomic structure of Bohemia and Moravia continued to change during the two decades before World War I under the impact of industrialization. In 1890, 38 per cent of the population in Bohemia lived by industry and commerce and 40 per cent by agriculture. In 1910, the ratio was reversed in favor of industry: 35 per cent of the population were employed in agriculture and 39 per cent in industry. The growing ranks of industrial workers were recognized as an important socioeconomic element in the 'eighties, when social legislation designed to protect the industrial worker from some of the occupational hazards was passed. The worker began to demand political rights as well. Agricultural classes also became potentially important as a political force during this period. The substantial concentration of landed wealth produced a large number of agricultural laborers who formed a common social front with the small farmers. The small farmer, who was pressed by the competition of large landowners, combined with the farm worker in organizations to promote their common interests. The leading political element was the middle class, which was growing stronger economically. The Czech middle class gained important footholds in the textile and machine industries, the banking business, and other sectors of the economy. The middle class was strengthened by the growing number of professional people and civil servants. Toward the end of the century, the nobility declined in political importance as the national conflict between the Czechs and the Germans sharpened. The majority of the feudal nobility refused to take

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sides in the national question and preferred to remain faithful to the "fatherland" concept. By the end of the century, the nobility had ceased to play a significant role in the political life of the Czech nation. A number of changes in the electoral provisions, climaxed by the adoption of universal suffrage in 1907, also affected the evolution of parties. Until 1896 political representation in the Imperial Council was limited to particular communities of class interests. The Imperial Council was elected from four curiae consisting of large landowners, chambers of commerce, cities, and rural districts. The franchise in the urban and rural constituencies was restricted to those who paid at least ten florins in taxes, until 1882, when the franchise tax was lowered to five florins. In 1896, a fifth general curia was added which included all previously qualified voters and all other citizens at least twenty-four years of age. This general class was allotted 72 seats out of a total of 425. The number of voters in the cities increased from 191,334 in 1879 to 298,793 in 1885, and to 394,196 in 1896, and in the villages, from 1,019,415 in 1879 to 1,369,536 in 1885, and to 1,490,058 in 1896.1 The introduction of universal suffrage in 1907 changed the distribution of political power in favor of the industrial worker and the farmer. These changes in the composition of society and in the electoral laws marked the end of the era of all-national politics.2 The Young Czechs, who had already made substantial gains in the elections to the Bohemian Diet in 1889, defeated the more moderate Old Czechs in the imperial elections of 1891. From its foundation in 1874, the Young Czech Party, which was opposed to the passivity of the Old Czechs and which put forward both economic and political demands, represented a varied group of followers. The party was supported not only by the middle classes and the intelligentsia, but also by skilled artisans, industrial workers, and agricultural classes. The all-national grouping represented by the Old and the Young Czechs began to break up into its component parts, and 'this splintering led to the formation of the multi-party system.

1 Josef Chmelaf, Politicke rozvrstveni Ceskoslovenska [Political Stratification of Czechoslovakia] (Praha, 1926), p. 8. The total population in Bohemia numbered 5, 852, 127 in 1890, and 6, 781, 997 in 1910. The electoral reform of 1907 did not apply to the provincial Diets which continued to be elected by the various curiae. 2 On party developments before World War I, see Z. Tobolka, Politicke dejiny ceskoslovenske od r. 1848 az do dneini doby [Political History of the Czechoslovak Nation from the Year 1848 to the Present], 4 Vols. (Praha, 1932-1937).

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Industrial workers were the first to leave the national front. The Czechoslav Social Democratic Party was founded in 1878 as a branch of the Social Democratic Party in Austria. The party gained five seats in 1896, when the fifth curia was introduced, and increased its strength to 24 deputies in the 1907 elections. In the period before World War I the party maintained its position as one of the three strongest parties in Bohemia and Moravia. The National Socialist Party, founded in 1898, tried to appeal to nationally minded workers who disagreed with the rejection by the Social Democratic Party of the state rights program. The first National Socialist manifesto stated that the party sought "its socialistic demands in cooperation and unity with the whole nation in the conviction that the inciting of class antagonisms would be without any purpose". The party was supported by industrial workers, small traders, professional classes, and civil servants. In the 1911 elections, the party elected 13 deputies. The founding o ftwo socialist parties, one with a modified Marxist outlook and the other attempting to reconcile socialism with nationalism, marked the beginning of the formation of class parties. The Old Czechs and, later, the Young Czechs attempted to include the agricultural classes in their organizations, but could not prevent the founding of special agricultural-interest groups. In 1896, the Association of Czech Farmers was organized to promote fanners' interests, and the founding of an independent Agrarian Party followed in 1899. Its program, adopted at the first Party Congress in 1903, was aimed not only at the small farmer and the agricultural worker, but also at the farmers with moderate-sized holdings, at small traders, and artisans. The Agrarian Party became the strongest party in the elections of 1907, when it seated 28 deputies, and its strength increased to 36 deputies in the 1911 elections. The splintering of the Young Czech Party was influenced both by the emergence of class interests demanding recognition and by the intellectual movements which appeared in the 'nineties. The Progressive State Rights Party, organized in 1908 as a fusion of the Radical-Progressive Party and the Radical State Rights Party, and the Progressive Party, which was founded in 1906, are two examples of parties that reflected intellectual attempts to redefine the issues of national identity and goals. These parties had, however, relatively few deputies, since they could not compete in electoral strength with class parties. Catholicism also became a foundation for political movements. In 1894, for example, the Christian Social Party was founded to oppose

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the social democratic movement, and as many as five Catholic parties later competed for votes. Party developments in Moravia lagged behind those in Bohemia, but similar realignments took place. In Slovakia, the development of modern political parties was hampered by the slow growth of a sense of national unity among the Slovaks, who were deprived of secondary schools, and by electoral laws which gave voting rights only to property owners. Before 1914, however, at least three political groups emerged: the People's Party, a Catholic group led by Ferko Skycak and Andrej Hlinka; the National Party, which emphasized in its program the need for educational work and the promotion of agricultural interests; and the Social Democratic Party, which was organized in 1904 as a branch of the Social Democratic Party in Bohemia and Moravia. In summary, the evolution of the multi-party system before World War I was conditioned by: 1) the rapid economic development of Bohemia and Moravia, which gave rise to specific economic and political demands from the various interest groups; 2) the widening opportunities for political participation, climaxed by the adoption of universal suffrage in 1907; and 3) disagreements over the nature and practical goals of the national movement. The multi-party system was made of four or five major parties, including the Agrarians, the Socialists, who were divided into two parties), the Catholic movement, and the middleclass grouping led by the Young Czechs and split into several minor parties. Since these parties could not participate fully and effectively in government, they tended to adopt oppositional styles and doctrinal postures. Organizationally, the parties after 1907 began to build massbased, bureaucratic organizational structures in which the party secretary competed with the intellectual leader, who was interested chiefly in articulating a program of principles. Program disunity was lessened at times, however, by the necessity of uniting against the German or Magyar ruling element. Even though many ideological currents were represented, the parties did not include anti-democratic or strongly antiliberal groups. The socioeconomic structure of the Czech and Slovak societies strengthened the democratic character of their parties. The basic outlines of the multi-party system were completed in the first two or three years of the Republic.3 Party realignments were shaped, 3

The richest source of information on the history of political parties in the first four years of the Republic is Ferdinand Peroutka, Budovani statu (The Building of a State) (4 Vols., Praha, 1933-1936). Other sources include the following works: J. Chmelar, op. cit.; Charles Hoch, The Political Parties of Czecho-

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in part by the impact of the Bolshevik Revolution and the sharpening of class conflicts, and in part by the resurgence of nationalism in the face of the German and other minorities' refusal to support the new state. Five middle-class parties, including the Old Czech Party, the Progressive State Rights Party, the Moravian People's Party, the Progressive Party, and the Young Czech Party, combined into a new National Democratic Party. The party did not want to "limit itself to the protection of the interest of a particular estate or class", but wished on the contrary, to consider all questions from "the higher all-national aspect". 4 The party hoped that the idea of a nationalistic umbrella under which all classes would unite would be appealing enough to arrest the process of political fragmentation along economic interest lines. This hope was to be disappointed. Party supporters came chiefly from the urban middle classes, which included many members of the professions and the civil service. In the 'twenties, the party came under the influence of industrial and financial interests, and its policies became more conservative and nationalistic. The party was opposed to the entry of any German parties into coalition cabinets and to the foreign policy orientation of the new state, which, in its view, should have been based on "the building of solidarity of all Slavic nations". The strength of the party declined from 54 members in the Revolutionary Assembly to 19 deputies after the elections in 1920, and to only 13 deputies in 1925. After 1925, the party, led by embittered Kramar, whose Russophilism and personal disappointments brought him into sharp conflict with Masaryk and Benes, attempted to regain some of its former importance by embracing extreme nationalism. After the 1935 elections, in which the party gained 17 seats, the National Democrats (renamed the National League) formed an alliance with the Fascist National Community, which obtained six seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Thus, during the life of the Republic, the National Democratic Party moved from the center to the extreme right of the political spectrum. The Agrarians entered the Republic with the aim of organizing a mass party based on the partnership of the middle and small landowners, tenants, and agricultural laborers. This strategy was the work of Antonin Slovakia (Praha, 1936); E. Capek, Politicka prirucka Ceskoslovenske republiky [Political Handbook of the Czechoslovak Republic] (Praha, 1931). Parliamentary political parties are surveyed in Vladimir Zadera, Politicke strany v Narodnim shromazdeni [Political Parties in the National Assembly] (Praha, 1930). 4 Peroutka, op. cit., II, p. 805.

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Svehla, the party leader starting in 1908, when he won the chairmanship of the party's executive committee. Svehla combined an extraordinary talent for organization and a flair for political bargaining with inexhaustible energy. In his dedication to building a mass agrarian party that would become the political backbone of the nation, Svehla was fired by a quasi-religious faith in the goodness of a way of life rooted in the soil, which was for him the "virgin source of all the material and moral forces".5 In the first year of the Republic, the party veered more toward the left than at any other time in its history. The beginning of economic stabilization in the 'twenties saw the party adopt a middle-of-the-road course which it held until the end of the Republic. In the 1925 elections, the Agrarians became the strongest political party and continued to form the nucleus of coalition cabinets under the leadership of Agrarian Prime Ministers. After Svehla's death in 1933, the conservative wing gained influence, and some of the rightist elements in the party began to support authoritarianism. The People's Party, organized as a merger of several Catholic parties, at first attempted to heal internal divisions, and then turned to overcoming the handicap of the movement's pro-Habsburg policy before and during World War I. In its 1919 program, the party pledged support to the Republic, and in economic affairs it emphasized the principle of Christian "solidarity" in the spirit of the papal encyclical, Rerurn Novarum, of 1891. Under the leadership of Dr. Sramek, the party quickly found its position in the center. Its 1920 electoral manifesto declared that "the Czechoslovak Republic cannot be built on the principle of class struggle nor on the idea of egotistic liberalism, but only on the ethical Christian principles which proclaim the solidarity of all people".6 The party's strength varied from 21 seats after the 1920 elections to 31 seats in the 1925 elections, 25 seats in 1929, and 22 in 1935. The Traders' Party, which was founded in 1906-07, grew into a strong political movement based chiefly on the idea of promoting the economic interests of small industry, crafts, and trade. Its program emphasized concrete economic demands for its supporters. The party increased its strength more substantially than any other Czech party 5

Antonin Palecek, Antonin Svehla, selsky vudce a budovatel Svehla, Peasant Leader and State Builder] (Praha, 1934), p. 35. 6 Peroutka, op. cit., Ill, p. 1697.

statu [Antonin

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during the Republic, its representation growing from 6 seats in 1920 to 17 seats in the 1935 elections. The Czech Socialist Party continued to emphasize evolutionary and democratic socialism, becoming gradually more nationalistic as economic conditions improved. Its failure to increase its strength in the 1920 elections was attributed to the fact that the party hesitated to choose either the revolutionary road of Marxism or the policy of unequivocal support of the national state. In 1925, the party, under the new label of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party, began to emphasize nationalistic aims at the expense of socialism. The party controlled, on the average, about 30 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and participated in most coalition cabinets with the exception of the period between 1925 and 1929, when it was in partial opposition. The Russian Revolution, the impact of Leninism, and the sharpening of class conflicts immediately after World War I led to a split in the Social Democratic Party and, eventually, to the founding of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. The nationalistically oriented wing of the Social Democratic Party prevailed, during the first two years of the Republic, over the Austrophile faction, led by Bohumil Smeral. The party proclaimed its loyalty to democracy and the Republic. In the 1920 elections, still formally united, it gained 74 seats and 25.6 per cent of the popular vote. The leftist wing grew in strength, even though its members were ideologically a confused and mixed group. The formal founding of the Czechoslovak Communist Party did not come until October 1921. At first, the party struggled with ideological problems and impurities. The bolshevization of the party was carried out eventually under the leadership of Klement Gottwald, although the party continued to proclaim its devotion to the Marxist principle of class struggle and revolution with one voice, and with another, its patriotic desire to protect the nation against its enemies. The party's strength remained a little over ten per cent of the popular vote. The Social Democratic Party was reduced substantially in its electoral strength after its left wing had organized itself into the Communist Party, but the party continued to adhere to evolutionary socialism and maintained its strength at 39 and 38 seats in the 1929 and 1935 elections, respectively. In Slovakia, the most significant party developments included the gradual penetration of the Czech parties and the organization of the autonomist People's Party by Andrej Hlinka. In the first months of the Republic, Hlinka stood firmly behind the idea of Czechoslovak unity,

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but when his services were not promptly and fully recognized, he turned against the Czechoslovak-oriented Hlasist group of the National Party, led by Vavro Srobar. His opposition to the Hlasist group grew into a strong movement demanding autonomy for Slovakia. Hlinka's appeal to Slovak nationalism met with considerable response for a number of complex reasons. The Slovak People's Party grew into the strongest party in Slovakia as the cleavages between the Czechs and the Slovaks deepened during the two decades. The national minorities organized their own parties, which at times, paralleled the Czech and Slovak parties. Of special significance among these parties was the Henlein Party, which in 1935 captured 57 per cent of the German vote and gained 44 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. The shifts in the party system under the Republic were relatively minor. The founding of the Republic did not mark a sharp break in the continuity of the political party pattern that had developed before World War I. The founding of the Communist Party and the Henlein Party, and the rise of the Slovak People's Party to a position of leadership in Slovakia were perhaps the major shifts in party alignments. The most important characteristic of the party system remained its fragmentation into many parties. No party gained more than 14 per cent of the popular vote or 46 seats out of 300 in the Chamber of Deputies. Therefore, no party even approached a majority. Even though political strength was fragmented among as many as fifteen parties in the National Assembly, the party system tended to resemble a modified two- or three-party system. Most of the Czech and Slovak parties, in spite of their differences over ideological and practical issues, were forced into a single political camp because of the persistent opposition of parties that either had no strong constitutional loyalties to the state, or were committed to a policy of non-participation in government.

THE GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL PARTIES

The relationship between the government structure and the party system is very complex because it is reciprocal. Political parties influence to a remarkable degree the functioning of the governmental machinery and, in turn, party organization, style, and strategies are shaped by the institutional framework of the government. What was the nature of this relationship in Czechoslovakia? It would be difficult to examine all aspects of this complex relationship within the limited compass of this es-

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say, but a brief examination of the interaction of the parliamentary system with the parties, and the role of the electoral provisions in shaping the party system may suggest, however, the importance of the governmental structure in the evolution of the party system.7 Political parties played a key role in organizing the constitutional system of the Czechoslovak Republic. The National Committee, which acted as the government of the new state between October 28 and November 14, 1918, and the Revolutionary National Assembly, which functioned under the provisional constitution, were created by political parties. The composition of these organs was based on the results of the 1911 elections. Every party which -had put up a candidate in 1911 and had gained at least one per cent of all the votes cast was entitled to representation on these bodies. The parties decided which of their members were to be included in the national Committee and, later, in the Revolutionary National Assembly. In addition, Section 2 of the provisional constitution which introduced the Revolutionary National Assembly implied that the members of this Assembly owed their seats to the parties that selected them, and that these parties could recall their representatives.8 This right to deprive party members of their seats in Parliament was upheld by the Electoral Court and became the basis for the disciplined party system. The committee charged with the task of writing the constitution was inspired, and probably directed, in some of its work by Antonin Svehla, the leader of the most powerful political group in the Revolutionary Assembly. Thus, the formation of the new constitutional structure was influenced by political parties and their leaders, who labored to make certain that the new constitution would not diminish their newly won power. The definitive constitution introduced a parliamentary system modelled chiefly on the French example. The President, elected by the National Assembly, shared executive power with the Cabinet, which wasresponsible to the Chamber of Deputies, Political power was centered in the National Assembly, composed of two houses, the Chamber of Deputies (300 members) and the Senate (150 members). Since the National Assembly was controlled by political parties, the parties emerged as the dominant centers of political power in the constitutional system. 7

The best discussion of the relationship between the parties and the government structure is found in Edward Taborsky, Czechoslovak Democracy at Work (London, 1945), pp. 102-114. 8 FrantiSek Weyr, Ceskoslovenske pravo ustavni [Czechoslovak Constitutional Law] (Praha, 1937), p. 86.

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The functioning of a parliamentary system depends on a delicate balance between the leadership of the cabinet and its dependence on the legislature, which makes certain that the cabinet does not abuse its power. A cabinet system of the British type is usually coupled to a twoparty system. The majority party forms the cabinet and the minority party plays the role of the responsible opposition ready to exchange places with the party in power. In Czechoslovakia, the cabinet was necessarily coupled to a multi-party pattern. The multi-party system required the formation of coalition cabinets, and the politics of compromise was an essential concomitant. The pool of parties from which coalition cabinets could be formed was limited to those parties whose loyalty to the state was not in question. The typical cabinet was composed of an all-national coalition of the Agrarians, National Socialists, Social Democrats and the People's Party. The cabinets could have been enlarged by the addition of two or three parties, but their heterogeneous characteristic would have remained. Attempts to form coalition cabinets that would assume a clear leftist or rightist political coloring were not successful. Consequently, the parliamentary system functioned with coalition cabinets composed of parties which were ideologically and programmatically at cross-purposes with each other. Even though the differences that separated them could not be resolved into a genuine consensus, temporary adjustments and compromises were possible and necessary. The process of arriving at compromises took place behind closed doors, and was institutionalized in the early stages of the Republic. The so-called Petka, a Council of Five made up of the leaders of the five major parties, was organized in 1921 to give political direction to a cabinet of civil servants. Consultation continued among the leaders of the major parties, even though these parties were formally represented in later coalition cabinets. The policy-making process which would ordinarily take place in the legislature, under cabinet leadership, was initiated, and perhaps concluded, in the extra-constitutional committee of party leaders who came together to explore possibilities of action which transcended the ideological differences that separated them. The organization of the Petka was perhaps the most significant modification of governmental machinery by the parties. In addition, several provisions of the Constitution worked out differently from the expectations of the framers, and other provisions became inoperative under the impaot of the highly disciplined party system. For example, no opportunity ever arose to use the referendum constitutionally pro-

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vided to resolve conflicts between the National Assembly and the Cabinet (Article 48). Not a single government bill was ever rejected by the Chamber of Deputies, and no cabinet fell because of a vote of non-confidence passed by the Chamber of Deputies. The constitution also provided a complicated procedure to be used in resolving conflicts between the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. The procedure was never used, because the political composition of the houses was almost identical and the party discipline in both houses ensured identical results. The electoral system also influenced the evolution of parties and, in turn, the parties molded the electoral laws to suit their purposes. The constitution stipulated that the two houses were to be elected on the basis of "universal, equal, direct, secret franchise and the principle of proportional representation" (Articles 8 and 13). This constitutional provision was implemented in a series of electoral laws which introduced a complex system of proportional representation.9 The Republic was divided into 23 districts for elections to the Chamber of Deputies, and 12 districts for elections to the Senate. (The number of districts for elections to the House of Deputies was reduced to 22 in 1925.) Candidates' names appeared on the fixed-order lists prepared by political parties. In the first counting of votes, seats were assigned on the basis of votes cast for party lists. The number of votes given to a political party was divided by an electoral quotient. The remaining votes were then used in the second counting, in which seats were distributed to those political parties that polled at least 20,000 votes in a Chamber of Deputies constituency or 35,000 votes in a Senate constituency. (These restrictions were introduced in 1935. Before 1935, only those parties that secured at least one seat in the first counting of the votes were eligible for the distribution of seats in the second counting.) In addition, in order to qualify for the second counting, a political party must have secured at least 120,000 votes in the entire state. For the second distribution of seats, when the entire state constituted a constituency, political parties prepared new lists containing names of candidates who had appeared on the first list, but had not been elected. A third distribution of seats was made if seats still remained unassigned after the second distribution. In the third counting of votes, political parties which had been eligible for the second distribution of 9

On these electoral laws and commentaries, see J. Trojanec and J. Fiser, Kommentierte Wahlordnnngen (Prag, 1935).

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seats were now divided into two groups, one containing Czechoslovak parties and the other comprising political parties of national minorities. Similarly, parties which did not qualify for the second distribution of seats were divided into two groups, and their votes were allotted to the two groups of parties entitled to be considered in the last distribution. Proportional representation had several consequences for the functioning of the party system. The use of fixed-order lists, especially in the second distribution of seats, when nomination by political parties was tantamount to election, underscored the importance of political parties as powerful organizations whose support was necessary for election.10 Under the fixed-order list system, the executive committee of the party had the sole responsibility for selecting candidates and determining the order in which their names would appear on the list. The party could ensure the election of a nominee by placing his name at the head of the list. Thus, for his election, a deputy was indebted to the party, and only indirectly to the voters. On the positive side, the control over nominations enabled the party to send to Parliament experts who may have lacked popular appeal, but whose technical knowledge was an asset to the party and the nation. Secondly, proportional representation encouraged the maximization of differences and distances separating the parties, and discouraged the formulation of agreements out of the variety of conflicting wishes and interests. The electoral system hardened the multi-party pattern which was already in existence when proportional representation was introduced. Thirdly, proportional representation contributed to the stability of the party system. Sudden shifts in the electoral strength of the major parties were very rare, and the distribution of seats among the major parties organized before 1918 did not change substantially. In attempting to evaluate the importance of the proportional representation system, it would be misleading to conclude that the multiparty system was the product of electoral provisions. The multi-party system preceded the adoption of the proportional representation system. In proportional representation the parties saw, of course, a system which very likely would maintain their electoral strength and 10 For a vigorous criticism of the fixed-order-list system, see Bohumil Baxa, "Volebni rad do Narodniho shromazdini republiky Ceskoslovenske" [Electoral Law for the National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Republic], Nase doba, XXXII (November, 1924), p. 71. Cf. Vaclav Joachim, "K otazce pomerneho zastoupeni a vazanych listin" [The Question of Proportional Representation and Fixed Order Lists], Nase doba, XXXII (January, 1925), pp. 196-205.

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maximize their influence in government. Therefore they were interested in keeping it, and stressing its ability to produce a mathematically accurate representation in Parliament of all the competing groups.

THE COMPOSITION OF SOCIETY AND POLITICAL PARTIES

The composition of the society which generated the various parties was unusually complex. Since economic groupings did not always coincide with ethnic, religious, or linguistic categories, divisive tendencies were multiplied. The most easily identifiable economic groups of political significance were the middle classes, the peasantry, and industrial workers. These three main groupings were not homogeneous, nor were they equally significant in all the sections of the state. Under the impact of continuing industrialization and specialization, new economic-interest groups appeared and began to organize themselves politically. The period following World War I was characterized by economic crises and a painful process of adjustment to new economic conditions. Organized economic groups, such as trade unions and peasant associations, escalated their economic expectations with the achievement of independence. All classes looked upon the achievement of independence as the beginning of economic improvement, and when their aspirations were not immediately realized they began to press their demands by organizing new political parties. The economic bases of political differentiation crisscrossed ethnic and linguistic divisions, thus further complicating the party system. Every minority, including the Germans, Magyars, Ruthenians, and Poles, preferred to organize its separate party, even though these were in part founded on the same economic interests and ideological outlook as the Czech parties already in existence. In the first elections of 1920, eleven out of twenty-two parties that submitted lists of candidates represented national minorities. Religious loyalties also created their own political affiliations, adding to the contending interests. The multi-party system was basically an expression of economic, ethnic, linguistic, and religious divisions. The attitude of the citizen toward the government system, particularly his sense of commitment to political parties as the means of influencing his government, also affected the functioning of the party system. The Czechs and, to a lesser degree, the Slovaks entered the Republic with a

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strong sense of national identity and a clearly formulated program of national goals. The citizen's orientation to politics and government was shaped profoundly by the first president of the Republic, Thomas Masaryk. Politics, according to Masaryk, was chiefly a cooperative effort to reach certain goals by means of self-discipline, dedication to high moral standards, and self-sacrificing work in the interest of general welfare. Masaryk's example and leadership set the tone and the style for political activity. His emphasis on the individual's moral responsibility for the welfare of his neighbor intertwined with the pragmatic and realistic bent of the Czechs, who are inclined to rely more on group effort than on rugged individualism to solve problems. The Czechs entered the Republic strong in national pride and unity, positively oriented toward politics and government, interested in political knowledge and discussion, and committed to the democratic process of open competition. During the life of the Republic, this positive orientation to politics and government led to an overvaluation of all that was political. The citizen became too deeply involved in politics, his political partisanship taking precedence over other values. Electoral contests grew more intense and bitter as personalities, rather than programs, became the center of disputes and issues. In addition, the citizen looked to his party to obtain economic privileges and favors of all kinds. Toward the end of the Republic, the place of political parties in democratic politics came under severe scrutiny. The citizen began to criticize political parties as his capacity to control and mold them decreased.

CRITICISM A N D D E F E N S E O F POLITICAL PARTIES

The Czechoslovak party system between the two world wars has been criticized on several grounds: 1) the party system failed in its representative function; 2) it failed in its integrative function; and 3) the parties developed into bureaucratic machines, competing for power with the state, imposing their will on parliamentary members, and discouraging internal democracy.11 There is much evidence that the parties accurately represented the 11

A critical analysis of the party system is found in Jan Mertl, Co s politickymi stranami [What Should Be D o n e About Political Parties] (Praha, 1938).

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various groupings and interests in the state. Yet it could also be argued that the voter was not represented effectively and meaningfully, because his choice was not translated into policy outputs. The programs advocated by the parties and chosen by the voters were modified and, at times, nullified by the need for compromise. Gradually, the programs turned into stereotyped expressions of principles no longer related directly to the processes of politics. Furthermore, the need for coalition cabinets and the limited pool from which party members could be chosen for such cabinets precluded the healthy party alternation from office to opposition, and from opposition back into power. Thus, there was no coherent opposition ready to criticize responsibly the parties in power and keep them responsive to the wishes of the people. This criticism is valid in terms of the prototype of parliamentary government in Great Britain. In that country, the voter's choice is translated either into the policies of the government of the day, which was formed by the majority party, or into the policies of the responsible opposition of the minority party. The two-party system is almost a perfect instrument of choice and representation. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that democratic institutions and practices must conform to a single norm. Czechoslovakia's democracy functioned relatively well with the help of coalition cabinets based on the politics of compromise, since one-party cabinets and regular alternation of parties in office were not possible. Innovation and forceful solutions to basic problems were, perhaps, avoided for the sake of stability, and the voter's influence on the policy-making process was indirect, but representative democracy was maintained. Secondly, the party system was criticized because it encouraged political fragmentation and failed to develop agreement out of a variety of differing opinions and interests. Parties maximized their differences at election times, in order to gain a competitive advantage. In consequence, electoral competition among many parties sharpened social, economic, ethnic, and religious divisions. This criticism is probably valid, but it is difficult to suggest how this defect could have been remedied. The crucial features of the situation were fixed - namely, the heterogeneity of the population and the presence of many centrifugal forces. In addition, there were signs that a broadly based consensus embracing most of the groupings might be found, but the hope for a successful resolution of differences quickly vanished under the threats to the security of the state from abroad. Finally, the parties were criticized because they grew too powerful

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and ceased to exercise their power responsibly. It was charged that the parties controlled the policy-making machinery, as well as the bureaucracy, which should have remained neutral instruments. Individual ministries became monopolies of certain parties. Spheres of influences were staked out in the various divisions of the civil service by parties. It is difficult to evaluate this charge on the basis of incomplete evidence, but it seems certain that the self-aggrandizing influence of the parties and the corresponding abuses of powers were not adequately curbed. It was also charged that the parties attempted to infuse voluntary associations of all kinds - cultural groups, gymnastic societies, trade unions, religious groups, neighborhood associations, work groups, peasant associations - with intense political partisanship. The individual was supposed to be committed completely and absolutely to his party. The criticism is perhaps justified, even though it is exaggerated. Political parties, if they are to link the citizen effectively with his government, must be interwoven with voluntary associations, so that they can transmit effectively and readily their wishes and demands. On the other hand, the parties must remain midway between the structure of the government and the groupings of society. If the boundaries separating the parties, the government, and society are completely blurred, the individual loses his independence and the government ceases to be identifiable as a distinct and functionally specific institution and, therefore, a responsible institution. There was a tendency for the parties in Czechoslovakia to exceed their proper roles. In spite of the defects that critics sometimes exaggerated, the party system supported stable governments that were able to protect the state from its enemies until external developments affected the viability of the system. In addition, the party system encouraged government by freedom of discussion, permitting basic issues to be debated in a reasonably open market of ideas. The wishes and demands of the groups not included in the government were respected and given a hearing. Finally, the party system generated a fair amount of social and economic legislation for the general welfare of the entire society.

The Normological and Political Bases of the Legal Order of the First Czechoslovak Republic ADOLF PROCHÀZKA

The "legal order of the First Czechoslovak Republic" comprises the legal norms which were created by the competent authorities of Czechoslovakia between October 28, 1918, the date of the establishment of the Republic, and September 30, 1938, the date of the "Munich agreement". In dealing with this legal material, the author follows the "normative concept of law" elaborated by Professors Hans Kelsen and Frantisek Weyr and their followers. This means that the legal norms of the First Czechoslovak Republic are dealt with as an entity, representing a logical system of norms. The first law of the Czechoslovak Republic is a focus from which lower (secondary) norms are derived and is the reason for their validity. It is, then, the logical nexus between "higher" and "lower" norms which establishes the unity of the Czechoslovak legal order. In addition, the author also examines the contents of the general rules of law which were enacted by the Czechoslovak legislative bodies during the lifetime of the First Republic. Such general rules, known as statutes, or laws, express a specific policy of the legislator. They have the practical function of influencing social conditions in a country. The author examines the general trend of the policy pursued by the Czechoslovak legislator or, in other words, the "political" basis of the Czechoslovak legal order. Once we approach the task of analyzing the contents of a legal order on a scholarly basis, we must be fully aware of the limitations of our endeavours, since we must necessarily base our generalizations upon a variety of often-conflicting material. Consequently, the results will be less reliable than an exegesis of legal texts. Before we start our investigation, a few prefatory observations should be made. First, we must clarify the type of material we shall deal with: (1)

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the laws or "statutes" issued by the Czechoslovak legislative organs during the first twenty years of the Republic; and (2) the government ordinances, or decrees, as well as other "lower norms". We consider all the statutary and other legal norms "valid", because they are derived from the original norm of the Czechoslovak legal order, to wit, Law No. 11/1918. Statutes are - as a rule - general norms establishing in abstracto duties and corresponding rights. With the help of sanctions, the concretised duties and rights - i.e., the knowledge of these duties and rights in the human mind - motivate the population of the country and mould it into a society corresponding to the political and social philosophy (the objectives) of the legislators. Second, it must be noted that when we investigate this process of motivation, we no longer deal with legal norms (duties) from a normological point of view, but we are, rather, in the realm of causality. Here, we study motives as causes of human behavior and search for their effects. It is a sociological investigation. We may also enlarge the scope of such studies and search for the causes of the legislation under consideration; we are then dealing with the material as historians. Also, we may state the contents of the statutes as postulates: e.g., we may say that the Czechoslovak income taxation (the statutes which obligated the citizen to pay a graduated income tax) expresses the postulate (demand) that each citizen or resident of the country should contribute as much as possible to the needs of the community. Here the postulate is an object of our investigation. Once we inquire into the political basis of the legal order, we cognize and formulate the postulates of the legislator and build them into a system. In such a case, the techniques we use are those of teleology, a method of studying ends and means. We seek the reason for a postulate and find it in a more general postulate. We also search for the means (subordinate postulates) to an end (aim, final postulate). The teleological nexus has often been characterized as a reversed causal nexus (e.g., by Kelsen). However, a Czech economist and political scientist, Karel Englis, 1 elaborated the teleological method as particularly appropriate to economics and parallel to the methods of normology and causality. Professor EngliS and his students also showed 1 For a detailed exposition of his theories, see Jaroslav G. Polach, "Teleological Construction of Economics. Professor Karel Englis Contribution to Economic Thought", The Czechoslovak Contribution to World Culture, ed. Miloslav Rechcigl, Jr. (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1964), pp. 329-341.

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that only the teleological method can be used for scholarly investigation of postulates expressed by legislative acts, in short, for scientifically conducted analysis of any policy of the legislators. In traditional jurisprudence, a strict distinction is made between considerations de lege lata and those de lege ferenda. In an investigation of legal material from the point of view of lex lata, the task is to discover the valid legal norms and to describe their contents. One is not expected to deal with the question of whether the contents of such norms are in harmony with our social ideals (objectives). It is often said that even lex dura, that is, a law contrary to our social ideals, is the lex, i.e., the valid law. However, if we investigate legal material from the point of view of lex ferenda, we may harmonize our criticism and suggest improvements in accordance with our social ideals and legislative objectives. Here we reformulate the content of the law as postulates to be evaluated on the basis of our social policy, by applying the teleological method. Thus, normology, causality (often called etiology), and teleology are the three methods which are used in a scientifically conducted investigation of our material. This material we may call social phenomena. However, we must be aware that each of these methods is oriented toward a different and separate object of cognition: Thus, (a) by applying the method of causality we deal with social causes (e.g., motives) and effects - an area of sociology; (b) by using the normological method, we search for valid norms i.e., look for a logical connection between norms - and thus practice normative or normological science; (c) when the object of our study is the cognition of postulates, and their classificiation as ends and means, we practice teleological science. Economics is a part of this science, as is political science, when we are examining purposive human striving, that is, ends and means (to be distinguished from political history, which describes causes and effects). It was one of the accomplishments of the Masaryk University Law and Economics Faculty that it elaborated and distinguished among epistemologies for causal, normative, and teleological thinking. The socalled Brno and Vienna schools of law were at the same time critical of syncretism of methods as (unfortunately) practised in traditional jurisprudence. This paper aims at distinguishing clearly between the normological aspects of law in Czechoslovakia and their underlying political considerations and evaluation. We shall, therefore, deal separately, first

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with the normological basis of the Czechoslovak legal order, and then with a teleological explanation of the policy embodied in the pre-Munich legislation of Czechoslovakia.

NORMOLOGICAL BASIS OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK LEGAL ORDER

Hans Kelsen, as well as Frantisek Wyer, Professor of Constitutional Law at the Masaryk University Faculty of Law, had identified a state with its legal order by the turn of the century. Later, under the influence of Adolf Merkl's writings, they both further developed the concept of the State as a legal order hierarchically arranged from higher to lower legal norms. They accepted Merkl's concept of a creation of lower norms by a delegation of authority emanating from the higher norms (the so-called dynamic system of norms). In effect, it was in the nineteen-twenties and thirties that the Brno School of Jurisprudence 2 took the position that the lower norms are created in a process consisting of norm-creating facts and determined by a higher norm. The higher norm, together with norm-creating facts, gives birth to a lower norm. This lower norm, however, must not be confused with the norm-creating fact. Thus, a contract must be distinguished from a contractual norm, or an act of a Parliament from a statutory norm. In this way the Brno School of Jurisprudence established the full scope of a legal process, which, as a rule, includes legislative acts, judicial decisions, contracts or other lawrelevant facts but may also include events, which are based neither on acts expressing human will nor on human acts at all. In the latter case, a lower norm emerges in the legal system, on the basis of a higher norm simply by materialization of the legally relevant facts, without any intervention of human will. This is referred to as an automatic norm-creation. In this way, the Brno School of Jurisprudence took the position that the legal order includes also individual norms originating in quasicontracts, delicts and quasi-delicts, and any legally relevant facts, e.g., a death of an individual, collapse of a building, etc. By this new concept of the legal order, the dualism of norms and norm-creating facts was expressed more clearly. Methodology of the Brno School of Jurisprudence serves us as a 2

See my other writings from 1924 on, especially, Tvorba prava a jeho nalezani (Brno-Praha, 1937); see also "The Brno School of Jurisprudence" in The Czechoslovak Contribution to World Culture, ed. Miloslav Rechcigl, Jr. (The Hague, Mouton & Co., 1964), pp. 405-413.

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point of departure in our investigation of the normological basis of the Czechoslovak legal order. We conclude: A state is the system of all legal norms, general and individual, higher and lower, which derive their validity from a basic norm which also determines the first norm-creating act: the historically-first constitution. Once starting out from the concept of primacy of international law over national law, we may, however, dispense with the hypothesis of a national basic norm, and simply adopt the provisions of international law regulating the birth of a new state as the reason for the validity of a new legal order, i.e., of a newly emerged state. Pursuant to international law, a new State comes "into existence if an independent government has established itself by issuing a coercive order for a certain territory and if the government is able to obtain permanent obedience to its order on the part of the individuals living in this territory".3 However, if the identical territory and population have previously belonged to a State, and only a new, revolutionary government has been established, "no new State in the sense of international law has come into existence".4 On the other hand, "a State remains the same as long as the continuity of the national legal order is maintained, that is to say, as long as the changes of this order, even the fundamental changes in the contents of the legal norms or of the territorial sphere of their validity, are the result of acts performed in conformity with the constitution; provided that the change does not imply the termination of the validity of the national legal order as a w h o l e . . . . If, however, the change is the result of a revolution or a coup d'état, the question of the identity of the State can be answered on the basis of the international legal order only. According to international law, the State remains the same as long as the territory remains essentially the same." 5 If we apply this doctrine to the case of Czechoslovakia, we see that the Czechoslovak State came into existence on October 28, 1918, when an independent and effective government established itself as a legal order, expressed by Law No. 11/1918, for the territory of Czechoslovakia. The question, whether this State ceased to exist because of the territo3

Kelsen, H., General Theory of Law and State (New York, Russell and Russell, 1961), p. 219. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid., pp. 219-20.

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rial changes brought about as a consequence of the Munich Agreement of September 30, 19338, depends on an answer to the two questions: (1) whether the changes of the national legal order (of territory, etc.) were made in conformity with the Czechoslovak Constitution; (2) and if not, whether the territory remained essentially the same. An affirmative or negative answer to the first question decides also whether there is legal continuity or discontinuity between the First and the Second Czechoslovak republics. Law No. 11/1918, establishing the Czechoslovak State, is the normological beginning of the Czechoslovak legal order. The validity of all subsequent legal norms of Czechoslovakia, constitutional and statutory, higher and lower (i.e., norms issued not only by Parliament, but also by the Government, administrative bodies, courts, private contracting parties, etc.), general and individual, norms belonging to the so-called "public" law and those of the so-called "private" law, etc., may be deduced from the above-mentioned first legislative norm of Czechoslovakia, Law, October 28, 1918, No. 11 of the Collection of Laws and Decrees. A norm which cannot be derived from this source is not a part of the Czechoslovak legal order and cannot be considered as valid from the point of view of this order. Among the constitutional norms which derive their validity from Law No. 11/1918 are the two subsequent Constitutions of Czechoslovakia: of November 13, 1918, No. 37 and of February 29, 1920, No. 121, Collection of Laws. We must now pose a question concerning the legal relation of Law No. 11/1918 to the preceding Austro-Hungarian legal order, in force on the territory of the Republic until October 28, 1918. The answer is that law No. 11/1918 is not in formal legal continuuity with the Austro-Hungarian legal order. This law was a revolutionary act, because it was not enacted on the basis of the Austro-Hungarian constitutional norms. A revolution in the legal sense means a break of formal legal continuity. It does not matter whether and to what extent the revolutionary act was resisted by the former regime. On the other hand, law No. 11/1918 preserved as much as possible the material continuity of the new Czechoslovak legal order with its predecessors, the two previous legal orders of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. With the exception of the former constitutional norms of the Monarchy incompatible with the emergence of the new democratic Republic, the two legal orders of the former dual State (that of Austria, on the territory of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, and that of Hungary,

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on the territory of Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia) were incorporated into the legal order of the young Republic. Thus, e.g., the Code Civil of 1811 remained in force in Czechoslovakia after October 28, 1918. Other codifications of the old Monarchy (such as the Penal law, the Laws of Procedure, taxlaws, etc.) and all higher and lower norms of the former legal system, likewise retained their validity. Only step by step were some of legal norms of the old régime repealed or amended.

THE POLITICAL BASIS OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK LEGAL ORDER, 1918-1938

The legal order of every country is always in a continuous flux, so that it is very difficult to ascertain and describe its characteristic traits in a satisfactory way. With this reservation, we shall now try to answer a question of the "political" basis of the legal order of the First Czechoslovak Republic, very often called by the name of its founder - the "Masaryk" Republic. As pointed out in our "Methodological Introduction", in referring to the "political" basis of the legal order we have in mind the political philosophy embodied in this order, mainly in its constitutional and statutory norms. The Czechoslovak legal order of the Pre-Munich Republic, 19181938, was, first of all, based on democracy as the term was understood in the Western countries, mainly in the United States, Great Britain, and France. It attempted to bring about, as much as possible and as much as advisable, government of the people, by the people, for the people. Those who were subject to the legal order of the Republic participated in the creation of the legal norms which constituted that legal order. The law of the country was thus their "will". This principle of self-determination of the citizens of the State by their participation in the creation of the legal order was implemented in Czechoslovakia not only on the level of the statutory norms (legislation), but also on the level of the judicial and administrative creation of law. Democracy was protected by legality: The general legal norms (laws) enacted by the elected representatives of the people were strictly executed. Independent judges and a system of legal controls and legal remedies ensured strict execution of the general legal norms as well as other norms. Thus guarantee of legality was a further leading principle of the Czechoslovak legal order. A third characteristic trait of the Czechoslovak legal system, in my

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opinion, was freedom, which meant the relative absence of legal coercion, or a sound balance between legal obligations and liberty. The principle that the individual is free as long as he is not bound by a legal provision was fully respected. Legal provisions limiting freedom of the individual were cautiously drafted, especially in matters of culture and religion. Also, economic life was free in principle and economic power decentralized. Liberalism was the prevailing economic philosophy. A t the same time, however, the Czechoslovak legal order provided protection for the individual against the hazards of life: for this purpose highly developed social legislation was enacted. By this legislation, by many services of the State, such as public education, and by the graduated income tax, the economic inequality among the inhabitants of the country was substantially lowered. But the intervention of the State into the economic life of the individual was mindful of the principle that the responsibility of the citizen for his own welfare and his family must not be weakened. The individual was not treated by the legislator as an object of the care of the State, as he was protected by the State only in matters in which he was in danger of being exploited or of being unduly exposed to the hardships of life. In short, T. G. Masaryk's democratic and humanistic political philosophy was the leading principle of the Czechoslovak legal order. In conclusion, one more legal trait of Czechoslovak democracy deserves to be mentioned, that is, the balance of power among the political parties. Between the two World Wars, Czechoslovakia was often praised as the only true and successful democracy among the Central European states. Without wishing to elaborate on this rather flattering evaluation, we may say that during the first twenty years of its existence, Czechoslovakia succeeded in resisting any tendency toward dictatorship or an authoritarian régime. This favorable result may be credited to many causes. One of them, and probably the most influential, was the fact that the real rulers of the country, the main Czechoslovak political parties, maintained among themselves an equilibrium of political power! They established and maintained a coalition government, which successfully resisted attacks from the outside by many enemies, first by a subversive domestic opposition, and in later years by neighboring Nazi Germany. Thus, our political parties had good reasons to get along with each other. Inside the coalition they often quarrelled, but in the end they always reached an agreement, because they had to do so, as none of

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them had an absolute majority in the electorate. A n "unwritten law" for the relations between the Czechoslovak political parties inside the coalition was the slogan: "We have agreed that we would agree." The mutual respect of the main Czechoslovak political parties resulting from the equilibrium of political power may be considered the basis of Czechoslovak democratic reality. It was due to this reality that the Czechoslovak legal order could be developed for the protection of freedom of the individual and of all classes of the population, in the spirit of the democratic and humanistic philosophy of Thomas Garrigue Masaryk.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Methodological

Introduction

Englis, Karel, Zàklady hospoddfského mysleni (Sbirka spisi prävnickych a ndrodohospodàrskych, svazek XI) (Brno, Barvic a Novotny, 1920). Kelsen, Hans, General Theory of Law and State (New York, N.Y. Russel and Russel, 1961). Prochäzka, Adolf, Tvorba prava a jelio nalézàni (Sbirka spisù prdnickych a ndrodohospodarskych, svazek LXXXVIII) (Praha, Brno, Orbis, 1937). Weyr, Frantisek, Teorie prava (Sbirka spisu prdnickych a ndrodohospoddfskych, svazek LXXXIII) (Praha, Brno, Orbis, 1936).

Normological Basis of the Czechoslovak Legal Order Merkl, Adolf, Die Lehre von der Rechtskraft (Vienna, Austria, 1923). , Obecne prdvo sprdvni, I. a II. dil. (Sbirka spisü prävnickych a närodohospodärskych, svazky LI a LII) (Praha, Brno, Orbis). Prochäzka, Adolf, Normativni teorie a tvorba prdva. Sbornik k pocte 50. narozenin Dra Karla EngliSe (Sbirka spisü prävnickych a närodohospodäfskych, svazek L.) (Praha, Brno, Orbis, 1930). Weyr, Frantisek, Soustava cs. prdva stdtniho (Sbirka spisü prävnickych a närodohospodäfskych, svazek VII) (Brno, Barvic a Novotny).

Political Basis of the Czechoslovak Legal Order, 1918-1938 Kelsen, Hans, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie, 2nd. ed. (Tübingen, 1929). Prochäzka, Adolf, Pravni teorie a politika. (tasopis pro vedu prävni a stätni, 1948) (Praha, Brno).

Czechoslovakia and International Organization

FRANK MÜNK

The West still is not fully cognizant of the salient position occupied by Central Europe in international affairs: all modern world wars, starting with the Thirty Years' War, and including the Seven Years' War, which transformed the political face of North America, have begun in the area now comprising Czechoslovakia, or in its immediate vicinity. Nor is its seminal nature limited to power politics; what might be called idea-politics has received practically all of its impulses from, and originated in, Central Europe. If the 18th century was molded primarily by ideologies emanating from Western Europe, the succeeding two centuries have been largely affected by ideas elaborated by Central Europeans: nationalism, socialism, and Freudian psychology are at the roots of every present-day struggle. The fact that the major protagonists of these ideologies have frequently belonged to ethnic or religious minorities only underlines the unique character of Central Europe during this period. The first Czechoslovak republic should be of particular interest to the student of social sciences, as well as to those interested in the history of ideas. It constitutes, as it were, the buckle between classical nineteenthcentury liberalism, of which it was a late flowering, and the twentiethcentury welfare state, also a Middle European creation. Thomas G. Masaryk was the last great theorist of liberalism and at the same time, a protagonist of the contemporary social welfare society. In the field of international politics and international organisation, Czechoslovakia can well be regarded as a pioneer of every innovation, every step forward, every experiment between 1919 and 1964. The fact that a fifteenth-century king of Bohemia proposed something like the present United Nations is less significant than Czechoslovakia's systematic efforts, during the twenty years from 1919 to 1938, to create an international system based on collective security, mutual assistance, economic aid, and a blend of universalism and regionalism, so characteristic of the

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present stage of international organization. These efforts are, of course, inseparable from the life and policies of Edvard Benes. We find all of the ideas now guiding the U.N., NATO, and the European Community propounded and elaborated in the speeches and writings of Benes, in his capacity, first, as Foreign Minister and, later, as President, during those critical years. His unusually long tenure provided a continuity almost unique in the annals of diplomacy - all the more reason to look for possible basic flaws in the underlaying assumptions. This may be even more fruitful in view of the fact that Benes, as well as Masaryk, was no dreamy-eyed theoretician. Both were hardheaded politicians, domestically as well as internationally, when the occasion required. Benes' internationalism and support of international organization did not prevent him from seeking additional security by international alliances and unilateral armaments, in an effort to deter aggressors by facing them with overwhelming power. That a policy so wellconceived and so brilliantly executed ultimately led to collapse and catastrophe is an additional reason for reexamining the theoretical foundations upon which the policy rested, all the more so because it still constitutes the understructure of present international institutions. The younger generation of political scientists may find it difficult to visualize the salient position of Benes, and, therefore, of Czechoslovakia, in that great, but doomed, experiment known as the League of Nations. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that Benes was not only active in every effort to make the League work, but that he was, in reality, Mr. League-of-Nations. From its very inception to its ultimate collapse, Benes labored to strengthen the foundations, to shore up the masonry, to build a strong shelter from Wilson's blueprints, fully aware that the League's failure would lead to the destruction of everything we value. The story of his efforts in Geneva is particularly instructive, because the United Nations is neither more nor less than the League remodelled along the lines Czechoslovakia advocated during the lifetime of the League. If it ultimately succeeds, it will confirm the wisdom of the underlying theories; if it fails, we will know that even a League reformed and fortified would not have been able to survive the strains and stresses of a revolutionary age. A student of that period must examine Czechoslovakia's role in the drafting of the ill-fated Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 1923, succeeded in 1924 by the Geneva Protocol. In both cases, Benes and, to a lesser extent, the Greek Politis were the chief artisans in drafting the documents - as a matter of fact, Benes was in both cases the final rapporteur.

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He was also the master politician who with a fine hand reconciled the differences among major powers and steered the debates toward final agreement. It was not his fault that British politics ultimately scuttled the Protocol. Even though an informed observer termed the Protocol "a legal system with no constitutional system on which to repose",1 it would have filled the principal lacunae in the structure of the Covenant by giving the Council of the League adequate powers to identify aggression and invoke measures to stop and punish it. It would, in short, have provided the League with teeth, embodying as it did the strong, or maximalist, conception of international organization. At the same time in 1924, the conclusion of a military alliance with France was to harden the cement of peace and to deter potential troublemakers, of whom Hungary was then the most likely. After the demise of the Geneva Protocol, Benes wholeheartedly accepted and cooperated with the system of regional security known as the Locarno Protocol and its related pacts. In 1928 he was again among the chief architects of the League-sponsored General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, including a model treaty of arbitration and conciliation, which in turn led to the Briand-Kellogg Pact. As late as 1933 Benes served as rapporteur of the General Commission of the Disarmament Conference, perhaps the last effort to shore up the crumbling edifice of world peace. Less well known - and much less appreciated in the West - is Czechoslovakia's pioneering role in regional international organization. Everybody has heard, of course, of the Little Entente which grouped Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania, but few now remember that it was transformed, after Hitler came to power in 1933, into something approaching a 'diplomatic federation".2 It even exhibited some of the features we now associate with such organizations as NATO, including a Permanent Council, a permanent secretariat which was to function at Geneva, and an economic council for coordination of economic policy. It enjoined the three member states to seek unanimous consent before undertaking any international commitment and would, in effect, have created a single diplomatic entity, had conditions per1

Alfred Zimmern, The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, 1918-1935 (London, Macmillan, 1936), p. 349. Cf. also William E. Rappard, The Quest for Peace (Cambridge, Harvard, 1940). 2 Harry N. Howard, "The Little Entente and the Balkan Entente", in R. J. Kerner, ed., Czechoslovakia (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California, 1949), p. 374.

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mitted it to mature. The Balkan Entente was intended to be a logical sequel to the Little Entente. It must also be emphasized that the Little Entente was never regarded as the ultimate objective, but that it was to serve as the core of a federation of the smaller Central European states, an objective very dear to the heart of both Czechoslovak statesmen. Current progress towards European integration, now temporarily stymied, is also very much an extension of Czech and Slovak interwar ideas. Masaryk's relationship with Count Coudenhove-Calergi, founder of the Pan-Europa Movement, a precursor of postwar efforts and institutions, is well-known to those who were his contemporaries. Even while the war was still going on, Benes spoke of a new organization of European states. "Europe must develop progressively", he wrote, "more along federal than along national lines".8 At the same time, he thought it would have to be a special kind of unity, more like a Commonwealth than the U.S.A. He also felt that European integration ought to be constructed in several tiers, with three categories of states: great powers, confederated blocs of nations, and individual small states. Czechoslovakia's place was clearly to be among the confederated blocs. He was right in asserting that in such a New Europe, postwar Czechoslovakia would have only to go forward in harmony with her traditions. That road was unfortunately blocked by the inclusion of Czechoslovakia in the Soviet bloc of Communist-dominated nations. I ought to add that the first, as well as the post-bellum thirds, Czechoslovak Republic, served to demonstrate still another international combination, even though the latter may not fall into the category of international organization. That was as a spearhead of West-East coexistence. Twice in his diplomatic career, Dr. Benes initiated a rapprochement with the Soviet Union, each time with far-reaching diplomatic consequences. He had always felt that there would be no permanent settlement without the participation of the Soviet Union. In this he was strongly opposed by Karel Kramar, first Prime Minister of the new state and acknowledged leader of the bourgeois National Democrats. Kramar never wavered in his conviction that there would be no peace as long as Communism prevailed in Russia. Benes was equally convinced that this was a quixotic position and that the West must come to terms with the Soviets if pan-Germanism was to be held in check. He took a leading role in bringing together Czechoslovakia, 3

Edvard Benes in his Own Words (New York, Czech-American National Alliance, 1944), p. 75.

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France, and the USSR in a system of military pacts after Hitler came to power. He again took the initiative, against the advice of Churchill and other leading Western statesmen, in going to Moscow and concluding a pact with the Soviets while the Second World was still in progress, thus opening the door to postwar Soviet influence. Whether events would have taken a different course had he not gone to Moscow remains a moot question. The result would probably have been the same. Today we are witnessing the third attempt at coexistence with the Soviets, this time under the leadership of the United States. It remains to be seen whether Khrushchev and post-Khrushchev Russia differ substantially from that of Stalin, and whether nuclear deterrence has permanently changed the rules of the power struggle. No historian of the Geneva era can neglect this unique role played by a small nation on the world scene. No statesman other than Benes, especially no representative of a small state, served six times as chairman of the Council of the League of Nations. None was as frequently consulted by the leaders of the major powers, nor was any other instrumental in building as many bridges between the two major antagonists within the League family, the French and the British. France represented - originally, at least - the maximalist view of the League's function, stressing collective security. Britain leaned increasingly to a minimalist view, with emphasis on national sovereignty, negotiation, peaceful change by diplomacy, and deemphasizing enforcement. Czechoslovakia was very much in favor of the French thesis, but Benes was diplomat enough to realize the importance of bringing about some sort of agreement. He could not have forseen that the French would finally yield to the British position. From the very beginning, and largely as a result of those differences, the League oscillated between a simple, if glorified, multilateral treaty and a super-state, or in the words of Alfred Zimmern, "it swung between these two poles, drawing nearer sometimes to the one, sometimes to the other, but never remaining fixed." 4 The failure of all efforts at international organization, and their final collapse, which brought with it the downfall of the first republic, still deserve close analysis. Was it such circumstantial causes as the rise of Mussolini and Hitler, or the Japanese invasion of Manchukuo, which started the downward slide? Or was it predetermined by inherent weaknesses in the Geneva edifice? Would the innovations of the Geneva Protocol have prevented it from crumbling like a house of cards in the 4

Zimmern, op. cit., p. 282.

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final test? And why did the Little Entente and the security pacts with France and the USSR fail just as badly? Such an examination is all the more imperative, because many of the shortcomings of the interwar system have been remedied since the Second World War. The Charter of the United Nations gives that organization powers far beyond those of the Geneva Protocol, especially in Articles 39 through 49. Even after they became a dead letter as a result of the cold war, new vigor was infused into the UN by enforcement activities in Palestine, the Congo, and, possibly, Cyprus. One of the most effective innovations is NATO: if anything approaching NATO had existed in 1938, war might well have been averted. Yet, it would be unrealistic not to recognize that international organization again is undergoing a severe test. There is no international agency which is not presently in a state of endemic crisis, with perhaps the single exception of the specialized agencies in the field of economics, health, or transport. The United Nations has been greatly weakened, perhaps fatally so, by the refusal of several powers, in addition to the Communist group, to contribute to its peace enforcement activities in the Congo and elsewhere. As the organization's membership has kept growing to about 125, its political influence keeps going down. In spite of devoted servants like Hammarskjold and U Thant, it is only a shell of the body created by, or to be built in accordance with, the Charter. Its one maximalist protagonist, the United States, has - and has been compelled to - seek solutions increasingly outside the UN framework. The UN is still expanding horizontally, but I am afraid it is being emptied of content vertically and functionally. As to NATO, it is, strangely enough, France which is increasingly taking the minimalist, nationalistic position that was Britain's in the defunct League. Unless NATO can, in the not-too-distant future, continue towards more effective Atlantic integration, it too will start before long to slide towards mere window-dressing status. It is only by building those supranational communities which Czechoslovakia vainly advocated thirty years earlier, whether of federal or confederal, that the present world order can be made sturdier and more enduring.5 But perhaps we have to go beyond the constitutional and institutional aspects of international organization to its philosophical and ideological foundations. Reading the words of Masaryk and Benes today 5

Cf. Frank Munk, Atlantic Ferry, N.Y., Oceana, 1964).

Dilemma:

Community

or Partnership?

(Dobbs

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leaves one with a double impression. On one hand, both reveal manyacute and trenchant insights into- societal dynamics - in fact, some of Masaryk's writings are almost prophetic. However, there are also numerous passages which sound dated and anachronistic to the social scientist of today. The task of sifting the valid from the invalid in their works is long overdue. They have certainly been vindicated in their repeated emphasis on the revolutionary character of our times, on the need for integrating nation states into larger confederations, on the need for European and world organization, and collective security. They may have been right in their belief that diverse social and economic systems can coexist, perhaps even cooperate. Where we are not quite able to follow them all the way is in their philosophy of history as invariably leading towards more democracy, greater humanism, and progress. Or, more precisely, we have arrived at the conclusion that the classical definition of democracy does not accord with modern conditions. That definition conceives of democracy as that institutional arrangement for making political decisions which realizes the common good by having the people itself decide issues, usually by the election of individuals who are to carry out the common will.6 Nowadays, though, there is a tendency to conceptualize democracy in two different forms: either as the choosing of a political, decisionmaking elite through a competitive struggle for their votes, as Walter Lippmann would have it, or by using Mannheim's concept of "fundamental democratization", i.e. politicalization of the masses.7 In that sense, totalitarian régimes fall into this category, since they are adept at mobilizing masses, without however, giving them any share in the real decision-making. This has transformed a "democracy of reason" into a "democracy of emotions" (Stimmungsdemokratie was Scheler's term) with all the irrationalism and mass-psychoses typical of our age. Similar overoptimistic expectations that have bedeviled most modern states are also basic to the crisis of international organization since the recent world wars. Both the League and the UN are founded upon political theories which issue directly from the classical concept of democracy, namely, harmony and compromise. They are simply extensions of intrastate democracy to international society. Furthermore, in the Western view, they are supposed to further the democratization, 6

Joseph A Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy Harper, 1942), esp. chs. XXI and XXII. 7 Karl Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction Harcourt, 1949), p. 44 ff.

(New York, (New York,

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in the classic sense, of all member nations. In the last analysis, the failure of the League of Nations, as well as present weaknesses of international organization (and that applies equally to Communist systems), are due to a failure of ideology, or perhaps to an ideological reliance on ideology, as such, be it that of classical democratism or Marxism. Western democracies did not come to the assistance of Czechoslovak democracy at the time of Munich, because the international system does not operate on ideological grounds. The same is true today, as the Communist régimes are now discovering.8 As a matter of fact, both the Atlantic and the Soviet worlds are undergoing a process of "de-ideologization". There is a tendency towards pragmatism, practicality, efficiency, mechanization, automation, productivity - toward reaching higher planes of living rather than higher planes of thinking. International organization will survive only to the extent to which it delivers the goods: otherwise, the fate of the first Czechoslovak republic may yet become the fate of other nations, some now existing, some emerging, some as yet unborn. Formulation of a new theory of international organization may be one of the most urgent tasks of political science.

8

It is significant that a basic work in the theory of international relations, such as James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York, Free Press of Glencoe, 1961) does not even include in its review of different methodological approaches in international politics either the classical democratic approach or the usual Marxist analysis.

Economic and Financial Policy of Czechoslovakia, 1918-1938 ANTONIN BÄSCH

In this brief review of the economic and financial policy of the First Czechoslovak Republic we shall deal mainly with the following issues: The monetary and financial policy, with emphasis on stability, and the foreign trade policy, which was faced with the difficult task of finding export markets to provide employment, particularly for industries, and to earn foreign exchange needed for imports, especially of industrial raw materials. The important land reform will be discussed, as well as the social policy, including the Czechoslovak Social Security System.

1. OVERALL ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK

In order to appreciate the magnitude of Czechoslovakia's problems, one must examine the economic structure of the country when it became independent (1918). There were significant differences in the stage of economic development between the highly industrialized Western part, on the one hand, - Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia and Slovakia and Podkarpatska Rus, on the other. In 1921, of a total of 2.2 million persons employed in industry and mining, only about 250,000 were in the Eastern part of the nation and of those only about 25,000 in Podkarpatska Rus. The Western part had inherited the major share of industries of the former Monarchy - for example, 90 percent of the glass and Gablonz Jablonec industry, 75 percent of the cotton spindles and 90 percent of the looms, 75 percent of the chemical industry, 95 percent of the malt industry, 70 percent of the paper, and more than 90 percent of the flax and jute industry. Agriculture in the Western part was very intensive and financial institutions were well-developed. In Slovakia there were only a few industries: pulp and paper, food processing, enamel, and small chemical industries and some high-cost

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production of steel. Except for the South (Zitny ostrov), agriculture was less intensive. Podkarpatskâ Rus was truly backward in nearly every respect; wood distillery plants were the only major industry and there was no well-developed agriculture. Thus, from the outset, the task of integrating the economy was very difficult as well as very important. It represented what one would call today a problem of economic development requiring education, technical assistance, and capital investment. Among other things, it needed a greatly improved and re-oriented transportation system. While the integration of the nation's economy could not be accomplished within a period of only twenty years, marked progress was achieved, including the establishment of new industries and improved techniques of agricultural production. With the dismantling of the old economic unit, which had been rather well-balanced, Czechoslovakia suddenly became a country greatly dependent on exports, since the largest proportion of goods had previously gone to the domestic, protected market of the Monarchy. Although the Peace Treaties envisaged the establishment of a preferential customs régime between Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Hungary, attempts to negotiate such preferential treaties did not succeed, mainly because of direct opposition by Germany, Italy, and even Great Britain. The greatest reliance on exports existed in the glass industry (80-90 percent of total production), cotton textiles (about 75 percent), china (about 60 percent), sugar (about 50 percent), and agricultural machinery (75 percent). There was hardly any industry which did not depend on exports for its full employment. Therefore, from the very beginning, it was necessary to find markets abroad and, with increasing industrialization and protection in the Danube Basin countries, this called also for a geographical re-orientation of exports.

2. MONETARY STABILITY AND DEFLATION

While monetary stability was a very important feature of the Czechoslovak economy, the policies required included two deflations 192223, 1931-33 which made the export position very difficult. The first Finance Minister, Alois Rasin, was determined to stop inflation and to restore a sound currency. As early as February 1919, the Czechoslovak currency was separated from the old Austrian currency through stamping of notes in circulation. At the same time, a substantial part of

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this currency was withheld and part of the bank deposits blocked as advance payment on a capital levy that was collected over a long period. The purpose of reducing the money volume was to increase the purchasing power of new currency through deflation. Rasin and a few other leaders believed in the importance of raising the exchange rate of the currency, and some even talked of the pre-war rate - considerations of prestige played some role here. During the one year from December 1921 to December 1922, the rate of the Czechoslovak currency rose in Zurich from 7.6 centimes to 16.6 centimes (U.S. 1.73 cts. to 2.10 cts.). Then the rate was stabilized at U.S. 2.96 cts. in early 1923, where it remained until 1934. This great and rapid appreciation of the exchange rate of the currency resulted in deflation, unemployment, and loss of foreign markets which were never regained. It is generally recognized that this policy was wrong, although against the unfavorable consequences one must weigh the advantages of confidence regained in the national currency, and a resumption of saving. But this could have been accomplished by stabilizing the rate of the currency at a lower level and thus greatly reducing the impact of deflation, limiting it to those adjustments which always accompany stabilization after considerable inflation. The second important period of monetary policy came after the devaluation of the Pound of Sterling in September 1931. Czechoslovakia joined the gold bloc and, following the French leadership, did not devalue. The effects of the world economic crisis, which hit the Danube Basin countries very sharply and further reduced the markets for Czechoslovak exports, were aggravated by a new deflation which could not succeed in any industrialized country. The price and cost level could not be adjusted through a policy of deflation; as a result, exports were lost and widespread unemployment followed. The situation deteriorated steadily and devaluation was urgently requested in public discussions. In the fall of 1933, this author, then an official of the National Bank, published an article on the price problem which supplied clear evidence that Czechoslovak exports were losing markets because they were not able to compete. The former Finance Minister, Karel EngliS, used this evidence in a strong public plea for devaluation. Finally, in January 1934, the currency was devalued by one-sixth (from 44.58 mg. of fine gold to 37.15 mg.). In October 1936, a second devaluation was carried out by another one-sixth (from 37.5 mg. to 31.21 mg.) for a total of 30 percent of the pre-January 1934 value. This action followed the devaluation of the French franc and the remaining gold bloc currencies. It

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will be shown later that deflation proved to be very harmful to exports, national production, and employment - once more, a policy of prestige played havoc with the national economy. There was one bright spot in this picture. Czechoslovakia, as distinct from other nations in Central and Eastern Europe, was reluctant to incur foreign debts. When an American banker offered a railway loan in 1928, he was surprised to receive the answer that such a loan was not needed, because locomotives and rolling stock were produced in the country and no imported goods were needed for the development of railways. Such was not the attitude, for example, of Germany or Austria. When the world crisis came, Czechoslovakia was in a position to maintain its foreign debt service without any standstill agreement or moratorium - the only country to do so in Central and Eastern Europe. This was possible despite the fact, that during the critical period, large French credits to the Skoda Works and Banska a Hutni Company (both firms in which French capital had large equity participation) were withdrawn and promptly repaid. Needless to say, this repayment made the foreign exchange position of Czechoslovakia quite precarious. As a result of the policy, the total foreign public debt amounted to only about $30 mil. at the end of 1937. This included a French loan of fr. 700 mil., obtained under difficult conditions in 1932.

3. FINANCIAL POLICY

This was always concerned with maintaining sound public finance. One important feature was that the first President of the Republic, in support of this policy, chose an expert as his Finance Minister rather than a politician. Among the postwar measures, the reform of direct taxes carried out by Finance Minister Karel Englis in 1926 should be underscored. A major objective of the new corporation tax and the stabilization balance bill was to increase investment in industries. Since the writer was a co-author of the stabilization balance bill, he can confirm that these measures represented a conscious effort to produce a substantial increase in investment - they can be compared with the investment credit bill introduced in the United States in 1962. The effects of these acts emerged clearly in stepped-up investment, building of new factories, and modernization of old ones; increased government revenue followed shortly thereafter.

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To avoid inflation was always a major objective of the financial policy. The years 1926-1930 may be regarded as a period of consolidation, during which no new loans were incurred, and existing debts were consolidated and even somewhat reduced. When the economic crisis developed in 1931 and was deepened by the policy of deflation, it resulted in budget deficits and new government borrowing. Additional borrowing was needed to finance heavy armament expenditures after 1935. As of January 1938, the internal funded debt amounted to about Kc 28 bil. and the Treasury bills to about Kc 7 bil. The rate of interest on most of the loans was \ x h percent (they were quoted on the Prague Stock Exchange at 97.5 in 1937), and on Treasury bills, about 4 percent. The government loans were readily absorbed in the market. A steady stream of savings into financial institutions made it possible to cover the demand for private investment as well as borrowing by the government. Czechoslovakia had a well-developed system of financial intermediaries into which savings were channelled from both urban and rural areas. There were old-established municipal savings banks and mutual savings banks, an efficient postal savings system, commercial banks, mortage banks, and fast-growing, popular agricultural credit cooperatives. Savings were also accumulated by the life insurance companies, the Public Pension Fund, and the Social Security System. Between 1925 and 1936, the total amount of savings in financial institutions rose from Kc. 35.8 bil. to 55.7 bil. — that is, by nearly 60 percent. 4. FOREIGN TRADE POLICY

That was a matter of key importance. Whereas exports from the AustroHungarian Monarchy had been rather small and directed mainly to Germany, the Balkans, and the Near East, foreign trade was vital to the new Republic, as many industries and parts of agriculture became highly dependent on foreign markets. Exports of manufactured goods represented almost 70-72 percent of total exports, and if processed agricultural goods are included, the figure is 80 to 85 percent. Raw materials accounted for nearly 60 percent of imports. In anticipation of the problems resulting from the new situation, Czechoslovakia, as a small nation with many well-developed industries and agriculture, should have pursued from the beginning a liberal foreign trade policy. Such a policy has been successfully followed by Swit-

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zerland, the Scandinavian countries, Belgium, and the Netherlands. In these countries however, the problems related to agricultural production were different from the difficult position in which Czechoslovakia found itself after 1928. The economic structure called for a liberal policy of moderate protection based on the most favored-nation clause and multilateral trade. One had to foresee that the old traditional markets would gradually be reduced because of economic nationalism and a growing protection of these markets. This, then, required a search for new markets and changing, to a certain extent, the structure of production and the composition of exports. After the 1921-23 deflation, exports rose and, in 1928 and 1929, reached the sum of Kc 21 bil. ($700 mil.) In the years 1927 and 1928, export surplus exceeded Kc 2 bil. annually. The foreign trade situation was greatly altered - first, as a result of the world economic crisis, and second, by the unsuccessful and very costly deflation which was to be ended by a devaluation in 1934, the extent of which was not sufficient. Furthermore, the foreign exchange difficulties in the Danube Basin and Germany brought about the introduction of a bilateral trade system based on clearing agreements, which Czechoslovakia was forced to join, though she realized from the start the unfavorable effects such a system would have on her foreign trade. The value of exports to these countries was reduced to the value of imports plus whatever credits Czechoslovakia was able to grant. It should be noted that normally she had had a substantial export surplus with this group of countries (about Kc 1.2 bil. in 1929). An additional serious complication arose from the development of the agricultural policy. In the late twenties and the early thirties export of barley and malt dropped to one-half and export of sugar to between one-third and one-half. The export situation in hops, fruit, and beer was similar. As a result, some 250,000 ha of land had to undergo a change (of that, sugar accounted for 150,000 ha). Gradually, then, the area under wheat increased from 640,000 ha in 1928 to 960,000 ha in 1935. The overall economic benefit of the wheat production was not as large as that of the sugar beet. Thus, in 1936, Czechoslovakia for the first time became an exporter of wheat, a grain which had previously been imported. The country became more than self-sufficient in cereals and, to a great extent, in meat, also, except for some import of hogs; even fat imports were greatly reduced. Under these circumstances, a policy of protection of agricul-

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tural products was developed which extended from cereals and livestock to such goods as cheese, fruit, fish, etc. In 1934, a Government Grain Monopoly was established to regulate the prices of cereals and fodder grain in order to secure price stability. A Livestock Syndicate, in operation since 1933, regulated production and imports of livestock and also of dairy products and eggs. In consequence of all these measures, a reduction of imports took place through quantitative restrictions, to quantities, and goods that could not be produced domestically. The agricultural sector of the economy was in a position to maintain and even increase the volume of production and income. Although some thought was given to switching from production of grain to production of various commercial crops, the time was too short to develop any steps of importance. These events had an unfavorable effect on exports, particularly with the Danube Basin countries; as agricultural imports from there declined sharply, exports of industrial goods were further curtailed. Little help could be expected from the Economic Board of the Little Entente, which was established in 1933 with the purpose of expanding trade between Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania. This author, who was a member of the Board, knows from personal experience that without an increase of imports of agricultural products - which Czechoslovakia could effect on only a very small scale - no real expansion of Czechoslovak exports could be achieved. Some small increase in trade was brought about, thanks chiefly to higher imports of petroleum products from Rumania, tobacco (in excess of need) which was stored, and some raw materials (for example, pyrites) from Yugoslavia. Despite substantial efforts and preferential treatment, imports from these two countries rose only from 6.7 to 8.5 percent of total imports between 1933 and 1937, and exports from 7 to 10 per cent; the export surplus was financed through Czechoslovak credits granted especially for armament exports. And the same was true of trade with Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria, where reduced agricultural imports also caused a decline in export of industrial products. We shall review briefly what happened to Czechoslovak exports during this period. In 1933, the value of exports dropped to only about 29 percent of the 1928 and 1929 value - to about Kc 6 bil. . . . Exports of industrial goods alone declined from Kc 14.7 bil. to 4 bil., and reached only about Kc 6 bil. in 1936. The index of industrial production decreased from 100 to 60.2 and the number of workers insured under the Social Security System from 2.7 mil. to about 2 mil.

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After the 1934 devaluation, exports began to move up to about Kc 8 bil. in 1936, and after the second devaluation, to nearly Kc 12 bil. in 1937, or to 55 percent of the 1929 value. Early in 1937 the index of industrial production went up to 92 percent, partly as a result of large armament production. The Czechoslovak share in world exports declined from 1.84 percent to 1.60 percent and its share in imports from 1.66 to 1.39 per cent. This means that the country remained behind the rest of the world in its level of foreign trade. The export surpluses were obviously greatly reduced; as a matter of fact, there was, in 1932 and 1933, a trade deficit totalling nearly Kc 1 bil. During that time the monetary reserves were rather meager and did not allow much leeway, particularly as most of the trade surplus was with the clearing system countries or countries under strict exchange control. At times, it was not easy to maintain payments to the countries without exchange control, but it was done. The changed situation resulted in a greatly altered geographical distribution of trade, particularly exports. As mentioned previously, trade declined substantially with countries where a bilateral trade system had been introduced. This applied to trade in the traditional markets, as shown by the following data: Between 1929 and 1937, exports to the Danube Basin countries, Poland, Germany, and Italy, declined from 58.1 percent of total exports to only 38.9 percent (to Germany from 19.4 to 13.7 percent, and to Austria and Hungary from 21.4 to 9.2 percent). The trade development with countries without exchange restrictions was quite different. From 1933 to 1937, exports to these countries increased by 130.6 percent and imports by 122 percent (the figures to the countries under restrictions were 82 and 57.5 percent respectively). Exports to the first group of countries reached in 1937 85.4 percent of the 1929 level and imports 73.5 percent. (The figures for the restricted group were 43.4 percent and 41.7 percent, respectively). The share of exports to overseas countries, including Great Britain, rose from 23 to 31.2 percent of the total, and during this period the United States became the second largest market for Czechoslovak exports, accounting for 9.3 percent of total exports. It is clear that the composition of Czechoslovak exports of industrial products had to change. Exports of manufactured goods maintained the 72 percent share of total exports, while exports in foodstuff and beverages declined from 11.4 percent to 8 percent. (Their imports fell from 19.4 to about 13 percent). However, to be able to compete in the new

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and distant markets in both quality and price, it was necessary to have not only a strong export drive, but also new and improved products available for foreign markets. Many such products were introduced to these new markets - heavy machinery and armament, shoes, pulp and paper, chemicals including dyestuffs, glass, and china, gloves, fine instruments, high-quality textiles, jute products, etc. Dynamic momentum was required to change the export structure and to recapture gradually the previous position in world trade. Space does not allow us to discuss some of the special achievements in this field, but one can say that, given the necessary time, the country would have succeeded in its endeavor. The magnitude of the task can be assessed if one remembers all the blows that had hit the Czechoslovak industry and exports. They were: the world economics crisis, failure to devalue the currency in time, and the losses suffered through deflation, the system of bilateral trade established in Central and Eastern Europe, the Nazi economic penetration of this area, an almost complete lack of assistance from the Western powers in this respect, such as increasing their imports from the Danube Basin, and finally, the effects on industrial exports of the new high, or even complete, protection of agriculture resulting in a shift of the relative economic position in favor of agriculture. It speaks for the strength and solid foundation of Czechoslovak industry that it fought back staunchly and created the dynamic impetus needed for its drive. The present régime in Czechoslovakia could learn from this history a lesson of how to operate industries successfully under trying circumstances.

5. LAND REFORM

Two other important accomplishments of the economic policy should be mentioned - the land reform and the Social Security System. A constructive land reform program was carried out soon after Independence. By a law passed on April 16, 1919, large landed estates were placed under government control "in order that the conditions of landownership may be adjusted", and on April 8, 1920, the bill on expropriation of large estates, rate of compensation, and the principle of land allotment was passed. The total land to be expropriated amounted to roughly 4 mil. ha (about 28 percent of the total land). Of this, 62.3 percent were forest, 25.5 percent, fields and gardens, and the rest,

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meadows, pastures, and fishponds. For the large estates, 150 ha of arable land or 250 ha of land in general was allowed, but this limit could be, and often was, extended to 500 ha (for example, when industries were connected with an estate). The amount of compensation was based upon the average 1913-1915 value for voluntary sales exceeding 100 ha. As a result of the land reform, the share of establishments over 100 ha was reduced from 16 to 10.7 percent of agricultural area, the share of those between 2 and 20 ha increased from 58.4 to 63.2 percent, and of those of 20 to 100 ha, from 17.8 to 18.8 percent. Thus, the change in ownership of the agricultural area was only 11 percent, the holdings in excess of 100 ha were reduced by 5.3 percent of the total agricultural area, and the medium-sized holdings were strengthened correspondingly. The widespread concern that the land reform would reduce agricultural output, especially in view of the high degree of efficiency on the majority of large estates, proved to be unjustified. Yet latifundia ceased to exist, the peasantry was economically strengthened and became politically conscious, and the Agrarian Party came to hold the balance of power in the political setup. The position of the peasantry was further strengthened through the development of well-organized agricultural cooperatives. The number of these cooperatives increased from 7300 in 1921 to 11.000 in 1930. Their functions included marketing, purchasing, and credit, as well as processing of agricultural products; there were 390 cooperative dairies, 18 sugar factories, 75 fruit-preserving plants, and a number of vegetable-preserving factories and malthouses. The agricultural credit cooperatives, which had a Financial Central Organization, played an important role in financing agriculture, including its foreign trade operations. One of the leading personalities who contributed to the growth of agricultural cooperatives was Dr. Ladislav Feierabend, whose knowledge in this field could now be of great service to the developing countries, and could be even more useful as a guide for agricultural policy in present-day Czechoslovakia. As mentioned already, the relative position of agriculture improved during the crisis of the 1930's, while various export industries suffered. Some of these were located in the Northern part of Bohemia, where Sudeten Germans represented a high proportion of labor; this fact had political repercussions. On balance, one would have to assess the benefits accrured to industries from increased agricultural production, com-

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pared with the losses in export caused by the drastic reduction of agricultural imports. Such calculation remains still be made.

6. SOCIAL POLICY

In the field of social policy, Czechoslovakia was often considered a pioneer of progress. In 1924, a comprehensive social security scheme was introduced, covering almost all risks for a worker and his family: unemployment, health, old age, invalidity, widow's pension, etc. The system was based on the capitalization principle, and accumulated a growing amount of savings. That this system was regarded as a great step forward even outside Czechoslovakia is illustrated by the fact that its principal author, Professor Emil Schoenbaum, through the good offices of the International Labor Office, was asked during the thirties to advise various countries, especially in Latin America, on the introduction of social security. Despite his advanced age, he is still adviser to the chairman of the important "Seguro Social" in Mexico, which was organized very much along the lines of the Czechoslovak system. In addition to its social security system, the government tried, during the economic crisis, to mitigate unemployment through increased public works. Housing for low-income groups was also given proper attention. Thus, in its last fairly normal year, Czechoslovakia was successfully emerging from the world economic crisis which had affected its growth so adversely. Industrial production in 1937 advanced to 96 percent of the 1929 level, thus still remaining behind Great Britain, and even Austria. National income in current prices was estimated at 74 percent of that of 1929, with exports in 1937 reaching only 58 percent of the 1929 value. Further improvement was achieved in the first nine months of 1938. Czechoslovakia entered the fatal year of 1938 with a stable currency, orderly public finance, a sound and strong structure of production, social stability, in spite of difficult political problems, and the justified hope that over-all production would continue to rise and foreign trade to expand. One must remember that since 1935 the country had been under the impact of heavy defense expenditure, which, in 1938, represented more than one-third of total government expenditures (about $150 mil.). Nevertheless, even with this burden, it was possible to avoid inflationary financing of the budget deficits. In reviewing the nation's total development during the twenty years

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of the First Republic, one must include progress in education, public health, and housing, where the record speaks for itself. While various mistakes were made in the monetary and economic policy, as pointed out here, Czechoslovakia represented a strong and dynamic economy, which to a great extent followed a policy of private enterprise and initiative. Through its foreign trade and social policy, it was on the way to becoming a modern, industrialized country that could have been compared with Switzerland, Sweden, and the Netherlands. It is noteworthy that substantial efforts were made to develop the economy of Slovakia, where, partly as a consequence of armament programs but largely by private initiative, major new industrial enterprises were built, such as paper, chemical industry, synthetic fiber, and agricultural industries. The problems were many and the position was not easy, but there was every reason to believe in continuous progress. This process was rudely interrupted by Hitler and the war, and before postwar reconstruction had been able to make much headway, the whole economy was transformed by the Moscow-dominated Communist Party into a centrally controlled, government-managed economy. The time will come to examine development since World War II and compare it with that of the twenty years of the First Republic. There is no doubt what such a comparison will show. Looking back from a distance in time and reviewing these twenty years as an outsider would, one may conclude that many of the happenings regarded as mistakes, as wrong measures, lose something of their importance if projected in the whole picture. One can say, in general, that a good job was done under difficult circumstances, but that the time was not sufficient to develop fully the sound and prosperous economy of the Czechoslovak Republic. We should forget about recriminations, however justified they might be, and derive satisfaction from the knowledge that we were associated with the great work of trying to build a progressive, free, and prosperous economy.

Agriculture in the First Republic of Czechoslovakia

LADISLAV K. FEIERABEND

The first Republic of Czechoslovakia originated in the year 1918 by a merger of the Western provinces of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, which had belonged to Austria, with the Eastern provinces of Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia, which were parts of the former Hungary. The territory of the new state comprised 140,508 square kilometers (54,250 square miles) and had 13,527,522 inhabitants in 1919. The population rose to 15,247,110 in 1937, the year before the First Republic was dismembered by the Munich Agreement.1 Agriculture in the new Republic had to face difficult tasks. Its Western provinces were mainly industrial and thickly populated, while the Eastern parts were predominantly agricultural, with less density of population, since each had undergone different historical development. The long shape of the country (940 kilometres from West to East) presented as great a barrier to the equalization effort as the lack of adequate communication facilities between the two parts. The food supply presented another problem; the population was undernourished after the war, and agriculture had to feed more people. While in Austria-Hungary there were 300 consumers for every 100 farm workers, this ratio was nearly doubled in the Czechoslovak Republic.2 At the same time, agricultural production had dropped 60 percent by the end of the war from its prewar level. Agriculture was second to industry as a source of national income, and according to official statistics it was a means of livelihood for 39.6 percent of the population in 1921 and 34.6 percent in 1930. Agriculture played an important role in the building of the new state. It provided food at prices approximately one-third or, at times, 1

Statistical Handbook of the Czechoslovak Republic (London, Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1942), p. 14. 2 Brdlik, Vladislav, Die socialdkonomische Struktur der Landwirtschaft in der Tschechoslovakei (Berlin, Verlag Franz Vahlen, 1938), p. 240.

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only one-fifth of the world price levels. The price of sugar beets was, in fact, ten times lower than the export prices of sugar. In the period from 1920 to 1922, for which official statistics exist, the export value of sugar - commonly referred to as white gold - barley malt and hops amounted to 11 billion korunas. 3 With foreign currency from the export of agricultural products, the Republic could at least partly cover losses resulting from imports of grains and flour; it could buy fertilizers abroad for one billion korunas and resell them at prices its farmers were able to pay, so that the soil could regain its fertility; and it could import the necessary raw materials for industry. Thus, agriculture helped to set in motion the economic life of the Republic. One of the first tasks of agriculture was to carry out land reform. This was motivated by social and national, rather than economic, considerations. Only sixteen percent of the agricultural land was in estates of over 100 hectares. (Agricultural land comprises fields, meadows, gardens, vineyards, and hop fields). The chief objection, however, was the fact that large estates were latifundia with over 1000 hectares. On the average, latifundia formed sixty percent of the large estates in the Republic, and in the Eastern part of the country, as much as seventythree percent. 4 Furthermore, the land in latifundia belonged to foreign nobility, descendants of those who had received it as a reward for helping the Hapsburgs destroy Czech independence in 1620. The transfer of this land was considered a national duty. In addition, there was a great hunger for land throughout the country, since peasants wanted to enlarge their small acreage and landless people wanted to own a piece of land. The improvement of these people's social status was a political necessity in the years of social turmoil after the first World War. The seizure of land, as set by law,5 affected estates over 150 hectares of agricultural land, or over 250 hectares of total land, involving approximately fifteen percent of agricultural and 50 percent of forest land, totally about 4,100,000 hectares, 6 which belonged to the large *

Ibid., p. 7. Ibid., pp. 36-37. 5 Law of April 16, 1919, No. 215 Collection of Laws. 6 Pavel, A., "The Czechoslovak Land Reform", in Pozemkova reforma, p. 33; also, Rozehnal, A., Pozemkove reformy v Cs. republice [Land Reforms in Czechoslovakia], mimeographed study, National Committee for a Free Europe, New York, September, 1952, p. 7; also Vozenilek, Jan, O nasi pozemkove reforme, On our Land Reform (Prague, 1931). 4

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owners. The transfer of the expropriated land had not been completed, however, even by January 1, 1938. The new owners received about 1,800,000 hectares, of which 868,000 hectares were arable land. About 1,832,000 hectares, including 419,000 hectares of farmland, were left to the large landowners for maintenance of parks, castles, and historical monuments. The 638,182 beneficiaries of this distribution acquired about 44 percent of the land, 800,000 hectares in all, of which 644,000 hectares was farmland; 2,291 residual estates acquired some 226.000 hectares, including 192,000 hectares of farmland; the state and public corporations received 43.5 percent, or 785,000 hectares, comprising a mere 32,000 hectares of farmland.7 The rest remained subject to transfer. Altogether, only 13 percent of the entire area changed owners, despite which the land reform in Czechoslovakia was the largest in Central Europe. The Czechoslovak Land Reform was the result of a political compromise between the agrarian party which defended the transfer of confiscated land into private individual holdings, and the socialist parties which preferred public ownership, or the assignment of land to cooperatives made up of the former employees of affected estates, or to other collective enterprises.8 A certain number of estates were assigned to cooperatives of former employees of landowners; such land was operated by these groups under the supervision of the Socialist-Democratic Party. On the whole, this venture was not successful, and despite the help they received from the Land Reform Office, these cooperative estates were liquidated before 1938. This showed that collective operation was unsuitable to the farm conditions in Czechoslovakia, as well as incompatible with the mentality of farm workers, who wanted to operate farms of their own.9 Land reform did not satisfy the people's hunger for land. Of the 17,000 village communities, only about 8,000 shared in the distribution. Out of the total claimants 30 percent landless farm workers and small holders could not get the land.10 Hunger for land increased during the depression of the thirties, when unemployment led to a revival 7

Pavel, Op. cit., p. 35; Rozehnal, Ibid., p. 10. Textor, Lucy E., Land Reform in Czechoslovakia (London, 1923), pp. 20-35; also a mimeographed study by Barlowe, Raleigh and Meissner, Frank, Land Reform in Czechoslovakia (University of California, 1952), p. 7. " Feierabend, Ladislav, Pozemkove reformy v Ceskoslovensku [Land Reforms in Czechoslovakia], a mimeographed study, Council for Free Czechoslovakia (New York, 1952). 10 Rozehnal, Op. cit., p. II. 8

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of the slogan, "Back to the Land". Industrial workers sought to supplement their part-time employment by working on small holdings of farmland up to two hectares; the unemployed wanted to operate selfsupporting farms. 11 Land reform was severely criticized. It was maintained that the outcome of the land transfer differed from what had been expected, since it left latifundia with over 1,000 hectares intact. It was pointed out that partisan political and personal influences were exerted in assigning the confiscated land, especially in the transfer of the residual estates. These shortcomings were to be corrected in the new bill to revise land reform legislation; such a bill was prepared in 1937, but it was not acted upon because of the precipitous events of Munich. Despite its inadequacies, land reform was of tremendous significance. It was carried out according to the law, in an unhurried and orderly manner. It was not outright confiscation, even though the former owners received only a partial compensation of one-sixth of the prewar value of their property. 12 Land reform was economically sound, since it did not interfere with agricultural production; on the contrary, it permitted animal production to increase. The farm sector of the population was strengthened, and farm units of two to twenty hectares were increased by 36.5 percent, thus strengthening family farming. Three times the number of people who had worked on the original latifundia found their livelihood on the small farm units they acquired. Residual estates were necessary in order to utilize, at least in part, the buildings of former big estates.13 The land reform legislation provided only for voluntary consolidation of scattered plots; making consolidation voluntary meant that an opportunity was lost to correct the system of cultivating isolated patches of land, which was slowing down production. There were some 6 million hectares of agricultural land, located in 12,000 village communities, which badly needed consolidation.14 In this respect the worst conditions existed in Slovakia, Carpathian Ruthenia, and those Eastern parts of Moravia known as Moravian Slovakia. The average size of a farm plot 11

Pavel, Op. cit., p. 100. Compensation Law of April 8, 1920, No. 329 Collection of Laws in accordance with the Law of June 18, 1922, No. 220 Collection of Laws. 13 Brdlik, Op. cit., p. 38; also Basch, Antonin, "Land Reforms in Czechoslovakia", in The Family Farm (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1947), p. 7. 14 Reich, Edward, Die tschechoslowakische Landwirtschaft, ihre Grundlagen und Organization [The Czechoslovak Agriculture, its basis and organization] (Berlin, Verlag Paul Parey, 1935), p. 50. 12

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for the entire territory of the republic was 0.33 hectares in farm units up to two hectares, 0.47 in farms of two to five hectares, and 0.67 in farms ranging from five to twenty hectares. 13 In Bohemia alone, regional law No. 68 of 1908 effectively limited the division of middle-size farm settlements; the traditional law of primogeniture was in force in Moravia, with the exception of the socalled Moravian Slovakia, which prevented further division. However, in Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia, farm settlements were divided equally among the heirs of a farm owner in such a way that each had to receive his share from each lot. There was much discussion, but no action was taken on the indivisibility of peasant enterprises and on entailed peasant property. Land was divided, as shown by the farm census of 1930, as follows: 43.2 percent was fields, gardens, and vineyards; 17.4 percent, meadows and pastures; 34 percent, forest; and the rest of the area comprised rivers, ponds, or housing space, or was unproductive. 10 In the Western part of the country, fields covered 51 percent of the total area, while in the East 14 percent was fields; pastures accounted for 4 percent of the Western provinces, 14 percent in the others. The percentage of land used for crops was a sign of intensive farming, and the percentage of pasture signified extensive operation. Among the most productive countries with highly developed agriculture, Czechoslovakia had the lowest percentage of unproductive land (4 percent for Czechoslovakia, 10 percent for Germany, 13 percent for France, 15 percent for England, and 17 percent for Denmark). 17 This indicated the diligence and vitality of the farm population. The Republic of Czechoslovakia had four different production regions: the sugar beet region in the fertile areas up to 350 meter above sea level mainly with crops of sugar beets, wheat, and barley, and in Slovakia with corn; the wheat region up to 450 meters above sea level with grains, fodder plants, and commercial crops, as, for example, rape and poppy seeds; the grain-potato region up to 700 meters above sea level with rye, oats, and potatoes; fodder region above 700 meters 15

Op. cit., p. 100. Robinson, C. R., Documentation for the European Conference on Rural Life (Rome, International Institute of Agriculture, 1939), pp. 16-17. Robinson uses the 1937 figures and gives the agro-forestal area breakdown as follows: 47 percent cultivated land, 18 percent pastures and meadows, and 35 percent forest and uncultivated land. 17 Brdlik, VI., L'agriculture tchécoslovaque en diagrammes (Prague, 1929), p. 5. 16

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above sea level with meadows and pastures. The designation of regions may indicate their general character; they frequently merged into each other without any indication or were mixed. With rising levels above sea the intensity of farming, of course, diminished. Agriculture was pursued as private enterprise, with the exception of forestry. In 1930, as much as 98.6 percent to the total 1,468,705 agricultural enterprises was privately owned.18 The state and public corporations owned only 1.7 percent of agricultural land.19 In forestry, 47.7 percent of the area was in private hands, while the rest belonged to the state and public corporations. The state owned 20.5 percent of all forests, and thus was the chief forest owner in the Republic.30 Farms of from 2 to 20 hectares were the most important productive units, while forestry was conducted mostly on a large scale. The typical agricultural unit was the family farm; these comprised almost 88 percent of all farm enterprises, of which 78.7 percent was operated solely by members of the family and only 9.2 percent employed additional hired labor.21 Most farm units were small enterprises. In 1930, 72.6 percent of farms were as large as 5 hectares, but constituted only 26.4 percent of agricultural land.22 The owners of these farm units could not, in most cases, maintain themselves from the income yielded by their land, and had to supplement their earnings by working as masons, small merchants, craftsmen, etc. Most of the family farms were in the category of 5 to 20 hectares, totalling, in 1930, 23,8 percent of all farm enterprises, and 43.6 percent of farmland. 23 Farms in this category provided a decent standard of living for all members of a family throughout the year. They could also provide the reserved portion for aging parents who had previously owned the land. Larger estates with 20 to 100 hectares of land constituted only 2.8 percent of all agricultural enterprises and owned 17.6 percent of the land. Large estates over 100 hectares accounted only for 0.3 percent of the enterprises, but comprised 13.9 percent of agricultural land.24 The great majority of small and very small 18

According to the census of agricultural enterprises as of May 27, 1930. Lazarcik, Gregor, The Performance of Socialist Agriculture, A Case Study of Production and Productivity in Czechoslovakia, 1934-38 and 1948-61 (New York, Columbia University Press), p. 4. 20 Brdlik, V., Die socialokonomische Struktur, Op. cit., pp. 93-94. 21 Ibid., p. 141. 22 Ibid., p. 87. 23 Ibid., p. 87. 24 Ibid., pp. 87-88. 19

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settlements up to two hectares represented one of the problems of Czechoslovak agriculture. The inadequate size of these settlements required that income be supplemented by tenant farming, which accounted for 51.5 percent of enterprises and 23.3 percent of the land in this category.25 Most of the farmers with units over 2 hectares, however, depended on their own farms, and only 7.8 percent of them depended on land owned by others.26 As many as 85.5 percent of the total number of persons employed in agriculture were owners-operators and members of their families; 14.5 percent were farm employees.27 This had a tremendous stabilizing effect on political and ecnomic conditions. Only half of one percent of those working in agriculture were solely tenants.28 Of all those employed in farming, 57 percent were women and 43 percent men; 5 percent were under 16 years of age, 89 percent under 65, and 6 percent over 65.29 Agricultural employees fell into several categories. In enterprises up to 20 hectares, the most important were the domestics, who received room and board on the farm, as well as wages. On estates over 50 hectares, the so called "deputatisten" were the most important segment. They were year-round laborers with their own households, enjoying living quarters of their own, along with other payment in kind, in order to raise their own poultry and hogs; they also received financial compensation. Besides the "deputatisten", there were farm workers, who also worked all year and were paid cash wages, and employees of higher categories. During the harvest season, large estates also employed seasonal workers, many of whom came from Slovakia. There was no shortage of farm labor, although their number declined by 22 percent between 1920 and 1930, as better earnings became available in industry. After 1930, conditions changed, because the depression reversed the trend, with workers moving from industry back to agriculture; this resulted in increasing unemployment of farm workers - 42,731 in 1933.30 After 1934, conditions changed for the better. The law of December 27, 1918, introducing the eight-hour work day, was valid for agriculture as well as industry. It did not create any hardship, since it permitted longer working hours during the harvest, 25 26 27 2 8 29 30

Ibid., p. 95. Ibid., p. 96. Ibid., p. 145. Ibid., p. 15. Ibid., p. 148.

Ibid., pp. 88-89.

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but the work week could not exceed 48 hours. Despite the fact that most farmers paid more than they were required to by labor contracts which were negotiated every year, the wages of farm workers were inadequate. Farm workers lived at substandard levels, because the farm operators' low income after 1928 did not allow them to increase the wages of farm laborers. Equally inadequate was the remuneration for members of the farm owners' family. They earned even less, especially during the years of depression, than did the farm workers. 31 The Republic of Czechoslovakia introduced health insurance for farm labor,32 previously covered only by publicly operated accident insurance programs, as was legally required in Austria. In 1925, farm workers were provided with disability and old age insurance. 33 In the Western provinces, old farmers used to enjoy a reserved portion annuity in their unproductive years. The farm owner transferred his farm to his descendant - his son, daughter, or other relative - while living, but reserved for himself and his wife living quarters and contributions in kind. In the Eastern provinces, the farmer continued to direct farm operations as long as he lived. The composition of agriculture was usually mixed, with most farms raising both crops and animals. On the larger farms, vegetable production prevailed, while on smaller farms, animal production was predominant. In this way, the different-sized farm units supplemented each other. In the Western areas, the agricultural workers moved to the cities and industrial centers, and the reduction in population permitted expansion of farming enterprises, better major equipment, mechanization, increased productivity of labor, and, thus, increased productivity of land, as measured in the total monetary value of its production. Land productivity declined as one moved East, when measured per hectare of land or per working day.34 Intensive agriculture in the Western provinces was commercialized, while in Carpathian Ruthenia, it continued as widespread subsistence farming. Experts estimated that the Eastern section of the Republic was 50 years behind the West in farming practices.35 Human labor and animal strength were the most important components of the agricultural work force. On small farms, the cow was 31 32 33 34 35

Ibid., pp. 153-154. Law of May 15, 1919, No. 268 Collection of Laws. Law of October 9, 1924, No. 221 Collection of Laws. Brdlik, Op. cit., pp. 159-166. Reich, Op. cit., p. 75.

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used as a draft animal. However, mechanization continued to increase rapidly, as the countryside was electrified. Of 20,522 farm communities in 1937, 11,465, or 60 percent, had electricity; however, 10,577 of these were in the Western provinces.36 The national production was as follows (in percentages of arable land): grains and legumes, 62.5 percent; beets and potatoes, 17.1 percent; fodder, 16.5 percent; plants for industrial use, 0.9 percent; and vegetables, 0.5 percent, while 2.5 percent lay fallow.37 Sugar beets were an important product of Czechoslovak agriculture; among industrial products, hops held the leading position in the West, and flax and poppy seed in the East. Animal production per 100 hectares is listed in the 1930 census as follows: 8.1, horses; 53.4, catde; 34.3, hogs; 9.7, goats; and 179.1, poultry. 38 Lake fishing was especially advanced in Southern Bohemia. Yield per hectare ranked Czechoslovakia among the most highly productive countries. The average yields per hectare, in Czechoslovakia as a whole, during the years 1934-38 were as follows: 17.1 q in wheat; 16 q in rye; 17 q in barley; 16.2 q in oats and 135 q in potatoes. This was the highest yield in Central Europe, except Germany; it was higher than in France and Italy. (Yields in France were as follows: 15.6 q in wheat; 11.6 q in rye; 14.5 q in barley; 13.9 q in oats; and 68 q in potatoes).39 Note that average yields in Czechoslovakia were decreased by the lower yields in Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia; in the Western provinces, they were substantially higher. Agricultural production (forestry excluded) expanded faster than the population; with its rising standard of living, the country was becoming more self-sufficient in providing an adequate food supply. According to Brdlik's calculations, approximately 10 percent more agricultural land would, according to hectare yields in that period (1934-1938), have been enough to provide total self-sufficiency.40 In other words, the increase of yield should have been one of the aims of the agricultural policy, if its goal was self-sufficiency. To understand the whole situation, we must know that on the na-

»• Ibid., pp. 23-24; Brdlik, Op. cit., pp. 161-166; Statistical Handbook, Op. cit., p. 40. " Brdlik, Op. cit., p. 17. 38 Ibid., p. 178. 39 Statistickd rocenka Cs. republiky, Statistical Yearbook of the Cz. Republic (Prague, 1962), pp. 570-574. 40 Brdlik, Op. cit., p. 230.

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tional level there was 1.66 hectare of agricultural land per capita, 41 and that Czechoslovakia had 108 people per 1 kilometer2.42 Balance of the agricultural foreign trade (forestry included) was very favorable. From 1932 to 1936, it had a surplus of 336 million korunas. The main exports were: sugar, barley, hops, rawhides, and lumber. Forests with a total capacity of 4,600,000 hectares supplied some 16 million meters 3 of wood materials a year. 43 After the establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic, the value of its currency declined greatly on the international market. The stabilization of the Czechoslovak koruna resulted in serious deflation, in which agriculture suffered very much. Prices of farm products declined (e.g., wheat prices dropped from December, 1921 to December, 1922, from 426 korunas to 148 korunas), and at the same time, the international prices of agricultural products fell low enough to compete with domestic prices. At that time, there was a campaign for the imposition of a tariff on agricultural products, since domestic crop production had no protection, and animal products, very little. The vigorous struggle ebbed in 1926 with the introduction of fixed agricultural tariffs, but even this did not protect agriculture as well as industry. The world depression (1929-1932) resulted in the continuous decline of farm prices in international markets; exporting countries had to pay premiums to counteract the tariff protection of the importing countries, and prospects for export of the traditional agricultural items, such as sugar, malt, and barley, were diminished. All these developments nullified the Czechoslovak tariff protection. The disparity increased between the amount received by farmers for their products and the prices they paid. In 1932, for his own output, a farmer could buy only approximately two-thirds of the goods and services he needed, compared with the prewar period.44 The lowered purchasing power of the farmers was adversely reflected in the entire economic life of the Republic, and prompted farmers to fight for increased tariff protection. The introduction of added tariff duties on agricultural products did not prove helpful; consequently, a planned economy in grains and fodder was introduced in the form of a state monopoly. The Government gave to a private corporation, whose shareholders were the organizations representing farmers, consumers, business, 41 42 43 44

Ibid., p. 140. Annuaire internationale de statistique agricole (Rome, 1937). Reich, Op. cit., pp. 185-187. Brdlik, Op. cit., pp. 18-19.

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and industry, a monopoly on the importing and exporting of grains and fodder, as well as on internal trade in these products. The state monopoly guaranteed stable prices to both the producers and the consumers, and tried to achieve a balance between central planning and individual initiative.45 The monopoly temporarily discontinued the traditional price-setting in the free market, and directed the farmers to the areas to be sown. However, experience showed that such regulation by government decree is practically impossible, and that the reduction of cultivated areas can be achieved only by established price policy. The weakness of the monopoly was that it was limited to crops; it therefore benefited only the larger land owners and neglected the small farmers, who were interested primarily in animal production. The disparity between crop prices and animal product prices had an unfavorable economic and political impact. Czechoslovak agriculture was forced to shift from the production of fats to the production of meat and milk because of inadequate tariff protection for fats, fattened hogs, and raw materials required for production of artificial fats. Import of these raw materials increased from 86,400 tons in 1925 to 211,000 in 1937.46 To correct the situation, a series of steps were taken in 1938; production of artificial fats was regulated by a quota system, production of the domestic vegetable oil plants was given support, and planning for animal production was in preparation. These steps were interrupted by Munich. The aforementioned price disparity resulted in leftist agitation among the small farmers, and this later proved unfortunate. Czechoslovak agriculture enjoyed good public and self-help organization. The public administration was headed by the Ministry of Agriculture, in conjunction with the Agricultural Councils in the various provinces. State agricultural research institutes with a network of experimental stations and model farms were set up for scientific research and promotion of modern production methods. The State Office of Agricultural Administration and Accounting supported the proper conduct of administration of agricultural enterprises. The public agricultural educational system was well-developed in comparison with the size of the territory. There were 275 technical agricultural schools in 45 Feierabend, Ladislav, "Czechoslovak Grain Monopoly", in The Czechoslovak Contribution to World Culture, edited by Miloslav Rechcigl, Jr. (The Hague, Mouton and Co., 1964). 48 Brdlik, Op. cit., p. 230.

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the country in 1937-1938, of which three were institutions at the university level; 1270 people's agricultural schools were organized, serving all citizens of the Republic. During its existence, the Republic of Czechoslovakia organized 106 new technical agricultural public schools, primarily in Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia. There was no public professional farm organization specifically devoted to farm interests. Disagreement among the political parties concerning the constitution of such farm organizations meant that prepared bills were not presented to the Parliament. The "Agricultural Society" (Zemëdëlskâ jednota) in the Western provinces and the "Farmer's Society" (Rolnickâ jednota) in Slovakia served the farm interests, along with the district chapters and a series of associations for the respective fields of production, such as sugar beet growers. Scientific agricultural interests were pursued by the Agricultural Academy and the Agricultural and Forestry Section of the Masaryk Labor Academy.47 Czechoslovakia was able to point with pride to its widely distributed and well-organized network of agricultural cooperatives. This movement was topped by "Centrokooperatif", whose membership was composed of unions of the cooperative associations of citizens of the respective nationalities. Agricultural credit cooperatives provided shortterm credit, marketing cooperatives provided joint procurement of essential goods and joint sale of agricultural products, while processing cooperatives prepared different agricultural products for the market. The strength of the cooperative movement is revealed by these data; in 1930, credit cooperatives with unlimited liability, known as "Kampelicky", made loans in the sum of 3,219 million korunas;48 buyers' cooperatives, in 1932, supplied farmers with almost 68 percent of all artificial fertilizers, and in 1938, marketing cooperatives, on behalf of their members, sold 80 percent of all grains.49 The Czechoslovak Agricultural Cooperative Movement was undoubtedly among the world's best-developed organizations of that kind. During its twenty years' existence, Czechoslovakia could not solve all its agricultural problems, but it took the initial steps toward this goal. It sought to increase the general and specialized education of 47

Agricultural schools and agricultural specialized groupings are discussed in Reich, Op. cit., pp. 251-270; also in Brdlik, Op. cit., pp. 28-31. 48 Polin, Raymond and Charon, J. P., Les cooperatives rurales en Tchécoslovaquie et en Roumanie (Paris, Librairie Felix Alcan, 1934), p. 18. 49 Reich, op. cit., p. 279; also Feierabend, Ladislav, Agricultural Cooperatives in Czechoslovakia (Mid-European Studies Center, 1952), p. 40.

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farmers in the Eastern provinces in order to raise conditions to the level of those of the Western provinces. With its economic planning Czechoslovakia tried to improve farm productivity and thus better the lot of both farm owners and farm workers. However, there was no attempt to solve the problem of small enterprises lacking sufficient capital. Thanks to the unparalleled diligence and frugality of the peasant population, there was great progress toward agricultural selfsufficiency, despite the difficulties the Republic had to face after the first World War and during the years of depression. Agrarian policy was aimed at the improvement and strengthening of family farming; this, in large part, was accomplished. The agricultural population played a significant role in Czechoslovak society. Farmers adhered to different political parties; small farmers were, in part, members of the socialist parties, and some middle peasants and landowners, of Christian people's parties, but the majority of peasants belonged to the Agrarian Party. The Agrarian Party received 1,177,000 votes and 45 parliamentary seats out of 300 in the general election of 1935. It was the leading party and carried great weight in the coalition government. The Czechoslovak peasant was politically conscious, educated, proud, materialistically inclined, but religiously oriented. He considered his land not only a source of income nor merely the means of production, but the basis of his very being.30 He loved his soil and dedicated himself to the principle of "The free peasant on the free soil".

50 Feierabend, Ladislav, "Land Reform and Agricultural Improvement", in Challenge in Eastern Europe, 12 Essays, edited by C. E. Black (Rutgers University Press, 1954).

The Progress of Czechoslovakia's Industrialization and its Effect upon National Unity

VACLAV E. MARES

In this collective review of problems of our First Czechoslovak Republic, I would like to call your attention to the history of Czechoslovakia's industrialization, and to the regional tensions which it either helped to settle or which it created or aggravated. This negative effect was often unavoidable, due to the painful consequences of necessary adjustments to the new political framework in which her Czechoslovakia's industries had to operate after 1918. Of those which Czechoslovakia inherited, some were oversized for the market of the new custom territory, others were separated from their complementary production units by the newly drawn political boundaries, and still others found themselves cut off from their natural raw material or power base. Moreover, the industrial establishments of Slovakia, formerly a province of the Hungarian Kingdom, were suddenly forced to find a market for their products within Czechoslovakia's domestic economy, where they had to face the competition of more advanced industrial enterprises in the historical provinces of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia. The coordination of these often conflicting regional interests forced the government to many unpopular actions which caused much bitterness and ill will. These difficult adjustments had their origin in the widely different conditions under which industrial enterprises developed, during the 19th century, in the Austrian and Hungarian halves of the dual Hapsburg Empire. To explain the difference, I will first clarify the important distinction which an economist makes between spontaneous and induced industrial growth: He speaks of spontaneous industrial growth when, in a given region, a fortunate combination of factors of production - material resources, power, labor, capital - offers to a potential industrial entrepreneur the prospect of enough profit to stimulate investment there. On the other hand, an economist speaks of induced industrialization when given industrial enterprises develop in a region

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which offers no natural conditions for such a development. This usually happens in response to inducements offered by the government or the local public authorities (such as grants of land, low interest loans, accelerated plans of amortization, long-term purchase contracts on goods to be produced, etc.). An extreme example of such induced industrialization is when, in a free-enterprise society, the government itself assumes the function of the entrepreneur, after trying in vain to attract private capital for an investment project in the execution of which it is particularly interested. Unlike spontaneous industrial growth, such induced investments are always the result of some deliberate policy: its purpose may be to create new employment opportunities for an economically underdeveloped or declining region, or it may follow some interests of national security; it might also be motivated by the aspirations of some nationalistic group, or by the foolish ambitions of a dictator or a ruling political party. The dynamism of technological change has never made industrial development appear a smooth and continuous process. It has always moved ahead by leaps and bounds, offering the benefits of a new prosperity to one region within one decade and to other regions, two, three, or five decades later. In the course of a hundred years, during which water power (in the form of an overshot water wheel), coal, oil, natural gas, and, again, water (as hydroelectricity) were, in turn, the dominant sources of energy, many regions first gained, then lost, and then regained (in some cases) the reputation for being good industrial sites. The Eifel region of Western Germany, the Borinage region of Southern Belgium, the Ardnnes region of France, the New England states in this country, were all pioneering areas of early industrialization; yet, half a century later, they all had to cede this role to other regions which seemed better endowed by nature and could better satisfy the material and power requirements of a changing technology. Nobody interpreted this as a deliberate political conspiracy of the newcomers against the early industrial pioneers when such a shift in economic opportunity took place in well integrated nations. On the other hand, when such upswings and downswings in industrial fortunes occurred in regions where different ethnic groups distrusted each other and whose relations were tense because of old grievances or a sense of inferiority, such changes were often interpreted as evidence of some deliberate discriminatory policy followed by the ruling majority; they generated emotional disputes which undermined the national political unity. The recent tension between the French and English provinces in Canada,

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or the late flare-ups of antagonism between the Vlams and Walloons in Belgium were generated by such grievances. Ignorance - partly assumed and partly real — of the natural forces which cause such shifts in prosperity among various regions was also responsible for many misunderstandings which developed between the Czechs and Slovaks during the years of the First Republic. Slovakia's special problem derived from the great imbalance between her level of economic development and that of the historical provinces, in 1918 - the year when, politically and customs-wise, they were joined in a common household. This imbalance was reflected in the widely contrasting employment figures of the new Republic's provinces. While 39 percent of the total population of the Republic was employed in agriculture, in Bohemia it was only 29 percent, in Silesia, 22 percent, and in Moravia 38 percent, but in Slovakia it was 62 percent. The heavy concentration of manufacturing in Czechoslovakia's historical provinces is also evident in the figures showing, for the year 1914, the contribution of these provinces to the industrial output of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire: It was 100 percent for porcelain, 92 percent for glass, the same for sugar, 86 percent for coal, 75 percent for chemicals, paper, and textile, 70 percent for leather, 60 percent for metallurgical products, etc. 1 Most of the industries which the new Republic inherited in the historical provinces were the products of spontaneous growth. They were based on the abundant supply of high-grade fossil fuels, from Kladno, Most, and Falknov in Bohemia, and from the Ostrava Basin in Moravia and Silesia. They also benefited from the long-standing regional tradition of manufacturing. Even in pre-industrial days, Bohemian glass and chinaware and Moravian linen products were known for their excellent craftsmanship all over Europe. This professional reputation of the Czech and German people in the historical provinces, as well as the abundant sources of mechanical energy, attracted the necessary capital from Vienna for the transformation of the old workshops and home manufacturing centers into modern industrial enterprises. The government of Vienna did not need to stimulate this development; it proceeded under its own power. It was in line with the political interests of the Hapsburg régime which, in the last decades of the 19th century, 1

For more detailed information about the geographical distribution of manufacturing enterprises among various provinces of Czechoslovakia during the early twenties, see Julius CihâS's Nârodohospodâfsky atlas republiky Ceskoslovenské (Orbis, Prague, 1928).

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became seriously concerned about the increasing political restlessness and about the growth in industrial and military power of its neighbor, the German Reich. Thus, the statesmen in Vienna welcomed the rapid industrialization of the historical provinces as an opportunity to restore, at least partially, the balance between the industrial and power potential of the old Danubian Empire and of their young German ally. In Slovakia, on the other hand, the early industrial enterprises developed under completely different conditions. Among its natural assets were forests and farms and some minerals. The former Hungarian landowners, who held much of the land, developed these assets only partially for industrial use. Moreover, the value of the mineral deposits for industrial operations was lessened, first, by their low metal content and, second, by the absence of coal; the lignite deposits of Handlova and Badin were in those days, of only limited use for industrial purposes. The flow of numerous mountain streams was harnessed to operate simple saw mills and forges, or to perform some stone crushing or grinding operations; but manufacturing activities during most of the 19 th century remained otherwise restricted to the production of articles which the peasants needed in their daily life and which could be produced domestically, such as brushes and wooden implements, wire products, and laces. Some of these gained a reputation for fine quality and artistic design; they were peddled by travelling merchants dressed in colorful Slovak costumes through all the provinces of the old Hapsburg Empire. The development in Slovakia of modern industrial enterprises began in the last decade of the 19th century, when the government in Budapest started to implement the Austro-Hungarian settlement of 1867. To achieve equality in power and prestige with the Austrian half of the dual Empire, the Hungarian politicians prepared an ambitious industrialization program. Here, they were also spurred on by the increasing competition of American grain in the European market. They wanted to see Hungary's economic prosperity assured by more than her role as the granary of the whole Hapsburg Empire. Since the natural resources which could be exploited industrially existed mainly in the peripheral provinces of the Hungarian Kingdom (Slovakia, Transylvania, and Croatia), these provinces had to provide the base for the proposed industrial development. The plain around Budapest, the Kingdom's capital, was supposed to become the center of transformation industries to which the surrounding mountain provinces, with their abundant and cheap labor, would supply the materials or half-finished products

Progress of Czechoslovakia's Industrialization

187

for final processing. This was a well-planned industrialization program, custom-made for the political ambitions of the old Hungarian Kingdom. In no way was it motivated by humanitarian considerations for the peoples of its backward border areas. As Harriet Wanklyn puts it in her study of Czechoslovakia's economic geography 2, the Budapest regime was trying hard to develop in its border provinces an industrial and power base similar to that which self-propelling forces of natural industrial growth had created earlier in the historical provinces, and which had boosted the prestige of the government in Vienna. All the advantages offered by the Budapest regime to potential private investors failed however, to convince them that Slovakia, without coal and (around the turn of the century) still without hydroelectricity, was a good location for major industrial enterprises. All government efforts attracted only limited amounts of private capital for industrial investments. Moreover, such capital was not placed into those industrial projects in which the government of Budapest was primarily interested. Some wealthy landowners, assisted by their bankers and business friends, started to invest their earnings in cellulose and paper, cement and sugar mills, and some furniture and kitchenware manufacturing, as well as in hotels and health establishments in scenic areas of Slovakia. Private capital, however, was not attracted by the profit prospects of iron and steel manufacturing or those of any metal fabricating industries. When the Hungarian government wanted these industries, it had either to build them itself or to assign the task to some of the Budapest banks which it controlled. This was how various iron foundries and steel rolling mills, copper converters and smelters, developed in such Slovak localities as Podbrezovâ, Banska Bystrica, Zvolen, Krompachy, and Hernad Valley; most of them proudly displayed the term "Royal Hungarian . . . " and so left no doubt as to their origin. Thus, not as in the historical provinces, where heavy industry and its processing branches developed in response to the inherent forces of the region's natural endowments, such establishments in Slovakia grew usually as a part of a nationalistic "Grossenwahn" of the royal Hungarian régime. This made Slovakian industry highly vulnerable, a fact which became apparent as soon as it had to face, within the new custom territory of Czechoslovakia, competition from the sound industrial enterprises of the historical provinces.

2

Harriet Wanklyn, Czechoslovakia

(London, George Philip & Son, Ltd., 1954).

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Václav E. Mares

This weakness of the Slovak industrial structure created, after 1918, many hardships for its population. Because of its strong peasant element and its obsolete forming practices, these people were anyway much poorer than those of the historical provinces. Even without a change in political setting, many older mills and workshops were ready to close when neither coal nor hydroelectricity could be economically substituted for the simple gravity of the descending streams which had once determined their location in various remote mountain valleys. A quick overhaul of the whole industrial structure of Slovakia became imperative when the first postwar slump in the early twenties caused the collapse of such major industrial establishments as the Krompachy Iron Works and the Iron and Sheet Metal Manufacturing at Zvoleñ. In an effort to prevent social unrest and to pacify the grumbling Slovak autonomists, the Prague government granted considerable subsidies to other Slovak establishments of the same "Royal Hungarian" origin. Thus, they were enabled to survive at least until the depression of the thirties, when more of them had to be liquidated. Only a few, like the iron ore mines of Rozñava and Zeleznik, the steel works of Podbrezová, and the copper works of Báñska Bystrica, were granted another lease on life because of their strategic importance, and stayed in business with substantial subsidies covering annually their operating losses. This liquidation of the undigestable industrial inheritance of the Hungarian Kingdom created many regional pockets of acute unemployment, coinciding with the establishment of immigration restrictions in the United States, which intensified Slovakia's unemployment problem. Some actions of the Prague government offered partial relief. The development of the river ports of Bratislava and Komárno brought a fresh burst of activity on the Danube Riber. The increased river traffic spurred such new industrial activity as the production of transport machinery and equipment in the Skoda shipyards at Komárno. Two new cement mills were built at Stupava and Hornie Srnie, which doubled Slovakia's production of this modern building material. New employment opportunities were opened in an impoverished peasant region by the new Bat'a plant in Poprad, in the Tatra foothills. New cellulose and paper mills and synthetic fiber plants were built on the Vah and Hron Rivers. Moreover, the state made large investments in some of the tourist centers; it built modern hotels in the Tatra mountains and it equipped some of the old Slovak spas - PieStany, Sliac, Trencanské Teplice - with modern medical and therapeutic installations. To support tourism in some of the less well-known areas, it restored many historical buildings

Progress of Czechoslovakia's Industrialization

189

in smaller Slovak communities and some dilapidated castles, such as those in the Nitra and Orava valleys. All such ingenious efforts on the part of the political leaders of the First Republic could not, however, fully compensate the Slovaks for the hardships of the transition period. But it was quite unjust to blame the central government for them. They were products of circumstances over which the Prague régime had no control. Many of the former prestige investments of the Budapest régime became "white elephants" to Czechoslovakia's economy. They had to be liquidated as soon as their political purpose - the prestige and imaginary power build-up of the Hungarian half of the Hapsburg Empire - disappeared, and as soon as profit became the yardstick of their value. The First Republic's plan for the industrial redevelopment of Slovakia was based on the region's natural endowments; it was to be supported by the rehabilitation of water power, in the form of hydroelectricity as one of the modern sources of energy, and by the newly discovered usefulness of Slovakia's lignites. Private enterprise from the historical provinces cooperated with the government. By multiple capital investments in Slovak branch operations during the thirties, they helped to create many new job opportunities in some of the poorest Slovak districts. Unfortunately, these promising developments were interrupted by the Second World War. They were resumed in 1945, but soon afterward, as under the Hungarian rule, were again subordinated to political objectives. Investment decisions were made again without proper consideration of their economic rationality; they followed the power objectives of the Kremlin in Stalin's years and, later, the prestige postulates of Slovak nationalists in the country's planning agencies. Only when the region's natural endowment and its economic integration with the surrounding regions of Czechoslovakia and the countries of East-Central Europe again become the criteria on which to base investment decisions will further industrialization of Slovakia be of real benefit to her people. There are some indications that such a change in Czechoslovakia's economic policy is under way. If so, it may mean an actual return to the blueprint which was prepared for the region's economic development in the second decade of the First Republic.

Social Progress in Czechoslovakia, 1918-1938

CESTMÌR JESINA

The purpose of this essay is to review social conditions as they existed in Czechoslovakia between 1918 and 1938, and to evaluate their nature in terms of social progress. Our scope does not allow any meaningful treatment of many developments which may justly be considered integral elements of social progress, such as improvements in the standard of living measured by the purchasing power of wages, per capita consumption of various commodities, the distribution of national income, child welfare, public health, and other topics. We will concentrate on examination of developments in several major areas which best illustrate the spirit with which Czechoslovakia approached social problems, and where the success or failure is also indicative of social conditions in other areas not specifically treated here. Social progress, in order to qualify as genuine progress, must occur in a degree significant enough to relieve man's burdens in acquiring the necessities of life, yet leave him an increasing amout of time and energy to enjoy the fruits of his labor. At the same time, parallel improvements in the cultural sphere must provide opportunities for every individual to enlarge his intellectual and moral field of vision through free access to an exchange of ideas, in order that he may live an intelligent life. Finally, a concomitant development in the political sphere must offer a chance to every man to participate in the formulation of the rights, freedoms, and duties of the citizen. Social development in Czechoslovakia will be examined in the light of these criteria. One important indicator of social progress is the willingness and ability of a society to offer its members adequate employment. The achievement of Czechoslovakia in this respect is partly illustrated by the following table of data from the census records of 1921 and 1930: 1 Statisticka. pfiruika Republiky ceskoslovenske (Praha, 1928), p. 309, and Statistickd rocenka Republiky ceskoslovenske, 1934, p. 15.

1

Social Progress in Czechoslovakia 1918-1938

Basic labor force Secondary labor force Total labor force Number of dependents Total population

191

1921

1930

Increase -Decrease

5,022,818 1,491,826 6,514,644 7,098,528 13,613,172

6,537,384 1,071,598 7,608,982 7,120,554 14,729,536

1,514,566 - 420,228 1,094,338 22,026 1,116,364

The "basic labor force" is the total number of people gainfully engaged in economic activities, whether as employer or employee. "Secondary labor force" constitutes immediate family members or relatives who assisted the chief breadwinner in his gainful employment. This secondary category, largest in agriculture and trades, was important in augmenting the basic labor force. The table reveals that in the nine years between the two censuses, 1,514,566 persons joined the ranks of the basic labor force: 1,094,338 persons came with the natural succession of generations derived from the increase of population, and 420,228 persons improved their position by leaving the ranks of the secondary labor force and by joining the ranks of the basic labor force. The total population increased by 1,116,364 persons, but the number of dependents supported by the basic and secondary labor forces increased by only 22,026 persons. The absorption of one and a half million people into the basic labor force and the reduction of the secondary labor force by 420,228 persons was an achievement which is remarkable by any standard. These figures and other indicators of economic activity illustrate the economic and social advances achieved by Czechoslovakia in the twenties. During this time, there was only one economic depression accompanied by widespread unemployment. It began in August 1922, when unemployment increased sharply from 104,273 unemployed in July to 141,308 in August and kept increasing until January 1923, when it reached its peak with 441,075 unemployed. From this point, unemployment began to decline and by June 1924 was reduced to 87,027. In the remaining years of the twenties, the number of unemployed remained well below 100,000, and thus within manageable limits. In 1929, the annual average was down to 41,630 unemployed persons.2 2

Statisticky prettied (Praha, 1930), p. 215, and Statistickd ceskoslovenske (1938), p. 218.

rocenka

Republiky

192

Cestmir Jesina

The bright picture of the twenties darkened in the thirties, when unemployment was widespread, owing to the general economic crisis. In Czechoslovakia, the highest peak of unemployment was reached in February 1933, when 920,000 persons were listed as unemployed; the highest annual average of unemployment was also reached that year, when 738,267 persons lacked a job. In 1937, the annual average was still very high, with 408,949 persons listed as unemployed.3 Without attempting to minimize the hardship and frustrations suffered by those who unsuccessfully sought jobs, and even by those who had jobs but lived in fear of losing them, some interpretation of these unemployment figures will help to give them more meaning. The figures published in statistical sources and representing the scope of unemployment are not quite accurate. They were largely derived from data collected by employment agencies which used a far too loose definition of unemployment. These agencies, as a rule, merely registered the number of job applications, the vacancies filled, and the number of unsuccessful applications. Job applications were submitted not only by persons already unemployed, but also by those seeking to change their job. On the other hand, the names of persons who submitted applications for a job and subsequently found them independently were still retained on the register of applicants. This was not fully reflected in the unemployment figures, and thus the figures are somewhat exaggerated. This is particularly true of applicants from the secondary labor force, i.e., people who were assisting relatives in their economic activity, but wanted to establish their own full independence. As shown above, this development had been under way since the early twenties, vastly accelerated by the prosperity of that decade, and carried with the increased force of aroused expectations into the thirties. These people continued to help in family enterprises while seeking a full-time job outside. They were not unemployed in the sense of having lost a job, but were "unemployed" merely in the sense of having failed, at least for a time, to establish themselves as independent members of the basic labor force. The degree of exaggeration in the unemployment figures published in various statistical sources may be determined on the basis of the numerical size of the basic and secondary labor forces, the number of dependents, the number of persons engaged in economic activity as employers and independent businessmen, the number of persons em3

Statisticka rocenka Republiky

ceskoslovenske

(1938), p. 218.

Social Progress in Czechoslovakia 1918-1938

193

ployed, the number covered by various social insurance schemes, and the number receiving unemployment assistance, as well as from various other data. Because the census of 1930 was the last before the war, much of the more recent information is scattered in numerous sources which are not readily and fully available outside of Czechoslovakia. This entire body of data has not yet been gathered and analyzed, yet even a partial examination strongly indicates that the unemployment figures exaggerate the actual scope of unemployment at least by 30 percent, and very probably more. In order to help people find jobs, Czechoslovakia greatly expanded its system of public employment agencies. The first of these were established in 1903 in Bohemia, in 1916 in Slovakia, and in 1917 in Moravia.4 They lacked uniformity, however, until 1936, when a government decree (No. 217) introduced greater systematization.5 Nevertheless, public employment agencies had already begun to expand their work and effectiveness, as is shown by the following figures: in 1919, they handled 685,439 applications and filled 281,541 vacancies, representing 41.1 percent of all applications; in 1937, they handled 2,545,460 applications and filled 1,548,965 vacancies representing 60.9 percent of all applications.6 In addition to the public employment agencies, there was a network of commercial employment agencies. The unemployed were not abandoned or forgotten. As early as December 1918, the National Assembly passed a law (No. 63) introducing and defining unemployment assistance. Under this law, the state gave unemployment assistance directly to a worker covered by sickness insurance, if he lost his job through no fault of his own; this assistance was provided for a period of 18 months in amounts varying from 8 to 18 Czechoslovak Koruny a day. Law No. 63 remained in force until the end of March 1925, and during this time, the state paid 1,201 million Koruny to unemployed workers.7 On 1 April 1925, the Ghent system of unemployment assistance was introduced; under it, the state contributed to trade union organizations a sum of money 4

Masarykuv slovnik, vol. 7 (Praha, 1933), pp. 1020-1021; Volf, Miloslav: Nase delnicke hnuti v minulosti (Praha, 1947), pp. 250-251. 5 Laws and decrees mentioned in this survey are identified by the number under which they were published in the official Collection of Laws and Decrees. Discussions or summaries of such laws and decrees are based exclusively on the author's own direct analysis and interpretation of their content. 6 Twenty Years of Social Welfare in the Czechoslovak Republic (Prague, 1938), pp. 29-30. Hereafter cited as Twenty Years.) 7 Statisticka phrucka Republiky ceskoslovenske (1928), p. 365.

194

Cestmir J esina

determined by the amount the union gave its members for unemployment assistance. Consequently, the trade unions played a greater role, but also carried a heavier burden in unemployment compensation. Between April 1925 and December 1937, the state contributed 4,896 million Koruny to the support of the unemployed.8 Besides direct contributions of money, the state also organized other forms of unemployment relief. Thus, a law of 1919 (No. 569) empowered the Minister of Social Welfare to pay a building contractor two-thirds of the prevailing wage in a given area (but not exceeding 6 Koruny a day), for everyone he hired who was entitled to unemployment assistance. A similar law of 1930 (No. 74) again empowered the Minister of Social Welfare to subsidize projects undertaken by state or local government agencies in the public interest, such as the construction and repair of roads, bridges, crossings, water canals, afforestation, recultivation of land, etc., to a miximum of 10 Koruny a day per unemployed worker hired for these projects. Other programs included distribution of bread, coal, medical supplies, Christmas gifts for children, and similar measures.9 Significant improvements were further effected in the general conditions of employment, particularly for women and adolescents. At the end of the World War I, the normal working day was eleven hours in factories, and eleven to twelve hours in business establishments. A law passed by the National Assembly in December 1918 (No. 91) established an eight-hour working day and a forty-eight-hour working week for industrial and agricultural workers. Overtime was restricted to two hours a day for a maximum of twenty weeks in a single year. The same law further forbade the employment of women and of adolescents under sixteen years of age in mines and other occupations which require much physical strength and endurance or which are particularly hazardous. It forbade the employment of boys under sixteen and girls under eighteen in any job requiring heavy work; it also forbade employment of children under fourteen, as well as the employment of women and adolescents for night work. Additional legislation later introduced holidays with pay, and stricter regulations concerning procedures for termination of employment when an enterprise closed down.10 In order to enforce these laws, a system of inspection of commercial 8 9 10

Statisticka rocenka Republiky ceskoslovenske (1938), p. 242. Twenty Years, pp. 36-41. For further details, see Twenty Years, pp. 17-19.

Social Progress in Czechoslovakia 1918-1938

195

enterprises was broadened and intensified. Inspectors appointed for this purpose were vested with substantial powers which also enabled them to help in settling industrial disputes, strikes, and lockouts during the drafting and signing of collective contracts. By 1937, the inspectors were conducting about 50,000 inspections a year.11 In addition to the state organs of inspection, a law of 25 February 1920 (No. 144) made provision for the establishment of Plant Councils in every mining enterprise employing twenty or more workers, and a law of 12 August 1921 (No. 330) made similar provisions for Plant Committees in other enterprises employing thirty or more workers. The Plant Councils and Committees were empowered to determine compliance with work regulations and wage contracts, to formulate the rules governing procedures for dismissal of workers, and to make proposals for improvements in production arrangements and working methods in order to give the workers greater protection against injury and other health hazards. In this way, the representatives of the workers themselves participated in the enforcement of laws. From the viewpoint of social progress, numerous measures carried out in the field of social insurance were especially significant. The groundwork of this structure had already been laid during the Habsburg Monarchy with the following: a law of May 1854 which established a rudimentary foundation for insurance of miners against sickness, injury, and old-age assistance; a law of December 1887 with provisions for aid to workers in case of injury; a law of March 1888 for workers' health insurance; a law of May 1896 which introduced a pension system for civil servants; and a law of December 1906 which established a pension system for salaried employees. The Czechoslovak republic substantially expanded each insurance category (sickness, injury, disability, pension, and support for survivors) in regard to both the scope of social groups included and the extent of benefits. The most important single improvement was an act signed into law by President T. G. Masaryk on 9 October 1924 which introduced invalidity and old-age insurance (a pension system) for workers. The great number of laws and regulations concerning social insurance and their complexity make it impossible to describe them briefly, yet meaningfully, within the limited scope of this survey. Therefore, we will merely identify major laws passed by the Czechoslovak Parliament in the field of social insurance, with a more detailed description of only invalidity and old-age insurance. 11

Volf, op. cit., p. 250.

196

Cestmir J esina

The major laws enacted by Czechoslovakia in the field of social insurance were: the law of July 1922 (No. 242), which newly defined and expanded the insurance for miners against sickness, invalidity, and old age, and providing survivor benefits; the law of October 1925 (No. 221), which introduced health insurance for civil servants; a law passed in July 1926 (No. 144), extending health insurance benefits to clergymen, officials of religious societies, and teachers of public elementary schools; a law of 1926 (No. 117), which extended health insurance coverage to all private employees; and a law of February 1929 (No. 26), which established a pension system for private employees. Czechoslovakia also expanded and improved accident insurance covering all employees in the event of temporary disability from on-thejob injuries. The entire cost of accident insurance was paid by employers at rates which varied according to the degree of danger to which employed persons were exposed in performing their work.12 Thus, by 1929, every regularly employed person in Czechoslovakia was covered to some degree by social insurance against sickness, injury, disability, and old age. A vast system of the most modern hospitals, sanatoria, convalescent homes, cure establishments, spas, recreation centers, and other such institutions was spread across the entire country to provide services to the insured. As mentioned above, the most important single law in the field of social insurance was that of 9 October 1924 (No. 221), which broadened the insurance against disability and old age. Its main stipulations are reviewed below. Under this law, every person who enters into a contract with an employer for regular, full-time employment is required to be insured. The law covers industrial and agricultural workers, domestic servants, apprentices, and home workers, i.e., those who perform work for their employers at home. The employer is responsible for the proper registration of each employed worker at the appropriate district office of social insurance; he pays one-half of the insurance contribution for each insured worker, and the worker pays half. Coverage starts on the first day of employment and continues as long as the insured holds a job subject to compulsory insurance. In case of illness, an insured person is entitled to sickness pay according to the established rates of his wage category, as well as to medical care, medicines, therapeutic aids, surgery, and other treatment in 12

For further details, see Twenty Years, pp. 44-49.

Social Progress in Czechoslovakia 1918-1938

197

hospitals, sanatoria, or convalescent homes. Similar medical care is also afforded the insured person's family members - spouse and children (including those born out of wedlock, step-children, foster-children, and adopted children) until they complete their seventeenth year. In some cases, medical care may be also provided for other members of the insured person's family, such as parents and grandparents, brothers, sisters, and close relatives who have shared the same household for at least half a year before requiring medical assistance. If an insured worker is incapacitated by an illness and is consequently unable to earn at least one-third of the sum commonly earned by a worker in his category, the insured is entitled to a disability pension. A worker who reaches 65 years of age after having been insured for at least 150 weeks is entitled to an old-age pension, provided that he does not hold any other full-time job subject to compulsory insurance. If he holds other employment in which he earns less than one-half of the sum commonly earned by an able-bodied person in such work, the insured worker is entitled to receive his old-age pension. Other stipulations of the law include benefits to be granted the insured or his survivors, such as special educational allowances for children, pensions for widows, and payments for orphans until they are seventeen years old. The law of 9 October 1924 was amended in November 1928 by a law (No. 184) which modified the disability and old-age provisions, as follows: persons who are not yet sixteen years of age (i.e., primarily apprentices), and home workers earning less than 60 Koruny a week, as well as seasonal workers who are employed less than 90 days a year, were excluded from the system of disability and old-age insurance. On the other hand, an insured person became eligible to receive a pension after having been insured at least for 100 weeks, instead of the previous 150. For citizens who were too old to earn any protection against disability and old age under the provisions of the law of October 1924, Czechoslovakia established a system of state old-age relief. This guaranteed a person 65 years old, without means of support and unable to earn a living, an income of 500 Koruny a year if he lived alone, or 300 Koruny a year if he lived in the same household with another person receiving state relief.18 13

Ibid., p. 72.

198

Cestmir J esina

The Czechoslovak social insurance system was as far advanced as that of any other country between the last two wars. This, of course, does not mean that it was perfect, or even adequate. The disability and old-age pensions, for instance, were too small for many categories of workers to assure them all the basic needs of their years in retirement. Even so, the pension system was a very substantial improvement over the past and it also held a definite promise of more comprehensive protection once the economic system had been rescued from its postwar chaos. To a great extent, the qualitative shortcomings of workers' insurance resulted not from a lack of social conscience, but rather from the depressed state of the economy. There was a strong determination to help those unfortunate people who, through no fault of their own, were unable to earn a decent living. What was lacking was money to strengthen the economy, to expand investments, to create jobs, and simply to keep the nation's economy sound and going. It appears, however, that the administration of social insurance could have been better organized. Its main fault was excessive fragmentation of functions among numerous administrative agencies. The insurance plans for miners, industrial workers, agricultural workers, salaried employees, civil servants, and other special groups were administered by separate agencies. In many cases, health insurance administration was separate from and independent of disability and old-age insurance. Moreover, insurance against injury and industrial accidents required yet another autonomous system. Each social group insisted on having its own insurance administration, in the belief that only its own members could supervise the work and prevent any irregularities in the use of funds. This conviction was so strong that it defeated all attempts at unification. Not until the war did Dr. Schoenbaum develop a plan to unify the entire system of social insurance, but no action had yet been taken when the Communists came to power. Like any other war, World War I left behind many crippled or otherwise disabled men, and dependents of those killed - widows, children, and, in some cases, parents to whom the loss of a son meant the loss of their only support in old age. The efforts of successive Czechoslovak governments to provide assistance to these people also deserve attention in a survey concerned with social progress. State assistance to war veterans and dependent survivors of those killed during the war was defined in a law of February 1920 (No. 142) and modified in several subsequent amendments. According to these provisions, disabled veterans were entitled to free medical treatment

Social Progress in Czechoslovakia

1918-1938

199

including hospitalization, residence in convalescent homes, physical therapy, orthopedic aids, and other necessary medical assistance. These veterans were further entitled to pensions which were differentiated according to the degree of disability. The dependents of dead servicemen were likewise granted pensions. Between 1919 and 1925, there were more than half a million recipients of pensions from the Office for the Welfare of War Veterans. The number gradually declined to 322,306 in 1931 and 225,388 in 1937. During the first ten years, 7,891 million Koruny were spent for veterans' welfare. In addition to medical and financial support, the state also made a special effort to find suitable jobs for the disabled ex-servicemen.14 Social progress in Czechoslovakia was also stimulated by numerous public projects undertaken to alleviate the housing shortage and to stimulate the economy by expanded construction programs. In order to achieve these goals, the Czechoslovak Parliament passed a variety of laws authorizing the following measures: the provision of direct State loans and subsidies for construction of public and private housing facilities; the establishment of a system of State guarantees of mortgage loans and long-term credits; the granting of exemptions from the rent tax in the renovation of older structures; and the undertaking of extensive construction by the State itself. The program of State subsidies resulted in the construction of 43,559 apartment and single family houses containing 131,602 dwellings; all were built at the cost of 8,863 million Koruny and completed by the end of 1937.15 Another measure of considerable social significance was the act passed by the National Assembly (No. 215) on 16 April 1919, which was designed to reduce the most glaring inequities in the ownership of land. Parts of huge landed estates were sequestered and 4,068,370 hectares of land thus obtained were assigned for redistribution. The owners were compensated for the sequestered land at prices representing its prewar value.16 The land reform program extended over many years. With the passing of time and the changes in the country's political configuration, the 14

Masarykuv slovnik, vol. I (Praha, 1925), pp. 1099-1100. Twenty Years, p. 96. Data concerning the land reform were published in Dvacet let ceskoslovenskeho zemedelstvi 1918-1938 (Praha, 1938), pp. 28-29. See also Rozehnal, Alois, Land Reforms in Czechoslovakia, National Committee for a Free Europe (New York, 1953), pp. 5-13; and Basch, A., "Land Reform in Czechoslovakia", in Family Farm Policy (University of Chicago Press, 1947). 15

16

200

Cestmir

Jesina

scope of land reform was sharply reduced: 1,831,920 hectares (45.02 percent of the land originally intended for redistribution) were released from sequestration and restored to the owners. As a result, only 1,800,782 hectares were allotted to new owners and 435,668 hectares still remained to be allotted by the end of 1937. Of the 1,800,782 hectares which were distributed, 784,673 (43.58 percent of the redistributed land) were mostly forests and pastures, assigned for the most part to corporate bodies such as municipalities and cooperatives. The remaining 1,016,109 hectares (56.42 percent of the redistributed land) were assigned to private individuals. These consisted of 835,889 hectares of agricultural land (82.26 percent) and 180,220 hectares of other types of land (17.74 percent). The 1,016,109 hectares of agricultural and other land assigned to private individuals were distributed in two categories. One was a category of small-scale distribution under which 638,182 applicants received 789,803 hectares of land, so that each applicant received an average of 1.23 hectares of land. The other category consisted of largescale distribution (the so-called remnant estates) under which 2,055 applicants received 226,206 hectares of land, with each applicant thus receiving, on the average, 110.12 hectares of land. The land reform fell short of the original intent to drastically reduce inequities of land ownership. Nonetheless, 638,182 small farmers were able to increase their holdings at least to a small extent, and such increases often meant a great deal. The very fact that such a redistribution was carried out at all, that it was conducted in an orderly fashion, that it was sponsored by a democratic parliament, all testify to the Republic's spirit of reform and progress. In considering now the field of education, we may describe merely the changes effected in areas where improvement was most needed, i.e., in the primary grades. In 1918, there were 13,887 elementary schools in Czechoslovakia, with 30,020 classes containing 1,987,786 children, or 66 children per class. In 1937, there were already 19,865 elementary schools with 56,190 classes and 2,387,982 children. 17 The ratio of children per class had dropped to 42. By expanding the network of schools and classes, the nation achieved a sharp reduction in illiteracy among adult population, as shown in the following table: 18 17

Young, Edgar P., Czechoslovakia: Keystone of Peace and Democracy, Victor Gollancz Ltd. (London, 1938), p. 175. 18 Lewis, Brackett, Facts About Democracy in Czechoslovakia (Praha, 1937), p. 49.

Social Progress in Czechoslovakia Territory Czech lands Slovakia Ruthenia Czechoslovakia

1918-1938

Census of 1921

Census of 1930

3.0 14.0 44.0 7.5

1.0 6.0 21.0 3.2

201

There were extensive improvements in other fields of education and cultural life, but it would require far more space to expand our description of these achievements.19 Finally, a few words must be said about political conditions. Czechoslovakia was a democratic country with a parliamentary system of government. All citizens enjoyed equal political rights and were free to join and support political parties and other special-interest groups according to their persuasion and inclination. Citizens were equally free to refrain from taking part in public activities if they so desired, except for the legal obligation to vote. A great variety of political parties competed for voters' confidence, and defended the interests of their supporters in a parliament the composition of which was based on proportional representation.20 In addition to political parties, strong trade unions were organized in all branches of industry to guard and promote the economic and social interests of their members. In order to establish orderly procedures for the expression of economic grievances and the right to follow one's own preference in political and economic disputes, a special law against intimidation was passed in August 1921 (No. 309). Thus, political democracy was also extensively practised in the sphere of labor and economic affairs. To summarize: Czechoslovakia assumed its place as an independent country in the community of nations at a point in history when longneglected problems of social life pressed for remedial action with all the force accumulated over many decades. The problems were vast and the means to solve them were limited. Viewed against this background, the improvement achieved in the social conditions of the Czechoslovak people within the brief span of two decades was truly remarkable. " See Stransky, R., The Educational and Cultural System of the Czechoslovak Republic (Praha, n.d.; probably 1938); it includes many interesting photographs. 20 See Taborsky, Edward, Czechoslovak Democracy at Work (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London, 1945).

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Great numbers of people were absorbed into the basic labor force, work time and conditions of employment of women and adolescents were regulated by law, protection against accidents and other hazards was markedly increased, social security was much expanded in insurance against unemployment, sickness, injury, disability, and old age, a partial redistribution of land was carried out, elementary education was vigorously intensified and illiteracy drastically reduced - these and many other actions testify to the speed with which Czechoslovakia achieved social progress between 1918 and 1938. To acknowledge that great social progress was effected does not mean that all serious problems were largely eliminated. Much still remained to be done: the attainment of steady economic expansion which would bring under control the problem of unemployment, the advancement of a more equitable distribution of national income, the provision of higher benefits in social insurance, and the production of more and better housing, to name only a few unmet needs. But the work left unfinished must be measured by the work accomplished, and such a test again confirms the conclusion expressed above. One final point must be stressed in this general evaluation of social progress in Czechovakia. The extent and depth of unemployment and other hardships suffered by segments of the population have been vastly exaggerated both by the Communists, in order to discredit democracy, and by members of various Nazi and ex-Nazi organizations, in order to discredit both prewar democracy and Czechoslovakia as a state. In countering this biased and exaggerated criticism, it is only proper to emphasize that the social progress achieved by the democratic government of Czechoslovakia was substantial and that no unresolved problems can possibly justify a preference for any totalitarian régime.

3 CZECHOSLOVAKIA

AND THE SECOND WORLD

WAR

The Role of Czechoslovakia in the Origins of World War II

KEITH E U B A N K

As German tanks drove across the Polish plains in the early hours of September 1, 1939, Europe was in the grip of the second world war of the twentieth century. Hitler's demands on Poland were the apparent cause. But the conflict had causes other than Poland and the Versailles Treaty. War had engulfed Europe also because of Hitler's plans and policies for Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia did not seem a threat to Germany in the 1920's, 1 nor did Germany threaten Czechoslovakia until after Hitler came to power. Before 1933 Germany was occupied with other problems, particularly the revision of the Treaty of Versailles. This document, so often cursed, but so little read, deprived Germany of a small portion of territory. 2 Objection to these losses was slight when compared to the crises over reparations and the war guilt clause. When Hitler came to power in 1933, he had first to obtain and keep political power in Germany, then to rebuild the armed forces and introduce universal conscription. Yet to high-ranking officers of the Reichswehr Hitler declared on February 3, 1933: "How is political power to be used after it has been won? [It is not] yet possible to tell. Perhaps the conquest of new export possibilities, perhaps - indeed preferably - conquest of new living space in the East and ruthless Germanization of the latter." 3 Thus, after less than a week in power, Hitler was thinking of a drive towards the East, and he coveted more than Poland. Within this Lebensraum, he intended to imprison Czechoslovakia. But armaments had to come before loot. At a cabinet meeting on 1

J. W. Bruegel, "German diplomacy and the Sudeten question before 1938", International Affairs, vol. X X X L I I (July, 1961), pp. 323-31. 2 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919 Peace Conference (Washington, 1946), III, pp. 877-81. 3 Documents on German Foreign Policy (hereafter cited as DGFP), series C, I, p. 37.

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Keith Eubank

February 8, 1933, Hitler declared that for the next four or five years, stress must be laid on the armed forces, because "Germany's position in the world was decisively conditioned upon the position of the German armed forces." 4 Action was impossible for at least four to five years. Hitler was not planning any moves against the new Czechoslovak republic in 1933 because he lacked the means to operate. Weapons had to be manufactured and battalions had to be trained, once he had broken the shackles of the Versailles Treaty. Czechoslovakia was important in Hitler's drive to dominate Europe, as is revealed by the Hossbach minutes of the meeting in the Reichskanzlei on November 5, 1937. A. J. P. Taylor has tried to minimize the importance of this meeting and its role in Hitler's policies. According to Taylor, Hitler was talking for the purpose of isolating Hjalmar Schacht, Minister of Economics, from the rest of the cabinet in order to continue the increase in armaments which Schacht opposed. Because Hitler prophesied incorrectly, Taylor believed that the talk meant little.5 Taylor ignored that portion of Hitler's speech which concerned possibilities for action, where the next move should come, and in what order. Taylor neglected evidence which reveals Hitler's intention to strike first at Czechoslovakia. Hitler emphasized all too clearly that Germany must seek "where she could achieve the greatest gain at the lowest cost". For him that would be in Austria and Czechoslovakia. Of the two, only Czechoslovakia had the strength to offer any resistance to German armies. Hitler already knew from conversations with Konrad Henlein on October 17 and 18, 1937, that recent visits to London and talks with British leaders had convinced the Sudeten German Fiihrer that "no serious intervention in favour of the Czechs was to be feared, either from Great Britain or from France". 6 On November 19, Henlein sent a memorandum to Hitler depicting the problems and aims of the Sudeten German Nazis. No longer did they want accommodation with the Czechs; they wanted union with the Reich.7 Shortly thereafter, on December 7, a supplement was issued to the military directive of June 24, 1937. The December supplement called 4

Cabinet Minutes, Feb. 3, 1933, ibid., pp. 35-37. A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (London, 1961), pp. 131-34. 6 Eisenlohr to the German Foreign Ministry, Oct. 22, 1938, DGFP, series C. II, pp. 20-23. 7 Henlein to Neurath, Nov. 19, 1937, ibid., 49-62. 5

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for German attack on Czechoslovakia to take precedence over previous plans for a policy of defense in the West as the chief German military policy. This directive clarifies much of the meaning of the Hossbach minutes. Taylor has omitted it from his book. According to the memorandum, when German military preparations were complete, then "conditions will have been created for carrying out an offensive war against Czechoslovakia, so that the solution of the German problem of living space can be carried to a victorious end even if one or another of the great powers intervene against us". If the political situation did not develop satisfactorily, the plan of attack against Czechoslovakia, Operation Green, would be postponed. Should events present Germany with the possibility of facing Czechoslovakia alone, then Operation Green would begin before rearmament was complete. The army should prepare for a swift invasion, leaving only a minimum force for protection of the western frontiers. The bulk of the Luftwaffe would also attack Czechoslovakia.8 General Blomberg received the message from the meeting of November 5. He was following orders, drawing up a directive in accordance with Hitler's instructions. Thus, Czechoslovakia was Hitler's first planned victim. The December 7 directive is a plan to support the objectives outlined in the November 5 meeting, a definite plan for assault on an independent nation which had not threatened Nazi Germany. It bore a striking resemblance to the plan that would be approved by Hitler on May 30, 1938, calling for the destruction of Czechoslovakia by October 1, 1938.9 Czechoslovakia forced Chamberlain to try his appeasement policy. Fearful lest Hitler use force to satisfy the Sudeten demands, Chamberlain set forth on his quest for a solution to the demands. From all the available evidence, his quest was popular in Britain and France. But appeasement did not include allowing Hitler to dominate the continent of Europe. Had Chamberlain not sought first to appease Hitler, he would have found it difficult, if not impossible, to achieve national unity in a conflict with Germany. The myth of Versailles and the aftereffects of the revisionist historians were still strong. 8

Directive by the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht, Dec. 21, 1937, ibid., VII, pp. 635-38. 9 "Directive for Operation Green", May 30, 1938, ibid., II, pp. 357-62; Schumundt file, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (Washington, 1946), IV, pp. 309-10.

208

Keith Eubank

Within Chamberlain's own cabinet, some thought that after a victorious war, the Sudetenland would have to be handed over to Germany in any peace conference. Why keep a people from the country to which they wish to belong? 10 This helped to lead Chamberlain into the trap of seeking accommodation with Hitler and his Sudetens, lest there be war. Yet Chamberlain did not thrust the Sudeten question at Hitler as A. J. P. Taylor alleges. Hitler revealed his decision to use the Sudeten question for his own ends when he informed Konrad Henlein on March 28 that he "intended to settle the Sudeten German problem in the not-too-distant future". Henlein was ordered to present demands to the Czechs that were sure to be unacceptable. The Sudeten leader must never be satisfied with the Czech concessions.11 This decision doomed Chamberlain's program of appeasement and helped to start a world war. The Czechoslovak tragedy revealed the sham behind the Russian declaration to form a united front against the Fascist aggressor. The Soviet government continually utilized the letter of the alliance to avoid giving any aid to her ally. Fresh excuses were always presented to escape the alliance obligations.12 Maxim Litvinov had played the role of the great friend of the West, but he knew well how easy it would be for the Soviet Union to hide behind France, for he had deliberately framed the alliance in terms that would give his government a loophole. He did not mind taunting the French chargé, Jean Payart, in September by reminding him that France was obligated to help Czechoslovakia regardless of Soviet policy.13 It is irony that in 1958 the Communist government of Czechoslovakia published a selection of documents from the archives revealing, more than any other source, the duplicity of the Soviet government. The myth of Russian desire to aid Czechoslovakia was probably a factor in all Anglo-American treatment of the Soviet Union after the German attack of June 22, 1941. "Let's not be beastly to the Russians" was too strong a theme of the wartime summit conferences. President Roosevelt certainly fell prey to this myth. 10 Halifax to Phipps, Sept. 9, 1938, Documents on British Foreign Policy (London, 1949), (hereafter cited as DBFP), Third series II, pp. 275-77. 11 Henlein's report, undated, DGFP, Series D, II, 197-99. 12 Litvinov to Alexandrovsky, May 25, 1938, New Documents on the History of Munich (hereafter cited as NDM) (Prague, 1958), pp. 39-42; Georges Bonnet, Défense de la paix (Geneva, 1946) I, 124-26. 13 Litvinov to Alexandrovsky, Sept. 2, 1938, NDM, pp. 62-63.

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Czechoslovakia disclosed the weakness and decay in the Third Republic. The French system of alliances was dependent on a swift attack on Germany to aid the allies in central Europe. France had a moral, as well as legal, obligation to aid Czechoslovakia. By refusing to keep her promises, the leaders of the Third French Republic doomed their nation to defeat. Too long has Britain born the guilt for the sin of Munich. Chamberlain held to the letter of his promises, whereas the French leaders wriggled out of their written obligations. There is a painful contrast between the French attitude towards Czechoslovakia in 1938 and their response to the German attack on Russia in 1914. In 1914 the French stood by their alliance when they had the opportunity to withdraw. In 1938 Daladier begged Chamberlain to find a way out of the alliance. In the early hours of September 21, the French government threatened to leave Czechoslovakia at the mercy of German troops unless the Anglo-German plan of ceding the Sudetenland was accepted.14 The September crisis, culminating in the Munich Conference and the notorious agreement, left Hitler disappointed because he had not won as brutal a victory as he had desired. He was resolved that the fate of his next victim would show the world his power. Thus he moved nearer to war, for he forgot - or ignored - his pledge to Chamberlain in the early hours of September 30, 1938, to settle all future questions through consultation and to work "to remove possible sources of difference, and thus to contribute to assure the peace of Europe". 15 On March 15, 1939, Hitler suffered one of his first defeats when the remainder of Czechoslovakia came under his domination. Czechoslovakia was the first non-German land to fall before the Nazi war machine. Hitler's argument that he sought no Czechs, but only Germans, was destroyed. Many who had been his supporters were now forced into opposition. Pierre Flandin complained that the German occupation of Czechoslovakia "has produced the conviction in France - as it has in British public opinion - that the Germans are just a people striving for the hegemony of Europe, and that the brutal urge of conquest is in their blood".16 When Austria had fallen, the Western governments were loath to act. 14

Les événements recueillis par la commission d'enquête parlementaire (Paris, 1947), XI, 268-72, 275; Hubert Ripka, Munich: Before and After (London, 1939), pp. 88-89. 15 Anglo-German Declaration, Sept. 30, 1938, DGFP, Series D, II, 1017. 16 Brauer to the German Foreign Ministry, ibid., VI, pp. 77-80.

Keith Eubank

210

Austria seemed somehow German. There was reluctance to oppose the Anschluss which had been prevented in 1919 and again in 1931. But Czechoslovakia was different, for there, Hitler seized lands inhabited by a people who could never be considered German. Occupying the Sudetenland was only rectifying an injustice of the notorious Versailles Treaty. When Hitler's troops marched out of the Sudetenland, he shook the Western governments out of their dream that he wanted only Germans in the Reich. He had utilized an internal dispute that did not concern the treatment of the Sudetens to invade a sovereign nation. How far would this go? The events of March 15 led to a basic change in the British foreign policy so complete that it was nothing less than a revolution. As the details of the Prague coup were reaching London, the Rumanian minister, Viorel Tilea, reported fresh German demands for economic concessions from Rumania. A German invasion was expected momentarily. Despite a repudiation later by the Rumanian government, the British government was much alarmed by his tale. Chamberlain resolved on a new policy calling for consultation by the Polish, Soviet, French, and British governments if the political independence of any European nation were threatened. By publishing such a four-power declaration, Chamberlain hoped to stop Hitler; it would be a warning, as well as a rallying point for the lesser nations. But the Polish government rejected a public declaration in conjunction with the Soviet government. While these discussions were in progress, new tidings came to London of German threats against Poland. Ian Colvin, Berlin correspondent of the News Chronicle, conferred with Halifax and the Prime Minister on March 29. He had been primed by Colonel General Ludwig Beck and Major General Hans Oster, leading members of the resistance. Hitler would next utilize the Danzig and Polish corridor problems to march against Poland. Before the day was over, Chamberlain and Halifax had suddenly decided on a pledge to Poland, which was announced in the House of Commons on March 31. Should any action threaten Polish independence, "which the Polish government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty's government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish government all support in their power".17 The British pledge was a result of the preceding twelve months' crisis over Czechoslovakia. There had then been no definite Anglo17

Parliamentary 2415-16.

Debates,

House

of Commons,

Fifth series, p. 345, cols.

Czechoslovakia in the Origins of World War II

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French promise to guarantee the integrity of Czechoslovakia. The pledge in the Munich Agreement had been considered collective, but had collapsed before Hitler's troops invaded Bohemia and Moravia. Because there was no definite promise of aid, Chamberlain reasoned, German aggression had occurred. If there had been such a promise, Hitler would not have marched. A clear warning would now bring him up short and prevent another war. The British leaders hoped that such a pledge would eventually lead to negotiations to settle the Danzig and Polish Corridor questions. Hitler had forced the British government into a pledge which they did not want, dragging the French along with them. Little thought was given, in March 1939, to the possibility that one day Anglo-French forces would have to defend this pledge. Hitler could not see that he had frightened the British into a pledge which would one day become an alliance and produce a world war. The Anglo-French protests without military action fooled German diplomats and Hitler into thinking that there would be a repetition of the September 1938 crisis if another one arose over Poland. Certainly, Hitler thought that the conferees of Munich would not really stand up to his threats over Poland. The pressure and tactics throughout the summer of 1939 indicated expectations that Britain and France would once more retreat before Hitler's ravings and rantings. Surely they would not wish to fight over Poland, a nation that had been created out of the Treaty of Versailles. Hitler's over-confidence, growing out of the collapse of the Czechoslovak government, influenced him to ignore the British pledge to Poland on March 31. On May 23, 1939, Hitler informed his generals that there would be war with Poland. 18 As the crisis continued throughout the summer of 1939, German fury at the Anglo-French action increased. Those who had to deal with the British and French could not see why they continued to support the Poles when they had refused to support Czechoslovakia a year earlier. British policies "had created for the Polish government a fool's paradise in which the Poles were not living unrestrained", Ernst von Weizsäcker complained to Neville Henderson, the British ambassador, on August 15, 1939. He denounced the British for being led "into disaster by her Polish friends who had run amok". 19 Hitler informed his generals on August 14 not to worry. Britain would "not allow herself to blunder into a war lasting for years. . . . England, knowing war, is well aware that she stands to lose in a war. 18 ,B

Conference Minutes, May 23, 1939, DGFP, Series D, VI, pp. 574-80. Memorandum by Weizsäcker, Aug. 15, 1939, ibid., VII, p. 73.

212

Keith Eubank

. . . She has no leaders of real calibre. The men I got to know in Munich are not the kind that start a new World War." 20 When Hitler saw Henderson on August 23, 1939, he complained that "if it had not been for England he would have achieved a peaceful settlement with Czechoslovakia last year, and would certainly have done the same with Poland this year as regards the Danzig problem . . . England alone was responsible." Hitler was bitter because the British were supporting Poland as they had never supported Czechoslovakia. The victory over Czechoslovakia had led him to expect another easy one over Poland.21 The fall of Czechoslovakia, after the attempt to satisfy Hitler, finally forced the West to look to their ramparts. Great Britain profited militarily from the Czechoslovak crisis. The September 1938 crisis provided a test of defenses which revealed the need for improvements. In the spring of 1939, the government took such needed steps as the introduction of conscription and the appointment of a ministry of supply. The two years from September 1938 to September 1940 saved Britain and helped defeat the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain.22 Without the Czechoslovak story before them, Britain and France would not have finally gone to war on September 3. The fate of the Czechoslovak people shocked the Western nations into comprehending the iniquity of Hitler. He was not rectifying the Versailles Treaty as many had imagined. European domination was his goal. In writing and thinking about history, it is dangerous to be an "if" historian. But with Czechoslovakia I cannot forego the temptation to write some "if" history. If Schuschnigg had resisted the ultimatum in March 1938, and had gone to war, perhaps the world would have been alerted sooner, although Austria would not have been aided by any nation. The old Hapsburg hostility would have kept Benes from helping Austria. Yet the warning would have been clear to the world. The warning did not become clear until March 15, 1939, when German soldiers goosestepped across the frontiers of Czechoslovakia. If Czechoslovakia had fought in 1938, world opinion might have been aroused eventually, but German power, aided by Polish and Hungarian troops, would have overwhelmed the Czechoslovak forces. If France and Britain had been more offensive-minded, prepared to attack 20

Haider Diary, Aug. 14, 1939, ibid., pp. 554-55. Loesch Memorandum, Aug. 24, 1939, ibid., pp. 210-15. 22 Cf. Keith Eubank, Munich (Norman, 1963), pp. 278-87; Derek Wood and Derek Dempster, The Narrow Margin (New York, 1961). 21

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in the Origins of World War II

213

Germany on the West, Hitler would never have dared attempt his plot against Czechoslovakia. If there had been a mighty coalition of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Russia, Britain, France, and the United States, leagued together to stop Hitler, then German troops would probably never have marched. But Poland was too greedy and Russia had other problems. Britain, France, and the United States were shackled by pacifism, dread of another bloodbath, and isolationism. If Hitler had failed in Czechoslovakia, would he have invaded Poland? We will never know.

Organization in the United States of the Struggle for Czechoslovakia's Independence, 1938 to 1941 JAN PAPANEK

The great support given, during World War I, to the Czechoslovak struggle for independence by President Woodrow Wilson and members of the United States government was thought of with pride by American public opinion in general and by Americans of Czechoslovak background in particular. It was more than justified by the record of the Czechoslovak Republic's successful achievements from 1918 to 1938. It was natural, therefore, that great concern was evidenced in the United States when the security of Czechoslovakia was threatened. During 1938, when Hitler's attacks were at their height, as were the propaganda campaigns of the Henleinists among the Germans and the separatists in Slovakia against the Czechoslovak Republic, there arose a strong spontaneous public reaction against them in the United States. Almost without exception, the press and radio broadcasts expressed great sympathy for Czechoslovakia. Organizations and schools desirous of hearing more about the situation requested speakers. Meetings were held protesting the attacks on the Republic. The Congressional Record quoted articles and speeches in the interest of Czechoslovakia and against Germany, over and over. Americans of Czechoslovak descent, and others, organized mass meetings to express their protests and win public opinion to support Czechoslovakia politically by pointing up the danger that threatened the entire democratic world if Czechoslovakia was dismembered. Official Washington, in sharp contrast, was not yet prepared psychologically, politically, or militarily for any intervention against Hitler, influenced as it was by the defeatist attitude then current in Europe. Moreover, some of the leading U.S. diplomats abroad sent home reports biased against Czechoslovakia and supporting the Munich policy. In some areas, isolationism was on the rise, but the average American was shocked by the Munich Pact, dictated by Germany, Italy, Great Britain, and France without Czechoslovakia's participation. Gifts of

Czechoslovakia's

Independence,

1938 to 1941

215

money began to trickle in to help mitigate the sufferings of the Czechoslovak victims, and hopes were high that the sacrifice of the Republic had saved the peace. Dr. Edvard Benes, who had been in England since October 22, 1938, came to New York on February 10, 1939. He was welcomed most enthusiastically. The Mayor, Fiorello La Guardia, gave a reception in his honor at City Hall; the President of Columbia University, Nicholas Murray Butler, honored him at a dinner; Hamilton Fish Armstrong paid homage to him in the Council on Foreign Relations. Alumni of the University of Chicago living in New York also did him honor. Similar attentions were given him upon his arrival in Chicago. He avoided political meetings and devoted himself in the main to his lectures on democracy at the University there, beginning on February 20. I wrote to him from Pittsburgh on February 17 concerning the need for communication and cooperation. Jan Masaryk, Minister to the Court of St. James, was sadly disappointed by the accepted Chamberlain policy; he resigned his post and came to the United States in January 1939 to lecture and tell of the terror that Munich had brought and to warn what it was yet to bring. In Pittsburgh, the Czechoslovak Room Committee, led by Michael Sram, Edward Tabor, Ruth Crawford Mitchell, Mrs. Papanek, and myself, had prepared to dedicate that classroom in the Cathedral of Learning of the University of Pittsburgh on March 7, 1939. Jan Masaryk, as the main speaker, deeply moved the thousands of students, faculty members, and friends, especially those of Czechoslovak descent, who were present. It was in Pittsburgh during that week that we Czechoslovak officials, together with Americans of Czechoslovak descent, began to create a unified organization, "Czechoslovak National Restoration". Similar groups were formed in Chicago, the hub of American Czechoslovak life, and all over the United States. On March 15, with Hitler's occupation of Prague, the situation changed radically. The Czechoslovak Legation and Consulates received orders from Prague to transfer their offices to the German establishment and act in accord with their instructions. The Minister in Washington, Col. Vladimir S. Hurban, ordered the Germans out of the Legation very forcefully. I had determined earlier to refuse to hand over the Consulate in Pittsburgh, which was then in my charge. All Czechoslovak Consuls and Honorary Consuls in the United States acted in a like manner. Mass meetings protesting the occupation of Czechoslova-

216

Jan

Papdnek

kia were held all over the United States. One of the largest took place in Pilsen Park in Chicago, where Jan Masaryk, in the course of his address, read Dr. Benes' first political message. On March 16 Dr. Benes sent a telegram to President F. D. Roosevelt and cables to Daladier, Chamberlain, Litvinov, and Avenol, Secretary-General of the League of Nations, asking that they refuse to recognize the military occupation of Czechoslovakia. On March 17, the Government of the United States protested the occupation of Czechoslovakia and on March 21 refused to recognize the new status of Bohemia and Moravia; nor did i recognize Tiso's Slovakia. Having made sure that the Czechoslovak offices would continue to exist, Col. Hurban, J. Hanc, and I traveled to Chicago to see Dr. Benes; there, on March 19, we put ourselves and our offices at his disposal. We agreed on the main lines and procedures in the struggle against the Germans and for the liberation of Czechoslovakia. March 19, 1939, was significant because on that day Dr. Benes appeared in an active political role before the American and world public for the first time. The University of Chicago Round Table weekly radio program that was broadcast at that time all over the United States, and by short wave around the world, on March 19 changed its policy concerning debate and gave its whole half-hour to Dr. Benes. After an extraordinarily moving introduction by Professor Quincy Wright, Dr. Benes spoke to the American people and others around the world, saying among other things: The regime which is now attempting to kill freedom in Czechoslovakia does not recognize any obligations unless it is expedient to do so; it will fulfill no promise; it will respect no law. The only principle on which this regime is based is the rule of force and violence. It preaches that the only right is might, force and violence. The people of the United States and of what remains of free Europe must be prepared for a continuation and extension of this rule of brute force. To-day there is no peace in Europe. What is considered a state of peace is but a terrible illusion, an illusion which will one day take its toll in the enormous sacrifice of all the nations of the world. Because there is war already! In the approaching battle for the victory of the spirit against the sword, the United States has a very great role to play. Be ready for that fight and be strong - Oh people of Democracy.

American Czechoslovak organizations sent cablegrams of protest to Prague and Bratislava in which they warned about the dire consequences of severing Slovakia from the Republic. A conference was held in Chicago, April 18-20, which brought together representatives of the

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Sokols and other Czech progressive organizations united in the Czech National Alliance and the Alliance of Czech Catholics. A national conference of Slovaks held simultaneously created the Slovak National Alliance. These, together with the Alliance of Czechoslovaks in Texas, reactivated the Czechoslovak National Council. Places in the Council were reserved for the Slovak autonomist organizations, but these never applied for membership. The propaganda and political activities were entrusted mainly to the Council under the leadership of Jaroslav Zmrhal and its able executive secretary, Josef Martinek. John Cervenka and Karel Prchal headed the Czech National Alliance; J. W. Voller of the Union of Czech Catholics was aided in great measure by Abbot Neuzil and Monsignor Zlamal; the Reverends Jan Bradac and Jaroslav Pelikan, the Slovak National Alliance; J. Maudr, Texas; and Messrs. Vansac, Ladizinsky, and 2atkovic represented the Carpatho-Russians. The Conferences empowered a delegation to go to Dr. Benes to ask him formally to assume the leadership for the struggle to restore Czechoslovakia's unity and independence and to pledge their full cooperation and support. The Conference of the Slovak National Alliance also sent a cablegram to Dr. Stefan Osusky and Dr. Milan Hodza in Paris, asking them to join in the effort under the leadership of Dr. Benes. Jan Masaryk returned to London, where international politics was focussed at the time. Dr. Juraj Slavik, who had come to the United States from Warsaw, where he had been Minister, effectively participated in this organizational work and also returned to Europe soon after. We agreed with Dr. Benes that, in addition to keeping and directing the diplomatic and consular offices and working with the American Czechoslovak organizations united in the Czechoslovak National Council, it would be necessary to create a political body under his leadership. It was this political body that he asked me to organize and direct. After long discussion, we agreed to call it "Ceskoslovenska zahranicni akce" [The Czechoslovak Struggle Abroad], Up to this time, Bohus Benes, as Dr. Benes' personal secretary, was in charge of all his affairs. English matters, particularly those relating to his lectures, were in the hands of Edward Hitchcock. Before leaving for England, Dr. Benes gave me full power to represent him personally and politically. I cite only the closing sentences of my accreditation, dated July 8, 1939: "You will negotiate in my name according to the principal directives we agreed upon verbally. You have full power to represent me personally in all affairs relating to our cause."

218

Jan Papanek

The first few months were devoted to building up and strengthening and coordinating the work of the various organizations in the Czechoslovak National Council. The diplomatic and consular offices continued to function. Minister V. S. Hurban and Dr. Karel Cervenka of the Legation and the Consulate General in New York with Karel Hudec at its head were concerned with finishing the building of the Czechoslovak Pavilion at the World's Fair in New York and providing for its maintenance. It was one of the most important means of bringing Czechoslovakia's plight to the attention of the public. Jin Janecek was put in charge of the Pavilion and a special committee was created to secure funds to finance it. It was in great measure due to the great efforts of Mayor La Guardia that the project was a success, since money obtained for the Pavilion had been used for other purposes. The Czechoslovak Exhibit at the San Francisco Exposition was also saved. The University of Chicago arranged lectures for Dr. Benes all over the United States. By July 10, when he left for England, he had delivered more than 100 lectures at many universities (several of which conferred honorary degrees upon him), before organizations and clubs, on the radio, and at mass meetings. He had sent appeals to members of the Council of the League of Nations, asking them to put the Czechoslovak case on the agenda, but to no avail. He set forth the whole program of Czechoslovakia's second struggle for independence to thousands of American Czechoslovaks who had come to honor him at Pilsen Park in Chicago on his birthday and to wish him Godspeed before he left for Europe. In addition to the work with American Czechoslovak organizations and to keeping active diplomatic offices that had not been transferred to the Germans, we tried to have our compatriots in other countries reactivate old organizations or form new ones, and to seek the support for Czechoslovakia's cause among important American friends in the political, economic, and cultural fields, as well as those in the mass media - the radio and press. The suffering and resistance of the Czechoslovak people were brought to the notice of the people of the United States and the rest of the world on every possible occasion. The financial straits of all the component parts, the diplomatic, the Czechoslovak organizations in the United States and abroad, made the start difficult. Dr. Benes alone had a regular salary from the University and fees for his lectures. It was his money that financed the early work. The Hotel Windermere, where Dr. Benes lived, provided offices for us free of cost. Almost all the people who worked in the organizations in

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the propaganda and political and social welfare fields were unpaid. The Legation paid its own and the consular staffs $60 to $200 a month, according to the number of dependents each had, out of what remained from pooled funds. Many-faceted, organized efforts bore fruit early. Dr. Benes was invited to Hyde Park to an off-the-record visit with President Roosevelt on May 28, 1939 - a meeting of great political importance. He was also received by top officials of the State Department and met with members of the diplomatic corps in Washington. At the opening of the Pavilion at the World's Fair on May 31, he was accorded honors reserved for heads of state only. The diplomatic status of Minister Hurban remained unshaken. There were conjectures that the cooperation of the various organizations would break down when Dr. Benes left. Such was not the case, however. There was much good will, much idealism, and little party politics. The goal of a free Czechoslovakia in a free Europe was too well cherished to abandon and the harmony was extraordinary. The Czechoslovak National Council of America and its member organizations began publishing pamphlets and periodicals in Czech, Slovak, and English, to inform people about the tragic situation of the people in Czechoslovakia, as well as about the efforts being made abroad to close the ranks of those who wanted to recover the Republic's unity and independence. They organized fund-raising projects - bazaars, benefits, Sokol gymnastic festivals, etc., and soon became the main source of funds for the "Zahranicni akce" (Czechoslovak Struggle Abroad). There were many contributions regularly and generously given, but they were small, with a very few exceptions (Vaclav Hovorka and Sara S. Sommer). I, too, gave the fees I received for my many lectures around the country to the "Akce". From June 8, 1939, to December 31, 1941, the member organizations transferred $350,000 to the Council and the Council in turn transmitted the sum to me for Dr. Benes' discretionary use. It is important to mention the close and effective cooperation we received from the Canadian Czechoslovak National Alliance, together with the Czechoslovak officials in Toronto, Montreal, and Ottawa. Canadian officials, too, were sympathetic to our efforts and gave substantial support to our cause in many ways. The politically important diplomatic offices were active, with minimal financial help from the "Zahranicni akce", in Belgrade, Caracas, Dublin, Geneva, Jerusalem, Lisbon, London, Montreal, Moscow, Ottawa,

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Rio de Janeiro, Santiago, Stockholm, Sydney and Warsaw. Another part of our funds was spent for the special services of important political, cultural, and military leaders. We supported friends and coworkers other than Czechoslovaks. We created an Information Committee in New York as a part of the "Zahranicni akce", with editors Arne Laurin and Jan Miinzer in charge. We established a press bureau there, delivered shortwave radio broadcasts to Czechoslovakia from Boston over WRUL, and began to organize archives. We supported the activities and periodical publications of the Carpatho-Russians, Messrs. Ladizinsky, Stankaninec and 2atkovic. Hungarians from Czechoslovakia under the leadership of I. Schultz, a member of Parliament, were also organized. Another member of Parliament, V. Taub, was in charge of German affairs. We helped refugees in various ways, such as securing visas for the more than 200 who had come to the United States by the end of 1940. A Relief Committee of the National Council was established to send much-needed supplies for both Czechoslovak soldiers and refugees. Clothing, shoes, medical supplies and instruments, ambulances, etc., were provided directly by the Council and its member organizations. Later, the Committee became a part of the United States National War Relief Fund. Each month, complete financial records of gifts and expenditures were sent to President Benes in London. He personally wrote letters of thanks to the donors. The Supreme Control and Accounting Office in London examined these records and they were again examined after the return of the Czechoslovak government to Prague. The President informed me about this in detail in 1946. I would be remiss if I failed to mention the great service of the women both in organizations and as individuals during these years. Bazaars and all the usual fund-raising projects were their responsibility in the main. These larger undertakings, as well as innumerable smaller tasks, would not have been accomplished without their willing hands and devotion to the cause. Dr. Alice G. Masaryk, Betka Papanek, and Vlasta Vraz organized the Czechoslovak branches of the American Red Cross in Chicago after preliminary discussions by me at ARC headquarters in Washington. Large supplies for the sick and wounded Czechoslovak soldiers - bandages, hospital gowns, etc. - were produced by hundreds of women in dozens of organizations. The Czech and Slovak press all over the United States played a very important supporting role in all our efforts. The Denni hlasatel,

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Svornost, Národ, Nové easy, Svét-American, Americké delriické listy, New Yorksky denník, New Yorské listy, Slovensky Sokol, and some thirty other periodicals edited by Messrs. Rezabek, Psenka, Geringer, Zizka, Matousek, Húska, Valusek, and many others, served the Czechoslovak cause faithfully and well. Despite the tremendous increase in activities, the number of paid staff members remained very small - Jozef Martinek in the National Council, V. Vrdsky and Vojta Benes in the Czech National Alliance, Dr. Zizka, with several others, in the Alliance of Czech Catholics, and Jozef 2ák-Marusiak in the Slovak National Alliance. John Golosinee served without pay as secretary and legal counsel to the latter organization as it developed one hundred branches all over the country. Editor Jan Hilgert and the devoted Rose Kovalik and Rose Sedlacek made up my headquarters staff. The diplomatic and consular offices also functioned with skeleton staffs. If one had to describe the character of our work to that time, the most appropriate words would be, Czechoslovak unity and cooperation in the true Masaryk-Benes-Stefánik tradition. Czechs, Slovaks, Carpatho-Russians, Catholics, Protestants and Free-Thinkers believed the independence of Czechoslovakia worth working and sacrificing for. This is not to say that there were no difficulties. There were difficulties within organizations, in the propaganda field, and internationally. There were some Czechoslovak diplomats who, after having given over their offices to the Germans, or even cooperating with them, offered to work with us and asked for financial support. Some of the leaders in the Czech National Alliance complained that their work and its results did not receive adequate recognition and began to act independent of the National Council, both in relief work and financially. There was the problem of the Bat'a Shoe Company, blacklisted by the government of the United States; the controversy with the map-makers who had included Czechoslovak territory in Germany; the propaganda efforts against Czechoslovakia by the Habsburgs and the Hungarians, with Tibor Eckhardt as their spokesman, and, of course, the separatist Slovaks. The Communists did what they could to hamper our work from the time that the Soviet-German Treaty of Friendship was concluded in 1939 until the Soviet Union was attacked in 1941. A serious rift developed in the Slovak National Alliance because some members believed and insisted that efforts be made to win over the autonomists and separatists to join the Alliance. Having had personal contacts with them during my tours of duty in the United States

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(1926-31 and 1935-39), it was clear to me that all such efforts would fail. As a Slovak, I had been invited to speak at many of their special meetings and conferences, but with a few individual exceptions, they were unwilling to lend any support to Czechoslovakia. There were also some members of the Provisional Government in London who believed and insisted that a Slovak member of the government should secure an invitation from the Slovak National Alliance to lecture in the United States in order to woo the autonomists to cooperation with the Zahranicni akce. Some members of the Alliance wanted Dr. Juraj Slavik, but others preferred Jan Lichner; the latter was invited and arrived here in September 1941. Minister Lichner began his series of lectures by promoting the Zilina Agreement of October 1938 that gave autonomy to Slovakia and led to the establishment of the Nazi puppet-State of Slovakia in March 1939. This created a serious conflict between us, for I have always been and will remain opposed to every action on the part of Slovaks or Czechs that would weaken the unity and democracy of Czechoslovakia. The four months' stay of Minister Lichner brought only negative results. He failed to convince the autonomists and separatists, and at the same time he divided the Slovak National Alliance. Moreover, by influencing Dr. Milan Hodza to avoid contacting the leaders of the cooperating organizations upon his arrival in the United States, especially by keeping him from attending the convention of the Slovak National Alliance then being held in Cleveland, he weakened Hodza's position and prestige and increased the mistrust of most leaders of the Slovak National Alliance toward the political leaders from Czechoslovakia. There were many individuals outside the organizations who aided us greatly. The murder of the Prague students and the closing of the universities in Czechoslovakia by the Germans were telling facts on which we focused our propaganda, especially at universities here. Among the professors who served the cause unstintingly was O. Odlozilik. His writing and lecturing, and, particularly, his preparation of material for Harrison Thomson's book, Czechoslovakia in European History, were important contributions. Charles Merriam, Bernadotte Schmitt, Samuel Harper, Dr. James T. Shotwell, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Dorothy Thompson, Senator W. H. King, Governor Herbert Lehman, H. V. Kaltenborn, Maurice Hindus, Dr. Kenneth D. Miller, Brackett Lewis, and many others were among the outstanding cultural, political, economic, and social leaders who participated in programs that served our cause, initiated by the "American Friends of Czechoslovakia",

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"Save Czechoslovakia Committee", "Masaryk Institute", etc. The three years of activity of the Ceskoslovenska zahranicni akce influenced American public opinion and political development in some measure, while America greatly influenced developments in the rest of the world. The United States began to arm in 1940, even while still only aiding the Allies. In 1941, the Lend-Lease Law was passed and the United States began to help the Soviet Union. On July 30, 1941, the United States recognized the Czechoslovak Government in London as the Provisional Government, with President Benes as its head, and established regular diplomatic relations with it. After this, Czechoslovakia was included in all allied actions and institutions. With the attack on Pearl Harbour and the entry of the United States into the war, our own position and activities changed character. The Declaration of the United Nations was signed in Washington on January 1, 1942. Minister V. S. Hurban represented Czechoslovakia as one of the United Nations signatories. This marked the closing of the first phase of the Ceskoslovenska zahranicni akce, which was based on voluntary cooperation and support given by American Czechoslovaks and United States government officials to Dr. Benes, who was everywhere recognized as the leader of and spokesman for his persecuted and silenced people in Czechoslovakia, because they shared his firm belief and his faith in the restoration of the independence, unity, and democracy of Czechoslovakia. The high regard and trust he received was extended to me, as his personal represensative, and to Col. Hurban, as the minister in Washington. The recognition of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile and the entry of the United States into the war established a new official relationship toward both London and Washington. I was named Minister Plenipotentiary and on January 1, 1942, was charged with organizing and directing the Czechoslovak Government Information Service, with headquarters in New York. This was the beginning of the second phase of our work in the United States.

The Assassination of Reinhard Heydrich : A Re-evaluation

JAROSLAV DRÄBEK

The assassination attempt on Acting Reichsprotektor, SS Obergruppenführer and General of Police Reinhard Heydrich took place in Prague on May 27, 1942. Heydrich was mortally wounded and died on June 4. At the time, Heydrich was one of the most powerful and most feared figures of the Nazi régime. Walter Schellenberg, later the head of the Nazi Intelligence Bureau, described him in his book, The Labyrinth, as "the pivotal, mysterious official of the Nazi régime". Many leading representatives of the Nazi intelligence service testified similarly before the International Tribunal in Nuremberg.1 It is a fact that the assassination of Heydrich was a wartime undertaking which resulted in the death of perhaps the highest and most powerful representative of the Nazi regime in the entire war. Its direct result was an unparalleled reign of terror in. the so-called Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, even to the wiping out of the village of Lidice. Understandably, therefore, the episode is coming to be historically well-studied.2 It must be said at the outset, however, that very few his1 For example, Willy Hoettl, alias Walter Hägen, high official of the Sicherheitsdienst. Edward Crankshaw, Gestapo (New York, Pyramid Books, 1957) p. 21. 2 The following are among the most important publications dealing with Heydrich: Zpovêd' K. H. Franka [K. H. Frank's Confession] (Prague, 1946.) Cesky nârod soudi K. H. Franka [The Czech Nation's Trial of K. H. Frank] (Prague, Ministry of Information, 1946.) Jan Drejs, Za Heydrichem stin [The Shadow Behind Heydrich] (Prague, 1947.) Chtèli nds vyhubit [Their Aim Was Our Extermination] Collection of Documents (Prague, Nase vojsko, 1961.) Jiri Dolezal and Jan Kïen, "Cesky odboj a Heydrichada" [The Czech Resistance and the Heydrich Episode] Nova my si, 1962, No. 8. Miroslav Ivanov, Nejen cerné uniformy [Not Only Black Uniforms] (Prague, Nase vojsko, 1963.) DuSan Hamsik and Jiri Prazâk, Bomba pro Heydricha [The Bomb for Heydrich] (Prague, Mladâ fronta, 1963.) Vladimir Krajina, Ceskoslovensky odboj za druhé svëtové vâlky [The Czecho-

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torical events have been shrouded in such a cloud of legend and fraught with so many historical errors so soon after they had actually taken place. There are many reasons for this. As will be explained later, the aftermath of Heydrich's assassination had an advantage for the Communists in that it strengthened their position after the war. By the same token, however, it also threw light on their passive and undoubtedly secondary role in the fight against Nazism. As for the Western sources, notably the British and American, we find serious errors caused principally by the fact that none of the authors tried to contact those people who had a direct connection with the assassination attempt and participated in it, although today almost all of the participants can be located in the free world. They include General Frantisek Moravec, head of the wartime Czechoslovak Intelligence Bureau in London, Professor Vladimir Krajina, a leading representative of the wartime Czechoslovak underground movement, and Colonel Jaroslav Sustar, who directed the training of the paratroopers selected for the action in England. In Western sources we find such incredible statements as, for instance, that Heydrich was killed in Lidice,3 or that one hundred and twenty Czechs died in the church on Resslova Street in Prague, along with paratroopers who undertook the action.4 Yet the height of fiction is reached in Charles Wighton's Heydrich, in which the author claims that the moving force of the resistance to Heydrich was not a Western-oriented group, but a Communist group assembled through the initiative of the present President of Czechoslovakia, Antonin Novotny, and ultimately controlled from the Soviet Union by Nikita Khrushchev.5 It should be pointed out here that the Communists really had nothing to do with the assassination. Contrary to Wighton's claim, both Heydrich and K. H. Frank not only thought the Communists relatively

Slovak Resistance During the Second World War] Manuscript. Vladimir Krajina, "La résistance tchécoslovaque" [The Czechoslovak Resistance] Cahiers d'histoire de la guerre, February 1950. Walter Schellenberg, The Labyrinth (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1956.) Alan Burgess, Seven Men at Daybreak (New York, Dutton, 1960.) Charles Wighton, Heydrich (Philadelphia-New York, Chilton. First published in 1962 in Great Britain.) Edward Crankshaw, Gestapo (New York, Pyramid Books, 1957.) 3 Crankshaw, op. cit., p. 141. 4 Schellenberg, op. cit., p. 146. Cited by William Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1960.) 5 p. 241.

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innocuous, but in their reports to Berlin they appeared confident of the insignificance of Communist underground activities, basing their conclusions on reports from informers who had managed to infiltrate the ranks of Communist movement. I can confirm this as one of the few non-Communists who had access to the Stechovice Archive of K. H. Frank, which fell into the hands of the Americans. The Americans turned it over to President Benes. This material is today in the hands of the Communists. I doubt that the Americans undertook to copy any of the documents, because most of the pages I saw, by that time mostly sticking together, did not indicate prior review by other persons. Two questions immediately arise: Who really initiated the assassination attempt and what was its background? Until recently these inquiries produced, for the most part, only conjectural answers. Although it is generally known that the plan had originated in London, it is not altogether clear whether the idea originated with the Czechoslovak exile government circles, with the Czechoslovak military sources there, or, possibly, from the British themselves. I had to give careful consideration to this problem when I was appointed after the war to investigate and prosecute the war criminals. Perhaps the most serious crime involved was the extermination of Lidice, a deed which had a direct connection with Heydrich's assassination. It was also necessary to bring to justice the traitors Viliam Gerik and Karel Curda. These two men revealed the whereabouts of the paratroopers and, after the war, were tried, condemned and executed. The political situation in Czechoslovakia greatly complicated my task. The Communist Party utilized the terrible aftermath of the assassination for their own propaganda purposes and labeled that act an irresponsible undertaking on the part of British Intelligence, one which served only the interests of Western capitalists. It was, therefore, politically inexpedient to bring the assassination question, in its full scope, before the public during the course of the trials and thus perhaps aggravate the already difficult position of President Benes and the nonCommunist cabinet members, particularly those who had spent the war years in London. Therefore, I met privately with those individuals who had had any connection with the assassination, whether abroad or at home. We learned at this meeting that the resistance leaders at home had been against it by and large, but we learned nothing about who had originated it. General Frantisek Moravec, who attended this meeting and who was in the best position to throw some light on the problem, chose

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to remain silent, possibly concluding that the time was not yet ripe to discuss it. Only on February 7, 1964, did General Moravec 0 speak in Washington, D.C., about the Heydrich assassination. In general he sketched its background in the following fashion (I am quoting from a tape record made at this meeting): About once a month, during the war, the British War Department published a certain official paper concerning the degree of participation in the Allied war effort of each of the occupied countries on the continent. During the second half of 1941 Czechoslovakia found itself at the bottom of this list, which greatly burdened President Benes' conscience. He often spoke about the need to change the situation. "Eventually we came upon the idea of a political assassination", General Moravec said. He went on to say that after a lengthy process of elimination ,only two names were left - the Protectorate's cabinet member, Emanuel Moravec, and Reinhard Heydrich. As for Emanuel Moravec, the President concluded that his removal would not be effective either politically or as a propaganda move. In addition, Moravec's death would not have been construed as direct action against Germany itself. This left only Heydrich, and President Benes instructed General Moravec to start preparations. These facts were related by General Moravec at that Washington meeting. Later, on June 19, in a smaller group, General Moravec filled in still more of the details, and stated that the plans were of wholly Cezchoslovak origin, that the British had no knowledge of them and they only offered airplanes to transport the paratroopers to Czechoslovak territory, without knowing the real purpose of the drop. General Moravec added that President Benes even spoke with the paratroopers prior to their departure and wished them luck. This part of General Moravec's statement appears to have been confirmed by others, such as Dr. Juraj Slavik, then the Interior Minister of the Czechoslovak government in London, who claims that President Benes knew in advance of the plan. 6a On the other hand, there are those who claim that they were personally assured by President Benes that he knew nothing of the plans. Among those are Vladimir Krajina and Arnost Heidrich. 7 Even I myself was personally assured by President Benes that he knew nothing 6

Deceased, July 26, 1966, Washington, D.C. Statement made at both meetings, which were recorded on tape. 7 At the meeting on February 7, 1964. Krajina confirmed in a letter to me that BeneS had told him personally that he did not know in advance of the proposed action.

6a

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of the assassination plans in advance. These contradictions will have to be analyzed by future historians in great detail, together with the testimony of those who cannot yet speak freely. It seems to be a fact that not all members of the Czechoslovak government in London were informed of the assassination plans, not even, in fact, after the groundwork had been laid.8 It appears to be a fact, too, that even the leading members of the resistance movement in Czechoslovakia remained in ignorance. As soon as the presence of the paratroopers on the territory of the Protectorate became known to them and their purposes ascertained, members of the resistance sent a strong protest to London. In this connection it is important to note a telegram, dated May 4, 1942, sent to London by the leader of Paratroop Group "Silver A", Lieutenant Alfred Bartos. The telegram suggested the assassination of Emanuel Moravec instead of Heydrich, should assassination become an absolute necessity. This document was dispatched in agreement with the leader of the Sokol underground group which the paratroopers had approached, Professor Ladislav Vanëk, operating under the assumed name of Jindra. 0 Vanëk consulted with Dr. Arnost Heidrich and Dr. Vladimir Krajina in this connection. Krajina himself sent a message to President Benes begging him to call off the plans. According to Krajina (in a personal communication) President Benes apparently did not receive this message. Krajina further claims that he was in personal contact with Paratroop Lieutenant Opâlka, who, after he had had an opportunity to see for himself the situation in the Protectorate, agreed thatthe assassination plans should be stopped, provided, of course, that his orders were changed from abroad. 10 The fact that members of the resistance movement at home remained uninformed about the details of the plans is a serious point, since it must be emphasized that the movement was well organized by then and had its controlling organization in ÛVOD, (tJstredni vybor odboje domâciho), directed by President Benes to coordinate all underground activities at home. As early as 1938, in Czechoslovakia, and later « According to the testimony of two former members of the London Government, Ladislav Feierabend and Vaclav Majer. 8 For the exact text, see HamSik and Prazâk, op. cit., p. 188. 10 Krajina, Ceskoslovensky odboj and Krajina "La résistance", p. 68. Details taken from my private correspondence with Krajina. In this connection, it is interesting to note BeneS' telegram of May 15, 1942, to the representatives of ÛVOD, cited on p. 185 of HamSik and Prazâk, Bomb: BeneS speaks of the critical situation that might "call for the need to undertake an action based on force, which might precipitate the need for a great sacrifice."

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through messengers sent to President in London, the means of relaying to him messages concerning the situation at home were agreed upon. It was settled that the first transmission station would be an underground center initially called Politicke ustredi, or PU (Political Center), which was later to establish contact with two additional resistance groups to form the so-called TJVOD. This center was then recognized by the President as the official spokesman for the resistance movement at home.11 Concurrently, all news furnished by this center abroad was addressed exclusively to the President, who had the sole responsibility in deciding how to handle it. The implications of the assassination of Heydrich were far-reaching. It was far more dangerous than all of us then in the Protectorate dared to imagine. One thing was clear from the beginning: the act would be followed by a sequence of events which would disrupt the hard-established contact with London, and would cripple the current organization of the resistance movement. This was the principal reason why leaders of the resistance movement ranged themselves against the assassination attempt. One must add, however, that despite this negative attitude, all members of the resistance movement at home actively supported the paratroopers after the act. The paratroopers had orders not to contact members of the resistance movement. The entire affair was aimed at creating the impression that it had been undertaken by the people home as an act of revenge against a multiple murderer of the Czech people.12 In these instructions, one can readily detect the basic fallacy of the plan, since they were quite impossible to obey. Those who lived in the Protectorate at the time can readily affirm that no paratrooper, however well-equipped with money and false documents, could for any extensive period of time hope to live undetected, particularly on the territory of the Czech provinces. It was impossible to find shelter in private homes or in public rooming houses or hotels, because everyone had to be registered with the police, and constant searches of homes and daily controls were commonplace. It was also impossible to obtain food without ration cards. If we couple this with the fact that Germans were able to detect any aircraft which managed to penetrate as far as Bohemia and Moravia, and thus knew of the probable paratrooper drop, it isn't hard to imagine why the existence of these men in occupied territory was, at best, difficult. It See Edvard BeneS, Pameti [Memoirs] (Prague, Orbis, 1948) p. 200. General FrantiSek Moravec. I am quoting from the taped transcript of the meeting of February 7, 1964. 11

12

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was somewhat easier in the mountain regions of Moravia and Slovakia. A great majority of the paratroopers were ultimately apprehended. Early in August 1942, for instance, K. H. Frank reported to Berlin that 19 out of total 25 paratroopers were apprehended. (This information comes from the Stechovice Archive.) The paratroopers dropped for the purpose of assassinating Heydrich did not know in advance how to acomplish their task.13 This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that their original idea was to attack Heydrich's train. Krajina informed me that the regularity of Heydrich's commuting from Panenske Brezany to Hradcany Castle in Prague was brought to their attention by a member of UVOD, Rudolf Mares, who took it on himself to investigate the fact. Let us now estimate the price the Czech nation had to pay for Heydrich's death. We will never know exactly how many people did perish, but the general extent of its repercussions can be gathered from the accompanying evidence. From these it may be concluded that the aftermath of the assassination inflicted such a wound on the Czech nation that it might have been fatal to its continued existence and development. As anticipated, the organization and activities of the resistance were completely disrupted and, for a long time, radio contact and other communication with the Allies ceased altogether. In Bohemia and Moravia, the Germans immediately began a dragnet operation ("Grossfahnung") of a magnitude probably unparalleled in all history. Over 450,000 members of all available units of the German police and forces, for the most part, hastily deployed to Bohemia and Moravia from other territories, searched and checked four million seven hundred and fifty thousand people; of these they held 13,119.14 How many of those detained never returned home is impossible to ascertain. Mass executions became a daily commonplace, and the names of those executed were announced on the radio and in the press. The official announcements account for 1381 executions between May 28 and July 3, 1942.13 Even the Germans themselves probably did not keep exact figures, because Frank reported to Hitler that the number of Czechs executed up to September 1, 1942 was 1357, although this figure does not coincide with the one reported in the official radio broadcast and press releases. These figures, however, reflect only the executions announced publicly. They do not include the victims of Lidice and 13 14 15

A claim to the contrary by Gen. Moravec appears to be the only one. Cesky ndrod soudi K. H. Franka, p. 206. Chteli nds vyhubit, p. 161.

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Lezaky or those who subsequently died in concentration camps. They also fail to include the ill-fated children of Lidice. It can be safely said that during the period following the assassination, there was an overall increase in the number of people sent to concentration camps, especially the Jews. If all these facts are taken into consideration, then it seems certain that the Czech losses ran into the tens of thousands, and an educated guess (according to Krajina) establishes the total at somewhere between forty and fifty thousand deaths. It is often argued that all this happened during the war and the loss of life among the Allies was much greater. This is a fallacy. It would be incongruous to compare losses on the battlefield and people killed in air raids with the number of deaths of people deliberately picked for slaughter pursuant to a specific plan of annihilation, and who could, in general, be classed as the nation's elite. This is a point to be examined with particular care and meticulously evaluated, since it is the very core of the question regarding the advisability of the whole undertaking. Documents which became available after the war seem to bear witness to the fact that the aftermath of the assassination resolved itself into not only the problem of how many people had to pay for it with their lives and what the total cost to the Czech nation was, but whether the nation could actually survive as an entity, or would be so decimated and paralyzed as perhaps to conceivably disappear from the ranks of the civilized nations of Europe. For my part, I maintain that this terrifying possibility was a mere hand's breadth away, and that it was only through a quirk of history that such a national catastrophe never did occur. The principal reason was that in 1942, the Germans were still in sore need of Czech industry and agriculture for the conduct of the war. Furthermore, they were unable to produce rockets until just before the final defeat. If they had been available, it would certainly have at least prolonged the war. Had it not been for these two factors, I repeat, the future of the country would have been in grave danger. It is not commonly known that, even before the war broke out, the Germans already had a detailed plan for the future, not only of the Czech provinces, but for Slovakia as well. This document was found in Henlein's office in As after the war, and it was proved to have been worked out in close cooperation with Berlin. Its name was "Grundplannung OA." Similar plans were gradually developed and enlarged by K. H. Frank, von Neurath, and Heydrich; their ultimate goal was the total Germanization of Central Europe. The Czech and other Slavic

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peoples were to be completely eliminated from the map of Europe.16 A precise timetable was established and the liquidation was to proceed in a predetermined order of priority. Here the reader should realize that in one Nazi concentration camp alone-notorious Oswiçcim (Auschwitz), nearly four million persons perished within less than three years, and plans were found after the war for increasing the camp's productivity. It does not take much to imagine the possibilities of what could have happened to the Czechs and Slovaks had the war lasted for another year or two. Space does not permit me to elaborate here on all the details of these diabolical plans for mass murder, for the liquidation of whole nations. Merely by way of illustration, I might point out that the plan called, first, for a permanent separation of Czechs and Slovaks. A very harsh régime was to be introduced for the Czechs, while the treatment of the Slovaks was to be much lighter. This, in turn, was expected to produce dissension between the two groups which would then cause the Germans to appear as protectors of the oppressed Slovaks.17 The underlying basis of the entire plan was the so-called "Sonderbehandlung", which, as Frank himself admitted to the Court during his trial, literally condoned murder without any judicial process. This "Sonderbehandlung" related primarily to the intelligentsia, which the Germans deemed forever unassimilable. We must bear in mind that the arrival of Heydrich in the fall of 1941 was occasioned primarily by his orders to take whatever steps were necessary to implement this plan, certainly more vigorously than his predecessor, von Neurath. Heydrich admitted this during a secret meeting on October 2, 1941. Heydrich was, in fact, charged with the implementation of the plan of destruction of all people unacceptable to the Nazi warlords. One can easily imagine Hitler's reaction when the news of Heydrich's assassination reached him, particularly since it was the Czechs who had killed Heydrich. What followed is well known and need not be repeated here. What is less familiar is Himmler's famous order, dated May 27, 1942, under which ten thousand members of the Czech in19

Cesky nàrod soudi K. H. Franka, p. 36. Also, Chtëli nds vyhubit, p. 29. Also, Radomir Luza, The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans (New York University Press, 1964) p. 192 ff. 17 Quoting from this document: A different treatment of the Czechs and Slovaks would amount to an important chess move in dealing with suppression of the Pan-Slavic ideas. The German Reich would present itself as guarantor of the Slovak efforts toward self-determination, anchored in the Pittsburgh Agreement. (Germania divide et impera). During the military action stage, Slovaks must be promised independence. Slovak prisoners of war must be treated kindly.

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telligentsia were to be placed immediately under arrest and one hundred of the most representative of this group were to be shot.18 Hitler personally approved this order, but it was not carried out, Frank explained, simply because of the fear that the daily life in the Protectorate would have been completely paralyzed. Future historians have to reevaluate the pros and cons of this assassination plot. There will be, no doubt, many who conclude that the assassination was a justifiable act of war and, as such, helped to expedite the victory of the Allies. There will be also those who conclude that the act was not an absolute necessity and that it extracted too great a tax on human lives at an even greater risk. Although I concede that the assassination increased the prestige of the exile government in London, in retrospect, I do not agree personally that it was wise. This conclusion is predicated upon my firm belief that no one has right to hazard the future being or annihilation of an entire nation. Until the discovery of the atomic bomb, statesmen of the great powers never had to face a question which involved not merely victory as against defeat, but a far more profound issue - whether, in the conduct of war, their respective nations might receive truly mortal wounds. The British, French, and Americans never had to face the possibility of disappearing from the map of the world. During the Nazi era, the Czechs and Slovaks did indeed face this bleak prospect. It is precisely for this reason that Munich will always be a great milestone in their history. Responsible leaders of the Czechs and Slovaks in 1938 were fully cognizant of the terrible possibility. Three years later, when deliberating the pros and cons of the assassination of Heydrich, they were apparently rather unmoved by the same risk. Heydrich's death made it possible for the Germans to accelerate their plans. For them the assassination of Heydrich was a matter of mere prestige which effected no slowdown in their war effort. For the Czechs it produced a paralysis that nearly resulted in the permanent crippling of the nation. More important, however, is the fact that the British criticism of the extent of the Czech war effort, criticism which was the immediate reason for the initiation of the assassination plans, was unjust and incorrect. First, the report failed to consider the different political régimes that existed in the various occupied countries. The Nazi political régime in Bohemia and Moravia was tougher than, say, Slovakia or Denmark. It was also nearly impossible to conduct 18 The photostatic copy of this order published in the Saturday June 18, 1960.

Evening

Post,

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successful guerilla activities in the Czech provinces because of the nature of the terrain. The region is not as mountainous as, for instance, Serbia, nor does it possess the extensive swamplands of Poland or Russia. It is significant that the Nazi themselves held an opinion regarding the effectiveness of the Czechoslovak underground effort which did not coincide with that of the British War Ministry. According to the Germans, 582 separate acts of sabotage took place during the year 1941 alone.19 Immediately upon his arrival in Prague, Heydrich held a secret conference at the Hradcany Castle on October 2, 1941; there he made the following statement, while addressing the leading personalities of the Nazi régime in the Protectorate: "During recent weeks we have been experiencing a development characterized by acts of sabotage, by terrorist groups, by destruction of agricultural crops, and by overall slowdown of labor effort. All these are obviously directed by an extensive underground movement. The situation of these past few weeks has been so critical that one can safely say that the unity of the Reich itself is in grave danger." During this same speech, Heydrich reiterated that the Slavic people are to be regarded as slaves of the German Reich and that the territory of the Czech provinces must never be allowed to "lapse into" such a condition as would enable the Czechs to claim it as their own. The territory must become German, and thus convince the Czechs that they have no business being there. Yet, in the same breath, Heydrich also appealed for caution. The Czech laborer must be fed like an animal - to use his exact words - in order to be capable of performing hard work. Because of the war, and for other strategic reasons, the Germans must not create a situation which would unduly arouse the Czechs and make them rebellious. "It is necesary to proceed in such fashion as to prevent the Czechs, who realize the hopelessness of their position, from resorting to an armed rebellion." 20 Let us keep in mind that Heydrich was speaking, here, to a group of his intimate associates, most of whom had a very good idea of conditions in the ls

For details, see Luza, Transfer, p. 217 ff. Luza properly points out that even the Prime Minister of the Protectorate Government, General Alois Elias, was an outstanding member of the Resistance movement. The author also emphasizes that the efficacy of the underground activities was not to be measured in terms of German casualties or number of trains destroyed. "The lack of immediate positive results was greatly offset by the state of chaos created in Nazi circles by the extraordinary feat accomplished by the transmission of intelligence data, the results of the passive resistance, and the strategy of 'pin-pricking'." - Luza also correctly claims that both Frank and Heydrich held the accomplishments of the resistance movement in high esteem and cites sources. 20 For the exact text of this speech, see Chtëli nds vyhubit, p. 125.

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Protectorate. We must also cite Heydrich's letter to Hitler, dated October 11, 1941, sent to the Fuehrer through Bormann. Heydrich wrote that prior to his arrival in Prague, the situation was extremely critical for the Germans and, perhaps within fourteen days, the resistance would have been able to spark decisive mass uprisings against occupying forces. 21 Heydrich, incidentally, saw fit to create a special commission for suppression of all underground activities immediately after his arrival. Its activities were renewed with great vigor after Heydrich's assassination and the notorious Ernst Kaltenbrunner was selected for its top post. Perhaps it can be argued that Heydrich formulated his conclusions with undue emphasis in order to get a free hand in his relentless efforts to subdue the Czechs. Nonetheless, the views of the British War Ministry and those of the Nazi rulers remain diagonally opposed concerning the situation in the Protectorate. Yet, even if we could completely subscribe to the accuracy of the British report, the above discussion should make it obvious that the Czechs were just then in greater danger than any other opponent of Nazism, save the Jews. London was well informed about this from the regular reports of the LJVOD. It was hardly justifiable to drive the nation toward an act which could have well spelled national catastrophe. 22 As I have already suggested, it was far more prudent to conduct underground activities on Czech territory less conspicuously, yet more effectively. What I have in mind are actions which strengthened the people psychologically in their resistance to the régime, while at the same time undermining the confidence of the occupiers. These included mass boycotts of the Nazi-directed Czech press and the Prague streetcars, and furnishing intelligence data to the Allies. As was often confirmed, these reports were more important to the Allied victory than the occasional destruction of a factory or bridge, or even the death of a tyrant such as Heydrich. In the long run, unfortunately, the assassination proved to be ill-conceived even from the standpoint of the cause of freedom, because it represented an unsolicited bonus for the Communists. As I stated above, the Communists had nothing to do with the assassination. Therefore they attempted to minimize the event from the very start by describing 21 22

Ibid., p. 70.

See E. BeneS, Pamëti, p. 200. Lord Vansittart and Lord Chancellor Viscount Jowitt also confirmed in the House of Lords on November 23, 1949 that this transmission of intelligence data was very important to Great Britain.

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it as an unnecessary and hazardous undertaking by the British intelligence organization and the Czechoslovak exile government in London. Only recently have there appeared more critical voices among the Communists. These now admit that the assassination was an event of paramount importance and that the resistance at home achieved merit in helping to carry it out. 23 Concurrently, of course, these sources hasten to emphasize that the resistance forces were, in effect, Communist resistance forces or, more exactly, that it was the Communists who played a leading role in the whole episode.24 Since the Germans were well aware that the Communists were not implicated in the assassination plans, there was no perceptible increase in pressure on the Communists by the Nazi régime. As stated above it was the Czech intelligentsia who felt the full force of the Nazi wrath when Czechs began to be eliminated on an ever-increasing scale. This was, naturally, a distinct disadvantage in the postwar efforts of the country to resist Communism. In this struggle, the Communist movement emerged after the war with relatively few losses, while the prevalent democratically-oriented middle classes and intelligentsia entered the contest largely exhausted, with their ranks decimated. The postwar entry of Communism was thus facilitated by the Heydrich assassination. Both Krajina and Luza endorse this view.25 If I may offer my personal verdict on this bloody chapter in Czech history, I would say this: The assassination of Heydrich was a hazardous undertaking which greatly endangered the existence of an entire nation. It was carried out without the consent of those who were primarily responsible for the fate of the people at home. For an extended period of time it paralyzed the resistance movement, particularly its transmission of intelligence data essential to the Allies. For the nation, it meant a very severe blow and thus, in the long run, damaged the resistance efforts even abroad immeasurably. The fact that it may have temporarily increased the prestige of the Czechoslovak exile government does not detract from the force of my reasoning.

23

See articles commemorating the 20th anniversary of the assassination, Prace, May 27, 1962 and Vecerni Praha, May 26, 1962. 24 See "Cesky odboj a Heydrichiäda" [The Czech Resistance and the Heydrich Episode] Nova mysl, 1962, No. 8. 25 Luza: Transfer, p. 222.

The Slovak Uprising of 1944*

ANDREJ ELIAS

INTRODUCTION

There are very few events in the history of modern Slovakia or Czechoslovakia which are more controversial than the Slovak uprising of 1944. Some writers call it the most shameful episode, while others refer to it as one of the greatest events in Slovak history. In present-day Czechoslovakia, the Slovak National Uprising is commemorated as the most glorious event in the history of Slovakia. Czech and Slovak writers have written countless fictional and nonfictional accounts of it; motion picture studios have so far based the stories of more than a dozen motion pictures on it; 1 artists take their inspiration from it; and the new, growing generation sings patriotic songs about it. And yet, this allegedly great event in Slovak history is very little known beyond the Western borders of Czechoslovakia. The Slovak National Uprising was the result of long underground effort. The underground resistance movement in Slovakia began to take root soon after the declaration of Slovak autonomy (October 6, 1938) and the forcible merger of all legal political parties into one party, the Party of Slovak National Unity, which was dominated by the Slovak People's Party. Some of the resistance groups which were in open opposition to the Slovak Autonomous Government in Bratislava, such as the Communist Party, went underground automatically after being declared illegal. These groups had the advantage of a disciplined organization, which could be utilized by their leadership for antigovernment propaganda, intelligence, sabotage, and other purposes. Other groups * This paper is only a summary of major events in the Slovak National Uprising. Readers interested in a more complete picture are referred to Andrew Elias, The Slovak Uprising of 1944, Ph. D. Dissertation, New York University, New York, 1963. 1 See Emil Lehuta, "Povstalecka tematika v nasom filme" (The Themes of the Uprising in Our Film), Slovenske pohl'ady (Slovak Outlooks), No. 8 (1962), p. 24.

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which went underground voluntarily usually did not have the advantage of a disciplined and organized following, but only nuclei of organizers, around whom the movements were to be broadened. By the summer of 1943, both Communist and non-Communist underground groups realized that they needed a unified central leadership in order to coordinate their activities and make their work more effective. Apparently each group thought that the unification of the antiNazi underground would be to its own advantage and that it could use the other group to attain its own aims. Also, the tide of war was turning against the Germans on all fronts and the internal resistance could count on material and moral help from the victorious Allies. The first meeting of the Communist and non-Communist underground leaders was held in September 1943. The Communists were represented by the Fifth Central Committee of the KSS, Gustáv Husák, Ladislav Novomesky, and Karol Smidke. They were accepted by the non-Communist group as the speakers for other socialist underground organizations as well. The non-Communist group was represented by Ján Ursíny, Jozef Lettrich, and Matej Josko. The outcome of this meeting was the formation in December 1943 of a clandestine Slovak National Council (Slovenská národná rada), consisting initially of the above six representatives. The first and most important task of the Slovak National Council was to make preparations for an armed uprising against the German Army and the pro-German regime in Bratislava. For this purpose, it created a military command from among those officers of the Slovak Army who could be trusted. At the head of this command was Lieutenant Colonel Ján Golian, the Chief of Staff at the headquarters of the armed forces in Banská Bystrica, later promoted by Dr. Benes to the rank of Brigadier General. Colonel Golian set up, in Banská Bystrica, a Military Revolutionary Staff which was to prepare operational orders for the uprising. He also appointed reliable officers to take over, on signal, the command of local army units stationed throughout Slovakia. To the two operational divisions stationed in Eastern Slovakia Golian arranged to send one of his men as Chief of Staff; he arranged to send another officer to Italy to take over command of the Slovak Technical Division, which was stationed there as an integral unit of the Germany Army. With the two Slovak divisions on the Eastern front greatly weakened, if not already disintegrated, their former members having joined either the Soviet partisans or the Czechoslovak Army Corps in the U.S.S.R., the control

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of the remaining Slovak Army units was being taken over by Golian's men. 2 Golian and his staff prepared a plan for a military revolt, which they submitted to the Slovak National Council. The plan consisted of two alternatives: offensive and defensive. The offensive variant was to be followed if all went according to expectations. It was based on the condition that the Military Council could count on all army units, the gendarmerie, armed customs officers, and the guerrilla units. A task of special importance was assigned to the two well-equipped divisions stationed in Eastern Slovakia. These divisions, with the supporting units, totaling almost 25,000 men, 3 were to open the Dukla Pass in the Carpathian Mountains to the Red Army. Simultaneously, other army units were to revolt and the Slovak National Council was to proclaim Slovakia a part of the Czechoslovak Republic. The Red Army would then be welcomed as an Allied army and, therefore, it would not interfere in the internal affairs of Slovakia, but would advance unopposed to the borders of the Protectorate. Slovakia would be saved from the destruction of front-line operations, and its army, led by the insurgent officers, would be at the disposal of the Benes coalition government-in-exile. The defensive variant was to be followed in case the uprising had to start before the army was thoroughly ready for it. In that case, the two Eastern divisions were to join the units deployed in the so-called strategic triangle of Banska Bystrica-Zvolen-Brezno nad Hronom. This rugged region in central Slovakia was to be held at all costs as long as possible.

ARMED REVOLT: AUGUST 29-OCTOBER 28

In conformance with the military plans Colonel Golian, in his capacity as Chief with headquarters in Banska Bystrica, rous military units and the necessary

of the Slovak National Council, of Staff of the Slovak rear army, was able to concentrate numeprovisions in central Slovakia.

2 Josef Marko, "Slovenske povstanie s hl'adiska vojenskeho" (Slovak Uprising from the Military Point of View), Partizani na Slovensku (Partisans in Slovakia) (Pittsburgh, Pa., Knihkupectvo Cudoveho dennika, n.d.), p. 8. 3 Jan Julius Töth et al., Po stopach Slovenskeho povstania (On the Traces of the Slovak National Uprising) (Bratislava, Sport, 1960), p. 188. Some sources give the number of soldiers in the two divisions as high as 60,000. See, e.g., Miroslav Hysko, Slovenske ndrodne povstanie (Slovak National Uprising) (Bratislava, Vydavatel'stvo Slovenskej akademie vied, 1954), p. 36.

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These concentrations were assembled under the pretext of defensive preparations against the advancing Red Army and of summer wargames in the early summer of 1944. At the same time, large financial reserves were brought there from Bratislava, allegedly for safekeeping in this remote region. Colonel Golian initiated contacts with the Slovak and Russian commanders of various guerrilla units, in order to coordinate their activities with the military operations, which were still in a preparatory stage. One such meeting between Golian and Major Marko, on one side, and Lieutenant Colonel Velicko and Captain Jegorov, on the other, took place in the military barracks in Turciansky Svaty Martin (now Martin), on August 13, 1944. Golian tried to persuade the guerrilla commanders to cease, or at least to curb, their actions until the army was ready to give orders for the uprising to all its units. He was afraid that the widespread partisan actions, particularly against German officials and nationals, would bring retaliation in the form of occupation of Slovakia by the German Army, before his army was fully prepared to resist it. After some deliberation, the partisan leaders in central Slovakia agreed to submit to the army command on condition that the army would "soon" declare a national uprising. When no uprising was declared after one week, the partisans resumed their activities on an unprecedentedly large scale.4 Golian's emissaries to the guerrilla commanders in other parts of Slovakia were likewise unsuccessful in securing the partisans' subordination to, or at least their cooperation with, the army's underground command. The Soviet partisans, who by then controlled the overwhelming majority of all guerilla units in Slovakia, were only obeying orders from their own headquarters in Kiev. These orders were frequently incompatible with the objectives of the Slovak National Council.5 Most of the incidents between Slovak Army units and the guerrillas during the last weeks preceding the uprising were caused by the insistence of the latter on obtaining arms from the former. The army was willing to supply arms to the partisans, if the partisans would accept subordination to the underground army command. This would have corresponded to the Soviet setup, in which the partisan command in 4

Bohuslav Graca, "Slovenske narodne povstanie - vyvrcholenie narodnooslobodzovacieho boja slovenskeho l'udu" (Slovak National Uprising - Culmination of the National Liberation Struggle of the Slovak People), Slovenske narodne povstanie (Slovak National Uprising), (Bratislava, Vydavatel'stvo Slovenskej akademie vied, 1954), pp. 78-80. 5 Josef Lettrich, History of Modern Slovakia (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1955), p. 202.

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Kiev was subordinated to the overall command of the Red Army in Moscow. However, to avoid unnecessary casualties, a number of army units were supplying the partisans with arms on a more or less regular basis. In the second half of August 1944, partisans began to challenge openly the authority of the Bratislava régime on a large scale. Considerable sections of the vital railroad lines were either blocked or controlled by the guerrillas. Isolated German military or Gestapo posts were attacked and liquidated. On August 24, the partisans stopped the international express at the railroad station in Turciansky Svaty Martin which was carrying the German Military Mission from Rumania back to Germany. Under the pretext of disrupted communication lines, the Mission was taken to the local military barracks to stay overnight. The next morning, while resisting efforts to disarm them, all members of the Mission, including some diplomats, were shot, at the insistence of the partisans. 6 Perhaps this incident also contributed to the friction between the army and the partisans. The army was more moderate and restrained in the treatment of its captives, trying to observe the rules of the Geneva Convention. The partisans were bound by no such rules. In self-defense, the partisans could point out that when captured, they could expect no mercy from their captors. As was proven later, army officers captured by the Germans got no mercy, either. The Slovak Government in Bratislava finally realized that it could not depend on its army to stop the guerrilla activities on Slovak territory. Many soldiers began to desert to the partisans, and the population in general was in an excited and rebellious mood. Finally, Dr. Tiso submitted to the partisan pressure from within, and to the German pressure from without, and asked the German Army for help. Immediately, German armed units crossed the borders of Slovakia. Their first clashes with the Slovak insurgents took place on the same day, August 29, 1944, in the vicinity of 2ilina. 7 Of all Slovak military garrisons, only about half a dozen refused or failed to join the insurgents, of which the most important was the Nitra garrison. From several other garrisons in Western and Eastern Slovakia, only small units were able to reach insurgent territory. It has been 6

Marko, op. cit., p. 14; and Milan Varos, "Rozsudok, ktory vykonali odsudeni" (A Sentence Which Was Carried Out by the Condemned), Slovenské pohl'ady (Slovak Outlooks), No. 8 (1964), pp. 80-82. 7 Milos Gosiorovsky, Slovenské nârodné povstanie (Slovak National Uprising), Bratislava, Slovenské vydavatel'stvo politickej literatury (1954), p. 59.

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estimated that in the first days of the uprising, the Slovak insurgent military units under the effective command of Colonel Golian numbered between 50,000 and 60,000 men. Their equipment included approximately 120 pieces of artillery of various calibers, 57 airplanes (most of them obsolete or training type), 40,000 rifles, 1,700 machine guns, 40 mine throwers, and 10 tanks.8 In addition to the regular army, guerrilla units, equipped with light arms, numbered, according to some sources, about 15,000, and later over 20,000 men 9 (These figures may be too high, depending on the definition of a partisan.) The German army attacking the insurgents in the first days of hostilities consisted of units from four incomplete SS divisions, supported by tanks, artillery, and air units.10 Since, according to the military plans, the uprising began prematurely, the underground army command chose to follow a defensive variant. Thus, orders were sent to all military garrisons outside of the so-called strategic triangle to fight delaying battles while the arms and supplies were removed to a safe area. However, because of confusion and indecision in many garrisons, the advancing German Army was able to occupy Zilina, Kezmarok, Levoca, and Presov by August 31,1944. Poprad fell on September 1, and Liptovsky Svaty Mikulas on September 4. Ruzomberok capitulated on September 5.11 In Eastern Slovakia, the uprising suffered a great setback when the Germans were able to disarm without resistance most of the two best divisions of the Slovak Army. About 8,000 soldiers belonging to those two divisions were able to escape to the mountains, where they either joined the partisans or tried to reach the insurgents' territory. Perhaps as many as 4,000 additional soldiers threw away their uniforms and fled to their homes. The rest, around 12,000 men, were taken to Germany for forced labor or into the concentration camps.12 After a bad start, the insurgents' resistance to the German advance began to stiffen and the front to stabilize. The revolutionary national committees in all cities and towns on insurgent territory declared a 8

Jozef Hrozien£ik, "Vyznam pomoci Sovetskeho svazu ve Slovenskem narodnim povstani" (The Significance of the Help of the Soviet Union in the Slovak National Uprising), Historie a vojenstvi (History and Military Science), No. 3 (1954), pp. 61-62; and Gosiorovsky, op. cit., p. 67. 9 Samo Falt'an, Partizanska vojna na Slovensku (Partisan War in Slovakia), (Bratislava, Osveta, 1959), p. 112. 10 Hysko, op. cit., p. 35. » Ibid., p. 37. 12 Falt'an, op. cit., p. 127.

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mobilization of all men up to 35 years of age. There were many volunteers above that age, most of whom had to be sent home for lack of arms. Fighting enthusiasm and high morale were visible everywhere. The people volunteered to dig trenches, to carry ammunition for the troops, to provide shelter, food, and care for evacuees, and to be helpful to the best of their ability.13 To consider the political situation: on September 1, 1944, the Slovak National Council assumed all legislative and executive powers on the territory controlled by the insurgents. Among its first legislative acts was the dissolution of all totalitarian organizations and the confiscation of their property. 14 Actual executive functions were exercised by the ten commissioners appointed by the council, one for each administrative branch. Major battles during the first stage of the uprising took place at the Strecno Pass (between Zilina and Vrutky), at Telgart (now Svermovo), near the confluence of the Orava and Vah Rivers, and in the upper Nitra Valley. Two of these battles, those at Strecno and Telgart, proved to be the hardest and bloodiest in the entire uprising. The battle at Strecno began on August 31, in the vicinity of the ruins of Strecno Castle. A direct attack by the German Army on the Strecno Pass was unsuccessful. In the next three days, more attacks by the Germans were beaten back. They were followed by the coordinated counterattacks of the insurgent army and guerrilla units. Tanks and other heavy weapons were used on both sides. German airplanes also took part in the battle. On September 4, attacking simultaneously from several directions, German units finally broke the resistance of the Slovak insurgents for good. The same day, Germans were able to occupy Vrutky, an important railroad junction, almost without any opposition, and thus open the way into the Turiec Basin. According to some estimates, in the general area of Strecno, the casualties of the insurgents and the guerrillas included over 180 killed and about 300 wounded in the first ten days of fighting. The same source puts German losses at about 250 killed, 520 wounded, and 60 taken prisoner. 15 An outstanding fighting unit in the battle for Strecno was a group of French partisans, probably one of the toughest such groups of its size in all of the insurgent territory. 16 13 14 15

18

Lettrich, op. cit., p. 205; and Graca, op. cit., pp. 108-109. Lettrich, op. cit., pp. 207-208. Falt'an, op. cit., pp. 131-133.

Ibid.; and Lettrich, op. cit., p. 215.

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Just as the Strecno-Vrutky section in the Northwestern corner of insurgent territory had strategic importance for the Turiec Basin, the Telgârt-Cervenâ Skala section blocked the entrance into the upper Hron River Valley and the heart of the insurgent territory from the East. Because of the relatively weak positions of the insurgent army in this area, and with only sporadic resistance from some partisan units, the German Army had occupied Telgârt by September 4. From September 5 to September 21, Telgârt changed hands several times. During that period, insurgent army officers, primarily from the Brezno garrison, were feverishly training and arming the male population of the nearby villages. On September 21, a coordinated counterattack against the German positions in and around Telgârt was begun by the combined units of the regular army from the Brezno garrison, freshly retrained reservists, and strong guerrilla groups. The result of this battle probably surprised both sides equally. The German troops were completely defeated and thrown back, not only from Telgârt, but from the whole surrounding strategic area.17 The doors to the Hron Valley were thus safely closed to the German Army until the last days of the uprising. The battle for Telgârt proved to be the only important encounter in the uprising from which the insurgents emerged unquestionably the victors. In the last days of September and early in October, the Second Czechoslovak Airborne Brigade, which was fighting alongside the Red Army on the Eastern front, was dispatched in Soviet planes to the insurgent territory. Beside the ground and air lones, it numbered about 1,800 men, and consisted predominantly of Slovak soldiers, former members of the two divisions sent by the Bratislava régime against the Russians; instead, they had surrendered to the Red Army at the first opportune moment. The Brigade, commanded by Colonel Vladimir Prikryl, had a favorable effect and influence on the insurgent army, whose morale, nevertheless, remained generally low. The enthusiasm of the early days of the uprising was gone, and in most areas, a defeatist mood began to permeate the troops. Many factors had probably contributed to the low spirits of the insurgent army: repeated defeats by the Germans; the continuing rift between the army and the guerrillas, and the efforts of the guerrilla commanders to recruit soldiers into their units; and - perhaps most of all - the failure of the field army officers to convince their soldiers that each of them had a personal stake in the outcome of the uprising. Unlike the partisans, who were repeatedly re17

Graca, op. cit., pp. 100-101; and Falt'an, op. cit., pp. 140-142.

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minded that they were fighting for better jobs, better education, and a better life for themselves, the soldiers of the insurgent army were, in general, left entirely uninformed, as far as their own aspirations for a better future were concerned. All they knew was that they were fighting for the restoration of the Czechoslovak Republic. Socially and econonomically, for many, if not most, of the insurgents this might have meant even a step backward; as an incentive it proved ineffective, especially when they compared their lot with that of the partisans, who were promised so much by partisan leaders. The lack of unity and coordination between the Slovak Army and the partisans caused the collapse of many defensive outposts around insurgent territory. But the lack of a unified command and coordination of actions were only external manifestations of a deeper mistrust, and even contempt, that the army had for the partisans. Apparently, most army officers viewed with suspicion the president refusal of the guerrilla commanders to submit to a unified, overall army command. They believed, perhaps correctly, that the partisans were more interested in the anticipated social and political changes than in a "bourgeois" nationalist struggle against the foreign occupation. Perhaps as much for political as for military reasons, the Czechoslovak Government in Exile dispatched one of its members, General Rudolf Viest, to Slovakia, to take over the command of the insurgent army. The newly-promoted General Golian became Viest's deputy. During the second week of October, the insurgent army, now including the Second Czechoslovak Airborne Brigade, was still capable of putting up strong resistance to the pressure of the reinforced German troops. Where the army and the guerrillas were directed by a single command, they were still able to push the Germans back in local battles. However, in spite of some isolated instances of heroism, signs of exhaustion and apathy began to appear among the insurgent troops and in some partisan units, especially those which were formed on territory already held by the insurgents and which, therefore, had had no experience in real guerrilla warfare. In the middle of October 1944, the German Army began a general offensive against the insurgents. The strongest attacks came from the South, most of them directed against the untried defense positions of the insurgents. Here, the German troops quickly succeeded in destroying the insurgents' outposts and, in a matter of a few days, made deep northward thrusts. The command of the insurgent army could not immediately deploy additional troops on the Southern front without weaken-

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ing the insurgents' defenses elsewhere. On October 22, General Viest hurriedly summoned high-ranking officers to discuss the next moves. The military command decided to establish its headquarters in the mountains of central Slovakia and to reorganize the regular army units into guerrilla units.18 Each military unit was to secure its retreat route into the mountains. However, the order to all military units to reorganize into guerrilla groups remained generally ineffective because army troops were already disorganized and scattered throughout the mountains of central Slovakia. The next events followed quickly. On October 24, the German Army occupied Telgárt; Brezno fell the next day, and Zvolen one day after that; and finally, on October 27, Banská Bystrica, the seat of the Slovak National Council, capitulated to the advancing Germans.19 The armed uprising of the Slovak Insurgent Army came to an end two months after its start. CONCLUSION

The uprising of the Slovak Army against the wartime government in Slovakia and the invading German Army was the culmination of underground work carried on by the leaders of the civilian and military resistance movements. The army's primary aim was to reestablish a free Czechoslovakia as a state of two equal Slavic peoples, Czechs and Slovaks, in accordance with the policies of the Slovak National Council. Another force in the uprising, numerically much smaller than the regular insurgent troops, but with far greater political influence on the local population, was that of the guerrillas. The guerrilla units acknowledged their subordination to the Slovak National Council only nominally. In reality, they were, more or less, a private army of the Moscow group of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, with Soviet officers holding most of the top and field command posts. In the two months of regular fighting, the insurgent army suffered, according to some sources, the loss of 1,555 troops killed in action.20 No figures are available on the wounded and missing. Likewise, there are no figures on the guerrilla casualties. The Czechoslovak estimates of German losses, the reliability of which could be questioned, range anywhere from 40,000 to almost 60,000, including those killed, wound18 19 20

Falt'an, op. cit., pp. 197-198. Ibid., pp. 199-200; and Lettrich, op. cit., pp. 214-215. Lettrich, op. cit., p. 218.

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ded, and missing.21 No German estimates of their own losses in the Slovak uprising are available. The liquidation of the Slovak insurgent army by the Germans had serious consequences with respect to the struggle for political power in Czechoslovakia. The insurgent army (the official name of which was the First Czechoslovak Army on the Slovak territory), on the whole, was unquestionably loyal to President Benes and his government. Its defeat marked the beginning of the decline of Dr. Benes' position vis-àvis that of Klement Gottwald in their behind-the-scenes struggle for the future political control of Czechoslovakia. President Benes could never regain real control of the new Czechoslovak army. Thus, the insurgent Slovak army was the last independent and self-sustaining army faithful to Benes and the West. On the other hand, the defeat of this army had no appreciable effect on the guerrilla activities in Slovakia. German occupation of the insurgents' territory may have deprived nearby partisan units of their comfortable sanctuary, but their freedom of action was affected to only a very small degree. Actually, the defeat of the insurgent army may even have resulted in some benefits for the guerrillas. For one thing, the partisan commanders now became the sole judges of their actions, without having to consider the judgements or fears of the insurgent army. When Dr. Benes undertook his journey to Moscow on March 17, 1945, to form a new Czechoslovak Government, Gottwald's position, supported by the guerrillas and by the pro-Soviet senior officers in the First Czechoslovak Army Corps in the U.S.S.R., was never stronger. In summary, the writers on the subject, as well as the participants, differ widely as to the nature of the Slovak uprising of 1944 and its place in the history of Slovakia. The terms used to describe the uprising range from the most laudatory to the most vilificatory. While there may be some doubt as to the accuracy of the former, there is no doubt as to the falseness of the latter. The Slovak Army rebelled against the totalitarian government which sided with Nazi Germany in World War II. The army revolt had overwhelming support among the Slovak people, and the Bratislava régime was able to survive only because of the immediate support and protection given it by the German troops. It is unfortunate and tragic that some innocent lives were lost, but all revolutions claim such innocent victims. To the extent to which guiltless

81

Cf. Hysko, op. cit., p. 69; and Gosiorovsky, op. cit., p. 85.

248

Andrej

Elias

persons were wronged because of the excesses of the insurgent troops or the guerrillas, those excesses are to be regretted and condemned. On the other hand, the insurgent army and the partisans freed a number of political and Allied war prisoners, and insurgent territory became a haven for many individuals and whole families who were hunted by the Gestapo because of their race, religion, or political associations. Even after the uprising had been suppressed, a great many of these persecuted people were saved by hiding in the mountains. Although the major aim of the army revolt, that is, the restoration of the Czechoslovak Republic, was temporarily frustrated, the uprising showed clearly on whose side the Slovak Army and the Slovak people wanted to be in World War II. German reprisals against the captured insurgents were unusually severe. Generals Viest and Golian, who were captured in the vicinity of the small village of Bukovec, were both taken to Berlin together with other captured high-ranking insurgent officers, interrogated, and executed. An American Military Mission, dispatched to the headquarters of the insurgent army in Banska Bystrica on September 17, 1944, met a similar fate. All fifteen members of the Mission, led by Navy Lieutenant James Holt Green of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, were captured while wearing American uniforms, taken to Germany, and executed in Mauthausen.22 The Stalinist historians see the uprising primarily as partisan warfare, with its simultaneous political penetration by the Communists of the Slovak cities and countryside. To them, the uprising was merely the beginning of social and political revolution, the first phase of which was completed in February 1948. The historical truth is, however, that the Slovak National Uprising was staged by the democratic forces in the Slovak Army against the tyrannical Nazi system, with the support of the Slovak population. The failure of the uprising to realize its goals and the pursuance of different goals by the guerrillas do not change the actual initial intentions of the army. Therefore, the uprising merits a significant place in the history of Slovakia and Czechoslovakia.

22

Lettrich, op. cit., p. 217; and Falt'an, op. cit., p. 205.

The Years of German Occupation, 1939-1945: The First Totalitarian Attack on the Czech Economy

KAREL HOLB1K

Nazi Germany plotted a scheme, on the one hand, of robbing the weaker, and, on the other hand, of planning war against the stronger; it never desired to do anything else nor - and this is the decisive point - could it do anything else. (Karl Robert) The aim of the Reich in Bohemia and Moravia must be the complete Germanization of the area and its inhabitants. (Reichsprotektor von Neurath, August 31, 1940)

I Nazi occupation of Bohemia and Moravia has been assured an important place in both Europe's and Czechoslovakia's history. As many will agree, the years 1939-1945 may be said to represent the second period of darkness (temno) in the nation's long life. (The first temno was brought about by Germanization and anti-Reformation in the 17th and 18th centuries.) And it is common knowledge that under Nazi rule the very existence of the nation was in serious danger. Ours is neither the first attempt - nor the last one, as we may safely predict - to set forth and evaluate the methods employed by Nazi Germany in her determination to crush the barrier which stood in the way of Hitler's expansionist schemes. Neither does the history of German penetration, in our presentation, call for another of the already innumerable condemnations of the intransigeance with which the Nazis pursued their goals. Inasmuch as the available space does not permit a more comprehensive treatment, the economic and financial facts that have been selected for our exposition of German occupation policies will speak for themselves.

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These facts, along with the statistical data selected,1 demonstrate among other things: (1) the impoverishment of the Czech lands caused by Nazi occupation; (2) the extent to which the country's subservience, rigidly enforced, to the German war machine distorted Czechoslovakia's productive structure; and (3) the desperate economic conditions inherited by the Third Republic in 1945. We submit that the second totalitarian attack on the Czech economy in the years following 1948 was facilitated, and, in some instances, perhaps also necessitated (especially in the case of the nationalization of industries and banks) by the economic disorganization with which the Czechoslovak government had to cope upon the return of an unstable peace and in the face of a bipolar world. Many economic as well as political decisions made by the liberated Czechs have to be appraised in the light of their wartime experience. Burdened with a disintegrated economy, the nation in 1945 did not have a free choice to return to its prewar economic system or to a liberal variant thereof. Nevertheless, a new form of totalitarianism was hardly what it sought or needed.

II. T H E STAGES OF TRANSITION

To the extent to which foreign trade flows (imports and exports) are recognized as the principal evidence of international economic interdependence, the data for Czechoslovak-German commercial relations during the period 1929-1938 disclose the decline shown below, which was gradual and uninterrupted: This development resulted, on the one hand, from the expansion of Czechoslovak overseas trade (in which the United States played a lead-

The statistical information on which this writer and eyewitness has relied appears in Leopold Chmela, Hospodarskd okupace Ceskoslovenska, jeji methody a dusledky; The Economic Occupation of Czechoslovakia, Its Methods and Consequences (Prague, 1946), and Vaclav Krai, Otazky hospodarskeho a socialniho vyvoje v ceskych zemich 1938-1945; Questions Regarding the Economic and Social Development in the Czech Lands, 1938-1945, Vol. I-III (Prague, 1957-59). These books contain data submitted by the Czechoslovak government to the Nuremberg Tribunal. Other sources include: R. Olesovsky et al., Prehled hospodarskeho vyvoje Ceskoslovenska v letech 1918-45; Survey of the Economic Development of Czechoslovakia, 1918-45 (Prague, 1963), and Karel Holbik, The Conquest of a Free Economy by Totalitarianism, unpublished Master's Thesis, Univ. of Detroit, 1949. 1

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TABLE I

IMPORTS EXPORTS (In millions of RM) 1929 1938

480 130

658 136

IMPORTS EXPORTS (As % of Total German Trade) 3.6 2.4

4.9 2.6

Note: In 1930, trade with Germany equaled 21% of Czechoslovakia's total foreign trade; by 1937, this percentage decreased to 14.5%.

ing role) and, on the other hand, from German discriminatory and aggressive practices which the Czechoslovak Republic evaded successfully, while Southeastern Europe and Latin America became their victim. Thus, trade flows did not offer any appreciable means to German domination of Czechoslovakia. Private inter-industry cooperation between Czech and German concerns and cartels was, however, considerable. Since the Republic did not underestimate the importance of the German market for some of her exportables, she, like others, found it unavoidable to accept clearing as the necessary method for the settlement of claims arising from her transactions with the Reich. Clearing and the overvalued Reichsmark were, of course, among the chief instruments which Nazi Germany relied on to maintain her commercial relations, to improve terms of trade, and to employ her exploitative financial techniques. Prior to the separation of the border region (Sudetenland), German (pro-Nazi) firms located there allegedly used to buy foreign exchange from Czechoslovak banks in order to secure with it abroad goods which these firms subsequently reexported to the Reich. The pressure that the Germans began to exert on the Republic after the Austrian Anschluss (March 1938) and the defenseless position in which Czechoslovakia found herself after the Munich conference (September 1938) reversed the above-mentioned trend in trade and undermined both the country's economic independence and its freedom of action. The German drive grew irresistible. While the Protectorate, established in March 1939, was granted autonomy in economic matters, including foreign trade, Czech authorities retained control over them only to that degree to which the Reich could benefit from well-established Czechoslovak commercial and financial relations with West European and other countries that used free foreign exchange to pay for Czech exports. This opportunism also made the Nazis recognize and honor Czechoslovak international agreements even after March 15, 1939.

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Holbík

On the other hand, the Germans did not wait long for the imposition of their "economics of force" on Czech industries. The latter's reorganization in accordance with Nazi principles of economic management began as early as the summer of 1939. Introduction of the "Leader Principle" became responsible for the setting-up of seven "Central Associations" (of Industry, Trade, Handicrafts, Foreign Contacts, Transportation, Banking, and Private Insurance), of many more "Economic Groups", of a "Central Price Office", state employment agencies, and other institutions through which the occupiers' will was enforced. Nazi intentions as regards the Czech economy were fully revealed when the Second World War started (September 1939). Germany then decided that it was imperative to accelerate the economic integration of the Protectorate into the Reich. The methods adopted to accomplish this purpose may yet become a memorable but ignoble chapter in the history of modern totalitarianism, or, as some may prefer to say, economic imperialism. The meaning to Germany of Czech productive potential may be evaluated from the following data showing Czech production (in terms of sales value) as a percentage of total German output in 1942: Sugar . . . Leather goods Glass . . . Steel . . . Beer . . . . Wood products Metal products Metallurgy Textiles . . Chemicals . .

27 percent 18

10

10 10 10 7 6 6 3

III. THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF MUNICH

In the autumn of 1938, after Munich, and Germany's annexation of the Sudetenland, it still appeared (and the Czechs were encouraged by their government to believe) that the deformed body of the Second Republic could continue to exist as an economically viable system. Even if the several tangible political and international variables would have justified such a position, we prefer to doubt - however reluctantly - that the

The Years of German Occupation, 1939-1945

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territory within the new boundaries could have sustained the level of economic activity and scale of living that were realized during the First Republic. Not only were the border areas cut off, but the Slovaks were determined to deal a mortal blow to the Czecho-Slovak national symbiosis. The Second Republic had to operate as a dependent economy, deprived of the benefits of the division of labor, the roots of which dated back to the pre-World War I period. Munich rendered this economy extremely vulnerable. The sinews of its former strength were seriously impaired when some 40 percent of the larger industrial enterprises, located in the Sudetenland and contributing heavily to the Republic's exports, were lost; when 42 percent of the forest resources and 35 percent of the former railroad network fell under foreign jurisdiction and control. The Nazis prepared their demarcation lines so carefully as to interrupt the principal railroad line between Prague and Bratislava as many as nine times. The country retained adequate agricultural resources for a population reduced by 34 percent, but had no way of replacing the ceramic, glass, paper, chemical, and other productive plants, most of them dependable earners of foreign exchange. The following table brings to light the first economic results of Munich: TABLE II

Foodstuffs Raw Materials Finished products Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports 1937 Before March 1939

Total

13.2%

8.2%

57.5%

19.8%

29.7%

71.9%

100%

17.2%

11.4%

36.9%

17.1%

45.6%

71.4%

100%

Whereas the smaller volume of industrial production called for smaller quantities of imported raw materials, the manufacturing losses showed in the rise of imported finished products. The overwhelming economic changes which occurred in 1938 were symbolized by goods that used to be exported but became importables, such as fuel, porcelain, paper, and textiles. It is noteworthy, however, that greater export effort made in the Second Republic did not cause the Czech balance of trade to turn unfavorable. The aftermath of Munich in Czech industries is reflected in these figures:

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TABLE III

Estimated percentage of losses in productive capacity

Industry Glass Textile Paper Chemical Metallurgical and Electrical Engineering . Timber Foodstuffs, Beverages . Leather Clothing

75.5 60.6 55.2 38.5 .

.

.

.

30.3 29.6 24.2 23.0 19.7

IV. THE PROTECTORATE

Upon incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia as the Protectorate into the Reich, the Czechs ceased to be masters of their own economic destiny. A national economy in the strict sense no longer existed. There was no longer any real balance between the nation's production and the actual satisfaction of its needs. Economically, Nazi occupation meant heavy losses almost everywhere. While the Germans disrupted all of Europe, it was possible for them to force upon the Czech economy, in an almost peaceful way, all their policies and practices of exploitation and to make it serve their imperialistic purposes. Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia became, in fact, the proving ground for Nazi colonial economic policy. For the Czech nation there was no choice or escape. In our opinion, it is beyond any question that the government of Dr. Hacha was aware throughout the war years of where Czech national interests lay and made appropriate efforts doubtless with continually decreasing effectiveness - to defend them. As pointed out above (page 252), totalitarian Germany began to adjust the democratic economy of Czechoslovakia to her own plans and objectives soon after the assumption of power. The coordination of the two economies meant in effect that all regulations issued for particular productive lines in Germany were valid and applicable to the respective similar sectors of the Czech economy. Thanks to the incorporation of the Protectorate into the Reich, those productive

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1939-1945

255

branches were suppressed in the former which were not of primary German interest, i.e., which were not a part of war production. On the other hand, those productive sectors which were of utmost importance for waging war were enlarged to an extent inimical to the sound economy of the small nation. The structure of the Czech economy was profoundly disturbed by these shifts. To exercise direct control over those enterprises closely connected with war production and services, the occupation authorities appointed their representatives, German nationals from either the Reich or the ceded border region, as managers and supervisors in such establishments and endowed them with the right of extraterritoriality. The latter exempted the Germans from Czech jurisdiction. According to a proclamation of the Reichsprotektor, enterprises with a turnover of at least three million crowns a year had to elect a German as president or first vicepresident. A decree was also issued according to the terms of which any Czech property could be confiscated if the interest of the German Reich so required. The opening wedge for the economic penetration of the Protectorate was the seizure of control of various business organizations of primary importance. The Nazis soon acquired control over many key industrial enterprises and secured a majority of votes in some of the largest banks. As the banks had been responsible for industrial policies, the Nazis, by controlling these financial institutions, could easily influence the industries. (German legal titles were usually won through pressure and threats, especially when the Czech industrial and commercial powers no longer possessed the necessary independence of action for effective resistance. Who in the Skoda Works could have ignored the world of Hermann Goring's brother, who was a member of its directorate?) All property of the Czechoslovak State became the property of Germany. It is estimated that Germany gained from Czechoslovakia more than 370 million Reichsmarks' worth of military equipment. By 1941, the participation of German capital in some key industries had developed thus for: Oil and oil refining . Paper Cement Hard coal Coal distribution Chemicals

. . . almost

100 percent 100 „ 90 90 50 „ 30-40

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Between 1938 and 1945, German capital invested in Czechoslovak industries rose ten times, i.e., from 209 million crowns to 2093 million crowns. Ten percent of the latter figure was employed in banking and secured 50 percent control of the banks involved. As regards the distribution of German labor force in the Protectorate, German workers made up only 3.3 percent of the total number of workers, while the proportion of Germans in top management positions was as high as 35 percent. The Nazis did not delay the application in the Protectorate of their anti-Semitic laws. The confiscation of Jewish property ("Aryanization") which resulted therefrom yielded impressive returns, inasmuch as over 30 percent of prewar Czechoslovakia's economic assets was in Jewish hands. (In 1939, there were over 100,000 Jews in the country.) By 1942, all these legal titles to tangible as well as intangible assets were wiped out. The estimated total value of the confiscated property amounted to 6028 million crowns, one-third of which represented bank accounts and another one-fourth of which corresponded to the value of confiscated industrial enterprises. Needless to say, this transfer of wealth from the Jews to the Nazi Aryans was carried out irrespective of any legal rules and provisions; it was an expression of brute force. Among the principal beneficiaries were the Hermann Goring Werke and I. G. Farben. V. THE CUSTOMS UNION

After the disintegration of the Republic in 1939, trade between Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia on the one hand, and the Sudetenland (as well as Slovakia) on the other, remained duty-free. This was not so much because Berlin would have hesitated to disturb the remaining vestiges of economic cohesion of these three regions, but, rather, because the Reich itself was interested in forming a customs union with the Czech lands. The Germans approached the Prague government shortly after Munich concerning this. But Prague decided against the union, reportedly after having debated the issue at length. The Czechs took this negative attitude because they desired to preserve the country's established connections with the West and because they realized that the proposed economic unification with Germany, a highpriced nation, would have depressed their real incomes. (To some extent they could draw on the experience of the ceded territory, where, upon annexation, prices began to rise by 20 to 60 percent.) Higher internal

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prices would not have failed to raise the prices of exportables and would have therefore reduced the volume of external trade. The latter began to suffer anyway from both the boycott by Jewish firms in the Western democracies and foreign animosity toward Germany, of which the Protectorate was a part. When the war began in the fall of 1939, the realization of Nazi aims and policies in the Protectorate was especially hampered by legal, tax, and other safeguards, different from those of Germany, as well as by the fact that Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia had been established as an autonomous territory. With the war in progress, the autonomy granted to the Protectorate became an extremely uncomfortable hindrance in the way of German exploitation. The Customs Union on which the Reich had been insisting, and which was instituted in October 1940, took effect despite Czech arguments against it and some protest-like declarations. When the two economies merged, the destruction of Czech economic independence was completed. The Ministry of Finance in Prague was deprived of competence in customs, and the crown lost its character as an independent monetary unit for foreign countries, having been replaced by the Reichsmark. It became a "vassal currency". (Following the occupation, the ratio between the mark and the crown was stipulated at one to ten, while the true [purchasing power] relationship was one to seven. The crown was undervalued, the mark overvalued.) Czech exports and imports became parts of German foreign trade and had to share all the disadvantages of the latter. On the one hand, Czech exporters were given smaller amounts of crowns for their claims than before, while, on the other hand, the prices of Czech exports increased by 15 percent. As the sales of the Protectorate to foreign countries constituted part and parcel of German exports, they were handled by the German Central Clearing Bureau, which became entitled to all claims of Czech businessmen. The Customs Union and the dictated ratio between the two currencies were two methods that could be relied upon to bring about the desired ends. In fact, such methods can be the most powerful means of exploitation in any monetary system of exchange. Then, too, the deliberate setting of prices and wage rates provided a firm basis for numerous currency manipulations, with the result that the quantity of goods shipped to Germany out of the Protectorate rose. German capital could be transferred without any difficulty and could be used to acquire any type of property in the Czech lands. The situation did not differ greatly from the destructive conditions of the Thirty Years' War.

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258

Following are the deflated values of Czech imports and exports during the years of German occupation:

TABLE IV

1939 (after March). 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 (April 30) .

.

.

Imports Exports (In millions of K) 4090 4309 3727 3501 2837 2876 1966 2678 1601 2529 980 1598 94 98

Note: The above data do not include the Reich, Sudetenland and Austria. '

How different the wartime purposes of foreign trade were from those of peacetime may be seen in Table V, which furnishes further evidence of the Protectorate's burdensome commitment to support German warfare:

TABLE v

Imports Exports

1937 1944 1937 1944

Foodstuffs

Raw materials

Finished goods

12.8% 36.3 8.2% 9.0

57.0% 16.0 19.3% 1.0

29.7% 46.6 71.9% 90.0

To make the Customs Union effective, agreements were concluded between various Czech and German cartels and other economic groups for the mutual protection of the two markets. While Czech producers were to supply Bohemia and Moravia and could distribute their goods in the Ostmark (Austria), the Reich was to be supplied by domestic (German) firms. In a sense, the Customs Union legalized processes that had already been taking place. Coordinated with Germany's determination to impose economic

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259

unification on the Protectorate was the establishment in Prague of the Ministry of Economics and Labor, headed by a German, Walter Bertsch. Whatever economic decision-making had remained with the nation until then (1942) in the Ministries of Commerce, Finance, Industry, Social and Health Administration, as well as Public Works, disappeared since these Ministries were simultaneously abolished.

VI. INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION

Chronologically, the next set of measures designed to assimilate the economy of Bohemia and Moravia consisted of the 1942 centralization of production called for by Germany's "total" war effort. This policy was not only tantamount to the drastic elimination of thousands of enterprises not engaged in war production, but it also changed irreparably the structure of Czech industry. Hardest hit were small- and medium-size firms in the construction and textile industries. Most intensive centralization took place in electronics, metallurgy, and chemicals. As the following table (VI) reveals, the centralizing policy had a discriminatory aspect; it depressed the Czech middle class and strengthened the German element in the Protectorate.

TABLE VI

NUMBER OF FIRMS Before Centralization German Czech Metal-manufacturing Ceramics Clothing Leather Paper-manufacturing Breweries

889 1633 386 232 91 175

333 116 176 81 20 53

After Centralization Czech German 625 524 261 88 57 94

304 92 164 68 19 49

Note: Between 1942 and 1944, 17,000 individual entrepreneurs were put out of business.

The dismissed workers and employees were either siphoned off into domestic war production or they were compelled to accept work in

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260

munitions factories in Germany. It is therefore understandable that the post-World War II occupational distribution in Czechslovakia resembled only very vaguely that of 1938. This fact turned out to be of paramount importance for the country's political developments in the late 1940's. As to the shifts of industrial employment in Bohemia and Moravia, they may be summarized as follows: TABLE VII Annual average (March 1939 = 100)

Total industrial employment

Metal industries

Other industries

1939 1944

104.9 141.9

107.9 223.8

103.1 93.6

Note: Various non-metal industries fared differently. In terms of the above index, employment in the textile industry decreased by 1944 to as low as 57 points. Needless to say, there was no unemployment during the war years.

Investments and installations built by the Germans in the Czech lands cannot be considered pure assets, since they were designed to meet the needs of a much larger territory than Czechoslovakia, being designated for war (especially aircraft) production. Moreover, many of the German installations were paid for out of the funds which the Reich owed to the Protectorate! And as regards the Czechs sharing the advanced German technology, it accrued largely to Germany's own benefit. Under peacetime conditions, the following statistics for Bohemia and Moravia would have evidenced a remarkable prosperity accompanied by unrestrained inflation. In actual fact, however, the figures shed light on the extent of the country's war-conditioned production - with a hopeless scarcity of consumer goods - and repressed inflation. The labor productivity index attests to this. TABLE VIII

1939 Gross industrial production (in billions of crowns) . . Index of gross production at constant prices Wholesale industrial price index Index of industrial employment Index of labor productivity .

.

. . .

.

. . .

41.6 100 100 100 100

1944 65.1 118.2 132.4 135.3 87.4

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261

VII. FINANCIAL EFFECTS OF OCCUPATION

The official Czechoslovak estimate of the comprehensive losses suffered by Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia during the war, submitted in 1946 to the Nuremberg Tribunal, was 347 billion crowns, of which one-third (114 billion crowns) represented the cost of - or compulsory payments imposed during - the German occupation. We accept these amounts for whatever they are worth (they are expressed in 1945 crowns) and content ourselves in this limited historical account with the more conspicuous methods of financial exploitation employed by the Nazis. In the separated border area there remained, in the autumn of 1939, about one and one-half billion crowns which the German authorities withdrew from circulation, demanding that the Prague government convert these into gold. The latter sum was released then, as well as later on, by the Bank for International Settlements (Basel), where it had been on deposit, and was turned over, with British consent, to the Reichsbank. (Czech gold deposits abroad equaled 88,000 kg.) 2 When the German Army entered the Czech lands in the spring of 1939, there took place a wholesale conversion of Reichsmarks into crowns, newly issued by the National Bank in Prague, which surrendered the marks to the Reichsbank, receiving credit for them in Berlin. Thus, the Czech central bank paid for German purchases with money that expanded monetary circulation and could not fail to intensify inflationary pressures. Between 1942 and 1944, Prague received credit in Berlin corresponding to 23 billion crowns. Even larger credit entries in favor of the Protectorate resulted from clearing used in payment for shipments of Czech goods. In the course of the years 1940-1945, the respective Czech claims rose to 140 billion crowns, of which one-third were considered a complete loss when the war ended. Two other noteworthy sources of funds and purchasing power in the occupied country consisted of (1) the matriculation tax, a levy justified as payment by the Czechs for Germany's "protection", and (2) revenues from Czech state monopolies. The payment obligations based on the aforementioned tax created a burdensome internal debt which amounted to 34 billion crowns at the time of liberation. Inasmuch as similar methods were used in other occupied countries, it is not surprising that these latter helped to defray over 30 percent of German war expenditures. 2

Krai, op. cit., vol. I, p. 150.

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Increasing financial requirements of the war, along with an unavoidable and ever-rising scarcity of products, brought about inflation, which the Germans suppressed resolutely. How else could the cost of living index have risen only to 175 by 1944 (1939 = 100), while monetary circulation multiplied seven times (having expanded from 14 billion K in 1939 to 96 billion K in 1945)? Tax policy was not invoked to reduce income inflation, since between 1939 and 1944 the Protectorate's tax collection increased by no more than 50 percent. (Similar policies were pursued in the Reich.) It was therefore inevitable for the Third Republic, in 1945, to resort to a monetary reform so as to rid the country of accumulated wartime liquidity. Turning briefly to prices, one must recognize that by 1940 there occurred partial adjustment of Czech prices and wages to the corresponding German levels. While neither prices nor wages reached the German niveau, in the Protectorate, wages lagged behind price increases and caused real income to decline, especially after the number of daily working hours was raised. Between March 1939 and the spring of 1944, the Czech wage index (1939 = 100) rose to 165, and that of living expenses to 175 - when official prices were taken into account. However, black-market prices eroded real incomes tremendously, as is clear from the following illustrative indices: The 1945 Index of Black-Market Prices (1939 = 100) Coffee 3500-4700 Sugar 2900-5000 Cigarettes 2000-3450 Butter 1700-3700 Pork 1500-1900 Woolen cloth 830-4200 Flour 800-1500 The above described inflation resulted in economic and social distortions traditionally associated with this undesirable monetary condition. It gave rise to a new distribution of income and wealth, rendering some persons and firms prosperous, while impoverishing others. Regardless of the degree to which a relatively few benefited from war scarcities, the nation as a whole became a heavy loser - and an easy prey for postwar propagandists. The conclusion appears to be warranted that whatever assets fell through the German net of exploitation described above were caught by the impact of inflation.

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VIII. EPILOGUE: THE INDEPENDENT SLOVAKIA

The national sovereignty of Slovakia was in many respects as fictitious as was the autonomy of Bohemia and Moravia. Nevertheless, it was only at the end of World War II that the Slovak Republic became Germany's economic puppet. During the first years of their independence, the Slovaks went along with the German policies of industrial concentration and centralization, in addition to Aryanization. They were not exposed to direct economic exploitation by the Nazis and did not adopt economic totalitarianism. Slovakia remained a separate customs area. While German banks exerted a strong influence on Slovak banking, the crown retained its own international character, but was subjected by Germany to even greater undervaluation than was the Czech crown. (The Reichsmark was worth 11.60 Sk.) For all practical purposes, Slovakia's dependence on the Reich was undeniable, as the following figures reveal: Slovakia's Foreign Trade With Germany (in percent of aggregates) Imports Exports 1940 total 71% (Protectorate) (44%) 1943 total 65% (Protectorate) (26%)

80% (35%) 67% (25%)

Clearing employed in the settlement of trade between the two countries also compelled the central bank in Bratislava to put new money into circulation, with the notorious effect that monetary circulation increased nine times in the course of the war years. With less thoroughgoing rationing of goods in Slovakia than in the Protectorate, differences between official and black-market prices grew to be greater in the former. The inflationary situation found expression in rapidly rising prices, as is evident from these indices for 1944 (1939 = 100):

Overall price index . Food Clothing . . . . Housing . . . .

Bohemia and Moravia

Slovakia

161 145 198 119

216 200 384 100

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The relative autonomy that Slovakia was granted after the war appeared to be a logical approach to the necessary coordination of the Western and Eastern parts of the reconstructed Republic. The preceding account of Nazi occupation has intentionally concentrated on a few selected aspects of the Czech economy in order to identify the forces which revengefully disrupted the economic organization of the prewar Republic. Economic sectors other than those specified, such as agriculture, forestry, and mining,3 also suffered, and would have to be included in a comprehensive history of those fateful years. When reviewing and recalling the war and immediate postwar events, one can hardly avoid the question: Did some other (especially West European) occupied countries have better chances and more favorable circumstances for overcoming the devastating consequences of German domination? The answer is: Yes, they did. The frosty winds of the Cold War found Czechoslovakia inextricably linked to the Soviet sphere of influence, which stark fact, plus the heritage of Nazi occupation, doomed the revival of economic and political liberalism in the country.

3

Very serious damage was done to Czech (but not Slovak) education: while universities were closed down in November 1939, enrollment in secondary schools declined between 1938/39 and 1943/44 from 94,164 students to 42,838 students. (Krai, op. tit., vol. I, p. 44.)

B CONTEMPORARY

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

1 POLITICAL

ASPECTS

The Political Role of the Coup of February 1948 in the History of Socialist Revolutions* PETER A. T O M A

Historians symbolically refer to our contemporary period as an avalanche of unsurpassable social and political upheavals. To them it represents a general historical process of modernization in which science and technology play the strategic role, and democracy and Communism the tactical part. Both systems are presently competing to control the minds of men caught in the web of this process. The outcome of this competition, it would seem, hinges on many factors and variables inherent in the problems of modernization. One such factor - a dominant one - is the method by which modernization takes place. In Communist terminology, modernization is conceived as an economic process employing the political means of socialist revolution whose function it is to bring about the birth of the new society, meaning Communism. Hence, socialist revolution constitutes a significant part of what might be called the Communist ideology of modernization. From Marx to Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung, the Communist theory of revolution has played a key role in the appeal to the minds of men interested in economic and social modernization. Today this appeal is not only intensified but also diversified.1 On the one hand, the Russian Communists are emphasizing the utility of peaceful socialist revolutions by referring to the February (1948) coup in Czechoslovakia * A grant from the Institute of Government Research (University of Arizona) and a grant from the Social Science Foundation (University of Denver) made this research possible and are gratefully acknowledged. This article represents a portion of the author's forthcoming book on Communist revolutions. 1 See "The Proletarian Revolution and Khrushchev's Revisionism". Editorial article - comment on the "Open Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (VIII)" - simultaneously published in central Chinese Communist party daily, Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily) and monthly Hung Ch'i (Red Flag) (March 31, 1964). [Hereinafter cited as JMJP-HC joint editorial]

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as a case in point; 2 on the other hand, the Chinese are denying the value of peaceful socialist revolution, and they insist that there is no historical precedent for a peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism. The aim of this paper is threefold: First, to type all socialist revolutions from 1917 to 1962; second, to reexamine the methods by which the Communist monopoly of power was effected in Czechoslovakia; and third, to evaluate the impact of the February coup on the Communist revolutionary thinking today.

I. BASIC TYPES OF SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONS

Socialist [actually meaning Communist] revolution is used here to denote the Communist bid for the monopoly of power in a non-Communist state. Operationally, then, socialist revolution prevails when the nonCommunist state's monopoly of power is effectively challenged, and persists until a Communist monopoly of power is established.3 Just how Communist power is indeed achieved may depend upon a matter of the form of struggle. It can be either peaceful (carried out without employing violence) or non-peaceful (accomplished by violent means). The forms of peaceful revolutionary struggle are: Coup d'état (when the transfer of the habit of obedience from the old to the new government is virtually automatic), plebiscite, and electoral process. The forms of non-peaceful revolutionary struggle are: Guerrilla or civil war, armed uprising, and military intervention. Since the power monopoly of the state depends largely on the habit of obedience of the governed (rather than their consent), socialist revolution usually begins with the lessening of the habit of obedience to the old government and ends, if successful, with the accomplishment of the transfer of power to the new government affiliated with the Communist system. Affiliation of the new government with the Communist system is not necessary at the time of the transfer of power (as was the case in Cuba), but affiliation with the Communist system is a prerequisite to socialist revolution. If the transfer of power to the govern2 George Kar, "The Socialist Revolution - Peaceful and Non-Peaceful", World Communist Review, V, 5 (1962), p. 33. 3 For a detailed description of this operational definition, see Peter Amann, "Revolution: A Redefinition", Political Science Quarterly, LXXVII, 1 (1962), pp. 36-53.

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ment affiliated with the Communist system fails to take place, then the revolution is unsuccessful. There have been thirty-eight socialist revolutions in the world since 1917. Fourteen were successful 4 and twenty-four were not. 5 A m o n g the fourteen successful socialist revolutions, eleven were accomplished nonpeacefully - in Russia, North Vietnam, China, Korea, Yugoslavia, A l bania, Bulgaria (1946), Poland, Hungary ( 1 9 4 7 ) , Romania, and East Germany - and three, peacefully (in Czechoslovakia, Outer Mongolia, and Cuba). Of the twenty-four unsuccessful socialist revolutions, three were peaceful attempts in Hungary, India-Kerala, and San Marino, and twenty-one, non-peaceful attempts - in Russia-Petrograd, Finland, Germany (1919), Bavaria, Austria (1919), Germany ( 1 9 2 3 ) , Bulgaria (1923), Estonia, Indonesia (1926), China: Shanghai, Wu-han, and Canton, Austria (1934), Spain ( 1 9 3 4 ) , Greece (1936), Spain (1937), Greece ( 1 9 4 4 - 4 5 ) , Burma, Malaya, and Indonesia ( 1 9 4 8 ) .

4

In Russia in October, 1917; in North Vietnam on September 2, 1945; in North Korea on September 6, 1945; in Outer Mongolia on October 20, 1945; in Yugoslavia on November 29, 1945; in Albania on January 10, 1946; in Bulgaria on September 9, 1946; in Poland on January 19, 1947; in Hungary in May, 1947; in Romania in November, 1947; in Czechoslovakia on February 25, 1948; in China on October 1, 1949; in East Germany on October 7, 1949; and in Cuba on April 16, 1961. The dates of these revolutions are approximations rather than absolutes. For example, in Cuba, April 16, 1961, had been selected as a symbolic date marking Fidel Castro's announcement of Cuba's affiliation with the Communist system. "He repeated it more fully and formally on May 1, 1961, but the former date had gained recognition as the official inauguration of the new era." Theodore Draper, Castro's Revolution: Myths and Realities (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 115. Therefore, the dates in this study are to be considered symbolic expressions enabling us to build a construct for quantitative analysis. Furthermore, there is no general agreement on dates concerning, for instance, military intervention in Eastern Europe after 1944, in either Communist or nonCommunist literature. 5 In Russia-Petrograd from July 16 to 18, 1917; in Finland from January 27 to April 12, 1918; in Germany-Berlin from January 5 to 12, 1919; in Hungary from March 21 to August 1, 1919; in Bavaria from April 13 to May 1, 1919; in Austria on June 15, 1919; in Germany-Mansfeld in March, 1921; in GermanyHamburg on October 5, 1923; in Bulgaria on September 21, 1923; in Estonia on December 1, 1924; in Indonesia-Java and Sumatra in November, 1926; in China: Shanghai in March, 1927; Wu-han from June to July, 1927; and Canton from December 11 to 14, 1927; in Austria-Linz and Vienna from February 12 to 16, 1934; in Spain-Asturias in October, 1934; in Greece from March to May, 1936; in Spain-Catalonia in May, 1937; in Greece from December 1, 1944, to January 11, 1945; in Burma from March, 1948, to the present; in Malaya from July 7, 1948, to June 30, 1960; in Indonesia-Madiun in September, 1948; in India-Kerala from April, 1957, to July 31, 1959; and in San Marino from August 14, 1945, to September 19, 1957.

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Of the eleven successful socialist revolutions that were accomplished non-peacefully, six were usurpations imposed by the agents of the occupying Soviet army in North Korea, Bulgaria (1946), Poland, Hungary (1947), Romania, and East Germany; and five were guerrilla or civil wars (in Russia, China, North Vietnam, Yugoslavia, and Albania. Of the three remaining successful socialist revolutions accomplished peacefully, two were achieved by coups d'état (Czechoslovakia and Cuba and one was a plebiscite in Outer Mongolia. Of the twenty-one non-peaceful socialist revolutions that failed, sixteen were armed uprisings - in Russia-Petrograd, Germany (1919), Germany (1921), Germany (1923), Bulgaria (1923), Estonia, Indonesia (1926), China: Shanghai, Wu-han, and Canton, Austria (1934), Spain (1934), Greece (1936), Spain (1937)e and Indonesia (1948) - and five guerrilla or civil wars - in Finland, Bavaria, Greece (1944-45), Malaya, and Burma. The form of struggle for peaceful socialist revolutions that failed was one coup d'état in Hungary in 1919 and two attempts by electoral process in India-Kerala and San Marino.

TABLE I

Four Basic Types of Socialist Revolution, Peaceful

1917-1962

Non-Peaceful

Successful

3 (8%)

11 (29%)

14 (37%)

Unsuccessful

3 (8%)

21 (55%)

24 (63%)

6 (16%)

32 (84%)

38 (100%)

In many cases, the form of struggle was not a single-factor affair. Overlapping of one form of struggle with another has been frequent in the history of socialist revolutions. For example, in North Korea and Poland, military intervention, and in Czechoslovakia and Cuba, the coups d'état were all preceded by guerrilla wars which, if not controlled, were at least infiltrated by the Communist takeover at an opportune time. Perhaps a more important factor affecting the outcome of socialist

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TABLE IX

Forms of Struggle of Four Basic Types of Socialist 1917-1962 Peaceful

Revolution,

Non-Peaceful

Coup d'état

Plebiscite

Electoral Military Guerrilla Armed Process Interven. Civil War Uprising

Successful

2 (5.3%)

1 2.6%)

0

6 (15.8%)

5 (13.2%)

0

14 (36.9%)

Unsuccessful

1 (2.6%)

0

2 (5.3%)

0

5 (13.2%)

16 (42%)

24 (63.1%)

3 (7.9%)

1 (2.6%)

2 (5.3%)

6 (15.8%)

10 (26.4%)

16 (42%)

38 (100%)

revolutions was Communist military conquest and cooperation. In fact, Communist expansion was more effective through military conquest and occupation than any other form of struggle. 6 Thus, while revolutionary

6

Since October, 1917, the following territories were acquired by the Communist through military conquest and occupation: Estonia (from October, 1917, to January, 1918); the Ukraine (from December 27, 1917, continuously); Belorussia (from December 30, 1917, continuously); Turkestan (from January 3, 1918, continuously); North Caucasus (from April, 1918, continuously); Latvia (from December, 1918, to April, 1919); Lithuania (from January to May, 1919); Slovakia (from June 16 to July 5, 1919); Azerbaidjan (from April, 1920, continuously); Armenia (from November 29, 1920, continuously); Poland-Bialystok (from July 31, 1920, to March 18, 1921); Georgia (from February, 1920, continuously); Mongolia (from March 13, 1920, to June 11, 1921); Poland: PoloskKamenetz-Podolsk line (from September 17, 1939, to June 22, 1941, and continuously after World War II); Finland-Karelia (from November 30, 1939, to June 22, 1941, and after World War II continuously); Romania-Bessarabia and Bukovina (from June 28, 1940, to June 22, 1941, and continuously after World War II); Lithuania (from August 3, 1940, to June 22, 1941, and continuously after World War II); Latvia (from August 5, 1940, to June 22, 1941, and continuously after World War II); Estonia (from August 6, 1940, to June 22, 1941, and continuously after World War II); Iran-Azerbaidjan and Kurdistan (from October 6, 1941, to May 6, 1946); Romania (from August, 1944, to May 13, 1955); Czechoslovakia (from October, 1944, to December, 1945); Subcarpathian Ruthenia (from February, 1945, continuously); Bulgaria (from September, 1944,

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Toma

attempts of all types and forms of struggle account for a total of thirtyeight incidents, military conquest and occupation, during the same period of time, total forty-two. 7 A s Figure I indicates, from 1 9 1 7 to 1920, the period of "international solidarity with the Soviet people", there were seven revolutionary attempts of various types (military intervention excluded), trying to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat, but only one succeeded, that in Russia. During the world depression years, 1 9 2 9 - 1 9 3 3 , when strikes, unemployment, and demonstrations were more c o m m o n than during any other period of Communist history, and when Communists all over the world were supposed to be guided by the program of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern (issued on September 1, 1928) calling for the creation of a "World Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" through the violent overthrow of bourgeois power and its replacement by proletarian power, there were no revolutionary attempts anywhere, and in many countries the membership in Communist parties declined rather than forged ahead. 8 After the Second World War, during the 1 9 4 5 - 1 9 5 0

to September 15, 1947); Tannu-Tuva (from October 11, 1944, continuously); Poland (from July, 1944, to May 13, 1955); Hungary (from September, 1944, to May 13, 1955); East Germany (from April, 1945, to May 13, 1955); Austria (from April, 1945, to May 15, 1955); Northern Manchuria (from August 9, 1945, to February 15, 1946); North Korea (from August 14, 1945, to January 1, 1949); Southern Sakhalin, Kurile Islands, and Port Arthur (from August 15, 1945, continuously); South Korea (from June 25, 1950, to September 10, 1950); Laos (from June, 1952, to March, 1953); Cambodia (from March to July, 1954); and Tibet (from March, 1959, continuously). (The reason for mentioning Estonia, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Turkestan, North Caucasus, Latvia, Lithuania, Azerbaïdjan, Armenia, and Georgia separately from Russia during the Bolshevik Revolution is mostly because these territories had declared their national independence without gaining recognition from any government, prior to the time of conquest and occupation by the Soviet Red Army - in most cases made up of their own nationals. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was not established until December 22, 1922.) 7 See Appendix I. 8 On the basis of empirical investigation, their is one tentative answer to the question of why, between 1929 and 1933, there were no socialist revolutionary attempts: The Communists must have learned from their past mistakes that without strong party support from the working class and the discontented masses giving them an even chance in the projected struggle - it is better to abstain and make more intensive preparations for the revolution than to take an uneven chance and risk defeat, which could be a great setback for world Communism, as evidenced by their experience in Finland, Germany, Bulgaria, etc. - countries where the Communist parties, after the abortive attempts, were driven underground.

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HML

o vO

n

N

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period, there were sixteen revolutionary attempts of various types (military intervention included); 9 this time, however, the ratio was almost reversed: There were twelve successful and only four unsuccessful socialist revolutions. Among the successful socialist revolutions, the February (1948) coup in Czechoslovakia was probably of greater significance than any other socialist revolution since World War II. It marked the beginning of a new revolutionary era in the history of socialist revolutions.

II. THE CZECHOSLOVAK EXAMPLE

The socialist revolution in Czechoslovakia, as the Czechoslovak Communist historians view it today, began on May 27, 1946, one day after the first postwar parliamentary elections, and ended on June 27, 1948, the day when the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party was absorbed into the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.10 From April 1945, (when the basic principles to which the postwar Czechoslovak government professed allegiance were spelled out in a document known as the KoSice Programme) until May 27, 1946, the Communists in Czechoslovakia were engaged in a so-called national and democratic revolution. The primary task for the Communists in this period was to build Communist strength in the nation. In practice, this meant the organization of a mass Communist party controlled by a hard-core Communist elite;11 the assumption of power by the Communist-controlled national committees;12 9 China, Indochina, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Korea, Poland, Hungary, Germany, Outer Mongolia, Malaya, Burma, and Indonesia. 10 See Jindrich Vesely, Prag Februar 1948 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1959), pp. 25 and 345. 11 While the Social Democrats, the Populists, the National Socialists, and the Slovak Democrats had only begun to establish and build their organizations, the Communists were already strengthening their mass party. . . . The Communist strength in membership was always stronger than that of all the other parties combined. See Vesely, op. cit., p. 14, and Jan Kozak, The New Role of National Legislative Bodies in the Communist Conspiracy (Washington, USGPO, 1962), p. 31. Cf. also Jan Kozak, "Znacheniye natsional'noy i demokratischeskoy revolyutsii v Chekhoslovakii dlya bor'by rabochego klassa za sotsializm" [The Significance of the National and Democratic Revolution in Czechoslovakia in the Struggle of the Working Class for Socialism], Voprosy istorii KPSS, No. 4 (July 1962). 15 "In the first months after liberation, the national committees wielded extraordinary powers, for no other authority existed and they expressed the first election of self-government after German oppression. In time they organized in

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the formation of a new people's security system and army; 13 prohibition of the revival of the political parties which had represented reactionary interests in pre-war Czechoslovakia (a group which also included the largest prewar political party, the Agrarian Party; 14 a syscommunes, districts, and provinces, and were granted broad powers of administration, both in local affairs and as arms of the authority of the government." See William Diamond, Czechoslovakia Between East and West (London, Stevens and Sons, 1947), p. 47. Although elections to the national committees were not held until May 16, 1954, shortly after the general election in 1946, the Communists - because of the support from the Soviet army until May, 1945, and because of the extraordinary strength of their own party after May, 1945 - held 55 per cent of the chairmanships of local national committees, 80 per cent of district national committees, and 100 per cent of provincial national committees. In 37.5 per cent of all local national committees, the Communists maintained an absolute majority. See Vratislav BuSek and Nicolas Spulber, eds., Czechoslovakia (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), p. 66; Vaclav Krai, ed., Vznik a vyvoj lidove demokratickeho Ceskoslovenska [The Origin and Development of People's Democratic Czechoslovakia] (Prague, Ceskoslovenska akademie vid, 1961), pp. 225 and 234; Vesely, op. cit., p. 25. Thus, the statement that "in 1944-45, under the leadership of the Communist party of Czechoslovakia, national committees became the main mass-media of our national democratic revolution", was both candid and accurate. See Krai, op. cit., p. 347, and Komunisticka strana Ceskoslovenska, Cistredni vybor, Narodni vybory [National Committees] (Prague, CJstredni vybor Komunistice srany Ceskoslovenska, 1946). 13 After the war, the former police force was replaced by the so-called National Security Corps (SNB). The majority of the new security officers were former workers and peasants, some were veterans of the 1944-45 partisan movement, and a large number of the new policemen belonged to the Communist party. The Ministry of the Interior, which was in charge of the new security organization, was headed by a Communist whose successful Communization of the SNB became one of the major issues during the February, 1948, crisis. The new Czechoslovak army was built on the Soviet model, with Soviet equipment; it resembled the Soviet army in almost every aspect of its organization, except that there were no party organizations in the Czechoslovak army units. "In the Army [we] introduced only a system of party confidants appointed from the top and reaching down to the company level . . . This system of confidants relied on the support of the enlightenment officers, and higher up it functioned parallel to the enlightenment apparatus. Thus, the organs of enlightenment became the nuclei of the party organs and the party apparatus in the Army. . . . Developments in the Army after 1945 were hastened by means of a struggle between the embryos of the new and the remnants of the old elements A significant contribution was made by some Army representatives, headed by the then-Minister of National Defense, General L. Svoboda, whom the party won to its side and who successfully carried out the military part of the government program." See Krai, op. cit., pp. 251-252. 14 This agreement enabled the Communists in Slovakia to divide party power on an equal basis with the Slovak Democrats in spite of the fact that, numerically speaking, they were actually in a minority. Until the spring of 1946, there were only two political parties - the Slovak Communist Party and the Slovak Democratic Party - in Slovakia; and because of the "parity system" (every party

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tematic purge of the political, economic, and cultural life of the country; 15 the settlement of relations between the Czech and Slovak nations on the principle of equality; the expulsion of the German minority; and other measures enabling the Communists to apply the "pincer" tactic against their enemies. In applying this technique, pressure is first created "from below" (the masses through agitation) then it is combined with pressure "from above" (a Communist-dominated national and local government 16 and parliament through legislative initiative) so that the opposition is constantly on the defense - moving in a Communist-activated area which can be described as the jaws of a pincer. The aim of this scheme is to force the rivals to yield to pressures exerted by the National Front (representing the political unity and by the workers and peasants (representing the national unity of the state) so that the adversaries can eventually be controlled and maneuvered into a desirable position for the final kill.17 In Czechoslovakia, this final act was accomplished in the middle of February 1948. Until then, the Communists were skillfully employing the "pincer" technique in a complex process of power struggle. During the first stage - the national-democratic revolution - the Communists kept alive the struggle against former Nazis and collaborators, against black marketeers and opportunists, against those hostile being represented by the equal number of officials in the local government), the Communists were able to maintain a lead over their rivals in both the Czech lands (where they had a numerical advantage) and Slovakia (where they had only one competitor). 15 "By October, 1946, twenty thousand persons had been arraigned before the People's Courts, one-third of them Czechs; 362 of them (of whom 205 were Germans) were executed, 426 sentenced to life imprisonment; 13,548 received sentences amounting to over 100,000 years; 3,771 were acquitted." See R. R. Betts, ed., Central and South East Europe, 1945-1948 (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1950), p. 176. 16 Ever since the first Provisional Government was formed in 1945, the Communists, through such fellow-travelers as Z. Fierlinger, B. Lausman, and L. Svoboda, maintained a simple majority until February, 1948. 17 The question of why the representatives of the non-Communist parties agreed to such a program in April, 1945, at Kosice, is accurately answered by a Communist historian in this passage: "What could they have done? Their political and organizational positions were still very weak, whereas the revolutionary élan of the nation was so strong and was expressed with such vigor and determination that the representatives of the bourgeoisie in the Government and the National Front had no other alternative but to consent to certain measures which, in reality, meant the undermining of the very foundations on which the capitalist order was built." Vesely, op. cit., p. 17. Cf. also Edward Táborsky, "Benes and Stalin - Moscow 1943 and 1945", Journal of Central European Affairs, XIII, 2 (1953), pp. 154-181.

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to the Kosice Programme, and against opponents of the CzechoslovakSoviet alliance. At the same time, although within bounds, the Communists encouraged private capitalist enterprise and, through their auxiliary organizations and left-wing Social Democrats, rallied support for greater civil, political, and economic rights in order to bring class antagonism into closer range. However, class struggle on such issues as "reactionary domestic forces", slow legislative work, "sabotage" by "the millionaires", the Marshall Plan, espionage for a "reactionary power", and the so-called "plot to overthrow the government" did not take place until several months after the parliamentary elections of 1946.18 The Communists in Czechoslovakia had decided first to legitimize their power through the electoral process and then to test it in a class war against the bourgeoisie involving "the revolutionary use of parliament". The main sources of the Communist strength during the socialist revolution, which in February 1948, tipped the scales in favor of the Communists were: (1) the ability to exploit the labor movement; (2) the monopolistic control of agricultural policy; and (3) the skill to transform the Social Democratic Party into a front organization serving Communist interests. Ever since the end of the war, the Communist-organized Revolutionary Trade Unions Movement (ROH) has proclaimed itself the one and only trade union organization in Bohemia and Moravia. A similar organization was established under identical circumstances in Slovakia, and on February 28, 1946, the two organizations merged into a single body called the United Revolutionary Trade Unions Movement of Czechoslovakia.19 In spite of the population loss of some 2.5 18

A s a result of the May, 1946, elections, the Communists emerged as the strongest postwar party in Czechoslovakia, with 38.1 per cent of the votes cast in their behalf. Second was the Nationel Socialist Party, with 18.5 per cent; third, the People's Party, with 15.7 per cent; fourth, the Slovak Democratic Party, with 14.1 per cent; fifth, the Social Democratic Party, with 12.1 per cent; sixth, the Slovak Freedom Party, with less than one per cent; and seventh, the Slovak Labor Party, with less than one per cent. It is noteworthy that the Marxist parties (the two Communist parties, the Social Democratic Party and the Slovak Labor Party) secured 51 per cent of the votes cast, while 516,428 out of a total electorate of 7,583,784 evaded the law of compulsory voting, spoiled their ballot papers, sent them in blank, or just declared their indifference to the election. For additional information on the elections, see Diamond, op. cit., p. 239. 19 After the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in 1939, the once-scattered and diffused labor movement (in the 1930's, the number of unions, organized by crafts, reached about 700, of which 485 were organized into 19 nation-wide centrals, while the remainder were independent) had been reorganized and unified

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million since 1939, the strength of the new trade union movement in February 1948 stood at its prewar peak of 2,250,000 - eighty-six per cent Czech and fourteen per cent Slovak members.20 This membership made it the largest single organization in the country. By law, ROH was permitted to participate in and to make suggestions about all legislative and executive matters affecting the workers; it had the right to representation on all public bodies not popularly elected; and it enjoyed a decisive position in management. Since ROH had a hierarchically centralized structure, decision-making was vested in a twenty-member Board of Trustees of the Central Council of Trade Unions (URO), both dominated by the Communist Party. Thus, whenever the Communist strategists needed to exert pressure on their rivals from below, they could call on the trade unions; the leadership of the labor movement would see to it that labor support for Communist programs was available to a notable degree. The trade unions in postwar Czechoslovakia were controlled by Communists, and not by Social Democratic bureaucrats: ROH, as a class and socialist organization, consolidated the unity of the workers' class; it enhanced its revolutionary strength and weight and, under the leadership of the Communist party, it used its strength most effectively for the fortification of the people's democratic power and for the advancement of the socialist revolution. 21

What URO was able to achieve for the Communists during the national-democratic revolution in the labor movement, the "Peasants' Commissions" were able to master in the agricultural drive during the socialist revolution. As organs of the landless, small, and medium farmers (applicants for land), these commissions - founded and con(in both the so-called Protectorate and the Slovak state) into two unions, one for private employees and one for civil servants. They became the nuclei for the passive Communist underground movement until the twilight of Nazism in Czechoslovakia. When the Russian Red Army was entering Czechoslovakia, the members of the labor movement began to organize underground national committees and revolutionary guards in factories, and after the liberation, they assumed police duties in many cities and towns. Thus, it is safe to assume that what Anton Zapotocky, leader of the Red Unions in pre-war Czechoslovakia, could not accomplish from 1927 to 1938, the Nazis achieved during their occupation of Czechoslovakia. See A. Zapotocky, Boj o jednotu odboru [The Struggle for the Unification of Trade Unions] (Prague, Prace, 1949). 20 The number of wage and salary earners in Czechoslovakia for that period was 3,500,000. See State Statistical Office, Statisticka pfirucka republiky Ceskoslovenske (Prague, Prace, 1948), p. 41. 21 Kozak, op. tit., p. 25.

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trolled by Communists - represented the strongest organized farm group demanding a new land reform in Czechoslovakia.22 Their pressure on the non-Communist parties in the Czechoslovak Parliament helped to trigger a class struggle with the bourgeoisie which, in February 1948, culminated in the Communist seizure of power. The Communist scheme for the advancement of the socialist revolution in agriculture entailed the following steps: First, the members of the Peasants' Commissions discussed a draft proposal for land reform, submitted to them by the Communist-controlled Ministry of Agriculture; then, after voting upon it, they drew up petitions and passed resolutions in favor of the draft bill which were forwarded by the thousands to Parliament, where the Communists openly agitated and debated for passage of the program. M.P.'s who were opposed to the measure were exposed as friends of "kulaks" and enemies of the people. Next, the Ministry of Agriculture announced even more drastic land reform proposals, thus exerting more pressure "from above", which in turn created greater intensity in the class struggle. In order to bring the complex process to a climax, delegations from the Peasants' Commissions - joined by representatives of other Communist-inspired organizations - stormed the Parliament building and shouted slogans demanding immediate implementation of the proposal, thus exerting more pressure "from below". Finally, the pressures from "above" and "below" closed like the claws of a pair of pincers, and the badly shaken opposition, suffering from political pressure, submitted to the passage of the land reform laws, which were interpreted by Communists and nonCommunists alike as one more Communist victory. When the last step of this scheme was actually taken on July 11, 1947, according to the Communist historian, Jan Kozâk, the consequences of it were "the liquidation of more of the economic positions of the bourgeoisie in the village, a big political defeat of the bourgeoisie (its increasing isola-

22

In accordance with the Kosice Programme, the first large transfer of land was carried out in 1945 and early 1946, when 2,946,395 hectares of land belonging to "big holders, enemies, and traitors" were confiscated and allotted, on the basis of decrees, to 305,148 families of farm workers, tenants, and small-holders. Large landowners - those holding more than 50 hectares of land - still occupied approximately one-fifth of the land, which the Communists interpreted as dangerous bourgeois strength in the countryside. Therefore, in the fall of 1946, the Communist-headed Ministry of Agriculture announced a proposal for a drastic "reform" program that would confiscate land from the so-called "real-estate holders" and "speculators", i.e., land-owners with over 150 hectares of arable or 250 hectares of cultivated land. See Kozâk, op. cit., pp. 28-29.

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tion), [and] a considerable strengthening and broadening of the bond between the workers' class and the working peasantry".23 Since it was imperative for the Communists in Czechoslovakia during the socialist revolution always to be on the offensive,24 pressures against the opposition, similar to those mentioned above, continued in full force until February 20, 1948. Twelve non-Communist party leaders in the twenty-six-member Gottwald government, exhausted and unable to cope with such pressures any longer, resigned, and thus prompted a Communist-engendered government crisis. While the disorganized opponents were still in shock, suffering from Communist "fair play", the proponents were displaying "mass support" for Premier Gottwald by organizing workers' and peasants' demonstrations and by parading armed militia-men in the town squares. Meanwhile, pressure had been mounted against a feeble old man, the President of the Republic,25 to accept the resignations of the twelve ministers and appoint new ones (Communists and fellow-travelers), hand-picked, long before the February crisis, by the Presidium of the Communist Party. With the formation of a new government, the opposition suddenly disintegrated, opportunists from the opposite side of the aisle found new allies, and the Communist Party seemed to be moving steadily toward the final stage of the socialist revolution. By February 25, 1948, the transfer from the old to the new government through the habit of obedience was, to all practical purposes, completed. The replacement of the capitalist with the Communist state's monopoly of power, however, had not become final until June 27, 1948. The period between the February coup and the June Gleichschaltung was effectively used by the Communists to win to their side the "orphans" of capitalism and to consolidate the power of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the new people's democratic state. For these ends, the Communists employed the following means: They initiated a third land reform as an overture to collectivization and announced in November 1949 that private ownership of the land would be limited to fifty hectares; 26 permitted a new influx of members into the Communist Party; 27 introduced a new constitution which formalized the transmission 23

Kozak, op. cit., p. 31. Krai, op. cit., p. 176. 25 For a personal account of President Benes' attitude toward the Czechoslovak Communists during the coup, see Josef Korbel, The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia, 1938-1948 (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1959). 26 For additional information on this, see BuSek, op. cit., pp. 250 ff. 27 For a table on membership changes, see below, p. 17. 24

Political Role of the Coup of February 1948

283

belts of the new régime; 28 gradually removed all "enemies of the people" from responsible positions in the state; and, on May 28, held a new election, this time with a single list of candidates receiving 89.3 per cent of the votes cast (the rest were blank ballots, indicating opposition), which legitimized the power they acquired in February 1948. Hereafter, the road was open for the Communists to travel with full speed towards the complete establishment of Communist monopoly of power in the state. It took them only one month to reach their destination. On June 7, Edvard Benes formally resigned his post as President of the Czechoslovak state, and on June 27, the Communist Party rejoiced over the incorporation of the expurgated rump of the Social Democratic Party. According to Klement Gottwald, President Benes' successor, June 27 was as outstanding in the history of the Czechoslovak working class as May 1945, and February, 1948.29 It symbolized the finale of a performance by the left-wing members of the Social Democratic Party under the "baton" of their leader, Zdenëk Fierlinger. First as Premier and later as Vice-Premier, Fierlinger was instrumental in converting the National Front into a "symphony orchestra" monopolized by Communist patrons. With Social Democratic support in both the government and the legislature, the Communists were able to put through all their major proposals by simple majority. Since, in the multipolar system of the national-front government, the balance lay with the Social Democrats, the non-Communists, eager to win Social Democratic support, were also prepared to yield to Social Democratic demands which, in effect, represented Communist proposals advertently assigned for implementation to their front organization. The post-war Social Democratic party, which was built vertically by the surviving left-wing leaders as an integral part of Communist power,30 served as both a Communist catalyst and a national solidifier in the political arena of new Czechoslovakia. Considering the strength of the pre-war Social Democratic Party, especially in the labor movement,31 the reason for organizing two Marxist parties rather than one at least 28

For details, see Edward Tâborsky, Communism in Czechoslovakia, 19481960 (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 165-348. 29 Komunistickâ strana Ceskoslovenska, S jednotnou stranou dëlnické k vitëzstvi socialismu [With a Unified Party of the Working Class to the Victory of Socialism] (Prague, Svoboda, 1948), p. 6. 30 See Z. Fierlinger's testimony about this in his address to the Merger Convention of the two parties on June 27, 1948; ibid., pp. 31-33. 31 For a penetrating analysis of Communist strength in Czechoslovakia and other East European countries, see R. V. Burks, The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961).

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in the Czech lands, becomes obvious. In order to capture the forty per cent of all union members who before the war belonged to Social Democratic unions, and in order to prevent the right-wing leaders from usurping the potential Social Democratic power, the left-wing leaders, supported by the Soviet army and Czech Communists, built a new Social Democratic Party which in reality became a branch of the Communist Party under a different label. Under left-wing management, the Social Democratic Party had become an indispensable tool of Communist conspiracy. Without Social Democratic support, Communist pressure "from above" would have been a fiasco and the peaceful seizure of power in February 1948, unattainable. The above analysis of the peaceful socialist revolution in Czechoslovakia is derived from arguments for the most part presented by Communist historians of that country. Our next task is to examine the Communist Chinese interpretation of the socialist revolution in Czechoslovakia in the light of the Sino-Soviet rift, and then to extricate the lessons that follow from the controversy.

III. T H E PEKING VIEWPOINT

Unlike the Communists in Prague, those in Peking are of the opinion that the Communist monopoly of power in Czechoslovakia was taken from the bourgeoisie non-peacefully during World War II, rather than peacefully during the period from May 1946 to June 1948. The Chinese Communists argue that, in the course of the anti-fascist war, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, by employing "guerrilla warfare and armed uprisings against the Fascists", was able to establish a national coalition government which "was in essence a people's democratic dictatorship under the leadership of the proletariat, i.e., a form of the dictatorship of the proletariat".32 The events in February 1948, according to the Chinese interpretation of the socialist revolution in Czechoslovakia, represent . . . a counter-revolutionary coup d'état to overthrow the people's govern-

ment by an armed rebellion. But the government, led by the Communist party, immediately deployed its armed forces and organized armed mass demonstrations, thus shattering the bourgeois plot for a counter-revolutionary come-back. These facts clearly testify that the February event was not a 'peaceful' seizure of political power by the working class from the bourgeoisie, but a suppression of a counter-revolutionary bourgeois coup d'état 32

JMJP-HC

joint editorial, March 31, 1964.

Political Role of the Coup of February 1948

285

by the working class through its o w n state apparatus, and mainly through its o w n armed forces. 3 3

In other words, Peking would like us to believe that the socialist revolution in Czechoslovakia began in August 1944 (with the "Communistled" Slovak National Uprising) and ended in May 1945, (with the "Communist-led" Prague Uprising and the establishment of the Provisional government - designated as "a people's democratic dictatorship under the leadership of the proletariat"). From then on, according to Peking, the administration, the armed forces, the police, the courts, legislation, the schools, trade, industry, foreign relations, and other parts of the state power monopoly were in the hands of Czechoslovak Communists, who, in February 1948, continued to maintain this power in spite of the "reactionary plot" to overthrow them. To those individuals who lived in Czechoslovakia prior to February 1948, or who participated in the struggle against Nazi occupation, or who were members of President Benes' state apparatus, the Chinese explanation of the socialist revolution in Czechoslovakia is at best a fantasy. Communist power in Czechoslovakia was weakest (paradoxically, however, Soviet power, because of the so-called liberation of Czechoslovakia, was strongest) from August 1944 to May 1945; it was gradually stronger in 1946 and 1947, and strongest in 1948. TABLE III

Membership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia * Period

Number of Members

May 1945 August 1945 March 1946 November 1947 January 1948 November 1948

27,000b 712,776a 1,081,544a 1,281,138b 1,539,672c 2,500,000d

* Sources: *Rude pravo [Prague], March 31, 1946; bPavel Korbel, "Numerical Strength and Composition of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia," published in mimeographed form by the Free Europe Committee, New York, 1954, p. 4; «MiloS and Marcel Zachoval, "Prispevek k problematice ünorovych udälosti v Ceskoslovensku v ünoru 1948" [A Contribution to the Analysis of Problems Related to the February Events in Czechoslovakia in February 1948], Ceskoslovensky casopis historicky [Czechoslovak Historical Journal], VI, 2 (1958), p. 191. dRude pravo, November 20, 1948. 33

Ibid.

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Peter A. Toma

As Table III shows, it took the Communists in Czechoslovakia almost three years, going through a complex process, to build up their power position in the multi-party political society before they could attempt to seize power from their rivals.34 The Communists claimed that while the other parties were organized in 60 t o 7 0 percent of the communities, Communist cells blanketed 96 per cent of all localities.33 By the end of 1947, in spite of the sample polls indicating a drop in the Communist vote, the Communists controlled all major arteries of the power organism of the Czechoslovak state. Now the Communists were ready for a showdown with their opponents; they possessed at least an even chance to win the monopoly of power in Czechoslovakia. They did so - and by doing so, they transferred the power peacefully, without violence, in February 1948, and not in May 1945. Czechoslovakia's affiliation with the Communist system was effected after, not before, the February coup. Hence, the Kremlin explanation, although not absolutely correct, is more plausible today than the Peking viewpoint. Here as elsewhere, the fascist occupation regime with its collaborators was overthrown by armed action. But the national and democratic revolution developed into socialist revolution along peaceful lines. The alliance of the Czechoslovak and Soviet people presented imperialist intervention; the workers' representatives took over the key posts in the government and the national committees, the organs of revolutionary authority; the working people established control over the nerve centers of political and economic life; the working class was united, the Communists formed a bloc with the Left Social Democrats and other democratic forces; the counter-revolutionary putsch was nipped in the bud; meetings, demonstrations and strikes but no destruction of production capacities - such was the general pattern of the February, 1948, events. The workers, led by the Communists, carried arms but did not use t h e m . . ,36 This explanation of the parliamentary road to socialism in Czechoslovakia is predicated on the Kremlin assertion, first introduced at the twentieth Congress of the CPSU, that, as a result of the changes in the world balance of forces, "imperialism and reaction" have changed their nature, the law of class struggle has changed, and hence, armed revolution as a form of struggle has become outmoded. 37 Since the essence of 34

For a revealing account of how the socialist revolution in Czechoslovakia was effected, see Krai, op. cit.; Kozak, op. cit.; and Vesely, op. cit.. 35 Rude pravo, November 30, 1948. Cf. also Paul E. Zinner, Communist Strategy and Tactics in Czechoslovakia, 1918-48 (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 124. 36 Kar, op. cit., p. 33. 37 JMJP-HC joint editorial, March 31, 1964.

Political Role of the Coup of February 1948

287

socialist revolution today is "not so much in coercion as in creating a new society",88 "revolution" in the Kremlin vocabulary now implies "social coercion" and not necessarily armed violence. Under conditions of peaceful coexistence, the Kremlin asserts, "favorable opportunities are created for the intensification of class struggle in the capitalist countries, for the national liberation movement, and socialist revolutions".39 Such opportunities" include the nationalization of certain "monopolized sectors of industry", the democratization of the management of public sectors of the economy, the development of the initiative and participation of the working people in all spheres of economic life, the creation of democratic control over capital investments in industry and agriculture, the carrying out of agrarian reforms, and others. Thus, Moscow maintains, "now the working class can carry out the socialist revolution by peaceful means if it wages a struggle to uphold and extend its democratic and social rights and gains".40 Peking, however, finds Khrushchev's thesis of peaceful coexistence the same as preaching class peace. The Chinese equate peaceful coexistence and the peaceful road to socialism with heresy committed by revisionism.41 The Chinese Communist leaders admit that historical conditions have changed fundamentally since the end of World War II;42 however, they categorically deny the Kremlin allegation that "imperialism and reaction" have changed their nature: Abundant historical evidence indicates that the reactionary classes never give up power voluntarily. . . . They are always the first to use violence to repress the revolutionary mass movement, and to provoke civil war, thus placing armed struggle on the agenda. 4 3

Inasmuch as the leaders of the Communist Party of China [CPC] believe that the chief component of the "bourgeois state machine" is armed 38

Kar, op. cit., p. 31. Pravda, January 7, 1963. 40 Kar, op. cit., p. 36. 41 For the complete text of the Chinese criticism, see "The Proletarian Revolution and Khrushchev's Revisionism", JMJP-HC joint editorial, March 31, 1964. 42 "The change is mainly manifested in the great increase in the forces of imperialism. Since the war, the mighty socialist camp and a whole series of new and independent nationalist states have emerged, and there have occurred a continuous succession of armed revolutionary struggles, a new upsurge in the mass movements in capitalist countries, and the great expansion of the ranks of the international Communist movement; the international proletarian socialist revolutionary movement in Asia, Africa, and Latin America have become the two major historical trends of our time." JMJP-HC joint editorial, March 31, 1964. « Ibid.

39

288

Peter A. Toma

force and not parliament, to them the acquisition of a stable majority in parliament by the proletariat through elections is either impossible or undependable. They consider it impossible because roughly one half of the Communist parties in the capitalist countries are still illegal and undependable, since the bourgeoisie can always change the electoral laws of the country. Thus, in Mao Tse-tung's own words, The seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution. This Marxist-Leninist principle holds good universally, for China and for all other countries. . . . We may say that only with guns can the whole world be transformed.44 Hence, the Chinese Communists exalt their own concept of armed revolution and repudiate the Kremlin concept of peaceful transition.

IV. C O N C L U D I N G OBSERVATIONS

Eight years ago, at the Congress of the CPSU, the Communist theory of socialist revolution was reexamined in the light of certain fundamental changes that had taken place in the world since the Second World War. As a result, revolution was termed synonymous with social coercion rather than armed violence. Moscow's optimal belief in peaceful socialist revolution - challenged by Peking - is based on the premise that, under conditions of peaceful coexistence, favorable opportunities are created for the intensification of class struggle in the capitalist countries, for the national liberation movement, and socialist revolutions in the underdeveloped areas. The Kremlin leaders cite Czechoslovakia as a case in point. "Here as elsewhere, the fascist occupation regime with its collaborators was overthrown by armed action. But the national and democratic revolution developed into socialist revolution along peaceful lines." 45 Peking, on the other hand, considers the achievement of the socialist revolution in Czechoslovakia a non-peaceful development during the final stage of World War II. "From China to Cuba", Peking proclaims, "all [Communist] revolutions, without exception, were won by armed struggle and by fighting against armed imperialist aggression and intervention".46 Peking insists that there is no historical precedent for peaceful transition 44

"Problems of War and Strategy", Selected Military Writings (Peking, Foreign Language Publishers, 1963), pp. 267 and 273. Quoted in JMJP-HC joint editorial, March 31, 1964. 45 Kar, op. cit., p. 33. 46 JMJP-HC joint editorial, March 31, 1964.

Political Role of the Coup of February 1948

289

from capitalism to socialism, and therefore regards the use of violence as a prerequisite to proletarian revolution. How accurate is the Chinese contention? Is there an historical precedent for a Communist party seizing power peacefully? Who has a better chance of convincing the members of the world Communist movement about the validity of the two types of socialist revolution, Peking or the Kremlin? What should be the role of the non-Communist countries, and, of course, the Czechoslovak exile, in this controversy? Unfortunately, on the basis of gross figures, Peking's argument for non-peaceful methods of socialist revolutions is historically justified. As Table I shows, eighty-four per cent of all socialist revolutions were non-peaceful and only sixteen per cent were peaceful. Seventy-eight and one-half per cent of all successful revolutions were non-peaceful and only twenty-one and one-half per cent were peaceful. However, if we disregard the old cliché that history repeats itself and take into consideration the present danger of the annihilation of mankind, then the Chinese claim obviously cannot be justified. Furthermore, if we accept the premise that it was predominantly the Western challenge manifested by the arms race, the ability to cope with chronic tension during the ice period of the so-called Cold War, the nuclear stalemate, and the ability to overkill that compelled the Soviet Union to seek competitive peaceful coexistence, which, in turn, made war and violent revolution obsolete as methods of continuation of foreign policy, then we must also admit that the success or failure of the Chinese advocacy of their own concept of revolution will depend largely on whether or not the nonCommunist countries will permit Mao Tse-tung to prove his theory in practice. Should the Chinese Communist leader be successful in his endeavor, we can be certain that all gains toward peace would suddenly be jeopardized by the blind ambition and excessive optimism of the Communist warmongers. It must, therefore, be the duty of all peaceloving nations of the world to prevent the militant Chinese philosophy of revolution from becoming a practical tool of international politics. This must be the goal of all nations, using every available means, including that of the Quai d'Orsay (working to resolve the issue by using political power rather than military force). As the most powerful nonCommunist country in the world, the United States must let Peking know that any Communist Chinese-sponsored revolution or military adventure anywhere in the world would invoke multilateral action against her. Perhaps Communist China will one day realize - as did Communist Russia - that any change by force is futile, especially when

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Peter A. Toma

it incorporates the possibility of self-destruction. If, however, the Soviet Union should continue to promise military aid to Communist China in case of war, it is doubtful that Peking will soon change its bellicose attitude toward the United States and her allies. One might even venture to argue that the present-day polarized Communist system is, militarily speaking, as strong as ever, because it is able to accommodate extremists of the left and the right, as well as those in the center of the spectrum, without actually sacrificing its security arrangement. Thus, while the Sino-Soviet dispute leads to internal diversification of the Communist system, its security remains inviolate. The Sino-Soviet controversy over the concept of socialist revolution must not go unchallenged by the Czechoslovak exile. It should induce a reexamination and a response. It is high time for the world, engaged as it is in the struggle between darkness and light, to learn the truth concerning the events of February 1948. No apologia or rationalizations of any kind can help prevent repetition of the pincer technique, skillfully used by Communists in Asia, Africa, Latin America, or Europe. Just as the Communists were able to learn from their own past mistakes - i.e., the unsuccessful Communist revolutions - so must democracies learn from the weaknesses they showed in the past, vis-à-vis totalitarianism. The argument that the Communist coup d'état of February 1948 in Czechoslovakia was successful because of "the display of Soviet power" has very little validity today, especially when the question is raised: Was not the display of Soviet power in Czechoslovakia strongest from May to December 1945; less strong in 1946, and gradually weaker in 1947 and 1948? Had the Czechoslovak Communists considered "Soviet power" to be the key to a successful socialist revolution, in all probability, the Prague coup would have been carried out before December 1945 - before the Soviet army withdrew from Czechoslovakia. The fact remains that, unlike Poland, Hungary, Romania, Finland, Bulgaria, and other countries where the Communist parties were outlawed shortly after World War I, in Czechoslovakia, the Communist party had a long tradition - interrupted only during World War II and a favored position in the multi-party system of the first republic. It ranked as the second largest party in the general elections held in 1925, and third in the general elections of 1929 and 1935. Hence, the strength of the Communist party of Czechoslovakia was built rapidly and effectively after the Second World War. Yet, the Communists had to apply all available democratic and undemocratic means for almost three years to capture the monopoly of power in Czechoslovakia.

Political Role of the Coup of February 1948

291

This reporter's aim is not to judge but to examine, not to condemn, but to correct. Much is yet to be learned from the mistakes committed by the leaders of the democratic forces of the post-World War II Czechoslovak Republic. This plea, therefore, is addressed to those who can bring light to darkness, so that truth shall prevail, even at the cost of self-criticism and loss of pride. Let us prove to the world that we are worthy pupils of our late teacher, Thomas Garrigue Masaryk.

APPENDIX

Place (In Chronological Order)

COMMUNIS!

Military Conquest and Occupation

Russia (Petrograd) Russia Estonia (SRA) X.1917-I.1918 XII.27,1917Ukraine (SRA) XII.30,1917Belorussia (SRA) 1.3,1918Turkestan (SRA) Finland IV.1918N. Caucasus (SRA) Germany (Berlin) XII.1918-IV.1919 Latvia (SRA) I.-V.1919 Lithuania (SRA) Hungary Bavaria Austria VI.16-VII.5,1919 Slovakia (HRA) IX. 1920Azerbaïdjan (SRA) Armenia (SRA) XI.29,1920 Poland (Bialystok-SRA) VII.31,'20-111.18 ,'21 Georgia (SRA) 11.1921Germany (Mansfeld) Mongolia (SRA) III.13-IV.11,1921 Germany (Hamburg) Bulgaria Estonia Indonesia (Java) China (Shanghai) China (Wu-han) China (Canton) China (Prov. Govt.) Austria (Linz-Vienna) Spain (Asturias) Greece Spain (Catalonia) Poland (Polosk-Podolsk-SA) IX. 17,'39-VI.22,'41 IX.30,'39-VI.22,'41 Finland (Karelia-SA) VI.28,'40-VI.22,'41 Romania (Bessarabia and Bukovina-SA) 37. Lithuania (SA) VIII.3,'40-VI.22,'41 38. Latvia (SA) VIII.5,'40-VI.22,'41

Types of Socialist Revolutions Peaceful

NonPeaceful

1.

X

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

X

Key:

Successful

XII.30,'22

Unsuccessful VII.16-18,1917

I.27-IV.12,1918

X X

1.5-12,1919

X

III.21-VIII.1,'19 IV.13-V.1,1919 VI.15,1919

X

III.1921

X

X.5,1923 IX.21,1923 XII. 1,1924 XI. 1926 III.1927 VI.-VII.1927 XII. 11-14,1927

X X

X X X X X X X

X.1,1949

X X X X

SRA = Soviet Revolutionary Army HRA = Hungarian Red Army SA = Soviet Army AVNOJ = Anti-Facist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia LNC = National Liberation Movement PEEA = Pan-Popular Committee of National Liberation EAM = National Liberation Front ELAS = People's Liberation Army PP = Prague Uprising

11.12-16,1934 X.1934 III.-V.1936 V.1937

ÌXPANSION, 1917-1962

Forms of Revolutionary Struggle Military Interv. Armed Uprising

Plebiscite Guerrilla or Civil War

Coup d'Etat

VII.16-18,1917 X.1917-XII.1922

I.27-IV.12,1918 1.5-12,1919 III.21 -VIII. 1 1 9 IV.13-V.1,1919 VI.15,1919

III.1921 X.5,1923 IX.21,1923 XII.1,1924 XI. 1926 III. 1927 VI.-VII.1927 XII. 11-14,1927 II.12-16,1934 X.1934 III.-V.1936 V.1937

XI.7,'31-X.1,'49

SNP = Slovak National Uprising KRN = National Council of the Homeland AL = People's Army KPA = Korean People's Army NVPA = North Vietnamese People's Army CPA = Chinese People's Army PEL = People's Emancipation League 26JM = 26th of July Movement

Elect. Process

APPENDIX (continued)

Place (In Chronological Order)

3940. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73.

COMMUNIST EXPANSION, 1917-196

Military Conquest and Occupation

Estonia (SA) VIII.6,'40-VI.22,'41 Iran (Azerbaidjan-SA) X.6,'41-V.6,'46 Indochina (N. Vietnam) Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) Albania (LNC) Greece (PEEA-EAMELAS) Bessarabia & Bukovina (SA) VI. 1944Karelia (SA) VII. 1944Latvia (SA) VII. 1944Iran (Azerbaidjan-SA) VII. 1944VIII. 1944Lithuania (SA) IX. 1944Estonia (SA) Romania (SA) VIII.'44-V.13,'55 X.'44-XII.'45 Czechoslovakia (SNP-PP-SA) VII.'44-V.13,'55 Poland (KRN-AL-SA) IX.'44-IX.15,'47 Bulgaria(SA) Hungary (SA) IX.'44-V.13,'55 X.l 1,1944Tannu-Tuva (SA) 11.1945Subcarpathian Ruthenia IV.'45-V.16,'55 Austria (SA) IV.'45-V.13,'55 East Germany (SA) Northern Manchuria (SA) VIII.9,'45-11.15,'46 VIII.14,'45-1.1,'49 North Korea (PEL-SA) VIII. 15,1945So. Sakhalin, Kurile Is. & Port Arthur (SA) Outer Mongolia Malaya Burma Indonesia (Madiun) VI.25,'50-IX.10,'50 South Korea (KPA) VI.'52-III.'53 Laos (NVPA) 1II.-VII.1954 Cambodia (NVPA) India (Kerala) III. 1959 Tibet (CPA) San Marino Cuba (26 J M)

Totals Key:

42

Types of Socialist Revolutions Peaceful!

Nonpeacefull

X X X

Successful

IX.2,'45 XI.29,'45 1.10,'46 XII. 1,'44-1.11,'45

X

X X X X

Unsuccessful

XI. 1947 11.25,1948 1.19,1947 IX.9,1946 V.1947

X

X

X.7,1949

X

IX.6,1945 X.20,1945

X

VII.7-16,1948 III.1948IX. 1948

X X X

1V.'57-VII.31,'59

X

X

IV.16,1961

X

6

32

14

SRA = Soviet Revolutionary Army HRA = Hungarian Red Army SA = Soviet Army AVNOJ = Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia LNC = National Liberation Movement PEEA = Pan-Popular Committee of National Liberation EAM = National Liberation Front ELAS = People's Liberation Army PP = Prague Uprising

VIII.14,'45-IX.19,';

24

Forms of Revolutionary Struggle Military Interv. Armed Uprising

Guerrilla or Civil War

Plebiscite

Elect. Process

Coup d'Etat

III.1941-VII.20,'54 XI.1942-XI.29.1945 IX. 1942-1.10,1946 III. 1944-1.11,1945

IX. 1947

VIII.'44-V.9,'45

11.21-25,'48

1.19,1947 IX.9,1946 V.1947

V.30,1949

IX.'44-VIII.14,'45

IX.6,1945

IX, 1948

X.20,1945

VII.7,'48-VI.31,'60 III.1948

IV.'57-VII.31,'59 VIII.14,'45-IX.19,'57 VII.26,'53-1.1,'59

6

16

10

SNP = Slovak National Uprising KRN = National Council of the Homeland AL = People's Army KPA = Korean People's Army NVPA = North Vietnamese People's Army CPA = Chinese People's Army PEL = People's Emancipation League 26JM = 26th of July Movement

IV.16,1961

3

1

2

Action Committees A Case Study of the Application and the Use of Action in the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party

Committees

VRATISLAV BUSEK

"Action committees" were used as a revolutionary weapon by the Communists during the coup d'état in Czechoslovakia of 1948. Very few people remember today that in 1920, the left wing of the Social Democratic Party used the "action committee of the workers of Prague" to occupy the publishing house of Prâvo lidu and Lidovy dûm and provoked a week-long general strike, trying to take over the leadership of the Social Democratic Party from the right wing and to force the Party to abandon the coalition with the bourgeois parties and to adhere to the Third Socialist International controlled by the Communists. Superficially, those action committees resembled the councils of workers, soldiers, and sailors, which made their first appearance in Russia in 1905 and the Bolshevists' Soviets of 1917. The shortlived attempt of 1920, led by Bohumir Smeral, Antonin Zâpotocky, and J. Haken, was unsuccessful, but it was not forgotten by the Czechoslovak Communist Party, which was founded in 1921. 1 During the first days of the Communist coup d'état, late in February and during early March 1948, several hundred thousand action committees mushroomed all over the country, not always according to the plans of the Communist Party. Action committees were formed in the office of the President of the Republic, in government departments, offices, and associations, in universities, in the state opera and other theatres, and in the conservatory of music; they took over control of Parliament, the local, district, and provincial national committees, the railroads, the Boy Scouts, the Sokol gymnastic association, all publishing 1

Miloslav Broucek, Ceskoslovenskâ tragedie [The Czechoslovak Tragedy], in Czech, published in Germany (1956), pp. 55, 58, 59; Ivo Duchâcek, "Czechoslovakia: The Classic Maneuver" in The Strategy of Deception: A Study in Worldwide Communist Tactics, edited by Jeane J. Kirkpatric, (Farrar, Straus & Co., New York, 1963), pp. 249, 250; Vlastislav Chalupa, "Action Committees Weapon of Revolution", in Vëstnik, Organ of the Czechoslovak National Council of America, Chicago, 111., February 1964.

Action

Committees

297

houses, the media of communication, and others; they were formed even in factories, replacing the existing factory committees, "závodní vybory", controlled by Communists already. The action committees quickly replaced the legally elected or legally appointed managers of all important institutions and agencies in the nation, who were summarily dismissed and replaced by staunch Communists. It seems to me that neither Chalupa nor other authors who have dealt with those events and the action committees distinguish clearly enough between the illegal action committees in general, mentioned above, and the extralegal action committees, which were established in the political parties.2 To understand fully the real meaning of the action committees in the political parties we have to sketch in a few words the structure of the political parties throughout the history of the Czechoslovak Republic, especially that of the National Front. Czechoslovakia was a multiparty state, with large national minorities and many economic and social problems. N o political party ever reached an absolute majority in 2

Jaroslav Mlynsky's article,, "Úlona akcních vyborü Národní fronty pri zajist'ování únorového vitëzstvi. K cinnosti akcních vyborü N F v ceskych zemích v r. 1948" [The Task of the Action Committees of the National Front in Safeguarding the February Victory - The Activities of the Action Committees of the N F in the Western Provinces in 1948]; In Sbornik historicky 12, published by Nakladatelství Ceskoslovenské akademie vëd, 1964 (printed 2/65) was not available at the time this paper was presented to the Second Congress of the Czechoslovak Sociey of Arts and Sciences in America, Inc., at Columbia University, New York City, September 1964. It became available to the author late in 1965. Mlynsky, as suggested by the title of his article, does not shed much light on the origin of the action committees of the National Front, being mainly concerned with the activities of the action committees of the N F after the February coup d'état. He does not distinguish clearly between the legal character of the action committees in general and that of the action committees of the National Front, as the author of this paper has tried to do. The subsequent availability of the Mlynsky article thus did not result in any changes in the conclusions of this paper. References will be made to the Mlynsky article only in some additional notes. See also Ivo Ducháíek, The Strategy of Communist Infiltration: The Case of Czechoslokakia (Yale Institute of International Studies, Frederick S. Dunn, Director, New Haven, Conn., July 1, 1949), pp. 1-47; Mimeographed. Ivo Duchácek, The Strategy of Communist Infiltration: Czechoslovakia, 1944-1948; "The February Coup d'état in Czechoslovakia", World Politics, Vol. II, No. 3 (April 1950) and Vol. II, No. 4 (July 1950). H. Gordon Skilling, "The Prague Overturn in 1948", Canadian Slavonic Papers, No. 4 (1959), pp. 88-114; H. Gordon Skilling, "The Breakup of the Czechoslovak Coalition 1947-1948", Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Sciences, vol. 26, No. 3 (Toronto, August 1960), pp. 396412; Karel Kaplan, "On the Role of Dr. Edvard Benes in February, 1948", Histórica, Vol V (1963) (published by CSAV, Prague), pp. 239-265.

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elections. The coalition system was, therefore, a necessity to keep the government working. The experience of half a decade of conspiratory collaboration against Austria produced a solidarity of feeling, of national unity, among the parties which crystallized in the "petka", a coalition of five major political parties, as an unwritten convention of the Czechoslovak Constitution.3 Political parties are the essence of political power and are considered necessary in a democracy, even in the Communist so-called "people's democracies". Political parties did not have any legal status. From time to time, there was much criticism of the lack of intraparty democracy and especially of the system of rigidly tied lists of candidates. In various coalition governments, there were some experts, officials, and technicians who were appointed by the President, in addition to the parliamentary cabinet members. Only two governments consisted exclusively of experts for short periods during parliamentary crises when the usual coalition cabinet could not be constituted. In all those coalition governments, the Agrarian Party always participated, mostly in a leading role; the Communist Party always refused to join any coalition, professing the principle of dictatorship of the proletariat. They never forgot that in 1920, the coalition government, headed by the Social-Democratic Premier, Tusar, had yielded to the first cabinet of experts, headed by Cerny, who energetically suppressed their abortive coup in the SocialDemocratic Party and their general strike. After the Munich agreement of 1938, the Czechoslovak Parliament lost its influence on the government. Political parties were outlawed or disbanded. The German occupation ended the constitutional phase of the Czechoslovak state, weakened the foundation of its democratic order, and decimated its political leadership. The six-year lapse in legal political activity further impeded the restoration of a democratic state.4 The Czechoslovaks got their first lesson in totalitarianism during the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, imposed by Hitler, and in Slovakia, by the Nazi-like Hlinka Party. Fear broke the backbone of many Czechoslovaks who became accustomed to political terror, intimidation, and liquidation of enemies of the regime. The sense of political stability and personal security was lost. What was much worse, the feeling of national unity was lost, too. 3

Malborn W. Graham, "Parties and Politics", in Robert Kerner, Czechoslovakia (Univ. of California Press, 1949), p. 140; Curt Beck, "Politics and Political Organizations", in Vratislav BuSek and Nicholas Spulber, Czechoslovakia (Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1957), pp. 62, 64. 1 Curt Beck, I.e. 64.

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The Czechoslovak underground resistance movement split into the democratic pro-Western line of the exile government in London, led by President Benes, and the Communist pro-Soviet line, led by Gottwald from Moscow. Some of the pre-Munich political parties were represented in the State Council, an advisory body to the President, and in the Cabinet. Benes wanted to synchronize the activities of the Czechoslovak Communists in Moscow and to include some of the Communists in the London government. The Communists were unwilling to enter his government unless it was reorganized. During his trip to Moscow in 1943, Benes agreed to the Communist demand for a program of economic and social change after the liberation. Benes and Gottwald favored the cooperation of the Communists, Social Democrats, and National Socialists with the People's Party in a united "National Front". 5 On February 28th, 1945, eighteen representatives of the National Front in Moscow and London issued a patriotic appeal to the Czech people at the dawn of liberation.6 Benes and some members of his government returned to Czechoslovakia in May, 1945. They first stopped in Moscow, where further concessions were made to the Czechoslovak Communists. "The agreements reached by Benes and Gottwald in 1943 and 1945 formed the basis of the Kosice Program of the Government of the National Front, accepted on April 5th, 1945." 7 At first glance, the National Front resembled the "petka" system and the coalition system to which the Czechoslovak people had been accustomed in pre-war times. The National Front consisted of the Czech(oslovak) and the Slovak Communist Parties (officially separated, but in fact a single party), the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party (the Slovak Social Democrats merged with the Slovak Communists), the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party, the Czechoslovak People's Party, and the Slovak Democratic Party. No party outside of the National Front was permitted to organize. For the first time, the Communist Party was included in the governing coalition. The Party Coalition had become a Party Directorate. 5

Curt Beck, I.e. 64, 65; Edward Taborsky, Communism in Czechoslovakia 19481960 (Princeton Univ. Press, 1961), pp. 10-15. « Published in Csl. listy, No. 4, Vol. Ill (Moscow, Feb. 28th); reprinted in Za svobodu ceskeho a slovenskeho ndroda, Sbornik dokumentu k dejindm KSC v letech 1938-1945 (SNPL, 1956), pp. 364-367. 7 Program prve domaci vlady republiky, vlddy Ndrodni fronty Cechu a Slovaku, Sbirka dokumentu, Ministerstvo informaci (Prague, 1945), pp. 9-29.

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The absence of any opposition party transformed the parliamentary system into a parliamentary dictatorship.8 The Constitution of 1920 was still considered valid, but a few changes occurred in the overall character of the pre-war liberal-democratic Czechoslovak Republic which were not quite apparent immediately after the liberation. We are limiting ourselves here to a study of the National Front and are not criticizing the causes which led to it. Strange as it may sound today, the real Communist idea of the National Front was not quite evident at that time. The idea of the "National Front" was disguised under various names and forms in various peoples' democracies and the Communists used various tactics and timetables to exploit it for their real purposes. The idea of the "National Front" as a cover-up for the Communist plans to seize full power at an appropriate time was formulated for the first time in June 1942 in Moscow by the Bulgarian Communist leader and former secretary general of the Cominform, Georgij Dimitrov. According to his plans, the so-called Fatherland Front was formed in Bulgaria. The transformation of the Fatherland Front from a Party Coalition into a monolithic political organization under Communist political control became a reality in 1948.° Hungary got acquainted with this idea in 1949-1953, when the socalled National Independent People's Front was established.10 In Poland, a Front of National Unity was solemnly proclaimed in the period of struggle against Hitler, but in 1949 this National Front remained only a slogan and the Communists at that time still tried to hide under the cover of the Polish Workers' Party.11 In Czechoslovakia, the National Front was an extra-parliamentarian and extra-governmental body, composed of "licensed" parties, which nominated their representatives in the National Front. Like the pre-war political parties, it did not have any legal or constitutional status, but, like them, it was a real source of power. "The Kosice Program was in fact a political mandate, because it presented to the people the only political organization legally permitted 8

Beck, 1, pp. 65, 66. Bulgaria, L. A. D. Dellin, editor (Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1957), pp. 116, 125; Gsovski and Grzybowski, Government, Law and Courts in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Vol. I, art. "Bulgaria", by Ivan Zlatin, P. 207 (Fredrick A. Praeger, 1960). 10 I.e.: Gsovski and Grzybowski, art. by George Torzsay Biber, p. 291; anonym, art.: "Party and Political Organizations", in Hungary," edited by E. C. Helmreich (Frederick A. Praeger, 1957). 11 I.e.: Gsovski-Grzybowski, art. by Grzybowski and Jozef Gwozdz, pp. 332-333. 9

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to operate in Czechoslovakia. Within the National Front power was centered in the Central Committee, in which the Communist Party figured significantly. The Communists tried to establish the National Front Committees on lower levels too (in provinces and districts), but without success. In the Central Committee of the National Front an parties were usually represented by their secretary general. Special committees of the National Front used to be established ad hoc. Thus the Central Committee of the National Front assumed the role played by the party directorate in the pre-war Republic without, however, being checked by opposition in the National Assembly." 12 "The creation of the National Front considerably improved the position of the Communists. They had the support of other parties in eliminating the opposition, especially in regard to the conservative Agrarian Party. The non-Communist parties believed they would gain votes by dissolution of the rightist parties, their printing houses and other material resources too. The Communists, under the guise of 'national unity', compelled the other parties to follow their policies or else bear the blame for dissension within the National Front." 13 Still in London, in 1945, a "socialist bloc of workers of town and country" was created, where the Communist Party, the Social Democratic Party, and the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party were supposed to unite their efforts towards socialization of the liberated country. The Communist Party hoped that with the help of the Social Democratic Party, at least with the support of its left wing, headed by fellow traveller Zdenek Fierlinger, the less reliable Czechoslovak National Socialist Party could be brought under control. Then, with the unity of the "socialist bloc" secured, the Communist Party was sure to command the National Assembly.14 But this trick did not work, because the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party, back home in June 1945, refused to participate in the "socialist bloc".15 Even this trick of the "socialist bloc" was not without analogy in other 12 C. Beck, I.e. 85; Stephen Kocvara, "Czechoslovakia", 2: Particular Features, p. 232 in Vladimir Gsovski and Kazimierz Grzybowski, Government, Law and Courts in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Vol. I, 1960 (Frederick A. Praeger, New York). 13 C. Beck, I.e. 66; Paul E. Zinner, Communist Strategy and Tactics in Czechoslovakia 1918-1948. (Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1963), pp. 103-104, 149151. According to Skilling. I.e. 400, 62% of population were in favor of the Kosice-Program and 28,8% approved it with reservations. 14 Zinner, I.e. 149-151. 15 Boh. Lausman, Kdo by I vinen?, (Vienna 1953), p. 97; Mlynsky, I.e. 130.

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"People's Democratic Republics". In Hungary during the first half of March 1946, a left-wing block was established, with more success, by the Communist Party and its dependencies: the National Peasant Party and the Social Democratic Party. It aimed at the destruction of the powerful Smallholders Party.16 Without the help of the "socialist bloc", the National Front was not always satisfactory to the Communists. The Communists hoped that the 1946 elections would give them the badly needed absolute majority in the National Assembly. Until then, they used and abused the key positions which they got hold of in the government, in the people's committees, in the local governments, and in all mass organizations, especially the trade unions, during and after the liberation. The peaceful coexistence in the National Front was not quite so peaceful in 1945-1946. When the Allied forces (the Red Army and the American Army) left Czechoslovak territory in the fall of 1945, the non-Communist population got more courage to resist the Communist terror and many clear violations of the Kosice agreement. For them, the coming elections in 1946 too were to bring the answer. The results of the Czechoslovak elections of 1946 were not quite satisfactory to the Communists, who obtained only 38 percent of total votes. More than before, the Communists needed the support of the Social Democratic Party in the government, which party had received 12.1 percent of the votes. With the support of the Social Democrats and the (Slovak) Labor Party, the Communists had a majority in Parliament of only 50.8 percent. The support was not always reliable, though.17 The result of the 1946 elections was much more unfavorable to the Communists in Slovakia, where the Slovak Democratic Party carried 62 percent of the total vote and the Communists polled only 30.4 percent. The rest was shared by two parties established shortly before the elections, the Freedom Party, which got 3.7 percent, and the Labor Party, which got 3.1 percent. On January 22, 1947, Klement Gottwald for the first time attacked the "reactionary forces in the National Front". He declared that it was necessary for the Communist Party to reach an absolute majority in the 16

Gsovski-Grzybowski, I.e. George Torzsay-Biber, p. 281. The leader of the Social Democratic Party, Zdenek Fierlinger, controlled only 40 percent of the members of the Social Democratic Party. The Social Democratic Party was usually willing to cooperate with the Communists to promote social progress, but in political matters preferred to cooperate with other nonCommunist Parties, because the Communists, especially in factories, very often recklessly enlarged their positions. 17

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next elections, in 1948. To achieve this goal, Gottwald declared, the Communists must step up their aggressiveness against the reaction.18 On April 1, 1947, an article appeared in Moscow in Novo je vremje, which was reprinted in Rudé prâvo, stating that the number of reactionaries in the National Front was increasing, especially among the Czechoslovak National Socialists. In 1947 the international and internal situation was worsening for the Communists. The Czechoslovak nonCommunists were achieving more courage, but the National Front still worked as usual, not shaken by the gathering storm. In June 1947, the Czechoslovak Government unanimously decided to adhere to the Marshall Plan. It was encouraged by the identical intention of the Polish Government. A governmental delegation was sent to Moscow, but, on July 10, Stalin strongly rebuffed this decision and Gottwald received a stern lesson in Communist behavior from him. The Czechoslovak Government had to revoke its decision, unanimously. On that day President Benes had one of his worst strokes, which paralyzed his judgment and action.19 The days of Czechoslovak "independence" were numbered. Perhaps they came to an end in Moscow during those days, perhaps a little later. Unless the archives of the Cominform, or those of the Czechoslovak Communist Party or the Soviet Communist Party, are opened, nobody can tell exactly when and where the order to the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia came from that it should not take the risk of another defeat in elections and rather should seize power by a coup d'état.20 About one week after the return of the Czechoslovak delegation from Moscow, Dr. P. Zenkl (the leader of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party) and Dr. J. Lettrich (the leader of the Slovak Democratic Party) concluded a clandestine agreement on cooperation in principle. About September 10-17, the Communist Party made a similar agreement on collaboration with the Social Democratic Party. This agreement was sharply criticized among the old guard Social Democrats, who disliked being mere fellow-travellers of the Communists. At the end of September 1947, the Cominform was founded for the purpose of strengthening the ties among the Communist Parties of various countries. The then-Secretary General of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Rudolf Slânsky, reporting on that occasion on the 18 Kl. Gottwald, Spisy, Vol. 1, p. 12; Josef Korbel, The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia 1938-1948 - The Failure of Co-existence (Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 183. 19 Korbel, I.e., 182. 20 Korbel, I.e., 185.

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situation in Czechoslovakia 21 indicated some of the things to come, something of the policy to follow. He stated that the reactionaries were increasingly aggressive; that there was no unity in the leading circles of the National Front; that there was, however, unity among those who were organized in the powerful trade unions, in the Youth Association, in the Cooperatives, and in the United Association of Peasants. "These organizations", Slansky reported, "particularly the trade unions, can play a more active role in the National Front in the future. They can help more actively in its strengthening." Slansky further voiced the expectation that, with the increasing tension in international affairs, an increasing struggle of the forces within the individual parties of the National Front would develop. Slansky was positive that the "democratic elements" in the non-Communist Parties would undoubtedly follow the Communist Party. "It would be necessary", he said, "to throw the reactionary forces out of the National Front, and thus to bury forever the hopes of international and internal reaction." This is exactly what happened in Czechoslovakia during the fourth week of February 1948.22 After that date, the Communists stepped up their aggressiveness, and the internal political situation became very tense.23 Here I can only mention the so-called Krcman affair of September 11, 1947, when explosive "perfume" packages were sent to Dr. P. Zenkl, Dr. P. Drtina, and Jan Masaryk; the plot of the "agent provocateur", Komandera, against the Slovak Democratic Party, culminating in arrests of the Party Secretary, Dr. Milos Bugar, and Dr. Jan Kempny, and the forced resignation of the Vice Premier, Jan Ursiny; the so-called Most affair, plotted by the Communist "agent provocateur", Podivin, and the lesser provocation of Horcic, by which the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party was to be compromised and branded as treacherous. More important for our study was the long parliamentary struggle about the agricultural bills of J.Duris,the Communist Secretary of Agriculture. On September 30 the Parliamentary Agricultural Committee proposed a vote of no confidence in Mr. Duris, and there were even tendencies in the Committee to propose to Parliament a vote of no confidence in the entire Gottwald government. There was some discussion about the 21

Korbel, I.e., 185, 186; Zasedani deviti komunistickych stran o zalozeni informacni kancelare komunistickych stran v Belehrade (Prague, Svoboda Publishing House), pp. 113, 118. 22 Korbel, I.e., 186. 23 See LauSman, I.e., 94; Busek, Pouceni z unoroveho pfevratu (New York, C.S. Publishing Co., 1954). pp. 61-64.

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possibility of replacing the Gottwald government by a government of experts, which should prepare elections. All these possibilities were, however, rejected by the National Front. This was the last time the National Front worked and maintained the usual unity, which served the Communists at that time more than ever. Perhaps it was the last opportunity to save Czechoslovak democracy, because the Communists were not as yet prepared for a coup d'état. On October 30 the Communists arranged the so-called "little coup d'état" in Slovakia, which was a rehearsal for the later coup in Prague in February 1948. On that day, October 30, 1947, a meeting of the Slovak National Front took place in which some representatives of the Slovak mass organizations such as the Central Council of Trade Unions (URO), peasant associations, and the Partisans' Association participated.24 On November 4, Klement Gottwald convoked the National Front in Prague and invited representatives of the URO and peasant associations to attend as well. The Czech political party representatives in the National Front refused to come, and on November 17-18, Gottwald convoked a new meeting of the National Front, this time of only the legitimate political parties. On November 14-16, the General Assembly of the Social Democratic Party repudiated the agreement of cooperation between the Communist and Social Democratic Parties concluded on September 10-17, and elected Bohumil Lausman as Chairman of the Social Democratic Party. One week later, Dr. Zenkl and Bohumil Lausman concluded an agreement on cooperation in political matters between the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party and the Social Democratic Party.25 At the end of 1947, and in January and early February 1948, there were more meetings between the leaders of both parties 26 which made the Communists highly nervous, like the leaking of the news about a meeting of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party leaders with the People's Party leader, Msgr. Fr. Hâla, early in January 1948, during which a closer cooperation was agreed upon. On November 28, 1947, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia issued a warning "to those who were tinkering with the idea of excluding the Communists from the government and 24 25 26

BuSek, I.e., 61-62. Lausman, I.e., 97. BuSek, I.e., 67; Rudé

prdvo,

Feb. 17 (1948).

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installing a government of experts and hastening the elections." 27 At this meeting, Klement Gottwald made a strong statement, the seriousness of which probably escaped the democratic leaders. Gottwald declared that "the situation in the National Front was not good".28 "The reaction", he said, "wants a reversal and turn-back to the pre-Munich situation, to provoke a governmental crisis at an opportune moment and to try to establish a government of officials. From a political point of view such an attempt would mean an attempt of a reactionary coup d'état. There must necessarily be an adequate, and, for the reaction, crushing answer. Repetition of the situation of 1920 with Tusar (the Social Democratic Prime Minister) and Cerny (Prime Minister of the Cabinet of Experts succeeding Tusar) would be ideal for the reaction. But today is 1947 and an experiment with a reprise of 1920 would be deadly risky for the reaction." 29 In the elections of the university students' associations in the fall of 1947, the Communists were badly beaten. Those student elections were rightly considered by the public a preview of the coming parliamentary elections. The official polls and the Communist Party's private polls of public opinion in January 1948 confirmed the bad auspices for the Communists. On December 3, V. Kopecky, the Communist Secretary of Information, made his famous speech in which he declared that "being anti-Communist means to be guilty of high treason". Under those circumstances, the Communist Party leaders were no longer interested in elections and pushed their plans ahead for a coup d'état. Probably at the end of October 1947, J. Vodicka, the Czech delegate to the Cominform, reported to Laurentij Beria, somewhere in East Germany, that the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia had decided for a non-violent coup d'état, at the latest by Easter 1948. The National Front should be enlarged by representatives of URO, agricultural organizations, and the Partisans' Organization. The Slovak Democratic Party and the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party were to be "liqui" 2 8

BuSek, I.e., 65. BuSek, I.e., 57. 29 The reference to 1920 was a clear Communist reaction to Fierlinger's defeat at the Brno Congress of the Social Democratic Party, to the speculations in the Agricultural Committee about the possibility of a cabinet of experts, and to the later agreement between the Social Democratic and Czechoslovak National Socialist Parties. The crisis in the National Front progressed. In December 1947, the Communists were defeated in a cabinet meeting when their bill on the pay of state employees was voted down. The Chairman of the URO, A. Zâpotocky, then declared on January 10, 1948, that the URO would find ways to correct the erroneous decision. Busek, I.e., 66.

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dated". Information about this Vodicka-Beria conference was confidentially reported to the leaders of the People's Party by Edmund Rehák from Paris on December 9, 1947; he sent another confidential report on January 17, 1948, that the Communists had decided, in a secret session of the Cominform in Milan or elsewhere, to put President Benes under pressure to surrender to their plans or to abdicate. Zdenék Fierlinger allegedly discussed this plan with Valerian Zorin and was willing to become President Benes's successor.30 On January 20, 1948, the Political Bureau of the Communist Party decided that the coup d'état should take place at the end of February 1948. This historical sketch shows that the Communist Party was ready for the coup d'état, one way or the other. The main forces displayed during the Communist coup d'état in Czechoslovakia, February 13 to 25, 1948, are pretty well known today: The democratic parties based their strategy and tactics exclusively on a parliamentary basis. They were not prepared for any other alternative and probably there was no other way. They could not prepare for a bloody conflict with Communists; there were too many informers who would betray them and the Communist-controlled police would quickly step in to thwart any such attempt.31 On the other hand, the Communists used brutal force and intimidation of their adversaries whenever and wherever there was any danger that they might be the losers in the democratic parliamentary game.32 30

Both of ftehák's reports leaked into the Czech press (Lidové noviny) and there were mixed up. I must apologize for my own confusion and inexact reproduction of these reports in my Poucení z únorového prevratu, (str. 65 and 71). The plenary meeting of the Cominform actually took place sometime in January 1948 (Korbel, I.e. 202). But, in essence, my reproduction of E. ftehák's reports was correct, and ftehák gave me permission to quote him in his letter of December 11, 1955. He wrote that the late Hubert Ripka, and even President BeneSS, were aware of his warnings of December 9, 1947, and January 17, 1948, but did not consider them serious enough. Neither did the Department of Foreign Affairs. Unfortunately, ftehák's warnings were deadly serious and exact. 31 Vladimir Krajina, Ceské slovo, June 6 (1964). 32 Thus it turns out that we do not have to make any basic corrections in my Poucení z únorového prevratu [The Lesson of the February Coup d'état] (New York, 1954), and Deset let po komunistickém prevratu v CSR [Ten years after the Communist Coup d'état in Czechoslovakia] (New York, 1958). In his article "On the Role of Dr. Edvard Benes in February, 1948", in Histórica, Vol. V (published by CSAV, Prague, 1963), pp. 239-265, the Communist author Karel Kaplan candidly admits that the "formerly persecuted and oppressed (sic) working class and the Communist Party had become a political force: They had built their own state, in which they occupied a dominating position, and all the means of coercion or persuasion, such as the state apparatus, the army, the security

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The idea of a bloodless coup d'état was Gottwald's idea, probably approved by Moscow. But "bloodless" does not mean non-violent. All details could not yet be planned at that time, and in February 1948, Gottwald had to adapt his tactics to the actual situation. Slânsky (according to VI. Krajina, the former Secretary General of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party) accused Gottwald of being too soft and inefficient. Slânsky advocated a tough policy. Gottwald's success, culminating in the legalization of his bloodless coup d'état by President Benes, secured Gottwald's leadership and later led to the liquidation of Slânsky. Failure of Gottwald's "soft line" would have meant a bloody liquidation of the democratic leaders and many of their followers. It would have meant the demotion of Gottwald, too. The real trouble started as early as February 13, when the Communists in the Gottwald government were outvoted for the first time by all nonCommunist members of the Cabinet. What infuriated and united all the non-Communist parties was an ordinance of Colonel Dybal (Communist) chief of the police forces (strâz nârodni bezpecnosti) in the Province of force, radio, the mass organizations, and the press operated in their favor (pp. 263-264)." This fateful situation had developed since the Yalta and Kosice agreements. Kaplan is right in his statement that the democratic parties "failed to organize any counter force (p. 262)," but as Krajina (I.e. supra, note 31) says, there was no way to organize any such counterforce. We may note the tragic irony that Kaplan concludes his analysis (p. 261) with the same words used by the author of this paper in his Pouceni z ûnorového prevratu (supra, note 32), p. 123: "Defeat, though unavoidable, did not necessarily have to be so ignominious." Closer to the historical truth is Jaroslav Opat, Prispëvky k dëjinâm KSC [Contributions to the History of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia], No. 1, 1965, who acknowledges that "until the middle of 1947 the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was willing to cooperate with the other parties" and that "February, 1948, was a consequence of the new Stalinist line, which the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia had to follow, and not a premeditated policy of the KSC after May, 1945. The February coup d'état reflected the new international situation, which was not influenced by the KSC, and was not dictated by the evolution in the Republic." See Dr. Radomir Luza, "K 20. vyroci osvobozeni" [The 20th Anniversary of the Liberation] in IUSSY Bulletin, No. 27/28, 1965, pp. 1-2; M. Boucek, Praha v ûnoro 1948 [Prague in February 1948], Prague, 1963. The tragic error of the Czechoslovak Social-Democratic Party was its belief in the willingness of the KSC to cooperate with the other democratic parties. It, even more than the other democratic parties, should have known better the subservient character of the KSC in relation to the Soviet Communist Party. The KSC followed the line of friendly cooperation with the other parties in accordance with Stalin's orders before 1947, and it changed its policy as soon as Stalin ordered the change. The basic question remains: Why was the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia - and why has it remained to this day - Stalinist, and thus different from the Communist parties of Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary, and even Romania?

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Bohemia, removing eight non-Communist chiefs of important police districts and replacing them with reliable Communists. The security of the population would, from now on, be entirely in Communist hands. The non-Communist cabinet members refused to participate in any cabinet meetings unless this ordinance was revoked. As we know today, the Dybal Ordinance was the last step in the Communists' preparations for the coup d'état.33 The governmental crisis, which the Communists, from the very beginning, declared a crisis of the National Front, started at that moment. On February 24, 1948, Rudé prâvo "reprinted" an article from the Soviet organ Pravda which said just that. Rudé prâvo of February 17 published the "sensational" news about a secret agreement between Zenkl and Lausman on cooperation: This "revelation" was not a revelation at all, and aimed to prove that the "reactionary forces" were trying to isolate the Communist Party in the National Front. The same day, February 17, the Central Committee of the Communist Party issued a statement that, "a true National Front to defend the People's Democratic Regime will be set up." On February 18, another alarming "news" item appeared in Rudé prâvo about plans, allegedly conceived by the presidium of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party on December 5, 1947, to substitute a government of officials for the parliamentary government of Gottwald. The presidium of the Czechoslovak Communist Party issued a statement repeating that a "true National Front" would be set up under the leadership of Klement Gottwald. On the same day, a meeting of the National Front was convoked to finish its work on the draft of the new Constitution, but Jaroslav Strânsky, on behalf of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party, refused to participate unless the Dybal case was first settled within the government.34 On February 19, the idea of a "true National Front under the leadership of Klement Gottwald" was rejected by the Svobodné slovo. "For the Communists", the Svobodné slovo said, "the idea of the 'true National Front' means one single, i.e., Communist party, which should lead, and some 'annexed' parties or organizations which should follow blindly. The non-Communist parties, on the other hand, insist upon the National Front idea, to which they pledged themselves by the Kosice program, the National Front founded on principles of parliamentary 33 34

BuSek, I.e. 71 and seq. Busek, l.c., 79.

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democracy." The Social-Democratic leaders, B. Lausman, Vilim, and Tymes, strongly, though unsuccessfully, urged Gottwald to comply with the decision of the government of February 13, and to settle the crisis within the National Front.35 On the same day, February 19, the presidium of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party issued a statement entitled "Defend Parliamentary Democracy", rejecting the idea of a "true National Front" demanded by the Central Committee of the Communist Party on February 17.36 On February 20, Gottwald convoked an afternoon Cabinet meeting, but the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party refused to participate unless Gottwald placed the Dybal case on the agenda. Gottwald was evasive and announced that at this Cabinet meeting, Interior Minister V. Nosek and the Minister of Defense, General L. Svoboda, would make an important statement about the so-called Most affair. The Czechoslovak National Socialist Party declared it would be willing to discuss this matter in the National Front, but not in the Cabinet meeting. At this moment, all parties had reached a dead end. The three democratic parties ordered their twelve cabinet members to resign. They hoped the President would not accept their resignations and elections would be called immediately. The question of how far this action had been agreed upon between President Benes and the democratic leaders, especially the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party, remains unanswered today.37 But Gottwald was not willing to resign, because he still had a majority in the Cabinet, where only twelve of the twenty-six members had resigned. Late in the evening of February 20, the presidium of the SocialDemocratic Party declared that the National Front was still operative and that Gottwald should convoke a meeting of the National Front to settle the crisis by parliamentary means. On the same day, Plojhar (a deputy of the Catholic People's Party), in a telephone conversation with Gottwald, expressed his willingness to cooperate, and on the following day, Al. Neuman (a deputy of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party) 35

Busek, I.e., 81. This statement was published in Svobodne slovo, No. 43 (February 20), and amplified in a remarkable lead article, "What is the National Front", by Stanislav Kabat. 37 BuSek, I.e.; Jaromir Smutny (the former Chancellor of the President's office) in his tJnorovy prevrat, 1948, 5 vols. (London 1953-1957), states that the President had not been accurately informed about the fateful resignation; Petr Zenkl, in his article in commemoration of President BeneS's 80th birthday, published in the Canadian weekly Nase hlasy of May 30 (1964), insists that the President had been fully and correctly informed by him at all times. 36

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followed suit. Both acted without the knowledge of their legitimate party organs.38 On Saturday, February 21, Gottwald convoked a public mass meeting at Staromestske namesti, where he issued the order to establish, in all districts and counties, Action Committees of the National Front, composed of the democratic and progressive representatives of all political parties and nationwide organizations, of "new people who have remained faithful to the original spirit of the National Front". A "reorganized government of the National Front which would conduct free and democratic elections at the proper time" was promised.39 On the same Saturday, February 21, the presidium of the Communist Party and that of the Social Democratic Party exchanged letters which showed an irreconcilable difference of views: The presidium of the Communist Party invited the Social Democratic Party to join it in the reconstruction of the cabinet by "people who have remained faithful to the program of the National Front, on the basis of the real National Front". The presidium of the Social Democratic Party insisted upon the necessity of reconstructing the government on the basis of the National Front of the political parties.40 The same day, a statement of the presidium of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party (published in Svobodne slovo of February 22) reacted against Gottwald's call for "Action Committees of the New National Front in villages, districts and provinces," composed of "true progressive adherents of people's democracy from all political parties and other organizations." "It is clear", the statement said, "that this is only a maneuver of the Communist Party. When it cannot impose its will to dictate to the other parties of the National Front, it tries to create a new National Front where it would make the decisions alone. The presidium of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party strongly rejects these destructive attempts and orders all its members to refrain from participating in any similar actions and to follow only the directives of the Central Organs of the Party." On February 22, Svobodne slovo published a proclamation to the 38

J. Vesely asserts, in his Kronika unorovych dnu, p. 90 (1958), that, as early as Feb. 20, Gottwald was sure of a majority in the National Assembly, even if he could count on only the left wing of the Social Democratic Party, led by Zdenek Fierlinger; Cp Jos. Korbel, The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia, 1939-1948 (Princeton Univ. Press, 1959), p. 232. We cannot take Vesely's statement seriously: Gottwald was not sure of victory until Fierlinger and Lausman reached an agreement on cooperation with the regenerated National Front, Feb. 23-24. See infra n. 44-45. 39 Busek, I.e., 90-91. 40 BuSek, I.e., 93.

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Czechoslovak public "for a socialist and parliamentary democracy". This proclamation called for "unbiased and free elections" and stated that "cooperation is possible only in the existing National Front". The proclamation was signed by more than eighty individuals in prominent cultural or political positions, such as Vojta Benes, Prof. Vratislav Busek, Dr. Ivan Derer, Prof. Vaclav Hlavaty, Dr. Milada Horakova, Dr. Antonin Hfebik, Dr. Miloslav Kohak, Ferdinand Peroutka, and others. During the night of February 22-23, the police (straz narodni bezpecnosti) searched the premises of the Central Secretariat of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party, and on February 23, V. Nosek, the Communist Minister of the Interior, informed President Benes that during this search, police allegedly had discovered documents about preparations for an armed coup by the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party. Monday, February 23, was full of fateful events. On the following day, the National Assembly was to convene and many deputies were in Prague to attend the meeting. The National Assembly could have its decisive vote in the cabinet crisis. Hodinova-Spurna, a Communist deputy and a member of the presidium of the National Assembly, urgently requested the President of the National Assembly, Jozka David, to postpone the National Assembly meeting. The Communists evidently feared that the majority of the National Assembly might vote down the Gottwald cabinet. David, who was afraid of his responsibility, called President Benes on the telephone; the latter, strangely enough, did not tell David that, under the Constitution, the President had no right to interfere in that matter, but advised David to postpone the National Assembly session. By this political decision, he eliminated the only forum which could have legally stopped Gottwald. It may be that President Benes was afraid that Gottwald, if cornered by the National Assembly, would launch all the terror and bloodshed he was capable of. By this decision, President Benes deprived himself of the only legal weapon at his disposal, and destroyed the only hope of the three democratic parties whose ministers had resigned. Afterwards, Jozka David easily obtained the consent of the other members of the presidium of the National Assembly during the morning session, and postponed the meeting of the National Assembly to March 10 (Svobodne slovo, Feb. 25). By that time, Gottwald was sure of his majority.41 41 I am obliged to Jan Stransky, former deputy of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party, who was in David's office during that telephone conversationn, for this highly important information, not known to me before.

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On the same day, February 23, the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Social Democratic Party confirmed the resolution of the presidium of the Social Democratic Party of Saturday, February 21, that the National Front was still to be deemed in existence and that the crisis should be settled there. Likewise, on February 23, the presidium of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party adopted the same view.42 The presidium of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party urgently appealed to its functionaries, members, and followers to keep absolutely quiet in all events and despite any disturbing news, and to remain firm. "Politically, the situation, the solution of the governmental crisis, is in hands of the constitutional organs and the central executive committees of the parties of the National Front. The Czechoslovak National Socialist Party, faithful to its program and its good, fifty-year-old tradition as the most firm and loyal protector of the working people and of the most sacred rights and aspirations of the Czech and Slovak people and of the sovereign democratic Czechoslovak Republic, insists unconditionally upon the principle of a government established on a parliamentary basis and on the basis of the National Front, as it was established in accordance with the last orderly and democratically conducted elections. We do not want any other solution and we will not accept any other. In this serious moment we demand that our followers maintain strong discipline and self moderation. We instruct them everywhere to refuse to participate in the so-called 'Action Committees', which are nothing else than branches of the Communist Party. We call to the attention of all our followers that anybody who accepts a function in these committees or any other political function without the knowledge and approval of the competent party organs is putting himself out of the Party cadres . . ." On the evening of February 23, Gottwald convoked an "informative" meeting in Obecni dum, where he announced the foundation of the "regenerated National Front". The "informative meeting" in Obecni dum was convoked on a personal basis, without the knowledge and approval of the legitimate organs of the political parties. The Czechoslovak National Socialists who participated at this meeting were former deputy Ferdinand Richter and deputy Dr. B. Patkova. At this meeting, a preparatory committee of the regenerated National Front was elected, with Antonin Zapotocky as chairman.48 42

43

BuSek, l.c., 105.

According to Svobodne slovo of Feb. 25, the Secretary of Defense, Gen.

Svoboda was among the speakers who spoke for Masaryk's and BeneS's democracy. The meeting elected the following members of the Preparatory Committee:

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This Preparatory Committee was to start negotiations with political parties and nationwide organizations to establish an Action Committee of the National Front. Father Plojhar and A. Petr (People's Party deputies) were elected to this Preparatory Committee, but no representative of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party was as yet included. What the Communists most earnestly sought was the support of the Social Democratic Party, so as to create the outward appearance of having solved the crisis in a constitutional manner, and to bring the Communists out of their political isolation. After a bitter struggle between Fierlinger's and Lausman's factions during the night of February 24 (Tuesday), Fierlinger and Lausman reached an agreement.44 On Wednesday, February 25, a joint statement by Fierlinger and Lausman was published in Pravo lidu, approving the proposed new government and the new National Front on a broad basis.45 The Social Democratic Party now accepted the resignation of Secretary Vaclav Majer, and forwarded it to the President. At 11 a.m. on Wednesday, February 25, Gottwald presented to the President the list of members of his new cabinet, and the list of 166 deputies who were allegedly willing to support him. Reluctantly, as Gottwald acknowledged, Benes accepted both the original resignations of the twelve cabinet members and the later resignation of V. Majer, and appointed Gottwald's new cabinet of the "Regenerated National Front". Among the twenty-four members of the new cabinet were Prof. Em. Slechta and Alois Neuman, parading as representatives of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party.46 These men were not approved by the legitimate organs of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party.47 But Gottwald did not care any more, and for him these men were supposed A. Zapotocky, Communist deputy; Zdenek Fierlinger, dep. "Smerista"; V. Kopecky, Cabinet member, Communist; E. Erban, Sect. Genl. of ROH (Council of the Trade Union Movement), "Smerista"; J. Nepomucky, Com. dep.; Plojhar, dep. People's Party; A. Hodinova, Com. dep; Prof. Dolansky, "Smerista"; A. Petr, dep. People's Party; Dr. A. Cepicka, Com. dep; Dr. J. John, Soc. Dem. dep; Hejzlar, Com., Chairman of the SCM (Czechoslovak Youth Assoc.); J. Drda, Com. writer; Smrkovsky, Com.dep. The term "Smerista" refers to those Social Democrats who gathered with Zdenek Fierlinger around the newspaper, Smer. 44 Zinner, I.e., 213. 45 Ripka, I.e., 294; Lausman, I.e., 171; Vesely, I.e., 152. 46 The full list of the new cabinet is published in the February issue of Rude pravo and in D. A. Schmidt, Anatomy of a Satellite (1952), p. 130. 47 According to the decision of the presidium of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party (published in Svobodne slovo on Feb. 24), by accepting those functions they put themselves out of the Party's cadres.

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to be "democratic and progressive representatives of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party". President Benes surrendered to Gottwald, and, in a way, put the stamp of legality on Gottwald's coup d'état to avoid bloodshed and eventual armed intervention by the Soviets. Maybe he was even afraid that Czechoslovakia might be annexed by the Soviets. The presence in Prague of Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Valerian Zorin during those days of crisis was ominous and there were rumors in Prague that the Soviet Army was concentrating in Carpatho-Ruthenia, and that some Soviet officers were allegedly hiding in Prague.48 President Benes had some comfort in the fact that Jan Masaryk and Vavro Srobâr, in whom, at least, he could have personal confidence, were members of the new cabinet.49 At the end of the crisis, on February 25, President Benes was left alone to make his fateful decision. Three democratic parties put themselves out of play on the 20th of February, when their twelve cabinet members resigned. They put all the responsibility in the hands of a sick President, who was a great President in peace time, but weak in times of crisis. Their cause was good and they hoped that the President, who was informed of their plans and who encouraged them, however cautiously, would not abandon them. At the end, he did. The President tried to persuade Gottwald to play ball according to parliamentary rules, and applied various arguments adapted to the swiftly changing situation. During February 20 and 21, 1948, he tried to placate Gottwald by assuring him that he would never appoint a Cabinet without the Communists, recognizing their leading role. He firmly rejected any idea of a government of experts, and even if agreement among the political parties should not be reached quickly, he promised that Gottwald would lead the interim government. But he insisted that a settlement could and should be found only on a parliamentary basis. On February 22, he came to the conclusion that he had to accept the resignation of the twelve non-Communist members of the Cabinet, but he told Gottwald that he should reconstruct his Cabinet after consultation with the leaders of the three democratic parties, as usual. He excluded the possibility of reconstructing the cabinet by any stooges who 48

By some strange coincidence, the author's telephone line in Prague - Bubene£ was, for some time, connected with some place from which conversations in the Russian language could be heard clearly. 49 On Feb. 28, Dr. Prokop Drtina, called "the Rock of Gibraltar," the former personal secretary to the President, unsuccessfully tried to commit suicide, and on March 10, when the National Assembly convened, Jan Masaryk was murdered or committed suicide.

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would not represent the legitimate political parties. During the last two days of the crisis, on February 23 and 24, he stuck desperately to the idea, promoted by the Social Democrats, that the National Front still existed and that the crisis should be settled there. This argument lost its justification the evening of February 23, when Gottwald announced in Obecni dum that a "real, regenerated National Front on a broad basis" had been founded, and on the 24th when Fierlinger and Lausman reached agreement, accepting the new Gottwald government of a "new National Front on a broad basis". After that, there was nothing that could stop Gottwald. He escaped the threat of political isolation by having eliminated the independent maneuvers of the Social Democratic Party. The President himself helped Gottwald to eliminate the National Assembly, which could have been the last legal battlefield of the three democratic parties. There was no further obstacle in Gottwald's way to stop him from reconstructing the government and playing his tricks with the new National Front. He did use some political stooges, but the President was just a broken man, too afraid and too sick to argue with him. There was no constitutional rule that cabinet members could only be selected from among the political parties and the political parties did not have any constitutional standing, either. The usual parliamentary procedure was certainly violated. A new political era started, introduced by threats and intimidation, and dominated by fear. Militia, army, trade unions, and mushrooming action committees in government departments, offices, universities, and associations controlled by Communists dominated the situation. On March 10, the National Assembly convened to confirm unanimously the new Gottwald Cabinet of the regenerated National Front. It was a crippled National Assembly which had been purged by the Communists, who controlled the Clearing Committee of the Central Action Committee of the regenerated National Front. Many former political leaders escaped from the country or resigned and were replaced by new deputies, who were their substitutes and were accepted by the Central Action Committee of the new National Front. 50 50

On March 10, 251 out of 300 deputies were present. On May 6, there were only 153 at the last meeting of the National Assembly; on May 9 there were 244 deputies present. (For the varying list in the National Assembly, see BuSek, I.e., 117). According to Mlynsky (I.e., p. 146), the Action Committee of the National Front in the National Assembly "asked" only 25 deputies of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party and 33 deputies of the People's Party for their support

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Like the previous National Front, the regenerated National Front did not have any legal basis or formal constitution. The regenerated National Front existed de facto as a representative of "admitted" political parties and nationwide mass organizations such as the Central Trade Union Council-URO, the Association of Youth, Cooperatives, the Women's organization, the Partisans' organization, and the United Association of Peasants. On February 25, the Central Action Committee of the National Front was constituted under the chairmanship of Antonin Zapotocky, chairman of U R O and Vice-Prime Minister in the new Gottwald Cabinet. According to Rude prdvo of February 26, this Central Action Committee of the National Front had 93 members and was completely controlled by the Communist Party. 51 The full list of the Central Action Committee of the National Front was never published. 52 of the program of the new government. It "ceased to count on" 30 (other) National Socialist deputies and 13 deputies of the People's Party, because they "notoriously had a negative approach to the People's Democratic regime." Mlynsky remarks that "this was the way in which parliament was purged, even though the Actional Committee (of the National Front) did not in any way interfere in its composition." Mlynsky also mentions that " of the 23 deputies of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party who had supported the program of the new government after February, only 10 were left by the end of 1948." (I.e., p. 147). 51 Rude prdvo, 11/30/55; Gsovski-Grzybowski, Vol. 1, 257. 52 Besides A. Zapotocky, the Chairman, the following were members: R. Slansky, 1st Vice-Chairman (Comm. Dep., Secretary General of the Communist Party); ZdenSk Fierlinger (Social Democrat) 2nd Vice-Chairman; Dr. Alois Neuman (Czechoslovak National Socialist) 3rd Vice-Chairman; Father Plojhar (People's Democratic Party) 4th Vice-Chairman. According to Rude prdvo of March 10, Viliam Siroky, the Deputy-Prime Minister, was included in the Presidium of the Central Action Committee of the Regenerated National Front. Members of the Presidium of the Central Action Committee of the National Front were, according to Rude prdvo of February 25: Dr. Dolansky, Cabinet Member; Drda, writer; E. Erban, Cabinet Member; Hejzlar, Chairman of the Czechoslovak Youth Association; Hodinova-Spurna, Communist, Vice-Chairman of the National Assembly; Ing. Jankovcova, Social Democrat Cabinet Member; Dr. John, Social Democrat Deputy; Vaclav Kopecky, Communist, Cabinet Member; MachacovaDostalova, Social Democrat Deputy; Prof. Dr. Em. Slechta, Czechoslovak National Socialist, Cabinet Member; and Svermova, Communist Deputy. Dr. Alexej Cepiika, Communist, Cabinet Member, was elected Secretary General. Among the members of the Central Action Committee of the National Front, Rude prdvo of February 25 mentioned Ferdinand Richter, Czechoslovak National Socialist. According to Rude prdvo of February 26, the Action Committee of the Regenerated Parliamentary National Front, composed of representatives of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, Slovak Communist Party, Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party, and progressive and democratic representative deputies of the People's Party and the Slovak Democratic Party, met on February 25. No names were mentioned. (In general, the news of those hectic days is very incomplete.)

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The fundamental difference between the National Front, which was established in Kosice in 1945, and the Regenerated National Front of 1948 consists in the fact that from the very beginning of the Regenerated National Front, the Communist Party secured for itself a reliable majority to support the leading role of the Party in the Regenerated National Front. According to the Svobodné slovo of February 25, the Communists had 57% of the members of the Preparatory Committee of the Regenerated National Front. In the free elections of 1946, they had only 46% in the Czech provinces. The inclusion of the nationwide mass organizations in the Regenerated National Front camouflaged the way the Communists secured their majority.52a Those nationwide mass organizations had been controlled by the Communists since 1945, but until 1948 they did not play any role in the National Front composed only by political parties. Here, as shown above, the Communists had to struggle, more or less, to keep the unity of the National Front, and as long as they could not win the parliamentary majority, the Social Democrats could play some role. The Communists launched their coup d'état because they knew that they could not win the elections. The coup d'état gave them all the necessary power to win the elections and to control the Regenerated National Front as they chose. They could have succeeded even without a Regenerated National Front. The question arises: Why did the Communists stick to the 52a According to Mlynsky (I.e., p. 134), the chairman of the Action Committee of the National Front was always a Communist, and the Communists always held an absolute majority in the Committee. In the early days of May 1948, there were 687 members of regional Action Committees and 3971 members of District Action Committees. Of these, 68.9% were Communists. In addition, there were Social Democrats (under the leadership of Zdenëk Fierlinger), 17.37%; People's Party, 4.53%; Czechoslovak Socialists, 3.95%; the remaining 5.25% consisted of members of some "mass organizations" not belonging to any political party. In percentages of the membership of these mass organizations, their representatives in the Action Committee of the National Front amounted to 18% of the members of the resistance organizations, 14% of ROH, 9% of the United Association of Czech Peasants, 6% of the Czech Youth Organization, and 4% of the Sokol organization. Among the representatives of the mass organizations, the Communists held a majority, too. Mlynsky states quite openly that they were chosen from among the "progressive elements" of these organizations. On lune 27, 1948, the Communist Party absorbed the Social Democratic Party; since that time, it has held 90% of the membership in the Action Committees of the National Front (Mlynsky, I.e., p. 165), and enjoyed absolute control over the sad remnants of the "non-Communists", purged and repurged by the Central Action Committee of the National Front. Mlynsky (I.e., p. 140) admits that the activities of the Action Committees of the National Front were "developed and directed by the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and by the Ministry of the Interior".

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political fiction of the Regenerated National Front, which meant, at the same time, sticking to the fiction of the political parties? It was less risky for them to keep the fiction of the Regenerated National Front than to keep the fiction of some non-Communist political parties, as we will demonstrate later. The Communists needed them both to obscure the revolutionary character of their coup d'état. They preferred rather to talk of a reconstruction of the government, of the National Front, and of the political parties, than to admit openly their coup d'état. For 16 years they built up their peaceful image at home and abroad. It never was an easy task. On February 27, Rudolf Slânsky, Secretary General of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and Vice-Chairman of the Central Action Committee of the (regenerated) National Front described the tasks of the National Front as Follows: "1) to be the organizer and representative of the unity of the working people in cities and country; 2) to liquidate all destructive reactionary elements from offices, economic, and cultural institutions, political parties, and all public life; 3) to be the initiator of the great constructive effort of our people." 53 Those three phrases did not say much about the real meaning of the National Front; only the determination to liquidate all destructive reactionary elements was admitted clearly enough. Some clarification was brought by Article Six of the last Constitution of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic of 1960, which says: "The National Front of Czech and Slovaks, where the social organizations are associated, is a political result of the association of the cities and country, under the leadership of the Communist Party." This article of the Constitution legalized the existence of the National Front (which, however, was not defined) and legalized, much more precisely, the leadership of the Communist Party in it. No wonder that, even today, it is difficult to grasp the real meaning of the National Front. 54 53

Rudé prâvo, February 27, 1948. In Rudé prâvo of June 10 (1964), F. Pokorny tried to explain it to his readers, remarking that up to the present there were people, even among the youth, who did not know what the National Front was. We doubt very strongly that F. Pokorny's explanation is satisfactory. F. Pokorny did not mention that the National Front had no by-laws, that there were no elections in the National Front, or that its organs were nominated directly by the Communist Party and were fully under the control of the Party. The so-called National Front is a helpless lever under the hand of the Communist Party. Everything else that F. Pokorny said in answering the letter of a young reader to the editor is nothing but high-sounding phrases: "The Constitution, in its Article Six, proclaims that the National Front of Czechs and Slovaks, where the social organizations are associated, is a political result of the association of the cities and country under the leadership of the Communist Party. Therefore, it is the task of the National 54

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A s we said above, the Communists needed the fiction that democracy still existed in Czechoslovakia to cover the revolutionary character of their coup d'état. This fiction was needed for their propaganda purposes abroad as well as at home. The regeneration of the National Front served these purposes, in the first place, and was relatively easy to reach. The necessary consequence of this idea of the regenerated National Front was to regenerate the political parties which were to be the basis of the National Front. To achieve this goal, the Communists were compelled to destroy the legitimate leadership of the political parties, which was not willing to accept the idea of a Regenerated National Front and which stuck to the idea of the old National Front. The regenerated political parties with new leadership would step into the Regenerated National Front. Front to work in close cooperation with the Communist Party and under its leadership to reach the goals which the whole society of ours endorsed. To this task its activity was devoted during the whole time of its existence . . . . It is necessary to mention, also, the significance of the non-Communist political parties as an important part of the National Front. These parties associate, on a voluntary basis, those who belong to some strata of the people from the cities and country. These political parties help, through their members, their own press, and other forms of action, to influence and to acquire their followers for active participation in fulfillment of the contemporary buildng tasks. In the frame of their organization, these parties develop an independent political life. Their representatives are elected as deputies, they work in the National Assembly and in the Slovak National Council and in their presidiums, and they are members of the government. They work in other state functions and in national committees. On a nationwide basis, the National Front is represented by its Central Committee and its Presidium, which are composed of the representatives of all political parties and important social organizations. In the various provinces, districts, cities, and villages, there are committees of the National Front with analogous structure. Their members are also representatives of the representative bodies, members of the Cabinet, deputies, etc. The Chairman of the Central Committee of the National Front is the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the National Front. According to the election law, the National Front has an important task during the elections to the National Assembly and National Committees. Its election committees supervise the elections and watch that the rules of the elecion laws are exactly followed and respected, they collect the nominations for candidates, they submit the names of candidates for registration at the respective election commissions (obvodni volebni komise), decide with final authority about complaints against irregularities during the elections, take care of preparing the ballots, register the elected deputies, and deliver the election protocols to the official election commissions. The candidates for election to all representative bodies are candidates of the National Front. This means that the class and social structure, not only of the National Committees, in all instances, but even of the Government, of the Presidium of the Slovak National Council, of District National Committees, etc., reflect the National Front, to which they all belong under the leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, and therefore they directly participate in all decisions throughout the country."

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This is the spot where the Action Committees moved in the picture. Action Committees were not needed and were not set up in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia or the Slovak Communist Party. Action Committees were not created in the Social Democratic Party, where, after some pressure, Lausman and Fierlinger reached their agreement of adherence to the new National Front and Government. Such a device was not accessible in the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party, in the People's Party, Slovak Democratic Party, nor the Slovak Freedom Party. It is only the situation in the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party which this case study is dealing with. Until February 24, the old leadership of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party was still functioning. For the last time, on February 23, the Presidium of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party issued a statement to its functionaries, members and followers, asking them to be firm and stating that everybody who accepted an assignment on the Action Committees, or other political functions, without the knowledge of the respective party officials was putting himself out of the party cadres.55 This was the last time the Presidium of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party could state publicly that the National Front should settle the crisis. On the following day, the last Central Committee of the National Socialist Party (originally convoked for February 26) convened to discuss the situation. There was not much left to be discussed. The Presidium did not and could not give a satisfactory report as to what was done to secure the full cooperation of the Social Democrats during the crisis, namely, why the Social Democratic Cabinet Members did not resign with the Cabinet members of the other democratic parties. There was an uneasy feeling among the members of the Central Committee that something had gone wrong. There were some vague allusions on the part of the Presidium that the President had not yet surrendered to Gottwald's pressure and still stuck to the idea that the National Front existed and should solve the crisis. If there were any doubts, nobody was willing to draw the President into the debate. The only explosive moment came when Deputy Al. Neuman refused to comment about the role he was rightfully suspected of playing with the Communists. At this very moment, as we know, no representative of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party was included in the Preparatory Action Committee of the new National Front. Neuman hurriedly left the meeting with some vague hints that the President approved his attitude, and on 55

Svobodne slovo of February 24. See above, page 313.

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his way out, he was branded a traitor by Deputy Milada Horakova. Then the meeting was dismissed by the Chairman, P. Zenkl, who brought the alarming news that the police were searching through the Party's Central Secretariat. Only with the greatest effort was a committee established to draft a proclamation of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party, which may be called its "swan song", to its members and followers. The draft of this proclamation was hastily written in the office of Deputy Julius Firt. For the first time, as far as I recollect, the possibility that it might become necessary to leave the country, and how to do so, was aired there among the members of the drafting committee. This proclamation was never published, because, on the following day, the central organ of the Czechoslovak National Party ceased to appear.56 In the very late hours of February 24, a "Central Action Committee" of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party was established. Its members were E. Slechta, Al. Neuman, Jozka David (probably also Ferdinand Richter and Deputy B. Patkova), and Matl and Koktan as secretaries.67 On the following day, February 25, the members of the Presidium of the Party gathered in the villa of Secretary P. Drtina. They frantically tried to reach the President, but in vain. They were deeply shocked when the President accepted their resignations and refused to give them an audience. From that moment on they were only private individuals and some of them started to ponder about the possibility of escaping from the country. From that time on they were confined to their homes and under surveillance by secret agents of the police. They were practically cut off from almost all contact with their former friends and followers. There was nothing they could do. President Benes, they felt, had abandoned them, and they did not know his motives. This was

56

Since February 1, 1948, Svobodne slovo No. 27, the central organ of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party, was published with a red stamp "Truth prevails". The Rude pravo of February 26 claimed that the employees of the printing houses took the initiative to refuse to print the reactionary newspapers which disrupted the People's Democratic Republic. Steps were taken in printing and publishing houses to stop the provocations; the employees of paper factories decided not to deliver paper to Svobodne slovo any longer and the employees of the electrical works decided to stop the delivery of electricity. Even in the printing house of Melantrich itself, a campaign was started against the further publication of Svobodne slovo, which did not appear on February 25. Slovo naroda in Brno was published under the control of the President of the (Moravian) Provincial Court, Ferdinand Richter, who was a member of the Central Action Committee (of the new National Front). The Action Committee of the National Front in Liberec took over the daily paper Straz Severn. 57 Vesely, I.e., 150.

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the bitter end for them, or at least it seemed so at that moment, and in their bitterness they compared President Benes with Hacha.58 But it was not the end for the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party, which was promised continued existence in the Regenerated National Front. The future was very cloudy. Everyone who judges those events today ought to realize the real meaning of a party. A political party was not only the embodiment of its ideology and an organizer of its followers, but, at the same time, it was a mass of secretaries, employees of printing and publishing houses, and many party functionaries. Their security and very existence was from now on in extreme danger, exposed to tremendous Communist pressure and terror. We must admit the bitter truth that in those days, the "generals" of the party did not care much what might happen to their faithful officers, employees, and followers. There was some well-founded bitterness, despair, and a feeling of abandonment among them. The only excuse was that the party leaders could not do anything at all. The Communists put great pressure on all strata of the population. Starting February 25, Rude Pravo reported daily about local and district organizations of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party, which had dissolved themselves and jumped on the triumphant bandwagon of the Communist Party. Almost everybody employed in offices and in various positions, in those days, found on his desk an application blank for the Communist Party. Those were the tragic days which severely tested and sometimes broke the character of many honest Party members, anxious fathers of families, pondering their future existence. Not everybody wanted to go into the Communist Party; not everybody would be accepted there. Not everybody would and could escape in exile. To most members of the former Czechoslovak National Socialist Party the Regenerated Party was still open. For the secretaries and other officers and personnel, the Regenerated Party meant existence, security, and, for their children, an open way to higher schooling. The regular members did not dare to resign from the Party. Such a resignation and abstention from political activity would expose them and their children to persecution. Such fears were real and well-founded. No new members were admitted and wanted by the Regenerated Czechoslovak National Socialist Party. In reality, the ranks of the Regenerated Czechoslovak National Socialist Party and of the People's Party were closed. These parties were de facto condemned to vanish in due time. Naturally, all 58

Bu§ek, I.c„ 114.

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this was not quite evident in those fateful days of complex terror. In March 1946, the Czechoslovak Communist Party had 1,159,164 members. Toward the end of 1947, the Czechoslovak Communist Party had 1,309,732 members. In October 1948, there were 2,418,199 members. This avalanche, almost daily publicized in Rude pravo, was a threat to those who were reluctant to join the Communist Party. Not all of those new members came from the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party, but many did. The Communist Party seemingly welcomed the new adherents. They were a demonstration of the "irresistible" force of the Communist Party. Its propaganda at home and abroad used this growth of the Party as proof of its claim that the population had approved the February events and that everything had gone on peacefully.59 It certainly influenced the elections of May 1948. Only after those elections did the Communist Party purge its ranks of most of those newcomers. In February 1951, only 1,677,433 and in June 1954, only 1,489,234 members and candidates remained in the Communist Party. Continuous purges are the most effective part of the Communist system to keep the Party under control. This mechanism of purges was, of course, applied in the other, non-Communist, Parties, also under Communist control. The Communists are the first to know that everybody who survives the purges is not necessarily reliable from their point of view. Eternal vigilance, distrust, and repeated purges are, therefore, imperative for them. According to reliable underground information, to the present day, there are some nuclei of the old faithful members of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party in existence who trust each other and survive in the "rejuvenated" Party. In those nuclei the invisible resistance of minds and hearts against the Communist tyranny survives. It is only fair to say that the same happens in all former democratic parties and associations, such as the Sokols, Boy Scouts, etc.60

59

Mlynsky (I.e., pp. 143, 162) admits that this forced mass enrollment had no further useful purpose after the elections of May 30, 1948, and marred the class structure of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. 40 Taborsky, supra, note 59, pp. 24-27, 147. Mlynsky (I.e., p. 147) openly admits that the "most reactionary members of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party started to organize an underground after the elections" (of May 30, 1948) - I.e., pp. 148, 164 - and declares that after February 1948, only 10,000 members were left in the "rejuvenated" Czechoslovak Socialist Party. This number seems incredibly low, but Mlynsky, who should know better, says that "the backbone of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party was politically and organizationally broken and the majority of its former members abstained from any political action." The Czechoslovak Socialist Party sue-

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Under those circumstances, how did the Central Action Committee of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party manage to keep at least some members in the "rejuvenated" Party, and what for? I must repeat what I have written before: Gottwald was "sure of this majority, which would support his new government in the next session of Parliament, as early as February 24. The stepped-up terror, the steadily more evident indecision of the President, the actions of stooges and frightened people in various parties and the lack of any contra-revolutionary action did what was needed." 61 What was true that day was not the full truth after the coup d'état, as the dramatic story of the Action Committees in the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party shows: Only a few people were necessary to help Gottwald during the coup d'état, but more people were needed to build a new "rejuvenated" Czechoslovak National Socialist Party. Naturally, there was no time to organize an "underground", but there were some quick consultations among friends. A sort of bipolarity arose between the Central Action Committee of the Party and some people in the "rejuvenated" party, who were not willing to give up yet. Some people felt that there were loopholes in the Communist strategy and, therefore, some possibilities for the survival of the Party, which could be useful for its membership, too. The first question was how the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party should be "rejuvenated" and by whom. Perhaps it could be better done by the Czechoslovak National Socialists themselves than by the Communists. Perhaps one might build the future party apparatus by taking over many reliable party officers from the past? To some of my colleagues, the idea occurred that a few party secretaries, strategically located, e.g., in Karlovy Vary, could be instrumental in helping our people to cross the frontiers and escape abroad. The originator of this idea, Vlastislav Chalupa, is today a resident of Chicago, but others are still in Czechoslovakia and their names cannot be revealed. No doubt, there were purges in the Party, and more were to come, but

ceeded in establishing only 16 regional Action Committees (of a total of 17), 97 District Action Committees (of a total of 171, i.e., 57%), and 101 Local Action Committees - i.e., only 1% of all local organizations! This was the end of a party which formerly had been the second largest in Czechoslovakia; in the 1946 elections it polled 1,298,980 votes - 18.3% of all votes cast. Unofficial estimates of the membership of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party in 1947 ran between 450,000 and 500,000. 61 BuSek, I.e., 112; Taborskf, I.e., 160.

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why not try to "purge yourself". The new party organs and officers could, perhaps, help to mitigate at least some of the hardship and terror of the Communist persecution. Where there is life, there is hope. Some people in the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party acted quickly. It is only fair to give many of them some benefit of the doubt when we judge their behavior during those days, even with the hindsight of today. The Czechoslovak people became accustomed to conspiratorial actions during the Nazi occupation and this spirit revived after the Communist coup d'état. He who did not act took no responsibility. It may be that some ordinary citizen, a grocer or another non-political tradesman who had never been involved in politics, could not understand that everything that was not white did not have simply to be black, as he felt during those fateful days, the meaning of which he could not fully grasp. So, too, he feels to this day, still failing to grasp what really happened then, full of bitterness and frustration, far away from his native country which he was forced to leave. On February 27, Svobodné slovo, No. 48, reappeared as the organ of the Action Committee of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party, naturally without the previous customary red stamp: "Truth prevails". On its first page, three documents were published which need our close attention. They must all be read together. There was a lead article under the headline: "The common cause above personal interests." It says significantly that "the signature of the President of the Republic under the nomination list of the new government provides guidance for the further steps of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party, which established its Action Committees from its followers who remained faithful to the Socialist and Progressive Program of the Party." The President's signature was the cover for the Action Committee. An order, "Action Committees of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party must be formed," followed.62 62

"The Action Committee of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party issues the following instructions to all members of the Party: 1. The Party members authorized by the Central Action Committee (of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party) will immediately establish Action Committees in all provincial organs and expel those members who have betrayed the Socialist program of the Party. 2. The provincial Action Committees will purge all lower organizations and other Party institutions in this sense and will establish District and Local Action Committees in a similar way. 3. These Action Committees will immediately offer their cooperation to the Action Committees of the National Front if they have not yet done so. 4. The Action Committees will take over the management of all local, district, and provincial secretariats and all possessions and assets of the Party. 5. The Action Committees will report without delay to the

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The controversial Proclamation to the faithful followers of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party deserves even closer attention. This Proclamation was an appeal from the Central Action Committee to the faithful followers of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party to follow the new leadership. It tried to persuade them that democracy had not died completely on February 25. This Proclamation was signed by some people who wanted to keep the Party in existence as an independent organization and not to let all the faithful members become victims of the Communist Party. They were assured, and they believed, that an independent Czechoslovak National Socialist Party would participate in the coming parliamentary elections with an independent list of its own candidates. The first list of the signatories of this Proclamation was published in issue No. 48 of Svobodne slovo of February 27; a supplementary list of signatories was published in Svobodne slovo, No. 50, of February 29. This last list concluded with the signature of Ing. F. X. Novak, on behalf of the Central Action Committee of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party. Being one of those whose names were listed on the Proclamation as signatories, I can explain the meaning and purpose of it. It can be easily understood by close examination of this document and by the Communist reaction to it. The Proclamation deliberately avoided referring to the former members of the inner Presidium of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party by name. Such moderation was not meaningless in the highly excited atmosphere of those days. It declared "that the leadership provoked a very grave governmental crisis and lost its right to lead the party and put itself out of its cadres." This statement, paying the prize to the devil, was, under those circumstances, at least factual. The essence of the Proclamation was in the following paragraph: "We, therefore, take the great responsibility of reorganizing the membership of the Party in this fateful moment of its life until its organs are regularly convened and constituted in a democratic way." This sentence, and the names of some who signed this Proclamation aroused the Communists' furor. Their reaction came quickly. On February 28, the Presidium of the Central Action Committee of

Central Secretariat of the Party, Prague I, Republic Square No. 7 (which has just been taken over by the Action Committee of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party), how these instructions have been carried out. 6. The Central Secretariat of the Action Committee will issue more detailed instructions in due time."

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the National Front protested that "discredited reactionaries try to implant themselves into leading positions of the new organs of the political parties." The Presidium reserved for itself the right to approve the constitution of the political parties and to control the progress of the purge in these parties. This control would be performed on the national, provincial, district, and local levels. The Presidium of the Central Action Committee of the National Front created a special Clearing Committee (with R. Slansky as Chairman and Secretary Al. Neuman as a member) to perform the purge in the political parties.83 On February 29, Rude pravo reported from the Central Action Committee of the National Front that this Committee, in its second session, had discussed some aspects of the purges in the political parties. It was resolved that it was necessary to establish, in the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party and the People's Party Action, committees of honest members of those Parties. Their constitution should be presented for approval of the Action Committee of the National Front. 64 On March 4, Svobodne slovo, No. 53, Page 2, in answer to a question, declared that "Jindrich Stulik, one of the signatories, is not a member of the Action Committee of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party." At the same time, it stated that "a signature on the Proclamation published on February 27 does not create membership in the Action Committee of the Party." Also, on March 4, Svobodne slovo, No. 53, reported that on February 29, the Presidium of the Central Action Committee of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party had been constituted and that it had been approved by the Central Action Committee of the National Front on March 3. It was promised that the Inner Presidium of the Central Action Committee of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party, in its next session, would set up the complete Central Action Committee, enlarged by the representatives of the country from outside of the City of Prague.66 More information appeared in Svobodne slovo of March 5, No. 54: ". . . On Sunday, February 29, 1948, the Presidium of the Action Committee of the 'Czechoslovak Socialist Party' was constituted. It 63

Rude pravo of Feb. 23 reported also that the Secretariat of the Central Action Committee of the National Front and the Action Committees of the National Front were not elected, but nominated. Representatives of the political parties in the Action Committees of the National Front were delegated by the political parties. 64 Svobodne slovo, No. 50 of Feb. 29. 65 N o list of the complete Presidium or Central Action Committee was published until June 9.

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approved unanimously the Proclamation to all faithful party members which was published in Svobodne slovo on February 27, 1948. The Presidium takes over its heavy task with the consent and trust of the broadest strata of the faithful party members. Once more it resolutely repudiates the antisocialist policies, disrupting the unity of the people, of the former inner leadership of the party, and notes the expulsion from the party of the former leadership. The Presidium considers its first and foremost task to finish the purge of the party of all antisocialist adversaries of our People's Democracy, who disrupted the unity of the National Front and who refused to back firmly the alliance with the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and other Slavic countries. This purge must be completed in the shortest time possible in all parts of the party, in accordance with the directives of the Central Action Committee of the National Front. Pertinent organizational instructions will be published in the near future. The names of all expelled members who have previously occupied outstanding functions in the party will be published in the press after the purge is concluded (which never happened). According to the unanimous resolution of the Presidium, the party will be constituted as a socialist selective party, disciplined in following its program to be a good member of the National Front in whose cadre it will cooperate with the other political parties building the work of the Gottwald Government." Seemingly endorsing the Proclamation of February 27, this resolution of the Presidium of February 29 digressed from it fundamentally: the democratic organization of the party in a regular convention promised there was replaced here by the proclamation of the principle of selectiveness of the Party. "To manifest the new mission of the Party, the Presidium has decided to go back to the name of the party which expresses the socialist program of the party. It has, therefore, accepted the name of "Czechoslovak Socialist Party". The Presidium requests all Action Committees of the party to use this name exclusively, effective immediately. At the same time it was resolved to change the name of the central organ of the party . . . signed: The "Inner Presidium of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party." 68 66

Chairman: Univ. Prof. Dr. Emanuel Slechta, Secretary of Engineering Matters; Vice-Chairmen: Dr. Alois Neuman, Postmaster General; Deputy Josef David, President of the National Assembly (he was asked by Jaroslav Kvapil, the wellknown writer, to keep this position); Ferdinand Richter, Justice; and Dr. B. Patkova*, Deputy. Members; (The names of Dr. B. Patkova and Bohumil Santrucek did not appear among the signatories published in Svobadne slovo, Nos.

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With those organizational changes, the story of the struggle of some truly democratic members of the former Czechoslovak National Socialist Party did not end. It was a desperate and hopeless fight, but it should not be belittled or forgotten. Alexej Cepicka, Minister of Justice and Secretary General of the Central Action Committee of the National Front, in his first statement in his latter function, announced on March 1 that it was "necessary to distinguish between Action Committees of the National Front and the other Action Committees, which where established in offices, institutions and other fields, for which they were established. By wrong interpretation some action committees also were established in some factories." 67 The Communists did not plan to establish Action Committees in factories which were under their control anyway through the factory councils and the trade union organization. In his second broadcast statement of March 3, Alexej Cepicka clarified his first statement: "Each action committee established in a political party has to be approved by the respective Action Committee of the National Front. New political organs may be established only if they have been purged. Old organs of the political parties cannot under any circumstances continue in their functions. In the same way, one has to procede in establishing Action Committees in all offices and institutions, namely, in institutions of economic self-government, in cooperatives, associations, economic groups, cultural institutions, corporations, etc." This important distinction between the action committees in political parties and the other action committees indicates that the Communist Party had more difficulty in getting the Action Committees in the political parties under control than the others. Here it was possible to put the Action Committees under direct control of Communists. Those in the political parties, which, logically, had to be composed only of non-Communist members of those parties, could be controlled only indirectly, by approval of their organs through the respective organs of the National Front, where the representatives of the respective parties were present and could eventually defend themselves. Rude prdvo of March 11 brought new directives for approval of the action committees

48 and 50. Many names published there were not mentioned here. Those were the "undesirable reactionaries.") Fr. Koktan, Secretary; Josef Cerny; Dr. Vaclav Hulinsky; Dr. Miroslav Klinger; Jan Matl; Vaclav MikulaS, Deputy; Ervin Tichy: B. Stepan Kobylka, Deputy; Bohumil Urbanek, Deputy; Alois Hatina, i.ch.o.org.matters and Ivan Petr, i.ch.o. financial matters, and Ing. F. X. Novak, i.ch.o.admin. matters. 67 Svobodne slovo, March 2.

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in the political parties under a significant headline: "Purges of members of the action committees have not been performed properly." 68 It is clear that, on the lower levels, in the local and district Action Committees, purges were not proceeding according to the wishes of the Communist Party, and the respective Action Committees of the National Front were rather tolerant with the proceedings of the local and district action committees of the respective political parties. Even today, it is easier to control the higher echelons of the political parties than the lower, especially on the local level, where neighborly human relations are stronger than party instructions from above. 68a It would be an error to assume that the Communists held the political life of Czechoslovakia completely in their hands. When the Presidium of the Central Action Committee of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party was approved and took over the "rejuvenated" Party, when many people in the Party were purged, there was still one real hope that the coming elections could somehow change the situation. Even President Benes cherished such hopes, and the former Chairman of the Social Democratic Party, Bohumil Lausman, describes very persuasively how Gottwald's promises of February 21, that each party would be entitled to present its independent, individual list of candidates for the parliamentary elections, kept the hopes of the Social Democratic Party alive. The same is true of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party. This was the real reason why some cs

"Until now, the local and district Action Committees of the political parties have been approved by the respective local and district Action Committees of the National Front. Experience shows that purges of members of the Action Committees in the reconstructed parties have been insufficient, and, therefore, it will be necessary in future to proceed as follows: 1. A district action committee must not start its function: a. unless it has been approved by the respective provincial action committee of the respective political party; b. unless the district action committee of the political party has been approved by the provincial Action Committee of the National Front. 2. N o action committee of a political organization is permitted to start its function; a. unless the respective district action committee of the political party has been approved by the provincial Action Commitee of the National Front; b. unless the local action committee has been approved by the district committee of the National Front. This is mandatory even in those cases where things were settled otherwise before these directives were published. Therefore, the local and district committees are not permitted to work unless these conditions are complied with." «"a Mlynsky (I.e., p. 146) candidly admits that there were "difficulties in constituting the regional, district, and local Action Committees in the Czechoslovak Socialist Party and in the People's Party."

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people, as mentioned above, tried to keep their Party still working.89 All these hopes were destroyed on April 15 when the Presidium of the Central Action Committee of the National Front announced its unanimous decision that there would be a single unified list of candidates of the National Front. 69a The Presidium of the Central Action Committee of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party issued a Proclamation on May 9, expressing its "hope that all members of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party, as good Czechs, would vote for the unified list of the candidates of the National Front." President Benes became suspicious when he was told about the new election law No. 89, to be published on April 15. Secretary of the Interior V. Nosek had declared, two days before, that the single unified list of candidates of the National Front would not mean any "Gleichschaltung", or forced unanimity, because the voters would be free to vote for a separate list of their own under certain conditions. But Secretary V. Kopecky cynically remarked that nobody was expected to commit suicide by sticking to his right to present a separate list of candidates. President Benes asked Secretary Nosek for an explanation, but no explanation was given. The issue was discussed between President Benes and Gottwald in their historical meeting of May 4. Gottwald's argument was that the political parties in the National Front were free to agree on a single unified list of candidates, as they had done. President Benes was adamant and told Gottwald of his decision to resign, for two reasons: First, because he did not want to sign the new Constitution, which he considered antidemocratic. He, said Benes, had just experienced what the "will of the people" in reality meant and he was not willing to sign a constitution based on the unlimited "will of the people". His second reason for resignation was the prepared single slate of candidates of the National Front. His resignation was accepted and the last-ditch battle of democracy was lost on May 30, the day parliamentary elections with a single list of candidates were held. The 30th of May was, according to my views, really the last day which concluded the February coup d'etat. CONCLUSION

President Benes resigned on June 7; Klement Gottwald succeeded 69 BuSek, I.e., 114; B. LauSman, Kdo byl vinen?, p. 222. «»a According to Mlynsky (I.e., p. 141, n. 29), the single unified list of candidates of the National Front was proposed by Antonin Zapotocky at a plenary meeting of URO on April 7, 1948, and approved by the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party on April 9, 1948.

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him in office, and Antonin Zapotocky succeeded Gottwald. On June 9, the Presidium of Central Action Committee of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party issued a fairly warm farewell statement to the President, which, however, distorted many facts. This Proclamation was signed by the "Presidium of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party". The era of rule by Action Committees of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party had come to an end. 70 A t the first meeting of the newly-elected National Assembly, the oldest mamber, Vavro Srobar, presided. Ironically, the first deputy who took his oath of allegiance was Dr. Burian, a deputy of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party. 71 Some members of the Presidium of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party as of February 29 and March 3, respectively, were dropped 72 and some new names appeared on the list of June 9, but those were minor changes, of personal significance only. Nothing changed in the character of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party. Since May 30, it has remained a subservient satellite and conveyor of the decrees of the "only leading" Communist Party. "Not always an easy role," was probably the last thought of Minister Dr. Emanuel Slechta, before he committed suicide on March 18, 1960. 70 Svobodne slovo, No. 133. This Proclamation was signed by: Univ. Prof. Dr. Emanuel Slechta, Secretary of Engineering Matters, as Chairman; Dr. Alois Neuman, Postmaster General; Deputies Josef David (Josef David was no longer a candidate for the National Assembly). Ferdinand Richter, and Dr. Bozena Patkova as Vice-chairmen. The following additional members of the Presidium signed the Proclamation: Deputy Josef Cerny; Alois Firt; Alois Hatina; Deputy Dr. Vaclav Hulinsky, Architect Jan Jarolim; Deputy Vaclav Jirasek; Karel Ji5e; Deputy Fr. Koktan; Deputy Dr. Miroslav Klinger, Secretary General of the Party; Deputy StSpan Kobylka; Karel Lobl; Deputy Jan Matl; Deputy Vaclav MikulaS; Dr. Zdenek Moravek; Deputy Ing. F. X. Novak; Ivan Petr; Martin Rumisek and Deputy Bohumil Urbanek. 71 According to Svobodne slovo, No. 136, June 12. Dr. Al. Neuman was elected Chairman of the Club of Deputies of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party. Members of the Presidium of the Club were: Dr. Bozena Patkova, Bohumil Urbanek, Antonin Vandrovec, Jan Matl, and Dr. Vaclav Hulinsky; Dr. Ladislav Hobza was elected Treasurer, and Dr. Josef Cupera was reconfirmed as Secretary of the Club. The Club suggested Deputy Ferdinand Richter as Vice-chairman of the National Assembly and Deputy Fr. Koktan as a member of the Presidium of the National Assembly. The Club of the Deputies of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party consisted of 24 deputies: Prof. Dr. E. Slechta, Dr. Alois Neuman, Dr. Gustav Burian, Josef Cerny, Antonin Fiala, Dr. Ladislav Hobza, Dr. Vaclav Hobza, Dr. Vaclav Hulinsky, Vaclav Jirasek, Karel Kacl, Dr. Miroslav Klinger, Stepan Kobylka, Fr. Koktan, Dr. Gustav Loubal, Jan Matl, Vaclav MikulaS, Ing. F. X. Novak, Dr. Bozena Patkova, Dr. Ferdinand Richter, Josef Ruzha, Jos. Safarik, Bohumil Urbanek, Antonin Vandrovec and Antonin Vlasak. 72 B. Santruiek and Fr. Ticliy.

The Power Structure of Today's Czechoslovakia

VLASTISLAV J. CHALUPA

I. INTRODUCTION

When the power structure of contemporary Czechoslovakia is considered, three complementary views are necessary to present the whole picture. First, it is useful to establish a model of the power structure as an ideal, the attainment of which is the goal of the ruling political group. Second, it is necessary to consider the consequences and repercussions which are produced in various spheres of society by the effort to make reality conform with the political goal of the ruling group. Third, the degree of success of this endeavor is to be observed - the outcome of the action of the political group on one hand and the resistance of the society - its inertia and opposing forces - on the other. When observing the politics of the ruling political group in Czechoslovakia, we shall consider its activities, not as a disjointed sequence of reactions, but as a system of conscious, rational, and goal-directed actions, a system in which the aim is a rational conception of societyto-be, and the means are selected on the basis of a rational evaluation of their usefulness with regard to the aim, i.e., the degree in which they are also bringing about its realization. To describe the connecting link between the acting subject and the aim with the means, we use the term "will" - obviously not in a psychological sense, but in a logical sense, since the "will" in this sense is attributed not only to individuals, but also to organizations which pursue a distinct aim separate from the individual aims of its members, such as a political party, the State, enterprises, etc. Power, then, in this semantic framework, is the ability of an acting subject to attain its aim, to fulfill its will, against the will of other subjects. With regard to the aim of the subject wielding power, power is a means, and therefore its orientation and its nature are determined by

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the nature of the aim - in our case, of the political aim of the ruling group which is the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The professed and proclaimed aim of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia is to build a Communist society. We can state in general that the Communist society is - in the conception of the Communist Party itself - the ultimate evolutionary step of society to be attained by application of scientific methods - the only scientific methods - embodied in the theory of dialectical and historical materialism as understood and interpreted by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, with modifications as required by special conditions in Czechoslovakia. The latter are worked out by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia with the help and approval of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. From this premise, viz., that the political aim of the Communist Party is identical with natural and historical development and that the Communist Party is the only depository and true interpreter of these laws, the claim is deduced that all power should and must be concentrated in its hands. The tenet that it is the only holder of absolute truth justifies the claim of the Communist Party to absolute power, a power not to be shared with any one or anything else. The absoluteness of power in a society dominated by the Communist Party has been best defined by Lenin's dictum: "Scientifically defined, a dictatorship is an authority based directly on force, an authority which is absolutely unrestricted by any laws or regulations. . . . The dictatorship means . . . power, unlimited power, based on force and not on law . . . . " 1 This principle has been repeated in many variations by speakers and leaders of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. In recent times it was reiterated by Antonin Novotny in his rebuttal to claims of Czechoslovak writers and poets to be "the nation's conscience". Such a claim, stated President Novotny, would put the writers as judges above the Party and thus deny to the Party its leading role in society, the leading role which it will not and cannot share with anyone. Since power means the ability to fulfill one's will against the will of other subjects, the Communist Party's claim of absolute power means that the Communist Party intends to force its will on each and every subject within its reach; that it intends to destroy the independent aims of other organizations and of individuals and to substitute its own aims for them. The Communist Party aims thus at becoming the only 1 V. I. Lenin, Works (Russian edition), vol. xvii, pp. 355 and 361, quoted by J. V. Stalin, Leninism (London, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1928), p. 26.

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source of will, i.e., of independent rational action, in the society. The claim to absolute power - a monopoly of power - determines also the relationship of the Party to the State. In modern theory, the State is conceived as sovereign, i.e., as a source of will not subordinated to any other body. Within its borders, its "will" as expressed by the legal order - constitution, laws, ordinances, regulations, and judgments - is supreme and enforceable; outside its borders, it is supreme in the sense that it can unilaterally refute and renounce all obligations and treaties it has previously incurred. The Communist Party refuses to acknowledge this sovereignty of the State; on the contrary, it places itself openly above the State and outside of its legal order. The constitution, laws, ordinances, regulations, and court decisions, have, therefore, in a society dominated by the Communist Party, only a conditional and secondary validity; they are valid only insofar as they implement and aid the policy of the Party; they are ignored or violated whenever the pertinent organ of the Communist Party decides that they are contrary to Party policies. Thus, the society dominated by a Communist Party, such as the present-day Czechoslovak society, is basically a lawless society, a society in which law and the organs of the State never protect the subject and always serve the rulers. Admittedly, in every society, there is some discrepancy between its formal (legal) and factual arrangements. Possession of material wealth, of knowledge, of key decision-making positions, favors the possessors against those who lack them. However, in a society dominated by a Communist Party, this discrepancy is intended, planned, admitted, and enforced. The constitution of a State embodies the rules by which the will of the State - its laws, ordinances, court decisions, regulations, etc. - is formed, as well as the limits beyond which the will of other acting subjects, especially of individual citizens, remains free. After domination of a society by the Communist Party, these rules become meaningless for two reasons. First, the Communist Party excludes from the creation of the will of the State every acting subject except itself, so that the legal order reflects its aims fully. Second, it does not respect the limits the State imposes upon itself with regard to other acting subjects in the society. The Communist Party acts directly upon these subjects by its own means, even using the means of the State, regardless of whether such actions are permitted or prohibited by law. Organizations other than the Communist Party have, in a Com-

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munist-dominated society, only a supporting role - the role of a "transmission belt". Here again, Lenin succeeded in defining most clearly the role allotted to other organizations by the Communist Party: as "levers and transmission belts of the dictatorship". To attain this stage, the Communist Party, after having seized the State, abolishes many organizations, and groups the others into giant, nation-wide organizations of which each has a monopoly in its particular field: uniform trade unions, a uniform youth organization, a uniform sports and gymnastic organization, a uniform military-preparedness organization, and even satellite political parties. The dominance of the Communist Party over the State and other organizations is accomplished by a system of personal unions between the respective organs of the Party and the other organizations. Thus, the members of the highest Party organ hold also the highest positions in the State administration and in all nation-wide organizations. This system is used also at lower levels: the members of the Communist Party Regional and District Executive Committees hold the key positions in regional and district public administration (National Committee) as well as in the Regional and District Executive Committees of all nation-wide organizations. Other purely local organizations also have Party members in key positions. A Party member thus installed in a public office or an officer of another organization is required by the Party and forced by the Party to execute the instructions of the Party in his office, not those instructions which may be given him by law, or by other citizens, or by the members of his organization. This system ensures that decisions of the highest Party organs are passed to lower levels through two channels: one is the dominated organization itself, the other, the lower levels of the Communist Party. Thus, a decision of the Communist Party Presidium concerning activities of District National Committees is passed on to the Ministry of the Interior, which issues instructions to the Regional National Committees, which in turn pass them on to the Districts National Committees. At the same time, these instructions are directed from the Party Presidium to the Party Regional Executive Committee and from there to the Party District Executive Committee, whose members, as officers of the District National Committee, are instructed to see to their implementation there. In this way, all the machinery of the Communist Party, of the state, and of the combined nation-wide organizations force the individual to subject himself to the will of the Party. To facilitate this process,

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membership in one or several of the nation-wide organizations is compulsory for every citizen. The basic units of these organizations are constituted as small, face-to-face groups, with attendance at meetings obligatory. The aim of all this gigantic and complex machinery is not only to bring the citizen to obey the will of the Communist Party, but also to substitute the will of the Communist Party for the individual will. He is not only required to comply with the directives handed down to him, but he is expected to make the aim of the Communist Party the supreme aim of his entire personal life, to subordinate or discard his own personal and private aims in favor of Communist Party objectives, and, therefore not only to fulfill duties laid upon him by the State and by the various organizations he must belong to, but also to search on his own for ways to implement the Communist Party objectives more fully and to induce others to do likewise. To attain this stage, the Communist Party seeks to isolate the individual from all influences which would disturb or undermine his development towards a full acceptance of Party goals as his own. The tendency is to remove or weaken any spontaneous contacts the individual may have which are not under direct or indirect Party control, through State organs (police) or through the dominated organizations. The result is a disruption of horizontal communication processes in the society and their replacement by vertically converging processes whereby instructions flow from the top to the bottom and information and suggestions flow from the bottom to the top. Uncontrolled communications are abolished to a degree which disintegrates even primary face-to-face groups, especially the family. A model of a Communist Party-dominated society can be thus summed up as follows: The society is organized as a pyramid. At its apex is the leadership of the Communist Party, the elite members who are versed in the "only" scientific theory of natural and historical processes. By applying this scientific theory to the development of the dominated society, this leadership guides society to Communism, the highest state of development, by deciding what must be done when and where. These decisions are imparted to and executed by a system of organizations, including the State, dominated ("led") by the Communist Party by means of personal unions on all levels, molding the citizens who accept the objectives of the Party as enunciated by its leadership as their own objectives, who identify with them and work for their implementation

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within the scope determined by decisions of the Party, State and other pertinent organizations. II

From the aforesaid, it is obvious that the Communist Party bases its claim to a "leading" position in society, not on the consent of the citizens, but on the alleged fact that it is the only group which has mastered the only existing scientific theory, and thus, the only group qualified to rule. The Communist Party rightly does not expect the other segments of society to accept its self-proclaimed superiority, but proceeds to force them into obedience until they are molded and "educated" to accept Party leadership. This the Communist Party exerts by establishing a system of monopolies which concentrate in the hands of the Party all elements of power, thereby simultaneously isolating and dispersing its opponents. The basic monopoly in which Party power reposes is, obviously the monopoly of arms, which is obtained and secured by seizing the government. This monopoly enables the Party to establish a monopoly of mass communication media, which, in due time, is enlarged into a monopoly of all communications by a police system which makes it dangerous to spread unauthorized information. To prevent any concerted action of its opponents, the Communist Party then establishes and secures a monopoly of organizations — no organization and no organized action is tolerated outside of the net of controlled nation-wide organizations. To these monopolies is then added the monopoly of means of production, which makes everyone materially dependent upon the Communist Party and gives it the means to distribute material rewards and punishments outside the legal order. Finally, the system is completed by establishing a monopoly of intellectual leadership, a monopoly on thought: no intellectual activity is allowed unless exercised in the form of dialectical/historical materialism within the limits laid down by the Party. Having attained this stage, the Communist Party not only controls, but also molds the society; it need no longer concentrate on repression, but mostly on prevention. The dictatorship grows into totalitarianism. The results of this arrangement of society influence the arrangement of the sociocultural regions of the life of the society. Whereas, in an open society, the various sociocultural regions - morals, religion, arts,

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science, education, economy, politics, recreation 2 - have an autonomous development and influence each other mutually, the desired structure of society under Communist Party control deprives them of their autonomy and strongly modifies the direction and extent of their interaction; in fact, a definite hierarchy develops in which some areas have a decidedly higher and more effective controlling position than others. Dr. Gadourek arrives at the following pattern of cultural regions in a Communist Party-dominated society: politics; economy; science; education; recreation; arts; morals; religion. This is not only an order of importance; it indicates also the influence which one sphere exercises on the others: every lower region is influenced and controlled by all the higher regions, but not vice versa. Politics dominates all the other activities of the society, whereas the religious and moral spheres hardly influence the other sociocultural areas at all. This dynamics in the relationship of sociocultural regions has, in the long run, an important result which springs from the error in the basic premise of the whole system, viz., that dialectical and historical materialism is the only exact and true scientific method, and that the decisions of the Communist Party are scientific findings with no possibility of error. According to theory, the creation of political will in the Communist Party is identical with scientific/ideological research; to those individuals within the Communist Party who find the right answers to the actual problems belongs - in theory - the power. This, of course, leaves open the question of who decides which answer is right and which is wrong. This dilemma is resolved by the Communist Party by applying the principle of "democratic centralism" which, reduced to essentials, permits discussions on theory and policies only up to the point at which a superior organ of the Party had reached a decision on the problem in question. The basic principles of "democratic centralism" are: (1) a minority must subordinate itself to the majority; (2) lower organs of the Party must subordinate themselves to decisions of higher organs; (3) once a decision by a majority and/or a higher organ has been reached, further discussion of the subject is prohibited; (4) creation of fractions, i.e., of organized groups holding opinions which differ from the official 2

I. Gad'ourek, The Political Control of Czechoslovakia fert, Kroese N.V., 1953), p. 196 ff.

(Leyden, H. E. Sten-

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stand of the Party, is prohibited. Theoretically, the final decision would lie with the Central Committee or the Congress of the Party as tht highest organs of the Party hierarchy. In practice, however, it is the Presidium of the Communist Party which is the real source of will and the final arbiter of what is right and what is wrong - not only in politics, but, in view of the controlling position of politics over all sociocultural regions, in the entire life of the society and of its individual members. This shift in importance is caused by the simple fact that the Central Committee or the Congress are called into session by the Presidium only at long intervals. Between sessions, the Presidium is the highest organ of the Party, so that when the Central Committee or the Congress of the Party meet, the opinion of the Presidium has already become the only valid and permissible opinion within the Party. The statutes of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia have always embodied the provision that the Executive Committee or the Congress must be convened at the request of a qualified number of Party members. This provision, however, has never been put into effect, since the attempt of any group except the Presidium itself to organize a request for convocation of the Central Committee or the Congress would be considered fractionalism, and suppressed. This, of course, is possible only as long as the Presidium has secured to itself the prerogative to decide who is right and who is in error; this security is guarded by the total power which includes control of the society's wealth, which is vested in the hands of the Communist Party. According to the statutes of the Communist Party, the Presidium reaches its decisions by majority vote. In practice, decisions are reached by the play of power among the members of the Presidium, and the voting and resolutions only confirm the outcome of such power plays. In the highest instance, then, the basic tenet of Communist theory, i.e., that power belongs to those who are right, is reversed.-, those who have power decide who is right. In power struggles, the influence of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is usually decisive. By interfering in struggles among factions in other Communist Parties, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union defends its prerogative as the supreme arbiter in the Communist world; and it must defend this prerogative with regard to other parties as mercilessly as the leaders of those parties defend it against their respective memberships. T o doubt the correctness of the decisions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union or to arrive at different conclusions is tantamount to undermining the legitimacy of

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power of Soviet Party leadership, not only outside, but also inside, the Soviet Union. The restriction of the decision-making process and the fact that ultimate decisions are reached on the basis of a power struggle rather than research and scientific investigation, affects, in turn, the character and composition of the Communist Party, as well as of the whole Partydominated society. The ban on consideration of political problems already decided by the Communist Party favors the rise, within Party ranks, of energetic, ambitious, and ruthless opportunists at the expense of revolutionaries and inspired idealists. Moreover, since every functionary in the Party hierarchy feels threatened by anyone excelling him in intelligence and creative ability, the new recruits into the ranks of the Party elite are of a lesser caliber than the original group, and, as they advance to higher positions, the process is repeated and the whole level of the Party apparatus tends to deteriorate. What is required is not devotion to the cause, creative intelligence, and personal integrity, but conformity with one's superiors, ingenuity and efficiency in the implementation of directives, and silent obedience, along with a flair for picking the winner of present and future Party struggles in the higher and highest echelons. Obviously, even the most qualified elite can not avoid all mistakes, and as the quality of the Party leadership deteriorates, faulty decisions multiply. The Communist Party apparatus, because of its composition, self-satisfaction, and limited horizons, does not of course recognize that the root of the evil lies within itself, but seeks to overcome the difficulties by increased application of power, by increased terror, increased controls, increased suspiciousness, and increased restrictions on independent thought and actions. New difficulties lead to new splits in the leadership which result in denunciation and persecution of defeated factions, although their representatives and members were previously exalted and glorified as embodiments of the infallible historical process. This shakes the foundations of the system: If yesterday's leaders can have been wrong, where is the guarantee that today's leaders are right? This confusion is multiplied when, in a reversal of the power play, the victors in turn are defeated and branded as criminals, while their victims are rehabilitated. Such reversals in the Party leadership and policies, of course, have deep repercussions on all the sociocultural spheres of the society, since they are all controlled by politics. Especially deeply affected is the area of morals. The principal norm of Communist morality - good is what

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aids the attainment of Communism, evil is what delays it - is replaced early by a different ethic: good is conformity with leadership, evil is non-conformity. But when leaderships change, each denouncing wholly or partly the previous one, even this maxim becomes invalid and is replaced by a simple drive for survival and materialistic egoism. Once this stage is reached, the functioning of society itself becomes impaired: society can no longer provide the material and spiritual goods necessary for its own perpetuation, and increasing application of preventive and/or repressive measures has reached the point of no return. Then, the only way open is to relax, not to relinquish, the controls; to restrain, not to share, the power; to give a voice, but not power, to any creative thinkers among the Communists; to give the society a respite during which those forces which could not operate under the stifling totalitarian power system will heal and revive society and build up new resources of material and spiritual goods which then can be used in another attempt to reach the unchanging ultimate political goal. This reversal from tightening to loosening of controls is never undertaken voluntarily by the group in control; it is forced upon it, either by outbreaks of violence among the population, especially among workers, or by interference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which is anxious to prevent such outbreaks and to reverse the disintegration of the society in order to salvage it as a usable tool in the execution of its own world-wide policies.

Ill This is precisely the state in which Czechoslovakia is today. Fifteen years of domination by the Communist Party disintegrated the Czechoslovak national ethos ultimately formulated by the first two Presidents, Masaryk and Benes. The Communist Party, however, failed utterly to replace this ethos by any Communist ethics. The moral vacuum thus created was filled with the most primitive motivations: the instinct for self-preservation, the drive for personal comfort through material means, a tendency to get the most in return for the least. The Communist Party assertions that there are no absolute or eternal moral values were widely accepted; but Communist moral values were also rejected, and there remained a prevailing moral relativism which regarded lies, corruption, bribes, theft, and sexual license as acceptable means to survival and to personal material satisfaction. This attitude also brought about an

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economic collapse, and, faced with famine after a disastrous winter, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, under proddings by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, had to restrain the use of power while nevertheless maintaining its claim to the position of the leading and directing force in the nation. The situation is not yet stabilized, but so far, the following areas have been granted some autonomy: The monopolies of mass communication media and intellectual leadership were breached by: (a) allowing the editorial boards of some newspapers and magazines to publish articles opposing and criticizing the official policies of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia; (b) permitting circulation of limited numbers of foreign magazines in the country: (c) allowing visits from and to foreign countries on a more extensive scale. The monopoly of means of production was somewhat relaxed by allowing the establishment of a few small privately owned trades and services. The monopoly of organization was never entirely attained, because churches, especially the Catholic Church, were never fully integrated into the Communist system of "belts and levers of dictatorship". Their autonomy has been somewhat strengthened. The monopoly of arms remains unaffected by the "liberalization" process. The use of direct police persecution was sharply reduced; however, economic persecution has been stepped up by a realignment of pensions and retirement benefits, increase of taxes, manipulation of prices, and new regulations concerning living space. Thus, it is safe to say, in summary, that the so-called liberalization of the regime affects only the extent of the use of power and the personal composition of the Party organs, but is not a modification of the structure itself. From the beginning of the period of "thaw", after the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, there were several attempts to change the basic structure of Communist society. They were directed toward three different aims: establishment of an independent (opposition) party; change from dictatorship to a society governed by law, albeit autocratically imposed by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia; and the strengthening of intra-Party democracy at the expense of the Presidium. No publicity was given to the efforts to permit the functioning of an independent political party which would assume the role of an opposi-

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tion party as a corrective of the policies pursued by and mistakes committed by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. Such a step would, of course, mean abandoning the system of the National Front, which is the base of the dictatorship in the so-called people's democracies 3 and which has been carried over, in Czechoslovakia, even into the stage of socialism. Within the Communist Party, discussions about the possibility of permitting an opposition party took the form of deliberations on the function of the National Assembly, which was considered superfluous by the advocates of an opposition party, as long as no opposition party is represented therein. Only after all these efforts had been subdued did President Antonin Novotny condemn them, in his speech before the Statewide Conference of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on June 11, 1956: Side by side with incorrect opinions stemming from a low level of political thinking, there appeared also voices of disguised enemies and attacks against the general line of the Party. I have in mind, for instance, harmful opinions negating the role and importance of the National Front, or bourgeois and liberalistic opinions requesting a weakening of the leading role of the Communist Party, claiming freedom for bourgeois anti-socialistic propaganda, and defending various enemies of our social order. There were even voices which, under the disguise of 'freedom', called for return of the pre-February situation. These tendencies appeared outside of the Party but attempts to smuggle them even into Party ranks were not missing. Some Communists committed the mistake of not detecting immediately the inimical class origin of these opinions and of not opposing them resolutely right at the beginning. 4

Complaints about disregard of constitutional and legal provisions by courts, by the police, and by other state organs have been raised incessantly since it became possible to voice criticisms in Czechoslovakia. Endeavors to remedy the lawless character of Czechoslovak society came to a head in April 1963, when the official organ of Czechoslovak Lawyers, Pravnik, organized a discussion of leading Czechoslovak Communist lawyers concerning the situation of law in the country. The results of the discussion 5 focused on the demand that "socialist legality be observed". This demand is to be understood in the sense that the constitution and the laws promulgated by the Communist state 3

V. Chalupa, Rise and Development

of a Totalitarian

State

(Leyden, H. E.

Stenfert Kroese N.V., 1959), p. 51 ff. 4 "Contemporary Situation and Tasks of the Party", Rude pravo, June 11 (Prague, 1956), Special Supplement p. 10. 5 Pravnik, July 1963 (Prague), p. 1 ff.

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should be observed, not violated, by the organs of the state for purposes or under the pretext of "class struggle". The Communist lawyers supported this demand by two arguments: First, the class character of the legal system in Czechoslovakia is determined by the fact that it is created by the Communist Party. Therefore, it is not necessary to enforce the class character of the legal system by violating this system. Second, Czechoslovakia has already achieved the stage of socialism, which means that its society is now composed of classes which are not antagonistic, but which cooperate under the direction of the Communist Party; therefore, Stalin's teaching about the strengthening of class struggle during the period of building socialism is erroneous and the term "class struggle" acquires a different meaning. In the present stage of socialism, the rights of individuals, as defined by the legal order, are in harmony with the interests of society, not contrary to them; consequently, they must be protected and not violated. Stripped of Communist terminology, the argument of the top Communist lawyers proposes basically that the Communist Party itself determine the contents of laws and other legal norms without respecting the will of the citizens, but that the Party also observe these laws and legal norms. Inherent in this request is the abandonment of dictatorship, which means, precisely, "an authority based directly on force, an authority which is absolutely unrestricted by any laws or regulations". 6 This demand is being paid lip-service in public declarations from time to time, but the fact that these declarations have been necessary to this very day proves that the transformation of Czechoslovak society from dictatorship into autocracy has not taken place. The efforts at strengthening democracy inside of the Party took, in their first stage, the form of a request for calling an extraordinary Party Congress. In the above-mentioned speech, President Novotny admitted that 235 Party organizations and 15,000 Party members requested the convocation of an extraordinary Party Congress. The Party Presidium refused this request flatly and the whole Party bureaucracy was mobilized to suppress any similar tendencies. The official line was that the demand for convoking an extraordinary Party Congress had nothing to do with the workers, but had originated with members of the intelligentsia and white-collar workers. This discussion went on at all levels of the Communist Party and only years later did reports thereof reach the press indirectly. A typical example follows: 6

V. I. Lenin, loc. cit.

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The regional ideological conference underscored that the fact that the hysterical and exaggerated demands to convoke an extra-ordinary Party Congress originated in meetings of people not working in production, was not accidental. . . . Often there appeared disguised tendencies intending to prove that the intelligentsia, being elevated above narrow class interests, is the only element capable of objective evaluation of the development of society.7 President Novotny spoke in this connection during the Statewide Conference of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia: . . . The question arises how to apply correctly the principle of democratic centralism. In the Party, it is impossible to conduct eternal discussions; this has nothing in common with Leninist principles of intra-Party democracy. Our Party democracy is a democracy of action, which means that, after a free exchange of opinions concerning the problems in question, a resolution follows and then the main thing is its implemention.8 The Conference then amended article 27 of the Statutes of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia from: "However, a broad intra-Party democracy must be applied so that it cannot lead to attempts of a small minority to impose its will on a great majority of the Party" to: "However, a broad intra-Party democracy - including discussion - must be applied so that it cannot lead to attempts of a small minority to impose its will on a great majority of the Party." Thus, the attempts to enlarge democracy within the Communist Party actually resulted in further reducing it. The new statutes of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, adopted December 10, 1962, preserve the dominant position of the Presidium. Article 32 states only that "the Presidium and the Secretariat submit to the Central Committee a report on their activities". The statutes do not contain any provision at all for revocation of the Presidium and/or defining its responsibilities towards the Central Committee or the Congress. Great importance was attached by some observers to economic reforms in Czechoslovakia which were considered to be a return or, at least, the beginning of a return to a free enterprise system. In fact, these reforms are very limited and their only purpose is to remedy the weakest spots in the economic system and to strengthen the Communist dictatorship. The leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia 7

Speech of F. Kraus, Secretary of the Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Poclioden, January 30, 1959 (Hradec Kralove, Czechoslovakia), p. 3. 8 "Contemporary Situation and Tasks of the Party", Rude pravo, June 11 (Prague, 1956), Special Supplement p. 11.

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is fully conscious of the possible consequences of those reforms which were undertaken, and is supervising them very closely. President N o votny said in Prostejov on October 28, 1965: All the increase in our standard of living . . . will be uniformly directed; we cannot admit any wilfulness; this would only make matters worse. . . . Things which we are today justified in criticizing we would replace by complete freedom, which would mean anarchy in our national economy, and not a planned socialist economy. . . . In the process of perfecting our economy we shall oppose liberalistic opinions, acceptance of principles of capitalist economy, as well as of dogmatic opinions which could tend to continue in the old discredited ways. 9 The principal author of economic reforms, Ota Sik, devoted a lengthy article to the refutation of the opinion that the new methods introduced into Czechoslovak economy mean a return to a free enterprise society centered around a free market. The central economic plan will naturally also in the future be the instrument determining the long-term development of Czechoslovak economy. The possibility of ascertaining and streamlining the basic macro-economic processes centrally by the society is and will remain forever the advantage of socialist planning. Only a prospective plan covering several years can guarantee the proportional development and secure structural transformation of the whole national economy. And only a central economic institution covering the whole state can secure the implementation of these tasks through a longterm plan. 10 From the above-mentioned, it can safely be concluded that the ruling political group in Czechoslovakia has succeeded in preserving the basic power structure established during the period of Stalinism without relinquishing any substantial amount of its power, and in securing for itself the option of increasing the application of power and reversing the trend of granting small reforms any time it deems advisable. It is beyond the scope of this essay to document widely the thesis expounded above; nevertheless, we wish to add the now-famous letter which Dr. Ivan Svitak, former Professor and member of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, wrote to a high functionary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. This letter, or a copy thereof, reached by unknown means the Viennese magazine, Forum, and was published in October 1965. 9

A. Salomoun, "Z poslednich udalosti v Ceskoslovensku", Vestnik Ceskoslovenske narodni rady americke, No. 138 (Chicago, Nov. 1965), p. 5. 10 Ota Sik, "Nova soustava planoviteho rizeni hospodarstvi", Otazky miru a socialismu, No. 3 (Prague, March 1965), pp. 23-31.

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"Dear Comrade, I turn to you as a Czech philosopher, as a university teacher, and scientist who during the last twenty years studied and taught Marxist philosophy in Czechoslovakia. Even a year ago, I was a member of the Philosophic Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. I was dismissed from this Institute a year ago on the basis of a decision of the Central Committee of the Party and of the Presidium of the Academy. This decision was a repressive and administrative reaction to my critical opinions on Czech philosophy and culture. It was implemented with no regard to the fact that my co-workers had three times refused to accept my dismissal and punishment as unwarranted. The decision was put into effect only after extraordinary measures had been taken by the President of the Ideological Commission (Vladimir Koucky). The imposed dissolution of the Party Committee in the Philosophical Institute, the institution of an extraordinary investigative commission, open threats of abolition of the whole Institute, and an atmosphere of personal intimidation - all this finally resulted in my dismissal. The use of such merciless administrative measures to settle a philosophical discussion were quite exceptional, even for Czechoslovak conditions. In publishing houses, all my publications were seized; in the editorial offices of cultural magazines, my ten articles were confiscated; all my lectures in universities were suspended, my passport was taken away and I was grossly slandered for seven sentences from an unpublished letter. Now, I have already been unemployed for a year because all my applications have been rejected; all this was on the basis of an order that I must not be employed by any Czech cultural institution. The only offer - insulting and intentionally provocative - from the Presidium of the Academy was that of an unspecified job in the Charitas, a Catholic organization which manufactures religious objects and has nothing to do with philosophy. You will better understand these absurd measures directed against a scientist if you remember that in the spring of 1964, for the first time in the history of socialist countries, police dogs were used in great numbers against young workers - in Prague, during the May celebrations. For the first time peaceful citizens not engaging in any demonstrations were chased by the police with truncheons from public parks. At the same time, a caricaturist was punished by one year of imprisonment for a caricature which had been passed by the censors. This happened at a time when the question of the responsibility for still-unpunished political murders during the years 19501952 remained unresolved. My dismissal thus is connected with a wave of persecution of the intelligentsia, a wave which reappears in Czech cultural life with a regular four-year rhythm. In 1948 members of the Intelligentsia were sent to the mines, in 1952 to the scaffold, in 1960 some were dismissed, and now they are only slandered. The reasons of my dismissal stand in contradiction to the law and to the norms of scientific life, and aim only at a purely administrative solution of a theoretical discussion about the orientation of Czech philosophy. Any defense was made impossible; by various means of intimidation and pressure, all persons and organs who defended me and rejected the administrative pro-

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J.

Chalupa

cedure against me were quickly silenced. My dismissal was intended as an exemplary punishment of a 'revisionist orientation' and was an expression of purely Stalinist, not yet outgrown practices of slome leading cultural politicians who are led by Vladimir Koucky. This unnatural culmination of a theoretical disagreement between Marxists is due to the present tension in Czech political life. I have accepted this connection of events with temporary conditions and have openly demonstrated that I do not intend to misuse my case against the Communist Party and that I do not want to exchange Czechoslovak citizenship for advantageous scientific possibilities abroad. Against my expectations, however, the pressure against my person continues, and for this reason I take the liberty of requesting f r o m you certain assistance. A week ago, the new President of the Ideological Commission and member of the Politbureau, J i n Hendrych, declared he intends to have me prosecuted according to the law against parasitism, although I am an independent scientist, translator, and member of the World Federation of Scientific Workers. Perhaps I am threatened by arrest. One of the mightiest men in the state can thus take the liberty of designating a philosopher a parasite, and if he finds it convenient, have him arrested. I enclose all the documents to let you know which methods are used by cultural dogmatists often quite openly and unashamedly, even in the year 1965, in Central Europe and even in a socialist State which formally rejected the methods of the personality cult. I would be most grateful to you if you would influence favorably my application f o r a passport, because I would like to continue my philosophical studies abroad. At present that is impossible in Czechoslovakia, because all scientific activities and any philosophic or literary production are prohibited to me. Nevertheless, I do not intend to emigrate f r o m Czechoslovakia because I am convinced that a practical defense of Czech socialistic humanism is much more important and difficult than pure theoretical philosophy. With sincere regards, Ivan Svitak 11

IV. CONCLUSION When judging the failures of Communist methods, it is usually pointed out that their humanitarian goals cannot possibly be accomplished with the dehumanized methods the Communist Parties use, because such methods invariably affect the aims they supposedly serve, as well as those w h o use them. This criticism is valid, but it ignores a deeper problem which faces the Communist Parties; how could any method achieve the goal they pursue — which the latest Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union declares to be a society in which everyone pursues the 11

"Dopis z Prahy", Ceskoslovensky zpravodaj, No. 561 (New York, Free European Committee Inc., November 15), 1965, pp. 1-2.

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goals set by the Communist Party leadership according to his abilities as defined by the Communist Party, and is satisfied by being rewarded according to his needs - as defined by the Communist Party. As Milovan Djilas pointed out in The New Class, thinking is, for man, a process as natural and indispensable as eating or digestion. And thinking men inevitably will arrive at conclusions different from those of their rulers or leaders. The endeavor to suppress thinking must lead to conflict, which produces repression, which in turn starts the vicious circle by which Communist Party-dominated societies try to perpetuate themselves. Thus, not only faulty means, but also a faulty goal, are the root of the difficulties which beset present-day Czechoslovakia.

Czechoslovakia's Relations with Underdeveloped Countries1

CURT F. BECK

The limits within which Czechoslovak foreign policy has operated since the 1948 coup have been set by the Soviet Union. Besides providing support for Soviet positions in general, Czechoslovakia has had the task of reiterating and amplifying Russia's policy toward Germany. Since 1954, Czechoslovakia has been given a major part in Soviet efforts directed toward the underdeveloped countries. Why Czechoslovakia was picked for this task, her accomplishments, and the extent of her successes will be explored in this paper. Although Czechoslovakia's activities have covered the globe, ranging all the way from Latin America to Southeast Asia, the primary emphasis in this paper will be placed on Africa. Soviet interest in the underdeveloped parts of the world grew as a result of stalemates in Europe and the Far East which prevented the accretion of further Soviet power in those traditional centers of conflict. A virtual power vacuum resulting from the disintegration of European colonial empires beckoned Soviet leaders and forced them to revise the previous Soviet policy associated with Stalin, a policy which had condemned nationalist movements in Africa and Asia as tools of the "imperialist" West. The Bandung Conference in April 1955 set the stage for what seemed at first to be a self-effacement of traditional Soviet Communism vis-à-vis the Afro-Asian world. At the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, in February 1956, Khrushchev declared that the awakening of the peoples of Africa had begun.2 The November 1960 Declaration of Communist Party leaders assembled in Moscow pursued the subject further when it stated: 1

This paper is a revision of "Czechoslovakia's Penetration of Africa, 19551962", World Politics, April 1963, pp. 403-416. A visit to West Africa in the fall of 1963, financed by the University of Connecticut Research Foundation and the American Philosophical Society, facilitated on-the-spot checking of data obtained from contemporary Czechoslovak sources. 2 David Morison, The U.S.S.R. and Africa (London, Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 7-8.

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Countries

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The socialist countries are the sincere and true friends of those nations that are fighting for their freedom or that have already succeeded in throwing off the imperalist yoke and oppression. They decisively reject any interference whatsoever in the internal affairs of the young nation-states and deem it their international responsibility to help the nations in their fight to strengthen their national independence. They offer these countries help of all types and support on their road ahead as they build their own industries, develop, and strengthen their national economy, build up their own trained manpower reserves; and they cooperate with them in their fight for peace on the entire globe, against imperialist aggression.8 Antonin Novotny, First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, said, in addressing the 12th Congress of that Party on December 4, 1962: We have good and friendly relations with those countries that have freed themselves from colonialism. . . . We stand on their side and today, just as in the past, we are seeking to help them in accord with our abilities.4 These were the guidelines for Soviet and, hence, Czechoslovak conduct toward the new nations of Africa and Asia. 5

CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S ASSETS

The Soviet Union recognized the advantage of utilizing her European satellites in her policy toward the new states. By doing so she hoped to dispel the fear shared by smaller states of the Russian colossus. There was also the obvious element of exploiting the considerable wealth of Eastern Europe, thereby supplementing Russia's limited resources. Among the Eastern European satellites, Czechoslovakia stood out as best-fitted for the Soviet Union's new policy. Czechoslovak experts had 3

As translated from the Czech in a quotation used by Jaroslav Sedivy, "CSSR a hospodarsky malo vyvinute zeme" [The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Underdeveloped Countries], Nova mysl, No. 7 (July 1961), 798. This statement can therefore be considered the guideline for the Czechoslovak Communist government. For the text of the full statement, see New York Times, December 7 (1960), pp. 14-17. 4 Rude pravo, Supplement, December 5 (1962). 5 Czechoslovak recognition of Soviet leadership in dealing with developing countries is repeated frequently. "It is impossible to wage a successful war against imperialism and for the development of those countries which were, and even today still are, dependent on the imperialists in many different ways without the cooperation of the socialist countries, especially without the cooperation of the most experienced and the most powerful country, the Soviet Union"; Evzen Paloncy, "Komunismus a narodne osvobozenecke hnuti" [Communism and the National Independence Movements], Nova mysl, No. 8 (August 1963), p. 898.

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experience in underdeveloped countries. They had established factories in Iran, India, and North Africa in the 1930's. At that time, there had also been set up one of the largest sales organizations in the world by the Bat'a shoe company, the remnants of which are still very much in evidence in most of the countries of Africa, even though the name of the parent company has disappeared from Czechoslovakia.6 Of crucial interest to the Russians was Czechoslovakia's armaments industry. Czechoslovakia was able to furnish requested weapons to Egypt in 1955 7 and to Guinea in 1958.® These were only two of a longer list of armaments deals. The Czechoslovak armaments industry was evidently suited to fill comparatively small orders when time was a critical element in the transaction. Another, and perhaps decisive, asset was the extensive reservoir of skilled technicians and the factories producing machinery for light and heavy industries. Furthermore, since the experience of many Czechoslovak engineers and technicians anteceded the wholesale nationalization of the economy, they were in a better position than their Soviet counterparts to operate in the economies of the underdeveloped countries, most of which had mixed economies. Czechoslovakia benefited also from being so much smaller than Russia and, therefore, with less room for the bureaucratic jungle of a Communist state and a great saving of red tape. This made possible relatively quick responses to the needs posed by suddenly available opportunities.

DIPLOMATIC TIES

Czechoslovak involvement in the underdeveloped world is based on an extensive network of diplomatic ties which connects Czechoslovakia with a large number of the states of Asia and Africa. Relations are facilitated by transportation and communications contacts between • Bohumil Lehár, "The Economic Expansion of the Bat'a Concern in Czechoslovakia and Abroad (1929-1938)", Histórica, V (Prague, Ceskoslovenská akademie véd, 1963), pp. 147-188. ' New York Times, October 14 (1955); Obrana lidu, February 17 (1957), and subsequent issues. See also Frank Uhlir, "Red Sky over Prague", East Europe, October 1960, p. 33. 8 East Europe, May 1960, p. 15; Smith Hempstone, The New Africa (London, Faber and Faber, 1961), p. 297; Franz Ansprenger, Politik im Schwarzen Afrika (Köln, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1961), p. 301.

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Prague and what used to be, only a decade ago, remote outposts of Western colonialism, such as Conakry and Phnom Penh. The Czechoslovak presence in Africa and Asia involves expansion of trade relations with selected countries, the granting of aid projects, and the construction of heavy, as well as consumer, industrial plants in countries as diverse as India, Mali, and Cuba and, last but certainly not least, the great efforts spent on influencing the rising intelligentsia in parts of the world where a certain sophistication of learning has not yet been achieved. Diplomatic relations with the newly sovereign states of Asia and North Africa date back to the 1950's. 1960, the year of African independence, was marked by frenzied efforts to establish diplomatic ties with the large number of newborn states South of the Sahara. Hardly an independence celebration in even the remotest corner of the African tropics was permitted to pass without the appearance of a laudatory article introducing the newcomer to those Czechs who exposed themselves to Rude pravo.9 Goodwill greetings from the Czechoslovak government were usually addressed to the new leaders of the former colonial territories. A government mission whose composition and size varied to fit the relative importance of the country in question was dispatched to participate in the independence celebrations and, hopefully, to pave the way for the establishment of regular diplomatic and trade relations. Such efforts were not always immediately successful, especially in those countries where French influence survived independence. On the whole, Czechoslovakia has established more embassies and legations than any one of the other Soviet bloc countries, with the exception of the Soviet Union. By the end of 1962, she had relations with the following countries in Africa: Algeria, Congo (Leopoldville), Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Tanganyika, Togo, Tunisia, and Uganda.10 Since then, countries in East Africa and more countries of so-called French expression were, or will soon be, added to the list. Once established, these relations have not always remained on a friendly or correct basis. This was particularly true in the case of relations with the Congo (Leopoldville) from which the 8

Rude pravo, January 4, 1960 (Cameroons); June 21, 1960 (Mali); June 30, 1960 (Congo, Leopoldville); July 1, 1960 (Somalia); July 28, 1960 (Malagasy Republic); August 4, 1960, (Dahomey); August 7, 1960, (Ivory Coast); November 28, 1960 (Mauritania). 10 Vernon McKay, Africa in World Politics (New York, Harper and Row, 1963), p. 228; Ost-Probleme, XIV (August 1962), p. 490.

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Czechoslovak diplomats were expelled in the fall of 1960 and where they were again involved in compromising activities inNovember 1963.11 These difficulties must not be exaggerated. Czechoslovakia's diplomatic activities have borne fruit by creating the desired image among many Africans of Czechoslovakia as a very important country which is interested in their fate. Countries which have only recently become independent attach considerable importance to the ceremonial and symbolical paraphernelia of sovereignty, a fact which some older Czechoslovaks can recall from their own not-so-distant past. A Czechoslovak ambassador participating in a ceremonial automobile procession through the streets of Bamako, welcoming the return of President Modibo Keita to the capital, raises Czechoslovakia to a more important level in the mind of the people of Mali than some other state, which may be more powerful, but which is absent from the streets of Mali. Embassies also serve as social centers of political and cultural propaganda. Bilateral relations have been supplemented by Czechoslovak efforts to gain the goodwill of the Afro-Asian bloc at the United Nations by making gestures of one sort or another in support of what the Communist bloc considers to be the anti-colonial interests of the new nations. That such efforts have not always been successful and that there has occasionally been public evidence of disharmony does not detract from the fact that Czechoslovakia has enhanced its image as a white European state, with no involvement in past colonial affairs, which is favorably disposed to the developing countries.

AERIAL DIPLOMACY

Diplomatic relations have set the stage for economic, cultural, and political contacts. To facilitate these contacts, Czechoslovakia has established an impressive network of air transportation. Czechoslovakia has also taken important steps to help new countries establish their own airlines. It is unwise to underestimate the importance of airline diplomacy. Almost all of the underdeveloped countries are woefully short of traditional means of transportation. Railroads, river transports, oceanliner docking facilities, and highways are usually primitive and neglected. 11 "Conflict in the Congo", American Universities Field Staff Reports, Central and Southern Africa Series, VIII, No. 4 (October 1960), p. 2; New York Times, November 21 and 22 (1963).

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Their construction or modernization requires the expenditure of considerable capital and time. The establishment of modern air facilities is a shortcut to at least superficial modernity. The international airport terminal gives the visiting stranger his first impression of the backward country which he enters through a Western façade. Any country can establish its national airline on a shoestring by buying surplus planes, painting the national flag on the fuselage, dressing a politician's favorite in the smart uniform of a stewardess, and typing a few timetables. The purchase of status in this manner is cheaper and simpler than building up armies or establishing navies, those erstwhile symbols of statehood. The Communists have recognized this. The Soviet Union has given or sold some of its propeller-driven and jet planes to Guinea, Mali, and other countries, thereby making possible such airlines as Air Guinée and Air Mali. These airlines are staffed with Czechoslovak pilots, who operate in the tropical environment with few of the navigation aids which are standard in Europe and America. 12 Aside from helping Africans establish and operate their own airlines, Czechoslovakia has enhanced its own prestige by flying modern planes to all parts of the world, with the exception of South America and Australia. The Czechoslovak Airline operates weekly or more frequently to Havana via Ireland and Newfoundland; to Conakry and Bamako via Morocco and Senegal; to Kabul via Syria and Iran; to Iraq via Turkey and Syria; and to Burma, Cambodia, and Indonesia via Lebanon, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and India. This means that there exist now connections linking Prague directly with North America, West Africa, and the Near, Middle, and Far East. 18 In this sense, at least, geographically determined provincialism is a thing of the past. The extensive Czechoslovak airline network which is in part overlapped, and in part supplemented, by the Soviet Aeroflot line cannot but have some military implications. Flying routes around the tip of West Africa, across the Atlantic, over the Suez Canal, and to Southeast Asia familiarizes Czechoslovak and Russian pilots with places which even in this nuclear age have not entirely lost their strategic value. It must also be noted that Czechoslovakia has moved into the field of ocean transportation. The heavy amount of trade between Czechoslovakia and Cuba has resulted in Czechoslovakia joining Poland, East 12 Rudé prâvo, January 10 (1962). Has an interesting article describing the Czechoslovak contribution to Air Mali. 13 CSA (Czechoslovak Airline) Letovy fâd [Time Table], Winter 1963-64.

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Germany, and Cuba in the establishment of a joint shipping service between the Baltic ports and Cuba.14

CZECHOSLOVAK TRADE A N D AID

Czechoslovakia's economic involvement in the developing countries has followed a pattern determined by political considerations. The factors influencing the pattern can be summarized as follows: Trade, with which country, as well as in what goods, is largely influenced by the economic enterprises to which Czechoslovakia has committed herself. Thus, Czechoslovakia accepts Egyptian cotton or Guinean pineapples and bananas, not because the Czechoslovak government is impressed with the need to provide its citizens with those particular goods, but in order to obtain some repayment for capital and technical aid which it has invested in those countries. It is therefore quite common to find Czechoslovakia concluding agreements providing for the exchange of specified products with countries in which it has agreed to construct certain projects.16 Since trade is dependent on aid projects, the question is what determines the nature of the project and the country in which it is located. There is discernible a route along which Czechoslovak projects have migrated. This is not to say that Czechoslovak attention shifts from place to place, never to retrace its steps, but rather to maintain that places where major efforts are exerted vary from one year to the next. The route which this migration has taken is, of course, entirely the result of political considerations. The most important criterion is where the investment of Czechoslovak resources may reap the greatest rewards, in terms of goodwill and influence for the Soviet bloc. Getting a foothold in a country where the Soviet bloc has not previously been permitted to operate is an important consideration. Building projects in countries which are centers of attention for larger regions because of the dynamic nature of their leaders, their religion, or their cultural role is another consideration. And so is the likelihood of a continuingly favorable political climate, with the 14

East Europe, December 1963, p. 5. Czechoslovakia has concluded arrangements for the exchange of goods with the following countries of Africa; Congo (Leopoldville), Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Somalia, Tanganyika, Tunisia, and the U.A.R. A Czechoslovak advertisement in the Trade Directory of the Republic of Ghana (London, Diplomatic Press and Publishing Co., 1964), p. 106. 15

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prospect of the project remaining a monument to Czechoslovak good will. If we bear these considerations in mind, we can trace the route of the migration. We start in India, the most prominent exponent of neutralism in the Cold War, in 1953, when the earlier Stalin opposition to neutralism was reversed and when this was the time and the place in which to test the new policy, and move to Egypt in 1955 when the opportunity presented itself to move into the center of what had been the lifeline of the British Empire; to Indonesia in 1956 at the time of the crisis with the Netherlands; to Guinea in 1958, when there beckoned the prospect of establishing a bridgehead leading to the African nationalist movements which were about to undermine European colonial control; to North Africa in 1962, with the final success of the Algerian revolution and, finally, to East Africa at present, as apportunities open there with the fruition of the independence movement. The case of Cuba, where Czechoslovakia became seriously involved in 1960, is so obvious it hardly needs mention. Inasmuch as political considerations determined in which countries Czechoslovak projects were located, it also follows that the type of projects offered were geared to the needs of the country being wooed. Czechoslovakia's industrial versatility played a significant role at this juncture. Unlike the other satellites, Czechoslovakia was able to offer plants for heavy industry and plants for processing primary resources, as well as plants for the production of consumer goods. Czechoslovakia was in a position also to offer the necessary credits with which to finance the projects. To facilitate these tasks, Czechoslovakia set up a foreign trade corporation, Technoexport, which specializes in the export of complete industrial installations.16 In order to illustrate the variety of projects in question, a few will be listed here: a metallurgical plant in India, cement plants in Afghanistan, India, and elsewhere, sugar mills in India, Guinea, and elsewhere, a water filter station in Egypt, an oil refinery in Syria, shoe factories in many countries, including Ghana and Ethiopia, a textile factory in Mali, a ceramic plant in Ghana, and a telecommunications center and railway equipment in Guinea.17 16

A typical Technoexport advertisement is published in the Trade Directory of the Republic of Ghana (1964), p. 23. 17 Czechoslovakia has organized a number of exhibitions or trade fairs to advertise her capabilities. Such fairs have been held in 1962 and 1963 in the following underdeveloped countries: Morocco (2), Syria (2), Turkey (2), Tunisia (2), India, Afghanistan, Peru, Somalia, Chile, Nigeria, Lybia, Mali, and Cam-

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Curt F. Beck TRAINING A N D EDUCATION

An integral part of the establishment of Czechoslovak plants in underdeveloped countries is the training of native technicians and engineers to enable them to operate the new machines. A special agency, the Polytechna enterprise, has been established to coordinate Czechoslovak technical assistance activities and to act as a general servicing organization catering to the needs of developing nations.18 A large number of Czechoslovaks have been sent to all parts of the globe to carry out the task of training. In 1963 there were ninety-five technicians in the relatively small country of Guinea alone. The number of Czechoslovaks engaged in a variety of projects is reputed to be much larger in Cuba. Training Africans, Asians, and Cubans on the spot is the quickest method of imparting technical knowledge and leaves probably the least trace of the instructor's own culture and political beliefs upon the trainee. Training men in specially set up training institutes in Czechoslovakia in programs of varying duration provides fuller and more detailed training and an opportunity for Communist propaganda to make a deeper impact. On the other hand, it also gives the visitor an opportunity to judge for himself the performance of the Communist regime. Czechoslovakia has taken a leading place among those advanced states which attract students from underdeveloped countries. Agreements with many African and Asian states provide that Czechoslovakia will educate and give financial support to specified number of students. About 3316 foreign students were studying in Czechoslovakia in 196263. Most of them were from the underdeveloped countries.19 Special language schools have been set up to prepare the foreigners for higher education. This apparently was not sufficient to solve the academic, cultural, and social problems which the foreign students encountered in their studies at Czech universities. As a result, a special university was created on September 15, 1961, the University of the bodia, according to the Czechoslovak Central Commission of Public Control and Statistics, Statistickâ rocenka Ceskoslovenské socialistické republiky 1963 (Prague, 1963), p. 370. Czechoslovakia also "appreciates the already traditional participation of many African countries in the Pavilion of Nations every September at the Brno International Trade Fair", Trade Directory of the Republic of Ghana (1964), p. 106. 18 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Africa and the Communist World (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1963), p. 99. 19 Statistickâ rocenka Ceskoslovenské socialistické republiky 1963, p. 417.

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17th of November, commemorating the uprising of Prague students against the Nazis in 1939. This University was intended to serve, not only foreign students, but also those Czech youths who plan to work in underdeveloped countries. In 1962/63 only foreigners were officially matriculated. 20 The prorector of the University, V. Stepanek, defined the function of the University as not merely to educate good specialists, although this is its primary responsibility, but also to create friends for Czechoslovakia. 21 There have been a number of accounts portraying the foreign students' dissatisfaction with the excessive amount of Communist indoctrination to which they have been exposed as part of their training. A number of these students left Czechoslovakia for the West or for their homes. It appears, however, that the number of acutely dissatisfied students represents only a small fraction of the total. It is likely that most students remain indifferent to Communist propaganda, treating it as a necessary payment for their training. There will always be some students, on the other hand, who will carry home with them favorable attitudes toward the country where they received their higher education. Among these may be some future national leaders.

POLITICAL INFLUENCE

Czechoslovakia acts as host, not merely to skilled workers, technicians, engineers, and students, but also to numerous delegations of men active in public life, such as trade union leaders, journalists, politicians, government administrators, and heads of government. Sekou Toure, Kwame Nkrumah, Modibo Keita, and Haile Selassie have all been on state visits to Czechoslovakia. Among the first-, second-, or third-echelon leaders are some who returned home determined to cultivate closer relations with Czechoslovakia and the Soviet bloc. For those intellectual and political leaders who cannot be reached in any of the above ways, the Communist leaders of Czechoslovakia have other means of establishing contact. The Czechs have been active in training African journalists. In Mali, the Czechs have been engaged to 20

In 1962-63, 880 foreign students matriculated at the University of the 17th of November. Of these 796 were enrolled in the section for language and technical preparation, 67 in the section for natural sciences and engineering, and only 17 in the social sciences. Ibid, p. 417. 21 Rude prdvo, October 2 (1962).

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establish a press agency and to train Mali journalists.22 They export to Africa and Asia Czechoslovak journals translated into English, which are meant to appeal to the local intellectual leaders. They direct shortwave radio broadcasts to key African and Asian listening areas. SUCCESS OR FAILURE?

It is not easy to evaluate extensive Czechoslovak efforts in the underdeveloped countries. In view of Czechoslovakia's small population, her efforts in the underdeveloped countries are impressive. Her performance on specific projects has varied greatly, depending, in part, on local conditions. Czechs have, at times, been criticized for delay in implementing construction promises, and for maintaining inadequate servicing facilities. One finds, for instance, a large number of Czechoslovak trucks out of commission on the streets of Conakry for want of parts. Whether the criticisms which have been levelled at Czechoslovak performance are par for the course, or more serious than those directed against Western enterprises, is difficult to determine. The Czechs have been accused of lacking the necessary tact to deal with populations which encountered the wheel and the jet engine within a single generation. The reality of the African world has also been a far cry from the myth of the noble savage who merely awaited the departure of the imperialist oppressor before turning into a modern man indistinguishable from the rest of us, except perhaps for color. There are indications that Czechoslovaks, as well as other Central and Bast Europeans who had not encountered Negroes at home, quickly acquired all those racial prejudices which Western Europeans and North Americans have been gradually shedding. This also explains the numerous accounts of student incidents in Prague which have racial overtones. It is not difficult to gauge the popularity of the aid program among Czechoslovaks who remain at home. A Communist Party official recently took to task those "who blame our supply difficulties on the aid we give to the newly liberated African countries." 23 Such a statement, and others like it, if added to the recurring accounts of brawls among foreigners and so-called "hoodlums" in Prague,24 are evidence of the fact that many 22 CTK (Czechoslovak Press Agency), March 30, 1961. Czechoslovakia also built a radio transmitter in Bamako which became operational on December 12, 1963. Rude prdvo, January 3 (1964). 23 Pruboj (Usti nad Labem), January 23, 1963, as cited in East Europe, April (1963), p. 31. 24 New York Times, May 15 (1963); Rude prdvo, May 16 (1963).

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Czechoslovaks feel that their nation, in its present economic condition, cannot afford the tremendous effort which goes into cultivating influence in Africa and Asia. On the other hand, the political leaders clearly feel that the many tangible evidences of Czechoslovakia's worldwide activities fill the hearts of many citizens with pride. In some remote manner, one can even compare the Communist leaders' emphasis on the problems of Africa and Asia with Bismarck's major effort to divert France from her lost province of Alsace-Lorraine by encouraging her to engage in imperialist adventures in Africa and Indochina.

Czechoslovakia and the World Communist System* JAN F. TftlSKA

After sixteen years of membership in the world Communist system, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, one of the fourteen Communist party-states, 1 displays certain significant characteristics which are system-, rather than state-determined and relevant. It is the purpose of this paper to attempt to discover, via quantitative benefits-costs analysis of available statistical data, those properties, functions, and propensities which may be attributed, directly or indirectly, to Czechoslovakia's participation and role in he world Communist system. Which system attributes displayed which state attributes, and to what extent? In terms of size or weight in the system, Czechoslovakia is a small party-state: It ranks eighth in territory, eighth in population, and its GNP of 11,94 billion dollars 2 is relatively small. In terms of natural resources, Czechoslovakia is close to the bottom of the list (Table 1). In relative or per capita figures, on the other hand, the story is different. Here Czechoslovakia ranks high - close to the top of the list among the Communist party-states: low infant mortality, high number of physicians and dentists in proportion to the population, high degree * I wish to acknowledge the able research assistance of Mr. Andrew Rossos, Research Assistant with the Stanford Studies of the Communist System, who collected exhaustive data on the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic for a pilot study of the Communist party-states for the SSCS. 1 The others are: the USSR, the Chinese People's Republic, People's Republic of Albania, People's Republic of Bulgaria, Hungarian People's Republic, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, German Democratic Republic, Korean People's Democratic Republic, "Heroic People of Cuba", Mongolian People's Republic, Polish People's Republic, Romanian People's Republic, and Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. While both the CPSU and the Chinese CP recognize Cuba as one of the party-states, China excludes Yugoslavia. - This is a 1957 estimate based on a gross national product analogous to Western definition, at current market prices, in Czechoslovak Koruny, converted into dollars at the tourist exchange rate of 14.32 Kcs for one U.S. dollar. The estimated Soviet GNP, for example, was 270 billion dollars in 1957.

Czechoslovakia and the World Communist System TABLE

The Communist Population (est.) (in thousands) Rank 1 China 700,000 2 USSR 221,000 3 Poland 29,730 4 Yugoslavia 18,540 5 Romania 18,410 6 East Germany 17,200 7 North Vietnam 16,000 8 Czechoslovakia 13,700 9 North Korea 10,800 10 Hungary 10,000 11 Bulgaria 7,900 12 Cuba 5,830 13 Albania 1,610 14 Mongolia 850

365

1

Party-States

Area (in million km 2 ; 2.59 X km 2 = sq.mile) Rank 1 USSR 2 China 3 Mongolia 4 Poland 5 Yugoslavia 6 Romania 7 North Vietnam 8 Czechoslovakia 9 North Korea 10 Cuba 11 Bulgaria 12 East Germany 13 Hungary 14 Albania

22,4 9,56 1,53 0,31 0,26 0,24 0,155 0,128 0,122 0,12 0,111 0,108 0,093 0,0287

Density of Population (persons/km 2 ) Rank 1 East Germany 2 Hungary 3 Czechoslovakia 4 North Vietnam 5 Poland 6 North Korea 7 Romania 8 China 9 Yugoslavia 10 Bulgaria 11 Albania 12 Cuba 13 USSR 14 Mongolia

159 108 107 103 96 89 77 73 71,5 71 56 49 10 0,5

of literacy and high educational standards (only three percent of Czechs and Slovaks are illiterate), and wide distribution of mass media of communication [newspaper circulation and radio receivers (456 and 278 per 1,000 population respectively)] are characteristic of the qualitatively high rank of Czechoslovakia within the Communist party-state system.3 These figures, coupled with per capita economic output indices, place Czechoslovakia in the leading position within the Communist system: Czechoslovakia is second in per capita gross national product, third in per capita industrial production, first in per capita crude steel production, first in per capita gross energy consumption, and first in installed capacity of electric energy (Table 2).4 As a consequence, in terms of advancement or modernization (i.e., industrialization, urbanization, literacy, and enlightenment, communica3

Jan F. Triska, with David O. Beim and Noralou Roos, "The World Communist System", Stanford Studies of the Communist System, mimeo (1964), 49 pp. 4 It is true that for the Communist party-states, data are not only hard to come by, but the available statistics are frequently unreliable a n d / o r obsolete. Per capita gross national product (or income, which is essentially similar), when available, tends to be both grossly understated for the less developed states and distorted even as a relative index of societal well-being, because of the cultural differences among states. Nevertheless, since per capita national income is generally recognized as perhaps the best available measure of economic development, it may be convenient to use it, together with other data given above, as a useful comparative economic profile of the party-states, individually as well as collectively.

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Jan F. Tfíska TABLE

The Communist

2

Party-States I \ i

Gross Energy Consumption*

Rank Total 1 USSR 636.84 2 China 197.35 3 Poland 95.39 4 E. Germany 84.66 70.64 5 Czech. 26.62 6 Romania 25.04 7 Hungary 8 Yugoslavia 16.83 12.43 9 Bulgaria 6.01 10 Cuba 0.56 11 Albania 12 N. Korea n.a. n.a. 13 N. Vietnam n.a. 14 Mongolia * 1961

Kg Rank Per Cap. 1 Czech. 2,921 n.a. 2 E. Germany 3,182 3 Poland 4,942 4 USSR 5,125 5 Hungary 1.433 6 Bulgaria 2,496 7 Romania 904 8 Yugoslavia 1,565 866 9 Cuba 337 10 Albania n.a. n.a. n.a.

TABLE 2

Per Capita Gross National Product*

Installed Capacity of Energy (Electric)* in 1000 kilowatts Per Cap. 3 5 2 4 1 6

Rank Total 1 USSR 74,098 2 China 11,594 3 E.Germany 8,268 4 Poland 6,768 5 Czech. 6,372 6 Yugoslavia 2,681 7 Romania 1,863 8 Bulgaria 1,046 932 9 Cuba 10 Albania 31 11 Hungary n.a. n.a. 12 N.Korea 13 N.Vietnam n.a. 14 Mongolia n.a. * 1961

(continued)

Indices of Industrial Production* 1955 = 100

PartyPer Rank $ States World Cap. Rank 682 1 1 USSR 18 1 1 Bulgaria 2 Czech 2 2 N. Korea 543 2 20 4 3 E. Germany not available 3 Yugoslavia 4 Poland 468 3 25 5 4 Romania 387 4 27 3 5 Czech. 5 Hungary 361 5 31 6 USSR 6 Cuba 7 Poland 7 Romania 320 6 35 40 8 Hungary 8 Yugoslavia 297 7 42 9 E. Germany 9 Bulgaria 285 8 10 China 10 China 56 9 11 Cuba 11 N. Korea n.a. 12 Albania 12 Albania n.a. 13 N. Vietnam 13 N.Vietnam n.a. 14 Mongolia 14 Mongolia n.a. * 1961 * 1955 or earlier

230 217 200 194 181 179 176 160 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.

Crude Steel Production* in thousands metric tons Per Cap 2 5 3 1 4

Rank Total 1 USSR 70,000 2 China 15,500 3 Poland 7,234 4 Czech. 7,043 5 E.Germany 3,444 6 Romania 2,126 7 Hungary 2,053 8 Yugoslavia 1,532 9 N. Korea 780 10 Bulgaria 340 11 Cuba n.a. 12 Albania n.a. 13 N. Vietnam n.a. n.a. 14 Mongolia * 1961

Czechoslovakia and the World Communist System

367

tion system, and well-being of the population) Czechoslovakia - and East Germany and Poland (and in several respects, also, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria) often surpass, on the relative, or per capita, basis, the two large and, in absolute terms, leading Communist party-states, namely the USSR and China. The considerable quantitative asymmetry between the two principal and the several supporting actors among the party-states is thus greatly aggravated by the qualitative asymmetry between the two huge and several of the small partystates. Since modernization and advancement are professed major system goals, the least advanced party-states might be expected to profit most from membership in the system. The backward party-states should be the most enthusiastic members of the system, while the more advanced members might understandably be somewhat reluctant. The available empirical evidence, however, fails to support this proposition: Czechoslovakia and East Germany, relatively the most advanced party-states, show more enthusiasm for the system than the relatively backward members, namely, Albania, China, and North Korea.5 In assisting the other, less fortunate party-states, the advanced members play a positive, contributory, awarding role for which the system appears to value them, reward them, and place them close to the top of the system hierarchy. The advanced members have thus a considerable stake in the system's stability and progress which the backward members do not appear to share. Six years ago, in the summer of 1962, I spent some time in the Bulgarian sea resort, Varna, the famous playground of the Balkans. A stay at Varna, a privileged vacationland, serves, these days, as one of the more tangible personal rewards for the lucky winners of socialist competition in Eastern Europe. And they have a ball here! But, carefree at first glance, the East European crowd seems to be rigidly stratified when observed at close quarters. As I put it in an article in East Europe in 1963, The Czechs and Slovaks are the local elite [here]. After the Bulgarians, they seem to be the most numerous. They are the best-dressed, the most deeply tanned (which means that their stay in Varna is the longest), drive most of the f e w cars parked in front of the hotels, and have more beach equipment portable radios, inflated mattresses, beach shoes, swim caps - than all the 5 F. Bruce Dodge, Comparative Enthusiasm at the International Level: A Research Design and an Application to Eastern Europe, (Honors Thesis, Stanford University, 1964), 98 pp.

368

Jan F. Triska

rest. They spend more for food and drinks (and for fur coats, quite inexpensive in Bulgaria) than the others. Also, they tend to get the best hotels. Czech is an official language here, after Bulgarian and Russian, and the several orchestras play a good number of Czech songs. 6

The Czechs and Slovaks are followed on the social scale in Varna by East Germans; then come the Hungarians and the Poles; then the Romanians; and then the Bulgarians. (We saw only a handful of Russians, Chinese, and Yugoslavs in the resort.) The social stratification is rigid; the supranational rewards appear to be scaled according to achievement and contribution to supranational goals. But what about the tangible national rewards dealt by the system to the advanced member so valiantly assisting those less developed? That is, how much did Czechoslovakia have to pay out to the system, or on its behalf, for the receipts from the system? A comparative analysis of the available statistical data should be helpful in answering these questions. How different is the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic of the early '60's from the pre-Communist, independent Czechoslovak Republic? And, having drawn the two differing statistical profiles, which deviant attributes can be attributed to the membership in the system and which cannot be so attributed? The cumulative, overall impact of Czechoslovakia's membership in the Communist system is its turn eastward. Geographically, demographically, economically, politically, socially, and culturally, Czechoslovakia, the Central European, Western-influenced and oriented nationstate turned East and became an East-European Communist party-state: (a) Czechoslovakia's boundaries with the West decreased by half (from 2,094 km to 926 km); the loss was the system's gain (from 2,017 km to 2,902 km). (b) Its population decreased for many reasons - expulsion of the German population, exchange of ethnic minorities with Hungary, loss of territory through cession to the USSR, defections after the coup d'état - and also because of the conspicuous decline in the birth rate (from 1954 to 1960, Czechoslovakia's birth rate dropped by 2 2 . 8 % ) 7 caused by the widespread practice of abortions legalized by the régime married women into the labor force: In 1961, 59.8% of the working-age

6

"Varna, Playground of the Balkans", East Europe, Vol. 12, No. 6, 1963, pp. 17-18. 7 A. Zauberman, Industrial Progress in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany, 1937-1962 (Oxford University Press, London, 1964), p. 69.

Czechoslovakia and the World Communist System

369

females were employed, constituting 43.6% of the Czechoslovak labor force. 8 The forced collectivization of agriculture and the subsequent retreat from it, accompanied by a general neglect of the countryside, and the higher earnings and more attractive living conditions in cities were responsible for the high rate of migration of the working population from the villages to the cities. While the number of persons in industry and the service trades increased by almost one-third (from 1,640,000 in 1948 to 2,422,000 in 1962), agriculture lost more than one-third (2,239,000 in 1948 and 1,334,000 in 1962) of its labor supply." The result was such rapid urbanization that the cities just could not cope with it; in fact, they have not caught up with it yet. (c) The transformation of the Czechoslovak economy after 1948 was rapid and thorough. The agricultural sector suffered most, and depopulation was its direct consequence: While the number of various kinds of cooperative farms increased from 28 in 1948 to 8,784 in 1961,10 the labor force decreased by almost 1,000,000 in that period, and the agricultural contribution to the GNP declined from 23% to 14%.11

The beneficiary of the transformation was heavy industry. While insufficient investment resulted in lagging mechanization and modernization in agriculture (in 1959, the total Czechoslovak agricultural production was behind that of 1936), 12 and while the production of light industry and basic consumer goods was (in 1961) below the pre-World War II figures, the output of heavy industry in 1962 was about four times higher than in 1937, 13 and the industrial contribution to the GNP increased from 53% before World War II to 74% in 1961.14 In the per 8

"Ostfedni urad Statni kontroly a statistiky", Statisticka rocenka C.S.S.R. 1963 (Statni nakladatelstvi technicke literatury, Praha, 1962), pp. 113-114. And the problem is bound to get worse before it gets better: The percentage of economically active population has been declining steadily since 1948. While in 1950, 62.2 per cent of the population fell within the productive age groups of 15 to 59, the projection for 1970 is 57.4%. Increasingly, the Czechoslovak economy will have to carry the burden of population too old to work. Rocenka 1962, p. 67. J. M. Michal, Central Planning in Czechoslovakia (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1960), p. 9. » Rocenka 1960, p. 90; Rocenka 1963, p. 114. 10 E. Taborsky, Communism in Czechoslovakia, 1948-1960 (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1961) p. 403. 11 A. Zauberman, op. cit., p. 59. 12 Ibid., p. 55. 13 Rocenka 1962, p. 515. 14 Ibid., p. 59.

Jan F. Tfiska

370

capita production of some basic commodities, Czechoslovakia showed a remarkable growth. By 1957, Czechoslovakia had achieved a higher per capita production of crude steel, for example, than France, but still lagged behind the United Kingdom and West Germany, as well as the United States. In 1961, only West Germany was ahead of Czechoslovakia (Table 3).15 TABLE

3

Austria

France

West Germany

U.K.

U.S.A.

East Germany

Poland

USSR

1957 Crude Steel (kg.)

387

360

320

476

429

597

165

188

250

59

1961 Crude Steel (kg.)

511

439

382

619

425

483

201

241

325

83

Yugoslavia

Czechoslovakia

Per Capita Output of Basic Materials, Energy and Main Manufactures

(d) Czechoslovak foreign economic relations and foreign trade were also subjected to enormous changes after 1948. In 1937,12% of Czechoslovak foreign trade was conducted with states presently within the Communist system; by 1953, the figure jumped to an incredible 7 8 % ; by 1965, however, the trade with the East decreased again to 73% of Czechoslovak foreign trade. 16 The level and direction of the foreign trade affected its pattern. In 1949, consumer goods exported by Czechoslovakia still amounted to 27.9% of its total exports; by 1961, the figure was only 19.6%. In the same twelve-year period, the exports of machinery, heavy equipment, and tools, principally to other Communist party-states, were almost doubled - from 27.2% to 44.6%. 1 7 A primary consequence for the Czechoslovak economy of the heavy alterations in Czechoslovak foreign trade was the chronic scarcity of much-needed hard currencies. 15

Rocenka 1962, pp. 563-569. The output of passenger cars per 1000 people in 1957 was lower in Czechoslovakia than in the West, but four times higher than in the USSR. Rocenka 1962, pp. 289-290. " V. BuSek and N. Spulber (eds.), Czechoslovakia (Praeger, New York, 1956), pp. 352-353; Rocenka, p. 433. 17 Rocenka 1960, p. 316; Rocenka 1962, pp. 350-357.

Czechoslovakia

and the World Communist

System

371

(e) In the field of foreign economic aid, both economic and military, Czechoslovakia plays an important role. Practically every Communist party-state has benefited from Czechoslovak credits in one way or another. According to an estimate by the United States Department of State, Czechoslovak economic aid to less developed countries between 1954 and 1961 was as high as 420 million dollars. In one two-year period (1956-57) the known per capita foreign economic aid granted amounted to approximately $47 in Czechoslovakia, $20 in the United States, and $14 in the Soviet Union! 18 TABLE

4

Butter (kg) Eggs (each) Milk (c) Beef Sirloin (kg) Pork Cutlet (kg) Wheat Flour (kg) Rice (kg) Potatoes (kg) Sugar (kg) Coffee (kg) Tea (kg) Electricity (kwh) Cigarettes (pack of 20)

3 50 6 11 5 21 0 06 0 09 0 08 021 0 18 0 15 3 57 3 34 3 23 3 05 4 10 3 23 0 39 0 40 0 27 0 42 1 04 051 0 07 0 05 0 06 1 29 1 38 1 21 8 22 31 20 29 49 25 — 0 23 0 04 0 06i 0 25

United Kingdom

United States

Poland

Hungary

USSR

1957* 1957** 1957

West Germany

1937

Austria

Czechoslovakia

Purchasing Power of Hourly Earnings of Workers in Manufacturing (Western Europe) and Industry (Eastern Europe). (Time in Hours and Minutes)

1957

1957

1957

1957

1957

1957

1 45 3 15 1 40 0 48 9 50 9 20 7 00 0 07 0 08 0 07 0 05 0 02 0 04 0 13 0 12 0 14 0 07 021 0 25 0 29 4 18 2 19 2 11 1 02 3 18 2 38 2 07 0 57 0 26 021 0 17 0 07 0 54 40 0 34 0 28 0 24 0 11 1 30 0 06 0 05 0 08 0 03 0 37 0 33 0 17 0 08 1 42 1 33 2 10 8 24 9 08 4 05 1 03 33 — 57 — 12 — 15 — 41 — 32 — 32 — 17 — 0 03 0 06 0 02* 0 02 0 04 0 05 0 26 0 45 0 52 0 08

Average Hourly Wages 2.20 57 2.07 7 7 4.30 6.70 7.10 10 $ d Ft. K£s DM Z1 Kis Kcs Sch Note: Figures for 1957 - * Tàborsky, p. 433; ** Michal, p. 204 or Rude Pravo, March 14, 1953. 18

4 Rub.

E. Taborsky, "Moscow's Aid Program: The Role of Eastern Europe", East Europe, Vol. 12, No. 12, December 1963, p. 7.

372

Jan F. Tríska TABLE

5

Housing: Number of Dwellings, Size and Density of Occupation, 1961

Country

Czechoslovakia Austria France United Kingdom* West Germany Poland USSR* East Germany

Dwellings (Total Number)

2,250,000 15,826,200 14,152,719 15,563,501

Number Occupied

3,819,873 2,153,000 14,020,780 13,783,845 7,023,980

17,300,000 5,507,000

Average Size (Rooms per Occupied Dwelling)

Average Density of Occupied Dwellings (Persons per Room)

2.7 3.5 3.1 4.6 4.1 2.5 3.3 2.6

1.5 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.9 1.7 1.5 1.2

* U.K. 1951; USSR 1956.

(f) The several changes described above produced a general decline in the standard of living and the well-being of the population. The real monthly earnings of the wage earners rose much more slowly than the nominal earnings (the average in 1948 was 819 Kcs; in 1961, 1,382 Kcs),19 thus for example, in 1953 the real earnings of industrial workers were only 84% of those of 1937 and in 1955, only 8% higher.20 The present-day industrial worker labors longer to earn the retail price of most consumer goods than his counterpart did before Munich: butter, meat, coffee, clothes, shoes, transportation, etc., take much more working time to buy now than in 1937. And housing, deteriorated though it is, is in short supply; the density of occupation per room has risen from 1.40 in 1930 to 1.50 inhabitants in 1961 (Tables 4, 5).21 (g) The cultural transformation of the country has been primarily of content rather than quantity. To be sure, the number of radios (in 1962, the ratio was 3 persons per radio) and television receivers (10 persons per TV in 1962) 22 and the circulation of books,23 newspapers, and periodicals 24 have increased, and so had the attendance at concerts, theatres, and movies.25 However, the changes in what these media 18

Rocenka 1958, pp. 91 and 124; Rocenka 1962, pp. 210, 216. A. Zauberman, op. cit., p. 95. 21 J. M. Michal, op. cit., p. 62. 22 Rocenka 1962, p. 379. *> J. M. Michal, op. cit., p. 207. 24 United Nations Statistical Yearbook, p. 676-677. 25 United Nations Statistical Yearbook, op. cit., pp. 682-683. 20

Czechoslovakia

and the World Communist TABLE

System

373

6

Books and Translations (Production by Number of Titles) Total Number 1962

Country

Czechoslovakia Austria France Germany E Germany W United Kingdom United States USSR Poland

*

8,703 3,557 12,705 6,540 21,103 25,079 21,901 22,140 7,162

Translations, 1961 Original Language

Total Number

English

1,897 176 1,680 3,304

114 74 881 1,561

447 5 73 359

77 59 58 614

141 2 214 2

717 1,316 4,666 705

5 4 494 157

83 158 2,105 184

249 425 163 84

160 292 251 69

Russian

French

German

have to offer today as compared with pre-Communist Czechoslovakia are more significant (Table 6). In 1961, 447 books were translated from the Russian - a number nearly six times higher than translations made from French, and five times higher than from English. 26 The number of full-length films imported from the Soviet Union in 1962 was 35, from Poland, 18, and from East Germany, 17; while only 5 came from the U S A and an equally small number from Great Britain (Tables 7, 8, 9). 27 (h) Although equality

of earnings is not being realized as yet - e.g., TABLE

Daily

7

Newspapers

Country

Year

Number

Czechoslovakia Austria France West Germany United Kingdom United States USSR Poland

1962 1962 1961 1962 1962 1962 1961 1962

24 36 136 433 112 1,760 457 44

26 27

Ibid., pp. 668-673. Rocenka 1963, p. 464.

Circulation Per 1000 Total (1000) Population 3,800 1,604 11,800 17,431 26,200 59,848 39,355 4,379

274 225 257 306 490 321 181 144

Jan F. Tríska

374

TABLE

8

Cinemas Country

Year

Annual Total (1000)

Attendance per Capita

Czechoslovakia Austria France West Germany United Kingdom United States USSR Poland

1962 1962 1961 1962 1961 1961 1961 1962

151,500 90,750 344,300 453,000 460,000 2,165,000 3,849,000 179,600

10.9 12.7 7.5 8.0 8.7 11.8 17.7 5.9

TABLE

9

Export and Import of Movies in 1962 Country USSR United States Bulgaria France East Germany West Germany Italy Poland United Kingdom Cuba China (P.R.)

Import

Export

Full Length

Short

Full Length

Short

35 5 5 10 17 4 5 18 5 1 3

47 1 2 7 15 6 7 12 5 1 2

13 1 22 2 22 7

3 4 12 12 92 10 7 102 7 61 1

-

18 1 31 3

in 1956/57, an average office worker earned, 950 Kcs, a miner 2,000 Kcs, and an editor of the Party paper, Rude pravo, 9,000 Kcs per month 28 - there is greater equality of income distribution in Czechoslovakia today than before the war, in the sense that extreme poverty and wealth have both been reduced. Also, social conditions have improved. Almost every adult is now covered by a comprehensive social security system and an all-embracing national health plan.29 The number of practising physicians and surgeons more than doubled (from 11,684 in 1937 to 24,849) since 1937, and the number of persons per physician declined by more than half (from 1236 in 1937 to 556 in 1961).30 Infant mortality decreased (from 117 s8

J. M. Michal, op. cit., p. 193. Rocenka 1962, p. 516; Rocenka 1962, pp. 447, 516; Rocenka 1960, p. 394. Rocenka 1962, pp. 541, 561; United Nations Statistical Yearbook, op. cit., pp. 53, 526. »

50

Czechoslovakia and the World Communist System

375

per 1000 live births in 1948 to 22.5 in 1962),31 and the rise in school enrollment has been remarkable at all levels. The total number of fulltime students attending institutions of higher learning jumped from 27,068 in 1936/37 to 75,315 in 1961/62 (112,623 including parttime students).32 After sixteen years in the Communist system, then, Czechoslovakia, facing the East rather than the West and somewhat smaller in both area and population then before World War II, is a more urbanized, more industrialized, and less agricultural Communist party-state supporting other party-states more generously than it can afford. Its population is harder working, but much poorer - though relatively more equal, better educated, and better protected against illness, old age, and social disasters than in 1947. Though not ruined, Czechoslovakia has been impoverished by the tight embrace of its Eastern neighbors. In tangible properties - foreign trade; foreign aid; membership in costly system organizations such as the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance or the Warsaw Pact; cultural-financial tributes to the motherlode of the movement and organizer of the system, the USSR; assistance to developing nations on behalf of the system; and so on - the integration of Czechoslovakia into the system has been costly for Czechoslovakia (Table 10). Too costly, in fact, when the costs expended are compared with the accrued benefits; while the tributes paid by Czechoslovakia into the system's kitty are entirely tangible, hard, and material, the rewards and benefits from the system to Czechoslovakia are largely intangible, psychological, and ephemeral. They consist of such things as inexpensive, though effective, guarantees and assurances of security and protection against the Germans and their war machines; permission to indulge in a degree of internationalization - so important to a small, landlocked, gregarious nation - which has been the highest in the Communist system,33 and a Communist Party which has become a mass, 31

Ibid., p. 53. Rocenka 1962, pp. 391, 548; Ibid, p. 69. 33 Index of internationalization, i.e., the volume and dimension of transactions of the party-states with the outside world - based on sub-indices of (A) participation in the United Nations, (B) participation in other international organizations, (C) per capita imports of foreign goods, and (D) "communications" (the number of foreign tourists, and the number of local citizens travelling abroad; the flow of non-governmental mail in and out of the country; and the percentage of translated books to the native languages books) where 1.00 is the "average" amount of internationalization and the index the average of A, B, C, and D - produces the results (in several cases, information for C and D was not available) contained in Table 10. 32

376

Jan F. Tr'iska table

Index of Inter nationalization

A. UN

1. Czechoslovakia 2. Yugoslavia 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

1.75 1.45 1.25 1.18 1.13 1.07 1.06 .85 .62 .56 .54 .09 .08 .07

USSR Poland Cuba Bulgaria Hungary Romania East Germany Albania Mongolia N o r t h Vietnam

13. N o r t h K o r e a 14. China

10

B. Int. Orgs.

C. Imports

1.63 1.90 1.42 1.83 1.08 1.42 1.63 1.70 .27 .51 .13 .17 .10 .13

1.74 .57 .31 .67 1.63 1.00 1.21 .51 1.37 .58 (1.35)

1.51 1.70 3.01 1.47 1.24 .83 .70 67 0.2 .58 .15 0 .05 0

D. Communications

2.14 1.63 .26 .77 .57 1.06 .70 .53 .82 —

• —

—

—

—

—

- —

—

( T h e A and B figures denote principally governmental activities while the C and D figures have principally non-governmental import.) TABLE

11

CP Membership for Year Ending December 1962 (Includes Candidate Members when Applicable)

Total

Rank 1 China 2 USSR 3 Czechoslovakia 4 East Germany 5 Poland 6 North K o r e a 7 Yugoslavia 8 Romania 9 10 11 12 13 14

N orth Vietnam Bulgaria Hungary Cuba Albania Mongolia

a b

1961 claim, 1962 claim. estimate.

c

over 17,000,000a over 10,000,000a 1,680,819b 1,610,000« 1,337,000b 1,311,653a 1,000,000b about 875,394b 600,000-700,000c 528,674b 511,565b 60,000 c 53,000b about 46,000a

C P members/ population (in % ) Rank 13 6 2 3 11 1 almost 5 abiut 1 10 about 4 8 14 about 12 9

2.4 5 11.6 9.4 4 16 5.3 4.7 4.1 6.3 4.7 1 3.2 4.6

C P members/ adult population (in % ) Rank not available 4 8 1 17.8 2 13.3 5 7.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3 9.5 7.1 6 n.a. n.a. n.a.

Czechoslovakia and the World Communist

System

377

rather than an elite, organization. Party membership is used to reward all industrious Czechs and Slovaks for their skill and know-how (the ratio of Czechoslovakia, with 17,8% of all adults being CP members, is virtually unequalled anywhere in the world) ;34 and rewards include system-wide praises and citations, medals, handshakes, and embraces, glamorous but inexpensive vacations such as those at Varna, entertainments of "delegations", and so on (Table 11). On balance, then, the level of integration into the Communist system is high and the pattern deeply set in Czechoslovakia: The Czechoslovak nation-state attributes were displaced by Communist party-state attributes, in that the Communist system or communiy criteria displaced the national criteria, and the supranational, the national goal achievements. The system demanded from Czechoslovakia as dues for integration and in turn bestowed on Czechoslovakia as integration benefits - the values, capabilities, standards, and styles which both had to offer. And this made for an unequal bargain. But the system is bestowing respect and prestige on its industrial, industrious member, and is assigning it the prestigious role of modernizer within the system. If the system indeed succeeds in assigning supporting, specific, specialized roles to its members — a big if - then Czechoslovakia is bound to profit from its assigned role of heavy industrial supplier and supporter of others. This is why Czechoslovakia appears to have a vested interest in the Communist system's maintenance, wellbeing, and growth. The benefits which have accrued to Czechoslovakia to date have been meager, and of limited national significance; but they might become tangible and more significant in the future. For Czechoslovakia has been permitted to maintain and develop a heavy industrial base - a supranational privilege denied to most other members. 34 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations, Intelligence Report #4489, R-15, lanuary 1963. See also UN Demographic Yearbook, 13th edition, 1961, Table 5: "Population", pp. 138-61. These figures were calculated from population data based on censuses which, where available, gave the age group breakdown as provided by U N publications. A s the figures given by the State Department publication on CP membership are for 1961, the census data on total and adult population was adjusted to 1961 by using the U N figures for average annual growth rates. A s the U N figures for population growth rates were all based on the period from 1953 to 1960, the Communist sections of Korea and Vietnam are not accurately described by those population growth averages, and the 1960 population estimate was used in conjunction with the 1961 figure for CP membership. ("Adults" are persons 20 years of age and older.)

Czechoslovakia Twenty Years After*

PAVEL TIGRID

1

Twenty years ago, on May 9, 1945, the remaining German troops in Prague had surrendered or fled and Czechoslovak Liberation Day was proclaimed. Three years later, the Czechoslovak Communist Party took over all the power in the state, the latter eventually sharing with the Soviet Union the distinction of being the only country which reached the stage of full "Socialism" and could therefore be officially called Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. The anniversary of the liberation was celebrated in Prague and other towns by huge public manifestations, and the Party leaders extolled the achievements of "Socialist construction". A document entitled "Theses of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia", published for the occasion, enumerated and praised these achievements, calling the past twenty years "a glorious period in the history of the Czechoslovak people and its leading force, the CPCS".1 This optimistic account, however, is hardly borne out by what the Communists themselves, including officials in high positions, have been saying on a day-to-day basis in the past three years. The list of criticisms is impressive in volume as well as presentation, often passionate and merciless; as a matter of fact, even an ardent Western anti-Communist could not compile a more complete or more devastating catalogue, not only of mistakes and shortcomings which marked the "construction of Socialism" in Czechoslovakia, but of outright crimes and blatant injustices. And all these things were not something out of the Stalinist past; the exposure of many of them dates right up to the * Originally published in German in the Swiss daily paper, Neue Ziircher Zeitung, No. 2325 (30 May 1965). 1 "Dvacet let svobodneho teskoslovenska - Teze tJstredniho vyboru Komunisticke strany Ceskoslovenska", Rude prdvo, Praha, 3 April 1965.

Czechoslovakia Twenty Years After

379

present. The scope of this criticism and self-criticism is equally staggering: it ranges from the near-chaotic situation in agriculture to the rise of veneral disease among the young, from the shortage of electric bulbs to judicial murders committed on Communists and non-Communists alike. The ultimate question had inevitably to be raised: How did all this come about? What went wrong with an ideology and a system which set out as a movement to liberate man from the shackles of injustice and exploitation? The answers make fascinating reading, whether in the form of scientific analyses of economic and legal ills of the society, or as plays, poems, or personalized accounts of the now-renowned Belated Reportages by the Slovak writer Mnacko. A truth once uncovered leads directly and inevitably to another. And it has to be borne in mind that the authors are mostly the same men and women who, only twenty years ago, as devoted partisans of the Cause, plunged with enthusiasm and fanatic devotion into the "building of Socialism" in order to bring about the "attainment of the revolution". Small wonder that an "old-guard" Communist only recently cried out in bewilderment on the pages of a Prague Party publication: ". . . In reading some of these articles . . . one simply does not believe one's own eyes. . . . What is going on here? . . . Is it perhaps really true we lived in error for the past fourteen years? Is it really true that all we did as members and officials of the Party . . . was just mistakes, a chain of mistakes, a system of errors, or perhaps something even worse? Is it really true that those who were all these years against us were indeed in the right?" 2 All this said, it would be a major mistake (sometimes made in the West) to consider these often-devastating scrutinies as manifestations of a revolt against Marxism-Leninism in general, or the Czechoslovak type of Communism in particular. With one or two noteworthy exceptions, this is not the case. Even the severest critics aim at reforming, not opposing, much less destroying, what are called the "fruits of the Socialist revolution" of 1948. On the other hand, the chain reaction generated by this critical search is of incalculable consequence to the future of the régime. For it takes place in a country which, unlike all others in the Communist orbit, has known parliamentary democracy in its classical form, and in a country which can claim a high degree of political sophistication for 2

Vojtëch DolejSi in Zivot strany, No. 14 (Praha, July 1964).

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Pavel Tigrid

its people. It is within this framework that current developments in Czechoslovakia should be understood and evaluated. The Ninth of May celebration should, in fact, be that of a renewal of the Czechoslovak state independence which began in 1918. During the Stalinist era, the "First Republic" was publicly mentioned just to recall the "capitalist hell" it allegedly represented for the working class, only to be finally betrayed in 1938 and sold out to "foreign imperialists". T. G. Masaryk, the Republic's founder and first President, when mentioned at all, was invariably pictured as a bourgeois politician and "a tool in the hands of foreign interests". Only in 1963 did these vulgar falsifications begin to be revised. Jan Kfen, a young Marxist historian, published a series of articles exposing "simplification" and outright distortions in the current Party interpretation of modern Czechoslovak history.3 The cry was taken up by a Party journalist, who bluntly asked why the "very best traditions of the Czech and Slovak struggle for freedom against fascism" were purposely destroyed. And he provided the answer as well: the "Stalinists" discovered in the broadly humanitarian tradition of the anti-fascist struggle an obstacle, and decided to destroy it. They had declared war on truth. . . . " 4 As for Masaryk, a critical but serious study of his philosophy was made by a young Marxist philosopher and published in book form in 1962.5 At about the same time, Benes' role as head of the Czechoslovak government in exile in London and postwar President was significantly reappraised. But the full impact of this process of restoring historical truth to the recent past was felt in Slovakia. The Slovaks, including Slovak Communists, were more directly and much more severely hit by subsequent waves of "administrative measures" (a frequently-used euphemism for terror) in the period of the "cult of personality". The main consequence was that, almost traditionally, Slovaks were inclined to put all the blame on Prague and the Party's "centralist policies". To complicate matters, the Prague Party leadership brought up charges of "bourgeois nationalism", a specific Slovak Communist crime with no comparable equivalent among the Czechs. And while few tears were shed by anyone for Rudolf Slánsky, the Party's Secretary-General, executed in 1952, Vlado Cle3

Jan Kren, "Kult a historie", Kulturní tvorba, No. 21 and 22 (Praha, May 1963). 4 J. Horec, "Rehabilitace protifasistickych tradic", Hlas revoluce, No. 17 (Praha, September 1963). 5 Lubomír Novy, Filosofie T. G. Masaryka (Brno, 1962).

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mentis, who died with him on the gallows, was considered a "good Slovak", even by staunch anti-Communists. Only a few weeks ago, a memorial tablet was unveiled in Bratislava in the presence of Madame Clementis and thousands of embittered Slovaks. Consequently, while initially Stalinist terror doubled Slovak dislike for the Czechs, the later official repudiation of the same terror could only further increase Slovak hostility towards Prague. This was so strong that the leadership of the central Czechoslovak Communist Party (there exists a separate, but previously almost powerless, Slovak Communist Party) admitted the danger of a split. Throughout 1963, Prague followed a stick-and-carrot policy vis-à-vis the Slovaks and the Slovak Communists in Bratislava. The latter, however, virtually forced the Novotny leadership to drop and publicly disavow the two most despised Slovak Stalinists, Siroky and Bacilek, both Party Presidium and government members. Even more important, Slovak courage and persistence, as well as tactical skill, inspired and encouraged Czech revisionists. President Novotny, considered the most orthodox, if shrewd, Stalinist in the present party leadership in Prague, himself testified to this fact in a militant speech delivered in Kosice, Eastern Slovakia, in June 1963: ". . . We shall not permit the official organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia . . . to become the platform for the propagation of incorrect views and . . . hysterical attacks on the Party." The more so since "by means of the articles published in this newspaper, not only the Slovak but also the Czech public would be influenced in a wrong way".6 The main target of Novotny's wrath at that time was Miro Hysko, a Slovak Communist journalist who launched a still unprecedented (in a Communist country) attack on a Prime Minister in office. It was he who for the first time formulated the principle that those Communists who were or are in actual power bear a greater share of responsibility for past and current mistakes than those who had to obey their orders. The mouthpiece of the Slovak dissidents is Kulturny zivot, the weekly magazine published in Bratislava by the Union of Slovak Writers and edited exclusively by members of the Slovak Communist Party. For several years, the magazine successfully resisted repeated onslaughts from Prague, ignored threats, and continued more or less consistently to maintain its liberal editorial policies. While its circulation has been 6

For full text of Novotny's address, see Rudé prâvo, Praha, 13 June 1963.

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kept at a low 30,000 copies, it is estimated to be actually read by some half-million people each week. Early in 1965, the journal published an open letter by the West German playwright Rolf Hochhut to the Slovak novelist Mnacko. It took more than two months to push through the censorship office the full text of the letter, originally published in a West German paper. 7 Its publication ranks among the best-founded and brilliantly reasoned rejections of a one-party régime (and of the inevitable pitfalls for intellectuals engaged in serving it and propagating its tenets) ever to appear in print in a Communist country. The publication of the Hochhut letter serves well to illustrate the methods and tactics used in this uneven struggle of the Slovak Communists. We see here an important faction of the Slovak Communist Party (which, apparently, does not lack support in the highest organs of the Central Party), spurred by traditional Slovak nationalism and gaining strength from it, launching repeated attacks on the bastions of dogmatism and centralism under the banner of a more glorious future for Communism. Under this slogan, it repeatedly suggested on every possible occasion that guilty and unreformed Stalinists be singled out and stripped of power; this stand, in turn, wins for the Slovak Communists sympathy or, at least, grudging consent among the largely hostile or indifferent population. In view of this increasing support among the Slovaks, Prague has had to think twice before taking administrative measures against the dissidents, which otherwise would be swiftly and mercilessly carried out. The Novotny leadership has tried repeatedly to bribe the more influential comrades among the Slovak critics by offering them positions in the central government. But the Slovaks rejected these offers; what they seemed really to want were positions in the highest party organs, in other words, in the very seat of effective power. There have been, on the Slovak side, retreats and defeats. Yet some of them, at least, are temporary for on the Slovaks, whose tactics and timing reveal the skills of trained revolutionaries, this time locked in a tenacious battle with their orthodox comrades. An article in Kultûrny zivot goes far toward making us understand these advance-attack-take 7 Die Zeit, No. 42 (Hamburg, 16 October 1964). In Slovak in Kultûrny zivot, No. 1 (Bratislava, 2 January 1965). On the Hochhuth-Mnacko controversy, see also: Frank Osvald, "The Case of Ladislav Mnacko", Survey, No. 55 (London, April 1965); Pavel Tigrid, "Entre l'Est et l'Ouest", Censure contre les arts et la pensée, No. 5 (Paris, July 1965); "Nocni rozhovor: polemika nikoli s MnaCkem aie s mnackismem", Svëdectvi, No. 27 (Paris, 1965).

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cover tactics. It comes to the defense of those dissidents who, in the opinion of the same Slovaks, have now for a long time remained silent. The article answers the accusation with the following comparison: "A river does not always manifest itself as a torrent. Even when faced with obstacles in its path, it just disappears for a while and cannot be seen by the eye, but it is there nevertheless, underground." And the article continued: "The Stalinist concept of the (Communist) movement as an army with its general staff at the top seems to have entered our bloodstream: the general staff gives orders, the military obeys, especially in such situations when the military is facing its own units. . . . It is this concept which is still practiced in our peculiar games." 8 On balance, the undeniable progress of liberalization in Czechoslovakia since the twelfth party congress in 1962 is due, in important measure, to Slovak pressure. It was, and is likely to remain, the one single important factor in the struggle against the well-entrenched dogmatic forces in the party apparatus. Slovakia is the soft underbelly of Czechoslovak Communism. II

Another equally important but more weighty and irresistible factor in Czechoslovakia which brought about a sharp decline in orthodox Marxist thinking and its application was the steadily deteriorating state of the country's economy. When the party's Central Committee met in January 1964, some very harsh economic facts could no longer be hidden. Although the current 1963 plan of industrial production had to be "revised downward" twice in the course of the year, actual production still remained below the 1962 level: in agriculture, production did not reach even the level of 1961; labor productivity and working morale were so low that in 1963, the value of rejects alone reached the astronomic figure of 1.5 billion koruny (i.e., 200 million dollars); a very strained balance of payments, poor planning, and investment policies, overcommitment of resources, outdated industrial equipment, a depleted labor force, and the accumulation of unproductive reserves were among the chronic ills of Czech economy. Experts had been pointing since the early sixties to the danger signs, 8

Ladislav HoldoS, "PreruSene mlCanie", Kulturny 9 April 1965).

zivot,

N o . 15 (Bratislava,

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but the dogmatic party leadership, always fearful of change, ignored them or tried various ineffective palliatives. Above all, it resisted all suggestions of a meaningful revision of "command planning" which embraced every conceivable detail, from the production of hair shampoo to the construction of industrial sites. At the close of 1963, the party was faced with a full-fledged economic crisis. The Novotny leadership had no choice but to let the economists - a majority of them favoring basic and vast economic reforms - have their say, and have it in public. The reformers could not afford to miss such a rare opportunity. In newspapers and magazine articles, over the radio and on television, they expressed their honest opinions ("with Olympian arrogance", complained Novotny quite early in the game). Their verdict was unanimous; the present, centralized "command planning" system had to be scrapped and replaced by a market economy. This in itself was a revolutionary proposal. But that wasn't all. At a conference of the reformers (published in full in the Prague economic weekly, Hospoddrske noviny, November 8 and 15, 1964) startling political demands were made as prerequisites to a successful economic reform. A Slovak economist declared that "it should be permitted that socialism be criticized as a system". Others added that if such free and consistent criticism were allowed, "not one of the traditional laws of socialist political economy would survive". They insisted that nationalization and collectivization were "means, not ends", laws of supply and demand "should govern the entire economy", and, last but not least, economists should no longer "act as mere interpreters of a priori Party decisions". There could hardly be any doubt: the proposed reforms threatened the tight controls and, therefore, the political power of the leadership. The latter, to be sure, dragged its feet, but it was left in the lurch by the advocates of "command planning", who not only failed to provide an alternate draft, but fought an uninspired rearguard action. Meanwhile, the economic situation deteriorated still further. Finally, a detailed draft of the principles of the new economic model was published in October 1964, and, after much inner-Party haggling, the final version was approved at a plenary session of the Central Committee in January 1965. The text witnesses to the victory of the reformers, headed by Professor Oto Sik. Its acceptance put Czechoslovakia, together with Yugoslavia and East Germany, in the forefront of economic revisionism.

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Whether the reforms will work is, of course, another question. Western analysts and even the authors of the reform themselves express serious doubts about it, mainly because the party leadership is unwilling to dissolve the complicated and parasitic system of controls through which power is manipulated, and because, on the other hand, it has met with strong opposition on the part of lower Party cadres and other bodies deeply entrenched in local administration and the enterprises themselves. But whatever the actual economic results, the political significance of the reform can hardly be overrated. In the words of a Western analyst, "economic reform always involves changes in the power structure of those affected by it. . . . Successful assertion of autonomy by any social group, such as management, opens the door to similar assertions by other groups, with obvious consequences for the totalitarian system".9

Ill The economists' debate and its successful conclusion were indeed seized upon skillfully by dissidents among the Czech and Slovak writers, artists, and scholars. Ever since 1956, the year of the first writers' congress, they have been conducting an uneven struggle with the dogmatic forces. And although they succeeded in pushing the most notorious Stalinists from commanding positions in the writers' and artists' unions, as well as in some of the scientific institutes, the ever-vigilant Central Committee could, at decisive moments, silence or otherwise punish the most outspoken partisans of broader freedom. (Incidentally, the punishment often consisted in denying the offenders, most of them Party members, permission to travel to the West.) Another formidable weapon, entirely in the hands of the dogmatists, is the centralized system of censorship. In the case of literary periodicals (which command a huge popular readership and represent an important platform for revisionism or, at least, for open debate), galley proofs already broken into pages have to be submitted to the censor. In case of doubt, the proofs are sent to the Central Committee Secretariat with which rests the final decision. In return, the "cultural revisionism" succeeded in playing havoc with the long-standing structure of ideological shibboleths to no less a 9

Vaclav HoleSovsky, "Les embarras économiques de la Tchécoslovaquie"; Témoignages, No. 41 (Paris, novembre-décembre 1964).

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degree than that caused by their comrades-in-arms in economics. Time and again, the party bosses admonished, cajoled, and threatened the intellectuals, requesting them to toe the party line - but to no avail. The measure of this failure can be read, for instance, in the frequent and recent changes in the set-up of the Central Committee's ideological commissions and its various branches, which act as watchdogs over the purity of doctrine among the intellectuals. Even more important, the admittedly two-steps-forward-one-stepback "progress" of the liberalization of arts and letters succeeded in bringing about a significant, probably a lasting, change in the intellectual climate of the country. Czech writers and artists visiting Western countries (and there have been tens of thousands of them in the past two years) testify to this fact in the frank discussions they no longer hesitate to engage in while abroad. A measure of creative freedom was secured, sufficiently large to give rise to a remarkable renaissance of Czechoslovak arts and letters. Works of the highest quality and broad humanitarian inspiration were created. Young poets and new playwrights produced surprisingly mature works; Czech theatre, films, and plastic arts are winning for an international reputation. A brilliant book by a Marxist philosopher of the younger generation, Karel Kosik, entitled Dialectics of the Concrete,10 has been widely acclaimed as an analytical work going deeper and further than similar critical studies by Lukacs or Kolakowski. Czech satire and the "theatre of the absurd" are flourishing in Prague. In this sudden outburst of original creativity doubtlessly lies a lasting triumph for the revisionists. This victory is no less remarkable for the fact that many of these original creators are members, and even officials, of the very Party which did not promote any effort to prevent this resurrection. A reader of current Czech and Slovak belles lettres is struck by the moral fervor, almost indignation, which so often enlivens this postStalinist literary production. The criticism and self-criticism are pitiless, and the authors seem to take it for granted that the reader shares with them the common knowledge that there exists a tragic discrepancy between the actual condition of man and what is being said about it on a day-to-day basis, a conflict between truth and Party truth, between reality and mystique. This tacit understanding explains the record

10 Karel Kosik, Dialektika konkretniho, Nakl. Cs. Akademie ved (Praha, 1963).

Studie o problematice

iloveka

a sveta,

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printing and sales of books (Mnacko's Reportages sold 300,000 copies) and the tremendous popularity of the so-called "small theatres" in Prague and other cities. The writers, especially those who themselves were at some time believers in and propagators of the official "party mystique", can be divided into two fairly distinct groups: some are partisans of the view that by now the mistakes, injustices, and persecution are things of the past and that currently there are no differences between them and the Party. This attitude goes a long way toward explaining the benevolent, even friendly, disposition of the leadership towards these "critical apologists" of whom Mnacko himself is a leading figure. A vast majority of others, including all those who are too young to share any responsibility for the "cult of personality" period, have avoided this pitfall and insist that the follies of the past have a tendency to persist. This is especially true in the case of the reluctant and insufficient rehabilitation of persons persecuted in the Stalinist period, tried on trumped-up charges, and sentenced to die or to serve long prison terms. The disclosure of these judicial crimes and of the scope and nature of atrocities committed against innocent people in Czechoslovakia has made a tremendous impact, especially on the intellectuals. The moral indignation so apparent in current Czech and Slovak literature has its source just here; moreover, it is rumored that scores of novels dealing with this subject have not passed the censor, and remain hidden in the writers' drawers. The failure of the leadership to rehabilitate fully and publicly the persecuted comrades, and the denial of any justice at all to the much greater number of victimized non-Communists, have served only to increase the critics' dissatisfaction and suspicion. "In 1956 to 1962", wrote a Slovak journalist, "we consistently heard from authoritative places about the systematic fight against the consequences of the cult of personality and about the fact that . . . everything was (now) quite alright . . . What matters here is not only the responsibility for the violation of legality . . . but also the responsibility for the continuation of the methods of the cult. . . . " 11 Communist legal experts came to the help of the writers and, in the summer of 1963, engaged in a public debate on the merits of "Socialist legality" which is still continuing. They came to the rather un-Marxist conclusion that "the very conception of penal repression as a means of realization of certain positive goals . . . was wrong. . . . Repression can11

Miro Hysko, "Novinari a kult osobnosti", Pravda (Bratislava, 3 June 1963).

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not be conceived as . . . the means to solve the tasks of socialist construction. . . . " 12 From here, it was only a step to the reexamination of such fundamental social and political ideas as freedom of the individual, humanism, democracy, and the relation between man and society. Once again, a Slovak Communist blazed the trail. In the Hochhut-Mnacko polemic, Eugen Loebl, himself a victim of Stalinist persecution, came to the defence of the German playwright and wrote candidly: "Would it not be possible to start from the premise that the individual is more than society and that society should serve the individual? People formed societies in order to protect themselves as a group and in order that this entity should protect the individual. . . . The extent of power will be deduced, in this case, from the state's duty, and the fundamental postulate is not power, but the basic human rights which the state is to defend; its power should then correspond only to the demands of this duty. . . . Any power which exceeds this limit is not just an evil; it is, in fact, a crime . . . Only power which is derived from the duty to defend the independence of the individual is not an evil." 13 A few weeks later, a Czech journalist succeeded in publishing in a Prague weekly magazine an article entitled "Communism and Social Democrats After Fifty Years". The author said bluntly that it would be "senseless to deny such an organization as that of social democracy the title of a "workers' party", and that there was no denying that at times "the majority of the working class followed the Social Democrats". The article quoted from the well-known theses of Italian Communists and concluded with the assertion that new ways and means must be found in conducting a dialogue with Democratic Socialists, the more so since, in this domain, "the experiences of the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies no longer command general validity".14 IV

These and numerous other similar thrusts in the realm of objective political thinking have to be judged against the background of what was 12 Michal Lakatoä, "K niektorym problemom vyvoja prävneho vedomia v naSej spolocnosti", Prdvny obzor, No. 3 (Bratislava, 1964). 13 "Vecny smäd po poznani", Kultürny zivot, No. 12 (Bratislava, 19 March 1965). 14 M. Häjek, "Komuniste a sociälni demokrate po padesäti letech", Kulturni tvorba, No. 14 (Praha, 8 April 1965).

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until recently, a wholly closed society, run by an all-powerful, centralized party apparatus. The impact of these explorations cannot be overestimated. The régime understands this quite well: an all-out press campaign had been launched to refute those views which were labeled as "petit-bourgeois idealist illusions" about 200 years old. It is doubtless through these explorations, and by the broad resonance they have among the population, that liberalization in Czechoslovakia has assumed its most interesting forms. Essentially, the "thaw" in that country developed along lines similar to those in Poland and Hungary. However, the Czechoslovaks seemed to have learned from the Polish and Hungarian experiences and succeeded in avoiding certain impasses. First of all, the Czechoslovaks, unlike the Hungarians, were from the start conscious of certain definite limits to potential liberalization, given the power structure of the society they lived in. Consequently, they directed their fire purposefully, not against the Party as a whole, or against Marxism-Leninism as such, but against certain features and certain acts of both. Instead of launching a frontal attack against the Party or its overall policies, they tried (and succeeded) in gaining a part of that body as allies in exerting pressure on certain groups and elements within the Party. Second, the Czechs took it for granted that any lasting liberalization would have to come as a result of a series of decisions made within the Party and with the consent of those internal forces which (for widely different reasons) were inclined to grant a measure of independence in certain fields of Czechoslovak endeavor. This, among other things, explains why the majority of Czechoslovak intellectuals pressing for liberalization were and are Party members. They not only developed a shrewd system of tactics, of advances and planned retreats, of paying lip service to the leadership's admonitions while behaving quite the opposite way, but attempted to influence, or even to occupy, positions of power. In short, everything seems to point to a new phenomenon in the evolution we have been witnessing since 1956 in the Communist countries of Eastern Europe: the exploration of ground within a oncemonolithic power structure, the utilizing of positions from which political changes could be successfully attempted. For the Czechs and Slovaks have learned that while it is praiseworthy to proclaim equality and justice from the stage or in print, to do the same from a position of strength within a Party which commands, and is likely to continue to command, all real power in the country is effective.

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The obvious question is, of course, whether this may continue to be possible. Past experience, as well as the complexity of the process of change involved here, suggest great caution. In spite of the spirited and skillful struggle of the reformers, the actual power structure in Czechoslovakia has survived practically intact. The same is true of the local administrations, which have a vested interest in the status quo and which, more often than not, are more dogmatic and rigid than the Central Party organs. The position defended by the dissidents can always be taken in a frontal attack as long as the diehards remain in control. But it is also a fact that the twentieth liberation anniversary finds the party leadership fighting with its back to the wall. Slovak dissension has acquired alarming proportions: the economic situation has gone from bad to worse and yet another reform would almost inevitably involve radical changes at the top; among the intellectuals, the dogmatic leadership stands isolated, except for a handful of totally discredited Stalinists; the Party's rank-and-file is indifferent or outright cynical; young people could not care less about the Party or its doctrine; the working class, worn-out and spiritless though it is, has recently shown signs of restlessness in a number of industrial enterprises. And it is in this situation, highly disquieting overall for the régime, that certain qualities which may be called traditionally Czech begin to manifest themselves. Pragmatism is one of them. Political maturity and cautiousness are others. The Czech disposition to practise the art of the possible should not be underrated in a country where discussion of current events and feasible political modalities cannot be confined to cafés in the capital: such discussion usually spreads at once among the people. Developments in Czechoslovakia probably will not be dramatic or sensational: people, generally, rather than revolt, will support a gradual change. Under the circumstances, such gradual changes should have a greater chance to succeed and become institutionalized than similar changes in Poland or Hungary. The rhythm of these changes could be significantly quickened (as Czechoslovak reformers do not fail to stress in private conversations) if the Western powers were to adhere to a policy towards Eastern Europe based on knowledge and understanding of the nature of change now in train there rather than on wishful thinking or expediency.15 The German question, admittedly complex, forms the 15

Alternatives to current Western policies toward East Central Europe were

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crux of the problem. Yet a purposeful Western policy could exert only positive influence on the process of emancipation of the peoples of Eastern Europe, now that Moscow - or any other single center of Communist power - can no longer recklessly impose its will.

recently discussed in a number of books and studies. See, for example: Zbigniew Brzezinski, Alternative to Partition: For a Broader Conception of America's Role in Europe (New York, McGraw-Hill Company 1965); John C. Campbell, American Policy Toward Communist Eastern Europe: The Choices Ahead (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1965). Andrzej Korbonski, "U.S. Policy in East Europe", Current History, March 1965; "The Future of Eastern Europe", East Europe, New York, May 1964; "Stredni Evropa do ohniska mezinârodnich jednâni", Svëdectvi, No. 23 (Paris, 1964).

Futures of Czechoslovakia: Some Alternatives Steps toward an Analytical Model JIfti NEHNEVAJSA

A.

INTRODUCTION

Three major foci are of particular interest in an analysis of concrete social systems. The first has to do with delineating the characteristics of the current, or time-defined, system state. This essentially amounts to a description of the system relative to the values of some descriptor attributes and their interrelations. T h e notion of any "current" system state is, of course, an abstraction from on-going processes. A s in a still photograph, time is arrested and ossified, and we obtain a kind of portrait of reality within the apparently motionless duration confined to the shutter speed of exposure. The second major axis of analysis bears upon efforts to account for the current system state in terms of processes whereby it may have come about. T h e system state thus has a history. T h e major emphasis rests with the identification of paths which link the past with the present so that these paths explain the ways in which the current circumstance was realized. The third orientation pertains to future states of the system. It stresses the transformations which might be possible, given the constraints established by the present state of affairs and by the paths which account for the salient properties of the present system state. This paper addresses itself to this futuristic dimension of analysis. It deals with some of the main futures of Czechoslovakia; it provides a frame of reference for analysis rather than results. In this conception, the various futures are possibilities. T h e actualization of a particular outcome - that is, what the future might really be like - depends upon actions of relevant segments of the Czech and Slovak population and upon actions of significant national actors in the surrounding international environment. In turn, the choices regarding such actions are viewed as a function of likelihood attached to the alternatives, of the

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desirability of the possible outcomes, of their desirability to significant alters - including, of course, other Communist nations as well as the United States, Western Europe, and so on. The choices also depend upon the degree to which Czechs and Slovaks feel that their actions affect the course of events, hence their sense of efficacy, and on the intervening and mediating power of the alters. 1 At one end of the analytical spectrum lie deductive exercises of sorts. Their objective is to spell out what it would take to produce a particular Czechoslovakia of the future; that is, who would have to do what, when, and how, and in what societal and international context, for Czechoslovakia's transformation to take a given form. 2 These, then, are essentially statements of what requirements might bring about one outcome rather than another. At the other end of the analytical axis lie concerns with an empirical assessment of the tendencies toward the various futures. The key question is the extent to which the requirements associated with alternative outcomes are met in the actual social system and in its wider international setting. Are there identifiable population segments which actually seek to bring about a given outcome or prevent it from actualizing? Which action means, if any, might be available to such population segments? Given their location in the Czechoslovak social structure, how much power and influence do such groups wield? - in other words, what is the likelihood that the various available action courses might succeed and what are the constraints resulting both from actions of other social groupings and from the international context? It might be argued that the implication that the approach is somehow scientific is unwarranted and that we are basically advocating a common-sense speculation, expert or lay, about the future. The main difference, however, is one of reproductibility. The results of the analysis must be capable of replication by other analysts. This, in turn, demands that we make explicit: (a) the assumptions which generate statements linking alternative futures to the present state of the system; 1 The underlying theoretical framework is given in Jin Nehnevajsa, Theory of Anticipations, forthcoming. Some of the key elements of the model have their origin in expectational economics, and particularly in the work of Franco Modigliani. 2 Empirical research was conducted along these lines in Colombia. Some of the main results are reported in Jifi Nehnevajsa and Aldo C. Scafati, Images of Colombia: 1970 (University of Pittsburgh, Research Office of Sociology, 1965).

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(b) the data requirements which provide empirical parameters for the postulated relationships; (c) the modes of data acquisition; and (d) the criteria for the determination of the degree of fit between proposition and the empirical information. The total fabric of such components amounts to the construction of a model with explicit relational properties. The results of the analysis need not be, at first, "true" or "valid". But the explicitness of the framework and its standardization permit iteration of the analysis within the same format with the potential of ever-increasing approximation to "reality". Needless to say, truly scientific models of the unknown future are, at best, in their infancy. In the subsequent pages, we shall consider a number of alternative futures of Czechoslovakia relative to the waning years of this decade. Thus, we shall largely limit ourselves to the time frame of the 1960's; selectively, a few major questions will be formulated, and any suggested answers are propositional, rather than factual, in character. B. STATUS QUO MAINTENANCE

The concept of "status quo" does not necessarily imply the idea of a static social system. Rather, it incorporates the continuation of ongoing processes of change provided that they occur at similar rates and in the same direction, and that the normative structure within which the processes are taking place remains substantially unaltered. In any event, the "status quo" is but another expression for the state of the system at some particular time, such as in 1965. The analytical problem is one of determining the minimum number of variables and their relations which permit an adequate description of the current system state. We may point out that contemporary social science as yet has not developed a framework for such viable descriptions of complex social systems, and the issue regarding the state of affairs of Czechoslovakia is in no way, in this regard, different from an effort to describe, for instance, the American social structure of a given time. 3 Without being exhaustive, we may point to some of the directions of 3 An important step in this direction has been made, for instance, by Banks and Texter, Cross-Polity Survey (Cambridge, M.I.T. Press, 1963), in which the authors generate a variety of descriptors of system states for the nations of the world, and seek to analyze the relations among the descriptors. Bruce M. Russett's World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (Yale University Press, 1964), is still another effort along these lines.

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description which are, of necessity, prerequisite for statements about the maintenance of the status quo or departures from this system state. Nonetheless, the major analytical task remains to be done in social scientific theory on the whole, and not only relative to Czechoslovakia as a special case. A nation has a population of a certain size and composition. It is typified also by rates of change having to do with mortality, fertility, immigration, and emigration. It is characterized by horizonal mobility within communities, between communities, from rural areas to urban centers, and from urban complexes to the countryside. The "description" itself may be trivial unless we recognize the vast variety of ramifications which differences even on these extremely simple dimensions have for the social system. Variable population characterizations, in these respects, bear upon the utilization of resources, demands for goods and services, size of the labor force and, similarly, size and composition of the population (the very young, the very old, the ill) for whom provisions must be made by others (Government, communities, families, friends), and size and type of electorate, to name a few. Changes relative to the system state (including the expected and built-in change rates) lead to continuous reassessment of rules which pertain to the acquisition and distribution of services, goods, resources, and so on. Thus, changes in these system attributes may often lead to changes in the rules themselves and be conducive to the triggering of fundamental transformations of the social system as a whole. Czechoslovakia, like all other nations, is characterized by its Gross National Product and its growth patterns (wherein growth is understood both positively and negatively, as appropriate). It is described in terms of per capita income and its distribution. The economy involves planning by particular agencies on the basis of information received through currently established channels with built-in rules for verification and evaluation. The planning process, in turn, involves durations, level of detail, and scope, and it sets the tone for requirements of human and material resources and particular (though not unique) deployments of energies. Changes in these attributes may be induced by changes in the rules of economic activity or may be a by-product of changes in the demographic characteristics of the society, and, usually, involve both. But the social system is altered when the appropriate procedures and rules become modified and when such changes are implemented and enforced (whether his occurs at the governmental, community, or even family level). There are import-export trade rates, tariff barriers of

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varying kinds, tax laws, pricing and costing rules (and laws), wage and incentive rules and laws, etc. There exist norms governing the processes of recruitment of people into various positions in the social system such that only people with certain attributes (such as "political loyalty" established by procedures germane thereto, or "high school education," or "being male", or "being at least 21 years of age", and so on) may enter particular positions. Changes in these recruitment rules have a profound effect upon the social system as a whole. Czechoslovakia is characterized by a political environment of a certain kind. There are rules of ascendancy into positions of political power, processes whereby appointments are made, structures of rewards and punishments and modes of their administration, permissiveness (at the other extreme, absence of permissiveness) of overt political expression, and so on. The point is that it is quite possible to identify an inventory of large numbers of attributes which are salient descriptors of the social system at face value. Yet, we are not sure which of these attributes are necessary and sufficient and thus constitute the minimum set of descriptors (and their relations) whose changes must be monitored if we wish to speak of alterations and stabilities in the social system.4 In any social system, fewer people objectively benefit from prevailing societal arrangements than do not. This is so because of the inequitable distribution of both responsibilities and privileges which, in turn, stems from the basically hierarchal ordering of the division of labor in all its implications. The benefits, of course, need not be considered in economic terms alone: they have to do with a sense of satisfaction and its meaning which may, in part, be related to monetary and tangible returns for one's effort, but is, in part, related to status and prestige considerations. It follows that there tend to be fewer people in any social system in whose interest it is to maintain the status quo than there are people in whose interest it is to change it. The status quo entails those provisions which have produced the uneven distribution of privilege and responsibiliy, and changes in its fundamental rules are thus threatening, especially to those whom the prevailing norms have favored. 4

The "values" of the descriptors along all these axes can be obtained from the above cited sources, along with additional - and quite interesting - indicators as in Jan F. Tfiska, The World Communist System (Stanford Studies of the Communist System). The actual empirical statement of the status quo characteristics in Czechoslovakia is not essential for the main (framework-building) purpose of this paper.

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In Czechoslovakia, the more privileged groups include a disproportionate representation of Communist Party members. To the extent to which the desire and activity to maintain the status quo are a mark of conservative orientation to social life, we must conclude that the Communists of Czechoslovakia (and, indeed, wherever they are in power) are the conservatives within the system. Since fewer people benefit directly than do not (or else, they benefit less than they consider just), we should argue that a sizeable majority of Czechs and Slovaks desire, and work toward, changes in the social system. We think this to be the case, but with an entirely crucial provision: the demands for changes are issue-specific, by and large, and not generalized to demands for total transformation of the society. Thus, we can readily see that young married people might exercise pressures upon their localities, the Communist Party, and the Government to allocate more resources to housing development and construction, and to ease constraints on the acquiring of household goods for people who are setting up households for the first time. Note that the severity of this pressure would depend on current housing status (availability, cost, location), on the numbers of marriages, which, of course, would be affected by the age-sex composition of the population, as well as by laws governing "marriageability", and by other factors besides. We can see too, that those people who feel that becoming a Communist might lead to a better life than otherwise would be possible may apply pressures to change the rules of admission into the Communist Party. The extent to which such tendencies are manifest would depend, to suggest one hypothesis among several, on the discrepancy between the pattern of benefits given the Party membership, as opposed to similar benefit distributions for nonmembers. Here we could single out group after group and identify the specific demands which each such group is likely to levy upon the system for specifiable reasons. This is quite different from the desire to change the social system as a whole. Such individuals and groups, too, may and do exist. They would include disproportionate numbers of people who have been relatively deprived under the existing societal arrangements in a number of significant areas of life simultaneously. And they would include the usually small sprinkling of genuinely idealistic individuals whose demands (generally, in the Communist systems, these demands are not overtly voiced) to change the system are grounded in moral and political principles which are contradicted by, and not merely different from, the current social organization of Czechoslovakia.

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We cannot pursue this analysis much further. The key issue is, of course, to identify groups which seek specific changes in the society, the means at their disposal, and the consequences of such changes for the social system if the present elites yielded to such demands.5 In the face of the unavoidable pressures, overtly exercised or resulting from on-going functioning of the society, it seems obvious that the status quo of 1965 - whatever its precise properties - is unlikely to be maintained. At the same time, this need not imply either numerous or drastic shifts in the political subsystem of the society. C. LIBERALIZATION

The concept of "liberalization" is used here in its Western democratic context. Thus, it assumes changes of a particular kind, whereas changes in the direction away from liberalization would point to "totalitarian hardening".6 Although not exhaustively, we may specify some of the stages on the liberalizing spectrum. This does not assume that one stage is prerequisite to another, or that several or even all of these illustrative shifts could not occur "simultaneously" (e.g., at just about the same time). We would speak of a change toward liberalization if, for instance, economic planning became less detailed and less pervasive; or if, in given economic plans, more explicit attention were paid to the satisfaction of consumer demands than to heavy machinery production. Such shifs indicate changes in governmental concern, and increasing decentralization of existing control procedures. Output requirements associated with economic plans, furthermore, may be largely viewed as enforceable prescriptions (in so far as deviations from plans must be explained and 5 Numerous "case studies" of specific transformations which have already taken place would be highly desirable. The relevant ones cannot be summarized here. But the line of analysis is parallel to that which considers the pressures and counterpressures on Czechoslovakia's literary and artistic front, as in VojtSch Duben, Ledy se hnuly (N.Y. Universum Press, 1964). In a different area of life, Carl Beck, "Bureaucracy and Political Development in Eastern Europe" (p. 268 ff. in Joseph LaPalombara, editor, Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton University Press, 1963) deals with the transitions which have produced the "current" system state as a shift from its Stalinist ancestor. See also Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1960); Ivo Duchaiek, "Czechoslovakia: New Course or No Course", Problems of Communism, Vol. 8 (Jan.-Feb., 1958), pp. 12-19, and so on. 6 The concept of "liberalization" refers to future transformations of the society relative to the existing system state (which is already "liberalized" in contrast to its past).

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negative deviations may lead to severe punishments) or as aspirations. The recognition of the latter dimension also entails a degree of liberalization, even if the planning process otherwise remains unaltered (in the initial phases). Less pervasive and less detailed planning permits the relaxation of controls over manpower and resource flow, and makes the economy somewhat more adaptive to supply and demand processes which operate both within it and in the international environment. Increasing the numbers, types, and sizes of business enterprises owned and operated by individuals, groups of individuals, and families rather than the State also reflects a form of economic liberalization. Whether such changes are based on the recognition of the value of technical efficiency as contrasted with political expediency, or on the notion that private incentives are desirable, these are the kinds of transformation which have been, partially, occurring in the Soviet Union under the heading of "Liberalism". Demands for less centralized and less detailed planning should chararterize, to varying degrees of intensity, just about all industrial and business managers of the nation. This is so because the traditional plans render each manager and executive far too dependent on the output of other industries and business so that each man's capacity to live within the plan, and even exceed the postulated output, is impaired by this dependency. In other words, even Communist Party members in managerial positions are, in this sense, inclined to favor "more rational" planning, and its rationality, from their vantage point, is directly related to their own capacity to execise control over the attainability of the industry-specific plans. This involves a definite relaxation of internal trade barriers and the establishment of a kind of competitive, if highly regulated, market. 7 Yet, changes of this type have a profound implication for the political myth of Communism itself. Under such circumstances, concerns with technical efficiency (so typical of technologically developed nations regardless of their form of Government, but entirely integral to the organization of a free economy) soon come to dominate the doctrinaire prescriptions of the ideology. On the other hand, we would not expect pressures toward private ownership of industry and business to be wide7

The point seems no longer to be whether such economic liberalization is likely or not, for it clearly has been taking place. Rather, the issue is one of the probable future directions, and in concrete terms, which such changes might take, and the rate at which they can be anticipated. The problem is for economists to evaluate more explicity.

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spread or very severe. First, overt manifestations of such demands are not legitimate within the prevailing political symbology, so that there are built-in pressures for not advocating such changes in public ownership. 8 Second, the legal entanglements which link past owners of business and industry to any reestablishment of future private ownership patterns are such as to discourage the process even if it were desired by many. Third, such changes would strike at the very core of Communist ideology, and the power elites are unlikely to yield on this point in the forseeable future. It is probably correct to assert that the sentiment favoring private activities in agriculture and the consequent decollectivization may be quite widespread and intense in the rural areas of the country. This should be as true about Czechoslovakia after less than two decades of Communist rule as it has been about the Soviet Union in spite of over three decades of a similar régime. But sentiment is one thing, and practice another. We can easily envisage the difficulties which would be experienced in a serious and largescale process of decollectivization: those having to do with redistribution of land, stock, equipment, and so on. The Communist régimes are increasingly allowing some private farming on the part of the same individuals who also operate in collectives. This, too, is a form of liberalization, but it fails to take the more extreme form of reestablishing private enterprise in agricultural pursuits. We might speak of changes toward liberalization if rules governing the movement of people both within the country and without were relaxed. This includes growing permissiveness for foreign travel as well as for migration, and it includes such permissiveness without concomitant insistence upon loyalty tests of any kind. Having adapted, of necessity or by desire, to the existing social system, relatively few people would tend to avail themselves of an opportunity to emigrate even if it were granted. This is not a reflection of the "affection" people might hold for the existing social order, but a by-product of the normalcy of one's existence which migration so totally disrupts. Only a few people could be expected to pay all the costs, largely noneconomic ones, indeed, for the (to them) doubtful gains accruing from their departure from the home-country, Communist or not. There is some evidence of increasing liberalization along these lines. Whether the motives mirror the desire for hard currencies, or the desires of the leaders to lessen the 8

At least, not on the part of people who are not exceptionally well integrated into the present régime.

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high costs associated with maintaining the elderly (who, by now, have been occasionally permitted to emigrate), the fact remains the same.9 If intra-party opposition were permitted, even relative to basic premises of Marx-Leninism, we might also speak of a trend toward liberalization. This includes the possibility that the Communists might question the very cornerstones of their own ideological position, and might submit these premises to serious probing without fear of punishment. This does not mean that many Communists would be prone to question the stands to which they have, idealistically or opportunistically, dedicated a good portion of their lives. Such a liberalizing move might be interpreted as evidence of strength (and of absence of internal threat) as much as it might effectively lead to the modification of the doctrine itself. It may well be that in closed circles of the Party leaders, such heretic discourses have already become possible, and there is evidence that in one area of life, at least (the arts), even public disclosure of dissension has become somewhat acceptable. Indeed, the desire for such liberalization from among the Communists would tend to be strongest among the intellectuals, particularly among those whose pursuits are dedicated to the manipulation of symbols. This in no way means that such intellectuals need be opposed to Communism per se\ rather, they need to be viewed as a form of loyal opposition, and an opposition which seeks to improve the existing (thus, Communistic) system and not to counteract it. In education, liberalizing tendencies would be signified by a deemphasized indoctrination, or rather, by the availability of MarxistLeninist indoctrination for those who prefer to be so taught and the availability of exploring alternatives. In the country's educational order, liberalization would also imply changes in rules governing opportunities for higher education, in particular, the abolishment of any rules which involve tests of political loyalties on the part of the student, or of his family background.10 Similar provisions, of course, apply to the recruitment of teachers and professors and to the cessation of controls over 9

I am ignorant of the actual statistics for, let us say, the past two years. Nonetheless, one must be struck by the fact that of the thousands of Czechs and Slovaks who have travelled during the recent period of more relaxed rules on movement of people, few indeed have chosen to remain abroad. Whether this is in any way connected with the financial and/or political selection and selfselection of Czechoslovakia's tourists and travellers is not clear. 10 As time goes by, such "tests" will become increasingly unimportant anyway, because of the built-in generational transitions, and the relative success of any society in its capacity to socialize people to a degree of acceptance of the society's underlying value premises.

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the choice of teaching materials to be used within their area of competence, over the selection of textbooks, and over the manner in which they present knowledge. Some controls over these important societal activities exist everywhere. But the point is whether the control apparatus is political in character or professional in nature, In religious activities, liberalization entails measures which separate religious organizations from any form of state control; and it involves non-discrimination in educational work, and other opportunities for those who desire to lead a religious life or to abide by the rituals of their Church. It need not involve encouragement of organized religion or even of religiosity, but it must preclude its discouragement and persecution, overt or hidden. In relation to the Roman Catholic hierarchy, the predominant religious organization in Czechoslovakia, liberalizing tendencies mean that processes of selection, recruitment, training, and utilization of priests and nuns are intrinsic to the operations of the Roman Catholic Church and not an aspect of Czechoslovak Governmental activities, or Communist Party decision behavior. The parallel processes germane to Judaism or Protestantism in their respective versions require, similarly, controls by these organizations and faiths and not by any external agencies, political or otherwise. In Czechoslovakia, the clergy, older people, and, especially, older women are most likely to be concerned with changes in these directions. Their occurrence would, of course, serve as another index of liberalization in the prevailing social structure. In the legal and judicial structure, liberalization might take the form of steps to insure that courts are independent of given political arrangements, but abide solely by the framework of established laws and procedures. Similarly, liberalizing steps would entail provisions against arbitrary seizure of person or property, against their arbitrary detention, and for rights of appeal against judicial decision for any crime whatsoever. The concept of "arbitrariness" has to do with administrative seizures, detentions, and punishments, in contrast with such activities under a binding system of explicit laws, the violation of which is fully as serious when committed by the police, secret or otherwise, as when by any ordinary citizen. The process involves emphasis on a professionally trained, rather than lay, judiciary and on the kinds of rights so admirably expressed in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the United States. Finally, the cornerstone of liberalizing tendencies has to do with the return to political liberty. Indeed, such a measure would suffice in lieu

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of all others exemplified here, because the aftermath of changes implicit in political liberty would be those other changes which Czechs and Slovaks themselves would determine. This includes the right to publicly protest and demonstrate, to organize into interest groups, pressure groups, and political parties (including the Communist Party); to express views on matters of public policy and on individual national leaders without fear of reprisals; to strike without Government permission; to set up new trade unions without Government approval (provided they do not violate other fundamental laws of the land); to work or not to work; to serve in "voluntary" brigades or not to serve. Many more ramifications could, of course, be mentioned. Thus, liberalization of Czechoslovakia in the coming years pertains to changes such as these, some or all of which may characterize the "status quo" of 1970 or thereabouts. Not all seem equally important or equally likely. For instance, from the vantage point of the total social system, the possibility of intra-party opposition even on issues of ideological principle is less important than are other alternatives. This is so, simply because the internal workings of the Communist Party ought to be up to the Communist Party itself and the issue would not even arise were the Party not also the Government. Pressures to liberalize in some aspects of social life are, however, considerable. Indeed, some involve the Communist leaders themselves: the necessities for a more dynamic economic program are likely to force further relaxation of international trade barriers and rules governing the movement of persons both to and from Czechoslovakia. This would seem highly likely, since there is hardly any group within the country, including the Communists, in apparent opposition to such changes. Similarly, the failures of detailed, pervasive planning also are likely to lead to liberalizing the industrial and business complex with the subsequent consequence of increasing the relative intra-national power of industrial managers and executives regardless of their ideological convictions. Greater decentralization of planning, legitimation of managerial or worker incentives, and even their encouragement, are likely eventualities in the near future. 11 At the same time, the chances are quite low that an effort would be 11

During 1965, since the completion of this paper, several major changes along these lines have already taken place. The Communist Party's public admission (December 1965) of large-scale economic mismanagement, and of difficulties associated with highly centralized planning of the Stalinist variety, only underscore the points made here.

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made to return the economy to patterns of free enterprise either in agriculture or in industry. Nor do we think that significant segments of the Czech and Slovak population actually demand such changes at this time, partly because of the extremely destabilizing effect of the transitional phase this would necessitate. The political, legal, educational, and religious systems are also not likely to be much altered in the coming years. Barring changes resulting from the shifting international context, it is hard to see what might induce the Communist Party to alter the existing rules, and it is even harder to identify any population segment of sufficient power to enforce such changes. It is, of course, quite likely that some changes might occur. For example, as time goes by, the threat to the régime is declining (at least internally), so that legal redefinitions of political crimes might be anticipated in the direction of a more liberal interpretation and a more liberal punishment as well. The expected changes in the economic domain will, in turn, alter the definitions of economic crimes and, also, the respective pattern of punishments related to them. These are, of course, highly tentative analytical remarks. They raise the kinds of questions which must be answered in terms of systematic empirical evidence regarding the kinds of changes which have already taken place, those which seem to be occurring, and those which are or are not desired by particular segments of the population. D.

REVOLUTIONS

Czechoslovakia's future may be marked by a revolutionary threat from within the country. In a somewhat oversimplified manner, yet one appropriate at this level of abstraction, we may postulate (a) civil warfare, (b) intra-party coup d'état, and (c) intra-bureaucracy coup as the major forms of insurgency. Clearly, all such alternatives are highly undesirable to the governing elites and they are similarly undesirable to the Soviet Union. A popular uprising of any kind requires a degree of revolutionary organization to provide its direction and its impetus. The setting up of effective revolutionary groups is exceptionally difficult in countries with formidable secret police systems, especially those in which both revolutionary agents and Government agents are indigenous and thus rather difficult to distinguish from one another. Furthermore, the operation of revolutionary activities and the triggering of an actual uprising tend to be affected by estimates of the probability of success. In technologically developed societies, those with well-trained armed forces and well-

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developed means of communication and transportation, the odds are against revolutionaries in almost all instances. Finally, in nations in which one or more of the major world powers, the Soviet Union, United States, or China, feel they have a strong commitment, the likelihood of intervention, as in the Hungarian uprising, further lessens the chances for success. In other words, the relatively few and scattered individuals who, after almost twenty years of the current regime, might be willing to provide revolutionary leadership, face almost unsurmountable odds in organizing a movement and in deciding that such a movement has any chance of success even if they managed to get one organized without police infiltration. On the other hand, more-or-less spontaneous turmoil or rioting seems possible in any situation. But such public outbursts, most often confined to young people and some segments of the industrial working populace, tend to reflect localized and individualized grievances rather than to be directed against the Government as a whole. Indeed, as time goes by, the Communists in Czechoslovakia's Government seem to have less and less to fear from a grass-roots revolutionary upheaval. 12 A popular uprising aimed at overthrowing the Government in a given, even if somewhat prolonged, upsurge is rather different from the possibilities of protracted and sporadic guerilla activities, for instance, in the nation's mountainous regions. But the recruitment of insurgents for such high-risk and low payoff programs would again be extremely difficult. From within the country, only those people who have precisely nothing to lose, perhaps those entirely at odds with the existing laws (both civil and political), might be available for guerrilla activities while otherwise "normal" conditions prevail in the country and in the world environment. From abroad, former refugees and exiles from Czechoslovakia could be a conceivable insurgent force and this includes both refugees of the Communist era and the Sudeten Germans expelled during the years following World War II. Yet, are there such groups in those categories who might be willing to accept the risks of protracted guerilla activity? More specifically, are there such individuals or groups in existence some eighteen years after the successful Communist 1948, 12

This is not to assert that an uprising against the régime would be impossible or cannot be expected at all. The point is that the probability of such a popular revolution must be considered very low because of the organizational difficulties, the existing occupational and emotional commitments of people to one another (and even "to the regime"), and because of the low chances of success which even potential revolutionary leaders would have to acknowledge.

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and some twenty years after the expulsion of the German populace? The very nature of guerilla warfare requires considerable reliance on young people. Czechs and Slovaks of refugee origin who are in their late teens or early twenties are socialized in countries of their parents' settlement and not in Czechoslovakia. Children of Sudeten Germans, up to the age of twenty-four or even more, have never been in Czechoslovakia and their emotional and cultural connections with the country of their parents is, if anything, negligible. Finally, the climate and topography of Czechoslovakia may make possible limited insurgent activities. But the countryside could probably not sustain the rebels against a determined and effective military force deployed by the Government. In sum: This simply means that guerilla group formation is unlikely because of recruitment problems, and that the likelihood of success if such groups were formed is even lower than the corresponding chances of a popular uprising. The extent to which there exist serious divisions within the Communist Party itself cannot be readily ascertained. Struggles for power within the party itself, of course, are always possible, but it is questionable whether such exchanges of one ruling elite for another would have a revolutionary effect upon the social system as a whole, even though their effect within the Communist Party might be revolutionary indeed. There is, of course, very little tradition of palace revolutions in Czechoslovakia and there seem to be too few issues which would so split the Communist leadership as to produce an intra-party faction intent on a take-over even at the cost of violence. The armed forces and the police are probably the the only loci of sufficient alternative power to organize and execute a coup d'état within the larger Governmental bureaucracy. By now, of course, the leadership positions in these organizations tend to be staffed by well-screened Party members and adherents. In this regard, the power struggle would then simply be a version of the intra-party conflict alternative. To the extent to which non-Communists, or occasional anti-Communist infiltrators, might be found in these positions of power, they face organizational difficulties similar to those of any revolutionary elite. That some Czechoslovak generals might defect and lead their forces in a coup against the régime thus does not appear very likely by 1966 or 1967, and will tend to become even less probable in the coming years. Whether or not such individual staff officers in the armed forces or the police force do exist at all, and whether any potential for revolt is present, cannot be ascertained.

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At the level of sentiment, considerable numbers of Czechs and Slovaks might wish for a revolutionary transformation which would wrest the reins of Government from the Communists. More often than not, these are probably older people steeped in the tradition and ideas of a pre-Communist Czechoslovakia - thus, not precisely the people who are most capable of attempting such a revolution. At the action level, the difficulties connected with organizing a revolutionary movement, the low probabilities of success which would accompany its operations, the inertia which goes with living under abnormal condition for so long that they come to seem normal, all are factors strongly counteracting whatever emotional potential might exist. Furthermore, in face of some liberalizing tendencies on the part of the régime, even the degree of ideological opposition within the country would tend to wane in the hope that an evolutionary transformation might accomplish what revolution would attempt at a much higher cost.

E. FEDERALISM

Czechoslovakia might opt to become a republic within the Soviet Union, or be requested to do so. It might form a union with some other Communist nations, for instance, Poland, Hungary, and East Germany. It might become party to a federal arrangement within the region (or throughout Europe) including Communist and other nations. Finally, with the emergence of world government, Czechoslovakia could be one of the participants. The chances that world government might materialize by 1970 are so negligible as to be dismissed. The process, if at all conceivable in the next quarter-century or so, is inextricably linked with the larger spectrum of cold war issues, and hardly any aspect thereof is within the control of Czechoslovakia, its Communist Party, its Government, or its population. Similarly, problems connected with limited European or continent-wide Federation are largely defined by the cold war environment. Even if a (political) European Union could emerge in the coming years, the participation of any currently Communist state would depend on the cold war circumstance or would be contingent on prior transformations of Czechoslovakia which, in turn, do not seem likely during this time frame. Undoubtedly, preferences for federalism of a global, continental, or even regional (such as Poland, Austria, Hungary, Germany) variety

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might exist, but are unlikely to be expressed. Even now, of course, the historical experiences with Germany as viewed by the Czechs and parallel experiences of the Slovaks with Hungary would mitigate against the adoption of such views by the vast majority of Czechoslovaks. This means, indeed, that people who might desire such a future would be a distinct and extremely small minority, and there is little to suggest that the attitudes will change in the next few years. The formation of a federation of some currently Communist European nations would not seem desirable to the Soviet Union. Or rather, there is nothing the Soviets might hope to gain, while the potential menace to the already-threatened international prominence of Soviet Communism (i.e., by China) would make this an unpalatable alternative. Thus, we suggest that the Soviets would prefer not to permit unionism on the part of the European satellites, and would discourage even its serious consideration, for example, by the Czechs, Slovaks, and Poles (and possibly others). Furthermore, federalism with other 'eastern" European nations holds little, if any, promise for Czechoslovak elite groups, within and without the Communist Party. They, too, have nothing to gain and a lot of relative political power to lose. It is even really doubtful whether any such tendencies exist in Poland, even though the very size of Poland would help insure to Poland a more prominent role in an establishment of this type than to the smaller nations such as Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Hence, the national sentiments, Communist, non-Communist, and anti-Communist alike, would largely tend to be opposed to these moves, and along with the likely opposition of the Soviet leadership, we may conclude that strains toward federalism in Eastern Europe will not become manifest in the next several years. Finally, neither the Soviet Union nor Czechoslovakia have anything to gain if Czechoslovakia becomes one of the Soviet republics. Many Czechs and Slovaks may desire the formation of world government, although not a majority, perhaps. Furthermore, world government remains an unlikely prospect in the foreseeable future. And it is a future which those who might desire it cannot effect very readily. The Communist elites would be clearly opposed except on their terms, which are set by the international Communist movement (primarily by the Soviets, of course), and in turn, are not acceptable to the rest of the world. Very few Czechs and Slovaks would seek a federation in which Germany might play a significant, and possibly dominant, role. Even

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among Czechoslovaks opposed to Communism, the idea of a European Union would not be exceptionally appealing within the German semiencirclement of the country. The Communist elite would be as opposed to this option, as would others, but chiefly for reasons related to their evaluation of global arrangements. Federalism on the part of some of the Communist nations without the Soviet Union or without Czechoslovakia's subsumption into the colossus of Soviet republics is similarly unlikely to be attractive. The population would tend to be opposed because of the increased commitment of Czechoslovakia to Communism; the Communist elite would be, at best, lukewarm because there is nothing "in it" for themselves or for Czechoslovakia. No evident economic or political gains are to be made; no enhancement of Communist or national prestige. The main alternatives whereby Czechoslovakia enters into some larger union of nations are thus generally both unlikely and undesirable.

F. SHIFTS IN THE ALLIANCE SYSTEM

There is sufficient evidence of the nearly complete dependence of Czechoslovakia's politics, domestic and international, and of its economy, upon the Soviet Union. Since the establishment of the United Nations, for example, there are no instances in which the Czechoslovak (post-1948) delegation did vote at variance with the Soviet Union. The bulk of Czech trade relations, often disadvantageous in pure exchange terms, involve the Soviet Union. In the future, Czechoslovakia could become independent of Moscow; and it could trade its dependence on Moscow for a dependence on China. The former option amounts to the Yugoslav version, and, increasingly, to the Rumanian process. The latter comes closest to the Albanian situation of the recent years. The Polish setting is one midway between subordination to the Kremlin and nationalistic Communism which operates nonetheless within the Party framework, more or less on its own. Relative to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia presents a case different from any of the European Communist countries. There is no historical record of hostilities between Czechs or Slovaks and Great Russians, Belorussians, or Ukrainians, the dominant Soviet groups. There is no record of a past Russian attempt to dominate the Czech lands or Slovakia. There is no record of warfare between Czechoslovaks and Russians (with the sole exception of the Czechoslovak

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Legions in Russia at the end of World War I, who fought the Bolsheviks mainly because they wanted to be able to return home unmolested). There is no mythology which casts Russians in the role of villains, nor is there anything like this in the Soviet Union regarding the Czechs and Slovaks. This points to the notion that Czechoslovak dependence on the Soviet Union would be least resented in Czechoslovakia in contrast to similar patterns of subordination on the part of other Eastern European nations. Even the anti-Communists within the country tend to maintain warm feelings toward the Russians as a people, and their hostility to the domestic or Soviet régime has simply not spilled over into the kind of sentiment which characterizes the traditional Czech-German relations. The trend toward independence from Russia is thus weaker in Czechoslovakia than in any other Communist country. The reasons have to do with historical sentiment; and, in part, they reflect the dilemma of a small nation anywhere which must make choices among competing alignments in its geographical vicinity. There is probably no one in Czechoslovakia, Communist and nonCommunist alike, who would trade Soviet-Czechoslovak relations for a closer affiliation with China at the cost of deteriorating economic and political (and cultural) exchanges with Russians. Czechoslovakia, for all practical purposes, remains a "safe" ally from the Soviet vantage point, safer than any of the other countries subordinated to the Kremlin leadership. Yet, this does not mean that the Czechoslovak leaders may not desire increased economic independence in the sense of being able to establish more normal trade relations with the rest of the world under less control from Moscow. Indeed, Khrushchev's Russia - and there is no evidence that this pattern has changed under the present Government - has shown a gradual relaxation of exchange barriers, so that greater independence of the Czechoslovak economy from Soviet concerns is not deviant even within the Communist sphere, and occurs within its political context. Hence, greater independence of Czechoslovakia's domestic Communism may be quite likely, especially on the economic front. But independence coupled with strong anti-Russian nationalism, or a shift to an alliance with China (logistically just about impossible, even from China's vantage point) do not seem in the cards. On the cultural front, increasing absorption of Western culture, particularly the American and French, appears extremely likely, but with few political implications threatening to the Communist elites.

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G. DISSOLUTION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

We would think that there might be some pressure toward the "balkanization" of Czechoslovakia. Specifically, there undoubtedly exists a fair amount of sentiment in Slovakia which would favor the establishment of a Slovak nation-state, Communist or otherwise, but on a par with the Czech lands. Some such feeling is likely to prevail even among Communist elites in Slovakia. Among Czechs, the opposite attitude is just about certain. However, the existing power relations along with the legislative provisions would make "separatism" at the overt level almost impossible. Regardless of the given level of Slovak autonomy within the Czechoslovak state, we might expect demands for greater autonomy on the part of Slovakia. Provided these occur within the established system ,such demands can be both voiced and, at least partially, honored. At the same time, political activity and economic planning require a more centralized machinery to approach even a modicum of rationality; the decentralizing tendencies would be continuously belied by centralizing realities, so that the grounds for resentment on the part of much of the Slovak population, including the Slovakia-based elite, remain ever-present. Ample justification for latent hostility toward the Czechs exist at any time. Yet, these are patterns different from outright dissolution of the state, which the leadership would not tolerate even at the tentative level of national discourse. Without doubt, the central Government would forcibly counter any attempt at the establishment of an independent Slovakia. Furthermore, it is hard to identify circumstances under which such a split would be advantageous to the Soviet Union. Hence, the Soviets would be unlikely to permit such Slovak strivings to succeed, even if the central Government of Czechoslovakia were unwilling or unable to curb the tendencies. With its more intense religiosity and its more forceful refusal to actually endorse Communism, a separate Slovakia would not appear to be an at all desirable prospect to the Soviet Union. If a revolution against the Communist regime throughout Czechoslovakia is quite improbable, an uprising against a Communist regime in a separate Slovakia might be an altogether different matter. H. LIMITED WARS

Czechoslovakia could get involved in limited wars, or it could, as a nation-state, become involved in some war of its own (which, too, would remain limited, relative to the international scene, unless it were

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to escalate into World War III). Czechoslovak weapons were used by the North Koreans and by the Chinese "volunteers" in that particular conflict. Czechoslovak weapons are found in the hands of the Viet-Cong insurgents. Czechoslovak weapons have been in the hands of Fidel Castro, and may have supplied to other insurgency potentials in Latin America. They seem to have been used in the Congo, and perhaps elsewhere. In some of these engagements, Czechoslovak advisors and technicians have been present. Yet, the nation's armed forces as such have not been called upon to participate, nor have large numbers of "volunteers" been sent around the globe to fight on the side of Communist insurrections. This does not mean that the Communist Party leaders may not issue a call for "volunteers" in the future, in either a current or future conflict. Yet, a major involvement of Czechoslovakia in such a conflict does not seem likely ,if only because of the continued dubious loyalty of the troops from the standpoint of the régime (which is quite different from the policy of shipping around the world very small contingents of thoroughly committed cadres). Furthermore, Czechoslovakia is not a likely battleground for a limited war of the future. Short of some insurgent activity within the country, which we already mentioned in connection with revolutionary upheavals, there seem to be no issues which might pit Czechoslovakia against West Germany, or Austria, and certainly not against Poland or Hungary or the Soviet Union. And there are, similarly, no apparent issues over which West Germany, East Germany, Austria, Poland, Hungary, or the Soviet Union might trigger off a war against Czechoslovakia. This is entirely apart from the point of whether or not such warfare in central Europe could remain limited. The desire to be involved in wars around the globe is probably quite lacking even among the Communist leaders. To the extent of symbolic gestures and actual supply of weaponry, advisors and technicians, the Communists may find ways of participating in ongoing and future limited conflicts. But a large-scale engagement would not seem desirable even to the leaders, not to speak of the non-Communist or anti-Communist population. The desire to wage wars in Czechoslovakia, or to employ Czechoslovakia's war-making machinery against one or more of the neighboring countries, would also be lacking. Above all, there seems to be nothing over which to fight in this manner. By 1970, Czechoslovakia is not likely to be involved in limited wars either abroad or at home.

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I. WORLD WAR III

We may argue that Czechs and Slovaks, like people elsewhere, have come to the conclusion that a central war is becoming less and less likely. Like people elsewhere, most Czechoslovaks would tend to consider such wars undesirable, although the strongest opponents of Communism (whose numbers we think are dwindling), might be prepared to pay the price with the hope of liberation of the country thereafter. With greater and wider knowledge of thermonuclear devices, the appeal of the most drastic solution to the world crisis must have waned considerably. As part of a potential target system, Czechoslovakia would not represent a "survivable" entity in a major thermonuclear war. Even if spared direct attacks of any kind, the impact of secondary weapons effects (particularly fallout) should have made central wars quite unpopular, in contrast with, for instance, the public attitudes in the era immediately following the 1948 coup. Among the non-Communists, and especially the anti-Communists, a major war between the Soviet Union and China may, however, have a considerable degree of appeal. Furthermore, we would think that the expectation that Soviet-Chinese relations will lead to violence between the two nations may have been increasing. That the Communist elite are not pleased by such prospects we need not doubt. That the leaders would engage Czechoslovakia formally on the Soviet side in the event of a Soviet-Chinese conflagration seems also highly likely. With regard to central wars of any kind, Czechoslovakia is more of a spectator - and under certain conditions more of a victim - than an initiator or participant. Other than by invading West Germany or Austria (for what conceivable reasons?), the nation might even lack the capacity of triggering some process which could escalate into a central war. A central war could, of course, occur in the coming years. Yet, this pertains to the future of the world environment within which Czechoslovakia plays a part, rather than to a distinct future of Czechoslovakia. J. CONCLUSIONS

Are there futures other than those which have been sketchily outlined? Perhaps. If so, they need to be identified and evaluated. Each alternative considered here, furthermore, needs to be studied at lower levels of abstraction by being dissected into its more concrete components.

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Roughly, however, Czechoslovakia's destiny for the next several years seems circumscribed by these basic prospects. Which particular one might characterize the country by, let us say, 1970 depends on what Czechs and Slovaks are doing and will do, on what Soviets, Americans, Chinese, and others do. This is so self-evident as to be trivial. But what these populations and portions thereof, the Governments and factions within Governments, might be doing depends on the evaluation of desirable and undesirable alternatives; of odds associated with the outcomes; of availability of action means to bring about or prevent particular futures; of relative power as the degree to which such actions affect the course of events. These, then, are some of the items of information required as building blocks for a model which can link the futures with the present in a systematic, reproducible, and validatable manner.13 Which groups and population segments expect each alternative, and how much, relative to other options? Which groups and population segments desire particular outcomes or want to prevent them? How are these futures evaluated, in terms of likelihood and desirability, by Americans and by the Government of the United States? By the Soviets? By the Chinese? By the British? By the Poles? . . . Which action courses are open to the various groups and population segments seeking to bring about desired futures or to prevent unwanted ones? Speculatively, we have spoken of the intra-Czechoslovak evaluations of the various alternatives as if we had the actual knowledge. The "answers" are thus suppositional and nothing more. We began by stating that a complete analysis necessitates the standardized and systematized collection of empirical evidence on all these issues, and this evidence is currently not in our hands.14 What would it take to produce a revolution in Czecho-

13

Carol L. Sheldon of Chatham College has now collected some relevant data on a few of the key issues. The study sought to establish, among many other things, the manner in which Czechs and Slovaks (members of SVU) in the United States view the future of Czechoslovakia from the vantage points of both the "likely" and "desirable" states of the nation in the years to come. 14 It must be underscored that "evidence", for the purposes of this analysis, does not consist of a historical record of "what has happened" or even an explanation of "why" some changes have already taken place. Rather, the notion of "evidence" is confined to the futuristic dimension: What is likely to happen? What is desirable to whom? What is undesirable to whom? Such evidence simply does not exist, except for the previously mentioned study by C. Sheldon, which, of course, deals only with the Czech and Slovak elites in the United States and not with population segments within Czechoslovakia. Previously, this writer re-

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Slovakia, in terms of people, resources, timing, and so on? What would it take to prevent one? What would it take to produce a Polish-Czechoslovak Federation (or some other one)? What would it take to prevent one? In other words, who would have to do what, when, and how? In the "real" world of Czechoslovakia of today and tomorrw, are the requirements met for "producing" a revolution, a coup d'état, a federation, liberalization, or a limited war engagement, or for "preventing" these outcomes? Is there evidence of propensities in these directions and how much of a tendency is there and what are the scope, distribution, and direction of countervailing trends? These are among the key questions for a system's analysis of Czechoslovakia as tomorrows become todays. By which methods can one render any model of complex systems scientifically more viable? Do we generate "scenarios" which imaginatively and speculatively (though, like all speculations, based on prior data and knowledge) connect the future with the present and render some paths more plausible than others? Do we generate simulation models and reduce the prolonged and complicated process into manipulations of known, partially known, and estimated parameters in computers? Do we conduct gaming experiments by enacting alternative actions of various segments of the Czechoslovak population and of its international environment? Do we gather empirical data by literary and content analysis of available sources? Do we seek to enrich the model by empirical parameters obtained through appropriate survey methods? Indeed, all these techniques are appropriate. In fact, all methods of all kinds are highly appropriate if they even so much as hint at a promise that men can gain a better understanding of one of the greatest mysteries of them all - the future.

ported anticipations regarding a few basic transformations of Czechoslovakia (liberalization, revolution, emergence of nationalistic Communism independent of Moscow) on the part of elites in several countries. See Jiri Nehnëvajsa, "Anticipated Futures of Czechoslovakia", in M. Rechcigl, Jr., editor, The Czechoslovak Contribution to World Culture (The Hague, Mouton and Co., 1964).

2 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC

ASPECTS

Economic Growth of Czechoslovakia since World War II* GREGOR LAZARCIK

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper attempts to summarize the growth pattern of the Czechoslovak economy since World War II. Czechoslovak postwar economy is of particular interest as an example of economic performance by a socialist economic system in an advanced industrialized country. By 1937, Czechoslovakia was already one of the ten most industrialized nations in Europe, 1 and her capacity to produce goods and services of special types increased further during the war. Before the war, her economy had all the attributes of a private enterprise system in which the role of the government was limited. Since the war, however, basic structural changes have been made in the whole Czechoslovak economy. The ownership and control of the bulk of productive resources were transferred to the state rapidly in some sectors, and gradually in others. Industry was the first sector to be nationalized in the early postwar years. In October 1945, two presidential decrees completely nationalized mining, metallurgy, the chemical industry, power-generating, banking, and insurance. Other industries and enterprises were subject to varying degrees of nationalization according to their importance to the nation's economy.2 Agriculture, crafts, and retail trade outlets, however, remained wholly under private ownership. This "mixed economy" remained in operation until 1948, when, in February, the Communist * The author is indebted to Dr. Thad P. Alton, Director of the Project on National Income in East Central Europe, and his colleagues at the Project for valuable suggestions and comments on the substance of this paper. 1 According to the League of Nations as cited by Gregor Lazarcik, Le commerce en matière agricole entre l'Europe de l'Ouest et l'Europe de l'Est. (Paris, Librairie Rivière, 1959), p. 11. 2 Sbirka zàkonù a nafizenî republiky Ceskoslovenské 1945 [Collection of Laws and Ordinances of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1945], Prague, Ministry of the interior, Nos. 100, 101, 102, and 103, dated October 24, 1945.

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Party took full control of the government. A new wave of nationalization in April 1948 absorbed the small remains of privately owned industry. 3 Crafts and retail trade were rapidly transformed into nationalized enterprises.4 Agriculture, other than state farms, remained private until 1949, when its collectivization was initiated by the Czechoslovak government. By the end of 1952, almost one-third of all agricultural land had been collectivized; furthermore, 13.5 percent of all cultivated land was owned by the state.5 In the next three years, however, the state authorities relaxed the pressure for collectivization, producing in a decrease of almost one-fifth of the area in collective farms. But at the beginning of 1956, collectivization was resumed, and at the end of 1962, only 10.6 percent of agricultural land was being cultivated by private farmers. 6 During the time-period covered in this study, there were three different institutional set-ups in the Czechoslovak economy. First, a "market economy" prevailed in the prewar period. The institutional arrangements in the prewar years, with the exception of agricultural products under the grain monopoly, in general safeguarded the operation of the free market system, in which the production, consumption, and prices of goods and services were the result of the interaction of supply and demand of all producers and consumers. Second, a "mixed economy" emerged from the 1945 nationalization, lasting until about 1949. Although most productive resources were under state ownership, the governmental regulation of the economy was mainly confined to price fixing, rationing, control of foreign transactions, and the formulation of general economic policies embodied in the Two-Year Plan. The aim was to attain prewar production and consumption levels. The third setup was a "centrally planned economy," the operating mechanism of which was first formulated in the laws of the First Five-Year Plan, 1949-1953. 7 During this period fully centralized economic planning and control were established by the government. In this paper we shall present the summary findings of growth of the 3

Sbirka 1948 (Laws 1948) op. cit., Nos. 114 and 115, dated April 8 and April 24, 1948. 4 Employment in private handicrafts decreased from 459,000 in 1948 to 54,000 in 1952; see Statisticka roienka republiky Ceskoslovenske 1957 [Statistical Yearbook of Czechoslovakia], (Prague, State Statistical Office), p. 180. 5 Ibid., p. 112. 6 Ibid., 1963, p. 236. 7 Sbirka 1948, op. cit., No. 241 dated October 27, 1948, and ibid., 1951, No. 38 dated April 10, 1951.

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Czechoslovak economy. Our results will be compared with the official measures, and the differences discussed in general terms. Then, we shall discuss the most important sources of growth: labor, capital, and land. Finally, we shall attempt to calculate some of the conventional output-input ratios: GNP per unit of labor, per unit of capital, and per unit of combined inputs.

2. SUMMARY FINDINGS OF GROWTH

In terms of industrial origin, our findings show a 79 percent increase in gross national product (GNP) between 1937 and 1962, and a 92 percent rise from 1948 to 1962. In the postwar years, 1948-1962, the average annual rate of growth was 5.0 percent, (see Table 1). The growth, however, was uneven for different industries. Since the prewar years, the transportation sector had showed the largest increase in growth, about 500 percent from 1937 to 1962, followed by industry, with an increase of 153 percent, trade with 135 percent, communications with 128 percent, and construction with 93 percent, during the same period. The remaining industrial sectors grew at a slower-thanaverage rate for the whole economy. Domestic service, banking and insurance, agriculture, administration, and housing sectors showed a decline by 55, 47, 24, 22, and 2 percent, respectively from 1937 to 1962. Because agriculture and housing were adversely affected by the war, their postwar performance seemed to have been satisfactory, reflecting recovery rather than real growth. Only banking, quasi-governmental organizations, administration and justice and domestic servants have continued to decline during most of the postwar years. The economic growth, however, has not been even during the postwar period. In the first period, 1948-1954, which covers the first FiveYear Plan (1949-53), the rate of growth for the whole economy and for most of the sectors was lower than for the second period, 1954-1960, covering the second Five-Year Plan (1956-60). Since 1960, growth has slowed down greatly, resulting in an absolute decline in 1963. In the whole postwar period, however, the GNP grew at a 5 percent annual rate. The lower rate of growth between 1948 and 1954 can be explained by the excessive regimentation of the labor force, the lower incentives of workers because of wage-squeeze, and inexperience in central planning which resulted in misallocation of productive resources among different sectors. The second post-Stalin period was characterized

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Gregor Lazarcik TABLE 1

Growth Rates of Gross National Product by Sectors of Origin and by Use, 1948-1962 8 Item

Average Annual Percentage Rate of Increase

By Industrial Origin: Total gross national product Industry and crafts Agriculture Forestry Construction Transportations and communications Transportation Communications Trade, banking, and insurance Trade Banking and insurance Housing Government Administration, defense, and security Administration and justice Defense Internal security Other government services Education Culture and recreation Health service Science and research Social welfare Quasi-govt. organizations Other services Domestic servants Communal and other services

1948-62

1948-54

5.0 6.9 0.9 1.9 7.2 9.3 10.1 5.2 5.5 7.0 -6.8 0.5 2.7 -1.7 -3.9 -1.0 2.6 5.8 4.5 6.7 6.9 13.6 -1.9 -1.7 3.7 -2.5 4.4

3.4 6.5 0.8 5.6 6.3 9.9 11.1 4.6 3.1 5.1 -15.6 0.2 5.4 3.5 -1.4 6.1 13.8 7.3 3.2 13.9 11.8 16.6 5.0 -1.7 -0.1 -2.8 0.2

1954-60 6.5 9.7 2.1 -0.4 9.0 9.6 10.4 5.1 6.7 7.1 -0.3 0.7 1.0 -4.2 -5.8 -4.0 -1.7 4.3 5.1 2.4 4.8 8.5 -1.2 -2.1 4.6 -2.1 5.3

4.4 2.9 0.5 3.5 2.4 -1.1 -0.5 5.9 7.5

4.1 3.0 0.2 3.8 6.3 5.2 7.0 7.6 4.7

5.5 3.4 0.7 4.0 0.5

By Final Use: Total gross national product Personal consumption N Housing services Other consumption Government Administration, defense, and security Defense and internal security Other governmental services Gross investment

-3.6 4.3 10.7

Calculated by fitting an exponential curve to the indexes by the least squares method: 1 = 2"xy i + r

~mr~

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Growth

Since World

War II

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by a certain degree of liberalization in the economic sphere. Workers' incentives were increased with higher wages and other fringe benefts, greater availability of consumer goods, greater personal freedom, and the greater experience of planners in more efficiently allocating the productive resources. The gross national product by end use showed a pattern similar to that of industrial origin. A s to individual components of G N P , gross investment showed the largest increase, followed by government and personal consumption. Defense and security showed a small decrease over the whole period. However, between 1 9 4 8 and 1954, defense increased by a 7 percent annual rate, while from 1 9 5 4 to 1960, it declined by 3.6 percent annually. The rapid growth of investment was necessary to support the expansion of productive capacity in industry, construction, transportation, trade, and agriculture. Personal consumption, o n the other hand, was permitted to increase only about 3 percent annually. The social consumption, i.e., education, culture, and medical care increased annually by 4.5, 6.7, and 6.9 percent, which is a 8

Sources of data for 1, 3, and 4 were derived from: Alton, Thad P., at al. Czechoslovak National Income and Product 1947-48 and 1955-56 (New York, Columbia University Press, 1962). Holeäovsky, Vaclav, Personal Consumption in Czechoslovakia, 1937, 1948-62 (New York, Columbia University). Occasional Papers of the Research Project on National Income in East Central Europe, 1965. Gregor Lazariik, Growth of Trade, Banking, and Insurance in Czechoslovakia, 1937-1962 (New York Columbia University), Occasional Papers of the Research Project on National Income in East Central Europe, 1965; idem, Growth of Government, Housing, and other Services in Czechoslovakia, 1937, 1946-1962 (with the cooperation of Vaclav HoleSovsky) (New York, Columbia University), Occasional Papers of the Research Project on National Income in East Central Europe, 1965; idem, Czechoslovak Transportation and Communications; Output and Derived Gross and Net Value Added, 1937 and 1946-1962 (New York, Columbia University). Occasional Papers of the Research Project on National Income in East Central Europe, 1965; idem, Output of Czechoslovak Forestry, Fishing and Hunting, Trapping, and Game at Constant 1948 Prices, 1936, and 1942-1962, (New York, Columbia University). Occasional Papers of the Research Project on National Income in East Central Europe, 1965; idem, Czechoslovak Agricultural Output, Expenses, Gross and Net Product, and Productivity, 193438, and 1946-62 (New York, Columbia University). Occasional Papers of the Research Project on National Income in East Central Europe, 1965); George J. Staller, Czechoslovak Industrial Production Indexes, 1937-1962 (New York, Columbia University). Occasional Papers of the Research Project on National Income in East Central Europe, 1965; idem, Czechoslovak Index of Construction, 1937-1962 (New York, Columbia University). Occasional Papers of the Research Project on National Income in East Central Europe, 1965. Czechoslovak Index of Investment, 1937-1962: Machinery and Equipment (New York, Columbia University). Occasional Papers of the Research Project on National Income in East Central Europe, 1965.

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Lazarcik

substantially higher rate than for personal consumption. Housing showed the smallest rate of increase, 0.5 percent annually.

3. OFFICIAL INDEXES OF GROWTH AS COMPARED WITH OUR FINDINGS The official indexes of Czechoslovak economic growth are less inclusive, less detailed, and not strictly comparable with our indexes, which were calculated according to the Western concept of GNP. The official index of "national income" includes only material production and excludes all "non-productive" services, according to the Marxist concept of national accounting. 9 According to this concept the "national income" is the total amount of all final producers' and consumers' goods produced by the nation during the year, after the deduction of capital consumption allowances. The following industrial secTABLE 2 Growth Rates Calculated

from Official "National Income"

(Material Product)

1948-1962

Item By Industrial Origin: Total "national income" (material product) Industry Agriculture and forestry Agriculture Construction Transportation and communications Technical supplies and farm purchases Trade and restaurants Transportation, technical supplies, farm purchases, and other material production

Data

10

Average Annual Percentage Rate of Increase (-decrease) 1948-62

1948-54

1954-60

7.4 8.4 -0.9 -0.9 12.1 9.5 14.9 1.5

8.7 8.5 1.3 0.7 16.8 12.4 16.9 13.1

7.4 8.9 -1.0 -0.5 10.9 7.4 7.4 -6.3

8.1

17.7

2.6

5.7

4.6

6.2

By Final Use: Personal consumption

Calculated by fitting an exponential curve to the indexes by the least squares method. » Statistickâ rocenka 1962, 1962, op. cit., p. 23. 10 Sources of data for Table 2 were derived from: Czechoslovakia State Statistical Office. Statistickâ rocenka republiky Ceskoslovenské (Prague, 1959), pp. 3637; ibid., 1961, pp. 38-39; and ibid., 1963, pp. 42-43.

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tors are included in the Marxist concept of national income: industry, agriculture, forestry, construction, transportation of goods, one-half of the communications services, technical supplies and purchases of farm products, trade, restaurants, and other material production. Excluded are all governmental and private services, i.e., administration, education, culture, health, science and research, social welfare, defense, internal security, social organizations, banking and insurance, housing, domestic, communal, and other personal services. Thus, the coverage of official indexes of "national income" is about 20 to 25 percent narrower than the coverage of our indexes of GNP. Therefore, both sets of indexes should reflect these differences. Since the governmental and personal services showed a much smaller rate of growth than material production (see Table 1), the official indexes of "material product" should show a higher rate of growth than our indexes. In fact, the official index (see Table 2), increased by 7.4 percent annually as compared to the 5.0 percent annual growth for our GNP index from 1948 to 1962. But in 1962 the total material product rose less than 2 percent, and in 1963 it decreased by about 2.5 percent.11 However, the officially estimated rate of growth was higher for the 1948-54 period than for the 1954-60 period, while our indexes showed an inverse trend. Unfortunately, we do not know the details of the official calculations. Therefore, we can only guess at several factors which may have produced different results. One significant factor may be the institutional changes which affected the coverage of different sectors with the passage of time. This may have played a significant role in agriculture, trade, and construction, where the socialization wave could have drastically affected the coverage of each sector from year to year, as can be seen by abrupt changes in official indexes. Another factor is the change in quality, which may account for much of the difference. It is not known which production series were used in the calculation of the official indexes. In addition, the series which were published may not be a representative sample of the whole economy. It is probable that most of the series published were those which showed an above-average increase. As a result, our own calculations may be upward-biased for some sectors also. The different pricing systems may also have affected the results. The official calculations are expressed in 1955 prices for 1948-60, and in 11

Statisticke pfehledy fice, Prague, p. 70.

[Statistical Reviews], No. 2, 1964, State Statistical Of-

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1960 prices since I960. 12 These are prices prescribed by planners, and they may differ significantly from free market prices. Detailed structure of these prices is not known. Our final aggregations were expressed in terms of adjusted factor cost prices as of 1956.13 4. SOURCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH

In this study, we follow the conventional method of dividing the measurable sources of growth between two groups of input, the labor and capital used in production. Land is treated as a special category of capital. We shall discuss the contribution to growth of each of these factors. Labor Input - Labor is the single most important input, accounting for about 59 percent of the total input in 1956.14 Because of its importance, the correct measurement of labor input is essential to the calculation of factor inputs. The labor input is the number of people employed in each sector expressed in terms of full-time man-year's work. The yearly employment is the sum of daily employment divided by the number of days per year. Within several important sectors, the employment was divided into sub-sectors and weighted by average earnings in 1956. The employment data in industry permitted its division into 18 sub-sectors, which were weighted by the estimated average wages in 1956. The employment in nine governmental sub-sectors, as well as in others (domestic servants, communal ,and other services), was weighted by the 1956 returns to labor. In agriculture, the employment was divided according to sex and weighted by the average earnings for each sex.15 The employment of the main sectors of origin was weighted by returns to labor in 1956. Our labor input measures, unfortunately, do not take into consideration the qualitative changes over time. There were factors at work which had a tendency to lower the quality of labor, but there were other factors which worked in the direction of improving the quality. The average quality of the labor force was affected adversely by the following factors. The rapid shift of labor from agriculture into non12

Statistickd rocenka 1961, op. cit., p. 19. T. P. Alton, et. al., Czechoslovak National Income and Product, 1947-1948 and 1955-1956, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 214. 14 Ibid., p. 214. 15 Gregor Lazarcik, Production and Productivity in Czechoslovak Agriculture 1934-1938 and 1946-1960, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertaion (Columbia University), 1960, pp. 297-98. 13

Economic Growth Since World War II

All

agricultural sectors and the increased participation of housewives in the labor force brought down the average quality of labor in the sectors they entered. In agriculture, the labor force was aging because of the exodus of younger people into other economic branches. The percentage of the active labor force in agriculture over 60 years of age increased from 14.5 percent in 1956 to 26 percent in 1962. The percentage of women in the total labor force of the country increased from 37.8 to 43.6 percent between 1948 and 1962.16 Also, the low real wage during the hard era of Stalin of the early fifties adversely affected personal incentives to work, while in the following period, the increased financial rewards may have had a positive effect on the quality of work. The factors which worked in the direction of improving the quality of labor were increased education and specialization, plus better training. The percentage of graduates from professional schools, colleges, and universities in the total labor force increased from 7.4 percent in 1953 to 14.3 percent in 1962.17 At present we are unable to measure these two groups of opposing factors. Our tentative conclusion is that the quality of labor deteriorated somewhat in the early fifties and then gradually improved in the second half of the last decade. Our findings show a 21 percent increase in the total labor force from 1948 to 1962. However, employment in some sectors increased sharply: 108 percent in construction and 36 percent in industry, while in agriculture it declined by 40 percent, and sharp decreases occurred in banking, central administration, domestic service, and semi-govermental organizations. In general, employment followed the pattern of output, except that the rate of change was less than that of output. The average yearly rate of increase in total labor (see Table 3) was 1.4 percent for the whole period. However, in the two periods, 1948-54 and 1954-60, the average rates were 1.2 percent, while in 1961 and 1962 the rate of increase rose over 2 percent. Capital Input - The input of capital is defined in a broad sense as the value of all assets tied up in the productive process. The Czechoslovak authorities estimated the full replacement value of fixed capital for the postwar years. The published indexes for the main sectors include the full value (undepreciated value) of buildings, 16

Statistickd rocenka, (1958), op. cit., pp. 89, 224, and ibid., 1963, pp. 114, 259. Ibid., 1958, p. 92; ibid., p. 106; ibid., 1963, pp. 113 and 117. In the United States, improved education and training contributed 23% of the total growth of GNP from 1929 to 1957. See Edward Denison, The Sources of Economic Growth in the United States, New York, CED, 1962, p. 267.

17

428

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Lazarcik

TABLE 3 Growth

Rates of Major Inputs: Labor and

Item Labor: Industry and craits Agriculture Forestry Construction Transportation and communications Trade, banking, and insurance Housing Government Other Total, weighted

Capital18

Average Annual Percentage Rate of Increase (-Decrease) 1948-62

1948-54

1954-62

2.4 -3.2 0.6 4.1 2.5 0.3 10.4 2.6 3.4 1.4

1.4 -3.3 0.5 7.3 2.8 -0.7 5.8 5.4 -0.3 1.2

2.8 -4.1 1.4 3.7 2.0 0.1 8.4 1.0 4.3 1.2

6.4 5.3 8.4 2.3

5.5 2.3 6.3 1.5

6.6 7.4 10.5 2.6

2.8

1.7

3.3

1.9 5.4 3.1 4.4 5.0 4.1 3.5 9.4 5.0 5.0

1.4 2.3 1.9 3.8 5.4 2.4 3.4 5.1 1.4 3.3

2.1 7.0 3.8 4.5 4.0 4.9 3.5 12.0 7.0 5.9

3.9 0.2 5.4 2.4 2.3 3.2 2.7 3.9 2.9

2.9 -1.5 7.0 2.0 0.4 2.0 5.4 0.2 2.0

4.3 0.5 5.8 2.4 2.9 3.9 1.0 4.7 3.2

Capital (undepreciated): Industry and crafts Agriculture and forestry Construction Transportation and communications Freight transportation & "productive" communications Transportation of persons & "unproductive" communications Trade, banking, and insurance Housing Government Administration and justice Education and culture Health and social welfare Science and research Other (communal services) Total, weighted Capital and Labor: Industry and crafts Agriculture and forestry Construction Transportation and communications Trade, banking, and insurance Housing Government Other Total, weighted

Calculated by fitting an exponential curve to the indexes by the least squares method. 18

See footnote 8.

Economic Growth Since World War II

429

machinery and equipment, draft animals, livestock for breeding, and land improvements (irrigation, drainage facilities).19 No official estimates of working capital are available, except for 1947-48 and 1955-56.20 Because of the unavailability of complete data on capital, the full replacement value of fixed capital indexes is used as an approximation of capital series in the Czechoslovak economy. The value of fixed capital is given in terms of the 1955 wholesale prices. We recalculated the value of fixed capital in terms of 1956 prices. It may be argued that the actual, depreciated value of capital is a better measure, indicating the real money value of capital resources tied up in the productive process, rather than the undepreciated value. Therefore, an attempt has been made to estimate the actual value of capital for the whole economy. At the present stage of our knowledge, however, the Czechoslovak official index of undepreciated fixed capital perhaps yields a better measure for our purpose, because: (1) it is available for individual sectors, while the unavailability of data does not permit calculation of the depreciated index of capital for each sector; and (2) the Czechoslovak authorities seem to give great care to the yearly compilation of the value of undepreciated fixed capital in the economy. The undepreciated indexes of fixed capital (as well as depreciated ones) show only the available capital stock for every year. However, the intensity of its use might have changed over the period, and hence its productivity. Such possible changes are not expressed in our indexes. The average rate of growth of capital was uneven during the postwar period (see Table 3). In the first period, 1948-54, the rate of growth was a little over one-half of that in the second period, 1954-60, and for the whole postwar period, it grew at the same rate as GNP (5 percent). However, different industries experienced various rates of growth. The fixed capital grew fastest in science and research (9.4 percent annually), followed closely by construction (8.4 percent) and industry (6.4 percent). Transportation and communications with an average growth rate of 2.3 percent, and housing with 3.1 percent, were at the low end of the growth scale. In most of the sectors, capital grew at a faster rate than labor, especially during the second period, when the rate of increase of the labor force slowed down because of the lack of new labor reserves in the 19

Statisticka rocenka (1962), op. cit., p. 23. T. P. Alton, et at., Czechoslovak National Income and Product, op. cit., pp. 223-26. 20

430

Gregor

Lazarcik

country. The rapidly increasing productive capacity was due primarily to the expansion of fixed capital and to a lesser degree, to the increase in the labor force (see Table 3). Land as such was not included as an ordinary input in our study; rather, it was considered a broad natural resource whose value normally does not depreciate. Only improvements on land are taken into account and included in the value of fixed capital in agriculture. By weighting the indexes of fixed capital shown by the 1956 returns to capital at an adjusted factor cost 21 , we obtained the value of capital input in terms of 1956 prices for the whole period. By summing up the labor and capital input, we obtained the combined value of labor and capital input. The rate of growth of combined labor and capital input varied according to industry and period (see Table 3).

5. PRODUCTIVITY: OUTPUT-INPUT RATIOS

GNP per Unit of Labor In our study, the indexes of GNP per unit of labor are ratios of the indexes of GNP in individual sectors to the indexes of labor input, expressed in total value of man-years of work in each sector, respectively.22 These indexes were derived for all major sectors and for the whole economy. The GNP per unit of labor is an accurate measure of change in the average unit productivity of labor when: (1) the output (GNP) is constant in quality and composition; (2) the scope of the measurement of labor input is constant over time; and (3) the measure of labor input is identical in coverage with the measure of output to which it relates. The quality of output in some sectors changed more than in others. In agriculture and forestry, perhaps the quality of individual series did not change to any significant degree; in industry and other sectors, the changes were greater in deterioration of quality 23, though certain improvements in quality occurred in some kinds of producers' goods. No adjustment has been made for these changes in our calcula-

»

22

Ibid., p. 222.

The algebraic form of this ratio is Q/M, where Q is the index of the value of GNP in that sector, and M is the index of the total value of labor used in producing the GNP in that sector. 23 Planovane hospodarstvi (Planned Economy), 1957, Prague, No. 5, p. 331;

ibid., 1958, Nos. 6-7, p. 513; and Podnikova organizace (Enterprise Organization), 1955, Prague, No. 12, p. 443.

Economic Growth Since World War II

431

tion of output. The composition of output changed also, and this change may have affected the reliability of output per unit of labor. As to the scope, coverage, and quality of labor input, the following remarks may be made: (1) There is no available evidence to indicate that the average number of hours per man-year changed significantly during the period covered; (2) the coverage of labor input seems to be generally identical with the sectorial output - the periodic changes in industrial classification may have resulted in discrepancies in the coverage for some years, although none were detected; (3) the quality of labor probably changed because of greater skills and education, but the increased participation of women in the labor force and decreased incentives in some sectors, e.g., agriculture, had a negative effect on the quality of labor. It is felt, however, that the above factors, though materially affecting the accuracy of our measure of output per unit of labor, were not so great as to invalidate the significance of our findings, given in Table 4. The growth of GNP per unit of labor is given in terms of the average annual rate of change in Table 4. The increase in GNP per unit of labor is attributable mainly to the increased amount of capital per unit of labor, which rose 63 percent from 1948 to 1962. The improved skills, training, and education of the labor force, as well as new technology, also contributed somewhat to the increase in GNP per unit of labor. GNP per Unit of Capital - The index of GNP per unit of capital is defined as the ratio of the index of GNP valued at 1956 adjusted factor cost prices to the index of total replacement (undepreciated) value of fixed capital at 1956 prices. The accuracy of this measure depends on the reliability of both the output, discussed above, and the capital input. To obtain an exact measure, the capital input should include all capital assets tied up (or used up) in the production of that output. Unfortunately, because of the lack of adequate data, we used only the undepreciated fixed capital as an approximation of the indexes of all capital. It should be noted that we use the available stock of fixed capital as an approximation of capital input. These two measures would be identical only if the intensity of the use of capital and the rate of its obsolessence did not change during the period under study. It is felt that the intensity of the use of capital was greater in the early fifties, when multiple shifts in factories were more common, than in recent years. The rate of obsolescence, however, increased in recent years because of rapidly developing technological innovations. Whether these two op-

432

Gregor

Lazarcik

TABLE 4 Growth Rates of Gross National Product per Unit of Labor, of Capital, and of All Inputs Item Gross Nat. Product per Unit of Labor Industry and crafts Agriculture Forestry Construction Transportation and communications Trade, banking, and insurance Housing Government Other Total, weighted

24

Average Annual Percentage Rate of Increase (-Decrease) 1948-62

1948-54

1954-60

4.2 4.1 1.2 2.9 6.5 5.2 -9.9 0.0 0.3 3.5

2.3 4.2 6.0 -1.0 6.9 3.6 -5.6 0.0 0.2 2.2

6.7 6.2 -1.8 5.6 7.5 6.5 -7.7 0.0 0.3 5.3

0.4 -4.4 -0.9 7.3 0.1 -2.6 -1.3 0.0

-2.1 -1.1 0.0 8.2 0.6 -1.7 -1.6 0.0

2.9 -5.4 -0.2 6.9 -0.3 -3.1 -2.3 0.6

2.8 0.4 1.7 6.8 3.1 -2.7 0.0 -0.2 2.0

0.6 2.7 -0.7 7.7 2.6 -1.8 0.0 -0.4 1.4

5.2 1.4 3.9 7.1 3.6 -3.2 0.0 -0.5 3.2

Gross National Product per Unit of Capital: Industry and crafts Agriculture and forestry Construction Transportation and communications Trade, banking, and insurance Housing Other Total, weighted Gross Natonal Product per Unit of All Inputs: Industry and crafts Agriculture and forestry Construction Transportation and communication Trade, banking, and insurance Housing Government Other Total, weighted

Calculated by fitting an exponential curve to the indexes by the least squares method.

24

See footnote 8.

Economic Growth Since World War II

433

posing factors cancel out is impossible to measure and, therefore, there is no clear-cut evidence that the index of undepreciated fixed capital differs significantly from the actual capital input. The GNP per unit of capital experienced different changes in various sectors (see Table 4). Except for industry and transportation, the annual rate of GNP per unit of capital was negative for all other sectors in the 1954-60 period. This decreasing tendency indicates that the marginal efficiency of capital was diminishing as its stock was increasing. GNP per Unit of All Inputs - In this study, the GNP per unit of all inputs (known also as output-input ratio) is the ratio of the GNP index to the index of all inputs used to produce that GNP, both being valued at 1956 adjusted factor cost prices. This ratio measures the average aggregate productivity of all inputs together, and, therefore, it does not show which particular input is used in excessive or deficient quantities. The input consists of labor input weighted by the 1956 returns to labor and undepreciated fixed capital weighted by the returns to capital valued at 1956 adjusted factor cost prices. The output-input ratio, it should be noted, expresses only those relationships which can be measured in money, and the magnitude of this ratio depends on the valuation of factors and price weights used. The intangible inputs (e.g., technology, economic organization, satisfaction derived from work, etc.) are not included in the ratio because of our inability to measure them. The correctness of output-input ratio depends on the reliability of the output and input measures discussed above. As in all other index-type measures, a part of the change in the ratio is due to the "index number problem", i.e., changes in relative prices and quantities which introduce bias in the ratio.25 Provided that we allow for certain marginal error in both directions because of the failure to include quality changes in our output and input indexes, and other imperfections and deficiencies already noted, the increase in the ratio over a given period indicates a rise in average aggregate productivity (sometimes referred to as "total productivity") in the whole economy or industry due to one or more of several intangible factors. A decrease in the ratio would indicate a decline in "total productivity" due to one or more of several intangible factors. 25

For a brief analysis of bias in output-input ratio, see: Vernon W. Ruttan, Technologcal Progress in the Meat Packing Industry, 1917-1947 (Washington D.C., U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1954), pp. 15-20.

434

Gregor Lazarcik

The changes in "total productivity" (output-input ratio) of the Czechoslovak economy over a period, therefore, may result from a combination of several intangible inputs, such as technology, changes in basic science, education, training, economic organizations, and the effects of all other causes, i.e., increasing (decreasing) returns to scale, economies resulting from increased specialization, the nature of the tax system, the character of government subsidies, regulation of prices, and all other government regulations and activities affecting the efficiency of the allocation and use of productive resources. All of those factors are elements in a complex relationship and are integral determinants of changes in "total productivity." Because of our insufficient data, it is impossible at present to measure separately the effect of any of these intangible factors on changes in productivity. Despite the difficulties of the calculation, and certain biases, the output-input ratio has been rather extensively used in recent years to estimate changes in efficiency or technological progress in both the whole economy and individual industries.26 In the Czechoslovak economy and its individual sectors, significant changes in "total productivity" occurred in the postwar years, (see Tabel 4). The ratio for the whole economy increased 2 percent annually. In the period 1954-60, the increase in "total productivity" tended to be higher, except in agriculture, housing, and certain other areas, than in the early fifties. It seems that the productive mechanism became more efficient in the more liberalized post-Stalin period of centralized planning from 1954 to 1960. Since 1961, however, there has been a sharp decline in productivity due to a series of errors and inefficiencies in the planning mechanism.

6. CONCLUSION

The materials presented in this paper bear on questions central to the appraisal of an economic system. One of the basic tests of performance of any economic system is: How large a quantity of economically useful goods and services has it produced per unit of productive resources, or has the system grown in effectiveness as a production mechanism? 26

John W. Kendrick, "Productivity Trends: Capital and Labor", Review of Economics and Statistics, August 1956, pp. 248-57; Solomon Fabricant, Basic Facts on Productivity Change, Occasional Paper No. 63, (New York, NBER), and other studies.

435

Economic Growth Since World War 11

We may evaluate the performance of the present socialist economic system in Czechoslovakia by comparing it to the economic performances of other countries with similar natural and economic conditions, but which have operated predominantly under the private enterprise system. TABLE 5

Growth Rates of Gross National Product and GNP per Unit of Labor in Percent from 1948 to 1963 Country Czechoslovakia Austria Federal Republic of Germany France Italy Netherlands

Gross National Product

G N P per unit of labor

4.3 7.0 7.2 5.3 6.0 5.0

3.2 4.8 5.0 4.0 4.5 3.8

The figures in Table 5 show that the average rates of growth of GNP and output per unit of labor were significantly higher in Western European countries where the competitive free market system prevailed than in socialist Czechoslovakia. In fact, the difference in economic growth between Czechoslovakia and Western Europe was even greater, because the figures in Table 5 do not include the changes in quality. In Western European countries, the average quality of goods and services has improved substantially since the war, while in Czechoslovakia, there have been frequent complaints about the deterioration in quality of goods by consumers and government officials alike. If we included these changes into our calculations, the growth rate of GNP in Czechoslovakia would perhaps fall to about one-half of that in Austria or the Federal Republic of Germany. Thus, under the socialist economic system, the Czechoslovak economy has so far been producing less efficiently than the economies of Western Europe under the free market system.27

27

A detailed account of economic conditions and problems planning in Czechoslovakia can be found in: Michal, Jan M., Central Planning in Czechoslovakia (Stanford University Press, 1960) and Boris P. Pesek, Gross National Product of Czechoslovakia in Monetary and Real Terms, 1946-58 (University of Chicago Press, 1965).

Short- and Long-Term Aspects of Changes in the Czechoslovak Agriculture Since the Second World War V. E. ANDIC

I. INTRODUCTION - POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS REFLECTING ON AGRICULTURE

The changes in the agriculture of Czechoslovakia since the creation of the People's Republic in 1948 are of such nature that the present agricultural institutions are quite different from those which existed during the internar period (1918 to 1938). It is intended to set forth here the present collectivistic aspects of the emerging agricultural structure. As predicted by the new leaders, a new agricultural system had been initiated by 1960. The new arrangements may alter the agricultural structure of Czechoslovakia as we knew it in the past. The People's Republic of Czechoslovakia was established in February 1948, patterned on Marxist-Leninist doctrines. The role of the new economic system was defined by the government representatives as follows: A new epoch in Czechoslovak history began in February 1948. The victory of the people opened up a new path to socialism. Since that date the economic and political foundations of a people's democracy have been enlarged and reinforced; much has been accomplished to popularize and improve public administration. One is in the presence of a cultural awakening; the masses are learning to conceive of the world in terms of the ideas of Marx and Engels.1 The philosophy of the new Czechoslovak State is based on the principle of social, i.e., government ownership of the means of production, which include arable and agricultural land, as well as forests, presumably in order to secure the maximum welfare for the largest number of

1

From the report presented to the Third International Conference on Public Education by Dr. Josef Vana, delegate of the Czechoslovak Government, International Yearbook, (Paris, UNESCO, 1949), p. 101.

Agriculture Since the Second World War

437

citizens.2 To achieve this goal, all members of Czechoslovak society are to work at maximum potential, produce more, and give the country their best efforts. Production is planned collectively on a national scale, affecting every social unit. 3 The sense of emergency, generated from wartime and postwar events, led to the establishment of national committees in every community. The national commitees gradually assumed the function of "soviets" and were dominated by Communists. The number of political parties Changes in Ministries, 1948-1959. Ministers Agriculture Industry Education Fuels and Power Construction Transportation Manpower Security Foreign Affairs Justice Foreign Trade Finance State Planning Office Internal Trade Interior Communications Consumer Industry Health

2

Reorganizations

Ministers

17 11 8 5 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

10 14 5 5 3 4 4 9 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 1 1 1

George J. Staller, in an unpublished doctoral dissertation, Czechoslovak Industrial Production, 1945-47, shows that agricultural production increased from 100 in 1948 to only 110 in 1961, while industrial production increased in the same period from 100 to 406, p. 143. 3 Failures of agricultural policies are readily admitted by Czechoslovak leaders, despite the fact that Czechoslovakia has been turned into a large national enterprise (narodni podnik). The name implies a method of economic organization, and also a new way of life. In this national-enterprise Czechoslovakia, everyone is, in effect, a civil servant. See the report of Dana Adams Schmidt, "Czechoslovakia Dominated by National Way of Life", in the fourth of six reports on Czechoslovakia, The New York Times, June 8 (1950).

438

V. E.

Andic

was reduced.4 Some traditional political parties, including the Agrarian Party, the largest in the interwar period, were prohibited. The Communists worked feverishly to take over every elective and administrative office they could. In fact, two years before the actual coup, because of the election of 1946 held under the shadow of the Red Army, "they were able to control the majority of units of local government, i.e., regional, district and local national committees". Among the important government positions, they held four ministries, including that of the Ministry of Agriculture.3 It was the Ministry of Agriculture that underwent the most frequent reorganizations, a fact that indicates the extent of pressures applied against farmers and their institutions.®

II. EVOLUTION O F SHORT- A N D L O N G - R A N G E A G R I C U L T U R A L POLICY

Changes in Czechoslovak agriculture are of two types; short-term and long-range. Their characteristics and effects are as follows: Short-term

Long-range

Nature: War-emergency reorganization necessitated disruptions, dislocations and adjustments in post-war era.

Permanent changes in the structure of the emerging agricultural system based on (a) collective ownership; (b) duty to work; and (c) large-scale operation.

Aim: Land to belong to the workers; instead of ownership by individual settlers, land was pooled into producers' cooperatives. By April 30, 1962, over 700,000 private farms had been integrated into 8,165 collective farms, 7 administered under selfgovernment.

Land to belong to the state, i.e., the community at large; Keep increasing production at all costs; What looked like cooperation assumed the form of collectivism fostered by force.

4

The post-war Czechoslovak National Assembly, in 1946, consisted of four Czech and four Slovak parties; out of 300 deputies, the Communists had 114. See William Diamond, Czechoslovakia between East and West (London, Institute of World Affairs, 1947), pp. 12-13. 5 Duchäcek, Ivo, "Czechoslovakia", in The Fate of East Central Europe (Notre Dame, Indiana, Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1956). 6 Beck, Carl, Party Control and Bureaucratization in Czechoslovakia (Univ. of Pittsburgh, Administrative Science Center, 1961), Reprint No. 4. 7 Lazarcik, Gregor, The Performance of Socialist Agriculture (New York, N.Y., L. W. International Financial Research, Inc., 1963), p. 13.

Agriculture Since the Second World War Short-term

439 Long-range

Form of organization: Farm collectives, although promised self-government, do not yet have it.

Collectives are governed by a uniform set of by-laws subject to approval by ministry of agriculture and control of the District National Committee.

Marketing: Delivery quotas introduced, market system abolished, distribution to be carried on by government stores.

Delivery of farm products to the State to be voluntary under terms determined by district national committees.

Population Shifts: Emphasis on industrialization led to depopulation of countryside. In 1930, there were 3,537,000 agricultural workers; in 1961, only 1,320,000, or 37.5 percent of the 1930 figure. 8

Lack of farm manpower a chronic problem due to (a) disparities in income (b) overage population (c) flight of youth to cities.

Land Tenure: Collective ownership: (a) state; (b) community; personal property up to 0.5 ha.

All land to belong to the state even though it may be used by collectives, institutions, or individuals; Garden plots (up to 0.5 ha) may be abolished.

Work: Compulsory: One hundred fifty work units minimum; for monetary compensation, see table in footnote 9 ; absenteeism became a problem.

Work units (output norms) are regulated by the collective membership meeting.

Mechanization: Farm industrial development given priority; increased emphasis on vocational and technical farm education carried on with determination.

Increased emphasis on self-financing, regardless of any particular harvest; even if operation at a loss, industrialization may lead to replacement of manual labor by machines.

8

Hospodârské noviny [Economic News] (Prague, March 22), 1963. Work units (norms of output) in the farm collectives. Of the total number of collectives, the percentages, according to monetary compensation paid per work unit, are as follows:

9

Up

8,00 Koruna to 8.10 - 16.00 16.10 - 20.00 over 20.00

1958

1959

1960

12.8 52.1 20.0 15.1

11.9 61.4 17.5 9.2

8.6 51.5 21.7 12.2

Statistickd rocenka Ceskoslovenske socialisticke repuhliky [Statistical Yearbook of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic] (Prague, 1961), p. 263.

440

V. E.

Andic

Food Supply: Shortages; public cafeterias promoted to liberate women from drudgery of work in the kitchen, laundry, etc.

Adequate supplies promised with increased industrialization of farming, fertilization, irrigation, and canalization. Imports to supplement home production.

Collective way of life fostered through nurseries, homes for students, elderly, etc., and by increasing welfare programs.

Concentration on manufacturing production to continue.

Theory: Policy to be as close to Marxist theories as possible.10, 11

Constant changes indicate search for a realistic theory 12 of sound economic development.

Provision for Adjustment: Only in favor of the collective, against individual member of his family.

Marxism to stand or fall on collectivism; any concessions only tactical; private farming not to be allowed even though small-scale farming will remain a burning issue even under socialist agriculture.

III. CRITICAL EVALUATION

Of all post-1948 agricultural changes in agriculture, the most basic and most significant are: Monopolization-nationalization of property which does not tolerate private ownership and free enterprise. Monopolization of employment, since monopolization of property leads to monopolistic power over labor, meaning loss of independence for labor. 10 Mitrany, David, Marx against the Peasant (New York, Collier Books, 1961), writes: "Marx took for granted that the same process (as in the Industrial Revolution) was bound to take place also in agriculture, p. 36. 11 Andic, V. E. "Economic Arguments against Gigantism in Farming", International Peasant Union (New York, luly-August, 1964), pointed out the standards used in comparing criteria for small farm units with those of large-scale farms, and stated, "There is no doubt that in the Soviet Union, as in Czechoslovakia, they are going beyond the optimum size", p. 11. 12 Piest'ansky, Juraj, "The Communist Economy", Nase snahy [Our Aims] (Toronto, Ontario, 1965), Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 12-13, deals with four phases of the Czechoslovak economy: (1) 1945-1948, as the beginning of socializaion with a mixed economy similar to the National Economic Policy in the Soviet Union after 1921; (2) 1948-1954, as the Stalinist Era liquidating the remnants of private enterprise in industry and agriculture; (3) 1954-1961, as a period when forcible collectivization was temporarily halted and when central planning began to be subjected to criticism; (4) 1962-1965, as a period of complete purging the economy of all vestiges of capitalism.

Agriculture Since the Second World War

441

The principles advanced with regard to property in the Constitution 1S of Czechoslovakia are: I. Land shall belong to those who cultivate it (Sec. 110) 2. Government Socialist property has only one owner; it is the people of Czechoslovakia organized into the state 3. Private property is incompatible with the idea of Socialism. The Constitution recognizes three types of ownership: 14 I. Socialist, which may be (a) government-nationalized property, including the state farms; eventually all land is to be incorporated in state farms in full socialist ownership. (b) Cooperative or collective ownership as another type of socialist ownership in which marketing of land is prohibited. II. Private, in a limited sense, referring to private ownership of the means of production, which can be either that of (a) capitalist ownership, non-existent, since private ownership of enterprises, including corporations, was abolished; or (b) small-scale producers, including small farmers, condemned to gradual disappearance. III. Personal, referring to means of personal use and consumption: Within socialist enterprise, such as collective farms, a family may be permitted to maintain a cow, or three goats, or one or two pigs, or no more than five sheep. Household objects or personal goods and savings are inviolable. Sec. 158 of 1948 Const. Sec. 105 of 1950 Civil Code. There are two outstanding departures from past practices here: One, ownership may not be renounced and property may not be alienated.13 Sections 104 and 115 are intended to prevent transfer of socialist property to the private ownership of individuals, so that while the property brought by the farmer into the collective continues to be his in name, he cannot make individual decisions about it; the collective membership does. In this way, ownership of property becomes an empty term, since the owner is not allowed to control his property.16 13 The provisions of the 1948 Constitution were strengthened further, especially, by the 1964 Law on Property. 14 Ko£vara, Stefan, "Property Law of the Czechoslovak People's Democracy", The American Journal of Comparative Law, Spring (1958). 15 KoSvara, Stefan, Ibid., p. 270. 16 Curtis, W. M., "Foundation for Economic Education", The Freeman, March (1958).

442

V. E. Andic

That ownership, even though in name only, imposes on the owner the duty to work: he must not harm the community, as he may if he refrains from work. Property in a collective imposes the duty to work, and other duties, as a consequence of subordination of the farmer to the collective leadership; it carries none of the privileges we attach to property in a free enterprise system. A farmer is without legal protection. He cannot sell or even give his property without a specific release and authorization from the collective's membership meeting and a permit from the District National Committee. Whether or not he will be released depends on whether this would contribute to public welfare, since public welfare represents the supreme criterion. While this practice does not make the present agricultural system in Czechoslovakia a successor to feudalism, it does seem to be a "reasonably close facsimile thereof".17 Discussing the plight of the Soviet farmer, who is frequently cited as an example for the Czechoslovak farmer, it is further held that "the Soviet collective farm system, which attaches the farm hand to the soil or the worker to the shop if he wants to eat, is, by whatever name you want to call it, substantially a revival of servitude". Observing Communist land practices, a Czech author, Frantisek Modracek, observed, back in 1918: "Russian peasants want the soil they work on to belong to them and not to the nation", and added emphatically: "In my opinion, the very fact of community ownership is incompatible with truly cooperative production. Common ownership is a public monopoly. As a monopoly, it means a negation of free enterprise." 18 Modracek, a strong advocate of cooperative efforts on a voluntary basis, quotes, from the German version (Organisierte Arbeit) of John Mitchell's Organized Work,19 arguments of young trade unionists in England during the first half of the 19th century, demanding that "not the state but workers in each particular occupation be the owners of their machines and capital." At the same time, Modracek cites Herbert Spencer's stand on the loss of initiative in workers employed by a state monopoly, quoting from Spencer's Principles of Sociology, III, vol. p. 805, that "here a worker had no personal interest and this vacuum 17 Durante, Will, Caesar and Christ, starting with page 641 discussed by Frank Ford in "Feudalism Linked to Communism", Pittsburgh Press, September 23 (1959). 18 Modracek, Frantisek, Samosprava prace [Self-Regulation of Work] (Prague, Antonin Sveceny, 1918), pp. 10, 12. 19 Dresden, 1905, p. 22, in Modra£ek, ibid, p. 44.

Agriculture Since the Second World War

443

must be replaced by a whip." 20 The accuracy of this analysis was confirmed by the production in forced-labor camps in the Soviet Union, and in Czechoslovakia as well. It was not long after the Communist take-over that forced-labor camps were introduced for the regime's opponents, real or potential. It was estimated that "there were in Czechoslovakia about one hundred forced-labor camps with approximately 300,000 prisoners; over 85 percent of those who worked in Soviet-operated uranium mines of Czechoslovakia were political prisoners". 21 However, forced labor is not a phenomenon only of specifically disignated forced-labor camps. It exists in collectives, also, and threatens to continue there as long as farmers have to operate under pressure. Western observers hope that there will be changes in the direction of a mixed system, so that private and public enterprise can operate side by side and satisfactory forms of land tenure sought as in Israel, Mexico, India, Yugoslavia, and Poland. An agricultural system based on freedom and justified self-interest without the parasitism of either the idle rich or the idle poor must be worked out according to the particular needs of each individual country. Hilaire Belloc, in his work, An Essay of the Restoration of Property,22 does not see much hope for the restoration of private property, since such an attempt is "too late" in a modern society "with the use of machinery and rapidity of communication", even though Belloc, in an apparent attempt to develop mixed enterprise, suggests that it may be possible "to reestablish the peasant, the craftsman and the small (and scarce) retail tradesman". Yet he seems to be pessimistic when he states that "we have lost our economic freedom and it is impossible to recover it". Belloc cannot be taken seriously, after Czechoslovakia's experience, when he makes the following proposition: Since there must be monopoly, and since the mass of men must be slaves of monopoly, let us at least put monopoly into the hands of the state and not leave it to a few millionares.23 But economic welfare, if it does exist, would not provide the complete answer to human needs. Dr. Alois Rozehnal writes that "Commu20

From Czech translation, Modracek, ibid, p. 78. U.S. House of Representatives, Report No. 2684, Part 14, Communist Takeover and Occupation of Czechoslovakia, December 31 (1954), p. 26; published originally by The Distributive League, 1936, pp. 39, 41. 22 London, Distributive League, 1936, pp. 39, 41. 23 Rozehnal, Alois, Unfulfilled Promises (Rome, Italy, Accademia Cristiana Cecoslovacca, 1960). 21

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V. E. Andic

nism, however successful it may be in producing rockets or infantry divisions, is in human terms a failure. Communism will remain a failure even with an increasing standard of living." 24 Furthermore, Henry George, author of Progress and Poverty,23 does not consider it imperative to take land away from individual proprietor for state ownership; he proposes, instead, a tax on surplus. Others, like Flurscheim,26 propose to expand this theory to socialize surplus profit and surplus interest as well. Henry George's policy of private use of public property or public use of private property (through taxation) would allow the individual to enjoy a normal rent as a reward for his work, while, at the same time, society would also benefit.27 In the United States, family farming, which has served as an example to many nations, resulted in unprecedented productivity, surpassing the achievements of any other system. Family farming is a personal rather than an impersonal concept. To consider land as a mere means of production of the same order as a boring drill or a machine, or to consider a farm in impersonal terms, like a plant or a shop, is the Achilles heel of MarxismLeninism, as well as of Stalinism and Khrushchevism. Land is a quite unique and organic entity. Reports have circulated in Czechoslovak publications of grain or potatoes rotting in the field, of unharvested fruits, or fruits not reaching the market while there are acute shortages. Both production and distribution in an agricultural system are matters of personal care. Elements of nature and biological factors make it impossible for a farm to be run like, factory. Workable solutions must be sought, rather than enforcement of unworkable dogmas about public monopolies. Economic reasons lead us to believe, however, that no reasonable person thinks of returning to the cultivation of narrow strips of land, in conformity with the dogmas of absolute private property. "Increase in the efficiency of the family farm based neither on individual enterprise nor on the kolkhoz system must be carefully tested", is the considered and well-taken conclusion of an Indian observer of Czechoslovak agriculture.28 24

Public monopoly in Czechoslovakia led to a deterioration of consumption, as is evidenced by the table following the text of this article. 25 Fiftieth Anniversary Edition (New York, Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, 1942). 20 Flurscheim, Michael, Rent, Interest and Wages, 3d. Ed. (London, 1895). 27 An example what can be done with a surplus is provided by the Rochdale pioneers and their principles for distribution of the "surplus". 28 Farming Cooperatives in Czechoslovakia, a study published in the Indian Cooperative Review, July-September (1953), p. 209.

Agriculture

Since the Second World War

445

IV. STATISTICAL DATA IN SUPPORT OF INDICATED TRENDS Acreage of agricultural land, especially cultivated land, is decreasing, while that of non-agricultural land is increasing, as seen in the following data: 2 9 In 1,000 ha Total area Agricultural land Cultivated land Non-agricultural land Undetermined area

1934-1938

1960

1962™

12,781 7,756 5,602 4,926 99

12,787 7,327 5,131 5,460

12,787 7,296 5,120 5,491

—

—

Change in main crop yields (in hectares of areas sown) 3 1 Increase Barley Corn Rape & mustard Poppy Flax Sugar beets Fodder plants

1934

1960

652,680 105,223 4,836 13,824 14,610 165,946 896,368

707,099 194,848 39,406 21,698 52,813

Decrease Wheat Rye Oats Potatoes Edible legumes Fodder root crops

1,187,059

Change in consumption per inhabitant Food Milk Milk products Cereal (total) Rye flour Bread Potatoes Edible legumes Meat (total) Fat and oils Butter 29 30 31 32

Unit of measure litre kg kg kg kg kg kg kg kg kg

1934

1960

882,444 983,327 748,461 714,769 35,869

651,568 431,133 504,045 569,033 24,207

157,274

93,506

32

Increase 1960 1936

Decrease 1960 1936 159.1 205.4 170.8 53.0 84.7 118.9 4.0

34.0 14.1 4.9

108.6 173.0 167.3 34.2 71.8 100.3 1.3

56.8 19.3 6.1

Statistical Yearbook of the Czechoslovak Republic (Prague, 1961), p. 218. Statistical Abstract (Orbis, Prague), 1963. Ibid, 1957, p. 120; 1958, p. 200; 1959, p. 232; 1960, p. 225; 1961, p. 244. Statistical Yearbook (1961), p. 389.

V. E.

446

Andic

Distribution agricultural land Sector Total* Socialist sector State (farms) sector Collectives, type III & IV Private sector, incl. I & II type Private plots

1955 7,414 3,108 1,149 1,842 4,139

*

Unfarmed land included in the total.

«

Ibid, 1961, p. 239.

1960 7,327 6,393 1,490 4,548 861

(in 1,000

hectares)33 arable land 1955 5,156 2,224 736 1,399 2,881

1960 5,131 4,657 996 3,403 463

The New Economic System in Czechoslovakia

JAN MICHAL

On October 17, 1964 the official newspaper of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Rudé právo, published a long article of approximately 8,000 words, entitled "Draft Principles to Improve the Planned Management of National Economy." 1 It was the blueprint of a new economic system, which can be described as a market socialism of a specific Czechoslovak type. The "Draft Principles" and the theoretical articles of some prominent members of the Central Committee of the Party, including one of the main authors of the new system, Professor Ota Sik,2 made it clear that Czechoslovakia was facing the most sweeping change of basic economic concepts and institutions that has ever been carried out by any East European country which had relied hitherto on central planning of the Soviet type. At the end of January 1965, the Central Committee of the Communist Party approved the new system. Its decision was published in another lengthy article in Rudé právo of January 30, 1965. Some of the most startling statements concerning the importance of market forces and the inefficiency of central planning have been watered down, and new sections on the importance of an economic plan and of the observance of the Party maxims have been inserted, probably to make the new economic system politically more palatable to the Party leaders. But the basic new economic principle has been maintained - namely, to substitute "planned management" (that is, indirect planning through the market) for the previous "administrative planning" (that is, centralized command what to produce, how to produce, and for whom to produce). Most of the central rigid plans of output and investment are 1 The original title is: "O návrhu zásad zdokonalení plánovitého rízení národního hospodáíství." In Czech, a distinction is now made between "plánovité rízení", which means "indirect planning" (mainly through credit policy) and "plánování", which means the rigid central plans based on material balances. 2 Ota Sik, "Problémy nové soustavy plánovitého fízení", Nova mysl, No. 10 (October 1964), pp. 1165-80.

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Jan Michal

supposed to be replaced by decentralized decisions of managers of individual enterprises and trusts; 3 the managers are supposed to make optimum input and output decisions by reacting mainly to flexible prices; and most prices are supposed to reflect, at least to some degree, changing supply and demand conditions on the market. After the Communist Party - which remains the leading political force - had reluctantly, but unequivocally, accepted the new economic principles, the government apparatus started to translate them into legal norms. On the basis of the Economic Code No. 109/1964 of the Collection of Laws (Sbirka zakonu Ceskoslovenske socialisticke republiky), the State Planning Commission issued in June 1965 its "Methodical Directives for Elaborating the State Plan of Developing the National Economy" under No. 55/1965 of the Collection of Laws. It is noteworthy that a great deal of the "indicators of the plan" is, in fact, market research studies; that the plan will be computed in terms of 1966 prices coming somewhat closer to the relative scarcities, whereas until now, the official prices deviated dramatically from both the pattern of cost and the pattern of the planners' preferences. On the other hand, some economically dubious methods, such as expressing volume of output also in terms of gross value, are being retained. The most important norm which will determine the actual application of the new economic principles (vladni vyhla§ka o planovitem rizeni narodniho hospodafstvi), was published only after the completion of this article (on September 23, 1965, No. 90/1965 of the collections of Laws). My paper will endeavor to achieve the following three objectives: 1. To inquire into the present state of the Czechoslovak economy, which obviously has made such a revolutionary change of the economic system necessary, in spite of political and ideological objections. 2. To describe the economic discussion which preceded the publication of "Draft Principles" and other norms, and to outline the new system, as it appears to be taking shape while this article is being written (Summer 1965). 3. To examine the chances for success of the new economic system. I In a paper submitted to the first Congress of Czechoslovak Society of Arts and Sciences in America 1962,4 I argued that the official index of 3 4

In Czech, "oborove podniky." Jan M. Michal, "Problems of Measuring Industrial Output in Czechoslovakia",

The New Economic System in Czechoslovakia

449

Czechoslovak industrial output, based on gross value of production, has an upward bias and that the net product of, or income originating in, industry was increasing more slowly than is indicated by the official index. However, industrial growth alone, even if measured in terms of "net product", cannot be used to assess the economic performance of a country. "Industry" as defined by Czechoslovak statistics is only one sector of the national economy; it has been a privileged sector, enjoying most of the inputs in both labor and capital. Most other sectors, especially agriculture, have achieved a much less spectacular rate of growth. Only the whole national product or income at constant prices can serve as an approximative measure of over-all economic growth. In the case of Czechoslovakia, there are, unfortunately, some specific difficulties involved in such an approach, because the official Czechoslovak definition of national income, in contrast to the usual Western definition, covers only the so-called "productive sectors" (industry, construction, agriculture, forestry, freight transportation, and some other minor sectors). It excludes the so-called "non-productive services" (passenger transportation; cleaners, barbers, and similar "communal services"; research, health and cultural services; administration and justice; a part of banking, etc.). On the other hand, the official Czechoslovak national income data include a great part of the "turn-over tax" (a very heavy and very discriminatory excise tax) which, under the Western method of computing national income, would be considered a mere transfer. In spite of these peculiarities of the official Czechoslovak computation of national income, it seems justifiable to use the official figures as an indication of an approximative trend of economic growth.5-8 in M. Rechcigl, Jr. (Ed.), The Czechoslovak Contribution to World Culture (The Hague, Mouton & Co., 1964), pp. 373-78. 5 For 1948-1963, based on Table 1-4, Statisticka rocenka Ceskoslovenske socialisticke republiky, Prague, 1964, p. 42; For 1964, based on a statement by E. Loebl in Kulturny zivot, No. 30 (July, 1965), that the national income in 1964 "remained on the same level as in 1963" presumably in constant prices). 6 My approximation of the index of the Czechoslovak Gross National Product at constant prices - Jan M. Michal, Central Planning in Czechoslovakia (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1960), p. 229 - is as follows: 1948 1953 1957 66 100 133 This corresponds to a compound annual rate of 61% over the nine-year period, as above. During the same period, the official Czechoslovak national income index shows a compound annual rate of growth of slightly over 8%. Another, rather detailed, Western estimate of Czechoslovak national aggregates by Alton, et al. - Thad Paul Alton and Vaclav Holesovsky, Gregor Lazarcik, Paul D. Sivak, Alexej Wynnyczuk, Czechoslovak National Income and Product, 1947-1948 and

450

Jan

Michal

Annual Increase in National Income at Constant in percent

Prices Plan

Average 1948-1958

1959

1960

1961

8

6

8

7

1962 1

1963 -2

1964 0

The dramatic slowing-down in the growth of real national income in recent years is obvious. In 1963, national income has, in fact, decreased in comparison with 1962. What is important is not only the rate of economic growth itself, but also the way it has been achieved. T h e main source of growth of the Czechoslovak national product has been an increasing mobilization of economic resources. The labor force grew, not only because of the natural increase in population, but also because of more employment of w o m e n and because of other methods used to achieve more extensive participation of the population in the labor force. A t the same time, longer hours have apparently been worked in Czechoslovakia than in most Western European countries or in North America. Yet, the really dramatic increase was brought about in the input of capital. In 1956, for instance, the Czechoslovak rate of investment amounted to well over one-third of the gross national product (under Western definition) 7 and was therefore twice as high as in the 1955-1956 (New York, Columbia University Press, 1962) - cannot be used for checking Czechoslovakia's rate of growth, because Alton does not deflate his figures to a constant price base. Most recently, a third Western computation of national accounts for Czechoslovakia has been published by Professor Boris P. PeSek. PeSek's figures suggest almost the same average growth rate for the nine years from 1948 to 1957 as this author's estimates - slightly over 6% per year, that is, one-fourth less than the average annual growth claimed by the official Czechoslovak national income statistics for that period. In several respects, however, PeSek's computations are substantially different from Alton's and this author's estimates. 7 Alton, et al. estimated the gross investment rate in 1956 as 39% of GNP (op. cit., p. 68) and, alternatively, as 35.9% of GNP (op. cit., p. 235). Pesek's above-mentioned estimates of national accounts for Czechoslavkia suggest a substantially lower investment rate. In terms of an adjusted current price, this is obviously due to the underration of investments because of low, subsidized prices of investment goods, and to overration of consumption, because of the extremely high incidence of the turnover tax on consumer goods prices. But even in terms of 1948 prices (which are used by PeSek as a constant price base and which are supposed to reflect factor costs) Pesek's implied gross investment rate (approximately one-fifth of his GNP figure) is, in this author's opinion, unduly low. In terms of real cost, substantially more than one-fifth of GNP may have been used in Czechoslovakia for investment during the central planning era, as covered in PeSek's study.

The New Economic System in Czechoslovakia

451

United States and approximately 50% higher than in the booming West Germany. This situation was not substantially different in other years of the central planning era. The corollary of this extremely high investment rate in Czechoslovakia has been a depressed rate of personal consumption. It is obvious that there is a limit to fast-increasing inputs of labor, capital and natural resources. Once these limits of mobilizing factors have been reached, further economic growth can be sustained only by increasing national productivity. It would go beyond the scope of this paper to discuss to what extent an increase in national productivity depends on improved quality of factors, on one hand (better trained labor, or better technology as far as capital assets are concerned), and on greater efficiency of allocation, on the other. For the purpose of this paper, I will simply state that allocational efficiency seems to have been substantially worsening under comprehensive central planning in Czechoslovakia. Labor, fixed capital (the so-called zakladni fondy or "basic funds"), raw materials, and intermediate products have been allocated to purposes where returns, in terms of useful output, have been extremely low, sometimes even zero. Such an absolute waste of resources occurred, for instance, in connection with investment projects which were abandoned after the investment of billions of Kcs, representing millions of hours worked and a great amount of capital goods. In other instances, the input was not commensurate with the results. A well-known Slovak author, Ladislav Mnacko, has described vividly the unbelievably high cost of the construction of a textile factory which ultimately is converted into a metal foundry, although the buildings are unsuitable for such a purpose.8 Another almost absolute waste of economic resources has been the output of products which, mainly because of technical faults and low quality, are unsaleable at the price fixed by the planners, and almost unsaleable at any price. One of the chief planners, Oldfich Cernik, has been reported to say that from 1960 through 1963, accumulated inventories of unsaleable goods amounted to 24.6 billion Kcs. Another example of the inefficient use of national economic resources is the Czechoslovak foreign trade. Instead of achieving a net return on such trade, the Czechoslovak economy has to pay a net subsidy. 9 ' 10 Ladislav Mnaiko, Opozdene reportdze (Prague, Ceskoslovensky Spisovatel, 1964), Story "Diar", pp. 127-41. 9 According to my rough estimate, such a "net foreign trade subsidy" amounted to 7-9 billion K£s in 1957 (Michal, op. cit., p. 132). Unless if this estimate is too inaccurate it means that approximately 5% of the Czechoslovak GNP was

8

452

Jan Michal

Section I, "Inevitability of Basic Changes", of the Draft Principles leaves no doubt that the above-mentioned misallocations of resources are the main difficulty which has bedeviled Czechoslovak economy under central planning of the Soviet type. It stated inter alia: "The present economic system does not create sufficient incentives for a steady improvement of the utility of products . . . It does not secure the necessary conditions for a continuous, flexible change in output structure . . . In the field of foreign trade, we were faced with . . . the inevitability of selling some of our goods at an increasing disadvantage." The new economic system seeks to do away with the most flagrant misallocation of resources by introducing a far-reaching decentralization of economic decision-making and by trying to bring the pattern of prices closer to the pattern of buyers' preferences. This major switch from rigidly centralized planning to a substantial reliance on market forces came as a surprise even to such an expert on East European economic affairs as Professor Montias of Yale University who, in an otherwise well-informed article about the economic troubles of Czechoslovakia, stated, as late as in April 1964, that "the institutional reforms so far initiated are all clearly aimed at a tightening of central controls." 11 Before discussing the basic functions of the new system, it seems worthwhile to point out two things in connection with the now openly admitted waste of resources. First, in the available estimates of Czechoslovak national aggregates, hardly any correction has been made for the useless, or almost useless, output. As far as I know, there are four recent estimates of Czechoslovak national income and/or product: the official one, which, except for index numbers, was withheld from publication until 1964; Alton's estimate, published in 1962; my own approximation, published in 1960; and Pesek's estimate, published in 1965. Of these, Alton's estimate and my own correspond to the usual definition of Gross National Product. Pe§ek's figures exclude the imputed items (especially income in kind of the farmers, and other nonmarketable output of goods and services). "wasted" through economically inefficient foreign trade, if "efficiency" is analyzed in a static way. Sik also seems to refer to losses in international trade when he speaks about "value losses in the markets" (op. cit., p. 1171). 10 A survey of economic inefficiencies which led to the "economic crisis" in Czechoslovakia can be found in two articles by Professor Vaclav Holesovsky, "Czechoslovakia's Economic Quandary", East Europe No. 11 (1964), pp. 7-13, and "Czechoslovakia's Economic Debate", East Europe, No. 12 (1964), pp. 13-19. 11 John M. Montias, "A Plan for all Seasons: Second Thoughts on the Czech Economy", Survey (London, April 1964), p. 75.

The New Economic System in Czechoslovakia

453

The official National Income aggregate is, in fact, net material product in market prices; it excludes by definition the output of the so-called nonproductive services, such as passenger transportation, cultural services, barbers, cleaners, and other communal and state services to households. For the most recent year for which Alton's estimate is available (1956), these computations compare as follows: In Billion KCs, at Current Market Prices (1956) Official Estimate National income under Marxist definition (after partial adjustment for transfers through turnover tax) Sum of adjustments to make aggregates comparable with Western definition of GNP GNP

Alton

Michal

Pesek

129

129.1

162.1

35 164

139*

* This figure is not comparable with Michal's and Alton's estimate because of narrower coverage. Sources: Statistika, July 1964; Alton, Paul Thad, et al., Czechoslovak National Income and Product, 1947-1948 and 1955-1956, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 60; Michal, Jan M., Central Planning in Czechoslovakia (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1960), p. 231; PeSek, Boris P., Gross National Product of Czechoslovakia in Monetary and Real Terms, 1946-58 (The University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 31.

There is, however, one thing which all the above estimates have in common: They all include the output of unsaleable products, of investment goods wasted through unfinished projects, etc.12 In other words, they reflect only cost expended, and not the utility of output of final goods, even if the latter is measured against the scale of preferences of the planners themselves. Unless adjustment is made for the great gap between higher social cost and lower social utility of aggregate output, all the past estimates of national income and product cannot be linked with future data. Yet, it will be necessary to make past and future data somewhat comparable, in order to try to assess the efficiency of the new system. It also is noteworthy that rigid central planning seems to have pro12

I tried, however, to adjust my estimate of GNP for the net foreign trade subsidy. Michal, op. cit., p. 235, Table 10. 9.

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Jan Michal

duced worse results in Czechoslovakia than in most other East European countries. There are of course, many possible reasons for this, such as managerial dissatisfaction with the official red tape,13 dissatisfaction of the workers with more or less stationary real wages, dissatisfaction of all consumers with the poor quality of products and with local, and some specific general, bottlenecks in supply, and many psychological factors. Other difficulties arise because of neglected maintenance and modernization of capital assets, especially in the consumers' goods industries, housing, etc. But perhaps the most important reason for the near-collapse of rigid central planning in Czechoslovakia is the fact that "material balances" of the Soviet type tend to become more economically wasteful, the more developed and diversified the economy. From this point of view, rigid central planning of output is bound to be exposed to greater strains and stresses in highly industrialized countries, such as Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and possibly also the U.S.S.R. itself, than in such countries as Bulgaria, Rumania or China. My next task will be to outline the attempts to improve allocational efficiency of Czechoslovakia's economy.

n For many years, planners and economists in Czechoslovakia criticized the distortions of "wholesale prices" through indirect taxes and subsidies; they argued that "state wholesale prices" (disregarding the distorting effects of an extremely heavy and discriminatory turnover tax in retail prices) should reflect "value", or "real cost"; on March 14, 1956, the government issued a directive that wholesale prices should be determined, in principle, by the enterprises' own cost of production. (Under "value" or "cost", only direct and indirect labor cost and depreciation charges were allowed for; no allowance was made for any rate of interest on fixed capital assets.) But all these attempts to rationalize somewhat the pattern of wholesale prices disregarded the following important condition of (static) economic optimization: a rational pattern of input prices (and, therefore, of cost of production) should reflect the relative scarcities of inputs; a relatively scarce input should be relatively high-priced and a relatively abundant input relatively low-priced in order to induce substitution of 13 This was also ably described by Mnacko, op. cit., stories "Diaf" and "Slavnost".

The New Economic System in Czechoslovakia

455

abundant inputs for scarce inputs. Only in this way can the (static) cost of a given amount of output be minimized, or, in reverse, the output obtained from a given amount of input be maximized. But an input material is "scarce" or "abundant" only in relation to the desirability of the final products it helps to produce. In other words, a rational cost and price pattern must allow for the interaction of both supply and demand.14 Until 1963, hardly any economist in Czechoslovakia dared, however, to discuss demand functions, probably for fear that such a discussion might have conflicted with the Marxist theory of value15, or interpreted as questioning the infallible wisdom of the central planners who determined the pattern of both intermediate products (which are one of the input categories) and final products. A tour de force occurred in November 1963, when Hospodarske noviny published a discussion entitled "Against Dogmatism, to Promote Creative Economic Science." 16 One of the discussants, Radomir Selucky (Professor at the Prague College of Technology) stated: "The law of supply and demand must be decisive for the pattern of output of consumer goods and also, in the long run, for the structure of the whole economy . . . I would like anyone to explain our foreign exchange situation on the basis of the Marxist theory of value. It cannot be explained on the basis of the Marxist value theory because this theory is irrational . . . a price system has been created which is not economically justifiable . . . ." One of the other participants, Zdenek Haba of Bratislava University, emphasized that collectivization and nationalization should not be regarded as ends in themselves. Karel Kouba of the Party College in Prague advocated the publication of translations of the works of Keynes, Leontief (obviously Wassily Leontief, who is a Professor of Economics at Harvard), and Oscar Lange.17 Meanwhile, the Czech translation of 14 Demand does not necessarily involve consumers' sovereignty. Demand functions can be based on any combination of planners' and consumers' scales of preferences. 15 It is not the purpose of this paper to examine whether a price system which is based on interaction of supply and demand must necessarily conflict with the Marxist system, how ever interpreted. There seems to be no inherent conflict between a rational system of supply and demand functions and some Marxist macroeconomic theorems. 18 "Proti dogmatismu a za tvorivy rozvoj ekonomicke vedy", Hospodarske noviny, Prague, November 8 and November 15, 1963. 17 It is very likely that what Kouba had in mind were not only the more recent works of this chief Polish planner, but also Lange's prewar book, which he published while still teaching at the University of Chicago and which is a blueprint for a decentralized socialist economy: Oscar Lange and Fred M. Taylor, On the Economic Theory of Socialism (University of Minnesota Press, 1938).

456

Jan Michal

Keynes' General Theory has actually been published - twenty-eight years after the English original appeared. Its message is, of course, that depressions and unemployment which used to recur regularly under market systems can be smoothed out by government action (through fiscal and monetary policies) without any necessity for a comprehensive central planning of output. Since November 1963, several Western macroeconomic and microeconomic theorems which used to be stigmatized as "bourgeois formalism" have become respectable again. Among the host of recent articles. 1 will quote from just one which tried to popularize some aspects of Western economic thought in a nontechnical way: Miroslav Rumler's Marxian Economics and Bourgeois Economic Theories, published in June 1964.18 Rumler states inter alia: ". . . The majority of Marxist economists agree that some bourgeois economic theorems are of importance to elaborate on the Marxist economic theorems. . . . It is absolutely necessary to get rid of any feeling of superiority or dogmatism in relation to bourgeois economics. . . . We often found a so-called mistake where there was a rational nucleus of a bourgeois economic concept." He then discusses Keynesian income equilibrium, the theory of imperfect competition, citing Chamberlin and Joan Robinson, Galbraith's Affluent Society, and growth models of Harrod, Domar, and Leontief. It is also noteworthy that Rumler referred to the argument of the Polish economist, Brus, that a socialist economy should observe marginal analysis and that it should not wholly disregard consumers' sovereignty. Several events in the summer and fall of 1964 indicated that theoretical economists may have convinced Czechoslovak central planners, as well as the reluctant Party and Government, that the only way out of their economic mess would be a substantial shift towards a decentralized, competitive economy. For instance, in June 1964, the Czechoslovak State Planning Commission "exchanged opinions with the Yugoslav Institute for Economic Planning on methods of planning and various economic questions".19 Yugoslavia has, of course, the most decentralized economic system of all Communist countries. In November 1964, Czechoslovakia submitted proposals to lower the import duties within the framework of the so-called Kennedy round of tariff negotiations at GATT. 20 It was the only East European country which indi18 Miroslav Rumler, teorie", Veda a zivot, 19 Rude prdvo, July 20 New York Times,

"Marxisticka politicka ekonomie a burzoasni ekonomicke June, 1964. pp. 334-9. 18 (1964). November 17 (1964).

The New Economic System in Czechoslovakia

457

cated its desire to liberalize its foreign trade with the GATT members in this way. The most important (implicit, and, in part, also explicit) acceptance of at least some features of the neoclassical competitive model can be traced, however, in the "Draft Principles" themselves, as may be evident in the following quotations (with my own comments in parentheses): "All workers' remunerations (pay of workmen, employees, managers) should be financed with revenue from actual sales. (Hitherto, the pay, especially that of managers, was geared to the fulfillment of output plans in quantity or gross value terms, irrespective of actual sales, and to some additional, often contradictory, indicators of economic success.) An enterprise should contribute a predetermined portion of its income to the formation of the financial resources of the State (which boils down to taxing the enterprise's gross income). The following methods will be tested: Inducing the enterprise to be primarily interested in the gross income (according to the Czech definition, gross income is actually value added on the enterprise level, that is, the sum of wages, salaries, interest, rent, and profit; such a method approaches the Yugoslav method). Also, inducing the enterprise to be primarily interested in profit development (this method would have some features in common with the Liberman proposal in the USSR), and, in the field of public utilities, in lowering its own cost of output (obviously, the authors of the "Draft Principles" are aware that competitive pricing is impossible in public utilities which are faced with diminishing unit cost)." "The total cost of an enterprise will be covered by its own cash revenue from the realized (i.e., actually sold) output. After deducting the cost of material, labor, depreciation, and transportation, the enterprise will be left with the gross income (or, in Western terms, value added, or net product). From this, the enterprise will have to finance its interest on basic funds (that is, interest on existing fixed capital - one of the revolutionary innovations of the 'Draft Principles'), interest on, and amortization of, (short-term) credit, its own investment, and its contribution to the State. The balance will constitute the fund for workers' remunerations . . . . Thus, the enterprise will be impelled - not by administrative order, but by economic pressure - to produce, in its own interest, only those goods which are in demand . . . . Furthermore, the funds for remuneration of workers will grow if the material costs are lowered. . . . Under the assumption that prices will reflect social cost,

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the enterprises, while endeavoring to maximize their fund of remuneration, will choose a more and more efficient pattern of output and cost. . . . " After having mentioned briefly the danger of speculative price hikes (and the resulting inflationary pressure, as discussed in the last part of my paper), the "Draft Principles" describe the function of prices in the following terms: "The new function of price as an economic tool will make it necessary to change the price relations in such a way as to make them reflect the socially necessary cost of production 21 and - with some qualifications - the interaction between supply and demand. . . . Our price policy should not disregard the price relations on the world markets. What is important is to allow the price movements to divert the enterprises from producing old, inefficient products to new, better types. . . ." "The following categories of prices should be set up: fixed prices, set by central organs for basic raw materials and labor on the wholesale level and for the basic necessities of life on the retail level; limit prices for standardized products with the upper limit, and sometimes the lower limit as well, and free prices, depending only on an agreement between supplier and buyer . . . . The new price system should make it possible for the authorities to control the price level, and to use advantages of flexible prices. . . ." Here, the authors of the new economic model seem not to realize fully the inherent conflict between the objectives of stability of the price level on one hand, and flexibility of prices and full employment, on the other (unless we assume the unattainable, economically ideal world of pure and perfect competition, with no questions asked as to the social justice of the resulting degree of inequality in income distribution.) Nor do the authors of the new Czechoslovak economic model fully spell out the possible conflict between the aim of short-term allocational efficiency, short-term improvement in quality of products, and other short-term optimization which can supposedly be brought about by a greater reliance on more competitive markets, and the long-term objectives of economic growth. However, the new model allows implicitly for such a conflict by introducing two basic categories of investment: the so-called "development investments", decided upon by central planners and financed through the State budget, and "branch and enterprise investments", decided upon by the managers of trusts and individual 21

Cost includes the explicit rate of interest; thus, the orthodox labor theory of value has been tacitly abandoned.

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enterprises, and financed by the enterprise or by bank credit. As to the centralized investments, the "Draft Principles" stress that they should be undertaken only "after having been compared with similar actions abroad". Here, and in the whole field of international trade, a closer link between domestic and world economic conditions is being envisaged. This is certainly a laudable effort, but one must wonder again whether the reformers in Czechoslovakia are fully aware of the possibility of conflict between optimum domestic equilibrium, on one hand, and external (balance-of-payments) equilibrium, on the other. In spite of all these possible conflicts of objectives, and in spite of some inconsistancies in the new model, the "Draft Principles", as well as the resolution of the Central Committee of the Party of January, 1965, emphasize very rightly the need to do away with the tremendous waste of resources in a static sense. As I have argued before, microeconomic misallocations definitely seem to be the weakest spot of Czechoslovakia's economy at the present time. It is noteworthy that the new Czechoslovak economic system is somewhat different from "Libermanism" and other proposals of the Soviet economists to revise the Soviet economic system. Even if Professor Liberman considers "profit" to be the most meaningful, comprehensive indicator of economic success, he wants to maintain the far-reaching control of central planning authorities over the price system. The decisions of the managers of socialist enterprises would thus still reflect the preferences of the planners (rather than the preferences of all the buyers on the market) in response to centrally fixed prices. The new Czechoslovak system comes closer to a genuine market economy. Professor Sik, in his article "Nova soustava planovitehe rizeni hospodarstvi" in Otazky miru a socialismu, No 3/1965, emphasized the importance of "market mechanism" and of flexible prices, which should reflect changing supply and demand conditions. Centrally planned prices are to be fixed only for very basic commodities and products. Let us now consider the prospect that the new, more competitive economic model will improve Czechoslovakia's economic performance under the present circumstances. in Although the basic principles of a decentralized market socialism were approved by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, it is not yet certain that they will be fully implemented. There are many reasons why such an implementation seems to be difficult to achieve.

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Those who are not familiar with microeconomics may not understand what the new system is really getting at. Central planners may resent losing their position of power. Many other Party members, from managers and leading administrators down to foremen, who achieved their positions because of "political reliability" rather than ability, may fear competition with their more able peers. Party leaders may fear that decentralization of economic power may lead to decentralization of political power as well. Dogmatic ideologists may claim that the new system tends to weaken the dictatorship of the proletariat. Others Communists and non-Communists alike - may feel that economic competition tends to create recklessness and selfishness. (In fact, without a good deal of compassion and honesty, stemming from religion, humanitarianism, or some other belief in a higher ethic, a competitive market economy would hardly be a satisfactory socio-economic system.) Philosophers may point out that competition does not help to overcome man's feeling of loneliness. (Not being economists, they would not understand that, "ideal cooperation" may, in reality, result in mutual support of inefficient ways of production and, thus, in unnecessary poverty.) And there is, of course, an continual conflict between material and spiritual needs. It is far beyond the scope of this paper to try to examine all the political, sociological, and ideological aspects of the proposed change in Czechoslovakia. My task, and my ability to present a hopefully meaningful discussion, are limited to the field of economics. From the purely economic point of view, the conditions necessary for the smooth operation of the new economic system are similar to those without which no market economy can work satisfactorily. The most important among these prerequisites are set forth below. (a) There must be sufficient workable competition in the economy. Otherwise, the whole system of checks and balances upon which a decentralized economy is based would be illusory. With relatively few exceptions, the buyers must have an opportunity to choose among several sellers of the commodity in question, and must be free to buy from the lowest bidder. On the other hand, producers must be free to sell to the highest bidder. In this way, the drive of producers to maximize profit (or "gross revenue", as suggested by Sik), and the drive of buyers to derive the greatest possible satisfaction from the given expenditure 22 would serve as a check upon each other. 22

If the commodity in question is an intermediate good and the buyer is, therefore, another enterprise, the drive to make expenditure most efficient coincides, of course, with the material cost-minimizing and gross-income maximizing rules under the system proposed by Sik.

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However, modern technology makes it necessary that the some commodities must be produced on a large scale if the industry is to be efficient. In some industries - especially in a small country - there is room for only a very few large productive units, with a resulting monopolistic power over the price of the product. Furthermore, monopolistic power may be promoted, under the new Czechoslovak system, for institutional reasons. The specific problems of imperfect competition are discussed under (d). (b) There must be an appropriate degree of flexibility in the price system. O n one hand, sudden wide swings in price, because of speculation, may be harmful. However, changing prices must be allowed to serve as signals between producers and buyers, if "indirect planning" is to replace the rigid, wasteful administrative orders about what to produce. For instance, if a new invention makes it possible to produce a given commodity at lower cost, competition between producers should bring down the corresponding price and thus signal to the buyers that they should substitute this commodity for those which cannot be produced so efficiently. On the other hand, if the real cost of production goes up substantially, this should be reflected in a higher price, to discourage unnecessary use of the commodity in question. If the buyers want substantially more of a commodity, relative to other goods, the increase in price of this commodity should flash like a signal throughout the economy to attract more resources to its production. Likewise, the price of a decreasingly sought-after commodity should fall. From this point of view, even the proposed "fixed prices" should be changed if there is a great shift in cost or demand functions. (c) There must be no severe inflationary pressures (severe deflationary pressures seem to be unlikely under the present conditions in Czechoslovakia). A n inflation of the price level may be due, not only to the so-called demand-pull inflation (which is usually combined with an unduly high increase in money supply through the banking system), but also to the so-called cost-push inflation. The latter type may become a special danger in Czechoslovakia, as is discussed in the next paragraph (d). In any case, inflation is a highly psychological phenomenon. If most people expect the price level to go up, it will go up, because buyers will buy more in spite of an initial increase of price, since they expect the price to go up even more; and a higher price will not induce the producers to supply more. On the contrary, they may reduce market supplies until the expected additional price increase

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takes place. 23 Expectations of a continuous price increase may be rather strong in Czechoslovakia, on the basis of past experience. A t the same time, the propensity to consume has been pushed to a very high level, and the propensity to save to a very low one, by the two postwar currency reforms which involved the confiscation of most private savings. All this makes inflationary pressures rather dangerous. (d) If enterprises are induced to maximize "gross income", the resulting situation may resemble what is called in the West a bilateral monopoly. The management may agree to grant wage increases above increases in productivity of labor, in exchange for the workers support of price increases. If the product in question is a basic commodity, such a price hike will spread throughout the economy. 24 The resulting costpush inflation is difficult to cure by monetary measures. If the central bank reduces money supply, the result may not be a constraint on further price and wage increases, but rather a falling aggregate demand in real terms, which tends to create unemployment. The above-described situation seems to be one of the main reasons why the Yugoslav economy has been plagued by severe inflation, as well as by substantial unemployment. (e) The "Draft Principles" suggest that monopolistic price increases can be combatted by increased imports. This may, of course, create a great excess of imports over exports. Such an import surplus must be financed either out of foreign exchange and gold reserves, or by foreign credits. Reserves of convertible foreign exchange and gold seem to be very low in Czechoslovakia right now, so the possibility of battling inflation and monopoly by increased imports depends very much on foreign credits. A s a matter of fact, the success or failure of the new system, at least in the short run, may depend to a great extent on the success or failure, of the Czechoslovak government to secure sufficient credits from abroad. If such expectations exist for a longer period of time, demand would have a positive price elasticity and supply a negative one; this would destroy the assumption that flexible prices tend to provide equilibrium, as implied in the classical model in point (c) in my previous paragraph. 24 There are other possible sources of cost-push inflation. For instance, if workers in an industry with low productivity increase demand the same pay raise as workers in industries with rapidly growing productivity, the result will be a wage-cost-push. This possibility of inflationary pressures seems not to have been fully realized by the Yugoslavs, by Sik ,and by any model which, by maximizing "gross income" rather than net revenue of the enterprise (profit), does not pay enough attention to the fact that wages are not only components of national income, but also cost on the enterprise level. 23

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(f) Finally, a decentralized market economy cannot work smoothly without a sufficient number of managers who are knowledgeable, have access to the necessary information about changing supply and demand conditions, and have the necessary enterpreneurial energy. Furthermore, buyers, whether of intermediate goods (that is, managers) or of final goods (that is, consumers and the government), must behave in a fairly rational way. From this point of view, the decentralized economy in Czechoslovakia may have a slight advantage over the Yugoslav economy. On the other hand, Yugoslavia has a genuinely decentralized agriculture, whereas in Czechoslovakia, nothing specific has been said so far about the reorganization of its inefficient agricultural sector. There will be many other economic and ideological obstacles and transitional difficulties. Yet, the economic rewards of the new system may be even greater than the economic risks involved. Czechoslovak economy may finally have a comprehensive indicator of success which will tend to cover not only the quantity, but also the quality, utility and efficiency of output. However - in Czechoslovakia, as in any other country, whether socialist or capitalist - some important economic aims, such as full employment, acceleration of economic growth, or socially acceptable distribution of income, cannot be achieved by merely relying on competitive markets. It is somewhat paradoxical that many Western economists have recently discussed certain failures of the market system in greater analytical depth than the Marxist economists in Czechoslovakia. But the new school of economic thought in Czechoslovakia is obviously willing to learn and adopt new tools of economic analysis, especially mathematical methods. This, too, may contribute to a greater degree of rationalism in the organization of Czechoslovakia's economy.

The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance: Its First Fifteen Years HUGO M. SKALA

A discussion of the evolution and operation of the institutional arrangements by which the economy of Communist nations has been coordinated is useful for the study of the economic development of Czechoslovakia. The aim of this paper is to analyze available information and to discuss changes in the development of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, known also as COMECON or C.E.M.A. While a general knowledge of the ideological background of the Communist economy by the reader is assumed, a few issues pertinent to the topic of this paper do bear mentioning: (1) To quote Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov (Nikolai Lenin), the man responsible for the ideology and tactics of the Russian Revolution and Soviet economic planning: "The whole of society will have become one office and one factory." 1 ". . . After the revolution, dictatorship of the proletariat constitutes the transition to the abolition of all classes and to a classless society." 2 Any existence of more than one Communist nation was never contemplated. No international problems among Communist nations were foreseen. (2) Joseph Stalin emphasized as the permanent policy of every Communist nation the development of heavy industry and full selfsufficiency.3 This policy was defended by Khrushchev up to 1955, in opposition to Malenkov's "more goods for consumers" program.4 (3) While Ricardo's theory of value was accepted by the Commu1 V. I. Lenin, State and Revolution (New York, International Publishers, 1932), p. 84. 2 Marx-Engels Selected Correspondence (New York, International Publishers, 1935), p. 57. 3 "Comecon Progress Report", The Economist, Vol. CXCL, No. 6038 (London, May 16, 1959), pp. 639-640. 4 Zbigniew M. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, Unity and Conflict, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1960).

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nists, no heed was paid to his principle of national specialization in accordance with its relative advantage. (4) Khrushchev formulated the relations between Communist nations as "a genuine friendship, equal rights, fraternal cooperation and mutual assistance in the sphere of politics, economics, and culture determined by the nature of the social economic system of the countries of the socialist camp, by the unity of their fundamental interest and ultimate great aim: the building of Communism, and by the single Marx-Leninist view of the Communist and workers parties".5 Again, no basis for any practical division of labor, no use of the principle of relative advantage, no directives towards multilateral trade relations or trade organizations, were contemplated. (5) In the People's Democracies, domestic prices are never determined by the forces of supply and demand. Instead, they are set by the government in accordance with internal considerations, political as well as economic. Thus, these prices do not reflect the relative scarcity of goods and services. Neither do they represent, surprisingly, the value of labor socially necessary for their production. There are no forces to control or induce a better allocation of resources. (6) The foreign trade of the nations of the Communist Bloc is a state monopoly supervised by a Ministry and based, as far as other Communist nations are concerned, on bilateral agreements concluded in accordance with, and usually for the duration of, the current national plans. With the above introduction in mind, the history of COMECON may now be sketched. The pattern of changes in the development of COMINFORM created in 1947 cannot be overlooked. This organization was designed to reduce existing differences between the Communist nations; to ascertain certain basic common principles and programs; and to create a pattern of growth peculiar to the People's Democracies, possibly with a common goal. Tito's expulsion and political changes in the postwar period dominated U.S.S.R. policies.6 Russia tried to exploit Eastern Europe economically to achieve self-sufficiency and a buildup of its heavy industry. Russia seized hundreds of plants in countries it liberated during World War II as "German property" and as "reparation" for war damage, and brought these properties as her "contribution" into numerous "joint companies", 5

Ibid. p. 179.

6

Ibid.

pp. 59-62.

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forcing the governments of the "liberated" (though occupied) nations to contribute equal amounts of capital. Nominally equal participation, equal profit sharing, and equal control of these companies was given to the Soviets and the satellite nation. In Hungary, such companies controlled the bauxite production, petroleum refining, coal mines, electric power plants, chemistry, transportation, and banking; and in Rumania, nearly all industries, particularly petroleum production and Danube navigation. For example, in Rumania, SOVROM PETROL exploited petroleum, a joint transport company controlled shipping and harbor installations, and a SOVROM BANK financed these "joint" undertakings. The Soviets then set the policy for exploiting these most important Rumanian resources in colonial style, since the other "contracting party", the Rumanian government, was merely their straw man.7 Yugoslavia escaped from this position and revealed the real situation of such "joint companies". While Russia exploited Eastern Europe to achieve a higher degree of self-sufficiency and her own industrialization, Western Europe was being reconstructed and developed by the Marshall Plan. The rapid success of the "Organization for European Economic Cooperation" (O.E.E.C.), in which 17 nations turned the American aid program into one plan, was in direct contradiction to Stalin's prophecy of the collapse of this plan and the consequent economic dependence of the participants on aid from the United States. The need for Soviet pressure and, finally, Stalin's order of July 10, 1947, to prohibit Poland and Czechoslovakia from joining the Plan called for action. On January 25, 1949, Moscow released a communiqué announcing the creation of the "Council for Mutual Economic Assistance" by a conference comprising representatives of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and the U.S.S.R. Later, Albania, East Germany, and Outer Mongolia were to join this group. The aim was to "effect a broader economic cooperation among the countries of the People's Democracy and the U.S.S.R. on the basis of equal representation of the participating countries for the purpose of rendering each other technical assistance, mutual aid in supplying raw materials, food machinery, equipment, etc., with all decisions made only with the consent of the countries concerned." A permanent secretariat was established in Moscow. A fund of 100 million rubles (then equivalent to 20 million dollars) was created, with Russia contributing half of the 7

Nicholas Halasz, In the Shadow of Russia (New York, Ronald Press Company, 1959), p. 86.

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amount. A twenty-year agreement was signed, with the following goals: to coordinate the economy of Eastern Europe; to standardize its industrial production; and to provide mutual aid through trade, loans, exchange of experience, and investments.8 All decisions had to be unanimous and not binding until approved by the governments concerned.9 However, Stalin's principle of self-sufficiency for each Communist nation continued to create serious shortages and dislocations of scarce resources.10 Only bilateral barter agreements were signed between COMECON's members.11 The institution was of very little importance up to 1955. It collected data and exchanged information among the members, granted membership to Albania in 1949, to East Germany in 1950, and to Outer Mongolia in 1960. The other Communist nations were represented only by observers at the meetings. The slavish imitation of the Soviet economic system to the last detail was the only common goal of the members during this period.12 Until 1955, COMECON had only four meetings, all devoted to planning of programs which never materialized.13 Many Russian economists were disturbed by the "unproductive expenditure of funds and time in the solution of scientific and technical problems without any cooperation" and called for "a joint integrated approach by the Soviet Union and the other socialist nations" with the "common purpose of building Communism".14 However, COMECON produced merely a few policy declarations. Khrushchev had expected the European Common Market to collapse. When it failed to do so, an attempt was made to revitalize COMECON. Stalin's principle of the self-sufficiency of each nation was replaced by Khrushchev's idea of specialization in accordance with the natural capacities and needs of each nation.15 This changed COMECON's 8

"Council of Mutual Economic Assistance", International Organizations, Vol. 3, (Boston, Mass., May-August 1949), pp. 379, 407, and 564; B. Miroshnichenko, "Coordination of the National Economic Plans of the Socialist Countries", Voprosy ekonomiki, No. 3 (1960) quoted in Problems of Economics, Vol. Ill, 6 (October 1960), p. 48. 9 Brzezinski, op. cit., pp. 116 and 124-6. 10 Isaac Deutscher, "The Soviet Economic Common Wealth", The Reporter, July 9 (New York, 1959), #21, pp. 9-13. 11 Brzezinski, op. cit. 12 Ibid. 13 N. Siluyanov, "A New Stage in the Development of International Socialist Division of Labor", Problems of Economics, May 1959, p. 16. 14 Ibid. pp. 15-17. 15 Brzezinski, op. cit., pp. 168-172.

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activities. Session after session produced more realistic and concrete programs.16 The sixth session, held in November and December of 1955 in Budapest, initiated plans for multilateral cooperation and specialization of production of machinery. The seventh session, held in May 1956 in East Berlin, concerned itself with raw material and resources problems and long-run economic planning. A commission to study collaboration and develop recommendations in these matters was created.17 However, political events in Hungary, Poland, and East Germany retarded any actual developments.18 The eighth session, held in June 1957 in Warsaw, set the world market prices of 1957 in U.S. dollars as the prices to be used for the next three to five years in all bilateral agreements. At the same session, a kind of "supra-national planning" was mentioned for the first time.19 A special session in May 1958 in Moscow looked for means to achieve "international planning" and a realistic division of labor. For this purpose, committees were formed as a permanent institution to prepare the work in the respective member-countries. The Committee on Coal was located in Warsaw, the Committee on Iron and Steel in Prague, the Committee on Machine Tools in East Berlin, the Committee on Agriculture in Bucharest.20 The ninth session, held in June 1958 in Bucharest, reached an agreement on long-run raw material planning. The tenth session in December 1958 in Prague recommended specialization in the production of plastics, chemical fibers, and synthetic rubber. It adopted plans for pipelines from the petroleum wells in the Urals and Rumania to the refineries in Czechoslovakia, Poland and East Germany.21 The eleventh session (July 1959, in Tirana) and the twelfth session (December 1959, in Sofia) more exactly defined the pipeline program and established several scientific and technical committees in agriculture.22 16

D. T. Cattell, "Multilateral Cooperation and Integration in Eastern Europe", Western Political Quarterly March 9, 1960, p. 60. 17 Siluyanov, op. cit., p. 17; Miroshnichenko, op. cit., p. 49. 18 Siluyanov, op. cit., p. 20. 19 E. Medvedev, "Soviet Trade Agreements with Socialist Countries", Voprosi ekonomiki, #3 1960; in Problems of Economics, May, 1960. 20 Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 284. 21 Ibid., pp. 20-21. 22 Siluyanov, op. cit.-, Isaac Deutscher, op. cit.

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The thirteenth session, held in July 1960 in Budapest, discussed for the first time a "socialistic pool" "to solve problems of economic development as one unit". The integration of the Bloc was planned with twenty-year programs for each member and a slow expansion of COMECON responsibility and control to determine the trends of the Bloc economies; to plan the form of the integration; and to define the extent of the contribution of each member to the overall target.23 At the fourteenth session in 1961 in Berlin, Khrushchev's concept of centralized planning prevailed against Polish opposition, and work began on drafting the twenty-year plan. However, only Russia had prepared such a plan, including a program for international Communist economic integration, and only Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria accepted the concept of a supra-national planning authority. In December 1961 in Warsaw, the "socialist division of labor" be. came the leading issue for three days.24 Of course, it had to be in Moscow on June 6 and 7, 1962, that COMECON underwent a basic, major change into an institution of international importance.25 Previously never mentioned by name, littleknown "representatives of the member nations" met. This time, names made headlines: Veniamine Cymshits was appointed to the newlycreated post of a Deputy Prime Minister of the U.S.S.R. to preside over a newly-established COMECON Executive Committee composed of Deputy Prime Ministers of the member-nations. Surprisingly, this Committee had only advisory powers in the preparation of a Communist World Trade Organization, in the control of the "Friendship Pipelines", and in the preparation of programs for the twenty-year economic common plan first mentioned by East Germany in 1961.26 Changes in personalities, scope, and responsibilities among the member nations - some planned, others not - preceded the introduction of the ambitious Soviet plan for specialization among the members of COMECON. No COMECON nation wanted to make large investments in primary production and leave the more lucrative industrial production to the better-developed nations.27 Rumania, an important producer of 23

"Planning Pains", The Economist, London, December 23, 1961. "Comecon Looks Ahead", The Economist, London, 1960; Miroshnichenko, op. cit., pp. 50-51. 25 "Stuffing for Comecon", The Economist, London, July 28, 1962, p. 333. 26 A. Werth, "Russia Reacts to the Common Market", Nation, August, 1962, #195, pp. 68-70. 27 Alec Nove, "Common Market and Comecon", New Republic, September 17, 1962, #147, pp. 18-20. 24

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petroleum and farm surpluses, refused to pay part of the cost of Russian machinery connected with the production of capital goods for Rumania and demanded support for primary production. At the same time, Rumania refused to buy more expensive, but inferior, machines from COMECON nations, preferring competitive offers from members of the Common Market.28 Rumania, Poland, and Czechoslovakia had to expand their production of consumer goods and were permanently opposed to the investment of about thirty percent of their productive capacity in machinery for U.S.S.R. and the underdeveloped nations.29 In September 1962, a summit conference agreed on the following specialization scheme: 30 Poland - machine and ship building, coal extraction, and chemical production; Czechoslovakia - machine production for heavy industry, especially the chemical and power industries; East Germany — tools, power machinery, machines for the metallurgical and chemical industries; Rumania - agricultural machinery, equipment for the petroleum industry; Bulgaria - raw materials, machines for some chemical production, and some specific machinery and equipment; the U.S.S.R. - all sectors! 81 The Session held on December 14, 1962, in Bucharest adopted a recommendation to correct prices in trade between the member nations based on the average prices on the world commodity markets in the period from 1957 to 1961.32 But in January 1964, such "modernization" was postponed to some later date in 1965. Similarly, plans for a clearing bank for the COMECON nations originally expected to begin operations in Prague on January 1, 1964, in imitation of the European Payment Union, was rescheduled to open in Moscow later in 1965.33 In 1962 in Bucharest, Polish Deputy Prime Minister Piotr Jaroscewicz promised the establishment of a secretariat with the same structure and 28

"Rumania: Shopping List", Newsweek, N e w York, June 15, 1964; "Red Rumania Knocks at G A T T Entry Gate", The Washington Post, June 7, 1964; "Marxist Disunity", New York Times, May 2, 1964; "U.S. Acts to Spur Rumanian Trade", New York Times, June 2, 1964; "Rumania Expands Trade with China", New York Times, July 9, 1964. 29 Marvin and Madeleine Kalb, "The Communist Dread of the Common Market", The Reporter, July 19, 1962, #27, pp. 27-30. 30 "Second Thought", The Economist, London, September 8, 1962, p. 881. 31 "New Path for Comecon", The Economist, September 15, 1962, p. 1021. 32 Alexander Kutt, "Prices and the Balance Sheet in Soviet Captive Countries Trade in 1962", AC EN News, New York, 19, #108-109, April-May 1964, p. 10. 33 "Russia Rivets its own Common Market", Business Week, #1718, August 4, 1962, p. 62; Stanislav Skrzypek, "Soviet Bloc Common Market System", The Evening Star, Washington, June 10, 1962.

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functions as that of the Common Market, to centralize the control of production of member nations, to reorganize the Communist agriculture, and to "streamline fiscal affairs". Mr. Jaroscewicz advocated mutual investment and suggested a detailed plan. For the first time, Albania did not participate in this meeting.34 On June 17, 1963, Pravda published on the front page the newly formulated principles for economic integration. They represented a radical departure from the original complete independence of each COMECON member: (1) "International socialist division of labor by long-range plans of specialization and subcontracting among member-countries in machine building, chemicals, and ferrous and non-ferrous metals"; (2) "To insure high economic efficiency through increased labor productivity, specialization must be combined with the integrated development of the economy of each country to overcome historical differences in the level of development"; (3) "This to be achieved in practice through long-term trade agreements both bilateral and multi-lateral." 35 This was an ambitious Soviet attempt at the division of labor and specialization, and it met again with opposition from the members. There was more than specialization at issue. Where large-scale investment was required to develop an industry, members who would benefit had to carry an appropriate share of the cost. Now, all over the world, people are conservative. Nobody likes to change jobs, learn a new skill, or lose a line of production. Thus, Hungary refused to turn over the production of radios, East Germany was displeased with the prospects of the loss of the jet aircraft industry, Poland was not ready to invest in unprofitable raw-material production, and Czechoslovakia "considered the dismantling of certain industrial enterprises and their transfer to other socialist countries as a proof of economic integration disadvantages." However, it was Rumania that protested most. It had achieved the greatest industrial growth of the nations of the Bloc and refused to be34 Paul Underwood, "Comecon Defers Reform in Prices", New York Times, January 21, 1964, p. 8; Dan Coritz, "Communists' Version of the Common Market Makes Slow Progress", Wall Street Journal, March 26, 1963; Theodore Shabad, "Moscow Outlines Red Bloc's Links", New York Times, June 18, 1963. 35 Paul Underwood, "Poland Rules out Shift in Economy", New York Times, December 9, 1963; David Binder, "Rumania Adheres to Industry Plan", New York Times, January 19, 1964; K. C. Thaler, "Red Bloc Agency Set Up For Aid Coordination", Washington Post, February 3, 1963.

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come a raw material producer. It resisted strongly any integration plan that would have COMECON move from coordination of individual national economic plans to a unified plan for the whole Bloc. Thus, Rumania opposed practically any COMECON planning, even though COMECON planning had been based, up to now, almost entirely upon separate national plans.36 As to the outlook for COMECON-any logical or analytical approach may be a mistake. In a part of the world where personalities have such an impact on political and economic events and where political aims are the leading determinants for all decisions, any change in the leadership in Moscow or elsewhere in the Communist world could result in anything from a basic change in COMECON policies to the abolition of this institution. After nearly one decade of stagnation under Stalin, the 1958 session under Khrushchev in Moscow was a promising start for growth and vigor. Yet, no realistic integration of the Bloc's economies followed. COMECON succeeded partly in supplying scarce raw materials to its members. However, COMECON failed to create enough production to satisfy local needs, failed to take any steps to overcome the lack of convertibility of the currencies of its members, failed to find a way to expand bilateral barter agreements to a multilateral market, and even failed in equitable allocation of food! For example, a phenomenon called the "Braila complex" proved that the situation inside COMECON was bad. Rumania obtained for its factories at Braila better and cheaper machinery from Switzerland than was offered by the COMECON nations. The same happened with machinery for its steel plant in Galati - Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany could not compete in price and quality. In 1961, while every country of the Bloc had food problems, Poland sold ninety percent of her agriculture surplus to Western Europe to earn about half a million dollars to pay for Western machinery.37 Seemingly, the problems have not been made easier by the establishment of fourteen permanent commissions devoted to particular tasks, 36

Alexander Kutt, "Exploitation in Soviet Bloc Trade", East Europe, May 1962; "$8 Billion Claim Against U.S.S.R. Filed By ACEN For Plunder of East Europe", ACEN News, Nos. 108-109 (April-May, 1964), p. 14; Stanislav Skrzypek, "Notes on Soviet Bloc Trade", East Europe, February, 1962, pp. 16-21; "Comecon; Rotten Fruit", Newsweek, September 2, 1963, pp. 38-39; "Trade Exploiting by Soviet denied", The New York Times, July 1, 1962. 37 "Report of the High Commissioner of the Common Market, Brussels, March, 1962", East Europe, June 1962, p. 4.

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with offices in capitals of member nations. The experience of Benelux has shown that it is not easy to build one economic unit from nations with different economic structures, different cultural pasts, and different standards of living, in spite of similar political structure, geographic location, and size. The task of creating an economic unit from nations as far from each other in politics, culture, and development as, say, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, and covering a territory larger than half of Europe and nearly one-third of Asia is indeed a great undertaking. Why does COMECON seem like a stagnant institution, compared to the dynamic Common Market? The main reasons are as follows: (1) The scarcity of goldand/or convertible currencies or some clearing mechanism permits only barter bilateral agreements in which any remaining balance has to be transferred to the next period; (2) The lack of any free market prevents unity in pricing and leads to price discrimination in favor of the stronger partner - usually the U.S.S.R.; for example, Russia sells raw materials at higher prices to Czechoslovakia and Poland than to other COMECON members. The losses of the other members of the Bloc to U.S.S.R., according to the research of the Estonian economist, Aleksander Kutt, amounted to $ 8,095,000,000 by the end of 1962. (3) Except for U.S.S.R., no member has a home market large enough for mass production, and no common market for manufactured goods has been established; (4) Price determination by governments eliminates any possibility for better allocation of resources; (5) The totally planned economy of each member nation permits neither cost nor the forces of supply and demand to determine which member has the relative advantage in any specific field of production; (6) The prices in the home markets of each member have been determined by their respective needs and political situation. Export and import prices have been adjusted to the domestic prices by subsidies or taxes and, therefore, have never represented real costs. Because foreign trade has accounted for less than three percent of the U.S.S.R.'s gross national product, such policies have created no problems to her. However, since foreign trade represents up to thirty percent of their gross national product to some member-nations, the above-mentioned policies have been dangerous, particularly when they meant selling at a loss or granting credit to the developing African nations for the sake of Communist propaganda.

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Hugo M.

Skála

A t this time, the outlook for C O M E C O N seems poor. The growing trade of Rumania and other member nations with the West and the desire for such a trend in international economic relations does not promise C O M E C O N a good future. In 1965, through C O M E C O N activities, the total trade among the members may reach sixty-five to seventy-three percent of the respective volumes of their foreign trade as compared with eleven to thirty-three percent in 1949. However, in spite of this increase, Czechoslovakia and Poland expanded their trade with the West after the 1 9 6 2 and 1963 C O M E C O N summit sessions, and Rumania also continued to do so. 3 8 With a possible political change or two, and with favorable economic development, in the long run, C O M E C O N could become one of the 88

Friedrich von Hayek, The Road To Serfdom (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1944), 12th impression 1958, pp. 226-227; "Rumania and Comecon", New York Times, May 7, 1963; "Bucharest Balking on Economic Unity", Ibid., May 10, 1963; David Binder, "Rumania is Emphasizing National Communism", The New York Times, January 23, 1964, p. 6; Binder, "Rumanians Press Trade with West", Ibid., January 26, 1964, p. 21; Binder, "Rumanians Plan Closer Tito Ties", Ibid., April 8, 1964, p. 8; Tad Szulc, "U.S. and Rumania to Open Talk on Trade Issues", Ibid., May 1, 1964, p. 1; "Rumania Widens Rift With Soviet", Ibid., June 9, 1964; David Binder, "Rumania Presses Pursuit of Independent Economy", Ibid., July 6, 1964, p. 1; Henry Tanner, "Red Bloc Prints Rumania Dissent" Ibid., July 10, 1964, p. 2; and Harry Schwartz, "Red Bloc Presses Integration Plan", Ibid., August 16, 1964, p. 15. Joseph Gruber, ed., Czechoslovakia (New York, The Macmillan Co., 1924). R. S. Kerner ed., Czechoslovakia, Twenty Years of Independence (University of California Press, 1940). "Czechoslovakia. An Economic and Financial Survey", Special issue of The Banker, London, June 1938. Charles Rist, La deflation en practique (Paris, 1924). Milos Horna, Monetary Policy with special regard to Monetary Conditions in Central Europe, in Czech (Prague, 1945). L. Feierabend, "Land Reform and Agricultural Improvement", Challenge in Eastern Europe (Rutgers University Press, 1954). Czechoslovak Agriculture, ed. O. S. Morgan (The Macmillan Co., New York, 1933). Czechoslovak Statistical Yearbooks for 1936 and 1937. Following are books and articles written by the author: "L'économie tchéchoslovaque depuis la dévaluation monétaire", Revue d'économie; "Memorandum on devaluation experience in Czechoslovakia". "The Frozen Credit Problem in Central Europe", both in the Problems of Monetary Stabilization, published by the Joint Committee of the Carnegie Endowment and International Chamber of Commerce (Paris, 1936). Czechoslovak Economy during the Crisis, in Czech (Prague, 1937). The Danube Basin and the German Economic Sphere (New York, Columbia University Press, 1943). "Land Reform in Czechoslovakia" in Family Farm Policy, ed. by J. Ackerman and M. Harris (University of Chicago Press, 1947).

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steps, in fact, leading towards one united Europel This possibility is based on such COMECON setbacks as Rumania's turning toward West, and the establishment of Intermetal, a steel-rolling mill combine that will control plants of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland like a typical West European industrial combine. The economic development of each member of COMECON and the influence of this institution on these developments must be discussed before COMECON can be fully evaluated. In this paper, there is no room for such a discussion. A brief summary: In the first fifteen years of its existence, COMECON has gone through three distinct stages. Created by Stalin in 1949 as a substitute for the Marshall Plan for the satellites of the U.S.S.R., in its first six years, it was just another institution without responsibility or authority, though intended to coordinate the People's Democracies in their endeavors to copy Russia. In 1955, COMECON was led into its second stage by Khrushchev's policy that every Communist nation should specialize according to its particular natural advantages and structural development. Though COMECON was revitalized and redirected by this new policy, it failed to live up to the expectation that it would create a "common market" for Eastern Europe. It had neither the momentum nor the authority to achieve this end. In 1962, the third stage evolved. A kind of central authority was created, common goals were programmed, and the common market was copied. This bold Moscow program found increasing opposition - possibly because the U.S.S.R. did not want to be a big brother or a helping hand to the others, possibly because Eastern Europe began to drift closer to the West than to China and Asia in its economic growth. The future of COMECON depends largely on political developments, on the decisions of the leading personalities in the dictatorships called People's Democracies, and on economic relations between East and West.

Czechoslovak-Polish Cooperation in Peaceful Applications of Nuclear Energy: Foundation and Results JAROSLAV G. POLACH

It seems an interesting historical coincidence that during these days, when the Third United Nations International Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy is taking place in Geneva, we should engage in an analysis of Czechoslovak-Polish cooperation in the field of atomic energy, and its economic foundations. The purpose of the paper is, however, limited: to examine and evaluate critically this unique example of the only bilateral arrangement in the Communist Bloc which has bypassed the Soviets. The study is divided into three parts. In the first, after considering some historical and human factors affecting later atomic energy developments in both countries, I will examine the particular conditions of the Czechoslovak and Polish atomic energy sub-economy as they favor the application of atomic power and support the nations' cooperation. The second part reviews the purpose, institutional framework, and actual course of their atomic cooperation. Evaluation of results and final comments conclude the study.

1. BY WAY OF INTRODUCTION

The foundation for the atomic age was in effect laid down in Bohemia in 1789, when a German chemist, H. M. Klaproth, discovered a new element in the pitchblende (smolinec) from the Jachymov area and called it uranium. 1 More than half a century later, a Czech mining engineer, A. Pazdera, initiated the first commercial exploitation of uranium ores by devising the technology for industrial production of 1

Based on Ceskoslovenska vlastiveda, IX Technika (Praha, Sfinx, 1929), pp. 100-101; and V. I. Spicyn and A. K. Lavruchina, "Vyuziti jaderne energie v Ceskoslovensku", Jadernd energie, 1957, 2:253. ladernd energie will be quoted hereinafter as I.e.

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tri-uranium oct-oxide to be used for coloring purposes in the Czech glass industry. A factory to exploit this process was built in Jachymov in 1854 and, interestingly enough, was later involved in the developments which ultimately ushered us into the Atomic Age. It was the uranium residues (the so-called "uranove zbytky") from this plant which were used in French research, notably by Pierre Curie and his wife, Maria Sklodowska, as the basic material in a series of experimens which, in 1898, resulted in the discovery of the new radioactive elements polonium and radium. This was a link in the long chain of discoveries culminating with Enrico Fermi's controlled nuclear fission. Sklodowska's participation in the development of new nucleai sciences, as well as the strong attachment she felt to her native land, was an important factor in evoking great interest among Poles in radiological studies and, later, in nuclear physics and chemistry.2 With her help, quite a few Poles studied the new sciences in Paris, London, and even the United States. She was also instrumental in setting up an establishment for radiological research in Warsaw before World War I, and later, in the thirties, an institute for research into radium. Thanks to this early start, and the enthusiasm and continuing support of Sklodowska, as well as the Joliots, Poland had a number of young scientists in the nuclear sciences even before World War II, such as J. Danysz, Ludwig Wertenstein, Cezar Pawlowski, A. Soltan, and Jan Blaton, and others. It also had some important technical facilities for research. Thus, the Institute of Experimental Physics at Warsaw University possessed the only accelerator then in existence in Central and Eastern Europe. 3 In Czechoslovakia,4 with one of the biggest European deposits of uranium-rich pitchblende, interest was directed more toward the practical utilization of uranium in industry and medicine. As a matter of fact, in addition to being the first in the commercial exploitation of uranium, Czechs were also among the first to use radium for the treatment of cancer, during this period. The research in radiochemistry carried out at Prague's Institute of Radiology was widely recognized as superior. Furthermore, shortly before World War II, Professor Zacek, of the 2 The subsequent account of Polish developments is based on Joz. Hurvic (ed.), Energia jqdrowa w Polsce w latach 1955-1960 (Warszawa, Panstwove Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1963), pp. 4-11; and George A. Modelski, Atomic Energy in the Communist Bloc (Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1959) pp. 146-152. 3 A. Soltan, who studied at California Technical Institute, was credited with the design of this cascade accelerator. 4 See here, Modelski, loc. cit. and pp. 152-157, on atomic energy beginnings in Czechoslovakia.

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Jaroslav G. Polach

Prague University Department for Experimental Physics, sent one of his students, V. Petrzilka, to study nuclear techniques in Cambridge, England. Whatever progress the two countries achieved was completely obliterated by the subsequent war and the Nazi occupation, which destroyed technical facilities and most human resources in this field in both countries, especially Poland. Later, when they entered the U.S.S.R. orbit, real progress in nuclear physics and techniques was effectively blocked by the Soviet policy of maintaining absolute secrecy and close control over atomic developments in all satellite countries. However, some research in nucleonics was still conducted at the respective university departments in Prague, Warsaw, and Cracow. In Czechoslovakia, Professor Zacek renewed his work after 1945, and during the short period before February 1948, there was hope that negotiations with Western companies for delivery of nuclear equipment, including an accelerator, would be successful. All that was in vain, however, and although the Czechs were able to construct their own accelerator in Prague by 1951, their progress was extremely slow, due to complete isolation from the rest of the scientific community. Still, Czechoslovakia was somewhat more fortunate in this respect than the Poles, because, during this period, the Czechs alone among the satellite peoples received at least some Soviet nuclear information. In Poland, the situation was, to some extent, worse because of the scope of the war destruction. Yet, nuclear research was renewed at Warsaw University, and later also in the new Theoretical Physics Centre under Professor L. Infeld, who returned to Poland from Canada after the war. In addition, the Jagielon University in Cracow established a department of nuclear studies. Nevertheless, here, as in Czechoslovakia, the situation in the mid-fifties looked bleak. There was very little hope that, within any foreseeable future, the necessary human and technical base for the exploitation of atomic energy could be established to benefit their own national economies. All that suddenly changed in 1955, when the Soviets relaxed their original control over access to atomic knowledge and technology in the countries of the Communist Bloc, simultaneously announcing that they would assist individual member-nations in nuclear development.5 For Poland and Czechoslovakia, this opened the door to atomic cooperation; both endeavored to cover lost ground as rapidly possible. 5

For the USSR Government declaration, see Pravda, Moskva, Jan. 18, 1955, and compare also, e.g., Rude pravo, Praha, Jan. 18, 1955.

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TABLE I

Apparent Energy Consumption in Selected Years in Czechoslovakia and Poland (in 106 metric tons HCE)& A.

Czechoslovakia

Year

Solid Fuel

Liquid Fuel

Natural Gas

Hydropower^

Total

1963 1962 1961 1960 1955 1950

72.42 68.69 64.76 59.94 48.44 35.72

4.52 4.10 3.47 2.96 1.98 0.81

1.33 1.42 1.68 1.72 0.23 0.00

0.96 1.22 0.86 0.90 0.70 0.72

79.23 74.59 70.77 65.52 51.35 37.25

0.29 0.35 0.38 0.38 0.32 0.23

105.77 99.67 95.65 92.25 71.76 52.20

B. 1963 1962 1961 1960 1955 1950

98.88 93.50 90.16 87.59 68.81 50.87

4.89 4.35 3.79 3.24 1.95 0.82

Poland ] .71 1.47 1.33 1.04 0.69 0.27

Source: United Nations, World Energy Supplies, Nos. 1-8 (1929-1964), except hydropower for 1955-1963; totals then adjusted accordingly. a Except hydropower, hard coal equivalents as given in Ibid. b For 1950, 1 kwh equals 0.6 kg HCE; for all other years, 1 kwh equals 0.4 kg HCE.

One reason for these efforts was the very promising prospect of having cheap atomic energy soon available. With the goals of economic growth and improvement in living standards, access to abundant, cheap nuclear energy seemed to be the most promising and fastest path to follow. At the same time, the leading scientists in both countries came up with the idea that their efforts would be substantially advanced if undertaken in close cooperation. However, to understand the purpose of this cooperative scheme and its later course, we must inquire first into some fundamentals of the Czechoslovak and Polish energy situation. Energy Balance in Czechoslovakia and Poland. The fact that these countries' economies are predominantly fueled by domestic coal, which still supplies about ninety percent of all energy

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TABLE II

Primary Energy Production in Selected Years in Czechoslovakia and Poland (in 106 metric tons HCE)* A. Year 1963 1962 1961 1960 1955 1950

Coal and Lignite 72.16 68.84 65.41 61.26 46.59 34.95 +

Czechoslovakia

Crude Oil

Natural Gas

Hydropower b

Total

0.23 0.23 0.20 0.18 0.14 0.06

1.33 1.42 1.68 1.72 0.23

0.93 1.22 1.02 1.99 0.77 0.66

74.65 71.71 68.31 64.15 47.73 35.68

0.26 0.32 0.26 0.26 0.29 0.30

119.63 114.63 111.23 108.51 97.36 80.25

—

B. Poland 1963 1962 1961 1960 1955 1950

117.75 112.93 109.71 107.24 96.29 79.45

0.30 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.26 0.23

1.31 1.09 0.98 0.73 0.52 0.27

requirements in both,6 has essentially conditioned their attitude toward atomic power and mutual cooperation. At first glance, their cases may seem to be quite different. Table I summarizes energy consumption in Czechoslovakia and Poland during selected years and comparing it with their production of primary energy sources in Table II, we may readily see that Czechoslovakia has consistently been an energy-deficient country since World War II. In some years, the difference was small, but in recent years the gap between energy requirements and domestic supplies has had a tendency to grow. During the same period, Poland recorded a sizeable surplus of energy which, in this case, may be identified with her surplus of coal. This, for the moment, suffices to balance out the Polish deficit in petroleum supplies. Both countries lack adequate petroleum resources, although Czechoslovakia has also now become a net importer of coal and her petroleum imports are skyrocketing. This is clearly indicated in the 6

Based on the United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, Coal and/or Electric Committee Working Papers, Annual, Surveys of Energy Situation in Europe; and United Nations, Statistical Office, Statistical Papers, Series J. World Energy Supplies, Nos. 6-7.

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481

figures quoted below, which give Czechoslovak petroleum net imports in selected years. 7

Year

Net Trade in Petroleum 8 (in 10® metric tons)

1963 1962 1961 1960 1955 1950

4.20» 3.85 3.08 2.52 1.04 10 0.50 11

Notwithstanding the obvious differences between the two countries, Poland's energy position approaches the Czech when past trends in Polish energy flows are examined with an eye to their future implications. For one thing, Polish coal exports have been steadily diminishing, as is obvious from the figures quoted below, giving net exports of solid fuels 12 (in million tons of HCE) for selected years.

Year

Net Trade in Solid Fuels 1 3

1963 1962 1961 1960 1955 1950

18.9 19.4 19.4 19.8 27.3 28.1

These figures show clearly that in the span of thirteen years, Polish coal exports declined by almost 10 million tons. As a consequence, the net 7

Ibid., for 1950, T.2 and T.9; for all other years, T.8 and T.9. Refers, in principle, to a total of crude petroleum and refined petroleum products used as liquid fuels. In recent years, Czechoslovak petroleum imports consist chiefly of crude. 9 Based on the UN, WES, it includes my estimate of net imports of liquid fuels in amount of approximately 70 th. met. tons. 10 Chiefly refined fuels. 11 Chiefly refined fuels; estimate of the U N Stat. Office. 12 Refers to hard coal, brown coal, lignite, and their derivatives as converted into hard coal equivalents (HCE) by the U N Statistical Office. 13 Predominantly hard coal. 8

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Jaroslav G. Polach

Polish energy exports, which accounted for 34 percent of total energy production in 1950 and 26 percent in 1955, declined to only 11 percent in 1963. Moreover, there is nothing in the conventional Polish energy situation which could promise a reversal of the mentioned trends in the future. In effect, with heavy stress on speeded-up industrialization of the country and substantially increased electricity consumption, a growing quantity of domestically produced coal must be devoted to Polish internal consumption, particularly in view of the rapidly expanding population. It is, therefore, not surprising that, according to Polish experts' estimates, Poland may change from a net exporter to a net importer of energy in the early eighties.14 Of course, by that time, Czechoslovakia may be in a precarious energy situation,15 provided that the planned economic goals are achieved, living standards improved, and nothing but conventional energy is available. The ratio chart (Figure 1, below), a résumé of the Polish-Czechoslovak energy situation, permits a comparison of the consumption-production trends with the developing tendencies in their net trade in energy. As may be seen, the recent steep increase in the rate of Czechoslovak net imports of energy, and the similarly pronounced decline in Polish net exports of energy indicate an accelerated growth in the Czechoslovak energy gap and, in the case of Poland, an accelerated approach to an energy deficit. As a result, their economists have pointed out the urgent need for developing atomic power as the only new, domestically available source of energy which could arrest the dangerously growing gap between indigenous energy potential and their economies' requirements. The need for developing nuclear electricity is further underscored by the stress the Communists put on the role of electricity in their economic planning and production. However, since in both countries most electric power has been generated thermally,16 and because of the abovementioned shortage of domestic liquid and gaseous fuels, domestic coal (brown coal included) has been expected to support an expansion in 14

Artur Bodnar, Gospodarka europejskich krajów socjalistycznych (zarys rozwoju w latach 1950-1975) (Warszawa, Ksi^zka i Wiedza, 1962), p. 134; and also P. J. Nowacki and Wl. Frankowski, "Considérations sur les perspectives d'évolution de l'énergie nucléaire en Pologne", World Power Conference, Paper XI/B-3-4 (Beograd, 1957). 15 See, e.g., Lad. Nëmec, "Jak vëda pomahâ zabezpeòit ukoly energetiky v tïeti pëtiletce", Cs. akademie vëd, Vëstnîk, 1960, 1:87; also Bodnar, op. cit., p. 127 ff. 18 In Poland, the share of hydro-power in total generation of electricity is negligible; in Czechoslovakia, hydro-power accounts for about 10 percent, but there is very little left for future expansion.

Peaceful Applications

of Nuclear

Energy

483

Figure 1 Primary energy production, consumption and net energy trade in Czechoslovakia and Poland, 1950-1963 (In 10« m.t. HCEa)

Source: United Nations, World Energy Supplies, Nos. 1-8 (1952-1964 except hydropower for 1955-1963 (see b below); totals adjusted accordingly. Except hydropower, hard coal equivalents as given in Ibid. b For 1950, 1 kwh equals 0.6 kg HCE; for all other years, 1 kwh equals 0.4 kg HCE . a

a Hard coal equivalents as defined in UN WES, except hydropower which is converted at the rate of: in 1950, 1 kwh equals 0.6 kg HCE; in all other years, 1 kwh equals 0.4 kg. HCE.

484

Jaroslav G. Foladi

electricity output. Yet, should the original plans for electricity production be achieved, not much coal would be left for other purposes, as, for instance, the steel or chemical industries. Thus, in Czechoslovakia, whose sources of cheap coal are rapidly nearing the limits of economic exploitation, the plans for 100 X 109 kwh annual output in 1975 and about 170 X 109 kwh in 1980 17 might require something like 45-60 million tons of coat (measured in HCE) annually - that is an amount approximately on the order of the entire 1960 Czechoslovak coal production (as may be seen in Table II, above). This means that economic expansion would have to be sustained chiefly - and in the very near future - by imported fuels. The Polish case is more favorable right now, because Poland still has great potential supplies of cheap coal. Nevertheless, a goal of 180 kwh for 1980 18 could mean that coal burnt in the electricity plants alone would equal almost the entire Polish consumption of coal for all purposes in 1960. Whether the realized increment in coal production could sustain all other Polish industries' requirements for coal is questionable.19 In brief, the difference between the Czechoslovak and Polish interest in the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes has been more in the emphasis on timing rather than on substance. That came to the fore at their first conference undertaken within the framework of bilateral atomic cooperation in 1956.

2. CZECHOSLOVAK-POLISH NUCLEAR CONFERENCES

A foundation for closer cooperation between both countries in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy was laid during the summer of 1956, when a Polish delegation of scientists inspected the nuclear establishments in Czechoslovakia. In the course of this visit, it was agreed to start nuclear cooperative efforts within the framework of the respective National Academies of Sciences (that is, the Ceskoslovenska akademie ved (CSAV) and the Polska akademia nauk (PAN). As a consequence, the first conference of "scientific workers in nuclear energy" was convoked to Zakopane, Poland, under the aegis of the PAN 17

See United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, Committee on Electrical Power, The Situation and Future Prospect of Europe's Electric Power Supply Industry in 1961-62 (Geneva, UNECE, 1963) ST/ECE/EP/17, T. 13 and T.T. 18. 18 Derived by projecting the ECE figures for 1965-1975 in Ibid, T. 13 and T. 14. 18 This may be inferred from, for instance, Nowacki-Frankowski, op. Cit.

Peaceful A pplications of Nuclear Energy

485

Institute for Nuclear Research (Institut Badan Jqdrowych, IB J) in September 1956. On the Czechoslovak side, the sponsoring agency was the CSAV Institute for Nuclear Physics (tJstav pro jadernou fysiku, UJF). 20 The immediate purpose of this conference was to exchange information and to start real cooperation. In an introductory statement, Zdislaw Wilhelmi,21 leader of the Polish Delegation, said that the Conference was to offer a mutual opportunity for getting acquainted with the state of nuclear research and development (R&D) in both countries, with the problems encountered and results achieved, as well as to explore the ground and conditions for future joint endeavors. Obviously, the ultimate goal of their cooperation was to expedite the establishment of closely associated but nationally independent atomic sciences as a base for their own nuclear technology and nuclear industries. Interestingly eoungh, Wilhelmi, as well as Jan Urbanec, 22 who led the Czechoslovak delegation, stressed at this point the substantial lack of experience among the members of the delegations and their comparative youth. 23 In a way, this alone clearly indicated that the most serious bottleneck for both countries in this field was a shortage of nuclear manpower, especially experienced scientists, and the lack of training and experimental facilities. Characteristically, some contributions to the Conference were more or less a sort of progress report. Judged by the standards then prevailing in this field in the West, the majority of the eighteen papers presented in Zakopane merely rehashed what was already known in the West. Nevertheless, as the participants placed the problems within their own national framework, these papers cast some interesting light on the issues and difficulties besetting nuclear R&D efforts in either country. Atomic Power — Czechoslovak

and Polish Public Policy.

One of the fundamental differences between the Czechoslovak and Polish nuclear policy goals was their respective approach to atomic 2(1

Papers presented at this Conference were published in extenso by P A N as Zagadnienia energetyki jadrowej (hereinafter quoted as Zagadnienia). For further details and full titles of the papers, see Appendix, below. See also, M. Arkuszewski, "Czechostowacko-polska konferencja energetykow jadrowych", Nukleonika, 1958, 1:197-206. 21 Zagadnienia, p. 7. 22 Ibid., p. 8. 23 Arkuszewski, loc. cit., points out that the average age of the Conference participants was 35 years, while two members of the Polish delegation were only 22 years old!

486

Jaroslav G. Polach

power. In conformity with the Czechoslovak energy situation, the main characteristics of which were indicated in Part I, the Czechs were interested in having nuclear-generated electricity as soon as possible; 24 cost considerations were of secondary importance. Also, realizing that time was running short for developing a particular reactor through their own research, they gladly accepted a power reactor of an already "proven type", 25 using natural uranium, moderated by graphite and cooled by heavy water. This was offered within the framework of Soviet assistance. The time saved was to be used for diversifying Czech research so as to cover several reactor systems, in an effort to develop a nuclear system best fitting Czechoslovak conditions.26 An illustration of such endeavors is the Conference paper by J. Vlach, dealing with the fuel balance in a homogenous reactor.27 The Poles, following the logical implications of trends in their energy economy, started from the presumption that they would need a supplementary source of nuclear power much later than Czechoslovakia.28 Consequently, they outlined and limited their R&D objectives accordingly. First, they decided that when they constructed a power reactor in the future, it would be based on their own R&D. Second, they excluded the thermal (slow-neutron) reactors, since for fuel, these use thorium, which is not available in Poland. Third, because of Poland's limited uranium resources, they put full stress on developing a breeder, i.e., a reactor producing more fissile material than it consumes. Finally, still having enough cheap coal, they stressed the competitive cost of nuclear energy as a condition for its application in Poland. Therefore, 29 they focused their efforts on a natural uranium-fueled, graphite-moderated, gas-cooled reactor system producing plutonium, which would permit lower costs for produced power by deducting credit obtained for Pu. In this context, two papers devoted to technical aspects of such reactors were presented at the Conference. In addition, a study by T. Wojcik 30 examined (as far as I know, for the very first time) the 24

See here the discussion following T. Wojcik's paper in Zagadnienia, p. 289; also Urbanec, Ibid., p. 8; and further J. Neumann in I.e., 1963, 1:1-2. 25 Cf. Urbanec, ibid., also Rude pravo, May 1, 1955, and Lidova demokracie, Praha, July 1, 1955. 28 Urbanec, ibid. 27 For full title, see Appendix, below. 28 That is well presented in a paper by Wtadislaw Frankowski, Zagadnienia, pp. 9-13; and also in a paper by Tadeusz Wojcik, Zagadnienia, pp. 275-290. 29 See Wilhelmi; Frankowski; Wojcik, all loc. cit. 30 Zagadnienia, loc. cit.

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487

economic prospects for nuclear power in Poland. Of course, Wojcik's paper is squarely based on foreign experience and cannot be considered as truly reflecting the Polish conditions for nuclear power. Nevertheless, it is of interest to note that Wojcik concluded that the cost of nuclear power at that time could be expected to be, on the average, in the neighborhood of 31.6 grosz per kwh, as compared with 13.3. to 17.8 grosz per kwh for electricity generated by coal. Obviously, even on a purely theoretical basis, the case for competitive atomic power in Poland was still remote. Second Czechoslovak-Polish

Nuclear

Conference.

In May 1958, the second bilateral conference was held in Libcice, near Prague, this time convoked by CSAV. 31 However, before the meeting took place, some significant developments within the Soviet Bloc, as well as outside, injected a new note into the project, which up to now had been bilaterally cooperative. For one thing, following the 1956 decision to establish in Dubna a joint nuclear center for all members of the Soviet Bloc, the U.S.S.R. was stressing a multilateral rather than a bilateral approach to problems in the nuclear field. Quite obviously, channeling intersatellite cooperative nuclear research through the Dubno Institute gave the Soviets a direct and incisive control over such endeavors. Another factor was the European economic and atomic integration. Catching the attention of Europe, the idea of European unification threatened to become a point of contention among the Bloc members (like the issue of participation in the Marshall Plan) and forced the Soviets to counteract with emphasis on cooperation within the Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation of the Socialist Countries (the socalled COMECON) and, too, for cooperation in the field of atomic energy within it. The COMECON framework has permitted a slight diffusion of Soviet control. There is, however, no reason to doubt that the COMECON Committee for Peaceful Exploitation of Atomic Energy has, in effect, become another instrument of Soviet nuclear policy, which keeps a watchful eye on atomic activity and cooperation in the Bloc. Although this might not have been quite so obvious in May 1958, when the second Czechoslovak-Polish meeting took place, a harbinger of things to come was the presence at that Conference of nuclear 31

Full papers and proceedings of the Conference are not available; for the list of the Conference papers, see Appendix, below.

488

Jaroslav G. Polach

scientists from some other Communist countries; significantly, though, no Soviet nuclear representation (nor any paper) was mentioned in connection with either the first or the second Czechoslovak-Polish Conference. The second Conference itself revealed nothing particularly startling. The Polish and Czechoslovak policy for civilian atomic power outlined at the first meeting remained essentially the same. Of course, the individual papers (again, eighteen of them) now dealt with concrete projects and experiments bearing on the respective national atomic goals. In this context, the Poles advanced their expectations and assumed that the first Polish power reactor, using natural uranium and based completely on their own R&D, would be in operation in 1967. To get the appropriate clinical experience needed for running such a station, they planned a second experimental reactor for 1961, using the same fuels, moderator, and coolant as in the power reactor. Interestingly enough, the two Polish experts in economics of nuclear power, W. Frankowski and T. Wojcik, 32 suggested at the Conference that despite the assumption that nuclear fuels produced in Poland would cost more than on the world market, the atomic power cost of the Polish plant would be competitive with electricity produced from coal. 33 The generally optimistic tone of Polish expectations is reflected in their analysis of a materialtesting reactor (MTR) system. For a while, it seems they entertained the notion that they could construct it by themselves. In the end, they recognized that this was a task which would tax their human, technical, and financial resources beyond the national capabilities, and, therefore, they suggested that the best solution might be to have a M T R constructed as a joint venture with Czechoslovakia, or even with other countries. 34 As might have been expected, Czechoslovakia has strongly stressed an urgent need to supplement her energy base with atomic power. At the time of the Second Conference, she had already started work (the first country in the Bloc outside the U.S.S.R. to do so) on her A . I . , i.e., atomic power plant No. 1. Yet, strangely enough, and unlike the Poles, the Czechs had not presented a paper examining the Czechoslovak energy balance and projected future supply and demand, and, within it, the role of atomic power. Instead, the Czechoslovak papers centered on reports concerning experiments for developing three different reactor 32

Polish Paper, N o . 8; see Appendix, below. See FrantiSek Berger's, "summary review of the Conference", I.e., 8:237. 34 Polish Paper, N o . 5; see Appendix, below.

33

1958,

Peaceful Applications of Nuclear Energy

489

systems. One was obviously destined to provide practical experience in operating the A.I., since experiments in this area concentrated on a natural uranium-fueled, heavy water-moderated, and gas-cooled reactor. 35 A second group of experiments dealt with a homogenous reactor in which fuel is suspended in boiling (light) water. 36 That was considered the most promising system for the Czech needs of small and medium power output. The third group of experiments concerned a fast reactor (a breeder) and, particularly, the problems of an appropriate metallic coolant. 37 In general, the Conference ended on an optimistic note. It was assumed that the bilateral nuclear cooperation would continue and result in mutual savings from a planned division of labor and complementary research and development. In this respect, the Conference, as indicated in a summary report by F. Berger, adopted a number of resolutions, including a decision that the Third Polish-Czechoslovak Nuclear Conference would be convened by the Poles in 1960. There is no indication that the Third Conference has ever taken place, and, in effect, all references to the (exclusive) Czechoslovak-Polish nuclear cooperation completely disappeared from the Communist publications after 1958 - with one exception, about which I speak further, below. 3. RESULTS A N D CONCLUSIONS

It is not easy to evaluate the results of the Czechoslovak-Polish nuclear cooperation on the basis of the meager reports available. Obviously, we can safely assume that both countries drew the usual relatively significant benefits, at the then-prevailing stage of their atomic development, from an open exchange and mutual criticism of experience and information. 38 The close affinity of their languages undoubtedly facilitated their cooperation 39 and substantially increased the immediate impact of scientific information disseminated at the Conferences. Also, we may surmise that the resolutions adopted during the meetings concerning the respective nuclear tasks of the Poles and Czechoslovaks created a sound 35

Czechoslovak Papers, No. 1 and No. 7; see Appendix, below. Czechoslovak Papers, No. 3 and No. 4; see Appendix, below Czechoslovak Papers, No. 5 and No. 6; see Appendix, below. 38 Explicitly mentioned as a helpful factor by Berger, loc. cit., and obviously of some significance during the construction of analog computers by Poland and Czechoslovakia. 39 The fact that there was no need for translators during the Conference and subsequent discussions was particularly stressed by Arkuszewski, loc. cit. 36

37

490

Jaroslav G. Polach

base for a useful division of labor. This is clearly indicated in a symposium on the theory of neutron transportation,40 carried out explicitly in accord with one of the resolutions adopted by the Second Conference. Moreover, I am inclined to believe that other results of the originally bilateral endeavors were later presented at one or the other of the multimember Bloc conferences, where any reference to separate CzechoslovakPolish cooperation was simply banned. This is my impression, for instance, about a paper by P. Mokry and W. Wojcik on "Construction and Investigation of the Properties of the Spark Chamber", jointly delivered at the (Communist Bloc) IX Conference on Physics and High Energy in Cracow in 1963, although with no indication how the joint effort came about. Evidently, even if we assume that the exclusive Polish-Czechoslovak nuclear cooperation ended some time after 1958, their mutual contacts and efforts have continued. However, they have now been placed within the framework of either special nuclear conferences of the Communist Bloc,41 or the Permanent Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy of the COMECON. Lacking any official clarification, we can only speculate about the reasons for the abrupt end of the initially separate nuclear cooperation between Czechoslovakia and Poland. For one thing, it seems quite obvious that the Soviets did not look with favor on this show of a potentially dangerous precedent for "independence" among their satellites. It might be expected that the U.S.S.R. would exert all its pressure to force both countries back into the fold and use the framework of the common institutions within the Communist Bloc for direct control in a field fraught with military implications. The other reason might well be the feeling among the Poles and Czechoslovaks that their separate nuclear cooperation had outlived its usefulness. After all, both countries still lacked the human and technical capabilities to carry out, by themselves, even a modest plan for atomic power. Czechoslovakia has been conspicuously lagging in her construction of the A.l. station, and the Polish plans for atomic power in 1967 are also obviously beyond their reach - at least, without any outside help. It is, therefore, not surprising that J. Neumann, Chairman of the Czechoslovak Atomic Energy Commission, openly admitted recently that Czechoslovakia cannot achieve full progress in the field of atomic 40

See Nukleonika, 1959, 4:576-7. See, for inst., Third International (i.e., the Communist Bloc) Conference Research in Reactor Physics and Techniques, Prague, April 1963.

41

on

Peaceful

Applications

of Nuclear

Energy

491

fission and fusion outside a framework of broadly based cooperation.42 Let us hope that the cognizance of the enormous demands imposed by atomic energy upon human and natural resources, as well as on the technical and financial capabilities of a country, will also bring an understanding in the Communist countries of the transnational effects of atomic developments. This should help to establish truly supra-national controls and cooperation in atomic energy throughout the world, and, we all hope, open the door to the entry of free science into Czechoslovakia and Poland. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES Eva B. Polach * 1. Czechoslovak-Polish Conference in Zakopane, Poland, on 24-30 September, 1956. Papers presented at this Conference were published by Polska akademia nauk in Zeszyty problemowe nauki polskiej, vol. XIII (Wroclaw-Warszawa 1958), under the title, Zagadnienia energetyki jqdrowej: Materialy czechoslowackopolskiej konferencji energetyków jadrowych, Zakopane, 24-30 Wrzesnia 1956 R. All papers are in Polish, each followed by summaries in Russian and English, in addition to a short Polish résumé of the discussion following the delivery of the main paper. The list of papers (pages refer to Zeszyty, vol. XIII): Adamski, T., J. Modrzew, J. Panas, R. Wiodarski, "Ekonomika procesów chemicznych w produkcji paliwa reaktorowego" [Economics of Chemical Processes in Reactor Fuel Production], pp. 258-274. Arkuszewki, Jacek, M. Greniewski, K. Kowalska, "Metody statycznej teorii reaktora makroskopowo niejednorodnego" [Some Methods of Macroscopically Heterogeneous Reactor Statics], pp. 52-81. Bartosek, Vaclav, "Wyprowadzenie równan dia dwugrupowej teorii reaktora z 'reflektorem' mnoz^cym i powielaj^cym" [The Derivation of Two-Group Diffusion Theory Equations for a Reactor with a Multiplying and Breeding Blanket], pp 125-137. Berger, FrantiSek, Vaclav Stach, "Intensyfikacja wymiany ciepta przy zastosowaniu jonizacji gazu" [Heat Transfer Improvement by Means of Gas Ionisation], Cepelàk, J., "Kilka uwag do ekstrakcji azotanu uranylu eterem dwuetylowym" [Some Remarks on the Diethyl Ether Extraction of Uranyl Nitrate], pp. 248-257. Dabrowski, Cyryl, T. Dobrowolski, J. Mika, J. Zuberek. "Wstepne obliczenia j^drowe reaktora energetycznego na uran naturalny z moderatorem grafitowym przy równomiernym zaladowaniu," (Preliminary Nuclear Calculations for a Uniformly Loaded Natural Uranium Graphite-Moderated Power Reactor), pp. 28-51. DIouhy, Z., J. Kutzendoerfer, J. Maly, "Adsorpcja i descorpcja radioaktywnosci na powierzchni glinu" [Radioactivity Adsorption and Desorption on an Aluminium Surface], pp. 293-303. , "Odkazenie powierzni skazonych radioizotopami" [Decontamination of Surfaces Contaminated by Radioisotopes], pp. 304-314. 12

*

Neumann, loc. cit. Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

492

Jaroslav

G.

Polach

Frankowski, Wactaw, "Informacja o pracach Dziahi energetyki jadrowej Instytutu badan j^drowych PAN" [Information about the Work of the Reactor Development Division of the PAN Nuclear Research Institute], pp. 9-16. , Andrzej Wierusz, Arkadiusz Zmyslowski, "Obliczenia cieplne reaktora energetycznego na uran naturalny z moderatorem grafitowym i chtodzeniem C 0 2 " [Heat-Transfer Calculations for a Natural Uranium Graphite-Moderated C0 2 -Cooled Power Reactor], pp. 138-158. topuszynski, Jerzy, "Uklad cieplny elektrowni jadrowej z reaktorem na uran naturalny z moderatorem grafitowym i chtodzeniem C 0 2 " [Steam-cycle of a Nuclear Power Station with Natural Uranium Graphite-Moderated, C 0 2 Cooled Reactors], pp. 191-209. Schmid, Josef, "Projekt ukiadow cieplnych reaktora jednorodnego wrzacego" [Design of Steam Cycles for a Homogeneous Boiling Power Reactor], pp. 210-247. Stach, Vaclav, "Prace Zakladu energetyki instytutu fizyki jadrowej CSAV" [The Work of the IJJF CSAV Reactor Development Division], pp. 17-27. Trlifaj, Ladislav, "Wariacyjna metoda ujednoradniania srodowiska niejednorodnego" [The Variational Method in the Homogenisation of a Heterogeneous Medium], pp. 106-124. Urbanec, Jan, "Przedmowa przewodnicz^cego delegacji Czechoslowackiej" [Introduction by the Head of the Czechoslovak Delegation], p. 8. Vlach, Jaromir, "Bilans paliwowy reaktora jednorodnego" [Fuel Balance in a Homogeneous Reactor], pp. 82-105. Wilhelmi, Zdzisiaw, "Przedmowa przewodniczacega delegacji polskiej" [Introduction by the Head of the Polish Delegation], p. 7. Wojcik, Tadeusz, "Koszty wlasne produkcji energii elektrycznej w elektrowni jadrowei" [Costs of Electrical Energy Generated in a Nuclear Power-Station], pp. 275-292. Zmyslowski, Arkadiusz, "Koncepcja konstrukcji urz^dzenia do tadowania i rozladowania prgtow w reaktorze z chiodzeniem gazowym" [Construction Concept of a Device for Loading and Unloading of Fuel Rods in a Gas-Cooled Reactor], pp. 180-189. II. Polish-Czechoslovak Conference in Lihlice, Czechoslovakia, 12-17 May, 1958. The only available material concerning papers delivered at this Conference is a summary report by Frantisek Berger, published in Jaderna energie, vol. IV:8, 1958. The list of papers presented is arranged in two groups: (a) Polish Papers; (b) Czechoslovak Papers. This division will be followed here. In the original list by Berger, only the last names of authors are given. Further research established authoritatively the full names of Polish authors on the basis of data available in Jozef Hurvic (Ed.), Energia jqdrowa w Polsce w latach 1955-1960. In case of Czechoslovak names, several sources were consulted, but a few names remain incomplete. There is a possibility that in a few instances (as, e.g., for Sulc) the initials given here may be incorrect, (a) Polish Papers. Arkuszewski, Jacek, "Dvouapulgrupove rovnice a jejich pouziti pro systemy uran-voda" [Two-and-a-Half-Group Equations and their Utilization for Uranium-Water Reactor Systems], Polish Paper, 1. Baran, W., "Zavislost periody reaktoru na souciniteli rozmnozeni v podkritickem stavu" Dependence of the Reactor Period on a Multiplication Coefficient in the Subcritical State], Polish Paper, 3. Filipczak, W., and M. Sztajnkoler, "Simulator kinetiky reaktoru" [Simulator of Reactor Kinetics], Polish Paper, 6.

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Energy

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Frankowski, Waclaw, "Uvaha k urceni charakteristiky reaktoru pro vyzkum materialu" [Some Remarks about Determination of Characteristics of a Material Testing Fector], Polish Paper, 5. Greniewski, M., "Graficko-numericke metody reSeni dvougrupovych difusnich rovnic" [Graphic-Numerical Methods of Solution of Two-Group Diffusion Equations], Polish Paper, 2. Labno, L., and M. Sztajnkoler, "Doplnkova merici zafizeni pro reaktor WWRS" [Supplemenary Measuring Equipment for a WWRS Reactor], Polish Paper, 7. Mika, J., and A. Zmyslowski, "tJvodni projektove studie pro experimentalni reaktor s grafitovym moderatorem" [The Introductory Project Studies for Experimental Reactor with a Graphite Moderator], Polish Paper, 4. Wojcik, Tadeusz, and Waclaw Frankowski. "Metoda porovnavacich vypoctu ekonomie jaderne a konvencni elektrarny" [Method of Comparative Calculations of Cost in Nuclear and Conventional Power-Stations], Polish Paper, 8. (b) Czechoslovak Papers. Berger, F., and Pelcik, "Plynem chlazene reaktorove smycky" [Gas-Cooled Reactor Loops], Czechoslovak Paper, 7. Klik, Frantisek, and laroslav Markvart, "Dalsi vyvoj tezkovodnich, plynem chlazenych energetickych reaktoru" [Further Development of Heavy-Water, Gas-Cooled Power Reactors], Czechoslovak Paper, 1. Kovanic, P., "Aplikace priblizne rovnice kinetiky reaktoru k analyze vlastnosti automatickych regulatoru reaktoru se smisenym regulacnim systemem" [Application of Approximate Equation of Reactor Kinetics for the Purpose of Analyzing Characteristics of Automatic Regulators in Reactors with Complex Regulatory Systems], Czechoslovak Paper, 9. Krej£i, M., Melichar and Zikan, "Reseni prechodovych procesu v jadernych reaktorech pomoci elektronickeho analogonu" [Solution of Transfer Processes in Power Reactors by Electronic Analog Devices], Czechoslovak Paper, 8. Malak, J., Paryzek and J. Schmid, "Tepelna problematika homogenniho varneho reaktoru" [Fuel Problems in a Homogeneous Boiling Reactor], Czechoslovak Paper, 4. Novotny, P., "Hydrodynamika homogenniho reaktoru na suspensi kyslicniku uranu ve vode" [Hydrodynamics of a Homogeneous Reactor with U 0 2 Suspended in Water], Czechoslovak Paper, 3. PaSek, M., and J. ftezni£ek, "Experimentalni prace z oboru tekutych kovu I" [Experimental Studies in the Field of Liquid Metals I], Czechoslovak Paper, 5. Pasek, M. and Petr or M. Sulc, "Experimentalni prace z oboru tekutych kovu, II" [Experimental Studies in the Field of Liquid Metals, II], Czechoslovak Paper, 6. Trlifaj, Ladislav, "K feSeni kineticke rovnice pro difusi neutronu ve valcove soumernem prostredi podle metody sferickych harmonik" [Some Remarks on the Solution of Kinetic Equations for the Diffusion of Neutrons in Cylindrical-Symmetric Space in Accordance with a Method of Spherical Harmonics], Czechoslovak Paper, 10. Zajic, V., "Projekt pokusneho 10 MW prutocneho homogenniho reaktoru s palivovou suspensi kysliiniku uranu v lehke vode" [A Project of a 10 MW Experimental Homogeneous-Flux Reactor with Suspension of U 0 2 in Light Water], Czechoslovak Paper, 2. Besides the above-mentioned lectures, there were also presented papers by delegates (not further identified) from East Germany, Hungary, and Yugoslavia, dealing with prospects for atomic energy in the countries in question. Unfortunately, no further details are known.

Czechoslovak Postwar Housing: A Case Study of Communist Czechoslovakia

Housing

Production as Compared to the United States* MICHAEL SUMICHRAST

1. A COMPARISON OF HOUSING OF TWO ECONOMIC SYSTEMS

Czechoslovakia has, for the most part, copied the Soviet model of constructing of new housing. Many contradictory claims have been made as to the actual level of home building activity in the United States and the Communist bloc. On numerous occasions, for instance, it has been stated that Soviet activity, in terms of housing units, surpasses that of the United States. A closer look at home building activity in Czechoslovakia - in a way a prototype of home building behind the Iron Curtain - will help to put housing comparisons of the two economic systems into better perspective. This paper concerns itself with an examination of some characteristics of new home building, as well as the ability of both economic systems to house their population. 2. HOUSING PRODUCTION HIGH

In terms of housing units built compared to the increase in population, the Czechoslovaks' 20 years of home building must be considered very remarkable. Since 1945, Czechoslovakia has built about 1.1 million housing units (Table 1). At the same time, the net increase in population has been slightly over 2 million. At the same time, in the United States, 28 million housing units were built compared to a net population increase of nearly 51 million. Thus, in both cases, one housing unit was built for every 1.8 persons added to the population. Twenty years' data, however may be somewhat disfavoring recent Czechoslovak production. In the first four years after the war, there was relatively little home * Published with the permission of the National Association of Home Builders of America.

Czechoslovak Postwar Housing

495

building in Czechoslovakia compared to the United States. Not until 1955 did Czechoslovakia get into home building on a large scale. United States production was already over 1 million units in 1946, reaching nearly 2 million in 1950, the highest postwar record. In 1950 there were 14 new units built per 1,000 persons in the United States, a postwar high; in Czechoslovakia in that year, only 3.1 units per thousand were TABLE 1

Building Intensity Rates, United States and Czechoslovakia, 1956-1964 United States

Czechoslovakia

Year

Population»

Housing Ratio Housing Ratio Units (3> 1000 Population Units @1000

1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 19451964

168,088,000 171,187,000 174,149,000 177,135,000 179,992,000 183,057,000 185,890,000 188,616,000 191,300,000

1,349,100 1,223,900 1,382,000 1,531,300 1,274,000 1,336,800 1,468,700 1,590,300 1,600,000

50,832,000 27,278,000

8.0 7.2 7.9 8.6 7.1 7.3 7.9 8.4 8.4 1.83

13,092,570 13,358,035 13,474,400 13,564,593 13,654,088 13,776,332 13,880,000 13,980,000 14,100,000

63,677 64,275 53,395 68,336 76,265 87,260 85,200 b 82,000 c 80,930 d

2,010,000 968,338

e

4.8 4.8 4.0 5.0 5.6 6.3 6.1 5.9 5.7 1.83

* Source: Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Population Estimates. Bureau of the Census, C-20 Series, Construction Reports, Housing Starts, June, 1964. All other data besides the one mentioned below, from Czechoslovak Statistical Yearbook, 1962. a

Mean population. Resident population only, excluding armed forces abroad. Rude pravo, February 11, 1964. e Prace, January 15, 1964. d Ibid. e The ratio is actually 2.07 when 968,338 units are calculated. But to this total an estimated 150,000 housing units should be added for family houses built by individuals and not included in the total. This would raise the level of construction activity from 1945 to 1964 to 1.1 million units. b

built. Since 1950, this ratio has been declining in the U.S.A., reaching a low of 7.1 in 1960. The opposite was true in Czechoslovakia; from a low of 1.8 in 1948, it increased to 6.3 in 1961; then declined to 5.7 in

Michael

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Sumichrast

1964. It is forecast to increase to 7.0 next year with construction of nearly 100,000 units planned. 1 In general, this ratio is higher than the ratio in other Socialistic countries, except Soviet Russia, and higher than Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. It is lower than Denmark, Finland, France, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 2 In the United States, 56% of all existing housing units were single family, in Czechoslovakia, 3 8 % . Single family houses account for TABLE 2

Single Family Housing Construction Country

in Europe,

1961 *

Percent of Units Built in Single Family Housing

Ireland United Kingdom Turkey Belgium Norway Denmark Bulgaria Yugoslavia Czechoslovakia France Sweden Finland Austria West Germany Switzerland Spain

90% 78 (1960) 75 66 50 (1960) 49 42 42 32 27 27 26 25 (I960) 22 11 8

United States

72

* Source: United Nations, Annual Bulletin of Housing and Building Statistics for Europe, Geneva, 1962, p. 21 and Bureau of the Census, C-20, Construction Report, Housing Starts. 1

Ing. S. Takac, Minister of Construction, Rude prdvo, February 6, 1964. United Nations, Annual Bulletin of Housing and Building Statistics for Europe (1961), Table 5, pp. 14-15.

2

Czechoslovak Postwar Housing

497

about 30% of all new construction in Czechoslovakia,3 and the rate is twice as high in the United States.4 In 1961, for instance, when Czechoslovakia built 32% of all new units in single family houses, Ireland built 90%, the U.S. 72%, West German 22%, Switzerland 11%, and Spain only 8% 5 (Table 2). Thus, multifamily construction is prevalent in Czechoslovakia.

3. PRODUCTION MEASURED IN SPACE

Of course, a comparison of the number of units built each year is deceiving. Let us say, for example, that U.S.S.R. housing production in 1961 was 2.7 million units,6 as compared to 1.4 million units in the United States.7 This in itself would not signify the difference. But a comparison will show that in the U.S.S.R. the average is about 500 square feet,8 and in the United States about 1200 square feet.9 In terms of total space provided, the U.S.A., therefore, built about 17 billion square feet as against nearly 14 billion in the U.S.S.R. in 1961. Czechoslovak housing also shows that spacewise their units are smaller than those in the United States (an average unit has around 400 sq. ft.).10 Czechoslovakia also produces over four times as many housing units with 3 rooms and under, than is the case with United States housing.11 On the average, only 18% of all new housing units contain 3 rooms or less in the United States, as against 73% in Czechoslovakia. And yet, Czechoslovakia in this respect has the highest standard among Socialistic countries, excluding Russia. Yugoslavia built 98% of all new units with 3 rooms and less, Bulgaria 95%, Hungary 94%, East Germany 81%, and Poland 75% 12 (Table 3). 3

Czechoslovak Statistical Yearbook (1962), Tables 6-19, 6-20 and 6-29, pp. 138, 139 and 144. 4 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Construction Reports, Housing Starts, C-20. 5 United Nations, Annual Bulletin of Housing and Building Statistics for Europe (1962), p. 21. 6 Ibid., Table 8, p. 24. 7 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Construction Reports, Housing Starts, C-20. 8 United Nations, Op. cit. and Uriel Manheim, Europe Builds (New York, Housing Securities, 1960). 9 National Association of Home Builders, Economic News Notes, February 1964, p. 3. 10 Czechoslovak Statistical Yearbook (1962), Table 6-19, p. 138. 11 Ibid. 12 United Nations, Op. cit., Table 6, pp. 16-19.

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Michael

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TABLE

Size of Housing

Country Austria Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Denmark East Germany Finland France Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Netherlands Norway Poland Romania Spain Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom West Germany Yugoslavia United States

3

Units in Europe

and U.S., 1961 *

Up to 2 Rooms

Up to 3 Rooms

50.3% 68.8 11.6 29.6 28.0 37.2 15.0 50.8 42.5 3.2 19.9 1.1 6.1 32.7 67.4 .1 19.3 8.0 10.9 8.1 84.1

78.0% 95.2 73.2 58.8 80.5 65.2 46.0 73.9 93.9 8.6 46.7 5.2 15.6 74.7 n.a. 1.6 42.5 23.0 n.a. 28.6 97.7

8.5

17.9

Remarks Kitchen not counted Kitchen not counted Kitchen not counted Kitchen not counted Data for 1957

Data for 1960

Data for 1960 Data for 1960 Kitchen not counted

Kitchen not counted

* Source: United Nations, Annual Bulletin of Housing and Building for Europe, Geneva, 1962, Table 6, pp. 16-18. n.a. - not available. 4.

Statistics

INVENTORY

Not only are housing units smaller in Czechoslovakia, but there are more people per unit (3.6 persons) than in the U.S.A. (3.3 persons). In spite of substantial strides by the Czechoslovakian government in building new housing units, their total inventory is older than the U.S.A. housing inventory. Over 67% of all units in C.S.S.R. are over 30 years old,13 as compared to 46% in the U.S.A.14 Of the total number of 13 14

Czechoslovak Statistical Yearbook, Op. cit., Table 3-1 la, p. 67. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Housing 1960, U.S. Summary HC(1), 1.

Plate 1

New housing using poured concrete structures in the Street of the F e b r u a r y Victory, Bratislava. Project: County Project Office, Bratislava arch. V. Houdek, S. Svetko, O. D u k â t .

Model of a housing scheme in the Street of the F e b r u a r y Victory. View of residential houses. Technology of building structures of poured concrete.

G r o u n d plan of a standardized flat in the Street of the F e b r u a r y Victory.

Plate 2 Situational plan of a housing scheme Standard flat.

Czechoslovak Postwar Housing

499

housing units in the Czech region, 32.41 % were built before 1900. 15 The total inventory as of 1960 had the following characteristics: Water supply - 49% in C.S.S.R., 93% in the U.S.A.; bathrooms 33% vs. 8 8 % ; central heating - 8% vs. 5 3 % ; gas - 20% vs. 40% used for heating and 51% used for cooking fuel in the U.S.A. 10 New housing units built in Czechoslovakia, however, represent a different picture. Nearly 100% have electricity, bathrooms, nearly all have water supply, and 83% have central heating. 17 This would be pretty much in line with new housing built in the U.S.A., even though the equipment in new units can hardly be compared. While the bare necessities are provided in Czechoslovakia in what we would call good functional housing, the market place in the U.S.A. would not tolerate such standards. 5. CONSTRUCTION TYPES A N D METHODS

Since about 1957 there has been a marked shift into complete préfabrication. The basic technological breakdown of apartment construction is divided into four classes. The first class relates to the use of conventional materials such as bricks, small stone blocks, etc. The second class comprises the use of smaller prefabricated parts weighing less than 600 kg (1,323 lbs.). The third class consists of buildings assembled from brick or clinker and concrete blocks, parts of panels, weighing from 600 to 1,500 kg (1,323 to 3,307 lbs.). Buildings of the fourth class are assembled from complete walls and large prefabricated parts and panels usually weighing more than 1,500 kg (Plate l). 18 While in 1957 only 6% of all apartment units built by the state were classified as fourth-class, their number increased to 26% in 1961. Similarly, the third-class construction increased from 10.6% in 1957 to 30.3% in 1961.19 Over 90% of all construction done by state and cooperatives is socalled standard construction, which is identified as projects laid out according to standard blueprints. Projects designed without the standard blueprints are referred to as individual projects. 20 Units built by as15

Zdenëk Urbânek, Plânované hospoddrstvi, No. 8, (1963). Czechoslovak Statistical Yearbook (1962), Table 6-24, p. 140 and U.S. Bureau of the Census, Housing 1960, United States Summary, HC(1), No. 1. 17 Ibid., p. XXIII. 18 Czechoslovak Statistical Yearbook (1962, p. 121. 18 Ibid., p. 140. 20 Ibid., p. 121. 16

500

Michael Sumichrast

sembly methods accounted for nearly 70% of all structures in 1961, a 4% increase over 1960. The cost of standard construction was about 5 % lower per unit than was the case with individual construction. The construction cost of units built by using assembly line construction was over 10% less than for units built by traditional methods, and the difference between fourthclass and first-class construction was about 12% in favor of fourth-class (assembling of complete walls) per unit.21 The average cost of units declined from $4,684 22 in 1960 to $4,479 in 1961. The average cost per square meter (10.76 sq. ft.) was $121 in 1961. According to the Minister of Construction, modern methods have reduced the building cost of a unit from $6,666 in 1957, to $4,167 in 1963.23 The use of préfabrication is characterized by using a large number of mechanical cranes, which now form an inseparable part of most of the largest towns' skylines. Much of the structure is constructed by using poured concrete, which, similar to panel construction, cuts the weight of one unit, as compared to brick structures - roughly, to one-third. The cross walls measure only 12 cm (4.7244") and are made of thin, poured concrete without steel reinforcement. 2 '' The outside light panels serve as insulation. Other structural materials used, mostly in panel forms, are made of ceramzit, porous concrete, gas concrete, prestressed, poured and vacuum concrete, thin-wall blocks and others. The increased use of cement in construction can best be illustrated by the total production. In the ten-year period, 1951-1961, this production increased 260%. In 1961, Czechoslovakia was 8th among European nations in the production of cement, producing 5.34 million tons. In the same year, Czechoslovakia ranked 11th according to population.25 The use of cement in its many forms and applications seems to be very popular among the Socialistic countries. Their total production between 1951-1961 increased 250% as compared to 100% 21

Ibid., Table 6-26, p. 141. Using the tourist rate of exchange, 14.40 crowns to one United States dollar. The official rate is 7.20 crowns to one dollar. However, this rate is very much out of reality and three times this rate is being paid in some international transactions. When the Czechoslovakian government sells dollars to its citizens for foreign travel, it charges five times the official rate. 23 Ing. S. Takâc, Rudé prdvo, November 1, 1963. 24 Ing. Vladimir Zila, Pragorpress, 1536/61, B-26. 85 United Nations, Annual Bulletin of Housing and Building Statistics for Europe (1961).

22

Czechoslovak Postwar Housing TABLE

501

4

Production of Cement in Europe and United States 1957 and 1961 * (In thousand tons) Western Europe and United States Country 1957

1961

Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Greece Ireland Italy Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom West Germany

1,475 4,527 985 829 8,355 433 433 5,765 702 642 2,323 2,035 1,320 396 10,355 11,744

3,084 4,439 1,576 1,576 16,691 1,380 774 17,578 1,228 1,245 5,928 3,012 3,601 2,031 14,375 27,144

United States

41,967

55,156

627 2,064 1,656 948 2,692 1,147 12,070

1,744 5,343 5,275 1,601 7,360 3,308 50,900

Eastern Europe Bulgaria Czechoslovakia East Germany Hungary Poland Romania U.S.S.R. Western Europe Eastern Europe

50,021 22,363

United States

41,967

107,330 + 1 0 2 % 77,872 + 2 4 8 % 55,156 +

* Source: United Nations, Annual Bulletin of Housing and Building for Europe (Geneva, 1962), Table 16, pp. 36-41.

31% Statistics

502

Michael

Sumichrast

increase among all other Western European countries, and 31% in the United States 26 (Table 4). In Czechoslovakia the use of concrete production parts has increased tremendously. Total structural parts increased from 483,000 m 8 (17.05 million cubic feet) in 1955, to 2,080 m:i (73.47 million cubic feet) in 1961. The production of prestressed concrete ties increased from 70,183 pieces in 1951, to 1,002,955 pieces in 1961. The production of masts and poles made of reinforced concrete and prestressed concrete increased from 4,868 pieces in 1951 to 61,841 pieces in 1961. Also, the production of asbestos-cement water and sewer pipes increased about four times. On the other hand, the production of brick increased only about 5 0 % , signifying a shift into the fuller use of cement products in construction. 27 There are few data available of the types of material used in individual home construction, but there are some indications that in this field there is also a trend toward the use of préfabrication methods. Wood, as a building material, is still in little use, even though some effort is now under way to use wood panels in préfabrication. The extensive use of préfabrication apparently has had a tremendous impact on the reduction of construction time needed per unit - resulting in reduction of cost. The difference between the conventional method of construction and full préfabrication is quite surprising: full prefabricated units can be erected five times faster than units built by conventional methods. An average time for erecting a housing unit is: 1st class, 26.2 days; 2nd class, 18.3 days; 3rd class, 8.1 days and 4th class, 5.3 days.28

6. WHO IS DOING ALL THE BUILDING?

Individual apartments, or the ones built without standard blue-prints, accounted for 35% of the total apartments built in 1961. These would be the units built by private individuals, as defined in the Czechoslovakia Yearbook, 1962. These units, as a percentage of total apartments built, reached a low of 22% in 1952, increased to almost 50% in 1956 and 1957, then dropped sharply to 23% in 1960, and increased again to 35% in 1961.20 In 1961, 40,890 apartment units out of a total 87,260, M

" »

88

Ibid. Czechoslovak Statistical Yearbook (1962), Table 7-32, p. 195. Ibid., Table 6-25, p. 141. Ibid., Table 6-19, p. 138.

Czechoslovak Postwar Housing

503

were built by individuals. In addition, nearly 20% were built by cooperative housing, with the state then accounting for little over 40% of total new housing construction in 1961. The cooperative construction has been so popular that in 1964 its part will increase to an estimated 40% of the total housing construction; a substantial change considering that this construction only began in 1959.30 At the present time there are more than 150,000 members in over 1,300 housing cooperatives. The recent rise in membership has been primarily due to a government decision to lower the deposits. The allocation of cooperatives was first done on a "first come-first served" basis, but has been changed to basic need, according to the number of people in a given household, people who work in important branches of the economy, who travel to work daily from distant places, or families now living in unhealthy units, etc. The reason why the principle of money deposits alone cannot be applied according to the government decision is that the state contributes to the financing of construction by paying 30% of the costs and by offering advantageous credit of up to 50% of the cost of the apartment. The second major reason for the allocation by merit rather than by down payments is the scarcity of labor and materials. Thus, the state maintains that, since it bears the largest share of the costs, it has the right to lay down what members are to get what kind of units.31 The state believes that this new cooperative status will put an end to speculation. There were many cases where one person applied for membership in several cooperatives and waited to see where he could get the apartment first. Such action distorted the picture about the number of members and had a bad effect on planning. Now a member must deposit a part of his share (for instance, $174 for a one-bedroom unit, $264 for a two-bedroom unit) in a special account which he can use only with the consent of the cooperative. After having made his deposit, the cooperative member may obtain a loan from the savings bank up to $695.32 Just recently, a new type of single-family home has been tried. A prototype was built from prefabricated parts developed by the Regional Association of Building Enterprises in Prague. The public has shown a great deal of interest in this house, which can be purchased for between 30

Prace, November 10, 1963, "New Principles for Housing Construction Cooperatives". al Ibid. 52 Ibid.

504

Michael

Sumichrast

$5,069 and $6,458, depending on size. If desired by the customer, the house can be delivered to site only with the essential equipment (including central heating) for $3,125 to $4,514, and the home owner can finish it himself. The prefabricated parts are produced in 14 forms and can be assembled into a house with a living space of about 50 m2 (538 sq. ft.).33 This type of house should be about 20-25% more expensive to build than an average apartment.34 7. FINANCING

Financing of individual home construction is usually done through the state, mutual aid, or building enterprises. The National Committees help the housing cooperatives in acquiring lots and adequate economic plans, as well as materials needed for construction.85 But loans for individual houses are low, compared to United States standards. In 1961, an average loan was only about 15% of the total cost as compared to 74% in the United States.36 Out of the total state loans granted in 1961, 66% were granted to laborers, 15% to professionals, 13% to members of agricultural cooperatives, 2.0% to privately operating farmers, and 4.3% to other individuals. But only 35% of all laborers applying were actually granted loans from the state, as compared to 44% by professionals, and only 15% of privately operating farmers. The professionals also received, on the average, about 20% higher loans than did laborers.37 8. LIMITED HOME OWNERSHIP ONLY

A definition of a family house is quite different from that used in the United States. In Czechoslovakia, the determining factor of home ownership is the space in a home. While in the United States, home ownership is determined according to the fee simple, in Czechoslovakia, it is determined according to the size of the living space. Any house with a livable space of over 120 m2 (1,291.7 sq. ft.) or over 5 rooms,38 cannot "

Mladd fronta, November 11, 1963 Vladimir Cervenka, Pragorpress, 1285/62, p. 4. 35 Ibid. s« Federal Home Bank Board, September 4, 1964. 37 Czechoslovak Statistical Yearbook (1962), Table 6-30, p. 144. 38 In calculating space, only living rooms are included; kitchen, only that part which is over 12 m 2 (129 sq. ft.); entrance hall and bathroom are not included. 34

Czechoslovak Postwar Housing

505

as defined by law be in private ownership, and have certain advantages as compared to a nonownership group of people living in rental units. These advantages are mainly in the possibility for the owners to live in their own house or to accommodate their own married children. The home owners with living space of over 120 m2 do not have these advantages, even though they may be in urgent need of the house.39 The allowable space has been recently reduced by 30%, for instance, for a family of three. It works this way: Up to April 1, 1964, a family with three people calculated the space as follows: 12 + 12 + 6 = 42 m2. Now, multiply this by 2 = 84 m 2 (904.2 sq. ft.). If you happen to have more room than 84 m 2 , then the units were considered to be oversized - and as a practical result - other people could have been moved to live with you, and did. Now, you calculate like this: 18 + 18 + 18 + 6 = 60 m2. If the unit is bigger than 60 m2 (645.8 sq. ft.) for a family of three - it is considered to be oversized! This then means that there could be a maximum of 18 m2 of living space per person as against 24 m2 per person until April 1, 1964.«

9. SHORTAGE OF HOUSING STILL A VERY PRESSING PROBLEM

This reduction of living space per person is a drastic measure to cope with the ever-increasing housing shortage, a surprising fact when one considers homebuilding activity since the end of the second World War. In the middle of 1963, there were 270,000 applications for housing.41 At the rate of 3.6 persons per household, this means nearly 1,000,000 people were on the waiting list for housing, or over 7% of all population. Contrast this with the situation in the United States, where there is over 4% of the total inventory vacant all year round! But let us show an example of this situation as presented last September by Helena Kottenova, Prague 4. Ulice na Sypcine 646: "I am living with my three daughters, age 2l/i, 11 and 15, in a damp, cold basement. There is a space of about 19 m2 (196 sq. ft.). I have had an application for an apartment since 1948, but the way it looks, I will never get on the list. My first marriage fell apart because my husband was forced to live with his mother, since there was not enough room in my place." 39

Prdce, No. 223, 3:4 (September 18, 1963). Lidova demokracie, September 4, 1963, p. 3 and Prdce, February 16, 1964, p. 41. 41 Oldrich Vesely, Prdce, No. 216, 4:1-5 (Aaugust 19). 40

506

Michael Sumichrast

The housing office in Prague 4 said in a letter to Mrs. Kottenová: "We have investigated your situation and found it the way you describe it, but we cannot get you on the list since your name was not proposed by the representative of your district. . . . " After another year, when Mrs. Kottenová was put on the list, another letter came from the housing office: "Your application cannot be approved because of a very severe housing shortage." 42 Why is this? What makes the system in this respect so different from the United States system, considering that Czechoslovakia built as many housing units per increase in population as the United States? The shortage of adequate accommodations is a manifestation of the working of the system itself. Neglected private housing, inadequate maintenance of newer units, the taking-over of units by the state, the administrative process of handling nearly all of the national housing inventory, the problem of people working for wages and not having interest in properties - all of these and others brought about a gradual deterioration of the housing stock. The emergence of cooperatives, where home-ownership is assumed to set right most of the wrongs done before, is a late realization of that well-known fact, discovered only now by the leaders of the Socialistic system. 43 The sudden return to an old principle of home ownership effected by the changed directions of the Ministry of Finance by which the state decided to sell the family homes is the further realization of the fact that the old system did not work. To quote the reasoning behind this decision: "It is quite understandable that the management of these family homes by the state is not economical. Therefore, in order to achieve proper economies, it is essential that the family homes become the property of the citizens themselves, and the home owners, in turn, will take care of them properly. The family homes should first be offered for sale to people using them. If they did not have an interest in purchasing them, homes could be sold to other buyers." 44 10. PROBLEMS IN HOUSING

Let us turn our attention to some of the most pressing problems found in the Czechoslovakian socio-economic system as it affects home build42 43 44

Veierni Praha, September 28, 1963. Hospodárské noviny, No. 2 (1964). Rolnické noviny, July 31, 1964.

Czechoslovak Postwar Housing

507

ing and the ability of this system to accommodate its population. Many of the problems mentioned are created by the system itself, and some are the result of the forces beyond the systems control. It can be said that, by far, more problems are the direct result of the system itself and are not the derivatives of lack of materials, ingenuity of its people, or knowhow. What is missing is the spirit of competitiveness, individual initiative - which by the nature of the system has necessarily been replaced by absolute control of production and distribution.

11. PLANNING CANNOT REPLACE SUPPLY-DEMAND RELATIONSHIP

The process of central planning has been subjected to much criticism. The fact remains that the system of detailed planning by a central government agency failed to raise the living standard, creating in many instances nothing but utter confusion in supplying the necessary goods. Not only the ultimate consumer was the one to suffer, but production has been hampered by directives and more directives coming from above, and, in many cases, without reference to the actual need and potential of the local situation. Just recently, Professor Ota Sik, head of the Economics Institute of the Academy of Sciences, writing in Hospodarske noviny,45 emphasized that "a more extensive use of the objectively necessary supply-demand relations of a Socialist nature does not weaken, but strengthens the principle of Socialist planning". According to him, a suitable structure of the production sphere and changes in fundamental production relationships can be brought about only by means of better long-term planning, not by using supply-demand instruments. "Nevertheless, should somebody think that improvements in the system and methods of planning are sufficient and that they themselves can replace the supply-demand relations, he would be over-simplifying and distorting the problem. Not even the best plan, which fixes the enterprise targets from above, can define all aspects of the current operations in enterprises, so as to make them harmonious and so as to prevent one process developing at the expense of others." "Bureaucrats, who think more of their own position and their power to decide on every trifling detail with no regard to the society's interests, reject this approach. There are other, more reasonable, opponents of supply-demand relations, who incorporate 15

Hospodarske

noviny, No. 2 (1964).

Michael Sumichrast

508

specific enterprise plans into the planning system which they propose." 46 The whole of this system of planning rests on artificially established conflicts of interests between the central organs and the enterprises. It is also based on the empiric assumption of the central organs that the subordinate enterprises always keep some hidden reserves untapped. Anyway, this is also the reason why the central organs try to set the targets very high and to squeeze out of the enterprises the maximum. The same kind of empiric thinking has taught the enterprises to hide as much as they can. And thus, the resulting plan does not reflect a scientific inquiry into objective economic conditions and contexts, but a struggle between the planning organs, with bargaining and cheating. It is grossly erroneous to suppose that this kind of relationship between the central and the enterprise organs will change with the introduction of new structural accountancy and record-keeping. Mr. Sik agrees that the "great majority of enterprises must explore in advance their customers' demand for a large quantity of individual goods. None of the superior organs is able to give them specific numbers and qualities of these goods. If the quantitative demand for individual items, ascertained by the enterprise, can be included in the total volume of production, and if the existing capacity suffices to manufacture this quantity, everything goes all right. It is not clear, then, why there had to be a plan of the volume of production, coming from above. If the enterprise were interested in manufacturing all the necessary items, which it itself ascertained, the same goal would be achieved. The point is to make the enterprises interested in the optimum use of their own facilities and in complying with the demand of customers. The result would be an interplay of the demand by the customers and the supply by the suppliers,47 If this were accomplished, there would be no subjectivist plans of production volumes, for which the requisite conditions and deliveries are not properly ensured." 48 It is precisely because, under the present system of management, the enterprises do not direct their interests toward an optimum development of production, but only towards fulfilling global, oversimplified, and subjective plans, that the real demand for goods is growing worse. Enterprises strive to fulfill those production targets, which are expressed in the plan and which can be checked. This means that they are trying to meet the global production targets or some nominal quotas at the ** " 48

Ibid. Author's italics. Ibid.

Czechoslovak Postwar Housing

509

expense of manufacturing others without due care for the quality of goods, the introduction of new production programs, technical progress, etc. In the most general terms, it could be stated that the main defect of the present system of management is the isolation of producers from the sphere of consumers, ineffective pressure by consumers on suppliers, the impossibility of forcing the producer to submit to the real needs of consumers. The market which is almost entirely a producer's market does not effectively fulfill the role of a link, an effective mediator, but has far more characteristics of mere distribution.49

12. INVENTORY TOO OLD

Nearly one-half of all housing units are over 70 years old.50 But this alone is only part of the problem. Old housing is by nature hard to maintain and functionally obsolete. Other problems are: the rent structure creates pressure in the demand for new housing units; there is no money for repair and maintenance; insufficient differentiation in rents is one of the most serious shortcomings of the housing system; the liquidation of housing with excessive space is not effective enough, resulting in about one-third of the apartments being "underpopulated"; 51 great differences exist between rents in various parts of the country and even in different parts of one town (there exist 57 various types of rent); rents in state, cooperative, and enterprise apartments vary; and finally, there is the ever-present problem of individual initiative and responsibility.52

13. OVER 75% OF HOUSING UNITS BELONG TO STATE

More and more housing units belong to the state. Between 1957 and 1963, the number of units belonging to the state increased 127%. This has increased the total number of housing units in state ownership to 49

Dr. Rudolf Kocanda, Hospodarske noviny. No. 40 (1964). Trace, No. 253, p. 3 (September 23, 1963). Rude pravo, January 30, 1964. 52 A good illustration of this can be found in the 1963 fulfillment of plan: individual housing fulfilled plans 107.9%, State 92.1% and Agricultural 62.9%. Source: Rude pravo, February 2, 1964. 50

51

510

Michael

Sumichrast

7 5 % . This increase created a problem of administration mainly for the maintenance of properties. 53 In the Socialist sector alone, there are 1,300,000 housing units for which the state makes up 1.5 billion crowns annually. In North Moravia, for instance, there are at present nearly 17,000 housing units concentrated in housing enterprises and housing administration. These units brought in crowns 6.1 million for the year 1963. Maintenance, administrative work, and other expenses, however, were over $17.0 million. This was a deficit of over $10.9 million. One housing unit in North Moravia last year, on the average, got $89.70 from the state treasury. In addition, many people pay their rent late and even more owe rent for a considerable period of time. In North Moravia alone, in 1963, people owed $111 million in rent. Photographs of these debtors appear now and then in public, but this helps little.54 14. PRODUCTION PLANNING

The problems of planning for the production of materials in the construction industry and for design have developed into an open war between the architects and the production people. Architects maintain that the problem of design is not theirs, but that it belongs to society and mainly to the people responsible for the production of building materials. In open letters published in Nova svoboda,55 four leading architects, in a reply to Engineer Melichar, openly attacked the inability of material producers to solve the problem of quality and variety. Among other things, they said in the letter, "A visiting Cuban architect asked us in a private discussion and rather gently, whether we intend to build these TOB and G-57's everywhere. Unfortunately, we had to say yes, since we do not have anything else. This is what we architects are against: construction of the same units, which could not be changed, which are inflexible, stereotyped, one unit like another, one town like another and on top of everything else - an inferior supply of material and labor." On the other hand, the production people maintain that architects should pay more attention to water leakages through walls and basement, insufficient heating, mildew, low standards of color schemes, land planning, finishing of units, construction methods, etc.66 53 54 55 59

Ing. S. Gasparik, Prace, February 4, 1964. Vladimir Kubicek, Prace, February 4, 1964. Nova svoboda, September 3, 1963, p. 3. Ibid., September 13, p. 4.

Czechoslovak Postwar Housing

511

15. LOW QUALITY OF MATERIALS

It has already been said that in the early postwar years, mainly because of the pressing task of rebuilding the economy, construction of housing on a large scale did not develop. But from 1954, and especially from 1959, when the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee passed a resolution to solve the housing problem, the number of housing units built increased substantially. Still, as of the end of 1963, it was estimated that nearly 50% of all units were overpopulated according to Czechoslovakian standards. 57 As far as the quality of construction is concerned, only about onethird of the new housing units are classified as first class.58 The campaign aimed at finishing units to a high standard has been successful in the West and South Bohemian regions, where half of the finished units could be graded as first-class. 59 The low quality of panels, insulation, equipment, cement work, etc., is resulting in costly delays and repairs. For instance, out of 725 projects built in Central Slovakia, 481 were turned over with faults. It took 2 million crowns to correct them. 60 In Eastern Slovakia, 76% of all projects had faults. The use of outer-wall prefabricated slabs, the insulation of which had not been tested, resulted in costly repairs to more than 1,300 housing units in Prague. 61

16. LITTLE SELECTION POSSIBLE

As to the type of building itself, a good illustration was published in Nova svoboda under the title, "More Confidence in Architects". 62 "We have been overwhelmed by the building of identical units. It is inhuman to want to build in the whole republic all the same houses, all the same villages, all the same towns. "Imagine an architect studying the old and new architecture of the world for many years and then designing identical structures, identical units, identical panels, without possibility of any changes, or ideas, or different solutions." 57 58 59 60 61

•2

Ibid., February 2, 1964. Ing. S. Takac, Minister of Construction, Rude pravo, February 6, 1964. Ibid. Prdce, September 28, 1963, p. 3. Rude pravo, February 11, 1964. Zdenek Urbanek, Planovane hospodafstvi, No. 8 (1963).

512

Michael

Sumichrast

This, of course, is mainly the result of a decision to increase rapidly the number of units built. The simple, panel-type construction was, and still is, repeated to a drab uniformity. On the other hand, it cannot be disputed that it helps alleviate the most pressing housing shortage. 17. SHORTAGE OF MATERIAL

The shortage of materials is mostly a result of improper planning, distribution, and allocation to individual projects. Nearly always, there is a shortage of one kind or another. In 1963 there was a great shortage of central-heating radiators. This affected houses built in the winter of 1963-1964, and as a result, they were not equipped with radiators.63 To quote from Svoboda, "The construction industry is hampered by difficulties encountered in rail and road transport, as well as by shortages of certain materials such as steel girders, pumps, radiators, elevator components, etc. These shortages are known to the Ministry of Construction and will be gradually eliminated." 64 The limited materials from which to choose makes it hard, if not impossible, for architects to use variety in design. This results in simplifying the production and, of course, is appreciated by construction people. On the other hand, it makes the construction people defend this simplicity against the arguments of architects. They spend a great deal of time arguing that a different kind of building is impossible to build, since there is no such material available. This, then, hinders the development of new products and ideas. The United States system for the production of building materials is in direct contrast to the limited number of items manufactured in the C.S.S.R. There is a great variety of materials produced in the United States. For instance, there are about 2,500 manufacturers producing all kinds of doors listed in the Thomas Registry, about 180 makers of hot-water heaters, nearly 1,000 lock manufacturers, etc.65 18. SHORTAGE OF SKILLED LABOR

One of the greatest problems in construction is the labor shortage. In 1963, building enterprises employed 436,000 people, including 253,000 63 64 65

Rude pravo, December 6, 1963. Nova svoboda, January 1964, p. 7. Thomas Registry of Manufacturers, 54th Edition, 1964.

Czechoslovak Postwar Housing

513

manual workers. This was about 6,000 fewer than were considered adequate for planned production. In that year, the productivity plan was 96.4% fulfilled. The average wages in the building trade were $105.97 a month. 88 The labor shortage is impossible to solve, according to the Chief of the Planning Division of ONV, Robert Koutny: "It is hard to do anything. We can't get any more people. Even our workers are leaving us. And the reason? Better pay." 67 To alleviate this shortage and make up for days lost due to severe winters, the Central Committee of the Building Workers decided to make some radical changes in working hours. The short winter working week will be supplemented by a longer working week during the summer. An uninterrupted cycle will also be tested at big building projects. So, for example, the builders will work during a 90-hour cycle for 10 days, at 9 to 10 hours of full shifts, and then will have four days of rest. This will enable builders who live far away to visit their families. To increase builders' material incentives, piece-rate wages will be paid to more people. A check will be made as to whether it would be possible to grant extra benefits to those who take their leave during the winter. For every week of leave taken during this period, the building worker would get an extra two days of leave. The loss of wages due to bad weather would thus be lessened.88 19. LABOR PRODUCTIVITY LOW

There is a move to reduce the number of white-collar workers in construction. A part of the savings from the wage funds to result from this reduction will be left with the enterprises for bonuses and special rewards.69 Having too many white-collar workers must be one of the most acute problems in Czechoslovakia. Even though the data are hardly comparable, at least some idea can be derived by comparing previously mentioned figures on total employment in construction and the number of manual workers. Obviously, this definition is too vague, but it shows that only about 60% of the total force are manual workers, as against nearly 85% so-called nonsupervisory personnel employed in total construction activity in the United States (Table 5). 88 87 68 89

Rudé pravo, February 2, 1964. Zemedelské noviny, No. 8, p. 3:1 (January 9, 1964). Svobodné slovo, February, 1964. Ibid.

514

Michael Sumichrast TABLE 5

Total Contract Construction Employment in the United States, 1963 *

Total Construction General Building Heavy Construction Highways and Streets Others Special Trade *

Total

Nonsupervisory

2,974,200 904,600 565,100 278,500 286,600 1,405,200

2,511,000 708,000 483,300 244,500 238,800 1,256,900

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, April, 1964.

An index of total employment in the construction industry increased from a 1953 base of 100 to 109 in 1963, while in the United States this index fluctuated quite rapidly, reaching a high of 114 in 1956, and declining to 102 in 1961. In the U.S.S.R., this index continued to increase each year, reaching 156 in 1958 and 187 in 1961.70 Fluctuation of labor employment in the U.S.A. is the result of free enterprise and supply-demand relations. Obviously, this is not the case in Socialist countries, where the customer demand does not as yet play a role.

20.

MAINTENANCE

At present, on the average, there is one maintenance man for 189 housing units, which is considered intolerable. Plans are for reducing this to 100 units to one maintenance man.71 The situation for repairs and maintenance is critical in all parts of the country. This can be welldocumented by conditions in apartment houses in Ostrava. There, despite a steady increase in the number of new apartments, thousands of old buildings in downtown Ostrava, in Pfivoz, Marianske Hory, Vitkovice, and elsewhere are dilapidated. Apartment buildings built in new residential areas ten years ago also need preventive maintenance. Rain and bad weather cause great hardship to thousands of citizens. Every year the situation becomes more critical, in spite of the town 70

United Nations, Annual Bulletin of Housing and Building Statistics rope (1961, Table 11, p. 29. 71 Narodni slovo, December 12, 1963.

for Eu-

Czechoslovak Postwar Housing

515

national committees and district national committees seeking a solution. The work of the maintenance crews is developing slowly and the capacity of the town construction enterprises and cooperative building organizations is not growing. One of the reasons for the deteriorating condition of apartment buildings is the obsolete method of collecting money directly for repairs. According to the Socialist system, this method was justified when buildings were privately owned. Methods are the same now, however. Workers from the town construction enterprises and cooperative building organizations travel to suburbs and even farther to repair privately owned family homes, in order to collect cash. Tinsmiths and roofers, urgently needed in Ostrava, are building private recreation cottages in Beskydy or Jeseniky Mountains. As a result, the collectively owned property is deteriorating. The 19,000 dwellings in Ostrava need more than 2,000 new roofs, gutters, and plaster. According to the 1961 census, about 12,000 apartments have leaks because of bad roofs. Another reason for this situation is a manpower shortage in construction enterprises. Workers are leaving to work with preferential enterprises, such as the Klement Gottwald Iron Works in Vitkovice. National Committees take over buildings into collective ownership and have no repair facilities (Plate 2).72 A further example of difficulties in quality of construction, preventive maintenance, and repairs is presented below, concerning housing in the Eastern part of Slovakia. Dozens of complaint letters are being written by tenants in East Slovak Kraj housing developments who are afraid that in winter they will again freeze in their apartments. Their fear is justified, because the housing administrations have not utilized the warm season to complete or repair heating equipment. In Presov, for instance, 22 boilers cracked during the winter (196364) and heating radiators are useless within two years, owing to corrosion. Almost everywhere, equipment is not functioning properly because of a shortage of switches and other small but essential items. Hot water supplies, too, are irregular, thanks to frequent breakdowns of equipment. Tenants have withheld rent in many cases, and confusion in the housing administration's records (for instance, rent vouchers are simply thrown into a large wooden box) caused a shortage of funds exceeding $70,000. In fact, the housing administration doesn't even Ibid.

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know how many buildings and apartments it administers, and so it may happen that two superintendents are assigned to the same building. Measures are now under way to bring order into the accounts. Tenants who withhold rent on the ground that they do not get enough heat are being asked to move out of centrally heated apartments. However, some shortcomings cannot be eliminated by the administration itself, or even the national committee, which has dealt with housing problems 20 times in the past two years. Improvements are being sought in cooperation with the district authorities, with building enterprises, and, last but not least, with the tenants themselves. For instance, it is intolerable that the city should employ no one with expert training in the maintenance of elevators and boilers.73 These are the problems connected with a system where most real estate is in the state's hands, where rent are controlled, and where all of the decisions usually determined by the supply-demand relationship are made at a central office run by the state. 21. RENT CONTROL STRUCTURE INADEQUATE

The rent structure, as set up after 1948, brought about deterioration in much of the housing. The rent was kept artificially low, especially for units owned by individuals. From these rent, no money was left for preventive maintenance, repairs, or new improvements. But even the rent on state-owned properties was too low to pay the maintenance and repair costs, which had to be paid by the state. The following table shows the loss incurred by the state, because of disproportionately low rents, in the North Moravian Region alone: TABLE

6

Operating Deficit of State Apartments in North Moravian Region

1960-1963 * Year

Number of Flats

Paid for Flats

1960 1961 1962 1963

71,562 85,915 109,513 121,250

$3,946,250 4,353,810 5,662,700 6,180,550

* "

Costs $11,987,560 13,077,430 15,869,580 17,058,330

Source: Nova svoboda, February 2, 1964. VN, October 13, 1963, pp. 2-3.

Deficit

Deficit for Flat

$ 8,041,310 8,723,620 10,206,880 10,877,780

$112.37 101.54 93.20 89.71

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The average rent of a new two-room apartment is about $12.86 per month and $41.60 per year for all units.74 The question often asked is whether society can afford to make up for the cheap rents, especially in modern housing units, out of the state treasury. The answer is "No", since it is perfectly obvious that not the state, but the people themselves, pay it. It is also quite obvious that the accommodation and services received are of low quality. Therefore, a new system of rents has been devised by which higher rents will be paid for better accommodation than for inferior accommodation.75 Under this new system the flats will be divided into four categories. The first will include flats with central- or long-distance heating; the second category will comprise flats without this type of heating, but with every other facility; the third category will consist of flats which lack a bathroom or any other vital facility; the last category will include flats without bathrooms, etc. of their own. The rents will be raised in only the first three categories. They will be calculated on the basis of the habitable floor space and the rest of the floor space of the flat. In the first category, it is expected that a square meter of habitable floor space will cost $1.87 per annum, in the second category, $1.25, and in the third, $0.97. The rate for the rest of the floor space will be lower. Built-in furniture and other advantages of modern flats will also count when setting the higher rents, while flats with windows facing backyards, basement flats, or damp flats will be valued at less. The new rents will apply everywhere throughout Czechoslovakia. The term, "the rest of the floor space", applies to corridors, entrance halls, bathrooms, water closets etc.; kitchens will count as "habitable floor space" if exceeding 12 square meters 129.17 square feet).76 Rents will also be reduced when a flat is inhabited by children. In the case of flats in the first two categories, there is to be a reduction of 5% for one child, 15% for two children, 30% for three children, and up to 50% for four children or more. In flats of the third category, the reduction will amount to roughly half the reduction applicable to the first two categories. The rent will include all the payments collected every time the rent is paid. But it will not include payments for the use of lifts, for the cleaning of the staircase and other parts of the house used by all the tenants, payments for water and heating, or for hot water. The local rate 74 75

Vladimir Kubicek, Prace, February 4, 1964. Stefan Gasparik, Rude pravo, February 13, 1964. Ibid.

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levied on excessive floor space will also be paid in the future. It is expected that the rent will be higher on a percentage basis in relation to the excess floor space. The adjustment of rents will apply to about 60% of all housing and will affect about a quarter of all families. It will not extend to family houses and cooperative housing. If a person modernizes his flat at his own expense, the flat will not be upgraded to a higher category; but if the modernization is carried out by the National Committee or housing enterprise, upgrading will apply.

22. OTHER PROBLEMS

The continually recurring and ever-worsening problem of insufficient technical equipment has not, so far, been given enough attention. Construction is not planned so as to provide housing units with heating, water supply, and other utilities. A last-minute effort has to be extended to fulfill the plan, resulting in many construction difficulties; and there are considerable shortcomings in the internal organization.77

23. PROPORTION OF INCOME SPENT ON RENT ABOUT SAME AS IN U.S.

An interesting claim frequently made by politicians and economists in Socialist countries is that the low rent structure is part of the average income in their countries, as compared to rents paid in capitalist countries. They usually quote 2% of income paid by their workers as compared to 6 % - 2 5 % in capitalist countries. For instance, Mr. V. Cervenka, the Director of the Building and Architecture Research Institute, published a paper in which he said: "Low rents are a characteristic feature of the housing policy of the Czechoslovakian Republic. As the state contributes from its own funds toward housing, rents amount to 3-4 percent of the working people's average income. The propitious housing policy has substantially lowered the portion of the working people's earnings which they must allot to rent." 78 Now this sounds really great in terms of allocation of income for accommodation, from any point of view, and certainly extremely favor77

Ing. S. Takac, Minister of Construction, Rude pravo, February 6, 1964. "Perspectives of Housing in Czechoslovakia", VI. Cervenka, Pragorpress, 1285/62.

78

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able from the point of view of the rent structure in the United States. However, an investigation of comparability of the two rent structures reveals an entirely different story. Let us examine what is comparable in these two systems, to determine the percentage of income paid per capita per square foot of accommodation. Let us exclude the old buildings and compare only the new rental units, leaving out the home-ownership group, as well. The average monthly rent, as we said before, for a new apartment in Czechoslovakia is about $12.86 per month. The average income per worker per month was about $95.97 in 1961.79 To the monthly rent paid by the workers, the state contributes about $90.28 per year per unit (each contaning about 560 square feet).80 Adding the rent paid by workers to the state's contribution (which, rightly or wrongly, is assumed to be ultimately paid by the consumer) would give us an average rent per month of $55.50 per capita, or 16.2% of the income. Now we consider the United States rent structure. According to the 1960 census, the median income of a family was $4,200 per year and the average rent was about $100 per month for each new unit.81 This would give us an average rent per person of $38.46 per month, or 28.6% of his income. Now, comparing this payment of rent with what it is paid jor, we can see that on the average, U.S. rental units are 1.7 times larger than the average unit in Czechoslovakia.82 Relating this, then, to what it would cost to rent a similar unit in Czechoslovakia to one in the United States (strictly on a per square foot basis) would bring the portion of income spent on rent in Czechoslovakia to 27.48%, or about the same level as in the U.S. So in both cases a little over one-quarter of the average income is spent on rent for housing. This comparison does not take into consideration the amenities offered by the two systems, such as inside finish, playgrounds, parking space, equipment, etc. It is likely, that, in this respect, U.S. standards are higher than Czechoslovakia's.

24. FUTURE PLANNING

There have been interesting ideas from the planners of the future development of towns and cities. Most of the towns and villages in CzechoCzechoslovak Statistical Yearbook (1962), Tables 5-7, p. 109. Allowing 80 sq. ft. for kitchen and 80 sq. ft. for other space, plus 400 sq. ft. for an average unit. 81 Built since 1955. Source: U.S. of the Census, Housing 1960, HC(2), No. 1, Table A-2, pp. 1-4. 82 National Association of Home Builders, Special Report 64-5 (April, 1964). 80

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Slovakia are small: 14,616 have less than 500 inhabitants, with 12.6% of the total population living in them. On the other hand, 40% of the population lives in places with over 5,000 inhabitants.83 This diffusion of people creates immense problems, mainly in getting people to and from work. There is no network of good roads, and the use of cars is extremely limited. The goal of planners is to achieve maximum centralization of industry in conjunction with the living quarters, so that there will be no uneconomical use of travel time and needless expenditures for transportation. With respect to this fundamental goal, 1,236 locations (plus Prague) were picked (containing about 52.4% of the total population), where construction of housing will be concentrated. This selection was published in a document called "The Selection of Towns", and serves mainly in directing the construction activity in small places, mostly those with less than 1,500 inhabitants. This, in a way, is similar to master planning in the United States, except that only the broad lines of future goals are defined. These goals have to do with the economical, cultural, and sociological growth of a community. It is a unique plan covering wide areas and designed to improve the living conditions of people in villages. According to this plan, the result will be balanced communities with schools, cultural buildings, hospitals, shops, etc., in healthy and aesthetically pleasing surroundings.84 In the sphere of regional planning, the main tasks of Czech architects lie in the correct location of new factories, housing settlements, and transport lines, in relation to manpower, so as to support the economic development of all regions and, on the basis of new factories and settlements, to ensure an equal standard of services and benefits in all urban centers. This is, in fact, the problem of eliminating differences between town and village.85 A further concentration of settlements, in accord with world trends, is also to be reckoned with. This concentration, however, will not be unplanned or allowed to lead to excessive growth of individual cities and towns, but is expected to limit the growth of towns to an optimum size. For instance, in Slovakia, only two cities of more than 100,000 inhabitants are envisaged, and the preferential growth as planned is for 83

Rude prdvo, No. 282, p. 3:2 (September 12, 1964). Based on Ing. Jan Kuklica, in Rude pravo, No. 282, p. 3:2 (September 12, 1964). 85 Slovak Building Development in Socialistic Czechoslovakia, Union of Architects, Bratislava, Osveta, 1963.

84

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about 50 selected existing towns of 50 to 100 thousand inhabitants each to become the center of a district having an area of about 600 sq. km. (about 1,500 acres). Such towns will then be provided with the necessary public services, utilities, and institutions, catering to the whole district. The time required to reach such a town from any part of its district (for work, office, culture, etc.) will not exceed 30 minutes. The districts containing these towns will also have smaller urban centers, developing as the result of a concentration of small country settlements (of about 10,000 inhabitants), with the change-over from smallscale agricultural production to large-scale cooperative production. The problem of community planning is being gradually solved, as when new projects are planned with more and more community facilities. Unlike the situation in the United States, where schools and business of all kinds readily follow a larger development, in Czechoslovakia, until 1963, most of the new developments were built without shops, schools, restaurants, or roads. Many times, lengthy delays in developing the complete community resulted from using panels for housing units and bricks on community facilities, and not completing the outside improvements on time.86 New methods since developed in overall planning now make it possible to complete the outside work before the actual construction of housing is undertaken. 87 In 26 developments planned for 1964, 10% is earmarked for the development of community facilities, while the total outside improvement, including all the utilities, will account for an additional 15% of the total investment. An average development comprises 1,925 housing units with an average living space of 431.63 square feet. 88 The average time of completion of a development is nearly four years.89

25. RECONSTRUCTION OF OLD TOWNS PLANNED RATHER THAN CREATION OF NEW CITIES

The gradual liquidation of small villages and the retention or formation of larger centers of agricultural production is planned. When the mechanization of cooperative agriculture is completed and transport fully developed, the population will no longer be tied to small, dispersed villages. 8S

Práce, February, 1964, p. 4. Ibid. 88 Not comparable to U.S. definition of usable space. 8 » Ibid. 87

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These will then serve, according to need, as recreational centers for the inhabitants of cities and towns. Such a system of settlements follows from applying the principle of urban residential areas (districts, localities) to a whole region. A hierarchy of interdependent settlements having a unified system of production, entertainment, services, transport, and recreation does away with the existing differences between town and village housing and the concomitant disproportion in time required for travelling to work from villages to urban centers. The liquidation of differences between industrial and agricultural production on the basis of collective work will also enable people from the towns to reach the countryside more easily to work in agriculture. The second large group of problems to be solved by the town planners is the problem of the towns themselves, their optimum size, structure and architectonic composition. Medium-sized towns developed from older, historical towns will be most typical. New towns will be built only in rare cases. Towns nearing optimum size will not be expanded. Their development will take place, in the main, on their existing territory (American towns are very much spread out). Therefore, the problem of the reconstruction of existing towns is of the utmost importance. Instead of urban centers of mixed functions, they want to achieve larger onefunctional units, even in the older towns. Thus, the goal is not to build new satellite towns, which is the trend in the United States, but rather to preservation of old towns and develop already existing ones. This, of course, is a rather logical step, mainly because of the limited amount of land in Czechoslovakia and because of the historical significance of many of its cities. What Czechoslovakia has failed to do, so far, is to develop cities or suburbs similar to those in the United States, and provided with all the facilities necessary to modern life. Housing units themselves are only a part of the total community. If the community facilities are not provided within a short time, if the road system is not forthcoming, if recreation facilities are not planned for, the development is not fulfilling its function of reasonable accomodation. This seems to be the case in most, if not all, projects built in Czechoslovakia. The plans are to change all this. But that cannot be done overnight. It takes time and much investment, as well as planning. And not until such time as this gets to the planning boards will modern housing become a reality. Technologically, the Czechoslovak home-building industry is capable

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of mass-producing low- to moderate-quality functional housing units. This, in a sense, is true of other satellite countries and Soviet Russia. Czechoslovakia has been politically, one of the closest allies of Russia. Economically, there is very little that this satellite did not copy from the Russians, and this applies, without question, to the construction industry, as well.

Public Welfare in Today's Czechoslovakia

ALOIS ROZEHNAL

1. PUBLIC WELFARE A N D THE FORM OF THE STATE

Public welfare affects the life of every individual citizen; thus, this world of subjective experience has been the object of consideration of thinkers throughout history beginning with Plato and Aristotle, continuing with the Church Fathers Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, the medieval philosophers, such as Machiavelli, up to the modern philosophical (Pascal, Belloc) sociological (Rousseau, Wilde), economic (Marx, Keynes), and legal (Kelsen, Weyr) scholars. But the main credit for revealing and interpreting the objective relations of public welfare and the external form of the state human society belongs to Professor Karel Englis (1880-1961), who developed his teleological theory in his life work, The System of the National Economy. However, his original ideas were suppressed by both the Nazi occupation and the Communist revolution, because they were equally critical of both. The objective goal of the national economy is that public welfare (salus rei publicae) which is considered the highest guiding principle of the national economy (suprema lex esto), without clarification of its content. Thus, public welfare varies according to the purpose of the national economy which is served by various forms of the state. The individualistic system needs the state for the preservation of the formal legal order which governs its economic interrelations and is based on a maximum of freedom. The individualistic state has its origin in the economic interest of the individualistic economies and serves them without having its own independent purpose. The individualistic state pursues the common interest, i.e., an interest common to all, which is therefore only formal.1 Karel EngliS, Soustava narodniho hospodarstvi [The System of National Economy] (Praha, 1937), Vol. I, p. 636. 1

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The solidaristic state pursues the ideal of a healthy and strong nation and also delimits the sphere between economies - not in order to secure their freedom, but to limit these spheres even against the will of those concerned. The solidaristic state does not realize the common interest, but the public interest. The solidaristic state does not spring from the interest of the individual economies and does not serve the individual interests, but serves an independent purpose external to that of the subordinated economies.2 Every social order has its corresponding moral and organizational principles. According to the economic system (capitalism, cooperative, solidarism), the natural rights of man also are grouped, but they can become effective rights only insofar as the given social order imposes certain obligations toward individuals on the whole. The state, in its material function, also has to care for the preservation and improvement of the citizen's and nation's life. In fact, it is an economic order whose goal is to secure: a) the best development of the whole (objective commonweal; the nation cannot be happy); b) the happiness of citizens (subjective commonweal; only an individual can be happy). These are different values for the people which are embodied in different possible arrangements of systems. The consistent solidarism as the material function of the state does not lend itself to democracy as the formally political construction, but rather to every kind of authoritarian form (dictatorship), because solidarism is at variance with man's right to happiness and protection of human dignity. The identification of the power of the Communist Party with the power of the state and the impossibility of controlling it are the typical characteristics of a permanent dictatorship. Communist solidarism seizes the whole personality of man, all the variegated aspects of his life. If we judge the public welfare from the Communist viewpoint, we cannot escape the final conclusion that life is absurd.3

2. SOCIAL DETERMINISM

Social determinism as advocated in Czechoslovakia deprived the individual of freedom of will and reserved the formation of a common will and decision to a narrow collective of the ruling oligarchy of the Communist Party, which alone is considered to care for the public 2 3

Ibid., Vol. I, p. 637. Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 49, 484.

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welfare.4 What sprang from the Marxist theory is a system of state organization based not on economic but on political determinism. Between economic and political power, there is a relation of reciprocity expressed by the economic plan 5 which determines the standards of living (economic power) of both the whole nation and every individual, in the form of a binding law (political power). However, the economic plan (in the same way as Marxism) has not taken into consideration its main element - man. After the nationalization of the means of production and of the work of human muscles,6 there followed the nationalization of the human intellect and thinking.7 Whereas the bases from which modern planning springs are the human needs, it is the goal of Marxism to transform man into a homo economicus whose religion is production. The solidaristic state provides public welfare by orienting its activities toward the ideal of the life, health, and culture of the nation (summum bonum). However, the results achieved in the realization of public welfare justify the conclusion that Communism is on its way to barbarism because, under the slogan of elimination of exploitation of man by man, it has introduced 4

a) Constitution of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic of July 11, I960, No. 100 of the Collection of Laws (C.L.), Art. 4. The guiding force in society and in the State is the vanguard of the working class, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, a voluntary militant alliance of the most active and most politically conscious citizens from the ranks of the workers, farmers, and intelligentsia; b) George Gurevitch, Déterminismes sociaux et liberté humaine (Paris, 1963), p. 322. 5 Czechoslovak Constitution, sub 4, Art. 12: a) The entire national economy shall be directed by the state plan for the development of the national economy, which shall be drawn up and implemented with the widest active participation of the working people; b) The plan for the development of the national economy and culture, usually worked out for a period of five years, shall be promulgated as law and shall be binding for that period as the basis of all planning activity by state organs and economic organizations. 6 Czechoslovak Constitution, sub 4, Art. 7: a) The economic foundation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic shall be the socialist economic system, which excludes every form of exploitation of man by man; b) The socialist economic system, in which the means of production are socially owned and the entire national economy directed by plan, ensures, with the active cooperation of all citizens, a tremendous development of production and a continuous rise in the living standard of working people; c) Labor in a socialist society is always labor for the benefit of the community, and, at the same time, for the benefit of the worker himself. 7 Czechoslovak Constitution, sub 4, Art. 16: a) The entire cultural policy of Czechoslovakia, the development of all forms of education, schooling, and instruction, shall be directed in the spirit of the scientific world outlook, MarxismLeninism, and closely linked to the life and work of the people, b) The State and the people's organizations shall systematically endeavor to free the minds of the people from surviving influences of a society based on exploitation.

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the exploitation of man and human work by the state, to an extent which has no parallel in modern history. What good is an economic system which boasts that it yields the greatest productivity in the world and the greatest progress in production, if its standard of living is so low that people cannot obtain the basic necessities of life?

3. SOCIAL POLICY

The final problem of productive society is what it produces, because both the social balance and the nation as a whole depend on the composition of the national product. 8 The Communist experiment of the economic policy in Czechoslovakia ended where it started at the time of the seizure of power sixteen years ago (February 25, 1948): "The political economy of socialism suffers from a lack of concept and a lack of method." 3 The concept of the Czechoslovak national economy was, however, defective from the very start, because it was not based on the economic laws of the optimum structure of national economy and therefore led to deep imbalance and disproportions in the national economy,10 which now finds itself in dire straits. The national sacrifice in standard of living has been best proven by the size of the investments, which totalled 371,4 billion koruny between 1950 and 1962 11 and surpassed 50 billion koruny early since that period, so that the sum total of the investments is in excess of the capacity of the Czechoslovak national economy.12 At the same time, only 30 percent of the machinery and equipment produced has kept pace with world standards 13, and goods that nobody wants are being turned out,14 whereas goods needed in both industry and household have

8

Karel Englis, op. cit., II, p. 617; J. K. Galbraith, The Affluent Society (New York, 1958), p. 212. 9 Benedikt Korda, "Proti dogmatismu - za tvofivy rozvoj ekonomiky" [Against Dogmatism - For a Creative Development of Economics], Hospodàrské noviny, November 8 (Praha, 1963). 10 Zdenék Wergner, Planovand hospodarstvi [Planned Economy] (Praha, 1962), Vol. XV, No. 11, p. 2. 11 Statistickà rocenka [Statistical Yearbook] (Praha, 1963), p. 129. 12 Rude pravo, December 5, (Praha, 1962); Antonin Novotny, So great a volume of investment construction proved to exceed our means. 13 Prace, Oktober 28, (Praha, 1962). 14 Plànované hospodarstvi, Vol. XV, Nos. 9-10 (1963), p. 10.

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not been manufactured 15, so that the crisis has its roots in the shortage of goods (the queues for consumer goods and staple foodstuffs). But only if there is a surplus of goods is it possible to ensure their adequate supply and distribution among people (personal solidarity) and their use for various objective needs resulting from the social ideal (material solidarity). For this reason, the solidaristic state is concerned in the first instance for the increase of productivity, in the interest of the social ideal. The Czechoslovak road to socialism leads, however, via heavy industry, which has resulted in the disintegration of the whole national economy. The concept "economic goods" must be interpreted in a very broad sense; it includes all those things which serve to satisfy wants - hence, not only material goods, but also a wide variety of services. However, here occurs the biggest distortion of consumption, which touches directly upon the quality of life, because the individual is not an end in himself, but merely an instrument to satisfy the objective interest of society. As far as the subjective needs of the citizen are concerned, society has nothing but promises of improvements in the quantity and quality of goods and services (transportation, catering, laundering, repair services, barbering, and other services which have been liquidated and not replaced. Social policy is, in substance, a distinctive policy. Not only the distribution of the national product as the fruit of national work is involved, however, but also the distribution of the work itself. Social policy is, therefore, the shaping of the nation toward the social ideal. Consistent solidarism does not carry out a special policy, because there is no need to regulate the distribution of work and burdens of work according to the principle of personal solidarity (work according to capacity) for everything is based on that principle. 4. EXPLOITATION OF LABOR

The problems of economics prevail in the ideology of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on the basis of the false theory of the identity of interests and goals of the party and the people, and work has been 15

Rude pravo, December 4, (Praha, 1962), Antonin Novotny. At present, our production of some products does not satisfy the growing needs of the working people; Rude pravo, January 30 (Praha, 1964); Antonin Novotny; The State Bank established that there are products worth 2.4 billon koruny in the plants (for 1964) for which no reliable market has been provided - nobody wants them while, on the other hand, the demands of the customers are not covered to the tune of 5.3 billion koruny.

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proclaimed to be the goal of man. 16 A s citizens have no income from any other source (profits from business having been eliminated), compensation for work has become the only income which determines the volume of consumption of their households and, consequently, their lives. They cannot choose whether to work or not, because without selling their work power they simply cannot live. 17 It is of no consequence whether work is guaranteed in the constitution as a general work obligation, 18 or as the special obligation to fulfill the plan, 19 or as a right to work, 20 because freedom of work does not exist. 21 The amount of wages is determined by authority of the State Wage Commission, 22 which uses the organization of the wage system as an instrument to direct production and plan fulfillment, 23 to reduce wages, 24 and to increase work norms. 25 In case of a wage reduction, the worker 16 Jaroslav Engst, O socialistickém humanismu [On Socialistic Humanism] (CSAV, Praha, 1962), p. 43. 17 Karel EngliS, op. cit., II, p. 511. 18 Czechoslovak Constitution of May 9, 1948, No. 150 C.L., Section 32: Every citizen is obliged to work according to his abilities and to contribute by his work to the betterment of his community. 19 Czechoslovak Constitution of July 11, 1960, sub 4, Art. 13: a) Every organization and every citizen who is allotted any task connected with the fulfillment of the state plan for the development of the national economy shall exert every effort and show the utmost initiative in carrying out this task with maximum success; b) All economic organizations shall systematically create the material, technological, and organizational conditions for their activity, in accordance with the long-term plans for the development of the national economy, in such a way that their planned tasks may be fulfilled. 20 Czechoslovak Constitution, sub 4, Art. 21: a) All citizens shall have the right to work, and to remuneration for work done according to its quantity, quality, and social importance; b) The right to work and to remuneration for work done is secured by the entire socialist economic system, which does not experience economic crises or unemployment, and guarantees a continuous rise in the real value of remuneration; c) The State shall follow a policy which, as production and productivity increase, will permit the gradual reduction of working hours without reduction in wages. 21 A. Svolos, Predpisy o prâci v soudobych ustavâch [Le travail dans les constitutions contemporaines] (Praha, 1947), p. 52. 22 Legistlative measure of the Presidium of the National Assembly of November 13, 1963, No. 84 C.L., concerning the State Wage Commission. 23 Rudé prdvo, December 14 (Praha, 1963). 24 Statistickâ rocenka CSSR [Statistical Yearbook] (1964), p. 123. 25 Prâce, May 12 (Praha, 1961): The workers noted with satisfaction the natural principle that the norms or any other wage adjustments would always be carried out with their consent and after a change in technological method or a technical or organizational improvement. . .. Changes were carried out - without the knowledge of the workers and without the consent of the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement Works Committee. The workers characterized the result of this curious practice very fittingly: We make more articles for less money.

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must increase his efficiency (performance) in order to preserve his present standard of living. Where there is only one employer, there prevails a new principle: The lower the wages, the higher the performance. As there is only one employer in the Communist state, the worker is defenseless against social injustice.26 Another means of exploitation of human work is being realized by socialist competition; its value is about two billion koruny per year, but as a result of exhaustion and haste, it produces rejects equaling this amount.27 On the other hand, brigade work in the campaign for the improvement of cities and villages (Action Z), which is performed without compensation, yields net values to the tune of two billion koruny per year.28 The principle of equal rights for women is being used as a pretext for compelling women to work at night.29 It is true that there exists a special constitutional guarantee for protection of youth,80 but not even the young are exempt from night work, which results in demoralization and leads sometimes even to attempts at suicide.31 A nation as a whole measures the fruits of its work, not in money, but by its living standards.32 The state influences the consumption of the population by means of the retail price and the sales tax which often exceeds the production costs.33 The largest item of household expenses is food,34 so the exploitation directly cuts down supplies of food to the population and thus affects the very survival of the nation. 26

Rude prdvo, October 25 (Praha, 1963) I can't leave the plant - they wouldn't take me anywhere else. 27 Rudi prdvo, November 28 (Praha, 1962); Prdce, December 22 (Praha, 1963), January, 2 (1964). 28 Rude prdvo, January 29 (Praha, 1962), March 15 (1964); Cud, February, 27 (Bratislava, 1964). 29 Rude prdvo, April 8 (Praha, 1956), November 28 (1959), Prdce, June 3 (Praha, 1956), April 16 (1964). 30 Czechoslovak Constitution, sub 4, Art. 26: a) Society shall ensure to all children and young people opportunity for full physical and mental development. This development shall be secured through the care provided by the family, the state, and the people's organizations, and by the special adjustment of working conditions for young people. 31 Prdce, March 18 (Praha, 1956): The intervention of the doctors prevented in time what the 16-year old girl had planned to do in her sudden excitement: to end her life. That day, Marie prepared for night work in the presence of her parents, but instead of going to the plant, she went to a night club. 32 Karel EngliS, op. cit., sub 1, 11-617. 33 Prdce, August 15 (Praha, 1959): 105% of the total production costs. 34 Rude prdvo, December 7 (Praha, 1958). The expenditures for foodstuffs in workers' households exceed 47% of all costs of the maintenance of the family.

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5. SOCIAL SECURITY

Social security requires a double price: from the citizen, in the sacrifice of his freedom, which is limited in favor of the state,35 and from the state in the sacrifice of money, which is limited by the productivity of the national economy. Social security, however, suffers from internal contradictions, because it decreases the responsibility of the individual, on one hand, and frees him from need, on the other. 80 But the maximum of social security is detrimental to the citizen because it deprives him of personal responsiblity (social security of military barracks or jail) and to the state, because it may lead to economic bankruptcy by excessive expenditures for social security, and lack of interest of the workers in the creation of national income. After the Communist coup Czechoslovak social insurance has gone through a period of stormy development which has been characterized by the following changes: National Insurance (1948-1956) was welcomed as the fulfillment of the national social ideal, because it was to cover all working strata of the nation; it was supposed to cover, not only employees, but all working people (self-employed persons and persons in family employment).37 However, self-employed persons were excluded from the national insurance plan by its implementation; their contributions were so high that it became an instrument for the liquidation of entire classes of the population. 38 Gradual reorganization of the National Insurance (1952-1956) changed the social basis of insurance and was carried out according to the principle that insurance should be in accordance with production. 39 Unified national insurance was divided into two branches: a) health insurance, which is administered by the Trade Union Council,40 and b) pension insurance, which is administered by the State Social Security Office. 41 A subsequent reorganization of social insurance (1957) abandoned the principle of national insurance completely. It was based on the principle 35 39 37 38 39 40 41

Gabrielle Bremme, Freiheit und soziale Sicherheit (Stuttgart, 1961). Georg Boese, Unsere Freiheit Morgen (Duesseldorf-Koln, 1963), p. 64. Act of April 15, 1948, No. 99 C.L., concerning national insurance. Alois Rozehnal, Unfulfilled Promises (Rome, 1961), pp. 40- 41,28, 50, 65, 118. Act of December 19 (1951) No. 102 C.L. Edict of the Prime Minister of December 30, 1953, No. 100 C.L. Act of December 19 (1951) No. 102 C.L., Section 6.

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Rozehnal

that the insurance must be "in accordance with the development of production forces" and introduced a new system of both health insurance 42 and social security.43 The motive for this reorganization was to convert insurance into an instrument for the stiffening of labor discipline and increase in production. To achieve these goals, new organizational principles were introduced. They were based on preference given to important occupations and discrimination for or against the insured, according to various factors: birth, property, present or past occupations and activities, political affiliations, party loyalty, and, last, but not least, "cadre opinions" (political character opinion). On the occasion of this reorganizaton, a warning was uttered for the first time that "the increase in claims and the tasks of social security were already approaching the limit of economic capacity".44 The breakdown of the benefit system of the social security was really not long in coming; it was hastened by the preferential system and the discriminatory treatment of insured persons, as well as by the loss of appropriate balance between the insurance contributions and the claims for benefits. The constitutionally guaranteed right,45 which is expressed by the principle that "the benefit is not a gift", is now opposed by the new principle which is defended by the régime and according to which "the benefit is no annuity",40 so that its benefit rates depend on the arbitrary power of the régime applied in the distribution of the national income. The 1964 crisis of the national economy culminated in a decrease in the national income, in stagnation of work productivity together with a slowing down of the increase in earnings,47 and in the general decrease in the standard of living. This is evidenced by the following measures: reduction of the planned increase in average wages, abolition of the employer's contribution to the costs of meals in canteens, average raise of rent by at least one-third, increase in food prices, and the reduction of social security benefits. The reorganization of social security (which took effect on July 1, 1964) is a result of the crisis in the national economy. The breakdown of the Czechoslovak social insurance system which used to be proclaimed as the best in the world was illustrated by «

43

44 45 46 47

Act of November 30, 1956, No. 54 C.L. Act of November 30, 1956, No. 55 C.L. Rudé prâvo, April 11 (Praha, 1956). Czechoslovak Constitution, sub 4, Art. 23. Rudé prâvo, November 15 (Praha, 1962). Rudé prâvo, February 12 (Praha 1964).

Public Welfare in Today's

Czechoslovakia

533

the régime's admission that "the increase in social expenditures for social security has outrun the economic capacity". 48 The latest reorganization of social insurance has brought about the following changes for the worse: a) lengthening of the time required to be eligible for old-age benefits from the present twenty years (life-long employment qualification) to twenty-five years; b) rise in the age limit of women for retirement and eligibility to old-age benefit (from 55 to 57 years); c) cancellation of the so-called "one-third old-age" benefit according to the principle, "either wages or benefits" (extension of the work activity); d) restriction of concurrence of benefit and earnings according to the principle, "the benefit is not an annuity"; and e) reduction of benefits by taxing those over 700 koruny at progressive rates ranging from 1 percent to 12.5 percent (lower benefit ceiling).49 Variations in social insurance in various countries (cooperative, mutual, voluntary, obligatory) result from general economic and social conditions, and, not least, from the national character, which is manifested in part by the degree of initiative and solidarity, independence or dependence, and cultural and political conditions. The Czechoslovak social insurance system, however, has abandoned the national tradition and betrayed its humanitarian mission by being distorted into an instrument for the tightening of workers' discipline and the dependence of the individual whose only means of subsistance is his work.

6. HEALTH SERVICES

Of special importance in social measures is health insurance, whose social aspect is significant for modern human society because the cost of illness is not simply a personal, but a social problem. The special nature of this insurance is emphasized in the solidaristic order in which medical care is being given, not for the private benefit of the individual (private commonweal), but in the public interest.50 After the nationalization of the health services,51 these services were 48 48 50

«

Rude pravo, January 26 (Praha, 1964). Rude pravo, February 8 (Praha, 1964). Karel Englis, op. cit., I, p. 151. Act of December 19, 1951, No. 103 C.L.

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Alois Rozehnal

divided into two branches, which were organized in the following manner: a) preventive and curative care, which is offered by the state "on a preferential scale and free of charge to the participant in the National Insurance, and members of their families", and b) special curative care, which is offered by the agencies of the national insurance program. However, the health services, too, have lost their humanitarian mission, because curative care does not depend on the seriousness of the illness, but is offered on a preferential scale to the employee, and special curative care in spas is offered, not according to the need of health, but according to work achievements.52 The socialization of health services was carried out under the direct supervision of Soviet experts according to the Soviet pattern. 53 The nationalization of the health services resulted in the patient's loss of choice of his personal physician, and in the physician's loss of his patients' confidence, because physicians have been turned into state employees who are expected "to take measures against unjustified absenteeism and, at the same time, to examine the social conditions and the class profile of the patients". 54 After the liquidation of the national insurance system (1956), a new reorganization of the health services took place.55 Free medical treatment was extended to children up to 15 years of age, regardless of their social origin, but not to their parents if they are not employees; in 1957, there still were 1,354,000 people working in the national economy who were not covered by health insurance. 56 It is true that the number of physicians has doubled since before the war,57 but the benefits of this increase have disappeared in the maze of the bureaucratic health administration. For that reason, there is still a shortage of dentists, as well as of general practitioners, who are 52

Alois Rozehnal, op. cit., sub 38, p. 77. Zdravotnicke noviny, December 7 (Praha, 1963); Josef Plojhar. The period from October 1951 to the end of May 1952 was decisive in the development of the organization of the Czechoslovak health services. At that time, Prof. M. N. Litvinov acted as my consultant. From May 1954 to January 1955, Prof. G. I. Lavrishev coninued the work of Prof. M. N. Litvinov. 54 Odbordf [Trade Unionist], No. 19 (Praha, 1958), p. 1035. 55 Act of March 6, 1957, No. 17 C.L. 5 ® Alois Rozehnal, op. cit., sub 38, p. 162. 57 Statisticka rocenka [Statistical Yearbook] (Praha, 1963), p. 433; Number of physicians: 1937 - 11, 684; 1962 - 25, 823.

53

Public Welfare in Today's

Czechoslovakia

535

subject to work discipline in the same way as other employees: they have work norms, not only for the number of patients (56-75 per day), but also regulation as to the percentage of patients they may find sick and the amount of drugs they can prescribe.88 Doctors in hospitals work sometimes 65 hours without a break. 59 Dedication to the profession has preserved medical practice at the level of world standards despite its troubles, as is evidenced by the frequent international medical congresses in Prague and internationally recognized successes in surgery, especially in heart operations.

7. PRECONDITIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE

The Czechoslovak planned society has encountered the problem of the loss of individual initiative and lack of interest of the citizens, not only in the economic results, but also in lack of cooperation in the national economy. However, the social question cannot be solved without active participation of the citizen.60 Economic balance is one of the conditions of public welfare. However, this economic precondition has not been achieved even after the three reorganizations of the national economy in 1948, 1958, and 1963. The problem of whether and to what extent the economic law of value or the principle of price stability should apply has not yet been solved. Empiricism in the national economy is a bad philosophy which results in loss from wasted investments in the national economy amounting to hundreds of billions of koruny and low living standards for the entire population. 61 The history of the national economy teaches us that this science usually lags behind social development, but in the end it still helps to secure both social progress and an enlightened democracy. At any rate, Alfred Marshall's teaching still applies: "The economist, like everyone else, must concern himself with the ultimate aims of man." Man has a higher value than all other social groups and is the main purpose of the social order that is expected to secure him the social conditions for the full development of human life.62 58 39 60 61 82

Pravda, January 21 (Bratislava, 1964). Mladâ fronta, November 14 (Praha, 1963). Erich Fromm, La peur de la liberté (Paris, 1941), p. 217. Rudé pravo, May 20 (Praha, 1961); November 9 (1962); April 6 (1964). a) André Philip, Histoire des faits économiques et sociaux, II, p. 221. b) Hans Herbert Goetz, Weil alle besser leben wollen (1963), p. 342.

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Alois Rozehnal

The greatest spiritual treason is the canonization of a social order as if justice finally reigned. From the dawn of history, mankind has been led by a beautiful vision of justice, but the greatest jurists are still unable to explain what justice really is. It is true that individual justice was defined by Roman law,63 but social justice is still lacking a definition, although it is conceived as a civil virtue with which every citizen and the entire society must be imbued.64 As the content of distributive justice cannot be hatred but love of one's neighbor, so love must be the ideal of society.65 Czechoslovak Communism suffers from internal contradictions because it has replaced love with hatred, justice with party-mindedness, and law with arbitrariness. Marxism has engaged in the study of economics, but has forgotten man. Marxism has lost its fight for man because it has not succeeded in fulfilling the goal of public welfare to make man better and happier.

65 Ulpianus, Lib. I, D . l , 1. De justitia et jure: Justitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuendi. 64 a) Jean Onimus, Face au monde actuel (Bruges, 1962), p. 43. b) Félix Senn: De la justice et du droit (Paris, 1927), p. 37. 65 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Self and the Dramas of History (London, 1963), p. 253.

Class Struggle and Civil Law: the Case of Czechoslovakia

OTTO ULÒ

i

Few innovations have so strongly affected the lives of Czechoslovak citizens, since the Communist takeover in February 1948, as the forcible introduction of the concept of class justice. This concept was imposed upon a society which previously had enjoyed a considerable degree of social harmony. Class struggle was made the essence of both its moral code and its laws to the point where no aspect of life in Czechoslovakia is now free of its impact. Adhering to the Soviet maxim that "a club is a primitive weapon, a rifle is a more efficient one, the most efficient is the court",1 the old belief in "blind justice" was contemptuously brushed aside. To prominent Czechoslovak jurists, the Marxist tenet that law is a weapon in the hands of the proletariat against its class enemies came as a revelation. For example, Victor Knapp, the country's most influential writer in the field of civil law, called this class content of law "a brilliant discovery of legal science". "Until then", he confessed, "we staggered through an impasse of sterile, idealistic speculations".2 This "brilliant discovery" has plagued the once democratic Czechoslovak society ever since, creating second-class citizens and introducing an irrationality into their lives which to some degree parallels the irrationality of the Nazi racial concept.3 Some writers have paid considerable attention to the sociopolitical discrimination expressed in criminal law and put into practice by the criminal courts. On the other hand, the non-punitive law in which the 1

N. V. Krylenko, quoted in Harold J. Berman, Justice in Russia (New York, Random House, 1963), p. 36. Viktor Knapp, Pfedmet a system ceskoslovenskeho socialistickeho prava obcanskeho [The Object and System of Czechoslovak Socialist Civil Law] (Prague, NCSAV, 1959), p. 29. 3 Ivan Klima in Literarni noviny (January 25, 1964).

2

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Otto Vic

true mission of class justice is less apparent remains almost unexplored. One may even encounter the view that the people's democratic state demotes civil law to a politically insignificant role.4 II

Any terra incognita is a temptation which I, too, often fail to resist. For the sake of my work, it is fortunate that Czechoslovakia - unlike other "people's democracies" - has not been too reticent about the implementation of the class struggle in civil law; its presses have published a number of treatises and court decisions on this subject. The difference between civil and criminal law as instruments of class warfare is, of course, significant. For example, the criminal law is mainly confined to two Codes - one on substantive, the other on procedural, law - while the civil law consists of an unlimited number of legal provisions ranging from basic codes and government ordinances to instructions issued by individual ministries and trade unions. The civil law as such is no longer identical with the Civil Code. Following the Soviet example, the functional sphere of the Civil Code does not include domestic and labor relations. The socialist legal persons, too, operate outside the Code, and the law of agricultural cooperatives was made an autonomous discipline of law. Before proceeding with analysis of the class bias of non-punitive law, let us first consider the victims of class warfare. The designation "class enemy" remains elastic and extensive enough to welcome many unconscious victims under the same banner. The original Marxist criterion - one's relation to the means of production — proved insufficient, and so not only "ownership", but also "state of mind" and "heritage" came into the picture. Not only the propertied bourgeoisie is labelled "class enemy", but everybody, regardless of his economic standing, who does not demonstrate sufficient loyalty towards the political status quo, quite in accordance with Lenin's statement, "All who are not with us are against us." The régime includes among the hostile elements, also, those individuals whom we might call "hereditary enemies": First, the expropriated bourgeoisie, those who, with the change in their actual status, are not considered to have changed their class denomination ("bourgeois remnants"); and second, the descendants and family members of any of those mentioned. In the case of Czechoslovakia - un4

Vlastislav Chalupa, Rise and Development Kroese, 1959), p. 243.

of a Totalitarian

State (Leiden,

Class Struggle and Civil Law

539

like that of the Soviet Union - the emphasis on class warfare against the artificial entiry of "hereditary enemies" has been especially strong and durable. The Czechoslovak Civil Code, Act No. 141 of 1950, Sbirka zäkonü a narizeni (Collection of Laws and Ordinances, hereafter Coll.) went into force on January 1, 1951. It was drafted for a specific political purpose, namely, "the liquidation of bourgeois property relations as well as the bourgeois thinking in our society". 5 The individual has rights which are conditional, "the rights if". Thus, for example, according to Section 2, "Civil rights shall be protected by law", while according to Section 3, "No one shall be permitted to misuse civil rights to the detriment of society." Jurist Vincenc Spacek comments on this dialectic of simultaneous giving and taking as follows: Our Civil Code expresses the class nature of the civil law in its introductory provisions . . . (Sects. 1, 2, 3). Legal protection must not be granted in cases in which the contents of the legal relation contradicts the basic provisions mentioned . . . (those legal actions infringe socialist legality and are, therefore, invalid). 6

Thus, the validity of individual rights is clouded with uncertainty and it will depend on various circumstances in what manner "an act in law [prdvni iikon]... a manifestation of intention to establish, alter, or annul, a right or a duty" (Sect. 30) will be finally interpreted. Sections 31 and 36 constitute further important limitations. The preoccupation with protecting the State against the individual led to a plethora of limiting clauses empowered to negate citizens' rights: (1) rules of socialist community life, (2) fulfillment of the uniform economic plan, (3) law, (4) common interest, and (5) important common interest. The difference among the clauses and their degree of importance has not been satisfactorily clarified. 7 The Civil Code of Procedure, Act No. 142 of 1950 Coll., is also not lacking in provisions sanctioning political bias. Like the Civil Code, it also implements the clause, "common interest", thus encouraging the imagination of every politically alert judge. 8 The procedural position of 5

Viktor Knapp (ed.), Ucebnice obcanskeho a rodinneho prdva [Textbook of Civil and Family Law] (Prague, Orbis, 1953-5), I, p. 9. * Vincenc Spacek, Projevy vüle a prävni ükony v obcanskem pravu [Declaration of Intention and Legal Transactions in Civil Law] (Prague, Orbis, 1953), p. 124. 7 Frantisek Stajgr and Ferdinand Boura, Prokurator v obcanskem soudnim fizeni [The Prosecutor in Civil Law Procedure] (Prague, Orbis, 1955), p. 65. 8 Ibid., p. 65.

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litigants is highly limited. A party to a suit cannot withdraw or give up the claim, to acknowledge the duty in granting the claim, or make a conciliatory settlement without approval by the court. The court must evaluate the procedural action of the party from the viewpoint of law and "common interest" (Sect. 76, C.C.P.). Voluntary settlement by the parties contradicts the common interest without violating any binding legal provisions. This would be exemplified by the case of the defendant who agrees to pay, by small installments, his debt to the plaintiff, in this case, a national enterprise.9 The civil judges are authorized to use the practice of "free deliberation" (volnd uvaha), Sect. 94, C.C.P., if the legal basis of a claim is evident, but its extent can not be ascertained at all or only with considerable difficulty. The court has also the right to reduce the award if the common interest intervenes, and if - in the words of Professor Viktor Knapp - "the precise procedure according to the law was in conflict with the legal feeling [pravni citeni] of our people".10 Hence, in many cases, the feeling of the people might become superior to the law (e.g., Sects. 122, 223/2, 286, 487 C.C.), especially in the reference to Section 358, C.C., on the right of "extraordinary mitigation": In cases of special consideration, the court may adequately reduce damages, taking particularly into consideration the conditions of the parties, the importance of the damage and of compensation therefore, the character of the person who has caused the damage, as well as the nature and degree of the fault. . . .

The Supreme Court, in its decision Cz 246/55 of June 27, 1955, was more specific and urged the courts "to be concerned with the class profile of the defendant", once Section 358 C.C. was in question.11 The successful party in the suit is entitled to have the court costs including the attorney's fees - wholly compensated by the losing opponent (Sect. 129, para 1, C.C.P.). At the same time, however, this right might be denied for "reasons worthy of special consideration" (duvody hodne zvlc&tniho zretele, Sect. 130, C.C.P.). According to the Commentary on the Code, this provision "is closely connected with the class 9

Komentdf k obianskemu soudnimu fddu [Commentary on the Code of Civil

Procedure] (Prague, Orbis, 1957), p. 371. 10

Viktor Knapp, Splneni zavazku a jine zpusoby jejich zaniku [Fulfillment of

Obligations and Other Means of Terminating them] (Prague, NCSAV, 1955), p. 173. 11

Sbirka rozhodnuti ceskoslovenskych soudu [Collection of Decisions of Czecho-

slovak Courts, hereafter Coll. Dec.], Civ., No. 118 (1955), pp. 237-9.

Class Struggle and Civil Law

541

profile of the parties". 12 The failure by the court to pay due attention to this requirement constitutes a violation of socialist justice. The Regional Court at Nitra handled the appeal in a case of sale and barter (Sects. 366-382, C.C.) and decided in favor of the plaintiff, granting him also the right to full recovery of court expenses from the losing defendant. The Supreme Court, on June 13, 1958, annulled the decision for alleged infringement of socialist justice, with this reasoning: If the Regional Court had considered correctly the social profile of the parties, in which view the plaintiff was the widow of a merchant, and the defendant a worker and her husband a normovac, while the defendants are of proletarian origin and were honored several times as exemplary workers . . . the Regional Court must have arrived at the conclusion that the circumstances of this case were worthy of special consideration, fulfilling thus the requirements for the application of Sect. 130, C.C.P. Because the Regional Court failed to do so, it violated the law in its provisions Sects. 1, 130, 8 8 / 2 , and Sects. 3, 4, of the Act N o . 66 of 1952 Coll.™

The courts have developed a similar practice in applying Section 140, C.C.P. According to this provision, the party to a suit might be exempt from paying the court fees and/or deposits, provided that such a payment would endanger the sustenance of the party concerned or of his family. The Commentary interprets Sect. 140 extensively and urges the judges to examine whether the applicant participates in the people's effort in building socialism.14 A strict class application of this provision means, in fact, that many pauperized class enemies cannot seek their rights at the court because they cannot afford it. Engels pointed out that "all known revolutions have aimed at the protection of one form of ownership against another". 15 This approach, naturally, promotes the political importance of one part of civil - property - law, or, to quote Professor Knapp, "It is the task of our property law to contribute to the economic liquidation of the economic power of the bourgeoisie, as well as to the development of the socialist economy." 16 In contrast to capitalist law, which recognizes one principal form of 12

Komentdf, op. cit., p. 528. Cz. 222/58, Coll. Dec., Civ., No. 94 (1958), pp. 206-8; cf., Colt. Dec., Civ., No. 90 (1951), No. 7 (1953), Nos. 44, 113 (1956). 14 Komentdf, op. cit., p. 561; cf., Coll. Dec., Civ., No. 86 (1953). 15 Friedrich Engels, Puvod rodiny, soukromeho vlastnictvi a statu [The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and State] (Prague, Svoboda, 1949), p. 105. 18 Viktor Knapp, Vlastnictvi v lidove demokracii [Property Ownership in the People's Democrasy] (Prague, Orbis, 1952), p. 425. 13

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property - that of private ownership - the Czechoslovak civil law divides ownership into three basic categories: 1. socialist ownership; 2. personal ownership; 3. private ownership. While the state socialist ownership is the most privileged and favored one, protection is nonexistent in case of the detested private ownership. For sake of brevity, let us disregard the phenomenon of socialist property and concentrate on the peculiar distinction between the values an individual may or may not own. This is the rather artificial concept of the so-called "personal property" - the "good" property - allegedly favored by the state, and the old "private" property, reminding one of the bourgeois past and exploitation. The crucial distinction between what is private property and what is not has been poorly elaborated: A needle might be in the personal ownership of a housewife patching the trousers of her proletarian husband. The same needle will be in private ownership if used by an expropriated tailor who fixes, in his spare time, a suit for his illicit customer. Sometimes, not the economic destination, but the person determines what is private or personal ownership. If a member of the working class buys a hundred needles, these will be his personal property. If a former artisan buys a hundred needles - or less - the class profile of the owner indicates the speculatory character of the purchase and the needles will be a matter of private property. An inheritance transferred from a capitalist country to a Czechoslovak beneficiary constitutes in all cases an undeserved income. If, however, the recipient should be member of the working class, the inheritance becomes his personal property. If he is a class enemy, the same inheritance would receive the label of private property.17 Contractual life in the people's democratic state is severely limited in comparison with its counterpart in a capitalist society. This limitation, reflected in both material and procedural civil law, is due to several factors, of which the most outstanding is the subordination of all contractual relations to the economic plan.18 17 In March 1963, this writer was approached by Mr. D. Cobb, representative of the law firm in Washington, D.C., to deliver an opinion on Czechoslovak inheritance law. This firm specifically represents the interests of Czechoslovak beneficiaries in the United States probate courts. The writer pointed out the dependence of the classification of the property on the social profile of the beneficiary. The legal counsellor of the Czechoslovak Embassy in Washington, Dr. Zdenek Pisk, read the report of this writer and considered it (according to Mr. Cobb) "pretty accurate". 18 Obcansky zakonik [The Civil Code] (Prague, Ministry of Justice, 1951), p. 52.

Class Struggle and Civil Law

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In this sphere of civil law, there have not been so many decisions of a discriminatory nature. This situation has to be attributed to the general decrease in the court calendars and also to the common knowledge that the class enemy, should he approach the court, will seldom be successful. One of the class enemies, who constituted an exception to the rule, went through the following experience: In 1950, a former bank director living on his 5,000 Kcs pension, submitted to the court a claim against a bank, a national enterprise, for payment of 950,000 Kcs. He based his claim upon a contract, concluded under capitalism, with the bank, in which he had held a prominent position. According to this contract, the bank allegedly obligated itself to add a bonus of 10,000 Kcs monthly to his pension. This director was so impertinent that, in the people's democratic state and at the people's democratic court, he dared to present the claim for a colossal amount of money and speculated that the court would decide in favor of his groundless and illegal [sic] claim. It is self-evident that the court rejected the claim with the justification that the bonus to the pension would be an undeserved benefit and that the agreement thereon was contrary to our people's democratic laws and therefore, such a contract was invalid according to our laws. 19

The courts will also disregard or even annul contracts which they find to be in disagreement with the principles of socialist community life. For this reason, the Supreme Court invalidated a contract of donation conditioned by the obligation of the beneficiary to marry the man the donor would pick out.20 The institution of inheritance in Czechoslovakia since February 1948 has acquired, against expectations, very distinct features of class discrimination. For example, according to Section 548, C.C., the testament or its parts will be invalidated if the content contradicts the law or common interest. In a ruling of the Supreme Court, a testator who named as his heir a relative who had defected from Czechoslovakia and was living abroad was held to have violated the conditioning clauses of Section 548, C.C., and thus the testament was null and void.21 It is also no surprise that, for inheritance of private rather than personal property, 19 "Volime soudce a soudce z Iidu lidovych a krajskych soudu" [We Elect the Judges and the Lay Assessors for District and Regional Courts], Socialistickd zdkonnost, No. 8 (1957), p. 469. 20 Supreme Court, C 39/51; c/., Vitezslav Provaznlk in Socialistickd zdkonnost, No. 7 (1957), p. 423. 21 Supreme Court, December 12, 1952, Cz 648/52; Coll. Dec., Civ., No. 20 (1953); Supreme Court, June 27, 1957, Cz 285/57; Ibid., No. 115 (1957), pp. 232-233.

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fees paid to the State are higher (Sect. 6 of the Act of April 18, 1957, No. 26,

Coll.).

The heirs might come to some agreement concerning which of them is to take over the property. As usual, the State Notary (or court) will not confirm an agreement which contradicts law or common interest (Sects. 76, 335, C.C.P.). This conditional clause is interpreted very freely and absence of alertness in this respect is considered on infringement of socialist justice. The following example is illustrative of the situation where prospective heirs disagree among themselves: The District Court at Boskovice dealt with an inheritance case in which there were two heirs, brother and sister, both of whom were willing to take over the inheritance, i.e., the farm, of the deceased parent. The son was an innkeeper, the daughter a housewife married to a plumber, and living outside the village of her deceased parent. The District Court decided in favor of the son, because: (1) his succession was favored by the Farmers' Association; (2) he had already worked at the farm (his inn was open only in the evening hours); and (3) he lived in that particular village. The losing party appealed. The Regional Prosecutor intervened in the suit and suggested that the daughter of the deceased be designated as his successor. The Regional Court in Brno complied with this proposal and reasoned: T h e son refused to join the c o m m u n a l enterprise and should h e gain, at present, additional private property his speculative goals w o u l d be encouraged. O n the other hand, the daughter is loyal to the people's democratic regime; she is a m e m b e r of the U A C [i.e., in a different village. A t the District Court she claimed to be in a household]. . . . B y joining the U A C , she had manifested clearly her positive attitude to the socialist f o r m of agriculture w h i c h guarantees that the land inherited will be duly cultivated. 2 2

After a few years the number of inheritance cases with more than one heir willing to succeed a deceased farmer dropped considerably in favor of cases where there was an inheritance, but no available heir. This change simply reflected the socialization of agriculture. Hunger for land was replaced, during the period of collectivization, by the desire to leave the land. The judiciary, too, was recruited to prevent this move. In practice, this has come to be one of the ugliest in Czechoslovak socialist justice. The class approach was flavored with the medieval glaebae adscripti experience. For this express purpose, the privilege of Section 517 » Regional Court Brno, September 5, 1951, 9 OK 3 4 / 5 1 ; Ibid., N o . 38 (1952), pp. 52-53.

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C.C., guaranteeing an heir the right to disclaim his inheritance, has become widely ignored in the practice of State Notaries and the courts.

Ill

Questions of family relations were excluded from the Civil Code and established as an indepedent legal discipline. In it the courts have come to manifest a strong social class bias, mainly in the child-parent relationship. The Code on Family Relations (Act of December 7, 1949, No. 265, Coll.) was designed, in the words of Alexej Cepicka, "in accordance with the ideas and interests of the working people's political and economic power". 23 The political basis for this law can easily be observed in the attitude of the courts toward divorce. As Professor Frantisek Stajgr observed, "In divorce cases, it is frequently possible to detect under surface disorder of a marriage, the reflection of class conditions or of class conflicts in society." 24 Political considerations affect decisions as to whether a marriage is to be dissolved, and also the question of culpability. For example, in the opinion of the Regional Court at Osti n.L. The fact that the wife, with good reason, informed the police about her husband, who had embezzled some things from a national enterprise, could by no means be held against her and could not constitute a grave reason for a rift in the marriage. 25

On the other hand, the conditions for a divorce are met if for instance, the wife resists political reeducation by her husband. 26 In view of these two examples, it will be no surprise to the reader to learn that divorce may be granted and a spouse found guilty if he defects and leaves from the country,27 or if he is convicted of a political crime. In the latter case, the Regional Court in Ostrava reasoned: There is no doubt that the antistate activity itself, proving the defendant an enemy of the people's democracy w h o joined the ranks of the enemies of 23

Alexej Cepicka, New Family Legislation in Czechoslovakia (Prague, Ministry of Information, 1950), p. 7. 24 Frantisek Stajgr in Pravnik (June, 1959), quoted in East Europe (December, 1959), p. 6. 25 Regional Court, Usti n.L., 7 OK 93/52, quoted in J. Andrlik et al., Komentdf k zakonu o pravu rodinnem [Commentary on the Code of Domestic Relations] (Prague, Orbis, 1954), p. 117. 26 Regional Court, Pardubice, 5 OK 32/52; ibid. 27 Regional Court, Prague, 26 OK 219/51; ibid., pp. 116-7.

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the working class, must have caused disdain and disgust on the part of his wife, loyal to the people's democracy, and destroyed all her emotions for the defendant, provided that such emotions were still left. 28

In the parent-child relationship, a particularly important factor is the parents' state of mind (potential class enemies of group 2). The economic position of the parents, important in the determination of material responsibility toward the child, is irrelevant to the decision concerning custody.29 What matters most is the political maturity and social purity of the parents. The courts, "first of all, have to examine the parents' attitude toward the people's democratic régime",30 their ability "to develop in the children the characteristics necessary for every member of the socialist community, and in particular, to nourish in them a love of the people's democratic fatherland". 31 Thus, according to the District Court at Policka, in a case where the father was "reactionary-minded, disagreeing with the principles of the democratic system" the two minor daughters were entrusted to the "mother, who remarried, although this fact was entirely irrelevant".32 World War II, and the Communist coup in 1948, caused the disruption of many families, some members often remaining in Czechoslovakia, others living abroad. The agenda of the civil courts reflected, of course, the desire for reunion. Those of the parents who left Czechoslovakia illegally had no chance to see their offspring again. The Regional Court in Brno reasoned: It is essential to reject the proposal of the grandfather and grandmother of the minor child whose mother died and whose father left in 1948 without permission to go abroad, that the child, eleven years old, should obtain an exit visa and join the father. The father, because of his departure, manifested a hostile attitude toward the people's democratic regime, and it is assumed that he would not educate the child in the way required by both the Family Code and the interest of a society approaching socialism. Therefore, the

28

Regional Court, Ostrava, May 8, 1951, 11 OK 34/51; Coll. Dec., Civ., No. 7 (1952), pp. 11-12. 29 Regional Court, Olomouc, March 7, 1950, R II 34/50; Coll. Dec., Civ., No. 187 (1950), pp. 282-3; cf., Regional Court, Olomouc, 10 OK 73/51; Regional Court, PreSov, 4 OK 140/51; Andrlik, op. cit., pp. 154-5. 30 Regional Court, Ceske BudSjovice, 6 OK 140/51; cf., Regional Court, Banska Bystrica, OK 50/51; Andrlik, op. cit., pp. 154-5. 31 Regional Court, Prague, 17 OK 23/52; Regional Court, Ceske Budejovice, 6 OK 136/51; ibid., p. 152. 32 District Court, Policka, February 24, 1950, P 138/46; Coll. Dec.. Civ., No. 9 (1951), pp. 16-18.

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departure of the child would be contrary to the interest of the child [himself] as well as society. 83

The same approach, with the same reasoning, was taken also toward the claims of parents who had left the country legally or had already obtained permission to do so.34 It was no secret to parties to a custody suit, especially to those who felt that they had a weak case, that political backing might be a weapon more effective than law. Some even found their way to the top and brought their cases to the attention of the Supreme Court, urging initiation of extraordinary proceedings. The Supreme Court appeared to be quite responsive. For illustration, let us refer to just one example: Decision of the Supreme Court of April 29, 1958, Cz 7 1 / 5 8 : 3 5 Both parents are members of the working class and there are no objections to their political attitudes. They are divorced. Their only child has been brought up by her incurably ill mother. The court does not specify the disease and merely indicates that this handicap is of a mental, rather than physical, nature. Every year, for a two-month period, the child has been entrusted to the father to spend vacations with him. During this stay, the child has always prospered both physically and mentally. The father then applied to the court to take over the personal care of the minor. Both the District and Regional Court decided in favor of the petitioner. The Supreme Court, however, annulled the decision with the following biased reasoning: The mother of the child is sick. According to the expert's testimony, her illness is virtually incurable; however, at present, it is at a stage of decrease, so that there is nothing to prove that the mother is unfit to take proper care of the child. The civic and moral behavior of the mother is absolutely in order. The mother lives with the child at her parents' home. Her father is the chairman of the Uniform Agricultural Cooperative in his village, and chairman of the local organization of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. This educational environment guarantees the correct education of the child in becoming a politically loyal member of our society.

The Supreme Court, subsequently, rejected as irrelevant the weight gain of the child during time spent with the father and the loss in weight after her return to the mother, both confirmed by an expert witness. Finally, as the ultimate persuasion for the decision, this supreme 33

Regional Court, Brno, R 4 239/50; Andrlik, op. cit., p. 159. Regional Court (Brno, July 20, 1949, R IV 214/49; Coll. Dec., Civ., No. 95 (1950), pp. 133-4. 35 Coll. Dec., Civ., No. 97 (1958), pp. 211-2. 34

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judicial authority in the state referred to the Communist Party weekly, Tvorba, No. 37, 1957.

IV

The date of this decision, 1958, is of considerable importance, indicating the sad delay of de-Stalinization in Czechoslovakia. In the sphere of nonpunitive law, no moderation and no de-emphasis on the militant classapproach in civil court decisions was evident in 1953 after Stalin's death, or in 1956, after the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. In fact, things were going from bad to worse, reaching a nadir in the period of 1958-59. To my knowledge, in the era immediately following the Twentieth Congress, there was only one serious attempt in Czechoslovakia to modify the political interpretation of nonpunitive law. This was the case of sixteen 36 distinguished jurists, authors of the Commentary on the Civil Code of Procedure, published in 1957. The most prominent political figure in this group was a young professor of law, Ferdinand Boura. 37 They attempted to confine the class approach within some reasonable boundaries: Once we speak about the class character of socialist legality, we have to keep in mind, first of all, that "classness" is not something existing outside the law, which might be conditioned - as it is thought sometimes - by a free deliberation of the court. "Classness" emanates from the sense and purpose of the law and cannot be "added" to it. This "adding" of "classness" leads to illegality and, in many cases, to open arbitrariness . . . The consistent and correct application of the law guarantees the political correctness of judicial decisions. Every other interpretation of the relationship between socialist legality and "classness" leads inevitably to violation of law. . . ,38 T o this statement the following footnote was added: We consider incorrect, therefore, the view that makes the class profile (or even the mere class origin) a matter of specific evidence. The class profile (origin) is an objective sociopolitical fact which exists outside the court 36

Supreme Court: J. Fiala, J. Frydrych, J. Hrdlicka, K. Hrouda, J. Pisko, J. Riha; Law School of Prague: F. Boura, Z. CeSka, F. Stajgr; Academy of Sciences: J. Elias, V. Steiner; Legal Institute of the Ministry of Justice: J. Gemrich. 37 Ferdinand Boura was born in 1921, became Dean of the Law School in Prague in 1953. Incurably ill, he died in 1957. His obituary appeared in Socialisticka zakonnost, V, No. 3 (1957), pp. 145-7. 38 Komentdr, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 14, 24.

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proceeding. The court, therefore, must not make it the object of the suit and the object of special evidence. 3 9

In a nutshell, Boura and his associates presented this formula: Law, being a product of the ruling class, is always a class law. Objective interpretation of these class laws is the only right one, while any extralegem class approach negates the concept of class justice. The ruling Stalinists did not wait long with a counterattack. First, it was Socialistickâ zâkonnost, in the same year, 1957. However, the full blast came a year later. Minister of Justice Vaclav Skoda, in person, volunteered to be the executioner. 40 Skoda called for an unscrupulous, conscious class-approach by judicial personnel concerned with civic law condemning all those - including the sixteen commentators - reluctant to accede: "Our shortcoming is in the unequal standard between the criminal and civil courts. . . . The higher quality of criminal courts has been achieved by the more correct application of 'classness' [tridnost]." He then announced that a new purge of civil judges would take place. Skoda continued: There are views heard that "classness" is merely in the law and, therefore, the class application of the law is not justified. Some legal theoreticians and also judges . . . even call the class approach in civil law a social discrimination, because the class profile, they say, is an objective sociopolitical reality which remains outside the court proceeding.

The Minister of Justice, without confirming or denying the existence of social discrimination, went on to proclaim the need for unlimited class struggle, and concluded that a formalistic approach which excludes "classness" from the application of the law must lead to violations of socialist justice, to the detriment of the working class and to the benefit of the bourgeoisie. For these reasons, such views must be characterized openly as revisionism.

Nobody since Skoda has formulated the official policy of the régime on class justice in nonpunitive law more candidly. The leaders in Prague needed twelve years before declaring the era of people's democracy at an end. The year 1960 marked the alleged

Ibid., p. 24. Vaclav Skoda, "Ükoly justice vyplyvajici z Xl.sjezdu KSC" [The Tasks of the Judiciary Issuing From the Eleventh Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia], Socialistickd zdkonnost, VI, No. 7 (1958), p. 404 ff. 39

40

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turning point in the history of Czechoslovakia; the country then became truly socialist, second only to the Soviet Union. 41 V

The achievement of socialism signified by definition the extinction of the last hostile social class. The bourgeois groups had wiped out, and the old pluralistic society is already a matter of the past. Does the "abolition of antagonistic classes" imply also the abolition of class struggle and class discrimination? It is true, as President Antonin Novotny formally and solemnly proclaimed, that "all citizens have equal rights and equal duties". 42 On the other hand, however, the new socialist constitution of 1960 43 guarantees the equality of all citizens only with regard to nationality and race (Sect. 20, para 2) - which is no great consolation to people designated as class enemies. The Czechoslovak régime has shown great reluctance to give up that useful scapegoat, the class enemy. In the late fifties, the term "exploiting class" was replaced by "remnants of the exploiting 'classness'." 44 In 1960, the "remnants being too miscroscopic, the formula was no longer satisfactory. A new excuse justifying the immortality of the class struggle was invented, namely, the "remnants of bourgeois mentality" and the "existence of the capitalist part of the world". 45 The First Deputy-Minister of Justice, presently the Chairman of the Supreme Court, Josef Litera, wrote in 1961: The members of the exploiting classes are still living among us; because of their former parasitic mode of life and because progress has not taught them anything, they commit crimes under the influence of the enemies from abroad, in particular, the agents of American imperialism. 46 41 Cf., Zdenëk Jiîinsky and Pavel Levit, "Strana-organizâtorka vystavby socialistického statu" [The Party, Organizer in the Construction of a Socialist State], Prâvnik, CI, No. 9 (1961), p. 744. 42 Prâce, April 17, 1960. 43 No. 100 of Sbirka zâkonû a narizeni of 1960 (Collection of Laws and Ordinances). 44 Jan Bartuska, "Upevnënim social istické zâkonnosti k zvySené ochranë naseho zfizeni a vymozenosti lidu" [Through Strengthening Socialist Justice to the Increased Protection of Our Regime and of the Achievements of the People], Socialistickd zâkonnost, VI, No. 1 (1958), p. 9. 45 FrantiSek Stajgr, "The Courts and the Office of the Prosecutor Under the New Constitution", Bulletin of Czechoslovak Law, XVIII (1960), p. 105. 46 Josef Litera, "Za dalSi upevnovâni socialistické zâkonnosti a zlidovëni soudnictvi" [Toward Further Strengthening of Socialist Justice and Popularization of the Judiciary], Socialistickd zâkonnost, IX, No. 1 (1961), p. 4.

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The official Collection of Court Decisions of 1962 47 urges the socialist courts to analyze carefully the class profile of the offenders, etc.48 Socialisticka zakonnost of 1961 49 calls for enforcement of class discrimination in all spheres of nonpunitive law, from matters concerning domestic relations to the question of whether the party shall be exempt from paying the court fees. This ad absurdum-extended class intolerance makes a strange bedfellow, indeed, for the proud pronouncements of the 99.9 percent unity of the population as shown in the polls. New codes of criminal and civil law - the result of revived legislative activity in the sixties - have changed nothing substantial in class discrimination.50 The Codes also retained the old, ambiguous, vague provisions susceptible to arbitrary interpretation.

VI

This peculiar de-Stalinization of justice lasted practically unchallenged until 1963. That year, under the cumulative impact of economic difficulties, criticism from the writers, and a moral hangover caused by the rehabilitation of the Slánsky group, some jurists finally raised their voice. Surprisingly, their criticism went beyond the clichés of mere attacks on the anonymous cult of personality, according to which everybody - and therefore nobody in particular - is responsible for the injustices committed. "The cult of personality reserved for itself a monopoly on the power to think",51 the writers assert. It degraded legal science to about the level of primitive propaganda,52 and "it represented a power hard to control. Because power carries within itself a potential evil, the threat is greater when power is unlimited." 53 The critics also challenge the exces47

Regional Court, Brno, January 18, 1962, 4 Tc 20/62; Coll. Dec. Crim., No. 20 (1962), pp. 51-3; Supreme Court, May 19, 1961, 3 Tz 13/59; Coll. Dec., Crim., No. 36 (1961), pp. 149-53. 48 Socialisticka zákonnost, IX, No. 6 (1961), p. 335. 49 "Typické závady v obcansko právním íízení" [Typical Shortcomings in the Civil Law Procedure], Socialisticka zákonnost, IX, No. 8 (1961), pp. 478-92. On page 484 there is a reference to a typically Stalinist decision No. 95, Coll. Dec., Civ., (1958) to be interpreted still as a binding directive. 50 Criminal Code, Act No. 140 of 1961 Coll.; Civil Code, Act No. 40 of 1964 Coll., etc. 51 Vojtéch Hatala, "Kult osobnosti a niektoré noetické a etické problémy náSho trestného práva" [Cult of Personality and Some Noetical and Ethical Problems of Our Criminal Law], Právny obzor, No. 2 (1964), p. 66. 52 Ibid., p. 67. 53 Ibid., p. 69.

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sive application of class bias in the courts, namely, the practice of "making a class approach to justify the violation of legally guaranteed personal rights". 54 They demand, furthermore, that favoritism toward functionaries and Party members in judicial decisions stop. 55 Despite the honest desire on the part of some jurists to democratize Czechoslovak life, judges continue to violate the law; 5 0 as one writer put it, "We should not be surprised if people have adopted a certain [i.e., Stalinist] pattern of thinking which had been demanded of them and which had been enforced for so many years." 57 On the one hand, the cult of personality is alleged to be a thing of the past, and a number of victims of Stalinism have been rehabilitated (very often post mortem). On the other hand, however, only four minor officials of the Ministry of the Interior are known to have been held responsible for wringing confessions from innocent people. 58 The individuals most responsible for distorting the Czechoslovak judiciary beyond recognition, namely, Jan Bartuska, Josef Litera, Vaclav Skoda, and Josef Urvalek, have never paid for their excesses in interpreting class justice. Bartuska still remains Prosecutor General and Litera was even promoted. 59 Those jurists demanding unconditional de-Stalinization are courageous, but not courageous enough. They identify sins, but not the sinners. Their crusade reminds us of Don Quixote's adventures, rather than the defiance of Jan Hus. Nobody, of course, has the right to propagate martyrdom, provided he himself does not volunteer to be the first martyr in line. By the same token, however, it would be imprudent to overlook the fact that while some of the jurists are engaged in criticism with unprecedented vigor, the government continues to enjoy a "business 54

Editorial: "Ucinne pomahat upevnovani zakonnosti" [Effective Assistance to Strengthen Legality], Pravnik, No. 7 (1963), p. 522; cf., Editorial "K aktualnim otazkam ideologicke prace" (Urgent Problems of Ideological Activities), Pravnik, No. 4 (1964), p. 319. 55 "tJiinne pomahat", op. cit., p. 522. 58 Socialisticka zakonnost, No. 2 (1964), pp. 63-64; Socialisticke soudnictvi, No. 11 (1963), pp. 335-337; Pravnik, No. 7 (1963), p. 585. 57 "Diskuse" [Discussion], ibid., p. 591, comment by Zdenek Krizek. 58 Rude prdvo, August 22, 1963. 59 For Bartuska's Stalinism, cf., Rude prdvo, June 20, 1957, and December 14, 1960, Socialisticka zakonnost, No. 1 (1958), p. 7. Bartuska, i.a., maintained that Stalin, in fact, was the founding father of Czechoslovakia in 1918: Jan BartuSka, Obrana nasi vlasti a boj za zachovani miru [The Defense of Our Fatherland and the Struggle for the Maintenance of Peace] (Prague, Orbis, 1953), p. 18. For Skoda's Stalinism cf., Socialisticka zakonnost, No. 8 (1956), pp. 449-468, and No. 7 (1958), pp. 401-416.

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and Civil

Law

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as usual" attitude. On the one hand, the practice of class discrimination is rejected as obsolete, irrational, and immoral,60 and on the other, a government ordinance of June 24, 1964, further reduces the pensions of ex-class enemies and members of their families.61 No one expects the Communist Party to vote itself out of power or to give up the discriminatory concept of class justice in order to make law superior to politics. The principal objective of the present Czechoslovak legal system remains the subordination of law to the political goals of the government. The process of de-Stalinization has modified, but not entirely changed, the picture of limited legal certainty and equality, for these limitations continue to be expressed both in the laws and in the administration of those laws. BIBLIOGRAPHY Documentary

Materials

Boehm, A., Abecedni prehled platnych pravnich predpisu [Survey of Valid Legal Rules, Alphabetically Arranged] (Prague, Prace, 1958). Czechoslovak Academy of Science, Bibliography of Czechoslovak Legal Literature, 1945-58 (Prague, NCSAV, 1959). Czechoslovak Republic Constitution (Prague, Ministry of Information, 1960). Gsovski, Vladimir, ed., Legal Sources and Bibliography of Czechoslovakia (New York, Praeger, 1959). Justice Enslaved: A Collection of Documents on the Abuse of Justice for Political Ends (The Hague, International Commission of Jurists, 1955). KSC, tJstav dejin. Sbirka dokumentu [Documents: Collection] (Prague, SNPL, 1954-56). Ochrana socialistickeho vlastnictvi. Sbornik pravnich predpisu. [Protection of Socialist Ownership: Collection of Legal Provisions] (Prague, Orbis, 1960). Sbirka rozhodnuti ceskoslovenskych soudu [Collection of Czechoslovak Court Decisions] (Prague, Supreme Court, 1945-1962). Sbirka zakonu a nafizeni republiky Ceskoslovenske [Collection of the Laws and Ordinances of the Czechoslovak Republic] (Prague, Govern. Print., 19451962). Ofedni list Ceskoslovenske republiky [Official Gazette of the Czechoslovak Republik] (Prague, Ministry of Interior, 1945-1962). Books Andrlik, J., et. al., Komentar k zakonu o pravu rodinnem [Commentary on the Code of Domestic Relations] (Prague, Orbis, 1954). BartuSka, Jan, Obrana nasi vlasti a boj za zechovdni miru [Defense of Our Fatherland and the Struggle to Maintain the Peace] (Prague, Orbis, 1953). 60

Hatala, op cit.; Josef Brest'ansky, "Porusovanie procesnopravnych predpisov a jeho hmotnopravne dosledky" [Violation of Rules of Court Procedure and Its Substantive Law Effects], Prdvny obzor, No. 2 (1964), p. 81. ,1 "Adjustment of Benefits of Some Persons", Ordinance No. 120 of 1964 Coll.

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Blazke, Jaromir, Majetkove prävo manzelske [Law on Common Property in Marriage] (Prague, Orbis, 1953). , Nährada skody v novem ceskoslovenskem prdvu [Damages in New Czechoslovak Law] (Prague, Orbis, 1954). Boguszak, Jifi and Jiiinsky Zdenek, Socialisticke prävo a zäkonnost v lidove demokratickem Ceskoslovensku [Socialist Law and Legality in the People's Democratic Czechoslovakia] (Prague, ÜV KSC, 1956). Boura, Ferdinand, Dokazovani podle obcanskeho civilniho fddu [Presentation of Evidence in Civil Law Procedure] (Prague, Orbis, 1954). , Soudni rozhodnuti [Judicial Decisions] (Prague, Orbis, 1957). BuSek Vratislav, ed., Czechoslovakia (New York, Praeger, 1957). Bystfina Ivan, Lidovd demokracie [People's Democracy] (Prague, NCSAV, 1957). , Prdvni nazory a prävni instituce [Legal Opinions and Legal Institutions] (Prague, Orbis, 1954). Capek, K., Obcansky zäkonnik [Civil Code] (Prague, Orbis, 1956). Cepicka, Alexej, New Family Legislation in Czechoslovakia (Prague, Ministry of Information, 1950). Chalupa, Vlastislav, Rise and Development of a Totalitarian State (Leiden, Kroese, 1959). Colotka, P., Osobne vlastnictvo [Personal Ownership] (Bratislava, VSAV, 1956). Dressier, Alfred, Politicko-ekonomicky vyznam noveho obcanskeho zdkona [The Politico-Economic Significance of the New Civil Code] (Prague, Orbis, 1951). EliäS, Josef, Socidlne prdvni ochrana mlädeze [Social and Legal Protection of the Young] (Prague, Orbis, 1954). Gottwald, Klement, Za socialisticky stdt, za socialisticke prävo [Toward a Socialist State, Toward Socialist Law] (Prague, Ministry of Information, 1950). Gsovski, Vladimir and Grzybowski, Kazimierz, eds., Government, Law and Courts in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (New York, Praeger, 1960). Hajda, Jan, ed., A Study of Contemporary Czechoslovakia (Chicago, The University of Chicago, prepared for the Human Relations Area Files, Inc., 1955). Hikl, Mario, The Civil Codes in Communist Czechoslovakia (Toronto, Czechoslovak Foreign Institute in Exile, 1957). Holub, Rudolf, Komentäf k obcanskemu zäkoniku. Prävo dedicke [Commentary on the Civil Code: Inheritance Law] (Prague, Orbis, 1958). Houska, J. and Kara, K., Otdzky lidove demokracie [Problems of the People's Democracy] (Prague, SN PL, 1955). Kabes, Vladimir, Socialist Legality in Czechoslovakia (The Hague, International Commission of Jurists, 1953). Knapp, Viktor, Pfedmet a system ceskoslovenskeho socialistickeho präva obcanskeho [The Object and System of the Czechoslovak Socialist Civil Law] (Prague, NCSAV, 1959). , Splneni zävazkü a jine zpusoby jejich zdniku [Fulfillment of Obligations and Other Means of Terminating them] (Prague, NCSAV, 1955). •——•, Vlastnictvi v lidove demokracii [Ownership in a People's Democracy] (Prague, Orbis, 1952). , ed., Ucebnice obcanskeho a rodinneho prava [Textbook of Civil and Family Law], 3 Vols. (Prague, Orbis, 1953-55). Komentäf k obcanskemu soudnimu rddu [Commentary on the Code of Civil Procedure] (Prague, Orbis, 1957). Korbel, Pavel, Sovietization of the Czechoslovak Judiciary (New York, Free Europe Committee, 1952). Lakatos, Michal, Formy ceskoslovenskeho präva [Forms of Czechoslovak Legal System] (Prague, NCSAV, 1956).

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Luby, Stefan, Prevencia a zodpovednost v obiianskom prave [Prevention and Liability in the Civil Law] (Bratislava, VSAV, 1958). Neuman, Alois, Lidovi demokraticky pravni fad ve sluzbdch pracujiciho lidu [People's Democratic Legal Order in the Service of the Working People] (Prague, Orbis, 1955). O prdvu a jeho tvorbe [Law and Its Creation] (Prague, Orbis, 1951). Otdzky ndrodni a demokraticke revoluce v CSR [Questions Concerning the National and Democratic Revolution in Czechoslovakia] (Prague, NCSAV, 1955). Patschovä, Zdenka et al. Vyzivocaci povinnost podle zdkona o prdvu rodinnem [Elementary Obligations to Provide Food According to Family Law] (Prague, Orbis, 1956). Plank, Karol, Majetkopravne vztahy v rodine [Legal Relations Concerning Family Property] (Bratislava, SVPL, 1957). Puzman, J. Pravni ndroky a procesni ndvrhy [Legal Claims and Procedural Notions in Courts] (Prague, Orbis, 1957). Rozehnal, Alois, Unfulfilled Promises (Rome, Academia Cristiana Cecoslovacca, 1961). RubeS, Josef, Dodatky k obcanskemu soitdnimu fadu [Supplements to the Code of Civil Procedure] (Prague, Orbis, 1954). Sbornik studii z obcanskeho prava [Symposium of Studies on Civil Law] (Prague, Orbis, 1953). Spacek, Vincenc, Projevy vide a prdvni ükony v obcanskem prdvu [Declarations of Intention and Legal Transactions in Civil Law] (Prague, Orbis, 1953). Spravedinost ve sluzbdch lidu a socialisniu [Justice in the Service of the People and Socialism] (Prague, Ministry of Information, 1950). Stajgr, Frantisek, Materidlni pravda v obcanskem soudnim rizeni [Substantive Truth in the Civil Judicial Procedure] (Prague, Orbis, 1955). •, Ucebnice obcanskeho prava procesniho [Textbook on Civil Judicial Procedure] (Prague, Orbis, 1955). Stajgr, Frantiäek and Boura, Ferdinand, Prokurdtor v obcanskem soudnim rizeni [The Prosecutor in the Civil Judicial Procedure] (Prague, Orbis, 1955). Steiner, V., Obcanske prdvo procesni v praksi [Procedural Civil Law as Applied by the Courts] (Prague, Orbis, 1958). Stepina, Jaroslav, Rodinne prdvo [The Law on Domestic Relations] (Prague, Orbis, 1958). Stuna, Stanislav, et al. Zdklady prdva [Principles of Law] (Prague, Orbis, 1958). Täborsky, Edward, Communism in Czechoslovakia, 1948-1960 (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961). Zdklady prvni ceskoslovenske petiletky [The Basis of the First Czechoslovak Five-Year Plan] (Prague, Ministry of Information, 1948). Periodicals Socialistická zákonnost (Prague). Socialistické soudnictvi (Prague). Bulletin of Czechoslovak Law (Prague). Soudce z lidu (Prague). Acta Universitatis Carolinae. Jurídica (Prague). Prdvnik (Prague). Stdt a prdvo (Prague). Prdvny obzor (Bratislava).

Property Rights of Aliens under the Legal Order of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic

STEFAN KOCVARA

A. SOURCES OF ALIENS' PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE CSSR International private law and procedure in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CSSR) are governed by the Law of December 4, 1963 N o . 9 7 / 1 9 6 3 Coll., which took effect on April 1, 1964, superseding the Law of March 11, 1948 N o . 4 1 / 1 9 4 8 Coll. o n International and Interprovincial Private Law and the Legal Status of Aliens in the Field of Private Law. Under Law N o . 9 7 / 1 9 6 3 Coll., aliens in Czechoslovakia have the same property rights as Czechoslovak nationals, provided the foreign government concerned grants reciprocity. The pertinent provisions of this Law read as follows: Sec. 32. (1) in the field of both personal and property rights, aliens shall have the same rights and the same duties as Czechoslovak nationals unless the present Law or special [legal] provisions provide otherwise. (2) Should a foreign country treat Czechoslovak nationals in a manner different from that in which it treats its own nationals, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in agreement with the competent Czechoslovak agencies, may decree that the provision of Subsection 1 shall not apply. (3) The provisions of Subsections 1 and 2 shall apply by analogy to legal entities, as far as property relations are involved. Sec. 53. (1) The court shall take any necessary measure to ascertain foreign law; to the extent that the foreign law is not known to the court, it may also ask the Ministry of Justice for information for this purpose. (2) Should doubts arise while hearing cases specified in Sec. 1, courts may ask to the Ministry of Justice to issue a statement. Sec. 54. A declaration concerning reciprocity on the part of a foreign country, issued by the Ministry of Justice, in agreement with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other ministries concerned, shall be binding upon the courts as well as upon [other] public authorities. Law No. 9 7 / 1 9 6 3 Coll. is not the sole source of aliens' property rights. In this respect, reference should be made to the following statement:

A liens under the Legal Order

of the

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T h e main source of our private international law, as of all branches of our law, is the M a y 19th [1948] Constitution [superseded by the Constitution of July 11, 1960, No. 1 0 0 / 1 9 6 0 Collection of Laws] which contains f u n d a mental legal provisions concerning our social and economic system. T h e principles of this system also have a f u n d a m e n t a l significance concerning private law relations involving foreign elements. . . . Aliens m a y not acquire, in c u r territory, such rights as would be at variance with the provisions of the Constitution (the right to acquire the means of production, land in an acreage exceeding the a m o u n t permitted, etc.) 1 Thus, to ascertain the property rights of individuals -

Czechoslovak

citizens, as well as aliens - the Constitution is to be consulted, in addition to other laws concerning property rights, especially the Civil Code. Concerning property rights of individuals, there are two doctrines; ( 1 ) the citizens of a state have certain inherent, inalienable rights, which, under the protection of an independent judiciary, must be and are respected by the government; and (2) citizens have only such rights as are granted to them by their government. T h e first doctrine prevails in the countries of the free world; the second, in the so-called socialist states. Czechoslovakia belongs to the second group. Its Civil

Code

(Law of October 2 5 , 1 9 5 0 , N o . 1 4 1 / 1 9 5 0 Coll., which was superseded by the L a w of February 2 6 , 1 9 6 4 , N o . 4 0 / 1 9 6 4 Coll., in effect since April 1, 1 9 6 4 ) provided in its Section 1 as follows: The basis of civil [property] rights shall be the constitutionally guaranteed social order of the people's democratic republic and its building u p of socialism. T h e meaning of this provision was e x p o u n d e d by the Cabinet in its message introducing the Draft of the C o d e to the National A s s e m b l y , as follows: Basic private rights and their actual content result f r o m the social system, the class structure of society, and the class nature of the State as a political organization of society . . . the progressive regulation of property relations between citizens which helps to build u p socialism to the widest extent is, in addition to the rule of the working people headed by the workers' class, the most important prerequisite of the consistent realization of civil rights as decreed by the May 9 [1948] Constitution. 2

1 Bystricky, Rudolf, Zaklady mezindrodniho of International Private Law] (Prague, Orbis, 2 Tisky k tesnopiseckym zpravdm o schuzich Ceskoslovenske [Printed Matters Appended Meetings of the National Assembly of the 1950), Bill No. 509/1950, p. 105 (hereinafter

prava soukromeho [Fundamentals 1958), p. 28, 29. Narodniho shromazdini republiky to Stenographic Reports on the Czechoslovak Republic] (Prague, referred to as Tisky).

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A treatise on Czechoslovak constitutional law states that . . . our state law is an instrumentality by means of which our people's democratic State . . . removes the remnants of capitalism in the economy, way of life, and consciousness of man. 3

Thus, according to both Section 1 of the 1950 Civil Code and the government message, there are four factors qualifying civil [private] rights: (1) the social system or class structure of society: (2) the class nature of the State as a political organization of society: (3) the rule of the working people headed by the workers' class: and (4) the building up of socialism as based on the progressive regulation of property relations among citizens. These factors required, according to the Czechoslovak Government, . . . the smashing of the bourgeois concept of civil law it is the mission of the people's democratic regime to cilable contradiction between the socialist condition of individualistic character of the capitalist appropriation

at its roots, because remove the irreconproduction and the of products. 4

The smashing was carried out, either by extralegal means or by means afforded by law. Of the latter instrumentality, a textbook on civil law states, . . . Our civil law is an effective weapon for suppressing and restricting the remnants of capitalist private property which still exist in the country in the form of private property belonging to kulaks [farmers who did not join the so-called uniform agricultural cooperatives]. 5 B. TYPES OF OWNERSHIP

The smashing of the bourgeois concept of civil law was carried out, first of all, in the field of ownership. Under the Civil Code of 1811, which was in force in the Czech lands before 1950, and under the corresponding Slovak (Hungarian) civil law, there was a single concept of ownership. Anyone, whether individuals or legal entities, could hold any kind of object in ownership, with a few exceptions in the field of monopolies. The Czechoslovak lawmakers introduced various types of ownership in the 1948 Constitution. The new concept of ownership was more precisely formulated in the 1950 Civil Code, though some pro3

Ceskoslovenske statni pravo [Czechoslovak Constitutional Law] (Prague, 1953), p. 9. 4 Tisky (1950), Bill No. 509/1950, p. 100. 5 Prdvnicky iistav Ministerstva spravedlnosti. Uiebnice obcanskeho a rodinneho prava [Textbook on Civil Law and Domestic Relations] (Prague, 1955), p. 18.

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visions of the Constitution were disregarded, as, for instance, the concept of communal ownership. Three main types of ownership were enacted: (1) socialist ownership (1950 Civil Code, Section 101); (2) personal ownership (Sec. 105); and 3) private ownership Sec. 106). The legislation divided socialist ownership into (a) governmental (state) ownership and (b) cooperative ownership. Private ownership was divided by jurisprudential writers into (a) capitalist private ownership and (b) private ownership of smallscale producers. 6 The different types of ownership vary according to the identity of the owner, the kind of property that may be held in a given kind of ownership and the rights of the owner. Thus, the introduction of different types of ownership has served both theoretical and political purposes. The latter include the deprivation of individuals and nonsocialist legal entities of their property, and the creation of a classless society. 1. Govermental (State) Socialist Ownership The subject matter of property which may be owned exclusively by the Government (State) and which, as such, may be held exclusively in governmental (State) socialist ownership was specified in Section 148 of the 1948 Constitution. At present, it is circumscribed in Article 8 of the 1960 Constitution, which reads as follows: (1) Socialist ownership has two basic forms; governmental (state) ownership, which is ownership by the people as a whole (national property), and cooperative ownership (property of people's cooperatives). (2) National property is, specifically, mineral wealth and basic sources of power; the main areas of forests, rivers, and natural therapeutic sources; means of industrial production, public transport, and communications; banks and insurance institutions; broadcasting, television, and motion picture enterprises, and the most important social institutions, such as health facilities, schools, and scientific institutions. (3) Land joined for purposes of joint cooperative cultivation shall be in the joint use of uniform agricultural cooperatives.

Apart from the subject matter of property as delineated, above, there are also other things which may be owned by the Government. Thus, things belonging to the Government are of two kinds: those that may be held exclusively in governmental (state) ownership and thus comprise a government monopoly, and those that may be owned by anybody, i.e., any legal entities or individuals. r>

Knapp, V., Vlastnictvi v lidové demokracii cracy] (Prague, 1952), p. 224.

[Ownership in a People's Demo-

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560

2. Cooperative Socialist

Ownership

Concerning property held in cooperative socialist ownership, no provisions were made in either the 1948 and 1960 Constitutions or the 1950 and 1964 Civil Codes. However, it may be stated that, except for property which may be held exclusively in governmental socialist ownership, all other kinds of property may be owned by people's cooperatives. 3. Personal

Ownership

The 1960 Constitution provides for personal ownership in article 10, which reads as follows: (1) A citizen's personal ownership of consumer goods, particularly articles of personal and domestic use, and small family houses, as well as savings derived from labor, shall be inviolable. (2) Inheritance of such personal property shall be guaranteed.

In regard to the property rights referred to in Article 10, it should be noted that the things mentioned there are covered by a common term: namely, consumer goods which are held in personal ownership. This category of objects is to be distinguished from those that are called "means of production" and which, under Article 7 (2) of the 1960 Constitution, are "socially owned". Such things are held, if allowed, in private ownership (e.g., Art. 9). The institution of personal ownership is described as . . . the full expression of the new concept of civil liberty in a socialist society, e.g., the full freedom of every working man, as attained by deliverance of the working people from the yoke of the oppressive exploiters, by the removal of the freedom to exploit others, and by coordinating the individual's interest with the interest of the community. In this way we are achieving real freedom for all and the right for everyone to be rewarded according to the work done. 7

The right to choose articles of personal and domestic use is limited by the economic policy of the Government, because "the entire national economy shall be directed by State plan for the development of the national economy" (Art. 12 (1)). Therefore, the production of such articles is determined not by the demand of consumers, but by the Government. Thus, the right of individuals, including aliens, is, in that sense, limited. 7

Knapp, v . , op. cit., p. 372

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a. Small Family House From the point of view of ownership there are two categories of dwellings: that which is held in personal ownership, the so-called small family house, and that which is held in private ownership, i.e., houses which cannot be so classified. The first category is governed by the 1960 Constitution and the 1964 Civil Code, and the second, by the Law of February 26, 1964, No. 4 1 / 1 9 6 4 Coll. on the Management of Dwellings. The difference between the two kinds of dwelling houses is, that while the personal ownership of a small family house is, under Article 10 of the 1960 Constitution, inviolable (whatever that means), private ownership has not been accorded such constitutional protection. The 1964 Civil Code defines a small family house in Section 128 as follows: (1) A small family house is a place of residence in which at least twothirds of the floor area of all premises serve dwelling purposes. A small family house may contain a maximum of five dwelling rooms, not including kitchens. It may contain more dwelling rooms, if the total of the floor area does not exceed 120 square meters [a square meter equals 1550 square inches.]. Only that part of the floor area of the kitchens belonging to the dwelling shall be counted in the total which exceeds 12 square meters per kitchen. (2) Under the conditions specified in Subsection 1, the dwelling part of a farm homestead shall be considered a small family house. Sec. 129. Only one family house may be held [by the same person] in personal ownership. The ownership of a dwelling as defined above shall be considered held in personal ownership and, under Article 10 of the 1960 Constitution, inviolable. The right covered by personal ownership is defined in Section 130 of the 1964 Civil Code, as follows: (1) The owner shall have the right to use the object for his own need, for the need of his family and his household; he shall have the right to the profit and increment to the object, and the right to convey it to other persons. If it does not conflict with the interests of society, the owners shall have the right to grant a person the use of the object, or to dispose of it otherwise. (2) Objects accumulated in a way which conflicts with the interests of society beyond the extent of the needs of the owner, his family, and household, shall not enjoy the protection otherwise accorded personal ownership. The personal ownership of a small family house loses its inviolability as soon as the owner indicates his intention of letting other persons use

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it. In such a case, the local people's committee has the right to allot the dwelling space in a family house according to a list of those persons who applied for allotment of dwelling space in houses which cannot be classified as small family houses. 8 Although the 1964 Civil Code, in Sec. 131, reiterates the constitutional provision concerning the inviolability of personal ownership, at the same time, it stipulates that the interests of society qualify the rights of the owner as specified in Sec. 130 {supra). The qualification reads as follows: Sec. 131. (1) Personal ownership shall be inviolable. If an important interest of society is involved which cannot be otherwise satisfied, the object may be further used without the consent of the owner, but only temporarily, to a stated degree, and for compensation. This shall also apply if the life or health or pressing interest of a citizen is seriously endangered. (2) An object held in personal ownership may be expropriated only [to serve] an important interest of society, on the basis of law, and for compensation. The same shall apply if the personal ownership of an object is to be limited permanently. A timid comment on the above provisions appeared in a legal periodical, as follows . . . Practice does not always respect the above principles, and the alleged interest of society often hides various erroneous principles, and the lawful interests of citizens are thereby impaired. Furthermore, emphasis on the right to full compensation for an expropriated object may be very important to prevent the recurrence of cases in which legal norms lower than law [were invoked] to award disproportionately low compensation for expropriated objects, or did not acknowledge the right to payment of an equivalent when it was ascertained that the realty exceeded a certain value. It is not correct if confiscation methods are applied in cases of expropriation of citizens' personal property which may be justified in cases of private property when, in the case of personal property, they are at variance with the principle of its inviolability.9 In addition to the above provisions of the 1964 Civil Code, the Decree of the Ministry of Justice No 1 7 9 / 1 9 5 0 Coll. also qualifies the rights of the owner of a small family house. In its Section 1, Clause f, it provides as follows: 8

Cf. Prdce (Prague, of July 22, 1964), No. 174, 3:4. Plank, Karol, "K niektor^m otdzkam osobneho vlastnictva v novom obiianskom zakonniku" [On Some Questions of Personal Property in the New Civil Code] in Prdvny obzor, No. 4/1964, p. 221 ff. 9

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Notice [to vacate], with regard to the need of a landlord, may be approved (f) if the landlord wants to move into a dwelling in his own small family house, or if he needs the dwelling therein for his married children, provided neither the public interest - established with consideration to the conditions of the landlord or his children and those of the tenant - especially the interest of fulfilling the tasks of the Uniform Economic Plan, nor the economic and family conditions of the tenant require the preservation of the landlord-tenant relation. The Regional Court in Prague, as the appellate court, in its decision of November 8, 1958, No. 22Co 7 4 6 / 1 9 5 7 , dealt with the interpretation of the above Decree. In this case, the owner of a small family house petitioned the court for approval of the notice on the ground that he needed the dwelling for his widowed daughter. Both the trial and appellate courts denied the approval of the notice. The appellate court stated the following reasons among others: The overriding consideration of this reasoning must be regard for the public interest. At the same time, the question must be weighed against the class point of view, because such a point of view may be decisive in determining which is more important from the viewpoint of the public interest: the termination or preservation of the landlord-tenant relation, i.e., from the viewpoint of our society, from the viewpoint of the political goals of the working class and thus also from the viewpoint of the interest of the working people as a whole. 10 The appellate court, in reaching the above decision, no doubt relied on the instructions of December 20, 1957 No. Pis 1 3 / 1 9 5 7 , issued by the Supreme Court when it sat as a plenum concerning the interpretation of the Decree No. 1 7 9 / 1 9 5 0 Coll. (supra) Sec. 1, Clause f. It then instructed the lower courts to cooperate with the people's committees in landlord-tenant cases, and before handing down a decision, to inquire into the family and economic conditions of the parties a n d / o r their married children in whose behalf approval of notice is petitioned, as well as into their class profile and their participation in the constructive efforts of our people. 11 It should be emphasized that the Decree No. 1 7 9 / 1 9 5 0 Coll., as interpreted by the courts (see above), has been abolished by neither the 1 9 6 4

10 Sbirka rozhodnuti ceskoslovenskych soudu, rocnik 1959; rozhodnuti ve vecech obcanskopravnich [Collection of Decisions of Czechoslovak Courts; Decisions in Civil Law Matters], Published by the Supreme Court in Prague. Vol. for 1959, p. 97 ff. 11 Ibid., Vol. for 1958, p. 1 ff.

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Civil Code nor Law No. 41/1964 Coll. on the Management of Dwellings. The conveyance of personal ownership of a small family house does not require the approval by the county people's committee, as does the conveyance of private ownership in other kinds of realty. However, the validity of the conveyance requires the form of an instrument in writing (deed) and its registration by the office of the state notary. Having ascertained the opinion of the local people's committee, the notary shall deny registration if the transaction is at variance with the law or with the interests of society.12 As for building a small family house, the individual is, under the 1964 Civil Code, entirely dependent on the Government. It is the Government which produces and distributes building material, and which does not permit the owner to convey the title to a (building) lot to an individual. Such title may be conveyed only to the Government or to an authorized socialist organization (Sec. 490). In the future, a situation may arise in which all (building) lots will be owned by the Government or by socialist organizations. County people's committees are authorized to create the right of personal use to such a lot (Sees. 205, 198). Thus, the citizen who built a small family house will become the owner of the house, but not of the lot. The right to personal use of the lot may not be transferred by deed to another person (Sec. 202), but the lot may be used by the Government without the consent of the individual for whom the right to personal use was created (Sec. 204). b. Articles for Personal and Domestic Use as Personal Property Concerning this kind of personal ownership, reference is made to a decision of the Regional Court in Prague, which dealt with the question of whether jewelry is to be considered personal property. The facts of the case are as follows: The property of E. L. was declared forfeit, and the court attached same, including some jewelry which the plaintiff claimed as personal property which she had placed in the custody of B. L., the wife of E. L., and the plaintiff therefore asked that the court dissolve the attachment of the jewelry. The trial court granted the request of the plaintiff, but the appellate court reversed the judgment, specifying the following reasons for its decision: The edge of this sanction [forfeiture of property], aimed, as it is, at the class of former exploiters, serves, first of all, to weaken the economic position 18

Cf. Sees. 63, 64, Law No. 95/1963 Coll.

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of the offender, which, as a rule, is a basic reason for him, or members of his family, to launch further attacks against our social order. . . . This is why they try to thwart, by any - often crafty - means, the effective forfeiture of property. If they are not able to do so themselves, they may be aided by persons close to them. . . . Such is the case under consideration. . . . The matter must be judged, first of all, from the class point of view, i.e., whether the decision is in accord with the interests of the workers' class, considering its political goals at the present stage of building up socialism in our country. . . . As to the legal nature of the jewelry, that is, whether it was to be considered personal or private property, the court stated the following: . . . In the present case, it is not possible to say whether the objects under litigation [jewelry] are ipso facto personal property. Objects of personal ownership are things serving personal consumption both subjectively and objectively, their ownership excluding further exploitation of manpower. There is no doubt that jewelry habitually, and according to its original design, provides for the ornamentation of an individual, thus [for] personal consumption. However, it is known that in a capitalist society, (jewelry) frequently serves other, often primary purposes - e.g., as a safe investment of resources which permits their profitable sale, as occasion requires, thus enabling the owner to use them as production capital. Without question, this was the case with our plaintiff, because nothing was easier than for her husband to invest his enormous income in just such a way. . . .1:i c. Savings as Personal

Property

Savings derived from labor are also declared inviolable under Article 10 of the 1960 Constitution. This was stipulated also under Section 158 of the 1948 Constitution. Despite such constitutional protection, the Government repudiated, through the Law of May 30, 1953, No. 4 1 / 1953 Coll. on Monetary Reform, all claims based on deposits of any kind (including those derived from labor) which had been accumulated up to November 1, 1945, and other claims for which the State was responsible. The above Law affected not only Czechoslovak citizens, but also all foreigners who had moneys and securities on deposit in Czechoslovakia. 4. Private Ownership (of Means of Production) Under the 1948 Constitution, there was "coexistence" between the socialist and capitalist economy. In this respect, the Constitution pro13

Regional Court in Prague. Decision of May 15, 1959, No. 21 Co 292/59. Collection of Decisions of Czechoslovak Courts, Vol. for 1960, p. 28.

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vided that the means and instruments of production should be either national property, the property of people's cooperatives, or in the private ownership of individual producers (Sec. 146). Thus, individuals, as well as their associations, could hold in private ownership any means of production except those which, under Section 148 of the 1948 Constitution, were national property and as such could be held solely in socialist ownership by the Government. Neither the 1960 Constitution nor the 1964 Civil Code defines the concept of private ownership (property). The Civil Code states, only incidentally, among its closing provisions, in Section 489, that "civil law relations also originate from individual ownership of objects which are not the subject matter of personal ownership (private ownership); also, such ownership shall be protected against unlawful interference". Legal writers distinguish between "capitalist private ownership" and "ownership of small-scale producers". While the former was applied to individuals who, in their productive activities, employed labor, the latter was applied to those who worked alone without employing labor. The reason for distinguishing between these two types of private ownership was to indicate how best to eliminate them: While suppression is being used against capitalist ownership (in the rural areas, against the kulaks), persuasion is being employed with small-scale producers to induce them to adopt higher forms of production (cooperatives). 14

a. Private Ownership of Lands is governed by the Law of March 21, 1948, No. 4 6 / 1 9 4 8 Coll. on the New Land reform (Permanent Regulation of Agricultural and Forest Land), which divides owners into two categories. The first category includes owners who till their land themselves, and the second, those who do not, as well as certain legal entities identified in the Law. 15 Those in the first category are permitted to own land not to exceed 50 hectares. Land in excess of this amount is taken over by the government. Owners in the second category are permitted to retain land not exceeding 1 hectare, provided they start tilling it themselves within ten years; otherwise, the Government will take over this land, also. (There are minor exceptions to the latter rule.) Despite the fact that Law No. 4 6 / 1 9 4 8 Coll., in its heading, calls its 14

Knapp, V., and Others, Ucebnice obcanskeho a rodinneho prava [Textbook on Civil Law and the Law of Domestic Relations], Vol. I (Prague, 1953-55), p. 291. 15 Law No. 46/1948 Coll., Sec. 2.

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rules final, and despite the fact that the 1948 Constitution also guaranteed the ownership by an independent farmer of land up to 50 hectares, a relentless drive has been conducted by the government to deprive such farmers of either their land, or the opportunity to farm it independently, or both. To achieve collectivization of land, thus far left in private hands and to secure the cultivating of such land, the government has divided farmers, according to the Soviet pattern, into two categories, the first including the so-called kulaks, and the second the smalland medium-scale farmers. Who is to be considered a kulak? The criterion is quite arbitrary. While the Official Gazette declared a kulak to be any farmer whose land exceeds 15 hectares, 10 the national youth organization gave the following definition: The village rich [kulaks] are those who do not comply with the rules concerning deliveries of agricultural products [to the government], who interfere with the establishment of uniform agricultural cooperatives, who defame the people's democratic legal order, and who are a sounding board for America and "Free Europe", who conspire with Vatican agents and with the murderers [belonging to] the American CIA . . , 17

After the formulation of such arbitrary definitions of kulak, the government formally incited the population to take action against such people; this appeal was published in the Official Gazette: The Cabinet calls on all groups forming the National F r o n t . . . to mobilize their members for the struggle against the sworn enemy of the working people, the "village rich" [kulak]. 1 8

Free legal commerce in land held in private ownership has been abolished. The transfer, lease, and dividing of real property are contingent on the permission of the people's committee of the county in whose jurisdiction the property is located. The committee must deny permission if the transaction "is at variance with the public interest". 19 The Ministers of the Interior and Agriculture, respectively, are authorized to define the public interest. The 1950 Civil Code goes even further in limiting the owner's right to dispose of his property. It provides that "ownership may not be renounced with respect to things which, pursuant to provisions issued in regard thereto, may not be freely alienated". 20 The provision applies, according to the cabinet message, not only to inalienable 16 17 18 19 20

Oredni list [Official Gazette], II, December 28, 1951. Mlada fronta, September 23, 1951, a Czechoslovak newspaper. Oredni list [Official Gazette], February 14, 1952. p. 89. Law No. 65/1951 Coll. 1950 Civil Code, Sec. 132.

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property held in socialist ownership, but also to things held in private ownership which may not be alienated without official permission (e.g., land). 21 This provision is also connected with the principle of the 1948 Constitution that "by means of the uniform economic plan, the government shall direct the economic activity".22 A consequence of the latter principle is contained in the following provision: Sec. 164. (1) Everyone who was assigned any task concerned with the operation and fulfillment of the uniform economic plan shall carry it out conscientiously and economically to the best of his personal and economic capacity. (2) Individuals and corporate bodies shall adapt their economic activity to the uniform economic plan. Identical provisions are contained in Art. 13 of the 1960 Constitution. Thus, fulfillment of a task assigned in connection with the uniform economic plan may not be avoided by renouncing ownership of an object which is supposed to serve the fulfillment of the task. Renunciation of ownership combined with failure to carry out the task may result in the application, by the courts, of pertinent provisions of the Criminal Code, such as those concerning sabotage, 23 abuse of the right of ownership,24 or jeopardizing the uniform economic plan 25 (each such provision carrying severe penalties of confinement), or of the provisions of the Criminal Code for Administrative Authorities, 26 which set high fines as penalties. Culled from the available court decisions, a case may be cited to show the application of the Criminal Code concerning the abandonment of land. The Regional (Appellate) Court in Karlovy Vary, in the decision of October 13, 1950, No. 917 of 1950, found a "village rich" (kulak) who had "abandoned his farm" guilty of the crime of sabotage. Among other grounds for the decision the court gave this reason: The perpetrator committed the crime of sabotage because, by arbitrarily and surreptitiously abandoning his farm, he violated his duties as farmer purposely to frustrate or render more difficult the operation of the uniform economic plan, which, to be successful in its agricultural sector, requires, among other things, that the entire land be farmed.27 21

Tisky, p. 125.

22

1948 Constitution, Sec. 162. 1950 Criminal Code, Sec. 85. Ibid., Sec. 133.

23 24

25 26

27

Ibid., Sec. 135. 1950 Criminal Code for Administrative Authorities, Sees. 38, 51, 53 and 56.

Sbirka roznodnuti ceskoslovenskych

p. 73 ft.

soudit (1951). Nos. 5-6, Decision No. 42,

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While the 1948 Constitution guaranteed private ownership of land up to 50 hectares, the 1960 Constitution does not guarantee such ownership up to any amount. It only permits, in indefinite terms, small private farming to which several conditions are attached. The pertinent Article 9 reads as follows: Within the limits of the socialist economic system, small private farming, based on the labor of the owner himself and excluding exploitation of another's labor power, is permissible. It should be noted that the above Article is included in Chapter One (Articles 1-18), providing for the social order of the State, and not in Chapter Two (Articles 19-38), providing for rights and duties of citizens. Thus, private ownership of land, no matter how small in acreage, is not considered to be a right and is not protected by the Constitution. It is only permissible subject to suppression at any time. b. Private Ownership of Dwelling Houses Although many houses were confiscated or nationalized, or their owners banned from communities in which the houses are located to prevent them from using them, the institution of private ownership of houses has not been abolished. It still exists, but under the Law of February 26, 1964, No. 4 1 / 1 9 6 4 Coll., which superseded the Law of December 20, 1956 No. 67/1956 Coll. on management of dwellings as amended by Law of November 30, 1961 No. 147/1961 Coll., it is subject to limitations - so many restrictions of such a kind that they render the value of this ownership dubious and the income therefrom insufficient even for paying the repair costs. This is the reason why houses, especially tenement buildings in cities and towns, are neglected, in disrepair, and shabby. It was this state of affairs that produced the Law of November 19, 1959 No. 71/1959 Coll. on Measures Concerning Certain Private House Property, authorizing the local people's committees to have houses held in private ownership repaired at the expense of the owner, with or without his consent. As long as the owner does not defray the costs of repair to the people's committee, he may make no disposition concerning the house except with the approval of the county people's committee. The Ministry of Finance has the right to regulate the management of tenement houses which have been repaired at the expense of their owners, as well as the financing of their repair. If the claim resulting from this repair, along with the claims of other socialist organizations, is in excess of two-thirds of the value of the house before its

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repair, the title of the house, of the lot on which it was built, and of the garden adjacent to this lot are conveyed to the State as its socialist ownership. The owner of a house held in private ownership is under obligation to report, within eight days, to the local people's committee that a dwelling house has been newly built or established, vacated, is not being used or is used only occasionally, or that the user of the dwelling died; furthermore, he must report the fact that anyone has moved into a dwelling without a permit from the local people's committee or other agency authorized to allot a dwelling; that the user of the dwelling has two or more dwellings; or that the dwelling space is excessive. Such reports are checked and supplemented by the "actives" of the local people's committee, especially civic committees and house commissions. On the basis of such information, the local people's committee allocates dwellings among applicants. Anyone who has moved into a dwelling without a permit from the local people's committee is evicted (Section 41). It is forbidden to integrate or divide dwellings or to use them for other than dwelling purposes (Section 56). Rentals are governed by the Proclamation of the Central Administration for the Development of the Local Economy of March 26, 1964, No. 6 0 / 1 9 6 4 Coll. If the landlord and the tenant cannot arrive at an agreement, the rent is determined by the local people's committee. Conveyance of any kind of realty, including dwelling houses, which are not held in personal ownership is subject to approval by the county people's committee, which must withhold approval if such conveyance is at variance with the interests of society. At present, tenement houses are built by the Government or cooperatives.

C. RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN PRIVATE ENTERPRISE

There is no such right. The Government has become a monopolistic entrepreneur in all areas of the national economy, and runs its enterprises either directly or through national enterprises and enterprises of the local economy. The property held by such enterprises belongs to the Government. 28 The 1948 Constitution provided in Section 8 that "within general statutory limits, every citizen may, anywhere within the territory of the Czechoslovak Republic, acquire real and other property and carry on 28

Law No. 67/1958 Coll. and Law No. 73/1959 Coll.

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gainful activity there", and in Section 158 that "the private ownership of small and medium enterprises [employing] up to 50 employees is guaranteed". Notwithstanding all the constitutional guarantees, private enterprises have been nationalized (confiscated) without regard to the number of employees. Even individual producers (craftsmen) not employing any hired labor were forced into organizations of the local economy now governed by the Law of November 19, 1959, No. 73/ 1959 on the Local Economy. Organizations of the local economy carry on the following work: services, repairs, maintenance, and production of local significance in the field of community services, local building, local industry, and housing. Before the "victory of socialism", all such work was done mostly through private enterprise and by technically trained, skilled craftsmen. Today, they cannot do such work as individual entrepreneurs because, in the words of the 1960 Constitution, "the means of production are socially owned", i.e., owned by the Government, which does not allot them such means (leather to shoemakers, flour to bakers, etc.) and thus forces them to join such organizations of the local economy.29 Many traders and artisans also lost their trade in an extralegal way. In the revolutionary days of February 1948, the so-called action committees evicted thousands upon thousands of traders and artisans from their trades and shops for merely political reasons. These lawless acts were afterwards validated by Law No. 213/1948 Coll. Thus, the number of independent traders and artisans possessing the means of production in private ownership is today negligible. The 1960 Constitution does not guarantee the right to private enterprise of any kind or of any size. On the contrary, it provides, in Article 7, as follows: (1) The economic foundation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic shall be the socialist economic system, which excludes every form of exploitation of man by man. (2) [In] the socialist economic system . . . the means of production are socially owned and the entire national economy [is] directed by plan. . .. Article 11 provides for the establishment of socialist economic organizations which shall, as independent legal entities, be entrusted with the administration of part of the national property, and 29 By the Law of June 4, 1964, No. 109/1964 Coll. (Economic Code) the organizations of the local economy have been transformed since July 1, 1964, into governmental (state) economic organizations managed by people's committees.

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Kocvara

all economic activity of state and other socialist economic organizations shall be carried on in mutual harmony and directed according to the principle of democratic centralism. . . . These and similar rules of the 1960 Constitution form the foundation of the 1964 Civil Code, which provides in its introductory part for these among other things: The main purpose of the Civil Code is to anchor and define the rights and duties of citizens and organizations that arise from [the necessity of] meeting their material and cultural needs, to protect these rights, provided they are exercised in accordance with the interests of society, and to contribute to the consistent observance of socialist legality in civil law relations. The provisions of the Civil Code aim . . . at overcoming anachronisms in the minds of people, and thus help to create the prerequisites for changing socialist relations into Communist ones. . . . Thus, in the activities necessary to meet the material and cultural needs of citizens, the right of individuals to conduct private enterprise, in accord with the above-quoted constitutional provisions, was wiped out almost completely. Private economic (business) organizations were abolished by the 1950 Civil Code and replaced by socialist organizations, which are defined by the 1964 Civil Code as follows: Socialist organizations are state, cooperative and social organizations, as well as other organizations the activities of which contribute to the development of socialist relations (Section 18). Socialist organizations do business in civil law relations on their own behalf, and bear the responsibility resulting from such relations unless provided for otherwise (Section 19). If then a citizen wants to transact business which in a non-socialist country is governed by the law of contracts, e.g., if he wants to buy something in a store (Sec. 239), to have a suit made to order (Sec. 263), to have an object (e.g., shoes) repaired or fitted, to bail a thing (Sec. 298), etc., he must enter into civil law relations with a socialist organization, because individuals are not permitted to render such services or engage in such business on their own account. The economic activities of an individual are controlled by a socialist banking organization. If he negotiates a loan, for example, to build a small family house, he must state the purpose he needs it for. The bank has the right to cancel the loan agreement if it has been used for any purpose other than those stated by the borrower Sec. 344). The 1964 Civil Code also governs civil law relations to which both parties are natural persons. Such relations are treated in six short Sec-

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tions (384-389) in a chapter called "Civic Aid" and are defined as follows: (1) If a citizen performs a job for another citizen at the latter's request, advances him a loan, or gives him aid in another way, civic aid is involved. (2) Rendering civic aid must be in accord with community life (Sec. 384). Renumeration or interest may be required if it has been so agreed.

The Communist Party daily, Rude prdvo, of April, 1964, reported as a big concession to private enterprise that some consumer and personal services previously contained in the socialist segment were returned to private ownership, effective on April 1, 1964. These include: services as porters, errands, laundering and ironing, shoeshining, minor tailoring jobs, car washing and guarding, cloakroom attendance, sales of refreshments and souvenirs, and other unspecified jobs. These concessions were made in view of the expanding tourist traffic from the West. The individuals concerned are not private businessmen in the proper sense of the term. They have to be licensed, and must enter into a contract with the proper socialist organization authorized to render such services, which also fixes the relevant prices.

D. ALIENS AND THE LAW ON TRADING IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE

The Law in Trading in Foreign Exchange of December 12, 1953, No. 107/1953 Coll. as amended by the Law of October 17, 1958, No. 64/ 1958 Coll. is based, not on the principle of nationality, but on the principle of living for a certain time in the territory of Czechoslovakia. All individuals who have been living there at least one year, and all legal entities which have their seat in Czechoslovakia are to be considered natives with regard to foreign exchange: all others are to be considered aliens with regard to foreign exchange. The Law is replete with duties, limitations, and restrictions in trading in foreign exchange. Thus, an alien who is considered a native with regard to foreign exchange must offer foreign currency, instruments of payment in foreign currency, and precious metals for purchase to the Czechoslovak Government (State) Bank; he also must sell, at the request of the Ministry of Finance as it shall specify, real and other property which he has abroad, or he must obey the Ministry to deal as otherwise ordered with such valuables. Apart from other limitations and restrictions, he is not allowed, without a permit from the Ministry of Finance, to assume contractual obligations involving foreign countries or acknowledge

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obligations involving foreign countries, nor to buy foreign currency, precious metals, foreign securities, etc.

E. SUMMARY

The law of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic guarantees to aliens the same property rights as to the Czechoslovak nationals, which, stated in a negative way, means that aliens are not permitted to have such property rights as are not accorded to Czechoslovak nationals. Thus, aliens may not own objects which can be held only in governmental socialist ownership; this includes means of production and distribution in all fields of economic activity. Apart from the fact that government commitments have been grossly violated by government agencies themselves, exceptions concerning agricultural land cannot be taken into consideration as far as an alien is concerned, because he cannot meet the basic condition: to till the land in person. Like a Czechoslovak national, an alien has no right to own and run an enterprise, on either a collective or individual basis, since the civil and commercial law governing corporations was abolished, their property nationalized or confiscated, and socialist forms of enterprise established such as national enterprises and enterprises of the local economy (now governmental (state) economic organizations managed by people's committees). The property of such enterprises belongs to the Government. The Constitution guarantees personal ownership of consumer goods, particularly articles of personal and domestic use, and small family houses, as well as savings derived from labor. Apart from the fact that the two first categories are impractical for an alien, the courts adjudge them from a class point of view, i.e., from the viewpoint of whether the decision of the court accords with the interests of the working class and its political goals. Accumulated savings as a property right may be taken into consideration, but the past shows that, notwithstanding constitutional guarantees, such rights were repudiated. Dwelling houses may also be held in private ownership by aliens. Such ownership, however, is subject to so many limitations and restrictions that it is almost worthless. It is a burden rather than a right.

3 CULTURAL

ASPECTS

Contemporary Czechoslovak Philosophy

NIKOLAUS LOBKOWICZ

The history of Marxist-Leninist philosophy in Czechoslovakia since 1945 is the history of a dilemma: that of the Communist Party, which took great pains with the education of competent philosophers and then had to discover that the same philosophers became independent seekers of truth as soon as they were able to stand on their own feet; and of the Marxist-Leninist philosophers themselves, whose ideology requires them to serve the Party even while their philosophical eros leads them towards truths which usually have little to do with, and often are contrary to, the Party line of the day. This dilemma became most conspicuous when, early in 1959, Ladislav Tondl, Karel Kosik, Ivan Svitak, and others were pilloried by the Central Committee because of allegedly "revisionist" attitudes. The three main defendants were the representatives of a generation which seemed to justify the Party's fondest hopes: they had received their training in Marxist-Leninist philosophy between 1948 and 1953, that is, in the Stalinist era; they were trained, on the one hand, by old Communists interested in philosophy, such as Ludvik Svoboda and Ladislav Stoll, and, on the other hand, by bourgeois philosophers converted to Communism, such as Ladislav Rieger, Jifina Popelova-Otahalova, or Igor HruSovsky; they were the authors of the first Czechoslovak contributions to Marxist-Leninist philosophy, published in 1953, when the Institute of Philosophy at the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences and the Filosoficky casopis were established; and, finally, they occupied the leading chairs of philosophy both at the Charles University and at the Institute of Philosophy. In short, those accused of revisionism in 1959 were neither philosophers from the pre-Communist era nor young hotheads, but men whom the Party had expected to become the props of Marxist-Leninist philosophy in Czechoslovakia. The accusation of revisionism was only a camouflage for the Party's embarrassed disappointment in these men.

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Tondl, Kosik, Svitak, and all others accused quite obviously were not revisionists in the ordinary sense of the term. They were far from wanting to revise the Marxist-Leninist dogma; they only called for more "elbow room". They were not opposed to the Party; they only believed that they would best serve it by being good and honest philosophers and argued that their work had to suffer if it was harrassed daily and burdened with nonphilosophical problems. They were prepared to fight the battle of the revolutionary movement of the working class, as befits good Marxist-Leninists; but they considered it improper, annoying, and degrading, and above all harmful to their Marxist-Leninist philosophizing, to comply with each and every political whim of the day. And this was precisely what the Party could not tolerate. Though it wished to have qualified and highly specialized philosophers who were more than only philosophizing apparatchiks, it could not possible tolerate philosophers who were interested in philosophy for philosophy's sake rather than for the sake of the Party. It had to insist upon its own interpretation of the slogan concerning the "Unity of Theory and Practice": "practice" had to refer to the concrete politics of the Party, not to "spontaneous" movements of the working masses. That theory and practice were one had to mean that theoreticians were forced daily to re-think their ideas in terms of aims outlined by the Party. It is obvious that this dilemma does not lend itself to trenchant and lasting solutions. The Party needs creative, though fawning, philosophers who are both original and sensitive to the Party's slightest movement. The philosophers wish to serve the Communist movement and acknowledge that the Party is its only true representative. But the truth which the philosophers seek has its own laws, even if (and perhaps precisely because) it is Marxist-Leninist. The dilemma can only be modified and camouflaged from case to case; in spite of the enormous pains taken by the Party, and in spite of the self-control displayed by the philosophers, the future does not look rosy for either of the contracting parties. From the point of view of the Party, the situation is still further complicated by the fact that its philosophers do not form a homogeneous body - in the eyes of totalitarian rulers, a rather disagreeable phenomenon. At least six different groups must be distinguished. In the generation of those who were adults when the Nazis came, there were only a few Communists interested in philosophy without having had anything comparable to professional training - men such as Svoboda and Stoll in Bohemia and Szanto and Siracky in Slovakia; then professional philosophers who refused to change sides and consequently could not be

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used except for occasional, highly specialized work such as producing annotated translations of Greek texts or reviews (Josef Krai, Emil Utitz, Emil Svoboda, Svàtopluk Stur, A. Kffz, etc.); and, finally, the fairly numerous professional philosophers who converted to Communism, at least to the extent of being useful to the Party. The importance of this last group can hardly be overestimated, for it is they who gave the younger generation their professional training and probably awakened in them the truly philosophical eros which, as far as the Party is concerned, turned out to be a disagreeable Geist dessert man sich nicht erwehren kann. Why men such as Ladislav Rieger, Igor HruSovsky, J. Popelovà-Otàhalovà, Mirko Novak, or Otakar Zich ever became Communists is difficult to tell. Since most of them were not overly successful before 1948, it is difficult to reject offhand the suggestion that their conversion was motivated by opportunism. But it would be too easy to leave it at that. One will have to add that these men succumbed to Marxism-Leninism because the Communist ideology was more "vital" and more "existentially" relevant than the pale talk of democracy, the enlightened, but very little engagé, "positivism", the shallow emphasis on civil virtues, the watered-down religiosity, and the indifference to really relevant problems, an indifference both sceptical and estheticizing, all of which was characteristic of most philosophy and, more generally, of the intellectual atmosphere in prewar Czechoslovakia. A vacuum sucks in whatever comes closest - a law that applies to philosophy as much as to physics. As for the younger generation, it too comprises three groups: philosophizing apparatchiks, most of whom were brought up by the Institute of Social Science at the CC of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, under the direction of Ladislav Stoll ; next, the few Marxist-Leninists who deserve the title of "philosopher", men such as Tondi, Kosik, and Svitàk; and third, a vast group of younger philosophers who will have to decide sooner or later whether they want to side with the pseudophilosophy of the apparatchiks or with the dangerous, but genuine, philosophizing of the "revisionists". Here is the Party's greatest problem: on the one hand, it knows only too well that to push the youngest generation in the direction of the apparatchiks, though it may be a comfortable solution, means doing away with philosophy-proper; on the other hand, it hardly can risk abandoning these youngsters to those philosophers who have been struck by the lightning of genuine philosophical reflection, especially if the philosophers are able to publish books such as Karel Kosik's Dialektika konkrétniho, which is one

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of the most original Marxist-Leninist products since Lukacs' Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein (published in 1923) - so much so that a West German translation is in print and an English translation is under way. In 1963, Kosik, at the International Congress of Philosophy in Mexico City, drew a clear-cut distinction between "orators" and "thinkers". The former, he argued, are only interested in convincing their hearers of the truth of an ideology which seems to them beyond question; the latter, on the contrary, are interested in discovering truth. The Party has need only of "orators," we may add; but it wants "orators" who are at the same time creative and original. There is no way out of this dilemma, which lies in the existence of two incompatible criteria by which to evaluate Communist philosophizing, and in the fact that the Party seems unprepared simply to sacrifice one of these criteria for the sake of the other. Communist philosophy is "better" or "less good", first, according to whether it totally commits itself to the Party line or not; and secondly, according to whether it is expressed in a properly philosophical manner or not. That the Party believes these two criteria compatible is due to the very nature of Marxism-Leninism, which is Party politics and philosophy in one, philosophical politics rather than a political philosophy. Unfortunately, the very nature of MarxismLeninism also is the force which, time and again, leads to its bursting asunder. As to the ensuing patchwork, its withering away would seem to be a matter of time rather than of essence.

LITERATURE N. Lobkowicz, Marxismus-Leninismus in der CSR (Dordrecht, Holland, 1961). , "Philosophy in Czechoslovakia since 1960", Studies in Soviet Thought, 3 (1963), pp. 11-32. , "Partei-Philosophie", Wort und Wahrheit (1963), pp. 280-298. , "Philosophical Revisionism in Czechoslovakia", Studies in Soviet Thought, 4 (1964), pp. 89-101. K. Kosik, Dialektika konkretniho. Studie o problematice cloveka a sveta (Praha, NCSAV, 1963).

The Age of John Hus in Recent Czechoslovak Historical Literature (1948-1961)

VACLAV MUDROCH

In a new political climate the Czechoslovak historians test the old national soil and replant many an acre with ideas drawn from the cornucopia of Communist maxims, axioms and social laws developed since the appearance of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Thus, the belief of Benedetto Croce that all history is contemporary history has been confirmed by recent Czechoslovak historians: in reassessing the past they justify their present. No other period of history has received so much attention from contemporary Czechoslovak historians as the Hussite period. It has been traversed and retraversed many a time, and the results of this long journey are now available to the scholars. The new literature has been hitherto without an international audience. This article will present its salient features to the public in the hope that this will stimulate an examination of its theses - an examination which, I may add, it sorely needs. At this juncture a caveat is in order. Different meanings may be attached to "Hussite literature", and the post-1948 Hussite literature vindicates our view: it is sui generis. It deals with John Hus only incidentally - it is much more concerned with the social message that can be lifted from the times in which he lived than with his theological works, which must be read in conjunction with his opposition to the Church. We learn, therefore, of the existing social inequalities in Bohemia during the first decades of the fifteenth century, but we are told almost nothing about the religious upheavals that shook the world in the same period. Josef Macek was the first historian to reevaluate the Hussite period. We read, in the introduction to Husitské revolucní hnutí (a book which, incidentally, earned the author the Czechoslovak State Prize for 1952), the following significant words: "The Hussite armies fought against the darkest forces of reaction: they fought, that is, against the

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hierarchy of the Church, the nobility, and the patricians. These were the privileged exploiters who kept the great masses of the workers under their heel. To safeguard the life of our people and to open their way to the sun, it was necessary, therefore, that all the parasites and beasts of prey who had sucked blood from the wounds of the exploited classes be mercilessly exterminated." This fight which the Hussites had begun, Mr. Macek adds, was completed only by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. These words show that in 1952 Mr. Macek was writing history under the impact of contemporary events, and a passing reference to the mercenaries of Wall Street and the Vatican who could expect to have their teeth knocked out if they venture to attack the Republic only confirms the unavoidable conclusion.1 Was Mr. Macek the prisoner of a thesis or did he follow his own views? There is no difficulty in answering this question: references to Joseph Stalin abound. Less surprising, but equally irrelevant to an account of the Hussite movement, is the author's dependence on the few pages that deal with the Hussites in Engels' The Peasant War in Germany.2 The references to Joseph Stalin are useful; they are indicative of Mr. Macek's orientation in the critical decade between 1950 and 1960, and occasionally supplement the meaning of the text. Mr. Macek's Tabor v husitskem revolucnim hnuti, the two-volume magnum opus of his feverish activity between 1951 and 1956, when he published six volumes dealing with the Hussite period, has the merit of bringing into focus the Taborite chiliasts who had received only scant attention in Palacky's Dejiny narodu ceskeho.3 The chiliasts, as the name implies, were those sectarians of the Middle Ages who, on the basis of the Book of Revelation 20, 4, anticipated the second coming of Christ and the establishment of his thousand-year reign on earth. These eschatological expectations were common in the early Middle Ages, but they appear only sporadically in the "classical" period. The Taborite chiliasts, therefore, deserve attention. Mr. Macek considers the Chiliasts as fifteenth-century social reformers. He says explicitly: "Chiliasm was the revolutionary ideology of the Hussite masses." Thus, the foundation of Tabor, following the sack of Sezimovo Osti in the spring of 1420, Mr. Macek continues, expressed the "class' demands of the villagers and the plebeians. The 1

Josef Macek, Husitske revolucni linuti (Prague, 1952), pp. 11-13. Friedrich Engels, The Peasant War in Germany (Moscow, 1956), pp. 57-60. Josef Macek, Tabor v husitskem revolucnim hnuti, 2 vols., Vol. I. 2nd ed. (1956), Vol. II (1955).

8 s

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author then states his cardinal thesis: Tabor was a community governed by the chiliasts who became its first town leaders. It was in Tabor, Mr. Macek claims, that they launched their appeal to arms against the exploiters - the Antichrists.4 The chiliast articles, which originated in the same environment, represent, according to Mr. Macek, the ideological arsenal of the poor (chiliast) priests. Although he is well aware that the articles are based on biblical doctrine, he nevertheless maintains (without a critical apparatus) that they represent the class demands of the medieval paupers. The article that predicts, for example, the end of the world in 1420, when the "evil sinners" would be engulfed, Mr. Macek suggests, was understood as putting a terminus ad quem to the feudal social order in general and to the existence of the rich in particular.5 The chiliasts were social reformers, too, we learn from Mr. Macek, and he reformulates the chiliast doctrine in the following words: "The image of Christ's kingdom had been developed from nebulous representations of Christian equality, but it foreshadowed, in fact, little less than a classless society." 6 The chiliast articles, taken one by one and juxtaposed with Mr. Macek's interpretations, would lead to conclusions which we have attempted to eschew in this contribution. However, there is room for a marginal remark: The chiliasts were Christians "a outrance"\ in reading Mr. Macek's presentation, the reader is sometimes guided, sometimes driven, to the view that they were proletarian skeptics and libertines. Consequently, when we are told that the Hussite revolutionary movement was an antecedent of the bourgeois revolutions and must be viewed as the most powerful class struggle of the exploited against their exploiters in precapitalist«: times, we suddenly find ourselves on familiar ground, holding the clue to the author's interpretation. Whether this dogma can help us to understand the Hussite movement is open to question. In view of these pronouncements, the conclusion that Mr. Macek has prepared for the reader is a surprise. What Mr. Macek presents is a historiographical "salto mortale". The chiliasts suddenly become visionaries, and the chiliast program that the author has previously extolled in mellifluous tones has, to quote the author, a reactionary * Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 252-53, s Ibid., II, pp. 53, 58. * Ibid., II, pp. 66-70.

258; II, pp. 43-45, 126, 360.

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form. Moreover, it is replete with foolish visions, displays contradictions, and is unable to solve the problems that it has posed. Mr. Macek, however, saves his former statements by another dictum: "The inherent limitations of chiliasm and its reactionary form cannot alter the fact that its content was revolutionary and was designed to mobilize the masses." 7 The only explanation that I can offer the reader is that Mr. Macek is an ad hoc historian who formulates his interpretations on the spur of the moment and in the heat of the battle, and then assumes that he has done his duty; the haphazard organization of his works tends to confirm this. Mr. Macek's remaining works, Prokop Veliky and Husité na Baltu a Ve Velkopolsku, are postscripts to his major works. The latter is a conventional biography, and the former reviews and summarizes material that has been collected and assembled in book form by Polish, German, and Czech scholars. One looks in vain for a single original idea; results of original research are conspicuously absent.8 The final work in which Mr. Macek has chosen to interpret the Hussite period is a biography of Jan Hus. The work, published in 1961, is in many respects Mr. Macek's most readable opus.9 A reader of his works, a follower of the themes he has dealt with in the not-so-distant past, is astonished to find that the biography lacks the verbal violence which characterizes Macek's earlier writings. Jan Hus is a historical work in which the author's political credo suddenly ceases to be advertised in the text, though it is still evident in the introduction. The biography, let it be said immediately, does not break fresh ground. All the well-known facts which historians inevitably emphasize are presented to the reader once again. We are in the Chapel of Bethlehem with Hus, we are with him among the country-folk, we witness in detail his journey to Constance, his trial, and his death. To this factual material Mr. Macek has added excerpts from his works and a few letters that Jan Hus addressed to his friends in Bohemia. The picture we thus receive from the author is clear and approaches the standards of verisimilitude. It is interesting to note that in this work Mr. Macek has remembered not only Hus's mother, whom he forgot to honor in his 7

Ibid., Josef (Prague, 8 Josef 1961). 8

II, pp. 135, 364-69. Macek, Husité na Baltu a ve Velkopolsku ("Za svobodu lidu") sv. 9 1952); Josef Macek, Prokop Veliky (Praha, 1953). Macek, Jan Hus (Odkazy pokrokovych osobnosti nasi minulosti) (Prague,

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previous works, but also the English reformer, John Wyclyf, who, as the author plainly admits, was responsible for many a thought that Hus developed during the most formative years of his life at the university. This is a popular biography in which the author does justice to Jan Hus and, no less important, to himself, too. The narrative reveals the author's insufficient knowledge of texts which are no longer common in Czechoslovakia. The well-known words: "Let every person be subject to the governing authorities. For there is no authority except from God, and those that exist have been instituted by God", are not St. Peter's but St. Paul's (Romans, 13, 1). The author's knowledge of English history also leaves something to be desired: Wyclyf's articles could hardly have been condemned by the University of London - it was founded in the nineteenth century. Economic and social history is an area of general history which historians in Czechoslovakia have cultivated sotto voce, as it were. In the period between the two World Wars, Bedfich Mendl penetrated the complex social conditions of medieval towns in Bohemia and Moravia, and discovered new material bearing on Bohemian town life in the late Middle Ages. FrantiSek Graus is Mr. Mendl's heir. His work consists of two monographs: his first publication in 1949 dealt with the social conditions in pre-Hussite Prague, and he followed this early investigation of Bohemian town-life with a general rural history of medieval Bohemia.10 In his first major work, Mr. Graus focused on the plebeians (ichudina) in Prague. He tells us first whom he considers plebeians: 1) unskilled laborers, 2) journeymen, 3) dependent guild members, or artisans who had been reduced to poverty and were dependent on wealthier citizens, 4) individuals who were not directly involved in the production of articles of commerce, but were nevertheless wage earners [servants] and 5) individuals plying trades that were more or less outside the law (prostitutes, beggars). Mr. Graus then sheds light on each of these groups and it is interesting to note that the results of his examination are closely related to the facts of social and economic history which have been established in the West. It is now generally admitted that there was an economic decline in the fourteenth century, and Mr. Graus presents evidence to support the following, widely held thesis: In 1318, a master tailor was not allowed to store more than two sets of men's clothing. The reluc10

FrantiSek Graus, Chudina mestska v dobe predhusitske (Prague, 1949); Dejiny venkovskeho lidu v Cechach v dobe predhusitske (2 vols., Prague, 1953-57).

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tance of wealthy masters to increase the number of their competitors was responsible for the swelling ranks of their wage-earning dependents. The victims of this restrictive policy were the journeymen, whose social status was thus deprived of the economic basis on which it wholly depended. 11 Although Mr. Graus believes that economic conditions had deteriorated in pre-Hussite times, he does admit nevertheless that artisans occasionally became rich, and, that merchants sometimes accumulated enough wealth to add rural estates to their property and thus advance one step towards the nobility; he admits that even laborers (though neither as a rule nor very exceptionally) moved up on the social ladder. 12 Here and there Mr. Graus entertains ideas - or, should we say, guesses? - that his factual statements do not substantiate. Moreover, he lacks adequate documentation. It is surely guesswork to postulate that three-quarters of the town population lived side by side "with the spectre of complete pauperization". 13 Mr. Graus' major work is his two-volume Rural History of Medieval Bohemia. It is an interesting work, since many parts do not dovetail. One comes with surprise to the conclusion at the end of the first volume, published in 1953, that Mr. Graus has become an ideological partisan. He had not been one in 1949 when he published Chudina mestskd v dobe predhusitske, nor did he continue to mix history with ideology in 1956 when he published the second volume of Dejiny venkovskeho lidu v Cechdch v dobe predhusitske. The riddle invites solutions more tantalizing than accurate and, since it is medieval history we are dealing with, we pass on to the substance of Mr. Graus' arguments. The first volume begins, as do so many other volumes by Marxist historians, with a survey of bourgeois literature bearing on the same problem as this text. Therefore, it is not surprising to discover the notion that Josef Pekar had worked out the most systematic and cosmopolitan historical doctrine of Czechoslovak bourgeois historiography, and that, in general, the teachings of Goll and his followers represent the cosmopolitan doctrine of the bourgeoisie "whose lordship (panstvi) was being then assailed". (One looks in vain for a much-desired elaboration of this enigmatic sentence). The main complaint against the bourgeois historians is that they abandoned the theory of the autochthonous development of Czech society, and attempted to integrate "

12 13

Graus, Chudina, pp. 35-69, esp. 42-45.

Ibid., p. 121. Ibid., p. 131.

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it with the general European development. Krofta, who tried to formulate a synthesis of all the existing views, attempted, in Mr. Graus's peculiar phraseology, "to circumnavigate the cliffs with round words". 14 In the chapter dealing with methodology, Mr. Graus proclaims his allegiance to Lenin and quotes with approval ("wonderful characterization") his words that "a materialist is more objective than an objectivism The former proclaims specifically which class [of people] determines the inevitability [of a social process]." 15 Mr. Graus, however, as in all his other works, has done his research, and his nonpolitical statements are worth reading. His discussion of the plough, the three-field system, and the horse as a working animal provides us with information that has been either unknown or hidden in journals that are unavailable in the West. In the final pages of the volume, Mr. Graus tackles the historical problems of both feudalism and the Church. Here we find ourselves on more familiar ground once again: feudalism is a system of exploitation (Stalin's words are drawn into the narrative at this point to buttress the author's thesis), and the Church, Mr. Graus continues, is the servant of the feudal lord and, of course, is class-conscious. Did not St. Methodius (Mr. Graus is here illustrating his point) pray for the prince (knize)? The Church, to paraphrase the author's words, aided and abetted the exploitation and subjugation of the serfs. The celebration of Sunday as a holiday, for instance, is a sign of exploitation - the serf was given rest on Sunday only to be saddled with even heavier work during the rest of the week.16 Some of Mr. Graus' findings require close scrutiny by specialists: for instance, the conclusion that feudalism was the result of undisguised violence nezastfene nasili lacks documentary support. 17 Mr. Graus's dependence, however, in the chapter on feudalism, upon the so-called classics of Marxism-Leninism is remarkably well-documented, and Joseph Stalin's views are prominently displayed in the body of Mr. Graus's arguments. The second volume of Mr. Graus's Rural History of Medieval Bohemia, which was published in 1957, differs in many respects from the first. The author has jettisoned Joseph Stalin as an authority and relies solely on Marx, Lenin, and Engels. The tone of the book is less 14

15 16 17

Graus, Dejiny, I, pp. 20, 27, 29.

Ibid., I, p. 45. Ibid., I, pp. 188-190, 214, 218, 221. Ibid., I, p. 189.

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polemical, and historical facts are in evidence. Moreover, Mr. Graus presents material to the reader which his predecessors in Czechoslovakia failed to examine in depth. The author concentrated in this work on the so-called colonization of the Czech lands during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The settlement of vacant lands at that time went hand in hand with the general development of medieval society. He draws attention to the way in which the settlements of the colonists were established, and mentions especially the importance of "Ihota", a privilege invariably granted to new tenants on the land, which exempted them for a specified period of time from the payment of feudal dues, and thus enabled them to cultivate their lands without the burdens weighing upon the "noncolonizing" peasants. He also emphasizes the effect which colonization had on the transformation of the old feudal rent into money rent, but still maintains the view that the change was the result of evolution rather than revolution. He then examines in detail the effect of the German (emphyteutic) law of the colonists on the Czech peasantry. He opposes the view which predicates that it was of either of Czech or German origin; it was rather, he holds the result of a general social development, and must therefore be connected with the commutation of menial services that preceded it. However, he nevertheless emphasizes the important facets of the German law: hereditary possession of the peasant's land, usufructuary dominion of the land, and the freedom to dispose of it with the consent of the lord.18 In the latter half of this second volume, the author examines money rent as it developed in the fourteenth century, and in this connection he mentions the social distinctions among the peasants which resulted from these socioeconomic developments. It is here that the village and the villagers receive his attention, and in the final passages we are brought face to face with the "class struggle" in the rural districts that, Mr. Graus claims, is assisted to by the documents of the fourteenth century. However, Mr. Graus has not convincingly proved, for example, that, the burning of a lord's barn was an expression of medieval class struggle. Is everybody around a burning barn class-conscious? 19 Despite one's occasional reservations about Mr. Graus's arguments, the author deserves credit for the considerable research he did in preparing this volume. His labor is evident and the book he has pro"> Ibid., II pp. Ibid., II, pp.

19

79-158. 290-91.

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duced not only reads well but is also informative. Among the recent historians who have examined the Hussite period in general, and its protagonist in particular, is Milan Machovec. His volume, Husovo uceni a vyznam v tradici ceskeho naroda, published in 1953, has not been eulogized and his conclusions have not been drawn upon by his colleagues. Mr. Graus has remembered Mr. Machovec in a footnote only to let it be known that there are serious failings in his work.20 Mr. Machovec undeniably stands apart, or, rather, stood apart, from the other Hussitologues in contemporary Czechoslovakia. One has only to remember the vituperative language of both Mr. Macek and Mr. Graus in the early 1950's to realize that the calm flow of Mr. Machovec's prose moved along in a different river bed. It should be remembered that Mr. Machovec wrote his account - the dedication and the preface tend to confirm this - under the aegis of the President of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Zdenek Nejedly. In other words, he was not forced to demonstrate his bona fide Communism to the outside world. It is interesting to note, for instance, that the dogmatic utterances of Joseph Stalin are not, with few exceptions, in evidence, and that Mr. Machovec has not listed in the bibliography a single work of this modern Marxist know-it-all. (Mr. Macek, on the contrary, listed three of Stalin's works, while Mr. Graus limited himself to only one title.) In addition, Mr. Machovec's approach to the Hussite period differs from that of his contemporaries. He reflects on the (economic) crisis of feudalism, but he is much more concerned with the pre-Hussite movement which, as is well-known, revolved around the Czech religious pre-reformers, Konrad Waldhauser, Jan Milic of Kromeriz, and Matej of Janov, to whom he devotes the first part of the work.21 His analysis of Matej of Janov's Regulae veteris et novi testamenti is valuable. The latter shows the actual process of fermentation of many ideas to be later presented by Hus in a more popular form, orally in the chapel of Bethlehem, and in his written works to a more knowledgeable audience at the University. Mr. Machovec does not stay on the surface; he dwells at length for instance, on the Bible, and elucidates the meaning it had for the late medieval believer.22 He also considers Wyclyf, and ex20 Ibid., II, p. 305 note 270. However, cf. Robert Kalivoda, Husitska ideologie {Prague, 1961), p. 158. 21 Milan Machovec, Husovo uceni a vyznam v tradici ceskeho naroda (Prague, 1953) pp. 30-122. 22 Ibid., pp. 53-68.

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plains his significance in the development of the Hussite movement and doctrine. He quite rightly points out - if I may be allowed to use this word - the "folksy" nature of Hus's character (lidovost), and distinguishes him in this respect from both Matej of Janov and Wyclyf.23 According to Mr. Machovec, who is a Marxist historian, the material conditions of the environment bring forth those leaders of men that society requires. However, in analyzing a historical personality (Hus), he takes into consideration various subjective factors neglected by his colleagues. Thus, he draws attention to Hus's pious mother.24 He then follows chronologically the career of his hero. The facts have been rehearsed many times, and Mr. Machovec retouches them only lightly: his avowed aim, we read in the introduction, is to interpret the teachings of Hus. Many features of this interpretation are novel. He maintains, for instance, that Hus was already a Renaissance man who had the orientation of a humanist (with a definite accent, we may insert, on the word homo.-' He questions the view that Hus was a theologian or a reformer, and assigns him a different label: Hus was a "homo politicus", that is, "a man whose work is dominated by efforts to establish viable conditions of life in society".26 Mr. Machovec, moreover, assumes that Hus was a born revolutionary and affixes this epithet to many a view which originated in either Hus' sermons or his written works. He is thus drawn to emphasize the revolutionary nature of nearly all Hus's words, but he strongly disclaims the idea that Hus preached class warfare against the feudal lords.27 Mr. Machovec has also attempted to assess Wyclyfs influence on the rise of the Hussite movement, but he emphasizes, above all, those works of Wyclyfs second period of literary activity that more or less stressed the need for reform of the Church. He does not mention, for example, that Hus had become a "Wyclyfite" quite early, after he had encountered those of Wyclyfs philosophical works which first reached Prague and its University. Finally, the following remark is in order: The book under review is a work which, in 1953, required of the author the courage to bring into the open the past Communistic moral judgment of Hus that both Mr. 2

3 Ibid., Ibid., 25 Ibid., 26 Ibid., 27 Ibid., 24

pp. 157-165. pp. 138. pp. 165-175. p. 177. p. 198.

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Macek and Mr. Graus never dared to mention. Thus, Mr. Machovec reminds the reader that in 1923 the Proletkult (a Trotskyite group, he says) sent Hus back where he belonged: to the Middle Ages. 28 In other words, the Proletkult believed that Hus had no significance for the modern Communist. We are entitled, I think, to say: "Tempora mutantur". The last author I will deal with is Robert Kalivoda, from whom we have a treatise on Hussite ideology, a work which, despite its tendency to meander in the thickets of Marxist ideology, represents the most original contribution of the Czechoslovak post-World War II scholars to our knowledge of the Hussite movement. 29 Mr. Kalivoda wrote, it must be emphasized, during a period in which the hysterical breast-beating of puffed-up political victors became old-fashioned and out of line with the developments in Czechoslovakia. Thus, to illustrate our point at close range, the latest words of Mr. Macek became the very last words for Mr. Kalivoda. Mr. Macek, for instance, dismissed with a gesture of doctrinal superiority the works of Ernst Troeltsch and Rudolf Holinka. For Mr. Kalivoda, the work of these two scholars represents the two summits of bourgeois literature dealing with the medieval heretics. 30 Mr. Kalivoda's book is not Sunday-afternoon reading; its title is also its program, and the program revolves around dogmas. What we are offered is not pure Hussite ideology - it is, as we might expect, Marxist Hussite ideology. The first chapter is a survey of the many attempts to characterize the Hussite revolution in Marxist terms. The remaining three chapters present Mr. Kalivoda's analysis of the various articles of heretical faith that the Hussites have formulated. In these chapters Mr. Kalivoda breaks fresh ground. He does not consider the Hussite movement as an isolated fragment of the continental movement of heresy that so distinctly marked the Middle Ages. He draws into the net of his arguments those expressions of religious dissent that preceded the elaborations of the various Hussite doctrines in fifteenth-century Bohemia. Thus, one could say that Mr. Kalivoda presents a survey of those European heretical movements which contributed to the rise of the Hussite heresy. 31 2

8

Ibid., pp. 362-363. Robert Kalivoda, Husitska ideologie (Prague, 1961). 30 Ibid., (Prague, 1961), pp. 29, 139-140, 142, 272. Mr. Macek's violent condemnations are in Tabor, I, p. 25 and Tabor, I, p. 128. Mr. Macek speaks of Troeltsch's "vulgar idealism that enables the author to falsify history". 31 Ibid., p. 195. 29

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The author gives us the following views: The Hussite revolution originated in a period of history which was marked by a general crisis of Czech society. The intellectual development of Taborite radicalism was the result of (social) class changes that had taken place in the first period of the Hussite revolution. The doctrine of the Waldensians which failed to recognize both the Church and the feudal social order was closely followed, at first, by the Taborite radicals. However, this doctrine could not satisfy the masses. Chiliasm, a popular radical movement aiming at reform of the existing society, with God's help, then assumed its important place in the revolutionary society. However, rationalism, the true legacy of Hus's teaching, filtered in and dissolved the fantastic, chiliast ideology. The Taborite Pickarts developed the revolutionary doctrine further: the dogma of transubstantiation, which Hus had never attacked, was deprived of its sacred character. The concept of social reform has been put on a rational basis, and a social-political program incorporated the demands of the peasants and plebeians. Among the ideas of reform we find demands for the abolition of serfdom, feudalism, the feudal Church, and feudal nobility. In these articles, too, we come across the demand to establish the most primitive form of Communism, that is, the Communism of consumer goods. And, as the leaders themselves realized, all these reforms could only be accomplished with the help of the revolutionary masses. However, the most revolutionary aspect of these revolutionary times, according to Mr. Kalivoda, has the transformation of the image of God in the minds of the people: the idea of a transcendent God was abandoned, to be replaced by that of a humanized God. In this way, God, who was expected to descend on earth, has dematerialized, anthropomorphized; in brief, he became immanent. This transformation can be ascribed to Hus and his teaching, since it was the Czech reformer who introduced and insisted ideologically on a human God.32 The Hussite Adamites express most forcefully the revolutionary doctrine of the Hussite milieu. Their anthropological pantheism, the conjunction of divine substance with the nature of man, implies a metaphysical sanction of realistic social needs and social justice.33 The views of Mr. Kalivoda are the views of a philosopher who has attempted to interpret the Hussite doctrine in the light of Marxist dogma. He has reduced the enthusiasm of the Taborites to a social doctrine. 32 33

Ibid., pp. 289-394. Ibid., pp. 372-383.

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He has repudiated the God of the Taborites without examining the crucial problem of antecedents. Or, to put it in different words: Were the reformers God-motivated? And, if they were, were not the Taborite priests religious rather than social reformers? Be that as it may, the views of Mr. Kalivoda are too important to be dismissed lightly. They belong into the court of history, and I, for one, shall expect the announced second volume, (to deal with Peter Chelcicky, who, as Mr. Kalivoda correctly believes, belongs to the Hussite period) with the same interest with which I have read this dogmatic-philosophical treatise. History, to take the most common definition, is the story of the past. Historical works prove beyond doubt that the past may be reconstructed with the aid of many words and many different ideas. However, they always fulfill need. The modern Czechoslovak historian fulfills a need, too: he tells us of history a l'heure marxiste. We may disagree with his view, but we learn from it. We learn above all that history and historical interpretation never stand still. We also learn that there are times when the human mind, deprived of secrecy, is a book of notes. There is little doubt in my mind that the Marxist historians were, in 1948-1960, readers of other peoples' minds.

Palacky : A Marxist Portrait*

JOSEPH F. 2 Â C E K

Not the least of the problems faced by a new communist régime is that of rewriting the country's history. While Czechoslovak Marxists, with some assistance from their Russian mentors, have already completed a preliminary reinterpretation of their nation's past, only the broad lines of the picture have been tentatively drawn, leaving the mass of detail still to be supplied.1 Among the many tasks still remaining is that of re-evaluating the national heroes of the previous stages of social development. Sometimes the problem is not difficult: hoary figures such as Hus and George of Podëbrady can be safely accepted, even though they belong to the "feudal" epoch; "capitalist" leaders of the recent past (Masaryk, Benes) must usually be thoroughly discredited. The problem becomes more sophisticated when it concerns personalities who fall between these extremes, as, for example, the bourgeois heroes of the Nârodni obrozenî, who have been dead for a century, but whose legacy is still very much a part of the Czechoslovak tradition. In such cases, every facet of the subject's thought and activity must be carefully evaluated according to the familiar Marxist criteria before a final, often tortuously qualified judgment is rendered. * This paper is based upon research which was partially financed by a grant from the Haynes Foundation in the summer of 1964. An abridged version of it appeared in the Slavic Review, XXIV (1965), pp. 297-306. 1 See: Historical Institute, Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Prehled ceskoslovenskych dëjin, 3 vols, in 4 (Prague, 1958-1960), covering the period to 1945; and Institute of Slavonic Studies, Soviet Academy of Sciences, Hcmopun HexocAoeaKuu, 3 vols. (Moscow, 1956-1960), to 1958. See also the two complementai series of university texts, Prehled dëjin Ceskoslovenska v epose feudalismu and Prehled dëjin Ceskoslovenska v epose kapitalismu, and the new Marxist history of Czech literature issued by the Institute for Czech Literature, Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Dëjiny ceské literatury, 3 vols. (Prague, 1959-1961), extending to 1900. N o attempt has been made in this article to give a complete listing of all significant Czech and Slovak writings on Palacky since 1948. Such data are included in a study entitled "A Quarter-Century of Palacky Research", in preparation.

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There has been a decade and a half of such study of Frantisek Palacky (1798-1876), the most famous of the "National Awakeners", and a fairly clear Marxist portrait of him is now available. Despite its predictable features and its inconsistencies, it is an interesting reinterpretation of the Velky Cech and provides a good case study of Marxist historiography at work. Those who remember the ruthless denigration of Masaryk and Pekar, the other two members of the famous historico-philosophical triumvirate, may have serious forebodings about Palacky's treatment at Marxist hands. Such fears are unnecessary. Palacky's name, so thoroughly erased by the Nazis during the Protectorate, is again ubiquitous in Czechoslovakia. His famous statue by Sucharda stands again on Palacky Square, facing the Palacky Bridge across the Vltava.2 On Palacky Street in the Nové Mésto stands the "Museum of Four Generations", formerly Palacky's home, its contents still intact (but the building, like most structures in the capital city, in a precarious state of repair). His precious manuscripts and correspondence and his personal library rest safely in the National Museum and in the archive of the Museum of National Literature in Prague. In Olomouc stands Palacky University, the most eminent of the many institutions bearing his name. Since the end of the Second World War, the annual pilgrimages to his natal cottage in Hodslavice (a national museum since 1948) 3 and to his grave in Lobkovice have also been resumed. And finally, as in times past, the anniversaries of his birth and death (especially those in 1946, 1948, 1956, and 1958) have been remembered by the popular press and have provided the occasion for the usual impressive number of scholarly and not-so-scholarly, original and hackneyed publications on the Otee národa ("Father of the Nation"). Judging chiefly from the number and types of titles which have appeared in scholarly bibliographies and commercial catalogues published in Czechoslovakia since 1948, it appears that Palacky is not as popular as many of his famous contemporaries - as, for example, the scholarly Safarik, the Pan-Slav Kollár, and the outspoken Havlicek. Nevertheless, he has certainly not been neglected by Czechoslovak scholars. To be 2 The Palacky Embankment to the south, however, is identified on some current maps of Prague as the "Frederick Engels Embankment". 3 According to its curator, Jaroslav Zila-Lipjan, the museum had more than 54,000 visitors, including many from abroad, during the decade 1948-1958. "Jubilejni vzpominka (Deset let Musea FrantiSka Palackého v Hodslavicich)", Cerveny kvét, III, special supplement to No. 6 (1958), p. 3.

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Joseph F. Zdcek

sure, the first full-length, scholarly biography of Palacky still awaits its author, as it has waited almost a century since Palacky's death. (Indeed, on ideological grounds, Czech Marxist historians generally avoided biographical studies as a whole until the mid-fifties, when the intellectual climate of the Soviet bloc began to soften.) But not only is his Dejiny närodu ceskeho still cited as a basic reference work, collections of excerpts from it have been published, and we are told that an entirely new (presumably Marxist-annotated) edition is in process under the auspices of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences.4 Some of Palacky's smaller works have also been reprinted, as have several previously unpublished manuscripts. 5 Fragments of his still-unpublished correspondence continue to appear in periodicals and books, and a long-awaited continuation of the official Noväcek collection is reported under way.6 As for secondary writings about Palacky, their large number testifies to the fact that, as in pre-Marxist times, the man's long and varied career continues to be a rich source for scholars seeking topics for research and publication. 7 Many of these studies focus on the petty details of his public and private life (for example, his interest in music, his ties with various people and places). Others recall his pioneer activities in the development of various venerable Czech cultural institutions (the Royal Bohemian Society of Sciences, the National Museum). Still another series deals with Palacky's first love, literature, 4 Reported in Milan Machovec, Frantisek Palacky a ceska filosofie, "Rozpravy Ceskoslovenske akademie vSd, ftada spolecenskych ved", Vol. LXXI, No. 2 (Prague, 1961), p. 101, n. 159. 5 Miloslav BSIohlävek, "Prispevky k bibliografii Frantiska Palackeho", Casopis Spolecnosti pfdtel starozitnosti, LXVIII (1960), pp. 22-25, describes and partially reprints two unknown Palacky manuscripts in the archives of the city of Pilsen. A critical edition of Palacky's previously unpublished "Geschichte der schönen Redekünste bei den Böhmen" (1827) by Jaromir Dvorak and Oldfich Krälik has been "in preparation" since 1948: see LuboS Holy, "Komentär k stati FrantiSka Palackeho: Rozhledy a vyhledy öeske reii a literatury z roku 1822", Slovesnd veda, II (1948-1949), p. 20; and Dvorak, "K pocätküm literärne kriticke iinnosti Frantiäka Palackeho", Sbornik prdce jazykovednych a literarnevldnych, "Acta Universitatis Palackianae Olomucensis", Facultas Philosophica 2, Philologica I (Prague, 1960), p. 91. 6 Edited by FrantiSek Hejl and covering the years 1826-1848. Reported in Richard Prazäk, "Palacky a Mad'afi pred rokem 1848", Casopis Matice moravske, LXXVII (1958), p. 77, n. 5. 7 It also testifies to the Marxists' acknowledgment that "everyone who concerns himself with the intricate problem of our [Czech] national revival must come to terms, in one way or another, with Palacky, with his political conception as well as his literary and organizational work, without which we cannot imagine our national revival at all". Ibid., p. 74.

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and his involvement in the Czech and Slovak linguistic controversies of the nineteenth century. Most of these works are thoroughly objective and professional, and few show more than minimal traces of Marxist influence. The same cannot be said for those writings concerned with Palacky's two major roles, those of statesman and historian. Apparently the first systematic Marxist attack upon Palacky's social and political views did not come until 1950, and then not from a Czechoslovak pen but a Soviet one - that of I. I. Udal'tsov. 8 His characterization has been generally accepted by Czech and Slovak authors ever since. Briefly stated, his thesis is that Palacky's political theories and actions were determined deliberately and completely by the narrow contemporary needs of his social class, the Czech liberal bourgeoisie. In the first half of the nineteenth century, this fledgling group was faced with the competition of the more powerful and entrenched German bourgeoisie in the Habsburg empire. It saw clearly that the way to obtain a larger share of the captive imperial market was to gain more political rights in Bohemia. Yet even before this group had attained such security, it was faced with the frightening prospect of a rising revolutionary movement, led by the radicaldemocratic wing of the bourgeoisie and staffed by the increasingly restive peasantry and the growing proletariat. True to Lenin's dictum that the bourgeoisie fears popular revolution more than reaction, the Czech liberal middle class joined forces with its other "natural enemy", the Bohemian feudal aristocracy. Henceforth, the entire political program of this coalition is only comprehensible, not as a genuinely "national" program, but as representative of the selfish interests of these two groups. The aristocracy sought only the restoration of the "historic

8

"K xapaKTepncTHKe n0JiHTHHecK0ft .ZJeHTejibHOCTH OpaHTHimca najiamcoro".

Bonpocbi ucmopuu No. 10, (1950), pp. 72-85; reprinted in Slovak translation, in

Historicky sbornik Slovenskej akademie vied a umeni, X (1952), pp. 347-369.

All subsequent references are to the Slovak translation. In reviewing previous Czech treatment of Palacky, pp. 349-351, Udal'tsov is very critical, charging that many authors still employ the old liberal-bourgeois concepts and that even "progressive" contemporary historians content themselves with labeling Palacky's acts "wrong", but avoid the logical conclusion that they were absolutely determined by his class affiliation. Udal'tsov is the Soviet authority on 1848 in Bohemia and has written many works on the subject. His major writings are listed and discussed in John Erickson, "Recent Soviet and Marxist Writings:

1848 in Central and Eastern Europe", Journal of Central European Affairs, XVII (July, 1957), pp. 119-126. See especially his Stalin Prize work,

Ovepxu U3

ucmopuu HaifuoHajtbHO-noAummecKou uopbdbi e Wexuu e 1848 e, (Moscow, 1951); German translation, 1953; Czech translation, 1954.

598

Joseph F. Zâcek

rights" of the Bohemian Estates; the liberal bourgeoisie disguised its economic-political aims by whipping up the "equality of nationalities" issue.9 Both programs were urged upon the lower classes as priority goals, primarily as a tactic to deter their own social demands and their recourse to revolutionary methods of attaining them. Of humble birth, but married into a wealthy bourgeois family, and the protégé of aristocrats in Bratislava and Prague,10 Palacky was the 9

The charge that Palacky and his associates fanned the flames of the nationalist conflict in order to smother class conflict bears some similarity to the one made by Sudeten and Nazi writers of the World War II period, that by deliberately spreading his "historical myth" of the congenital enmity between Slav and German, Palacky had shattered the peace of Central Europe. See Jaroslav Werstadt, "Frantisek Palacky a nâs osvobozensky boj", Cesky casopis historicky, XLVII (1946), pp. 75-105. However, in a recent important study, written in the freer atmosphere of the post-1956 era and displaying clear Czech national sympathies and decreased Marxist verbiage and dogmatism, Milena Jetmarova accepts the sincerity of Palacky's preoccupation with the nationality question. She points to the important role that nations play in his philosophy of history (he sees them as carriers of great moral and political ideas and the principle of nationality as a healthy antithesis to increasing political centralization), and praises his farsightedness in giving Czech nationalism a political program instead of merely a cultural one. She criticizes his tactics (his cooperation with the reactionary aristocracy), however, and agrees that he overstressed the importance of the nationality issue and paid too little attention to the more pressing social problems of the day. Frantisek Palacky (Prague, 1961), esp. pp. 119-124. 10 Radical democratic criticism of Palacky for having alienated himself f r o m the working class from which he had sprung by his successful assimilation into the upper classes began during his own liftetime (notably expressed by J. V. Frii) and has often been repeated since his death. See, for example, the editorial entitled "Frantisek Palacky" in the Social Democratic newspaper Rovnost (Brno), June 14, 1898. It is quoted extensively in Bedrich Sindelâr, "Frantisek Palacky a dëlnickâ trida", CMM, LXXI (1952), pp. 35-38. Contemporary remarks in the same vein are made by Vënceslava Bechynovâ, "Korespondence a prâtelstvi P. J. Safarika s Frantiskem Palackym", introduction to Korespondence P. J. Safarika s F. Palackym, ed. Bechynovâ and Z. Hauptovâ (Prague, 1961), pp. 6-7. She contrasts Palacky's behavior sharply with that of his friend, Safarik, pointing out that the former accepted favors from the nobility gratefully, but that the latter absolutely could not tolerate such society. Moreover, "in his expressions Safarik was more direct, less bound by the conventions of the time, closer to our contemporary manner of comprehending and reacting than the correct, refined, careful, and polite Palacky". Similar petty criticism apparently exasperated Oldrich Krâlik, who wrote testily: "The Czech nation has become too accustomed to revering prematurely deceased poets, figures illuminated with a martyr's halo. .. . Our public does not love successful people. . . . Obviously, society cannot be composed only of accursed poets, martyrs, and exiles." Krâlik prefers to think of Palacky in terms of a medieval "mayor of the palace", who served his noble masters only in order to acquire the political and administrative skills to overthrow them. "Frantisek Palacky", Cerveny kvet, III, special supplement to No. 6 (1958), pp. 1-3. pp. 1-3.

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logical person to provide liaison between the two ruling groups and to act as their ideologue. Udal'tsov agrees that, viewed in the abstract, Palacky's major proposals - his demand for a Danubian federation of states based on national equality and for the domestic autonomy of the Bohemian lands, his rejection of a union with a new German state might be considered praiseworthy. Viewed in the context of the Revolution of 1848, however, they were clearly reactionary and counterrevolutionary. The Revolution required the abolition of the feudalabsolutistic Habsburg monarchy and major social reforms for its population. Yet, in his famous letter to Frankfort, Palacky, says Udal'tsov, "speaks of the equality of rights, but only of the equality of rights of nationalities, by which he tries to deter the solution of the question of social equality". 11 His program of Austroslavism, his condemnation of the separatism of Italians, Germans, Poles, and Hungarians in the empire, and his conservative stand in such bodies as the Slavonic Congress and the Kremsier Parliament gave invaluable support to the tottering régime at the decisive moment. Thus, the Czech liberal bourgeoisie and its spokesman, Palacky, threw a "shadow on the name of the Czech nation". 12 They must bear a major part of the responsibility for the failure of the Revolution of 1848 throughout the Austrian empire and, indirectly, for the continuation of absolutism everywhere, even in Russia. Nor did Palacky change for the better after 1848. In his later years, the leader of the "Old Czechs" was still denouncing the use of revolutionary tactics (for example, in the Polish Revolution of 1863, as he had previously denounced them in the Revolution of 1830 and the Prague Uprising of 1848) and warning that class warfare would only be a "betrayal" of the fight for the historic rights of the Bohemian Crown. He was not, says Udal'tsov, the "Father of the Nation" but simply the leader of the Czech liberal bourgeoisie of his day.13 11

Udal'tsov, Hist. sbor. SAVU, X, p. 361. Jetmarová, p. 107. 13 Udal'tsov, Hist. sbor. SAVU, X, p. 368 - unless we agree with Sindelár (CMM, LXXI, p. 26) that Palacky completely identified the "nation" with the "bourgeoisie". At least one prominent Czech historian disagrees: FrantiSek Kutnar states that Palacky conceived of the state as embracing the broad masses of the people, all social classes, from the common people to the nobility, with the core being the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry. He concedes, however, that Palacky had little interest in the economic and social welfare of the lower strata, especially the proletariat. "Palackého pojetí spolecnosti, národa a státu", in Tri studie o Frantisku Palackém, "Acta Universitatis Palackianae Olomucensis", Vol. I, ed. Frantisek Kutnar (Olomouc, 1949), pp. 23-32. Kutnar's study, says Sindelár (p. 28, n. 25) still suffers markedly from "bourgeois objectivism" and obsolete methods. 12

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Another major study, which complements Udal'tsov's, is Bedfich Sindelar's "Frantisek Palacky a delnicka trida", in which the author explores Palacky's social views exhaustively.14 Sindelar states flatly that "Palacky simply could not comprehend the aspirations, wishes, and rightful demands of the common people".15 "He could look upon the members of the working class with a certain condescending indulgence and a conventional humanitarianism",18 but only as long as they were willing to toil patiently, to press their economic demands legally and peacefully, and to accept in political matters the leadership of their social betters. For the most part, Sindelaf's task was quite simple. He had only to let Palacky speak for himself and damn himself. Thus, Palacky opposed the outright liquidation of the noble estate, on the grounds that every social system ultimately evolves an aristocracy, and he urged that feudal privileges not be abolished without monetary compensation to the noblemen. He reserved the right to vote for those qualified by education and property. He resolutely rejected the idea of setting up republics within the Austrian realm.17 The revolutionary labor movement was senseless and unjust, he believed, since the worker could simply refuse to work under conditions he did not like: ". . . Only he who wishes to work for the proferred wages does so; he who does not wish to is not forced to work." 18 The only kind of socialism of which Palacky approved was that of primitive Christianity or of the old Bohemian Brethren. The First International was "infamous", advocating measures which were not only foolish but "godless and sinful". As for communism, "should it reign over only one generation, it would end by leading it unavoidably back again into bestiality".19 What emerges is an unflattering, though certainly not atypical, profile of an early nineteenth-century liberal, and a side of Palacky - be it said which pre-Marxist Czech historians undoubtedly slighted. We may well expect numerous other studies which will plumb Palacky's "class profile" in depth. "Czech historians", says a recent survey of Czechoslovak historiography, "will still have to acquit them14

CMM, LXXI (1952), pp. 19-40. Ibid., p. 40. Ibid., p. 21. 17 For a reason that must certainly give Czech Marxists pause: "Imagine the Austrian empire", he wrote, "divided into a multitude of republics, large and small. What a convenient base that would be for a universal Russian monarchy!" Quoted in Udal'tsov, Hist. sbor. SAW, X, p. 360. 18 Quoted in Sindelaf, CMM, LXXI, p. 29. 19 Ibid., p. 25. 15

18

Palacky: A Marxist

Portrait

601

selves of this obligation." 20 The worst has already been said, however, and there remain several large credit entries on Palacky's socialpolitical balance sheet. They have to do with Palacky's major preoccupation, the age-long conflict of Slav and German. On one hand, he strikingly called attention to the perennial threat of German aggression, not only against the strategically located Czechs, but, thanks to geopolitical factors, against all of Europe. His warning was applicable as recently as the eve of World War II and, it is claimed, is not without validity even today. 21 On the other hand, Palacky was throughout his life a dedicated Slavophile. H e had great faith in a coming "Slavonic" era of liberty and equality, when "Slavdom as a whole, united by some higher idea" - Palacky did not yet know how to express it - "will then be the decisive factor in a newly organized world. Palacky thus became a great prophet, anticipating by almost a whole century the world events of today." 22 And, at the end of his life, despite his guarded attitude toward the autocratic Czarist government, he even wrote warmly of the "identity of the souls of the Russian and Czech nations", and pledged that "the Czechs could become the most faithful allies (though not

20

J. Macek et al., eds., Vingt-cinq ans d'historiographie tchécoslovaque, 19361960 (Prague, 1960), p. 25. 21 In a serialized article in Rudé prâvo on the eve of the Second World War ("Palacky a naSe doba", July 3-10, 1938), the veteran Czech communist, Bohumir Smeral, used Palacky's words to warn of the danger of German fascism for Czechoslovakia and Europe. It is summarized in Vaclav Husa, "Smeralovo hodnoceni Palackého vfkladu ieskych dëjin", Zâpisky katedry csl. dëjin a archivniho studia, III (1958), pp. 158-166. Husa, until his recent death a professor of history at Charles University, claims (p. 165) that the German threat is not to be viewed as a permanent "geopolitical reality", but simply as part of the imperialist phase of the capitalist epoch, and that it will disappear with capitalism. "Moreover, world events of the last years have basically changed the situation of Czechoslovakia, so that it no longer stands unable to resist any sort of aggression. Today, when our country is a firm member of the huge socialist camp led by the Soviet Union, when our own government is fully in the hands of the working people, when there is no longer the danger of betrayal by domestic classes, and when at our side stand even the working people of the German Democratic Republic and the peaceful forces of all the countries of the world, there can never again be a repetition of Munich and of March 15, 1939. Nevertheless, one cannot fail to see that the historical threat of aggression still exists and that it gains strength with the renewal of West German militarism, supported in every possible way by American imperialism. . . . [Thus] Palacky's warning appeals for vigilance ring out again with full urgency." 22 K., "Vzpominati 155. vyroîi narozeni Fr. Palackého", Cesky zâpas, XXXVI, No. 25 (1953), p. 4.

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subjects) of these natural blood brothers . . . and, if necessary, even their vanguard in Europe".23 Palacky's defense can also draw upon the great esteem accorded him by such leading representatives of the Czechoslovak Communist Party as Klement Gottwald, Jan Sverma, Julius Fucik, and Zdenék Nejedly. Indeed, the latter, until his recent death the mentor of Czechoslovak historiography, has been Palacky's powerful champion, whose repeated praises and defenses of Palacky have been regularly parroted by other writers.24 As early as the 1920's, he wrote two studies in which he ingeniously demonstrated how even Palacky's class shortcomings might be qualified.25 He explained that in the early nineteenth century the embryonic Czech bourgeoisie was still a "fighting class"; that the legalistic and evolution-minded Palacky still considered conflict necessary and salutary for human progress and had made it the core of his philosophy of history; that he had opposed revolution purely on a priori grounds, but had himself been spurred to political activity only by the Revolution of 1848, and had never abandoned the revolutionary Karel Havlicek; and that he considered the "nation" not as an end in itself, but as a means of propagating a universal idea, that is, that his nationalism was a "world nationalism".26 Finally, should all else fail, Palacky's historical labors should be enough to redeem him.27 Palacky the historian has come off rather well 23

Quoted in FrantiSek Kutnar, "Palackého slovanství", Slovansky pfehled, XLII (1956), p. 154. 24 He wrote: "Even these contemporary attacks on Palacky . . . are a sign of the awareness of the importance of Palacky even today, and that it is still necessary, even today, to settle accounts with him in some way. These attacks on Palacky are, in their own way, expressions of respect. . . ." "O poméra historie k dneSku", Ceskoslovensky casopis historicky, VIII (1960), p. 33. 25 Written in 1921 and 1926, they are reprinted together under the title "FrantiSek Palacky" in Nejedly's O smyslu ceskych déjin (Prague, 1952), pp. 144-198. 26 Other Czech Marxist authors have, with increasing frequency, taken the simpler alternative of writing off Palacky's political and social failings as lamentable but human frailties and as the inescapable (and therefore excusable?) result of his "imprisonment" within the conditions of his time and his social class. Husa warns that it would be "schematic vulgarization" of the historicomaterialistic conception of history to ignore the historical situation in which Palacky worked and the overall position of the Czech nation at the time. Zápisky 27

kat. csl. dej., I l l , p. 164.

It is interesting to note that this standard Marxist distinction between Palacky's "good" historical and cultural-organizational activities and his "bad" political ones is quite old. It was already expressed, very acutely, in 1898, in the editorial in the Brno Social Democratic newspaper, Rovnost (see above, note 11). However, professional Czech philosophers (such as Jetmarová - see especi-

Palacky:

A Marxist

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Portrait

at Marxist h a n d s - all of his w o r k in this area is evaluated very f a v o r ably. 2 8 D e s p i t e n e w Marxist m e t h o d s and e m p h a s e s , the b r o a d m o d e r n historical w o r k i n g p r o g r a m that P a l a c k y initiated and a d v a n c e d w i t h s u c h great p e r s o n a l industry - t h e e x p l o i t a t i o n of archives, t h e c o l l e c tion, evaluation, and publication of source materials, the d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e auxiliary sciences, and detailed m o n o g r a p h i c research the basis of c o n t e m p o r a r y

Czechoslovak

historiography.

product of this p r o g r a m in Palacky's day, his o w n Dejiny ceskeho,

remains

The

chief narodu

is still regarded as a classic, 2 9 v a l u a b l e n o t o n l y f o r m u c h of

its factual c o n t e n t 3 0 but especially f o r the p h i l o s o p h y of history w h i c h p e r m e a t e s it. (It is, of course, the o n l y c o m p r e h e n s i v e p h i l o s o p h y of C z e c h history besides the Marxist o n e . ) C o n t e m p o r a r y C z e c h p h i l o s o phers, like those of the p r e - M a r x i s t period, d e v o t e m u c h effort to trying to determine its varied ideological roots and to p r o v e that it d o m i n a t e d

ally pp. 132-34) generally insist that this distinction does not correspond to a basic change in Palacky's personal philosophy. They claim that all of his thoughts and actions throughout his lifetime have an intellectual unity, the basis of which is liberalism of the eighteenth-century "Enlightened" variety. They base the distinction, instead, on a change in the "social dynamic", in the surrounding circumstances, especially in the situation of the liberal bourgeoisie, which prompted Palacky to emphasize different elements of his philosophy at different times. Thus, in the comparatively peaceful period before 1848, Palacky sincerely worked for a gradual enlightenment of the entire Czech people and a "democratization of culture" as the path to national progress. From the 1840's, however, with the nation beginning to split along class lines and with increasingly radical demands being made from below, the conservative facet of his philosophy came to the fore. Like most of his liberal-bourgeois contemporaries (even Kollar and Safarik), he moved considerably to the right. This explains how one of the most progressive of bourgeois historians became the ideologue of reaction. 28 See the summary evaluation by Josef Polisensky, "Frantisek Palacky a nase historicka veda", Zpravy Ceskoslovenske historicke spolecnosti, I, No. 2 (1958), pp. 33-38. Nejedly calls Palacky "to date our greatest historical genius and one of the greatest of all modern historians". Dejiny naroda ceskeho, 2 vols.; 1st ed., Prague, 1949-1955, I, p. 72. To be sure, "with his class ideology and bias, he shut himself off from the way to the greatest historical progress of all", i.e., from the Marxist interpretation of history. Ladislav Rieger, "Poznamky k Palackeho filosofii dejin lidstva", Zdehku Nejedlemu Ceskoslovenskd akademie ved (Prague, 1953), p. 446. 29 Nejedly calls the Dejiny the greatest monument of Czech historiography and declares that it will always remain alive and glorious "like the first rocket to the moon". Csl. C. H., VIII, p. 32. 30 "The debt which [Czech] historians have to pay to their prototype has not greatly lessened. How much of that imposing pile of paper covered with [their] writings was limited to transcribing and paraphrasing, how much of it contains [their] own personal judgments?" PoliSensky, Zpr. Csl. hist, spolec., I, No. 2, p. 34.

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the actual writing of the detailed historical narrative.31 They have sought to show (quite convincingly) that Palacky's concept of boznost (deiformity), the final, unattainable goal of human life, is secular and anthropocentric in nature rather than religious and theocentric, an immanent state, not a transcendental one. Predictably, they make much of the stillborn dialectical features of his concept of "polarity", the unending, mutually beneficial antithesis between spiritual and material forces by which history develops. To be sure, Czech scholars are "aware" that the History and its philosophy, like Palacky's political activities, were entirely dedicated to providing ideological support for the political and cultural aspirations of the embattled Czech bourgeoisie in the "National Revival". But, as one author puts it, ". . . This is . . . a classic example of the fact that a work, because of the value of its insight, sometimes rises above and outgrows the ideological level of its creator." 32 Palacky's conception of the national past was not only successful in developing national selfawareness among the bourgeoisie and their followers in the lower social strata, but, claim the Marxists, it has also inspired all popular revolutionary forces in the nation to the present day.33 This includes, of course, the communists, who see themselves as "the heirs of the great traditions of the Czech nation" and the direct "spiritual descendants" of the Hussites. It was, of course, the "revolutionary" Hussite period 34 31

See Jetmarová (e. g., p. 106) and Machovec. On the other hand, professional Czech historians, like their bourgeois predecessors, continue to assert that Palacky reached his conclusions primarily on the basis of careful study of historical source materials. See Poiisensky, Zpr. Csl. hist, spolec., I, No. 2, p. 36; and Jaroslav Marek's review of Machovec, Csl. C. H., IX (1961), p. 609. 32 Marie Repková, "Príspévek k osvétlení problematiky éeského obrození" (Review of Machovec), Ceská literatura, IX, No. 3 (1961), p. 373. 33 Jetmarová (p. 10) asserts that "it is no longer the bourgoisie which has the right to claim his [Palacky's] work, which . . . would be capable of practically realizing the progressive appeals flowing from this work. . . ." 34 Of course, the Marxists realize that Palacky did not really approve of the revolutionary character of the Hussites' activity, nor did he intend to recommend such behavior as a model for contemporary action: "Palacky saw two wings in Hussitism, and to him the Taborites were the real representatives of Hussite goals. However, speaking of Tábor and Zizka, he did not have in mind the Tábor of the period of the supremacy of the poor, but of the period when it was the head of the bourgeois opposition. The revolutionary manner by which the Taborites achieved their goals was completely unacceptable to him." Déjiny ceské literatury, II, pp. 465-66. Furthermore, he "was unable to see the deep class conflicts which led to it [the Hussite Revolution] and which were veiled by religious terminology and motives". Jaroslav Charvát, ed., Z Déjin národu ceského (Prague, 1957), p. 26. Jetmarová (p. 130) says that Palacky's blindness

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which Palacky identified as the greatest, most "progressive" epoch of Czech history, its greatness stemming entirely from its "popular character", the efforts and pains of the broad masses of the people. 35 It was also the period when the Czech nation undertook a major democratic mission on behalf of all humanity, a mission which contemporary Czech Marxists see themselves as having again assumed. 36 Thus the Déjiny, despite its author's personal and political shortcomings, became a "great progressive work" and "a work for all time to come". Eventually, the History of the Czech Nation and Palacky merged in one in popular consciousness, 37 and the independent merits of the work have, in no small measure, helped to rehabilitate its author. In summary, then, Czech Marxists have examined Palacky carefully and found him to be one of the great and progressive personalities of the national past. Accordingly, like their bourgeois predecessors, they have sought to define precisely his "testament" (odkaz) for their own generation. To be sure, the exact nature of this "testament" has never been completely clear. It is ostensibly concentrated in the epilogues to Palacky's Radhost and Gedenkblatter, but Czech scholars have traditionally selected and emphasized those of its elements which they considered especially valuable for contemporary purposes. For this reason, the current Czech emphases are also instructive. Insofar as it concerns Czechoslovak historians, stated Zdenék Nejedly, Palacky's testament is pragmatic, urging them not to bury themselves in the past, not to divorce themselves from the present, not to try to "bring a corpse back

to the significance of social class differences within nations led him, as historian and statesman, to the error of describing Czech-German enmity as involving both nations in their entirety, instead of only the bourgeois classes of the respective nations. 35 However, Machovec (p. I l l ) is accurate when he points out that, despite numerous passages in which Palacky acknowledges the importance of the historical role of the popular masses, the work as a whole is not structured on this basis - he values far more highly the activities of prominent individuals. But Jetmarová (p. 103) insists that "the very principle of this overvaluation . . . is social; personalities are comprehended and judged by their relationship to significant social events". 36 "And we shall be able to say, with Palacky, that we fought on the side of right, justice, and progress against brutal force which tried to turn the wheel of history backward for the material interest of a few individuals, thus fulfilling the bequest of our own history, especially the great Hussite period." Rieger, Zd. Nejedlému CSA V, p. 448. Alas, "[Palacky's] class connections and bias made it impossible for him to recognize that it is precisely communism which is the realization of the humanitarian idea". Charvát, p. 17. 37 Ibid.

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F.

Zdcek

to life", but to help create something which has not yet existed.38 Its message for the layman, says J. L. Hromadka, Dean of the Comenius Theological Faculty in Prague and Chairman of the Ecumenical Council of Churches in Czechoslovakia, is "to understand enormous historical changes, not to try to save that which cannot be saved, to work bravely, without fear, for the victory of that which we recognize as the task and goal set for mankind by the will of Providence. . . . Look with open eyes upon the flow of history, determine its course, do not think only of your own interests and needs - but, at the same time, remember that it is your duty to stay true to that which you know to be eternal truth and good. That is Palacky's testament for us." 39 Perhaps this last quotation, in particular, illustrates how ingeniously Czech Marxists and their assistants have managed to reinterpret Palacky's great life for their own purposes. "It is the great task of those who are building a new society," writes Hromadka, "to utilize with a fine and creative understanding everything accomplished by the really creative and forward-looking spirits of past generations." 40 To this it seems only fitting to add Palacky's own motto: "Svoji k svemu, ale vzdy die pravdy" - "Each to his own, but always with the truth!"

38 Csl. C. H., VIII, p. 33. This article, "O pomeru historie k dneSku", was originally delivered as an address at the Third Congress of Czechoslovak Historians, Sept. 16-19, 1959. 39 "Palackeho koreny", in Palackeho rodna obec: Kronika Hodslavic, ed. FrantiSek Hanzelka (Hodslavice, 1948), p. 10. 40 "Ke dni Palackeho", Kostnicke jiskry, June 11, 1953, p. 1.

The Literature of De-Stalinization*

GEORGE KÀRNET

In recent years two courses have been charted on the Czechoslovak literary scene. On the one hand, a genre has emerged which attacks the excesses of the Stalinist era but which, at bottom, gives the reader the same old socialist-realism. On the other hand, a truly apolitical novel has appeared which would reject in toto the sterile formulae of communist heroics. When Jean-Paul Sartre visited Czechoslovakia last year, he discussed the situation of the contemporary novel, declaring that the great world novel of the future will be produced under socialism. In this context Sartre mentioned Don Quixote. His words can be understood only in the sense that the hero of this as-yet-unwritten masterpiece will turn out to be some kind of Comrade Don Quixote, i.e., a pure socialist dreamer whose untarnished faith will conflict with the hard realities of communist life. And it is equally easy to predict the conclusion of this novel: its hero Comrade Don Quixote will wise up, and realize that communism as he has known it so far does not correspond with his ideals. However, in spite of this, he will refuse to give up his dream and instead will decide to fight for its purity against all the hostile forces inside and outside the communist world. One can safely say in advance that this novel of Sartre is never going to be written. At the same time we can understand only too well why all the Czechoslovak writers and all the cultural magazines so eagerly embraced this prophecy and why they share Sartre's belief in the glorious future of this great, unwritten, obviously anti-Stalinist novel everybody in Czechoslovakia who owns a typewriter has already tried, is trying, or will be trying to turn out this masterpiece. It is equally obvious that the Czechoslovak writers who lived through the conflict with Stalinism from a less safe distance than Sartre are already much more *

A modified version of this paper was published in East

Europe.

608

George Kárnet

familiar with this subject matter. For instance, they already know that the hero of this anti-Stalinist novel will not be a priggish Comrade Don Quixote but rather an antihero who of necessity gets "dirty hands". In fact, there is little doubt that everything produced during these years by Czechoslovak writers will be put, by a future historian, under a common heading: literature of the de-Stalinization period. In a certain sense this is correct: everything, almost everything, which is being written in these years in Czechoslovakia in some way contributes to the breaking of the ice under which Stalinism tried to smother all art. However, if we want to characterize more precisely artistic production today, we must first scratch off this political label and see what is beneath it. In one way or another, everything which is being produced nowadays in Czechoslovakia is necessarily political art. In the broad sense, every public - and consequently every artistic - endeavor is political in its final impact. However, despite this, we can divide the literary production of recent years into political literature proper, and apolitical or antipolitical literature. How do we make this distinction, and is it not largely artificial and arbitrarily drawn? In many cases it may seem arbitrary; however, precisely this kind of division is a great help in analyzing contemporary trends and makes it much easier to decide which works belong to the past, which to the present, and which point the way to the future. In further defining this classification: political, in the current literature of de-Stalinization, is everything which is clearly a response to the preceding period of Stalinism. On the other hand, apolitical or antipolitical are all those recent efforts to transcend or overcome a wholly - and hence narrowly - political outlook, to explore the uncharted area lying beyond Stalinist communism, beyond the system of Stalinist values in order to find new ones. 1. LITERARY BULLDOZERS

This apolitical literature is preoccupied with a new man who no longer hammers on the walls of his prison, who neither breaks these walls nor bloodies his helpless hands against them, but confronts the whole world of problems which plague mankind outside of prison walls. This is not meant to disparage the contemporary political novel. That part of the Czechoslovak literature of de-Stalinization which is a direct reaction to the Stalinist era did fulfill and still does fulfill a very important function. Works such as Ladislav Mñacko's Belated Reportages, Peter Karvas's The Scar, or Ladislav Bublik's novel The Spine do have

The Literature of De-Stalinization

609

- independent of their purely literary qualities or shortcomings - a great importance in contemporary literature. Mñacko's Reportages may become an important milestone even for the literary historian. However, the broad and sometimes sensational appeal of this writing for the Czechoslovak public cannot hide the fact that all these works are a species of cultural bulldozer. Books which wreck the mouldy architecture of Stalinist victorianism, books which remove the Stalinist ruins and create a new smooth and empty space. But on this new tabula rasa, other books will eventually be able to set up foundations for an altogether different and more human architecture, neither anti-Stalinist nor Stalinist. Let us first take as an example of this narrowly political literature Bublik's novel The Spine, which is completely imprisoned by Stalinism, in spite of, or possibly because of, its negative attitude toward the cult. His hero has fallen victim to a Stalinist purge and been hurled from a prominent position into the muddy hole of a construction site which he now tries very hard to get out of. Thus the book seems to be an anti-Stalinist novel containing direct allusions to the Slánsky trial and to the brutal police persecution of those years. However, when we take a closer look we can see that The Spine - for all its manifest antiStalinism - is still our old familiar socialist-realist novel glorifying the building of a socialism of precisely the same variety we knew in the times of the cult of the personality. Yes, in its conception, its characters and even its conclusion, it is the same set of outworn Stalinist precepts which Bublik has merely turned inside out like a glove. The Spine is anti-Stalinist only in its intent. Of course, Bublik's hero-victim violently despises the Stalinist police dogs, finks and inquisitors. At the same time he does not really differ from them in his own behavior, in his own emotional attitudes, and in his own inability to become a truly different man who does not just have second thoughts but undergoes a true change of heart and of outlook. It is true that he is now anti-Stalinist in his political beliefs and utterances. But he acts exactly like a model party apparatchik in his private emotional life. For instance, in his relationship to his wife. After his downfall, instead of trying to find work somewhere near his pregnant wife, he chooses, with typically Stalinist austerity, that same muddy hole mentioned above, that same socialist construction site, which does not even now cease to be his first mistress and to which he almost sacrifices his marriage. In other words, only the side of the barricade has been changed. Bublik did not dare to quit this narrow political background,

610

George Kämet

he did not start seeing people and human relations in a new light, in a more humane way. Bublik's hero fell from the ladder of power into the mudhole but he never gave up his desire to ascend the Stalinist pyramid; he never understood that in life there are more important things than one's career. This of course clearly limits the impact and import of the novel which, it is true, tries to destroy something but does not replace it with anything new and better. That's why all the novels of this kind - Karvas's drama The Scar or Frantisek Pavlicek's The Fight with an Angel and, to some extent, even Mnacko's Belated Reportages - do not, in spite of their great present-day importance, open a bold new chapter in the Czechoslovak chronicle. Rather, they are an anti-Stalinist comma inserted after the age of the purges with which these works are - in spite of their critical and hostile attitude - undeniably linked. If these are the books of the new literary wrecking crews, this automatically means that the object of all their efforts remains the same as that of socialist realism and of the Stalinist novel - the same old ugly houses or their ruins we learned to despise and detest. In considering future trends, there are other works which are more important, aside from their literary merit or shortcomings, novels which resolutely abandon the ruins of Stalinism and search for new signs of life in different terms altogether. Examples of this kind of apolitical or antipolitical literature are Josef Skvorecky's books The Cowards and The Emoeke Legend, Dominik Tatarka's novelette The Chairs Made of Straw, Alexander Kliment's short story Meeting Between Two Trains, Josef Topol's play The End of the Carnival and Vaclav Havel's The Garden Party. Havel's brilliant satire is at first glance just as political as Karvas' The Scar; both plays attack Stalinism. Why then do we put Karvas into the political category and Havel into the apolitical group?

2. REFUSING TO PLAY THE GAME

The important difference between the two plays is that The Scar criticizes Stalinism and its world in its own terms and from the same party positions Stalinism itself would adopt in fighting a "deviation". Havel, on the other hand, portrays the whole world of Stalinism and of antiStalinism as absurd, and thus condemns not only the Stalinistic "Union of Organizers" but also Karvas's revisionists, represented as "Commissions of Liquidators". And he shows by this comparison that both sides

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of the current communist power struggle have, despite all their differences and mutual antagonisms, the same ugly and inhuman traits. Since The Garden Party negates in a Kafkaesque way not only Stalinism but also the familiar terms of the struggle against it, the author clearly reveals his essentially apolitical credo. Havel's first article of faith is that the whole political world is in reality a masquerade and a farce, a pointless and vain exercise in futility, because the real problem of human existence lies somewhere outside Stalinism and anti-Stalinism, Marxism or Leninism. That is why Havel's play cannot be properly called revisionist. It is much more than that. It is a refusal to play the game. While in this particular satire the new, more human world is of necessity merely implied, in other books of contemporary apolitical Czechoslovak literature we can already detect a concerted and purposeful search for a new humanism. This task, from the point of view of tackling the censor, as well as reckoning with the purely literary obstacles a writer may run into, is relatively easiest in those works which do not deal with the present. This occurs in Mr. Tatarka's novelette The Chairs Made of Straw or in Ladislav Fuchs' beautiful novel Mister Mundstock and in most other books preoccupied with the war and with the fate of the Jews during the occupation. However, even this kind of escape into history is not always easy, for the dogmatic supervisors of Czechoslovak literature always knew how to impose their Stalinist concepts even on the historical novel. For this reason, one can truly appreciate Tatarka's novel describing the adventures of a Czechoslovak exile in the post-Munich Paris of Daladier, because its author knows how to express - together with his condemnation of the French police of those times - a condemnation of the police of all kinds and of all regimes. With his sympathy for the exile of that unhappy period he also unmistakably shows his compassionate attitude toward exiles as such, toward an exile an sich. Of particular interest was the fact that he was not afraid to set against a political backdrop a hero who is basically nonpolitical, who is truly involved with a woman and with her world and not with leaflets and underground intrigues and police interrogations which merely interfere with and endanger his inner world. This is also why a Czechoslovak reviewer ranged this book - which otherwise in no way concerns the regime and does not directly touch upon the current problems - with the group of libri prohibiti, with the books which until recently could never have been written or published. This is a dangerous book because

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Mr. Tatarka clearly parts company with Stalinism and communism at the most essential point - by considering not the socialist hero but existential man in search of a new humanism. Despite the successful use of the historical genre, the main struggle for a new novel has to be fought out on the circumscribed territory of the contemporary theme, a no-man's-land full of traps but at the same time offering the best possibility for a genuine breakthrough. In this category belongs Topol's play The End of the Carnival which - though in a slightly baroque fashion - marginally touches upon the political struggle of a collectivized Czechoslovak village, but in reality is preoccupied with its human tragedy and with the emotional problems of its young victims. Beside it we can place Kliment's novelette Marie, which is only superficially a "kitchen sink" novel. In this work the author also observes the incredibly impoverished world of a successful Stakhanovite worker viewed against the emotional backdrop of his ugly family life. A similar technique is used in his next novel, A Meeting Between Two Trains, as well as in the stories of Hermina Frankova, Bohumil Hrabal, Jan Trefulka, Josef Nesvadba, Jaroslava Blazkova, Hana Belohradska, Vladimir Pribsky, Vladimir Minac, Ivan Klima, and finally in the movies of Vera Chytilova and Milos Forman.

3. A LOST WORLD

The most important and prominent representative of this trend is unquestionably Josef Skvorecky. In his first and best novel, The Cowards, which was roundly condemned by all neo-Stalinists in 1958, Skvorecky seemingly does not deal with contemporary problems but instead places his hero back in the first days of May 1945. But in reality The Cowards is an obvious extrapolation of much more recent feelings and attitudes: it is the outcry of a heart oppressed by Stalinism. For those readers who did not detect this while reading The Cowards, the fact should be abundantly clear in Skvorecky's more recent books of stories, The Seven-Arm Candelabra, or in his Emoeke Legend. In the latter diptych, he presents a precisely drawn trio of characters and strikes the most important theme of all in Czechoslovakia today: the problem of emotional life, of the conflict between the ideological and emotional worlds of the contemporary Czechoslovak man as he looks toward the future. In these works, the author confirms what we merely guessed while

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reading The Cowards, i.e., that Skvorecky, in spite of all his occasional public pronouncements, is in reality a Catholic writer, and what's more, a writer deeply in love with that type of Roman Catholicism which one could almost call un-Czech because it is rather akin to the South Moravian or Slovak, or let us say the Mediterranean, variety. It is a Catholicism strikingly permeated and humanized by the influence of the feminine or Marian element. One must not be misled in this respect by the superstitious and ridiculously naive beliefs of Skvorecky's heroine Emoeke, who, with good reason, is a Slovak girl rather than a much more sober and down-to-earth Czech woman. Skvorecky quite intentionally chose this type of woman who is superstitious rather than truly religious, and who parallels the setting of the novel - a deteriorating, carnival-like place of pilgrimage called Marienthal. He did so because he intended to show - not unlike Graham Greene in The Power and the Glory - that this almost provocatively distorted religiosity, seen through the eyes of a skeptical existentialist hero, is the only really spontaneous form of faith modern man may be capable of. What Skvorecky demonstrates is that the forms do not matter very much after all; it is not important whether we deal with a superstition or with an organized religion. What does matter is the strength of our beliefs and their capacity to channel the stream of our emotional life and thus provide modern man an opportunity to find some kind of metaphysical perspective. This belief of the author is also obvious in a more indirect way from his hostile and stutteringly furious attack against the antihero of his Emoeke Legend, the Marxist teacher the man Skvorecky calls "a birdbrain" and who represents an acidly sketched parody of all Marxist attempts to eliminate the emotional side of man. Such efforts only end in an empty and humiliating fiasco. Between these two antagonists - one representing the old superstition of the heart and the other symbolizing the new superstition of the "brain" - stands Hamlet-like the third hero, the "I" of the novel, who only knows how to refute but not how to embrace. Skvorecky's sophisticated editor can repeat the formulae of existentialism which contain a glaring light but no solace and can vainly try to unite the emotional spontaneity of American jazz with scientific facts, and can confront a bearable though aimless world; he cannot, no matter how hard he tries, enter the lost world of the girl Emoeke. It is clear that if, by some human necessity, our editor should have to choose, he would unhesitatingly reach out for the twisted world of Emoeke and the cheap carnival-like Marienthal. He could abandon the

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dry desert of the Marxist teacher with his "recreation" consisting of a ping-pong table and party propaganda where the soul experiences an even more hopeless emptiness and where the wind merely blows about a few dirty scraps of paper full of even more superstitious and meaningless shibboleths than the revelations of Nostradamus. Skvorecky's world is a tragic one. It is existentialist, and faith - a clear faith - seen only as an unattainable dream which the writer is unable to embrace. Yet at the same time, in every line, Skvorecky expresses his conviction that a spiritual will has to be rediscovered, and also his timid hope that a new breed of men will rise again which will not be subhuman and which will have a sane mind as well as a full heart. It was shown in the ice age of Stalinism that a man without a heart will not in the end be a man of reason, he will not even be that supposedly rational human being out of Marxist textbooks, but will end up in a frighteningly short time as a brute without heart or brain, the Homo Gletkin of the terrible purges. In this clear recognition lies the main importance of Skvorecky's new book The Emoeke Legend. We can also recognize in Skvorecky and in the other embryonic antipolitical literature of recent years an opening toward a better future in which Czechoslovak artists will bother neither to deny nor to destroy the ugly Victorian façades of communism but will outline instead a blueprint of a new architecture fit for a new man, a man with no unthinkable thoughts and with no unfeelable feelings, a man who understands the nature of his essentially tragic condition and of his inalienable hope.

BOOKS DISCUSSED Ladislav Mnacko: Oneskorene reportaze (Belated Reportages). Peter Karvas: Jizva (The Scar). Ladislav Bublik: Pdtef (The Spine). FrantiSek Pavlicek: Zapas s andelem (The Fight with an Angei). Josef Skvorecky: Zbabelci (The Cowards). Josef Skvorecky: Legenda Emoeke (The Emoeke Legend). Dominik Tatarka: Proutena kresla (The Chairs made of Straw). Alexander Kliment: Setkani pred odjezdem (Meeting between Two Trains). Josef Topol: Konec masopustu (The End of the Carnival). Vaclav Havel: Zahradn't slavnost (The Garden Party). Ladislav Fuchs: Pan Mundstock (Mister Mundstock). Josef Skvorecky: Sedmiramenny svicen (The Seven-Arm Candelabra).

Art in Communist Czechoslovakia

JANA M. FEIERABEND

During the First Republic, Czechoslovak art flourished in an atmosphere of cultural freedom. Artists were free to follow their creative impulse and inclination, and many of them spent years abroad. Some, such as the painters Rudolf Kremlicka, Jan Zrzavy, and Julie Mezerevâ, and the sculptor Jan Stursa, exhibited their works in Parisian salons and in international exhibits. Others, among them Frantisek Kupka, Josef Sima, and Otakar Kubin (Coubine), left their native land and settled in Paris. Kupka became one of the outstanding exponents and founders of abstractionism. In those days, Czechoslovak art evolved within the mainstream of Western cultural trends. The Communist takeover in February 1948 abruptly terminated this development and placed art within the straitjacket of socialist realism. Two months after the February coup d'état, a Congress of Czechoslovak National Culture met in Prague. On this occasion, Klement Gottwald, then Premier and First Secretary of the Communist Party, explained to the assembled artists the mission of art during the period of socialist reconstruction.1 During the same period, Zdenëk Nejedly and Vaclav Kopecky, both influential Communist leaders, made similar pronouncements.2 In May 1949, the Ninth Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party set forth firm directives for the future development of art in Czechoslovakia.3 The artists were to follow the precepts of socialist realism as defined in the Soviet Union by P. Sysojev and A. A. Zdanov. According to Sysojev, "Socialist realism . . . [is] . . . an art of profound Bolshevik partisanship and bias depicting reality in its relentless revolutionary develop1 "Projev Klementa Gottwalda na Sjezdu narodni kultury 1948", Vytvarné umeni (1950), pp. 4-7. "Provolâni k vytvarnikum", Tvorba (1948), p. 200. 2 "O realismu pravém a nepravém", Zdenëk Nejedly, Var (1948), p. 225. 3 Josef Rybâk, "K nëkterym otâzkâm naseho vytvarnictvi" (Report on the IX. Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party), Vytvarné uméni (1950), pp. 8-9.

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ment and motion." 4 Following Leninist prescriptions, art was to reflect the new relationships within socialist society and to assist in developing the new man of the socialist order. Lenin himself rejected art movements of the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th, claiming: "I cannot consider the products of expressionism, futurism, cubism, and all sorts of 'isms' as the highest level of artistic genius." 5 Alternative modes of artistic expression were thus banned, and the art practices of the Soviet Union were to serve as the model for Czechoslovakia. Under the Author's Law of December 22, 1953, the newly formed Association of Czechoslovak Artists obtained the sole right of distribution of all art work. Furthermore, it was established that the state was the leading purchaser of works of art. In this way, the free market in art was abolished.6 The Association of Czechoslovak Artists accepted the dictates of the Communist Party. 7 Contemporary Czechoslovak art was to resume the tradition of the 19th century realists as represented, for example, by Josef Navratil, Josef Manes, Mikulas Ales, and Max Svabinsky, and in sculpture by J. V. Myslbek and his pupils. Architects were to create in the spirit of the late 19th century builders of the National Theatre, Josef Zitek, Antonin Wiehl, and Rudolf Krizenecky.8 Style, method, and subject-matter, all were prescribed. Stress was laid on intelligibility, monumentality, and nationalism. Themes were to be chosen from historical material or else were to represent great contemporary events and vignettes from the life of the people. Genre scenes of everyday life were recommended, following the Russian model. Landscapes were to be painted in such a manner as to awaken admiration and love for the fatherland and were to include human figures. Still lifes and nudes were not tolerated. Painters were to use bright and rich colors. Portraits of political leaders and other notable and his-

4

P. Sysojev, "Boj o socialisticky realismus v sovëtském vytvarném umëni" (translated by V. Solta), Vytvarné umëni (1950), pp. 18-41. 5 Vytvarné umënt (1950), p. 18. 6 "Référât o hospodârskych otâzkâch", "Spotrebitelem nebude jednotlivec, aie cely nâS nârod a stât", "Rozhodny krok ku predu"; (Remarks to the Conference of the Delegates of the "Svaz es. vytvarnych umëlcû" in March 1950), Vytvarné umêni (1950), pp. 146-156. 7 Declaration of "S. V. V. Mânes", Volné sméry (1947-48), p. 146. 8 Oldrich Stary: "Ucit se z nârodniho odkazu", Vytvarné umêni (1953), pp. 97101.

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torical figures, as well as working-class types, were welcome as long as they were perfect facsimiles.9 Within these concepts, art became a tool of Communist politics and propaganda. The Communist Party became the final and only arbiter of art. The artists themselves were presented with a dubious choice: either to fall in line with party dictates, in which case they could continue painting and be materially and financially rewarded, or else to hold firm to their convictions, to create spontaneously, and, as a result, to suffer privation and loss of livelihood. The politically deviant artist could not become a member of the Association of Czechoslovak Artists, his canvases were not allowed on exhibit, and his works, condemned by the Party, were left without public or buyers. He received no commissions from the state, and private persons either could not afford to purchase his works or were afraid to do so. The majority of artists submitted to the dictates of the Party, as did the art critics and art historians. Some of the older generation of painters, such as Vaclav Rabas, Vlastimil Rada, and Jan Slavicek, in adapting themselves to the new way, lost some of their individuality of expression. Etchings and lithography utilized themes from socialist life, or else caricatured bourgeois life, often in a vicious manner. Book illustrations were perhaps least affected. Josef Lada, in his primitive drawings, Karel Svolinsky, in his light, folk-art style, and romantic, lyrical Jiri Trnka were able to maintain their idiom. Sculptors, such as Jan Lauda, Josef Malejovsky, and Karel Pokorny, portrayed Czechoslovak and Soviet Communist leaders, soldiers of the Red Army, and similar figures. Others of the older generation, notably Emil Filla, abandoned their style and tried to follow as closely as possible the dicta of socialist realism. And the avant-garde of the younger generation (such as "Group 42" and "Seven in October") changed their style completely, since it was so prescribed by the régime. It is interesting to note that although impressionism was banned as harmful because it allegedly estranged art from the life of the people, created art for art's sake, and sacrificed reality to the phantom of color, it was evidently not thought judicious to ignore the father of Czech impressionism, Antonin Slavicek. The critic, Josef Cisarovsky, championed him, and another critic, Dusan Sindelâr, wrote as follows: 9

L. Kara: "Dëtské nemoci hledâni socialistického realismu", (1949), p. 3. "Ukazatel cest socialistické kultury", Tvorba (1949), pp. 12-14.

Vol né smer y

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"Slavicek created landscapes full of human torment: the torment of those nameless, exploited mountain people, weavers and poor peasants. And it does not really matter that these figures are not depicted on his canvases. After all, it is their landscape that suffers with them; the trees ravaged by cruel winds are their trees. In Slavicek's pictures, we find something socialistic." 10 In this case, Czechoslovak Communist criticism made an exception, as did Soviet criticism in evaluating Picasso. Matisse, and Leger, who can hardly be counted among the exponents of socialist realism. The products of socialist realism were shown in numerous exhibitions in Prague and the provinces. The exposition, "The First Review of Czechoslovak Art", took place in 1950 in the Riding School of the Prague Castle. In December 1950 and January 1951, another exhibition was hold in Prague, called "Art Harvest, 1950". 11 And in March 1953, yet another comprehensive exhibit took place ,again in the Riding School of the Prague Castle, "The Second Review of Czechoslovak Art". Among the exhibited works, the following titles give a good indication of the subject-matter of socialist realism! In painting, Otakar Nejedly: "Blast Furnace in Moravská Ostrava"; Vladimir Sychra: "February 1948: Scenes and Events"; Antonin Bukolsky: "The Wounded Refugee, A Scene From Partisan Life in Slovakia"; Jaroslav Pokorny: "The Construction of the Dam on the Chrudimka"; Ctibor Belan: "Partisans"; Marie Medvecká: triptych of "The Building of the Orava Dam"; Milos Slovák: "New Railroads"; Radomír Kolár: "Harvesting the Sugar Beet"; and Ludvik Kuba: "At the Thresher, Morning, Noon and Night". An example of a monumental composition on canvas was the "Thanksgiving of the Czech and Slovak People to Generalissimo Stalin", painted in 1952 by the collective of painters, Jan Cumpelík, Jaromir Sochor, and Aleña Cermáková. In the middle of the composition Stalin stands in a white uniform, framed by a flood of flags and surrounded by jubilant throngs. Among the noteworthy monumental paintings commissioned for the walls and ceilings of public buildings was the painting in the entrance hall of the Klement Gottwald Museum by Vojtéch Tittelbach, elaborating peasant motifs; also memorable is a mosaic by 10

Josef Císarovsky, "Proti formalismu za odváznéjsi cestu k realismu", Vytvarné uméní (1950), p. 406. Dusan Sindelár, "Chvíle zastavení s Antonínem Slavíckem", Vytvarné uméní (1955), pp. 212-218. 11 V. Solta, "Pfipomínky k vystavé Vytvarná úroda 1950", Vytvarné uméní (1950), pp. 385-398.

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Vladimir Sychra, in the Red Army Hall of the National Memorial in Prague. Czechoslovak sculpture of this period abounded in statues of ranking contemporary political leaders, prominent historical figures, Red Army soldiers, and industrial and agricultural workers. These are a few examples: Jan Lauda: "V. L. Lenin", "Antonin Zapotocky", and "Zdenek Nejedly"; Karel Pokorny: J. V. Stalin", "Bozena Nemcova", "Leos Janacek"; and the "Memorial to the Red Army" in Ceska Trebova; Vincenc Makovsky: "Klement Gottwald" and "Red Army Man"; Josef Kostka: "Collective Farm Woman" and "Partisan"; Rudolf Pribis: Medallion, "For Peace, For Fatherland and For Socialism". In sculpture, a good example of monumentality was the Stalin memorial erected on the Letna in Prague, the work of a collective of sculptors headed by Otakar Svec, architect Jin Stursa, and Vlasta Stursova. The monument was unveiled with tremendous pomp in 1953. However, it was quietly demolished in 1962in thewaveof de-Stalinization. The tower-like monument depicted Stalin in gigantic proportions. Behind him, on either side, stood a row of four figures, separated by flying flags. These figures, in theatrical poses, represented the Czechoslovak and Soviet people: the worker, the peasant, the intellectual, and the soldier. The titles of paintings, as well as of sculptures and monuments, showed that the artists were following the rules of socialist realism. Were it otherwise, their works probably would not have reached the public. At the same time, it is difficult to judge the form and shape of any clandestine production. The work exhibited showed that adherence to the official dictates was leading Czechoslovak art into a blind alley. The artificial interruption of continuity with the immediate past made the new art obsolete and sterile. Not only was artistic development stopped, but the new conservatism carried artistic expression backwards fifty years or more. Furthermore, the new art forms lacked originality, and were overlaid with mannerism and eclecticism. Even if one regards the easy intelligibility of the new idiom as a gain, the price paid in all other aspects of artistic expression was disproportionately high. Among the art media, painting suffered the most adverse effects. Realist precepts were mechanically interpreted, leading to minutely detailed canvases which revealed a conventional perception of reality and an empty fidelity. Landscapes were typically contrived, with "socialist gadgetry" such as a smoke stack in the background or a tractor in the foreground, and executed in the brightest of tones, perhaps to signify the official optimism of socialist man. Compositions with figures

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were unavoidably accompanied by an artificial bombast and animated gesticulation, to express the energy, determination, and heroism of the synthetic new socialist species. Many of these paintings were not unlike cheap commercial posters; few had much in common with art. They were banal and often repulsive. The striving for monumentality in the larger works also met with frequent failure, indicating that sheer size and complex composition were not sufficient to guarantee success. This harsh judgment of the state of Czechoslovak painting under Stalinism should be modified in individual cases of accomplished artists of both the older and the younger generations. Artistic talent did not perish in the country, and some individuality of expression was preserved, although badly hampered by the official dogma of socialist realism. In comparison to painting, sculpture fared much better under the new conditions, although it, too, was undoubtedly handicapped by eclecticism and mannerism. Several young talented artists emerged, able to continue as heirs of the legacy of Myslbek and Stursa. This tradition, which had lasted in Czechoslovakia for half a century, protected the medium from poor taste, banality, and vulgarity. Graphic art, too, especially book illustration, maintained high standards. Architecture, in this Stalinist era, relied on ornamentality and historical perspective, while a sharp battle raged against survivals of functionalism, condemned as the expression of "pernicious cosmopolitanism". 12 In 1955, the "Third Review of Art" was held in the Riding-school of the Prague Castle 13 and later in the year, a new exposition was opened, "Ten Years of Art in the Czechoslovak People's Democratic Republic". 14 The latter was described as the largest exposition held to date. It reviewed and evaluated the entire production of socialist realism. The exhibited paintings and graphic art did not differ markedly from those shown on earlier occasions. However, a novel idiom was introduced in genre themes for small sculptures, as, for example, Frantisek Gibal: "Escape From A Burning Village", Vlastimil Vecera: "Carpenter's Apprentice, Klement Gottwald"; and Jozef Kostka: "The Reading Worker". Karel Hladik drew themes from historical novels for his 12

K. Honzik, "Nova cesta cs. architektury", Architektura (1949), p. 6. J. Kroha, "Architektura socialistickeho budovani", ibid., p. 65. 13 V. Formanek, "Treti prehlidka a problem slohu", Vytvarne umeni (1955), pp. 364-368. 14 "Za novy rozkvet vytvarneho umeni Otevreni vystavy Deset let cs. lidove demokraticke republiky ve vytvarnem umeni", Rude pravo (Dec. 5, 1955).

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small sculptures and Vincenc Vingler offered artistic renditions from animal life. The dissatisfaction of the critics was clearly and sharply voiced. The artists were chastised for not sufficiently comprehending the significance of the great new epoch, and criticized for their inadequacy in expressing the new reality. Furthermore, the paucity of themes, as well as the lack of diversity in techniques, were decried. Yet, during the same year,, the Stalinist era of strict political control in the arts ended. At the end of 1955, as the result of political changes in the Soviet Union, the first inkling of relaxation in the Communist regimentation of the arts became apparent. Czechoslovak art criticism identified with the demands of the Second Congress of Soviet Writers in December 1954, calling for more latitude of expression in artistic creation, of course, within the framework of socialist realism.15 In February 1956, the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, in condemning Stalinism, brought about further and substantial easement for Czechoslovak art as well.16 Thus, a new era was in the offing. Perhaps most important was the fact that the Iron Curtain, at least in the arts, was lifted. Art magazines and books from the West, with illustrations of works of art and art criticism, were allowed, for the first time in years, to reach the Czechoslovak art community and the public. Dead Czechoslovak painters previously on the blacklist, such as Rudolf Kremlicka, Josef Capek, and Bohumil Kubista, were again remembered. Living artists, for example Jan Zrzavy, Jan Sima, and Frantisek Tichy, who had previously been neglected or condemned, were again allowed to exhibit their works. And the new generation of artists started to show, albeit hesitantly at first, their own personalities, inclinations, and styles, often in a modern mood. Some began to create under the influence of French masters such as Degas, Rouault, Matisse, and others. Most recently, compositions have appeared which even flirt with abstractionism. Diversity in style and conception also brought about the formation of groups. The paintings of Richard Fremund, from the group "May 1957", should be mentioned for their adaptation of the stylized form of modern French art trends. Originality of expression and individuality of style characterized the paintings of Libor Fara, who employed simple planes with accented contours, scaled in tones of white, grey, and black, 15 16

V. Formanek, op. cit., p. 368. "XX. Sjezd KSSS a vytvarne umeni", Vytvarne

umeni (1956), pp. 46-97.

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to achieve the illusion of the background of contemporary life. Closest to abstractionism came Robert Piesen. Jitka Valovâ, from the group "Trasa 54", adopted a style reminiscent of Filla, while Jiri John, member of yet another group, derived inspiration from the works of Jan Zrzavy. Euzen Evan, from the group "29th of August", should be mentioned for the modernity of design and color or his still lifes. The longing for modern expression was also apparent in sculpture. The strongest influence from the past generation was wielded by Otto Gutfreund. The relief, "Fruit Picking", by Jan Kodet (1955) was conceived in a very modern manner. Sculptor Jindrich Wielgus, in his portrayals of children (1958) and "Nude with Apple" (1958), executed his work in a modern, rough-hewn form, yet achieved lightness and grace of motion. Eva Zoubkovâ, in "Woman with Vessel", presented a very modern figure conception with an accented, earthy form. The realist monument of Comenius in Naarden, Holland, by Vincenc Makovsky offered a contemporary elaboration of the material. This work is striking for the gesture of the hands poised for prayer, as well as for the facial expression. It may well be speculated that Czechoslovak artists could not have, in such a short time, switched so suddenly from the rigidly prescribed style of socialist realism and resumed their work within the modern idiom. It seems likely that they had actually been creating within the privacy of their ateliers without regard for, and in spite of, official directives. This conclusion is justified since certain works exhibited after 1956 carried the dates of the Stalinist period. It is further corroborated in published interviews with some of the artists. About the same time, the functionalist controversy in architecture diminished in intensity. In January 1956, the architects split from the Association of Czechoslovak Artists and founded their own association.17 The previously interrupted development was resumed, as evidenced in the design of the Czechoslovak Pavilion at the Brussels World Fair in 1958. The Pavilion was created by the architects Frantisek Cubr, Josef Hruby, and Zdenëk Pokorny. It was then officially announced that purism, constructivism, and functionalism were important movements for the future development of Czechoslovak architecture. It seems that two models of functionalism, the rationalist and the emotionalist, took root in Czechoslovakia. No project as yet appeared in 17

"Nové vybërové organisace vytvarnych umëlcû", Rudé prâvo (Jan. 23, 1956).

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structuralism and sculpturalism. The emotionalist functional conception was used in the design of public construction or large apartment houses. The rationalist style dominated small dwellings and tract developments. These structures seem uninteresting and banal and actually, until now, no construction of a complete housing development had materialized inclusive of theatre, cinema, cultural center, shopping center, and municipal buildings. The closest example is the tract of Anatol Stasek in Pankrac. The architecture of larger buildings was much more successful. As an example, the cooperative house in Litvinov by Vaclav Hilsky may be cited, or the children's hospital in Brno by Bedrich Rozehnal. The building of a consumer's cooperative in Gottwaldov by Zdenek Plesnik is a good illustration of modern Czechoslovak architecture of the post-Stalinist period. After 1956, architecture was definitely rid of historical perspectives. It became progressive and forward-looking. At present, it seems that there is no insurmountable schism between the architecture of the Western world and that of Czechoslovakia. Architect Karel Honzik expressed this thought at a Congress of Architects in Prague in March 1964, saying: "It is a matter of course that we shall learn from world masters such as LeCorbusier." Czechoslovak art today, then, goes its own way and largely ignores political directives and theoreticians. Quite the opposite: the critics are attempting to tolerate and even to excuse excesses of modern art that are quite obviously beyond the pale of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Czechoslovak art ceased to be dependent on Soviet art which, by comparison, appears backward. In fact, some voices occasionally criticize the canons of Soviet esthetics.18 Czechoslovak art is slowly returning to the cultural mold of the Western world. This is clearly witnessed in the resolution of the Congress of Artists held in December 1964. The Congress called for a full development of relations and professional contact with the entire world.19 It is difficult to predict, however, whether this new trend will be allowed to follow its full course.

18

V. Formanek, "O nikterych zvlaStnostech spole£enske funkce vytvarneho umeni", Vytvarne umeni (1958), pp. 56-60, 106-109. 19 Rude prdvo (Dec. 12, 1964). Literarni noviny (Jan. 16, 1965).

Total Planning of Science on the National and International Levels*

VLADIMIR SLAMECKA

INTRODUCTION

Throughout the first half of this century, the attainments of science under Communism were hardly exceptional. For decades, Stalin's tampering with scientific objectivism stifled its potential and role; for decades, science was either proletarian ("true") or capitalist ("false"). During the last twenty years, however, science has officially come to the fore as a recognized force of the Communist movement. The turning point in early 1956 was manifested by such events as Lysenko's downfall, and the public denunciation of the so-called Zhdanov line in science; since then, by a broad emphasis upon scientific excellence, and by continuing efforts to give science a united organizational structure. Today, science is an indispensable factor in the development of the Communist state. Organizational marshalling of science into the direct service of the state can have a variety of immediate causes: the exigencies of a war, the interests of a social revolution, and so on. In technologically advanced countries whose economies are based on the concept and practice of total planning, the marshalling of science onto a platform from which to foster the aspirations of the state is a consequence of the social and economic order to these countries, and a necessary condition for its continuance. Given the present relative maturity of socialism there, it is nearly impossible that a further advancement of the economic and social goals proceed from an empirical basis; it must be founded on science, on its research and findings, and on its method. The recruitment of science into an almost exclusive service of the * This study is based on official materials issued by the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences and its Institute of Science Planning, the State Planning Commission, and the State Committee for Technical Development, and on the analysis of Czechoslovak publications, e.g., Vestnik CSAV. For further details, see V. Slamecka, Science in Czechoslovakia (New York, N.Y., Columbia University Press, 1963).

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state presumes the imposition upon it of several constraints, the principal of which affects the direction of science development, and is exercised by intensive, central planning. The distinction of being the first country to plan virtually the entire content of its scientific effort belongs to the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. The Czechoslovak experiment provides an interesting insight into the contents, methods, and effects of an exercise in statewide planning of scientific research. In contrast to democratic systems, in which governments as a rule affect only "big" science by controlling fiscal appropriations, but leave the remaining, broad scientific effort to the impetus of its numerous sponsors, science in Czechoslovakia has become a prime tool of the state, fully tied to its economic and social goals, and intimately fused into the political apparatus of the country. Administratively, science is subordinated to the central agencies of the government and to the Communist Party, which have reoriented scientific endeavor toward pragmatic, highly utilitarian goals, and have taken it upon themselves to provide the human and material resources needed. The practice of intensive, all-state science planning dates back in Czechoslovakia some seven years. Following a two-year Science Plan for 1958-1960, a more ambitious, five-year plan was announced in 1960. Since science plans parallel the time span of the economic plans, the Science Plan 1961-1965 came to a premature end when in 1962 Czechoslovakia withdrew her economic plan as being too ambitious. A new Science Research Plan was launched in 1964, intended to prepare the scientific platform for the political, economic, and social goals formulated by the Communist party for the seven-year period of 19641970. As a rule, there exist side-by-side at least two science plans, one shortrange (covering five to seven years), and one long-range (a so-called perspective plan). For a number of years, the State Planning Office and the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences had worked at a twenty-year plan for scientific research, based on the assumed image of a future Communist man and society, in which all people voluntarily limit their demands, all eat in communal kitchens, and so on. Since 1963, this perspective plan has not been heard of. CATEGORIES OF RESEARCH PLANNED

When science becomes a direct prerequisite of the economic and social development of a state and a society, a condition of its successful plan-

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ning is a balanced division of research and development assignments from the viewpoint of the society's requirements which science is supposed to satisfy. The Czechoslovak Science Research Plan for 19641970 is based on a latent distinction among three categories of tasks; together, they exhaust the scope and capacity of the country's scientific endeavor. The first category comprises developmental tasks, dictated by the immediate research requirements of current economic production plans, and by the existing social services of the country. Since a nation with limited human and material resources cannot be expected to stand in the forefront of all scientific disciplines, the tasks of this category of research plans aim at attaining, hopefully, the highest existing level of technological and social achievement. Such tasks can be either purely developmental (as when the goal is a new, but known, process or product), or they may call for a limited amount of applied research (as when known solutions are incomplete or impractical for local conditions). In both cases, tasks of this category lend themselves to accurate definition and costing out, and to realistic timing and planning. The second category of tasks consists of applied research assignments purporting to meet certain stated future needs of the economy and of society. In Czechoslovakia, which anticipates a transition of its socialist economy and society to Communist ones, these tasks fall into five general areas of research: 1. Research in methods of more efficient exploitation of conventional energy sources, and of development of new sources of energy by means of energy transformation processes; 2. Development of new types of metals and nonmetals, via research into the relationship between the properties and physico-chemical structure of matter; 3. Complex automation of production processes, through applied research in the computational disciplines and in advanced instrumentation; 4. Research into the nature and control of living matter, primarily by studies of the relationship between chemical structure and biological function, study of biological phenomena at the cell level, and study of the function and development of organisms; 5. Research into social phenomena of the advanced phase of socialist societies, with particular attention to its economic and social intercourse. Effective solutions of tasks in the second research category presume a

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high standard of erudition in certain basic and interdisciplinary subject areas which, like mathematics, are fundamental to the advancement of other disciplines, or which, like the computing sciences, precede the emergence of social and other needs. Research in these subject areas - the intrinsic prerequisites of the development of science itself constitutes the third category of tasks; it is "basic" in the sense of having no concrete objectives and no abrupt time deadlines. The subject matter of research tasks in this third category is broadly restricted to those disciplines in which Czechoslovakia has excelled in the past: some areas of mathematics, areas in the chemical, physical, and biological sciences, and certain areas of astronomy and archeology. In comparison with the first two categories of concrete research and development assignments, the proportion of basic research stipulated by the Science Research Plan 1964-70 amounts to less than ten percent of the total national research effort in the natural, engineering, and social sciences.

SCIENCE PLANNING RESPONSIBILITIES

The Czechoslovak apparatus for science planning involves two agencies, both subordinated to the government. The first category of developmental assignments is the responsibility of the State Commission for the Development and Coordination of Science and Technology, a powerful governmental organ. The tasks are meted out to the 200-odd industrial research and development institutes owned and administered by the state or by state-sponsored agencies. The responsibility for defining and meeting the research requirements of the second and third categories is that of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. The Academy is today the only formal science platform in the country, having absorbed in the past two years both the Slovak Academy of Sciences and the Czechoslovak Academy of Agricultural Sciences. The research load is distributed over the 141 scientific installations of the Academy, and a certain volume of research tasks of the second category was also assigned to Czechoslovak universities and technical colleges. This assignment of applied, concrete research tasks to institutions of higher learning seeks to reverse the alleged attempts of these institutions to develop "individualistic trends" in scientific research. The development and organization of science research at Czechoslovak institutions of higher learning is regulated by law, and the accomplish-

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ment of assigned research supervised and controlled by the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. To implement its responsibilities in the planning, assignment, coordination, and performance control of research tasks, the Academy has established an Institute of Science Planning. The principal planning bodies are, organizationally, the "collegia", composed of Academicians, directors of the Academy institutes, and other leading experts; each scientific area or discipline has its own collegium. Prior to their submission to the government and its State Planning Commission, science research plan drafts are approved by the presidium of the Academy. In their final form, science research plans become a part of the overall economic plans of Czechoslovakia. When the content and direction of scientific research are intimately associated with the political, economic, and social goals of a government, a prerequisite for sound science planning is sound manpower planning. The distribution of the human resources of science, when permitted to develop freely, tends to follow the current demand rather than anticipate that of the future. As the planner, the government must undertake to assess the present and future manpower requirements for each and every discipline and profession, and to introduce appropriate educational and training measures to meet these requirements. Czechoslovakia, whose annual increase in scientific manpower is 1.7% (compared with 4.5% in the United States and 10% in the Soviet Union), currently has at her disposal approximately 5,000 scientifically trained people. It is difficult to see how she can, in the next few years, have the 9,000 scientists for whom the government is tailoring the current Science Research Plan, despite the intensive, centrally planned educational system: official statistics show that in the past seven years, the average age of the Czechoslovak scientists increased by almost that figure. It appears, therefore, that the research load in the current plan is, quantitatively speaking, unrealistic.

SOME VARIABLES OF EFFECTIVENESS OF SCIENCE PLANNING

The judiciousness of total science planning, regardless of the realism of its goals and schedules, is very difficult to express in absolute terms. In countries with advanced, planned economies, the practice of planning at least some degree of applied research is a necessary consequence of the planned society, and the need for it increases with the extent of economic

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and social planning; the optimum scope and depth are, however, difficult to determine. Total science planning, on the other hand, harbors certain constraints. Like an organism, science requires proportional development. To exert some of its parts and to neglect others may damage the organism, for one cannot fully predict the effect of one component upon another. One constraint lies in the assignment of total scientific resources to predetermined goals, for which they are then exhausted; and its impact obviously increases with the depth and duration of the plan. A related, basic factor which influences the effectiveness of total science planning is the proportion of research uncommitted to concrete goals (basic research) to that applied to the solution of known goals. In Czechoslovakia, this overall ratio is 1 : 10, and it is considered alarmingly low. As a specific example, the former Skoda Plant in Plzen (Pilsen) devotes only one-third of its total scientific effort to uncommitted goals (whereas the prewar ratio was reversed). This aspect is not, of course, a necessary consequence of total planning as such; rather, it indicates the ambitiousness of the economic production plans to which science - applied and basic - was rendered subservient. It is also plausible to expect that the complexity of total science planning will increase the planning and administrative apparatus. The continuous coordination of the changes and deviations from the science research plan, caused by changes and deviations from the economic and social-development plans, requires a very expensive, unproductive effort; stable, realistic economic plans are therefore essential to the efficient execution of science research plans. In Czechoslovakia, where the research plan spells out work assignments for practically every scientist (following a two-year survey of the country's material and manpower resources in science), the administrative complex is so demanding of the scientist that the Academy recently had to issue a decree forbidding them to hold meetings in the morning - for the justified fear that scientists would spend their working hours literally at the conference table. To suggest, as some proponents of planning have, that refined methods of total planning of scientific research will ultimately permit the government to anticipate and order inventions and to schedule their exploitation by society is preposterous, at least in the foreseeable future. Nor will the Czechoslovak experiment in total science planning, which was guided by politico-economic considerations and commitments rather than by a concern for the best development of science, settle un-

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equivocally the plausible question of whether permanent, total science planning can optimize national scientific productivity without ill effects of some kind. Continued analysis of the Czechoslovak practice will, nevertheless, prove fruitful and interesting, not merely from the viewpoints of political science and administration, but largely because it ignores two assumptions usually held inviolate for a healthy development of science. Czechoslovak planners have abandoned the principle of proportional development of science, by emphasizing heavily the goalcommitted (applied and developmental) scientific effort at the expense of uncommitted ("basic") research; and secondly, they have repudiated the notion of the causal role of science in the development of society and mankind by relegating science to the status of a mere tool whose direction of development can be predetermined through the prescription of certain economic and social goals of the state. It is possibly in this latter hypothesis - inherent in the Czechoslovak planning experiment, although not necessarily subscribed to by Czechoslovak scientists - that the experiment is most significant.

INTERNATIONAL PLANNING OF SCIENCE RESEARCH

One important result already emanating from the brief experience in total planning of national scientific research is the present course of the Soviet bloc toward science planning on an international basis. Since a high degree of science planning is considered indispensable to the centrally planned economy of the Soviet bloc states, the Czechoslovak experiment has found a favorable response. East Germany began building its structure for nationwide science planning in 1961, and both Poland and the Soviet Union are remodelling their Academies of Sciences in order to vest in them the function of a central agency, responsible, under the direction of the government and the party, for all state planning of science research. Furthermore, the organizational separation of responsibilities for planning applied and basic research from planning development (by assigning the former to the Academy of Science, the latter to a governmental economic agency) is likely to be emulated at the international level within the Soviet bloc, by establishing a similar relationship between the national Academies of Sciences on one side, and the Permanent Commission for Coordination of Scientific and Technical Research of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) on the other.

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The present practice in scientific cooperation among the Soviet bloc Academies of Sciences is to establish bilateral agreements, signed or renewed annually. The first conference of Academies of Sciences of the Soviet bloc, held in Warsaw in 1962, formulated, however, the principles of multilateral international cooperation in scientific research; and it proceeded to designate some topics for joint research (observation of artificial earth satellites, semiconductor research, macromolecular chemistry, chemistry of natural and physiologically active compounds, etc.). The trend toward multilateral scientific cooperation has been since carried further, by the demands for a supranational organization of scientific research for the Soviet bloc, and for a system of research planning on this level. In the light of the already existing and increasing economic interdependence of the bloc countries, the logical aims of international science planning are better distribution and utilization of the resources of science, reduced duplication of research efforts, more effective support to economic and social plans of individual countries, and so on. Joint research planning in the Soviet bloc is envisioned as proceeding in two directions. Again, one category of tasks stems from the immediate economic and social requirements of individual countries, incorporated in their existing economic plans; these tasks can be defined, scheduled, and assigned to correspond with the economic areas of responsibility assumed by individual states. Developmental tasks which exceed the facilities or capabilities of any one state will be assigned to two or more states in an overlapping or sequential pattern. For the second category of planned research tasks, whose substance cannot be defined and scheduled concretely, the planning mechanism will employ two methods of assigning responsibility. Distribution of research responsibility can be either arbitrary, although mindful of such factors as scientific potential and capacity to muster sufficient material and human resources; or research tasks may be assigned to specific outstanding installations, together with the responsibility for coordinating similar work elsewhere in the bloc countries, and for training scientific manpower. Examples of such installations already in existence are the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in Dubna (U.S.S.R.), the Institute of Organic Chemistry and Biochemistry (Prague), and the Institute for Fiber Research (Teltow, East Germany). Multilateral research planning among states has, of course, farreaching implications. While it undoubtedly can strengthen the selected subject areas and resources of individual countries, and make their

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research results available faster to others, by the same token, it reduces the overall scientific self-sufficiency of each participating nation. Total, multilateral planning favors, in the long run, the large state at the expense of the smaller ones, insofar as it increases the dependence of the latter; thus, planned division and coordination of scientific research in the Soviet bloc is, in the words of the President of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, not only a scientific, technical, and economic question, but one which has "significant political, psychological, and moral aspects".1 Beyond being "an enterprise for those willing to calculate the risks and rewards inherent in an adventure of high calling" (as Murray Todd of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences described international science cooperation), the planning of scientific research on an international level is an immensely challenging technical problem. When viewed as a management information system, the variables and decision criteria of the planning complex are so interrelated and time-sensitive as to be beyond the capabilities of existing, conventional management techniques and information systems. Thus, the methods of solution-seeking adopted in this ambitious enterprise of large-scale science planning are as important and interesting to follow and study as are the effects of their implementation, regardless of the overall probability of its success in the immediate future.

1

For example, the conversion, three years ago, of the East German industrial standards to those of the Soviet Union has placed, in the opinion of some practical-minded observers, the biggest obstacle in the path of hopes for a German reunification.

The Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences

JAN ROCEK

In this short paper, I do not wish to attempt to give a full account of the history and structure nor of the political, national, and cultural aspects of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. In this respect, I could hardly compete successfully with the excellent job Dr. Vladimir Slâmecka has done in his book, Science in Czechoslovakia.1 On the other hand, I believe that my experience in working at one of the institutes of the Academy quite recently qualifies me to give at least some personal - and I emphasize that - purely personal reflections about the formation, nature, and function of the Academy. My experience is based upon seven years' tenure in one of the largest institutes of the Academy. I joined the Institute of Chemistry (now the Institute of Organic Chemistry and Biochemistry) in Prague in 1953, and worked there until my escape in 1960. The director of the Institute was and is Academician Frantisek Sorm, who was generally believed to have been the most important single person in the founding of the Academy. Dr. Sorm also became the first Secretary General of the Academy and at present is the President of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. I believe that because of the close involvement of the director of the Institute of Chemistry in the establishment and administration of the Academy, we at the Institute had a better than average insight into its structure and policies. The Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences was founded in 1952. Even though the basic idea and pattern were clearly those of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, it definitely took a certain effort to set up the Czechoslovak counterpart. This effort came principally from those seeking support for basic research in science. Let me remind you of the situation at the universities, the traditional place for basic research, at that time. After the coup d'état in 1948, the 1

Published by Columbia University Press (New York and London, 1963).

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universities were almost completely dominated by technicians, janitors, and junior faculty members. They came to function exclusively as a training school for specific needs of industry, so that even the number of students specializing in any field was precisely set according to the planned requirements of the economy. It is not necessary to emphasize that the spirit at the universities under these conditions was hardly conducive to basic research. Moreover, the Czechoslovak universities have been traditionally subordinate to the Ministry of Education, whose main interest naturally lay in primary and secondary schools. This ministry never had a very large budget and ranked rather low in the complicated priority list of ministries. In the immediate post-war period, some research at the universities had been supported by industry. With increased tightening of the bureaucratic system, this loosely allocated money was harder to justify; industry found it much less troublesome to build up its own research institutes than to support outside work. The first successful attempt to establish a center of science divorced from the Ministry of Education was the foundation of the "Center for Scientific and Technical Development" (Ostredi vedeckeho a technickeho rozvoje, UVTR), in 1949. In spite of its short life, the Center fulfilled the important function of paving the way for the foundation of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. It established several research institutes which later served as the nucleus of the research establishments of the Academy. Even more important, it launched a new system of three-year grants for postgraduate study. This so-called "Aspirantship in Science" (vedecka aspirantura) had since been considerably expanded; it was and is of foremost importance for the development of science in Czechoslovakia. Not only does the aspirantship offer financial support to graduate students; but - and this is at least of equal importance - the aspirantship in science has achieved priority over any assignment to an industrial post. Also, in contrast to the system of admission to undergraduate studies at the universities, which heavily stresses political and social considerations, the selection of aspirants is based predominantly on examinations in the particular field of science. The aspirantship has therefore ensured a steady supply of well-trained scientific workers for the research institutes of the Academy itself, as well as for industrial research. Today, after twelve years of existence, the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences has well over one hundred research establishments, ranging from large institutes of several hundred employees to small laboratories. The Academy employs more than 10,000 people including, according to my

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estímate, between one and two thousand scientists holding advanced degrees. Administratively, the Academy is on the ministerial level, subordinate directly only to the government. The President of the Academy holds the rank of minister. Since its foundation, the Academy has enjoyed rather generous support by the government. Its research laboratories and libraries are very well equipped - at least, by local standards. The salary scale in the Academy is, I believe, the highest in the country. Its scientists have more opportunities for contact with scientists from abroad, attend more international conferences and symposia, and find it much easier to work, even for an extended period of time, in laboratories and institutes all over the world. There is, besides this, another very important factor: even though exceptions do exist, in general, the system of promotion, awards, and granting of degrees in the Academy puts great weight on actual scientific ability and achievement. This policy stands in sharp contrast to that at the universities, where political considerations are - or were, at least in 1960 - by far the most important. Many scientists who were purged from the universities were allowed to continue their research in the Academy. It is quite understandable that, with all these factors on its side, the Academy of Science has been able to attract most of the best scientists in the country and to train a competent staff. I believe that it is fair to say that the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences has indeed succeeded in creating centers of high standards in a great variety of scientific fields throughout the country. (I should like to emphasize here that my impressions are drawn basically from the field of chemistry and related disciplines.) Now what is the actual function of the Academy? First of all, its role is to conduct basic research, while applied research is the domain of research institutes of the various ministries and of individual industrial plants. Second, the Academy today certainly plays the key role in the training of postgraduate students. In this role, the Academy also awards advanced scientific degrees. Furthermore, it bears responsibility for research and its coordination and planning on a nationwide scale. The Academy also maintains a publishing house which issues both monographs and journals. Beyond this, one of the important functions of the Academy is undoubtedly to serve as a showcase intended to support the claim that communism is a particularly fertile ground for the development of science. Related to this last function is the publication of a whole series of scientific journals in foreign languages; characteristically, the

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predominant languages are English and German, rather than Russian, though the latter would be much more in accord with the political and cultural orientation of the régime. Also, the generous hospitality shown to foreign visitors and the funds made available for symposia and meetings are manifestations of this same function of the Academy. Let me now try to assess the overall effect of the foundation of the Academy on the standards of research and postgraduate education in Czechoslovakia. I should like to re-emphasize that the privileged position attained by the Academy has led to an entirely new situation in which the universities no longer play the dominant role in basic research, in postgraduate training, nor even in the awarding of advanced degrees. This is basically different from the situation in Czechoslovakia before 1952 and from that in the Western democracies. On the positive side, the founding of the Academy certainly has accelerated the development of scientific work and raised the standards of science in Czechoslovakia. On the negative side, this system has without doubt greatly lowered the prestige, importance, and quality of the universities. It has become easier than ever before to regard and treat universities as mere training centers for specific jobs. Also, the basic organization of the Academy, with its many physically separated institutes, makes it almost impossible to set up a formal program of advanced courses for graduate students in a manner comparable to the American system of graduate schools. I personally believe the American system to be greatly superior to the traditional European system in which postgraduate study is confined to guided research only. Therefore, I find it very hard to predict the long-range effect on the standards of scientific work and higher education. It is almost impossible to guess how the situation at the universities would have developed if the Academy had not been established. It might well be that in a Communist state, with its prime interest in the indoctrination of the young generations, the universities would have had no opportunity whatsoever to develop the conditions necessary for true scientific endeavor, and that the separation of basic research from the universities was the only possible solution.

c CZECHOSLOVAKIA

AND THE WORLD

1 CZECHOSLOVAKIA NATIONALISM

AND ITS VERSUS

NEIGHBORS

FEDERALISM

Central Eastern Europe at the Mid-Century

FELIKS GROSS

I The process of emancipation of Central European nations culminated in 1918. It took a hundred years, from the first Serbian Uprising to the First World War, to liberate most of the nations of this area from foreign rule. Never before, since the tenth century, perhaps, had so many nations of this area had their own states and their own political identity. The experiment did not last long. After twenty years, the independent states were obliterated by a powerful combination of authoritarian superpowers. Central and Eastern Europe had statesmen of stature, had their progressive enlightened political doctrines and powerful democratic movements, but only a few governments - Czechoslovakia belonged to this noble minority - have shown goodwill and mature prudence. The narrow nationalism and political misjudgment of Central and Eastern European governments and parties contributed to the decline of independent states, although the ruthless force of the neighboring superpowers, especially Germany, was the primary factor in the history of this great defeat. The destruction of various peoples in this area was not accomplished without the assistance of some of the East Europeans and their political groups. Only a brutally realistic evaluation of the past permits us to understand the present and suggests choices for the future. And the hard facts tell us that the international political structure of Central and Eastern Europe between the wars was not workable; it was weak, and survived no more than twenty years. This was a region of local tensions, instigated and intensified from outside, by the governments of small weak nations as well as of the larger powers. The international architecture of this region was not strong enough to resist the force of external pressures. Representatives of weak impoverished states frequently acted like representatives of great expansionist powers, seeking division and

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aggrandizement rather than union in the face of mortal danger. The previous system, the twenty years of existence as weak, quarrelsome, and only seemingly independent states, offer no solution for the future, nor any vision of a new society in a new, scientific, technological age. II

Since 1918, not one, but many revolutions have occurred. Our political and technological environment has changed. Moreover, our world outlook is changing rapidly in an era in which children no longer play with railroads, but with interplanetary toy rockets; and the study of astronomy, of our immediate planetary neighborhood, may soon become a required subject in high schools and colleges, as geography once was. Young people study the maps of the planets and the moon rather than small and strange, forgotten nations. At the same time, nuclear weapons and missiles have created a terrifying new challenge. It is man and man only who is in a position to destroy humanity and our civilization. Avoidance of war has become a major goal of the superpowers. The political environment has changed completely. Since the middle of the 19th century, the French-German border has been the strategic boundary of the big power zone. Any changes within this area could affect world peace. Europe, or, rather a divided Europe, was definitely the center of world politics. A European balance of power was decisive for maintenance of an unstable peace. The old European balance of power has now been displaced by the world balance. Europe is no longer the center of international politics. At best, the European Community is one of many major actors. The Atlantic Community, the Soviet Bloc, the Chinese Communist system, the non-allied, recently emancipated nations-all are partners or opponents in this big game. This company is too powerful for single, sovereign, but pocket-size, nations. System of nations, Commonwealth, unions, blocs are the great actors in the current historical drama. Single European nations, such as France, Belgium, Holland, or Germany, play their role in European politics. In world politics, however, they count as part of the European Community, since only in such a combination do these nations represent issues and potentialities of importance. Only within a community and in union with the other Atlantic nations are the European nations an active element in world politics. Twice in history, a combination of Atlantic nations saved European democracy from total disaster. European strength today is anchored in the spiritual and political

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kinship of the entire Atlantic Community. The two disastrous wars destroyed the political primacy of Europe. The relationship between the Atlantic Community, the Soviet Bloc, and Mainland China is decisive today in determining world peace or tensions, just as, at one time, was the relationship between Germany and France. A political miracle took place when two mortal enemies, two Erbfeinde, the French and German nations, formed the core of the European Community. Now, the general tendency, economic and social trends, indicate that the process of integration will continue, although it may be temporarily reversed. The problems of nationalism and of Central and Eastern Europe should be considered against this background of global international politics. At a time when the European balance of power has been displaced by a world balance, the problems of Pirim Macedonia, Burgenland, and Teshen Silesia - a few of the past major issues of Central and Eastern Europe - are secondary, insignificant, in spite of the impressive literature. Indeed, few people today have time and patience to listen to the involved arguments. Few students of Central Eastern Europe in American colleges and universities are even interested in those problems, and fewer have ever heard of their long histories and juridical arguments. East European nationalism and its issues have become, like others, petty and tedious. Since 1918 this area moved through five "models": 1) national states, 1918-38; 2) German-Soviet conquest and occupation, 1938-41; 3) German occupation, a period of total enslavement and biological extermination; 4) Soviet sphere of influence and Communist Stalinist-type dictatorships and terror, 1939-56; and 5) since 1956, a post-Stalinist period of various degrees of liberalization, with the continuation of the basic political system. What is the next "model?" A number of alternatives are possible. Should the liberalizing trend continue, a more decentralized, perhaps even more "mixed," socialist economy may evolve. There is no return to the past. In the political sense, we cannot exclude a possible return to more oppressive methods; nonetheless, forces are at work which suggest an evolution toward a more liberal, if not yet democratic, society. This profound will to freedom, expressed by the peoples, though not by the governments in the revolution of 1956, may find its own ways, perhaps gradually or perhaps more decisively, to democracy and revisionism. Central Eastern Europe as a de facto regional entity of Socialist and democratic states is a possible vision of the future. With a policy of

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gradual changes in international relations, this region may return to the European Society of Nations, where it belongs, as the Soviet Union does. This could pave the way toward the next stage: further regional and democratic consolidation. The future socialism may be more pragmatic, workable in a variety of ways, a mixed economy. This, however, is more a possibility than a reality. Unexpected events and forces may move Central Eastern Europe in a different direction. For the moment, this is an area of de facto dictatorships evolving in a variety of directions; Yugoslavia, in a more "liberal" direction, Poland, in a retreat from the freedom of 1956. The change comes in times of a certain lessening of East-West tensions, while the Atlantic Community has been also weakened. Nationalism, however, does not suggest answers for the modem world. Nationalism originated as a liberalizing ideology of political and social emancipation. Nationalistic movements often degenerated into this extreme form, which appeared in the latter part of the 19th century and later. Patriotism, however, as one's identification with a cultural and historical community, is as ancient as the idea of a civilized and free society. Herodotus and Plutarch give us numerous illustrations, although the term had not yet been coined. Patriotism as an ideology originated in the eighteenth century. As an ideology of preservation and cultural growth of a national community, patriotism does not preclude concepts of federalism or even broader universal communities. In this sense, patriotism, unlike the militant or even conservative nationalism, is not an antithesis of internationalism. National communities grow safely in this large and comfortable home known as the European Community. Ill A powerful movement of intellectuals in Central Eastern Europe challenged the doctrine of supremacy of the state. The quest for the rights and place of an individual in a modern society has reappeared among the young, born in times of German occupation. Neohumanism and personalism are the central themes of a nascent ideology. It is an issue which touches the very roots of a civilized society: the problem of relationship between the individual and the group, between the individual and the state. This is an ancient dilemma and, as Ernest Barker, the English political historian and theoretician, rightly indicates, it constitutes the very essence of Greek political philosophy. This great issue has never been

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fully resolved. It reappears now, magnified by the suffering of millions of innocent victims of an all-powerful state. It is this creative unrest which appeared in Eastern Europe. Ethnic hostilities, whatever their nature, are not a creative force nor the ideological fiber of a new political ideology. The nationalistic issues of the past are hardly a motivating force, in spite of the fact that ethnic prejudices and hostilities, although subdued, have survived and sometimes appear in the violent form of discrimination or hatred. The class structure has changed profoundly. As much as one may admire statistics, the consumer does not feed on statistical data nor does he clothe himself with statistical abstracts. The economic difficulties of the vast mass of consumers remain a single, paramount truth about Central and Eastern Europe. A hard-working man or woman cannot afford many commodities and consumer goods regarded as basic in Western Europe or supplied to the needy by welfare boards in New York City. Twenty years after the war, development of heavy industry has not been fully matched by the production of consumer goods. The economy works for a system, but not for man, for individuals or families. A humanistic economy is a man-oriented, not a system-oriented, economy. The way of life in Eastern Europe as compared with Western Europe is gray, dull, and drab. In an age of rapid economic change, socio-economic advancement of the working people is of primary significance. This implies a socioeconomic system based on democracy, free from excessive exploitation and economic inequalities, a socio-economic system which can supply a working man, a farmer, or an intellectual with the necessary means of livelihood. Before the war, the socio-economic structure of most of Central and Eastern Europe was far from that of an industrial democracy. Class differences were deep and distribution of income and property uneven. Economic nationalism in this part of the world is unable to supply an answer to the socio-economic problems of the area in a spirit of industrial democracy, nor does it open new avenues for the renascent spirit of personalism and neohumanism. The world is moving from an industrial-agricultural to a technological-scientific stage. We have reached a level at which less than nine percent of the total population in the United States is employed in agriculture. American university faculty members and research scientists total about 500 thousand, while the number of employed miners has declined to about 150 thousand. For every miner in the United States,

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there are three college professors or research scientists. The new economic system is based on large continental and intercontinental markets, on regional specialization in agriculture. Europe has made rapid economic advances, thanks to the European Community. The socioeconomic base of political and economic nationalism in highly civilized countries disappears rapidly. IV

Against this background, the future of Central and Eastern European nations cannot be answered by a political nationalism, which suggests closed, "introverted" national states. The rich national culture of the people of this region calls for new political forms. In the future quest for a new political structure, native Central and Eastern European traditions may supply roots. Tendencies toward federation and cultural pluralism are well known in this area. Since times of insurrections, a hundred years ago, democratic movements have related national liberation with plans for union. In this area of great historical invasions, the problem of national survival was paramount. The nation as a cultural, historical community is a social reality. Individuals and groups were persecuted because they were identified with such national communities. Preservation of those historical communities, traditions, and loyalties became for many a supreme goal. National communities supplied the very sense and goals of life. On the other hand, Poles were persecuted because they were Poles, as were Czechs, Slovaks, Ukrainians, Bulgarians, and Serbs. The great historical problem was how to create a political shelter, a proper political form which would offer conditions for the development and growth of national culture and national communities. Federalism was the answer, a union of the weak nations into an international community. A confederation of free nations was, in this area, a synthesis of patriotic and democratic ideologies. Nationalism thus represents only a part of the ideological tradition of the area. Thomas G. Masaryk, Hubert Rypka, Edvard Benes, and Jaromír Necas are among the leading Czechoslovak statesmen of modern times who have advanced ideas and plans for federalism, at the same time recognizing the vital significance of national community, national cultures, the need for national freedom associated with political liberties. The theory and practice of democracy and national autonomy were advanced in modern times by Oscar Jaszi and Mikhail Karolyi in Hungary; similar ideas were

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advocated by Mieczyslaw Niedzialkowski and Zygmunt Zulawski in Poland; East European federalism was proposed by Stabuliski of Bulgaria, General Sikorski of Poland, Gafencu Take Jonescu of Rumania, Sava Kosanovich of Yugoslavia, and Venizelos of Greece, to mention only a few. It is on those traditions that the future structure of Central and Eastern Europe may develop. Of course, these are distant visions today, and the present political realities are seemingly hostile to such changes. The last ten years have taught us, however, that there is a chance for more elbowroom, to be won through hard, skillful effort and firmness. Furthermore, tendencies toward Balkan unity have reappeared under Communist rule. Even today, a sense of direction is paramount for the future. We live in times of rapid social change. Without noticing it, we have moved into a social and technological revolution of historic magnitude. Continuity and change are essential to constructive social evolution. Old, constructive ideas and basic values form the elements of continuity, since they form the traditional historic element of the new development. New conditions may and usually do require new social and political forms. In the long historical development, one can observe the processes of cultural and institutional differentiation. Religious organizations, once integrated with the state, have separated and developed in successfully in the United States as an independent system, free from government interference. In the very interest of their own culture, nations today need a new architecture which can house larger socio-economic and cultural areas. This need implies separation of the ideas of ethnicity and nationality from the state. Self-determination of nations may ultimately lead to union rather than separation. Nations may join to build one common, political structure to house several culturally and politically related nations, and offer better shelter, as well as more space for creative effort. A deliberate policy of political and economic decentralization to secure national and local independence and initiative, cultural autonomy, cultural pluralism, to secure the cultural rights of weaker nations and minorities, offers a flexible and civilized political form adjustable to rapidly changing socio-economic conditions. The Central and Eastern European area has a certain cultural homogeneity. The nations of this area are related by a community of both fate and history. Thomas G. Masaryk, in his New Europe, and later in the Philadelphia Manifesto of 1917, developed an international doctrine for this area, a doctrine of regional unity based on political and social democracy and cultural autonomy.

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Federal and regional systems were formed either by coercion or by consensus. Large imperial systems were built by conquest, while federations and communities developed through the voluntary association of nations, usually because of common danger and external pressure. The voluntary association of nations of Central and Eastern Europe is, of course, a distant proposition today. The fact remains, however, that most of them cannot be easily absorbed into the Soviet system, which was imposed by force, and experience shows that the regional tendency toward independent identity is strong. In a long-range policy, a voluntary association of nations in this area, based on political and economic democracy, may supply the needed elements of international stability and peace here at the crossroads of the continent. Let us return to the question of coercive and voluntary associations of nations. Great empires of the past built on conquest and centralism were not adapted to rapid change, nor were they able to resist strong, continued pressure. Those created by voluntary association can change and adjust to new conditions, sometimes even through separation and secession, as with Norway and Sweden. It is the voluntary association of nations which can secure international stability. History also offers us the example of India; that democratic country achieved the peaceful separation of a conquered nation from its conquerors and paved the way toward friendship between those who were once enemies. It is from such experiences and traditions of the civilized world that future states may profit. The logic of political dialectic suggests change and struggle for power. Systems based on extreme forms of coercion display, sometimes all of a sudden, a carefully hidden, inherent weakness. In such a moment of crisis, change and transformation are also alternatives one cannot overlook. By change, I mean here a change toward a more democratic and independent form of government. But regional or, even, continental communities alone offer no fully adequate answers today to the future problems of our planet. Sooner or later, our international system will have to move toward a broad political, cultural, and economic pluralism implied in a variety of systems and cultures bound now by a common interest in survival. The consciousness of a world community will grow with time. And once mankind has discovered the balance of moderate unity, unity based on respect for differences and heritage, the need will become self-evident for reconstituting mankind on a moral basis, for acceptance of universal, basic standards to protect the weaker from the powerful.

Czechoslovakia and Austria

ROBERT A. KANN

A survey of Austrian-Czech relations under the heading, "nationalism versus federalism", however brief it may be, requires a distinct separation of these two concepts. The idea of nationalism has always been present, that of federalism only intermittently. While I shall discuss in the main some major problems of Austro-Czech relations, I will confine myself to a few observations concerning the problem of federalism. A more thorough survey would have to encompass the interrelationships of the East Central European nations in general. Another factor is also general in nature, namely, that the relationship even after 1918 was very much influenced by the previous association of various ethnic groups with the Habsburg empire, particularly in the case of the Czechs. Only five of the eleven national groups within the Habsburg empire, - in alphabetic order, the Croats, Czechs, Magyars, Slovaks, and Slovenes - were wholly settled within the empire. Yet two of them, the Croats and Slovenes, later formed a union with another group, the Serbs, the bulk of whose population lay outside the monarchy. 1 Of the remaining three groups, the Magyars, Czechs, and Slovaks, the last two represented nearly two-thirds of the population of the Czechoslovak republic of 1918, and more than four-fifths of the republic as restored within narrower boundaries in 1945. Inasmuch as the present republic of Austria, in its history, geographic location, name, and tradition, represented and still represents the very core of the bygone empire, the common past of four centuries is the first factor, and one of overriding importance, in the relationship of the two republics. 1

W. Jaksch, Europas Weg nach Potsdam (Stuttgart, 1958), 30 ff.; K. Krofta, Das Deutschtum in der tschechoslowakischen Geschichte (Prag, 1962), 36 ff.; J. Chmelaf, The German Problem in Czechoslovakia (Prague, 1936), 11 ff.; R. A. Kann, The Multinational Empire (New York, 1950, 1964), I, 39 ff.; R. A. Kann, Das Nationalitatenproblem der Habsburgermonarchie (Graz, Cologne. 1964), I. 50 ff.

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To put it more precisely, it has been not only an important factor in more than one way, but a heavy encumbrance, as well. The Czechs felt themselves to be an oppressed nationality within the Habsburg monarchy and considered the Germans and Austrian-Germans 2 within it as part of that centralizing superstructure which impeded the full development of their national life. From the vantage point of a long chain of historical events, it can be said that this Czech view was absolutely, and (in relation to other national groups within the Habsburg lands) also relatively, justified by the fateful seventeenth-century Battle of the White Mountain. Thereafter, whatever the restrictions of the Czech national evolution, they were not out of line with those of most other national groups under Habsburg rule. The serious national problem in general, and in Bohemia in particular, in imperial Austria's constitutional period is, of course, uncontested. Still, it may be said that the Czechs, within the half-century from 1867 to 1918, marched next to Germans and Magyars with the Poles in the forefront of the national groups as far as adequacy of political representation, autonomy of educational institutions, and share in the central bureaucracy were concerned. Every one of these rights had to be secured by the powerful impact of their cultural and economic standing and their contributions to the welfare of the empire. Just as certainly this relatively, but not absolutely, satisfactory status fell still short of fully democratic national rights. It did not suffice to satisfy the Czech nation when World War I commenced, a war which ultimately brought about the dismemberment of the empire. It is not for us to speculate here what the situation would have been if the war had ended in a more satisfactory way for the Central Powers. At all events, it found the Czech representatives at the peace conferences with the victors, and those of the new Austrian republic with the defeated. The Austrian-Germans from the Right to the Left, those of distinct political leanings toward Germany only a minority among them, had always felt that this war was fought by all the peoples of the monarchy for its continued existence. In doing so, they by no means necessarily approved of the World War I designs of the Central Powers, nor did they, in their majority, clearly endorse an unjustified German-Magyar supremacy. Yet they did believe very firmly that Austrian-Germans

2 The Austro-Germans will be referred to as Austrians in the subsequent discussions of the interrelationship between the Czechoslovaks and the Austrian Republic. References to Austria after 1918 pertain to the Republic of Austria.

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and Czechs ought to be in the same boat, the former not as masters, and the latter not as serfs. According to Czech historiography, the overwhelming majority of the Czechs fought under the Austrian flag because they were forced to do so. The heroes of the Czech liberation were those who had gone over to the side of the Western Allies, the Czech legionnaires in the East, the leaders of the Czech emigration abroad, Benes, Stefanik, and the great Thomas G. Masaryk foremost among them. The revolution at home seemed to be centered mainly on the last days of October 1918 in Prague. The Austrians, because of war-time censorship, learned all too little of what happened abroad and the Czechs focused their attention on just these decisive external aspects of their history. As for domestic developments, their attention was wholly directed toward the struggle against Austria as presented in the treason trial against Kramar and, in fiction, in the sabotage philosophy of a Schwejk. The other, the pro-Austrian side of the Czech picture, appeared to be blurred. We cannot discuss here the merits or demerits of these conflicting Czech and Austrian interpretations of the history of the last generation. Yet the very difference itself is one of the chief reasons why the Czechs felt, in perfectly good faith, that they deserved a rightful place among the victors, and why the Austrians could not understand why only they should be singled out in the Western half of the monarchy as heavily indebted receivers of the bankruptcy of the empire, loaded with part of the war guilt and the resulting damage claims. This strikingly dissimilar relationship to the former empire, its history, its tradition, and, above all, its legacy, remained at the root of the misunderstandings between the Czech and the Austrian republics until the infamous days of March 1938 and 1939, when the Nazis destroyed the independence or, perhaps more correctly, the shred of independence of both countries. I consider this historic and tragic misunderstanding about background conditions between the two countries basically as important as three other issues which everyone relates to our topic: the Sudeten German question, the Anschluss, and the Restoration problem. All these factors, combined, encompass in essence the very issues of Austro-Czech relations after 1918. After a brief discussion of them we will turn to the problem of federalism, by which we may gauge the possibilities of future developments. It is true that late in October 1919, the Sudeten Germans proclaimed their willingness to join a new German-Austrian republic, and demands to include their territories within the Austrian boundaries were still

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being advanced at the peace conference of St. Germain. We know that in certain points, members of the peace conference, not only, specifically, Masaryk and Benes, were considering some slight modification of the future frontiers in favor of Austria and Germany. On the other hand, Austria might have done even worse if a Czech-Yugoslav corridor had been established on former West Hungarian territory. All in all, the Austrian struggle in substance for the ethnic rather than historical boundaries of the former crownlands of Bohemia and Moravia was, for geographical and political reasons, hopeless from the start.3 This was certainly realized by the Austrian government, although Austrian policy was bound to be largely determined by less rational factors. A steady influx of Sudeten Germans into German Austria, particularly Vienna, had always played a most important part in the administration, and especially in the cultural, economic, and political community of imperial Austria. This group and its descendants still had a good share in the shaping of public opinion in the Austrian republic. Quite a few of them, it is true, could lay claim to distinguished achievements in various fields. Just the same, these former Sudeten Germans and their families exercised an influence quite out of proportion to their numbers. Naturally, they took a dim view of the settlement of the boundary question and the decline of German influence in Czechoslovakia, in general. Undoubtedly, these are considerable barriers to cordial relations between the two countries, though, I believe, prior to the rise of National Socialism, they were no decisive. Certainly, it would be an oversimplification to confound the second problem, the Anschluss question, with any kind of Sudeten German propaganda. It was, as will be remembered, endorsed by all three parties who presided at the birth of the Austrian republic, Christian Socials, Social Democrats, and Great Germans [Grossdeutsche] and it was not repudiated by the first two, the truly representative parties of the republic, until many years later. The joke was often heard that the Anschluss stood not the slightest chance since it was the one issue on which the three major Austrian parties were agreed. As in many jokes, 3

W. Goldinger, Geschichte der Republik Österreich, (Munich, 1962), 38 ff.; F. G. Kleinwaechter, Von Schönbrunn bis St. Germain (Graz, Cologne, 1964), 221 ff.; J. Opoöensky, The Collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (Prague, 1928), 176 ff.; E. Wiskemann, Czechs and Germans (London, 1938), 87 ff.; R. W. Seton-Watson, Masaryk in England (Cambridge, 1943), 116 ff.; D. Perman, The Shaping of the Czechoslovak State (Leiden, 1962), 152 ff.; Z. A. B. Zeman, The Breakup of the Habsburg Empire 1914-1918 (London, 1961), 177 ff.; R. G. Plaschka, Cattaro Prag, (Graz, Cologne, 1963), 293 ff.

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there was a shred of truth in this one also. Since the Anschluss question was no longer a campaign issue for any political party, it thus lost its emotional impact, which had fed the domestic conflicts during the tragic history of the first Austrian republic. Yet the basic issue in the nineteen-twenties was not yet one of national German and German-Austrian ties, but one of international relations. In so far as the Anschluss was blocked by provisions of the peace treaties, it could not materialize, except by the unanimous consent of the Council of the League of Nations, as long as the League system worked. When that finally collapsed, the crisis not only of Czechoslovakia, but of Europe and the world was at hand. Prior to this period, not even the misguided Austrian-German customs union project of Spring 1931 offered a clear and present danger to Czechoslovakia, since the League of Nations and International Court of Justice could be appealed to prevent its materialization. There is, of course, the further question of whether an Anschluss between the Weimar republic and a democratic Austria would have impaired the security of Czechoslovakia. This is a controversial issue which cannot be answered simply by supposing that what happened later was bound to happen anyway. However, simply as a matter of precaution, the Czech government had every reason to give close attention to this question, particularly in view of the problematic stability of democratic government in Austria and Germany. As long as it existed, every problem of international relations seemed to be soluble; when it began to decline, every problem began to look serious.4 This is the main reason why our third problem, though of minor significance itself, the restoration of the Habsburgs, began to play an increasingly important and increasingly unwholesome part in AustrianCzech relations. It is generally assumed that the driving force in the fight against the restoration was not Czechoslovakia, but Yugoslavia, thanks specifically to her fear of Hungarian revisionism, which Czechoslovakia certainly had reason to share, but only to a point. The widely circulated view that Dr. Edvard Benes, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, 4 M. M. Ball, Post War German-Austrian Relations (Stanford, 1937), 142 ff.; W. Goldinger, op. cit., 67 ff.; C. A. Gulick, Austria from Habsburg to Hitler (Los Angeles, 1948), II, 926 ff.; J. Gehl, Austria, Germany and the Anschluss 1931-1938, see particularly 6 ff., 45 ff., 133 ff.; G. Brook-Shepherd, The Anschluss (Philadelphia, 1963), XIV ff.; see also E. Ledebur-Wieheln, "Die Nachfolgestaaten und die Anschlussfrage" in F. G. Kleinwaechter and Heinz von Paller, eds., Die Anschlussfrage (Vienna, 1930), 172 ff. See further K. Krofta, Dejiny ceskoslovenske (Prague, 1948), 724 ff. and particularly 752 ff.

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and even later as President, feared the Restoration more than the Anschluss, lacks confirmation. It is in conflict with the internal evidence concerning the philosophy of a man who certainly was not naive, whatever else be said of him. True, the possibility of restoration at the time of Emperor Charles' attempts to reinstate himself as King of Hungary in 1921 - possibly with the acquiescence, but certainly not the approval, of France — seemed quite real, as long as frontiers in the immediate post-revolutionary years appeared rather flexible. Nevertheless, as long as Austria was democratic - that is, until 1933 - restoration did not have a chance, even in Hungary, quite apart from the fact that the ruling Horthy regime looked with misgivings at a movement which split the ruling Magyar oligarchy. After 1933, under the conservative authoritarian regimes of Dollfuss and Schuschnigg, particularly the latter, the restoration movement gained importance in Austria. Its primary psychological and political impact was still geared to home consumption. Tradition was to back up a feeble régime which lacked the support of a democratic majority. No doubt, Chancellor Schuschnigg, who in 1935 initiated the revision of legislation concerning the property rights and the return of members of the former dynasty, was personally a firm adherent of the Habsburg monarchy. Yet, in regard to his fartherreaching sympathies for genuine restoration, he was not oblivious to the danger to the independence of Austria which it might entail by way of foreign intervention from Germany and of the Little Entente. Still, this understandably seemed to him a far less direct threat and a lesser probability than the ever clear and present danger of outright German National Socialist aggression. 5 If one reads the memoirs of the Czech Prime Minister, Dr. Milan Hodza (1935-1938), certainly in many ways a more moderate statesman than Benes, about his discussion with Schuschnigg, one gets the impression that this point was not fully realized. The Czechoslovak policy toward Austria seemed to have been as much dictated by the fears resulting from the last war as by those far more frightful ones to be expected from the next one. 6 Needless to say, this observation does not in any way represent an advocacy of restoration, either then, before, or afterwards. It should merely help to explain

5

C. A. Gulick, op. cit., II, 1678 f.; Kurt Schuschnigg, Ein Requiem in Rot Weiss Rot (Zurich, 1945), 254 ff., 290 ff.; J. Gehl, op. cit., 122 ff.; G. BrookShepherd, op. cit., 11 ff. 6 M. Hodza, Federation in Central Europe (London, 1942), 127 f.; A. Wandruszka in H. Benedikt, ed., Geschichte der Republik Österreich (Vienna, 1954), 349 ff.

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another disturbing flaw in Austrian-Czech relations. After the suppression of the Austrian workers' revolt in February 1934, the sympathy of the Czech democratic parties was, of course, not in favor of the authoritarian course in Austria. The Czech position on the Restoration question did not in turn endear Czechoslovakia to the ill-fated ruling régime in Austria. Misunderstandings on both sides were obvious and tragic. Austrian resentment on national and traditional grounds failed to recognize the basic strength of the Czech democratic position. Czechs, on the other hand, frequently failed to see that the feeble Austrian experiment with restoration represented the effort to erect an effective dam against Nazism, since the better course - a return to democracy - seemed to be blocked. I do not wish to convey the impression that there was only gloom in the relationship between the two neighboring republics. In the first place, there was at least no open conflict. In fact, at the time of the conclusion of the treaty of Lana between the two countries in December 1921, it seemed almost as if Austria might become a kind of indirect partner of the Little Entente. Yet, since the Austrian Christian Socials, after the breakdown of their coalition with the Socialists, were dependent on the support of the Great German (Grossdeutsche) party in Austria, the treaty lapsed in 1926. What did not lapse was Czech assistance in keeping Austria economically viable by way of financial help from the League of Nations, and the gradual expansion of trade relations. Even more important, the cultural exchange between Austria and Czechoslovakia, particularly in the fields of music, theatre, and literature, continued undiminished as long as the two republics remained in control of their own destinies. That was fully true for Austria only until July 1936, when she was pressed into signing a pact with Nazi Germany which subordinated her foreign policy to that of Hitler. The agreement prolonged her agony by less than two years, and the Western surrender of Czechoslovakia at Munich in September 1938, by not even six months. Events had begun to move fast. Perhaps at no time in their history were the relations which really count most between countries, the feelings of men, closer than when they were officially nonexistent, that is, during the era of Nazi occupation. 7 Their fight against the common oppressor joined the 7

O. Molden, Der Ruf des Gewissens (Vienna, 1958), 53 ff.; K. Krofta, Dêjiny ceskoslovenské, 792 ff.

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sentiments of both countries more strongly than ever before in their history. After 1945 the relationship between Austria and Czechoslovakia suffered from restrictions somewhat analogous to those preceding the outbreak of the Second World War. Austria, under Four-Power domination, regained her full independence in international affairs only by the state treaty of 1955. Czechoslovakia lost her unrestricted freedom of action indirectly by the friendship treaty of President Benes' government in exile with the Soviet Union in December 1943, and, in a far more real sense, by the Communist coup of spring 1948. It is notable that, in the interim period during the protracted treaty negotiations for the restoration of an independent Austria, Czechoslovakia was far more friendly to her Southern neighbor than were Poland and Yugoslavia. To be sure, the republic could not yet be considered a full satellite state. It is perhaps most appropriate to say that since 1948, the relations between both countries have been as good as can be expected. This means that they are correct on political terms, by force of the nature of the Iron Curtain, though somewhat less critical than Austrian relations with Hungary were, up to a few years ago. It means also that to the Czech people, Austria is the window to the free West, a window in the house of a former fellow victim of Nazi oppression. To the Austrians, it is a matter of pride and sympathy to offer opportunities to as many of their neighbors as can avail themselves of this freedom. Certainly, their approach to the Czech people, with whom they have shared so many memories of good and bad days, is as friendly as it should be. 8 This factor of a basic cordial relationship between people as individuals, as distinguished from their governments, leads to a final evaluation of the problem of federalism in the Danube area as a means to further social, economic, and cultural progress, and above all as means to secure common defense against aggression, and thereby peace. Here we have inevitably to transcend the issue of Austrian-Czech relations within the frame of the two republics. We have to look, at least briefly, at the background situation in the Habsburg monarchy. As is generally known, during the revolution of 1948/49, a very great Czech intellectual leader, the historian Palacky, made magnificent, although unfortunately largely unheeded, conributions to the problem of federalism in 8

R. A. Kann, "Looking across the Iron Curtain", in Journal Affairs, X V I / 1 , (1962), pp. 67-76.

of

International

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the Habsburg monarchy. One was to draw up a plan for a federation of her peoples on a thoroughly democratic basis in which the national rights of all groups, including national enclaves of small minorities, would be secured. Czech and German opposition brought the plan to naught, but for different reasons. Czech conservatives and liberals alike insisted on the historic frontiers for the member states of the federation. They were unwilling to concede ethnic boundaries. Germans, on the other hand, including many German liberals, opposed a federation which would impair German leadership in the central administration of the empire. Two decades later, Palacky, while still loyal to the Habsburg empire idea, fell back on the concept of a federation based on the historic claims of the various nations, in the Czech case on the former domains under the rule of the Bohemian Crown. Since all historic claims of various nations conflict with each other, this obviously offered no solution, although it must be added that the Crown within the straitjacket of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise would hardly have agreed to a better settlement, even had it had a chance otherwise. The so-called Hohenwart crisis of 1871 bears this out. Later, an attempt was made to convert the dualistic system into a kind of triple (trialistic) one, in which the lands of the Bohemian crown would have formed a separate unit within the Habsburg monarchy. This federal plan on historic foundations never materialized however, because of the opposition of the privileged German and Magyar national groups within the empire and, indirectly also, the unfavorable reaction of the new German empire. 9 The chance, certainly less than in 1848/1849, did not offer itself again. About half a century later, T. G. Masaryk, in his World War I writings, rejected the idea of federalism in the Danube area, not so much in theory as in practice. He strongly believed in the future prospects of the smaller independent state and he held, further, that union, one way or another, could be brought about only after national independence had been achieved, and not before. The type of federalism which the Habsburg or Ottoman empires might conceivably have offered, according to some interpretations he deemed as nothing but a camouflaged kind of oppression. 10 There are certainly differences between Masaryk's 9

R. A. Kann, The Multinational Empire, I, 18 ff.; II, 21 it, 134 ff. On the Hohenwart crisis see Ibid. I, 181 ff. and the literature quoted there. See also R. A. Kann, Naionalitätenproblem I, 177 ff., II, 33 ff., 140 ff. See further H. Münch, Böhmische Tragödie (Braunschweig, 1949), 346 ff.; see also Francis Palacky, Gedenkblätter (Prague, 1874), pp. 287-313 (written in 1874). 10 T. G. Masaryk, Das neue Europa (Berlin, 1922), 40 ff. (Czech and English

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prewar, wartime, and postwar writings, but even before the war he was much more concerned with the problem of raising the social and economic living standards of the Czechs as a precondition of future political changes than with political concepts of federalism which appeared unrealistic to that famous realist.11 To be sure, there is a basic difference between the premises of Palacky and Masaryk. Palacky believed in the need to maintain the Habsburg empire as a bulwark against Panslav imperialism threatening from Russia, which only the united national groups, namely a federalized Austria, could check. Masaryk's attitude to Russia was certainly not conditioned by the same fears as Palacky's. We face here an interesting bifurcation in the further development of federal trends. Two conspicuous examples must suffice to illustrate the point. Edvard Benes - and I refer here to his policies even before the submission to Moscow in 1943, before Munich - while not averse to a kind of preferential economic system between the Danube states, including Austria, was strongly opposed to a genuine federation. In the Little Entente, it would raise all the accumulated fears of a Habsburg Restoration; in Austria and Hungary the possibilities of such a scheme might be a clarion call to the champions of the old order. On the other hand, Benes took the possibility of a Russian threat rather lightly. If it worried him at all, he believed it to be fully offset by the French alliance.12 Milan Hodza, the agrarian leader and prime minister during the best part of the pre-Munich crisis, developed a federation scheme while in British exile during the Second World War, which was built on premises almost diametrically opposed to those of Benes. His federation plan was based primarily on the recognition of the need for protection against an advancing Russian imperialism. Without saying this in so many words - though it was obvious in a book he published in England in 1942 - Hodza was vitally concerned with the preservation of Central Europe, from the clutches not only of Fascism, but also of Communism. editions not available); T. G. Masaryk, The Making of a State (London, 1927), 369 ff.; E. BeneS, My War Memoirs (London, 1928), 339 ff.; E. BeneS, The Problems of Czechoslovakia (Prague, 1936), 9 ff., 37 ff. 11 T. G. Masaryk, The Making of a State, 331 ff.; R. A. Kann, The Multinational Empire, I, 209 ff. 12 C. A. Macartney and W. Palmer, Independent Eastern Europe (London, 1962), 255 ff., 307 f.; R. F. Schlesinger, Federalism in Central and Eastern Europe (London, 1945), p. 432; see also 429 passim; see also K. Krofta, Czechoslovakia and the International Tension (Prague, 1937), 12 ff. and, by the same author, Czechoslovakia and the International Tension at the Beginning of 1937 (Prague, 1937), 15 ff.

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In this sense, the main social problem to him was the strengthening of the middle classes. If, in some respects, Hodza was a greater realist than Benes, in others he was not. The former prime minister, certainly a man of good intentions, had for a time belonged to the brain trust of the Austrian heir-apparent, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and had familiarized himself with various federal ideas. Perhaps subconsciously influenced by this early connection with the so-called Belvedere Palace Government (Nebenregierung), he sincerely believed that a federal government with sweeping executive powers could be set up in Central Europe after the war. Obviously, this presumption was thoroughly unrealistic.13 Yet a point could still be made in favor of Hodza's scheme. It was drawn up at a time when matters politic were still far more in a state of flux than later, after the Iron Curtain had been drawn for so many years. Furthermore, during the Second World War, the thesis was still widely held - by no less a man than Winston Churchill among others - that the elimination of the fifth great continental power in Europe, the Habsburg monarchy, had made the Russian advance to the West possible. While this view may have been considered controversial, it was not unreasonable. The further deduction that a new Central European federation could stop this advance might be argued on this basis. But we fully realize today that whatever the objectives and potentialities of a Central European federal system may be in the nuclear age, they could not be primarily geared to military defense. Of course, this observation does in no way negate the principle of federalism itself; it does mean a call for the sober examination of what federalism in the Danube area could possibly accomplish. In the short run, I frankly believe, very little. A federal system which could straddle the Iron Curtain, with Austria on one side and its fellow succession states on the other, seems to me as much inconceivable as undesirable. It could only lead to an extension of the Communist-dominated sphere. Whether a genuine Danube federal system East of the Iron Curtain would be less strongly influenced by Moscow than are the Eastern Central European nations today, I would not presume to judge. That such a combination, possibly in the frame of a kind of modified Rapacki plan, would gain full freedom of action in domestic and international relations seems to be frankly illusory at this stage of historical 13

M. Hodza, Federation in Central Europe (London, 1942), 127 f.; see also M. Hodza, The New European Situation and Czechoslovakia (Prague, 1938), 9 ff. (Speeches by the then Prime Minister). See further R. F. Schlesinger, op. cit., 431 f.

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development. Anyway, at present there is little evidence that the barriers between Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and, of course, Yugoslavia have been lowered to any appreciable extent.14 Common ties appear still to be based chiefly on ideological coordination - not to say Gleichschaltung - rather than on political pluralism, as is clearly visible in the intentions of many individuals, but only dimly in governmental actions. Yet, a democratic federal system can prosper only as a truly pluralistic order with wide possibilities for divergence for the individual federal units and the individuals within these units. I should like to conclude with two observations concerning the errors frequently inherent in federal concept. They may sound very Utopian, since they deal with the possibility of a federal Central European union of free peoples in a still-distant and obscure future. Actually, they are not without realistic content. First, any federation must be based primarily on the needs and wishes of the people concerned and not on the true, or alleged, historic, geographic, or economic unity of an area. The latter two aspects are frequently overemphasized in discussions of East Central European federalism, yet the Danube area, contrary to widespread belief, does not by any means constitute a natural entity in terms of economic geography.15 Certainly, the common phases of historical experience and the common sufferings of the past and present should rate higher in significance. However momentous any of these factors may be, either individually or combined, they do not compare in importance with the vital and central concept of popular sovereignty. Only if this is fully realized can the danger be avoided that federalism might be subordinated to obvious interests of reaction or totalitarianism of any brand, as the case and the opportunity may be. Secondly, let us be very sure of the fact that there is no inherent magic in political organization of any kind. Federalism alone does not secure either genuine democracy or peace, which are our truly imperative needs. We can perfectly well settle for peace and democracy without federalism. We cannot accept federalism as a substitute for either one of them.16 Princeton, September 1964 14

Hugh Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution (London, 1952), 2nd ed., 339 ff. 15 R. F. Schlesinger, op. cit., 334 f.; H. Ripka, Eastern Europe in the Post War World (New York, 1961), 8 ff.; R. A. Kann, The Habsburg Empire. A Study in Integration and Disintegration (New York, 1957), 13 f., 102 f. 16 R. A. Kann, Federalism and the Federal State in History. Report to the International Congress of the Historical Sciences (Vienna, 1965), IV, 41 ff. and the literature quoted therein.

Czechoslovakia and Hungary

STEPHEN BORSODY

Neighbors in the age of nationalism are rarely friends. More often, they are rivals and enemies. The history of relations between Czechoslovakia and Hungary is no exception to this rule. In fact, ever since both nations gained independence from Habsburg rule, the history of CzechoslovakHungarian relations distinguished itself by a special touch of acrimony. This deplorable fact does not necessarily reflect the sentiments of the broad masses of people in the two countries. Nor should this observation lend support to the theory of some inevitable historical hostility between Czechslovakia and Hungary. As a matter of fact, the historical record of relations between Czechs and Slovaks on the one hand, and Hungarians on the other, evinces more mutual sympathy than inevitable conflict. Notions of an historical hostility are of very recent origin. The Czech historian, Frantisek Palacky, popularized in the 19th century the idea that the very foundation of the Hungarian state in the mid-Danube Valley was a catastrophe for the Slavs. Simultaneously, similar notions of an historic Slav-Hungarian hostility found credit amoug Hungarians, partly as a response to the problems created by Slav national awakening in and around Hungary, partly as a traumatic reaction to Russian intervention in the Hungarian War of Independence in 1849. These grim views overshadowed the more cheerful facts of Slav-Hungarian relations. For, taken as a whole, relations between the ancestors of present-day Czechoslovakia and Hungary were, indeed, not bad at all. Slovak-Hungarian relations before the age of nationalism were among the most peaceful and harmonious on the record between any neighbors in any part of the world. And in Czech-Hungarian relations, too, Palacky's gloomy view, which sees a Slav disaster in the Magyars' arrival in their present home in 895, calls for drastic revision. It is true that at that time, the Magyars were allies of the Germans (whatever that meant in the 9th century) and that together they defeated the Great Moravian Empire. On the other hand, the Moravian Empire was in

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decline at the time, to the extent that, according to Hungarian historiography, the triumph of the Magyars consisted merely in delivering the coup de grâce.1 Furthermore, whatever its cause, the collapse of Greater Moravia enabled the Czechs to develop their own state. In the words of a Czech historian, "From that moment on begins the uninterrupted flow of Czech history . . . " 2 Then, too, shortly thereafter, we see Czechs and Magyars fighting side by side against Bavaria. Nor do subsequent centuries of Czech and Hungarian relations bear out the theory of SlavMagyar hostility, as advertised by modern nationalists. Parallelism in the course of their histories, rather than antagonism, impresses the student of the Czech and Hungarian past. After tasting greatness in the Middle Ages, both the Czech and Hungarian kingdoms met a similar catastrophe in early modern times. Mohâcs (1526) in Hungarian history is what Bilâ Hora (1620) has been in Czech history. Nor did the modern national awakening turn Czechs and Hungarians into rivals and enemies right away. As Czech and Hungarian historians have recently pointed out, Hungarian Protestants gave a helping hand to the Czech brethren in rebuilding the Hussite Church in the late 18th century.3 And as far as the Slovaks go, although rumblings of discord were heard towards the end of the 18th century, real conflict with the Hungarians did not occur until the 1830's, when Magyar was made the official language of the Hungarian state. Conflicts between Czechs and Slovaks on the one hand, and Hungarians on the other, arose only in the course of the 19th century as a result of national awakening. Therefore, Czechoslovak-Hungarian hostility should not be viewed, as it often is, as a counterpart to the much more vicious and much earlier Czech-German enmity. Nationalist propaganda of the 20th century spread the concept that the Czechoslovaks throughout their history had been struggling against a hostile German-Magyar alliance. This view is totally unfounded. The fact of the matter is that Hungary's history has been at least as much a struggle against German hegemony in Central Europe as Czech history has been. For over nine centuries, Hungary was struggling "to maintain 1

Bâlint Homan, Magyar tôrténet, Vol. I (Budapest, n.d., but 1935), p. 89. Milos V. Kratochvil, Tisiciletou stopou ceskoslovenskêho lidu (Praha, 1947), p. 38. 3 See Richard Prazâk, Mad'arskà reformovanâ inteligence v ceském obrozeni (Brno, 1962); and Oszkâr Sârkâny, Magyar kultûràlis hatâsok Csehorszâgban, 1790-1848 (Budapest, 1938). Cf. Ludwig v. Gogolâk, Beiträge zur Geschichte des slowakischen Volkes, Vol. I: Die Nationswerdung der Slowaken und die Anfänge der tschechoslowakischen Frage, 1526-1790 (München, 1963), p. 204. 2

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her independence against German ravenousness", 4 as one historian recently expressed it. The so-called Hungarian-German friendship dates back only to the age of Austro-Hungarian dualism, when, eager to secure their primacy in Danubian Europe, the Hungarians allied themselves with the ascendant power of imperial Germany. The Hungarian alignment with Germany served purposes of national imperialism very similar to the later Czech alliances with France and Russia. The conflict between Czechs, Slovaks, and Hungarians was part and parcel of the broader struggle which has engulfed Europe in the age of modern nationalism. This struggle has been waged for modernization of political, as well as social and economic, institutions in Central Europe. However, in the ensuing conflicts, the struggle for political control of territories, the rivalry over boundaries, took precedence over all other objectives. Social and economic differences often contributed more fuel to national conflicts - but common social and economic interests seldom generated international cooperation. Czechoslovak-Hungarian conflicts have often been characterised as primarily an antagonism between two societies with different social and economic structures. The gulf between so-called feudal Hungary and democratic Czechoslovakia no doubt aggravated the tension between them. But the essence of their conflict has always been national - so much so, that their antagonism could have been no less bitter even if their social-economic structures had been more alike. Czech, Slovak, and Hungarian national aspirations clashed over boundaries. This emphasis on territory continued to poison their mutual relationships - well after the once-hotly contested right to their own national governments had been mutually recognized. Historically speaking, all Danubian national aspirations were parallel movements aiming at the same goals. Identical objectives, however, created no bond of union. On the contrary, they exaggerated the differences well beyond all reason. The point at which Czech, Slovak, and Hungarian national policies parted was the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867. Jealously guarding their privileges under the Dualist system, the Hungarians came to regard the aspirations of others for national equality, including those of the Czechs and Slovaks, as incompatible with Hungarian national interests. The awakened Slovaks were estranged from Hungary, their historic 4

Denis Sinor, History of Hungary (London, 1959), p. 37.

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home, by Magyar aspirations to transform the multi-ethnic historical kingdom into a Hungarian national state. The Czechs, on the other hand, could not forget the role the Hungarians had played in wrecking the Hohenwart experiment in 1871, aimed at an Austro-Czech compromise modeled on the Austro-Hungarian compromise. The role of Count Gyula Andrassy the Elder in killing the Hohenwart experiment has often been exaggerated.5 Indeed, Hungarian veto alone did not wreck the federalization of Austria - not in 1871, nor at any other time. On the other hand, only the Hungarians could have made the federalist reform of the Habsburg empire possible. For it was primarily their alliance with the Germans that blocked the transformation of AustriaHungary into a commonwealth of Danubian nations. Imbued as the Hungarians were with the spirit of imperialist nationalism, a federal reform of the Empire never became an aim of Hungarian policy. The original Magyar architects of the 1867 Compromise, particularly Ferenc Deak and Baron Jozsef Eotvos, entertained liberal views concerning the treatment of Hungary's non-Magyar nationalities. But liberal as they were, not even they would have consented to a federal structure for the Hungarian state. Meanwhile, their heirs came to be bewitched by the contemporary ideal of the homogenous nation-state and pressed the policy of Magyarization ever harder. The fierce nationalist leader of 1848-49, Lajos Kossuth, grown wise and tolerant in exile, saw the inevitable catastrophe of Austro-Hungarian dualism and Magyarization. He also raised his Cassandra-like voice from exile in 1871, advising the Hungarians to support the Czech compromise with Austria. Bohemia - he maintained - had as much right as Hungary to regard herself as an autonomous state. For that matter, Kossuth added sardonically, the title of the Czechs to equality might be even stronger than that of the Hungarians. Bohemia, after all, had been a flourishing kingdom even before the Magyars settled in Central Europe. 6 Kossuth's warnings, as well as the admonitions of a few other farsighted Hungarians, went unheeded. Free again as a nation, for the first time since Mohacs, Hungary was eager to undo her historic misfortunes by taking full advantage of her privileges under the Dualist system. 5 Cf. Robert A. Kann, The Multinational Empire, Vol. I: Empire and Nationalities (New York, 1950), pp. 138, 191. Also, Rudolf Wierer, "Das bohmische Staatsrecht und der Ausgleichversuch des Ministeriums Hohenwart-Schaffle", in Bohemia: Jahrbuch des Collegium Carolinum, Vol. 4 (Munchen, 1963), pp. 157161. • Lajos Kossuth's letters in Ellenor (Budapest) for November 10, 11, and 15, 1871; Cf. Istvan Borsody, Magyar-szlovak kiegyezes (Budapest, 1945), pp. 45-46.

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Similar ambitions spurred the Czechs on when, during the First World War, their exiles launched their struggle for national liberation under T. G. Masaryk's leadership. The Czech plan of liberation was stimulated by accumulated resentments against the inequities suffered under the Dualist era, as well as by bitter memories of even greater misfortunes during the preceding centuries since Bilâ Hora. However, resentment alone does not entirely explain the bias and radicalism of Masaryk's New Europe plans. The chief target of Masaryk's resentment might have been the Habsburg Empire. But the main objective of his policy was to seek protection against a more recent menace - the German empire founded by Bismarck. German imperialism, Masaryk believed, was a threat to the Czechs, as well as to all Slavs. Masaryk's plan was essentially a Slav plan of liberation.7 His allies during the First World War were the Western powers. But Masaryk never ceased to hope that, eventually, a liberated Slavic Europe would be protected against the Germans - and their allies, the Hungarians by the full might of a free and democratic Russia. Grown to political maturity during the Austro-Hungarian Dualist era, and launching his national liberation movement during the war against Austria-Hungary, it is no wonder that Masaryk's Czechoslovak liberation program placed the Germans and Hungarians on the same footing. Yet, the antiHungarian bias of the Czechoslovak liberation program was a mistake as a matter of practical peace policy. Czech and Slovak freedom would have rested on much firmer foundations if Hungary had not been excluded (by definition, so to speak) from the community of liberated peoples. The Czech liberators' view of Hungary is best illustrated by Edvard Benes' famous wartime pamphlet, Détruisez l'Autriche-Hongriel Benes' interpretation of Hungary's place and role in Central Europe's history was as follows: While the Czechs were suffering under Austrian oppression, the Slovaks were suffering under Hungarian oppression. While the Czechs were victims of a policy of extermination under German rule, the Slovaks met the same fate under Hungarian rule. It is a miracle that either Czechs or Slovaks even survived the German and Hungarian policies of extermination. The brutality of Germans, Austrians, and Hungarians is of the same kind. The Hungarians are the loyalest allies 7

See, in particular, Masaryk's memorandum, "Independent Bohemia", in R. W. Seton-Watson, Masaryk in England (Cambridge, 1943), pp. 116-134.

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of the Germans. They are related to them spiritually. The Hungarians are charter members of the band of Central Europe's oppressors. The Hungarians are responsible for the outbreak of the First World War. The disastrous Balkan policy of the Habsburg Monarchy, too, was primarily inspired by Hungary. The Hungarians prevented the Serbs and Croats from uniting into one nation. Also, the Hungarians drove a wedge between Czechoslovaks and Yugoslavs. To undo this particular injustice, and to establish a link between free Czechoslovakia and free Yugoslavia, a Slav corridor should be cut across western Hungary. In the interest of the Slavs, in the interest of Europe, and in the interest of mankind (Benes added, for good measure), Hungary should be partitioned. 8 Benes' pamphlet cannot be dismissed as mere wartime propaganda. It reflected the attitude of the founders of Czechoslovakia toward Hungary - not merely during the war, but also during the crucial period of peacemaking. And it should be remembered that at the Paris Peace Conference, Czech influence was greater than anybody else's among the liberated peoples of the former Habsburg empire. "We supplied the Allies with a political program" - thus Masaryk himself summed up the role of the Czechs in planning the peace.9 The partition of Hungary, as envisaged by the Czech plan, was not a division of historic Hungary according to ethnic principles in conformity with the Wilsonian program of national self-determination. Rather, it was a plan to reduce the ethnic territory of Hungary so radically that it would paralyze the Hungarians for good as a political factor in Central Europe. It goes without saying that Hungary's other rival neighbors were as eager as the Czechs to see the Hungarians paralyzed. Yet it is questionable whether the other neighbors could have carved up Hungary so radically, had the Czech campaign against Hungary not been so successful in influencing the views of the victorious Allies. Whoever was to be blamed (whether the Hungarians, for antagonizing the Czechs since 1867, or the Czechs, for taking vengeance on the Hungarians in 1918), at any rate, relations between liberated Czechoslovakia and independent Hungary got off to a very bad start. The punitive peace, anti-Hungarian as it was, frustrated prospects for a Danubian reconciliation. The Treaty of Trianon placed over one-fourth (or, perhaps, as much as one-third, depending on the national origin of 8

»

Edvard Benes, Détruisez l'Autriche-Hongrie! (Paris, 1916). Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, The Making of a State (New York, 1928), p. 370.

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statistics) of all so-called ethnic Hungarians (Magyars, that is) under the rule of either Czechoslovakia, Rumania, or Yugoslavia.10 The victors had a hard time finding a Hungarian government willing to submit to such a national humiliation. The territorial punishment was first opposed by the democratic Hungarian revolutionary régime headed by Count Mihâly Kârolyi. The Kârolyi regime's failure to settle historic Hungary's territorial conflicts with her neighbors in a spirit of fair compromise contributed decisively to its downfall. A critic of long standing of old Hungary's oppressive policies, Oszkâr Jâszi, became Minister of Nationalities in the Kârolyi Cabinet. But Jâszi's plans for an "Eastern Switzerland" were wholly remote from the partition plans advocated by Hungary's neighbors. It was tragic indeed that the democrats of vanquished Hungary could not be united in a joint peace effort with the democrats of victorious Czechoslovakia. Fundamentally like-minded liberals, as they were, they represented the core of a potential democratic union. Had such a union been called to life, it could have converted to the common cause of liberty democrats from all over Danubian Europe. The Western powers as arbiters of peacemaking should have been the principal promoters of such a liberal union of the liberated. Instead, they sided with one set of nationalities against the other. In this "wholesale nationalist hysteria", as Jâszi characterized the temper of liberated Central Europe, the counsel of liberal common sense could not be heard. Nationalist hysteria defeated Jâszi's own desperate initiatives for fair compromises.11 The Czech gift to the Slovak nationalists was the southern frontier of Slovakia. Approval by the Peace Conference of that greatly inflated territorial demand against Hungary needed the assistance of the Czechs - the kind of influence, that is, which only the Czechs had in the power centers of the West. It is another matter whether triumphs of this sort were helpful in promoting peace between neighbors. Conflict over the Slovak-Hungarian frontier marred understanding 10

According to the first postwar census, following Hungary's partition, there were 7.1 million Magyars living in Hungary-proper, while a total of 2.7 million Magyars was counted in Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. However, on the basis of the last prewar census taken in old Hungary, it was claimed that the number of Magyars separated from postwar Hungary was well above 3 million. In Czechoslovakia, the census of 1920 found 745,431 Magyars. Hungarian sources spoke, as a rule, of a million Magyars incorporated into Czechoslovakia. 11 Oszkâr Jâszi, A monorchia jôvôje: A dualizmus bukâsa és a dunai egyesiilt allamok (Budapest, 1918), Preface.

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between newly-founded Czechoslovakia and newly-born democratic Hungary under the republican Kârolyi régime. Over the same fateful issue (namely, the frontier), war broke out between Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the latter then under the Communist dictatorship of Béla Kun. It was small wonder that relations between Czechoslovakia and Hungary failed to improve during the counter-revolutionary conservative régime which installed Admiral Horthy in Hungary as Regent of the restored kingdom. Czechoslovakia was the cornerstone in Central Europe of the French system of alliances, and of the Little Entente, created for the defense of the territorial status quo. Revisionist Hungary, on the other hand, was an uncompromising foe of the territorial settlement. Moreover, Hungary controlled the geographic center of the Danube Valley. Without her cooperation, post-Habsburg Central Europe, as it then existed, was not workable. In theory, a Czechoslovak-Hungarian reconciliation might have been the key to a broader Danubian pacification. In practice, however, the prospects of a Czechoslovak-Hungarian reconciliation were very poor. In addition to the territorial conflict, Czechoslovak-Hungarian relations were aggravated by the antagonism that existed between the bourgeois democracy of Czechoslovakia and the semi-feudal class rule of counter-revolutionary Hungary. Yet a glimmer of hope, holding out the promise of improvement in Czechoslovak-Hungarian relations, appeared at a meeting held at Bruck an der Leitha in Austria on March 14-15, 1921. The principals at the Bruck conference were Foreign Minister Edvard Benes of Czechoslovakia and Prime Minister Count Pal Teleki and Foreign Minister Gusztâv Gratz of Hungary. No detailed Czech account of the conference is available. From the available Hungarian records, however, it can be inferred that the Bruck conference amounted to a major experiment in Benes' postwar diplomacy. Never before, or after, did Benes approach the Hungarians with as much understanding as he did in Bruck. He referred to his earlier successful negotiations with Chancellor Karl Renner of Austria, and pledged himself to the same spirit of conciliation with respect to Hungary. He disagreed with his Hungarian partners that territorial revision should be the starting point of reconciliation. He insisted that economic cooperation should be a preliminary to the discussion of any political question, including those most difficult questions involving boundaries. He recognized, however, that the frontiers, as set by the Treaty of Trianon, were "not the best possible" ones. Also, he suggested a formula

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by which the number of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia and the number of Slovaks in Hungary could be brought eventually into balance through a territorial revision in favor of Hungary. Last, but not least, Benes suggested an alternative to the Little Entente formula of Danubian cooperation. He stressed Czechoslovakia's loyalty to the Little Entente, but he also drew a distinction between the Czechs, who "belonged to the West", and the Rumanians and Yugoslavs, whose countries were "Eastern". Both Czechs and Hungarians, he went on, "belonged to Western civilization", and this, in addition to economic interdependence, was "another link" between them. He derided Karel Kramâr's "senseless" Pan-Slav policy and declared: "The Occidental Czech people had nothing in common with the Oriental Russians." Benes also let the Hungarians know that they might find it much more difficult to cooperate with Rumania or Yugoslavia than with Czechoslovakia, and he offered his help in composing Hungary's differences with those two countries, provided Czechoslovakia and Hungary reached an agreement between themselves. He concluded his proposals by saying that his ultimate goal was to change fundamentally Hungary's relations to her neighbors so as to be able to create a Danubian federation - a "United States of Central Europe". 12 A few days after the Bruck conference, exiled Emperor-King Karl made his first attempt to regain his throne in Hungary. Relations between Czechoslovakia and Hungary consequently hit a new low, to sink even lower a few months later when, following Karl's second attempt in October, Benes threatened Hungary with armed intervention. Never again was the Bruck spirit revived. It came three years too late, anyway. Had Benes and Masaryk spoken the Bruck language to Kârolyi and Jâszi in 1918, Central European history might have taken a different course. Benes' Bruck experiment of 1921 was reminiscent of Hohenwart's 1871 experiment. In both instances, at a time when the newly-inaugurated system (the dualist régime of 1867, and the nationstate order of 1918, respectively) had not yet hardened, an attempt was made to correct its mistakes. Both attempts were dismal failures, proving the old adage that it is easier to make mistakes than to correct them. Relations beween Czechoslovakia and Hungary in the interwar

12 Papers and Documents Relating to the Foreign Relations of Hungary (Published as a manuscript by the Royal Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Budapest, n.d.), pp. 225-231, 233-241 passim.

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period were in a state of "virtually constant tension", as one student of Danubian diplomacy aptly described it.13 It has always been popular among Czechs and Slovaks to think of the conflict between Czechoslovakia and Hungary in terms of a collision between democracy and feudalism. No doubt, Hungarian aristocratic contempt for democratic Czechoslovakia, as well as Czechoslovak democratic contempt for aristocratic Hungary, added a special quality of acrimony to Czechoslovak-Hungarian hostility. Yet, to explain tensions in terms of an ideological conflict is to divert attention from the real issue, which was national rivalry. Essentially, all conflicts among the Danubian neighbors were over boundaries. The revisionist claims of Horthy Hungary were unreasonable. But it is far from certain that Czechoslovakia could have reached a mutually satisfactory settlement of the boundary conflict with a democratic Hungarian régime. Incidentally, Hungary's relations with Rumania and Yugoslavia, too, were in a state of "virtually constant tension". Rumania and Yugoslavia were much less entitled than Czechoslovakia to regard their conflict with Hungary as a struggle for democracy. Nevertheless, they, too, liked to indulge in ideological interpretations of the same sort as the Czechs. Meanwhile, the Hungarian ruling classes, with their senseless arguments in favor of restoring "the territorial integrity" of historic Hungary, merely provided ammunition to the Little Entente's anti-Hungarian propaganda. The three-quarters of a million or so Hungarians in interwar Czechoslovakia were better treated than the Hungarian minorities in the other Danubian states. Minority rights, however, are never a substitute for majority rights. Furthermore, in the case of the Hungarians, it was particularly painful for them to have been downgraded from a majority to a minority. In Czechoslovakia, the Czechs thought, disadvantages of minority status were offset by advantages of democracy. According to this view, a Magyar peasant could be happier in democratic Czechoslovakia than in feudal Hungary. 14 In general, the minority Hungarians appreciated the blessings of Czech democracy. However, no Czech could claim that they had incorporated the Hungarians into Czechoslovakia in order to extend to them the blessings of democracy. And the oftenheard argument that the Hungarian minority, by betraying Czecho13

Paul E. Zinner, "The Diplomacy of Edvard BeneS", The Diplomats, eds. Cordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, (Princeton, 1953), p. 109. 14 Cf. Dr. Edvard BeneS, Rec k Slovâkom o nasej nârodnej pritomnosti a buducnosti (Bratislava, 1933).

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Slovakia in 1938, betrayed democracy - if it was sincere - betrayed a lack of understanding of the point of view of another nation. T. G. Masaryk did not lack this understanding, as the following episode of the early 1930's shows: Oscar Jaszi, then an American professor, in one of his meetings in Prague with Masaryk, referred to the "desperate dilemma" of some Hungarian progressives "between servile submission and secret irredentism". He asked Masaryk: "If you were a Hungarian statesman, what would you do now?" Masaryk answered: "First, I would fight for honest carrying out of national autonomy for the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia. In the second place, I would advocate the return to Hungary of those territories in the frontier regions where the Magyars constitute a solid, homogeneous majority . . ." 15 It is never easy for rival nations to understand each other's point of view. Yet, Czechs and Slovaks should not find it too difficult to comprehend the Hungarian point of view. Their own painful national memories should help them to understand the feelings of the Hungarians. The Paris peace treaties of 1920 and 1947 were national disasters for the Hungarians, as were the Munich and Vienna awards of 1938 for the Czechs and Slovaks. And the catastrophies that befell Czechs, Slovaks, and Hungarians shortly after the Second World War were even closer in kind and scope. In his study of the Czech catastrophe, Jaszi saw in the tragedies of the Czechs and Hungarians "common traits", as well as "common mistakes". Both of them, he maintained, pursued the same false aims of national grandeur; only their means were different. 10 Czechoslovak-Hungarian relations entered their darkest and most violent phase in the course of the Second World War. The exiles who were acting on behalf of Czechoslovakia treated Slovak-Hungarian relations, as they had during the First World War, as a counterpart to Czech-German relations. This parallel, always wrong, was even less correct this time, since both Slovakia and Hungary were in the same camp during the war. This unpleasant circumstance has been conveniently glossed over by the victorious Czechoslovaks. Germans and Hungarians were to suffer the same punishment - expulsion, that

15 Oscar Jaszi, "The Significance of Thomas G. Masaryk for the Future", Journal of Central European Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 1 (April 1950), p. 7. 16 Oszkar Jaszi, "A cseh katasztrofa - es amit tanulhatunk belole", Ldtohatar, Vol. IV (Munich, 1953), pp. 329-336.

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is, from a restored Czechoslovakia, which now embraced the ideal of an homogeneous Slav national state.17 The Soviet-supported effort, however, to expell the Hungarians from Slovakia did not succeed. At the Paris Peace Conference in the Summer of 1946, the Western powers came to the rescue of the hard-pressed Hungarians. The advocates of expulsion were unable to reverse the principle of reciprocity which had served as a basis for the so-called Agreement on the exchange of populations signed between Czechoslovakia and Hungary in February 1946.18 After the Second World War, both Czechoslovakia and Hungary became Communist states within the Soviet-Russian orbit of power. It is safe to say that the conflict which poisoned relations in the past between the two countries on account of their different political systems and social-economic structures is now eliminated. It is less certain that the national conflicts between them have also come to an end. At any rate, reconciliation cannot be regarded as fully accomplished until Czechs, Slovaks, and Hungarians have unconditionally endorsed in their mutual relationships the principle of national equality. For all practical purposes, this could hardly be attained under any other system than that of a democratic federation.

17

See Stephen Borsody, The Triumph of Tyranny: The Nazi and Soviet Conquest of Central Europe (London and N e w York, 1960); in paperback, The Tragedy of Central Europe, (New York, 1962), Chapter 15, "BeneS and the Russians." 18 Cf. Hungary and the Conference of Paris. Vol. II; Hungary's International Relations Before the Conference of Paris; Hungaro-Czechoslovak Relations; Papers and Documents Relating to the Preparation of the Peace and to the ExVol. IV; Hungary change of Population Between Hungary and Czechoslovakia. and the Conference of Paris; Papers and Documents relating to the Czechoslovak Draft Amendment Concerning the Transfer of 200,000 Hungarians from Czechoslovakia to Hungary (Budapest, 1947).

Attempts at Czechoslovak-Polish Cooperation: Achievements and Failures PIOTR S. WANDYCZ

In 1918, as the First World War was drawing to its close, Tomás G. Masaryk wrote: "Without a free Poland there will be no free Bohemia, and if Bohemia is not free Poland cannot be free either". 1 On the Polish side, Roman Dmowski echoed these sentiments when he said that "the German flood menacing the Czechs could never be a matter of indifference to us". 2 One can hardly agree more with these statements. Geography, economics, political and strategic interests, dictated close cooperation between the two West Slav countries. And yet, interwar relations between Warsaw and Prague showed that coolness, mutual suspicion, and conflict were the rule, and attempts at cooperation the exception. It is natural that the former are better-known than the latter, and it is worthwhile therefore to turn one's attention to those instances when chances of close and friendly relations seemed real. How did the attempts at cooperation originate and why did they fail? This paper aims to suggest at least some explanation and indicate some of the principal reasons. Genuine Czechoslovak-Polish cooperation during the First World War began only toward the end, but three episodes deserve some attention. These were; the somewhat vague pledges to cooperate made by Masaryk and Ignacy Paderewski in America at the time of the organization of the Mid-European Union; the May 1918 agreements in Prague between Polish and Czech leaders; and the mission sent in December 1918 by Pilsudski to Masaryk. The last was perhaps the most interesting, because by that time both Czechoslovakia and Poland had already emerged as independent states, and also because the Czechoslovak his1 Tomás G. Masaryk, L'Europe nouvelle (Paris, 1918), p. 179. For other statements of Masaryk on Poland, see also K. Kierski, Masaryk a Polska (Poznañ, 1935). 2 Roman Dmowski, Polityka polska i odbudowanie paústwa (Warszawa, 1926), p. 217.

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torians have ignored it completely while the Poles have made merely passing references to it. The mission comprised at least two pro-Czechoslovak members 3 and its objective was to prevent a border clash in Teschen (Cieszyn, Tesin) by means of an amicable settlement. Had it succeeded, the whole Teschen incident which produced such fateful consequences in the years to come would have been avoided, and the Paris Peace Conference spared the pitiful spectacle of a struggle between two newly reborn Western Slav states. But the mission failed, and the well-known clash over Teschen took place in January 1919. The conflict continued, to be settled only at the height of the Polish-Soviet war in the summer of 1920. Whatever the justice of the respective claims may have been, the Teschen affair threw a shadow over Czechoslovak-Polish relations. Looking at it from a forty-year perspective, one sees the conflict primarily as a clash between two nationalisms, equally violent though of a different nature. Czech nationalism of the period was characterized by self-confidence and almost unbounded optimism.4 Polish nationalism was in many ways more hysterical, but was highly colored by the very real difficulties which accompanied the rebirth of the Polish Republic.6 A spirit of compromise was conspicuously absent on both sides. The early 1920's saw a new attempt at Czechoslovak-Polish cooperation which culminated in the signing of the Skirmunt-Benes political agreement on November 6, 1921. The background of this treaty, as far as the Poles were concerned, was particularly interesting. It was closely connected with the coming of a new team - Konstanty Skirmunt and Erazm Piltz - to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Both Skirmunt, the foreign minister, and Piltz, the envoy in Prague, came perhaps closer than other contemporary Polish diplomats to the model of the Westerntype realist in politics. Piltz' lengthy memorandum, in which he recommended a new policy toward Czechoslovakia, and Skirmunt's cir3

These were Stanislaw Gutowski, who was on friendly terms with Karel Kramaf, and Damian Wandycz, who had been active among the younger generation of Czech politicians. For the story of the mission, see his reminiscences, Zapomniany list Piisudskiego do Masaryka (New York, 1953). Three reports of the mission are in Akta Adjutantury Generalnej Naczelnego Dowodztwa, file II, Jozef Pilsudski Institute of America, New York. 4 On Czech self-confidence, see especially Ferdinand Peroutka, Budovdni statu (4 vols, in 5, Praha, 1934-36), I, 223 and passim. 5 The devastation of Poland by the war, bitter political strife, economic ruin, and armed conflicts in the East and in the West made for such chaotic conditions there that Czechoslovakia in 1918 seemed, by comparison, a haven of order and security.

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cular note are especially noteworthy in this respect. 6 The two diplomats realized that Polish feelings toward the Czechs were far from friendly and that their policy would run into serious difficulties at home. Largely to satisfy Polish nationalism and amour propre, Piltz almost "invented" the question of Javorina. The cession of this mountain commune in Slovakia with some 400 inhabitants - or even its exchange for a Polish commune — was meant to obliterate the memory of the Teschen defeat. But then the unexpected happened - a nationalist outcry in Czechoslovakia which put Benes in a highly embarrassing position and then forced him to become the champion of the Czechoslovak rights to Javorina. The outcome of it all was the Javorina crisis, a veritable "storm in a tea cup" as an American diplomat called it. The crisis not only spelt the doom of the political pact, which the Polish sejm refused to ratify, but the affair was dragged before the Court of International Justice and the League of Nations. The steadfast friend of Poland, Professor Jaroslav Bidlo, sadly remarked that the extreme Czech nationalists who torpedoed the Javorina settlement "harm the Czech and Slav cause for whole generations". 7 The handling of the affair by the most strongly Czechophile cabinet that Poland ever had, that of Wincenty Witos, with Marian Seyda and Roman Dmowski acting as successive foreign ministers, was in turn characterized by lack of imagination and political flair. A new Czechoslovak-Polish rapprochement came about in 1925 under the shadow thrown on East Central Europe by the negotiations leading to Locarno. The Locarno pacts which opened the way for the comeback of Germany presented dire dangers for both Western Slav states. It was evident that the pacts, by seriously restricting French

6

Piltz criticized the constant references in Poland to the Teschen issue, and wrote: "There are still people and groups among us which constantly return, like the little kings [krolewieta in Polish] of Rzeczpospolita of old, to the viewpoint that local and territorial interests come first and the Polish question follows next . . . Polish policy cannot be, in my opinion, a continous summing up of local interests [and] must finally become a synthesis." Discussing the tense relations with all neighbors, Piltz felt "that the only way out of this charmed circle of isolation and constant strife . . . is an understanding with Czechoslovakia." I have published lengthy excerpts from Piltz's memorandum in "U zrodei paktu Skirmunt-Benesz", Kultura, 11/133 (1958). 7 In Tribuna, June 17, 1923. Quoted from Z. Gasiorowski, "Polish-Czechoslovak Relations 1922-26", Slavonic and East European Review, XXXV, No. 85 (1957), p. 485. The above article, and one which appeared in the preceding issue of the Review, contribute much to our understanding of Czechoslovak-Polish problems in the 1920's.

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Wandycz

freedom of action east of Germany, undermined the Franco-Polish and Franco-Czechoslovak alliances. It seems now that only a determined joint Czechoslovak-Polish pressure could have kept France from signing the agreements or, at least, given them a different character. But in spite of an apparent closing of Czechoslovak-Polish ranks witness Aleksander Skrzynski's visit to Prague and Benes' to Warsaw no real political entente took place. Poland, largely by necessity, at this time put all her eggs in one basket, that is, the French alliance, and could count on no relaxation of tension with Germany. She turned down Soviet overtures, but whether these were genuine or merely tactical is debatable. 8 Benes felt that Prague had much more freedom in the diplomatic sphere. Relations with Berlin were reasonably good and Prague counted strongly on a British-French rapprochement, which seemed like one of the pillars of the Locarno edifice. The Germans learned that "the position of Czechoslovakia visà-vis Germany was completely different from that of Poland with whose interests people [in Prague] in no way identified themselves". 9 Direct Czechoslovak overtures to Gustav Stresemann showed only too clearly that the much-publicized (by the Poles) agreements signed by Skrzynski and Benes did not amount to much. If most attempts to achieve Czechoslovak-Polish cooperation stemmed, up to 1925, from the Polish side, there was a change after Locarno, though it became evident only in the mid-1930's. The Piisudski coup of 1926 and the nomination of Jozef Beck as Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1932 opened a new chapter in the relations between the two countries. It is important to realize that Piisudski and his foreign minister were highly sceptical of the durability of the Czechoslovak republic, which to them was largely an artificial creation. Their views on foreign policy also differed in many respects from those of their predecessors. Piisudski was alleged to have said that "a good Pole spits with disgust when hearing a mention of Locarno", and he favored a system of bilateral, rather than multilateral, arrangements. The first of the former to attract wide attention was the German-Polish Declaration of Nonaggression of January 1934. 8

Compare the views of J. Korbel, Poland between East and West 1919-1933 (Princeton, 1963), pp. 174-175; J. Krasuski, Stosunki polsko-niemieckie 19191925 (Poznan, 1962), p. 421; and P. S. Wandycz, France and her Eastern Allies 1919-1925 (Minneapolis, 1962), p. 358. • Schubert to Koch, March 12, 1925, Auswärtiges Amt microfilms, container 1509, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

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A discussion of this important and controversial agreement lies beyond the frame of this paper. Taken together with the 1932 Nonaggression Treaty with Russia, it undoubtedly constituted a new departure and created on the surface a stability which Poland had not enjoyed so far. The respective positions of Poland and Czechoslovakia did in fact undergo a change. The latter still had its multilateral arrangement, the Little Entente - which Beck's diplomacy scorned - the old alliance with France, and the new pact with Soviet Russia. But the German threat, which, after Hitler's coming to power became the most immediate and real, could not be effectively countered by either of them. Poland, on the other hand, had at least a temporary respite on her Western border, and felt that German aggressive thrust was now directed toward the Southeast, toward Austria and Czechoslovakia. Benes asserted that in 1932 he had made overtures to Warsaw for an alliance which the Poles had turned down.10 The Poles have always denied it, and one can find no documentary evidence to substantiate Benes' assertion. What is more, the Czechoslovak foreign minister confidentially told Sir John Simon on March 17, 1933, that "he had already declined an alliance with Poland".11 Then what is it all about? A partial answer to this question can be found in a recently published study of Czechoslovak-Polish relations in the 1930's. Its author, a young Poznañ historian, discusses at length the intricate diplomatic maneuvers which lasted from mid-1932 to January 1934, and which concerned a rapprochement between Warsaw and Prague.12 It appears that Poland took the initiative in sounding out Prague in 1932, and again in 1933, after Beck took over the foreign ministry. The Poles seemed to have had in mind a military alliance directed principally against Berlin and this ties up with the plans for the so-called preventive war.13 The Czechoslovak minister in Warsaw, V. Girsa, took a highly sceptical attitude toward these proposals and reported against them to Prague. Polish interest in cooperation with Czechoslovakia increased when Mussolini proposed the Four-Power Pact, and Beck made preparations for a visit to Prague. The change of front of the Little Entente, which modified its originally negative stand toward the Pact, nullified 10

Edvard Benes, Pameti: Od Mnichova k nové válce a k novému vítézství (Praha, 1947), p. 11. 11 Documents on British Foreign Policy, 2nd series, V, 64. 12 Jerzy Kozeñski, Czecliosfowacja w polskiej polityce zagranicznej w latach 1932-1938 (Poznañ, 1964), esp. pp. 30, 47-48, 53-54, 66-75. 13 It is interesting that Girsa devoted an entire report to the analysis of the socalled preventive war plans.

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the possibility of such a visit. The Czechoslovak government, meanwhile, pressed by the general staff, which genuinely wanted military coperation with Poland - some exchanges, in fact, took place — also showed initiative. After some vaguely formulated statements about the desirability of a Czechoslovak-Polish entente, BeneS in late 1933 suggested a pact of friendship. In turn, the Polish minister in Prague, W. Grzybowski, reported critically and suggested that Poland demand concrete engagements on the part of Czechoslovakia, especially in the military sphere. By that time, Warsaw was actively preparing the German-Polish Declaration of Nonaggression, and the conversation between Beck and Benes in January 1934 proved unsatisfactory. Using the excuse that Benes' proposals lacked precision, Beck backed out of the whole scheme. The episode commands interest for two reasons: because it shows that at first Pilsudski and Beck did not pursue a policy which excluded cooperation with Prague; and further, because one sees the contrast between the Polish proposals for an alliance and the Czechoslovak offers of a pact of friendship.14 The key to understanding the failure of Czechoslovak-Polish cooperation in both the 1920's and the early 1930's lies mainly in the very different meanings attached to the word "cooperation" in Warsaw and in Prague. To the Poles, cooperation meant a complete alignment between the two countries, operative against the big neighbors, Germany and (if possible) Russia. They aimed at a political and military alliance that would strengthen Poland's position in Europe. Prague had steadfastly avoided such an alliance, which would commit her to the defense of the exposed Polish borders. When Prague spoke of cooperation it meant a détente, normalization of relations, or, at best, a pact of friendship. But the Czechoslovak government was not interested in tying its hands and becoming identified with Polish aims in foreign policy.15 This was true in the 1920's as well as in the 1930's, except that at that later date, the distrust of Pilsudski and Beck contributed another reason against an entangling alliance with Poland.16 This state of affairs bred 14 As Ferdinand Kahânek, commenting on Benes' proposals for a pact of friendship in 1933, wrote: "A pact of friendship means nothing, a military pact is a pact of mutual assistance in case of war. Czechoslovakia did not want to be tied down by such a pact." Benes contra Beck (Praha, 1938), p. 177, quoted in Kozenski, p. 54 n. 15 Hubert Ripka wrote about this: "If Czechoslovakia did not seek a military alliance with Poland, this was because she did not want to undertake any commitments towards a state which had so many unsettled disputes to resolve both with Germany and with Russia." Munich: Before and After (London, 1939), p. 427. 16 Reports of Girsa quoted by Kozenski are illuminating in this respect.

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mutual resentement. To the Poles, Czechoslovak policy appeared opportunistic and unreliable; to theCzechs, Polish attitudes seemed unreasonable. Benes, the Grand Master of Compromise - to borrow Taborsky's expression - deemed the Polish demand of "all or nothing" a denial of sound policy.17 The period from 1934 to 1936 was barren of real attempts to achieve cooperation. Czechoslovak feelers and overtures were usually directed through Paris, which watched the development of Beck's diplomacy with increasing anxiety. As time went on, the Polish foreign minister consciously or unconsciously slipped more and more into the habits of "new diplomacy" as practised by Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. Their determination, sabre-rattling, and youthful exuberance appealed to him more than the stagnant atmosphere of Geneva. This diplomacy found its expression in fostering anti-Czechoslovak agitation in Teschen, and thrived on peremptory responses given to French diplomats whenever they ventured to mediate between Warsaw and Prague.18 Beck naturally became the chief villain as far as Czechoslovakia was concerned, although in the final analysis, his policy was more offensive in tone than in actual content. Benes, and the French placed their main hope for the improvement of Czechoslovak-Polish relations on the removal of Beck from his position. Intrigues and counter-intrigues multiplied. Beck mentions in his memoirs the attempts of the Polish opposition, reinforced by some people in governing circles, to modify his policy toward Czechoslovakia, but adds proudly that he nipped the whole thing in the bud.19 Then came the Munich crisis and Czechoslovakia's darkest hour. Polish foreign policy and the march into Teschen in October 1938 are too well-known for me to dwell upon them here. They evoked criticism in numerous quarters in Poland and naturally produced great bitterness among the Czechoslovaks. It might be interesting, however, to draw certain parallels between the two Teschen crises of 1919-20 and 1938. In both cases, the country to be wronged was fighting for its very existence - Poland militarily against Soviet Russia, Czecho17 The term, "Grand Master of Compromise", appears in an excellent article by Eduard Taborsky, "The Triumph and Disaster of Edvard Benes", Foreign Affairs X X X V I (1957-58) 18 See, for instance, the record of the Beck-Laval conversation on May 11, 1935, in T. Komarnicki, ed., Diariusz i Teki Jana Szembeka (London, 1964), I, 289-290. This is a more complete version than the one which appears in the French edition, Journal (Paris, 1952), p. 70. 19 See J. Beck, Dernier rapport (Neuchatel, 1951), p. 110.

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Slovakia politically against Nazi Germany. In both cases, there were unheeded appeals for amicable settlement - Pilsudski's letter to Masaryk and Benes' appeal to Ignacy Moscicki. In each case, the people of one country suspected collusion between its neighbor and the great inimical power. Finally, the actual settlement was effected only after recourse to force or the threat of it. There were obviously also great contrasts between the situations of 1919-20 and 1938, and the Polish action of the later date appeared more glaring than the earlier move by the Czechs. In each case, the prophecy of Masaryk was applicable. Had Poland collapsed in 1920, Czechoslovakia would have been in danger of becoming a Soviet satellite as the events after the Second World War demonstrated. The disintegration of Czechoslovakia in 1938 preceded the Nazi attack on Poland by eleven months. The verdict of history could not have been clearer. The dependence of Czechoslovak fate upon that of Poland and vice-versa has been manifestly demonstrated. Czechoslovak-Polish negotiations in London during the Second World War, stemming as they did from the realization of past mistakes, seemed to open new vistas for the future. They broke down in the face of a Soviet veto. The solidarity between the two Western Slav countries which had been lacking with regard to Germany prior to the war proved also nonexistent against the Soviet Union. 20 What then, were the obstacles to genuine Czechoslovak-Polish cooperation during the internar period? Some of them have already been mentioned, but they need to be recalled and stressed in this final summary. The Twenty Years' Crisis - to use Carr's word - was the heyday of nationalism in Europe. The dreams of the nineteenth-century liberals and radicals about the peace-loving masses as opposed to warlike governments of the old régime were shattered by reality. The peoples proved more nationalistic than their former masters, and governments using nationalism for their own purpose often became prisoners of passions they had liberated. Compromise, which, as a Czechoslovak writer justly observed, was never a comme il jaut expression in the Polish political vocabulary, 21 did not always work on the Czechoslovak side either. The 20

For the story of the London negotiations, see E. Tâborsky, "A Polish-Czechoslovak Confederation: A Story of the First Soviet Veto", Journal of Central European Affairs, IX (1950); T. Komarnicki, "Próby stworzenia zwiqzku polskoczeskiego w okresie drugiej wojny swiatowej", Sprawy Migdzynarodowe No. 2 / 3 (1947) and Nos. 1/5 (1948); and P. S. Wandycz, Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation and the Great Powers 1940-43 (Bloomington, 1956). 21 Vaclav Fiala, Soudobé Pohko (Praha, 1936), p. 163.

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fetish of absolute national sovereignty and economic autarchy was already a thing of the past, but statesmen and people alike refused to recognize it. War still seemed a way of settling disputes. Within this charmed circle of ideas, it is obvious that Polish and Czechoslovak interests often clashed. Why should Czechoslovakia sacrifice herself for Warsaw and antagonize Germany or Russia? Why should Poland care what fate overcame her Southern neighbor? The prevailing motto was one of "sacro egoismo". There were important differences, to be sure: differences of approach to Russia, Germany, Hungary, the Ukrainian question, the Slovak issue. It is evident that the varying internal structures of Czechoslovakia and Poland - economic, social, and political - constituted a serious obstacle to cooperation. There is also another factor which generally receives less recognition, and which was of tremendous significance, namely, the psychological element. It is curious that both nations, in spite of a thousand years of mutual relations, never fully understood each other. The numerous things they shared for centuries proved, somehow, of less importance than all the elements that divided them. Mutual antagonism, hurt susceptibilities, mutual distrust, envy or contempt, and to call things by their proper name — even dislike of respective national characteristics existed and could not be destroyed overnight. A recent discussion between leading Czechoslovak and Polish journalists in Prague shows that many of these problems are relevant even today. 22 Real cooperation between the two countries cannot be achieved easily and if the subtitle of this paper is "achievements and failures," it really means actual failures and search for achievements. This search, if history has any inner logic, is bound to continue.

22

"Zwietrzale stereotypy: Szwejk i Kozietulski", Polityka, 7, 1964; also Kulturné Tvorba, N o . 10, March 5, 1964.

N o . 10 (365), March

Czechoslovakia and Rumania A Brief Historical

Retrospect

R A D U R. FLORESCU

It is puzzling to observe that Rumanian historians who have dealt extensively with the subject of relations with neighboring countries should have narrowed their observations on Czech and Slovak matters to comments on an ill-fated marriage de convenance, known as the Little Entente. This one-sided neglect, which was noted by the scholar, J. U. Jarnik,1 has not been substantially remedied through present cultural agreements between the Rumanian People's Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. In recent years, except for a few topics of common interest, there has been scant reference to CzechoslovakRumanian history in professional historical journals or in the press.2 Given available material proving a common historical experience, what is the explanation of this extraordinary omission? Answers might range from attempts to explain away individual neglect - that of Professor Nicolae Iorga, for instance, by far the most prolific of Rumanian historians (no fewer than 1000 articles and books to his credit), who 1

J. U. Jarnik and H. Jarnik, Relatiunile Romino-Cehoslovace din Trecut ¡/i Viitor, (Bucarest, 1919) p. 19. In contrast to the Rumanians, Czech scholars such as J. U. Jarnik, H. Jarnik, J. Dobrovsky, K. J. Jireêek, J. Neruda, J. Stolba, K. Droz, K. Sarlih, L. Pic, L. Niederle, P. J. Safarik, J. Macurek, R. R. Triffle, F. Kaderavek, etc., have tackled a variety of historical, economic, and literary topics of common interest, some of them writing in Rumanian; (J. Jarnik, H. Jarnik, F. Kaderavek) (Bucarest, 1923). The only general syntheses on the Rumanian side are by I. I. Nistor, Cehoslovacii si Românii Expunere Istoricâ, (Cernauji, 1930) and N. Iorga, Roumains et Tchécoslovaques, (Prague, 1924). There is also a German translation, essentially three lectures given at Prague. Professor I. Simionescu's Cehoslovacia (Bucarest, 1922) is no more than a textbook. 2 The historical review, Studii, which has considerable material on the history of relations with other "socialist" countries has, with the exception of the Hussite problem (1954-55 issues), few references to Czech-Rumanian history. The same relative indifference is to be noted in Scinteia, (the official organ of the Communist party) during the official visit of Novotny to Bucarest in April 1961. This is in marked contrast to abundant references to common historical ties when Polish, Bulgarian, and even Yugoslav dignitaries visited each other's country.

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devotes little more than three lectures on the topic of CzechoslovakRumanian relations 3 - to more general factors, stressing inherent incompatibilities of social structure, political institutions, cultural influences, and even national character. One tends, for instance, to contrast the introverted and philosophic "Slavic soul" of the Czech to the extroverted and volatile temperament of the Latin Rumanian. 4 With a research program which can hardly be said to have got under way, a synthesis is evidently impossible; it is rendered even more difficult by the complexity of the subject, depending upon which specific Czech, Slovak, or Rumanian ethnic group or which period we have in mind. Slovak-Transylvanian relations after the Ausgleich in Transleithania, for instance, which were close, have little in common with the greater aloofness between Czechs and Bukovinans in Cisleithania during the same period. Conclusions about economic and cultural contacts between Moldavia and Bohemia in the sixteenth century would not necessarily apply equally to the neighboring Principality of Wallachia. I will not, in this brief survey, cover the interwar or the post-World War II period, for two reasons: first, the nature of relations between the satellite republics has been artificially controlled by Russia, and second, recent friction during the Khrushchev era are still insufficiently crystallized.5 The much-vaunted period of the Little Entente, on the other hand, has been satisfactorily covered and represents less the inauguration of an era of collaboration than the betrayal of a traditional friendship. The 125-mile so-called "invulnerable frontier" separating the Czechoslovak Republic from Greater Rumania in 1919 has too often been highlighted as inaugurating formally the "neighborliness" of the two countries, which ended prematurely with the Hungarian occupation of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia in 1938, and Russian incorporation in 1945. However, since the dawn of history, neither the river Tisza nor the forested belt of the North Carpathians seems to have formed a particularly effective natural frontier. On the contrary, geographic proximity and the hazards of historical circumstance impelled Rumanians to move 3

See Note 1 above. In addition, Iorga was interested in the impact of the Hussites. See. nevertheless, a nice tribute by Iorga to Masaryk, E. Socec, H. Jarnik, in N . Iorga, Oameni cari an fost (Bucarest, 1939), Vol. 4, pp. 223, 287, 399. 4 During the Carol dictatorship, the coolness of relations with Prague was often attributed to the incompatibilities existing between an aristocratic monarchical state and a democratic republic. 5 See an interesting article by Philip Ben, "Rumania, Another Split in Communist Rank", The New Republic, October 19, 1963.

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north and northeast into the territories of Ruthenia, Slovakia, Moravia, Silesia, and even Bohemia, while Czechs and Slovaks at various times have come in contact with Rumanians on the territory of Transylvania, Maramures, and Moldavia. The Roman historian, Pliny, was the first to suggest such interpénétration when he extended the boundaries of the Dacian kingdom, then at its height, well into the mountainous districts of Eastern Slovakia. Recent archeological discoveries on various sites in Northern Transylvania, Maramures, and Moldavia have uncovered remains of ceramics, tools, cemeteries, etc., bearing remarkable analogies to similar finds in the Bohemian region, some of which can be traced back to the sixth century.6 Whether further discoveries will ever substantiate the hypothesis of certain Slavicists who claim the existence of a superior Slavic culture in the former province of Dacia during the early Middle Ages, or whether similar archeological investigations in Bohemia will eventually reveal reciprocal influences, cannot at present be determined. What can be affirmed, however, particularly in the light of ninth and tenth century excavations, documentary fragments, and philological studies, is that established religious, cultural, and economic contacts suggest contiguity between the Moravian Principality of Rostislav and Svatopluk, and various ill-defined North Transylvanian Cnezates such as that of Nenumorut. 7 By far the most significant consequence of the Moravian proximity resulted from Rostislav's decision to summon the apostles Sts. Cyril and Methodius from Constantinople to preach Christianity to his people - a decision which proved more epoch-making for the Rumanians than the Czechs. Although Christianity has earlier origins in both lands, 8 there is little doubt that an organized church was first estab6

Notably, the discovery on several Transylvanian sites of ceramics identical to the Prague type-, Academia Republicii Populare Romîne, (ed.) Istoria Romîniei (Bucarest, 1960), Vol. 1, p. 738. 7 The so-called Russian chronicle of Nestor refers to Bohemian silver and horses exported as far South as Dobrogea, and salt, mined in Transylvania, being sold in Bohemia (10th century). During excavations in 1953-54, remains of churches were found in Northern Transylvania and Maramurej, bearing similarities to the Modrâ (8th-century) and Staré Mësto (10th-century) church of Moravia. L. Cibulka, Velkomoravsky koslel a Modré u Velehradu a zacdtky Krest'anstvi na Morave (Prague, 1958). See also Istoria Romîniei, Vol. 1, pp. 408, 744; Vol. 2, p. 38. Slavic words in the dialect of North Moldavia and Maramures can similarly be traced to this proximity. 8 Most historians agree that the first evidence of Christianity on the Danube can be traced back to Roman times - a thesis corroborated by the fact that all basic religious terms are Latin. A. D. Xenopol, Istoria Românilor (Bucarest, 1925), Vol. 1, pp. 90-97, p. 113 et seq. Biserica Romand UnitS (Madrid, 1952), pp. 1-21.

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lished on the Danube through the efforts of disciples of the Moravian apostles, such as Zandov (Sandu) and Moznogon (who preaohed the gospel north of the river), and St. Klement and Naum who preached it south to the Bulgarians. These disciples evidently labored more diligently than their sponsors, organizing churches under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Bulgarian see of Ochrida, improvising an alphabet (mistakenly known as Cyrillic), and substituting Church Slavonic as the language of culture. Thus, ironically, one might say that a direct consequence of the decision of a Moravian ruler was that the Latinspeaking Rumanians were, for centuries, to be subjected to an Eastern Patriarch, an oriental script, and an alien culture, while the Czechs entered the sphere of Rome and adopted a Latin alphabet. Professor Iorga implies that one of the factors which prevented Rumanian-Czech assimilation and the possible creation of a combined state was the Hungarian invasions, which drove a wedge between the two peoples for 1000 years, also separating the historical destinies of the Slovaks and the Czechs." History had proved that such permanent isolation between neighboring ethnic groups occurs mostly in the imagination of a writer intent upon proving the calamitous consequences of some specific event. If, indeed, the overthrow of the Moravian state by the Hungarians was calamitous, it seems probable that the Czechs would have sought the refuge of the Carpathians, in much the same way that the Daco-Romans had earlier sought shelter during the Gothic migrations. Although little is known of Czecho-Rumanian contacts in the mountains of Maramures and Transylvania during the early Middle Ages, or of Czech migrations southward in general, much attention has been focused on successive 10 Rumanian migrations to the 9

N . Iorga, Etude roumaines: Influences étrangères sur la nation roumaine, (Paris, 1923), Vol. 1, p. 27. A rather fascinating hypothesis, which might have provided the framework for a centralized state more powerful than either the medieval Bulgarian or Serbian Empires. The 19th century historian, B. P. Hasdeu, considered the Serbs the product of a Daco-Roman and Czech assimilation. 10 Successive Czech and Slovak migrations to the Rumanian lands left relatively few permanent traces after the 10th century. Among Czech colonists in Moldavia, the Hussites in the 15th century, the Bohemian Calvinists in the 17th century, the nomadic artisans known as "drotatorii" (Drahtbinders) in the 18th century - each in turn disappeared. During the 19th century, migrations of Slovak artisans to Austrian-occupied Bukovina ended with migration to the United States. In the older kingdom, there was established during the 19th century a Czech colony of shopkeepers, artisans, and professional men, including such well-known figures as the academician, L. Mrazec, the naturalist, J. Cihac, and the popular publisher, E. Socec. The official census after World War I lists 50,000 Czechs and Slovaks (15 Czech and Slovak schools) within the territory of greater Rumania.

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high river valleys of the West Carpathian mountains, extending to Eastern and Northern Moravia, Galicia, Silesia, most of Slovakia, and Ruthenia, which may have begun as early as the twelfth century and persisted until the eighteenth century (the last known document referring to the Vlachs is dated 1671). In spite of all the work that has been done, mostly by Czech scholars, a definitive study on these Moravian Vlachs is still pending11 Precisely why, or exactly when, these Vlach migrations to the mountainous districts of Czechoslovakia occurred is still shrouded in obscurity. It is sufficient to state that they were more significant and more extensive than commonly supposed, that they cannot be narrowed down to mere seasonal pastoral peregrinations,12 that they were probably politically motivated (an early 16th-century migration, for instance, coincides with the loss of Moldavian independence), and that they ended in a unique case of voluntary Slavo-Rumanian assimilation (in contrast to planned Russification in Bessarabia). It is certain that these Rumanian establishments constituted, for a time, a veritable state-within-a-state. The Vlach maintained their language and customs, elected their local assemblies, were governed by their laws, and payed a Wallachian tax to the Czech feudal lords, thus maintaining until modern times the character of an early medieval patriarchal society, which had been destroyed by feudalism in the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. These Rumanian communities, by the clever exploitation of the mountain economy (sheep, wood, even agriculture, at high altitudes), had by the end of the Thirty Years' War so greatly contributed to the prosperity of the region that, at a time of general stagnation on the lowlands, Czech and German mi-

11

The most recent and most comprehensive account of the Moravian Vlachs is J. Macùrek, Vaiasi v zàpadnich Karpatech v 15-18. stoleti. K dejinam osidleni a hospodàrsko-spolecenského vyvoje jizniho Tes'mska, jihozdpadniho Polska, severozàpadniho Slovenska a vychodni Moravy (Ostrava, 1959); French and German summaries. See also M. Vàclavek, Moravské Valassko (Trebic, 1887); on the Rumanian side, G. M. Murgoci and I. Popa Burca, Romania ¡i Jàrile Locuite de Romàni (Bucarest, 1902); I. I. Nistor, Migratimi Romàne in Polonia in secolul al 15-lea si al 16-lea (Bucarest, 1939); Th. Holban, "Romànii pe Teritoriul Polonez pana in secolul al 16-lea", Arhiva (Jassy, 1930), Vol. 37; I Mototolescu, Jus Valachicum in Polonia (Bucarest, 1916). 12 There are several conflicting theories concerning the origins of these Vlachs. Palacky held them to be descendents of the ancient Celtic Boii, Piò, and Vàclavek held the term "Vlach" to mean the occupation of shepherd, rather than to designate ethnic origin. A majority, however - Iorga, Miklosic, Nistor, the Jarniks, etc., - agree with Macurek that these "Vlachs", looked upon as "foreigners" in contemporary sources, were definitely of Rumanian origin.

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grants had incentives for migration to the uplands.13 Although, with the exception of the Apsa region of Ruthenia, little survives of the Vlach element today, there can be little doubt of their impact, attested by the survival of Rumanian words, place names, customs, architecture, dress, even physical types, etc.14 If the Czecho-Rumanian contiguity was instrumental in Rumania's adoption of a Slavic culture and Cyrillic script, after an interval of 500 years, by another quirk of fate, it was the immediate proximity of the Czech Hussite movement which, in the eyes of some scholars, contributed to the establishment of Rumanian as a written language, an event of untold national and cultural significance. Although Professor Iorga's arguments that, a century before the Calvinists, Hussite Rumanian monks at the monastery of Peri were the first to translate the Acts of the Apostles into Rumanian, failed to win universal acceptance, 1 ' it 13

The prosperity of the TSSin region, for instance, can be gauged from the fact that the Lord of the Duchy received 18 percent (2564 florins) of his revenue from the Wallachians alone. J. Macurek, Valasi, p. 490. 14 The A p j a Trans-Tisan region of Ruthenia (11,724 Rumanians in 1923) is one of the oldest and most historic of these islands of Rumanianism, and the monastery at Peri, no longer existing, can probably be traced back to the 14thcentury rule of D r a g o j Voda, the first known ruler of Moldavia, circa 1352. The best known 19th-century personality of the area was undoubtedly Bishop Victor Mihali, leader of the Uniate Transylvanian Church f r o m 1893 to 1918. In other districts of Bohemia and Slovakia, place-names (e.g., ValaSske Mezirici) and no less than 91 words, mostly pastoral, such as brinza (cheese), merinde (victuals), vatra (homestead), dil, deal (hill), coliba (hut), and hotar (boundary) were adopted in local Czech and Slovak dialects. 15 Iorga's theory is based essentially upon three arguments: (1) the Voronel, Scheia, and Hurmuzachi Manuscripts were found in the Bukovina-Maramures region, indicating proximity to the Czechs; (2) the rhotacism of language bears a similarity to the North Moldavian idiom; (3) the Transylvanian copyists of the 16th century, such as Coresi, were too unsophisticated and untrained to initiate a work of translation; they merely recopied older works. See N. Iorga, Istoria Literaturii Romane.jti, (Bucarest, 1925), Vol. 1, pp. 88-124; Istoria Literaturii Romane§ti: Introductie Sintetica (Bucarest, 1929), p. 24; Sextil Pujcariu, Istoria Literaturii Romane, Epoca Veche (Sibiu, 1930), Vol. 1, p. 64; I. Popovici, Pa lea de la Ora^tia (Bucarest, 1911), p. 15; I. A. Candea, Psaltirea Scheiana comparatie cu celelalte Psaltiri din Secolul 16-lea si al 17-Iea (Bucarest, 1916); J. Macurek, "Husitismul in Romania", Revista Istorica (1928), Vol. 14, p. 41; Husitstvi v rumunskych zemich (Brno, 1927). Iorga's theory of Hussitism has been opposed by several authors such as I. Barbulescu, J. Balan, T. Palade, and O. Densusianu (e.g., Densujianu, "Cand s'a scris intaiu Romanejte", Arhiva, (Jassy, 1916), Vol. 26); Histoire de la langue roumaine (Paris, 1914). These authors fail to see how monks at an institution dedicated to the Patriarchate of Constantinople could have been so disloyal to their See. Historians in the Rumanian People's Republic, though emphasizing the general cultural and social importance of Hussitism (e.g., the Liblice conference of Russian and East European historians, November

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nevertheless seems inconceivable that Prince Alexander the Good of Moldavia (1401-1431) should have been willing, at the cost of diplomatic difficulties with this Catholic neighbour and with the Papacy,10 to allow Hungarian Hussites to translate the Scriptures into their tongue at Trotus, and been reluctant to do the same for a language which, after all, was his own. Hussites were not only settled on Moldavian soil from Trotus to the Dniester (there is some argument as to whether the town of Husi on the Pruth can be traced to that origin), but in subsequent reigns, even after their defeat at Lipany (1434), Moravian Brethren were colonized and given privileges in various Moldavian towns. Even should one completely discount the nationalising impact of Hussitism and reduce the thing to "a mere hypothesis", a movement which so profoundly affected the whole fabric of feudal society, even in the West, was bound to have deep-seated social consequences in neighboring lands where there were no inquisitors to fear. Translation of the Scriptures, initially directed against the Catholic hierarchy, proved a good device for converting the movement into a powerful anti-feudal crusade. Three years after Lipany, there occurred on Transylvanian soil the Rumanian-Hungarian peasant and burgher revolt of Bobalna (1437). which, in the light of recent research, can be looked upon as in part occasioned by the Hussite wars.17 It is interesting to note in this connection that John Hunyady, the Magyarized Wallachian Governor of Transylvania who was to render such signal service in the Turkish wars, (and whose son Matthias, King of Hungary, married the daughter of the national Hussite, King George of Podebrady), owed his early military reputation and his castle at Hunedoara (1409) to his participation in the Hussite wars in the service of Emperor Sigismund.18 This experience 26-27, 1954), prefer to stress the role of the popular masses in the adoption of written Rumanian. See F. Kavka, "Miscarea Revolutionary Husita, si Importanja ei Interna{ionala", Studii, (1955), Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 84-106. 16 A papal bull of Eugene III read, "The pope has learned with the greatest displeasure that in the Moldavian Principality a great many of the accursed Hussite sect have found a refuge." The Poles also accused Alexander of, "giving protection to heretic preachers". I. I. Nistor, Cehoslovacii si Romanii (Cernauti. 1930), p. 17. Also, Iorga's Histoire des Roumains et de la romanite orientate (Bucarest, 1937), Vol. 4, p. 40. 17 The peasants used the military methods of the Hussites, surrounding their camp with carriages for defence; Istoria Republicii Populare Romtne Manual pentru Inva(amantul Mediu (Bucarest, 1952), p. 110; Jean Boulier, Jean Hus (Paris, 1958), p. 311; N. Iorga, Histoire des Roumains, Vol. 4, pp. 68-89. 18 C. Murejan, "Rolul lui Ion de Hunedoara in Mobilizarea Maselor Populare impotriva expansiunii Otomane", Studii, (1956), Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 55-72.

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undoubtedly accounts for his understanding of the importance of enlisting the support of popular elements in his crusade - the key to his military successes against Mohammed the Conqueror. Hunyady's initiative in directing a peasant crusade, however, proved a dangerous expedient, particularly in the absence of a popular leader like him, and could easily be converted into a social revolution. This is precisely what occurred on 3 July 1514, when some 33,000 Rumanian, Hungarian, Czech, and Slovak serfs, under the leadership of a Szekely captain, George Dozsa, turned against their feudal and ecclesiastical leaders, urging the need for the establishment of a new society based upon the social rights of a primitive Hussite Christianity.19 Further social uprisings in Eastern Europe in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries also tended to cut across boundaries of state, emphasizing the common solidarity of the oppressed.20 The Hussite Rumanian-Czech connection suggests more formal diplomatic and cultural ties, warranted by the geographic and strategic importance of Prague, particularly after the Hungarian defeat at Mohàcs (1525), when the Habsburgs succeeded to the throne of Bohemia and Hungary and inherited the oriental policy of the Arpad kings. Prague, perhaps even more than Vienna, became the focal point of a complicated diplomatic chess-game played by the remaining autonomous states of Eastern Europe - Transylvania, Moldavia, Wallachia, Poland - in the face of the Ottoman threat. It is idle to claim that in this game of diplomacy and war, relationship among the Christian states were invariably friendly, that Rumanians and Czechs always fought on the same side,21 or that the opportunist hospodars who came to Prague had any other purpose than seeking the support of the Habsburg court. Of the two historic Principalities, it was, in many ways, logical, for reasons 19

For the most recent research on the Dozsa revolt, see Istoria Rominiei, Vol. 2, pp. 158, 601. 20 Czech sympathies for the Transylvanian revolt of Horia and Clojca (1784) are exemplified by a popular Prague puppet show called Horia and Kloska, the origins of which are obscure, but which was still being performed by puppeteers in the 19th century. N . Iorga, Roumains et Tchécoslovaques (Prague, 1924), p. 32. 21 The first hostile encounter between Czechs and Rumanians occurred at the Battle of Kroissenbrunn (Jedenspeijen, 1260), in which the Rumanian Cneaz fought on the side of King Bela IV of Hungary, his overlord, against Ottokar II of the Premysl dynasty. Such occasions, however, were exceptional and both Rumanians and Czechs fought together against the Mongols at Liegnitz (1241); against the Teutonic Knights at Grunwald (1409); against the Turks at Belgrade (1456); and in the crusades of Steven the Great (1457-1504) and Michael the Brave (1593-1601).

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of geographic proximity, that cultural and diplomatic contacts should favor Moldavia, particularly when it is recalled (the chronicle of Putna) that the Principality was founded in the middle of the 14th century by a Cneaz descending from the mountains bordering Ruthenia and Maramures. This is probably the reason why 15th-century Czech chroniclers, rather than use the name of the tortuous river Moldava, refer to the province as Multany (the land of the mountains).22 Although a CzechHungarian Moldavian defensive alliance against the Turks seemed plausible, particularly after the fall of Constantinople, such a combination failed to materialize because of petty rivalries between three of the most able rulers of Eastern Europe at the time: the Hussite, George of Podebrady (1420-1472), his Transylvanian son-in-law, Matthias Corvinus, King of Hungary (1440-1490), and Steven the Great of Moldavia (1457-1504), born not very far away from the borderlands of modern Czechoslovakia. The 17th-century Moldavian chronicler, Grigore Ureche (incidentally, one of the first historians to make use of the term Czech rather than Bohemian 23), explains a great deal of this failure in terms of the ambitions of the Hungarian King: In 1469 Matthias was with difficulty persuaded to abandon a projected invasion of Moldavia, only because of difficulties with his father-in-law, George of Podebrady, whom he supplanted in "the land of the Czechs". In the course of difficult negotiations with his so-called allies, Steven often used the diplomatic and linguistic talents of a certain John Tot ("the Slovak" in Hungarian), a name subsequently Rumanized into Täutäu, one of his chief councilors in old age, who may have signed the country's first official act of submission to the Turks.24 The close relationship between the two countries, however, went beyond personal, dynastic, and diplomatic ties. In his constant quest for the education of bureaucrats and diplomats beyond the basic standards of the hometrained Slavonic scribes, and in order to find men who knew Latin, it was logical to send the sons of the lower boyar class to the University 22

Matila Ghyka, A Documented Chronology of Roumanian History (Oxford, 1941), p. 65. Interestingly enough, Rumanian histories refer to Wallachia as Muntenia. The Czech term for Wallachia is identical (Valassko); for Transylvania, it is Sedmihrady, i.e., Siebenbürgen. 23 An older variant of the word "Ceh" (Cehi) used by Ureche and found in Transylvanian folklore is the word "Ceu" (Jara Ceului). 24 In compensation for his numerous services, Täutäu received a church at Bälinejti (with its richly ornate Gothic sculpture), a district of Dorohoi, and the property adjoining. The village of Täutäu in Northern Bucovina further attests the importance of this Slovak family.

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of Prague, the first true center of Renaissance culture in Central Europe, where these young men formed part of the "Polish nation".25 Nor was this impact of the Renaissance on Moldavia limited to the study of the classical languages and humanist philosophy. It also found expression in art and architecture. When Steven desired to rebuild a church in stone at Radauti in gratitude for a victory over the Turk, he imported Czech artisans (the architect signed himself Mistr Jan), and for two centuries or more, Moldavian ecclesiastical architecture, sculpture, and iconography bore the distinctive imprint of that Western current (an influence equally noticeable, and perhaps more easily accountable, in Transylvania, through Saxon contacts with the Germans of Bohemia).26 Commercial contacts between Moldavia and Bohemia after the defeat of Hungary in 1526 were so close that the Bohemian taler served as a generally recognized medium of exchange. In fact, when Prince John II Basil, known as Despot Voda (1561-1563) decided to strike coins of his own at Suceava, he based their value on the silver taler of Bohemia and, in token respect to the double-tailed lion on one face, named the basic unit of his currency "Leu" (Rum. lion), the ancestor of Rumania's national currency.27 Wallachian relations with Bohemia were politically and culturally less close - Wallachian Boyars sought contacts with Renaissance culture direct in Italy at Venice, Padua, and Pisa. Commercial contacts, on the other hand, either direct or by way of the Transylvanian trading centers of Brasov and Sibiu,28 had respectable antecedents. Prince Mircea the Old (1386-1418) was sufficiently convinced of the superiority of Bohemian linen to subject it to a lower tax (a mere three percent) than the competitive imports from Flanders (twelve per-

25

Upper-class Boyars preferred the Polish educational centers of Lwow and Krakow. N . Iorga, Histoire de I'enseignement aux pays roumains (Bucarest, 1933), pp. 13-14. 26 As wealthy burgher Saxon families of Transylvania sent their sons to Prague, contacts with the Germans of Bohemia remained close. Many Bohemian-German artisans built and decorated German Transylvanian churches in the Bohemian style. 27 On the other side of the Bohemian taler was engraved a representation of the figure of St. Joachim, the patron saint of the silver mines. 28 Apart from being transit centers for Wallachia, Cluj, Brajov, and Sibiu also had substantial, reciprocal direct-trade relations with Bohemia. The work of the Transylvanian silversmiths was, for instance, greatly sought after in Prague. It was only during the 18th and, particularly, the 19th centuries, that more efficient techniques of manufacturing and extracting iron ore in Bohemia cut heavily into imports from Transylvania.

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cent).29 From the Wallachian point of view, however, Prague was not to assume much diplomatic importance until the reign of Michael the Brave (1593-1601), the Prince who in a flash had succeeded in realizing what was eventually to become the goal of nationalists, reuniting all three provinces within his realm. It can be defnitely documented that Prince Michael came to Prague with a large embassy of thirty-five men in the spring of 1601, to seek renewed support from the Emperor 30 after his defeat in the preceding autumn at Mirisläu. The Emperor was certainly instrumental in the apparent reconciliation with General Basta, and plans were drawn for a joint campaign against the Turks, which led to the victory at Goroszlo and, shortly thereafter, to Michael's treacherous assassination (August 19). More interesting than the negotiations with the Emperor, from the point of view of Czecho-Rumanian relations, are certain less wellknown aspects of Michael's visit which reveal specific Czech, rather than Habsburg, interests. Professor J. Macürek sees the Wallachian's visit to Prague 31 — where his career had been followed with interest and his reputation had preceded him - as a personal bid for continued material and moral support, evidenced by special messages sent to the Diets of Bohemia and Silesia, both of which responded warmly, not only in mere pledges, but in actual contributions. A more personal note to the visit was Michael's attempt to solve the complicated affair of the Koenigsberg estate which he had been granted by Emperor Rudolph since August 1599, but which was encumbered by a mortgage.32 The whole business was satisfactorily settled by the Silesian authorities 29

C. C. Giurescu, Istoria Romänilor (Bucarest, 1937), Vol. 2, part 1, p. 573; E. Hurmuzachi, Documente privitore la Istoria Romänilor (Bucarest, 1887-1908), Vol. 16, pp. 8-10. 30 In spite of the scepticism of some writers, it can definitely be documented that Michael the Brave came personally to Prague with a delegation of 35 Boyars (three of whom died, asphyxiated in an overheated room), and resided in the Czech capital from February to April 1601, when he left for Vienna. In the course of that time, Michael had two official audiences with Emperor Rudolph (probably conversing in Italian), at one of which the reconciliation with General Basta was effected. Reference to this visit is to be found in the reports of the agent of the Duke of Parma, in paintings and engravings of the period (e.g., A. Sadeler of the Flemish School) and in contemporary brochures, panegyrics, etc. For further details, see Hurmuzachi, Documente, Vol. 12, pp. 1153, 1158; P. P. Panaitescu, Mihai Viteazul (Bucarest, 1936), pp. 241-44; Istoria Rominiei, Vol. 2, p. 44. 51 J. Macürek, "Michael der Tapfere und die böhmisch-schlesischen Stände am Ende des 16 Jh", Revista lstoricä Romänä (1932), Vol. 2, pp. 346-353. 32 For further details on the Koenigsberg affair, see Hurmuzachi, Documente, Vol. 12, pp. 1159, 1160, 1174, 1176.

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during Michael's visit, and a Bohemian official was dispatched to administer the lands in Michael's absence. After the Prince's assassination, the estates reverted to the Emperor, who inherited a profitable brewing establishment founded by two Wallachians. The premature death of the Wallachian Prince certainly represents yet another missed opportunity in terms of Czecho-Rumanian collaboration. A final "might have been", which could have led to the formation of a Carpathian union linking Moldavia, Transylvania, and Wallachia to Bohemia, occurred at the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War. Under the common threat of the Catholicizing crusade of Ferdinand II, and with relative freedom from interference by the Turks, the moment was singularly opportune for threatened orthodox Rumanians and Protestant Hungarians and Czechs to repel a potentially dangerous aggressor. The Calvinist Prince Bethlen of Transylvania actually marched into Slovakia to help the rebel armies of the Elector Palatine, before all hopes were crushed at the Battle of the White Mountain in 1620. Even this defeat, however, did not exclude the possibility of joint Moldavian, Wallachian, and Transylvanian action to save Bohemia from Habsburg control; a treaty of mutual defence, more anti-Habsburg than antiTurkish in intent, was signed between the Calvinist George Rakoczy of Transylvania and Matthew Basarab of Wallachia in 1633, and extended to include Basil Lupu of Moldavia the following year. This interesting combination of forces was subsequently jolted and rendered useless by the usual petty rivalries and the failure of the Swedish offensive. After the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), formal contacts between an oppressed and Germanized Bohemia and the oppressed and increasingly Hellenized Principalities proved difficult and the period of quasi-independence drew to an end. Interest in Bohemia continued, however, motivated less by the needs of diplomacy than the desire to seek a safe refuge from Turkish vengeance. Prince Gregory Chica of Wallachia came in 1664, the adventurer George Steven of Moldavia in 1653, both residing at the Lobkowitz Moravian estates; Alexander Ypsilanti came to Brno in somewhat different circumstances in 1791, as a prisoner of the Austrians (there is still an effigy in front of the house of this "Turk"). In the 19th century, Barbu Stirbey and countless boyars after him visited the watering places of Karlovy Vary and Marianske Lazne merely to recover from gastronomic excesses.33 33 N. Iorga, "Un Boier Oltean la Karlsbaad in 1797 Calatoria lui Barbu Stirbey in Apus", Analele Academiei Romane, Memor. Sect. 1st., Vol. 29, p. 17 (1906).

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The national awakening of Rumanians and Czechs brought fewer contacts and some clashes, but reflects a remarkable historical parallelism already to be observed in the earlier periods.34 The Protestant Reformation in Bohemia, as in Transylvania, unwittingly tended to strengthen popular national tradition by the resultant translations of the scriptures into the respective vernaculars. What is even more interesting is how, in this prenational age of religious conflict, the Catholic Reformation in both countries was turned to national advantage. In the case of the Rumanian Transylvanians, it is a well-established fact that the Uniate Church, sponsored by the Jesuits as a double-edged instrument against both Calvinist and Orthodox, became converted into one of the most effective weapons for fostering a national cultural movement.35 The New Uniate priests who availed themselves of their privilege to travel to Rome neglected their theology and devoted all their efforts to proving Rumania's ancient connections with Rome and the Latin character of their tongue; they published their works in Rumanian, using the Latin alphabet for the first time. It is interesting to note that a Czech Jesuit, Wenceslas Franz, was initially selected to succeed Bishop Athanasius, the founder of the Uniate Church.36 Although the Catholic Reformation was in essence hostile to Czech national life, nevertheless, a revival of interest in the Czech language took place at least a century before the appearance of a genuine cultural nationalism, encouraged somewhat by the tolerant attitude of the Piarist order and by occasional interest on the part of individual Jesuits.37 Subsequently, both Rumania and Transylvania experienced the humane, tolerant, and universalist spirit of the 18th century Enlightenment, fostered by Joseph II, which saw works eulogizing Rumanian Latinity and the glories of the Slav race published in their respective languages both at Vienna and Budapest. Demonstrating essentially the same absence of bigotry and respect for 34

Such parallellism is evident in the formation of the Czech and Rumanian medieval states, and in similar patterns of feudal development. Both nations endured foreign domination (Habsburg and Turk) without losing their national identity and effective autonomy; the Church in both lands played a crucial role in their ethnic survival. 35 Samuel Klein (Micu) and George §incai produced the first modern Rumanian Latin grammar, Elements of the Daco-Roman or Wallach Language (Vienna, 1780), while Peter Maior published, at Budapest in 1812, History of the Origin of the Rumanians in Dacia. For the nationalising role of these erstwhile-Uniate priests, see Biserica Romàna Unità, p. 103. 36 Biserica Romàna Unità, p. 72. 57 Perhaps the most prominent was the Bohemian Jesuit, Bohuslav Balbin, who wrote, Epitome Rerum Bohemicarum (1677); and Dissertatio Apologetica pro Lingua Slavonica Praecipue Bohemica (1775).

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alien national cultures which led a number of 18th-century German authors to profess their love for the Bohemian tongue,38 the Fanariot Prince John Caradja of Wallachia decided to import the Latinist professor, George Lazar, from Transylvania to Bucarest in 1816, to give the first courses in the Rumanian language in competition with the officially established Greek. Undoubtedly, the ideals of liberty and equality and fraternity which accompanied the birth of a new era in the nineteenth century and their propagation by the revolutionary armies to Eastern Europe, turned this benign 18th-century cultural nationalism of the Rumanians and Czechs to more aggressive channels of political nationalism and helped inculcate a new awareness of oppression. Rumanians came to resent their Greek, Turkish, and Russian oppressors, just as the Czechs became more keenly impatient of their domination by Germans. Distorting and exaggerating the cultural nationalism of the 18th-century scholars, both Rumanians and Czechs in turn emphasized the exclusive character of their respective nationalism and began to formulate political programs. The Rumanians, increasingly conscious of their Latin ancestry, wished to revive the ancient kingdom of Dacia, and, for obvious reasons, anticipated the help of their most powerful Latin sister-nation, namely, France. The Czechs, equally aware of their Slavic racial ancestry, began directing their attention to the vast territories once controlled by the Moravian Principality at the height of its power and instinctively turned to Russia, their senior Slavic partner, for sympathy and support.39 Nationalists in both countries, for different reasons, simultaneously insisted upon the uniqueness of their respective Slavic or Latinizing mission; the Czechs stressing their role since Hussite times as an Eastern outpost of the liberal West, the Rumanians, their role as an Eastern outpost of the Latin West. The first explosion of political nationalism in 1848 saw a divergence of opinion, not so much between Czechs and Rumanians, as between the more conservative and the more radical elements in both countries. At Bucarest and Jassy, the moderates formulated a "little Rumania 38

Franz M. Dobner, 1719-1790, and Count Francis Kinsky, 1739-1805, were Germans, but felt Czech; F. M. Pelcl, 1734-1801, though of German origin and writing in German, had unquestionably been under Czech influence. Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism (New York, 1961), pp. 554-55. 39 The first literary pioneers of Pan-Slavism were two Protestant Slovaks, P. J. Safarik, 1815-1861, and J. Kollar, 1793-1852. J. Dobrovsky was the first Czech to have acually taken the road to St. Petersburg in 1792, but, rather like T. G. Masaryk, he came back disillusioned.

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program" in the name of autonomy and union of the Principalities, while a few radicals at Bucarest, in the name of unity and independence for all Rumanian lands, formulated the "great Rumania program". The majority of the Czechs, Slovaks, and Transylvanians at the Prague and Blaj assemblies, under the leadership of F. Palacky, L. Rieger, 1. Stur, and A. Iancu, and in opposition to the Rumanians in the Principalities who urged a common cause with the Hungarian rebels, staked their hopes upon an Austro-Russian victory. They envisioned their future in a reconstituted Habsburg Empire ensuring equal status for all the nationalities. Although Austro-Slavism was not to the liking of all Rumanians, even within the Habsburg Empire - the Bukovian, E. Hurmuzachi, preferred centralization 40 - there is nevertheless a basic identity of viewpoint between Palacky's Statsidee and the crude "federalism" inherent in Aurel Popovici's United States of Greater Austria (1906). In the short run, however, the moderate Rumanians in the Principalities proved the more farsighted, and, with the help of France, achieved their basic demands, while Czechs, Slovaks, Bukovians, and Transylvanians continued to labor under various disabilities until the end of World War I. Although relations between Czechs within the Habsburg Empire and the newly-established Rumanian state must be viewed in the context of these developments, in marked contrast was the close rapport which developed, particularly after the Ausgleich of 1867, between Transylvanians and Slovaks in Transleithania, on the one hand, and across the Leitha, between Transylvanians and Czechs, on the other. In fact, one may well trace the origins of the wartime and postwar alliance with full continuity to this collaborative Czecho-Slovak-Rumanian effort, which goes well back to the eighteen-sixties.41 The Slovak-Transylvania friendship of despair had, of course, ancient historical roots, which were renewed and strengthened after 1867, owing to the ruthless policy of Magyarization, intensified from 1875 onwards under the Tisza regime. Rumanians and Slovaks had risen together during the so-called cholera 40

The only major point of contention between Rumanians and Czechs within the Empire concerned Bukovina. Palacky and Rieger appear to have advocated the incorporation of Bukovina in Polish Galicia, a view resisted by Hurmuzachi, the chief Rumanian spokesman from that province, who at last won Rieger over to his view. 41 J. S. Rou£ek, Contemporary Roumania and her Problems (London, 1932), p. 127; also, an interesting article by J. Macurek, "Die Tschechische Politik und die Rumanen in den Sechziger und Siebziger Jahren des Neunzehnten Jahrhunderts", Prager Rundschau (1937), Vol. 7, pp. 257-273.

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insurrection of 1831,42 they had fought together against the Hungarians in 1848, 43 and they had supported each other's rights in the Viennese Parliament until 1867; what was more obvious than that they should continue to form a lobby resisting Magyar intransigence in the parliament of Budapest? It was in June 1870 that A. Moczonyi, the leader of the Rumanian group, made what might be described as the last opposition speech to come from a non-Magyar bench until 1918. From 1875 onwards, Rumanians and Slovaks who refused to accede to the Magyarization which was imposed from kindergarten to university, were systematically excluded from the economic and political life of the state. Slovak and Rumanian schools, colleges, national societies, libraries, newspapers, were dissolved or closed down - only at the two respective national centers, Blaj and Turciansky Svaty Martin, was a semblance of national activity maintained. But the Rumanians alone were able to preserve their denominational secondary schools.44 In an atmosphere of increasing tension, both Rumanian and Slovak politicians showed their discouragement by embarking on a fatal course of abstaining from elections, and those few candidates who continued to present themselves were considered traitors to the national cause. It was not until 1881 that the Rumanians gathered sufficient courage to summon a congress and organize a National Party with the inevitable traditional aim of appealing to Vienna over the head of their Hungarian oppressors. By 1894, the activity of the directing committee (J. Ratiu, N. Popa de Basesti, and T. Mihali) appeared sufficiently dangerous to the Hungarian government to bring its members to trial - the famous Memorandum trial - on the charge of incitement against the Magyar nationality. It was characteristic of the close relations existing between Rumanians and Slovaks that three Slovak Lawyers, M. Stefanovic, M. Dula (later President of the Slovak National Council), and S. Fajnor 42

For an interesting study on the Rumanian repercussions of the Slovak cholera uprising of 1831, the largest social uprising since the 16th-century Dozsa rebellion involving no fewer than 45,000 peasants, see L. Talkorsky, "Miscarile Jaraniste din Ardeal in 1831 §i legaturile lor cu Rascoala Holerii din Slovakia de est", Studii, (1958), Vol. 9, N o . 2, and also D . Rapant, Sedliacke pevstanie na vychodnom Slovensku roku 1831, 2 vols. (Bratislava, 1953). 43 Slovaks and Rumanians contributed some fifteen legions to the armies of General Piichner in the summer of 1890. "Conferinta Istoricilor Slovaci despre viaja lui Ludovic Stur", Studii (1956), Vol. 9, N o . 4, p. 153. 44 The Slovaks fared less well than the Rumanians and their three denominational schools were closed in 1874. The Rumanian Uniates were able to keep open their two Gymnasiums at Blaj; the Orthodox had one at Beiuj and Nasaud, and a Realschule at Brasov.

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volunteered to conduct the defence of the Rumanians. 45 The sentencing of the Rumanian leaders to five years in jail did at least succeed in bringing the plight of the oppressed nationalities of Transleithania to public attention both in Bucarest and Prague. Reaction in Bucarest to Hungarian pressures against the Rumanians of Transylvania had preceded the Memorandum trial. Three years before, the students at the University of Bucarest sent a strongly worded note of protest to their counterparts at Budapest - the beginning of a long polemic; a cultural league encouraging irredentist sentiment was formed. 46 The nationalist sentiments of certain intellectual circles in behalf of the Transylvanians, and sympathy for the oppressed Slovaks and Czechs were checked by the existence of a secret alliance with the Central Powers, renewed regularly from 1883 until the eve of the first World War, and the pro-German sympathies and Hohenzollern ties of Charles I. The utmost the successive Rumanian governments were prepared to concede to public opinion was that some diplomatic pressure be exerted in behalf of the Transylvanians, particularly during Caprivi's chancellorship, effective at the time of the renewals of the secret alliance. Concerning the Czech aspirations, there was little more in Bucarest than vague expressions of public sympathy, such as were manifested, for instance, by the genuine public response during the Bohemian flood of 1872,47 and occasional words of individual encouragement, like those spoken by Iorga in 1907, when it took some courage to appear as a pro-Czech. 48 Because of Rumania's official ties with the Central Powers, there was, ironically enough, almost more freedom of action in behalf of the Rumanian Transylvanians in Habsburg-controlled Bohemia than in the officially independent Kingdom. One might almost suggest that Prague, rather than the Rumanian capital, was the pivotal center for the organization of effective propaganda activity by way of Congresses, cultural exchanges, and articles in the press (particularly in the journal,

45 For the Memorandum trial, see R. W. Seton-Watson, History of the Roumanians (Cambridge, 1939), p. 413. Rumanian lawyers in turn volunteered to defend "Slovak conspirators" in a similar trial which was held in Prague in 1892. 46 N . Iorga, Sfaturi pe Intunerec: Liga culturalä ce a fost, ce este, la ce folose$te (Bucarest, 1936), p. 86. 47 Macürek, "Die Tschechische Politik und die Rumänen", p. 271. 48 D. D. Dimäncescu, Relations Between Czechoslovakia and Roumania (Oxford, 1941), p. 8.

Czechoslovakia and Rumania

699

Politik).49 The main objective of what might truly be described as an unofficial fin de siècle diplomacy was the alignment of all the nonGerman and non-Magyar nationalities on both sides of the Leitha in a concerted action to secure linguistic, administrative, and political equality within a reconstituted Empire upon a federalist program suggested by such men as Palacky and Popovici. A final entente proclaiming the solidarity of all non-Magyar and non-German groups was reached at Prague in 1898. It was undoubtedly owing in part to this new impulse that the policy of abstention was gradually abandoned in Transleithania, and by 1906 a new Rumanian-Slovak block of twentyfive deputies had reappeared in the Hungarian Parliament. 50 It was in the same spirit, and after many fruitless efforts with Francis Joseph, that the Belvedere coterie began with the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, who showed himself remarkably responsive to the demands of the nationalities. Prague was also instrumental, under various cultural pretexts, in organizing channels of communication with the friendly West, attempting particularly to enlist the interest of the academic world in the fate of the oppressed Rumanians, Slovaks, and Czechs. In this way E. Denis and R. W. Seton-Watson, two great friends of Czechs, Slovaks, and Rumanians, began to write of history from the point of view of the two respective nations. 51 Finally, efforts were made even in Bucarest through the influential Czech colony, and from 1913 onwards, by

4!l

There was collaboration among journalists, e.g., between the Prague Politik, the Tribuna of Arad, and Gazcta Transilvaniei of Cluj. There were cultural exchanges with Rumanian delegations visiting Prague in 1891, 1898, etc.; reciprocal expressions of sympathy such as when the women of Transylvania protested the imprisonment of the Slovak poet, S. H. Vajansky (1896), a protest eloquently answered by the women of Slovakia. Nistor, Cehoslovacii .¡i Românii, p. 27. 50 The Rumanian group of sixteen deputies included Mihali, Vaida Voevod, Maniu, Lucaciu, and Vlad. In the 1910 elections, the Rumanian-Slovak group was reduced from 26 to 8 deputies. 51 In 1891, a French delegation visited the National Exhibit in Prague. This was followed by the visit of a delegation of Czech Sokols to Nancy. In 1896, on the occasion of the one thousandth anniversary of the Hungarian state, Czechs, Rumanians, and Slovaks attended a Congress in Paris presided over by a former French Minister of Foreign Affairs, E. Flourens. R. W. Seton-Watson provides the best example of an intellectual who was simultaneously won over to the cause of Czech and Rumanian nationalism. See his History of the Roumanians (Cambridge, 1934) and his History of the Czechs and Slovaks (New York, 1943). For a recent view of the continuing presence of France in Czechoslovakia, see G. Pistorius, Destin de la culture française dans une démocratie populaire: La présence française en Tchécoslovaquie 1948-56 (Paris, 1957).

700

Radu R. Florescu

means of the United States minister in Bucarest, C. Vopicka, 52 who prided himself on his Czech ancestry, less to incite irrendentist circles than to inform the government of the progress of negotiations with the Archduke regarding the Rumanian Transylvanian question. The effectiveness of this action can be gauged from the friendly conversation which took place between Charles I and Francis Ferdinand at Sinaia in 1909. By 1911, talks had progressed so far that I. Maiorescu could seriously entertain the fascinating idea of uniting greater Rumania within a multinational Habsburg state. Only the murder of the Archduke channeled this Czecho-Rumanian cooperation into its final revolutionary stage. It was only with Rumania's formal entry into the war in 1916 that the unofficial entente existing between intellectuals since the 1860's was transformed into an alliance with the leaders of the future Czechoslovak State, still in exile. 53 Czecho-Rumanian wartime collaboration constitutes a fascinating episode, with many aspects deserving as many chapters in a study which has yet to be written. One phase of this collaboration is the purely military one: the joint effort of Czech legions which fought alongside the Rumanians in the Dobrogea campaign during the winter of 1916-1917. Another was the political prise de contacte\ this occurred when T. G. Masaryk assembled the Congress of Nationalities at Jassy in 1917, exploded the outworn formula of Austro-Slavism, and shortly thereafter was formally received by King Ferdinand and the Rumanian government. A third, rather complicated, diplomatic chapter could be written on the talks that were going on in Paris between Benes and Take Ionescu, which laid the groundwork for collaboration at the future peace conference and in the postwar world. One much-ignored aspect of Czech, Slovak, and Rumanian propagandist activity took place in various capitals, but particularly on American soil, where T. G. Masaryk and the Transylvanian delegate, V. Stoica, launched a Middle European Union, summoned a series of Congresses (Cleveland, May; Pittsburgh, June; New York, September; Philadephia, October), and obtained an interview with President Wilson in 1918. It 52

Charles J. Vopicka was appointed United States Minister to Serbia, Rumania, and Bulgaria on October 16, 1913, taking up residence in Bucarest. See C. J. Vopicka, Secrets of the Balkans (Chicago, 1921), p. 18. By 1892, a CzechRumanian society had been organized in Bucarest under the leadership of the journalist, V. Miller. A similar society was formed in Prague after World War I. 53 As soon as Rumania entered the war, Bene? and Masaryk sent Bratianu a message welcoming Rumania's struggle "for the cause of all oppressed nationalities". E. BeneS, My War Memoirs (New York, 1928), p. 315.

Czechoslovakia and Rumania

701

would be interesting for the scholar of the future to ascertain precisely to what extent the attitude of the American President, in his extension of the original Fourteen Points, was affected by the activity of Rumanian propagandists in the U.S., as has already been done in the case of the Slovaks and Czechs.54 The dissolution of the Habsburg Empire had certainly not figured in his original intentions. There are some very personal and touching incidents in this friendship strengthened by war. One concerns the individual solicitude of the Catholic Abbot, M. Zavoral, for the wounded Rumanian soldiers entrusted to his care at the Monastery of Strahov in Prague. There were dramatic moments as when, in spite of the twenty-five hour concessions of the Hungarian government in the autumn of 1918, the Transylvanian deputy, Vaida Voevod, followed by Slovak deputy Father Juriga, dared assert the independence of their respective provinces within the Hungarian Parliament. While the Austro-Hungarian Empire was dissolving everywhere and national councils were taking over, both at Arad and Turciansky Svaty Martin, an episode in Prague, more symbolic than significant, concluded and provided a fitting climax to this most fruitful phase of Czech-Rumanian wartime camaraderie. As the Council in Prague organized its final coup on October 28, two Rumanian Transylvanian regiments refused to heed the Austrian commandant, who ordered them to fire into the crowd, and by a swift volte-face contributed to the success of the bloodless revolution which proclaimed the Republic. 55 The sequel to this history of intense friendship was anticlimactic. A certain sour note had been introduced at the Peace Conference with Bratianu's claims on Ruthenia, conflicting with Czech demands. 56 The common policy compelled by the circumstances of the Kun revolt and the deployment of the Rumanian army in the territory of Czechoslovakia resulted in a certain pique in Prague, accounted for by the previous Czech defeat at the hands of the Hungarians and the denial of a victorious entry in Budapest. 57 Even the much vaunted alliance of 1921, 54

See V. S. Mamatey, The United States and East Central Europe, 1914-1918 (Princeton, 1957). 55 War-time collaboration and liaison between Rumanians and Czechs was facilitated by the practice of the Austro-Hungarian government of quartering Czech and Slovak regiments in Transylvania, and Rumanians in Bohemia and Slovakia. 56 S. D . Spector, Rumania at the Peace Conference: A Study of the Diplomacy of Ion I. C. Bratianu (New York, 1962), p. 128. 57 G. E. Bratianu, Ac(iunea Politicd si Militara a Romaniei in 1919 (Bucarest, 1939), p. 138.

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Radu R. Florescu

based on the common fears of Hungarian revisionism rather than on common interests, after an honest attempt by Benes and Titulescu to give it an air of sincerity, gave way to hypocrisy during the Carol dictatorship, which had never been friendly to the Czechs. The Munich crisis of 1938 simply confirmed Rumania's betrayal of Czechoslovakia (the crux of the difficulty had always been the King's refusal to allow the passage of Russian troops on Rumanian soil).58 Despite this tragic dénouement, traditional ties could not be destroyed overnight by the fickleness of a régime, and during the long night of Hitler's new order, Rumanian sympathies for the plight of Czechoslovakia were frequently expressed. It was sheer coincidence, but nevertheless an indication of the redemptive justice of history, that the first Rumanian army, under General Atanasiu, lost 61,554 men in a hardfought campaign during the spring of 1945 in helping liberate Czech soil from German control.59

58

H. Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe Between the Wars, 1918-1941 (Cambridge, 1945), p. 390. For a pre-Communist viewpoint, see G. Gafencu, Prelude to the Russian Campaign (London, 1945), p. 227. For the current standpoint, see J. Benditer (laji) "Atitudinea Guvernului Romîn fa}à de Cehoslovacia în Lunile premergàtoare Mtinchen-ului Mai-Septembrie 1938", Studii, (1956), Vol. 9, No. 5, pp. 7-21, and E. Campus, "Despre Politica Externa a Guvernului Reacjionar Romîn în Etapa Trâdàrii de la Munchen 1937-38", Studii: Revista de Istorie si Filosofie (1953), Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 33-52. An interesting, unpublished, authoritative survey is that of F. Nano, "The Foreign Policy of Rumania 1918-39" (Washington Library of Congress microfilm, 1953). The best basic works on the Little Entente are F. Codresco, La Petite Entente (Paris, 1931); R. Machray, The Struggle for the Danube and the Little Entente, 1929-38 (London, 1938), and J. O. Crane, Little Entente (New York, 1931). For documents, see: Documents diplomatiques, relatifs aux conventions d'alliance conclues par la République tchécoslovaque avec le royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes et le royaume des Roumains décembre 1919-août 1921 (Prague, 1922). 59 General V. Atanasiu, "Luptele Armatei Romîne pe Teritoriul Cehoslovaciei", Studii (1959), Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 205-222.

Czechoslovak-Yugoslav Relations, 1933-1938*

JOSEF KORBEL

Czechoslovak-Yugoslav relations in the period between January 1933 and September 1938 must be understood and analyzed in the light of European development at that time, as well as against the background of the basic concept of Czechoslovak foreign policy. As countries which regained independence and unification respectively in the wake of World War I, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia shared common interests in maintaining and undergirding the status quo created by the peace treaties. They wished to develop friendly relations with the Western Allies, giving preference, however, to France, should the Western powers find themselves at odds, as they did, in the defense of their own individual national policies. Within this general framework of political orientation, the two countries, however, differed in focusing both their efforts and apprehensions in achieving their national objectives. Yugoslavia, primarily a Balkan country, and exposed to severe internal strains, viewed with grave suspicion Italian and Bulgarian political moves, while Germany did not seem to her to present a direct danger; the Soviet Union was regarded for sentimental and ideological reasons as an outcast. For Czechoslovakia, a Central European country, the chief potential danger stemmed from a revengeful Germany, in spite of generally good contacts with the Weimar Republic. She did not wish to be embroiled in Balkan quarrels and endeavored to maintain friendly relations with Italy. In spite of temporary improvement at one time or another, her relations with Poland remained unsettled. In the Soviet Union, she saw an ideological enemy, but realized at the same time its importance for European peace. On three issues, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia appeared to have had paramount identical interests overriding other considerations: to * The author's thanks for research assistance go to Edward L. Miles, now Assistant Professor of International Relations, University of Denver.

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prevent an Anschluss and the restoration of the Habsburg (though even here existed nuances in emphasis), and to combat the revisionist goals of Hungary. Economically, Czechoslovakia was anxious to supply Yugoslavia with industrial goods, but the latter could hardly compensate for these imports by adequate exports of agricultural products. Emotionally, both countries were tied by traditional sentiments of mutual belonging and friendship. On the larger European scene, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia gave dedicated support to the League of Nations, which they viewed as a defender of peace treaties and an instrument of collective security. The Little Entente, in which Rumania joined the other two countries, was directed against Hungarian revisionism only, although it did not fail to express its position on other international problems and it acquired a highly respectable place in Geneva diplomatic circles. Established on bilateral treaties signed in 1920 and 1921, the Little Entente intervened successfully in many critical situations which stemmed from the frustrations and dissatisfactions of the Hungarian policy. On several occasions, the Little Entente attempted to bring about a consolidation of the situation in Central Europe by economic measures which would strengthen Austria and Hungary, but political considerations proved to exercise a stronger pull than the need for economic recovery. Since 1927, Italy had begun to give more and more pronounced support to the policy of revision of the peace treaties, and in the early 1930's, during the depression, became the leader of a revisionist bloc. At the same time, Dr. Edvard Benes, then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia, became increasingly concerned with developments in Germany and with the protracted and unsuccessful deliberations of the Disarmament Conference. When he was informed in Geneva about an Italo-German meeting in Rome, held in October 1932, at which presumably was elaborated a vast plan for revision of treaties, he journeyed directly to Belgrade and agreed with King Alexander on an even more energetic policy of the Little Entente. In January 1933, he initiated, with Alexander's approval, negotiations which led to the conclusion of the Organization Pact of the Little Entente, signed February 16, 1933. 1 The Pact came at a proper time. Hitler came to power on January 30, 1933. His political aims were well-known from his writings and 1

Memoirs 22-23.

of Dr. Edvard Benes (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1954), pp.

Czechoslovak-Yugoslav

Relations,

1933-1938

705

speeches, and the violent agitation of his cohorts pointed unmistakably to the methods he was to apply in achieving them. Yet, few statesmen understood the handwriting on the wall. Italy rejoiced in the new powerful impetus which the Fascist ideology received from the Nazi victory, though she was not at first without apprehension about a potential conflict between her interests and those of the Germans. The Hungarian revisionist campaign was rampant. The Organization Pact of the Little Entente expressed the wish of the signatories to give to their alliance an organic and stable basis which would assure them of complete unification of their general policies, thus establishing a superior institutional unity which, however, would be open to other states. It established a Permanent Council to direct their common policy. It obligated the member states to secure unanimous approval by the Permanent Council of any political treaty, including economic agreements with political consequences, which would change their political position toward other states. It established an Economic Council and a Permanent Secretariat, and prolonged the bilateral treaties of alliance without limitations to their duration. 2 In a statement before the Czechoslovak Parliament on March 1, 1933, Dr. Benes explained that the Organization Pact was "the first step toward an integration, a synthesis, a formation of a new international community". But he also emphasized that it represented a deterrent against "grave diplomatic conflicts" which might ensue in Central Europe following lack of success of the disarmament negotiations. He also pointedly warned big powers not to attempt to realize their plans above the heads of the small states or to use them as instruments of their policies.3 However, the subsequent parts of Dr. Benes' statement revealed the different emphasis of the individual members of the Little Entente toward relations with their powerful neighbors. Anticipating the reaction of Mussolini, he assured his audience that the Little Entente would never be directed against any of the big powers, "particularly not against Italy". He stressed that Czechoslovakia and Rumania seek the most amicable relations with Italy, and continued, "Since we have now unified our three foreign policies, how would it be possible that the same sentiments would not lead Yugoslavia, how would it be possible that in 2

For text, see Documents on International A ffairs, 1933, J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, ed. (London, Oxford University Press, 1934), pp. 115-18. Hereafter referred to as DIA. 3 Ibid., pp. 418-20.

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Korbel

a moment when a conflict should threaten to break out between Yugoslavia and Italy the other members of the Little Entente would not do everything to avoid such a conflict and to re-establish identical relations of friendship between themselves and Italy?" 4 Developing further this thought of difference of attitude of the individual members of the Little Entente toward the big powers, but of the simultaneous interest in bridging them, Dr. Benes mentioned that Yugoslavia and Rumania had no conflict with Germany, that, however, Czechoslovakia wished to maintain with Germany the same friendship as had existed during Stresemann's time. The same was true for the Soviet Union. As for Central Europe, Dr. Benes emphasized that members of the Little Entente were determined to defend their position with all of their energy and to render their territory impregnable. 5 To Benes, the Organization Pact was an answer to the international crisis caused by the events in Germany: economic depression, the political struggle in Geneva, and failure of the Disarmament Conference. In this environment, the Pact was to be a step toward integration in the world of disintegration of world order. 6 Subsequent events showed that these efforts toward integration collapsed before the forces of disintegration. The Pact was received with ill-concealed apprehension in Berlin, Rome, and Budapest. The Czechoslovak Minister to Germany explained to Baron von Neurath that the Pact did not signify any change in relations between the members of the Little Entente, who, however, considered it necessary to present their solidarity to the outside world, since, individually, they were being pushed aside by the Great Powers. The Alliance was not directed against Germany, but Italy's attitude toward Yugoslavia and the Hungarian attitude had constituted special reasons for signing the Pact. 7 Italy resented the Pact as an "offensively ingenious attempt . . . to present a united front to the world for the purpose of claiming, conjointly, the rank of a Great Power", while Hungary viewed it as another obstacle to her revisionist policy 8 . 4

Ibid., p. 420. Ibid., p. 421. 6 Edvard Benes, Le pacte d'organization de la Petite entente et l'état actuel de la politique internationale (Prague, Orbis, 1933), pp. 17-18. 7 U.S. Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy, JanuaryOctober 1933, Vol. I (Washington, D.C., 1957), pp. 67-68. Hereafter referred to as DGFP. 8 Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1933 (London, Oxford University Press, 1934). Hereafter referred to as SI A. s

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Relations, 1933-1938

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Hungary lacked power to act on her own, and the diplomatic efforts were, therefore, concentrated on Italy. On one occasion, Dr. Benes warned the British government against Italian plans to dismember Yugoslavia. Such a course, in his opinion, would provoke a general war. 9 Yugoslavia, as well as the other two members of the Little Entente, had serious reasons to follow with apprehension and anxiety Mussolini's political moves. He had proposed to France, England, and Germany that they all conclude a Four Power Pact which was meant to establish a directorate over Europe and open the question of revision of peace treaties. The Little Entente fought the proposal with all diplomatic means at its disposal. On March 20, 1933, the Permanent Council of the Little Entente published a statement in which it warned against agreements the purpose of which would be to dispose of the rights of other nations, and against a revisionist policy.10 As the original text of the Four Power Pact was, under the pressure from smaller states, modified by omitting any reference to the idea of revision of peace treaties, the Little Entente acquiesced in the new agreement, but it stated "solemnly and definitively" and in "absolute identity of their points of view" that the question of revision of boundaries did not exist for them. 11 When the German Foreign Office inquired of its Ministers in Prague and Belgrade what prospects existed for a revision of boundaries, the answers were quite negative. Though President Masaryk was reportedly inclined to negotiate with Hungary, a revision could hardly be achieved unless Hungary were integrated into the Little Entente and became an "entirely obedient instrument of the Little Entente policy of French orientation in the Danubian area". However, even in such a case, the German Minister to Prague considered a revision of boundaries entirely improbable, since "it [was] against the nature of the Czechs to give up something once they have it". 12 As to Yugoslavia, the German Minister to Belgrade gave a simple answer - no - but be added quite significantly that, should Yugoslavia 0

Woodward, E. L., and Rohan Butler, eds., Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, Vol. V, Second Series (1933), (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956), pp. 63-66. Hereafter referred to as DBFP. >® D.B.F.P., V / 2 , p. 109. 11 DIA, 1933, pp. 261-63. 12 D.G.F.P., Vol. I, 1-10, 1933, pp. 548-49 (June 9, 1933).

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Korbel

ever be willing to negotiate a peace treaty revision, it would be necessary to avoid letting the Italian hand be visible in this matter. 13 Another problem in which Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia were eminently interested was the future of Austria. Exposed to severe economic crises and nurturing at the same time the past glories of the Habsburg rule, influential political circles thought of finding a way out of miserable frustrations by either restoring the Habsburg dynasty or uniting with Germany. Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia made it quite clear on several occasions that they were against any of these two "solutions" — if these can be called solutions - of the Austrian problem. They supported, rather, the policy of giving economic assistance to Austria and attempting to draw her closer to the Little Entente through various devices of a Danubian confederation. However, should Yugoslavia be forced to choose between an Anschluss and the restoration of the Habsburgs, there were indications that she would give preference to the former, because the latter, it was feared, would encourage Croatian separatism. To Czechoslovakia, it appears, neither of the two alternatives was preferable. With Hitler's coming to power, Anschluss became a real possibility. The Little Entente, and Britain and France too, hoped and expected that on this particular problem they could enlist help from Mussolini. It took less than five years for them to experience a deep disappointment. In the middle of 1933, the French and British governments urged Dr. Benes to visit Rome, in view of the common interest in maintaining the independence of Austria. The French government was, at the same time, to attempt to rid the Italian mind of the suspicion that a policy of preserving Austria from Germany meant only to subordinate her to the Little Entente. Benes expressed willingness to visit Italy, if invited, but he insisted on preparing the visit beforehand and securing in advance a promise from Italy to abandon her hostility toward the Little Entente and to suspend the campaign for the revision of boundaries. 14 Mussolini was obviously not willing to offer such guarantees. He knew that France needed Italy in her attempts to face the growing German dangers and was not inclined to pay the price of suspending continuous harrassment of Yugoslavia. When France tried to convince Belgrade of the necessity to reach an » "

D.G.F.P., Vol. I, 1-10, 1933, p. 617 (June 30, 1933). D.B.F.P., V/2, p. 542, 547.

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Relations, 1933-1938

709

agreement with Rome, the only reaction was an understandable suspicion of the French policy, and even King Alexander began to think of a Yugoslav-German rapprochement to face the Italian designs. Czechoslovakia, as anxious as she was to establish friendly relations with Italy, could not, however, weaken the position of the Little Entente and deny full support to Yugoslavia. Nor could she undermine the solidarity of the Little Entente in the question of boundary revision. Moreover, as the agitation of Sudeten Germans began to menace her internal stability she became increasingly concerned with Hitler's plans. Yugoslavia, on the other hand, was little worried about a German danger; her chief attention turned toward Italy. Lack of vision prevented the leading statesmen from anticipating further developments; lack of courage blinded them to the need for mutual accommodation before the single menace of Nazism. Soon, other events followed which corroded the fabric of European peace and the system of security upon which depended Yugoslav and Czechoslovak independence. Soon, Yugoslavia herself was to contribute to this process. Poland, tired for quite some time of what Pilsudski considered French tutelage and distrustful of French foreign policy, signed in January 1934 a treaty of nonaggression with Germany. Italy entered in March 1934 into a bloc with Hungary and Austria, a move which aggravated the divisions in Central Europe and encouraged Hungarian revisionism. In July 1934, Chancellor Dolfuss was assassinated and Austria was opened to acts of mass violence between the Nazis and Austrian Fascists. In October 1934, King Alexander and the French Foreign Minister, Barthou, were assassinated by Croatian terrorists who received help from the Italian and Hungarian governments. All these highly disruptive events occurred in the shadow of Germany's growing strength and her negative attitude towards pressing problems of peace. Hitler had wrecked the Disarmament Conference and walked out of the League of Nations and, the following year, was ready to embark on a policy of general rearmament. France tried to counteract these developments by a rapprochement with Italy and the Soviet Union and by opening negotiations on East Locarno, but all these attempts sooner or later floundered because of lack of decisiveness and a growing ideological rift. The economic crisis further hampered efforts in political consolidation. The Little Entente kept outwardly steadfast in her traditional policy of mutual solidarity and close cooperation with France. Its Economic

710

Josef Korbel

Council passed several elaborate resolutions, recommending detailed measures for mutual trade and coordination of economic policies. Rumania and Czechoslovakia opened, in June 1934, diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and supported its entry in the League of Nations. However, under the surface, a realignment of forces between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia began to take shape - first unnoticeably, then at a quick and open pace. King Alexander, always highly sensitive and suspicious of Italy, and aware of Italian support of Croatian separatist activities, began to look toward Germany for strengthening Yugoslavia's position. Sir Neville Henderson, the British Minister to Belgrade, who was known to have free access to the King, reported that three contingencies in Europe were of particular interest to Yugoslavia: the Anschluss, a Habsburg restoration, and treaty revision. Yugoslavia was opposed to all, but in varying degrees, wrote the British diplomat. She opposed an Anschluss because it might prejudice the independence of Czechoslovakia, though she regarded it as inevitable and, in view of Italian involvement in Austria, as the lesser of two evils. In case of a Habsburg restoration, she "would be obliged to protect herself", but she would act only with support and at the advice of France and England. The report concluded by stating that the King of Yugoslavia, having personal predilections for Germany, was apparently waiting only for the time and opportunity to come to an agreement with Germany. The report warned, ". . . if Yugoslavia ends in Germany's arms, it will be Italy who has put her there". 15 The warning was only partly correct: she ended finally in the arms of both Fascist countries. One source, in fact, reveals that Alexander had attempted through secret contacts to reach an understanding with Italy since November 1930, and never relaxed in these efforts until his death. 16 France was to serve as a midwife of this plan, as she ardently wished to reach an understanding with Italy, but the tense Italo-Yugoslav relations were an obstacle to this policy. Negotiations between Belgrade and Rome started seriously in March 1934, but the King became increasingly impatient with French pressures as he realized that the efforts of Paris were motivated by a plan to establish an anti-German front. The King, in fact, put out at the same time feelers for a rapprochement with Germany. "

D.B.F.P., VI/2, pp. 521-24, March 5, 1934. J. B. Hoptner, Yugoslavia in Crisis, 1934-1941 (New York, Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 14, 19-20, 24-25.

Czechoslovak-Yugoslav Relations, 1933-1938

711

On March 9, 1934, the Yugoslav Minister to Germany was received by Hitler and suggested to him an extension of trade relations; he further expressed the wish for improved political relations. Hitler was undoubtedly also pleased to hear from the Yugoslav diplomat that Yugoslavia was opposed to the Habsburg's restoration. He did not care to mention that Yugoslavia was opposed also to Anschluss, but he conveyed to Hitler Belgrade's desire "for liberation from the ties with France". At the same time, King Alexander himself said to King Boris of Bulgaria that "in Yugoslavia they were tired of being treated like a puppet by the French, and would gladly free themselves of the tutelage by a rapprochement with Germany".17 Though King Alexander agreed during Barthou's visit in Belgrade to visit Paris at a later date, he did not fail to inform Berlin that he would not agree to any Central European settlement which excluded Germany.18 Whether inadvertently or deliberately, the communiqué issued by the Permanent Council of the Little Entente failed to mention, in an otherwise elaborate presentation of its political postulates, its opposition to Anschluss, though it did reiterate its decision to oppose the Habsburgs' return under whatever form.19 The tragedy of Marseilles exposed both Yugoslavia's internal weaknesses and her hostile relations with Italy. The League of Nations, investigating the assassination, cautiously avoided annoying Italy and condemning her complicity in the crime. This, in turn, led to further estrangement between Paris and Belgrade. In these circumstances, it may not be surprising that when Goring was in Belgrade for Alexander's funeral, he had two conversations with Prince Paul, who, according to German sources, "had at once found many points of contact and common interests with his German visitor".20 The German Minister to Belgrade sensed the delicate position of Yugoslavia as she looked at her internal problems and counted both her friends and enemies in the hour of national mourning. Though he admitted that much of the popular tide was running towards France and against Germany and suspected Italy of trying to make political capital out of Yugoslavia's sudden weakness, he recommended to Berlin to sit tight, to show to Yugoslavia German sympathy, "and not to dis17

C. H. Macartney, Independent Eastern Europe (London, Macmillan, 1962), pp. 316-17, quoting from D.G.F.P., C, II, p. 498. 18 Hoptner, op. cit., p. 24. 19 DIA, 1934, pp. 365-67, June 20, 1934. 20 Macartney, op. cit., p. 337.

712

Josef

Korbel

turb [her internal recovery] by any political combinations which would in any case be found to miscarry at present, given the prevailing situation in European power politics".21 Clouds were gathering at a threatening pace over the scene of Yugoslav politics and inevitably they affected the relations with Czechoslovakia and within the Little Entente. Whether sincerely unconcerned or playing a diplomatic "gute Miehne zum boesen Spiel", Dr. Benes stated on November 6, 1934, that King Alexander had been "devoted to the friendship, to the collaboration and alliance with Czechoslovakia . . ." and, while admitting the gravity of the international situation, he continued, "Whatever happens, nothing can divert our States from the common policy. . . ." He said further that Prince Paul had confirmed, after Alexander's death, "that he also, as well as the whole Yugoslavia, would continue faithfully and resolutely . . . the same policy toward Czechoslovakia." 22 The next two years, 1935 and 1936, witnessed the process of gradual breakdown of the European balance of power and of the peace system based on the League of Nations and the French alliances. Germany rearmed in March 1935 and a year later occupied the Rhineland. Italy invaded Ethiopia, and the League of Nations suffered by its impotence a mortal blow. Belated attempts by France and Italy to save Austria through close cooperation with other Central European states failed to stop the tide of feverish Nazi agitation. Instead, Italy and Germany drew closer together and France and Britain began the catastrophic policy of appeasing the two dictators. The civil war in Spain, in which Italy and Germany openly supported Franco's Fascist troops, while France and Britain headed a non-intervention policy, sharpened the ideological conflict between Fascism and democracy. The East Locarno project was buried by Germany and Poland, while the French-Soviet Treaty of Alliance occasioned Hitler's policy of burying the West Locarno. The dies were cast and few European statesmen realized that this regroupment of forces would soon produce an avalanche which would spread disaster all over Europe and the world. Yugoslavia played her part in the calamitous game and Czechoslovak-Yugoslav relations were this time seriously affected. In June 1935, Bogoljub Jevfic, the Yugoslav Premier and Foreign Minister, was replaced by Milan Stojadinovic. One of his contemporaries 21

D.G.F.P., Vol. Ill, 6. 1934-3. 1935, pp. 519-20, October 22, 1934. Edvard BeneS, Vers un regroupement des forces en Europe (Prague, Orbis, 1934), pp. 27, 28, 29.

Czechoslovak-Yugoslav

Relations, 1933-1938

713

characterized him as "a jovial but rather cynical man . . . reputed to be a great economic and financial wizard. He boasted that his approach to political problems . . . was purely realistic and in no way embarrassed by sentimental considerations." 23 The events proved this description to be an understatement. Stojadinovic's cynicism bordered on perversion; his "realism" led Yugoslavia to catastrophe. If he was embarrassed by anything, it was Yugoslavia's alliance with a democratic Czechoslovakia, since he was so impressed by Fascist dictatorial methods. Dr. Benes mentions in his memoirs that he sensed "unmistakably" already in June 1935 that Stojadinovic and Prince Paul were turning away from France. 24 This was certainly true, though indecision and flirting with Italy greatly facilitated Stojadinovic's policy, nay, inadvertently encouraged it. The German Minister to Belgrade, evaluating the change of government, explained that though one could not expect any sensational modification in Yugoslavia's foreign policy it already had resulted in considerable agitation in France, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia, which only proved the degree of rapprochement between Yugoslavia and Germany. He expressed further the conviction that general developments in Europe were bound to alienate Yugoslavia from her allies. Stojadinovic was, in his opinion, a firm supporter of Yugoslav-German economic collaboration and would do all he could to prevent his country's being used as an instrument of foreign interests. "From the German point of view we can only welcome these political proclivities of the new Yugoslav Minister President. They are the more valuable since they fully accord with the Prince Regent's views and in many respects also with the wishes of the Yugoslav Army." 25 Plans were being set in Rome and Berlin to weaken, if not completely disrupt, the Little Entente, and Yugoslavia was to serve in the role of blockbuster. The Hungarian Prime Minister, Gombos, confided to his colleague in Berlin, in September 1935, that Hungary wished to bring about a reconciliation with Yugoslavia in order to detach her from the Little Entente, and in his opinion Stojadinovic was the man who would understand such a policy. According to a report from Hungary, the idea of breaking the "iron ring" of the Little Entente by 23

Constantin Fotitch, The War We Lost (New York, The Viking Press, 1948), p. 13. 24 Memoirs of Dr. Edvard Benes, op. cit., p. 14. 25 D.G.F.P., 4. 1935-3. 1936, pp. 407-09.

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Josef Korbel

a rapprochement with Yugoslavia was gaining increasing favor, and high hopes were being set on the personal attitude of Stojadinovic. 26 To complement and substantiate these plans, the newly appointed Yugoslav Minister to Berlin, Cincar-Markovic, conveyed to Neurath Prince Paul's and Stojadinovic's message saying that the Yugoslav government was determined to carry on the policy of rapprochement with Germany and to loosen gradually existing ties.27 Hitler generously reciprocated the Yugoslav intentions; in February 1936, he sent a message to Prince Paul in which he promised that "no matter what the future policy of Germany will be, one of its principles will be a strong and independent Yugoslavia". 28 When, at the same time, the Little Entente attempted once again to consolidate the Central European situation by a plan of economic cooperation with the Rome Protocol countries, Germany hastened to convey to Stojadinovic that she would not accept any solution unless she was brought into the deliberations from the outset. 29 Though the official spokesmen, including Stojadinovic, and official communiqués of the Little Entente conferences spoke about absolute fidelity and solidarity among its members, the happenings behind the scene were clearly indicative of an opposite trend. When Joseph Beck, the Foreign Minister of Poland, visited Belgrade in May 1936, Stojadinovic told him that "Yugoslavia would not take up arms to defend Austria in case of Anschluss". Nor did he "conceal his aversion for the policy of M. Benes". Though the Little Entente in Stojadinovic's opinion had certain advantages for Yugoslavia, he could not see how she could help Czechoslovakia. It is not surprising that with such utterances Beck saw in Stojadinovic a man of greater courage and character than his colleagues in the Little Entente, that his "practical spirit . . . permitted him to distinguish between the truth and appearances". 30 Nor could Benes expect that Stojadinovic would accept his proposal, presented in June 1936, to strengthen the ties between the Little Entente countries by proclaiming common national holidays, convening regular meetings of Heads of State, common efforts in armament, and a unified command of armed forces. 31 On the contrary: to demonstrate 28

D.G.F.P., 4. 1935-3. 1936, pp. 667-68, 878-89. D.G.F.P., 4. 1935-3. 1936, p. 888, December 6, 1935. 28 Hoptner, op. cit., p. 47. 29 D.G.F.P., 4. 1935-3. 1936, pp. 1130-31, Febr. 13, 1936. 30 Joseph Beck, Dernier rapport (Neuchatel, Editions de la Baconnière, n.d.), pp. 118, 119, 120. 31 Hoptner, op. cit., p. 53. 27

Czechoslovak-Yugoslav

Relations,

1933-1938

715

to Prince Paul Yugoslavia's independence from her allies, he reported to him at the same time that Germany "made her an offer to furnish [her] complete security against Hungary and Italy". 32 When, on various occasions in 1936, Czechoslovakia proposed the establishment of a firm alliance against any aggressor between the Little Entente and France, Stojadinovic maneuvered, delayed, and finally rejected the idea. It is true that France herself first vacillated, but Stojadinovic's attitude at the Little Entente's Conference at Bratislava in September 1936 made it clear that he pursued a policy of disengaging himself from Yugoslavia's existing obligations rather than accepting new ones. He even asked Hitler for advice and received, of course, the expected answer, which was accompanied by a generous offer to supply Yugoslavia with German arms and even to guarantee her territorial integrity.33 There was a strange incongruity between these secret machinations and the outside appearances of firm unity in the Little Entente. Kamil Krofta, the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, evaluating the Bratislava meeting, declared that "the Little Entente [was] a political structure which arose out of definite political facts, and that the Little Entente will endure so long as there is practical foundation for its existence".34 There never was, maybe, a more practical foundation for the Little Entente's existence than at this time, when Hungarian revisionist agitation grew in intensity, supported as it was by Fascist Italy, and when the independence of Austria was clearly at stake. Stojadinovic was the principal instrument in Mussolini's and Hitler's plans to help the disintegration of the Little Entente and, particularly, the isolation of Czechoslovakia. In October 1936, Hitler urged Ciano to reach an understanding with Stojadinovic and to influence the Hungarians to direct their irredentism "against Czechoslovakia rather than Yugoslavia". 33 Ciano willingly obliged and bluntly advised the Hungarian Foreign Minister Kanya to be friendly with the Yugoslavs, "more friendly than with the Czechs".30 And Mussolini, advocating publicly a revision of the Treaty of Trianon, singled out Yugoslavia for a possibility of rapprochement,37 32

Ibid., p. 47. Macartney, op. cit., p. 356. 34 Ibid. 35 Hoptner, op. cit., p. 47. 30 John A. Lukacs, The Great Powers and Eastern Europe (New York, American Book Co., 1953), p. 73. 37 D1A, 1936, p. 393, Nov. 3, 1936. 33

716

Josef Korbel

Towards the end of 1936, France changed her mind and was now ready to sign an alliance with the Little Entente which would cover any aggression. She came too late. Prince Paul was in secret contact with Rome. Stojadinovic sabotaged the French proposal and explained to Prince Paul that "it must be clear to every Frenchman that the Czechoslovak guarantee [was] less interesting to [Yugoslavia] than Italy's "38 Krofta branded press reports about a crisis in the Little Entente as "journalistic canards", though he gently reminded Yugoslavia "that existing treaty obligations should be observed, that in the sphere of foreign policy agreement must be arrived at in advance with an ally, and that the course taken by any one of us must not be in conflict with our joint interests". 39 In a few days, the time bomb exploded. On March 25, 1937, Count Ciano, the first Italian Foreign Minister to take such a step since World War I, arrived in Belgrade. The same day, Stojadinovic and he signed a Pact by which the two countries undertook to respect their mutual frontiers and maintain mutual neutrality. 40 Stojadinovic accompanied the event by a statement that the Pact was not directed against the interests of any other country, that Yugoslavia remained faithful to her obligations to all friends and allies. 41 Happenings and conversations behind the scenes, however, revealed the true spirit of Italo-Yugoslav negotiations. Anxious to accommodate Ciano's inclinations for social frivolities, for which he himself was wellknown, Stojadinovic arranged an appropriate party in a chateau near Belgrade. The two statesmen developed soon, and without much inhibition, a close personal friendship. Stojadinovic told Ciano that he would definitely reject the French offer of alliance and criticized, in a true Fascist-racist manner, French policy. He further confided to Ciano that should Germany attack Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia would have to invade Hungary. This itself would be very difficult, but even if she did so, she would have, after the defeat of Czechoslovakia, to face the victorious German army. "A most unfortunate situation", he stated, "and a risk which we cannot let the Yugoslav people undertake; especially not as this people has no hostile sentiments for the Hungarians and nurtures no solidarity for Czechoslovakia." Stojadinovic further 36 3

»

40 41

Lukacs, op. cit., p. 75; Hoptner, op. cit., p. 58. DIA, 1937, pp. 350-351, 353, March 2, 1937. For the text, see DIA, 1937, pp. 302-03. DIA, 1937, pp. 291-92.

Czechoslovak-Yugoslav

Relations,

1933-1938

717

explained that "the Little Entente . . . will not be transformed formally . . . but while relations between Yugoslavia and Rumania will remain the same, that is loyal and cordial, relations between these two on one side and Czechoslovakia on the other will be reduced to empty formalities".42 Ciano noted, not without satisfaction, that Stojadinovic was "a Fascist. If he is not one by virtue of an open declaration of party loyalty, he is certainly one by virtue of his conception of authority, of the state and of life." 43 As to the Little Entente, it was according to him, "broken". 44 In spite of these developments and of such opinions, the Little Entente outwardly maintained a pose of continuous solidarity. Kamil Krofta, for example, stated that its other two members had approved in advance Yugoslavia's negotiations with Italy, 43 and the Permanent Council expressed on another occasion its determination not to take part in the ideological conflict which was tearing Europe apart. 46 This was, of course, only wishful thinking. The Fascist powers were advancing, the war in Spain only sharpened the ideological aspects of international tensions, and almost every European country was being increasingly divided internally by ideological rifts. Yugoslavia suffered from multiple divisions: she was unable to solve the vexing problem of nationalities, particularly of Croats; the régime used authoritarian one-party methods against the overwhelming opposition of the people; it was still tied to the Little Entente, but, in fact, was gravitating towards the Berlin-Rome Axis; it was still allied to democratic Czechoslovakia, though all its methods and desires ranged it in the camp of Fascism; it was still officially on traditionally friendly terms with France, but, in fact, despised her Popular Front government. All this was happening in an atmosphere of mounting tension between the government and the masses, which made their democratic, pro-Czechoslovak, pro-France sentiments known by demonstrations on various occasions. These conflicts came fully to the surface during and after Ciano's visit. The Permanent Council met four times in 1937 and on every occasion professed in the official communiqués a complete identity of 42

Lukacs, op. cit., pp. 75-76. Hoptner, op. cit., p. 82. 44 United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937, vol. I (Washington, D.C., 1954), p. 71. Hereafter referred to as USFR. « DIA, 1937, p. 363, May 21, 1937. 46 DIA, 1937, p. 341, April 1-2, 1937. 43

718

Josef

Korbel

views. The Prime Ministers of the Little Entente met on the Danube in June; they, too, found themselves in complete harmony. 47 Only two weeks after Ciano's trip, President Benes paid an official visit to Belgrade. The official statement was that "the close friendship and brotherly, indestructible alliance were once again sealed. . . ." 48 In fact, the visitor experienced everything but friendship and brotherly alliance. He was kept away from direct contact with Belgrade citizens, who tried to give him a cordial welcome, but were controlled by the police. The leaders of the democratic opposition issued a declaration of solidarity with the Little Entente and France, but it was confiscated. 49 The conversations which Benes had with Stojadinovic and Prince Paul only confirmed his "opinion that the leaders and official Belgrade were already whole-heartedly on the other side". Stojadinovic told him bluntly that in case of war between Big Powers, Yugoslavia would remain neutral "under all circumstances". 50 However, according to the Yugoslav documents, the President was quite optimistic about Czechoslovakia. He told Prince Paul that he did "not believe in the German danger, German strength or German designs on Czechoslovakia. Hitler does not want the Sudeten Deutsche", he said, "who were always the most radical element in the late Habsburg monarchy." 31 Stojadinovic boasted frequently in those days about the remarkable successes of his foreign policy: before he came to power, almost all Yugoslavia's neighbors were also her enemies. He succeeded in turning them into friends. It would have been, indeed, a remarkable achievement, had he not lost the friendship of his old-time allies and had not his newly-acquired friends converged on Yugoslavia only a few years later. Meanwhile, he continued in the policy which contributed to the disintegration of the system upon which Yugoslavia's security also rested. Now that his new relations with Italy were consummated, Stojadinovic turned toward Germany. In June 1937, the German Foreign Minister, Baron von Neurath, visited Belgrade. Though no official document was signed, the communiqué spoke about the conversations, which were "held in an atmosphere of mutual and sincere trust". 52 Walking a diplo47

«

49 50 51

"

DIA, 1937, pp. 340-346. DIA, 1937, pp. 380-381. New York Times, April 11,1937. BeneS, op. cit., p. 31. Hoptner, op. cit., p. 84. DIA, 1937, p. 209.

Czechoslovak-Yugoslav

Relations,

1933-1938

719

matic tightrope, Stojadinovic then immediately assured Czechoslovakia and Rumania of complete loyalty.53 Then, the funeral of President T. G. Masaryk brought him to Prague. There he spent four hours in a conversation with President Benes, who reproached him sharply for violating the Little Entente obligations by concealing negotiations with Italy, flirting with Hungarians, and secretly negotiating with Hitler. He made insincere excuses, but finally "was sincerely or insincerely? - moved, touched, and tears even came into his eyes!" He told Benes he had been invited to Berlin. Benes urged him not to go. Stojadinovic could not promise anything, as he had to return Neurath's visit.54 However, first he had to pay a visit to his new friends in Rome. There, he conveyed to Mussolini a message from Prince Paul, promising that "whatever the future might bring, Yugoslavia would never find herself in a camp opposed to Italy". 55 Though asked by Milan Hodza,the Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia, for help in the efforts to work toward a Czechoslovak-Italian rapprochement, "he deliberately defaulted, telling Mussolini that he was transmitting the Czech communication without recommending it". On the contrary, he spoke of Czechoslovakia as a "sausage state", 56 and promised not to assume further obligations toward her, but to endeavor to improve relations with Hungary. 57 Ciano characterized Stojadinovic on this occasion as a man who had "shown himself a genuine friend . . . strong, sanguine, with a resounding laugh and a vigorous handshake. . . ." To reciprocate Stojadinovic's hospitality when he had been in Belgrade, Ciano arranged for him "a few dances with the prettiest women in Roman society". 58 Immediately after the visit, Ciano advised the Hungarian government to concentrate its attacks on Czechoslovakia and reach "a thorough agreement" with Belgrade. 59 In January 1938, Stojadinovic journeyed to Berlin. To be received by Hitler must have been to him the climax of his diplomatic career. He assured Hitler that "Yugoslavia would never, under any circumstances, enter into a pact or coalition against Germany". Hitler, in return, expressed the wish for a strong Yugoslav-Hungarian rapproche53 54 53 56 57 58 58

New York Times, June 20, 1937. BeneS, Memoirs, op. cit., p. 32. Lukacs, op. cit., pp. 102-03. Ibid., p. 103, 95. Hoptner, op. cit., p. 86. Ciano's Diary, 1937-1938 (London, Methuen, 1952), p. 41. Ibid., p. 43.

720

Josef Korbel

ment. When they discussed Austria, Stojadinovic assured him that it was "purely a German domestic matter".60 In the effort to isolate Czechoslovakia, Hitler reportedly offered Stojadinovic a guarantee of the integrity of the Yugoslav territory - even against Hungary. Stojadinovic was, however, reluctant to commit himself, pointing to the still-existing Yugoslav obligations to the Little Entente in matters of Hungarian irredentism.'11 At any rate, the official communiqué about the Stojadino vic-Hi tier conversations spoke of "sincere friendship and complete comprehension of the political conceptions of the two countries".62 Between these trips to Rome and Berlin was sandwiched the visit to Belgrade of Yvon Delbos, the Foreign Minister of France. The usual conventional phrases on fraternal cooperation were exchanged between the two closely guarded statesmen, while thousands of people were demonstrating in the streets of Belgrade their friendship for France and Czechoslovakia.63 Belgrade became, indeed, a center of international happenings. It witnessed the meetings of the Little Entente, the visits of President Benes, Foreign Ministers Delbos, Ciano, Neurath, and Beck, and Kiosseivanoff of Bulgaria. Stojadinovic, on the other hand, visited Prague, Bucharest, Rome, and Berlin, without neglecting Paris and London. He expressed pride in having never visited Geneva. The developments were now inexorably unfolding toward a dénouement. The German aggressive pressure reached intolerable proportions; Austria was in a violent turmoil; Nazis in Czechoslovakia accelerated their mass treacherous activities. Czechoslovak-Yugoslav relations were inevitably affected by these mounting tensions. It was not the letter of Yugoslavia's obligations which was put to test. This, Stojadinovic repeatedly asserted, he would adhere to. It was, rather, the spirit of the traditional Czechoslovak-Yugoslav friendship which he buried and despised, undermining indirectly Czechoslovakia's international position in time of her supreme national crisis, but always shrewdly maneuvering to avoid an accusation of violating the textual obligations toward the Little Entente. The Anschluss was next on Hitler's agenda. Only to confirm what he had already told Hitler, Stojadinovic revealed to the German Minister 60 61 82 63

Hoptner, op. cit., p. 88. S M / 1 9 3 8 / I I , pp. 292-93. SIA/1938/1, pp. 394-95. Personal experience of the writer.

Czechoslovak-Yugoslav

Relations,

1933-1938

111

in Belgrade in February that he had refused the French proposal of a joint protest against German intervention in Austria. 64 On the day of the German invasion of Austria, the Yugoslav Minister to Berlin informed the German Foreign Office that "the Yugoslav government held the point of view that the Austrian question was an internal German affair", and when Czechoslovakia proposed an immediate meeting of the Little Entente, Yugoslavia refused.0"' A few days after Anschluss, Stojadinovic made a statement in the Senate in which he said that after Anschluss, Germany reconfirmed the inviolability of the Yugoslav boundaries. As to Czechoslovakia, he emphasized that Yugoslav commitments were "precisely defined in the reciprocal obligations assumed by the members of the Little Entente". He stated that the Yugoslav government would respect these undertakings. 66 One act of aggression accomplished - and unpunished as it was Hitler next turned against Czechoslovakia. His plans were now finalized and an order issued to the German General Staff to be ready for an attack on October 1, 1938. Stojadinovic developed feverish diplomatic activity to keep Yugoslavia out of any military involvement which might ensue from an attack on Czechoslovakia by Hungary. In April, he sent a message to Ciano that he wished to "concert and harmonize" his policy with Italy, in case Hungary and Poland joined Germany in an attack on Czechoslovakia. 67 One month later, he made it clear to the French Foreign Minister, Georges Bonnet, that Yugoslavia would not go to war to protect Czechoslovakia. 68 Bonnet, one can safely imagine, was only too eager to collect such information. Stojadinovic further assured Ciano that "under no circumstances would he attack Hungary". 69 He stated to the Bulgarian Prime Minister, Kiosseivanoff, that "in his opinion Czechs would not be helped". 70 In June, he met Ciano at Lido and urged him to prevent Hungary from attacking Czechoslovakia; in such a case, Yugoslavia "would remain indifferent to the fate of Czechoslovakia" and Hungary would get her territory

64

Lukacs, op. cit., p. 109.

«5 Ibid., p. 120. «• DIA/1938/1, 67

pp. 296-97.

Ciano's Diary, op. cit., p. 101. es USFR/1938, I, p. 502. 69 Ciano's Diary, op. cit., p. 117, May 17, 1938.

70

Lukacs, op. cit., p. 135.

722

Josef Korbel

later, he related.71 He didn't want "in the least to drag his country into a conflict with Germany to save the artificial and unfriendly Czechoslovakia, nor to please France, which is openly hostile to him". If only the Hungarians could abstain from openly attacking Czechoslovakia, he would be free from any obligations. He went as far as to promise Ciano not to go to war against Hungary if she provoked Czechoslovakia into an attack and a war declaration.72 As a result of this conversation, Ciano advised Kanya that Stojadinovic had been "quite explicit in ruling out an attack on Hungary, so long as Hungary does not take the initiative in a conflict with Prague but follows in the wake of Germany".73 In the months that followed, Czechoslovakia was exposed to increased pressures from all sides. Sudeten Germans were in open rebellion, Germany's vitriolic attacks reached a state of frenzy, Poland and Hungary presented their claim for a pound of Czechoslovak flesh, Great Britain sent to Prague the corroding mission of Lord Runciman and intensified the policy of appeasing Berlin, seconded as she was by vacillating France. The Soviet Union repeated that she would stand by her obligation to give Czechoslovakia assistance, an obligation which was conditional upon help from France. In the hour of excruciating crisis, the democratic Czechoslovakia stood alone. The attitude of Yugoslavia could not have tipped the balance in her favor, but Stojadinovic's policy was adding painful insult to fatal injury. Still committed to come to Czechoslovakia's assistance in case of an unprovoked Hungarian attack, he now opened secret negotiations with Budapest to neutralize Hungary in case of a German attack by making her certain substantial concessions. When Hungary asked for Yugoslav neutrality, he declined, because such a position would be in direct contradiction to Yugoslavia's obligations in the Little Entente. However, he did find a way out: he received from Hungary an assurance not to use force against her neighbors, but conceded in return her right to rearm. At the Bled Conference of the Little Entente, on August 21 and 22, Kamil Krofta, exposed to pressure from both allies, Yugoslavia and Rumania, had no choice but to yield. The official communiqué confirmed Stojadinovic's formula and indicated also that negotiations were in progress to assure the Hungarian minority of an autonomous posi71 72 73

Hoptner, op. cit., p. 113. Ibid., p. 145. Ciano's Diary, op. cit., p. 138.

Czechoslovak-Yugoslav

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1933-1938

723

tion.74 As Berlin had, just before the Bled Conference, informed Belgrade and Bucharest that it would take "all necessary measures" if Prague failed to meet the demands of the Sudeten Germans "on all points", he urged Krofta to make them drastic concessions. 75 Prince Paul, though approving of Stojadinovic's close relations with Italy and Germany, was nevertheless, because of his background, looking toward London for guidance. He inquired about His Majesty's attitude, and through none other than the notorious Sir Neville Henderson received the answer, "to do everything possible to preserve peace". The Prince wished to follow the lead of England, but could not see what Yugoslavia could do if she was cut off by Italy and Germany from Western assistance 76. Neither Prince Paul nor Stojadinovic needed to worry much longer. Great Britain and France solved their problem for them. Neville Chamberlain travelled to Berchtesgaden on September 15 and reached an agreement with Hitler on the peaceful dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. Then, both France and Britain, one an ally, the other supposedly a friend, put the Czechoslovak government under incredible pressure. The Prague government succumbed. For a few days after the Godesberg meeting, the situation seemed to have changed. Czechoslovakia mobilized; so did Hungary. Stojadinovic was gripped by another fear. With his devious reasoning, he now advised Prince Paul to apply "the principle of rebus sic stantibus. The situation had changed since the signing of the pact [of the Little Entente]; the Czechs would lose two million citizens in an international dispute, invalidating the covenant", he argued. He expected that the Czechs would not go to war, but would in all probability want "a negative answer from [Yugoslavia] to justify themselves". 77 Czechoslovakia did not go to war. Came Munich and the Prague government accepted its dictate. A chapter in Yugoslav-Czechoslovak relations was closed. Though the Serbian people demonstrated during the critical days of September their fidelity to the traditional attachment to the Czechoslovak people and showed their readiness to fight for Czechoslovak democracy and their own freedom, Prince Paul and Milan Stojadinovic had their way. Czechoslovakia fell. Her concept of foreign policy, enunciated twenty years ago, was in ruins. Her allies, France 74

DIA/1938/1, pp. 282-84. ™ D.G.F.P., II, Third Series, 1938, Doc. 2/3, pp. 135-36, 260. 78 D.B.F.P., Doc. 2/3, p. 241. 77 Hoptner, op. cit., p. 117.

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and Yugoslavia, abandoned her in the hour of trial. She stumbled over her own treaties of alliance and sank into a mire of Fascism. However, her shield remained clean. Yugoslavia, who thought she had gained friends and guarantors of her national integrity in Italy and Germany, stumbled and sank less than three years later.

Nationalism versus Federalism in Central and Southeast Europe BOGDAN RADITSA

In considering the issue of nationalism in our area, our first thoughts are of misunderstandings, disagreements, and conflicts between neighbors and relatives. The unfulfilled search for unity that has occupied half a century of the area's history has created for its people, and for the world around them, a sense of discouragement and frustation. On the other hand, all approaches to self-understanding and peace between neighbors have not been disappointing. In the two instances during the last fifty years when the nations of this areas served merely as pretexts for conflicts between the great powers of Central and Western Europe, the global earthquakes that ensued allowed these small nations to establish themselves on the world scene, becoming partners with the rest of the world in the making of history. Thus, one of the major goals of preceding generations was achieved. Those generations of Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes (in the South) and Czechs and Slovaks (in the North) grew up with the marvellous illusion that once the multinational Habsburg and Ottoman Empires had been wiped out and replaced by national states, all national conflicts, and even social contradictions, would disappear as though by magic, thanks to the sacrosanct establishment of national states. Those generations, with their romantic view of history (largely inspired by Hegel and Herder), were convinced that the end of the absolute monarchies and the achievement of national independence would bring about the demise of nationalism. Nationalism, they felt, would be replaced by a great universal idea that would unite the whole of Europe if not the whole of mankind; and the Slavs would achieve a position of equality with the other European nations. This conception, which came from the Italian visionary, Giuseppe Mazzini, was current among the South Slav intelligentsia as late as the beginning of World War I.1 Mazzini also filled 1 G. Mazzini, Lett ere slave (Bari, 1939). See, Del moto nazionale slavo (1847) pp. 23-75.

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Raditsa

the minds of Slavic intellectuals with his messianic notion of history, according to which each nation has a mission not only to become an historical entity, but also to contribute through its personality to the enrichment of mankind. Illustrative of these attitudes and beliefs are the numerous movements that strove for national awakening as the first step toward smaller multinational unions based on the principle of self-determination. The most significant of these manifestation among the South Slavs was the Illyrian Movement, which originated in Croatia in the last century and to which the Yugoslav Idea is often tied. 2 The Illyrian Movement signified an awakening of Croatian national identity, giving the Croats their first impetus toward separation from Austria and Hungary; but it also opened up wider possibilities. 3 It gave the Croat nation a sense of unity with the Serbs and all the other Slavic peoples who inhabited the lands of the ancient Illyrians. With their romantic notion of philology, the followers of the movement felt that the Croats and Serbs, speaking the same or, at least, a similar language, would inevitably become integrated, and that the Yugoslav Idea could forge from national fragments a unified and indivisible state. 4 These ideas were strongly reinforced by the All-Slav trends that developed in Prague before and after 1848. 5 Many generations of Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs found there a fresh source of inspiration for their unification movements. The South Slavs from the Austro-Hungarian Empire who were educated at Prague, particularly at the beginning of this century, took home with them ideas of a larger national kinship and a greater awareness of the need for positive action. The students of T. G. Masaryk, who were later known as the Masarykovci, replaced the irrationalism of romantic nationalism with a sound understanding of political and social problems. It was in Prague, too, that Croatian culture was transformed; the "Croatian Modern" (Hrvatska moderna) was born there and exported to Zagreb, its proper home. By the end of the century, the Prague All-Slav rapprochement 2

had

F. SiSic, Jugoslovenska misao, 1790-1918 (Beograd, 1937). See also: F. SiSic, "Génèse et caractère général du mouvement illyrien", Le monde slave, I (Paris, 1937). ' I. Pilar, J uznoslavensko Pitanje (Zagreb, 1943): F. Fancev, "Les Origines autochtones du mouvement illyrien croate", Le monde slave, XII (Paris, 1935). 4 V. Corovic, Istorija Jugoslavije (Beograd, 1933); J. Skerlic, Eseji o srpskohrvatskom pitanju (Zagreb, 1918); M. Radojkovic, "L'opinion française et le mouvement illyrien de 1840 à 1848", Le monde slave, XII (Paris, 1935). 5 M. Prelog, Slavenska renesansa 1780-1848, Zagreb, 1924.

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become a concrete, if not yet revolutionary, movement, determined to achieve a total separation from Vienna and Budapest; it prepared a solid ground for the unification of the new national states that were coming into existence as the old empires crumbled. Parallel Slavic states were envisioned: one in the North organized by the Czechs and Slovaks, and one in the South formed by the Serbs and Croats, to which the Slovenes were slowly but firmly to join themselves. The influences of Prague on South Slav culture were fundamentally liberal and anticlerical, rationalistic, and positivistic; they tended to free the intelligentsia from the old, romantic, nationalistic myths, and to arm their political thinking with a strong scientific methodology. Under the influence of Masarykovci, Croatian realism was expanded into an intellectual and cultural modernism, emphasized later by the "Croat Modern", and expanding into Yugoslav nationalism. A galaxy of young writers, literary critics, sociologists, and political analysts enriched the political and journalistic life of the country. Liberalism became a secular religion; its new ethics shook the archaic parochialism of a stultified society. Another even more vital and significant movement erupted in the forgotten and retarded Croatian countryside where the peasantry began its own radical social and cultural transformation. The movement was led by the great revolutionary peasant leader, Stjepan Radic, who, after several years in Prague, brought home with him the new ideas that were ultimately responsible for the political and social transformation of the Croatian peasants. 6 It was through his revolutionary work that the people were educated and prepared for democracy. Radic's movement, which had all the marks of a Slav populist regeneration, was undoubtedly the most impressive result of the great spiritual bonds that were established between Prague and Zagreb. Earlier in the last century, the Czech emissary of Count L. Czartoryski to the South Slavs, Frano Zach, attempted to reorient the policies of the newly resurrected Serbia toward broader All-Slav and Yugoslav concepts. To the Serb statesman and Prime Minister of the Obrenovics Ilya Garashanin, he introduced the idea of a future Yugoslavia that would be tied up with the Czechs. But Garashanin's Nachertanye, published in 1843, unfortunately ran contrary to Zach's suggestions. Instead of making the union of the South Slavs a corollary to the union of the Western Slavs, Garashanin reduced the whole matter to a Great 6

M. Marjanovic, Stjepan Radic (Beograd, 1937).

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Bogdan Raditsa

Serbian Idea. Instead of becoming a guide to Yugoslav rapprochement and eventual union, his Nachertanye became the manual of the Serbian leadership in its rise to hegemony over all the other South Slavs. To Garashanin, Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia represented nothing more than geographic segments in a Greater Serbia. As the Serbian historian, Vaso Cubrilovic, has written /'Ultimately Garashanin did not prepare the formation of a Yugoslav state, but that of a Serbian state. That is why, in his Nachertanye, he changed the expressions, 'South Slav', Yugoslav', and 'Yugoslav State' that Zach suggested to 'Serb', 'Serbian', 'Serbia', and 'Serbian Empire'. 7 The Great Serbian Idea was, however, merely a corollary of the Greek Megali Idea, for the Serbs, like the Greeks, considered themselves the leading Balkan nation, the Balkan-Byzantine empire-builder. Garashanin's Nachertanye was little more than a repetition of Rhigas' formulation of his romantic, but noble, dream for the unification of the Balkan peoples. 8 Actual developments did not, of course, conform to either of these patterns. The aftermath of the Balkan Wars found the Balkan nations much less united than one might have expected. All of them had developed ethnocentric complexes, contaminated as they were by the messianism that originated in the Byzantine Great Idea. The Greek Megali Idea, the Great Serbian Idea, the Bulgarian Great Idea, and the Rumanian Great Idea were all variations of what had once been the Byzantine Empire. Each of these nations had its own imperial mission; to the Serbs, for instance, Macedonia was South Serbia, while to the Greeks, it was Northern Greece. This experience, often called the Balkanization of Europe, was detrimental to common understanding. And it was significant in terms of coming events; it served as the overture to the great crisis of historicity and of its enfant terrible, nationalism, not only in the Balkans, but in Central Europe as well. The Balkan Federation movements that appeared in 1913 after the Balkan Wars, and again between the World Wars, were conceived by two radically different groups, the one democratic, the other Communist. Greek statesmen were responsible for the democratic initiative: Elefterios Venizelos, the leader of the Greek Liberal Party, made his contributions to the cause in 1913, and Alexander Papanastassiou, a leftwing agrarian party leader, strove toward Balkan Federation in 1929. 7

V. Cubrilovic, lstorija politicke misli u Srbiji XIX veka (Beograd, 1958). See a review of the book in the Journal of Central European Affairs (Denver, Colorado, July 1960). 8 Ap. Dascalakis, Rhigas Velestinlis (Paris, 1937).

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729

Venizelos, however, was attached to the Greek Megali Idea and never renounced his ambition to make Greece the leading nation in the Balkans; in fact, it was Venizelos who, playing power politics, later opposed and thwarted Papanastassiou's sincere efforts toward federation. 9 In Serbia, and later in Yugoslavia, there was never an official federalist policy; Garashanin's precepts were continued by Pasic and his followers, who insisted on the exclusive leadership of Serbia in the Balkans and in those parts of Yugoslavia which bordered on Central Europe. The Balkan Entente, which was effected in 1934 when Yugoslavia, Rumania, Greece, and Turkey signed the Balkan Pact, was only a superficial recognition of the idea of federation by those governments. It did not include Bulgaria and Albania, and those nations were wounded by the slight. Yet the Balkan Entente was an extension of the Czech-conceived Little Entente, and there existed between the two a community of aspirations toward the establishment of an extensive Balkan federal union which might have been a formidable opponent for German and Italian national fascist expansion. Unfortunately, the exclusion of Bulgaria and Albania from the Balkan Entente, and of Austria and Hungary from the Little Entente, excluded the possiblity of a strong federal structure and prevented the united resistance of the Balkan peoples when Germany and Italy set out to wreck the Versailles-conceived Europe and rob them of their independence. 10 The Communists introduced their plan for a Balkan Federation with greater vigor. Condemning the nationalisms of the Balkan countries as bourgeois parochialism, the Balkan and, particularly the Yugoslav, Marxists promised a Balkan federal movement. The dream was shattered by the Soviet Union, which had become the absolute power in that part of the world. In keeping Tito and G. Dimitrov from working out the Balkan Federation, Stalin forced on the Balkan Communists one of their most tragic failures. To complicate the situation, the Marxists cut Bulgaria off from the rest of the Balkans. And, through the contra dictions inherent in the Communist system, Red China now controls Albania, preventing any possibility of a future Balkan understanding. The Communists have managed to destroy totally the healthy inter-

9

B. Raditsa, "Venizelos and the Struggle around the Balkan Pact", Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki, June 1965. 10 L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453 (New York, 1958). See also: G. E. Mylonas, The Balkan States, Washington, D.C., 1947.

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Raditsa

dependence of the Balkan nations that, in the prewar years kept the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente tied to one another. 11 The present dramatic crisis within Yugoslavia is further proof that the Communists have not only failed to do away with the old national contradictions, but have made the problems even more complex than before. Internal dissensions have reached menacing proportions: Serbia is at odds with Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia, and the Albanian minority in the Kosovo-Metohija, with its growing sense of nationalism, now turns to Tirana for guidance before it turns to Belgrade. The last Congress of Yugoslav Communists, which was followed by a Congress in each of the republics, demonstrated pathetically that the national issue threatens the very existence of the Yugoslav federal structure. This infranational crisis began several years ago, when the leading Marxist political writers opened their now-historic discussion of the cultural divisions in Yugoslavia. 12 The old East-West antagonisms reemerged, with Croats and Slovenes emphasizing their Western cultural heritage as opposed to the Eastern orientation of Serbian culture and thought. The Croats and Slovenes upbraided the Serbians for their "Byzantine" insistence on exclusive leadership in a multinational state. A most eloquent analysis of this situation was made by Croatia's leading Communist theoretician, Vladimir Bakaric, in 1964, when he asserted that, while the Yugoslav Communists have solved the national issue in theory, in actual practice they are following the same mistaken policy that was pursued before the war by King Alexander and General Petar Zivkovic: Belgrade centralism masked by a superficial front of "integrated" Yugoslavianism". 13 The Slovenian Marxists have refused to submit to this artificial program of Yugoslav integration. They will not sacrifice Slovenian political, national, and cultural identity to the "old Yugoslav mythomany", to the basic Party doctrine according to which socialism can only be achieved through Yugoslav integration (Integralno Jugoslavenstvo). The Slovenian Marxists insist that there must be individual national socialist systems rather than a single Belgrade-controlled socialism. Slovenia's leading theoretician, Edvard Kardelj, has found himself isolated in his own nation, where his outdated ideas about Slovenian 11

M. Djilas, Lenin on Relations between Socialist States (New York, 1950). See also: Yugoslav Fortnightly (Beograd, January 27, 1950). 12 F. Culinovic, Nacionalno pitanje u Jugoslavenskim zemljama (Zagreb, 1955). See also: Bogdan Raditsa, "Yugoslav Nationalism Revisited: History and Dogma", Journal of Central European Affairs, XXI (January 4, 1962). 13 V. Bakaric's statement on the crisis of Yugoslavianism was published in the Nedjeljne informativne novine (NIN), Beograd, March 8, 1964.

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731

national questions have been abandoned by the Slovenian Marxists of the present day.14 When Yugoslavia was created a half-century ago, the Croats, particularly the founders of the Yugoslav Committee, Ante Trumbic and Frano Supilo, believed that Yugoslavia should be a new state, while the Serbian politicians, King Alexander, and Nicola Pasic saw Yugoslavia as an aggrandized continuation of pre-World War I Serbia. This basic clash led to the growth of nationalism in Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, and even in Montenegro. 15 In 1941, when Yugoslavia faced the German and Italian assault, it was already a deeply disunited country. Following the example of the Slovaks, the Croat nationalists founded their own secessionist state, and a terrible fratricidal civil war ensued. The mutual massacre of Serbs and Croats gave the Communists a rare opportunity to step in as peace-makers; they had a raison d'être in Yugoslavia — to solve the national problem. But in putting the state back together, the Communists did not make a new start. They were content to keep Belgrade as their political center, smug in their conviction that once the bourgeois social and economic systems had been replaced by their principle of "brotherhood and unity", the century-old national antagonisms would quickly disappear. As their blueprint for handling the national question, they adopted the blueprint of the old Serbian, Sima Markovic, one of the first secretaries general of the Yugoslav Communist Party. Markovic, writing in the early twenties, felt that the Croatian national question, which was at that time already a critical one, was nothing more than the product of a conflict between two bourgeois societies. It could be overcome, he argued, if Yugoslavia were only freed from the "bourgeois grip". He also assigned the leading role in the Communist federation to Belgrade and Serbia. Though Markovic's thesis had been attacked in the Comintern by Stalin himself as a Serbian ultranationalistic deviation, and new leadership had been imposed on the Yugoslav Party, the Communists continued in 1945 to follow Markovic's political principles. 16 They did so 14

E. Kardelj-Sperans, Razvoj slovenackog nacionalnog pitanja (Beograd, 1958). For an examination of the national issue as discussed by the Marxists see also: "The Yugoslav Intelligentsia: East and West, Old and New Nationalism", Journal of Central European Affairs, XXIII (January 4, 1964). 15 A. S. Pavelic, Dr. Ante Trumbic, Problemi Hrvatsko-Srpskih Odnosa (Munchen, 1959); See also: P. D. Ostovic, The Truth about Yugoslavia (New York, 1952). 16 J. Stalin, Marxism and The National and Colonial Question (London, 1942), pp. 200-21.

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Raditsa

in order to satisfy the powerful Serbian element in the Party, which refused to see its nation downgraded to the level of the other republics. 17 Tito, though he is a Croat, yielded to the prewar Serbian pattern in the Party, assuming the role of a "Yugoslav unifier" and taking up a stance of noninterference in national disputes. Today he is compelled to defend Yugoslavianism in his own nation, but the resurgence of Croat separatism is so strong that he is without success. In a recent speech in Varazdin, Croatia, he described the situation as follows: I have to admit . . . that nationality intolerance exists here . . . People are no longer ready to accept an abstract idea of unity or a unity based on slogans, but would rather have it based on facts, on everyday practice . . . (The national question) has recently created an unhealthy situation which is reflected throughout our society. Tito acknowledged that the national situation has grown worse even since the last Party Congress of December 1964. The profound setback that the Party policy of "Yugoslav integration" has suffered since 1945 has manifested itself, not only among the people in the country, but also in the Party itself. From the Party rank-and-file to the very top of the Central Committee, national antagonisms make themselves felt. Party leaders, political activists, the leading intelligentsia, exasperated by the economic crisis, have all allowed themselves to be contaminated bynationalist sentiments. Yugoslavia is in the midst of exactly the kind of fundamental crisis that arose before the pre-World War II civil war. Between the two World Wars, when Yugoslavia came into existence, it had become apparent that the Illyrian and Yugoslav Ideas had failed. The concept of a community of equal nations had been replaced by the Great Serbian Idea. Relations between neighbors and kinsmen grew as exacerbated as they had been in the prenational state. Each nation was inspired to an individual interpretation of its history by nationalistic embitterment. The crisis of Yugoslavia was not only a political tragedy, but also a profound mistake of historical interpretation. During these years, democracy suffered and had to be eliminated, despite the good example and expectations of Masaryk's Prague. Ivan Mestrovic, one of the leading promoters of Yugoslav Union, was a personal friend of President Masaryk. In his political Memoirs, Mestrovic tells what pains Masaryk took to persuade King Alexander to satisfy Croatia's legitimate demands for equality with Serbia, but all Masaryk's well-intentioned 17

D . Tomasic, National 1957.

Communism

and Soviet

Strategy

(Washington, D.C.),

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733

interferences were of no avail.18 The Yugoslav Idea was definitely eclipsed. The political conflict that followed was identical to the one we are seeing repeated today: an East-West struggle that cut through the center of Yugoslavia's structural organization and threatened her very existence. Recent expressions 19 of independence by three major republics (Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia) emphasize the failure of the Marxists to integrate Yugoslavia. Like every application of Marxist innovation, the enforcement of Communist federalism alternates rhythmically between coercion and persuasion. But the liberality that allows declarations of independence is only superficial. In reality, the republics are not free to secede from Belgrade's stringent control; the central power is strong enough to thwart any real attempt. Adequate national independence, or "states' rights", could hardly be achieved under such circumstances. Holding the federation together are the vested interests that the Communist leaders have both in their republics and in the central government. These provide strong connecting links, because no leader of a republic would act against the central organ of which he is himself a part. Nevertheless, the position of a Croat Tito, a Slovene Kardelj, or a Macedonian Lazar Kolisevski in the federal government is still less powerful than that of the Serb, A. Rankovic; 2 0 who seems to hold the real power in Belgrade. Thus, Serbia ,with Belgrade as its center, retains control of the country and the Serbian Communist apparatus maintains the power to exclude any diversion from its basic goal: the Communist state. I must apologize for insisting at such length on the Yugoslav case. But Yugoslavia, with its multinational character, dramatizes all the fundamental conflicts of the permanent crisis of nationalism in Central and Southeast Europe. If properly handled, nationalism could be a useful, constructive 18

I. Mestrovic, Uspomene na Politicke Ljude i Dogadjaje (Buenos Aires), 1961. Tito's, Kardelj's, and Vlahovic's reports to the VIII Congress of the League of the Yugoslav Communists deal extensively with the nationalistic tendencies in the Republics. See Komunist (Beograd, December 8, 1964); See also Kardelj's interview in the Ekonomska politika (Beograd, November 27, 1965) and in the Borba (November 27, 1965). Also: Bakaric's interview in the Slobodna Dalmacija (Split, November 29 and 30, December 1, 1965). The same problems are dealt with by the Yugoslav writers in the Praxis, Nos. 3. and 4 / 5 (Zagreb, May-June, 1965, and July-October, 1965). 30 A. Rankovic was ousted from the Party leadership on July 1st, 1966, however, the national relations did not improve. 16

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Raditsa

force; otherwise it will remain a firm obstacle to any future reorganization of Central and Southeast Europe. Nationalism is still very much a real presence, both in the spirit and in the life, in the history as ideas and reality, of that part of the world. Whatever new terms the Marxists may use in dealing with nationalism, whether they label it "economic", "cultural", or "political", they have to recognize that they, too, have been unable to rid themselves and their multinational societies of it. It stays with them in Yugoslavia, in Czechoslovakia, even in the Soviet Union, as a terrible disrupting force that they control only by means of coercion. Three whole generations - the liberal, the democratic, and now the Marxist — have failed to solve the crisis of the multinational state. There are two primary reasons for this failure: 1) Nationalistic resentment cannot be cured by an imposed mechanism of coercion, but only by reeducation in freedom; and 2) as Milovan Djilas has convincingly shown, the Communists use nationalism as one of their major weapons in controlling the multinational state; they make their presence possible by favoring one nationality over another. 21 This is nothing more than a repetition of the well-known policy of divide et impera that has repeatedly proved itself incapable of holding together multinational empires and states. This brings us to the core of the issue. The Communist form of government seems unable to reduce nationalism through its application of federalism. Federalism, by its very nature, is a constitutional outgrowth of democracy; it cannot work without political freedom. However, even though there is no real understanding of liberal and democratic ideas in Southeast Europe today, and even though federalism has not solved the basic issues of the multinational state, one must admit that the Marxists have made a step forward by declaring a federal union, if only in theory and on paper. In Yugoslavia, the establishment of six republics had contributed to the fuller development of the national conscience of each ethnic group. It is no longer possible to envisage a situation in which Croatia or Slovenia would consent to total integration with Serbia. Macedonia will never relapse into her prewar position as a southern Serbian province. And there is great doubt that the Albanian minority in the Kosovo-Metohija will remain an autonomous member of the Yugoslav federation; it may well unite itself with Albania in a Greater Albania. The future generations that will have to deal with the post-Com21

M. Djilas, The New Class (New York, 1957). See also: M. Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (New York, 1962).

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munist world should not return to the attitudes of the pre-Communist and Communist eras. Illusions have seldom worked out, in history. Future generations must dedicate themselves to refining the structures that the Communists have introduced, and to bringing these structures to a meaningful maturity. The federal framework cannot be destroyed, but the voids and contradictions created by the Marxists must be filled and replaced with the sort of substantial, convincing matter that only freedom can produce. The Communist parties in Southeast Europe did not come to power through popular support, or, rather, they did not have the massive support that governments still rely upon in some of the great Western societies. Given their opportunities by the weak domestic and foreign leadership, which did not sense the true nature of Communism, the Marxists seized power through a combination of revolutionary changes in the midst of a destructive war. Communism is not only a continuation of the chain of tyranny that has long existed in Southeast Europe; on a deeper level, it seeks to transform human nature and its historical development. Moreover, it has a messianic eagerness to involve the whole of mankind in the radical changes it announces. All strata of the Southeastern European societies have, under Communism, experienced profound changes in their political, economic, and social structures. The positions of the peasantry, the working class, the middle classes, and of every pre-Communist institution, particularly the churches, have been fundamentally altered. Through this process, the human being has been challenged and has matured politically. Without exaggeration, it can be said that a non-Marxist intellectual, a worker, even a peasant or a priest, living in a Communist society today is more knowledgeable about Marxism and Communism than the most acute Western political scientist can hope to be without long, day-to-day, practical experience of the system. The future will be determined by those generations whose existence has been shaped by Communist doctrine and practice. It is to be hoped that a final decision for freedom will be determined through a synthesis of the best aspirations of other generations, from the romantic era through that of literary and political realism to the present. Those generations have taught us that only through mutual understanding, and not through nationalistic and racial hatred, can a better destiny be achieved. Thus, the future of Southeast Communist Europe seems to lie in a mitigated and consenting nationalism through the realization of federalism - a federalism in which personal freedom will go hand in hand with national freedom and independence.

Czechoslovakia's Federalist Heritage: A Historical Perspective JOSEPH HAJDA

The tendency toward regional grouping in Central Europe has a long history. One of its important currents in modern history has been the idea of a federalist arrangement for the several national groups in the Central European region as a means of attaining their peaceful and harmonious development. A variety of federalist proposals were discussed in the Austrian Empire during the last seventy years of its existence, but the imperial authorities saw other devices as appropriate to ensure the preservation of the multinational state, and federalism remained a mere program without implementation. The sole satisfaction of Austro-federalists was that they were the heroes of a lost cause. Endeavors to advance the cause of genuine federalism found more support among the Czechs and Slovaks than among their neighbors. Czech leaders played a major role in efforts to transform the Austrian political structure into a federation, and in spite of their disappointing experience, the vision of a reformed and federalized Austria was not abandoned by the Czechs and Slovaks until there was no doubt that it was unattainable. They envisaged the construction of an effective regional grouping capable of inspiring confidence, because it would give adequate protection to themselves and their neighbors and would promote mutual reconciliation. They recognized the need for a strong and viable system of government which would enable Austria to articulate and defend the common interests of its component units, and to play a key role in the European balance. In short, they believed that a more adequate political structure in the Central European region could be established by means of a federal union rather than by means of centralist policies, on the one hand, or separatist courses of action, on the other. The hopes and aspirations of the Czech federalists in 1848 were based on a positive and pragmatic approach. They wanted to reform Austria, not to fight for its dissolution. They wished Austria to continue

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Hajda

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as an independent force in the European balance of power. Their vision of federation was inconsistent with the centralistic currents of the more recent political history of Austria, but compatible with its quasi-federal structure in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. They felt that Austria had moved too far away from the decentralized regional grouping and that the growth of the centralistic structure was detrimental to Austria itself. Moreover, the revolutionary flames of 1848 created conditions conducive to far-reaching changes in the political structure of Austria. Czech federalists felt an urgent need to move fast without the use of violent means. They wanted to redress the political balance eroded by the centralizing thrusts of the ruling Austrian circles, and to secure the emancipation of the underprivileged national groups before their time had run out. The Czech federalist position was defined at the Slav Congress held in May and June of 1848 in Prague. 1 It proclaimed loyalty to Austria and the Habsburg dynasty, and opposition to the inclusion of any Slav lands in a German confederation. It rejected the German and Magyar political demands for a dominant position and called for the transformation of Austria into a multinational federation of equals. A similar federalist position was taken by Czech delegates at the first Austrian Constitutional Assembly, which met the same year in Vienna, and which eventually moved to the Moravian city of Kromeriz (Kremsier). However, neither the proposals of the leading Czech federalist, Frantisek Palacky, nor the federal plans submitted by other Slav leaders, were acceptable to the Austrian Germans. Even the reform-minded German delegates were not prepared to give up their privileged political status and support proposals giving the Germans equal status with their neighbors. No delegates from Hungary were present at the Assembly, but the Magyars did not support the idea of a federal arrangement for the several national groups in Austria. The draft of the Constitution adopted by the constitutional committee fell short of the needed reform proposed by the Czech and other Slav federalists. It proposed a new kind of centralization, a version of a semi-federalist structure, which would have continued a German-directed Austria, and its representative institutions. 2 But the imperial authorities 1

Otakar Odlozilik, "A Czech Plan for a Danubian Federation in 1848", Journal of Central European Affairs, October 1941, pp. 254-274. - Robert A. Kann, The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1848-1918, II (New York, Columbia University Press, 1950), pp. 21-39.

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Federalist

Heritage

were no longer interested in any meaningful reform, and the Assembly was dissolved by imperial order on March 7, 1849. Another opportunity to federalize the political structure of Austria came in 1860, when it was once again in trouble as a result of its defeat in the Italian war and internal financial difficulties. With the appointment of pro-federalist aristocrats to the Reichsrat, some reform appeared possible, even though not on the basis of the federalist proposals of 1848. Among the leaders of the struggle for a federalist arrangement were two Hungarian noblemen, a Bohemian count, and certain leaders of the Slavs. The plan for a feudally oriented federalism was presented to the Emperor and promulgated as an imperial diploma on October 20, 1860. However, as a result of the opposition's pressure, the diploma was subsequently modified by a new imperial decree in February 1861 which retreated from federalism and paved the way for a solution contrary to the interests of the majority of the peoples of Austria. The fate of federalism in Austria was sealed when a settlement was negotiated between the imperial authorities in Vienna and the Hungarian magnates, in 1867. It brought victory to the Magyar aristocracy and the fulfillment of its national aspirations. But this dualistic compromise, which preserved the privileged status of the Austrian Germans in the northwestern half and the Magyars in the southeastern half of the Empire, was a great disappointment to all federalists. Those who saw in a federal arrangement the end of Austria as a great power failed to recognize the need to inspire confidence among the Czechs and the other Slavs by means of an enlightened approach to their national aspirations. The federalists, of course, argued that the existence of a powerful and independent Austria was their objective, for it was in the interest of the several national groups in the Central European region, as well as in the interest of Europe and mankind; they argued, too, that a federalized Austria would serve to preserve the European balance, with itself as the indispensable foundation. They saw in a federal union an adequate answer to questions of national selfpreservation and national equality, and believed that a federal structure would strengthen the cohesion and solidarity of Austria The defeat of the idea of federalism led to more skeptical attitudes toward the need for Austria itself. Palacky, who for two decades was a leading Czech advocate of federalism, after the victory of dualism abandoned with regret the vision of the permanent preservation of Austria. Since Austria would not promote the attainment of legitimate national aspirations, he advised his countrymen, whose forefathers had

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once lived without Austria and had had their own state before the Austrian Empire came into existence, that they should look toward the day when Austria would no longer exist and when a more adequate political structure would have to be established in its place. However, the hope that Austria might cease to live in sin and redeem itself was not extinguished among the Czechs until it was unmistakably obvious that the ruling circles would never permit Austria to do so. In spite of the many rebuffs from the imperial authorities in Vienna and the irresistible will of the Magyar magnates, all major Czech political factions remained loyal to Austria and retained in their programs the demand that Austria be transformed into a federation in which the Slavs would no longer have second-class status, but would be on an equal footing with the Germans and Magyars. The destruction of Austria was not seen as a remedy for its many shortcomings and failures. Not the destruction of Austria, but its reform, was advocated prior to World War I by Tomás G. Masaryk, Edvard Benes, and many other major and lesser political leaders among the Czechs and Slovaks. Masaryk proposed a federal "monarchical Switzerland", in which the several national groups of Austria-Hungary would attain equal rights, and which would be organized on a democratic basis; 3 Benes likewise supported the idea of a federalized Austria. Both Masaryk and Benes gave up on the reconversion of Austria into a democratic federation of nations after the outbreak of the war and became the staunchest antiAustrian Czechs. In place of Austria-Hungary, Masaryk envisaged the creation of several smaller independent states as the first stage of a process leading to a just and democratic federal organization of the New Europe.4 The hardening of anti-Austrian and anti-Magyar attitudes among the Czechs and Slovaks after 1914 was the result of Austria-Hungary's domestic as well as foreign policies. Federalism was one of the systems which might have appealed to them. The Czech Parliamentary Club urged the imperial authorities to follow a policy of appeasement as late as May 30, 1917, when it issued a proclamation asking for the transformation of Austria-Hungary into a federation of free and equal member states, national self-determination, and a union of the Czechs and Slovaks as a member state of the federation. 3

Robert W. Seton-Watson, Masaryk in England (Cambridge, The University Press, 1943), p. 20. 4 Thomas G. Masaryk, The New Europe: The Slav Standpoint (Washington, 1918).

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Federalist

Heritage

The transformation of Austria-Hungary into a federal union was supported by the other Austrian Slavs; some support could be found among the Austrian Germans, but virtually none among the Magyars. The federalist heritage of 1848-49, the reform efforts of 1860, the discussion of many different federal plans and programs,5 and the changed political atmosphere after 1914, all these exercised a certain degree of influence on the tendency toward federalism among some Austrian Germans. On the other hand, federal reform programs remained extremely unpopular among the Magyars.6 However, neither the ruling circles of Vienna nor the magnates governing Hungary would tolerate a federalist arrangement recommended by those who wanted to prevent the disintegration of AustriaHungary. Instead of a policy of appeasement by means of federalism and other reforms, the imperial authorities chose the path of political suppression and expansion of their own power. In addition, the much-publicized German proposals for a Mitteleuropa7 made a mockery of the vision of a new, reformed, and federal Austria which would offer real solidarity to the nations of Central Europe. The specter of a new postwar political structure for Central Europe, organized under the leadership of Germany, and dominated by the Germans and (in part) by the Magyars, helped to destroy the last remnants of hope among the Czechs and Slovaks that a federal AustriaHungary was an attainable goal. It was too late when a desperate attempt was made on October 16, 1918, by the reluctant Emperor Charles to federalize the Austrian part of the Empire, but not the Hungarian portion, on the basis of national autonomy. The plan was rejected, not only by the Slavs, but also by the German nationalists and the irreconcilable Magyars. The imperial authorities missed their opportunities for self-reform. They failed to meet the challenge of the rising expectations of the Slav nationalities while Austria-Hungary was still strong enough to have an effective government. However, under the impetus of the military defeat, its govern5

Especially the plans of Adolf Fishel and Albert Schaffle, and the Socialist programs elaborated by Karl Renner and Otto Bauer, as well as the vague reform plans of Ignaz Seipel. 6 A m o n g the exceptions were Count Mihaly Karolyi and Oscar Jaszi. 7 The most outstanding example was the plan published by a member of the German Reichstag, Friedrich Naumann, which envisaged a confederation of Germany, Austria, and Hungary. The proposal had wide appeal for German Austrians. For details of the plan, see Friedrich Naumann, Centra! Europe (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1917).

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ment could no longer operate effectively. Austria-Hungary ceased to exist as anything more than a mere conglomeration of peoples who had little desire to stay together. Their search for a more adequate political structure in place of the discredited Empire led them to part with the common state idea and to follow instead the risky, but strongly desired, ideas of separate statehood. Looking back in retrospect, we can see now that a necessary condition for Austria-Hungary's survival was to achieve a federal political structure and other reforms before 1914. The Czechs and Slovaks were keenly aware of the advantages of a regional grouping in Central Europe, and were greatly disappointed that its effectiveness was impaired by the policies of the imperial authorities. They were disposed to remain loyal to the idea of the Austrian state, and ever ready to support proposals for federalist arrangements aimed at reconciling divergent national and other interests. They were in favor of Austria-Hungary playing the role of an independent actor in the European balance, and against its role of a junior partner of Germany. On the other hand, had a federalist arrangement been agreed upon in Vienna, with the advice and consent of the political spokesmen for the Austria Germans and the Slavs, it would in all likelihood have been rejected by the Magyars. How long would have Austria-Hungary remained a house divided, half-federalist and half-anti-federalist? Would it have found adequate means to hold in check the many stresses and strains produced by such a political division? Austria-Hungary disintegrated even before the end of World War I. When the Paris Peace Conference met in 1919, it dealt with accomplished facts in Central Europe - i.e., the new system of states as it emerged at the end of the war - and the conference did not attempt the restoration of a common political structure in the region. Some contemporary observers questioned the wisdom of such action. They doubted that the cause of European peace had been advanced by the Conference's official recognition of the independence of the several states "already given over to rivalry and mutual suspicion", and believed that it might have been possible to devise some practicable scheme of federation in Central Europe. 8 They overlooked the point that, under conditions that then existed, no practicable scheme of federation was possible. It was the lack of solidarity and the intense rivalry and mutual suspicion which led to the emergence of several states in Central Europe 8

George H. Derry, 'The Treaty of Peace with Austria", The American Political Science Review, February 1920, p. 181.

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in place of a common political structure. The heritage of AustriaHungary was bound to lead to tensions, strains, and conflicts. If there had been a practicable scheme of federation, the Conference would have had to impose it from above upon nations not desiring to cooperate in such a scheme voluntarily. How successful would such a radical device have been in the absence of an agreement about the territorial status quo and without the assurance of a minimum political solidarity among the nations concerned? If there were no prospects for federation imposed from the outside by the Conference, the outlook for meaningful negotiations among Central European nations aiming at a federal arrangement remained unfavorable even after they had entered a period characterized by a moderate good-neighbor policy. Czechoslovakia found its place in the European political system, in which France played a leading role and the League of Nations seemed to offer an umbrella of collective security. The memory of their experience in Austria-Hungary was not dimmed by the new problems confronting the Czechs and Slovaks in their own state. Moreover, there was some expectation of revisionist efforts on the part of the new Hungary, and differences in foreign policy with other Central European countries which were not conducive to a great revival of the idea of federalism or to political endeavors for a federalist regional grouping in Central Europe. The belief of Masaryk and other leaders that the establishment of several independent states in Central Europe was preliminary to their gradual integration proved to be an unattainable vision. The new Europe was to emerge with the assumption that the military spirit among nations would grow weaker. Masaryk anticipated a long period of genuine peace and supposed that the New Europe would have a chance to consolidate itself. Unfortunately, it was not his idea of progress and democracy which was on the march, but reaction in the form of Fascist, Nazi, and other dictatorship movements. Their demands profoundly affected the political climate in Central Europe by intensifying the struggle for advantage, influence, and power; by fomenting violent territorial disputes and collective resentments; and by otherwise undermining the European political system and peaceful relations among Czechoslovakia and its neighbors. The New Europe as envisaged by Masaryk was attacked relentlessly by the anti-democratic forces and was not granted more time to consolidate itself. There were, of course, plans and attempts prepared by certain economists in Czechoslovakia to improve economic cooperation among

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Central European countries. In 1936, representatives of the Little Entente met, on the basis of a proposal by the Premier of Czechoslovakia, Milan Hodza, to consider his plan for improved trade relations. But such essays were hardly adequate substitutes for effective political regional arrangements. The Little Entente, conceived by Masaryk as an addition to his New Europe proposals, was not capable of playing an effective role in strengthening the crumbling European balance, since neither Czechoslovakia nor its partners - Rumania and Yugoslavia were prepared to act boldly and agree among themselves on a more adequate political structure. Nor did their neighbors display more wisdom or foresight. The vision of the New Europe faded away rapidly. The approaching catastrophe only accelerated its complete disintegration.

2 CZECHOSLOVAKIA

AND GREAT POWERS

Czechoslovak Independence and the Great Powers: Retrospect and Prospect GEORGE LISKA

The relationship of Czechoslovak independence to the great powers can be stated paradoxically, accounting thus for the nation's suspension between failure and hope. The very conditions which permitted the creation of the Czechoslovak state in 1918, and its subsequent restoration in 1945, made it difficult or impossible to maintain the independence of the state in the following periods. Only now, half a century after a common state for the Czechs and Slovaks became practical politics and at a time when the state's dependence is all the greater for being apparently voluntary, are conditions developing in the world at large that may sustain efforts to revitalize the state and its independence, without detriment to free membership in larger frameworks. The difficulties of independent Czechoslovakia were prefigured in the war politics of the great powers during the different stages of World War I. The critical point was reached roughly halfway through the conflict. A peace of compromise before the collapse of Imperial Russia (or revolutionary, but liberal, Russia) would have created the most favorable conditions for maintaining an independent Czechoslovak state in the fulcrum of great-power equilibrium. Yet the Western Allies were unable at that point to deflect Imperial Germany from her aim of a Mitteleuropa that would reduce Austria-Hungary, with its component nationalities, to the status of a German satellite; and they were not yet disposed to insist on a fundamental reconstruction of the Habsburg empire. Such a reconstruction would have jeopardized their first choice for Central Europe: a peace settlement that would preserve a viable Austria-Hungary beside a weakened Germany. The objective faded only as the conflict drifted into total war in its second half. The Imperial German government aided the drift by its inability to choose between the goal of aggrandizement and the means re-

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quired to secure separate peace arrangements that would divide the Allies. The British, and, to a lesser extent, the French proved unable to decide how much or how little Germany had to be weakened if it was to remain strong enough to counterpoise Russia, yet cease to be a threat to France in Europe and to Britain overseas. And the Habsburg Monarchy encompassed its final ruin by proving unable, for good, objective reasons, to disassociate itself internationally from an increasingly dictatorial ally and to find internal allies against the dominant nationalities within the dominated ones. Czechoslovak independence was one of the specific results of the ineptitudes and the real difficulties besetting the great European belligerents. A larger consequence of the war was the dislocation of the European great-power system. This made it extremely difficult for the new Czechoslovak state to find a stable position from which to safeguard political access to Russia, if needed against an encroaching Germany; to Germany, if needed against Russia; and to the Western powers against either Russia or Germany. Only such a position, however, and the disposition to utilize it evenhandedly, might have induced both of the two local great powers to accept an independent Czechoslovak state as a less repugnant solution than domination by one of them or perpetual Western interference against the encroachments by either or both of them. A rough equilibrium among the great powers and the policy of balancing between them had proved necessary, even if not sufficient, for small countries like the Netherlands and Belgium in the past; the same requisites have since served well the new states outside Europe. The absence of such conditions in 1918 (and after) was aggravated by the failure of the two Western European powers to arrive at a common, or even a settled, policy toward the Central and Eastern European ones. British policy was confounded by the juxtaposition of alternately disliked and needed Germany and Russia, both before and during the First World War and again before the Second World War; the principal confusion of purpose in France arose out of the superimposition of a more or less disliked Bolshevism on a still-needed and, therefore, cherished Russia. Thus circumscribed, the young Czechoslovak statecraft was unable to consolidate the country's international position before the policy of appeasement set out to recreate, in favor of Nazi Germany and against Soviet Russia, something resembling the Central-Eastern European order which Imperial Germany had come close to securing, in part owing to the policy of the Soviets, twenty years earlier. The more

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thoughtful among the appeasers attempted to restore a European balance of power and preserve an autonomous European state system against direct involvement by Soviet Russia and, secondarily, the United States. The attempt failed partly because it was initiated too late and could not be pursued long enough, or, in geographic terms, far enough, in the face of Hitler's observable methods and inferrable ultimate objectives. But the appeasement policy was in effect sufficiently long to spotlight the continuing contradiction between attempts to reconstitute the European great-power system and efforts to maintain Czechoslovak independence in the then-existing circumstances. When the weight shifted from Nazi Germany to Soviet Russia in the Second World War, and both the European balance-of-power and state systems lay shattered, formal Czechoslovak independence was restored. In view of the expressions of a different intent by important Western spokesmen at the time of Munich, it is impossible to say what organizational form the democratic powers would have favored for Central-Eastern Europe and, perhaps, imposed there, had they been free in 1945 to apply the lessons of the interwar period. In reality, the material content of Czechoslovak independence was foredoomed by the apparent necessity to concede to Soviet Russia still more predominance in CentralEastern Europe than (according to the anti-appeasers' earlier criticisms) Chamberlain was prepared to concede to Nazi Germany - and to do so under equally humiliating circumstances for the West. One may doubt whether the Second World War was really, in Churchill's words, an "unnecessary war", in the sense that Hitler's Germany could have been stopped without war by a coalition including Soviet Russia, perhaps even before the curtailment and destruction of Czechoslovakia. But, once started, the three-cornered contest undoubtedly became a virtually "unwinnable war" for the democracies, in the sense that they could not win against both Nazi Germany and Communist Russia at one and the same time. In a situation, however, in which the great democratic powers of Europe found their undoing, small Czechoslovakia stood a still smaller chance of saving more than appearances. In a great dramatic story, the end is, to some degree, implicit in the beginning. Thus, no excessive fatalism is required for believing that independent Czechoslovakia could not have done much to reverse the trend of events in the interwar period. In a European system lopsided, first, in favor of France and Britain, and, later and more tellingly, in favor of Germany and Russia, the options actually available to Czecho-

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slovak statecraft were few. The responsible architects of Czechoslavak foreign policy understood perfectly the need for options between individual great powers as the condition of safeguarded independence; being short of materials with which to work, however, they were inclined to postulate the existence of apparent alternatives while, perhaps, downgrading the importance or inevitability of a real choice. The desire to uphold the new state's diplomatic independence was strongest in the first postwar years. The foreign-policy makers in Prague were anxious to avoid alienating the other European powers, most particularly Great Britain, while preserving the indispensable backing of France. Independence was to be demonstrated, as well as increased, by efforts at mediation between the variously divided powers, and the standing of the mediator was to be enhanced by combining with other lesser states in a potentially powerful grouping, the Little Entente. The limited and merely supporting role that early Czechoslovak diplomacy assigned to the League of Nations was but another instance of its self-conscious realism. The policy underwent an ostensible change when, in the face of pressing needs, the fledgling state established a special treaty relationship with France in the early 1920's. If considering the Little Entente as a means for implementing the policy of diplomatic independence vis-à-vis the great powers had previously aroused some reservations in France, it was now Britain's turn, and even more Italy's, to frown upon Czechoslovakia's treaty commitment to their wartime ally. Thereafter, Czechoslovakia's understandings with Italy and Weimar Germany were as ineffective in limiting the immediate implications of the French connection as the alliance with Soviet Russia was to be in halting the alliance's decay about a decade later. One by one, Italy, Germany, and Russia were anxious to supplant French influence in Central Europe; but neither of them was ever ready or, if apparently ready, able to supplement France's economic and political involvement there with a view toward helping establish a stable regional order. With increasing clarity, the Locarno pact and, more than ten years later, the Munich accord illustrated the difficulty of achieving a stabilizing great-power agreement in the absence of preexisting balance in real and potential resources of the great powers; at midpoint between Locarno and Munich, the circumstances surrounding Mussolini's initiative toward a Four-Power pact for peaceful revision of the status quo merely confirmed the impossibility of anchoring Czechoslovak independence in a great-power consensus. The progressive collapse of the League of

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Nations demonstrated the suspected inability of a general organ of collective security to make up for the absence of such concert. With the disappearance of alternatives and supplements, the FrancoCzechoslovak alliance emerged ever more clearly as the one and only supporting pillar in the structure of Czechoslovak security. Its adverse fate was the compound of more than one irony, the last, but not least, of which unfolded as Britain came first to tolerate and then to accept the Franco-Czechoslovak treaty, relatively strong in the days of British opposition, in order to control the implementation and to preside over the repudiation of the alliance. Prague's long-standing desire to avoid a choice between Paris and London was fulfilled, in the event, with a vengeance. The foreign-policy makers of independent Czechoslovakia could hope, at the outset of their career, to combine the best elements of old balance-of-power diplomacy and new League of Nations diplomacy in a coherent system of security for the state. Instead, their efforts foundered amidst the worst possible configuration. Dependence on the principal great-power ally grew as the ally became less dependable and he himself more dependent. The Little Entente revealed its inner incoherence as concerns about influence and prestige gave way to those of security, and as the vociferous revisionism in Hungary fell in behind Germany's growing capacity for forceful revision. And the League of Nations was virtually defunct, even before Czechoslovakia was summoned to face a threat to her existence; it outlasted Czechoslovak independence (although in name only) long enough to eject from the international comity the very Soviet Russia which Czechoslovak diplomacy had labored to integrate into an old-fashioned European balance by way of Wilson's alternative to such balance - the Geneva system. The failure of efforts to develop what proved to be only apparent options points up the failure to face squarely what appears to have been a real choice. The choice is between seeking security and prestige in the widest possible framework of greater and lesser states, within a spectrum of complementary associations, and the quest for elementary security in integral commitment to states with identical interests, within a necessarily narrower framework. A narrowly based strategy for maintaining Czechoslovak independence would have subordinated all other concerns to the quest for an alliance with Poland, linked to a France willing and able to deal with the German problem in relative independence from Great Britain. Such a strategy would have run against serious economic obstacles;

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its political costs appeared to be particularly heavy for Czechoslovakia in the light of her apparent alternatives. Whenever the external or internal situation of Poland made leading Poles consider with favor a close association with Czechoslovakia, leading men in Czechoslovakia felt all the more reason for not bringing their country into Poland's contentions with Germany and, especially, with Russia. Moreover, Czechoslovakia would probably have had to pay for the privilege of embracing Poland's quarrels with some loss of national territory and some decline in international status. Even if they had managed to compose their differences, Czechoslovakia and Poland might still have been unable to keep France on a steady preventive course against Germany, in initial isolation from Britain, and in more enduring separation from Soviet Russia. But, if properly implemented against resurgent German power at the right time and in the right places, a tight Franco-Polish-Czechoslovak bloc might well have averted or weathered the Nazi storm, pending changes within Germany and Russia that would permit negotiated adaptations of the peace treaties. In its relations with France herself, a Polish-Czechoslovak combine would have constituted a real bargaining force, since it would have offered a real bulwark against France's chief enemy. It would, therefore, have come close to realizing a formula for maintaining small-state independence even under conditions of disequilibrium among the great powers. The formula is that of a special relationship with one great power, insured against the pitfalls of satellitism and abandonment by having the great power possess no suitable alternative to the small-state alliance (rather than by the small state having a range of alternatives among the greater powers). Faced with adverse external conditions, Czechoslovak foreign policy suffered its share of distortion by internal pressures. These are commonly more effective in blocking approaches than in imposing preferred foreign-policy solutions. A widespread tendency, moreover, to surround the origins of the state, and the means for maintaining it, with legend and sentiment only reinforced a disposition to shrink from genuine myth-producing acts of resolution and resistance in "hours of truth". Humane calculations of acceptable individual and collective sacrifice compounded gross calculations of group advantage in a progressively debilitating, joint moral effect. The raison d'état was downgraded as a principle, even before it was misinterpreted in practice. The progressive erosion of the idea of the state in Czechoslovakia had now come

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close to destroying the identity of the nation as something more than an accidental aggregate of self-seeking contemporaries. The middle-class élite in the interwar Republic was discredited by its failure to perform successfully a vital function of government in the essentially aristocratic domains of foreign policy and national defense. More recently comparable discredit for the so-called working-class élite has derived from its incapacity to perform successfully the essentially bourgeois function of capital accumulation within an already highly developed economic system. Like their democratic predecessors thirty years earlier, the Communist governors in 1948 achieved - with powerful assistance - too great a triumph over their adversaries. The ideology of class conflict made apparent sense in a still imperfectly developed industrial society, just as the ideology of national unity and internationalism had appeared sufficient in an externally insecure country. But both ideologies proved inadequate for coping with concrete problems when, as soon happened, the triumphant régimes found themselves without a feasible function in developing and maintaining their initial success. The function now lacking is one which has been sustaining Communist leaderships in countries less advanced, to wit, the initiation of an industrialization process as a common effort under national or anti-colonial slogans. The Communist régime in Czechoslovakia was no more required to start the country on the road toward economic development than it has been capable of advancing economic growth on its more complex levels. To compensate in part for the resulting frustrations, the régime has proffered technical and economic assistance on behalf of the Soviet bloc to the world at large, somewhat as the foreignpolicy makers in the interwar period sought to mitigate regional problems by good works for a global system of collective security, on behalf of the French alliance system. A more serious compensation for the lack of manageable function and consequent insecurity has been the present regime's tendency to ignore the obligations of sovereignty and independence with respect to the principal great-power alley. Whenever it has sought dependence without compulsion from the outside, the Communist régime has chosen to differ, in a vital respect, from some of its East-European and Asiatic counterparts, as well as from its bourgeois predecessors at their best. Only purposeful action can restore meaningful nationhood and independence to Czechoslovakia at some time in this next half-century of its existence. The action must be revolutionary, in the sense of

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reversing established priorities and subordinating issues that bear on the distribution of social and political power within the state to the task of rehabilitating the state itself as a moral and political force. The task of reconstruction is still defined by the choices open to small states in a world of great powers. A small state, we have already noted in passing, may seek independence in the more or less passive position of a more or less formally neutralized buffer; it can actively play off two or more great powers against one another; or it can align itself with one great power while keeping open access to other powerful states as a safeguard against abuses by the principal ally. All three formulas realize, in some way and to some degree, the international utility of the small state as ground for moderate competition and cooperation among the greater states, anxious to combine the advantages of reciprocal communication and insulation by ensuring the existence of intermediate lesser states. In the nuclear age, neutralization has been often coupled with schemes for denuclearization, not least in regard to Central Europe, as the balance of terror shows a potential for increasing stability with the aid of arms control. The second formula, under the name of neutralism or positive neutrality, has actually spread in the non-European world as a spontaneous reaction to the stalemate between the two nuclear (and, in the prevailing sense of the term, largely non-colonial) superpowers. It is possible to argue that integral neutralization and integral neutralism are not practical, or even desirable, options for the small countries between Germany and Russia under present circumstances. Neutralization, as perhaps the necessary political complement to military denuclearization, might result only from the improbably successful application of internal or Western pressures, or from an unlikely measure of agreement between a Soviet Union and a United States anxious to reassert control over a strictly bipolar situation. If none of these preconditions materializes, neutralization and denuclearization may be of interest for East Germany rather than for CentralEastern Europe as a whole. By contrast, the policy of neutralism would presuppose a considerably larger number of independent great powers in Europe and Afro-Asia. But if strict bipolarity is probably beyond recall, extensive multipolarity is still only a prospect. Moreover, if neutralization and neutralism are not to generate instabilities in the international system, they require a measure of political consensus and self-restraint within the practising countries that cannot be taken for granted in an area with the history of Central-Eastern Europe. On the

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and the Great Powers

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other hand, the kind of individual and group mentality that tend to become associated with withdrawal from great-power contests or exploitation of them would not necessarily suit the area's contemporary needs. There remains the third way, that of a special, if not exclusive, relationship to one great power, which may include elements of the other two approaches. The third way entails reconstruction of Czechoslovakia's ties with the Soviet Union in ways that would facilitate access by other great powers, and autonomous political relations with them. Such a revision is in keeping with the contemporary trend away from a polarized ideological and power contest toward classic polycentric diplomacy in the world at large; and it is compatible with the country's needs in regard to both external security and social policy. The Sino-Soviet differences have created obvious opportunities for increasing independence within and, derivatively, outside the Communist camp; even more important in the long run are possible transformations in the West and, especially, in the newly ascendant Western Europe. A hopeful factor here has been the reassertion of France's diplomatic independence. France continues to have a vital interest in recovering and then retaining her political access to the Central-Eastern European area as a condition of her long-term security and her status as a great power. Czechoslovakia and Poland, in particular, have the same significance for France that the Low Countries have had traditionally for Great Britain, and that Western Europe (meaning, chiefly, Britain and France) has acquired for the United States. B y the same token, Central-Eastern Europe is relatively less important to the Anglo-Saxon powers. The great-power deal at Munich illustrates the difference: it was promoted by certain British statesmen, with some American encouragement, as a reversion to a time-honored alternative for British policy in Europe, while it was agreed to by a shamed French Prime Minister only as the final act in the series of abdications. (The deal was denounced, to be sure, by other Britons and most Americans, but then in the name of flexibly applied principles of morality, or of the balance of power.) In our time, the United States can be trusted to fight for Western Europe and to refuse any "deal" that would threaten its exclusion therefrom, just as Britain could be relied upon in the past to fight for the L o w Countries, under the most adverse circumstances. But the United States government has been so far unwilling, and, in terms of its political priorities and inhibitions, actually unable, to exert maximum pressure on the Soviets to relax their controls in

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Central-Eastern Europe. This was true even at the peak of America's strategic superiority, just before and after the death of Stalin, and before Soviet nuclear missiles erected between the United States and CentralEastern Europe a barrier more effective than the conventional Maginot and Siegfried Lines combined. The crucial variable is vital interest, rooted in political geography and determining how much of its total political and material resources a nation can expend in promoting this interest. The thrust and intensity of the major powers' vital interests are important factors in considering Czechoslovakia's options, in no way inferior to the magnitude of the resources that the different great powers can muster. A related factor is the position of individual great powers toward actual or potential pressures, alternatives, and compensations, which condition peacetime diplomacy in a particular phase. In this respect, the United States and the Soviet Union are handicapped in all efforts to agree upon the terms and scope of reciprocal political access to countries adjoining their home bases - Central-Eastern Europe on one side, and the Central and South American area on the other. The United States is neither disposed nor yet constrained to barter concessions of influence in the two areas. Quite the contrary, it has been moving to secure unilaterally economic links in Central-Eastern Europe, not least to acquire the capacity for deterring or penalizing Soviet encroachments in Latin America by pushing more or less hard in CentralEastern Europe. The United States is no more able to offer meaningful compensations to the Soviet Union in Western Europe, of which it cannot dispose and from which it may be able to withdraw only if progressively replaced by resurgent forces from within. The inability to compensate strictly limits the bargaining between the two superpowers over Central Europe; the impossibility of bargaining meaningfully, even if tacitly, is likely to limit the practical scope of any American accomplishments in that area. As long as they are not part of a larger political reconstruction sanctioned by the Soviets, the political effects of American, related West German, and partly competitive French economic and cultural contacts with individual Central-Eastern European governments are likely to be nullified by the political motives and goals of the cooperating Communist elites. These are the merely tactical ones of self-aggrandizement, with respect to the two Communist great powers and to local publics; the measure of ostensible independence thus secured is not negligible, but its probable capacity for growth and stabilization is small. By contrast,

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a Franco-Soviet rapprochement might be a more promising approach to an all-European reconstruction. Such a rapprochement would logically entail, as the price for the reduction of direct American military involvement and political influence in Western Europe, a corresponding attenuation of Soviet controls and influence within the Central-Eastern European countries, with better communications between the latter and the Western European states. Since such transformations in CentralEastern Europe would serve the basic interests of the greater powers, with their own sanction, they might prove to be stable. Moreover, the revised pattern of great-power relations in Europe would probably accompany progress toward some kind of confederal organization for East and West Germany, increasing the common interest in maintaining the French political presence in Central-Eastern Europe, in order to control any possible resurgence of German ambition. France would be more effective if Western Europe progressed toward even a loose unity. A Western Europe built around France and Western Germany, with or without Great Britain, might constitute a militarypolitical and economic concentration of power which, while separate, would not have to be wholly separated from the United States in order to be both a respectable partner and a potential antagonist for the Soviet Union. Similarly, the Central-Eastern European states might benefit most by prospective changes in relations among the great powers, should they themselves constitute a coherent autonomous grouping. Future progress toward association may be facilitated by the changes that have taken place since the various cooperation schemes failed in the interwar period. Industrialization in the hitherto-agricultural countries may have reduced economic incompatibilities, even if it has not engendered outright complementarity. The great differences in fears and attitudes toward Germany, Russia, and (to a lesser degree) Italy, which had made it impossible to either enlarge or tighten the Little Entente, may have grown less intense or at least less significant for political action. And the confinement of the Central-Eastern European area between relatively coherent state or power systems in the West, East, and North of Europe has become more manifest, as well as potentially more manageable. There is also a new cardinal fact that may help bring about a common policy. The entire Central-Eastern European area is exposed to interdiction strikes by one or both belligerents against marshalling and communication facilities, particularly in a limited nuclear war. To deal with the area as a passageway in Europe between a potentially belligerent East and West, denuclearization or

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neutralization may be less appropriate than the acquisition of separate nuclear capability, usable in principle for deterrent and bargaining purposes with regard to the major nuclear powers. The long-range goal is then a rudimentary bloc of small states, middling in size and intermediate in location, with access to the seas for commerce and seaborne deterrents, offering a threat to none of the great nuclear powers because potentially menaced and protected by afl, sustained by pressure of forces and interests rather than by short-lived treaties and long-winded declarations. In foreseeable circumstances, such a grouping could freely maintain special ties with Soviet Russia; the form and extent of Russia's interference there would be controlled by her need to escape, through friendships in Western Europe, the double predicament of finding herself isolated between a resurgent and revisionist Germany and China, and of facing a United States able to exploit Russia's embarrassments from the position of political monopoly in Western Europe. The relationship between the European state system and the global system was as important for Czechoslovak independence in the period following the First World War as the relationship between the allEuropean system and the narrower Franco-Central European bloc. The entry of the United States into the First World War, which globalized international politics, propelled the European Allies on the road toward both decisive victory and radical war-aims, permitting the creation of the Czechoslovak state. America's subsequent withdrawal, compelling reversion to a primarily European system, contributed to the collapse of Czechoslovak independence by launching Britain and France into mutually self-defeating policies toward Germany. The engulfment of the European system by the global one after the Second World War did nothing to relieve the plight of Czechoslovakia. The expansion of scale reduced the significance of the country for the larger theater, and hastened Czechoslovakia's replacement by the non-European new states as objects of great-power concern and competition. The reemergence of a European system as part of a world system of security and welfare may yet create the very conditions of great-power balance that were lacking in 1918 and facilitate a negotiated termination of a contest that has taken the place of a third world war in the nuclear setting. The ultimate result may yet be the reconstitution of some informal concert of powers on a global scale, sustained by an equilibrium of power and a stalemate of ambitions among the major states. Such a

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concert has traditionally been the best framework for upholding a decent measure of independence for small states in Europe. The great hope must henceforth be that, as some European states again become great, another, undoubtedly great, becomes truly European; that the vital concern of the United States for the integrity of Western Europe as a self-sustaining ally can be meshed into a revived concern within Western Europe for the status of the area between Germany and Russia; that the two concerns can be so combined as to increase the West's capacity for creative diplomacy without disrupting its capacity for deterrrence and defense in the last resort; and that, finally, the Czechoslovak question will again be approached as a European question of immediate political importance, although still presenting a universal question in an ultimate, philosophic sense. ]n a precariously situated country like Czechoslovakia, the external setting sooner or later profoundly affects internal conditions. As the great-power environment evolves toward a new structure and stability, accommodation among particular creeds and interests can begin in earnest within the exposed smaller states. The only indispensable factor is a common regard for the irreducible requirements of the state's security and its standing within the larger society.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Fischer, Fritz, Griff nach der Weltmacht (Düsseldorf, Droste Verlag, 1961). Gilbert, Martin, and Gott, Richard, The Appeasers (London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1963). Liska, George, Europe Ascendant (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1964). Taylor, A. J. P., "The War Aims of the Allies in the First World War", in Richard Pares and A. J. P. Taylor, Essays Presented to Sir Lewis Namier (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1956). Vondracek, Felix J., The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia, 1918-1935 (New York, Columbia University Press, 1937). Wandycz, Piotr S., France and Her Eastern Allies, 1919-1925 (Minneapolis, The University of Minnesota Press, 1962). Wolfers, Arnold, Britain and France Between Two Wars (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1940).

Czechoslovakia and Germany, 1933-1945*

G E R H A R D L. W E I N B E R G

The history of the relationship between Czechoslovakia and Germany in the years 1933-45 has come to be viewed from a perspective that can be summed up in one word: "Munich". The territorial mutilation imposed upon Czechoslovakia by that conference is thought of not merely as a watershed, a point at which the historian can conveniently divide his narrative; it has become much more. It has, in fact, almost preempted scholarly attention and popular interest. Everything before and after Munich, if given any thought at all, is viewed in relation to that event. This focus of scholarly and public concern is, of course, quite understandable. In their meaning for the fate of Czechoslovakia, Germany, and the world as a whole - and as sheer human drama — the tensionladen days of September 1938, are surely a fitting subject for research and publication. But one may well ask whether there is much ore left in that mine, and whether prolonged digging into the same area may not threaten to distort our perspective. The continuation of intensive research on the Munich crisis itself is hardly warranted by the probable returns in new information. Interpretations and perspectives may well vary, but it seems most unlikely that great revelations will be forthcoming. The accounts of Celovsky 1 and Laffan, 2 or the recent summary by Keith Eubank, 3 serve very well. Ronnefarth 4 only proved that writing a book twice as long as anyone * The author has been assisted by grants from the Horace R. Rackham School of Graduate Studies of The University of Michigan, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Social Science Research Council. 1 Boris Celovsky, Das Miinchener Abkommen von 1938 (Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1958). 2 Robert George D. Laffan, Survey of International Affairs 1938: II, The Crisis over Czechoslovakia, January to September 1938 (London, Oxford, 1951). * Keith Eubank, Munich (Norman, University of Oklahoma, 1963). 4 Helmuth K. G. Ronnefarth, Die Sudetenkrise in der internationalen Politik (2 vols., Wiesbaden, Steiner, 1961).

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else's does not necessarily produce a work that is even half as good. It should be noted that whatever important new material has recently become available tends to substantiate rather than alter the existing accounts. This can be illustrated by a few examples. In the existing literature, there is much informed speculation on supposed statements by Neville Chamberlain to a group of journalists on May 10, 1938. Chamberlain is said to have indicated that the Sudeten area might well have to be turned over to Germany; that even after a successful war, Czechoslovakia would probably not be put together again in its old boundaries. 5 We now have a report on this luncheon talk of Chamberlain's, written on the following day by the Manager of the United Press office in London, who was actually present. According to his account, Chamberlain did not believe that France would take military action to save Czechoslovakia, and he "casually made the rather astounding statement that in view of the fact that the Cantonal system would be very difficult to apply, due to the fact that the Sudetens occupy a long thin fringe along the frontier, the solution might be merely to move the frontier!" Chamberlain is likewise reported as stating "that if war developed over Czechoslovakia and the opponents of Germany won, even then Czechoslovakia would never again exist in its present form". 6 In a way, this document is a historian's delight, but one must admit that it really only confirms what we already knew. Almost the same thing can be said for the publication in 1957, and again in 1958, of the instructions from Benes for Necas to pass on to Daladier via Léon Blum, defining the possible territorial concessions Czechoslovakia could make in September 1938. 7 Although the details are again extremely valuable, the general nature of this communication to the French government just before Daladier and Bonnet went to London on September 18 was already known. 8 One final example will

5 Celovsky, op cit., pp. 197-99; Laffan, op. cit., pp. 113-15; Eubank, op. cit., p. 55; George Eric R. Gedye, Betrayal in Central Europe (New York, Harper, 1939), pp. 391-95; William L. Shirer, Berlin Diary (New York, Knopf, 1942), p. 97 f. 0 London Manager of U P to the U P Vice-President for South America, May 11, 1938, attached to Weddell to Hull, June 7, 1938 (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Cordell Hull Papers). 7 Mnichov v dokumentech (Prague, 1958), II, pp. 209-10; concerning this publication, see F. Vnuk, "Munich and the Soviet Union", Journal of Central European Affairs, X X I (1961), pp. 285-304. s See the account in Celovsky, op. cit., pp. 345-49. Eubank, op. cit., p. 140 f.,

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indicate the lack of novelty in what, under other circumstances, might be sensational documentary finds. The publication in 1959 of the German Foreign Ministry documents for the period June 1934-March 1935 proved that the Sudeten German Party was financed in large part from Berlin, at least from 1935 on. 9 The details are certainly most welcome - and we could use a good many more on this subject - but it is unlikely that many historians were greatly surprised. The concentrated study of the events of 1938, is, moreover, not only subject to the law of diminishing returns, but also lends to those events a significance they may not deserve. Czechs and Germans lived side by side before Munich and after Munich, and - even if under very different circumstances - continue to do so today. Is there not another framework within which we might consider Czech-German relations from 1933 to 1938 and from 1939 to 1945? If we are to do this, one fact immediately becomes obvious: the plethora of publications concerning Munich contrasts with the grotesque scarcity of serious studies of the earlier and later periods. The term "serious studies" is used advisedly. There is certainly much nonsense propounded by those who have decided to recast Czech history in the mold of Soviet historiography. There are also those who, having learnt nothing and forgotten nothing, write unbelievable memoirs. An unintentionally revealing example of the latter is an account by Hans Neuwirth, who is so enamored of one particular fairy tale that he tells it twice in the same piece, attributing it to Frangois-Poncet on one occasion and to Nevile Henderson thirty-eight pages later. 10 What we really need is a serious examination of the relations between Czechoslovakia and Germany from 1933 to 1937 and from 1939 to 1945. The research source exists in the archives of the German Foreign Ministry and the vast quantities of German records microfilmed by the

is not as clear as the evidence then warranted. It might be noted that, as President of the Governing Board of the International Labor Organization (as well as Minister of Social Welfare), Neöas had done considerable travelling, visiting Franklin D. Roosevelt in April 1937 (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, O.F. 536). 9 Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, Series C, Vol. I l l (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959), N o . 509; Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals, XII (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951), pp. 783-86. 10 Hans Neuwirth, "Begegnungen im böhmischen Raum", Bohemia, I (1960), p. 270, note, and p. 308.

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American Historical Association's project in Alexandria, Virginia. 11 In addition, some important contributions have been made from within post-1948 Czechoslovakia, 12 and there is at least the possibility that archival research on the other side of the Iron Curtain may be feasible. 13 Beyond calling attention to these needs and possible means of filling them, this paper suggests a framework in which to view the events of those years. The two periods should each be examined from two perspectives: events as lived through and seen by most of the participants, and the same events as seen and directed by Hitler. The following account gives some idea of what such a double approach might produce. In the period 1933-37, the activities of the immediate participants ran in two channels: first, regular diplomatic relations, and second, the relationship of Czechs and Germans within the Czechoslovak state. A survey of the diplomatic aspect was published by Johann W. Bruegel in International Affairs in 1961.14 His conclusion that there were no really serious diplomatic problems is borne out by other evidence. The published documents (though not yet entirely clear on some matters) and then examinations of special topics, such as the author's report on the secret negotiations of 1936-37,• ' show that there were no diplomatic questions considered inherently difficult. The picture inside Czechoslovakia in those years was not quite as encouraging, though one suspects that the effects of the great depression have sometimes been underrated in assessing not so much the form as the intensity of the nationality conflict. The internal workings of both the activist parties and the Henlein movement might well be subjected to more detailed and less impas-

11

The microfilms of the German Foreign Ministry are listed in A Catalog of Files and Microfilms of the German Foreign Ministry Archives, ed. George O. Kent (Stanford, Hoover Institution, 1962). The microfilms from Alexandria are described in the series, "Guides to German Records Microfilmed at Alexandria, Va." (Washington, The National Archives, 1958). 12 There is some useful information, for example, in Václav Král, "The Policy of Germanization Enforced in Bohemia and Moravia by the Fascist Invaders during the Second World War", Histórica, II (1960), pp. 273-303. 13 See Helmut Lotzke. "Quellen zur tschechoslowakischen Geschichte im deutsc'nen Zentralarchiv (1867-1945)", in Karl Obermann and Josef PoliSensky (eds.), Atis 500 Jahren deutsch-tschechoslowakischer Geschichte (Berlin, Riitten & Loening, 1958), pp. 405-28. 14 "German Diplomacy and the Sudeten Question before 1938", International Affairs, X X X V I I (1961), pp. 323-31. 15 Gerhard L. Weinberg, "Secret Hitler-Benes Negotiations in 1936-37", Journal of Central European Affairs, X I X (1960), pp. 366-74.

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sioned analysis. 10 In both cases, the retrospective view of the Munich crisis tends to obscure the broad currents of the earlier period, and what may, on closer examination, well prove to be the loyalty of large parts of the German population to the Czech state. Just as post-World War I emphasis has focussed on the Czech soldiers who turned against the Habsburg empire, rather than the vastly greater number who served it loyally almost to the end, so post-Munich writers have often tried to make up for the widespread earlier acceptance of Henlein's good faith by later assuming bad faith on the part of all his followers. Scrutiny of the internal politics of the Sudeten German Party may well reveal a pattern quite different from that of the National Socialist parties in Austria and Danzig. In the latter cases, the internal squabbles were largely struggles for power and position, occasionally over tactics, but never over the ultimate goal. Within the Sudeten German Party, however, there appear to have been currents quite different from those symbolized by the goose-step, and these may well have influenced a substantial proportion of the membership. There is little advantage to idle speculation about the "ifs" of history, but just as the loyalty of a large proportion of the Habsburg subjects in World War I may indicate the possible chances of internal reform and cohesion there at that time - had there been courage inside and peace outside - so the relations of Czechs and Germans inside Czechoslovakia in the period before Munich may well substantiate the existence of similar possibilities, and thus cast a somewhat different light on the nationality clash of the 1920's and 1930's. If one looks for a moment at the other side of the coin - the plans, intentions, and ideas of Hitler - the picture changes quite drastically. Although Franz Jetzinger has shown that a nationalist-minded Czech was the best friend of Hitler's father, 17 and that, in fact, the name "Hitler" is itself of Czech origin, 18 the evidence of Adolf Hitler's personal attitude towards the Czechs is clear and indisputable. In Mein Kampj,ltt and in his second book, 20 he shows that he was disturbed over the allegedly excessive concessions the Habsburgs had made to the 16

In spite of its bias, the following recent study will be found helpful: César and Bohumil Cerny, "The Policy of German Activist Parties in slovakia in 1918-1938", Histórica, VI (1963), pp. 239-81. 17 Franz Jetzinger, Hitlers Jugend (Vienna, Europa-Verlag, 1956), p. 18 Ibid., p. 11. 19 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (Munich, Eher, 1933 printing), p. 101. 20 Hitlers zweites Buck, ed. Gerhard L. Weinberg (Stuttgart, Deutsche Anstalt, 1961), p. 92.

Jaroslav Czecho50 f.

Verlags-

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Czechs. The latter belonged to inferior racial stock and were certainly no more fit to be Germanized than other sub-human creatures such as the Poles. 21 As Hitler looked toward the future, in the 1920's, he condemned the Czechs for oppressing "almost 4 million Germans" 22 and assumed that they would be on the side of France in any war between that country and Germany. 23 The Eurasian empire he planned to construct would have no room for such obnoxious and inferior peoples; and as Rauschning informs us, by the summer of 1932, Hitler had already concluded that the presence of Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia was the real nationality problem there, one to be solved by their expulsion.24 At the beginning of his rule in Germany, Hitler realized that domestic consolidation and rearmament must precede foreign adventure. He told his generals on February 3, 1933, that if France and her Eastern allies (presumably, Poland and Czechoslovakia) had any sense, they would not allow him the time he needed, but would launch a preventive attack. 25 There was no such attack, and Hitler had all the time he needed. In the first part of that period, he had to play it safe. Hitler explained to Hans Knirsch, a deputy in Prague and one of the original founders of the National Socialist movement in Bohemia, that the National Socialists in Czechoslovakia would have to make their own policy, the Reich could not help them for a long time.26 It is, thus, perfectly understandable that for several years Hitler paid no particular attention to the internal problems of Czechoslovakia and postponed aggressive moves to a more auspicious day. That his basic perception of longterm German policy remained unchanged is clear from the famous or notorious - Hossbach Memorandum. 27 The Czech state would have

Ibid., p. 79. Ibid., p. 188. 23 Ibid., p. 147 f. 24 Hermann Rauschning, The Voice of Destruction (New York, Putnam's, 1940), p. 37 f. 25 Notes by Gen.Lt. Liebmann, "Gefährlichste Zeit ist die des Aufbaus der Wehrmacht. Da wird sich zeigen, ob Frankreich] Staatsmänner hat; wenn ja, wird es uns Zeit nicht lassen, sondern über uns herfallen (vermutlich mit OstTrabanten)." Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, II (1954), p. 435. 26 Eisenlohr to the Foreign Ministry, Dec. 17, 1933, Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, Series C, Vol. II (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959). No. 132. 27 Trial of the Major War Criminals, 42 vols. (Nuernberg, 1946-48), XXV, pp. 402-13. 52

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to disappear; its nationality problem was the presence of Czechs.- 8 In this context, as in other explanations of his long-term plans, the removal of the Czechs from Czechoslovakia was only a part of a very large scheme, an important part, to be sure, but still merely a small-scale model of the vast demographic changes he proposed for Europe as a whole. This is a point to which we shall return in another context. For the period 1939-1945, the actual sequence of events in CzechGerman relations is by no means clear. Complicated by the division of Czechoslovakia into several entirely separate political units, the investigation of these events has hardly begun. A few incidents like the student demonstrations and the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich have received considerable attention, but the fact remains that there has, on the whole, been very little scholarly work on the events of those years. 29 As the wartime developments are studied, some emphasis may well be placed on the day-to-day relationships, and on the details of economic activity. On the surface, at least, one gets the impression that the situation in Czechoslovakia was quieter and daily life less upset than in almost any other part of Europe involved in the war. If this should prove to have been the case, its reasons surely deserve some attention. The other aspect of this period - the intentions of Hitler and his immediate underlings - is quite clear. The long-term goal of expelling the Czechs remained. The very fact that they were hard-working and intelligent, and that their state had been less subject to corruption than others, made them especially dangerous. As Hitler expressed it, there was "no room for them and for us". 30 During the war, they would be obliged to put their industry and talents to work for the glory and victory of the Reich; the expulsion of a large proportion of the Czech population and the assimilation of the rest would be postponed until they had made this last contribution in their homeland to the triumph 28

At least some of the leaders of the Germans in Czechoslovakia had come to realize the main direction of Hitler's policy by 1939. On March 11, 1939, the German Legation in Prague reported: "Representative of the German Volksgruppe deplores perfectly correct, even accommodating attitude of the Czechs everywhere." Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, Series D. Vol. IV (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951), No. 189. 29 See Helmut Heiber, "Zur Justiz im Dritten Reich: Der Fall EliaS", Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, III (1955), pp. 275-96; the article by Kral cited in note 12; Gotthold Rhode, "Das Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren", Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament) March 11, 1964. 30 Hitler's Table Talk, 1941-1944, ed. Hugh R. Trevor-Roper (London, Weidenfeld, 1953), p. 234 f. (Jan. 23, 1942).

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that would prove their undoing. 31 The memoranda of Constantin von Neurath and Karl Hermann Frank, later produced at the Nuremberg trials, show that this policy was fully understood by those who needed to know. 32 When Neurath urged Germanization through "selective breeding", he showed that he not only listened to his master's voice, but also knew how to imitate its tones. Again, however, it should be noted that the considerations of general policy governing Hitler's attitude toward Czechoslovakia were dictated by concerns far broader than those for any bilateral Czech-German relationship. 33 In the future greater German empire, the area of Bohemia and Moravia would constitute a tiny segment of the vast territory to be settled by Germans. It was, in fact, the very size of the whole prospective Germanicized area that suggested the slight modification of earlier plans implied by the willingness to assimilate a portion of the Czech population, rather than expel it all. Viewed from the context of the New Order as a whole, the expulsion of most Czechs from their homeland would be only one drop in an ocean of human misery. Hitler's famous statement of September 26, 1938 - " W i r wollen gar keine Tschechen!" (We really don't want any Czechs!) 34 - was to be implemented in a manner far different from what his listeners anticipated at the time. But then the Sudeten Germans were to go "Heim ins Reich" (home to the Reich) in a way they had not expected, either. In May 1939, the American Consul General in Prague had foretold the ultimate outcome of Germany's policy: "The Germans will probably hold the upper hand without undue difficulty as long as the broad basis of national-socialist power remains intact. But they will have no happy time of it, and if the tide ever turns, Czech retaliation will be fearful to contemplate." 35 When Hitler looked back on his career in February 1945, he concluded that Munich had been his great misfortune. That would have

31

Ibid., pp. 204 (Jan. 13, 1942), 494 (May 20, 1942), 557 f. (July 4, 1942). Neurath to Lammers, enclosing memoranda from himself and Karl Hermann Frank, Aug. 31, 1942, 3859-PS, Trial of the Major War Criminals, XXXIII, 252-71; Der Wehrmachtbevollmächtigte beim Reichsprotektor, "Nr. 2 2 / 4 0 g. Kdos. Chefs.", Oct. 15, 1940, 862-PS, ibid., X X V I , pp. 375-77. 33 The evidence concerning Hitler's long-term intentions toward the Slovaks is not so clear. 34 Max Domarus, Hitler, Reden und Proklamationen 1932-1945, I (Würzburg, Schmidt, 1962), p. 932. 35 Linnell to Hull, May 23, 1939, Foreign Relations of the United States 1939, I (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 68. 32

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been the time to start the war. That was the "unique opportunity"; that was the occasion to liquidate Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain had cheated him by the outrageously deceptive step of agreeing to all of Hitler's demands - that is, as we know today, by agreeing to those demands which Hitler made in public. 36 Hitler was careful to avoid risking a repetition of such peaceful complaisance in 1939. He made certain that no "Schweinehund" would pull the same trick on him again by the simple expedient of prohibiting his foreign minister from even giving the text of his demands to the British, but then it was too late. "September 1938 would have been the most favorable date." 37 This point places the Munich agreement in a new perspective. The fact that, in the larger aims of Hitler, Czechoslovakia was but a minor pawn has been revealed by an examination of both pre- and postMunich developments. The failure of Chamberlain to understand this - or his unwillingness to face up to its implications - is what makes the Munich agreement understandable. As his comments to the journalists on May 10, 1938, clearly show, and as the policy of territorial concessions enforced by the Munich agreement confirms, Chamberlain thought that there really was a major problem in German-Czech relations which might be solved by use of the traditional mechanisms of European diplomacy. 38 In fact, however, the issue Hitler used to further his real aims - the presence of Germans in Czechoslovakia - was a fortunate, but essentially irrelevant, coincidence for him. It helped him as long as it was accepted at face value in international discussion and negotiations; it hindered him as soon as practical implications were drawn from that acceptance. If Munich marked a diplomatic defeat for Britain and France in terms of traditional diplomacy, it also marked a defeat for Germany in terms of Hitler's real, as contrasted with his avowed, aims. And this he himself soon realized, as we know from both the diplomatic documents of the 1938-39 period and the later utterances of 1945, quoted above. What Hitler did not realize, although it would not have meant much to him even if he had, was that, for the peoples immediately involved - namely, Czechoslovakia and Germany - both real and avowed aims were to have catastrophic consequences. Both peoples became objects of his will; both were to suffer for it. 36

The Testament of Adolf Hitler, ed. François Genoud (London, Cassell, 1961), pp. 83-85 (Feb. 21, 1945). 37 Ibid., p. 84. 58 A possible analogy is the cession of parts of Bessarabia by Rumania to Russia as a result of the Congress of Berlin.

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If the heritage of the years 1933-45 has been bitter for Czechs and Germans alike, perhaps there is something they may learn from the experience, once they are prepared to view it a little more in the perspective suggested here. There is no prospect of satisfactory neighbourly relations between the two peoples until and unless they begin to think of each other as neighbours likely to be threatened jointly, rather than likely to be threatened merely by each other. If the two were able to get along in many day-to-day activities even during the Hitler years, there should be nothing inherently impossible in future cooperation. It is instructive, as well as amusing, that even a Neurath noted in amazement the surprising number of people with "intelligent faces and good physique" in Czechoslovakia! 39 The serious economic troubles of Czechoslovakia in recent years, suffered despite her advanced technology and great human and material resources, suggest that the loss of the human skills of her former German population is not necessarily a complete gain. In a Europe of easing tensions, the two peoples may yet recognize each other for what they are: neighbours who can prosper - or suffer - together.

38

Trial of the Major

War Criminals,

op. cit., XXXIII, p. 255 f.

Great Britain and Czechoslovakia, 1918-1948: An Outline of their Relations

HARRY HANÄK

Diplomatic relations between Czechoslovakia and Great Britain may be said to have had their origin in October 1914, when, for two days in Rotterdam, T. G. Masaryk and R. W. Seton-Watson discussed the war and, in particular, the situation in Bohemia. Seton-Watson drew up a memorandum of this conversation and handed a copy of it to the Foreign Office.1 One must presume that this was the first indication received by the British authorities of the desire of some men to establish an independent Czech state. At the same time, Bohemia was receiving some attention in the British press. As early as 20 August 1914, The Times published a dispatch from Russia which announced that a revolution had broken out in Prague, that "the river Moldava . . . ran red with Czech blood", and that some Czech politicians, including Masaryk, had been executed. Of greater importance were a series of articles in The Times by a "Neutral Observer" which spoke of the aspirations of the Czechs.2 Yet the cause of the Czechs advanced exceedingly slowly. In 1915, Masaryk moved to London and became the head of the new School of Slavonic Studies. The School received a good sendoff in October 1915 with Masaryk's inaugural lecture on "The Problem of Small Nations in the European Crisis". The Prime Minister had agreed to preside, but he was sick that day, and Lord Robert Cecil, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, took the chair instead. Even he had to rush off after introducing Masaryk. Asquith sent a very kind message, which was read by Cecil, but, to Masaryk's disappointment, there was no mention of the Czechs in it.3 1 R. W. Seton-Watson, Masaryk in England (Cambridge, 1943), pp. 33-52, On Czech activity in Britain, see H. Hanak, Great Britain and Austria-Hungary during the First World War (London, 1962). 2 23 to 27 February 1915. 3 Seton-Watson, op. cit., pp. 135-152.

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The Allied note to President Wilson of 10 January 1917 was a greater triumph. It mentioned the liberation of the "Slavs and the Czechoslovaks" as part of Allied war aims. Yet, such aims were not taken too seriously except by the radicals on the left, who maintained that such ambitions were schemes "which would have staggered Alexander, Caesar, or Napoleon or any of the great conquerors of the past". 4 As the Czechs and Slovaks were especially mentioned in the Allied note, they were singled out for special attack. "Then we come to the TcheckoSlovaks, for whose claims of independence, as is well known, the British people marched enthusiastically to war in August 1914!" r* From the end of 1916 onward, the situation of the Czechs began to improve. The signs of strain within Austria-Hungary became more and more evident. Above all, news became more abundant. The weekly, the New Europe, founded and edited by R. W. Seton-Watson with the help of A. F. Whyte, a young liberal Member of Parliament, was a powerful weapon of the anti-Habsburg coalition. 6 But it was, above all, the collapse of Russia in 1917 and 1918, and the weakness that Italy showed at Caporetto, that made Czechoslovak independence possible. For more than a hundred years, the great question of British foreign policy had been "The Eastern Question". The Russian threat to the Bosphorus was seen as a direct threat to that most precious jewel in the Imperial crown - India. It was this threat that Masaryk and his friends used in order to persuade both the British Government and the public to support the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary. They argued that the Russian threat had been replaced by a German threat. The Dual Monarchy could no longer act as a counter poise to German ambitions. Only a group of non-German and anti-German states could preserve the balance of power in Europe. This was certainly the kind of argument that impressed both the French and British foreign ministries. As far as we know, the independence of Czechoslovakia was not discussed in the Cabinet before the summer of 1916. 7 In August of that year, Asquith invited the members of his cabinet and a number of other

4

Common Sense, 10 November 1917. The UDC, March 1917. This was the monthly periodical of the Union of Democratic Control, a radical pro-peace movement. 6 H. Wickham Steed, foreign editor of The Times, Ronald Burrows, Principal of King's College, London, and Masaryk were also concerned in the creation of this weekly. 7 Under the fifty-years rule, no archival material is available. There are, of course, the selections of British diplomatic documents. 5

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people to prepare memoranda on British war aims. A. J. Balfour's was the only one favourable to the cause of Czech independence: I should greatly like to see it (the principle of nationality) applied in Bohemia also. T o Bohemia, German civilisation is profoundly distasteful. The Czechs have been waging war against it for some generations, and waging it under grave difficulties with much success. Whether an independent Bohemia would be strong enough to hold her own from a military as well as from a commercial point of view, against Teutonic domination - surrounded as she is at present entirely by German influence - I do not know. . . . If the change is possible it should be made. 8

Other memoranda were not so favourable. The Foreign Office memorandum suggested that Bohemia might be included in the new Polish state while, interestingly enough, the General Staff memorandum spoke of the intention to break up Austria-Hungary.9 At the end of 1917, Lord Lansdowne, hoping for a negotiated peace, wrote to Balfour suggesting a peace debate in Parliament. In his answer, Balfour did not think that it was a suitable time to discuss "peace matters", but he gave Lansdowne some idea of his own views on the question. He said that it was not the aim of the Government to dismember Germany, but when he spoke of Germany, he only meant that part of Europe inhabited by the German people and, therefore, the transference of Alsace-Lorraine to France or the re-creation of Poland did not constitute dismemberment. And he added: "These observations which are true of Germany, may surely be applied mutatis mutandis to Austria also." 10 Lloyd George had little sympathy with the plan to destroy AustriaHungary. The various secret negotiations with Vienna met with his approval. It was he, also, who sent out General Smuts with his own secretary, Philip Kerr, to meet Count Mensdorff in Switzerland in December 1917, and Count Skrzynski in March 1918. Smuts advised the Austrians to reorganise their empire on British lines. Lloyd George greatly regretted the failure of these negotiations and in his war aims speech of 5 January 1918, he denied the desire to destroy Austria-Hungary. As late as October 1918, the Cabinet were not convinced of either the necessity or the allied ability to destroy Austria-Hungary. Lord Milner advocated a negotiated peace on 17 October,11 and on 19 Oc8

•

10 II

D. Lloyd George, War Memoirs (London, 1933-6), II, pp. 877-9. Ibid., p. 835. Lord Newton, Lord Lansdowne (London, 1929), pp. 464. In an interview in the Standard.

Great Britain and Czechoslovakia,

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tober, Lord Riddell was urging Lloyd George to recapitulate the main points of his speech of 5 January. 12 The government was waiting for the French or Italians to act first. On 11 February 1918, Wickham Steed, Foreign Editor of The Times and a firm friend of the Czechs, sent a telegram to Orlando, the Italian Premier, in which he said that if Orlando would declare in his forthcoming speech to the Italian parliament that it was Italy's war aim to liberate the nationalities of Austria-Hungary in pursuance of the principle of government by the consent of the governed, his speech would be welcomed in "responsible quarters here". In a letter to Miss Hall, Secretary of the Serbian Society of Great Britain, enclosing a copy of the telegram, he said that the telegram had been sent with the approval of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Office. 13 Few members of the government, however, and few Englishmen were interested in the plan to break up Austria-Hungary or willing to prolong the war to achieve such an end. They consented to it only when it became either inevitable, or seemed to be necessary in order to defeat Germany. Lord Riddell quoted an interesting conversation he had with Winston Churchill on 1 January 1918. They talked of peace terms and Riddell said that if the war continued another twelve months, Britain, in attempting to annihilate Germany, would annihilate herself. Churchill, however, would not waver and insisted that the Allies would have to fight to a finish. But, Riddell argued, suppose it were possible to persuade the Germans to evacuate Belgium and France; to settle the AlsaceLorraine question to the satisfaction of the French; to place Palestine and Mesopotamia under a protectorate; to make some suitable arrangement regarding the German colonies; and to restore Serbia and Rumania. Would not the Allies be prepared to make peace on such lines? Churchill agreed and thought that these were better terms than the Allies would actually get, but that they had become impossible and impractical.14 So when, in 1918, Lord Northcliffe's propaganda department decided that it could carry on effective propaganda against Austria-Hungary only if the Allies aimed at liberating the subject nationalities, it did not find the Government at all ready to fall in with its plans. In February 1918, the Government, realising at last that war aims could be turned into a war weapon by propaganda, set up the Depart12 13

»

G. A. Riddell, War Diary, 1914-1918 (London, 1933), pp. 355-6. Records of the Serbian Society (in London University). Riddell, op. cit., p. 303.

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ment of Propaganda in Enemy Countries and asked Lord Northcliffe to direct it. Steed, aided by Seton-Watson, was put in charge of the Austro-Hungarian section. In conversation with Northcliffe, Steed insisted that British propaganda had been ineffective because it had been divorced from policy. The aim of British propaganda, Steed held, was to weaken the Germans, and the best way of doing this was to strike at Austria-Hungary, the weakest link in the enemy's chain of defenses. Northcliffe, admitting that he knew nothing about the Monarchy, asked Steed to write a memorandum on the subject. This memorandum Northcliffe sent to Balfour over his signature on 24 February 1918. Steed argued that two policies were possible with regard to Austria: The Allies had either to work for a separate peace with her, or they had to aim at destroying her by supporting and encouraging the anti-German and pro-Ally peoples. The first policy had been tried without success, because Austria-Hungary no longer had the power of acting independently and separately from Germany, and because the Allies could not offer her acceptable terms without breaking with Italy. The time had come to try the second policy of supporting the 31 million Latin and Slav peoples of the Monarchy. If they were promised liberation, and not merely autonomy, the collapse of Austria would be hastened. Steed also insisted that the existing organisations of Czechoslovaks, Yugoslavs, and Poles in the Allied countries should be utilised in a propaganda campaign aimed at their compatriots within the Monarchy. Balfour answered on 26 February without approving either policy. H e said that he did not think that the two alternative policies were exclusive, because any action which encouraged the anti-German elements within the Monarchy really helped the Emperor Charles to a position of greater independence and in the direction of a separate peace. If he refused to lend himself to such a policy, the strengthening of the Slav and Latin elements would eventually result in a dissolution of the Monarchy. But in either case, the earlier stages of the process were the same, and propaganda which aided the struggle of the nationalities was right whether the complete break up of Austria-Hungary was aimed at or not. Steed answered this letter for Northcliffe. He said that though the two policies were, perhaps, not mutually exclusive, it was very important that absolute precedence be given to one or the other. Crewe House would be placed in an awkward predicament, if, after basing vigorous propaganda on the policy of dismemberment, it would then

Great Britain and Czechoslovakia,

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be confronted with some manifestation of the policy aiming at a separate peace on the part of the government. To this rejoinder there was no written reply, but a verbal ruling was communicated to Crewe House that the Department of Propaganda in Enemy Countries could go on with the policy of encouraging the anti-German and pro-Ally elements in the Monarchy so long as independence was not promised. 15 In any case, in April 1918, in a letter to Lloyd George, Northcliffe wrote that "a very precise impression has been conveyed that this country, at least, favours the liberation of the Habsburg subject races", 10 and he asked to be informed of any departure from this policy. It was after the meeting of the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities in Rome, in April 1918, that Edvard Benes really attempted to achieve diplomatic recognition for Czechoslovakia.17 Balfour had refused such recognition in May, and Benes had to be content with a speech of Lord Robert Cecil's expressing the hope that the Czechoslovaks might achieve independence. 18 On 3 June, the Prime Ministers of Italy, France, and Great Britain expressed their sympathy for the national aspirations for liberty of the Czechoslovaks. Benes showed considerable skill in these negotiations. Also, the military effort that the Czechoslovaks were putting forward was beginning to count. Czechoslovak forces were fighting the enemy on both the French and Italian fronts, while the Czechoslovak Legion was the only allied force in the field in Russia. The French were concerned that these troops be transported to the Western front. The British wanted them to remain in Siberia to form the nucleus of a force for intervention in Russia. Benes was asked to leave them there and the possibility was mentioned to him that Britain would recognize the Czechoslovaks as allies. On 3 June, Benes was informed that Britain recognized the National Council as the supreme organ of the Czechoslovak movement and the Legions as an organised unit operating in the Allied causc. In a cable to the British Ambassador in Washington, Balfour explained that the Government was obliged to take this step because of the military effort that the Czechs were putting forward both in the West and in Russia. 19 15

H. W. Steed, Through Thirty Years (London, 1924), II, pp. 185-216, C. Stuart, The Secrets of Crewe House (London, 1920), pp. 20-49. 16 R. Pound & G. Hamsworth, Northcliffe (London, 1959), pp. 635-6. 17 E. BeneS, Svetova valka a nase revoluce, 3 Vols. (Prague 1927-8). « The Times, 23 May 1918. 19 Quoted by D. Perman, The Shaping of the Czechoslovak State (Leiden, 1962), p. 35.

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The French were very much interested in bringing the Czech forces from Russia to France, expecting that this would provoke a revolution in Prague. On 29 June, they gave Benes the recognition he desired. It was now necessary to gain British recognition, and once more the Legions proved useful, especially because on 29 June they had seized Vladivostok. Benes indicated to Balfour that the National Council would agree to leave the army "temporarily in Siberia".-0 One of the difficulties in negotiating with London was that the British, unlike the French, were unwilling to make any territorial commitments. Cecil rejected the draft of a document submitted by Benes which specified that Czechoslovakia's boundaries would be the old historic boundaries of Bohemia and Moravia. Nevertheless, on 9 August, largely owing to an ingenious compromise by Steed, the British Government recognised the National Council in Paris as "present trustee of the future Czechoslovak Government".21 The Foreign Office made a territorial commitment to the extent that it recognised the union of the Czechs and Slovaks under one government. The British recognition was little noted by the press. Many newspapers still believed that the Czechs would have to be satisfied with autonomy within Austria-Hungary. "In any case, could Britain keep all her rash promises?" the Manchester Guardian asked. "We are under unliquidated obligations to Belgium, to Serbia, to Greece, to Rumania. There must be some list of causes for which we sent our sons to die." 22 Even those who most strenuously opposed the establishment of an independent Czech state were willing to see the Czechs as an autonomous province of Austria. Bohemia and Ireland were frequently compared. In a controversy between Masaryk and some of his English opponents, the radical weekly, The Nation, wrote: Bohemia has its parallels in Ireland, and the very close parallel is not entirely unfavourable to Austria. The root of the trouble is the existence of a rather bigger "Ulster" than our own. The German population of Bohemia is 35 per cent of the whole and like the Irish 'loyalists' it has the riches, the land, and the education - though in the last generation the Tchechs have, by hard work, intelligence, and fecundity, immensely improved their position.

The writer went on to say that, for a generation and a half, Bohemia had enjoyed a kind of home rule, and that on one occasion the crown 20 21

»

Ibid., p. 39. Steed, op. cit., II., pp. 233-5. 15 August 1918.

Great Britain and Czechoslovakia,

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had promised the restoration of the old kingdom, only to give way before the "Unionist" sentiment of the Germans. The Czechs had a language grievance, but it was not easy to demarcate the national areas: "Ulster once more." In education, the Czechs had no grievance at all, and their University of Prague was older than "our 'Catholic' University for Ireland". There had been periods of coercion, street riots, proclaimed meetings, and tricks with trial by jury: "How familiar it sounds!" The answer for the nationalities of Austria-Hungary, as for the Irish, was home rule, not independence. 23 Such comparisons continued to be drawn even after both the Czechoslovak Republic and the Irish Free State came into existence. In an article on the Germans of Czechoslovakia in 1924, The Times said: Suppose Ireland separated from England by only a mountain range instead of a broad channel of sea, and Ulster spread all round the east and south of it as far as Cork; then suppose the whole country run by an independent and extremely nationalistic Free State Government, with gentlemen from Kilkenny coming into Belfast public houses and calling for pints of porter in Erse, and expecting to be served; finally imagine the British Government prevented from doing anything to hold the balance between Ulster and the rest of Ireland, and you have something like the position of Czechoslovakia and its Germans. 2 4

Such comparisons were not in Czechoslovakia's favour. If Ulster was kept out of the Free State, why should not the Sudetenland be kept out of Czechoslovakia? it was asked in 1937 and 1938. Balfour, in spite of his sympathies for the principle of national selfdetermination, was clearly unhappy about the problem of the future Czechoslovak state, with its large ethnic minorities. In a memorandum of October 1918, he wrote: It seems, and perhaps is, absurd to redraw the Bohemian frontier so as to leave in German hands the whole mountain chain which guards the country from invasion. Yet if this be not done there will be in the new Czecho-Slovak State a German element amounting to not less than one-quarter of the whole population, compactly situated, bitterly hostile to their Slav neighbours, and in sympathy with the Saxons, Bavarians, and German-Austrians dwelling beyond their border, and with the German capitalists and Germanized nobles within them. 2 5

At the end of the war, the Czechoslovak cause in England had the support of a number of powerful men. The Foreign Secretary, Balfour, 23 24 25

27 January 1917. 12 July 1924. Quoted by H. I. Nelson, Land and Power (London, 1963), p. 65.

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and his Under-Secretary, Lord Robert Cecil, were generally sympathetic. Sir Samuel Hoare and Mr. (later Lord) Runciman were also, one is surprised to find, in the ranks of the pro-Czechs. A number of men in the Foreign Office like Sir William Tyrell, Harold Nicolson, Lewis Namier, J. Headlam Morley, and the brothers Leeper used what influence they had to promote the Czechoslovak cause. Their advice was frequently unwelcome to the government. These Foreign Office officials were in touch with Seton-Watson and Steed, both of whom were in Paris during the Peace Conference. In preparation for the Peace Conference, the Foreign Office drew up a number of memoranda for the use of the British delegates. One of these dealt with Czechoslovakia. The author or authors are not known, but it is probable that Lewis Namier had a hand in its composition. In it the Czechoslovaks were paid a handsome compliment. They had "proved magnificent organisers, and in the very act of taking over the administration of their country, in the order in which they had hitherto managed to maintain in it, they have fully proved their ability to carry on good government even in most difficult circumstances. They are likely to prove to us the greatest asset in Central and Eastern Europe. It would be most deplorable should they leave the Peace Conference disappointed and with a feeling of having been abandoned to the Germans or Magyars." The memorandum opposed the separation of the German-occupied areas from the new state. "The Bohemian mountain bastion is one of the most striking gestures on the map of Europe; its unity is almost as clearly marked as that of an island.' The Memorandum did, however, suggest a number of frontier rectifications which would have reduced the German minority by half a million. This, it was realised, would not materially improve the position, and it was to be hoped that the Czechs and Germans would work out a modus Vivendi. Failing such a compromise, "German Bohemia will remain a storm centre in Europe so long as politics are discussed in terms of nationality, and it will probably be found beyond reach of statesmanship to devise any solution for the problem." Britain should act as mediator. The two nationalities will have to put forward their claims, and we must stand by the Czechs whenever they can prove paramount interests, and must not allow these interests to be overridden by an absolute claim to national self-determination. On the other hand, we must make it clear to the Czechs that the right of nationality acknowledged by the Allied Powers is not meant to be exclusively a means for anti-German map-making.

The Foreign Office obviously did not expect that Czechoslovakia could

Great Britain and Czechoslovakia,

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carry on a policy very hostile to Germany, because of her exposed position on Germany's flank and because of the German minority in Czechoslovakia. At the same time, Czechoslovakia could act as a valuable link between the Anglo-Saxon powers and Russia, once the latter emerged from the anarchy in which she wallowed.26 Though Balfour and the British delegation in Paris followed the recommendations of this memorandum closely, the Prime Minister, Lloyd George, did not feel himself bound by such considerations. The moment Austria-Hungary collapsed, the new Czechoslovak government moved rapidly to establish its authority over the whole area which it claimed. It also wanted to prove to the Allied Powers its ability to preserve order and good government in Central Europe. Czechoslovak forces managed to put down the German separatist movement and also to occupy Slovakia. In this, they received the support of the French government, but both London and Washington were worried about these developments. However, in January 1919, the British government gave its opinion that "pending the decision of the Peacc Conference the frontier of the Czechoslovak Republic should coincide with the historical boundaries of the provinces of Bohemia, Moravia and Austrian Silesia." 27 The Allies were never clear in their minds as to the course they should pursue in the former territories of Austria-Hungary. Nor did they have at their command forces which could carry out their directives. The only practicable suggestion was that of General Smuts, who hoped that a subconference of all the states of the area should meet in Paris and settle at least some of their difficulties under the watchful patronage of the Allies. The Czechoslovak aims at the Paris Peace Conference were to preserve the historic unity of the lands of the Crown of St. Wenceslas, to draw a frontier with Hungary in such a way that the military and economic interests of Slovakia were protected, and to achieve a connection with Rumania by the inclusion within the Republic of Subcarpathian Ruthenia. In these it succeeded. Perhaps one should say that Benes succeeded, because the views of the head of the delegation, Prime Minister Kramar, were more expansionist. As it is, Czechoslovakia was left with very large German and Hungarian minorities. Masaryk and Benes were willing to cede some territory, which would have reduced the German 26 27

Ibid., pp. 101-5. Perman, op, cit., p. 85.

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population by about 800,000, but the French feared that such cession could be used as precedent for the inclusion of Austria in Germany. The promise of Benes that the Czechoslovak state would be organised on Swiss cantonal lines was little regarded, and in fact the Great Powers paid little heed to the protection of minorities living within Czechoslovakia, although the Commission on Czechoslovak Affairs did suggest that these ethnic minorities should receive special protection. 28 The Commission was indeed of vital importance ot the Czechoslovak cause. The British representative was Sir Joseph Cook, Australian minister of the Navy, but the actual work fell on the shoulders of Harold Nicolson. This was fortunate, since he was, in general, sympathetic to the cause of the Czechs. At the same time, his perception of justice was greater than that of his chief, and in the case of the Slovak-Hungarian frontier, he opposed the inclusion of the Velky Zitny Ostrov in the Czechoslovak state. Lloyd George took little personal interest in the settlement in the former area of Austria-Hungary, but much in the case of Germany. In a memorandum of March 1919, he wrote: I cannot conceive any greater cause of future war than that the German people, who have certainly proved themselves one of the most vigorous and powerful races in the world, should be surrounded by a number of small states, many of them consisting of people who have never previously set up a stable Government for themselves, but each of them containing large masses of Germans clamouring for reunion with their native land.29

Yet, after a few weeks of wrangling, the major Powers accepted the 1914 boundaries on the recommendation of the Commission. One may presume that Lloyd George did so because of weariness with what he regarded as a minor problem. In any case, both the British and French delegations were convinced that in the absence of a Habsburg superstate, the small state of Eastern Europe had to be given the power to resist future German expansion. In general, the British delegation, and, finally, Lloyd George too, supported the French, so that the boundaries of Czechoslovakia were largely those demanded by Benes. This is important, as Britain had by this action taken on a responsibility to support Czechoslovakia within the boundaries drawn up in 1919. As Foreign Minister, and later as President, Edvard Benes was the director of the foreign policy of Czechoslovakia for nearly thirty years. Though his knowledge and understanding of British life was never as 2

« Ibid., pp. 174-5. Ibid., pp. 159-160.

29

Great Britain and Czechoslovakia,

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thorough as his knowledge of France, yet he had been a student of Britain for more than a decade before he became Foreign Minister of the newlyborn Czechoslovak state. In 1906 he came to England for the first time, in order to study the development of British parliamentary democracy and the history of freedom in England. In 1909 and 1910, he had written for T. G. Masaryk's Nase doba a series of articles on "Socialism in England". 30 In 1939, in the preface to the lectures which he had delivered at the University of Chicago, he wrote: I freely admit that the history of British freedom and the political history of France in the last two centuries, have both profoundly influenced my ideas, and are the foundations of the ideology I have defended in the last twenty-five years of my active political life. 31

It was the conception of Benes, as of Masaryk also, that the Great War was not merely a clash of nations satiated with power and wishing to impose strife on others. Rather, it was a "clash between the old aristocratic and militarist system and the new liberal and democratic conceptions as they had grown out of the French and American revolutions".32 But the victory of 1918, though glorious, was not complete - indeed, in Benes's concept, no victory ever was. "It is the essential nature and quality of every revolution that it contains in its evolution and in its consequences the elements of the reaction against its own principles and results." 33 Therefore, soon after Versailles, the counterattack was unleashed. It reached its high-water mark in 1938 and 1939. But the forces of democracy could not be extinguished. A new war of aristocracy versus democracy broke out, as Benes was convinced it would for a number of years before its actual outbreak. It was a war of the totalitarian régimes of Germany, Italy, and Japan against the democracies of Britain, France, the United States, and even Russia. In the last resort, the Slavonic soul had to be on the side of the angels. There was never any doubt in the mind of Benes on which side Britain stood. It is true that he distrusted the English aristocracy and upper classes 34 - especially after Munich - but England was, after all, one of the cradles of democracy. Throughout the period between the wars, Czechoslovak policy was aimed at preserving and then mending the wartime alliance between 30 31 32 33 34

Vol. XVII, Nos. 2-8. Democracy Today and Tomorrow (London, 1939), p. v. Ibid., p. 184. Ibid., p. 187. R. H. Bruce Lockhart, Comes the Reckoning (London, 1947), p. 64.

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Britain and France. The future of Czechoslovakia, it was clearly seen, depended on such agreement. Both Masaryk and Benes made attempts to mediate, especially during an official visit which Masaryk paid to Paris and London in 1923. Indeed, during a government dinner in London, Masaryk turned to Lord Curzon and uttered an appeal on behalf of the small nations of Europe: We small and smaller nations look for some central authority in Europe, some international authority on which we may depend for the furtherance of peace and for our security. The only possibility for such an authority, so far as we can see, lies in the Entente between France and Britain. I hope that with your gifts you may achieve the feat of reconstructing the Entente which existed before and during the war, and which is needed after the war for work of peace.

It is very noticeable, and it was to prove dangerous for the future development of Czechoslovakia, what a mixed press Czechoslovakia had in England. There was admiration for the order and peace which existed in Czechoslovakia. Admiration, too, for the fact that Bolshevism could make little progress there. Yet the opposition was still there, opposition which had its origins in the war years, and which became more and more vociferous as the years went by. The gradual swing against Czechoslovakia really developed in 1924 and 1925, when Czechoslovakia concluded military alliances with France. Benes was described by Lloyd George as "a fussy little man who trots about Europe - to adopt a Gilbertian phrase — running little errands for French Ministers of State". 33 The Times, hitherto pro-Czech, was very shocked by the FrancoCzech connection 37 as it was to be equally shocked by the CzechoslovakSoviet pact of 1935. Any connection with France was extremely unpopular in the 1920's and Czechoslovakia became the victim of this unpopularity. Fortunately for the Czechs, the fervent support that they gave to the League of Nations did something to soften this British hostility. But to a great many Englishmen, not least to those in the Labour Party, support for the League could not be sincere if it was coupled at the same time with a web of treaties of a military nature. Unfortunately, also, the direct connections between Britain and Czechoslovakia were few. Czech loans were floated in London, official visits were exchanged, trading relations expanded, and the relations 35

Manchester Guardian, 24 October 1923. A similar plea was made by Benes in the Daily Telegraph, 12 July 1923. "6 As quoted in the Morning Post, 21 January 1924. 37 1 December 1923.

Great Britain and Czechoslovakia,

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between Prague and London remained cordial. Jan Masaryk, as ambassador in London from 1925 to 1938, used his considerable skill in the interest of Anglo-Czech friendship. In the 1920's, especially, the cooperation between Czech and British delegations in Geneva was notable. In the late 1930's, it was seen just how thin was the connexion between London and Prague. Britain was not essentially interested in the affairs of Eastern and Central Europe. The situation which had existed before 1914 - that is, one in which most of the area was controlled by large powers - was the one most in accordance with British interests. It was in the Balkans, in the area of small states, where trouble was always brewing. Britain was therefore ill-prepared to resist German pressure in Eastern Europe. Particularly threatening to the future of Czechoslovakia was the existence of a strong current of pro-Hungarian feeling. "As for Czechoslovakia, I heartily wish that country had never been called into existence", wrote Violet Markham to Thomas Jones from Budapest, 38 and this sentiment was echoed by many Englishmen. This pro-Magyar feeling had its origins in 1848. The First World War could not kill it; indeed, that conservative newspaper, the Morning Post, carried on a pro-Hungarian campaign throughout the war. Many Englishmen, and Frenchmen, too, hoped that Hungary could become the cornerstone of a new anti-German Central Europe. The passion survived the war and was to continue for twenty years, fortified by a feeling of outrage at what had been done to Hungary at Trianon. The speeches, questions, and answers on the Hungarian question in Parliament were sufficiently numerous to make a 400-page book in 1933. 39 Most of the sentiments expressed were friendly to Hungarian aspirations and hostile to those of Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. Lord Rothermere was the leader of the Hungarian faction. In 1927, he began his campaign in his newspaper, the Daily Mail. The article was called "Europe's Powder Magazine", a challenge itself to Czechoslovakia, as its propagandists had always claimed that it was a haven of peace and order. 40 First of all, Rothermere took credit for the support that he and his newspapers had given to the Czech cause during the war, and he reminded his readers that Masaryk had been "a highly esteemed member of the staff of contributors to these papers". Appa38 39 40

Thomas Jones, A Diary with Letters, 1931-1950 (London, 1954), p. 300. The Hungarian Question in the British Parliament (London, 1933). 30 August 1927.

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rently he had decided in 1925 - the year of the Franco-Czech alliance - to draw attention to the perils of the present position, "but I then determined to wait until the Treaty of Trianon had been in operation seven full years, so that whatever adjustments were necessary could take place in the calm atmosphere of mature reflection". Rothermere blamed the peace makers in Paris for not having completed their work, so that the "remaining treaties were left to be drafted behind closed doors and signed amid general indifference many months later in various suburbs of Paris". This suited very well the unscrupulous representatives "of various minor nationalities which had come to be associated with the Allied cause", who, with the aid "of certain doctrinaire pamphleteers of Allied nationality'", moulded the future of Eastern Europe in such a way that it contained the sure seeds of future wars. Rothermere maintained that the Czechs oppressed the other nationalities brutally, and that Czechoslovakia was so unstable that she could break up at any time. Rothermere followed this article with a whole campaign for Hungary.41 He was not the only one. Both Hungarians and Englishmen lent their pens to revisionist propaganda. 42 One Labour Member of Parliament, E. D. Morel, was even in receipt of confidential information from the Hungarian Embassy. 43 Appeasement remains the strangest episode in modern British history and, in spite of the large number of books that have been written about it, one that still defies comprehension. What could have possessed the appeasers, A. L. Rowse asks, in his spirited and passionate condemnation of them? "How to explain their blindness? That is the problem. There can be no question now that these men were wrong; but how could they be so wrong, in face of everything, and why were they so wrong - there is a problem." 44 A popular historian asks a similar question. Munich remains a hideously incised political indictment for which, twentyfive years later, there still does not exist a Rosetta Stone. 4 5

"Appeasement", it has been remarked, "was an affair of the heart, intuitive, not taught; a strong emotion, not an academic speculation".40 41 42 43 44 45 46

Viscount Rothermere, My Campaign for Hungary (London, 1939). R. Donald, The Tragedy of Trianon (London, 1928), and others. Morel papers in the London School of Economics. All Souls and Appeasement (London, 1961), p. 13. R. Blythe, The Age of Illusion (London, 1963), p. 227. M. Gilbert & R. Gott, The Appeasers (London, 1963), p. 23.

Great Britain and Czechoslovakia,

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In the three years before the outbreak of the Second World War, the British government did little to resist German aggression - or Italian or Japanese, come to that - and at times it seemed to be actively abetting it. As Dr. Abraham Flexner, Director of the Institute for Advanced Studies at Princeton, wrote to Thomas Jones, Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet from 1916 to 1930, and friend of both Lloyd George and Baldwin, "I read with care Hitler's speech from beginning to end, and it confirmed me in an opinion which has been slowly forming in my mind, namely, that both France and England are spoiling Hitler and probably leading him to exaggerate his demands by showing excessive anxiety as to what he does." 47 It was not only that the British Government allowed Hitler to seize Austria, the Sudetenland, and Czechoslovakia; it gave him, in fact, a license to penetrate into the whole of Eastern Europe and to bring this "danger zone of Europe", as T. G. Masaryk once called it, into Germany's sphere of influence. Nor could the government, its friends, and the newspapers which supported it complain of a lack of reliable information. There was plenty of information and there were plenty of men willing to warn those who would only listen that the policy of appeasement was not only morally indefensible, but wrong, because it could not hope to stem German expansion. Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary from 1935 to 1938, Sir Robert Vansittart, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, Sir Horace Rumbold, Ambassador in Berlin from 1928 to 1933, and many others who were in a position to understand German aims warned the Government. Others, outside the immediate precincts of power, were equally insistent: Winston Churchill and Leopold Amery on the Tory side, Hugh Dalton on the Labour side, the organisation known as Focus, and other groups and figures in public life. The most important reason for British actions was a fervent desire for peace. The First World War, with its appalling losses, was not forgotten. Over a million men from Britain and the Empire lost their lives in the holocaust of war, the majority from the British Isles. The horror of war was so strongly embedded in the minds of British people that they were determined, come what might, to avoid a repetition. The Great War was to end all war, and the peace of Versailles was to be the seal of this triumph. In the 1930's, the new Germany made it clear that it would no longer be bound by Versailles, but Englishmen's desire 47

Jones, op. cit., p. 311.

786

Harry

Hanàk

for peace was as strong as before. If peace could not be upheld by holding Germany down, it would have to be upheld by appeasing Hitler. Chamberlain's policy of appeasement was not "peace at any price, but peace at almost any price", as Eden put it in the House of Commons in 1937.48 The policy of appeasement pursued by the ministries of both Baldwin and Chamberlain was clearly in accordance with the pacificism of the English people. In 1933, at the East Fulham by-election, the Conservative majority of over 14,000 was turned into a Labour majority of over 4,000 by a candidate pledged to "peace". This was followed by a number of other serious electoral setbacks, especially in Putney. To a very large extent, these Labour victories were due to that Party's exaltation of unilateral disarmament. Even more significant was the by-election in Market Harborough, where the Conservative candidate argued that if any policy involved a danger of war, it was that of the Socialists. He doubled the government majority. In 1935, too, the Peace Ballot organised by the League of Nations Union showed, by an immense majority, that eleven million people were ready to restrain an aggressor by economic action; a much smaller number expressed its willingness to follow it up by military sanctions. To the pacifism of the thirties was added the guilt of Versailles. To many Englishmen, Germany had been grievously wronged in 1919. "We do not", Clemenceau had said, "have to beg pardon for our victory". But this is exactly what a lot of people felt, most prominently the economic genius J. M. Keynes.49 To these men, it seemed that the Allies had violated the idealistic hopes for which they had fought. The principle of self-determination was rigorously applied, but only in those cases where it worked to the disadvantage of Germany. Hitler's occupation of the Rhineland was therefore regarded as a case of a man walking into his own back garden, and the occupation of Austria and the Sudetenland as the just reunion of a family. This feeling of guilt at Versailles was propagated most effectively by those around the Union of Democratic Control. In 1938, many of these radicals had, as a result of the Spanish civil war, changed sides, but their ideas, as so frequently happens in British politics, had been taken over by those in or near government. That Chamberlain regarded himself as righting a wrong, cannot be doubted. By 1938, many were convinced that Germany had been no more guilty of the war than those Powers that had defeated 48

Quoted in Survey of International Affairs, The Crisis over January to September 1938 (London, 1951), p. 23. ** The Economic Consequences of the Peace (London, 1919).

Czechoslovakia,

Great Britain and Czechoslovakia,

1918-1948

787

her. Since 1918, many were irrationally convinced that France was the chief firebrand of Europe. Hence the unpopularity which Czechoslovakia gained for herself when she signed the treaties of 1924 and 1925 with France. British appeasement was connected with British imperialism in its last Indian summer. Sir Henry Wilson, writing from Paris in 1919, said: "I am going to look after and safeguard our own immediate interests, so that when all the hot air now blowing about Leagues of Nations, Small States, Mandatories, turns to the icy cold wind of hard fact, the British Empire will be well clothed and well defended against all the bangs and curses of the future." 60 Few people could seriously claim, between the two world wars, that Eastern Europe in general, and Czechoslovakia in particular, were vital British interests. It is not without significance that Geoffrey Dawson, editor of The Times, and arch-appeaser, had been one of Lord Milner's "kindergarten" in South Africa, and that Lord Halifax, Foreign Secretary from 1938 to 1940, had been Viceroy of India. Of course, Winston Churchill was as much an imperialist as the appeasers, and, surprisingly enough, the appeasers imagined that they could buy off Hitler by returning some of Germany's colonies. It is difficult to estimate how important the fear of Bolshevism was, as a factor contributing to the appeasement mentality. It has often been exaggerated. Many of those on the left, enthusiastic for appeasement, were equally enthusiastic for the Soviet Union. In the late thirties, too, Stalin's purges in the armed forces cast doubts on the military force that the Soviet Union could apply in case of war. Yet it had some effect. The Czechoslovak alliance with Russia was even more unpopular than her alliance with France, and the busy Ribbentrop, at that time ambassador in London, was telling all and sundry that Hitler's mission in life was to act as a shield for Europe, while Czechoslovakia was castigated as an outpost of Bolshevism. Finally, the appeasers argued that Britain was too weak to fight. For any nation, such an admission of cowardice was truly remarkable. A. L. Rowse records that when he once pointed out to Dawson the extent of German strength, Dawson answered. "To take your argument on its own valuation - mind you, I'm not saying I agree with it - but if the Germans are so powerful as you say, oughtn't we to go in with them?" 51 j0

C. E. Callwell, Field-Marshal don, 1927), II., p. 182. 51 Rowse, op. cit., p. 28.

Sir Henry Wilson: His Life and Letters (Lon-

788

Harry

Hanak

The stories of German might greatly impressed the English, and made this nation, with its glorious military tradition, believe that she would be defeated. 52 The fear of aerial bombardment was great, and it was confidently predicted that 100,000 people would die in London alone as a result of aerial bombardment. Yet, military weakness, though often used as an excuse for not acting, was hardly the reason. Strangely enough, the considerable military force at the disposal of Czechoslovakia did not seem to play any part in these calculations. The Czechoslovak mobilisation of May 1938 does not seem to have convinced the government that the Czechs might provide valuable military help, and that in surrendering Czechoslovakia, they were putting into the hands of Hitler a mass of armaments and releasing thirty-five to forty German divisions for service in the West. The Government certainly knew of Czech defences. In June 1938, the Czechoslovak general staff invited the British military attaché to visit the frontier fortifications. This he did for a week and reported to Halifax about them in June. Halifax asked him searching questions about the extent of the fortifications. 53 Neville Chamberlain became Prime Minister in 1937. While, in the case of his predecessor, appeasement seems sometimes to have been the result of laziness, in his case, it became an active policy. Chamberlain's conceit was atrocious. He was determined to achieve peace "in our time" and he was equally convinced that he, of all men, could handle Hitler. His belief in Hitler was touching in its simplicity; and he frequently restated that belief. Eden has recorded in the last volume of his memoirs a remark of Chamberlain's to the chairman of a meeting in Blackburn. "You know, whatever they may say, Hitler is not such a bad fellow after all." 54 To Jan Masaryk, he remarked that he trusted Herr Hitler. At the height of the Munich crisis, Masaryk wrote in exasperation that it was a misfortune that Britain was led by this "stupid, uninformed, small man". 55 Chamberlain grew up in the arena of Birmingham municipal politics. He was not a professional politician, but rather a typical businessman. As Arnold Toynbee noted:

52

Jones, op. cit., p. 411. Ian Colvin, Vansittart in Office (London, 1965), p. 215. 54 Earl of Avon, The Eden Memoirs, The Reckoning (London, 1965), p. 37. 55 In F. Berber, ed., Europäische Politik 1933-1938 in Spiegel der Prager Akten (Essen, 1941), p. 148. 53

Great Britain and Czechoslovakia,

1918-1948

789

Chamberlain's approach to the problem of dealing with Hitler cannot be understood unless it is recognized, appreciated and kept constantly in mind that this British Prime Minister had spent the best part of his working life, not in politics, but in doing business in the commercial sense, and that h e took it for granted that methods which, in his personal business experience, had proved fruitful for dealing with other business m e n would serve h i m equally well in the international arena in a gladiatorial encounter there with Hitler. 5 6

This man, - "looking at world-affairs through the wrong end of the municipal drain-pipe", according to Churchill, "a good Lord Mayor of Birmingham in a lean year", according to Lloyd George, his mind "tuned in to the Midland Regional", according to Attlee - was determined to carry on his own Foreign Policy. Eden resigned and Vansittart was kicked upstairs. Halifax was easily led by Chamberlain, while Neville Henderson in Berlin was a worthy exponent of his policy. Above all, he depended on Sir Horace Wilson, who was Chief Industrial Adviser to the Government, but whose advice on foreign affairs Chamberlain seems to have followed. So many of the appeasers had no knowledge of Germany or Central and Eastern Europe or, indeed, foreign policy. The Times had no foreign editor and, contrary to custom, there was no member of the Foreign Service among Chamberlain's secretaries. "To have any specialist knowledge of foreign affairs was to be quite out of fashion; it was the day of the uninhibited amateur." 57 The aim of British policy in 1937 was to dissociate itself from any French moves which might involve Britain in war for the sake of Czechoslovakia. After the Anschluss of Austria, this policy was pursued with ever greater urgency. The aim of Czechoslovak policy was to persuade the British government to give Czechoslovakia the kind of guarantee which Locarno had given to the frontiers of France and Belgium. ]n 1937, when Halifax visited Goering, he had already discussed the possibility of ceding Austria and the frontier areas of Czechoslovakia to the German Reich. On 26 November 1937, Chamberlain wrote: But I don't see w h y w e shouldn't say to G e r m a n y , 'Give us satisfactory assurances that y o u won't use force to deal with the Austrians and the Czechoslovakians, and w e will give y o u similar assurances that w e won't use force to prevent the changes y o u want, if y o u can get them by peaceful means'. 5 8 56 57 58

Survey, op cit., p. 4. Avon, op. cit., p. 21. K. Feiling, The Life of Neville

Chamberlain

(London, 1946), p. 333.

790

Harry

Hanàk

From a number of sources the Germans were hearing that Britain would not resist a territorial change of the Czechoslovak borders, on condition - and this the Germans frequently did not understand - that such a change be brought about peacefully and as the result of a negotiated settlement. Most people in England accepted the fact that a change in the situation of the Sudetenland would have to come. Even Vansittart maintained, in a conversation with Henlein in October 1937, that Britain would work with Czechoslovakia to secure the far-reaching autonomy for the Sudeten Germans.59 But the real point, in this era of defeatism and pusillanimity, was different. If war should come, Czechoslovakia would be at the mercy of Germany and her allies, and Britain could not come to her help. This was the view of Basil Newton in Prague and of Henderson in Berlin.60 Significantly, it was also the view of Amery,61 and of Kingsley Martin, the editor of the New Statesman and Nation.*2 Neither of these men was an appeaser. The situation deteriorated considerably after 20 February 1938. On that date Hitler addressed the Reichstag. In an ominous passage, he referred to the ten million Germans who lived in the two states adjoining the Reich and reminded his listeners that these people had been constitutionally separated from Germany only in 1866. It was intolerable for Germany "to know that across the frontier are kinsmen who have to suffer severe persecution because of their sympathy, their feeling of unity with Germany,. . ,".63 Hardly four weeks later, Hitler was to prove that he was man of his word. On the night of 11-12 March, German forces invaded Austria. It could not be overlooked that of the ten million Germans Hitler had mentioned in his speech, six and a half million had now been reunited, and that the remainder lived in Czechoslovakia. In this moment of peril, Prague attempted to get greater support from Britain. The Czechoslovak government had received certain assurances from both Goering and Neurath. Jan Masaryk, in London, tried to get the Foreign Office to take official cognisance of these assurances. In this he was partially successful.64 But this is as far as it went. 59

Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D. II, pp. 30-31. Documents on British Foreign Policy, Third Series, lp. 56. The abbreviation B.D. will be used. 81 L. S. Amery, My Political Life (London, 1955), III., p. 239. 52 H. Dalton, The Fateful Years, 1931-1945 (London, 1957), p. 162. 88 N. H. Baynes, ed., The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, 1922-1939 (London, 1942), II., pp. 1404-6. " B.D., I., pp. 36-7.

Great Britain and Czechoslovakia,

1918-1948

791

On 24 March, the Foreign Office informed both Paris and Prague that Britain's obligations to Czechoslovakia were those of one member of the League to another.65 The Czechs were no doubt disappointed, but knew enough, as Newton reported to London, not to expect more.66 On the same day, Chamberlain made a statement in the Commons in which he made it clear that he hoped for an agreement between the Czechoslovak and German governments, and hinted, in an obscure passage of his speech, that the Government would not be willing to support France if the French came to the aid of the Czechs.67 Chamberlain's speech was also notable in that it contained the first British suggestion for mediation. This marked a significant change from the British attitude of 1937, when the Government was prepared neither to offer advice nor to attempt any mediation.68 In pursuance of this policy, an Anglo-French conference was held in Downing Street on 28 and 29 April. There was considerable disagreement over the question of Czechoslovakia, but finally the two Great Powers agreed to use pressure on Prague. The British government was really trying to get the Czechoslovak government to accept, as a basis of negotiation, the programme put forward by Henlein on 24 April 1938. Meanwhile, the Czechoslovak Government had decided to take the forceful action which Britain and France were unwilling to take. On 21 May, as a result of rumours of German troop movements, certain classes of reservists were called up. For the Czechoslovak people this action was a welcome tonic and a sign of determination to defend the Republic. The inevitable British action followed. On 27 May, Newton urged the Czechoslovak government to countermand its military measures.09 This action, as with the action of Halifax in urging Masaryk to inform his government that Czechoslovakia should be cantonalised on the Swiss model, and also neutralised, signified the deeper involvement of Britain in Czechoslovak affairs.70 It is very clear that the British and Czechoslovak governments were not speaking the same language. The men in London were convinced that here was a dispute which, given good will on each side, could be solved by a compromise settlement. They failed to understand what was so clear in Prague, that Hitler and his minions in the Sudetenland were 65 66 67 88

•» 70

B.D., I., pp. 90-1. B.D., I., p. 102. H. C. Deb., Vol. 333. Coll, 1399-1407. B.D., I., p. 151. B.D., I., pp. 388-9. B.D., I., pp. 378-9.

792

Harry

Hanàk

not interested in a settlement, but in the destruction of Czechoslovakia. Holding these views, the British government persuaded the Czechoslovaks to accept a mediator. H e was Lord Runciman, "a man who goes down to assist in settling a strike", as Chamberlain put it. It is hardly surprising that Prague was not keen on the mission. The Czechoslovaks were, indeed, being put under pressure of blackmail. They were under the constant necessity of accepting Runciman's advice, for fear of losing the all-important support of London. The Sudeten German Party was in a more favourable situation. It looked to Germany for support and could simply point out to the mediator that the whole question was incapable of solution except by a partition of Czechoslovakia. Under these circumstances, it was hardly surprising that the mission failed to achieve its goal of conciliation and mediation. By the end of August, it was clear to Chamberlain that a reconciliation between Czechs and Sudeten Germans within the Republic was no longer possible and that the problem would have to be solved by direct negotiations with Hitler. This meant, in fact, as The Times pointed out in an extremely unwise leader of 7 September, the cession of the Sudetenland to the Reich. Runciman returned to England on 16 September, the same day on which Chamberlain returned from Berchtesgaden. His advice to the Government was the cession to Germany of those districts which had an "important majority" of Germans, and local autonomy for the rest. This was perhaps not all that unfavourable to the Czech cause. What was far more sinister was his recommendation that Czechoslovakia should be neutralised and forced into a customs union with Germany. Yet, in suggesting that the Republic should become a satellite of the Reich, Runciman was faithfully depicting the power position in Central Europe, given the British unwillingness to act against Hitler. 71 The Anglo-French proposals of 19 September went further than had Runciman. In fact, they sealed the fate of Czechoslovakia. She was now asked to cede areas which were over fifty procent German. In return, she was to be given a guarantee. 72 Moreover, the British and French Governments found it necessary, after the first Czechoslovak refusal, to give their proposals the force of a virtual ultimatum. The rest of the negotiations - the meetings at Godesberg and Munich, the Czech mobilisation, and the temporary Anglo-French decision to fight - need not be discussed here. Once the Czechoslovaks were 71

B.D., II., p. 675. How worthless such a guarantee was, even before 15 March 1939, was well described in Survey, op. cit., pp. 348-50.

72

Great Britain and Czechoslovakia,

1918-1948

793

forced to bow to the pressure of Paris and London, the rest was a mere detail. Munich marks the nadir of Anglo-Czech relations. It is interesting that Chamberlain, unlike Daladier, had no twinges of conscience about what he had done. He showed no embarassment when Mastny, the Czech minister in Berlin, was informed of the terms, but yawned continually. Later, he admitted that he was tired, "but pleasantly tired". No account of Anglo-Czech relations or of Munich would be complete without some mention of the part that the British press played in the crisis. For a number of years, the press had looked with hostility at Czechoslovakia. This was especially true of The Times, edited by Dawson, of the Observer, edited by J. L. Garvin, of the Daily Mail, owned by Lord Rothermere, and of Lord Beaverbrook's Daily Express. On the other hand, the Daily Telegraph, the Sunday Times, the News Chronicle, the Daily Herald, and the two important provincial papers, the Manchester Guardian and the Yorkshire Post, threw their considerable influence into the scales of those who were determined to resist the Nazi dictator. The role of The Times is particularly important because of the close connection between the editor and the Government. Throughout the crisis, it was, as it rightly claimed, ahead of both public opinion and the Government in its desire to achieve good relations with Germany. 73 On one occasion, indeed, Dawson expressed naive astonishment that The Times, of all newspapers, should actually be the victim of German attacks. I did my utmost, night after night, to keep out of the paper anything that might hurt their susceptibilities. I can really think of nothing that has been printed now for many months past which they could possibly take exception to as unfair comment. 7 4

Under these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that both Dawson and Barrington Ward tried to influence events in an anti-Czech course. Indeed, Barrington Ward even regarded Benes "as one of the most active architects of disorder in Europe". 75 When Dawson wrote, in his famous leader of 7 September 1938, that the Czechoslovak government should not exclude "the secession of that fringe of alien populations who are contiguous to the nation with which they are united by race", 73 74 75

28 October 1937. The History of the Times, IV, Part 2., p. 907. Ibid., p. 944.

Harry

794

Hanàk

he was once more leading public opinion and expressing with great precision the feelings of all appeasers. Other newspapers used the old "Irish" argument. "He (Henlein) merely asks for his people the same kind of government as Britain has given to all her people all over the world. The Irish Free State, which is an integral part of the British Isles, has been accorded far wider selfgovernment than members of the German race are claiming in Czechoslovakia. . . . It would be extremely illogical not to support the granting by Czecho-Slovakia of a much narrower measure of self-government to the 3,500,000 Germans in that State. If the Czechs object that autonomy for the Sudeten minority weakens the defence of their territory, the same argument holds good of the arrangements which Britain has concluded with the Irish Free State." 76 One wonders how many of the readers of the Daily Mail realised the falsity of an argument which compared Britain to Czechoslovakia and Eire to the Sudetenland, and left out of its calculation altogether the presence of Germany. Benes was one of the casualties of Munich. H e went into exile — to London. His choice of England has never been explained, but one may presume that the French government would have been unwilling to have him in Paris and that he considered the United States too far away. The liquidation of rump Czechoslovakia came six months after Munich, to the surprise of many, including Benes. It naturally made the work of resistance far harder, as Benes realised. And as I believed that war would begin with an attack against Poland not sooner than in the summer of 1939, I hoped to the last that Czechoslovakia would be able to rise again, at least partially, and at once take part in that war on the side of Poland, France and Great Britain - in spite of all that had happened between us and them in 1938. I wanted to dedicate all my work abroad first and foremost to the preparation for this eventually so that we could enter a second World War against Germany as a direct participant, as a State with a regular Government, which, if necessary, would in certain circumstances go abroad in good time and transfer at least part of our original army to the territory of one of the neighbouring States. Too well did I know from the war of 1914-1918 the Calvary of winning step by step international recognition ab initio for a new revolutionary Government and State.77

76

77

Daily Mail, 27 May 1938.

E. BeneSs, Memoirs of Dr Eduard Benes (London, 1954), pp. 57-8.

Great Britain and Czechoslovakia,

1918-1948

795

The date of 15 March 1939 is important in Anglo-Czech relations. It became clear even to Chamberlain that Hitler's word could not be trusted and that any further aggression on his part would have to be resisted. In April, the British government gave a guarantee to Poland. It also marked an important step in Benes' action in taking up once more the task of guiding the Czech and Slovak nation. The occupation of Prague invalidated the act of Munich. The first Republic had once more come into existence. Needless to say, neither the British nor the French governments took this view. On 16 March, Benes sent telegrams to Chamberlain, among others, protesting the crime perpetrated on Czechoslovakia. Yet Benes still had to act with considerable reserve, and it was not till the outbreak of war that he could openly espouse the Czechoslovak cause. During the years of war, Benes set himself a number of tasks. The first was to establish a government in exile recognized by all friendly Powers. The second was to get the signatories of Munich to accept an annulment of that treaty and to recognize Czechoslovakia in the frontiers as they had existed before 19 September 1938. The third was to establish the Republic on firmer foundations than those of the interwar years. This required cooperation with the Polish government, agreement with Soviet Russia, and also a settlement of the nationality problem within Czechoslovakia. In the first aim, Benes had already achieved a measure of success in September 1939. A few hours after the outbreak of war, Benes sent a telegram to Chamberlain in which he stated that Czechoslovakia had been in a state of war with Germany since 15 March and that she was automatically joining the allies. Chamberlain answered that "we anticipate that by the triumph of the principle for which we have taken up arms, the Czech people will be liberated from foreign domination". 78 A week later in discussions with Halifax, Benes demanded the establishment of a provisional government. The British were not keen. At the same time, they opposed the French plan by which Stefan Osusky would be recognized as the head of the Czech movement and Benes excluded. On 20 December 1939, the Czechoslovak National Committee was recognised by Britain. The German attack in the West in April 1940 afforded Benes the opportunity to reopen the question of setting up a government. But it

78

Ibid., p. 87.

796

Harry

Hanàk

was only after the overthrow of the Chamberlain government and the subsequent collapse of France that the cause of Free Czechoslovakia prospered. With the help of the British authorities, part of the Army in France was saved and transported to England. It was now an anomaly that the Czechoslovaks should not be accepted on the same footing as those other nations who had been overrun by the Nazis. British recognition of a Provisional Czechoslovak Government came on 21 July 1940. At the same time, it was made clear that this recognition did not imply a British engagement to any particular future boundaries. 79 Nevertheless, the establishment and provisional recognition of the Government, the recognition of Benes as president, the creation of a State Council in lieu of a Parliament, were great steps on the path towards the liquidation of Munich. If Benes was President, this meant that his resignation in 1938, and the events leading to it, were null and void. 80 Yet the final revocation of Munich was not achieved for another two years. The difficulties which hindered the British government in doing this are clear. But equally clear are the reasons why Benes insisted that Churchill declare that the Government no longer recognised the Munich frontiers, but regarded the question of all frontiers in Central Europe as open. It was on 5 August 1942, after the Soviet Union was beginning to outbid Britain in support for Czechoslovakia, that Eden announced that the British Government regarded themselves as free from any obligations incurred at Munich or any territorial changes effected in or after 1938. President Benes was, however, wrong to believe that this British announcement meant a complete reversal of British policy. The Munich mentality was an insular one which taught that Britain did not have the power to make her influence felt in Eastern and Central Europe. After the Soviet entry into the war and the subsequent Soviet-Czechoslovak Pact, the British government once more acted in this spirit. Eduard Taborsky has recorded that when, in February 1944, Benes began to negotiate with the Soviets for an agreement on the rights and duties of the Red Army on Czechoslovak territory, Benes asked the British to conclude a similar agreement, which they refused to do. Benes's

79 Ibid., pp. 108-110. Useful, but not always reliable, information on the Czechoslovaks in England is given by B. Lastovicka, V Londyne za valley, Prague, 1960.

80

E. Benes, Sest let exiln a druhe svetove vdlky (Prague, 1946), pp. 88-92.

Great Britain and Czechoslovakia,

1918-1948

797

persistent efforts to secure weapons from the British for the Czechoslovak underground movement were equally fruitless. 81 In the struggle for recognition, Benes had a loyal ally in R. H. Bruce Lockhart, who had been appointed British Representative to the Czechoslovaks. He frequently smoothed the path of negotiation and his advice was as valuable as that of Steed had been twenty years before.8-' The German invasion of Russia brought into being the very coalition against Hitler which Benes had been counting on since 1938. It was instantly clear to Benes that an agreement with Moscow was essential. A new Czechoslovak state could hardly exist without Russian cooperation. The condition of Polish-Soviet relations was a sufficient warning to Benes. In any case, he believed that if it had not been for the hostility between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union, Munich would never have taken place. Ever since the First World War, some Czechs and their well-wishers in the West had argued that Czechoslovakia could act as a bridge between the East and the West. It was a particularly propitious moment of the Second World War for such a grandiose enterprise. The British were unenthusiastic. They were deeply worried by the unsatisfactory state of relations between the Polish and Soviet Governments. Benes had established particularly cordial relations with the Poles, and discussions about a confederal union between the two states had been going on for some time. A Russo-Czech pact would result in the isolation of Poland and, probably, also in injury to the good relations between the Czechs and Poles. The British government certainly appreciated the necessity of good relations between the Soviet Union and all her Western neighbours. She was even willing to accept that these states would probably have some form of client relationship with Moscow. At the same time, it was argued that the collapse of Czechoslovakia in 1938 was due as much to the mutual enmity of East European states, particularly Czechoslovakia and Poland, as to other factors. There was, however still another reason. When, in the summer of 1943, Benes informed the Foreign Office that he intended to go to Moscow to sign a treaty with the Soviets, he was surprised to find that Eden declared such a trip inappropriate on the grounds that such an agreement would isolate Poland. Benes was not satisfied with this reason, and Eden therefore showed him a protocol in which Britain and Russia agreed not 81

E. Taborsky, "The Triumph and Disaster of Eduard Benes", Foreign Affairs X X X V I , pp. 669-684. 82 E. Taborsky, "BeneS and Stalin - Moscow, 1943 and 1945", Journal of Central European Affairs, XIII, pp. 154-181.

798

Harry

Hanàk

to enter into any agreements with small nations regarding frontiers and other postwar matters until after the end of the war.83 Benes was very greatly perturbed by this example of Soviet doubledealing and postponed his trip to Russia until after the Foreign Ministers' Conference of October 1943, during which Eden dropped his objections. Benes was carried away on a wave of euphoria in Russia. Visiting Churchill in Marrakesh on his way back, he assured him of the reasonableness of the Russians. In any case, both of them put pressure on the Poles to come to an agreement with Russia.84 It is fairly obvious that both Churchill and Eden were to some extent infected by Benes' enthusiasm for Russia. They certainly shared Benes' vision of a Russia with which it was possible to come to a reasoned agreement. The Czechoslovak success in diplomatic negotiations was not welcome to everyone. The Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs secured an assurance from Eden that the British repudiation of Munich did not apply to the Polish acquisition of Tesin.85 The other objector was Wenzel Jaksch, the leader of the German Social Democrats from Czechoslovakia. He asked the Foreign Office on 9 August 1942 to prevent the occupation of the Sudetenland after the war had ended and to entrust its administration to his (Jaksch's) group. If this proved impossible, then an international administration should be put in charge of the territory pending its final settlement.86 The liquidation of Munich meant that the future of the German minority in Czechoslovakia might now be settled. By September 1941, in The Nineteenth Century and After, Benes had written that he accepted the principle of transfer of populations.87 The British Government proved itself readier than the Soviet government to accept such a transfer. The news of German barbarities committed in every part of Europe made it difficult to resist such pressure. The assassination of Heydrich, in particular, and the Nazi reign of terror which this event then unleashed was an important landmark in the subsequent history of these Germans. To the Czechoslovak Government, and also to the Czechoslovak underground, the future existence of a German minority became impossible. In general, the British agreed. Lidice was a word deeply embedded in the minds of British people. 89 84 85 80 8

'

Comes the Reckoning, esp. pp. 53-124. W. S. Churchill, The Second World War, V., pp. 399-400. Count Edward Raczynski, In Allied London (London, 1962), p. 118. Europas Weg nach Potsdam (Stuttgart, 1958), pp. 373-4. CXXX, pp. 150-155.

Great Britain and Czechoslovakia,

1918-1948

799

For such a major expulsion of population, however, it was obviously necessary to get the approval of the Great Powers. Benes had mentioned this aim already during the negotiations for the annulment of Munich. The British Government answered that it did not intend to oppose the principle in an endeavour to make Czechoslovakia "as homogeneous a country as possible from the standpoint of nationality". 88 At this time, the Czechoslovaks favoured a plan by which certain areas would be ceded to Germany, thus reducing the number of those to be expelled. It only remained to work out a practical plan for the removal of the German minority, with the exception of those who had taken an antiNazi position. In August 1944, a Czechoslovak memorandum was presented to the European Advisory Committee of the Great Powers. It calculated that the war losses of the Sudeten Germans would be about a quarter-million, that half a million would escape from the country before the end of the war, that 1,600,000 were to be expelled, and that 800,000 would be allowed to remain. With the liberation of Czechoslovakia, the Government began to put its plan into action. It still depended, however, on the Great Powers. In June 1945, both the British and American governments protested to Prague about the way the expulsion was being carried out. The situation in the British and American zones of occupation was such that additional population could hardly be welcome there. On 3 July, Prague asked the three Great Powers to put the subject of the expulsion on the agenda of the Potsdam Conference. On 22 July, the Czechoslovak's plan for an orderly removal of the Germans was communicated to the three Great Powers. The question was discussed, and in Article 12 of the agreement, the transfer of the German populations from Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, was allowed. The Czechoslovaks were, however, asked to suspend the expulsions while plans for the integration of the Germans into the zones of occupation were being made. The Czechoslovak reply to the Potsdam agreement was a note dated 16 August in which it gave assurance that the expulsion would be carried out in an orderly and humane way, but suggesting that it be carried out as soon as possible and finished within one year. 89 From the end of the Second World War to the Communist coup d'état of 1948, the relations of the two states were no longer marked by the excitements of the previous quarter-century. Britain, in the process of liquidating an empire and making good the ravages and 88 89

Memoirs of Dr. Eduard Benes, pp. 235-6. R. Luza, The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans (London, 1964), pp. 277-292.

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Harry Hanàk

dislocations of the war, was withdrawing ever further from Eastern Europe, as was proved in Greece and Turkey. Czechoslovakia, with a democratic government, still lived in the shadow of the Soviet Union and under the pressure of a powerful Communist Party. In spite of the devotion of Jan Masaryk to Benes, the latter no longer had the influence on foreign affairs which he had enjoyed previously, Czechoslovak inability to attend the Paris conference on the Marshall Plan was a perilous sign of weakness. The events of February 1948 had as great an impact on opinion in the West as had Munich. Twice in one decade, Czechoslovak democracy had been allowed to fall. The Brussels Treaty and NATO showed Western determination to spare the others the fate of Prague. But, in the relations of Britain and Czechoslovakia, this was the first time since 1918 that they found themselves on different sides of the fence. The isolation of one from the other has not yet been broken, though the recent visit to Prague of the British Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, may be a sign of some improvement.

Franco-Czechoslovak Relations, 1918-1948

J. F. N. BRADLEY

I Franco-Czech relations are still awaiting systematic study. Though quite a lot is known about certain phases, such as the formation of the Little Entente or the Munich agreement, nothing is known about other periods. It seems that only events which affected the general course of European history are studied. But other episodes, however important, will always be distorted, if no overall picture is available. The overall picture can not emerge unless historical sources become accessible. Thus, the main reason for the lack of monographs and scholarly histories has simply been the scarcity of documentary material. The Czechs, though they have brought out certain documents, especially those dealing with the Munich crisis, have not yet published a comprehensive collection of documents of their Foreign Ministry; not even private documents, correspondence, or diaries of Czechoslovak foreign ministers (Benes, Hodza, Krofta, J. Masaryk) have appeared. Thus, even in 1965, the thirty years under review can only be covered fragmentarily and many gaps are left to be filled in the future. 1 Unfortunately, the French have not been any more productive than the Czechs, though possibly for different reasons. The French Foreign Ministry archives were burnt twice, in 1940 and 1944, and the mass of destroyed documents had to be reconstituted from the collections of documents preserved in French embassies in different countries outside the war area. Thus, it took the commission for the publication of French diplomatic documents some eighteen years to produce the first volume, starting with the first six months of 1936.2 Naturally, there exist other 1 The only Czechoslovak publication based on primary sources, O ceskoslovenské zahranicni politice v letech 1918-1939 (Prague, 1956), is an incomplete survey. The telegrams quoted below come from this book. There are photostat copies of them in the annex. 2 Documents diplomatiques français 1932-1939. 2e série, tome I (Paris, 1963).

802

J. F. N. Bradley

collections of French documents which are available, as well as memoirs, diaries, and correspondence of diplomats and foreign ministers. But the former are not of primary value, since they were produced largely to justify policies at the time and were, therefore, carefully selected. The latter, in the absence of their Czech counterpart, reveal only one side of the picture.3 Nevertheless, it is possible to construct a rough survey of FrancoCzechoslovak relations. The period 1918-48 can be divided into three phases: 1. the first and longest, that of the active alliance, 1918-36; 2. that of the collapse of the alliance and search for a new modus vivendi, 1936-1945; and 3. the postwar period, 1945-48, and after, marked by mutual indifference at worst and at best by polite cultural exchanges. The striking mark of these relations was that on the Czech side, the man responsible for foreign policy, Dr. Benes, remained in power through much of this period and gave them his unmistakable imprint. Thus, in a sense this study could also be called "Dr. Benes and France."

II It is meaningful to speak of Franco-Czechoslovak relations only after 1919, for France had previously taken cognizance of the Czechs only within the larger context of the Habsburg Monarchy.4 It was during the World War I, of course, that real Franco-Czechoslovak relations were forged. The man who really initiated them was M. R. Stefânik. It was he who had extensive contacts both within the Army and the French Foreign Service. It was he who introduced the young Dr. Benes to various French diplomats and politicians, thus laying the foundation for future development.5 The Czech anti-Habsburg cause flourished only in France. France was the first country to recognize the Czechoslovak National Council as the future government of independent Czechoslovakia. But France did this in recognition of the Czechoslovak wartime and postwar efforts. The Czech war contribution was minor, but still significant enough to persuade the Allies to grant the Czechs independence and fit them into 3

E.g., Le ¡ivre jaune français (Paris, 1939). Cf. my article, "Czech Nationalism in the Light of French Diplomatic Reports, 1867-1914", The Slavonic and East European Review (London, 1963), pp. 38-53. 5 E. Benes, My War Memoirs (London, 1928), p. 84 e? seq. R. Rajehl, Stefânik: vojâk a diplomat (Prague, 1948). 4

Franco-Czechoslovak Relations, 1918-1948

803

the new order of Europe after the war. The place of Czechoslovakia in this new order was paradoxically determined by the collapse of Russia, by Russia's peace with Germany, by the Bolshevik seizure of power, and by the revolt of the Czechoslovak Legion against the Bolsheviks.6 The revolt of the Legion perhaps most strongly influenced the Allies in favour of the Czechs. After the collapse of the Russian army, the Allies had tried in vain to reestablish the Eastern front. Instead, a new revolutionary party seized power in Russia, took her out of the war and embarked on an ideological war against the erstwhile Allies. The Czech Army Corps in Russia which, in February 1918, had become an autonomous part of the French Army, suddenly rebelled against the bullying Bolsheviks in May 1918 and fought them successfully until the Armistice in November. With the war finished, the next Allied effort in Russia was to liquidate the Bolshevik "collaborationist" régime, and the Czechs fitted admirably into this project. But Allied plans never really matured. They never launched a decisive campaign against the Bolsheviks. The French did send General Janin to command the Czech Legion, but very few troops arrived with the General. Ultimately, the Legion became further demoralized and returned to Czechoslovakia after the total collapse of the incomplete Allied intervention in 1920. Nevertheless, this particular, though unsuccessful, Czech contribution to the Allied cause became a cornerstone of the Franco-Czech alliance.7 S. Pichon, French Foreign Minister, came forward with the idea of the cordon sanitaire as early as 1918, long before the half-hearted intervention against the Bolsheviks collapsed. The French envisaged this cordon as stretching from Helsinki to Odessa, including the Baltic nations, Poland, the Ukraine, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Jugoslavia. Farsightedly, Dr. Benes perceived a special place for the Czechs in this cordon. On November 4, 1918, he sent a memorandum to Pichon declaring Czechoslovakia the key to Central Europe, to the peace in this area, and the cornerstone of the struggle against the Bolsheviks.8 Considering that the Czechs were at the time fighting the Bolsheviks under a French general, that the country was politically and economically the most stable in Central Europe and more than willing 6 Cf. my article, "The Allies and the Czechoslovak Legion in 1918", The Slavonic and East European Review (London, 1965), pp. 77-89. 7 Cf. my article, "L'intervention française en Sibérie 1918-1919", Revue historique, Paris, 1965, pp. 375-388. 8 Benes to Pichon, 16 December 1918, O ceskoslovenské zahranicni politice, p. 43.

804

J. F. N. Bradley

to ally herself with France, it was no surprise that she was ultimately chosen as the basis for French policies in Eastern Europe. The alliance was first implemented with actual French military aid to the young republic. The Czechoslovak army was placed under the command of Marshal Foch and a French military mission was sent to Prague to reorganize and command the new army. The formal alliance followed only much later. The main reason for the delay was the general instability in Central Europe and the Czech-Polish dispute; but, at the Quai d'Orsay, too, some diplomats had ideas for the future of Central Europe differing from those of Pichon and Benes. Chief among them was the secrétaire général, Maurice Paléologue. Fortunately, he disappeared in 1920 and his successor, Philippe Berthelot, Stefânik's great friend, reversed Paléologue's pro-Hungarian policy and exhibited great initiative in shaping Pichon's and Clemenceau's cordon sanitaire.9 Since the French had realized by then that they could unite the whole of Eastern Europe, they decided to set up regional alliances. It was to the interest of both France and the new states that Germany and Russia be kept isolated and in check by means of these regional groupings and by means of a bilateral alliance with France. During 1920, the Czechs, Rumanians, and Jugoslavs met in Paris, and decided on French initiative to form an alliance, later to be called the Little Entente. The Little Entente's basic aim was to keep in check the two defeated Central European countries, Hungary and Austria, but throughout the fifteen years of its existence, it aspired to even higher aims with varying success. France's interest in the new Central Europe was first of all military. Only after 1933, when Germany again became a military power, did it become political. After cementing the Little Entente in 1920-1, France continued to stabilize Central Europe successfully by concluding bipartite treaties with other countries. In 1921, her treaty with Poland brought the latter into the complex of alliances, if not politically then at least military. Unofficially, the Poles attended the conferences of the Little Entente. In 1922, additional treaties bound the Poles and the Little Entente to the Baltic Entente. This completed the diplomatic stabilization of Eastern Europe and France could turn her attention elsewhere. It should be remembered that this network of alliances rested primarily on one factor: the military impotence of the two great powers, Germany and Russia. The alliances were underpinned by secret military 9

P. Renouvin, Les crises du XXe siècle (Paris, 1957), volume I, p. 281 ff.

Franco-Czechoslovak Relations, 1918-1948

805

clauses, but these also presupposed the military impotence of the enemy. Thus, in case of a Franco-German conflict, the Czech Army was expected to make a thrust from Plzen westward to Regensburg, and then effect a junction with the French Army. This "Plan N" aimed at detaching the German North from the South. The Poles also had their role to play, but no minor nation in Central Europe could have hoped to carry out such a plan against a fully-armed Germany or Russia. In fact, these military conventions received a rude shock as early as 1923, when the French Army occupied the Ruhr. The occupation came as a surprise to Prague. The implications of the military clause became obvious and frightened the Czechs. In this case, French national interests were evidently not identical with those of the Czech, for the Czechs feared that Germany, if pushed too far by France, could turn Bolshevik, thus isolating Czechoslovakia off from the West. Dr. Benes bravely supported the French. Nonetheless, he felt very uneasy. On November 17, 1923, he firmly instructed his Ambassador in Paris, 5. Osusky, to urge the French to stop their sanctions against and their occupation of Germany. Benes was convinced that any further French pressure would inevitably lead to the Bolshevization of Germany. Any such change in Germany would vitally affect Czechoslovakia.10 During 1923, both T. G. Masaryk, and E. Benes visited France and talked with French statesmen. After the shock of the Ruhr occupation, it was deemed propitious to conclude a formal alliance between the two countries. National interests were to be delineated. The negotiations started in December 1923 and the formal alliance was made public on January 25, 1924. The treaty stipulated mutual assistance in case of the abrogation of the treaty of St. Germain, and in case of aggression against any one of the partners. The secret military clauses remained in operation.11 The treaty was then further propped up by the Geneva Protocol, which both the French and Dr. Benes propagated in the League of Nations. The Protocol provided for peaceful arbitration of disputes and was approved by the League in October 1924. The Franco-Czech Treaty formalized an existing reality, but the reality began to change fundamentally at the very moment of the signature of the treaty. President Poincaré and his policy of firmness against Germany were gradually replaced by the more realistic and farseeing policy 10 BeneS to Osusky, 17 November 1923, O ceskoslovenské p. 117. 11 Renouvin, op. cit., p. 283.

zahranicni

politice,

806

J. F. N.

Bradley

of Foreign Minister A. Briand. The latter recognized and acknowledged that Germany could not be contained forever, and in order to avoid future conflicts, he advocated the conciliation of Germany. This policy, however sound, inevitably weakened the Eastern alliances. The Dawes Plan and, especially, the Locarno Treaty in 1925 had both conciliatory and weakening effects on the various signatories. The subsequent Kellogg Pact of 1928 was designed to conciliate Germany and at the same time strengthen the Little Entente. But, in fact, it did neither. For the time being, both Briand and Benes remained convinced that the policy of conciliation would benefit both France and Czechoslovakia. Thus, the Czechs took part in all these conferences and negotiations, vehemently supporting the French. The French, on the other hand, strengthened the Czechs internationally. In 1929, when the Young Plan was discussed in the Hague, Briand insisted on Czech participation against Germany's opposition. But it was, above all, the economic weakness of the French alliance system which caused the first visible chinks. While Czechoslovakia was politically oriented almost exclusively toward France, her economic relations did not reflect this reality. Among importers of Czech goods, France came tenth. Though Schneider et Cie. practically controlled the Skoda Works, no other cooperation seems to have developed between the two countries. In the Little Entente, economic friction also became visible. Industrially developed Czechoslovakia had always the better of her agricultural partners, and the world depression came as a final blow. By 1931, this alliance reached a crisis. By then, it was also evident that Briand's plan for Pan-Europe, which was, broadly speaking, an attempt to revive the French European system, could not be realized, and French advice concerning mutual economic concessions was ignored by the Little Entente. H. Ripka, who should know, stated later that French tact and restraint in Central Europe were admirable.12 It seems that, at that stage, stronger pressure by France would have been perhaps less admirable, but much more useful to the Little Entente. As it was, the Tardieu Plan came too late. The plan meant, in fact, economic resuscitation of the Habsburg Monarchy. But by then, Germany was once again a great power, and Italy inimical to the idea. Both together easily blocked this attempt in London in 1932. It was obvious that France would have to create a new defensive grouping, since Germany steadily increased in strength and the Little 13

H. Ripka, Eastern Europe in the Post-War

World, (London, 1961), p. 34.

Franco-Czechoslovak Relations, 1918-1948

807

Entente was in the grip of the Great Depression. Between the 14th and the 19th of December, 1933, Dr. Benes visited Paris and talked with the French. On his return, Benes knew that France was hopelessly divided: some French politicians favored cooperation with Germany, others with Russia. No one now cared for Eastern Europe as such.13 From the Czechoslovak point of view, the lesser evil was cooperation with Russia, since Russia still seemed weak and was geographically further away than Germany. However, Benes clearly realized that any such move would finally ruin the Little Entente. Thus, Benes decided to wait for the French to move. By February 1934, when Barthou became Foreign Minister, the road was open for a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. The French, tactful as ever, first consulted their East European allies, the Poles and the Czechoslovaks. The Poles were opposed to any friendly move towards the USSR, but Benes became convinced that Barthou's policy was the only way out of the impasse into which Czech foreign policy had got itself with the virtual failure of the Little Entente. Immediately after Barthou's visit to Prague, Benes embarked on negotiations with the Russians, and in July recognized the Communist régime de jure. By September 1934, the USSR joined the League of Nations and there was a Czechoslovak ambassador in Moscow. Barthou's policy of re-arming the Little Entente and bringing in Russia as a counterbalance to Germany was in full swing. Then, suddenly, while still strengthening his new policy, Barthou was assassinated, together with the Yugoslav king, Alexander, in Marseilles in October 1934. Barthou's successor, Pierre Laval, proved immediately more cautious. Shortly after his assumption of office, Laval wrote Benes a letter in which he urged him to be more cautious vis-à-vis Germany. Benes still hoped that France and Czechoslovakia would be able to use Soviet Russia as the stick with which to compel Germany to be amenable, but soon after receiving Laval's letter, Benes, had Osusky's warning from Paris: Barthou's policy was dead.14 The change in French policy did not become apparent to the Czechs immediately. On December 5, 1934, Laval and Litvinov signed the Geneva Protocol and it seemed that negotiations for an Eastern Pact were progressing. BeneS signed the same protocol with the Russians five days after the French. He had a long talk with Titulescu, the Rumanian Foreign Minister, before the latter's departure for France on the 13 14

BeneS Memorandum. O ceskoslovenské zahranicni politice, p. 228. Osusky to BeneS, 31 October 1924, ibid., p. 243.

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J. F. N. Bradley

6th of April, 1935. Benes wanted the French to know that he and the Little Entente partners preferred an Eastern Locarno to bilateral pacts with Russia. But Titulescu's mission failed and he was unable to influence the French. On the 5th of May, 1935, the Franco-Soviet Treaty was signed. Characteristically, Laval left for Moscow and then, on the return journey, called in Berlin. The Czechs were, nevertheless, forced to come to terms with the Russians. A similar treaty was signed by Czechoslovakia and Russia later in May. On the 6th of June, 1936, Benes himself visited Moscow. If Bene§ was thinking of the treaty as a useful stick with which to threaten Germany, Laval, according to Osusky, had different ideas. He was more inclined to use the pact by way of rapprochement with Germany. 15 Osusky added that the Czechs would not be forgotten by the French if such rapprochement should come about, but Benes had no illusions. All the same, he reminded the French Ambassador in Prague several times of French obligations to Czechoslovakia, and even tried on his own initiative in Germany. But Hitler was not willing to deal with Benes. A short-lived, but brave, effort to sort out Central European problems was made by the new Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, M. Hodza, who replaced Benes when the latter was elected President. Hodza thought that a Central European federation could save the Czechoslovaks, and others with them. But he failed to convince even the French that any states other than Czechoslovakia would join such a federation. After his visit to Paris in February 1936, Hodza became convinced that without French support, his federal idea was dead. He resigned, and his successor Professor Krofta continued the old policy of complete dependence on France and open hostility to Germany. But by 1936, the Sudeten problem had become acute, the collapse of the Little Entente a fact, and French coolness towards the Czechs marked. Benes saw a glow of hope in the new French government of the popular front in April 1936. But this hope was quickly extinguished, after Ripka's visit to France as Benes's special envoy. From the Czechoslovak point of view, there was little new in France. According to Ripka, the French socialists were radical only in words; in foreign policy they followed the old line of their predecessors. 16 France was then trying to come to terms with Italy in order to use her against Germany, but failed. There were open disagreements between the Czechoslovaks 15 18

Osusky to BeneS, 2 July 1935, ibid., p. 267. Ripka to Benes, 3 May 1936, ibid., p. 281.

Franco-Czechoslovak

Relations, 1918-1948

809

and the French over Italy, Abyssinia, and the Civil War in Spain. It is no wonder that the negotiations for the rejuvenation of the Little Entente irrevocably failed. France was unwilling to ally herself actively with the moribund Little Entente, and in July 1936, the French Foreign Minister, Delbos, finally said so. Anyway, the rift within that alliance widened until the alliance finally passed out of existence. However useful the alliance had been in the beginning, its weaknesses were apparent throughout: the partners were unwilling to help Czechoslovakia against Germany; Rumania, against Russia; or Yugoslavia, against Italy. Thus, it was effective only against the minor powers. With Germany, a great power, it was wholly futile. Benes could see this impasse clearly and he began to feel the Czechoslovak isolation. H e tried hard to persuade Léon Blum to follow Barthou's old policy and come to terms with the Germans by using the treaty with the USSR. 17 The French at first showed interest, and Benes again tried bilateral talks with the Germans, but nothing came of it. It was Germany's turn to move, and she moved against Czechoslovakia. Hitler brought up the Sudeten problem. It was clear to the French that unless the Czechoslovaks solved this problem, France would be somehow dragged into a war with Germany, for the wrong reasons. The problem was insoluble; the Czechoslovaks pleaded for French support, but it was not forthcoming. France's entente cordiale with Britain precluded her from giving support to the Czechoslovaks even if she had wanted to. Britain's position was clear: she was not going to support Czechoslovakia against Germany, since the former was violating the principles of self-determination for which the First World War had been fought. Throughout the Czechoslovak crisis of 1937-8, France's policy was determined by her ally, Great Britain. But in any case, the French were unwilling to fight for Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, the French were more in favour than the British of an equitable solution to the Sudeten problem; they were definitely opposed to the liquidation of Czechoslovakia. But it was not France which was the dominant partner. After her failure to ally herself with the USSR and Italy, she found Britain the last remaining hope against Germany. Britain had no vital interests in Central Europe, and was unwilling to support French policies or the results of these policies in that area. It can, therefore, be argued that the inequitable solution of the Sudeten crisis and the Munich agreement both resulted from British policy. Yet France was an important 17

Benes to Blum, ibid., p. 303.

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J. F. N. Bradley

partner. Although Daladier was completely eclipsed by Chamberlain at Munich, he nevertheless signed the agreement.18 Ill When France repudiated her policy in Central Europe at Munich, the order which she had created in that area collapsed and vanished. Dr. Benes resigned and went into exile. In March 1939, the remainder of Czechoslovakia was annexed by Hitler and ceased to exist. It did not take long for France to collapse in turn and "vanish". By 1940, a new phase began in Franco-Czech relations. The Frenchmen of Munich disappeared and General de Gaulle, an exile, like Dr. Benes, claimed the leadership of the French nation. Immediately, a lasting friendship was struck between the two men who then represented their occupied countries. De Gaulle admired Benes' leadership and, above all, his realism in foreign affairs. The Czechoslovaks were now fully dependent on the West and the United States, which, in the circumstances, was the only viable policy. But with the entry of the USSR into the war, the situation became complicated. According to de Gaulle, Benes spent hours explaining to him his difficulty and lack of choice. Obviously, all the Czech leaders in exile were uncertain whether the USSR would "behave" after the War, but they really had no choice. With the elimination of France as a great power on the continent, the Czechs had to look for support toward the new power, the USSR.19 Inevitably, they went to Moscow and returned home via the USSR. Before they left, Benes made it clear to de Gaulle that even if France reestablished her former position in Europe, Czechoslovakia could never again rely on France as her sole ally, as she had before the war. France was too uncertain to be wholly trusted. De Gaulle recognized the justice of this policy and never forgot Benes' friendship. When, in February 1945, the Allies were deciding the fate of Europe, de Gaulle, though uninvited, raised his voice in support of Czechoslovak independence.20 This was only a friendly gesture, which could not help the Czechs practically. But even if the French had been prepared to help more practically, they could not do so uninvited, and no Czech initiative was forthcoming. 19

M. Baumont, La faillite de la paix (Paris, 1951), volume 2, pp. 782-853. Charles de Gaulle, War Memoirs (London, 1959), volume 1, pp. 101-2, 249-250. 20 Ibid, volume 3, p. 87. 19

Franco-Czechoslovak

Relations, 1918-1948

811

After the war, Franco-Czechoslovak relations consisted almost entirely of such friendly gestures. The French were visibly at a loss to know what to do about Czechoslovakia. The Quai d'Orsay was familiar with the person of the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, J. Masaryk, who was much respected, but it was obvious to the French that his deputy, V. Clementis, a Communist, was the moving power of that Ministry. Masaryk symbolized to them the Czech dilemma: the wistful gaze towards France and Britain and the total dependence on the USSR. But in 1947, a new Czech initiative suddenly burst on the French and gave them a chance to make the friendly gestures more tangible. On Benes' instructions, a new friendship treaty and cultural agreement was negotiated. Ambassador Nosek worked feverishly on the project and the conscience-stricken French were responsive. All the same, to the Quai d'Orsay, this new initiative was really "futile, fruitless and premature". France was not in a position to lessen Czech dependence on Russia, and the French had no illusions about that, though the Czechs probably had some. But, within six months, Benes' Czechoslovakia no longer existed; the Prague coup destroyed the last semblance of friendly relations between the two countries. The period from 1948 to 1958 was completely arid. It is true that the French tried to help some of their former friends, who were ousted politicians, but when these efforts came to light, they were interpreted as unfriendly gestures towards the new régime. In consequence, a diplomatic cold war began. Both countries engaged in deportations and accusations of spying. The Czechs launched a drive to eradicate the last vestiges of French influence in Czechoslovakia. The cold war was relaxed only after the de-Stalinization campaign in Russia and the slow thaw in Czechoslovakia. Not until the 1960's were cultural relations reestablished: exchanges of art and trade exhibits, theatre ensembles, ballet troupes, scholarships, etc. But with the growing rift within the Communist bloc and Czechoslovakia's gradual assertion of greater independence, the French, again guided by President de Gaulle, started political negotiations in 1964. Thus, still another phase has been embarked upon. President de Gaulle's idea of a Europe extending from the Atlantic to the Urals obviously found an echo in both countries. Nevertheless, the reestablishment of relations on the same basis as before the War is out of question. All the same, this latest Franco-Czechoslovak rapprochement may prove significant for the future.

D CZECHS AND SLOVAKS

ABROAD

The American Czechs, Slovaks, and Slavs in the Development of America's "Climate of Opinion" JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

When considering the image of the Czechoslovak immigrant in America's ideological arguments over the changing provisions of immigration laws, we must stress that it is more than difficult to make a specific study of the Czechs and Slovak "in isolation", since: (1) Historically, Czechoslovakia existed formally in general American thinking only after 1918, and hence many Czech and Slovak immigrants have been classified, or known, as "Bohemians", or Austrians, or Slavs - according to whatever category, before World War I, the immigrant officials or the student of immigrant problems happened to assign them. (2) The Slovaks, furthermore, often were classed as Hungarians ("Hunkies"). In short, as in the case of several other groups whose countries of origin attained independence after World War I, accurate definitions and statistics of several phases of Czechoslovak immigration have been lacking. (3) The situation was further complicated by the general misunderstanding regarding the "racial" or "ethnic" allegiance of colonies of Moravians in Bethlehem, Pa., where they founded the Moravian Seminary in 1742, and in Salem, N.C., where they established Salem College in 1771; but they are usually described as of German extraction, since they were even more popularly known as "Herrnhuters", or even as "Pennsylvania Dutch". 1 This confusing aspect of various concepts and definitions forces us to treat the American Czechs and Slovaks within the general framework of the attitudes which, in the general framework of American reference, has grouped the Czechs and Slovak as one rather small branch of Central-

1 Frederick Kless, The Pennsylvania Dutch (New York, MacMillan, 1950), bibliography, 445-451, tries to interpret the Pennsylvania Germans to their fellowAmericans and to "themselves", and includes the Moravians among the Mennonites, Amish, Dunkars, Lutherans, Reformed, and United Brethren. For the best survey of the relationship of the Moravian Church to its Czech background, see: Jan Herben, Huss and his Followers (London, Geoffre Bless, 1926), Chapter VII, "Echo of the Bohemian Reformation in other Countries", 193-204.

816

Joseph S. Roucek

Eastern "new" immigrants. There still also remains much misunderstanding regarding the concept of "Bohemia". Webster's New World Dictionary of the New American Language (College Edition, World Publishing Co., Cleveland, Ohio, 1957, p. 163) defines "Bohemian": (1) a native or inhabitant of Bohemia; (2) the West Slavic language of the Czechs; also called Czech-, (3) from the fact that the gypsies passed through Bohemia to reach Western Europe, a gypsy; (4) an artist, dilettante, etc., who lives unconventionally. As an adjective: (1) of Bohemia, its people, of their language: Czech; (2) like or characteristic of a Bohemian (sense 4); unconventional, party, etc. . . . Or Benét's The Reader's Encyclopedia claims: 2 "Bohemia, any locality frequented by journalists, artists, actors, opera-singers and other similar characters. See next entry, Bohemian. A term applied to literary men and artists of loose and unconventional habits, living by what they can pick up by their wits. . . . "

THE ATTITUDE TOWARD "BOHEMIANS" A N D "SLOVAKS" BEFORE THE 1880's

In general, it can be safely said that, on the whole, dominant trends of American public opinion had paid hardly any attention, if any at all, to the American Czechs and Slovaks before the 1880's - except when some individuals got involved in some political schemes, which were then classified as "socialist" or "anarchist". It is seldom noted that there are records in America's history of rather active Czechs who came to America imbued with socialist ideas, and who certainly helped to produce a rather unfavorable image due to the fact that socialism was not and has never been popular in the United 2

William Rose Benêt (éd.), The Reader's Encyclopedia, an Encyclopedia of World Literature and the Arts (New York, T. Y. Crowell, 1948), 125. For the encyclopedial references pertaining to the various Slavic concepts, see: Joseph S. Roucek (ed.), American Slavs: A Bibliography (New York City, Bureau for Intercultural Education, April, 1944); Joseph S. Roucek (ed.), Slavonic Encyclopedia (New York, Philosophical Library, 1949); Joseph S. Rou£ek, Alice Hero, and Jean Downey, The Immigrant in Fiction and Biography (New York, Bureau for Intercultural Education, 1945). It might be of interest that the now much-advertised booklet by John F. Kennedy. A Nation of Immigrants, AntiDefamation League of B'nai Brith (New York, 1963), does not refer to the Slavs or Czechoslovaks at all, and notes only the contributions made by Poles to the industrial development of the nation and that "Polish immigrants plowed the land in the fertile Connecticut Valley and helped rebuild a once-dying area into a prosperous one", p. 22.

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States, and that the activities of the socialistic and "radical" movements in America eventually became one of the elements which assigned the Slavs to the category of undesirable "racial" elements. In fact, Glazer points out that American socialists became the founders of the American Communist movement in 1919.3 Capek notes that J. Palda was "the father of Czech socialism in the United States"; 4 together with Frank Skarda, he founded in Cleveland in 1875, Delnicke listy (The Workingsmen's News), as the "Organ of the Socialist Workingmen's Party in the United States". Leo Beilbek, a member of the Illinois legislature, "classified himself as a Social Democrat, and Palda's business partner, Frank Skarda, was nominated, but not elected, on the socialist ticket for Lieutenant-Governor of Ohio". In 1877, the Delnicke listy was moved to New York City, where "Palda started organizing socialist clubs; the group he helped to organize bore the name, 'Cech-Slavic International Workingmen's Association of New York' ". But Palda realized that the socialist doctrine was foreign to most of his countrymen, most of whom had emigrated from rural districts, and did not renounce his Czech nationalism; he might, therefore, be called a "Nationalist Socialist". Then there were refugee socialists in the 1870's operating in New York and Chicago. One was Leo Kochmann (1844-1919), who was immediately given a job as the editor of Delnicke listy by Skarda; he was New York's strong man in the colony of Social Democrats (until 1913), and for a quarter of a century was editor-in-chief of the New York daily, Hlas lidu. In 1882, Johann Most reached the United States, after serving terms in jails in Austria, Saxony, Prussia, and England; he made a successful speaking tour through the country and established anarchist clubs.5 "The main feature of his propaganda was the glorification of terrorist acts", and Capek admits that he "found ardent sympathizers among those Czech Social Democrats who were dissatisfied with the orthodox scholarly socialism of Marx and Lasalle, and who clamored for deeds. . . . " 6 Then 3

Nathan Glazer, The Social Basis of American Communism (Boston, Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961), 13. 4 Thomas Capek, The Czechs (Bohemians) in America, A Study of their National, Cultural, Political, Social, Economic and Religious Life (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1920), 137. 5 Capek, op. cit., 142-143; Max Nomad, Political Heretics: From Plato to Mao Tse-Tung (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1963), 224-227. Capek lists him as a Czech, but Nomad notes that he was born in Bavaria. 6 Capek, op. cit., 143.

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there were also anarchists and other radicals, publishing seven periodicals and various leaflets and pamphlets, especially in Chicago, Cleveland, and New York. The Haymarket event dealt, however, a knockout blow to anarchism among the American Czechs from which it never recovered. But the Socialists, until recently, had four newspapers, and the socialist and anarchist currents among the immigrants, culminating in the railroad strike of 1885 and the Haymarket affair had very serious repercussions in regard to the subsequent re-valuation of the American immigrant from East Central Europe.7 The melting pot ideal after 1886 began to stir up controversies, the major argument being that the nation would have to close its doors to immigration because recent arrivals were impervious to its ideals. The spokesmen for the immigrants, on the other hand, justified their views by claiming that America's mission was not that of a refuge, but a showcase for liberty. But the dominant attitude "was unequivocal denial of the nation's responsibility to the world's oppressed. For the people frightened by the conflicts of these years, the immigrant became the scapegoat for every grievance: political corruption, labor conflicts, vice and crime, were strictly foreign products disseminated "through the land" by corrupt "invaders".8 In general, the immigrants, indicted for every imagined conspiracy against public welfare, were regarded as agents of doom carrying destruction in the new land. Of special concern were labor conflicts, which gave the Panic of 1873 a dimension of grim class conflict. Some observers connected it with socialism and imagined the Paris Commune transplanted to the United States. Such fear was helped by "the Slavic newcomers in Pennsylvania, supposedly the most docile of immigrants, soon (providing) a dramatic confirmation of businessmen's fears. Driven to desperation, several thousand Hungarian coke miners displayed a belligerence and solidarity that confounded the anticipations of unions and unions alike. In January 1886, a state law went into effect forbidding women to work in the mines. The immigrant coke workers, paid on piece-work, had depended on their wives' assistance to eke out a living. When the coke syndicate, headed by Henry C. Frick, refused to raise the rate of pay, "the Hungarians threw down their tools. There were riots and arrests . . . " 9 7

John Higham, Strangers in the Land (New Brunswick, N.J., Rutgers University Press, 1955), 54-55, 56, 62, 111, 138. B F. C. Jaher, Doubters and Disseners (Glencoe, 111., Free Press, 1964), 50. 9 Quoted by Higham, op. cit., 51; notice also that Higham is referring to "the Slavic newcomers", and then uses the word "Hungarian" - obviously referring to Slovak miners.

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In general, the years between the strikes and the Spanish-American War "were filled with confusion, fear, and - for some - despair". There was labor's militant growth, whose "large percentage of membership came from Central-Eastern Europe, remained in the cities, dominated leftist centers of New York and Chicago", and, logically, "immigration was the source of the trouble. Obviously, American institutions had failed, not because they were faulty, but because an alien element had undermined them". 10 All the forces contributing to the pessimism of the Eighties increased in magnitude in the next decade; strikes were bigger, more frequent, and more violent; cities were growing bigger - and the "wrong" kinds of immigrants were pouring in. Social hostility resulting from these difficulties was directed against groups that could be classified as "un-American": socialists, unions, and immigrants. Conviction was growing that "alien groups were blighting the nation's future and swindling the native-born of their just rewards". 11 Political corruption could be traced "to a desire to capture the foreign vote".12 Vice and crime were strictly foreign products; degenerate actions were the result of decadent blood and inferior race "drags down the stronger", and the American stock was in danger of "physical degeneration" through cross-breeding.13 The persistent "clannish spirit" of the immigrant disturbed national unity. But above all, the threat of social revolution was feared; "anarchists, ultra-socialists, and dynamiters" had "found here . . . a safe place to which to preach their doctrines of hate, revenge, murder and plunder". 14 In general, the immigrants were conceived as agents of doom; yet, despite growing opposition, ships laden with them continued to dock in America's harbor. After 1893, even the most respectable groups frowned on immigration. Even eugenic experts forecast race suicide if the canons of evolution continued to be violated by "inferior hordes" diluting native stock. By the mid-1890's, the business community was also committed to restrictions. Labor also rejected the immigrant, the unions looking upon

10

Jaher, op. cit., 35. Ibid., 39. 12 T. T. Munger, "Immigration by Passport", Century, XXXV (March, 1888), 797; see also: John H. Denison, "The Survival of the American Type", Atlantic, LXXV (January, 1895), 16. 13 Munger, op. cit., 793-4. 14 E. A. Hempstead, "Shall Immigration Be Restricted", Chautauquan, VIII (July, 1888), 610-612. 11

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him with increasing disfavor, because of job competition, strikes, and difficulties of organizing him.

THE IDEOLOGY OF RACISM A N D THE CONCEPTS OF NEW A N D OLD IMMIGRATION

One of the most interesting aspects of the evaluation of the Czechoslovak immigrant as a sort of a "backward", "inferior", and "undesirable" element in America, legalized in the recent immigration laws, is the influence expressed by the concepts of racism, violently denounced by all modern anthropologists, sociologists, and social psychologists, and yet in full operation in the immigration and naturalization system of the United States until 1965.15 Historically, from about 1820 to 1880, there was a constant influx of European immigrants into the U.S. They joined the older colonists of predominantly English ancestry who already formed the dominant majority. These immigrants, sometimes spoken as the "Old Immigrants", were primarily North Europeans, and tended to be Protestant in religion and similar in other respects to the dominant national group; they included German, Irish, Scotch, Swedish, and Dutch, as well as additional English immigrants. They came during the epoch of an expanding Western frontier, and most of them spread rapidly over the country, many to the West. A few of them persisted long in enclaves throughout the country, and settlements of German, Swedish, Norwegian, and Dutch descendants can still be found in the Midwest. But most of these "Old 15

See the articles, surveying the various angles of this problem, in: Benjamin M. Ziegler (ed.), Immigration: An American Dilemma (Boston, D. C. Heath, 1953), and especially the reprinted article: Fairchild, Henry Pratt, "The Melting Pot Mistake", 19-24, and "Conditions in America as Affected by Immigration", 34-49; E. A. Ross, "Immigrant in Politics: The Political Consequences of Immigration", 71-76; F. L. Auerbach, "Who are Our New Immigrants?", 92-95; "The Walter-McCarran Immigration Bill", 96-97; "President Truman's Message to the House on Veto of Immigration Bill", 97-103; "Speech of Senator McCarran", 104-108; "Excerpts from Report by President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization, 'Whom we Shall Welcome'", 109-112; "Statement by Senator McCarran Regarding the Report by the President's Commission", 112. See also: Marion T. Bennet, American Immigration Politics, A History (Washington, D.C., Public Affairs Press, 1963), Chapter III, "The Selective Period of Federal Restrictions, 1880-1920", 15-29; IV, "The New Immigration, 1880-1920", 30-39; V, "Numerical Restrictions - the Quota Act of 1921", 40-46; VI, "The National Origins Restricting Plan and the Immigration Act of May 26, 1924", 47-58, and passim.

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Immigrants" soon acculturated to the dominant English-AmericanProtestant pattern which was then taking form, and were assimilated rather quietly and peacefully. But in the latter part of the last century, a change occurred in the type of immigrant. As the frontier gradually receded, and as industry began to develop in the cities in the Northeastern parts of the country, there was a great demand for cheap labor. A wave of "new" immigrants came after 1880, mostly from Central-Eastern-Balkan Europe; they did not go to the rural zones and the frontier, but crowded into the cities; they were Roman Catholics, Orthodox Catholics, or Jews, and spoke languages strange to the ears of the "old" immigrants, who were by then overwhelmingly English-speaking. The newcomers were less skilled mechanically and were relegated to certain unskilled jobs and small business enterprises. They lived in relative poverty, and their level of education was low; they were forced to live in "Little Italies", "Ghettoes", "Hunky Towns", or in similar districts in big cities, where they could speak their own language and carry on their cultural activities (sociologically speaking) still rooted in their homelands. During the early 20th century, they came almost one million strong each year. Because of linguistic and cultural differences, and as a result of the competition for jobs, considerable prejudice grew up against them among the earlier settlers. Eventually, as we shall see, they were believed to be "racially inferior" to Northern Anglo-Saxons; they appeared to be more inclined to crime, unable to adjust to the dominant American culture patterns and systems. The growing prejudice against them was intensified by periods of economic depression, culminating eventually in a series of restrictive immigration laws establishing quota controls on immigration in the 1920's, which stemmed the tide of great mass movements of Europeans into the United States, while discriminating deliberately against the "new" immigrants.

PERENNIAL POPULARITY OF RACISM IN THE UNITED STATES

Burns points out that "Americans are fond of thinking of themselves as the most tolerant and broad-minded people on earth. But in the hundred and eighty years of their independence as a nation, astonishingly few of them rejected racial exclusiveness or championed the view that all men are brothers entitled to the same rights of privileges regardless of the color of the skin, shape of the head, or any other physical pecularities.

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Not a single one of the great popular heroes of democracy - neither Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, nor Woodrow Wilson - rose much above the common prejudice".16 And it must be, furthermore, noted that, in spite of the dominant American ideology featuring the standard clichés of "equality", "brotherhood", "equal citizenship", "the land of opportunity", "brothers under the skin", "tolerance", and the like, American racism has remained until recently on the statute books as the present immigration laws. It also found - even until now - respectable academic proponennts of the variations of this doctrine in terms of Puritanism, Anglo-Saxonism, Teutonism, Social Darwinism, Eugenics, and "Super-Racism".

THE PURITAN HERITAGE

The ideology of the value of Puritanism in American life has never entirely disappeared, and the ideologists who found in Puritanism the source of everything good in America also extolled the heritage from Britain. Historian George Bancroft, for instance, hailed John Calvin as the father of popular education, the originator of free schools; he tried to identify William Penn as a disciple of the Huguenots, and maintained that the ships that brought the first colonists to New Amsterdam were filled with Calvinists. For him, the Puritan was the incarnation of all the virtues that ennoble a human being and set him apart from his fellow; according to him, "the issue of Puritanism was popular sovereignty".17 Fiske believed that the leaders of the New England migration were country gentlemen, the backbone of England's strength, the stout gentry and independent yeomanry. Fiske's older contemporary, George William Curtis, lauded the Puritan spirit as "the master influence of American civilization". During the heyday of Progressivism, admiration for the Puritans evoked praise for their religious and moral qualities. President David Starr Jordan, who traced his ancestry to Puritan forebears, tried to transplant Puritanism to the Pacific when he went to head Stanford, and described the conscience as "the most previous political heritage of 14 Edward McNall Burns, The American Idea of Mission: Concepts of National Purpose and Destiny (New Brunswick, N.J., Rutgers University Press, 1957), 209-210. See also: William Peterson, "The 'Scientific' Basis of our Immigration Policy", 197-205, in William Peterson, and David Matza (eds.), Social Controversy (Belmont, Calif., Wadsworth Publ. Co., 1963). 17 George Bancroft, History of the United States of America (New York, D. Appleton & Co., 1885), I. 318.

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the backbone of American culture".18 Jordan's younger associate in the Progressive movement, Senator Albert. J. Beveridge, characterized Puritan principles as "the very breath of life" of the American Republic.1» Unquestionably, Amercans inherited law from Great Britain, and her language and many of the folkways and governmental institutions. But this cannot be said of her ideal of social equality, of her belief that the voice of the people is the voice of God, of her multiplicity of elections, and of such basic institutions as the town meeting, the national convention, the federal system, or the initiative, referendum, and recall. (Some of the elements of America's democratic institutions go back to ancient German and particularly to feudal customs; others, exemplified by the concept of the higher law and inviolable rights, have their roots in Stoicism.) It is true that industry, frugality, ambition, and glorification of material success are deeply imbedded in America's folkways; but Puritanism is not their only source. The religions of the frontier had little relation to Puritan ideology. The non-Calvinist sects of Methodists, Baptists, Episcopalians, Unitarians, and Quakers have produced more than twice as many Presidents of the United States as have the combined off-spring of Puritanism. Non-Puritan backgrounds are present in some noted American historical figures: Thomas Paine; Benjamin Franklin; Thomas Jefferson; Ralph Waldo Emerson; Abraham Lincoln; William James; and Justices Brandeis and Holmes. Yet, in regard to the concept of "new" and "old" immigration, the Puritanical ideology has been of definite importance.

THE IMPACT OF ANGLO-SAXON IDEOLOGY

Correlated to this idealization of the heritage of Puritanism (with its corollary of antagonism to the non-Protestant immigrants) is - and has been - the adulation proclaimed for the English heritage, both expressed in the popular formula: the WASP (White - Anglo-Saxon - Protestant). One of the sources of academic racism, one of the most strongest elements leading to the racist provisions of the immigration restrictions after World War I, can be traced to the Anglo-Saxon tradition, a 18

David Starr Jordan, The Strength of Being Clean (San Francisco, Calif., Viavi Press, 1898), 4-5. 19 Albert J. Beveridge, The Meaning of the Times and Other Speeches (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1920), 24-25.

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politico-literary concept of race, lacking a clearly defined physiological basis, but identifying culture with ancestry and featuring mainly the antiquity, the uniqueness, and the permanence of a nationality. America's greatness and, above all, its capacity for self-government, is, according to this ideology, attributable to its Anglo-Saxon derivation; it involves veneration for Britain (although it contradicts the historical facts - that the U.S. had arisen from its revolt against the British rule). This ideology has been most popular among the East coast élite, well removed from the fierce race conflicts of other regions. This group founded, in 1889, the Massachusetts Society for Promoting Good Citizenship, and the Immigration Restriction League in 1894. A number of such academicians (many of them also "Teutonist academicians") (such as Henry Adams, Herbert Baxter Adams, Richond Mayo Smith, William Z. Ripley), helped to create "the Anglo-Saxon Complex", carrying organized propaganda against immigrants from CentralEastern-Balkan Europe. 2 0

SOCIAL A N D RACIAL DARWINISM

During the period of the 1880's, another kind of race attitude was being developed from the inquiries of naturalists and under the impact of Social Darwinism. While the proponents of Anglo-Saxonism used history and literature to identify national groups as races, the naturalists concentrated on the great "primary" groupings of homo sapiens and used physiological characteristics (such as skin color, stature, head shape, etc.) to distinguish one from the other. This school associated physical with cultural differences and proclaimed the natural superiority of certain races. These early "anthropologists" stressed the force of environmental conditions in differentiating the human family. 21 At the turn of the present century, racial "science" increasingly mingled with racial nationalism. Many European naturalists thought 20

Barbara Miller Solomon, Ancestors and Immigrants, A Changing New England Tradition (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1956), bibliography, 211-221. 21 John C. Greene, "Some Early Speculations on the Origin of Human Races", American Anthropologist, LVI (1954), 31-34; and "The American Debate on the Negro's Place in Nature, 1780-1815", Journal of the History of Ideas, XV (1954), 384-396; Early W. Count, "The Evolution of the Race Idea in Modern Western Culture During the Period of the Pre-Darwinian Nineteenth Century", Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences, VII (1946), 139-165.

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that every national trait was wholly dependent on hereditary transmission, and this interchange formed "the intellectual background for the conversion of the vague Anglo-Saxon tradition into a sharp-cutting nativist weapon and, ultimately, into a completely racist philosophy". 22 This racist thinking was strengthened by Social Darwinism, depicting all species as both the products and the victims of a desperate struggle for survival. This evolutionary approach was adopted by racists, allowing them to anchor their claims to a biological basis, and also to arouse anxiety by denying any assurance that this base would endure, if "contaminated" by inferior races. It is important to note that, until the 1880's, the assimilationist concept of a mixed nationality "had tempered and offset pride in AngloSaxon superiority". But then came social, class, and labor unrest, and the Anglo-Saxon thinkers felt that their society - and thus their status was threatened, and "the new racial xenophobia" did not originate as a way of discriminating between old and new immigration. It arose from disturbances within American society which preceded awareness of a general ethnic change in the incoming stream. At the outset, AngloSaxon nativists vaguely indicted the whole foreign influx. Only later did the attack narrow specifically to the new immigration.23 The tradition of racial nationalism proclaimed orderly self-government as the chief glory of the Anglo-Saxons; this racial mystique numbered among its adherents such crusaders as Albert J.Beveridge, a professor at Stanford University, President David Starr Jordan of Stanford, and the journalist, William Allen White.24 The ideology of Anglo-Saxon nativism thus arose also as a corollary to anti-radical nativism - a convenient way of explaining why the stability of the American way of life was threatened by the immigrants. The Haymarket Affair changed attacks on radical foreigners to attacks on radical "races", and during the 1890's, as the social crisis deepened, racial nativism became more and more popular.

22

Higham, op. cit., 134. Ibid., 137. 24 For the academicians involved in this ideological movement, see: Edward N. Saveth, American Historians and European Immigrants 1875-1925 (New York, Columbia University Press, 1948), and "List of References", 225-238; Harvey Wish, The American Historian: A Social Intellectual History of the Writing of the American Past (New York, Oxford University Press, 1960), 150 ff. 23

826

Joseph S. Roucek THE IDEOLOGY OF TEUTONISM

At the end of the last century, the ideology of Anglo-Saxonism began to be fused also with the trend to accept the glories of Germanism, under the impact of a generation of American historians who had enrolled in German universities and accepted the much-extolled glories of Germanism; these took Germanism to mean Anglo-Saxonism and, on their return to America, applied what they had learned to an analysis of American political evolution as a continuation of the experience of the Anglo-Saxon "race".25 Their reasoning was that the political achievements of the English could be traced to remote beginnings among the ancient Germans, and that Britain brought these accomplishments to a full-rounded development, and passed them on to the New World. This was the reasoning of the historian, James K. Hosmer, the political scientist, John W. Burgess of Columbia University, and especially, of the Social Darwinist, Professor John Fiske. They introduced the belief that American institutions were peculiar "racial" products, making the intellectuals more conscious of the supposed "racial" differences between the "old" and "new" immigrants. They concluded that since American institutions were the unique creation of "Teutonic" peoples and were meant for their use, it was doubtful whether the newcomers could carry on the traditional concepts of freedom, individual liberty, local self-government, and federalism in government.

JORDAN A N D ROSS

Among the American academicians most affected by the coming of the "new" immigrants (and most influential) were the two Progressive reformers, David Starr Jordan and Edward Alsworth Ross; both professed to repudiate Social Darwinism. The former rejected the thesis that conflict results in the survival of the fittest among nations and the latter condemned the rugged individualism of Spencer and most of his followers. But when it came to race, both agreed with the theories of the most rabid of the Social Darwinists. Jordan considered the blood of a nation the cardinal factor deter-

25

For their survey, see: Saveth, op. cit., Chapter II, "Teuton and Immigrant", 32-64, and bibliography, 225-238.

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mining its history. America was basically a Nordic nation, accounting for much of its progress: "A good stock is the only material out of which history has made a great nation". Jordan recognized an almost infinite variety of ethnic types, each having its characteristics marking it off as a separate breed. He believed that the peoples could be divided into superior and inferior types. The best stocks were those which most closely approximated the blond, Nordic type; the worst were those at the opposite end of the scale; he concluded that the South and East European "races" were distinctly below the cultural and moral level of such peoples as the British, the Scandinavians, and the Dutch. 26 Ross, one of the founders of American sociology, had a strong antipathy toward the immigrant types flooding the country during his lifetime, as shown in his first important book, Social Control (New York, Macmillan, 1901), p. 32-35, 439-440, and his Seventy Years of It: An Autobiography (New York, Century, 1936), p. 332-333. He cast what he called his "practical eye" over the hordes of Eastern Europeans then settling in American industrial towns, and found "from ten to twenty percent" to be "hirsute, low-browed, big-faced persons of obviously low mentality". They ought to be garbed in skins and living "in wattled huts at the close of the Great Ice Age". When looking at the gathering of the foreign-born, he discovered that "narrow and sloping foreheads were the rule", and short and small craniums were noticeable. "Among the women, beauty, aside from the fleeting, epidermal bloom of girlhood, was quite lacking. In every face there was something wrong - lips thick, mouth coarse, upper lip too long, cheeck-bones too high, chin poorly formed, the bridge of the nose hollowed, the base of the nose tilted, or else the whole face prognathous." He saw so many of "sofar-loag heads, moon-faces, slit mouths, lantern-jaws, and goose-ill noses" that he almost was ready to believe that some demon had "amused himself by casting human beings in a set of skew-molds discarded by his Creator". 27 Although Ross toned down somewhat in the early 1920's, due to America's pride in its power of acculturation, he still characterized the "new" immigrants as "beaten members of beaten breeds . . . that . . . lack the ancestral foundations of American character", and exalted America's capacity to transform them. He marveled at the "change a few years of our electrifying ozone works in the full, fat-witted im26

E. M. Burns, David Starr Jordan: Prophet of Freedom (Stanford University Press, 1953), Chapter IV, discusses Jordan's ideas. 27 E. A. Ross, The World in the New World (New York, Century Co., 1914), 285-6.

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migrants". 28 He demanded a restrictive immigration policy similar to that sponsored later by the Ku Klux Klan; he feared that the foreigners of the types he described would "lower the general plans of intelligence, selfrestraint, refinement, orderliness, and efficiency"; he criticized them for their intemperance and their sexual irregularities; he noted that in the mining towns the women went about their homes barefooted, and their clothing reeked with the odors of cooking and uncleanliness; he was shocked to discover that the miner bathed in the kitchen before the females and children of the household, and that women soon to become mothers appeared in public "unconcerned". 20

INTERNAL A N D INTERNATIONAL FACTORS AGAINST THE IMMIGRANT

Through a combination of circumstances, the international situation was also influencing the attitude toward the "new" immigrants. RussianAmerican relations were deteriorating at precisely the same time that Slavic and East European immigrants were inundating the Northeastern seaboard and the Midwest. The Russian threat appeared grave in the context of fears that these "inferior hordes" would destroy the American way of life. Czarist "absolutism", Russia's "insatiable ambition", and the Slavic menace to Anglo-Saxon supremacy made Russia "the natural foe of England and the United States". 30 Numerous observers anxiously awaited the "final grapple" that would determine whether "the future of civilization" lay with "the English-speaking people of the world or the Russian empire". 81 Internally, in the background of the growing resentment of the "new" 28

Ross, "The Value of Rank of the American People", Independent, LVII (1904), 1061-63; also, "The Causes of Race Superiority", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, XVIII (1901), 85-86. 29 Ross, The Old World in the New, 228. 30 B. O. Elower, "The Proposed Federation of the Anglo-Saxon Nations", Arena, XX (August, 1898), 232. 31 A. H. Ford, "The Warfare of Railroads in Asia", Century, LIX (March, 1900), 794; F. A. Ogg, "Saxon and Slav: The Lion and the Bear in the Far East", Chautauquan, XXXVII (March, 1903), 14-15; Charles A. Conant, "The United States as a World Power", The Forum, XXIX (luly, 1900), 816; Franklin Henry Giddings, Democracy and Empire (New York, Macmillan, 1900), 289. Note, however, that, after 1905, the Slavs ceased to be feared as the bane of civilization; .mbination of domestic grievances and foreign fears focused attention on the "ici;i:-.v Peril" as the new menace; for details, see: F. C. Jaher, Doubters and Dissenten iG'encoe, 111., Free Press, 1964), 8-85, 113, 195-196.

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immigrant had been the realization that, while the nation had been on the way to solving the industrialization problems, the country was also suddenly torn by economic and social conflicts. An easy explanation was found in the shifts in type of immigrants, urban growth, and the rise of labor conflicts due to radicalism, with the immigrant usually pinned as the main factor. "Critics reasoned that American had had labor violence, cities, and even radical movements before and had been able to handle them, but never before had there been immigration on such a scale." 32 And "the foreign-dominated leftist centers in New York and Chicago seemed to be main sources of trouble". "American institutions had failed, not because they were faulty, but because an alien element had undermined them. The typical citizen was a farmer, a God-fearing Protestant who spoke English without an accent, believed in free enterprise, and descended from an impeccable set of AngloSaxon (or at least German) forebears. These people had achieved greatness for the nation. Now they were threatened by a new group who were urban dwellers, spoke strange tongues, worshipped despised faiths, and frequently questioned the truths of capitalism. Obviously, since they were the newcomers, they must be responsible for recent disasters." 33

THE NATIVIST A N D RACIST TRADITION IN WORLD WAR I

Although little attention was paid to racism during World War I, because of the need to concentrate on winning the war, interestingly enough, the spokesmen of this ideology continued their agitation, although they lost ground, due to the war, because of their integration of the AngloSaxon traditions with Teutonic claims. The persistent currents of antiCatholicism were discouraged, and racial nativism was not too popular since the United States was aligned with Italy and Japan against Germany; hence, even the influential and popular racist, Madison Grant, revised his The Passing of the Great Race (1918) and did away with references to early American settlers as being Teutonic; he declared that most Germans were Alpines rather than Nordics; and Professor Henry Fairfield Osborn received a lot of publicity in the Hearst press by proclaiming that the modern Germans were actually descendants of Asiatic barbarians. 32 33

Ibid., 47. Higham, op. cit., 218.

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Joseph S. Roucek

THE ATTITUDE TOWARD IMMIGRANTS DURING WORLD WAR I

World War I, at the same time, raised several antagonistic undercurrents against "foreigners". Extreme dislocation of every kind, combined with unemployment before the war started, and a housing shortage, created arguments against immigrations. The uneasy feeling that war was coming produced voices asking for national unity, alarms at the widening rifts of class, of race, and national ideology, due to the pro-German propaganda war on behalf of the "homeland". Of interest to us is that the reputation of the American Czechs suddenly, although only temporarily, became very high during the concluding years of the war, thanks to the contributions made to the war by the anti-espionage work of Captain Voska, the publicity given to the Czech Legion in Siberia, and Masaryk's tour of America. 34 But it must be also noted that Masaryk's tour of the United States did not always meet with the enthusiasm of President Wilson, as usually reported. While the Fourteen Points were proclaimed on December 22, 1917, it was only on May 29, 1918, that the United States took the initial step toward dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy. Secretary of State Lansing, with Wilson's approval, took cognizance of the Congress of Oppressed Races of Austria-Hungary, held in Rome in April, and declared that the U.S. had followed with "great interest" the "nationalistic aspirations of the Czecho-Slovaks and Jugo-Slavs" and expressed his "earnest sympathy". But the Declaration of May 29 was, Mamatey notes, "a timid venture into psychological warfare". 35 It did not commit the U.S., but it awakened America's interest in the subjugated nationalities. Meanwhile, Dr. Masaryk was being sponsored by Charles R. Crane in administrative circles, while Representative Adolph J. Sabath, Bohemian-born Democrat from Illinois, tried to help Masaryk in Congressional circles, with Senator William H. King. But "at the time the American public was not uninterested in the fate of the Czechs and Slovaks but, with rare exceptions, completely unaware of their existence".3® 34

Details can be found in: Emanuel Victor Voska, and Will Irwin, Spy and Counterspy (New York, Doubleday, 1946), "The Albert's Portfolio", 94-114. For other anti-German and anti-Austrian-Hungarian propaganda carried on by the American Czechs, see: Charles Pergler, American in the Struggle for Czechoslovak Independence (Philadelphia, Dorrance, 1926); and Victor Mamatey, The United States and East Central Europe, 1914-1918, A Study in Wilsonian Diplomacy and Propaganda (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1957). 35 Mamatey, op. cit,, 263-4. 3 « Ibid., 130.

The American Czechs, Slovaks, and Slavs

831

The much publicized (and also, later, much debated) Pittsburgh Declaration of May 20, 1918, was designed to change Wilson's attitude; the purpose was accomplished, since Masaryk was received four days later by Lansing. But it was three weeks before Masaryk was invited to the White House. It was also helpful that the first official recognition of Masaryk as President of the Czechoslovak National Council coincided not only with the declaration of May 29, but also with the growing public interest in the dramatic progress into Siberia of some 50,000 Czechs, and America's decision to intervene there. (As the Secretary of State revealed later, the plans actually had been under way to find a pretext to intervene in Siberia.) 37

REACTIONS AFTER WORLD WAR I

In spite of the sudden public interest in the Czechoslovak people, during Wilson's administration, we must also note that this Czechoslovak issue was also nearly entirely forgotten in the trends which led to the discriminatory legislation against all "new" immigrants in 1924. There remained the fear of "hyphenated Americans", voiced vigorously during the war by the former President, Theodore Roosevelt, who denounced every kind of divided loyalty as "moral treason", and insisted that the one maxim for all Americans, regardless of birth or ancestry, was "the simple and loyal motto, AMERICA FOR AMERICANS!" 38 World War I also strengthened the pro-Anglo-Saxon ideologists who now conceived the "hyphenate" vote as a threat to Anglo-American racial ties and thus to the source of American liberty. While "new" immigrants, including the Magyars, publicly supported the war, they also had their left-wing spokesmen denouncing it as a capitalistic bloodbath. (The hatred against this group was turned especially against the I.W.W., the tiny anarchist group, and the weakening Socialist Party). The anti-alien feelings and the fear of radicalism were intensified by events in Europe. The Bolsheviks seized control of Russia in November 1917, and eventually raised boldly the banner of world revolution. There 37

Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York, Macmillan, 1948), vol. I, 299; George Kennan, The Decision to Intervene (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1958), 340-404. For President Wilson's reactions to Masaryk, see: Kennan, 360-362, 391. 38 The Works of Theodore Roosevelt (New York, Scribner's, 1926), vol. XVIII, 278-2799.

832

Joseph S. Roucek

were bombings in 1919; the most sensational took place on September 16, 1920, when a terrific blast in noonday-crowded Wall Street in New York caused the death of 38 persons, injured hundreds of others, and caused damage to the extent of $2 million, resulting in untold harm to the cause of liberalism, tolerance, and pro-alien sentiment. Other damage to American public opinion resulted from the formation of the United Communist Party, in which Central Europeans, including some Slavs, participated. 39 And to middle-class Americans, a Red was a Red; they were unaware that "the Bohemian (Czecho-Slovak) Federation withdrew in August 1921, 40 and that the Socialists had purged Communists from their own ranks or that Anarchists were anti-Bolshevik in their ideology". All radicals were branded as un-American because of their hostility to the war and because of the preponderance of them of recent immigrant groups. Another factor was that foreign-born workers and radicals "played a prominent part" in the social upheavals, strikes, and violence. 41 Then came the disillusionment of America with the Versailles Treaty and the rise of isolationism. So, after 1920, the question was no longer so much of the absolute loyalty of some Americans (until the post-World War II emergence of the influence of Communism among the foreignborn), 42 but also a growing doubt whether mass immigration could be assimilated as it had been, to a degree, in the previous century.

OBJECTIONS TO "NEW" IMMIGRATION

One of the basic premises underlying the immigration legislation of 1917-1924, and which also animated the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, was the premise that the national origin of an immigrant was a reliable 39

Nathan Glazer, The Social Basis of American Communism (New York, Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961), especially Chapter II, "Foreign-Born Workers and the Party in the Twenties", 38-39. 40 Ibid., 41. 41 James Oneal and G. A. Werner, American Communism: A Critical Analysis of its Origin, Development and Programs (New York, Rand Books, 1947), 43-45, 52-53; Jerome Davis, The Russian Immigrant (New York, Macmillan, 1922), 173; Theodore Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia (New York, Viking, 1960), 18, 190. 42 For details, see: Glazer, op. cit., Chapter II, and chapter IV, "Jews and Middle-Class Groups and the Party", 139-168; Joseph S. Roucek, and Arthur D. Wright, "Political Activities of Minority Groups", Chapter 16, 426-448, in Francis J. Brown and Joseph S. Roucek (eds.), One America (New York, Prentice-Hall, 1952).

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833

indication of his capacity for Americanization. It was claimed, and science seemed to show, that some people, because of their racial or national background, were more capable of becoming Americans than others. It was also propounded that the "old" immigrants, who had come to the U.S. before 1880, were drawn from the superior stock of North and West Europe, while those coming afterwards were drawn from the inferior hordes of Southern and Eastern Europe. The proponents of the restrictive legislation wished to eliminate the "new", while perpetuating the "old" immigration. Congressman Vestal, arguing in favor of the measures, put the idea neatly: the South and East European immigrants "have not been of the kind that are readily assimilated or absorbed by our American life". 43

ACADEMIC SUPPORT OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

Academic support for these arguments was given forceful expression by the distinguished anthropologist of the American Museum of Natural History in his enormously popular book, adjudged by Science a "work of solid merit"; in The Passing of the Great Race,u Madison Grant adopted the reasoning of Gobineau and proclaimed that the new immigrants were not "members of the Nordic race as were the earlier ones. . . . The new immigration contained a large and increasing number of the weak, the broken, and the mentally crippled of all races drawn from the lowest stratum of the Mediterranean basin and the Balkans, together with the hordes of the wretched, submerged populations of the Polish ghettos. Our jails, insane asylums, and almshouses are filled with this human flotsam and the whole tone of American life, social, moral, and political, has been lowered and vulgarized by them." These theories supported neatly the conclusions of the detailed study by the Immigration Commission under the chairmanship of Senator Dillingham; its recommendations influenced directly subsequent legislation, for they supported popular opinions which now appeared to be official and were based, presumably, on scientific proofs. (The Immigration Commission, appointed in 1907, presented its conclusions in 1910 in 42 volumes.) Widely quoted, the report figured prominently in the deliberations which produced the Johnson Act of 1921. Then there was 43

Quoted by: Oscar Handlin, Race and Nationality in American Life (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1957), 76. 44 Madison Grant, The Passing of the Great Race (New York, Scribner's, 1916).

834

Joseph S. Roucek

a report by Dr. Harry N. Laughlin of the Carnegie Institution, "the expert eugenics agent" of the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, printed in 1923, which laid the groundwork for the restrictive legislation in 1924; it was widely quoted in quasi-scientific articles and entered prominently into the debate; his most publicized report presented statistics on the inmates of American mental institutions, jails, and poorhouses, showing that the "new" immigration contained a disproportionate percentage of "inborn socially inadequate qualities". When looking over the Dillingham report,45 it is astonishing to see how unscientific it was, and yet how influential. Handlin, for instance, points out that "the commission followed the procedure of presenting the introduction and conclusion of each individual report, together with its own interpretative comments, which supplied the judgment on the inferiority of the new immigrants. Those comments sprang from its own a priori assumption, not from any evidence - whatever that was worth; sometimes, indeed, they ran altogether against such evidence".46 "All the racial identifications were confused by the evident desire of the Commission to demonstrate that the old immigration was different in racial type from the new." Thus, Jewish immigrants, "though in language and physical characteristics akin to the Germans, were reckoned among the Slavs or Eastern Europeans...." 47 The English and Irish came to the U.S. "imbued with sympathy for our ideals and our democratic institutions". The "Norse" made "ideal farmers and are often said to Americanize more rapidly than do the other peoples who have a new language to learn. . . ." As far as the Germans are concerned, "it is too well known in America to necessitate to further discussion". By contrast, the SerboCroations had "savage manners". Although "the Poles verge toward the 'northern' race of Europe", being lighter in color than the Russians, "they are more highstrung", and resemble, in this respect, "the Hungarians". Also of considerable influence on the legislation were the ideas of Professor Jeremiah W. Jenks of New York University, who collaborated on the work of the Commission, and popularized its conclusions in his widely-used textbook, Jeremiah W. Jenks and Lauck W. Jett, The 45

A summary can be found in: 61st Congress, 3d Session, Senate, Document No. 747, Reports of the Immigration Commission, Abstracts of Reports of the Immigration Commission, 2 vols., Presented by Mr. Dillingham (Washington, U.S., Government Printing Office, 1911). 46 Handlin, op. cit., 82. 47 Ibid., 85.

The American Czechs, Slovaks, and Slavs Immigration Problem: A Study of American Immigration and Needs (New York, Funk-Wagnall, 1913).

THE PERSISTENCE

OF RACISM

IN

THE

835 Conditions

WALTER-McCARRAN

BILL

It is now generally accepted that the national origins quota system has no basis in scientific knowledge. Why, therefore, it was retained in the Walter-McCarran bill? First of all, there is the very fact that the system had acquired independent legislation since 1924, that it had been part of the law of land, it has created its own tradition, "so that the burden of the proof now lies with those who advocate a different immigration policy." 48 And what is even more important is that, in spite of all the criticism carried on systematically against it, there must be enough popular support for it, since Congress passed the Walter-McCarran Immigration Bill, in spite of President Truman's veto (and his message) of June 25, 1952, by a vote of 278 to 113. Although the dominant school of American sociologists and cultural anthropologists reject any form of racism, the fact also remains that the pro-racist elements were heard rather prominently after World War I, and remain attractive, in diluted form, to many Americans, as seen in the bitter and violent opposition to the civil rights legislation and to the decision of the Supreme Court on behalf of Negro rights, although the antagonism against the "new" immigrants remains more on the books of current legislation rather than in the area of public deliberate discrimination.49 Of interest is the fact that racist thinking, centered in the eugenics movement, continued to agitate academic circles even after the 1920's. Such famed scholars as E. A. Ross, Henry Pratt Fairchild, and Earnest F. Hooton, and their followers, felt that the salvation of a world was imperiled by the multiplication of the unfit. It is true that the passing of restrictive immigration legislation brought on the slackening of nativist impulse after 1924 and a marked decrease in race-thinking. Thus Henry Pratt Fairchild's Melting Pot Mistake (1926) proved "as much an epitaph 48

Peterson, op. cit., 295; see also: Robert C. Alexander, "A Defense of the McCarran-Walker Act", 206-213, in Peterson and Matza, op. cit. 49 John Madge, The Origins of Scientific Sociology (Glencoe, 111., Free Press, 1962), Chapter 7, "The Study of Subcultures", 210-254; 8, "Race and Color", 255-286. We cannot deal here, unfortunately, with the discrimination against Catholics, Jews, Chinese, Hispanos, Japanese, Mexicans, and Puerto Ricans.

836

Joseph S. Roucek

to this school of thought as a qualified summation of it".r>0 Although it received, on the whole, some favorable reviews, when Madison Grant returned "to the fray a few years later with The Conquest of a Continent, he met a chorus of critical jeers. One reviewer expresses surprise that such books were still being written." 51 Yet, even as late as 1947, Fairchild maintained that racial thinking and feeling were obstinate social realities and could not be exorcised by denying their existence or by alleging their unscientific character, since most of the opposing dogmas were equally unproved (Race and Nationality As Factor in American Life, New York, Ronald Press, 1947).

WORLD WAR II A N D COMMUNISM

On the eve of World War II, American Slavs and nearly all other "new" immigrants were deeply divided over European events. "It was the dissension and antipathy within the Slavic-American community which attracted the attention of the Communist Party." 52 The first opportunity for Communists to fish in troubled waters came with the partition of Czechoslovakia and its final conquest by Nazi Germany following the appeasement at Munich in 1938. The Nazi absorption of the Sudetenland, the concomitant Polish and Hungarian demands for Czech territory, and the formation of the Nazi puppet régime of Slovakia under Tiso promoted the disunity among American Slavs, most of whom were anti-Communists and some of whom who could not comprehend the true nature of Communist grand strategy, convinced that the "great Slav brother" had pan-Slavic plans on their behalf.53 At any rate, American Czechs turned against American Poles, American Slovaks against the American Czechs, American Hungarians against the American Czechs, while American Carpatho-Ruthenians resented American Slovaks for Tiso's treacherous action. But the disillusionment with the Western powers, who had allowed Hitler to absorb Czechoslovakia, spurred many American Slavs to unite in a common front against the threats of Hitler toward their native lands. 50

Higham, op. cit., 327. Ibid., 327; the reference is to: Madison Grant, The Conquest of a Continent: Or the Expansion of Races in America (New York, Scribners', 1934). 52 Louis L. Gerson, The Hyphenate in Recent American Politics and Diplomacy (Lawrence, Kans., University of Kansas Press, 1964), 164. 53 Ibid. 51

The American Czechs, Slovaks, and Slavs

837

In the fall of 1938, several non-Catholic Slavic American organizations (the Slovak Evangelical Society of America, the United Russian Orthodox Brotherhood, the Serb National Federation) sponsored a protest meeting in Pittsburgh against Munich and the establishment of pro-Nazi Slovakia; this all-Slav Congress elected Ivan (John) Butkovich, President of the Croatian Fraternal Union, as Chairman. Hitler's invasion of Poland produced another All-Slav Congress in Pittsburgh, in which Poles also participated.54 But when the meetings began, news came about the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact and the Soviet invasion of Poland. This somersault in Nazi-Soviet relations produced shocks in the Slavic ranks. The Communists adopted a "new line", and the Slav leaders, denouncing Soviet participation in the fourth partition of Poland, were denounced as "warmongers", "agents of capitalism", or "tools of Wall Street", and the destruction of Poland was justified as leading to "the salvation of the Polish proletariat" and the end of the "rotten ruling clique of Josef Beck". The ending of the Nazi-Soviet honeymoon produced another dramatic reversal, and the new slogan was "The Yanks are Coming!" - and President Rosevelt became, suddenly, the "hero of the masses". The growing sympathy for Soviet Russia helped the American Slav Communists to dream up plans to bring unity among Americans of Slavic descent; within a month of the Nazi invasion of Russia, the first effort was to unite the fifteen million American Slavs.55 Eventually, after securing a sort of semi-official approval of the State Department, the American Slav Congress was held in Detroit on April 25-26, 1942, with Blair Gunther and Stephan Zeman, Jr., as President and Secretary of the Board of Directors, respectively. Interestingly enough the Second All-Slav Congress had been held in Moscow a month earlier; it founded its newspaper, Slavenie, distributed in the U.S. But voices were heard already in Detroit that the Congress was merely another in the large network of Communist-front organizations sponsored by the U.S.S.R.66 The second American Slav Congress was held in Pittsburgh on September 23, 1944; the third was held a year after the end of the war in New York City on September 22, with delegates also from Soviet 54

For the reaction of the Communist Party, see: Gerson, op. cit., 296. For a fully documented report, see: U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Un-American Activities, Report on the American Slav Congress and Associated Organizations, 81st Cong., 2d Session, 1959, Report 1951. 56 Bernard S. Morris, "Communist Front Organizations", World Politics, IX (October, 1956), 79. 55

838

Joseph S. Roucek

Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. The keynote speech, attacking the foreign policies of the U.S. for abandoning the foreign policies of President Roosevelt, was given by George Pirinsky, executive secretary. Messages from Stalin, Marshal Tito, and George Dimitrov were greeted with cheers from the crowd of some 15,000. References to Henry Wallace met with enthusiastic approval, while the name of Secretary of States James Byrnes, whom the Chairman, Louis Adamic, charged with being "hell-bent on getting Joseph Goebbels' dreams to come true", was booed. 57 Although, by 1948, almost all of the major Slavic-American organizations had deserted the Congress, the participation of the "new" immigrants from the Slavic ranks obviously produced no favorable image of their thinking. At the same time, the Communist agents renewed their drive to infiltrate nationality groups through their cultural and political organizations and also through the Communist and pro-Soviet foreign-language press - a process about which we hear little, but which is still going on.58

GAINS A N D LOSSES IN THE AMERICAN CONCEPTS OF CZECHOSLOVAKS

American Czechoslovaks born abroad, and their descendants in America, have a long way to go in order to achieve the prestige and status attained by Nordic and other "old" immigrants. In spite of the available record of their accomplishments,69 the fact remains that American Czechoslovaks are far behind in making any impression on American culture and life as known to the general public, or on Mc57

For details, see: Un-American Committee . . op. cit., 6-7. According to Yaroslav Chyz, Communist and Pro-Soviet Press and Organizations among the Ethnic Groups in the United States, Common Council for American Unity, 1950, there were 27 jublications in 22 foreign languages and one in English that followed the Communist line in 1950; their combined circulation was 147,549, while the circulation of the Communist Daily Worker, according to Ayer's 1950 Directory of Newspapers and Periodicals was 23,400; cited in Gerson, op. cit., 297. See also: Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, Communist Activities Among Aliens and National Groups, 2 vols. (Government Printing Office, 1950); Edward Hunter, In Many Voices: Our Fabulous Foreign-Language Press (Norman Park, Georgia, Norman College, 1960), Chapter X, "The Communist Press", 153-179. 59 For details, see: Francis J. Brown, and Joseph S. Roucek (eds.), One America (New York, Prentice-Hall, 1952), and previous editions. 58

The American Czechs, Slovaks, and Slavs

839

Carran's type of legislation. This can be measured, roughly, and from one point of view, by comparing the courses at American higher institutions of learning sponsored or "helped" by the American Czechoslovaks, to what has been done by the Nordics or by the numerous Jewish organizations.60 We can note, for instance, that even such an "inferior racial" group as the Negroes had organized the American Negro Academy by 1897, or that the Norwegian-American Historical Association (Northfield, Minn.) had published, by 1962, Vol. 21 of its Norwegian-American Studies, that the Polish Roman Catholic Union of America has been sponsoring the publication of numerous series of academic and specialized studies on the role of American Poles in American history, or that the Ukrainians have been able to bring out, under their sponsorship, a Ukrainian Concise Encyclopaedia.61 A negative factor is the persistence with prevailing opinion among the American public and academicians tends to ignore all more serious topics pertaining to the area between Germany and Soviet Russia 62 unless the political events there become of world-wide importance and to the inability of the American-Czechoslovak intellectuals to provide enough dynamic support for activities which would place the role of Czechoslovakia in proper perspective before the world.63 We must also note that numerous "filiopietistic" publications of many kinds have sometimes done more harm than any good in this cultural competition.64 60

We might refer here to the support granted to the Zionist cause as an example, the help given to Brandeis University, or to the various Jewish academies, or to Norwegian-American Studies, vol. XXII (Norwegian-American Historical Association, 1962). 61 For some titles, see: Brown and Roucek, op. cit., 719-720; Volodymyr Kuvyjovyc (ed.), Ukraine — A Concise Encyclopedia (University of Toronto Press, 1963). Note also that the Ukrainians, united in the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, provided all the specialized articles on the various aspects of Ukrainia's history for The Slavonic Encyclopaedia, edited by Joseph S. Roufiek (New York, Philosophical Library, 1949); and that they are sponsoring The Ukrainian Quarterly, 302 W. 13 St., New York, 14, Vol. XIX, in 1963, which is frequently noted in academic circles. 62 A perfect example of how the "new" Slavic immigrant is nearly entirely ignored in academic circles is provided by: David F. Bowers (ed.), Foreign Influences in America Life, Essays and Critical Bibliographies (New York, Peter Smith, 1952). 6,1 It is, for instance, surprising that Clarence A. Manning, A History of Slavic Studies in the United States, Marquette Slavic Studies, vol. Ill (Milwaukee, Wis., Marquette University Press, 1957), is unaware of the existence of the Slavonic Encyclopaedia. 64 See: Edward N. Saveth, American Historians and European Immigrants, 1875-1925 (New York, Columbia University Press, 1948), "Filiopietism", 202-223.

840

Joseph S. Roucek

A positive step toward remedying this situation has been taken only recently, with the foundation of the Czechoslovak Society of Arts and Sciences in 1958. A group of scholars, led by the University of Indiana mathematician, Dr. Vaclav Hlavaty, and Dr. Jaroslav Nemec, of the National Library of Medicine, began then to organize the vast number of Czech and Slovak intellectuals, living abroad. Incorporated under the statutes of the State of New York, the organization soon had some 700 members; it held its first annual meeting in 1962 in Washington, D.C., where some 60 papers were read, ranging from linguistics to sociology and sciences, and the proceedings appeared in The Czechoslovak

Contribution

to World

Culture

(The Hague, Mouton & Co.,

1964), edited by Dr. M. Rechcigl. The second annual meeting, held at Columbia University in New York, September 11-13, 1964, scheduled more 100 papers; a special feature was the exhibit of Czechoslovak fine arts, publications, and music by Czechoslovak creative men living in America and elsewhere.

THE BRIDGE TO BE CROSSED

There are, in the writer's opinion, three major obstacles to securing the proper historical "status role" in America's concept of American heritage, as far as the Czechoslovaks living in America or of Czechoslovak background are concerned. (1) With the exception of the recent refugees, the curtailment of immigration has accelerated, or made possible, the continuing successful process of acculturation. The "first" generation, coming here between 1880-1914, and after World War I, is gradually dying out, leaving some immigrant institutions behind, most of them "acculturated", many exhausted by the demands of both World Wars on their loyalties and resources, and rather cool to any academic efforts to elevate the cultural status of their American-born sons and daughters. Their descendants, now second- and third-generation Americans, speak English of the American brand; and since they have entered a wide range of occupations and professions, they are also not always interested in their cultural heritage. They might attend Czech and Slovak churches, but their religious allegiance often has little to do with their cultural consciousness, and even less with cultural traditions. One wonders whether the present efforts to support or inaugurate courses in Czech and Slovak languages and literature will meet the same fate as those started after World War I,

The American Czechs, Slovaks, and Slavs

841

not to mention the fact that so many American institutions are willing to start them if provided with "outside" funds, and ready to drop them when the enrollments start to lag. (2) Another major difficulty has plagued the Czechoslovak concept of heritage because of the political course of world events. Contrary to the continuing stress by the Slavic specialists that there is no such a concept as "Slavish", and that the Czech or Slovak is not also a "Slovene", or a "Yugoslovak", or a mongrel "Russian", in the American public mind one often meets with such misconceptions, not to speak of the fear of the many academic and business administrators, or even professors, of promoting the "cause" of Czech and Slovak studies on account of being suspected of being pro-Russian (which usually means "pro-Communist"). Much damage has been done, in this respect, by Soviet-sponsored activities under the guise of Pan-Slavism, and especially by the memories of the American Slav Congress which was evaluated as "a Moscow-inspired and directed federation of Communist-dominated organizations seeking by methods of propaganda and pressure to subvert the 10.000.000 people in their country of Slavic birth or descent". Officially, it tried, "by means of a nationalistic appeal . . . to enlist our Slavic population in behalf of Russia's ambitious designs for world empire and simultaneously to incite American Slavs against the land of their adoption; 6 5 its Index is certainly loaded with some respectable and well-known Americans and academic names, running from Louis Adamic to Jaroslav J. Zmrhal, or V. S. Platek. The related difficulty is that the field of Slavic (Slavonic) studies is relatively unknown or not fully understood among American general and academic circles. Although, during World War II, some American institutions experimented with so-called "area studies", which eventually were classified as "Oriental", "Near East", "Central Europe", "Russian", and "Far Eastern" studies,06 the fact also remains that the field of "Slavic studies" has not been particularly comprehended or favored, and often has been presented by semi-literate Slavic "specialists". Then there are obviously too many institutions in this field, for the present number of students. 05

Committee on Un-American Activities, U.S. House of Representatives, Report on The American Slav Congress and Associated Organizations, June 26, 1949 (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1949), 1. 68 K. H. Silbert, Area Studies and Subject Areas: A Comment on Specialists, Generalists, and a Disciplinarians in Foreign Area Studies (New York, American Universities Field Staff, 1963).

842

Joseph S. Roucek

No special enthusiasm has been shown by the richly endowed American foundations for providing support.67 (3) What is probably the most serious problem facing the leaders who have been trying to remake the image of the Americans of Czechoslovak (and thus also, inseparably, of Slavic) background is the split not only within the "Slavic" ranks, but even within the ranks of the Czech and Slovak intellectuals. What impression can the average American scholar gain from following the arguments propounded by Slovakia (published by the Slovak League of America, "a cultural and civic federation of Americans of Slovak descent", Middletown, Pa., Jednota Press), whose "chief purpose . . . is to promote a better understanding and appreciation of the Slovak nation and its long struggle for freedom and independence", and which "firmly (believes) that the Slovak nation, just as all nations, has an inherent and God-given right to freedom and independence". While this thesis might be of some worth to some Slovakian-born or a few American proponennts of Slovak "autonomy", it is obviously of little interest to the American-born Slovaks, especially since this generation is more interested in opposing the present Soviet domination of Czechoslovakia than in hearing constant complaints about the "sins" committed against Slovakia by the régimes of Dr. Thomas G. Masaryk and Dr. Edvard Benes. And this theme is carried into the American public forum by such official publications as the work by Joseph M. Kirschbaum, Slovakia: Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe (New York, Robert Speller & Sons, 1960), where we learn, for instance that "Masaryk and Benes had continued the legend of Libuse and Premysl, that the Czech people was a ruling nation and the other peoples of Czechoslovakia - the Slovaks, Germans, Magyars, Poles, Ukrainians and Russians - existed only to serve the need of the Czechs" (p. 104); or in Slovakia: A Political History 19181950, by Joseph A. Mikus (Milwaukee, Marquette University Press, 1963), wherein this former Professor of History and International Relations at St. John's University, at Jamaica, New York, claims that "Messrs. Masaryk and Benes found it quite natural, by means of gobetween strawmen of their choosing, to deprive the Slovak nation of 67

Joseph S. Roucek, "Misconceptions About Slavic Europe", 804-816, in Joseph S. Roucek (ed.), Slavonic Encyclopaedia. The author may also refer to the extreme lack of interest in trying to promote courses in Central-Eastern Europe by convincing the publishers, Prentice-Hall, New York, to put on the market a symposium, Central Eastern Europe: Crucible of World War, 1946, which, during two decades, had sold only 3,000 copies.

The American Czechs, Slovaks, and Slavs

843

the right which had been clearly guaranteed by international treaties" (p. 13) Maybe there is something of value of such arguments. But are these debates by a Professor of the University of Montreal and St. John's University of any value to the cause of the descendants of Czechoslovakia or of current events? And are they not bringing into the American arena debatable issues which can be not only incomprehensible but quite irritating to the average American, interested less in the minor aspects of "historicism" of Central Europeans than in the current struggle of the Free World against Soviet imperialism?

The Journalistic Endeavors of Czech and Slovak Exiles (1945-1964) VOJTËCH N. DUBEN

Czech and Slovak anti-Communist exiles in Western Europe, South and North America, Australia and Africa have published some 260 periodicals since 1945. 1 About a fifth of these are Slovak-language periodicals. Over sixty-five thousand exiles have left Czechoslovakia since 1945, including more than fifteen thousand Slovaks. Many Czech and Slovak exiles stayed in West Germany and England after the war; some, mostly Slovaks, came to Germany with the retreating German armies in 1945.2 A large Slovak group in Bavaria launched its first periodical, Slobodné Slovensko, as early as 1946. It is the oldest anti-Communist exile periodical still being published. As for the Czech-language periodicals, a number of mimeographed newspapers appeared in 1946 in West Germany: Novocesky mec, Novocesky kompas, Hlas svobody, Predvoj, Integral, Cesky injormacni list and others. 3 Most of these periodicals did not last for even a year, because in 1946 the American occupation authorities in Germany turned nearly all their publishers over to the Czechoslovak government on suspicion of collaborating with the Nazis. 1. REFUGEE CAMPS

The first wave of Czechoslovak refugees after the February, 1948 Communist coup d'état in Prague brought about considerable journalistic activity, even though economic conditions in Germany at that time were far from favorable. At first, news was spread by word of mouth in the refugee camps, which were all situated in the American zone of 1 V. N. Duben, Czech and Slovak Periodical Press Outside Czechoslovakia. Its History and Status as of January 1962 (Washington, D.C. - New York, N.Y., Czechoslovak Society of Arts and Sciences in America, Inc., 1962). 2 This review of the anti-Communist exile press starts with the year 1945, and not in February, 1948, when the Communist putsch took place in Czechoslovakia. 3 Funfzehn Jahre: Verhand der Freien Presse (Munich, 1962).

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Germany. In most of the camps, it was customary to call a meeting once a week at which a journalist usually informed those present of events in the world, in Czechoslovakia, and among other exiles. The camps were managed by local German authorities and supervised by American occupation forces. Regular mimeographed publications resembling a newspaper or news magazine appeared later. The first publication of this type was Denik, published in the Dieburg refugee camp by Emil Lesak from May 1, 1948. Mr. Lesak prepared several copies of his paper on a typewriter. The length of each issue was determined, not by the amount of news, but by the quantity of paper which the publisher-editor could lay his hands on. In the camp at Unterjettingen near Stuttgart, Vojtech Nevlud, the information officer of the camp committee, toward the end of June, 1948, started a weekly called Hlas tabora with a few typed copies. At the same time, Dalimil Vesely began to publish a periodical, Cechoslovak, in Nurnberg. Simultaneously, a self-appointed Czechoslovak National Committee was created in Wiesbaden, headed by Dr. Jaroslav Zivansky, which started publishing a Czech-German periodical, also entitled Cechoslovak. The occupation authorities put an end to the activity of this organization in June, 1948, and the Wiesbaden Cechoslovak disappeared after the second issue.4 The first periodical published by Czech exiles in Germany after February, 1948, for all camps was Svoboda, a Czech and Slovak weekly produced in Frankfurt am Main. The first issue, edited by Pavel Tigrid, appeared on September 19, 1948. On August 1, 1949, Alois Lysy, press secretary of the Czechoslovak Association of Political Refugees in Ludwigsburg, took over the weekly Svoboda, issuing it for about a year as the official organ of the Association. There were two important changes in the life of Czechoslovak refugees in Germany in the summer of 1948 which greatly influenced their journalistic activity: the German currency reform, through which the economic situation of the country miraculously improved, and the transfer of refugees to better-organized camps of the International Refugee Organization of the United Nations (PC IRO). Both these changes bettered the economic situation of the refugees almost overnight. And this also brought about more lively political, cultural, and social activity in the camps. Various mimeographed publications began to appear, from merely informative periodicals to publications of polit4

Cechoslovak, No. 9, July 6, 1948 (Nurnberg).

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ical, professional, and other more or less useless, or even imaginary associations. A good example of informative publications is Ceskoslovenske noviny, a weekly newspaper mimeographed during 1949 and 1950 in Ludwigsburg and Pforzheim, first edited by Vojtech Nevlud and Jan Tuma, and later by Otto Graf. This weekly was a remarkable example, especially when edited by Mr. Graf, of journalistic work done under extraordinarily difficult conditions. Ceskoslovenske noviny was an outstanding publication not only in content, but also in its technical aspects, notwithstanding the fact that it was mimeographed. Mr. Graf wrote about it in a personal letter: Perhaps you can imagine in what a primitive way we are producing it here. What w e lack in means, w e make up for by additional time. Thus, for instance, the illustration for the article about Europe was a linoleum-cut. Instead of a typesetting machine or printing press, we used a toothbrush and a spoon. The three-color picture was done with a lipstick, talcum powder, and shoemaker's wax. Where there is no money, there must be brains. Some people lend money, some people contract debts. It is enervating, but it is possible, and w e like to do it . . ,5

An exceptional periodical of that time was Doba, a political and cultural semi-monthly published by the Central Union of Czechoslovak Studentsin-Exile in Ludwigsburg, and edited by Frantisek Bregha, Jin Vlasak, and others. The magazine devoted considerable space to ingenious discussions about European federalism, to criticism of party politics in exile, and to other pertinent issues of the times. Among the pioneering periodicals of the period was Sokolske listy, the monthly organ of the European units of the Czechoslovak Sokolin-Exile, edited and mimeographed in Ludwigsburg. It was the first periodical produced by the Sokols in exile, and was followed by others, notably Ceskoslovensky Sokol v zahranici, a monthly launched in New York City in 1951. In Murnau, Bavaria, Jaromir Netik began to publish Tribuna in 1949. It was distinguished not only by excellent news reports from Czechoslovakia, but also by the novel, though often controversial, ideas of its editors. Beside Tribuna there appeared in 1949 Narodohospodar. Edited by Jiri Trutnovsky, it was the first periodical issued by Czech and Slovak exiles which stressed the importance of considering current issues of political economy. Both periodicals actually marked the beginning of the Czechoslovak Foreign Institute in Exile, which 5

FCI, lnformacni stuzba svobodneho 16, 1950) (Chicago, III).

Ceskoslovenska,

Vol. II, No. 20, (May

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continued for years to evoke critical attention for its remarkable informativeness and research activities, as well as its new ideas for the ideological struggle against Communism. To complete the list of the more important periodicals then published in Germany, either in the camps or for them, we must cite the Ludwigsburg Injormator, a Slovak weekly edited in 1948 and 1949 by Karol Belak and others for the Association of Democratic Slovaks, and the Munich Bohemia (1950-1959) which was, at first, the Munich agency of the Czech National Committee in London, under the leadership of General Lev Prchala. This printed monthly was the successor of the mimeographed Zprdvy Ceske rtdrodni skupiny v zapadnim Nemecku. Shortly before its demise, the Munich Bohemia became the organ of the Association of Czech Democratic Federalists, headed by Vladimir Pekelsky.6 Since 1959, it has appeared only as a yearly almanac. The first Slovak periodical Slobodne Slovensko, mentioned above, moved in 1948 from Munich to Ludwigsburg, where it remained for some years as the only spokesman of Slovak separatists in exile.7 At the end of the 1940's and the early 1950's, Italske listy was added to this group of refugee camp periodicals, published by a group of Czechoslovak refugees in the Italian IRO camps. (The first contingents of Czechoslovak refugees from Germany had arrived there in August 1948). Outstanding in the journalism of refugee camps in Germany and Italy at that time was Quo Vadis?, an international refugee paper edited in 1949 for nine months, under the auspices of the IRO, by a group of Czechoslovak refugees headed by Petr R. Gregor. A weekly, it was published in Rome in batches of 4,000 copies, with articles in English, Italian, and German. 2. OUTSIDE REFUGEE CAMPS

At the end of the 1950's, the center of political activity for Czech and Slovak refugees moved from Germany, first to Paris and then, by way of London, to the United States. In some cases, centralized political organizations of exiles were newly formed, such as the Slovak National Council Abroad, headed by Dr. Karol Sidor and Peter Pridavok and 6 VI. Pekelsky and Fr. Janik-Horak, "Prehled exilniho tisku", Sbornik Bohemia, No. 2, 1957 (Koln-Ehrenfeld, Germany). 7 VI. Pekelsky, "Slovensky exilni tisk", Sbornik Bohemia, No. 3, 1958 (KolnEhrenfeld, Germany).

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founded at Christmas, 1948, in Paris; in others, established organizations, like the Czech National Committee, headed by General Lev Prchala, stirred with new activity. In February, 1949, in Washington, D.C., the founding of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia was ceremoniously proclaimed; branches were later established in Paris and London. The mimeographed Londynské listy (1947-1950), published in London after the death of its founder, Josef Bélina, by Blazej Vilim, former Secretary General of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party, was the first periodical of the Czechoslovak anti-Communist movement on British soil. The first printed periodical of the Czechoslovak exiles, however, was Svobodny zitrek, a monthly published in Paris from October, 1948, till February, 1950, by Ludék Stránsky. It was the only political periodical of the Czechoslovak exiles to which representatives of practically all political groups in exile contributed. Mr. Stránsky not only edited and mailed the paper himself, but also printed it. In 1950, he moved to the United States, where he expected to continue its publication. In the midst of his preparations, however, he died, in October 1950. The first independent political review produced by Czechoslovak exiles was Skuiecnost, published from 1949 to 1953, first in Zurich, then in Paris and London, by "angry young men" in exile. With an outspoken editorial board (K. Belák, F. Bregha, L. Cerych, L. David, P. Demetz, H. J. Hájek, O. Kostrba-Skalicky, L. Matéjka, V. Peska and J. Zák), the review not only brought up the problem of effective leadership through its open criticism of prominent personalities among the exile's leaders; it was also the first exile periodical to discuss calmly the problems of Czech-German relations and the postwar transfer of Germans of Czechoslovakia. Never before had the German issue been discussed in the Czechoslovak exile press. In 1951, Hlas Ceskoslovenska, a monthly political review of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia was launched in Washington, D.C., under the editorship of Dr. Juraj Slávik and Dr. Matéj Josko. Its chief merit was the printing of important documents concerning foreign policy and other materials on the modern history of Czechoslovakia. The publication unfortunately ceased in 1955. Among other printed periodicals of that second period was Slovensky národ, a Slovak monthly published by Jozef Hanzel in Paris from 1949 to 1951. A Czech printed monthly Návrat was edited by Helena Kozeluhová in Paris in 1949; Národ, a Czech mimeographed sheet, was edited by Rudolf

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Kopecky in London for four years beginning in 1949; Rozpravy, a Czech political review with Christian Democratic inclinations was issued by Simeon Ghelfand in Brussels and Rome from 1950 to 1954; Cesky boj, organ of the Czech National Committee in London, edited by Karel Locher (1948-1951) was followed by the Committee's Ceské listy in 1952 and 1953. Another Czech monthly, also called Ceské listy, was launched by Milos Svoboda in Munich, Germany, in 1960 as a successor to its London namesake. By the end of 1948, the first periodicals of political parties in exile began to appear. The very first of them did not last long. On the other hand, Nàrodni stred — Cs. zivnostnik v exilu, organ of Czechoslovak artisans in exile, edited by Josef Kucera in Paris (1949-1952) and in Washington, D.C. (1952-1957), was of excellent journalistic quality. Ironically, the first printed issue of Mr. Kucera's magazine was also the last. An unusual durability characterizes Demokracie a socialismus, the political organ of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party in exile, published in London since 1950; the Christian Democratic Demokracie v exilu, edited by Jaroslav Kusy in Munich has appeared, with only a short interruption, since 1957; Cas, of the Slovak Democratic Party in exile, edited by Dr. Jozef Lettrich, was published in Washington, D.C. from 1952 to 1955; Listy pràtelùm was issued in England by Dr. Ladislav K. Feierabend for his friends in the Republican Party in exile from 1948 to 1950; Nové obzory, of the Czechoslovak People's Party, was published in New York in 1953; the Social Democratic Hlas exilu appeared in Brussels and Toronto in 1950 and 1951; Nàs smér, of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party, edited by Dr. Vratislav Busek, was published in New York from 1952 to 1955; Novina, one of a number of Czech agrarian reviews, was published in Paris in 1949 and 1950. The exceptionally well written and edited NaSe cesta was published by young Social Democrats in Paris and Vienna, 1951-1957. Notable influence during this first period was exerted by Cas Cechoslovàkù ve svété, published by Franta Klàtil, at first in London (19491953), then in Chicago (1953-1955), and finally in New York City (1958-1961). During the 1955-1957 period, Mr. Klàtil edited Ceskoslovenské noviny, the organ of the Steering Committee of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia, in New York. During the 1950's, thanks to the efforts of post-February refugees, Czech and Slovak periodicals appeared for the first time in New Zealand and Australia. An extraordinary publication among these was - and is - the pioneering Hlas domova, published twice a month in

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Melbourne, without interruption since January 15, 1950, and in printed form since August, 1950. Edited by Frantisek Vana, it is still one of the best Czechoslovak newspapers abroad. Among other publications in that part of the world, Pacific was published in Wellington, New Zealand, in 1951 and 1952, and in Sydney, Australia, from 1952 to 1960; Slovensky stit started in 1951, is still published in Sydney. There are also other periodicals, mostly club organs. An example of a good exile newspaper with a large circulation that was published regularly for a long period is Ceske slovo, a printed monthly produced since 1955 in Munich by editors of the former Melantrich newspaper syndicate in Prague. It is still very much alive in 1964. Hlas exilu, published by the Association of Czechoslovak Refugees in Munich from 1954 to 1957, belonged to the same category of exile journalism. 3. INFORMATION AGENCIES

The journalistic activity of Czech and Slovak exiles did not stop with newspapers, newsmagazines, and reviews. Gradually, they also established information agencies, or contributed to the establishment and operation of agencies that did not belong directly to them. The oldest of such information agencies (except for the broadcasts to listeners in Czechoslovakia from various Western countries, such as the Voice of America and programs by the BBC, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, and networks in Paris, Rome, The Vatican, Madrid, and the Czechoslovak Service of the West German "Deutsche Welle" in Cologne) is the FCI, Information Service of Free Czechoslovakia, edited and published by Josef Josten in London. It was launched in April, 1948, to supply the English press with information about Czechoslovakia and the activity of its exiles. The first anniversary in February, 1949, of the Communist putsch in Czechoslovakia was marked by the appearance of the first regular FCI English bulletin. Thanks to the efforts of a group of Czech and Slovak journalists in West German refugee camps and some co-workers in Chicago, the FCI also started an information service in the Czech and Slovak languages; and in 1951, the London FCI agency launched Cechoslovdk, a Czech and Slovak weekly published to date without interruption. Because it is privately owned, the FCI lacks a broad organizational and financial foundation, which thus limits its effectiveness considerably. Nevertheless, in its first

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fifteen years of existence, it achieved many successes, acknowledged even by the world press. In 1949, it supplied the British press with the news of the first Soviet nuclear explosion thirty hours before the dramatic announcement, in Washington, by President Harry S. Truman. 8 The London FCI agency received the news about the Soviet atomic explosion from its sister organization, the Information Service of Free Czechoslovak Journalists (JFCI), in Ludwigsburg, Germany. It was there, in April, 1949, that the Association of Free Czechoslovak Journalists in Exile was founded; branches were later established in Nürnberg, Murnau, and other West German cities. Originally the Association was meant to be an affiliate of the Union of Czechoslovak Journalists in Exile, organized at that time in Paris as a federation of all exile journalists from Czechoslovakia. After a short time, however, the Paris Union was dissolved. Another attempt to form an all-embracing organization of Czechoslovak journalists in exile was made in 1950 in New York City, again, however, without success.9 The Information Service of Free Czechoslovak Journalists in West Germany lasted only two years. In addition to its cooperation with the London FCI center, it published periodicals for refugee camps, tried to publish a German information service, etc. It ended, finally, in 1951, when the center of Czechoslovak exiles in Germany was transferred from Ludwigsburg - first to Nürnberg and finally to Munich, where, in May, 1951, Radio Free Europe (RFE) started broadcasting to Czechoslovakia. The RFE broadcasts to East Europe under the auspices of the Free Europe Committee, Inc., based in New York City, which also operates its own press and information service in many languages including Czech and Slovak. First, it published Zpräva o Ceskoslovensku (19501953) and Ceskoslovensky prehled (1954-1958). Since 1954, it has published a Czech and Slovak review of news and events in Czechoslovakia, called Ceskoslovensky zpravodaj. Various information bulletins were also published by other exile or8

See: Sunday Times, Sept. 25, 1949 (London); Evening Standard, Sept. 24, 1949 (London); Sunday Empire News, Sept. 25, 1949 (London). Local Czech and Slovak press clubs founded during World War II still exist in London. Some exiled Slovak newspapermen became members of the Association of Slovak Journalists in the United States, founded before World War II. A Czechoslovak press club was founded by exiles in Toronto, Ontario, in the 1950's, but it did not exist for long. Individual Slovak and Czech journalists in exile are members of the "Verband der Freien Presse", an international organization of exiled publishers and editors in Munich, founded in 1947. 9

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ganizations, for instance, by the American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees in New York City and in West Germany, as well as by enterprising individuals. All refugee political organizations, the Council of Free Czechoslovakia, the Slovak National Council Abroad, the Slovak Liberation Committee, and others, published regular information bulletins in Czech, Slovak, English, German, and other languages, during their first years. A well-organized information service was run in the 1950's by the Research and Publishing Institute of the St. Cyril and Methodius League, an association of Czech Catholic intellectuals in exile. The institute was founded in 1950, at Prien-Chiemsee in Bavaria, as the "Krest'anskä akademie". It soon transferred its activities to Rome, where its first chairman, Stanislav Koutnik, built it into not only a model research organization, but also a successful information center. From 1950 to 1953, the "Krest'anskä akademie" published Veritas, an information bulletin in Italian, German, English, Spanish, French and Swedish. A Czech edition of Veritas was launched in 1952 in Mariazell, Austria. The "Krest'anskä akademie" also published other periodicals. Its current organ is Novy zivot, a Czech monthly printed first in London, and later in Rome, for almost sixteen years. A similar Slovak monthly Hlasy z Rima, has been published in Rome by the Catholic Action of Slovaks since 1952.

4. NEW TRENDS AFTER 1956

With the approach of 1957, a turning point was reached by political exiles; under influence of events in Poland and Hungary in 1956, they began to realize that they must build their economic, as well as their political, existence on firmer foundations. This new political philosophy gradually changed the journalistic attitudes and emphasis of Czech and Slovak exiles. Their newspapers started to pay more attention to those Czechs and Slovaks who had left Czechoslovakia even before World War II, often because of economic conditions. If new periodicals were founded, they were no longer purely "exile" in character. For instance, Nase hlasy, a weekly newspaper published since 1955 in Toronto, and Americke listy, appearing weekly in Czech and Slovak in New York City since 1962, were founded by exiles, but their readers are members of both groups of Czech and Slovak immigrants. A typical exile periodical is not a newspaper, but a political, cultural, or politico-cultural review. Its prototype as a matter of fact, was Doba,

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published by Czech students from 1948 to 1951 in Ludwigsburg. The first such Slovak periodical was Hlas, founded in Ludwigsburg in October, 1948, as "the result of a distinct feeling by Slovak democratic exiles of their moral responsibilty to defend the ideals, the work, and the achievements of Masaryk, Stefanik, and Benes which led to the creation of the Czechoslovak Republic. . . . " 10 The magazine, published by the Association of Slovak Democratic Exiles in Ludwigsburg, and edited by Karol Belak and Jan 2ak, unfortunately lived for only a short time. The previously mentioned Skutecnost (1949-1953) and Rozpravy, published by Simeon Ghelfand in Rome and Brussels, 1950-1954, followed. Still other cultural-political reviews were born in the second half of the 1950's. True, several attempts were made earlier to publish purely cultural periodicals. Dr. Frantisek Kovarna, for example, began Stopa, a cultural review, in Paris in 1950, but it was short-lived. More durable is Most, a Slovak quarterly on cultural affairs and scientific research, launched in 1954 in Cleveland, Ohio. However, Sklizeh, a pioneering Czech cultural monthly edited in Hamburg by Antonin Vlach since 1953, has had to overcome many difficulties, but it still lives. A Czech literary review called Bod was published in Oslo, Norway, during 1949 and 1950. A remarkable literary magazine, Archa, edited by dr. Antonin Kratochvil, has been published in Munich since 1958. A new kind of politico-cultural review was started in 1956 with Svedectvi, a quarterly edited by Pavel Tigrid in Paris. While Svedectvi presented a concept of gradualism which, in the gamut of political trends, is classified as "left of center", Modra revue, a cultural-political monthly published by Dr. Jan Beran in Rotterdam since 1956, might be placed to the right of that same center. In 1958, the Universum Press in New York City, headed by Frantisek Svehla, launched Zapisnik, a monthly edited by Jan Dresler. This periodical offered excellent analyses of then-current cultural and political problems until the fall of 1962. In 1961, the Universum Press started a new cultural and political quarterly called Perspektivy. It was first edited by Dr. Ladislav Radimsky, who resigned in 1963, and in January, 1964 took over the editorship of similar periodical, Promeny, published in New York by the Czechoslovak Society of Arts and Sciences in America (SVU). Most of the periodicals mentioned above were Czechoslovak magazines, printed in both Czech and Slovak. As far as purely Slovak cul10

Informator,

N o v . 13, 1948 (Ludwigsburg).

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tural and political reviews are concerned, in addition to Hlas and Most, there was an attempt in 1956, in New York City, to introduce an independent political review with a broad political base. It was Rozhl'ady, and it was published by the Slovak Study Center in New York until 1958. Its contents included remarkable studies of Czech-Slovak relations. Almost all other purely Slovak publications of this second era still belong to the category of newspapers, even though their editors try to give more space to political analyses than to straight news. Besides the oldest, Slobodne Slovensko, published by the Slovak National Council Abroad, and Sloväk v slobodnom svete, published by Dr. Ferdinand Durcansky and his exile organization in Munich since 1954, there appeared in 1962 Cernakov odkaz, published and edited by Kristof Greiner in Cologne and, in 1964, Slovenskä tribi'ma, published in Munich by Dr. Stephen G. Lukäts. 5. SATIRICAL MAGAZINES

Among satirical periodicals, the most durable so far is Bid, published and edited monthly by Alois Cizek in Paris since 1959. Among others that no longer appear, the most significant were the Czech Plzehsky prazdroj, published in Sydney, 1953-1954, and the Slovak Blcha, published in Ludwigsburg during the late 1940's. Most recently the Czech Ejchuchu has been appearing in Munich and the Munich Ceske slovo from time to time publishes a satirical supplement, Kvitko. The antiCommunist exiles apparently have little time for humor. 6. ON ALL CONTINENTS

The exiles' periodicals appeared on all continents, including Asia, or, more properly Asia Minor, if we may count the lzraelské listy, published in Czech in Israel for about five years, beginning in 1948. In Australia and New Zealand, the exiles introduced the first Czech and Slovak periodicals. In Pretoria, South Africa, a mimeographed organ of the Association of Czechoslovak Commercial Engineers warned its readers in May, 1955, that "the international situation will deteriorate around 1965", and advised - fellow commercial engineers in exile "not to participate in undignified politics and rather to take part in economic enterprises. . . . " 11 In South America, prewar immigrants 11

Obèznik Spolku cs.inzenyrù, No. 4, May, 1955 (Pretoria, So. Africa).

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from Czechoslovakia had only one periodical after World War II, the Czechoslovak Nova doba, published in Buenos Aires. This periodical was stopped in 1961. The anti-Communist exiles brought out new Czech periodicals chiefly in Brazil and Venezuela. The Slovak exile press was more productive, especially in Argentina. In 1964, there is one Czech periodical in Sao Paulo, Brazil, two or three Slovak periodicals are still printed in Argentina, and one Slovak sheet appears irregularly in Venezuela. Two-thirds of all free Czech and Slovak periodicals are published in the United States and Canada. In 1964, American Czechs, for instance, have 50 periodicals, and American Slovaks, 37 newspapers, magazines, and club organs. Several new exile periodicals appeared in North America after 1948. Zpravodaj, a Czech conservative monthly published by the Alliance of Czechoslovak Exiles in Chicago launched in 1956, Evropska federace, a Czech conservative quarterly started in February 1963 in Toronto, and Cin, an independent Czechoslovak monthly launched in February, 1964, in New York City, are the latest. 12 Europe remains, in the 1960's, the stronghold of the Czech, Slovak, and Czechoslovak exile press. In first place is the German Federal Republic, followed by England, France, Italy, and Austria. At least one Czech or Slovak periodical has also been published in Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, and Spain.

7. THE EXILE PRESS A N D THE REGIME IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The exile press is, for the most part, democratic. Essentially, it is the last remnant of the former free Czechoslovak press, and thus speaks not only for Czechs and Slovaks abroad, but also for the democratic people in Czechoslovakia. It fulfills this extraordinary mission by its mere existence. In general, it is successful. Proof of its effectiveness is the very number of periodicals, as well as their political variety and, finally, the recognition often accorded the exile press, sometimes unknown even to its publishers. Such recognition comes first from the present Czechoslovak regime in the form of both direct and indirect

12 Czech and Slovak Periodicals Outside Czechoslovakia as of September 1964, comp, by Vojtech N. Düben. The Second Congress of the Czechoslovak Society of Arts and Sciences in America, Inc. (New York City, 1964).

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attacks. 13 The present regime in Czechoslovakia would certainly prefer to remain silent if it were sure that the exiles' journalism lacks any influence, that their periodicals "are altogether uninteresting and obviously not important", 14 and that, therefore, it is best to ignore them. The cultural and political ferment which developed in Czechoslovakia in 1963 also brought a certain change in the attacks of the domestic Czechoslovak press on exile periodicals. 15 The more recent remarks about the exile publications which can be found in Prague and Bratislava papers are of a more polemical nature. In several cases, the Prague and Bratislava press indirectly, or even directly, acknowledges that there are some periodicals abroad with high-level contents and a highly professional graphic set-up. The exile press carefully follows new developments in Czecho13 The Czechoslovak Communist régime was, after February, 1948, well aware of the importance, in terms of propaganda, of political exiles, and their direct and indirect influence on public opinion in Czechoslovakia. From the very beginning, the régime tried to introduce confusion among exiles and instigate dissension. It used various tactics in which the press usually played an important part. (See the Czech monthly, Za svobodu, Rotterdam, Holland, Oct. 12, 1949.) In February, 1955, Czech Communist black propaganda introduced into West Germany a mimeographed magazine, HEPND, the so-called organ of a socalled "Movement for the Return Home of Refugees". The publication was mailed to refugees secretly from Paris, Berlin, and Vienna. In June, 1955, it ceased to exist, and its task was assumed by an openly published periodical called Hlas domova, issued in Prague by a new official Committee for the Return of Exiles to Czechoslovakia. The overt campaign to lure exiles home was dissolved at the end of 1956, and Hlas domova, never effective, did not outlive it. Another example of black propaganda directed at the exiles from Prague were falsified issues of various leading exile periodicals. The first of these was Nase cesta, a Czech socialist magazine published from 1951 to 1957 in Paris and Vienna. In 1955, all subscribers and other exiles received a counterfeit issue of its number 6 which carried all the signs of Communist propaganda. The second was Ceské slovo, an independent monthly published in Munich. In June, 1958, a counterfeit edition of about 10,000 copies was distributed in Western Europe, announcing that "the periodical will cease to exist". In this case, also, the style of the articles and their arguments were clearly the work of the Prague Agitprop. The falsification of a circular of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia, dated Sept. 5, 1954, also belongs here. The falsified circular asserted that the exile movement was strongly infiltrated by Communists and that the London weekly, Cechoslovâk, was "helping the Communist cause". On the other hand, still unexplained is the case of MatüS Cernâk, the Munich publisher of the Slovak monthly, Slobodné Slovensko, who was killed in July, 1955 by a time bomb explosion. 14 J. Sotola, "Nechod', kam të nezvou", Kulturni tvorba, No. 15, April 11, 1963 (Prague). 15 See: Vojtëch N. Düben, Ledy se hnuty. Ceskoslovensky kulturni a politick}' kvas 1963 (New York, Universum Press Co., 1964).

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Slovakia, but it has refrained, so far, from direct intervention in the dialogues between the Communist dogmatists and liberals. It did not try to remind the dogmatists systematically of their criminal past and on the other hand to explain to supporters of the more liberal trend in Communism that their repeatedly proclaimed "socialist humanity", "human dignity" and " socialist legality" very often are only hobbling along in theory as well as in practice. Svedectvi made an attempt at it, but only up to a certain point.

8. CONCLUSIONS

Early in 1955, an English-language periodical called the Exiled Europe Review was launched in New York City by the "Danubian Research Service". Its second number contained an informative article on various exile groups, including the anti-Communist exiles from Czechoslovakia. The author of the article writes: The Czechs (Czechoslovaks) themselves are the most influential of all European exiles. They are masters of propaganda, towering, in this respect, over all other exiled groups. They follow the almost professional paths of Benes and Masaryk, who, during and after World War I, created a formidable propaganda machinery which has been well oiled with vast financial funds ever since. "Compared with the other groups, the Czechoslovaks are veritable plutocrats - czars in the international world - possessing a formidable network of personal connections with the world press and other news media which enables them to mobilize sympathetic public opinion to an astonishing degree. . . . The Slovaks (rather isolated group . . . promoting the idea of an independent Slovakia) are skilled propagandists and the most talented among the smaller Slavic peoples. However, they were unable sofar to shake decisively the privileged position of the Czechoslovaks. . . , 16

It is true that both the first and the second Czechoslovak independence movements abroad excelled in well-organized propaganda. Their success was prompted, however, not by "vast financial funds", but, first of all, by the just cause which this propaganda machine sustained; at least, the managers of this propaganda machine firmly believed their cause to be just. Secondly, the nearly universal moral, political, and material support of the numerous groups of Czechs and Slovaks living abroad helped substantially. Thirdly, T. G. Masaryk, Edward Benes, and Milan 18

Exiled Europe Review, Vol. I, No. 2, April 1955 (New York).

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R. Stefanik were experienced journalists and diplomats. Neither Masaryk nor Benes ever underestimated the power of publicity, which they always placed first. They made it a point to study very carefully the public opinion and information media of countries in which they lived in exile. And fourthly, Masaryk and Benes were assisted by a number of experienced journalists or, at least, by officials versed in information methods and speaking various foreign languages. This tradition of the first and second Czechoslovak independence movements abroad was carried over into the anti-Communist struggle, but only up to a certain point. Prominent Czech and Slovak exiles have, since their arrival abroad, paid attention to the world press. Moreover, after a certain time the names of a number of Czech and Slovak journalists began to appear in by-lines in U.S., British, French, German, Italian, and other newspapers and political reviews, and there were many regular contributions from Czech and Slovak scientists in exile to various Western scientific periodicals. Unfortunately, the praise of the Exiled Europe Review for the propaganda activity of Czech and Slovak exiles does not apply generally to their publications. The exiles are dispersed in many countries, separated by oceans. There are insurmountable technical and financial difficulties. That is why the typical periodical is a simple mimeographed leaflet, typed on stencils, duplicated, stapled, and mailed at night after a day's work. "These leaflets, produced by hand, grow like mushrooms after rain", said one of the early Czech periodicals in 1949.17 The overproduction of newspapers is one of the most curious phenomena of the movement. "During World War II", according to Franta Klatil, the publisher and editor of Cas, "writing of poems was the illness of the Czechoslovak movement against Nazis; many airmen and soldiers were possessed by it. The Czechoslovak anti-Communist refugees are possessed by newspaper production. Everybody who has hands feels equal to publishing newspapers. No wonder our periodicals are in such a condition." 18 Thus he wrote in 1949 and at that time he probably did not foresee that this crisis would be repeated, with various modifications, in the mid-sixties. Another shortcoming of most exile newspapers is their editorial tendency to indulge in endless polemics concerning the recent past. Many editors are not able to write an objective analysis of current events, to 17 18

Za svobodu, Sept. 21, 1949 (Holland). Cas Cechoslovaku v Anglii, Dec., 1949 (London).

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concentrate on information, explanation, and education. Their product is usually obvious propaganda, either naked anti-Communism or their own narrow political beliefs. The average periodical abounds in poor language, banal phraseology, and clichés. The deluge of exile periodicals has, however, its many positive aspects. During the past sixteen or eighteen years, anti-Communist exiles have published various periodicals, both good and bad. 19 As long as the publishers were professional journalists, or people who were well aware of the real significance and mission of newspapers, the exile press could be favorably compared with newspapers and other periodicals published under normal conditions. Another positive aspect of the exile press is its variety, not only of subject matter, but also of political tenets.20 Neither the first nor the second Czechoslovak resistance movement abroad published such a wide political range of periodicals. An antiCommunist exile of any political color has always had an opportunity to express his opinion, even the most unorthodox. No less important is the fact that the exile press continues the tradition of the free Czech and Slovak press, and that in the future it will be a valuable, in many cases probably the only, source for historians who may explore the history of modern Czechoslovakia.

19

V. N. Duben, "Cesky a slovensky zahraniíní tisk. Nékolik kritickych poznámek", Perspektivy, No. 6, July 1963 (New York). 20 Fr. Janík-Horák, "Prehled naseho exilu", Sborntk Bohemia, No. 1, 1956 (Koln-Ehrenfeld).

Czech Poets in Exile*

PETR DEN

A great deal has already been written about the lot of the poet in exile. What new, therefore, remains to be said concerning Czech exile poetry? How can its verses be justly scorned or praised in a few lines, and how may people who repudiate them be persuaded to read them? Baudelaire wrote a poem called "Albatros". In three quatrains he depicts how sailors amuse themselves on long, tedious voyages: they catch an albatross, force it, with its long wings, to hobble about the deck, and then deride it for being comical and ugly. The last of the quatrains reads thus: Le Poète est semblable au prince des nuées Qui hante la tempête et se rit de l'archer; Exilé sur le sol au milieu des huées, Ses ailes de géant l'empêchent de marcher.

This is, briefly, the whole problem of the poet in exile. It confronts him in an entirely different way, for to him the two contrasting ideas, home and exile, mean something completely different than to ordinary mortals. A poet, then, really resembles a prince of the clouds who haunts the tempest and laughs at the archer, who is at home in the clouds of dreams and fantasies, and who is in exile on the deck of the bored sailors. The exiled Czech poet is at home as he unravels his bitter verses and clearly hears the "rusty creaking of the swaying wagons, in harvest, like the squeaks of the masts of ships", and would immediately be in exile if, with unfamiliar words, he tried to please the sailors who have captured him, or those of his compatriots who favour sentimentality. The Czech poet Nezval was as great at home, while dressed in his "glass cloak", as he was comical on the deck of a Communist ship, when, as a captured ministerial official, he versified in this manner: *

Translated from Czech by Dr. George J. Skvor.

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— pak nase v slunci narozene deti budou Vam zehnat, Staline, a vsem nam trochu zavideti, ze sme!i jsme Vas zblizka znat. . . .

All this implies that the situation of Czech poets who were chased out of their homeland by Communism is the same as that of the poets at home: they are all equally responsible and belong to the nation just as if they were living in Prague or in a Czech village, because they have gigantic wings which surmount both distance and time. Only these poets give rhythm to the great deeds of the future, a condition Arthur Rimbaud imposed upon them. It is one of the greatest shames of Communism that it stoned the prophets - for poets are prophets - and imprisoned or banished many singers whose hearts are purest, and devoid of hate. The severest punishment is for God to deprive us of songs - that is why gloom prevails in Czechoslovakia today. Now that I have tried to pull down the walls between poetry written in Czechoslovakia and that composed abroad, one is justified in asking me why I am discussing especially Czech poetry written in exile. The answer is, simply, that the poetry written at home is sufficiently talked about. It is talked about more and more, and with reason, for the Czech poetry at home is becoming very good; it is beginning to soar above the low, soap-scrubbed deck of triteness. Some of the Czech poetry written abroad is Popelka (Cinderella), who picks peas - according to Joseph Hora - it is Popelka, who thinks of the land where "dream is amazed at his sister reality" and pain is merely the "good of deeper love". Czech exile poetry is like Popelka because no one reads it, since the majority of the poems written in exile never saw or will see the printer's shop, and no one qualified person criticizes it, because to do so brings no profit. Manuscripts - of which I have many at home - lie in drawers in cities on all five continents of the world, awaiting publication, awaiting readers, when, polished and ready, they will be taken to that festive ball which constituted Czech poetry from the times of Macha and will do so again, soon. Czech exile is rich in poets. Many exiles write poetry: men and women, young and old, the profound and the shallow. It is no wonder that most of the poems are poor. Nevertheless, they act as a sort of fertile soil in which other plants may spring up, a sort of atmosphere favourable to their blossoming. The book Neviditelny domov (Invisible Homeland) included the verses of fourteen poets from 1948 to 1953. Another

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anthology, published in 1956, called Cas staveni, (The Time of Building Up), contains verses of fifteen other poets. Since that time, many new poets have emerged. Some who are dead — Kovarna, Nemecek, Popera, etc. - are being succeeded by younger poets. I receive examples of their work from South America, Australia, and other parts of the world. Only a few poets have succeeded in publishing their verses in book-form. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to say the last word on Czech exile poetry, or to say more about it than that it represents the plurality of our exile culture - that is, its freedom. We can illustrate this plurality better by a short browse through the works of our best-known exile poets. Disregarding criticism, we will introduce these poets to the reading public. The programme, then, will not include evaluation of the works. My remarks will deal with the poetry of individual authors whose work I have read. No claims are being made as to the completeness and no biographical data are included. Sometimes they are known only under their pen names. Yevtushenko wrote truly that the biography of poets is in their poems. In my introduction to a selection of Pavel Javor's poetry, I have named him the official poet of the exile. It is his merit that, by his poetical munificence, he destroyed many a banality which would otherwise have deluged our exile and local ethnical press. Javor eventually overcame the exile sentimentality of his precursors, Sladek and Hrubin, and found his own diction in which "you feel something calling you home, that familiar clover fragrance, sage and reseda and scented mint, that running beetle crossing the path in haste". The melody of his verses makes Pavel Javor the musician of our poetic exile.1 Jaromir Mest'an 2 is also one of those whose thoughts are constantly turning homeward with anguish which is creative. His simple poetical language is most effective when he succeeds in being aggressive like Viktor Dyk, and when, with succinct verses, often imbued with assonance, he pours out whatever burdens his heart. These lines, for instance -

1

Pavel Javor, Pozdrav domù (New York, 1951); Chudd sklizen (Paris, Edice Rencontres, 1953); Daleky hlas (Toronto, Novy domov, 1953); Nad plamenem piseii (Lund, Sklizen svobodné tvorby, 1955); Horkc verse (Toronto, Edice Na§e hlasy, 1958); Kour z Ithaky (New York, Universum Press, 1960); single poems published in Novy zivot, Sklizeh, Perspektivy, Promeny, etc. 2 Deceased Munich, July 22, 1965.

Czech Poets in Exile

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Jablka jsou rozkrojena Touha, ktera jmeno nema Ruze, jez se meni v morskou penu Divci prsty na hrebenu Zlata rybka v rybarove siti Mesic jenz se v hnedem baru zriti Huci noc z niz tece feka Smutek pada na cloveka . . .

which are excerpted from Mest'an's "Nafikani na smrt malire Cerneho" (Lamentation Upon the Death of Painter Cerny) exemplify such spontaneous eruptions of pain. 3 Milada Souckova is Proust-like, looking for her lost years, which, through poetic skill, she often finds. Her poems are more than a chain of remembrances of the southern Czech countryside; they are evocations of astonishing intensity. Souckova is a crusader against time: she can write of ancient things in a very modern novel form. Her verses tremble with impressionism akin to that of Monet and Debussy. In the city square in Bechyne, one gets glimpses of calico, and the drums and trumpets roar and shriek so that we hear them again with bated breath. Souckova loves not only people, but also things, such as an old garden chair: Stavala v rondelu pod lipami v sadu kdyz slivu cesali tam na ni zapomneli. Spalena siuncem, porosena easy zhruba vyspravena vie nez zidle-perenna vysila se z floxu u zdi z rybizu, angrestu pri odpolednim koncertu Petit Suite. 4

Gertruda Goepfertova is an artist paints them. Her first collection of is accurately called Hejno stehliku good Lord, when he created birds, 3

who does not write her verses, but poems, which she wishes to publish, (A Flock of Goldfinches). Like the Gertruda paints her poems from the

Jaroslav Mest'an, Mala nocni hudba (Zverokruh, 1954); Sladka jako med (ZvSrokruh, 1955); Otek do Egypta (Zverokruh, 1957); Potmechut' svoboda (Zverokruh, 1962); single poems in Perspektivy, Archa, etc. 4 Milada Souckova, Gradus ad Parnassum (Sklizen svobodne tvorby, ] 957), Pastoralni suita (Rome, Vigilie, 1962); single poems in Perspektivy and Promeny.

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multihued palette of her own senses. She paints Easter eggs, hangs colorful decorations on the Christmas tree for the happiness of those whom she loves. The following apostrophe to the month of September exemplifies her rich palette: mûj mily mësici zâri z dvanâcti nejmilejsi i ty zves jako velkolepé jaro do dâlky, ale po sousedsku sny poustët na provâzku jako draky z papiru près ploty zahrâdek jen krâtce, polibeni, je prâvë vëtérek ne sbohem, vlnobiti na ztroskotanou az na konec

Gertruda Goepfertova is the most feminine of the poets in exile, which seems to me of no little merit. 3 Frantisek Listopad is the experimenter-poet of the exile. This in itself has the dangers of eclecticism, which he successfully overcomes by ever - new experiments. Even in gray and "soiled" reality, he finds beauty and sometimes plays with people and things as if with a ball, with wild fantasy, which is never without love. Listen, then, to these excerpts from a poem called "Mapa Portugalska od jihu k severu" (The Map of Portugal, from the South to the North): Potom reka mate vojsko dëjiny Jiricka a datel stini pësiny

Most sni letopisem Cosi jsem se ptal v mëstë z zuly kde jsem st'astnë ztroskotal

usti v mësto bilé ctvrttonovy ton Schody vsudybylé tese Lisabon

Za nim Boze za nim krajânek kraj znâ Mimoza je v dlani krehce libeznâ 0

Robert Vlach 7 is an intellectual of whom it has already been written that, like Karel Hynek Mâcha, he was born in Prague; however, unlike Mâcha, he does not idolize nature, but his beloved Prague.

5

Gertruda Goepfertova, Hejno stehliku (Rome, 1966); single poems in Sklizen, Archa, Novy zivot, Perspektivy, Promeny, etc. 6 Frantisek Listopad, Svoboda a jine ovoce (Bohemica Viennensia, 1956); single poems in Novy zivot, Sklizen, Perspektivy, Promeny, Svedectvi, etc. 7 Deceased Norman, January 29, 1966.

Czech Poets in Exile N o e vydâ denici, ta zajde v hvëzdném trpytë. Jsou mrtvi zednici, co, Praho, stavëli te.

865

Ty vsak cnis k nebi dal, vëk p o vëku të chrâni. Ach, Praho katedrâl, vkotvenâ d o trvâni!

The reminiscences of Macha are seen better in his bitter struggle with death, for example, in this quotation: "And the hanged hangs, grins, nods, threatens, shakes his head, my exile, like a hanged cobbler". These words are from his poem "Astronaut", one of his most nearly perfect, which he wrote during his upward flight in the astronaut's cabin of his fate. 8 Poems sometimes show the inside of a poet. A man may live his whole life in politics, journalistically or publicly, but as a counterbalance, he needs the quiet and the concentration of poetry. Josef Martinek abandoned his desk for the desert land of Arizona and is now among those co se uz vymkli z casu a na dnesek ziraji z hor a znaji svatou jiskru z vëku d o vëku preskakujici, vëcnë zapalujici. . .

and those who "are not sad, although they are melancholy". Besides being a social poet, Martinek is a metaphysician who seeks infinity in the songs of the desert, like Persian, Arabian, and Biblical poets.9 Véra Stàrkovà is fond of Paul Valéry, Beethoven, and our Bfezina. In her poems she ascends higher and higher, until the reader loses his breath in a space where Eros turns into Agape, when l'amour rises to the rhythm of universal love. The ideal of Stàrkovà is an intellectually and sensuously developed woman, who makes a revered partner of a husband in his journey towards the absolute. Beethoven, in Stàrkovà's poem, speaks of his work: Ô dilo vnucené, ty vëno bolesti, mé vëno modliteb, uzkostnych polobdëni, ze které zemë jdes ke kfizi rozeesti, kde hore clovëka se v bozi zâkon mëni? 8

Robert Vlach, Verse z exilu (Stockholm, 1951); Verse pro nikoho (London, 1952); Tu zemi krasnou (Kniznice lyriky, 1953); Princezna (Sklizen svobodné tvorby, 1958); Slova k hostu (Rome, Vigilie, 1964); Plac za Spanélsko (Rome, Vigilie, 1964); single poems in Sklizen, Novy zivot, Perspektivy, Promèny, etc.; translation from Russian of A. Achmatova's Requiem. • Josef Martinek, Songs of the Desert (New York, Universum Press, 1963); Listy z deniku (Hamburg, Sklizen svobodné tvorby, 1964); single poems in Perspektivy, Promény, etc.

866

Petr Den Pod kterym nebem sladkost tvoje zrala, ze bytost moji pfiliv zaplavil, pres hlavy mdle se v celo moje vplala znameni zhava a oceanu sil.

Starkova is the philosophizing poet of the exile, or, rather, the philosopher-poet of profound calibre.10 Jiri Kavka draws lines and forms on the walls of his labyrinth, using a ray of light. Whatever he touches, he changes into a symbol through his verses. He himself is drowning in his symbol of the river which is carrying him off into the sea of eternity, whose salt he already tastes on his lips. He lives with his death as with a comrade, familiar as if she were a fisher woman on the river of his life: Rekami okouzlen, fekami posedly touzim dal dohlednout nez smysly dohledly vsech rek se zmocniti a snad je Bohu vzit /vzit mu je, smrteln^? jen si je vypujiit/ vyslovit slovo M£, V sebe je vstfebati v jedine vterine, ktera se nevrati v jedinem uderu podpatkem o skalu v zablesku nadeje, zrozeni kordlu ve spici extase, vybuchu rakety, v chvfli, kdy prozri muz, v smrtelnost zaklety

Kavka is, in the exile, a representative of the great school of symbolists; I believe he is related to the world of Rilke.11 The verses of Ivan Jelinek are difficult to read, since they lack musical or structural qualities. They are introspective, not of the author only, but also of ancient myths which most have long forgotten and which Jelinek would like to bring back to life. The poetry of Jelinek is an epiphany; he himself resembles the "fanatics" who wandered around temples telling the people about old heroes and their deeds. With Jelinek, we find ourselves in the world of eternal birth, in which the mystery of beginning gives a concept of a clandestine mission of man. 12 The poems of Inka Smutna are fugitive-travellers on the webs of her yearning and almost choke themselves in their ardour to live. In one of 10 VSra Starkova, Beethovenovy sonaty (Sklizen); "Nesmrtelna" (not yet published); single poems in Sklizen, Novy zivot, Perspektivy. II Jiri Kavka, £Ilomky torsa (Lund, Sklizen svobodne tvorby, 1956); Vyzndni rekam, Prvni sul (Norman, Okla., Sklizen svobodne tvorby, 1962); Plavba (Munich, Lucerniika, 1962); single poems in Perspektivy, Promeny, Novy zivot, Archa, etc. 12 Ivan Jelinek, Ulice bremen (Bohemia Viennensia, 1956); Skuteina (Munich, Lucerniika, 1960).

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them, she tells of the sorrow of a sunflower when the sun has gone and she herself has to burn vain love. Jiff Kovtun is a well-balanced poet who is sometimes inspired by Oriental poetry, chiefly Chinese.13 Ivan Blatny, a brilliant poet, stopped writing in exile; the same, obviously, holds for Jan Tumlif, Jaroslav Dresler, and Jiri Karnet. Their place has been taken by new poets about whom it is as yet difficult to comment. I will therefore mention only their names: Oldfich Toman, Junius, Josef Benacek, Zdenek Salzman, Marie Danesova-Hankova, Aurelie Jenikova, Chrysostom Mastik, and Ludvik Slama. I apologize to those whom I have failed to mention, although they merit it, and to those whom I have mentioned, for speaking of them too briefly. I cannot prophesy how many of the Czech exile poems will outlive our time. However, I know - and dare to assert, when I examine their work - that our poets bear well the heavy task of poets. It is a heavy task because it is paradoxical: among foreigners, and people who are forgetting the Czech language, they retain around their Czech words that vibration of undertones and overtones of our tradition without which a word is a dried branch. At a time of boredom and indifference, they resemble fools and lovers, as Shakespeare expresses it in his A Midsummer Night's Dream: they essay new forms without forgetting the old, unchanging ones; they change themselves in accord with their times, although only within a framework determined by providence, and they are the seekers of infinity in relative spheres and of a deity in worldly spheres. They know that the art of poetry is, at the same time, the freest of man's activities - as Karel Schulz wrote - and the strictest order of God. Let them never forget that true poetry is not an aesthetic ornament, but the water of life, reviving the dead and resisting death. According to Mr. Skala's speech at the Convention of Communist Writers in April 1963 - others were denied admission - "the poetry of an ordinary day" is a great contrivance of Communism. Yes, such poetry may sometimes become great poetry: but only at such time as when it makes - to paraphrase F. X. Salda - a feast out of an ordinary day. I would like to end my short essay with a humble bow to the Czech poets of the exile. I have stressed their heterogeneity, diversity, and pluralism. However, they have one thing in common: they have maintained their loyalty to the country from which they emerged and which they still love, Jiri Kovtun, Blahoslaveni (Lucerniika, 1953); 1954); single poems in Archa, Svedectvi, etc.

13

Tu-Fuuv zal

(Kniznice lyriky,

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Petr Den tu zemi krasnou, zemi milovanou, kolebku svou i hrob svuj, matku svou, vlast jedinou i v dedictvi jim danou, sirou tu zemi, zemi jedinou -

as did their teacher and the great master of Czech poetry, Karel Hynek Macha. For this reason, the words of Bfezina about the better poets of her Czech exile hold true: Deep is the night, yet lovers see through their heart.

Slovak Exile Literature

FRANTISEK VNUK

A nation with such a tormented past as the Slovak nation will always have an exiled and a self-exiled minority among which the men of letters will form the most noticeable group. In the days of the Counter-Reformation, for example, there were some well-known writers among the Protestant émigrés. Forcible suppression of the rising Slovak nationalism in pre-1918 Hungary, coupled with economic misery, caused extensive migration of the Slovak population, especially to the United States. The most distinguished migrant-writer of the period was Martin Kukucin (in South America), while, in the United States, there lived several other noted authors (Bielik, Marsall-Petrovsky, etc.). During the Second World War, some more literary personalities chose to live in exile (G. Vâmos, J. Slâvik-Neresnicky, V. Clementis-Hron, T. Herkel-Florin, and V. Szatmâry-Vlckovâ) but - apart from Florin (who published two small volumes of poetry) - they did not show many signs of literary creativeness. The end of war in 1945 spelled disaster for Slovak literature at home and ushered in an era of Slovak exile literature on a massive scale. To escape the advancing Red Army, some 3,000 Slovak intellectuals, with their families, sought refuge in the West. Among them were many of the best-known Slovak poets (A. 2arnov, R. Dilong, K. Strmen), prose writers (M. Urban, J. C. Hronsky, T. J. Gaspar), and literary critics and historians (J. Ambrus, J. E. Bor, S. Meciar, J. Mest'ancik). Their ranks swelled further when, after the Communist coup in 1948, more Slovaks fled to the West, including such literary figures as M. Ziar, G. Zvonicky, and P. Hrtus-Jurina. A writer-in-exile is an age-old phenomenon. Ovid, Dante, Hugo - to mention but a few - went through this experience and left us an artistic record of their feelings and sentiments. At one time, Paris was the capital city of Polish literature, and only recently, both Russian and German literature had their foremost representatives in exile (Bunin,

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Vnuk

Merezhkovskiy . . . Mann, Brecht . . .)• On a modest scale, a similar situation befell Slovak literature after 1949, when the fury of Socialist realism paralysed all artistic creativity at home. With the forcible imposition of silence on such authors as E. B. Lukâc, V. Beniak, and J. Silan, the imprisonment of the old Communist writers (L. Novomesky, I. Horvâth), and the severe censure of the younger ones (V. Minâc, D. Tatarka), literary life in Slovakia came to a standstill. Those years were remorsefully called, after the Twelfth Party Congress, "barren" or "lost" by the Communists themselves. It is thanks to the Slovak writers in exile that they were not completely lost or entirely barren. The fifty-odd Slovak men of letters living on this side of the Iron Curtain kept the lights of Slovak culture burning when they had been extinguished in the writers' native country. This may sound emotional or sentimental, yet it is a sad truth that in the years 1950-55, there appeared in Slovakia hardly a single book worth rereading. In those years, indeed, émigré literature was the contemporary Slovak literature. The productivity of the Slovak exile writers does not match the number of books published at home. It exceeds the domestic production in quality, however, possessing those attributes of artistic works which are so destructively absent from a literature with its function defined, its themes prescribed, its style predetermined, its production quotas planned and fulfilled. This does not mean that the Slovak writer in exile had smooth sailing. The fact is that here, also, many a writer was passing through a minor or even major crisis of his own, and for some of them, the obstructions were nearly insurmountable. Torn from their natural habitat and thrown into the hard and inhospitable life of exile, the Slovak writers recovered only slowly, perhaps never completely. Being too much the true sons of their own nation, they failed, as a rule, to strike roots in new surroundings. Continuously mindful of the foreign environment and longing for their native enslaved country, they excelled chiefly at expressing the nostalgia and melancholy which are ever-present in their work. The concept of the writer as the conscience of his nation which was so often (and justly) applied to the Slovak writers of the past was revived very quickly among the exile writers. They, too, saw themselves in this noble role, and as the voice of a silenced and oppressed people, they went on registering their agonized sighs, protests, and bitter complaints. This is reflected in one of the first poems written in exile, by an anonymous author. (The poem is a paraphrase of T. Milkin's

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famous hymn of thanksgiving, which was set to music by M. SchneiderTrnavsky and was subsequently sung in churches as a national anthem.) Boze, rác zhliadnut' na slovensky l'ud svoj, pod bicom krivdy ako zasa hynie: doma i v s vete octovsky pri ñom stoj, v súzení svojom kedv sa k Tebe vinie. K modlitbe vrúcnej spínajú sa dlane: Dedicstvo otcov zachovaj nám, Pane! 1

[O God, be pleased to look down on your Slovak nation / as it lies prostrate again under the whip of injustice: / As a kind Father, stand at the side of those at home and those in exile / when they in their suffering are seeking your protection./ They lift their hands in fervent prayer: / O Lord, preserve the spiritual inheritance of our fathers!] In the first postwar years (1945-48), Rome was the centre and, as it were, the rallying point for the exiled Slovak writers. But their exodus was not to finish there. It was followed by a diaspora: some emigrated to the United States, others to the Argentine, Canada, Australia, Germany, etc. In January 1956, they founded their organization, "Spolok slovenskych spisovatel'ov a umelcov" (The Association of Slovak Writers and Artists), and the quarterly, Most (The Bridge), became their official organ, published in Cleveland, Ohio. This journal, appearing since 1954 under the able editorship of M. Sprinc, became the principal forum of Slovak writers and intellectuals and a reliable chronicle of the cultural life among the Slovak émigrés of the last decade. Other writers (J. Slávik, F. Mikula, M. Zlámal, etc.) were active members of the Czechoslovak Society of Arts and Sciences in America ("Spolocnost' pre vedy a umenie") and published their contributions in its quarterly, Promëny (Transformations). The Slovak writers also contributed in no small measure to the journals and papers established by the prewar Slovak emigrants in the United States, Canada, and elsewhere, or started numerous publishing ventures of their own. These last-named attempts, almost without exception, were usually of short duration. By far the most significant literary activity occurred in the field of poetry. Emigré poetry - especially lyrical poetry - mirrors with seismographic accuracy the reactions of the poet's sensitive heart, both to the events at home and to the happenings in his new, strange, and often cold surroundings. 1

Rozvoj, I (1949), No. 3, p. 16.

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The Nestor of the Slovak émigré writers is Milos K. Mlynarovic (1887-). He migrated to the United States in 1914 as a young priest and spent most of his life in intense pastoral activity among the Slovak immigrants there. Though he wrote sporadically from his early years, it is only in the last two decades that his poems and prose works have appeared in book form. As a poet, Mlynarovic writes with Franciscan simplicity, his verse almost untouched by the fashionable poetic achievements of the present century. Religious zeal, charitable compassion for the downtrodden and humble, and captivating sincerity make him what, in one of his poems, he claims to be: "novy Elias" (a new Elias). His books of verse include Boha hl'adâm 2 (In Search of God), 1948,Zl'udu-za I'ud3 (From the People - For the People), 1956, Dejiny srdca 4 (Story of a Heart), 1964. In his prose, Mlynarovic is a writer of social protest, boldly revealing the hidden and festering wounds of modern society. His collection of short stories, Borba s osudom } (Struggle with Destiny), 1952, is interesting. His best novel is Vtâcence vo vichrici8 (The Birds in a Maelstrom), 1956. Among the poets a prominent place is held by Karol Strmen (1921-), now living in the United States. This promising poet and capable translator has matured in exile, widening his outlook and bringing new qualities into his poetry. His two books of verse show him to be a truly European poet of great sensitivity. The first collection, Bâsne nepreverenych 7 (Poems of the Dispossessed), 1948, still reflects the poet's personal sadness over his own and his nation's tragedy. Striebornâ legenda8 (The Silver Legend), 1950, contains some of the most beautiful love poems in the Slovak language. In his recent book of poems, Cakajii nivy jar9 (The Meadows Await the Spring), 1963, he repeatedly displays an astounding skill and mastery of the Slovak word. Strmen is also an outstanding translator from English, French, Spanish, Italian, German, and other languages. His new translation of Dante's

2 Z l'udu - za l'ud (Whiting, Ind., J. J. Lach, 1956). Boha hl'adam (Trnava, Spolok sv. Vojtecba, 1948). 4 Dejiny srdca (Middletown, Pa., TlaCiaren Jednoty, 1964). 5 Borba s osudom (Buenos Aires, Slobodnä slovenskä kultüra, 1952). • Vtàcence vo vichrici (Buenos Aires, Tlaciaren Dorrego, 1956). 7 Bdsne nepreverenych, roneoed under the pseudonym XYZ (Rome, 1948). 8 Striebornd legenda appeared in a joint publication with M. Sprinc's Vinohrad (see footnote 19) under the title Putovné piesne (Pilgrims' songs), Obrana Press, Scranton, Pa., 1950). • Cakajü nivy jar (Middletown, Pa., Hrobäk Publications, 1963). 3

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Inferno 10 (Peklo), 1965, bears eloquent testimony to his talent and ability. Rudolf Dilong (1905-) is a Franciscan friar who in 1965 moved from the Argentine to the United States where he is editor of the popular religious magazine, Listy sv. Frantiska (Leaflets of St. Francis). He is one of the most prolific writers of the Slovak diaspora (ten publications, to date). The centre of gravity of his work is in poetry, but he also writes prose works and plays. Dilong is a very versatile poet, but the wide scope of his activity is often at the expense of depth (though one must say that what is good - especially in his poetry - is very good). Noteworthy among his volumes are: a novel, Piesen lasky 11 (The Song of Love), 1953, another novel - partly autobiographical - Bez matky 12 (Without a Mother), 1955, a collection of religious legends, Golgota 13 (Golgotha), 1956, and several books of poems, Balady 14 (Ballads), 1953, Za svetlom 15 (In the Pursuit of Light), 1954, Na vrchu nadeji16 (On the Crest of Hope), 1955 and Dotyk s vecnost'ou 17 (Contact with Eternity), 1961. Mikulas Sprinc (1914-), the secretary of the Slovak Writers Association and the editor of its organ, Most, was known before 1945 mainly as a translator of Papini, Rilke, and other Western authors of the Catholic Revival. In 1949, he surprised his reading public with an unusual and most readable account of his Odyssey to the United States, K slobodnym pobreziam 18 (To the Coasts of Freedom). His poetry bears unmistakable influences of the Spanish, French, and Italian poets, culture and scenery. His verse is at its best in Vinohrad 19 (Vineyard), 1950, written partly in Italy. Other notable products of Sprinc's many-sided activity are: collections of poems, Tvarou proti slnku 20 (Face Towards the Sun), 1956, Z poludnia a polnoci21 (From 10

Bozska komedia. Peklo (Cleveland-Rim-Mnichov, Slovensky ustav, 1965). Piesen lasky (Buenos Aires, TIaCiaren Dorrego, 1953). 12 Bez matky (Buenos Aires, Slobodna slovenska kultura, 1955). 13 Golgota (Buenos Aires, TIaCiaren Dorrego, 1956). 14 Balady (Buenos Aires, Nakladom autora, 1953). 15 Za svetlom (Buenos Aires, TIaCiaren Dorrego a E. Skrzentova, 1954). 19 Na vrchu nadeji (Buenos Aires, Slobodna slovenska kultura, 1955). 17 Dotyk s vecnost'ou (Buenos Aires, 1961). 18 K slobodnym pobreziam (Scranton, Pa., Obrana Press, 1949). " Vinohrad, in Putovne piesne (see footnote 8), (Scranton, Pa., Obrana Press, 1950). 20 Tvarou proti slnku (Cleveland, Ohio, Slovensky ustav, 1955). 21 Z poludnia a polnoci, facsimile edition, (Slovensky ustav, Cleveland, Ohio, 1960). 11

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South and from North), 1960, Mladost' orla 22 (Eagle's Youth), 1962; lyrical religious meditations, Matka kràsneho milovania 23 (Mother of Fair Love), 1954; translations from G. Papini, etc. Andrej 2arnov (the pen-name of Frantisek Subik, 1903-) is one of the best-known Slovak poets of intense nationalist sentiment. A doctor by profession, he now lives in the United States where he settled in 1952. His literary output is not very large, yet one of his poems, Slovensky zial'24 (Slovak Sorrow), 1954, represents émigré poetry at its best. In a terse, elegiac tune, he expressed poetically a most powerful lamentation over the sorrowful Slovak present. Recently, Zarnov transcribed and adapted a number of poems by J. Holly (originally written in the West Slovak dialect, one hundred and fifty years ago) and published them under the title, Hlas matky Tatry 25 (The Voice of Mother Tatra), 1963. Gorazd Zvonicky (the pen-name of Andrej Sândor, 1913-) is a priest of the Salesian order who survived the Communist closing of monasteries in Slovakia and subsequently escaped. He typifies, perhaps most strikingly, the emotions of an emigrant for whom there is no substitute for his native land. His book of verse, S ukazovâkom na mraku 20 (Index-Finger on the Cloud), 1958 is a passionate outburst of protest, accusation, and pleas for the Lord's vengeance. His other works of poetry include: Prebudza sa zem27 (The Awakening Earth), 1964, and Na jubilejné vino 28 (The Wine for Jubilee Celebrations), 1965. He lives in Italy. Marian Ziar (the pen-name of Imrich Kruzliak, 1914-), a highly articulate poet, lives in Germany. His poems appear mainly in Most and bear witness to an alert eye for the contemporary literary scene in the West. But 2iar is also a keen and sympathetic observer of literary events behind the Iron Curtain. He has published translations of East European poetry of the post-Stalinist thaw, Podaj nam ruku, Europa!29 (Grasp our Hand, Europe), 1956. In 1955, he edited Modlitby a putâch 30 (Prayers of Those in Chains), a most remarkable and deeply 22

Mladost orla (Cleveland, Ohio, Slovensky ustav, 1962). Matka kràsneho milovania (Valparaiso, Ind., Slovenski frantiskâni, 1954). 24 In quarterly Most, I (1954), No. 1, pp. 10-12. 25 Hlas matky Tatry (Cleveland-Rim, Slovensky ustav, 1963). 26 S ukazovâkom na mraku (Buenos Aires, Eduard Stanga, 1958). 27 Prebudza sa zem (Rim, Slovensky ustav sv. Cyrila a Metoda, 1964). 28 Na jubilejné vino (Middletown, Pa., Kniznica Literârneho Almanachu Slovâka v Amerike, 1965). 29 Podaj nam ruku, Europa! roneoed (Mnichov, Vlastnym nâkladorn, 1956). 30 Modlitby v putâch (Mnichov, Imrich Kruzliak vlastnym nâkladom, 1955). 83

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touching collection of poems of anonymous prisoners of the Communist regime. Other poets whose contributions occasionally appear (or used to appear) in the Slovak press abroad are: Ján Okál', author of a small volume of poems, Kronika Slovákov31 (Chronicle of the Slovaks), 1954, and of a satirical novel, Blizenci32 (Gemini), 1962; Jozef Varinsky, author of Krvavé roráty33 (Bloody Rorate-Mass), 1961; Miloslav Zlámal, author of Zpévy z modrych hor34 (Songs from the Blue Mountains), 1964; Dominik Valko, Ludo Beseñovsky, Cyril Ondrus, Marusa Jusková, Jozo Zvonár-Tieñ, Ján Doránsky, Fero Zobor, Jozef Vágovic, Jozef Dragos-Alzbetíncan, Andrej Gemersky, Ján Vetva, L. Sebesta, M. Chudoba, A. Brázda, and others. Among prose writers, the most outstanding artist was Jozef CigerHronsky (1896-1960), an incomparable master of the Slovak language. His profound knowledge of the psyche of the Slovak "little man" enabled him to depict the complex pattern of Slovak village life with unique and inimitable artistry. In exile, in addition to a number of short stories, he wrote a historical novel, Andreas Búr, majster35 (Magister Andreas Bur), 1948. His most ambitious project, a novel, Svet na Trasovisku36 (The Little World at Trasovisko), 1960, did not reach the standard of his best pre-1945 writings. The novel deals with the memorable and dramatic events of the last months of the war immediately before the author's escape from Slovakia. As the testimony of a refugee writer, the novel has both artistic and social value. Juraj Slávik (1890-) returned to literary activity after 1948, having resigned his post as Czechoslovak Ambassador to the United States (in protest against the Communist coup of February 1948). In 1952, he started the serialized publication, in Newyorksky dennik (The New York Daily), of his memoirs; the first volume Detstvo, chlapectvo, mládenectvo 37 (Infancy, Boyhood, Youth), appeared in book form in 1955. It is a delightful series of personal reminiscences of persons, 31

Kronika o dejstvovaní, slave a ponízent Slovákov (1954). Blizenci (Middletown, Pa., Kniznica Literárneho Almanachu Slováka v Amerike, 1962). 33 Krvavé roráty (Rim, Slovensky ústav, 1961). 34 Zpévy z modrych hor (New York, Spolocnost' pre vedy a umenie, 1964). 35 Andreas Búr, majster (Scranton, Pa., Obrana Press, 1948). 3(1 Svet na Trasovisku (Whiting, Ind., J. J. Lach, 1960). 3r Moja pamat' - zivá kniha, Detstvo, chlapectvo, mládenectvo. Mój zivot v rakúsko-uhorskej monarchii. 1890-1918 (New York, Czechoslovak Publishing Company, n.d.). 32

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events, and places, narrated in a simple, unassuming style. The book contains many passages of lyrical beauty, betraying the author's earlier poetic career (in his youth, Slavik used to write poetry under the pseudonym of Neresnicky). Pavol Hrtus-Jurina (1919) started as an author of very great promise. Since his emigration to Australia in 1949 these expectations have been only partly realized. He has published a few short stories of imaginative vividness and rich lyrical undertones. In his most recent book, Z reci do reci38 (Heart-to-Heart Talks, 1964, he gives lively literary interpretations of the first experiences of the Slovak settlers who migrated to Australia in the 1920's. Draga Divinska (the pen-name of Draga Paucova, 1922) wrote a number of short stories in which she displayed delicate sensitivity and a keen talent for observation. Her stories have true feminine freshness and show signs of her search for an expressive individuality. Norin (the pen-name of Juraj Ciger) published his first and, so far, only novel, Tri stolicky39 (Three Chairs), 1947, followed by a few humorous stories. Then he withdrew into silence. Among other writers of prose one could mention Michal Gerdelan, author of a novel, Krai' otrokov40 (The King of Slaves), 1962; Rudolf Kalencik, who wrote a satirical novel, Doktor Sasa 41 (Doctor Sasa), 1964; Jozef Detvan, author of Osudy jedneho z nds42 (Fortunes of One of Us), 1963; Jan Dafcik, Felix Mikula, Teodora Rjachinova, Marian Dafcik, Andrej Kalnik, and others. Certain Slovak writers considered their personal experiences sufficiently interesting for English readers, and drew on their eventful past as authors or coauthors of several semi-documentary books in English. Since they are not written in Slovak, these books are not strictly within the scope of our topic but one should mention at least these writers: Sister Cecilia Barath, L. M. Telepun, L. Lahola, S. Ilok, and J. Pauco. J. Pauco's two books were later published in Slovak (Unconquerables,

38

Z reci do reci (Melbourne, Vic., Nakladom autora, 1964). Tri stolicky (Scranton, Pa., Obrana Press, 1947). 40 Krai' otrokov (Midletown, Pa., Kniznica Literarneho Almanachu Slovaka v Amerike, 1962). 41 Doktor Saia (Middletown, Pa., Kniznica Literarneho Almanachu Slovaka v v Amerike, 1964). 42 Osudy jedneho z nds (Middletown, Pa., Kniznica Literarneho Almanachu Slovaka v Amerike, 1963). 39

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1958 -Neporazitel'ni, 43 1961 \Flight to Wonderland, 1963 -Na uteku,44 1965). There is no significant accomplishment among the dramatic pieces written by Slovak émigré playwrights. Dramatic works which originated in exile reflect most plainly the emigrants' obsession with nostalgia for the past. Even Milan Novak (the pen-name of K. Strmen), in his dramatic attempt, Krvavy kr'iz45 (Cross of Blood), 1950, turned out a languishing melodrama. Jân Dorânsky (1911-), now living in Canada, wrote several plays, of which the most successful, Starâ mat', neopust'ajte nasi48 (Grandmother, Do Not Leave Us Alone!) 1956, was staged by various Slovak dramatic societies in Canada, Argentina, and the United States, J. Zvonâr-Tien published, in Canada in 1956, his drama in Alexandrine verse, Ohne47 (Flames), which was originally written in 1942 and which deals with incidents of the revolutionary years 1848-49. Some writers tried to revive in their dramas the remote history of the ninth century, when Slovakia was the setting for glorious and fondlyremembered historical events. Thus, Cyril Ondrus wrote a play in 1956 named after a celebrated ruler of the Great Moravian kingdom, Rastislav;48 and Rudolf Dilong called his dramatic experiment after a Slovak disciple of Sts. Cyril and Methodius, Gorazd49 (1963). Other playwrights among the émigré authors include J. Martinec (Pdserâci slobody - The Smugglers of Freedom, 1957), M. Dafcik (A hviezdy zhasli - The Light of the Stars Faded Out, 1956), and M. Veles (the pen-name of K. Culen). Slovak exile literature is somewhat deficient in workers engaged in the literary "sciences" (criticism, theory, history). It is true that the conditions for this kind of work are most unfavourable, and even those few who are thus aotive often deal with problems remote from the realities of the exile literary life. Stanislav Meciar wrote a two-volume treatise on M. Kukucin (Kukucin zivy 50 - Living Kukucin, 1960), J. E. Bor is the 43

Neporazitel'ni (Middletown, Pa., Prvâ katolicka slovenskâ jednota, 1961). Na ûteku (Middletown, Pa., Kniznica Literârneho Almanachu Slovâka v Amerike, Middletown, Pa., 1965). 45 Krvavy krii, roneoed edition (Montreal, Que., Rozvoj, 1950). 49 Starâ mat', neopûst'ajte nasi (Montreal, Que., 1956). 47 Ohne (Winnipeg, Man., Kanadsky Slovak, 1956). 48 Rastislav (Montreal, Que., 1956). 41 Gorazd (Rim, Slovenskâ ustav sv. Cyrila a Metoda, 1963). 50 Kukuiin zivy. Literdrne dielo 'Mat volâ' (I.); Odkaz slovenskému nârodu (11.) (Buenos Aires, Slobodnâ slovenskâ kultûra, 1960). 44

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author of several monographs on both well- and lesser-known Slovak writers (e.g.,Mlynarovic, Dilong,Zelenka). Among the writers of articles and studies in literary history and criticism, one may also name Jan Mest'ancik, Imrich Kruzliak, Jozef Kirschbaum, and others. Such, in brief outline, is the picture of Slovak literature in exile during the two decades from 1945 to 1965. Its achievements, if measured by the amount published, may not look very impressive. But when measured against the heavy odds it has had to overcome, these accomplishments will have an honourable and lasting place in future histories of Slovak literature.