Culture as learnables: An outline for a research on the inherited traditions

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Dedicated

To

K. Srinivasan, Mysore

the teacher to whom I owe more than a sense of discrimination towards all those ephemeral threads worth pursuing.

Preface

This book is part of a wider project. The nature of the project is elaborated in the first chapter, and therefore there is no need to go into it. Though it involves pleasure, from conception to birth is a laborious process. It took a long time for me to bring this into a recognisable gestalt. Research, like human life in general, is inconceivable without the context of a community. The innumerable nameless people who have a part in breathing spirit into a work can neither be mentioned exhaustively nor thanked sufficiently. I have received the co-operation of many whom I know, and still more number of them indirectly through their presence in the scholarly community. The realisation grows slowly how much of one’s thinking is dependent on the countless minds across the spatial and temporal borders of one’s own existence. Whitehead says somewhere that the measure of the success of learning is what remains after one has forgotten that which has been learnt. The sources of those thoughts that afforded casual pleasure, irritation, anger and stimulation are neither noted nor remembered. So, first of all, let me pay my homage to all those countless scribes whose thoughts have reached me, however much they might have been distorted in the process of my apprehending them. If not anything else, I have learnt humility in the process of writing this book. To overcome the hubris but at the same time not to lose sight of the objectives entertained when one’s thinking horizon was narrower, is not an easy task. But I think it is important. So apologies to all those who think that the thoughts of the past masters have been slighted by my brashness.

In the same way as a human child, a project to become capable of running on its own requires tending after the birth. The co-operation needed is even more than what is required at the stage of pregnancy. I hope this will be forth-coming equally after, as it was before, the birth.

Let me here thank those whose immediate help was depended upon as representing also those whose co-operation is not explicitly acknowledged. First of all I thank Prof. Dr. Annely Rothkegel, to whose pressure to write down of things I was contented with talking, owes the birth of this book. Secondly, the stimulation of the formulations by Prof. Dr. Kuno Lorenz during the seminars which I am privileged to host jointly with him over the years has gone into the formation of this book. The same thing holds good to the countless discussions I had with Dr. Dietfried Gerhardus, both during formal sessions, and much more in informal sessions of visiting art exhibitions. For many clarifications, especially on Greek and Latin terms I have

depended upon Dr. Shahid Rahman. To him my thanks are due both for this help, and also for other casual discussions of Philosophy in coffee breaks. Back in Mysore University in the 70s I used to call research jocularly as the activity of the Researchers in between the frequent coffee breaks. Shahid has made it possible that it is also an activity carried during those coffee-breaks. Further my association and discussions with the group of Anthroplogists, Philosophers and the students of Cogntive Science around the journal of Cultural Dynamics, edited in Gent, Belgium, especially with Prof. Dr. S.N Balagangadhara, Mr. Wilem Derde, Dr. Harrij van Bouwhuisen, Dr. Tom Claes, has given me my acquaintance with the more recent trends in and around the discipline of Anthropology. The project of this book is, at least in parts, consonant with their aims of establishing a discipline for the study of comparative knowledge systems. Similarly Prof. Dr. Hansgeorg Hoppe and Mr. Ralph Seidel have given me the pleasure of discussing Philosophy with them in recent years. In the last stages of this work Mr. B.P.C. Rao, a visiting scientist in Fraunhoffer-Institut, Saarbrücken from IGCAR, Kaplakkam, India, has been an invaluable help. Let me express my thanks for the warmth, both mundane and philosophical, all these persons have afforded me. Needless to say that for all the imperfections I carry the responsibility.

Saarbrücken, June 1997

B. Narahari Rao

Contents Preface

0

1

Introduction: ‘Cultural Difference’ and The Theories of Culture

1

Reflection as Making the Alternatives Available

5

1.1

Situating the Question: Traditions as Heritage Sentiment

1.2

In Place of Definitions

1.3

Theoretical Stance 1.3.1

5 9 13

Deliberation to Decide and to Make the Alternatives Available

1.3.2

13

Is Theory a Deferred Decision?

15

1.4

Under-labouring and other Philosophical Tasks

16

1.5

Object- vs. Conceptual Questions and

1.6

Empirical versus Heuristic Theories

21

The Category Habit

22

2

The Modernity Paradigma

3

The ‘Humanity’ and The Given World

25

of the ‘Intelligibles’

49

3.1

Aristotle’s Good and the Humanitas

49

3.2

The methodological Problem

50

3.3

Cultivation of humanity: Individual to Social Ideal of Perfection 3.3.1

The Philosophy of History and the ‘Culture of the Inward Man’

3.3.2

52

52

‘Natural’ as against ‘Animal’ Origin of Language

54

3.4

Aristotle: The One Given World of Objects and Many Customs 3.4.1

A Heuristic Device

3.4.2

Speech and Polis Rooted in a Common Natural Power of Man

4

57 57

58

Revelations Naturalised by Universalising the Polis: Aquinas

66

4.1

Ennobling the Heritage of the Athens

66

4.2

God: the Ruler and the Artificer

68

4.2.1

The Eternal Law

68

The Artificer and His Art

71

4.3

4.3.1

Potentiality and Actuality: the Form

72

4.3.2

The Agent and the Patient

74

4.3.3

The Capacities: Defining Actions in Terms of ‘Accusatives’

4.4

Theology: a Practical or a Theoretical Discipline 4.4.1

4.5

4.7

5

77

The Theoria-Ideal

78

Two Forms of Knowledge to Two Different Ways of Being ‘True’

4.6

76

85

The Will: ‘Reason’ versus ‘Instinct’ 4.6.1

The Greek Philosophy vs. the Christian faith

4.6.2

The ‘Human Acts’ and the ‘Acts of a Man’

A Side-Glance at the Stoics

88 88 89 94

Establishing a Polis: Imitating God’s Creation or Participating in It? 5.1

96

By Way of a Summary: The God, the World, and the Souls in Between

96

5.2

6

Knowledge as Propositions and Cultures as Belief Systems

98

5.3

‘Natural Reason’: Two Conceptions

103

5.4

Making the Polis by Imitating God’s Creation

109

Kant: The making of the Naturgeschichte

114

6.1

Kant’s ‘Love Affair with Metaphysics’

6.2

The Man, the Maker and the Social Animal

115

6.3

Anthropology from a Pragmatic Standpoint

119

6.3.1

114

Education as Partaking in the Idea of Humanity

6.4

119

6.3.2

‘Pragmatic’ vs. ‘Theoretical’ Knowledge

121

6.3.3

The Idea of Perfection

125

6.3.4

Nature as a Teleological System

127

6.3.5

Potentials Endowed by Nature (Naturanlagen) 131

Naturgeschichte

132

6.4.1

Three Types of Narratives

132

6.4.2

The Economy of Nature

134

6.4.3

The History as a Means of Instruction

136

6.4.4

The Cosmopolitan Order and the Theory of Stages

7

142

The Creations of the Unfinished Animal: The Human World

146

Myths, Sciences and other Wonders of the Earthy Angel 7.1

The German Tradition: the ‘Humanisation’ and the Grundlegung

146

7.2

The Human Animal and its Angelic Faculty

149

7.3

Herder: The ‘Instinctless Animal’ and its Special Faculty 7.3.1

Language, the Prototype and

152

the Centre of Human Institutions 7.3.2

152

A Not Sense-bound species and the Besonnenheit

7.3.3

154

‘Merkwort’: ‘Clear’ versus ‘Distinct’ Thinking

7.3.4

The ‘Instinct’ versus the Creations of the Unfinished Animal

7.3.5

158

Human Institutions: Creations of a Special or a Deficient Animal?

7.3.7

156

The Critique of Utility as the Root of Language and Society

7.3.6

155

160

‘Individualism’ versus ‘Communitarianism’: a Historical Footnote

7.4

161

Cassirer: Mythical versus Scientific Symbolic Forms 7.4.1

Kantianism as a ‘Philosophy of Culture’

7.4.2

The Task of Providing

163 163

‘the logic of Humanities’ 7.4.3

8

165

The Tradition of Logic versus the Contrastive Method

167

Cultures: Phenomena versus Learnables

175

8.1

The Pilgrim, the Mountain, the Wanderer, and the Heathen

175

8.2

The Pragmatic Turn

177

8.3

Investigating ‘Cultures’: What, When and Why?

179

8.3.1

Anthropology, Context and ‘Ethnocentrism’

179

8.3.2

Represented versus Representer’s Context

181

8.3.3

Ethnographic Representation and Philosophical Hermeneutics

8.3.4

182

‘Mother India’: Amnesiac or Barren Mother of her Religions?

184

8.3.5

Adventures, Holy Duties and Administration in Strange Lands

8.3.6

8.3.7 8.4

190

Representer’s Purpose and Constitution of Domains

196

Cultures: ‘When?’ versus ‘Why?’

198

Knowledge versus Phenomena 8.4.1

Concepts versus Objects

8.4.2

Reasons versus Causes

8.4.3

‘Making Sense of a Situation’:

202 202 203

Beliefs Inadequate and Unnecessary 8.4.4 8.5

Learnable versus Manipulable

206 209

Varieties of Knowledge and Configuration of Learning

8.6

A Whirlwind Detour to the Scene of Recent Anthropology

214

8.6.1

‘Thick Description’

214

8.6.2

The Story of What Anthropology is

217

8.6.3

Human Sciences as Purveyors of ‘Local Knowledge’

Bibliography

212

219

221

0

Introduction: ‘Cultural Difference’ and the Theories of Culture

‘Cultures’ in the sense in which this book is concerned with are different legacies of ways of going about in the world resulting from the different pasts of different groups of people. The ‘culture research’ as understood here is a task of making those knowledge inheritance from the past available for teaching and learning to the future generations. As I see it, the philosophical task in this connection is to provide an answer to the question, what constitutes cultural difference, as against, say, individual or social or biological differences?

One step in accomplishing this task, I will argue, is overcoming an important legacy of the existing philosophical theories of culture. Most of these theories are motivated by the question, why human beings have culture? In discussing its underlying assumptions and the lines of thinking motivated by it, we will have to deal with two predominant uses of the word ‘culture’ markedly different from the one I am concerned with.

One of them is that used in the context of the discussion about the ‘cosmopolitan democracy’1, i.e. a democratic polity where groups of people with different habits, backgrounds and customs can live without destructive conflict. The underlying question here is whether a notion of ‘good life’ need to be shared for this kind of polity to work. The concept of culture as used here is wielded by those who put forward the ‘substantive’ concept of liberal democracy as against the ‘procedural’ conception of it. Whereas for the latter, all that democracy requires is an acceptance of a certain set of procedures to resolve the interindividual or inter-communal conflicts, the former stresses the need for a shared idea of what good life consists of, and in this sense, a shared culture.

The discussion of ‘culture’ connected with the democratic polity implicitly or explicitly gets tied to the question of ‘modernity’, i.e., how the democratic polity came into being, what 1

The term used by Anthony Giddens (cf. Giddens, A. 1984). This is also the context of thinkers like Charles Taylor (cf. Taylor, C. 1992), and the more popular discussions like that of ‘multiculturalism’.

kind of values accompanied its birth, and whether and how those not sharing these values are to be treated equally. Suppose there are groups who do not share the idea of good life needed to make the liberal democracy work, how should the ethos of such groups need to be understood? One line of approach is to consider that such groups are not yet evolved enough to appreciate the liberal democracy. That is, their tastes are not yet ‘civilised’ enough. Thus, in the controversy between procedural and substantive conception of democracy, still another use of ‘culture’ - that in order to single out ‘the cultivated tastes’ from that of ‘the not cultured’ confronts us. This conception has a long intellectual history and the feuilleton use meant to refer to the offerings like theatre, music, paintings etc., is only one of its more conspicuous derivatives.

In fact, I will argue that the discussion of ‘culture’ within the context of modernity, invariably borrows from the discourse created by the German tradition of philosophy of history (Geschichtsphilosophie), which, in its turn, combines a theory of the historical evolution of human ethos with that of a theory of the distinction between the cultured and not cultured. I will term this paradigm for discussion of culture as the ‘modernity paradigm’.

The substantial part of this book (chapters 2 - 7) is a discussion of the various shades of the modernity paradigm and how it comes in the way of providing a theory of what constitutes a cultural difference. A minor part, chapter 8, attempts to draw out a theory of cultural difference by surveying critically certain distinctions in the philosophical tradition and modifying and extending them.

After indicating in the first chapter the nature of the philosophical task undertaken in this work, in the second chapter I will deal delineate the conceptual outline of the modernity paradigm by focusing on certain distinctions casually made use of in our daily talk. For this purpose I select a short passage from a journalistic writing, and then go into the history of certain words occurring in that passage. The next few chapters (chapters 3 - 7) go into excavating the category habits that shaped the modernity paradigm. There is in this century

a long tradition of criticism of the notion of ‘given’ in the theory of knowledge. One way of describing the intent of chapter 3 to 7 of this book is to consider the consequences of this to the investigation of culture. The tradition of conceptualising culture, as is the case in all other disciplines, originated in the background of certain fundamental category habits dominating the intellectual world. I will be investigating in the following the category habits informing one of the influential paradigms for the investigation of culture, which I have called ‘modernity paradigm’. My thesis is that it is underpinned by a notion of the ‘given’, and secondly, that it may be viewed as the result of the 18th century attempt at naturalising the Christian theological assumptions, which in their turn are the result of combining the heritage of the ancients with that of the Christianity. I will discuss in the following the formulations given by Kant and Herder to a thesis held by many that culture is the result of man being demarcated from animals through reason. I will trace the concepts in use in the modernity paradigm to these formulations and them in their turn to the Christian mediation of Aristotle.

Chapter 3 traces the Aristotelian model of polis and the underlying distinction between the things that grow by themselves, (here onwards the generated) and the things that are made. The chapter 4 shows how the introduction of the creator God into this system by the medieval Christianity alters the nature of concepts presumed in the Aristotelian model, even though the terminology remains Aristotelian. The focus of chapters 5 and 6 is the way the mediation of Aristotle through Christianity was inherited by thinkers like Hobbes, Kant, Herder, and how they in their turn shaped through that inheritance the characteristic notions we have inherited to talk about man and society.

Chapter 8 attempts to extend the Fregean distinction between ‘giving reasons’ and ‘explaining by giving causes’ by suggesting the criterion of learnable versus manipulable as the criterion to distinguish looking at something as knowledge versus looking at it as phenomenon. This is elaborated further into a concept of ‘configuration of learning’ to replace the traditional concept of ‘belief system’. It is argued further that the concept of configuration of learning would be a better means of conceptualising the inherited attitudes to life (Lebenshaltungen) available in the traditions of this world than the concept of belief system.

1

1.1

Reflection as Making the Alternatives Available

Situating the Question: Traditions as Heritage Sentiment

Two sentiments underlie this work: (i) Many different traditions or ‘cultures’ existing in the world are a heritage not to be lost (here onwards this will be referred to as ‘traditions as heritage sentiment’). (ii) There is neither a unique right manner of behaving nor a unique right way of conceiving the world of objects, even though not every manner is right and not every conception of the world, appropriate. This work attempts both to formulate, and to examine the conceptual obstacles for formulating some of the research tasks arising out of taking these sentiments seriously. The first sentiment involves noting a fairly obvious empirical fact and a normative attitude towards it. However, as in the case of all common sense sentiments the moment we ask what it would mean in terms of tasks we can undertake, we are likely to be at a loss what we mean by the sentiment itself. For example, what should be brought under ‘culture’ or ‘tradition’? According to historians, there was - and according to the popular opinion in Europe, there still is - a practice of committing widows to fire in India. No doubt that all over the world there are many such practices passed on to us by the past generations. Are they what we want to consider as valuable heritage? Obviously not. Or, are the monuments and exquisite artefacts resulting from a way of life that we want to consider as valuable, and worth preserving? Whereas in the former case, we are led to justifying many cruel practices and support their continuation, in the latter case, we are led to consider culture only in terms of artefacts that can be preserved even when the civilisation that produced it is dead and gone. The Roman way of life was destroyed long back even though the museums of the world are full of things Romans have left behind. To give a sense to the ‘culture’ as indicating only such remnants of dead generations, and only them as worth preserving is not doing justice to the sentiment I mentioned. What else then? This book doesn’t address such questions, but hopes to make some headway in clarifying the sentiment so that some of the possible ways of answering such questions would become foreseeable.

In continuation of what is said in the previous paragraph, perhaps, I also need to state a third sentiment, a methodological one, in addition to the other two: one of the tasks of philosophical investigation is that of giving voice to inchoate sentiments prevailing in one’s

milieu and make them capable of formulation into interesting questions for investigation. The common sense sentiments are valuable, not as ultimate truths, but as something to goad us to reflect and enquire. This implies that clarity, though an important goal, is not the criterion to identify a valuable piece of research. Though effort has to be made to avoid the wooliness of thinking, interesting problems should not be avoided or denied because they appear to be incapable of clear formulation at the present.

Now back to the first two sentiments. In contrast to the first, the second sentiment is more in the nature of a result of a philosophical climate of opinion than just an easily observable empirical fact. Even if one considers the assertion that there are no sets of unique right manners as an empirical observation, that there is no unique world may be disputed by our common sense. Some kind of philosophical tutoring is needed to concede that there is no set of unique right world. This fact reveals the status of such sentiments: they are not of the nature of empirical belief statements which can be verified or falsified by adducing certain kind of evidence; rather, they are more in the nature of norms or guidelines for orientation in the contemporary milieu, in the so called global village, either to perceive the tasks it engenders or to solve the problems it throws up.

It is necessary to demarcate the concern guiding this work from that underlying another prevailing discourse. For the last few years an important debate is going on in the context of how to gestalt a cosmopolitan democracy of the industrialised countries: how people with different cultural backgrounds can, and ought to, live together? This is a practical question, in the sense of a question of recognising, and getting sensitised to, the fact of our social world where people from different backgrounds live. The fact of many different ‘cultures’ living in close proximity gives rise to the practical question concerning the rights and obligations not only towards different individuals, but also towards different groups. The scope and limits of such group rights may call for profound conceptual elucidation. Situated in such a context, the clarification of the sentiment that all different cultures are a heritage not to be lost, may take the following line. Basic to liberalism is the assumption that all individuals have ‘equal dignity’ and correspondingly have a ‘right’ to be respected equally. Analogous to an individual one may construe group identities, and claim that such identities are constituted by the pasts of a group, and therefore the concerned groups have ‘rights’ to what they consider as their pasts. Accordingly, it may be claimed that we have an obligation to ‘respect’ these rights to the past of a people. (It is not clear what exactly this ensues in practical terms.

Perhaps the demand is for a ‘Kulturpflege’ in the sense of preserving the monuments, folklore, dances and such things. In this line of thinking, apart from sentimentality, the issue of the cultures as valuable heritage boils down to appreciating and preserving certain ‘aesthetic objects’ and ‘artistic forms’ arising from the practices of certain groups and geographical locations). Such arguments and oppositions to them constitute a field of discourse regarding plurality of cultures.2 At least a dominant part of the debate under the banner of ‘communitarianism versus individualism’3, is constituted by the question of the group versus individual rights, and arguments for and against the conceptual underpinnings to claim rightness of one or the other position. The sentiments I mentioned at the outset, and the problems for research that I envisage, may be mistaken as within this field of discourse. But in fact the question that inspires this work is of a different nature.

My question is whether, and how, cognitive gain can be derived from the fact of existence of plurality of traditions. At this juncture, it is not possible to give a clear idea of the nature and scope of the ‘cognitive gain’ I am speaking of. I can only indicate with the help of an example. If I succeed in making my intuitions understandable, the example I am giving now should look too intellectualistic to be adequate. But for the moment, even intellectualistic sounding example must suffice to indicate what I am going for. In this book I will be showing the enormous role played in the European intellectual tradition by two pairs of distinctions: (i) generated (or ‘things that grow by themselves’ such as plants, animals, more generally, all biological organisms) and made (things that are the results of human making such as tables, buildings, cars etc.), (ii) intelligible and sensible. (For the present, we can take this contrast to mean as that between the entities that require the intellectual capacities to discern them, and those that do not, leaving the question, where exactly to draw the line between the intellectual and sensecapacities.) As will be shown, it is almost impossible to think of any theoretical discourse on the social and cultural affairs without the influence of these categories. In saying this, I am neither criticising nor bemoaning the fact of this influence. Those distinctions are very powerful and productive heuristic devices that have proved their usefulness in the history of the growth of

2 3

Taylor, C. (1992) is an example. Cf. Avineri, S./de-Shalit, A. (eds.) 1992.

our knowledge. My point is rather that today it is almost impossible to visualise how an alternative to those distinctions can look like. Yet, these distinctions are the products of only one culture. What are the conceptual means employed by those others not familiar with the European theoretical tradition to think of things or issues that we cannot think of thinking without the distinctions, generated versus made and sensible versus intelligible? To come to know this, in the sense of being capable of using the alternative conceptual means than the ones we are accustomed to, is certainly an important knowledge gain.

In the following, rather than proving that there are specific research tasks flowing from the tradition as heritage sentiment, I am going to start with it as an assumption. I also want to make a suggestion as to what the traditions as heritage sentiment can mean, without hinging upon concepts like ‘respecting the identity of peoples’. My suggestion would also render the supposition that different traditions are heritage of humanity (and not merely of respective human groups) much more intuitively plausible. The suggestion turns on a ruling assumption of the present day set up that we have an obligation to preserve and enhance any inherited knowledge. Suppose we add to this the following innocuous looking propositions, certain research tasks become apparent. (i) It is one of the characteristics of being human that one becomes adult by acquiring various action or behavioural dispositions from the milieu in which one is born. These dispositions are the results of experience, trial and error, and reflections of past generations. They constitute the ways and means handed down both for leading a successful life and for solving the problems arising in the course of it, i.e. they are knowledge dispositions. (ii) Different groups of people in different regions of the world have different pasts and that is what makes for different ‘cultures’ in the world. Putting together (i) & (ii) one can draw a conclusion that traditions or ‘cultures’ are conceptualisable as forms of knowledge. In other words, one implication of taking the sentiment that plurality of cultures or traditions available in the world are the heritage of humanity, is that we recognise the obligation of looking at traditions as knowledge, and investigate them accordingly. I submit that at this juncture of history, even to start off, such an investigation involves a considerable amount of - to use a diction from Locke - conceptual under-labourer’s work.

1.2

In Place of Definitions

I have already used above and will be using in the following such concepts as ‘culture’, ‘society’, ‘community’, ‘tradition’ etc. Without doubt these are some of the most widely and variably used concepts. It is a custom in the philosophical community to expect some

definitions of such concepts when they become the means of talking about a focus theme of a philosophic work. But I am not going to fulfil this expectation.

The reason for this violation of a convention lies in the nature of this work itself. It will become clear that for my purpose a rough and ready use available in our daily discourse is sufficient. When not, I am going to indicate the meaning as and when necessary. As I will explain in the next section, this is a work of philosophical under-labouring, and as such, it does not require the specialised instruments of those who build more solid structures of empirical theories. I don’t require, for example, a criterion to identify particular societies and cultures, but only the admission that it makes sense to speak of different ‘cultures’ and ‘societies’ without bothering for the moment on where to draw the line of demarcation between one and another society, between one and another culture. There is no difficulty in understanding that there are groups or communities living elsewhere than in the big cities and metropolitan countries of Europe and America (or even in Japan) whose ways of going about in the world significantly differ from what we are accustomed to, but yet they lead a fairly orderly and satisfied life with the usual grumbles, quarrels and other imperfections ensuing from the practical contingencies. One need not idealise the way these people live, but nor one need to have the image (often transported and abetted by the media) that their life is penurious, brutish, exploited, terrorised and corrupt. Such things certainly exist in many places on this Globe, but my concern is not with them, but with the normal life differently led than the one we are accustomed to.

To indicate that there are normal life styles differently led than ours, one can use the diction that there are different ‘cultures’ than ours. It should also make sense if I say that those normal ways of life other than ours are learnable, and these learnable ways are the results of the experience, trial and error, toil, and reflections of the past generations of those groups of people. On that very general level there should not be any difficulty in understanding the talk of ‘different cultures’ and them as ‘learnables’. But there comes the catch when once we take up the task of conceptualising the significant traditions inherited from the pasts of different groups of people: how should we distinguish the individual differences from the cultural differences of a group? We have to have some conceptual means of distinguishing what is inherited from the past of a large group from that which is an individual fluke, however interesting it may be in itself. In fact it is my thesis that we don’t yet have a proper instrument for identifying cultural difference from other types of differences. To take a point that is

made by N. Goodman very powerfully:4 logically speaking anything is different from anything else in any number of ways, and similarly, similar in any number of ways. The identification of the difference or similarity is a consequence of a defined framework of search. In other words, in order to investigate the different learnable ways of doing things manifested by the variety of groups with significantly different pasts, we require a theory that can give some handle to distinguish the individual difference from the cultural difference, i.e. we require a theory of cultural difference.

This work does not pretend to accomplish that task. It is only a minor part, even though I claim, a very significant part of the enterprise of providing such a theory. My contention is that there are obstacles to be cleared on the way to such a theory. In chapter 2, I am going to show how the very word ‘culture’ is deeply embedded in a theoretical tradition arising from attempts to answer a different question than what constitutes a cultural difference. In the subsequent chapters, I will follow through a dominant line that contributed to the shaping of the very notion of ‘culture’. We cannot avoid using the concepts in use today to refer to the important things we want to talk about, as for example, that which I indicated in the last paragraph. But nor can we easily shrug off the load of implication threads transported through the history of the concepts we use. That conceptual baggage may rather be a burden in our task than an aid for our work. To make aware of what we are committing ourselves when we use the word ‘culture’ is one of the conceptual under-labourer’s work done in this book. Whereas some aspects of the history of the word ‘culture’ is explicitly handled in chapter 2, the other frequently used words will not be examined in detail. So a few remarks here on their history and the nuances of my use of them. I will be often talking of ‘traditions’. In the bulk of this work, this expression is interchangeable with ‘culture’, but in the latter part, especially in chapter 5, I will introduce a distinction between ‘culture’ and ‘tradition’, and give a technical sense to these words: the former is commandeered to refer to looking at actions or behaviour as manipulable and caused, and the latter to refer to looking at them as learnable. This specific use will be elucidated in detail at the proper juncture. I will be often saying things like ‘the pasts of a group constitute the tradition it inherits’. The word ‘group’ is my preferred expression where normally words like ‘society’, ‘people’, or even ‘nation’ are used.

4

Cf. ‘Seven Strictures On Similarity’ in: Goodman, N. (1972) p. 437-448.

One advantage of using ‘group’ in contrast to these latter terms is that the range of extension of the former term can be left open. It is used here in such a way that it is inclusive of even large aggregates of people: when we speak of a culture or tradition of a ‘group’ we have to assume certain level of validity to the broad distinctions prevalent such as the ‘Western culture’, ‘Indian Culture’, ‘Chinese culture’, ‘African Culture’ etc. but more specific delimitation can be left open. However, there are some disadvantages too. The ‘group’ conveys a sense of being a mere aggregate without any other binding than the coevalness or togetherness or some common past, which today is external to the members of the group. I certainly don’t intend to have these associations of meaning. But the danger of being identified with such associations are preferable than some of the connotations conveyed by those other words mentioned above. Unlike ‘culture’, the expression ‘society’ is more recently invented to talk of an aggregate of people with certain institutions binding them. Its present use is almost the technical one given to it by the Sociologists even though its use has become indispensable even in the day to day orientation. Still in Herder’s time, the word ‘nation’ was doing the job we today delegate to the word ‘society’, but it is now commandeered even in daily use to talk about either the institution of Nation States or of the people living in a Nation State; the formation of this latter institution has some connections with the history of the word ‘culture’, and is almost contemporaneous with that history. The other part of the job ‘nation’ was performing in Herder’s time is taken over today by the word ‘people’, used with singular and plural (to be distinguished from the mass noun having only one form, ‘people’, used to refer to any group of human beings) or the German ‘Volk’. When talking about culture or tradition I want to keep aloof from associations that the terms ‘nation’, ‘people’ and ‘society’ have, and therefore I will be speaking of the pasts of a ‘group’ wherever it is not too awkward, and avoid speaking of the pasts of ‘a people’.

1.3

Theoretical Stance

1.3.1

Deliberation to Decide and to Make the Alternatives Available

One of the tasks of a theoretical under-labourer is to make the theoretical stance itself understandable, especially when the venture looks so outlandish as the present one. What kind of venture is it to identify cultures as knowledge dispositions, and to preoccupy with the problems thereof? In what way does it contribute to our knowledge or welfare? ‘Theoretical’ and ‘practical’ have varied associations; so it is prudent to specify the sense in which theoretical stance is used here. We can distinguish the situation of deliberating when a decision is called for from a situation of reflection in a mood of taking stock, i.e. of a free

reflection on our action and other dispositions in a pensive mood. Just as we can distinguish an interest in cycling as an immediate practical means in order to reach some place from that of experimentally riding the cycle to find out the different modes of cycling, similarly, deliberation to decide, and reflection as an experimental taking stock of one’s actions and dispositions, can be distinguished. The former can be considered to be a ‘practical’ concern, and the latter, a theoretical one.

A theoretical concern may be motivated by a belief that the knowledge acquired by the theoretical activity has a practical efficacy. Nevertheless the theoretical activity is not the same as applying the available knowledge. Further, one has to distinguish the approach of pragmatism as a philosophical doctrine or method as to how to elucidate the theoretical concerns from a pragmatic interest in theories, i.e., an interest in theories in order to solve specific practical problems. The former is a way of clarifying the meaning of an assertion or a theory, by asking the question, what difference it would make in terms of actions if one or the other assertion is maintained. One can be following purely theoretical concerns within the philosophical approach of pragmatism. Broadly speaking my approach is pragmatic in the philosophical sense, but my interest is of a theoretical nature.

A convenient way of distinguishing practical from theoretical situation is by identifying these in terms of their relation to the alternative courses of action. Practical situation is one where deliberation is required or done in order to take a decision, i.e. it is deliberation involved in choosing one course of action eliminating thereby other alternative courses of action from one’s purview. Theoretical situation, on the other hand, is that of making the alternatives available for a choice, i.e. it is a situation of adding to, and not eliminating from, the available fund of courses of action open to ourselves.

We can translate these distinctions onto the level of theoretical engagement itself, and derivatively also onto the disciplines and (research and educational) institutions. One can conceive a discipline for the study of the inheritance from the pasts of different communities (I will be using the word ‘tradition’ in such a context) or different ‘cultures’ with a critical task in view, i.e. a task of exposing the ideological and other underpinnings that underlie certain thought structures, category habits and habits of behaviour. This critical reception is analogous to elimination of alternatives in a situation of decision, for what is being done in such a discipline is that of showing such things as what harm would accrue from such and

such habits, what good would ensue from such and such thought style or behaviour. In contrast, one can conceive a discipline that envisages the study of a culture in order to reconstruct the ways of going about in the world available in that culture. Sometimes, of course, the former type of task may be needed as a preliminary to the latter type of study. For instance, when we have a tradition of conceptualising the other cultures we have already the concepts and theories about those cultures which are rooted in the past of the theoretical tradition which gave rise to those theories and concepts. Such concepts and theories are likely to seep deep into our habits of looking at other cultures that we need effort to look at others as unfamiliar: there may be a familiarity of what the unfamiliar ought to be. A critical enquiry into the historical forces and concerns shaping that tradition of looking at other cultures may then be required in order to free oneself from those bequeathed conceptual habits that come in the way of looking at the alternatives to what is familiar to us. In fact the considerable part of this book devotes to the work of this nature; it reflects on the inherited conceptions with which we think and talk about other cultures, and tries to ask what implications our ways of talking commit us to, and how these implications have been transported through the history of the intellectual tradition in the context of which theories and categories to talk about culture took birth. The import of this part of the work, is thus, in a broad sense, ‘critical’. But it is only a preliminary to a more constructive part, and eventually, I hope, to a new constructive discipline. 1.3.2

Is Theory a Deferred Decision?

Another aspect of the theoretical stance, as I understand it, can be mentioned briefly by drawing attention to an opposite view of what theoretical reflection is. There is a view of the theory that it is related to problem solving when conflicts arise between the already existing habitual modes of orientation in the world. According to this conception, theoretical stance is a specialised mode of those rudimentarily existing behaviours in the biological domain: it is supervenient to a threat to the accustomed behaviour, or a conflict between two or more of such behaviours. Within the context of that view, theoretical activity can only be envisaged when we have some actual conflict, however rudimentary it may be. This view is traceable to a particular reading of Herder’s conception of man as an animal that lacks instincts (‘instinktloses Tier’).5 In this view all human capacities arise from that aspect of man which makes him, in contrast to other animals, a ‘deficient being’ (‘Mängelwesen’), i.e. he is See Gehlen’s appropriation of Herder for his conception of the Philosophical Anthropology, in: Gehlen, A. (1978) p. 73-85. 5

deficient in those capacities that all animals have which are required for a normal biological survival. Man cannot act without a deferred decision, because often he doesn’t have the capacity to decisively act. Reflection is of the nature of this deferred decision to act, and therefore it is necessarily related to an actual or a possible situation where the habitual mode of behaviour is inadequate. Taken to its logical conclusion, this would imply that a habituated mode of life that is successful does not require to be reflective. Projected on to my project, this would mean that only those groups or societies which are finding themselves on the receiving end of the onslaught of the ‘modernisation’ require to think on their inherited modes of actions. For they are threatened of extinction. The so called modern set up has successfully defeated those other groups who may be surviving in margins of a global society. So, what is the point in looking at the forms of behaviour or actions of exactly those societies which are defeated in the process of global hegemony, as learnables?

Thus the action oriented view of human being, in the sense given to it by the view that man is a deficient being, would imply that a theoretical stance as I have elucidated in the previous part of this section, is a self-delusion. Theories when not shown as related to actual or possible conflicts are meaningless. In contrast to this, my view may be read as a view of human being as endowed with a theoretical capacity, which can be exercised without reference to actual and possible conflicts. Both these views are the expression of man as a special animal with ‘reason’ as a capacity, one conceiving reason as a negative term to be defined in terms of ‘instinct’, and the other conceiving it as a positive term not definable as substitute for ‘lack of instinct’. The special niche of these views in the intellectual tradition will become clear as we proceed further in the following pages.

1.4

Under-labouring and Other Philosophical Tasks

In the above I have often used the term ‘conceptual under-labouring’ to refer to the kind of philosophical task I am setting myself. It is time I gave some elucidation of it. As assumed in this work, to philosophy in a broad sense belongs the task of investigating the interconnections of implications of the concepts we use. Ryle has given to this the name ‘drawing the logical geography of concepts’.6 Within this broad characterisation we can distinguish between three different kinds of (sub-) tasks, (i) that of providing an overview or encyclopaedic view, (ii) that of addressing the major paradoxes arising from the practices of

6

See Ryle, G. (1949), p. 9-10.

different sciences, and (iii) that of showing the niche of a felt problem, thereby helping to found new methods of enquiring into hitherto neglected areas. What I have termed as the ‘task of providing the encyclopaedic view’ is what in the beginning of this century used to be called ‘Metaphysics’.7 It was an ambition to synthesise the knowledge available into a unified system of theory. Such ambitions are neither feasible nor necessary, and therefore they have been, by and large, given up. However, we can attempt to articulate the insight meant to be conveyed by the encyclopaedic view in a different way than the attempt to construct a unified and complete theory of the world. It is that the concepts we use are enmeshed with each other in terms of implication threads, and any inventions we make have consequences elsewhere than the immediate field for which the inventions were thought of. The attempt to provide an overview is the attempt to rise above the immediate point of interest. It is an attempt to make the available practices understandable at a reflective rather than at a habitual level. But any such understanding is achieved in the very process of constructing a system of implication threads from a knowinghow level of knowledge to go about in the world: at an habitual level we can say, that we know how to move from one saying to another, what it implies and what it is implied by, even though at moments we may be stuck and confused. The construction of a system of concepts has to take recourse to this knowing-how level of knowledge, even though it may bring out the wider significance of the one or the other knowledge we already possess. But such bringing to the notice of the significance of the knowledge already possessed takes place by the process of confrontation of the knowing-how level knowledge and the constructed concepts, rather than as the end result statable in a theoretical system of propositions. The mistake of the conception of providing a ‘metaphysical system’ was that it was often conceived as if the insight to be gained is in the system as a result rather than in the process of constructing the system itself.8

Overviews are generally attempts at making the available practices or knowledge understandable by focusing on their inter-connections. They may open up new avenues for research in either of the two ways. First, by rearranging what we already know, it may make us see things in a fresh way and make us enquire into connection that may exist that has not

7 8

See for an interesting discussion of the notion of Metaphysics: Pears, D.F. (ed.) (1959). See Ch. 6 in: Rao, N. (1994).

been thought significant enough to be pursued. I hope, what I am going to narrate in the chapters 2 - 7, will be perceived as of this nature. I am hoping that particular kind of focus on the history of the concerns that shaped the concepts we have inherited to talk about cultures can be made to yield insights. I will draw attention to some well known facts such as (a) that the ancients were not Christians, (b) that intellectually it is the philosophies produced by the ancients, especially that of Aristotle, that were the mainstay of the Christian theology, and it is through the mediation of the Christian philosophers that the philosophy of the modern period originated. And I hope to raise a question as to the significance of these facts for a theory of culture.

The second way an attempt to provide an overview may open up new avenues of (empirical) research is as a result of the difficulty experienced in juggling the current concepts in use to cohere with each other. When such difficulties are acute we can consider the philosophical task as that of a second variety. This variety of task is especially thrown up in a context of a more and more specialisation: the specialised domains of investigations give rise to more and more specialised technical concepts meant for effective conduct of enquiry within those fields; but the habits of thinking engendered by the disciplines one works in day in and day out would make one susceptible to think of even other issues, i.e. those issues that are outside the purview of that discipline, with the same category habits. Moreover, the specialised concepts may even percolate to daily talk, and one may not be clear about which implication threads to be right, and which not, and why that which is right, is right. These conflicts call for resolution in such a way that we would get an overview of the niche within which these concepts function. As the famous example goes, in Kant’s time it was thought that the new science of physics of the day, the Newtonian physics with its paradigm of explaining everything in terms of the motion transmitted from one particle to another, preached a kind of view that is inimical to the free-will; Kant wanted to ‘make room for faith’ without denying the validity of the new science.9 Instead of ‘making room for faith’ one can even say that he wanted to make room for the possibility of assuming responsibility for the acts of omission and commission essential for the legal institutions to work. He drew the logical geography of the concepts like ‘cause’, ‘freedom’, the ‘legal’ and ‘moral responsibility’, and such like concepts. Kant’s philosophy has the special feature that it can be either considered as resolving the paradox arising out of the frameworks of concepts underlying the specialised

9

See Vorrede zur 2. Aufl., Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 34-35.

practices, like physics and legal institution for example, or as attempt to construct an encyclopaedic kind of overview. But this is not the case with one of the progenies of the problems that Kant attempted to solve. The conceptual paradox of the conflict between causality and free-will has its progeny in the analytical philosophy of mind: The following three assumptions appear equally compelling, but they conflict with each other. i) the mental has physical consequences - the decisions result in actions that involve physical effects; ii) the physical should be conceived as having only physical causes; iii) the mental cannot be reduced to physical phenomena, i.e. there are such things as ‘intending’, ‘wishing’ etc. which cannot be explicated in terms of physiological concepts.10 One can say that the whole of analytical philosophy of mind is constituted by the attempted solutions to this paradox, and the arguments for and against such solutions.

Common to both the conceptions delineated above is the activity of reminding us what we already know in the contexts when we have overlooked it. This reminding is also part of the third conception, the Lockean under-labourer conception of the philosophical task. As I have said already, the present work is motivated by the Lockean notion of philosophy as underlabourer of empirical sciences, but it also attempts to combine this with the notion of philosophy as clarifying what we already know. When I say that dispositions handed down one generation to another are the endowments we have for orienting and solving the problems of life, I am just reminding what more or less everyone knows. Everyone who has an acquaintance with a milieu where the formal institutions of education like schools are lacking, know fully well how much of things have been learnt by the children in the process of growing in that milieu. Even those who do not have a direct acquaintance with such milieus can imagine the situation of growing old without formal schooling yet learning the skills needed to master the problems of life. So in specifying the behavioural dispositions acquired from a milieu as knowledge dispositions, I am merely reminding what many know or, at least, can imagine, and giving it a technical name, so as to give it a wider significance than what one generally recognises. This attempt to give wider significance to something one already knows is what the underlabourer conception of the philosophical task is. It is a sustained attempt to think through

10

This formulation of the mind-body problem in a new context of Analytical Philosophy is due to P. Bieri, cf. his introduction to Philosophie des Geistes (Bieri, P. 1993).

common sense intuitions in order to clarify certain questions which may open up new domains of investigation. The best example of this kind of work is that of Saussure drawing a distinction between langue and parole on the one hand and langue and langage on the other.11 He suggested that for an investigation of languages, one can distinguish the ‘speech event’ in the sense of particular sayings by individuals at different places and times from the ‘language system’ (or langue) that is made use in order to produce these sayings. Similarly, language system is different from the totality of the possibilities it opens up for an individual to make use of. Thus by distinguishing language system from its particular uses by individuals on the one hand, and from an open system to which each individual and generation can contribute, on the other, Saussure opened up the possibility of making linguistics an empirical science we know of it today. (Chomsky’s distinction between competence and performance, as far as its immediate heuristic value apart from its particular type of psychologistic embedding is concerned, is identical with that of Saussure’s langue and parole). It also opened up a possibility of looking at human actions and institutions in terms of the underlying structure, and we know how extensive Saussure’s distinction has been made use of, ranging from that in the investigations of texts and myths to social systems.

1.5

Object- vs. Conceptual Questions and Empirical vs. Heuristic Theories

In the foregoing as well as in the following I have assumed that there is a distinction between empirical and conceptual enquiries. As is well known, about this distinction there are controversies. I just ignore those controversies, and assume for my purpose the distinction in the following way. We have an empirical question at hand when, in order to answer it, some information that we do not yet possess is required. When what is required is essentially thinking through the available information and rearranging it, then we have a conceptual question at hand. As I have already indicated in the previous section, this rearranging may goad us into an enquiry of a domain to get new information. On a higher level of abstraction it may goad us to conceive the domain in a new way and see whether this new way of conceiving the domain is empirically fruitful, whether it can generate interesting new theories which can be empirically tested etc. This distinction between conceiving a domain in a new

See the third chapter in the part titled ‘Introduction’ in: Saussure, F. (1959). Also cf. the section 4.1.1. Contrastive and definitional uses of Technical Terms’, in: Rao, N. (1994), p. 93-96. 11

way to generate empirically testable theories and the formulation of the empirical theories themselves, i.e. those theories for which a fairly clear criterion of empirical falsifiability exists, is generally accepted, however much the controversy may exist regarding where to draw the line, and how impermeable the line is. We can term those suggestions to look at a domain in a particular way as ‘heuristic theories’. Saussure’s demarcation, discussed in the foregoing section, of language system from speech event on the one hand, and langage on the other, is a heuristic suggestion, a powerful and fruitful one, but nevertheless not an empirical theory. It generated interesting empirical theories, and has brought into existence the empirical science of linguistics. But drawing that distinction was dependent upon no new facts unavailable before him, it was just reminding us the significance of the distinctions we can make, and making us able to ask interesting questions about particular languages, giving rise thereby to a mass of information about many languages of the world.

In the following I will be discussing the role played by the distinction between things that are made and things that are generated, or that grow by themselves, in the history of the European intellectual tradition. It is a heuristic distinction drawn from the daily life but then applied to any number of issues, including that of the nature of human knowledge, and the very human nature. Their influence in the conceptual apparatus we use to talk and formulate questions about culture is the theme of a considerable portion of this book. Similarly, but with a little more tutoring behind it, is the distinction between sense or instinct versus reason. This distinction gets made use of to characterise man as distinct from animals on the one hand, and gods or God on the other. In a secularised form, this heuristic distinction gets later used in order to distinguish (in the philosophical anthropology) man from animals by considering him as free from binding to the natural environment, ‘umweltfrei’ or ‘weltoffen’ in contrast to the animals which are considered as bound to the environment or Umwelt. How large a portion of our distinctions - both in phenomenological sociology and sociology of science actually stem from such heuristic distinctions is an interesting project of research.

1.6

The Category Habit

In the following I will be using the term ‘category habit’ to convey the idea that there are habits of thinking moulded by dominant models of thinking. I have borrowed this term from Ryle, and therefore what he says about it is appropriate for my purpose too: „I think it is worthwhile to take some pains with this word ‘category’, but not for the usual reason, namely that there exists an exact, professional way of using it, in which, like a skeleton key, it will

turn all our locks for us; but rather for the unusual reason that there is an inexact, amateurish way of using it in which, like a coal-hammer, it will make a satisfactory knocking noise on doors which we want opened to us. It gives the answers to none of our questions but it can be made to arouse people to the questions in a properly brusque way. 12

Category habits like all other habits are not consciously held beliefs, nor consistent theories, nor even consciously followed strategies of thinking. They are habits of thought that can be identified as giving rise to a certain array of arguments and a line of thinking. Because these lines of thinking do not constitute a part of the consciously followed strategy of thinking on a question, they are not necessarily followed consistently. Rather, they are habits of thinking fostered by assumptions that are accepted as trivially or evidently true, and therefore thought of as not requiring extra scrutiny. They involve models taken as paradigms for any theorisation.

One example for the category habit that has played a role in the history I am narrating is the habit fostered by Christianity of thinking of the world as made by God, thus erasing the distinction that was there for the ancients between the generated things such as plants and the made things such as beds. This resulted in thinking about the nature on the same lines as involved in that of making things by man. For the ancients, whereas the mechanics was a techne and was meant to conceptualise the principles involved in effecting the movements of the bodies, the Astronomy was a theoria conceptualising the principles of part of the movements found in the nature, i.e. in things that have their principles of change within themselves. Therefore, it was not possible for them to imagine that the latter could be conceived in the same lines as movements produced by man, i.e. thinking of identifying the principles involved in mechanics with the causes in the field of Astronomy. What was not possible for the ancients to imagine was made possible for Galileo because of the category habit of thinking the world as made and not as something generated.13 A similar type of consequence for a thinking about human institutions because of the category habit effected by the Christian mediation of the philosophy of Aristotle will be pointed out later in chapters 3 and 4 .

12

Ryle, G. (1954) p. 9. I have discussed this elsewhere in more detail, see section ‘God as the Artificer and Nature as the Artefact’, in: Rao (1994). Also, see chapter 3 in Watkins (1965). The upgrading of the practical arts into theoretical disciplines and the ensuing 'knowledge-is-power-ideal' is traced by Randall to the alliance between the study of medicine and that of Aristotle in Padua. See Randall, J.H. (1961); he has also shown that experimental physics owes a lot to an Aristotelian school of Medicine in Padua. Also cf. Serene E. (1982, p. 496-518), see especially p. 505 and footnote 7 on that page; James, A./ Weisheipel, O.P. (eds.) (1982, p. 521-36), both in: Kretzmann et al. (eds.) (1982). 13

To bring to light such category-habits is different from a historical empirical study of the history of philosophy. That is, it is assumed here that there is a task of the philosophical study of history of ideas or philosophy in contrast to the historical study of ideas or philosophy. The former is a task of identifying the category habits governing the thinking of an author, a current of thinking or an epoch. The latter has the task of weighing the evidence for one reading against another of an author, a current of thinking, or an epoch. These two tasks are mutually dependent upon each other; for to formulate a reading, one must construct a coherence system of concepts, and this is what is done in a philosophical study of a thinker, an epoch etc. Nevertheless a logical distinction between these tasks can be maintained, even though not the separability of them in practice.

The aim:  not ideologiekritik:  not empirical theory The notion of making alternatives available is goaded by the contemporary situation. It is not seeking an ideal past, not seeking an ‘identity’ through past, nor intended to criticise ideological constructions of the past. Rather it is governed by the notion of alternatives. But how to avoid the inherited modes of thinking in constructing the ‘alternatives’? in other words how to avoid the empiricist attitude at the level of symbols as characterised by the line of thinking pursued by Goodman. If avoiding the inherited modes is considered as unavoidable we end up in conceiving the reflection as a process of conceptualising what is already available in the tradition.

Reference Mnafred Brockner und Heino Heinrich Nau (Hrsgs), Ethnozentrismus: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen des interkulturellen Dialogs, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1997, see especially, the article by Rothermund.

2

The Modernity Paradigm

This chapter is meant to identify and elucidate a category habit pervading our discourse on social and cultural issues. My suggestion is that underlying our culture discourse there is a paradigm of thinking which I will designate as ‘modernity paradigm’.

This paradigm is epitomised in the following credo of one of the reputed Dutch journalists: „I would suggest that the primitive is a condition of life wherein the instinctive, subjective and collective values tend to predominate: the civilised condition of life is where the rational, objective and individual take command. Throughout history the two have been at one another’s throats because it appears that the value of one depends on the rejection of the other.“ 14

Since there will be occasion for repeated reference to this passage I require a term of convenience; so I will use ‘epitome’ here onwards to refer to this passage. The decisive concepts in the epitome are the ‘primitive’ and the ‘civilised’ condition with the correlation of them to collectivist and instinctive values on the one hand, and individualist and rational values, on the other. As a precaution perhaps I need to remark that my interest is not in the controversy concerning the evaluative associations of the terms ‘primitive’ and ‘civilised’, but rather in the congealed conceptual history that can be discerned from the listing of the subjective, instinctive and collective on the one hand, and the rational, objective and ‘individual taking the command’, on the other. This contrast underlies a lot of models for social investigation, and our discourse on social and cultural issues are saturated with it. An evocative image is that of a society where the individual is in an organic relation with nature and tradition as contrasted with a society where he is an autonomous entity with his own decision playing a role. Thus the same paradigm of thinking can be espoused even by reversing the evaluation: sometimes the collective orientations are considered as noble and sometimes the individual ones. Either way one can construct a history of human evolution from (or to) a collectivist to (or from) an individualist orientation, irrespective of whether as a story of progress or of degeneration.

14

Cf. van der Post, L. (1964), p. 272.

What is more interesting is to trace the history of the term ‘civilised’ and its association with ‘the individual taking command’. This term has a longer history than its opposite member in the epitome, the ‘primitive’15, even though it is doubtful whether the association with ‘individual taking command’ is equally old. Whereas the ‘primitive’ came into use sometime in the second half of the 19th century, and especially as a term of art in the discipline of Cultural Anthropology, the ‘civilised’ is derived from civis, the city, a direct translation of the Greek ‘polis’, - a term used by Aristotle in his Politics in the sense of a human association formed from a group of villages; further, according to Aristotle, polis shows a higher level of realisation of the human purposes than other forms of association such as family and village. I will be discussing later the relevant passage of Politics, and its significance for social and cultural theory.

For the present I want to merely assert that it is a particular interpretation put on this passage by Kant and the German idealism from which, ultimately, the conceptions of instinctive and collective orientation versus rational and individualist orientation stem.16 Further, Aristotle’s conception involves a notion of ‘good’ (agathos) that human beings can and have to achieve, and the human actions and institutions can be judged as the grades of realisation of that human good. I have used the phrase ‘have to’ in the previous sentence deliberately to distinguish it from the ‘should’ of command and ‘ought’ of obligation. For the ‘good’ here is conceived not as something a moral law commands to our attention. But it is not a mere object of desires either. It is more akin to a biological urge that would manifest itself under proper conditions and care. This is evident by the fact that for Aristotle every ‘natural kind’ substance has the ‘good’ it can achieve and man is only one of the ‘natural kind’ substances. The good each natural kind object can and has to achieve can be discovered by enquiring into what Aristotle calls ‘the why’ of them. The answer to the why of each thing is the nature of it, and to know the nature is also to know what the good it is capable of. In the case of man, by knowing the ‘why’ of his existence, i.e. his nature, one can recommend towards what good he has to and can strive for. (I will use throughout the phrase ‘has to and can’ and grammatical variations of it to indicate the sense of urge that an Aristotelian good is meant to evoke.) The Greek and Roman words of contrast to the ‘civilised’ was ‘barbaric’. In the 18th century, and till the word ‘primitive’ was invented the word in use was ‘savage’ and sometimes, ‘brute’. In other words, the word ‘primitive’ is already a sanitised substitute for still more condescending or outright abusive terms. 16 Kant and Herder’s philosophy of history and their connection to the passage in Politics will be discussed in chapter 5 and 6 respectively. 15

Obviously, this idea of the good requires a more elaborate interpretation and I will not be able to go into it. My purpose is a limited one of drawing attention to the connection between that notion of good, either Aristotelian or some unsystematised precedent of it, and the Greek ideal of education of the citizen of polis - the wise and good man (kalos k’agathos). This educational ideal transmitted through mainly, but not exclusively, by the writings of Aristotle was to become later the ideal of Cassiodorus’ programme of education, the civilitas, the ‘cultivation’ of a human being;17 the metaphor of cultivation is more than a fashion of talking: it is the outcome of Aristotle’s, a very specific sort of, biological model for understanding the nature of things, including that of human being, and its implications for the ideal through which to shape and live one’s life. Still later, especially the study of humanitas - education proper to man - believed by its propagators in the 15th century to be the Greek ideal of paideia, is meant as development of all the virtues - ‘virtues’ in the sense of perfection one has the potentials for, and not in the mere moral sense of actions in accordance with principles of justice18 - that the human being is capable of; it too is informed by the ‘good’. In short, the notion of good, in the sense of what man can and has to strive for, used to underlie the notion of making someone or some group cultured or civilised. If we focus now on the use of the words ‘civilised’ and ‘primitive’ in the epitome, it is striking in its ambiguity as to whether to be descriptive or evaluative. This ambiguity is pregnant of historical traces of both the Aristotelian recommendatory use and the more modern, and ostensibly, mere descriptive use. On the one hand, ‘the civilised’ and ‘the primitive’ appear to be meant to designate the conflicting ethos characterising the ‘natural condition’, that is, the conflicting ethos to be found within any society. On the other hand, the passage leaves no doubt that the civilised ethos is something to be strived after. In this use ‘civilised’ and ‘cultured’ are synonymous.

Cassiodorus lived in the 6th century CE. The word ‘civilitas’ occurs in the work called Instituiones divinarum et saecularium et litterarum, the second part of which contains a brief exposition of seven liberal arts, considered as valuable inheritance from the pagan learning. This second part was most widely used in the mediaeval period and commented upon, and is the source of the Carolingan conception of the liberal arts to be taught in the newly established schools for monks, which later became the model for the organisation of the universities in late mediaeval period. Cf. Ziegler, T. (1904), p. 19 and 26, also see: Leff, G. (1958), p. 55-73. 18 Sometimes the virtue ethics is considered as a transitional form of ethics between the Aristotelian notion governed by the notion of ‘good’ and modern notions governed by that of ‘right’. 17

‘Culture’ used to be what it in a popular feuilleton usage still is: a term to mark off the cultivated individuals, and perhaps also a strata of society, from the uncultivated. It was not specifically meant to compare the whole ‘societies’ taken as exhibiting the different ‘ways of life’. The ‘primitive’, on the other hand, is borrowed from the academic use in the discipline of Cultural Anthropology and there it is meant to refer to ‘a way’ of life of the whole society. Though one can distinguish between the history of the word ‘culture’ and that of ‘civilisation’, still, it is undisputed that the coming into being of a term, whether ‘civilisation’ (in expressions such as ‘civilised nations’) or ‘culture’, to speak of the whole way of life of a people, and compare it with the way of life of another such people or nation is comparatively recent.19 The emergence of this new use of ‘culture’ in English to refer to a ‘way of life’, and ultimately its being incorporated into the vocabulary of social sciences, has been traced by Raymond Williams in his landmark study of the history of the semantic web connecting ‘industry’, ‘democracy’, ‘class’, ‘art’ and ‘culture’.20 One significant contributory factor, however, he fails to mention, namely, the controversy about ‘ancients’ versus ‘moderns’.21 (The trace of this controversy is visible in the very term central to the discipline that took birth in the 19th century, the Sociology: ‘the modern’ as against the ‘traditional’ society).22 Starting as a controversy in the medieval universities about the text books to be used, it became by the 15th century a divide between those who upheld the place of ‘the wisdom of the ancients’ (in the form of inherited texts) in education and those who decried them in favour of more recently created knowledge. In the course of the 17th to the 19th century, this latter came to be identified with natural science and its methods, and the former with the literary heritage. Also, natural science was identified with analytical and particularised knowledge, whereas the literary heritage was associated with a much more essential development of man’s humanity, a ‘holistic’ development of human abilities. There were many different coinages of terms to make roughly this same contrast. Pascal’s esprit de

19

Cf. The preface by Willimas, R. (1958). Cf. Williams, R. (1958). 21 See Sorell, T. (ed.) (1995), especially, part III: Modernity in Morals and Politics. 22 For the centrality of the contrast modern vs. traditional to the classical sociology, see Giddens, A. (1989). The following succinctly puts the point: „The Social Sciences had their first formation somewhere around the mid 18th century in Western Europe. Emerging as a set of concerns having claims to ‘universality’ they were from their beginnings confined by perspectives and emphases reflecting their contexts of origin. The leading figures in the ‘classical social theory’ of the 19th and early 20th centuries were all preoccupied with the transformation of the ‘traditional’ into the ‘modern’ - in some sense - and the implications of this for likely future developments“ by Giddens A. (1989), p. 250. 20

geometrie and esprit de finesse, is perhaps one of the earliest, and also most clearly drawn, even though his contrast as an educational ideal was not meant to imply the cultivation of one to the exclusion of the other. Pascal uses these terms to contrast the exercise of particular skills and capabilities, on the one hand, and an involvement of the ‘whole man’ in the exercising capacities and judgements, on the other.23

The divide between those who emphasise the religious and literary heritage in the education of man to cultivate his humanity and those who emphasise the scientific knowledge as the ideal of education to emancipate him is an important current, recurring again and again in different guises.24 To one such recurrence in 19th century England we owe the incorporation of ‘culture’ into the vocabulary of the social sciences. ‘Culture’ entered first as an instrument of polemics in the controversy regarding the nature of social reform. On the one side there were ‘utilitarians’ or ‘philosophical radicals’ as they were called, and on the other side the protagonists of ‘culture’. Bentham, James Mill, John Stuart Mill, Aldous Huxley, and Herbert Spencer at different periods were representatives of the former camp; Coleridge, Carlyle and Mathew Arnold similarly of the other camp. Coleridge’s use of the word ‘culture of feeling’ was meant roughly in the same way as Pascal’s esprit de finesse. Cultivation is for him, „the harmonious development of those qualities and the faculties that characterise our humanity.“25

We will have occasion to see the philosophical significance of the emphasised word ‘humanity’ later. The expression ‘common humanity of mankind’ is quite ubiquitous in the writings of the 19th century. Coleridge’s ally, Wordsworth, makes use of this notion to describe the nature of knowledge the poetry conveys in contrast to other kinds of knowledge in use in daily life: „Aristotle, I have been told, has said, that Poetry is the most philosophic of writing: it is so: its object is truth, not individual and local, but general and operative; not standing upon external testimony, but carried alive into the heart by passion; [...] possessed of that information which may be expected from him, not as a lawyer, a physician, a mariner, an astronomer, or a natural philosopher, but as a Man. [...] He (the poet) is the rock of defence for human nature; an upholder and preserver, carrying everywhere with him relationship and love. In spite of difference of soil and climate, of language and manners, of laws and customs: in spite of things silently gone out of mind,

23

Cf. Kearns, E.J. (1982), p.102-103. Cf. on the C.P. Snow’s attack on ‘Two Cultures’ and its precedents and successor currents in British and American Literary Criticism, in: Lepenies W. (1988), chapter 6. 25 Cf. Coleridge, S.T., ed. by Coburn, K. (1969), vol. X. p. 42-3. 24

and things violently destroyed, the Poet binds together by passion and knowledge the vast empire of human society, as it spread over the whole earth, and over all time.“ 26

In the very language of Wordsworth, persons acquainted with the literature of Christian piety can unmistakably identify the religious origin of the notion of a knowledge of ‘whole man’. My interest, however, is to draw attention to the contrast made between the specialised knowledge and the supposedly holistic and ‘universal’ knowledge that poetry affords. In a similar vein to Wordsworth above, Shelly’s Defence of Poetry is directed against evaluating the ‘calculating faculty’ above that of ‘imaginative faculty’: „While the mechanist abridges, and the political economist combines, labour, let them bewares of their speculations, for want of correspondence with those first principles which belong to the imagination, do not tend, as they have in modern England, to exasperate at once the extremes of luxury and want. [...] The rich have become richer and the poor have become the poorer. [...] Such are the effects which must ever flow from an unmitigated exercise of the calculating faculty.“ 27

The ‘calculating faculty’, in the same way as Pascal’s esprit de geometrie, is used above in a more general sense than the exercise of a mathematical skill. It is also an indirect reference to Bentham’s doctrine of „hedonic calculus“ for choosing between the alternative courses of action. Bentham’s interest was in the Principles of Morals and Legislation, as this title of the book he published suggests.28 More generally, he and his followers, especially J.S. Mill, Huxley, and Spencer were interested in establishing the project of scientific study of man or ‘moral science’ as Mill called it. However, the controversy did not take place in the form of an academic dispute on how to study human phenomena, but on a question of social reform. Mainly the question was with regard to the nature of education and the responsibility to educate the citizens.29 J.S. Mill and his peers as well as followers were ‘utilitarians’ upholding the need for scientific subjects in the education. Their opponents thought that they were downgrading the education for ‘culture’. ‘Culture’ was meant to connote the need for an education for the cultivation of humanity of man and to emphasise the role of literature and literary sensibility in such a cultivation.30 26

Hutchinson, T. (ed.) (1908), p. 938-939. P.B.Shelly, ‘A Defence of Poetry’, in: MacIntyre and Ewing (ed.) (1930), p. 270. 28 Bentham, J. (1989). 29 See Williams, R. (1958) part I, especially, chapters 2, 4, 6 and 7. 30 This divide reappears within the discipline of Anthropology, in a transformed fashion as between those upholding the naturalistic approach and those calling for hermeneutic method. 27

Though not directly discussed, a question about the method of investigation did play a role in this controversy. J.S. Mill captures this accurately while writing on his assessment of the relative merits and drawbacks of Bentham and Coleridge: „By Bentham beyond all others, men have been led to ask themselves in regard to any ancient or received opinion, Is it true? and by Coleridge, what is the meaning of it? The one took his stand outside the received opinion, and surveyed it as an entire stranger to it: the other looked at it from within, and endeavoured to see it within the eyes of a believer in it.“ 31

Thus the divide between philosophical radicals and their opponents is the answer they gave to the question: is a third person perspective sufficient and appropriate for the study of the human phenomena? The former answered it in the affirmative and the latter in the negative. The answer that the study from a third perspective is sufficient I will call ‘naturalism’32. The proponents of naturalism extolled the application of ‘experimental methods’ (a third person approach par excellence) and the knowledge gained by it for the social reform. The opponents of naturalism denied the usefulness of such knowledge for cultivating the moral sphere of man.

To make this contrast between the knowledge from a first person and from a third person perspective understandable, let me give an example: Durkheim put forward the hypothesis that religion binds individuals into a social cohesion.33 Suppose this to be true, it then is a piece of knowledge about society obtained by ‘experimental method’ in the sense the philosophical radicals gave to it; i.e., it is knowledge obtained by a third person perspective. The opponents of naturalism would argue that such a hypothesis, even if true, would not give us any clue as to the beliefs the practitioners of religion entertain as reasons (as against causes) for the actions they perform. Thus for the opponents of culture, though science and scientific method can contribute to the development of specialised skills, in the domain of morality it has no value; for moral capacity is not of the nature of a specialised skill. Of course, it too requires to be developed through education, but the education required is not 31

John Stuart Mill, Collected Works, Vol. X. p. 119. This term is fairly accepted in philosophic circles. But there is no term capable of consensus for the opponents of naturalism; I thought of using ‘idealism’, but not all opponents would be willing to consider their position is ‘idealistic’. Idealism as a current is too closely associated with the German idealism of Schelling, Fichte and Hegel. I also thought of ‘humanism’, but its is too wide a term to demarcate the group of people I want to designate. So I am using in the following sometimes the term ‘protagonists of culture’ just for convenience. For a detailed discussion of the ‘first person’ and ‘third person’ perspective, see chapter 8. 33 See Durkheim, E. (1915). 32

that in science but in literature. Poetry or Literature has the task of developing the ‘culture’ of man, by instilling in him a knowledge of a variety that informs the ‘whole man’ and his ‘whole way of life’. Naturalism can be traced back to the attempts to put the practical philosophy ‘on the secure path of science’ such as that of Hobbes in the 17th century which then culminated in the project of a moral science by Mill. The desire to establish a science of human nature is equally motivated by the engagement in the social issues of the day as the motivation of those who opposed naturalism. Locke’s attempt to determine the limits and scope of human understanding was conceived as a contribution to overcome the passions that lead to civil war. Hobbes similarly believed that if Leviathan (the artificial body of the State) is founded on the basis of a sound science of human nature, peace and prosperity can be ensured.34 This project was later taken over in the attempt to establish a ‘science of commonwealth’ (Adam Smith and James Mill). All these were efforts of thinking directed at the specific social issues of the times in which the concerned philosophers lived, like that of overcoming the civil war (Thomas Hobbes), or the alleviation of misery of working men by effecting the legal reform (James Mill).

In other words, the proponents equally as the opponents of naturalism were motivated by an ideal of ‘common humanity’ and engaged in social reform, and therefore looked at knowledge in terms of its power to bring about a more perfect form of society. But they differed in the conception of knowledge that can become effective in that endeavour. For naturalism, knowledge is something that is gained from the ‘experimental method’, i.e. from a third person perspective. For the opponents, i.e. the protagonists of ‘culture’, there is another form of knowledge - a knowledge that in some sense involves the ‘whole man’ and his ‘whole way of life’, and that which can be gained only by involving a first person perspective. In a later chapter I will go into elucidating these two conceptions of knowledge and argue in detail that the issue turns on the conception of the relation between the ‘ideal’ and the ‘actual situation’, whether we can have knowledge of the former or it is something to be had on the basis of just a decision or will. For the present it is enough to point out that for the opponents of naturalism, ‘culture’ cannot have a mere descriptive use, for it is conceived

34

Cf. Introduction in: Hobbes (1651, cit. 1969), p.59.

as an ideal to be actualised, and thereby it necessarily issues in judgements whether, and to what extent, an action or an actual situation realises the ideal.

One further point of emphasis: even the proponents of naturalism in the 19th century entertained the notion of a ‘common humanity’ and used it in a self-assured manner. The exact meaning of the term as they used it is difficult to fix, but its use certainly indicates the belief in a common measure of perfection with which to judge the achievements of different epochs and civilisations: one thing that the 19th century writers were not squeamish about was evaluating. Also, its kinship to, or even identity with, striving after ‘spiritual perfection’ was clearly acknowledged. While reading the philosophical literature of the 19th century England, one is struck by the fact how important this notion of perfection then was, and how today it is no part of the general vocabulary, except perhaps in some ceremonial talk. In his essays meant to assess Coleridge and Bentham, and to integrate their contributions by reconciling their opposing views on society, Mill remarks that: „Man is never recognised by Bentham as a being capable of spiritual perfection as an end,“ 35

and, as against this, though a Benthamite himself, he commends the contribution of what he calls the ‘Germano-Coleridgian school’ as following: „But the peculiarity of the Germano-Coleridgian school is, that they saw [...] to the fundamental principles involved in all such controversies. They were the first [...] who enquired with any comprehensiveness or depth, into the inductive laws of the existence and growth of human society. [...] They were the first to bring forward [...] essential principles of all permanent social existence. They thus produced [...] a philosophy of society, in the only form in which it is yet possible, that of a philosophy of history; not a defence of particular ethical or religious doctrines, but a contribution, the largest made by any class of thinkers, towards the philosophy of human culture.36

[...] They [...] who regarded the maintenance of society [...] in a state of progressive advancement as a very difficult task, (therefore led to) enquire, both what were the requisites of the permanent existence of the body politic, and what were the conditions which had rendered the preservation of these permanent requisites compatible with perpetual and progressive improvement. And hence that series of great writers and thinkers, from Herder to Michlet, by whom history [...] has been made a science of causes and effects; who by making the facts and events of the past have [...] an intelligible place in the gradual evolution of humanity, [...] afforded the only means of predicting and guiding the future, by unfolding the agencies which have produced and still maintain the present.

35 36

Cf. John Stuart Mill, Collected Works, Vol. X., p. 95. John Stuart Mill, Collected Works, Vol. X., p. 138-139.

The same causes have naturally led the same class of thinkers to do what their predecessors never could have done, for the philosophy of culture. For the tendency of their speculations compelled them to see in the character of the education existing in any political society, at once the principal cause of its permanence as a society, and the chief source of its progressiveness [...]. Besides, not to have looked upon the culture of the inward man as the problem of problems, would have been incompatible with the belief which many of these philosophers entertained in Christianity, and the recognition by all of them of its historical value [...]. But here too, let us not fail to observe, they rose to the principles, and did not stick in the particular case. The culture of the human being had been carried to no ordinary height, and human nature had exhibited many of its noblest manifestations, not in Christian countries only, but in the ancient world, in Athens, Sparta, Rome, [...]. Every form of polity, every condition of society, whatever else it had done, had formed its type of national character. What that type was, and how it had been made what it was, were questions which the metaphysician might overlook, but a historical philosopher could not. Accordingly, the views respecting the various elements of human culture and the causes influencing the formation of national character, which pervade the writings of the Germano-Coleridgian school, throw into the shade everything which had been effected before, [...].“37

There are several things of interest in this perceptive assessment of the German idealism. I will confine myself to three points. First, Mill identifies the significance of the ‘Coleridge and the German school’ in the setting up of a view of the spiritual perfection that Bentham lacked. Moreover, it was set up as an ideal for the perfection of the body politic, i.e. for social perfection, and not merely for an individual cultivation. Secondly, he identifies the German school to have built a philosophy of history which he considers as a contribution towards the ‘philosophy of human culture’. The word ‘culture’ is used here clearly in a recommendatory sense, since what Mill refers to are ‘the noblest manifestations of human nature’ and not just ‘a way of life’. But there is a twist, and with it, we come to the third point: bearing in mind that in his day the word ‘philosophy’ indifferently meant what we today distinguish into separate disciplines, science and philosophy, his commendation of the contribution of the ‘German school’ was as a contribution towards his own endeavour of establishing a science of man, or ‘moral science’. This contribution, he identifies, first, with that of making the history the ‘science of causes and effects’, and second, with ‘making the facts and the events of the past have an intelligible place in the gradual evolution of humanity’. This reveals the historical (and also the kind of conceptual) link that exists between the German Geschichtsphilosophie and the Spencerian evolutionism. The latter is a hypothesis within the

37

John Stuart Mill, Collected Works, Vol. X., p. 139-140.

framework of naturalism espoused by Mill; but its scheme of evolution stems from the speculative history provided by the German idealism. In spite of there being a dominance of ‘Absolute Idealism’ of Green and Bradley in the philosophy departments at the fin de siècle England, especially in Oxford, naturalism did succeed in Britain by the end of 19th century as far as the social study is concerned.38 The word ‘culture’, that which was an instrument of polemic against naturalism, itself entered into the vocabulary of naturalism: a new discipline came into being that appropriated and incorporated the term ‘culture’ to form ‘Cultural Anthropology’. The moving spirit behind the emergence of this discipline is evolutionism, which can be looked at as a particular hypothesis within the approach of naturalism. Also, Cultural Anthropology was conceived as an encompassing and unified idea of scientific study of man - a sort of universal history of the ‘German Philosophy of History’ variety, but based on empirical methods. These philosophical moorings along with the dominant representative of it, Herbert Spencer - who was very popular in his time amongst intelligentsia - are, of course, now forgotten. But not the new discipline, though it also changed the name from ‘Cultural’ to ‘Social Anthropology’. The original adjective ‘cultural’ was meant to contrast it with the biological study of man and also to oppose biologism: The term ‘Anthropology’ connoted in England of 19th century the study of physical characteristics of man - what now is called as Physical Anthropology. ‘Culture’ came to be understood as those aspects that are inherited historically rather than biologically, but those that can be studied equally naturalistically as any other features of phenomena. The extent of the change in the meaning of ‘culture’ effected by this embedding of it in a naturalistic approach to the study of man can be gauged by comparing the Coleridge’s use of ‘culture’39 - used in the context of a programme of cultivating a humane ‘feeling’ that is to pervade the ‘whole man’ - to that of ‘culture’ as ‘that complex whole’ as defined in the following: „Culture or civilisation, taken in its widest ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.“ 40

38

See chapter 3 of Skorupski, J. (1993). Also see the chapters 3 and 4 in part II in: Lepenies, W. (1988), p. 93111. 39 see above note 12. 40 Tyler, E.B. (1871, cit. 1958), p. vii.

This definition by Tyler is considered as historically first initiating the discipline of Social Anthropology. But whereas ‘culture’ as a ‘whole way of life’ earlier in the century was meant to imply an educational ideal, Tyler’s term ‘culture’ as a ‘complex whole of capabilities inherited by man as a member of society’ is meant to be a mere descriptive term, and meant not to contain any implication of an ideal to be realised.41

In Germany too there was a struggle between naturalism and its opponents. In fact, Coleridge borrowed his ideas largely from the German idealists, and his circle and followers are referred to by J.S. Mill as ‘Germano-Coleridgian school’42. But, unlike in Britain, naturalism did not have a sway in Germany.43 Yet, here too, the word ‘culture’ gets transformed from its use in Herder44 as something implying an educational ideal into a wholly descriptive use in Max Weber. The current generated by the concern with ‘the wisdom of the ancients’ developed in Germany a conception of human studies involving a ‘hermeneutic method’. The latter was originally meant as a method of interpreting texts, but later, by an extension of the original meaning, came to mean interpreting any human expression, whether in texts or in actions. Human expressions are considered as embodying ‘Sinn’. This latter concept can be best understood as an extension of our day to day talk of ‘the meaning of an expression’. To apprehend something as a sign, and not merely as a mark, is to consider the mark as an expression of some meaning. This is simple enough to grasp, and if used within limits need not involve any controversy. This simple idea, if applied within a framework that distinguishes behaviour and action on the basis of the latter being behaviour plus something else, a ‘mental event’ for instance, opens the possibility of conceiving an ‘action’ as similar to a mark plus meaning or Sinn. Thus Sinn becomes correlative to the intention of a subject and has to assume its logical priority to the former. ‘Sinn’ is thus a concept arising out of a Cartesian framework.

Tyler’s definition still echoes the use by the Coleridgians in that it retains the idea of an inherited knowledge though the teleological aspects of their use has been elided. But in Malinowski’s use it becomes explicitly an indifferent use to both to refer to the ‘knowledge’ and ‘institutional order’, thus opening the way to speak of the study of the functioning of institutions of a society as the study of its ‘culture’. 42 See footnote 23. 43 Cf. for the opposition to sociology in Germany by literary circles in: Lepenies, W. (1988), especially chapter III; the title of the German original: Die Drei Kulturen is meant to be a pun, on the one hand denoting the Cultures of France, Germany, and Britain, and on the other, the cultures of natural science, literature, and of sociology. 44 See for a detailed discussion of Herder chapter 7. 41

For my narrative, the following is noteworthy. The hermeneutic approach makes all human actions expressions of meaning, and thereby opens up the avenue for a particular sort of justification as to why naturalism cannot give us knowledge of the human realm: to understand an action is to know what meaning it expresses. This we cannot know by observing behaviour - because behaviour is only a mark, i.e. a vehicle or medium to convey ‘meaning’ or ‘Sinn’. Thus understanding human actions is different from knowledge attained through observation and explanation of the corresponding behaviour. An action can be understood only through interpretation and not through observation. Thus ‘understanding’, ‘interpretation’, and ‘Sinn’ (or ‘meaning’) are important concepts in the hermeneutic approach. Max Weber incorporates them in his conception of sociology as following: „Soziologie (im hier verstandenen Sinn dieses sehr vieldeutig gebrauchten Wortes) soll heißen: eine Wissenschaft, welche soziales Handeln deutend verstehen und dadurch in seinem Ablauf und seinen Wirkungen ursächlich erklären will. „Handeln“ soll dabei ein menschliches Verhalten (einerlei ob äußeres oder innerliches Tun, Unterlassen oder Dulden) heißen, wenn und insofern als der oder die Handelnden mit ihm einen subjektiven Sinn verbinden. „Soziales“ Handeln aber soll ein solches Handeln heißen, welches seinem von dem oder den Handelnden gemeinten Sinn nach auf das Verhalten anderer bezogen wird und daran in seinem Ablauf orientiert ist.“ 45 With the notion of ‘Sinn’ as conceived in the above passage, it may be noted, the difference between an ideal guiding an action, or being actualised in an action, and the meaning (or Sinn) of a sign, gets erased. Thus we have another important aspect of the transformation of the notion of ‘culture’ involving an ideal of human good - in the sense of what human beings can and have to do - to a descriptive use, where the ideal becomes the Sinn attached to actions by the subjects. I will be discussing later the philosophical and historical significance of this conception of a subject attaching Sinn (i.e. Weber’s ‘Handelnder’ who attaches to a behaviour a ‘subjective Sinn’), thus exhibiting a capacity of will.

Now if we again look at the use of the word ‘values’ in the epitome, it becomes obvious that the author uses it in the same way as Max Weber uses the word Sinn. The diction is indeed quite different from that of Weber and more akin to the diction of naturalism: ‘values’ are said to ‘predominate’ in one way in the primitive condition and in another way in the civilised condition. But the language of ‘values’ is not that of naturalism; it requires ‘subjects’ who entertain them. Thus it is meant in the sense of human beings entertaining values: in the primitive condition, according to the author, human beings stick to the collectivist and subjective values, and in the civilised condition, to the objectivist and rational values.

45

Weber, M. (1984) (6.Aufl.), p.19.

Even this last contrast stems from Max Weber’s elucidation of the difference between the modern and traditional societies. Max Weber makes use of his notion of sociology (see passage quoted above) to understand the ‘modernity’ - both its emergence and dynamic, and the conditions of its emergence. The formulation he gives to the modernity paradigm can be summarised as follows. ‘Modernity’ as found in the contemporary Occident is characterised by the two features: (i) scientific-technical attitude, as against magical-mythical attitude of the pre-modern societies, towards nature, (ii) rational organisation of (formally) free labour, 46 i.e. organisation by submission to law as against submission through natural binding47 such as personal relationships - either due to deference or fear. The modernity paradigm involves a further assumption that all forms of social life other than the ‘modern’ ones can be looked at in terms of the pre-history of modernity. This last would be too strong a formulation as far as Max Weber is concerned. But it captures accurately the assumption made by Marx and Marxians in their models for the study of society and history. In a weaker form Max Weber too subscribes to this assumption. According to him, only the Occidental form of social life - the capitalist organisation of (formally) free labour, and the corresponding civil constitution (bürgerliche Ordnung) with its law - once it comes into being, is destined to prevail on all other social forms. Other forms in the history of mankind do not possess such a destiny of universalisability. In this, and for Max Weber only in this sense, forms of social life other than the ‘modern’ ones can be looked at in terms of the pre-history of modernity.48

In spite of this weaker version of universal history, the category habit informing Max Weber’s conception of, and questions about, the modernity has parallels to that of Marx’s question and answer: under what conditions did capitalism emerge, and once emerged what are its internal dynamics? Weber’s conception as that of Marx can equally be traced to Kant’s, and derivatively, to that of the German idealism, conception of Naturgeschichte - an elaboration of which I will undertake in chapter 6. Max Weber attempts to whittle down the teleological elements of this very specific doctrine of the German tradition. He is interested in making the speculative conceptions underlying Naturgeschichte in Kant’s writings on Geschichtsphilosophie into a model for empirical investigation.49 „In einer Universalgeschichte der Kultur ist also für uns, rein wirtschaftlich, das zentrale Problem letztlich nicht die überall nur in der Form wechselnde Entfaltung kapitalistischer Betätigung als solcher: des Abenteurertypus oder des händlerischen oder des an Krieg, Politik, Verwaltung und ihren Gewinnchancen orientierten Kapitalismus. Sondern vielmehr die Entstehung des bürgerlichen Betriebskapitalismus mit seiner rationalen Organisation der freien Arbeit. Oder, kulturgeschichtlich gewendet: die Entstehung des abendländischen Bürgertums und seiner Eigenart, die freilich mit der Entstehung kapitalistischer Arbeitsorganisation zwar im nahen Zusammenhang steht, aber natürlich doch nicht einfach identisch ist.“ In: Weber, M. (1973), p. 349. „[...] der Occident kennt in der Neuzeit daneben eine ganz andere und nirgends sonst auf der Erde entwickelte Art des Kapitalismus: die rational-kapitalistische (betriebliche) Organisation von (formell) freier Arbeit.“ ibid. 347. 47 The term, ‘natural binding’ is mine and not Weber’s but it encapsulates neatly the contrast Weber makes in the following, and connects it to Weber’s Kantian inspiration (Weber, M. 1973, p. 351f.). 48 The researchers of modernisation processes in economic sphere - in the socalled theories of development - have made this into their model to investigate the conditions required to industrialise the agriculture dominated societies. In microscopic application the same model has been applied in the socalled domain of enterprise culture, to refer to the styles of personal relationships prevailing within a firm. 49 In Soziologische Grundbegriffe (1984, p. 19) Max Weber distinguishes the conception of Sinn as required for ‘empirische Wissenschaften vom Handeln’ from the ‘dogmatischen’ conception of Sinn, and thereby indicates that he wants his model to fulfil the strict criterion of usefulness for empirical investigation. 46

By making use of a Kantian notion, ‘the self-directing individual’, one can bring all the different formulations of modernity under one single contrast: the group or society of self-directing individuals50 versus the group or society that does not exhibit this capacity among the members of its group. The adjective ‘self-directing’ is important, but I am not going to explain it at the moment; its Kantian sense and locus in the intellectual history will become clearer as we proceed further in the following pages. If we paraphrase the term ‘collective values’ with ‘exhibiting a lack of self-directing capacity’ then ‘primitive’ in the epitome becomes ‘a condition of life wherein the capacity for self-direction is absent’. It is the one pole of history and the modernity the other pole. In the latter, individuals ‘take command’. Thus we have the notion of history as the development from the primitive to the modern, meaning, from the man who is yet to develop his capacity for self-direction to a civilised condition where he has developed that capacity.

In this reading we have the speculative histories constructed by Hegel, Marx, and many others in the 19th century in a nutshell. In the 20th century, as in Weber,51 the ‘modern’ and the ‘primitive’, or any other equivalent of it, are, ostensibly at least, made into purely structural categories, without assuming that real history passes necessarily from one condition to another, but rather that some societies exhibit ‘primitiveness’ and some ‘modernity’. The epitome appears to be in this vein, with perhaps an added assumption that in one and the same society some groups may behave like the people in a ‘primitive condition’. Succumbing to ‘collective, instinctive and subjective values’ is what, in this reading, the mob or mass psychology is. This would indeed imply that, applied to the whole societies, ‘primitive’ means that they are herd-like. Again the word ‘herd’ should be dissociated from its evaluational connotation and just taken to mean that no mechanism for co-ordinating the self-directing individuals exists, and to the extent that there is a group or ‘society’ 52, it functions as an undifferentiated mass. Of course, it may be conceded that a group or society of completely self-directing individuals as well as completely behaving as a herd is a fiction, but nevertheless the empirical usefulness of these fictions may be argued for. What is important for this model, however, is that these fictions are used primarily for describing the behaviour and not to judge them as right or wrong. To the extent that the latter judgement is there, it is meant again as a description of a lower form of human behaviour in comparison to

Weber’s modernity paradigm is elegant, thorough going, and highly influential. He brings together all varied concepts associated with the modernity model in his essay Vorbemerkung zu den gesammelten Aufsätzen zur Religionsoziologie (cf. Weber, M. 1973). The essay contains a lot of seminal ideas and is rich in suggestions. 50 As may be evident for the informed reader, this coinage is a modification of Norbert Elias’ term ‘society of individuals’ (cf. Elias, N. 1987). For Elias there is no need for the adjective ‘self-directing’, because, the word ‘individual’ implies that. Since in daily use this implication is absent, I have added the adjective for my purpose of building up of a model on the basis of concepts understandable in common sense terms. 51 Weber does not use the term ‘primitive’ society because his focus of interest was not the genesis of the ‘early’ forms of society as in the case of many others, but in the genesis of bürgerliche Gesellschaft. But as I noted earlier, his notion of traditional society as characterised by natural binding both in its relation to nature and in social relations, can be conceived as less developed capacity for self-direction. 52 The word ‘society’ and its German equivalent ‘Gesellschaft’ are themselves of recent origin, and were meant to connote the community where law of a contractual nature predominates over law in the sense of custom. That is, law governing the human relations are more in the nature of putting contractual obligation rather than that of ‘natural’ binding sort. The latter sort of law (the Sitte) is supposed to be characteristic of Gemeinschaft.

another form that is higher, judged as higher and lower by a standard other than what is available in the descriptive content, and a standard, that cannot be made available descriptively. 53

In order to show that the category habit underlying Max Weber’s thinking is that of contrasting societies in terms of a concept of self-directing capacity, let me draw the attention to the motivation underlying his Religionssoziologie, and suggest that it be read in the light of Cassirer’s theory of what the mythical form of thinking, in contrast to that of scientific form, is. In his introductory remarks for the collection of his Essays on Sociology of Religion, Weber writes, „Es kommt [...] darauf an: die besondere Eigenart des okzidentalen und, innerhalb dieses, des modernen okzidentalen Rationalismus zu erkennen und in ihrer Entstehung zu erklären. Jeder solche Erklärungsversuch muß, [...] die ökonomischen Bedingungen berücksichtigen. Aber es darf auch der umgekehrte Kausalzusammenhang darüber nicht unbeachtet bleiben. Denn wie von rationaler Technik und von rationalem Recht, so ist der ökonomische Rationalismus in seiner Entstehung auch von der Fähigkeit und Disposition der Menschen zu bestimmten Arten praktischrationaler Lebensführung überhaupt abhängig. Wo diese durch Hemmungen seelischer Art obstruiert war, da stieß auch die Entwicklung einer wirtschaftlich rationalen Lebensführung auf schwere innere Widerstände. Zu den wichtigsten formenden Elementen der Lebensführung nun gehörten in der Vergangenheit überall die magischen und religiösen Mächte und die am Glauben an sie verankerten ethischen Pflichtvorstellungen. Von diesen ist in den nachstehend gesammelten und ergänzten Aufsätzen die Rede.“54 I suggest that the expression ‘obligation rooted in the magical-mythical conceptions of nature’ can be thought of as a contrast to the scientific attitude to nature, since Weber explicitly identifies the use of natural science and lack of any restraining factor, unlike in India and China, in the attitudes in using it for economic purposes, as one of the main constitutive elements of Capitalism. 55

Let us now look at this contrast in the light of how Cassirer elaborates the contrast between scientific and mythical attitudes. Cassirer’s ideas on myths were representative of many others in the late 19th century and early 20th century, i.e., the intellectual milieu within which Weber’s terminology has its origin. Cassirer makes a structural classification of symbolic forms where myth and science form two poles, and astrology takes a niche in between them, thus in spite of being concerned merely with varieties of human thinking and showing them

In Kantian terms that will be discussed later, for naturalism the use of ‘self-directing individuals’ has to be determinative, and not reflexive. 54 Weber, M. (1973), p. 351f. 55 Der spezifisch moderne okzidentale Kapitalismus nun ist [...] durch Entwicklungen von technischen Möglichkeiten mitbestimmt. [...] Das heißt aber in Wahrheit: durch die Eigenart der abendländischen Wissenschaft, insbesondere der mathematisch und experimentell exakten und rational fundierten Naturwissenschaften. [...] Und warum taten die kapitalistischen Interessen das gleiche nicht in China oder Indien? Warum lenkten dort überhaupt weder die wissenschaftliche, noch die künstlerische [...] in diejenigen Bahnen der Rationalisierung ein, welche dem Okzident eigen sind?“ Weber, M. (1973), p. 349-351. 53

as so many varieties of human spirit, still the underlying modernity paradigm is unmistakable. In many places in his writings he implicitly identifies these predominant modes of thinking (i.e., myths, astrology and science) respectively in societies characterised by primitive cultures, high cultures such as that of India and China, and the science-oriented modern West. This latter classification is not specific to Cassirer but quite prevalent till the second world war, and in non-academic circles even now. For Cassirer, Weber’s two aspects that divide the pre-modern from the modern - the magicalmythical attitude to nature and the human relations fostered by natural binding - are the characteristic features of the mythical and expressive symbolic form. In the scientific symbolic form on the other hand, the rule of constitution of the individual is what dominates, i.e. individual objects are not given and found for knowledge, but constituted through the laws. Thus, what is mentioned as two separate aspects in my summary formulation of the ‘modernity’ - the principle governing the attitude towards nature and the principle governing the social relations - are brought under one principle by Cassirer. The organisation of social relations in terms of ‘natural binding’ and the assumption of ‘magical-mythical’ powers in nature come both under mythical symbolic form; scientific attitude towards nature and the organisation of human relationships through commonly accepted rules or laws comes under the scientific (wissenschaftliche) symbolic form. The latter uses a temporal in contrast to the spatial schematism used by the former. The basic feature is the degree of ‘self-directing’ exhibited in the one and the other.56 It now becomes clear that the notion of self-directing does underlie Max Weber’s model: in modernity self-directing capacity expresses itself in rationalisation in every field, and in the traditional societies self-directing capacities are hemmed by the mythical modes of thinking, which is another way of saying: it is characterised by the predominance of natural binding towards nature and in inter-personal relationships. In Norbert Elias’s Civilisation Process, we have another formulation, now given a dialogical twist. His interest is to trace how the coming into being of the notion of the ‘private’ individual is connected with the coming into being of a specific form of society in history.

56

For a detailed discussion of Cassirer, see chapter 7.

The civilisation process is for him an individualisation process and he embeds his theory of individualisation in a theory of the specific nature of man in contrast to animals. „Daß man die Gestalt der psychischen Funktionen eines Menschen niemals allein aus seiner ererbten Konstitution zu verstehen vermag, sondern immer nur aus der aktuellen Verarbeitung dieser Konstitution in der Verflechtung mit anderen Menschen, aus dem Aufbau des Menschenverbandes, in dem der Einzelne aufwächst, das hat also letzten Endes seinen Grund in einer Eigentümlichkeit der Menschennatur selbst, in der relativ starken Lösung der menschlichen Beziehungssteuerung aus dem Bann der ererbten, reflexartigen Automatismen. Dank dieser Lockerung, deren Vorhandensein bekannt genug ist, deren naturgeschichtliche Genese wir freilich erst ahnen, wird die Beziehungssteuerung des einzelnen Menschen einer gesellschaftlichen Verarbeitung in höherem Maße fähig und bedürftig als die aller anderen Tiere. Dank dieser gesellschaftlichen Verarbeitung wird der Aufbau des Verhaltens, die Gestalt der Selbststeuerung in Beziehung zu anderen bei den Menschen mannigfaltiger und verschiedenartiger als bei allen übrigen Tieren; dank ihrer wird sie mit einem Wort „individueller“. Auch von dieser Seite her beginnt sich so die Gedankenkluft zwischen Gesellschaft und Individuum zu schließen.“ 57

Here it becomes evident that the ‘individual taking command’ of the epitome is conceived as an outcome of a feature that singles out humans from animals. Anyone familiar with Kant can immediately recognise the central thesis is Kantian in origin, and it is another statement of the Kant’s Naturgeschichte as elaborated in his Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht.58

Whereas in all the writers we have mentioned so far the implicit assumption is that groups living elsewhere than the industrial milieus of Western Europe and America (or more generally, though vaguely, ‘the West’) are deficient in the notion of individuality, and correspondingly the capacity for self-direction (and also a corresponding conception of ‘nature’), there are in recent years many works which are critical of the European use of the modernity paradigm to characterise the Non-European societies. The discourse of these authors can nevertheless be considered as coming under my characterisation of the modernity paradigm. These works usually blame the use of the categories of modernity to criticise the way other societies were conceptualised in the last two hundred years. Mainly 57

Elias, N. (1987), p.59-60. In his recapitulation and setting out the overall plan and conception of the book, his Kantian inspiration becomes even more evident. See chapter Zusammenfassung: Entwurf einer Theorie der Zivilisation, in: Elias, N. (1987) Bd. II, p. 312-445. 58 for a detailed discussion see Ch. 5.

the critique runs that Europe conceived Non-European cultures in terms of deficient modes of ‘subjectivity’, i.e. of less capacity for self-direction. Said’s ‘Orientalism’ does this with regard to Arabs,59 Ronald Inden’s ‘Imagining India’ does this with regard to India,60 Antje Linkenbach (1986) does this with regard to those cultures considered as having only mythical forms of thinking, Martin Fuchs (1996) similarly criticises the conceptual framework underlying the discourse in use among the academics and activists within and around the social revolt movements in India. In all these, the conceptual framework is derived from the modernity discourse making use of the concepts of self-directing capacity of human individuals or groups, and a critique of the conceptualisation is undertaken to show how the ‘other’ is attributed a passive rather than an active disposition. The interest of such accounts is what can be broadly termed as the critique of ideology or Ideologiekritik.

My interest is of a different nature. These conceptions in use to talk about culture have specific historical roots. What are they? Obviously these conceptions are not derived from a procedure of empirical generalisations, even if there may be efforts to find some kind of empirical corroboration for the theoretical assumptions made on some other grounds. What are these other grounds that make these assumptions important? In other words, my interest in identifying this model, and tracing in the following pages the conceptual genesis of it, is not an effort to put one more nail on the coffin of the supposedly dead ‘modernity’, but rather to grasp our modes of discourse as arising out of one predominant intellectual tradition. This interest is part of an enquiry on how to go about conceptualising the knowledge available in other traditions than the tradition in which the present conceptions in use to talk about other cultures originated.

59 60

Cf. Said, E. (1978). Cf. Inden, R. (1990).

3

3.1

The ‘Humanity’ and The Given World of the ‘Intelligibles’

Aristotle’s Good and the Humanitas

In the second chapter I delineated the modernity paradigm and some of the themes and controversies that went into its formation, though mainly in the 19th century England, but to a certain extent, also in Germany. I also quoted Mill’s assessment of German Idealism,61 and pointed out how Mill assimilates the specific conception of Geschichtsphilosophie of the German tradition to the ‘philosophy of culture’ which in its turn is conceived as a contribution to the ‘science of man’ thus signalling a conception of science of man within the fold of naturalism. I also indicated how his reading of the Geschichtsphilosophie could pave the way for combining its evolutionism with his naturalism, thus giving rise to a discipline of studying the ‘primitive societies’, the discipline of Cultural Anthropology as initiated by E.B.Tyler.62 This transition from a speculative universal history to a purported empirical science assuming evolutionism is a significant turn in the history of the culture theory as well as of the term ‘culture’. For it gave rise to the current use, with all its implications, of the term ‘culture’ as a descriptive term to refer to the ‘whole way of life’ of a society.

Simultaneously I hinted at some of the deeper lying layers of categories continuing from almost the ancient period that has contributed to the surface growth of the modernity paradigm. I said that the conception of culture is closely related with the notion of the cultivation of ‘humanity’ and that it is descendant of the Aristotelian idea of the ‘good’ the human being can and has to strive for. For Aristotle there is a class of substances that grow by themselves, which have natures, and these natures determine the end towards which they can and have to strive for. Man is one such substance and the good he is capable of is what

As we saw in chapter 2, Mill uses the term ‘Germano-Coleridge School’, and what he identifies explicitly as their contribution is the philosophy of history. He also mentions Kant in his assessment (Mill, J.S., cit. 1965, vol. X, p. 125), and therefore his designation of ‘Germano-Coleridgean school’ is more inclusive than the designation ‘German Idealism’. I have used it here to refer to the whole tradition of Geschichtsphilosophie, including to that of Kant and Herder. 62 There is a popular misconception that the idea of ‘evolution’ originated in the field of biology first, and then, after the publication of Darwin’s Origin of Species, made its way into the social theory. In fact the use of ‘evolution’ in the study of social institutions preceded its application in the domain of biology. 61

sets the life-ideal for him.63 I also hinted that underlying the educational ideal of the medieval and the Renaissance period, the humanitas, is this Aristotelian conception of a human good. Thus the Aristotelian life-ideal is mediated to the modern period of Europe through the Humanism of the 15th century.

All these are preparations for the following thesis of this chapter. As in many domains the scene is set for culture theory too by the distinctions provided by Aristotle. But these were mediated through the Christian tradition. This is of course a truism. But I hope to derive more insights from this truism by constructing a narration in the form of exegesis of some crucial texts. The story line is the following: Two pairs of concepts, the things that grow by themselves and the things that are made, and the sense capacity and capacity for intellection, transformed through the introduction of the creator God provide the category habits within which the modernity paradigm arose.

3.2

The Methodological Problem

There is one methodological difficulty in tracing back these category habits. It is part of the modernity paradigm itself to have built a story of progress from the ancients to the present as, a myth oriented to logos oriented, from a religion and cosmos centred to a secular and human centred, outlook. According to this story, even though the pre-christian philosophy was not theological in a Christian sense, nevertheless it was theistic. Similarly, the ancients, especially Plato and Aristotle, are attributed an objectivist value orientation, thus making them holders of a view of one world of objects and customs. According to this story, the ‘multiculturalism’ is a modern achievement due to the emancipation from a religion oriented, and less tolerant, outlook of the traditional societies. In other words, respecting plurality and many cultures are considered as the achievements of Europe of the modern period, a result of modernisation. Of course, it is also part of this modernity paradigm to revere the ancients and assert that they are the originators of the logos oriented line of thinking, i.e. Greek thinkers made the discovery of reason thereby emancipating the attitude towards nature and society from the mythical orientation. Sometimes it is even claimed that there was in the medieval period a falling behind the achievements of the ancients. This paradigm of history writing is so massive and fruitful Cf. Aristotle, cit. 1995, Nicomachean Ethics, 1097b 14-20; for an elucidation of Aristotle’s ‘theoria ideal’ see Rao (1994), p. 62-84. 63

that it is impossible for a single newcomer to the philosophy of history to overturn it. It is even foolish to try to overturn it at present. What I want to do is to present a plausible, and hopefully an illuminating construction, leaving for others better equipped than myself to probe whether my suggestion can be corroborated in a historical-empirical manner.

My aim is to draw attention to some well known facts and raise a question as to the significance of these facts for a theory of culture. (i) It is well known that the ancients were not Christians. (ii) Intellectually it is the philosophies produced by the ancients, especially that of Aristotle64, that were the mainstay of the Christian theology and it is through the mediation of the Christian philosophers that the philosophy of the modern period originated. What are the bearings of these facts for a theory of culture? My submission is that there is a bearing, and a proper focus on the history of the concerns that shaped the concepts we have inherited to talk about cultures can be made to yield insights.

In adjusting the lenses to perceive that history, my aim is not that of telling a story of progress or regress. It is rather to identify the Aristotelian scheme of concepts as starting from a fairly simple common sense orientation, and show how the addition of a creator God results in some specific shifts and ruptures within that conceptual framework. The Christian mediation of the thinking of the ancients results in a very specific conception, both responsible for the emergence of a view that the physical world is a system of mechanism, and an approach to the practical philosophy, considering it to be a matter of discovering universal or universalisable rules. Both these involve a notion of the given. The nature as a machine and the natural law as God imprinted notion of what is good are part and parcel of the same conceptual framework, which is the result of adding a creator God to the Aristotelian system.

3.3

Cultivation of humanity: Individual to Social Ideal of Perfection

3.3.1 The Philosophy of History and the ‘Culture of the Inward Man’

64

My confining myself Aristotle is to some extent influenced by my limitations of knowledge, but it is also grounded in the nature of the case. As Copleston, F.C. (1952) emphasises, one cannot overestimate the significance of the Aristotelian philosophy as the mainstay of the mediaeval period. Cf.: „In the Middle Ages Aristotle was, indeed, known as ‘the Philosopher’, and he was so named because his system was for the mediaevals ‘philosophy’ to all intents and purposes. [...] If we speak for example, the attempts of St. Thomas to reconcile the Aristotelianism with the Christian theology, one will realise the nature of the situation better if one makes the experiment of substituting the word ‘philosophy’ for the word ‘Aristotelianism’.“ Cf. Copleston, S. (1952), p. 239.

Before beginning the story in Greece, let me revert back to Mill’s assessment of the German Geschichtsphilosophie. The transition I mentioned, that from a speculative history to the science of man within a naturalistic mould, was executed by Mill, it appears, more or less consciously. There is, however, another transition that was effected, not by Mill, but by his German predecessors. There is a vague hint at this in the passage I quoted from Mill in the last chapter. The particular sentence is worth repeating: . „Besides, not to have looked upon the culture of the inward man as the problem of problems, would have been incompatible with the belief which many of these philosophers entertained in Christianity, and the recognition by all of them of its historical value [...].“65

How does this looking at the ‘the culture of the inward man as the problem of problems’ relate to what Mill designates as the contribution to the ‘philosophy of culture’ in the sense of a ‘science of society’? In other words, the ‘German school’, as Mill calls it, effected a transition from a notion of cultivating ‘the inward man’ to a notion of a ‘philosophy of history’; the former is the humanists’ educational ideal of cultivating the perfections appropriate for human beings (instilling humanity), and the latter, a speculative account of the evolution of ideas and institutions, and as Mill indicates, it involved a moral message regarding social ideal to be realised, i.e. it sets up an ideal of social perfection. But how does the educational ideal of cultivating the individuals’ ‘inner life’ link up with the latter?

A clue as well a key to answer this question is found in the following, seemingly simple, passage by Kant. „Kinder sollen nicht dem gegenwärtigen, sondern dem zukünftig möglich besseren Zustande des Menschengeschlechts, das ist: der Idee der Menschheit, und deren ganzer Bestimmung angemessen, erzogen werden.“66

I said ‘seemingly simple’ because the diction above appears common sensical but the qualifying phrase ‘der Idee der Menschheit, und deren ganzer Bestimmung angemessen’67 betrays an underlying assumption central to the whole of Kantian philosophy of history and morals, of what it is to approach a human being as a human being. Therefore an elucidation of this quoted phrase can simultaneously throw light on how an educational idea of instilling humanity in individuals could culminate in a purported account of the historical process of 65

Mill, J.S., cit. 1965, p.139. Abhandlungen über die Pädogogik, Kant, Werke, cit. 1975, A 17,18. Band 10, 704. 67 The expression ‘deren ganzer Bestimmung angemessen’ is difficult to translate into English, because, the word ‘Bestimmung’ can be taken simultaneously both at the level of language, in which case it is to be translated as ‘definition’, and at the level of objects, in which case it has to be translated as ‘destiny’: To say of a feature that it is the ‘Bestimmung’ of human being means simultaneously that it is the defining characteristic of being human and that it is the destiny of human race. 66

the humanisation of human race.68 Kant calls such an account by the term ‘Naturgeschichte’, and often uses the expression ‘what nature makes out of man’ in contrast to ‘what man has to make out of himself’ to indicate its theme. These expressions along with the specific Kantian conception of teleology will be elaborated later in this chapter. But a preliminary question may be raised: what does ‘nature’ in this term ‘Naturgeschichte’ refer to? It is certainly not used in the sense of flora and fauna of the earth. As a point of entry into this unusual term ‘Naturgeschichte’ let me draw attention to an apparently unusual use of the term ‘natural’ by Herder in his well known treatise on the origin of language.69 3.3.2

‘Natural’ as against ‘Animal’ Origin of language

Regarding language, Herder puts forward what he calls the natural origin thesis, and opposes it, not merely to the thesis of the divine origin but also to that of the animal origin.70 Both the latter are faulted for neglecting the human nature in their explanations of what the human language is and how it comes into being. As will become clear later, language is here a prototype of human institutions, and what is said with regard to it applies equally to other institutions. The divine origin thesis, in Herder’s characterisation of it, conceives language in the manner of a finished good given as a gift by God, thereby approaching language as if it is a ‘complete’ and closed system not open to human shaping of it. Thus it fails to account for the fact that human language is ‘unfinished’, in the sense, that it is remade by human beings constantly and open to such remaking. In other words, the divine origin thesis does not do justice to the fact that man is a maker, and not merely a receiver, of his language and culture. Not the divine grace, but the human nature, argues Herder, is what can explain the origin and nature of language. The same fault of overlooking the human nature is attributed to the other thesis too, which is identified by Herder as held by Condillac: it is said to make language the outgrowth of the animal rather than the human nature of man.

The theological connection of Kant’s philosophy of history would become even more clear if we read Kant’s passage above in the light of the short tract by Lessing, Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts (‘The Education of the Human Race’). Cf. Lessing, G.E., Werke, cit. 1996, Bd. VIII, p. 489-510. 69 Cf. Herder, J.G. (cit. 1966), Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache. 70 See the first part titled ‘Haben die Menschen, ihren Naturfähigkeiten überlassen, sich selbst Sprache erfinden können?’ in the first section of Abhandllung über den Ursprung der Sprache, cit. 1966, p. 5-24. 68

A proper understanding of Herder crucially depends upon grasping this contrast he makes between the animal and the human aspect of the nature of man. The ‘animal’ as used in the phrase ‘animal origin’ is not meant as a term to refer to the animal kingdom other than man, but rather, as a term to designate man looked upon as a token of the type, human animal: to consider man in terms of his animal nature is to look upon him as an empirical specimen of the human species. In this aspect, an individual human being, as any other animal, has to be considered as the complete exemplar of his species. But, to consider a human being in terms of his characteristic of humanity is more than this: it is to look upon him in terms of the aspect of his participation in the ‘idea of Man’, the rational animal. This last formulation is a Kantian one; though in details Herder may differ from the implications to be drawn from such a formulation, a broadly similar distinction between two ways of looking at human beings underlies Herder’s demarcation of the natural from the animal origin thesis. His main criticism of the latter is: „Und da die Menschen für uns die einzigen Sprachgeschöpfe sind, die wir kennen, und sich eben durch Sprache von allen Tieren unterscheiden: wo finge der Weg der Untersuchung sicherer an als bei Erfahrungen über den Unterschied der Tiere und Menschen? - Condillac und Rousseau müßten über den Sprachursprung irren, weil sie sich bei diesem Unterschied so bekannt und verschieden irrten: da jener die Tiere zu Menschen und dieser die Menschen zu Tieren machte.“71

Thus he identifies with the animal origin thesis the mistake of attempting to explain language in terms of characteristics that man shares with the animals rather than that single him out from the animal kingdom as a whole. That human beings share the expressive needs with the animals is not disputed by Herder: „Hier ist ein empfindsames Wesen, das keine seiner lebhaften Empfindungen in sich einschließen kann; das im ersten überraschenden Augenblick, selbst ohne Willkür und Absicht, jede in Laut äußern muß. Das war gleichsam der letzte, mütterliche Druck der bildenden Hand der Natur, daß sie allen das Gesetz auf die Welt mitgab: ‘Empfinde nicht für dich allein, sondern dein Gefühl töne!’, und da dieser letzte schaffende Druck auf alle von einer Gattung einartig war, so wurde dies Gesetz Segen: ‘Deine Empfindung töne deinem Geschlecht einartig und werde also von allen wie von einem mitfühlend vernommen!’ [...] Diese Seufzer, diese Töne sind Sprache. Es gibt also eine Sprache der Empfindung, die unmittelbares Naturgesetz ist. Daß der Mensch sie ursprünglich mit den Tieren gemein habe [...]. Eigentlich ist diese Sprache der Natur eine Völkersprache für jede Gattung unter sich, und so hat auch der Mensch die seinige.“72

That is, the expressive needs bring about a mode of communication specific to each species of animals, and man has his characteristic expressive mode which is universally understood

71 72

ibid. p. 20. ibid. p.6-7.

by all human beings irrespective of their particular languages. The mistake however is to identify such modes with the human language, and still worse, pressing expressive need into service to explain why man invented the human language. If language is conceived to have originated out of such needs, then language would be similar to those other, species-specific modes of communication existing in each species of animals; language in that case would still be considered as specific to man in the sense that it is one species of a generic feature, ‘communicative behaviour’, which differentiates man from each of the other species of animals, each of which have their own species-specific mode of that generic feature. But language would not be specific to human being in the sense of a feature that singles him out from the animal kingdom as a whole. Formulated in this way, the kinship of the Herder’s assertion with the theological belief is evident. The underlying contrast has a Christian origin: human being has both an animal and a divine aspect, the latter is his being endowed with reason. Herder (as well as Kant) develops this theological assumption into a heuristic device for providing theory of human institutions.

The critique of the animal origin hypothesis is directed against a more general target than that of merely explaining language. It is simultaneously a critique of naturalism and individualism implied in the English tradition of social contract theory. For Rousseau and French Philosophers, and indirectly, the English liberal tradition of social contract theory are identified as the representatives of the animal origin hypothesis. According to the theoretical tradition of Social contract theory, man in a state of nature is an individual with needs and desires recognisable as our own, and thus, we can explain both language and political community by enquiring into the human nature by empirical methods. Thus, for example, the need to communicate with others, and to conserve the acquired knowledge through a means common to all, can be seen being considered important in our milieu. This same need can be pressed into service to explain why man invented language. But this would make the human nature logically prior to human making in a sense that implies that man, like other animals, comes to the world endowed fully with the capacities he requires - as a ‘finished’ and ‘complete’ animal. But in fact, Herder points out, man is an ‘unfinished’ animal - both his endowed dispositions and the language are ‘open’ to change, are in a continuous process of being made, which results necessarily in the existence of the plurality of human languages and institutions.

I will come back to Herder at a later stage to give a fuller exposition of his theory of language and culture.73 This brief excursion is meant only to focus on the categories he makes use of: against the divine origin thesis, the character of language as being made by man is stressed, against the animal origin thesis, the character of language as the outgrowth of human nature is stressed. These two categories, being made and growing out of a nature, require a fuller appreciation in terms of their locus in the intellectual tradition. To provide for that, I must begin my story to where it belongs, to Greece; to be more precise to Aristotle.

3.4

Aristotle: The One Given World of Objects and Many Customs

3.4.1

A Heuristic device

A non-philosophical or naive day to day orientation in the world can be captured by saying that there are objects that are located at some place and endure for over a period of time. We can perceive them as they are through our capacity to cognise, be it perceptually or through more elaborate theoretical means. By exercising our will and the appropriate skill we can make or destroy some of these objects. We can say, this conception has a substance model of identity on the one hand, and reception and construction model of human capacities, on the other. Whether in making or in cognising, it is the nature of the substances that resists the arbitrariness of our will, and thus providing for orderliness and objectivity. In other words, there is a unique world of objects with their nature that provides for the cognition and what one can strive for. Add to this the fact that the customs of different communities vary. An inevitable question then is, how these customs are governed and constrained by human nature? In my reading of the philosophical tradition, this question underlies a long line of thinking which sought to bring customs too under ‘natures’ becoming actual. This was especially facilitated, if not initiated, by the Christian reading of Aristotle, which started off with a conception of revealed commands as the basis of customs.

3.4.2

Speech and Polis Rooted in a Common Natural Power of Man

In effect, the Aristotelian system can be viewed as an attempt to capture the common sense picture delineated above with a minimum number of conceptual distinctions. There are substances that exhibit either actualised or potential forms. All processes, including

73

See Ch.7, especially section 7.3.

knowledge ones, are actualisations of forms. Substances are either that are made or that grow by themselves. I will use here onwards, the terms made and generated to these two sorts of substances, and ‘making’ and ‘generation’ to the actions or processes through which these substances come into being. The made have no principle of their becoming within themselves, and the generated have them. More generally in the Aristotelian terminology, one can classify the substances into those whose why or principle of existence lie outside of themselves and those who have their why within themselves. The latter constitute a system of natural kinds whose essences can be investigated and systematised, and thus resulting in an episteme. The former constitute the sphere of techne, and within this sphere there are many different ways one can make and shape the world. Suppose we equate the world of customs with the rules or constitution governing a social association like the city, the polis, these are, according to Aristotle, made and not generated, and so they belong to the sphere of techne and not to that of episteme. Thus he may be considered as having assumed a unique world of natural objects, but in the sphere of customs to have assumed a plurality.74 However, it is one thing to admit that customs differ as a matter of fact, but quite another equally to concede that the rationale underlying them can belong to the category of made, and so of multiple nature. Aristotle did want to clarify the nature of social association in terms of the underlying purpose, the why, of them. While it is true that political associations or polis are the things made and so the knowledge concerning them is of the nature of techne, still, those who make the polis, the citizens, are human beings, and it is their purposes that govern

74

That the ancients conceived a world of objects with their natures is undisputed. What is highly improbable is that they conceived also a unique world of norms underlying the customs. For, it can be argued that for Aristotle laws are made, of course, by taking into consideration what good needs to be achieved, but yet for him, there is no such thing as a ‘norm’ that can be discovered. The description of Roman cities which as far as its ideational level justification is concerned is borrowed from the Greek thinking. This is how Wiedeman (1990, p. 69) speaks of: „The Roman empire was made up of about 1200 city units, plus a considerable number of ethnic groupings which we label ‘tribes’ and/or ‘client kingdoms’. The divine forces worshipped in each of these units might be seen as similar, analogous, or parallel; one obvious example is the Juno, the cohesive force which gives life to any social unit, whether a family or a city-state. The Roman worshipped not only the Juno who had once belonged to their own kings - but also the Junones of other states whom the Romans had invited to abandon their original communities and settle at Rome. [...] These Junones were parallel, but not identical, in the same way as the many Jupiters and Zeuses worshipped throughout the empire were parallel but not identical. Each cult honoured its own god“. The plurality of customs is part of the ancients’ experience is argued fairly elaborately, by Balagangadhara (1993). Burkert, W. (1985), p. 332-337, argues that Plato’s Laws is a conception of theocracy and that of a strict one custom view, which ‘if taken to its logical conclusion would mean the abolition of cult’. But he himself suggests that his polis not only allows the multiple cults, but enjoins it. He explains this as due to a ’dubious compromise with the existing state of affairs or of a perspicuous eye for a real life“. This is to attribute to Plato a bad faith. A better reading is called for that makes sense of why Plato enjoins the practice of plurality of religions in his polis.

the nature of the constitutions: do citizens have a nature or are they made? One straight forward Aristotelian answer could be that human beings are natural kinds, and what applies to other natural kinds applies to them too. But there are complications. Aristotle defines a polis as ‘a body of citizens sufficing for the purposes of life’ and citizen as ‘he who has the power to take part in the deliberative and judicial administration of any state.’ 75 By ‘power’ is not meant here something conferred on someone by a legal statute but in the sense of abilities and skills on the basis of which legal endowments are conferred. According to Aristotle, there are powers that come to us by nature such as the senses that have to be there before in order to be exercised, and those come to us by habituation (the ethos), i.e. those powers that we acquire by exercising them such as ‘virtues’.76 The deliberative capacity is of the latter kind. Aristotle also suggests that „legislators make the citizens good by forming the habits in them, and this is the wish of every legislator, and those who do not effect it miss their mark, and it is in this that a good constitution differs from a bad one.“77

This, along with his suggestion that the polis is „something prior in order of nature to the family and the individual“78, may be taken to mean that the ethos of the citizens is made.

However, Aristotle also says „When several villages are united in a single complete community, large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life. And therefore, if the earlier forms of society are 75

Cf. Aristotle, cit. 1995, Politics, 1275 b, 15-25. „VIRTUE, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for which reason it requires experience and time), while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit, whence also its name [...] is one that is formed by a slight variation from the word [...] (habit). From this it is also plain that none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature; for nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature. For instance the stone which by nature moves downwards cannot be habituated to move upwards, not even if one tries to train it by throwing it up ten thousand times; nor can fire be habituated to move downwards, nor can anything else that by nature behaves in one way be trained to behave in another. Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit.“ „Again, of all the things that come to us by nature we first acquire the potentiality and later exhibit the activity (this is plain in the case of the senses); for it was not by often seeing or often hearing that we got these senses, but on the contrary we had them before we used them, and did not come to have them by using them); but the virtues we get by first exercising them, as also happens in the case of the arts as well. For the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them, e.g. men become builders by building and lyre players by playing the lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts.“ Cf. Aristotle, cit. 1995, Niceomachean Ethics, bk. II, 1103a 15 - 1103b 5. 77 Cf. Aristotle, cit. 1995, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. II, 1103b 5. 78 Cf. Aristotle, cit. 1995, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. I, ch.2, 1253a 18. 76

natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them, and the nature of a thing is its end. For what each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family. Besides, the final cause and end of a thing is the best, and to be self-sufficing is the end and the best. Hence it is evident that the state (polis) is a creation of nature, and man is by nature a political animal.“79

In other words, the polis80 is an outcome of man’s nature.

One way of reconciling these apparently conflicting suggestions is as follows: the customs and constitutions of different cities are made by the respective citizens, but this making is governed by the human nature of being a political animal. This is to make human nature logically prior to polis. But there are different ways of conceiving that ‘logical priority’. Logical priority of human nature may be taken to mean that the human individuals have their innate needs and desires, such as need for security and the corresponding desire, which results in their forming political associations. Thus the human desire coupled with will to fulfil those desires is the source of human institutions. This is the line taken by Hobbes and the English tradition of social contract theory; it is this line of thinking that is identified by Herder as the animal origin thesis of human language. Another line of thinking may seek to emphasise Aristotle’s assertion that polis is a natural compound,81 and the citizen, like the parts of a body is nothing without the whole body, i.e. polis. In that case the coming into being of a polis from the smaller units like family and villages is the end of the human species as a whole, and not of particular individuals taken separately. This would imply that in the case of human beings, the nature one speaks of, is an attribute of the whole species, but the individual is made through the polis. This is roughly the line taken by Kant and Herder.82

79

Cf. Aristotle, cit. 1995, Politics, bk. I, 1252b 25 - 1253a 2. In the passage quoted above the ‘polis’ is translated as ‘state’. A more straight forward translation is perhaps ‘city’, since on the face of it Aristotle is talking of associations for living together like family, village and city. But Aristotle is also referring to the city as more an actualisation of human purpose, thereby grading the family and village as the less perfect realisation of human good. Secondly, his focus is on the nature of constitution and governing required for a city. Third, his reflections in this treatise provided a framework for reflections on the State in the European tradition. On account of these three considerations, the translating polis as ‘state’ is appropriate. However, in order to retain the ambiguity between ‘state’ and ‘city’ of the original term, I will often use the word ‘polis’ itself. 81 Cf. Aristotle, cit. 1995, Politics, 1253a 1-3; see also C.C.W. Taylor, ‘Politics’ in: Jonathan Barnes, The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, CUP, 1995. 82 Yet another reading, which looks at the individual-species relationship in the case of human beings as that of part-whole nature, is worked out by attempting to show its biological basis in humans as belonging to a 80

What is important is to note that in both lines of thinking, the notion of human nature, and the question, in what sense man is a maker, are central. The problem is mainly that which arises due to the application of the categories, of generation and making to the very human action and knowledge itself. The original distinction was made to distinguish between two types of knowledge concerning change, one that involves the human agency and another that lies outside its purview. The former is the sphere of theoria, and the latter techne. Politics is a treatise of techne and not of theoria or episteme. But there are some remarks as the following, indicating the speciality of human endowments in contrast to the capacities found in other animals, and these remarks appear to be source of the idea that man’s rationality expresses itself in the specificity of human institution: „And he who is by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is either a bad man or above humanity; he is like the ‘Tribeless, lawless, hearthless one’, whom Homer denounces - the natural outcast is forthwith a lover of war; he may be compared to an isolated piece at draughts. Now, that man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animals is evident. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal whom she has endowed with the gift of speech. And whereas mere voice is but an indication of pleasure or pain, and is therefore found in other animals (for their nature attains to the perception of pleasure and pain and the intimation of them to one another, and no further), the power of speech is intended to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and the unjust. And it is a characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the like, and the association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state (polis).“ 83

In this passage we find most of the distinctions that were to become prominent in the philosophical tradition for thinking about human affairs. (i) The characterisation of man without polis as being lawless and war mongering - Hobbes’ state of nature. (ii) Tracing back both polis and speech to a common characteristic that singles out human being from other animals, and considering this as the result of the economy of nature (central to Herder and Kant and cited by them as the basis for the speciality of human being who is unlike animals a Gattungswesen - a species-being).

biologically deficient species (‘Mängelwesen’), i.e. deficient in the innate capacities to master the problems set by the natural living environment, in the philosophical anthropology of Arnold Gehlen; cf. Gehlen, A. (1978). 83 Aristotle, cit. 1995, Politics, bk. I, 1253a 5-20.

(iii) Identifying the having the power of speech in man with that of having the capacity to form standards through which one can gestalt his life (also in Herder). (iv) Capacity for speech in man in contrast to that of animals have a function other than the expressive (‘emotional’) one (found in Herder).

These themes will be touched later with various degrees of detail. For the present all these can be summed up as the thesis that both speech and other human institutions (polis), though belong to the category of made, nevertheless, the process of their making is a process of an actualisation of a ‘nature’ of man. This nature is referred to as ‘reason’ by later writers84. It is this thesis that both Herder and Kant are interested in elaborating.

Herder’s Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache is virtually the elaboration of the above remarks as an answer to his question, given that there are many human languages and ‘nations’ what should be true of ‘human nature’. Thus even though Aristotle may not have formulated the question this way his treatise may be read, and, I suggest, has been read, as an answer to the question, given that there are many varieties of constitutions prevalent in various cities, what must be true of human beings? Thus underlying the effort to build a theory of human cultures is the question of what constitutes a common human nature that expresses itself in various social forms.

The agenda of modern philosophy beginning from the 17th century can be looked upon as that of building a theory of human nature which takes into account the scientific developments, either as a model for theorisation or as something to be accommodated with. Implicitly the English tradition and the German tradition differed with regard to the question, what it is to build a theory of human nature? For the English tradition epitomised by Hobbes it is that of building a theory of human needs. For the German tradition it is that of building a theory of This is worth emphasising: though the definition ‘man is a rational animal’ is often attributed to Aristotle, in this form it is not found in his writings. Perhaps we can derive such a definition, if we take the passage quoted above from Politics along with certain other passages in Metaphysics, 980b 25 to 981a 5, and De Anima, bk. III, 3. The original ‘Zoon Exon Logikon’ for which ‘rational animal’ is the Latin equivalent, goes back to Alkmaion, a Pythagorean thinker. 84

human reason, and especially that of differentiating the role of ‘ideas’ in the sense of ideals and the categories, the former the guiding and motivating factors and the later those factors that are responsible for organisation of the sensible material. This bifurcation of intelligibles into those which are pure and those which are mixed with the sense-material is what makes it a theory of ideals of human activities, whether that of theoretical, practical or poeitic activities.

At first sight there is also an incongruent exchange of models between these two theoretical traditions: the naturalism takes the making as the model of nature, and idealism takes the generation as the model for understanding man’s history. But the incongruence is only apparent. The models for both is making: the natural science arose out of combining (by Galileo) the mechanism (a techne) and the physics (a theoria) of the ancients and thus transforming the sphere of theoria of the ancients into a sphere of techne. This transformation is the result of an addition of a creator God to the Aristotelian system, whereby the nature becomes the made. Naturalism as an approach to the study of society can be traced to Hobbes and most probably, he adopted it because he was of the opinion that the State is an ‘artificial man’ constructed by ‘imitating the nature which is the art of God’, the word ‘art’ being the term for techne, the principles of construction.85 Thus he takes the making as the model to understand nature. The idealist tendency of the German tradition takes generation as the nature of nature. But here too, what is taken over is not the straight forward model of generation as found in Aristotle. Rather Kant speaks of nature as ‘making’ man. In other words, even when speaking of the nature the diction of speaking is that of making.

To conclude, the discussion by Aristotle of polis and its nature provided the terms of discourse on society in the subsequent period. The conceptual problems were that of arising out of the application of the categories of generated and made to the very human action and knowledge itself. We have the metaphors of cultivating and building used to speak of education, of knowledge, of customs, and of the State. For example, we find Descartes in the 17th century using the metaphor of building for describing his theoretical project of reconstituting 85

Cf. Hobbes, Th., cit. 1962, Leviathan, vol. III, p. 59.

knowledge. Hobbes uses the same to reconstitute the State, and he claims to found a science of human nature for that purpose. As will be shown shortly, there are important differences between the category habits informing the politics of Aristotle and that of Hobbes. Yet the inspiration from Aristotle’s politics is unmistakable. In the 18th century, Rousseau and his followers use the organic metaphors to discuss the educational growth of an individual. Herder makes use of that metaphor to speak of social existence and history. The question underlying these discussions is whether, and in what sense, ‘human nature’ is logically prior to the human making. This question, and the attempted solutions to it, still accompany the discourse on culture. This can be seen in the simplified rhetorical question appearing again and again in the debate concerning the issues of education and social reform, whether a characteristic x is due to nature or nurture.

3

3.1

The ‘Humanity’ and The Given World of the ‘Intelligibles’

Aristotle’s Good and the Humanitas

In the second chapter I delineated the modernity paradigm and some of the themes and controversies that went into its formation, though mainly in the 19th century England, but to a certain extent, also in Germany. I also quoted Mill’s assessment of German Idealism,86 and pointed out how Mill assimilates the specific conception of Geschichtsphilosophie of the German tradition to the ‘philosophy of culture’ which in its turn is conceived as a contribution to the ‘science of man’ thus signalling a conception of science of man within the fold of naturalism. I also indicated how his reading of the Geschichtsphilosophie could pave the way for combining its evolutionism with his naturalism, thus giving rise to a discipline of studying the ‘primitive societies’, the discipline of Cultural Anthropology as initiated by E.B.Tyler.87 This transition from a speculative universal history to a purported empirical science assuming evolutionism is a significant turn in the history of the culture theory as well as of the term ‘culture’. For it gave rise to the current use, with all its implications, of the term ‘culture’ as a descriptive term to refer to the ‘whole way of life’ of a society.

Simultaneously I hinted at some of the deeper lying layers of categories continuing from almost the ancient period that has contributed to the surface growth of the modernity paradigm. I said that the conception of culture is closely related with the notion of the cultivation of ‘humanity’ and that it is descendant of the Aristotelian idea of the ‘good’ the human being can and has to strive for. For Aristotle there is a class of substances that grow by themselves, which have natures, and these natures determine the end towards which they can and have to strive for. Man is one such substance and the good he is capable of is what

As we saw in chapter 2, Mill uses the term ‘Germano-Coleridge School’, and what he identifies explicitly as their contribution is the philosophy of history. He also mentions Kant in his assessment (Mill, J.S., cit. 1965, vol. X, p. 125), and therefore his designation of ‘Germano-Coleridgean school’ is more inclusive than the designation ‘German Idealism’. I have used it here to refer to the whole tradition of Geschichtsphilosophie, including to that of Kant and Herder. 87 There is a popular misconception that the idea of ‘evolution’ originated in the field of biology first, and then, after the publication of Darwin’s Origin of Species, made its way into the social theory. In fact the use of ‘evolution’ in the study of social institutions preceded its application in the domain of biology. 86

sets the life-ideal for him.88 I also hinted that underlying the educational ideal of the medieval and the Renaissance period, the humanitas, is this Aristotelian conception of a human good. Thus the Aristotelian life-ideal is mediated to the modern period of Europe through the Humanism of the 15th century.

All these are preparations for the following thesis of this chapter. As in many domains the scene is set for culture theory too by the distinctions provided by Aristotle. But these were mediated through the Christian tradition. This is of course a truism. But I hope to derive more insights from this truism by constructing a narration in the form of exegesis of some crucial texts. The story line is the following: Two pairs of concepts, the things that grow by themselves and the things that are made, and the sense capacity and capacity for intellection, transformed through the introduction of the creator God provide the category habits within which the modernity paradigm arose.

3.2

The Methodological Problem

There is one methodological difficulty in tracing back these category habits. It is part of the modernity paradigm itself to have built a story of progress from the ancients to the present as, a myth oriented to logos oriented, from a religion and cosmos centred to a secular and human centred, outlook. According to this story, even though the pre-christian philosophy was not theological in a Christian sense, nevertheless it was theistic. Similarly, the ancients, especially Plato and Aristotle, are attributed an objectivist value orientation, thus making them holders of a view of one world of objects and customs. According to this story, the ‘multiculturalism’ is a modern achievement due to the emancipation from a religion oriented, and less tolerant, outlook of the traditional societies. In other words, respecting plurality and many cultures are considered as the achievements of Europe of the modern period, a result of modernisation. Of course, it is also part of this modernity paradigm to revere the ancients and assert that they are the originators of the logos oriented line of thinking, i.e. Greek thinkers made the discovery of reason thereby emancipating the attitude towards nature and society from the mythical orientation. Sometimes it is even claimed that there was in the medieval period a falling behind the achievements of the ancients. This paradigm of history writing is so massive and fruitful Cf. Aristotle, cit. 1995, Nicomachean Ethics, 1097b 14-20; for an elucidation of Aristotle’s ‘theoria ideal’ see Rao (1994), p. 62-84. 88

that it is impossible for a single newcomer to the philosophy of history to overturn it. It is even foolish to try to overturn it at present. What I want to do is to present a plausible, and hopefully an illuminating construction, leaving for others better equipped than myself to probe whether my suggestion can be corroborated in a historical-empirical manner.

My aim is to draw attention to some well known facts and raise a question as to the significance of these facts for a theory of culture. (iii) It is well known that the ancients were not Christians. (iv) Intellectually it is the philosophies produced by the ancients, especially that of Aristotle89, that were the mainstay of the Christian theology and it is through the mediation of the Christian philosophers that the philosophy of the modern period originated. What are the bearings of these facts for a theory of culture? My submission is that there is a bearing, and a proper focus on the history of the concerns that shaped the concepts we have inherited to talk about cultures can be made to yield insights.

In adjusting the lenses to perceive that history, my aim is not that of telling a story of progress or regress. It is rather to identify the Aristotelian scheme of concepts as starting from a fairly simple common sense orientation, and show how the addition of a creator God results in some specific shifts and ruptures within that conceptual framework. The Christian mediation of the thinking of the ancients results in a very specific conception, both responsible for the emergence of a view that the physical world is a system of mechanism, and an approach to the practical philosophy, considering it to be a matter of discovering universal or universalisable rules. Both these involve a notion of the given. The nature as a machine and the natural law as God imprinted notion of what is good are part and parcel of the same conceptual framework, which is the result of adding a creator God to the Aristotelian system.

3.3

Cultivation of humanity: Individual to Social Ideal of Perfection

3.3.1 The Philosophy of History and the ‘Culture of the Inward Man’

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My confining myself Aristotle is to some extent influenced by my limitations of knowledge, but it is also grounded in the nature of the case. As Copleston, F.C. (1952) emphasises, one cannot overestimate the significance of the Aristotelian philosophy as the mainstay of the mediaeval period. Cf.: „In the Middle Ages Aristotle was, indeed, known as ‘the Philosopher’, and he was so named because his system was for the mediaevals ‘philosophy’ to all intents and purposes. [...] If we speak for example, the attempts of St. Thomas to reconcile the Aristotelianism with the Christian theology, one will realise the nature of the situation better if one makes the experiment of substituting the word ‘philosophy’ for the word ‘Aristotelianism’.“ Cf. Copleston, S. (1952), p. 239.

Before beginning the story in Greece, let me revert back to Mill’s assessment of the German Geschichtsphilosophie. The transition I mentioned, that from a speculative history to the science of man within a naturalistic mould, was executed by Mill, it appears, more or less consciously. There is, however, another transition that was effected, not by Mill, but by his German predecessors. There is a vague hint at this in the passage I quoted from Mill in the last chapter. The particular sentence is worth repeating: . „Besides, not to have looked upon the culture of the inward man as the problem of problems, would have been incompatible with the belief which many of these philosophers entertained in Christianity, and the recognition by all of them of its historical value [...].“ 90

How does this looking at the ‘the culture of the inward man as the problem of problems’ relate to what Mill designates as the contribution to the ‘philosophy of culture’ in the sense of a ‘science of society’? In other words, the ‘German school’, as Mill calls it, effected a transition from a notion of cultivating ‘the inward man’ to a notion of a ‘philosophy of history’; the former is the humanists’ educational ideal of cultivating the perfections appropriate for human beings (instilling humanity), and the latter, a speculative account of the evolution of ideas and institutions, and as Mill indicates, it involved a moral message regarding social ideal to be realised, i.e. it sets up an ideal of social perfection. But how does the educational ideal of cultivating the individuals’ ‘inner life’ link up with the latter?

A clue as well a key to answer this question is found in the following, seemingly simple, passage by Kant. „Kinder sollen nicht dem gegenwärtigen, sondern dem zukünftig möglich besseren Zustande des Menschengeschlechts, das ist: der Idee der Menschheit, und deren ganzer Bestimmung angemessen, erzogen werden.“91

I said ‘seemingly simple’ because the diction above appears common sensical but the qualifying phrase ‘der Idee der Menschheit, und deren ganzer Bestimmung angemessen’92 betrays an underlying assumption central to the whole of Kantian philosophy of history and morals, of what it is to approach a human being as a human being. Therefore an elucidation of this quoted phrase can simultaneously throw light on how an educational idea of instilling humanity in individuals could culminate in a purported account of the historical process of 90

Mill, J.S., cit. 1965, p.139. Abhandlungen über die Pädogogik, Kant, Werke, cit. 1975, A 17,18. Band 10, 704. 92 The expression ‘deren ganzer Bestimmung angemessen’ is difficult to translate into English, because, the word ‘Bestimmung’ can be taken simultaneously both at the level of language, in which case it is to be translated as ‘definition’, and at the level of objects, in which case it has to be translated as ‘destiny’: To say of a feature that it is the ‘Bestimmung’ of human being means simultaneously that it is the defining characteristic of being human and that it is the destiny of human race. 91

the humanisation of human race.93 Kant calls such an account by the term ‘Naturgeschichte’, and often uses the expression ‘what nature makes out of man’ in contrast to ‘what man has to make out of himself’ to indicate its theme. These expressions along with the specific Kantian conception of teleology will be elaborated later in this chapter. But a preliminary question may be raised: what does ‘nature’ in this term ‘Naturgeschichte’ refer to? It is certainly not used in the sense of flora and fauna of the earth. As a point of entry into this unusual term ‘Naturgeschichte’ let me draw attention to an apparently unusual use of the term ‘natural’ by Herder in his well known treatise on the origin of language.94 3.3.2

‘Natural’ as against ‘Animal’ Origin of language

Regarding language, Herder puts forward what he calls the natural origin thesis, and opposes it, not merely to the thesis of the divine origin but also to that of the animal origin.95 Both the latter are faulted for neglecting the human nature in their explanations of what the human language is and how it comes into being. As will become clear later, language is here a prototype of human institutions, and what is said with regard to it applies equally to other institutions. The divine origin thesis, in Herder’s characterisation of it, conceives language in the manner of a finished good given as a gift by God, thereby approaching language as if it is a ‘complete’ and closed system not open to human shaping of it. Thus it fails to account for the fact that human language is ‘unfinished’, in the sense, that it is remade by human beings constantly and open to such remaking. In other words, the divine origin thesis does not do justice to the fact that man is a maker, and not merely a receiver, of his language and culture. Not the divine grace, but the human nature, argues Herder, is what can explain the origin and nature of language. The same fault of overlooking the human nature is attributed to the other thesis too, which is identified by Herder as held by Condillac: it is said to make language the outgrowth of the animal rather than the human nature of man.

The theological connection of Kant’s philosophy of history would become even more clear if we read Kant’s passage above in the light of the short tract by Lessing, Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts (‘The Education of the Human Race’). Cf. Lessing, G.E., Werke, cit. 1996, Bd. VIII, p. 489-510. 94 Cf. Herder, J.G. (cit. 1966), Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache. 95 See the first part titled ‘Haben die Menschen, ihren Naturfähigkeiten überlassen, sich selbst Sprache erfinden können?’ in the first section of Abhandllung über den Ursprung der Sprache, cit. 1966, p. 5-24. 93

A proper understanding of Herder crucially depends upon grasping this contrast he makes between the animal and the human aspect of the nature of man. The ‘animal’ as used in the phrase ‘animal origin’ is not meant as a term to refer to the animal kingdom other than man, but rather, as a term to designate man looked upon as a token of the type, human animal: to consider man in terms of his animal nature is to look upon him as an empirical specimen of the human species. In this aspect, an individual human being, as any other animal, has to be considered as the complete exemplar of his species. But, to consider a human being in terms of his characteristic of humanity is more than this: it is to look upon him in terms of the aspect of his participation in the ‘idea of Man’, the rational animal. This last formulation is a Kantian one; though in details Herder may differ from the implications to be drawn from such a formulation, a broadly similar distinction between two ways of looking at human beings underlies Herder’s demarcation of the natural from the animal origin thesis. His main criticism of the latter is: „Und da die Menschen für uns die einzigen Sprachgeschöpfe sind, die wir kennen, und sich eben durch Sprache von allen Tieren unterscheiden: wo finge der Weg der Untersuchung sicherer an als bei Erfahrungen über den Unterschied der Tiere und Menschen? - Condillac und Rousseau müßten über den Sprachursprung irren, weil sie sich bei diesem Unterschied so bekannt und verschieden irrten: da jener die Tiere zu Menschen und dieser die Menschen zu Tieren machte.“ 96

Thus he identifies with the animal origin thesis the mistake of attempting to explain language in terms of characteristics that man shares with the animals rather than that single him out from the animal kingdom as a whole. That human beings share the expressive needs with the animals is not disputed by Herder: „Hier ist ein empfindsames Wesen, das keine seiner lebhaften Empfindungen in sich einschließen kann; das im ersten überraschenden Augenblick, selbst ohne Willkür und Absicht, jede in Laut äußern muß. Das war gleichsam der letzte, mütterliche Druck der bildenden Hand der Natur, daß sie allen das Gesetz auf die Welt mitgab: ‘Empfinde nicht für dich allein, sondern dein Gefühl töne!’, und da dieser letzte schaffende Druck auf alle von einer Gattung einartig war, so wurde dies Gesetz Segen: ‘Deine Empfindung töne deinem Geschlecht einartig und werde also von allen wie von einem mitfühlend vernommen!’ [...] Diese Seufzer, diese Töne sind Sprache. Es gibt also eine Sprache der Empfindung, die unmittelbares Naturgesetz ist. Daß der Mensch sie ursprünglich mit den Tieren gemein habe [...]. Eigentlich ist diese Sprache der Natur eine Völkersprache für jede Gattung unter sich, und so hat auch der Mensch die seinige.“ 97

That is, the expressive needs bring about a mode of communication specific to each species of animals, and man has his characteristic expressive mode which is universally understood

96 97

ibid. p. 20. ibid. p.6-7.

by all human beings irrespective of their particular languages. The mistake however is to identify such modes with the human language, and still worse, pressing expressive need into service to explain why man invented the human language. If language is conceived to have originated out of such needs, then language would be similar to those other, species-specific modes of communication existing in each species of animals; language in that case would still be considered as specific to man in the sense that it is one species of a generic feature, ‘communicative behaviour’, which differentiates man from each of the other species of animals, each of which have their own species-specific mode of that generic feature. But language would not be specific to human being in the sense of a feature that singles him out from the animal kingdom as a whole. Formulated in this way, the kinship of the Herder’s assertion with the theological belief is evident. The underlying contrast has a Christian origin: human being has both an animal and a divine aspect, the latter is his being endowed with reason. Herder (as well as Kant) develops this theological assumption into a heuristic device for providing theory of human institutions.

The critique of the animal origin hypothesis is directed against a more general target than that of merely explaining language. It is simultaneously a critique of naturalism and individualism implied in the English tradition of social contract theory. For Rousseau and French Philosophers, and indirectly, the English liberal tradition of social contract theory are identified as the representatives of the animal origin hypothesis. According to the theoretical tradition of Social contract theory, man in a state of nature is an individual with needs and desires recognisable as our own, and thus, we can explain both language and political community by enquiring into the human nature by empirical methods. Thus, for example, the need to communicate with others, and to conserve the acquired knowledge through a means common to all, can be seen being considered important in our milieu. This same need can be pressed into service to explain why man invented language. But this would make the human nature logically prior to human making in a sense that implies that man, like other animals, comes to the world endowed fully with the capacities he requires - as a ‘finished’ and ‘complete’ animal. But in fact, Herder points out, man is an ‘unfinished’ animal - both his endowed dispositions and the language are ‘open’ to change, are in a continuous process of being made, which results necessarily in the existence of the plurality of human languages and institutions.

I will come back to Herder at a later stage to give a fuller exposition of his theory of language and culture.98 This brief excursion is meant only to focus on the categories he makes use of: against the divine origin thesis, the character of language as being made by man is stressed, against the animal origin thesis, the character of language as the outgrowth of human nature is stressed. These two categories, being made and growing out of a nature, require a fuller appreciation in terms of their locus in the intellectual tradition. To provide for that, I must begin my story to where it belongs, to Greece; to be more precise to Aristotle.

3.4

Aristotle: The One Given World of Objects and Many Customs

3.4.1

A Heuristic device

A non-philosophical or naive day to day orientation in the world can be captured by saying that there are objects that are located at some place and endure for over a period of time. We can perceive them as they are through our capacity to cognise, be it perceptually or through more elaborate theoretical means. By exercising our will and the appropriate skill we can make or destroy some of these objects. We can say, this conception has a substance model of identity on the one hand, and reception and construction model of human capacities, on the other. Whether in making or in cognising, it is the nature of the substances that resists the arbitrariness of our will, and thus providing for orderliness and objectivity. In other words, there is a unique world of objects with their nature that provides for the cognition and what one can strive for. Add to this the fact that the customs of different communities vary. An inevitable question then is, how these customs are governed and constrained by human nature? In my reading of the philosophical tradition, this question underlies a long line of thinking which sought to bring customs too under ‘natures’ becoming actual. This was especially facilitated, if not initiated, by the Christian reading of Aristotle, which started off with a conception of revealed commands as the basis of customs.

3.4.2

Speech and Polis Rooted in a Common Natural Power of Man

In effect, the Aristotelian system can be viewed as an attempt to capture the common sense picture delineated above with a minimum number of conceptual distinctions. There are substances that exhibit either actualised or potential forms. All processes, including

98

See Ch.7, especially section 7.3.

knowledge ones, are actualisations of forms. Substances are either that are made or that grow by themselves. I will use here onwards, the terms made and generated to these two sorts of substances, and ‘making’ and ‘generation’ to the actions or processes through which these substances come into being. The made have no principle of their becoming within themselves, and the generated have them. More generally in the Aristotelian terminology, one can classify the substances into those whose why or principle of existence lie outside of themselves and those who have their why within themselves. The latter constitute a system of natural kinds whose essences can be investigated and systematised, and thus resulting in an episteme. The former constitute the sphere of techne, and within this sphere there are many different ways one can make and shape the world. Suppose we equate the world of customs with the rules or constitution governing a social association like the city, the polis, these are, according to Aristotle, made and not generated, and so they belong to the sphere of techne and not to that of episteme. Thus he may be considered as having assumed a unique world of natural objects, but in the sphere of customs to have assumed a plurality.99 However, it is one thing to admit that customs differ as a matter of fact, but quite another equally to concede that the rationale underlying them can belong to the category of made, and so of multiple nature. Aristotle did want to clarify the nature of social association in terms of the underlying purpose, the why, of them. While it is true that political associations or polis are the things made and so the knowledge concerning them is of the nature of techne, still, those who make the polis, the citizens, are human beings, and it is their purposes that govern

99

That the ancients conceived a world of objects with their natures is undisputed. What is highly improbable is that they conceived also a unique world of norms underlying the customs. For, it can be argued that for Aristotle laws are made, of course, by taking into consideration what good needs to be achieved, but yet for him, there is no such thing as a ‘norm’ that can be discovered. The description of Roman cities which as far as its ideational level justification is concerned is borrowed from the Greek thinking. This is how Wiedeman (1990, p. 69) speaks of: „The Roman empire was made up of about 1200 city units, plus a considerable number of ethnic groupings which we label ‘tribes’ and/or ‘client kingdoms’. The divine forces worshipped in each of these units might be seen as similar, analogous, or parallel; one obvious example is the Juno, the cohesive force which gives life to any social unit, whether a family or a city-state. The Roman worshipped not only the Juno who had once belonged to their own kings - but also the Junones of other states whom the Romans had invited to abandon their original communities and settle at Rome. [...] These Junones were parallel, but not identical, in the same way as the many Jupiters and Zeuses worshipped throughout the empire were parallel but not identical. Each cult honoured its own god“. The plurality of customs is part of the ancients’ experience is argued fairly elaborately, by Balagangadhara (1993). Burkert, W. (1985), p. 332-337, argues that Plato’s Laws is a conception of theocracy and that of a strict one custom view, which ‘if taken to its logical conclusion would mean the abolition of cult’. But he himself suggests that his polis not only allows the multiple cults, but enjoins it. He explains this as due to a ’dubious compromise with the existing state of affairs or of a perspicuous eye for a real life“. This is to attribute to Plato a bad faith. A better reading is called for that makes sense of why Plato enjoins the practice of plurality of religions in his polis.

the nature of the constitutions: do citizens have a nature or are they made? One straight forward Aristotelian answer could be that human beings are natural kinds, and what applies to other natural kinds applies to them too. But there are complications. Aristotle defines a polis as ‘a body of citizens sufficing for the purposes of life’ and citizen as ‘he who has the power to take part in the deliberative and judicial administration of any state.’100 By ‘power’ is not meant here something conferred on someone by a legal statute but in the sense of abilities and skills on the basis of which legal endowments are conferred. According to Aristotle, there are powers that come to us by nature such as the senses that have to be there before in order to be exercised, and those come to us by habituation (the ethos), i.e. those powers that we acquire by exercising them such as ‘virtues’.101 The deliberative capacity is of the latter kind. Aristotle also suggests that „legislators make the citizens good by forming the habits in them, and this is the wish of every legislator, and those who do not effect it miss their mark, and it is in this that a good constitution differs from a bad one.“102

This, along with his suggestion that the polis is „something prior in order of nature to the family and the individual“103, may be taken to mean that the ethos of the citizens is made.

However, Aristotle also says „When several villages are united in a single complete community, large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life. And therefore, if the earlier forms of society are 100

Cf. Aristotle, cit. 1995, Politics, 1275 b, 15-25. „VIRTUE, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for which reason it requires experience and time), while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit, whence also its name [...] is one that is formed by a slight variation from the word [...] (habit). From this it is also plain that none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature; for nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature. For instance the stone which by nature moves downwards cannot be habituated to move upwards, not even if one tries to train it by throwing it up ten thousand times; nor can fire be habituated to move downwards, nor can anything else that by nature behaves in one way be trained to behave in another. Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit.“ „Again, of all the things that come to us by nature we first acquire the potentiality and later exhibit the activity (this is plain in the case of the senses); for it was not by often seeing or often hearing that we got these senses, but on the contrary we had them before we used them, and did not come to have them by using them); but the virtues we get by first exercising them, as also happens in the case of the arts as well. For the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them, e.g. men become builders by building and lyre players by playing the lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts.“ Cf. Aristotle, cit. 1995, Niceomachean Ethics, bk. II, 1103a 15 - 1103b 5. 102 Cf. Aristotle, cit. 1995, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. II, 1103b 5. 103 Cf. Aristotle, cit. 1995, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. I, ch.2, 1253a 18. 101

natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them, and the nature of a thing is its end. For what each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family. Besides, the final cause and end of a thing is the best, and to be self-sufficing is the end and the best. Hence it is evident that the state (polis) is a creation of nature, and man is by nature a political animal.“104

In other words, the polis105 is an outcome of man’s nature.

One way of reconciling these apparently conflicting suggestions is as follows: the customs and constitutions of different cities are made by the respective citizens, but this making is governed by the human nature of being a political animal. This is to make human nature logically prior to polis. But there are different ways of conceiving that ‘logical priority’. Logical priority of human nature may be taken to mean that the human individuals have their innate needs and desires, such as need for security and the corresponding desire, which results in their forming political associations. Thus the human desire coupled with will to fulfil those desires is the source of human institutions. This is the line taken by Hobbes and the English tradition of social contract theory; it is this line of thinking that is identified by Herder as the animal origin thesis of human language. Another line of thinking may seek to emphasise Aristotle’s assertion that polis is a natural compound,106 and the citizen, like the parts of a body is nothing without the whole body, i.e. polis. In that case the coming into being of a polis from the smaller units like family and villages is the end of the human species as a whole, and not of particular individuals taken separately. This would imply that in the case of human beings, the nature one speaks of, is an attribute of the whole species, but the individual is made through the polis. This is roughly the line taken by Kant and Herder.107

104

Cf. Aristotle, cit. 1995, Politics, bk. I, 1252b 25 - 1253a 2. In the passage quoted above the ‘polis’ is translated as ‘state’. A more straight forward translation is perhaps ‘city’, since on the face of it Aristotle is talking of associations for living together like family, village and city. But Aristotle is also referring to the city as more an actualisation of human purpose, thereby grading the family and village as the less perfect realisation of human good. Secondly, his focus is on the nature of constitution and governing required for a city. Third, his reflections in this treatise provided a framework for reflections on the State in the European tradition. On account of these three considerations, the translating polis as ‘state’ is appropriate. However, in order to retain the ambiguity between ‘state’ and ‘city’ of the original term, I will often use the word ‘polis’ itself. 106 Cf. Aristotle, cit. 1995, Politics, 1253a 1-3; see also C.C.W. Taylor, ‘Politics’ in: Jonathan Barnes, The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, CUP, 1995. 107 Yet another reading, which looks at the individual-species relationship in the case of human beings as that of part-whole nature, is worked out by attempting to show its biological basis in humans as belonging to a 105

What is important is to note that in both lines of thinking, the notion of human nature, and the question, in what sense man is a maker, are central. The problem is mainly that which arises due to the application of the categories, of generation and making to the very human action and knowledge itself. The original distinction was made to distinguish between two types of knowledge concerning change, one that involves the human agency and another that lies outside its purview. The former is the sphere of theoria, and the latter techne. Politics is a treatise of techne and not of theoria or episteme. But there are some remarks as the following, indicating the speciality of human endowments in contrast to the capacities found in other animals, and these remarks appear to be source of the idea that man’s rationality expresses itself in the specificity of human institution: „And he who is by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is either a bad man or above humanity; he is like the ‘Tribeless, lawless, hearthless one’, whom Homer denounces - the natural outcast is forthwith a lover of war; he may be compared to an isolated piece at draughts. Now, that man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animals is evident. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal whom she has endowed with the gift of speech. And whereas mere voice is but an indication of pleasure or pain, and is therefore found in other animals (for their nature attains to the perception of pleasure and pain and the intimation of them to one another, and no further), the power of speech is intended to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and the unjust. And it is a characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the like, and the association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state (polis).“ 108

In this passage we find most of the distinctions that were to become prominent in the philosophical tradition for thinking about human affairs. (i) The characterisation of man without polis as being lawless and war mongering - Hobbes’ state of nature. (ii) Tracing back both polis and speech to a common characteristic that singles out human being from other animals, and considering this as the result of the economy of nature (central to Herder and Kant and cited by them as the basis for the speciality of human being who is unlike animals a Gattungswesen - a species-being).

biologically deficient species (‘Mängelwesen’), i.e. deficient in the innate capacities to master the problems set by the natural living environment, in the philosophical anthropology of Arnold Gehlen; cf. Gehlen, A. (1978). 108 Aristotle, cit. 1995, Politics, bk. I, 1253a 5-20.

(iii) Identifying the having the power of speech in man with that of having the capacity to form standards through which one can gestalt his life (also in Herder). (iv) Capacity for speech in man in contrast to that of animals have a function other than the expressive (‘emotional’) one (found in Herder).

These themes will be touched later with various degrees of detail. For the present all these can be summed up as the thesis that both speech and other human institutions (polis), though belong to the category of made, nevertheless, the process of their making is a process of an actualisation of a ‘nature’ of man. This nature is referred to as ‘reason’ by later writers 109. It is this thesis that both Herder and Kant are interested in elaborating.

Herder’s Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache is virtually the elaboration of the above remarks as an answer to his question, given that there are many human languages and ‘nations’ what should be true of ‘human nature’. Thus even though Aristotle may not have formulated the question this way his treatise may be read, and, I suggest, has been read, as an answer to the question, given that there are many varieties of constitutions prevalent in various cities, what must be true of human beings? Thus underlying the effort to build a theory of human cultures is the question of what constitutes a common human nature that expresses itself in various social forms.

The agenda of modern philosophy beginning from the 17th century can be looked upon as that of building a theory of human nature which takes into account the scientific developments, either as a model for theorisation or as something to be accommodated with. Implicitly the English tradition and the German tradition differed with regard to the question, what it is to build a theory of human nature? For the English tradition epitomised by Hobbes it is that of building a theory of human needs. For the German tradition it is that of building a theory of This is worth emphasising: though the definition ‘man is a rational animal’ is often attributed to Aristotle, in this form it is not found in his writings. Perhaps we can derive such a definition, if we take the passage quoted above from Politics along with certain other passages in Metaphysics, 980b 25 to 981a 5, and De Anima, bk. III, 3. The original ‘Zoon Exon Logikon’ for which ‘rational animal’ is the Latin equivalent, goes back to Alkmaion, a Pythagorean thinker. 109

human reason, and especially that of differentiating the role of ‘ideas’ in the sense of ideals and the categories, the former the guiding and motivating factors and the later those factors that are responsible for organisation of the sensible material. This bifurcation of intelligibles into those which are pure and those which are mixed with the sense-material is what makes it a theory of ideals of human activities, whether that of theoretical, practical or poeitic activities.

At first sight there is also an incongruent exchange of models between these two theoretical traditions: the naturalism takes the making as the model of nature, and idealism takes the generation as the model for understanding man’s history. But the incongruence is only apparent. The models for both is making: the natural science arose out of combining (by Galileo) the mechanism (a techne) and the physics (a theoria) of the ancients and thus transforming the sphere of theoria of the ancients into a sphere of techne. This transformation is the result of an addition of a creator God to the Aristotelian system, whereby the nature becomes the made. Naturalism as an approach to the study of society can be traced to Hobbes and most probably, he adopted it because he was of the opinion that the State is an ‘artificial man’ constructed by ‘imitating the nature which is the art of God’, the word ‘art’ being the term for techne, the principles of construction.110 Thus he takes the making as the model to understand nature. The idealist tendency of the German tradition takes generation as the nature of nature. But here too, what is taken over is not the straight forward model of generation as found in Aristotle. Rather Kant speaks of nature as ‘making’ man. In other words, even when speaking of the nature the diction of speaking is that of making.

To conclude, the discussion by Aristotle of polis and its nature provided the terms of discourse on society in the subsequent period. The conceptual problems were that of arising out of the application of the categories of generated and made to the very human action and knowledge itself. We have the metaphors of cultivating and building used to speak of education, of knowledge, of customs, and of the State. For example, we find Descartes in the 17th century using the metaphor of building for describing his theoretical project of reconstituting 110

Cf. Hobbes, Th., cit. 1962, Leviathan, vol. III, p. 59.

knowledge. Hobbes uses the same to reconstitute the State, and he claims to found a science of human nature for that purpose. As will be shown shortly, there are important differences between the category habits informing the politics of Aristotle and that of Hobbes. Yet the inspiration from Aristotle’s politics is unmistakable. In the 18th century, Rousseau and his followers use the organic metaphors to discuss the educational growth of an individual. Herder makes use of that metaphor to speak of social existence and history. The question underlying these discussions is whether, and in what sense, ‘human nature’ is logically prior to the human making. This question, and the attempted solutions to it, still accompany the discourse on culture. This can be seen in the simplified rhetorical question appearing again and again in the debate concerning the issues of education and social reform, whether a characteristic x is due to nature or nurture.

5

5.1

Establishing a Polis: Imitating God’s Creation or Participating in It?

By Way of Summary: The God, the World, and the Souls in Between

The narration I have endeavoured to build so far is meant to show to what extent the categories for talking about culture are indebted to the Aristotelian theory of polis mediated through the Christian theme of biblical revelations. As took place in the hands of Aquinas this mediation transformed the Aristotelian theory of polis into a theory of the universe, the whole universe being considered as a city of God. But in this universe man has a special place. Being created in the image of God, human being, like Him, is a maker. What proves decisive for the development of the concepts related to culture is that the notion of man being a maker gets combined with the Aristotelian theme of man having a faculty of intellect in addition to a sensefaculty. According to Aquinas, man, in addition to being impressed by the motivating principle of action as in the case of other beings, is also capable of self-regulation: thus through Aquinas the sense faculty gets identified with the capacity to get affected and the faculty of intellect with that of making.

What gets bequeathed thus from an effort at ennobling the heritage of Athens can be put into a simplified summary as following. A system consisting of God, the world of (both animate and inanimate) objects, and the human beings placed in between, sharing both the Godly and worldly features, emerges as a picture of the universe. The principle of identity is the ‘substance’. The capacities to be attributed to these substances are the capacity to get affected and the capacity to initiate the affection. The God is the ultimate initiator, the nature, the ultimate object to get affected, and the souls in between, having both the capacities to get affected and the capacity to initiate affection, i.e., both a capacity to receive and to make. The God, the nature, and the soul (psyche) these are the three pillars of a system of the universe. This picture is no more that of an Aristotelian conception of explaining everything in terms of the forms in process. Explanation of process is conceived as requiring not merely form and matter, but in addition, an agent-substance to be the bearer of the forms on the one hand, and a characteristic of agency independent of forms, on the other. In effect, this is what the Cartesian conception of two modes of thinking as delineated in the passages below provide. Descartes says that he would accept only

„two ultimate classes of real things - the one is intellectual things, [...] the other of material, [...]. Perception, volition, and every mode of knowing and willing, pertains to thinking substance; while to extended substance pertain magnitude or extension.“111

Further the attributes of ‘intellectual things’ „are all to be subordinated to two predominant properties, one of which is the perception of the understanding, the other the determination of the will.“ 112

The rationale of this classification is explained further: „When I saw that, over and above perception, which is required as a basis of judgement, there must needs be affirmation, or negation, to constitute the form of the judgement, and that it is frequently open to withhold our assent, even if we perceive a thing, I referred the act of judging which consists in nothing but assent, i.e. affirmation or negation, not to the perception of the understanding, but to the determination of the will.“113

It has to be noticed here that the capacities of human psyche corresponding to the Aristotelian distinction between ‘sensible’ and ‘intelligible’ are both brought under the notion of ‘perception of understanding’ and a new faculty is added, the faculty of the will. Thus ‘perception of understanding’ and ‘will’ as the two modes of thinking provide for the capacity to get affected and the capacity to initiate affection respectively. In Aristotle, to be affected is the characteristic of matter114, and to be intelligible is the characteristic of form. This remains so in Descartes too, but as a result of substance conception of the soul, a specific form of affection happening to the thinking substance gets postulated: it is ‘the perception of understanding’. But the capacity to initiate action or process, the other characteristic of the Aristotelian form, gets divested from the form and made into an independent mode, the will, of the attribute ‘thinking’. However, unlike the Aristotelian form, which features as a principle of activity in all the processes from the biological growth through making to thinking, the role of the will as a principle of activity is confined to that of assent and dissent (two sub-modes of the will) to the perceptions of understanding. Such a reduced conception of activity hardly recommends itself, especially for understanding the domain of social activity, and it is no wonder that from the moment of its formulation the Cf. Descartes, cit. 1962, vol. I. p. 238. Besides these Descartes says that there are also „certain things which we experience in ourselves, which should be attributed neither to mind nor to body alone, but to those intimate union that exists between the body and the mind [...]. Such are the appetites of hunger, thirst, etc., and also the emotions, [...] of anger, joy, sadness, love, and finally all the sensations such as pain, pleasure, light and colour [etc.].“ 112 Cf. ibid. p. 445. 113 Cf. ibid. p. 446. 114 The word ‘matter’ because of its two uses, the Aristotelian and the Cartesian, may cause some confusion here. The Cartesian use to refer to one of the two ultimate substances, ‘the material substance’, is different from the Aristotelian use: in the Aristotelian sense the Cartesian ‘thinking substance’ too is formed of matter and form. 111

Cartesian framework was the object of attack. But whatever the criticisms, the basic innovation of his period,115 the human soul as a substance being characterised by the faculties of understanding and will, remain fairly intact in the subsequent period. The relation between these two faculties, the rivalry or the ways of harmonising their relative claims become an important line of thinking having considerable influence in the emergence of the concepts to talk about culture.

5.2

Knowledge as Propositions and Cultures as Belief Systems

Another area where the mediation through Christian heritage presents itself is the erasing of the distinction between the made and the generated. This brings the customs under the rubric of the made, not by man but by God. This has a paradoxical effect of giving to techne a feature reserved for episteme in the Aristotelian system. In the latter the techne is that sort of knowledge which is context bound; the episteme, on the other hand, because it pertains to the sphere of generated things that exhibit eternal forms that constitute the natural kinds, is the context-invariant variety of knowledge. But the peculiar status of customs being made by a ruler of the universe as a whole, both abolishes the original domain of the episteme and at the same time upgrades the techne by conferring on it the status of being the context-invariant knowledge. Since everything is of the variety of made things the knowledge becomes of one variety: to be knowledge is to be true of a universal domain. Since only propositions can be the bearers of ‘truth’ and ‘falsity’, this results in the birth of the propositional model of knowledge, i.e. the model according to which all knowledge is of the nature of information embodied in propositions.

It is worthwhile to dwell awhile on the combination of the notion of techne and that of the universal ruler. For today’s academic reader of the classical texts, because he or she is accustomed to innumerable books, it is easy to overlook the continuous line of arguments, metaphors, often even almost the same diction and passages continuing from one author to the next, and one age to the next. It is especially easy to do this in the case of authors like Descartes or Bacon, because they often paint a picture of themselves as rebelling against and discarding the learning from the ‘Scholastics’. Descartes for example asserts that he has swept away all the earlier learning and has started afresh from the resources available to his lonely mind.116 I say, ‘the basic innovation of his period’, and not merely that ‘made by Descartes’ alone, because this division of the human faculties is found in Bacon too, cf. Bacon, F., cit. 1986, bk. 2, xxv, 1. 116 Cf. Descartes, cit. 1967, On Method, Part II, p.87-94. 115

But if we remember how thoroughly their formation was through a (comparatively) few classical texts available at their time, and how the notion of authorial ownership of ideas was not yet fixed as today117 (some of the writings of Hobbes, if published today would be considered as outright plagiarism of Aristotle, and perhaps also of other classical authors!), we can become capable of finding very interesting echoes right across the historical periods.

My interest in pointing out the above is not that of apportioning the originality or otherwise for different authors. It is rather to point out the conceptual significance of certain metaphors which otherwise we are likely to overlook. For example, if we read the following passage by Descartes in the light of Aquinas’ combining the notions ‘the ruler’ and ‘the maker’ for elucidating the Creation by God, a new insight can be gained as to the connection between the conception of the mechanism and the notion of an action as being governed by maxims. Also the metaphor of building used both by Descartes and Bacon, and also by Hobbes 118, and then later that provided the root metaphor to generate terms for the discipline epistemology, can be appreciated in a new way. „One of the first considerations that occurred to me was that there is very often less perfection in works composed of several portions, and carried out by the hands of various masters, than in those on which one individual alone has worked. [...] those villages, have become in the process of time great towns, are usually badly constructed in comparison with those which are regularly laid out on a plan by an architect who is free to follow his ideas. [...] Thus I imagined that those people who were once half savage, and who have become civilised only by slow degrees, [...] could not succeed in establishing a good system of government as those, who from the time they came together as communities, carried into effect the constitution laid down by some wise legislator.“ 119

Though this passage makes use of the common experience of the time (the time when the absolutist states started emerging in Europe120 after the religious wars, and whose rulers took pleasure in laying down the new planned cities and pleasure gardens) its rootedness in the classical learning is also unmistakable as the reference to Sparta (left out in the quote) makes it clear. For my purpose, the nature of the reference to the ‘slowly developing city out of the cluster of villages’ is pertinent: it is not merely a reference to the common experience of the time but also to the Aristotelian passage in Politics, of how the city (the polis) is the last in the generation process of the of human associations, the family and the village being the 117

See on this an interesting paper (which, among other things, provides a historical illustration through the citation of the earlier texts in the European tradition, how recent even in the ‘West’ the notion of plagiarism is) by Ikegami, Y. (1987). 118 see the passages quoted from Hobbes in the section 5.4. 119 Cf. Descartes, cit. 1967, On Method, Part II, p.87-94. 120 Anderson, P. (1975).

intermediate forms on the way of actualisation of human potential of being a social animal.121 Throughout his Discourse on Method, and also in other works of his, Descartes makes use of all possible nuances of the metaphor of building but blends it with the notion of a ruler and legislation. One can find a similar blending of the metaphors in other writers of the period.

The significance of this for my purpose is the following. The concept of knowledge made equivalent to the Aristotelian episteme by erasing the distinction between techne and episteme, got conceived as a system of rules promulgated by God as laws, which is also simultaneously a system of rules for mechanical construction.122 The artificer and the ruler both have plans, in one case it is a plan of construction of a functioning mechanism, and in another case a ‘motivating principle of action’ for the citizens. When this gets further identified with Aquinas’ theory of inclinations, the natural and the rational, we have the non-human objects of nature whose ‘motivating principles of action’ (or ‘maxims’) are natural inclinations, i.e. the mechanisms impressed upon them by God, and in the case of human beings, it is the maxims governing (or rather, that ought to govern) their actions. The dispute that arises later between the approaches of naturalism and idealism was about the way of discovering these maxims: whether one can, or cannot, use the same method both for discovering the maxims impressed by God on the things of nature and those maxims that have to govern the human actions.

That natural laws are conceived as the commands of God is stated by Hobbes in a passage that echoes Aquinas very clearly: „These dictates of reason, men used to call by the name of laws, but improperly; for they are but conclusions or theorems concerning what conduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves; whereas law, properly, is the word of him that by right hath command over others. But yet if we consider the same theorems as delivered in the word of God, that by right commandeth all things; then are they properly called laws“ (emphasis mine). 123

In other words, the notion of ‘laws governing nature’ owes its origin to an extension of the laws governing the polis, and not the other way round. But through this extension those laws get the status of the uniquely given, unlike the laws of the polis, their predecessor. To put differently, the propositional model of knowledge comes into being through the following route: the Aristotelian notion of forms defining the natural kinds were transformed into God’s dictates 121

Cf. Aristotle, cit. 1995, Politics, 1252a 24 - 1253a 2. For an illustration of this equation of rules promulgated as law by a ruler and the rules for construction of something, i.e. a mechanical rule, see the way Hobbes conceives the Leviathan. Discussion in section 5.4. 123 Cf. Hobbes, cit. 1962, Leviathan p. 80, Ch. iii, p. 147; see also Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society, 1651, Ch. iii, section 33, vol. ii, pp. 49-50. 122

and they in turn were identified with the plans and laws, which in their turn are considered as identical. This makes the description of the causal mechanism and the enunciation of the motivating principles of actions to be the same.

One consequence, which will be discussed in chapter eight in detail, of this propositional model of knowledge is that the investigation of the action dispositions inherited by different groups become the investigation of beliefs held by them. In the case no identifiable beliefs can be found overtly, one has to assume the ‘implicit’ beliefs, and thus arises a pre-occupation with the beliefs of ‘traditional’ societies, and the corresponding controversies like absolutism versus relativism, the judgements of truth by the participants versus judgements by the observers. The contrast made between the supposed beliefs held in ‘traditional societies’ as against in the modern ones has its roots in an earlier contrast drawn by Descartes between the opinions held due to ‘customs and example’ on the one hand, and the scientific knowledge of which a method can be given to prove their certainty, on the other.124 Historically, one can argue further, this Cartesian contrast, in its turn, is a reformulation of the contrast made by the early Christian fathers between the innumerable traditions prevailing in the Roman empire and the ‘true religion’ of the Christians. For Romans the words ‘religio’ and ‘traditio’ were synonymous.125 The Christian struggle with the intellectual currents existing in the Roman empire resulted in counter-posing the religio with the traditio, the latter consisting of the ‘idolatry’ - a term meaning more than a mere idol worship: in the Christian vocabulary (and also in the vocabulary of Islam, which in its intellectual heritage shares almost everything that Christianity can lay claim to) this term meant the practices not sanctioned by the holy book. In the newer form in the 16th and 17th centuries, the tradition was identified with the ‘Aristotelianism’ and its opposite the scientific knowledge, the knowledge acquired through a proper method (of reading the book of nature). It is not an accident that Francis Bacon in the early 17th century uses the terminology of ‘idols’ to refer to the obstacles for acquiring true learning.126

As far as my story is concerned the search for a unique method of arriving at truths characteristic of the late 16th to early 19th centuries is relevant in that it was associated with

124

Cf. Descartes, cit. 1990, Discourse on Method, part II. See for such an argument chapters 1 to 4 in: Balagangadhara S.N. (1994). Also my comments on this, in: Rao N. (1996). 126 Cf. Bacon, Novum Organum, bk. I, 39-44. 125

the notion of ‘natural reason’. The search for a method was a search for an answer to the question, ‘what is the right use of the natural reason?’ This is another way of raising the question about the nature, the scope, and the limits of the ‘natural reason’. What kind of conception is this ‘natural reason’ and what kind of a capacity it was conceived as? 5.3

‘Natural Reason’: Two Conceptions

The term ‘natural reason’ is already found in Aquinas and it probably owes its origin to a contrast between the ‘wisdom’ of the ancients and that conveyed by the divine revelation embodied in the Bible. Whereas the former relies only on the exercise of those capacities of understanding endowed on humans by nature, the latter requires the exercise of faith. The capacity for faith, it can be argued, became in due course of time a separate human faculty, the faculty of the will. In Aquinas, however, the will is identified with the special human form of acquiescing with the divine law, obeying it through an understanding in contrast to the obedience exhibited by other things and animals; the latter obey the God-given Law through these being impressed upon them as natural appetite. The connection established between the notion of obedience through natural appetite and the sensible nature of man is one important theme bequeathed to the theory of culture through the system of Aquinas. Perhaps, at this juncture, a word of clarification of the terms ‘sensible’ and ‘intelligible’ is called for. I have so far relied for conveying their special sense on the contextual indicators. In this book I am using the word ‘sensible’ to translate the German ‘das Sinnliche’, often using the English adjective as if it is a substantive. A similar convention is adopted in using the word ‘intelligible’. Both these uses depend on the doctrine that there are sense-specific and intellectspecific elements the designations of which function as transitive objects in a description of the exercise of the sense-ability and intellectual ability respectively. Borrowing from Ryle, I will use the term ‘accusatives’ to refer to the sense-specific and intellect-specific objects assumed in this doctrine of actions. Thus the notions of intelligibles and sensibles originated in the context of the Aristotelian conception of actions being defined through their accusatives, an elucidation of which was given in the previous chapter.127 Though often these commandeered terms have an awkward ring because they conflict with the more common usage of ‘sensible’

127

See section 4.3.3.

and ‘intelligible’, for lack of any other suitable alternatives I am resorting to this special use; however, I indicate the technical nature by using the cursive script.

Aristotle distinguishes intelligible from sensible forms, but the former are conceived as analogous to the latter in that just as the sensible forms are correlative to senses, intelligible forms are correlative to the intellect.128 „Thinking and understanding are regarded as akin to a form of perceiving; for in the one as well as the other the soul discriminates and is cognisant of something which is.“129

Further, the capacity to actualise the intelligible forms is mentioned as specific to a small section of the animal world, presumably the humans, and it is then connected with the ability to judge in terms of standards. A further intermediate ability is also alluded to - the ability to imagine - which depends on the sense-capacity and in its turn is depended upon by the capacity for intellection. „That perceiving and understanding are not identical is therefore obvious; for the former is universal in the animal world, the latter is found in only a small division of it. Further, thinking is also distinct from perceiving - I mean that in which we find rightness and wrongness - rightness in understanding, knowledge, true opinion, wrongness in their opposites; for perception of the special objects of sense is always free from error, and is found in all animals, while it is possible to think falsely as well as truly, and thought is found only where there is discourse of reason. For imagining is different from either perceiving or discursive thinking, though it is not found without sensation, or judgement without it. That this activity is not the same kind as judgement is obvious. For imagining lies within our own power whenever we wish (e.g. we can call up a picture, as in the practice of mnemonics by the use of mental images), but in forming opinions we are not free: we cannot escape the alternative of falsehood or truth. Further, when we think something to be fearful or threatening, emotion is immediately produced, and so too with what is encouraging; but when we merely imagine we remain as unaffected as persons who are looking at a painting of some dreadful or encouraging scene.“130

Intellect is on the one hand conceived as analogous to the senses in that it has its own specific accusatives, and on the other different from it in that it, unlike senses, is not a bodily organ.

This latter is taken to mean two things by Aristotle: first, its 'actuality' consists in taking the form of its objects, and it is pure activity; second, because its actuality consists in pure activity, unlike the bodily rooted activities such as perception there is no decreasing intensity resulting from indulgence, but rather an enhancing due to indulgence. 128

Cf. Aristotle, cit. 1995, De anima, bk. III. 4, 430 a 2-5. Cf. Aristotle, cit. 1995, De anima, bk. III. 3, 427a, 20-22. 130 Cf. Aristotle, cit. 1995, De anima, bk. III. 3, 427b, 7-27. 129

"Sense is not capable of perceiving when the object of perception is too intense, e.g. it cannot perceive sound after loud sounds, nor see or smell after strong colours or smells. But when the intellect thinks something especially fit for thought, it thinks inferior things not less but rather more. For the faculty of sense-perception is not independent of the body, whereas the intellect is distinct."131

This fairly common place observation by Aristotle becomes later the source of Descartes’ argument for the separation of intellectual knowledge from the bodily habits (Descartes almost literally repeats the argument, but now taking the metaphor of light to refer to the scientific knowledge that equally illuminates all things in contrast to the practical arts rooted in acquired bodily dispositions, which because of this makes the proficiency in one skill a hindrance for the proficiency in another132 ) and the idea that ‘reason’ is identical with the capacity for freedom.

Intelligible forms are also the essences defining natural kinds and are context-invariant. Both in the objects and in the apprehending persons the individuating factor is their matter, and it accounts for variation among the individuals (both animate and inanimate natural things) belonging to a species; in other words, 'matter' is the factor of context-variance. Both the activity of actualising the sensible forms and making artefacts involve the matter as a factor of the activity, and therefore they are context-dependent sorts of knowledge. Intellectual exercise concerning forms of nature is actualisation of pure forms, i.e. actualising the context-invariant variety of knowledge. As discussed already133, even though modern philosophy emerged by eradicating the distinction between the sphere of episteme and that of techne, it nevertheless retained one aspect of the notion of episteme: the context-invariance as the condition of knowledge. We find in Descartes an equation of knowledge acquired by tradition with knowledge through senses, and this in turn is equated with 'opinion'.134 This means that for him the term 'sense-knowledge' and 'opinion' are equivalent to Aristotle's 'empeiria' in one respect - in respect of connoting a means of orienting in the day-to-day world. But his overall thrust was to demarcate knowledge from sense-experience and opinion: he polemicises against the conception of scientific pursuits in analogy with the practical arts and against the supposition that different disciplines have

131 132

Cf. Aristotle, cit. 1995, De Anima, bk. III. 3, 429 a 29. Cf. Descartes, cit. 1967, Rules for the Direction of the Mind, in: vol. I. p. 1-2.

133

See the section 5.2.

134

Notes against a programme, in: Descartes, cit. 1967, vol. I. p. 443-444.

different methods;135 further, he asserts regarding the method of doubt in the Meditations, that its "greatest benefit lies in freeing us from all our preconceived opinions, and providing the easiest route by which the mind may be led away from the senses". 136

All these can be taken as an effort in the direction of defining intellectual knowledge as contextfree. However, now Aristotle’s nature is not available for anchoring the context-invariance, for the techne has been declared as the general model of knowledge. The only way of making the latter a context-invariant form of knowledge is to anchor the invariance in the maker who exercises the techne: either in God, the Maker or in man, the maker. (Descartes in fact makes use of both the options in making God the author of innate ideas in man.) Therefore the intellect - that factor that is supposed to render man's doings different from the doings of other animals - becomes the anchorage for context-invariance. This is the source of the notion of ‘natural reason' of the 17th and 18th centuries which spans the subjectivist turn of both the Cartesian and Kantian varieties of the modern philosophy. Since this reason was thought of singling out man from animals, to provide a theory of human nature is the same as providing the scope and limits of natural reason as against Reason as embodied in God.

What is of interest from the point of view of the concepts pertaining to culture is that the conception of natural reason gave rise to two projects. The first is a project of increasing man’s power to gestalt his life by finding out a method of how best to use the capacity of natural reason. Underlying this project is the assumption that knowledge is power which as an ideal was counter-posed to Aristotle’s theoria. This is a consequence of the techne model: since knowledge is equivalent to the knowledge for making, and this in turn, when spoken in the Aristotelian terminology, is equivalent to the power residing in the maker,137 the knowledge becomes a power. Hobbes recommends an imitation

135 136

137

Rules for the direction of the native intelligence, rule 1 in: Descartes, cit. 1967, p. 1-2. Cf. Descartes, cit. 1967, vol. I., p. 140.

The following passage from Hobbes indicates the connection between the techne model of knowledge and the ideal of ‘knowledge is power’: "The end or scope of Philosophy is, that we may make use to our benefit of effects formerly seen; or that by application of bodies to one another, we may produce the like effects of those we conceive in our mind, as far forth as matter, strength and industry will permit, for the commodity of human life. For the inward glory and triumph of mind that man may have for the mastering of some difficult and doubtful matter, or for the discovery of some hidden truth, is not so much worth the pains of the study of Philosophy requires. [...] The end of knowledge is power; [...] the scope of all speculation is the performance of some action, or the thing to be done." (emphasis is mine) in: Elements of Philosophy, introduction, See English Works of Thomas Hobbes, cit. 1962, vol. I., p. 7. What is referred to by the expression ‘inward glory and the triumph of mind’ in this passage is the Aristotelian ideal of theoria.

of God’s creation, i.e. an imitation of the method of making embodied in the natural objects, in order to gain a capacity analogous to His power. As described in the last chapter 138, it was thought that His methods could be discerned by the hypothetical constructions and the knowledge gained thereby can be used for the benefit of mankind.

When applied to the man, the natural product, this implies looking at him as embodying certain motivating principles (the ‘mechanisms’ or the Thomist ‘natural inclinations’) impressed on him, the feature singling him out of from other animals being the ‘mental mechanisms’.139 Hobbes looks at the task of providing a theory of human nature as that of providing a theory of human needs. I will discuss in the next section, the rationale of this and how this is connected with the Thomist Aristotelianism. For the moment I just want to suggest that the task of providing a theory of human needs was conceived as taking to man the same imitative stance as towards other natural objects in order to find out the procedures through which God made them. This is the source of naturalism that we came across in the second chapter, and it is to take an interest in increasing the competence pertaining to objects (the object-competence). Below in the next section I will discuss briefly how Hobbes applies his recommendation in presenting his conception of knowledge pertaining to the polis or the State.

The second project was that of demarcating the proper use of reason from its improper use. This is the concept of ‘critique’: basically this is to take Aquinas’ idea of man obeying God’s law by making the maxims of his actions himself. This is taking a participatory stance towards God’s act of making rather than an imitative stance recommended by Hobbes. Whereas in an imitative stance we have to discover the God’s plans embodied in the natural objects through a hypothetical procedure of construction of them, in a participatory stance such plans are assumed to be the given modes of regulating one’s actions. It involves a normative attitude, and thus a reflective stance towards actions and inherited dispositions. The notion of critique in the course of 19th century develops into the notion of culture critique. The mediating link between critique and culture-critique was provided by an historicisation of reason initiated by Kant.140 This stream of thinking looks at the task of providing a theory of human nature as a

138

See the section 4.5. Watkins, J.W.N. (1965) draws attention to the influence of Harvey, besides Galileo on the methodology of Hobbes. The combination of the mechanical principle with the functional anatomy of the body played an important role in the conception of the Leviathan. According to Watkins the uniformity of the human nature was drawn by an analogy with the uniformity of the human anatomy. See. Ch. III and VI, p. 47-63 and 100-115 respectively. 140 see next chapter. 139

task of showing how the feature of being characterised by the intelligible nature, as against the sensible nature of animals, gives rise to the specificity of human institutions, traditions, and the history. This will be discussed in detail in chapters 6 and 7.

5.4

Making the Polis by Imitating God’s Creation

Aristotle’s idea that polis is a natural compound like the body, and that it is made, is used by Hobbes in his Leviathan: "Nature, the art whereby God hath made and governs the world, is by the art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an artificial animal. For seeing life is but a motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principal part within; why may we not say, that all automata (engines that move themselves by springs and wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life? For what is the heart, but a spring; and the nerves, but so many strings; and the joints, but so many wheels, giving motion to the whole body, such as intended by the artificer? Art goes yet further, imitating that rational and most excellent work of nature, man. For by art is created that great Leviathan called a Commonwealth, or State, in Latin Civitas, which is but an artificial man; [...]. Lastly, the pacts and covenants, by which the parts of this body politic were at first made, set together and united, resemble that fiat, or the let us make man, pronounced by God in the creation."141

This passage is of interest on many counts. Here the three themes referred to earlier, of nature as an artefact made by God, of mechanism, and the covenants (i.e. the legislative elements, the covenants being akin to legislation) are all brought together and thus it illustrates perfectly the point about them made in the section 5.2. The Commonwealth is said to be an artefact made by man by imitating the natural man; nature in its turn, however, is called the art of God, the 'art' being the derivation from the Latin translation of Greek 'techne', thus, as to be expected, effacing the Aristotelian distinction between the process of generation and process of making. Further, the mechanical procedures of making, ‘the setting together and uniting’, are equated with the declaring of the covenants and pacts, which are further equated with the pronouncement by the God, the ruler, of ‘let us make man’. Thus the characteristic of law as defined by Aquinas - the promulgation as an important condition of bringing into existence of law - is adopted and also given the same status as mechanical procedures.

Apart from the expected difference of effacing the distinction between the generated and the made, the Aristotelian terminology is evident throughout the Leviathan and even in the subtitle of the book, the full title being 'Leviathan or The Matter, Form and Power of A Commonwealth 141

Cf. Hobbes, cit. 1962, vol. III., Leviathan, p. 1.

Ecclesiastical and Civil'. The 'matter-form' terminology is directly taken over from Aristotle and is also used with identifiably similar meaning as in Aristotle, with another expected difference, that in the notion of agency which rests here on the artificer rather than in the form that resides in the artificer.

Further, the description of 'art of men' as an imitation of nature is not an accidental metaphor; throughout the Leviathan the metaphor of 'body', and the body having a matter and an artificer, play a crucial role. Hobbes announces the programme and procedure of the Leviathan as "To describe this artificial man, I will consider First, the matter thereof, and the artificer; both of which is man [...]."142

Further, „Though nothing can be immortal, which mortals make; yet if men had the use of reason they pretend to, their commonwealths might be secured, at least from perishing by internal diseases. For by the nature of their institution, they are designed to live, as long as mankind, or as the laws of nature, or as justice itself, which gives them life. Therefore when they come to be dissolved, not by external violence, but intestine disorder, the fault is not in men as they are the matter; but as they are the makers, and orderers of them [...] for want, both of the art of making the fit laws, to square their actions by, [...] they cannot without the help of a very able architect, be compiled into any other than a crazy building, such as hardly lasting out of their own time, must assuredly fall upon the heads of their posterity. Amongst the infirmities therefore of a commonwealth, I will reckon in the first place, those that arise from an imperfect institution, and resemble the diseases of a natural body, which proceed from a defectuous procreation."143

The metaphor of the architect which we also came across in Descartes and Bacon, is a reminder of the continuing thread I spoke of earlier. To this another metaphor, that of the body and its susceptibility to diseases is added: Hobbes speaks of giving a diagnosis of the ‘infirmities’ afflicting the body politic comparable to natural diseases. But at the same time the idiom mechanisms, ‘of springs, joints and wheels’, rather than that of the organism is made use of in talking about the body itself.

Presumably he considers his work analogous to the theoretical endeavour in the case of medicine which aims at healing. Healing requires an understanding of the mechanisms proper to the body and applying it to restore the original functioning of the body. Whereas the medical man heals the natural body Hobbes' work is intended to heal the 'artificial man'. But in both 142 143

Cf. Hobbes, cit. 1962, vol. III., Leviathan, p. 2. Cf. Hobbes, cit. 1962, vol. III., Leviathan, p. 167-168.

cases in order to know the causes of the malfunctioning one has to know the proper mode of functioning. The project therefore is that of gaining a knowledge about the proper function, and for this what is recommended is looking at the way God has created the ‘natural body’. But the natural body of Hobbes’ focus is not merely that of the physiologist or anatomist. His interest is in the ‘motion’ and the theory of motion is very much spoken of in the ThomistAristotelian idiom.144 Watkins draws attention to an early work of Hobbes, Short Tract on First Principles and says that the basic ideas delineated there continued in the later work. He quotes the following from that work which is relevant to my story. „The act of the appetite is a motion of animal spirits toward the object that moveth them. The object is the efficient cause, or agent [...]. Appetite [...] is a passive power [...] to be moved toward the object. The Good is to every thing, that which hath active power to attract it locally.“

Watkins however suggests that this passage leads to ‘a remarkable inversion of the traditional idea of the agent and the patient.’145 But what Hobbes present in the passage, as far as it concerns with the ‘agent’ and ‘patient’, is Aquinas’ theory of natural inclinations, pure and simple. Those who are familiar with Aquinas’ theory would not find the passage as inverting the ‘traditional’ role of the agent and the patient at all; he is merely following the Aristotelian line of thinking of defining the actions in terms of the accusatives, and dispositions in terms of the actions defined in such a manner. The consequence of it is to look for a theory of nature in the theory of appetites, which in their turn need to be defined in terms of the appropriate objects that impel the animals. Thus for Hobbes the task of providing a theory of human nature becomes a task of providing a theory of human needs.

In the light of this, the criticism by Herder of Condillac that was briefly discussed in section 3.3.2 becomes historically revealing. Condillac is for Herder the representative of the theory of social contract. Herder’s criticism, as we have seen, is that such a theory looks at human being in terms of his animal rather than human nature. Hobbes is using the Thomist theory of nature for building a theory of human nature. Herder is criticising him for overlooking the speciality of man in the Thomist scheme. Instead, he calls for a theory of human reason against that about animal inclinations governing human being.

144 145

See Watkins, J.W.N (1965) Ch. III. for the influence on Hobbes of the methodology of the Paduan Aristotelians. See Watkins, J.W.N (1965), p. 29 & 45.

The divide between Hobbes and Herder, between a conception of a theory of human nature as that of his needs and as that about the speciality of human reason has its progenies even today. Roughly, in the English tradition there are more followers of Hobbes and in the German tradition of Herder or Kant. One may use with some caution, the terms naturalism versus idealism to refer to this divide. The latter wants to look at human beings as sharing with God the characteristic of having an intelligible as against the sensible essence. The web of implication threads surrounding this theme will be the focus in the next two chapters.

6

6.1

Kant: The Making of the Naturgeschichte

Kant’s ‘Love Affair with Metaphysics’

In chapter 3 I began by asking what could be the link between the Christian view of cultivating the ‘inner life’ of man and the ideal of social perfection that the German philosophy at the beginning of the 19th century effected. I haven’t yet answered that question but only hinted at a key and a clue to an answer by quoting a seemingly simple passage from Kant’s Pädagogik. I also mentioned the notion of Naturgeschichte, and the unusual sense of the word ‘nature’ in this expression that betrays a theological origin of the thinking of Kant and Herder. From there I made a jump to Greece in order to trace the categories of ‘making’ and ‘generating’ and the application of them to the very notions of ‘action’, ‘knowledge’ and ‘human nature’. I quoted the passage by Aristotle which can be considered as an answer to the question, given that there are varied human customs, what should be true of human nature. Such a question underlies Herder’s thinking on human institutions. I also indicated that the basic notions later to become prominent in theories of State and culture being already discernible in Aristotle. But it is a fact that Aristotle’s passage was mediated for the thinkers of the modern period through the Christian tradition. So, in the fourth chapter, I went into the conceptual consequences of the professed attempt to ‘ennoble’ the heritage of the Athens with the biblical revelations by a discussion of Aquinas’ attempts in this direction. Mainly I traced it by showing how the addition of the will as a faculty came into being, and the corresponding difference it made to the conception of leading a good life: I suggested, that it transforms the Aristotelian amoral view into a moral conception of what it is to lead a ‘good life’ by bringing into the Aristotelian idea of law of the polis made by man within the constraints of his nature, a notion of command promulgated by God which expresses itself as natural law. I elucidated the conception of the natural law as the consequence of universalising the Aristotelian model of polis to cover his notion of physis, thus transforming the objects of nature into the citizens of a universal city ruled by God, where the biblical commands become the laws promulgated for the good of the creatures.

If we read Kant after a reading of Aquinas we can hear a lot of echoes. That Kant has to be situated in a long specific German tradition of Enlightenment where the theological roots of pietism nourished the specificity of it, has long been noted.146 Recently, Beiser has drawn attention to the fact of Kant’s ‘love affair with Metaphysics’147 in his early period, and I take it that the love affair has much to do with the Thomist thinking mediated by Leibniz and Wolf on whom the influence of the Spanish scholastic theologian Suarez Franscisco has been noted. Kant’s conception of practical in contrast to theoretical reason is an attempt to revive the Aristotelian two conceptions of knowledge as against the Cartesian two domains of knowledge. Similarly, the role accorded to the will in moral life, making man himself as the maker of the maxims or commands in terms of which he acts, nevertheless these maxims having universality, is a revival of Aquinas conception rational as against the natural inclinations, and the notion that rational inclinations to be the specific human motivating principle of action. The will as identical with practical reason and as the source of man’s moral life and plans is an attempt to give a new meaning to the conception of man as imago dei. On the whole Kant’s effort can be looked at as that of reviving the earlier Thomist conceptions. But, as all efforts at revival, this too brings its own dynamic to the changed intellectual context rather than simply bringing back the older distinctions to new life.

6.2

The Man, the Maker and the Social Animal

One can approach Kant’s system as one of drawing the logical consequences of two of the assumptions of the Christian theology as underpinned by a neo-Aristotelian system: (i) nature is made, and not something that has its principle of existence (or, the why of its existence) by itself; (ii) man is created in the image of the creator God. In Aristotle, to be affected is the characteristic of matter, and to be intelligible is the characteristic of form. Applied to man, the maker, this would mean two things simultaneously. First, he is human to the extent his action is the actualisation of the ‘intelligible’ and not constituted by the ‘affective’ modes. Therefore, secondly, the nature he cognises is not something that affects him, but something that he, like God, has made: „nur soviel sieht man vollständig ein, als man nach Begriffen selbst machen und zustande bringen kann.“148

146

Cf. Beck, L. W. (1969). Cf. Beiser, F. C. (1992). 148 Cf. Kritik der teleologischen Urteilskraft, Kant, Werke, cit. 1975, B 310. 147

Similarly, an action is human to the extent it is governed by a maxim made by oneself rather than given or received.

Thus to conceive man in the image of God is to conceive the making to be the basic model of human activity, and Kant conceives cognition, making (in the usual sense of bringing about an artefact) and practical action as sub-species of making. However, it has to be emphasised, making ‘nach Begriffen’ and more generally through ‘Entwürfe’, or plans, and not in terms of the normal day to day sense involving the hands and some material.

The specific change brought about by Kant in the notions of thinking and will would become especially conspicuous if we contrast them with that of the Cartesian notions: For Descartes, the thinking substance is characterised by a perception of understanding and a will to assent or dissent to it. This is conceiving man more in the mode of being affected rather than being the maker. For in Cartesian conception, the perception of understanding is affection by ideas either adventitiously or necessarily. In action theoretical terms, they are defined in terms of the suffering (Widerfahrnis) aspect rather than the doing aspect of an action. Similarly, the Cartesian will is governed by a principle outside of its powers: if clarity and distinctness of ideas is not respected, the assenting and dissenting to ideas would go wrong. In Kant’s conception, the categories and the will are ‘spontaneous’ powers, i.e. powers designating the doing rather than the suffering aspect of an action: the categories connote the spontaneous powers in relation to theoretical (or ‘pure’) action, the will in relation to the action in the practical sphere; it formulates the maxims of conduct, and in formulating the categorical imperative, it is the maker of the principle of conduct absolutely, i.e. without the affective modes having any influence over it.

In both cases, of course, there are limitations put on reason, because, man occupies a middle space between animals and angels, i.e. he has, unlike in the case of angels, sensibility as part of his nature.149 This limitation put by man’s being a creature of sensibility is focused on two levels: in relation to the knowledge of nature and in relation to the conduct guided by ideals. Constraints on reason by the powers of sensibility to yield the knowledge of nature is enquired into in the critique of pure reason. As in the case of Aquinas, to get to know the 149

In order to emphasise that man cannot do away with sensibility when it comes to his powers of understanding, Kant frequently makes references to a hypothetical possibility of beings in other planets who may have pure intelligible powers in contrast to human beings.

product of God’s making, the nature, man has to subject himself to the limitations of sensibility; for nature doesn’t obey the dictates of the ‘pure’ human making. In contrast, in the sphere of (moral) conduct, man can become human only by transcending the limits put by the sensibility on the guiding principles of action. The critique of practical reason concerns itself with the nature of reason in relation to the maxims and ideals, and the kind of limits put by the sensibility, and the possibility of, as well as the need for, transcending those limits.

But there is one weakness that Kant had to confront in reviving the mediaeval metaphysical foundations. Kant wrote in an era that just preceded the French revolution. The Europe of the 18th century, just like the previous century of the aftermath of the religious wars, demanded a justification of the polis, and not merely ‘the justification of the ways of God to man’.150 It is one thing to universalise the existing picture of a polis, as Aquinas did, and it is quite another to provide for the foundations of a new polis. The very essential feature of practical life in the political context is that of sociality. The making of an artefact as well as that involved in transforming the affects into a phenomenon does not involve the social co-operation in an immediate tangible sense. But social institution and conventions are making in a sense that involve the cohesion of many wills. How are the social institutions, and thereby the conditions of acting socially, are made?

In answer to this Kant attempts to combine two of the Aristotelian assumptions, the doctrine of natural kinds and the doctrine that man is rational, and through their conjoint application to human being derive his sociality and history: man has the essence of ‘reason’, a metacapacity used synonymously with the capacity for ‘freedom’, and consequently his other capacities are realisable not at an individual level, but only at a species level. Man is a species-being (Gattungswesen) and therefore he is required to make his species through his self-activity.151 This, however, makes the term ‘making’ ambiguous: till now it is the individual human being whose making is spoken of. Now it appears as if the whole species is required to be conceived as the agent. To avoid this ambiguity Kant elaborates an ingenious distinction 150

Though predominantly about an earlier period, i.e. about the 17th century, Toulmin, S. (1992) delineates the role of what may be broadly called as ‘the social question’ in the rise and spread of modern philosophy. What he says is pertinent equally, if not more, in the case of the rise and spread of Kant’s influence in Germany. 151 This is the famous slogan of Kant ‘Sich im Denken orientieren’. See his ‘Was ist Aufklärung?’ See the 20th century adaptation by Mittelstraß, ‘Was heißt: sich im Denken orientieren? in: Mittelstraß, J. (1982) p. 162-184.

between conceiving nature as an object of physical science and as that of a teleological system: whereas the former is the product of theoretical thinking the latter is a product of practical (or pragmatic) thinking. The categories needed for the practical thinking are different from that required for theoretical thinking.

To clarify the logic of these distinctions is to enter into the whole Kantian system, especially, his programme for a theory of history and culture.

6.3

Anthropology from a Pragmatic Standpoint

6.3.1

Education as Partaking in the ‘Idea of Humanity’

To find an entry point let us go back to Kantian notion of education as found in the passage quoted in the third chapter. To begin with, we can approach it with the Aristotelian idea of realisation of the good specific to human beings. But what is the good specific to human beings? Children, we may remember Kant asserting in the quoted passage152, need to be educated not merely in terms of the immediate needs of the individual or a particular group but in accordance with the possible better state of humanity in the future, i.e. they need to be educated in accordance with the ‘idea of humanity’ and with a horizon of thinking that takes into account of the destiny of the whole mankind - ‘der Idee der Menscheit, und deren ganzer Bestimmung angemessen’. How exactly to unpack this notion of the ‘Bestimmung der Menschen’?153 As I indicated in the third chapter, the expression ‘Bestimmung’ in the passage in question, unlike ‘definition’ with which it is usually translated, has also a connotation of ‘destiny’: the German ‘Bestimmung’ has both a language- and an object-level connotation, i.e. it involves a combination of both the meanings - ‘the definition of man’ and ‘the destiny of man’. So we need to ask, what according to Kant is the destiny of a human being, not of this or that individual, but of human being ‘in general’? At the first sight, not merely the question but also Kant’s answer appears to be Aristotelian: the destiny or purpose of human being is to develop all the capacities endowed on him by nature, the ‘Naturanlagen’ as he calls it. But with what capacities man is endowed with? and

152 153

see above 3.4.2. see ibid.

how to find it out? Here comes the Kantian twist, and to understand it we require the whole batteries of specific concepts he makes use of. Kant’s programme, along with all the categories he makes use of for that purpose is encapsulated in the following passage. „Looking to principles of reason, there is ample ground - for the reflective, though not of course for the determinant, judgement - to make us estimate man as not merely a physical end, such as all organised beings are, but as the being upon this earth who is the ultimate end of nature, and the one in relation to whom all other natural things constitute a system of end. What now is the end in man, and the end which, as such, is intended to be promoted by means of his connection with nature? If this end is something which must be found in man himself, it must either be of such a kind that man himself may be satisfied by means of nature and its beneficence, or else it is the aptitude and skill for all manner of ends for which he may employ nature both external and internal. The former end of nature would be the happiness of man, the latter his culture. The conception of happiness is not one which man abstracts more or less from his instincts and so derives from his animal nature. It is, on the contrary, a mere idea of a state, and one to which he seeks to make his actual state of being adequate under purely empirical conditions - an impossible task. [...] Man, therefore, is ever but a link in the chain of physical ends. True, he is a principle in respect of many ends to which nature seems to have predetermined him, seeing that he makes himself so; but, nevertheless, he is also a means towards the preservation of the finality in the mechanism of the remaining members. As the single being upon earth that possesses understanding, and, consequently, a capacity for setting before himself ends of his deliberate choice, he is certainly titular lord of nature, and, supposing we regard nature as a teleological system, he is born to be its ultimate end. But this is always on the terms that he has the intelligence and the will to give to it and to himself such a reference to ends as can be self-sufficing independently of nature, and, consequently, a final end. Such an end, however, must not be sought in nature. But, where in man, at any rate, are we to place this ultimate end of nature? To discover this we must seek out what nature can supply for the purpose of preparing him for what he himself must do in order to be a final end, and we must segregate it from all ends whose possibility rests upon conditions that man can only await at the hand of nature.“154

The categories used above, (i) the determinate and reflective judgements, (ii) the ultimate end of nature and the final end of creation, along with some other important concepts - such as

154

Cf. Meredith, J.C. (1973, Part II, p. 92f). In deviation from my usual practice, here I am quoting Kant in translation in order to make the reader familiar with the English equivalents I am going tto use in the main text to render Kant’s German terminology. Cf. for the German equivalent in: Kritik der teleologischen Urteilskraft, Kant, Werke, cit. 1975, A 383 - 386.

‘anthropology from a pragmatic standpoint’ - within the context of which these distinctions are to be made sense of, can be elucidated in terms of a two stage argument of Kant. (1) It is necessary and justified to use teleological concepts such as purpose or end (‘Zweck’), if our aim is to consider nature or world from a ‘pragmatic standpoint’. (2) When we approach nature as a teleological system155 then we are compelled to develop an idea of a ‘final end’156, and to see in the idea of a freely acting human being such a final end.157

6.3.2

‘Pragmatic’ versus ‘Theoretical’ Knowledge

Kant demarcates ‘pragmatic’ from ‘theoretical knowledge of the world’ and correspondingly distinguishes anthropology in ‘pragmatic’ and ‘physiological perspective’.158 He says, „Die physiologische Menschenkenntnis geht auf die Erforschung dessen, was die Natur aus dem Menschen macht. Die pragmatische Menschenkenntnis geht auf das, was er als frei handelndes Wesen aus sich selbst macht oder machen kann und soll.“159

But this distinction between ‘what nature makes out of man’ and what ‘man as free acting being can and should make out of oneself’, requires a fair amount of elucidation of the Kantian system, and therefore not very enlightening in the beginning as to what these distinctions mean. In order to throw light I will draw attention to some parallel, though not identical, distinctions in Aristotle, and show by contrast what the meaning of these terms could be, and what change of tradition they are the result of. Even though not identical with it, the division, ‘pragmatic’ and ‘theoretical’ is likely to have been conceived in parallel to the Aristotelian division of techne and episteme, and correspondingly, between practical and theoretical philosophy: for Aristotle, the movement and change where human intervention does not and cannot take place is the physis which is open to theoria. The practical and poeitic knowledge on the other hand pertain to domains open to human making. This cannot be the way to distinguish knowledge types for Kant, because for him there is no such category of growing by itself; all domains are made. It is the perspective (Kant’s expression Hinsicht) from which a domain is constructed that

Kant sometimes uses the term ‘zweckmäßiges System’, ibid. Kant makes a distinction between ‘letzter Zweck der Natur’ and ‘Endzweck’. The English equivalents made use of in the translation are ‘the ultimate end of nature’ and ‘final end’ respectively, ibid. 157 Kant speaks of man as ‘frei handelndes Wesen’ as ‘Idee des Endzwecks’, ibid. 158 Cf. Vorrede zur Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, Kant, Werke, cit. 1975, BA III - VIII. 159 ibid. 155 156

differentiates one domain from another, and not the fact whether something is open to human intervention or not.

That is, his conception of knowledge involves a notion of making at a meta-level. This brings hurdles for the task of interpreting the Kantian texts: sometimes meta-concepts are used, sometimes the object concepts. For example, ‘what man makes out of himself’ cannot be taken on the same level as ‘what nature makes out of man’; for in order to identify the latter, one has to have a level of man making use of his capacity of ‘making out of himself’. That is, it is only in the context of man’s effort at trying to make out of himself what he can, and ought to, that he constructs an account of himself as being made by nature in such and such a way.

Let me bring another of Aristotelian contrast into the picture. Aristotle distinguishes between two orders of knowledge which he calls „what is prior in nature“ and „what is prior to us“: "Things are prior and more familiar in two ways; for it is not the same to be prior by nature and prior in relation to us. I call prior and more familiar in relation to us what is nearer to perception, prior and more familiar simpliciter what is further away. What is most universal is furthest away, and the particulars are nearest; and these are opposite to each other." 160

Corresponding to the two orders of priority - 'prior in relation to us' and 'prior in relation to nature' - Aristotle conceives two different inference modes - those starting from 'principles' and those starting from 'opinions' (endoxa).161 These in turn are meant to specify two functionally differing methods. Principles are asserted to be prior in relation to nature. That is, they are logically prior in the system of truths about any domain. Episteme is conceived as representation of 'the order of nature', the principles governing the domain coming at the top and the other truths occurring in descending order. This is also meant as the order of didactic discourse. ‘Prior in relation to us' are 'sense-perceptions' and 'opinions' which in the 'order of nature' are conceived to be the last. Dialectical deduction is supposed to start from the level of 'opinions' and arrive at the principles. That is, the 'order of our knowledge' in contrast to the order of nature ascends from opinions and sense-perception to the level of principles. This is identified by the medieval Aristotelians as the method of investigation.162 That is, enquiry

160

Cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, bk. I. 2, 72 a 1-5. Cf. Aristotle, Topics, bk. I. 1 & 2, 100a to 101b. 162 Cf. Randall, J.H. (1961a). 161

in contrast to teaching begins with what is 'familiar to us' and ascends to what is 'familiar in nature'.163 It is quite evident that Kant’s metaphysical deduction is conceived in parallel to the Aristotelian dialectical deduction: the given practice or opinion is taken as the starting point and the conditions for the possibility of that practice is enquired into. Therefore it is possible to surmise that Kant intends a kind of application of the Aristotelian ‘prior to nature’ and ‘prior to us’. But, since for him an object is to be conceived as made, the very starting point of what is ‘prior to us’ depends upon a sort of making: we can search for the principles in nature only after we choose the ‘Hinsicht’ - the perspectives in terms of which we consider something. Thus, in contrast to Aristotle, ‘prior to us’ too requires a principle - a principle of making that demarcates one domain from another, and within each domain one can search for principles that can explain the domain. In other words, Kant makes the principles of the Aristotelian techne which exist in the agent into a constitutive factor of the Aristotelian ‘prior to us’. Consequently, in contrast to Aristotle, two sorts of principles get introduced: the constitutive principles that constitute a domain and the explanatory principles, that are within the domains already constituted. Thus the objects are made through the choice of a perspective (Hinsicht).164 But the perspective involved may be one of distinguishing one situation from another, or of measuring up a situation in terms of standards of what ought to be, i.e. in terms of some standard of perfection. In the former case we use the concepts determinatively and in the latter case reflectively. That is, we can understand the Kantian distinction of two sorts of judgements and the corresponding two sorts of knowledge in the following way. A judgement is reflective to the extent it involves implicitly or explicitly a reference to a standard of perfection. Otherwise it is a determinate judgement. The concepts used in reflective judgements are ‘reflective concepts’ and those in determinate judgements are ‘determinate concepts’. As all such distinctions this too has a way of slipping away through the fingers, but roughly, we can consider a judgement such as ‘human beings live in houses’ as a determinate judgement and ‘human beings are free agents’ as a reflective judgement. For, in the former case, no consequences follow to the particular human beings if they do not conform to this

163 164

Cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 71 b 30 - 72 a 5 and Topics bk. I. 1 & 2, 100a to 101b. This is what later Habermas would call ‘knowledge interests’, in: Habermas, J. (1968).

judgement. Their not conforming can be considered as counter-instance having implications to the truth or falsity of the judgement made, rather than judging the non-conforming individuals as deficient. In contrast, in the latter case, suppose some particular individuals do not conform to the judgement that they are free agents; then their deviations are conceived as a deficiency of their humanity, and not merely as an instance of the empirical condition that can falsify the judgement made. Thus those judgements, that have implications as to whether the judged instance conforms or does not conform to the standard with which it is measured, are reflective judgements. (Of course, any determinate predicate can be turned into a reflective predicate in that any non-conforming instance is declared as not really falling under that predicate. We have such cases when a statement originally meant as a description is then made into a definition.165) Thus, in the context of Kant, ‘theoretical knowledge’ means the knowledge constituted by determinate judgements, and the ‘pragmatic knowledge’, that constituted by reflective judgements.

6.3.3

The Idea of Perfection

In the context of education the perspective one has to choose is that of improving oneself. Improving oneself involves, on the one hand, an idea of perfection166 towards which the striving of improvement can direct itself, and on the other, reflective judgements as to the state of one’s present level of perfection. For Kant, enquiry into both these are of ‘pragmatic’ nature, and the results thereof, ‘pragmatic knowledge’. The investigation of man in a pragmatic perspective seeks after the dimensions of those potentials that can be actualised into perfection, and the already achieved levels of their perfection.

165

A paradigmatic case of this happening is when Cassirer says that people thinking in terms of mythical symbolic form do not have abstract conceptions. He takes the field descriptions of the Ethnologists which are meant to be descriptive accounts as instances of mythical thinking, but then defines mythical thinking as those involving only spatial schematism, thus excluding the instances of temporal schematism in the corpus of the Ethnologists from the extension of the term ‘mythical thinking’. And in a third step suggests that because spatial schematism confines one to the concrete, the mythical thinking is incapable of abstract thinking. What is not clear is what this word ‘incapable’ means: is it meant to be descriptive of the corpus collected by Ethnologists under the rubric ‘mythical thinking’, or meant to set a definitional convention of what ‘mythical thinking’ should be taken to mean? If the former, it is easy to falsify Cassirer’s theory by citing the counter-examples available in the Ethnologists’ corpus, which themselves are very selective. 166 Kant’s term is ‘Idee der Vollkommenheit’, u.a. in: Kritik der teleologischen Urteilskraft, Kant, Werke, cit. 1975, B 404.

But a reflection on those capacities potential in oneself involve looking at oneself as a human being and conceptualising one’s potentials in terms of the idea of human potential: in terms of what the definition and destiny (‘Bestimmung’) of a human being is. However, an attempt at conceptualising the capacities potential in oneself as human potentials would make us confront with the fact that human beings depend on the skills and institutions passed on by the previous generations, and their ‘natural capacities’ are not merely a function of the biological potentials. This would mean that the perfection of the natural capacities is a task extending over generations covering the history of the whole species, spanning both the achievements already accomplished in the past and those to be accomplished yet in the future. In other words, man can perfect his natural capacities not at an individual level, but only at a level of the human species as a whole.

At this stage, it may be reminded that the above Kantian assertions (or those by me meant as elucidating and elaborating what Kant said) are meant to be reflective, and not determinate judgements. Also to be stressed is the following: a reflective judgement is something that involves not merely a statement of an ideal but also a reference to the actual sensible world. Judgements, for example, as to the degree of perfection human beings find themselves in, refer both to man as part of a natural process and to an idea of perfection towards which this natural process is conceived as tending. This combination of reference to an ideal and to the natural process (or, to an ‘intelligible Idea’ and to nature as a ‘system of sensibles’) is what constitutes, in Kant’s terms, the Naturgeschichte in contradistinction to a Natubeschreibung. The former is a narration of nature in terms of a teleology, i.e. it is conceiving nature as a system of hierarchical ends, and is distinguished from a mere chronicling of events on the one hand, and that of an explanation of nature from a purely biological, or physiological perspective, on the other. A fuller elucidation of Kant’s idea of Naturgeschichte calls for the elucidation of the notion of nature as a teleological system, on the one hand, and the concept of Naturanlagen, i.e. ‘abilities endowed by nature’, on the other. I will be brief on these, since my focus is not Kant’s system as such, but rather his line of thinking that has resulted in the modernity paradigm as we have it today. Therefore, I will focus on the notion of Naturgeschichte as applied to human history. 6.3.4

Nature as a Teleological System

The propositions with regard to nature as a teleological system that Kant argues are two: (i) to conceive nature as a system we do require a concept of an ‘end of nature’ (‘Naturzweck’), (ii) the concept of an end of nature requires a concept of ‘final end of creation’ (‘Endzweck der Schöpfung’) which, in contrast to that of an end of nature, has to be conceived as ‘unconditioned’.

The nature as a system requires some organising perspective only in terms of which one can think of it as a system. This organising perspective is not a feature discovered in the object, but assumed prior to the investigation in order to guide our enquiry: „Übersehen wir unsere Verstandeserkenntnisse in ihrem ganzen Umfange, so finden wir, daß dasjenige, was Vernunft ganz eigentümlich darüber verfügt und zu Stande zu bringen sucht, das Systematische der Erkenntnis sei, d.i. der Zusammenhang derselben aus einem Prinzip. Diese Vernunfteinheit setzt jederzeit eine Idee voraus, nämlich die von der Form eines Ganzen der Erkenntnis, welches vor der bestimmten Erkenntnis der Teile vorhergeht und die Bedingungen enthält, jedem Teile seine Stelle und Verhältnis zu den übrigen apriori zu bestimmen. Diese Idee postuliert demnach vollständige Einheit der Verstandeserkenntnis, wodurch diese nicht bloß ein zufälliges Aggregat, sondern ein nach notwendigen Gesetzen zusammenhängendes System wird. Man kann eigentlich nicht sagen, daß diese Idee ein Begriff vom Objekte sei, sondern von der durchgängigen Einheit dieser Begriffe, so fern dieselbe dem Verstande zur Regel dient. Dergleichen Vernunftbegriffe werden nicht aus der Natur geschöpft, vielmehr befragen wir die Natur nach diesen Ideen, und halten unsere Erkenntnis für mangelhaft, so lange sie denselben nicht adäquat ist.“167

In Critique of Judgement, Kant calls such principles used to conceive nature as a system the ‘subjective maxims of judgement’: they are the maxims guiding our thinking to bring about the perfection of knowledge. „Es ist also nur die Materie, sofern sie organisiert ist, welche den Begriff von ihr als einem Naturzwecke notwendig bei sich führt, weil diese ihre spezifische Form zugleich Produkt der Natur ist. Aber dieser Begriff führt nun notwendig auf die Idee der gesamten Natur als eines Systems nach der Regel der Zwecke; welcher Idee nun aller Mechanismen der Natur nach Prinzipien der Vernunft (wenigstens um daran die Naturerscheinung zu versuchen) untergeordnet werden muß. Das Prinzip der Vernunft ist ihr als nur subjektiv, d.i. als Maxime zuständig: Alles in der Welt ist irgend wozu gut; nichts ist in ihr umsonst; und man ist durch das Beispiel, das die Natur an ihren organischen Produkten gibt, berechtigt, ja berufen, von ihr und ihren Gesetzen nichts, als was im Ganzen zweckmäßig ist, zu erwarten. 167

Cf. Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, Kant, Werke, cit. 1975, B 674.

Es versteht sich, daß dieses nicht ein Prinzip für die bestimmende, sondern nur für die reflektierende Urteilskraft sei, daß es regulativ und nicht konstitutiv sei, und wir dadurch nur einen Leitfaden bekommen, die Naturdinge in Beziehung auf einen Bestimmungsgrund, der schon gegeben ist, nach einer neuen gesetzlichen Ordnung zu betrachten, und die Naturkunde nach einem andern Prinzip, nämlich dem der Endursachen, doch unbeschadet dem des Mechanismus ihrer Kausalität, zu erweitern.“168

When we want to consider human being in terms of his natural capacities we are in fact looking at human being as having a systematic nature or form (in the Aristotelian sense), and this is already conceiving human being in terms of a subjective maxim attributing to nature an end. Such thinking is required if our intention is to acquire pragmatic knowledge (in the already defined sense) of the human beings. In other words, when one undertakes to elaborate the ‘Naturgeschichte’ in contrast to ‘Naturbeschreibung’ one is compelled to look at nature as a teleological system, i.e. as hierarchical system of ends.

But the notion of a hierarchical system of ends requires us to make a distinction between ends which are not absolute and the ends which are absolute: „Endzweck ist derjenige Zweck, der keines andern als Bedingung seiner Möglichkeit bedarf. [...] Nehmen wir aber die Zweckverbindung in der Welt für real und für sie eine besondere Art der Kausalität, nämlich einer absichtlich wirkenden Ursache an, so können wir bei der Frage nicht stehen bleiben: wozu Dinge der Welt (organisierte Wesen) diese oder jene Form haben, in diese oder jene Verhältnisse gegen andere von der Natur gesetzt sind; sondern, da einmal ein Verstand gedacht wird, der als die Ursache der Möglichkeit solcher Formen angesehen werden muß, wie sie wirklich an Dingen gefunden werden, so muß auch in eben demselben nach dem objektiven Grunde gefragt werden, der diesen produktiven Verstand zu einer Wirkung dieser Art bestimmt haben könne, welcher dann der Endzweck ist, wozu dergleichen Dinge da sind. [...] Ein Ding aber, was notwendig seiner objektiven Beschaffenheit wegen, als Endzweck einer verständigen Ursache existieren soll, muß von der Art sein, daß es in der Ordnung der Zwecke von keiner anderweitigen Bedingung, als bloß seiner Idee, abhängig ist. Nun haben wir nun eine einzige Art Wesen in der Welt, deren Kausalität teleologisch, d.i. auf Zwecke gerichtet und doch zugleich so beschaffen ist, daß das Gesetz, nach welchem sie sich Zwecke zu bestimmen haben, von ihnen selbst als unbedingt und von Naturbedingungen unabhängig, an sich aber als notwendig, vorgestellt wird. Das Wesen dieser Art ist der Mensch, aber als Noumenon betrachtet; das einzige Naturwesen, an welchem wir doch ein übersinnliches Vermögen (die Freiheit) und sogar das Gesetz der Kausalität, samt dem Objekte derselben, welches es sich als höchststen Zweck vorsetzen kann (das höchste Gut in der Welt), von Seiten seiner

168

Cf. Kritik der teleologischen Urteilskraft, Kant, Werke, cit. 1975, B 300-301.

eigenen Beschaffenheit erkennen können. [...] Wenn nun Dinge der Welt, als ihrer Existenz nach abhängige Wesen, einer nach Zwecken handelnden obersten Ursache bedürfen, so ist der Mensch der Schöpfung Endzweck; denn ohne diesen wäre die Kette der einander untergeordneten Zwecke nicht vollständig gegründet; und nur im Menschen, aber auch in diesem als Subjekte der Moralität, ist die unbedingte Gesetzumgebung in Ansehung der Zwecke anzutreffen, welche ihn also allein fähig macht, ein Endzweck zu sein, dem die ganze Natur teleologisch untergeordnet ist.169

Thus a postulation of a subject - to define something in terms of ‘what for’ or ‘to what end’ something is there, necessitates a subject whose purpose it serves. Such a subject requires to be a purely intelligible being without there being any admixture of sensible content (bloß seiner Idee abhängig). An idea of ‘freely choosing and acting being’ (frei handelndes Wesen), who is not ‘legislated to’, but rather ‘legislates to himself’ is such a being. Thus the notion of Naturzweck logically necessitates an ‘idea of free-will’ which is an end in itself (‘die Idee eines freien Willens, der sein eigener Zweck ist’.) That is, a concept of a ‘self defining being’ that is free from every compulsion and traces of nature, (i.e. causal influence) is considered by Kant as a logical presupposition for a conception of nature as a teleological system. Human being is such a being to the extent that he is not under the compulsion of nature, and to the extent he subjects himself to moral law.170 Thus the moral law constitutes man as a free acting being, because otherwise, the freedom of an individual is the limit to the freedom of another individual. That is, the idea of freedom requires ‘the idea of an ethical community’ (Idee eines ethischen Gemeinwesens) .

But this freedom under the moral law has to be distinguished from the compelling from outside. That is, it has to be distinguished from the obligation defined by the custom and law of a State. Accordingly, Kant also makes a distinction between ‘civilisation’, in the sense of manners and customs which are the product of a historical process, and ‘culture’ which involves a ‘moral idea’. In the passage quoted earlier from the Critique of Judgement, Kant distinguishes those refinements and happiness that the history has bestowed on man, or what „nature can supply for the purpose of preparing him for what he himself must do in order to be a final end“,171

169

See Kritik der teleologischen Urteilskraft, Kant, Werke, cit, 1975, B 396-399. Cf. Methodenlehre der teleologischen Urteilskraft, Kant, Werke, cit. 1975, A 395. 171 Kant, Critique of Judgement, p. 92f. In German: „was die (Natur) zu leisten vermag, um ihn (den Menschen) zu dem vorzubereiten, was er tun muß, um Endzweck zu sein.“ In: Methodenlehre der teleologischen Urteilskraft, Kant, Werke, cit. 1975, A 386. 170

from man as the ‘final end’ of creation itself. Thus Kant demarcates ‘morality’ as an idea belonging to ‘culture’ from civilisation where the right use of such ideas belonging to culture is not yet there. This is based on the important distinction: man as the ultimate end of nature and man as the final end of creation.172

6.3.5

Potentials Endowed by Nature (Naturanlagen)

In order to elucidate this concept I require to introduce some distinctions. I will use in the following the three disposition words available in the common usage, ‘ability’, ‘skill’ and ‘capacity’, in such a way that the former two are commandeered for a purpose of technical distinction, and the last, without such regimentation of its sense, i.e. I will use the word ‘capacity’ indifferently to refer both abilities and skills. An ‘ability’ is a potential capacity of human beings that can be developed into a skill or skills. A ‘skill’ is a disposition discernible in the actions of the individuals when they perform it such a way that their success and accomplishments are not attributable to chance.173 ‘Abilities’ and ‘skills’ are dispositions attributable to individuals, but the former is a second order disposition over the latter. However we need to distinguish second order dispositions like abilities which are potentials from such second order dispositions like ‘methodical’ which too are conceived over skills. Potentials differ from second order dispositions like ‘methodical’ in that the former, though like the latter are conceived by discerning them through the realised skills, yet unlike the latter, do not imply that the individual to whom those potentials are attributed can necessarily exercise the corresponding skills.

6.4

Naturgeschichte

6.4.1

Three Types of Narratives

To approach the Kantian conception of Naturgeschichte (as applied to human history), it is useful to distinguish three different ways human beings can be looked upon, and correspondingly, three distinct types of narratives we can construct with regard to them.

First, human beings can be looked upon as having dispositions that distinguish them from one another. In this case we identify them as empirical individuals. The judgements that result in

The German terms are ‘letzter Zweck der Natur’ and ‘Endzweck der Schöpfung’. An action can be looked at in terms of its being exercised, a token, or in terms of a type of which the exercise is a token. For action type I use sometimes the term ‘action schema’. 172 173

differentiating individuals and their inter-actions can be made both in terms of their skills or in terms of their aptitudes (i.e. in terms of their abilities to develop certain skills). Such attributions constructed into a narration can be called a ‘biographical history’. Kant uses the term ‘chronicle’, but his use is not identical with the present day use of it to refer to a list of dates and events. In his use, chronicle is a way of constructing a narration about human actions and ventures where reference to human nature does not play a role.

A second way of looking at human beings is to conceive them in terms of certain capacities that distinguish them from the members of other species. In this case, we look at human beings as the tokens of the type, human being. The skills in that perspective are the modes of development of the abilities human beings as a species are capable of - in Kant‘s terms, they are the results of the development of the abilities endowed by nature (Naturanlage). Constructing a narration of human inter-action at this level, as for example, a narration about economic man or political man, is more than a biographical narration; it involves a reference to human nature. One can make even a comprehensive anthropology at this level - the Kantian Anthropology in physiologischer Hinsicht - by bringing together into a coherent whole all the characteristics that single out the individuals as exemplars of human species. The generalisation involved at this level, however, is that of differentiating the individuals or groups from the individuals or groups of other species. The realisation of human capacities in the form of skills are considered here determinatively and not reflectively. They are also used as attributes of individuals and groups distributively; thus skills exemplified by different individuals or groups are handled as invariant features to distinguish the doings of human individuals from that of the individuals of other species of animals. This is, to take the Herder’s characterisation of Condillac we have already come across, to consider human being in terms of his animal nature. His capacities are conceived even at this level as unique to his species, but this uniqueness is looked at an object level, i.e. as skills that human beings can have in contrast to the capacities that each species of animals can have. That is, both the biographical approach and the empirical approach to look at human beings are not approaching human beings from a pragmatic standpoint. The pragmatic standpoint is one where the idea of perfection plays a role. Once we bring to the notion of abilities that human beings can develop a notion of their possible state of perfection we realise the speciality of human being in a different sense than he having species-specific features. The capacity to reason is a species-specific feature, but it is species specific in a special way.

It is only by appreciating this special way in which the capacity to reason is species-specific that we will be able to look at human being in terms of his humanity. Kant defines the ability to ‘reason’ (Vernunftfähigkeit) as following: „Die Vernunft in einem Geschöpfe ist ein Vermögen, die Regeln und Absichten des Gebrauches aller seiner Kräfte weit über den Naturinstinkt zu erweitern, und kennt keine Grenzen ihrer Entwürfe. Sie wirkt aber selbst nicht instinktmäßig, sondern bedarf Versuche, Übung und Unterricht, um von einer Stufe der Einsicht zur anderen allmählich fortzuschreiten.“174

Elsewhere capacity for reason (Vernunft) is conceived as to be in a position to make „von seinen Naturanlagen einen vollständigen Gebrauch“. 175

In other words, to look at human being as rational is to consider him as being either in an actual process of learning, and partaking in a process of extending all the other human capacities, or being in a position to use other capacities to the full. We will see soon the far reaching implications of this second expression ‘using the other capacities to the full’. But an immediate observation following from the above assertion is that ‘reason’ is not an ability by itself, it has no content of its own. This is the same as saying that it is a capacity of a higher order: it is the capacity to develop all other capacities, a generalised capacity to learn to learn. Thus ‘rational’ is a meta-level predicate: rationality manifests in other human abilities and skills. This has another far reaching, and perhaps a problematic, consequence: since the ‘complete use’ of all the capacities that human beings are capable of cannot be learnt and possessed by any one individual or group, one can only become rational to the extent one is in the process of making the species in a position to use all the other capacities it is endowed with. This raises a question: what is the relationship between the individual learning and the progress of the species? Is the subject to whom the capacity to reason is attributed the individual subject or the human species as a whole?

6.4.2

The Economy of Nature

It appears, at least at times, that Kant reserves the attribute ‘capacity of reason’ for the species as a whole. In fact he even appears to have contempt to man’s terrestrial nature, thereby

174 175

Cf. Idee einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht, Kant, Werke, cit. 1975, A 389. Cf. Idee einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht, Kant, Werke, cit. 1975, A 389.

towards man as individuated, i.e. as an individual.176 As a compensation to this not very edifying sight of man as an individual in the earthy state of his life, Kant resorts to an assumption found in Aristotle: the nature cannot do something without a purpose. Therefore, man having been endowed with reason, cannot but develop it to its Bestimmung, i.e. to the full destined actualisation of that capacity. Not merely that. Whatever he does must be in some way be a contribution to the process of actualisation of the human species potential. At least, according to him, one has to assume this while writing human history from a pragmatic standpoint. The activities that appear as ‘planlose’ from an empirical standpoint (i.e. a standpoint where the ‘determinate’ concepts are used) must contain a plan, because otherwise the process of man’s realisation of his essence - the history - would be not history of the species. A history of the human species written in terms of the characteristic that singles it out from the whole of animal kingdom, and that characteristic being a meta-characteristic, must necessarily consider every action of the part of that species as the process of realisation of the species-essence. Consequently, the relationship between the individual and species, in so far as the capacity for reason is concerned, is a part-whole relationship (One can see the beginnings of some sort of ‘objective idealism’ here!).177

The actualisation of the potential of the capacity of reason is spoken of in the idiom of the human species as a subject undergoing through a process of enlightenment.178 The complete actualisation of ‘reason’ is said require many generations, each one promoting reason by their experiment, training, and instruction so that „um endlich ihre Keime in unserer Gattung zu derjenigen Stufe der Entwicklung zu treiben, welche ihrer Absicht vollständig angemessen ist. Und dieser Zeitpunkt muß wenigstens in der Idee des Menschen das Ziel seiner Bestrebung sein.“179

This would mean that man is a ‘rational being’ only when he is looked upon in terms of his active participation in the ‘humanisation’ or enlightening process of the species. Secondly, to the extent the human beings are rational beings, they not only differ in terms of skills, but

See for example: „noch mehr aber, daß das Widersinnische der N a t u r a n l a g e n in ihm ihn noch in selbstersonnene Plagen und noch andere von seiner eigenen Gattung, durch den Druck der Herrschaft, die Barbarei der Kriege u.s.w. in solche Not versetzt und er selbst, so viel an ihm ist, an der Zerstörung seiner eigenen Gattung arbeitet, daß, selbst bei der wohltätigsten Natur außer uns, der Zweck derselben, wenn er auf der Glückseligkeit unserer Spezies gestellet wäre, in einem System derselben auf Erden nicht erreicht werden würde, weil die Natur in uns derselben nicht empfanglich ist.“ In: Kritik der teleologischen Urteilskraft, B 390. 177 Perhaps, it may be reminded that the terms here such as ‘complete use of one’s natural endowments’, ‘process of enlightenment’ and ‘rational being’ are not discovered features of the encountered individuals. They are conceptual constructions in the reflection process, and thus ‘reflective’ concepts and not ‘detrminate’ ones. 178 Cf. Idee einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht, Kant, Werke, cit. 1975, A 389. 179 Cf. Idee einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht, Kant, Werke, cit. 1975, A 389. 176

also in terms of possessing those skills at a certain stage and a state of their development. For the actualisation of the potential abilities is a process extending over long periods of history, and therefore, the mode of use of those (object-level) capacities would continuously change from one period of history to another.

The passage just quoted is interesting on another count. Kant asserts there that a reference to a temporal point of an actual development has to be conceived as part of the ‘idea of humanity’. In all other instances where he refers to the ‘idea of humanity’ it appears that he wants to accord it only a regulative status, thus denying any type-token relationship to the real world. In the passage above, however, he appears to be asserting that the ideal is to be conceived as attainable in a real historical point. This insistence on a real historical point, I think, is connected with Kant’s conception as to why a construction of a Naturgeschichte is needed and when it can fulfil its function, i.e. what should be the characteristics embodied by the narration in order that it fulfils its purpose. This is the theme of the next section

6.4.3

The History as a Means of Instruction

As already mentioned, the Naturgeschichte is looking at human affairs from a ‘pragmatic standpoint’, i.e. from a standpoint of looking at how to improve the human situation. For Kant, there are two demands put on such a narration. (i) There is a need for a standard of judgement of the status of perfection one finds oneself in. This assertion presumes, and is a consequence of, Kant’s conception of rationality and the corresponding thesis of man to be a species being. In order to judge the level of accomplishment the species has reached, and what lies ahead, or how much is to be covered yet, one requires a universal history of a teleological kind which takes the whole ‘Bestimmung des Menschen’ into account. (ii) There is a need for a means that provides for a ‘moral certainty’ (moralische Gewissheit) that things do move in the direction of progress.

Whereas the first point pertains to bringing to the sensible the force of the intelligible world (i.e. the standard belongs to the category of the intelligible) the second point pertains to bringing to the intelligible the touch of the sensible world. In order to make the sensible world an exemplification of the moral world one is trying to establish, one requires to situate

oneself within a teleological process, but this teleological process must be experienced as a real thing. A properly written history can be of a service in this regard. In order to be of service, however, it must fulfil two conditions. On the one hand, it has to be more than an empirical description; for the latter would merely result in making the history ‘a sound and fury signifying nothing’: an empirically written history would record events and persons resembling the individuals we encounter in daily life and their inter-actions. They do not act according to an agreed plan180; rather they appear to be acting at cross purposes most of the times181. So a history written on an empirical basis would be aimless aggregate of human actions182. But on the other hand, an ideal meant for a realisation in this world has to be more than a mere projection; for an ideal without an evidence of their being grounded in real historical situation with forces effective in real history would not have an appeal needed to engage the mind in the real mundane forces in the becoming of the human being. The existence of progress of mankind “läßt sich nicht a priori [...] sondern nur aus der Erfahrung und Geschichte, mit so weit gegründeter Erwartung schließen, als nötig ist, an diesem ihren Fortschreiten zum Besseren nicht zu verzweifeln, sondern mit aller Klugheit und moralischer Vorleuchtung, die Annäherung zu diesem Ziele (ein jeder, soviel an ihm ist) zu befördern.“183

What we have come across earlier, the assertion of a need for a temporal reference point in the ‘Idea of perfect state of humanity’ can be explained as a necessary ingredient of promoting this psychological confidence in the historical progress. It is an attempt to bind the search for salvation to this world by arresting the feeling that history is an absurd play of human motives and desires and the events shaped by them such that their “Anblick uns nötigt, unsere Augen von ihm mit Unwillen wegzuwenden, und, indem wir verzweifeln, jemals darin eine vollendete vernünftige Absicht anzutreffen, uns dahin bringt, sie nur in einer anderen Welt zu hoffen.“ 184

In other words, a history from a pragmatic standpoint has to involve both the sensible and the intelligible elements, the former to make history illustrative and appealing in terms of the emotion (‘anschaulich’) and the latter to make it bestow to the factual content an ideal

„nach einem verabredeten Plane“ cf. Idee einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht, Kant, Werke, cit. 1975, A 387. 181 “einer oft wider den anderen“, cf. Idee einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht, Kant, Werke, cit. 1975, A 386. 182 „planloses Aggregat menschlicher Handlungen“, cf. Idee einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht, Kant, Werke, cit. 1975, A 408. 183 Cf. Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, Kant, Werke, cit. 1975, A 327. 184 Cf. Idee einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht, Kant, Werke, cit. 1975, A 410. 180

counterpart in order to make it intelligible in terms of the purpose of the ‘humanisation’ of human race. Thus it must be written in such a way that, on the one hand, it refers to real episodes and persons, but on the other hand, such persons and episodes should become constitutive of the process of realisation of the human species essence. Reminiscent of Aristotle’s idea of poetry as more of an episteme than historia, Kant compares such a history with the narration of fictions.185

Of course such a history of the species (and not of this or that individual or groups, therefore the term ‘universal history’) is a construction that is based on the data provided by the biographical and empirical history. In this sense it is in line with the Aristotelian methodology, of starting with what is prior to us, i.e. the more sensible level of things and enquiring into what is ‘prior in nature’. But, as made clear earlier, there are two types of principles at work in writing a universal history: the constitutive principle defined by the perspective that looks for the historical lines of perfection possible, and secondly the explanatory principles which show how the empirical individuals, whatever their conscious intentions may be, are in fact furthering the realisation of rationality. To emphasise again, Kant’s recommendation is that the history as a means of instruction should be written in such a way that it shows the human individuals as partaking in the destiny of the species irrespective of whether they do it consciously or not. But what they can and ought to do as human beings is to partake in it deliberately by being aware of it. This is Thomas Aquinas, pure and simple, and the Christian theme forces itself onto our attention.

The theme of Providence becomes even more conspicuous if we remind ourselves the question raised earlier: if the agency is conceived as being located in the species and not in the individual, how can they partake in the process of history? The answer, as has been indicated in the previous paragraph, is that it is by submitting to the purpose manifest in the nature (Naturabsicht) - the will that has foreseen man as the ‘final end of creation’ who has to

„Es ist zwar ein befremdlicher und, dem Anscheine nach, ungereimter Anschlag, nach einer Idee, wie der Weltlauf gehen müßte, wenn er gewissen vernünftigen Zwecken angemessen sein sollte, eine Geschichte abfassen zu wollen; es scheint, in einer solchen Absicht könne nur ein Roman zu Stande kommen. Wenn man indessen annehmen darf: daß die Natur, selbst im Spiele der menschlichen Freiheit, nicht ohne Plan und Endabsicht verfahre, so könnte diese Idee doch wohl brauchbar werden; und, ob wir gleich zu kurzsichtig sind, den geheimen Mechanism ihrer Veranstaltung durchzuschauen, so dürfte diese Idee uns doch zum Leitfaden dienen, ein sonst planloses Aggregat menschlicher Handlungen, wenigstens im großen, als ein System darzustellen.“ In: Idee einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht, Kant, Werke, cit. 1975, A 407. 185

live by the submission to the moral law. But such a moral law is not manifest in nature in such a way as to be open to an empirical discovery; it has to be discerned through the intelligible character of human beings, and his capacity to discern Ideas and Ideals ‘unconditioned’ from the admixture of sensible elements. This explains the need for writing a fictional history that shows the ways of God (here the ways of the ‘the purpose of nature’ Naturabsicht) to man. Thus the Naturgeschichte has a double character: on the one hand, as a product of man’s conception and writing (at the level of signs), it is stepping into the history by man self-consciously, to partake self-regulatively in the destiny foreseen for him by nature; on the other hand, at the level of objects, it is a description of how the purpose of nature (Naturabsicht) functions in history as a stern teacher providing the disciplining and instructing the human species for its good.186

186

It is interesting to compare what Kant says in Über Pädagogik about education with what he says about the role of Naturgeschichte in the becoming of the human species. About education he say: „Disziplin oder Zucht ändert die Tierheit in die Menschheit um. Ein Tier ist schon alles durch seinen Instinkt; eine fremde Vernunft hat bereits alles für dasselbe besorgt. Der Mensch aber braucht eigene Vernunft. Er hat keinen Instinkt, und muß sich selbst den Plan seines Verhaltens machen. Weil er aber nicht sogleich im Stande ist, dieses zu tun, sondern roh auf die Welt kommt: so müssen es andere für ihn tun.“ In: Kant, Werke, cit. 1975, A2. Compare this with: „[...] oder vielmehr annehmen solle, die Natur verfolge hier einen regelmäßigen Gang, unsere Gattung von der unteren Stufe der Tierheit an allmählich bis zur höchsten Stufe der Menschheit und zwar durch eigene, obzwar dem Menschen abgedrungene Kunst zu führen, und entwickele in dieser scheinbarlich wilden Anordnung ganz regelmäßig jene ursprünglichen Anlagen;“ In: Idee einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht, Kant, Werke, cit. 1975, A 401. Similarly the following is about the tasks of education „Bei der Erziehung muß der Mensch also 1) d i s z i p l i n i e r t werden. Disziplinieren heißt suchen zu verhüten, daß die Tierheit nicht der Menschheit, in dem einzelnen sowohl, als gesellschaftlichen Menschen, zum Schaden gereiche. Disziplin ist alo bloß Bezähmung der Wildheit. 2) Muß der Mensch k u l t i v i e r t werden. Kultur begreift unter sich die Belehrung und die Unterweisung. Sie ist die Verschaffung der Geschicklichkeit. Diese ist der Besitz eines Vermögens, welches zu allen beliebigen Zwecken zureichend ist. Sie bestimmt also gar keine Zwecke, sondern überläßt das nachher den Umständen. Einige Geschicklichkeiten sind in allen Fällen gut, z.E. das Lesen und Schreiben; andere nur zu einigen Zwecken, z.E. die Musik, um uns beliebt zu machen. Wegen der Menge der Zwecke wird die Geschicklichkeit gewissermaßen unendlich. 3) Muß man darauf sehen, daß der Mensch auch k l u g werde, in die menschliche Gesellschaft passe, daß er beliebt sei, und Einfluß habe. Hierzu gehört eine gewisse Art von Kultur, die man Z i v i l i s i e r u n g nennet. Zu derselben sind Manieren, Artigkeit und eine gewisse Klugheit erforderlich, der zufolge man alle Menschen zu seinen Endzwecken gebrauchen kann. Sie richtet sich nach dem wandelbaren Geschmacke jedes Zeitalters. So liebte man noch vor wenigen Jahrzehnten Zeremonien im Umgange. 4) Muß man auf die M o r a l i s i e r u n g sehen. Der Mensch soll nicht bloß zu allerlei Zwecken geschickt sein, sondern auch die Gesinnung bekommen, daß er nur lauter gute Zwecke erwähle. Gute Zwecke sind diejenigen, die notwendigerweise von jedermann gebilligt werden; und die auch zu gleicher Zeit jedermanns Zwecke sein können.“ (in: Über Pädagogik, Kant, Werke, cit. 1975, A 22-24) Compare this enumeration of the tasks of education with the tasks described in connection with what Nature has to accomplish with regard to the enlightenment of the human species: „Ehe dieser letzte Schritt (nämlich die Staatenverbindung) geschehen, also fast nur auf der Hälfte ihrer Ausbildung, erduldet die menschliche Natur die härtesten Übel unter dem betrüglichen Anschein äußerer Wohlfahrt; und Rousseau hatte so Unrecht nicht, wenn er den Zustand der Wilden vorzog, so bald man nämlich diese letzte Stufe, die unsere Gattung noch zu ersteigen hat, wegläßt. Wir sind im hohen Grade durch Kunst und Wissenschaft kultiviert. Wir sind zivilisiert bis zum Überlästigen zu allerlei gesellschaftlicher Artigkeit und Anständigkeit. Aber uns schon für moralisiert zu halten, daran fehlt noch sehr viel. Denn die Idee der Moralität gehört noch zur Kultur; der Gebrauch dieser Idee aber, welcher nur auf das Sittenähnliche in der Ehrliebe und der äußeren Anständigkeit hinausläuft, macht bloß die Zivilisierung aus.“ Kant, Werke, cit. 1975, A 403.

When human history is looked at as part of such a Naturgechichte, suggests Kant, it appears „as unrolling of a hidden plan in order to bring about a condition - an inner state, and for this purpose, also an outer perfect civil constitution, - in which alone all capacities inherent in human species can be developed to the full“. (translated freely by me) 187

The ‘inner state’ referred to here, as will become clear later, is that of a condition of culturedness which involves the submission to the moral law. This is the last step188 that human being has to take by himself to fulfil that destiny foreseen for him by nature, the destiny of being a ‘freely acting being’. The outer condition, the condition of the perfect civil constitution, on the other hand, has a double status both as a regulative instrument in the hands of individuals in their political engagement and as a description of the purpose of nature (Naturabsicht) in its making of the human history.

Two features of human nature provide the structural determinants of the human history that tend to the denouement indicated in the passage just quoted. (i) The human being has two opposing tendencies within himself: a tendency to enter into social relations on the one hand, and a tendency to withdraw into isolation from such relations on the other; in short, the human animal is characterised by the feature of the unsocial sociability.189 (ii) The full development of human capacities are possible only in the species, but not in the individual.190 These premises give to Kant’s use of the term ‘culture’ a double character: on the one hand it has a character of a moral appeal or command to human beings to develop his abilities (Kant’s term is Anlagen) to the perfect state possible within the species ‘man’. On the other „Man kann die Geschichte der Menschengattung im Großen als die Vollziehung eines verborgenen Plans der Natur ansehen, um eine innerlich - und z u d i e s e m Z w e c k e auch äußerlich - vollkommene Staatsverfassung zu Stande zu bringen, als den einzigen Zustand, in welchem sie alle ihre Anlagen in der Menschheit völlig entwickeln kann.“ In: Idee einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht, Kant, Werke, cit. 1975, A 389. 188 see the long passage from the Critque of Judgement quoted in the section 6.3.1. 189 „Der Mensch hat eine Neigung, sich zu vergesellschaften; weil er in einem solchen Zustande sich mehr als Mensch, d.i. die Entwicklung seiner Naturanlagen, fühlt. Er hat aber auch einen großen Hang, sich zu vereinzelnen (isolieren); weil er in sich zugleich die ungesellige Eigenschaft antrifft, alles bloß nach seinem Sinne richten zu wollen, und daher allerwärts Widerstand erwartet, so wie er von sich selbst weiß, daß er seiner Seits zum Widerstande gegen andere geneigt ist.“ In: Idee einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht, Kant, Werke, cit. 1975, A 393. 190 „Am Menschen (als dem einzigen vernünftigen Geschöpf auf Erden) sollten sich diejenigen Naturanlagen, die auf den Gebrauch seiner Vernunft abgezielt sind, nur in der Gattung, nicht aber im Individuum vollständig entwickeln.“ In: Idee einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht, Kant, Werke, cit. 1975, A 389. 187

hand it appears as a descriptive term - to describe a means that prepares human beings to become ‘freely acting beings’ (frei handelnde Wesen). Kant introduces a conception of an institutional order that can be visualised simultaneously as a concrete historical goal of one’s actions, and as a replica of the real historical tendency resulting from the unintended consequence of the basic feature of man as an animal, the unsocial sociability. This is his ‘Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective’, where an evolutionary scheme of human species development is sketched.

6.4.4

The Cosmopolitan Order and the Theory of Stages

As indicated earlier, in order to be capable of instruction, the purely intelligible, i.e. an ideal, conception of ‘the complete use of one’s natural endowments’ needs to be linked to the actual ‘civil society’. Kant does this by suggesting that a complete use of human capacities is possible only in a society governed by a civil constitution, which in its turn is embedded in a larger whole of federation of such societies with civil constitution, the Volkerbund (the later English translation which was taken up as a political agenda after the first world war, was ‘the league of Nations’). Of course, even such a cosmopolitan society (the ‘weltbürgerliche Gesellschaft’) has a regulative status191, i.e. it can only be approximated. But the ideal here is clothed in terms of a tangible plan for political action. With this plan, human being starts partaking in the destiny foreseen for him by nature ‘self-regulatively’ what until then was a role of being pushed by nature. With the help of this link one can offer the necessary political terminology that can serve, on the one hand, to describe the concrete political reality, and on the other, ‘indicate’ the amount of rationality this political reality incorporates.

Secondly, Kant adopts an approach that foreshadows the 20th century structuralism: for an understanding of the behaviour and inter-actions of individuals at the social plane their intentions are irrelevant; we can look at the social inter-actions as effects of the unsocial sociability, a feature all exemplars (or tokens of the type) of the human animals share, thus providing the structural determinant of their inter-actions. It is this characteristic that brings about the unrolling of the human capacities: it is the instrument of nature to make man fulfil his destiny foreseen for him by her: „welche an sich unerreichbare Idee aber kein konstitutives Prinzip (der Erwartung eines, mitten in der lebhaftesten Wirkung und Gegenwirkung der Menschen bestehenden, Friedens), sondern nur ein regulatives Prinzip ist: ihr, als der Bestimmung des Menschengeschlechts, nicht ohne gegründete Vermutung einer natürlichen Tendenz zu derselben, fleißig nachzugehen.“ In: Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, Kant, Werke, cit. 1975, A 333. 191

„Das Mittel, dessen sich die Natur bedient, die Entwicklung aller ihrer Anlagen zu Stande zu bringen, ist der Antagonismus derselben in der Gesellschaft, so fern dieser doch am Ende die Ursache einer gesetzmäßigen Ordnung derselben wird. Ich verstehe hier unter dem Antagonismus die ungesellige Geselligkeit der Menschen; d.h. den Hang derselben, in Gesellschaft zu treten, der doch mit einem durchgängigen Widerstande, welcher diese Gesellschaft beständig zu trennen droht, verbunden ist. [...] Die natürlichen Triebfedern dazu, die Quellen der Ungeselligkeit und des durchgängigen Widerstandes, woraus so viele Übel entspringen, die aber doch auch wieder zur neuen Anspannung der Kräfte, mithin zu mehrerer Entwicklung der Naturanlagen antreiben, verraten also wohl die Anordnung eines weisen Schöpfers; und nicht etwa die Hand eines bösartigen Geistes, der in seine herrliche Anstalt gepfuscht oder sie neidischer Weise verderbt habe.“ 192

In other words, at the level of Naturgeschichte all the products of human development - the manners, the customs, the skills and the artefacts, including that of political orders - are the results of the processes initiated by the characteristic feature of human beings, the unsocial sociability: it pushes the human animal into a combination of antagonism, and a search for the means to harmonise and contain that antagonism. The cosmopolitan order sketched by him is one such means, presumably the most sophisticated and advanced one, of harmonising the antagonism, which guarantees „die größte Freiheit (of the individuals) [...] und doch die genaueste Bestimmung und Sicherung der Gefahr [...] damit die Kräfte der Menschheit nicht einschlafen, aber doch auch nicht ohne ein Prinzip der Gleichheit ihrer wechselseitigen Wirkung und Gegenwirkung, damit sie einander nicht zerstören.“193

The ‘cosmopolitan order’ functions both as a sensible embodiment or a concrete temporally tangible endpoint of the process of enlightenment (the Zeitpunkt) and also as a measure of the different institutional arrangements which has embodied the combination of the antagonism and the means of containing it. That is, it is both a concrete liberal order and a measure to put different institutional arrangements in a scale of sophistication and effectiveness.

Thus here we find the forerunner of both the Hegelian temporal evolutionary scheme and the Weberian or of Cassirer variety of a structural evolutionary scheme. Both are the results of ideals transformed into a descriptive scheme in order to edify and instruct. (These ideals, in their turn, are the embodiments in not so secular language the Christian theme of the universality of the biblical commands). But in the process only the man is made the theme of conceptualisation of culture and not the different groups with their different pasts. One may attempt to recast Kant’s Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht into a history of a group 192 193

Cf. Idee einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht, Kant, Werke, cit. 1975, A 392. Cf. Idee einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht, Kant, Werke, cit. 1975, A 402.

rather than the history of progress of the whole human kind. This is what some of the postmodernist attempts amount to. But the categories available even for that purpose are the ones provided by the evolution from collectivist to the individualist ethos which is another way of expressing the evolution from instinctive and traditional binding to the binding through the self-given law.

7

The Creations of the Unfinished Animal: The Human World Myths, Sciences and other Wonders of the Earthy Angel

7.1

The German Tradition: the ‘Humanisation’ and the ‘Grundlegung’

In the field of culture theory it is possible to identify a characteristic German stream. Though including such varied thinkers as Herder, Kant, Hegel, Dilthey, Marx and Weber, still there is a certain flavour in the questions they ask that unites them. It is sometimes traced back to the influence of the German idealism, and sometimes to the specific hermeneutic approach. Though both the suggestions have much to commend about them, my suggestion is to look at this phenomena by situating it within the context of the narrative of this book, that of secularising the theological assumptions underlying the world of objects and customs. Which could be the thread binding the varied pre-occupations of this diverse group of individuals? In raising this question I am not presaging a detailed discussion of these thinkers; for my concern is not with the subtleties of the answers they gave but to isolate the characteristic category habit if any that inform the questions they have asked.

We saw in the second chapter that Mill in effect identified the contribution of the German school of his time with ‘evolutionism’ This is a very perceptive judgement both in its reading of the German philosophy of the time and in its identification of the theme of significance for the social sciences: the evolutionism was to have a far more wide ranging influence on the human sciences than Mill could imagine at the time of his writing, and it is still refreshed from time to time for new theoretical applications and endeavour. But, as must have become clear through the elucidation of Kant’s Naturgeschichte in the last chapter, evolutionism was derived from the thesis that human being is a species being (Gattungswesen) and the corresponding view that there is a need for humanisation of the human animal before the proper human form of life can begin. This last, in its turn, is built on the notion of man occupying the middle space between the heaven and the earth, i.e. sharing the angelic nature of being intelligible and the animal nature of being sensible.

Thus my suggestion is to identify the characteristic contribution of the German tradition with the influential theme in the thinking on culture that man differs from animals to the extent he has emancipated from his sensible nature either by ‘transcending’ it or ‘sublimating’ it. The

contributions to the philosophy of culture by the ‘German School’ that Mill commended194 is a derivative of this theme, and it can be considered as the main stay of the German tradition from Kant onwards: Hegel’s story of ascension of man to freedom, Marx’s story of primitivism through capitalism to the future communism, Weber’s story of modernisation, the efforts of Neo-Kantianism as well as that of the philosophical Anthropology at ‘Grundlegung’ of the sciences through rooting them in the speciality of the human nature, and Cassirer’s story of humanisation of the world through the symbolic forms - all owe to a contrast between the sensible and the intelligible on the one hand, and the need for a transformation of the former through the latter for the human form of life, on the other.

A much more detailed and richer story can be told than I have done of the transformation of the notion of ‘humanisation of individuals through education’ into a notion of ‘the humanisation of the human race’ as found in Kant and the subsequent German philosophy of history. Equally richer narration is possible of my next cursory glance at the field opened up by the Kantian tenet that the world we live in is humanised. The focus in the following is confined to identifying the motivating question of a tradition rather than going into the subtleties involved in answering it.

Perhaps we can begin by reflecting on the characteristic German word ‘Grundlegung’ which is used to speak about launching a research question or a discipline. Though it can be translated as ‘laying the foundations’ and in this idiom can lay claim to a tradition going back to Descartes and Hobbes, such a translation misses thereby the characteristic Kantian flavour of the German term. Surrounding the notion of ‘Grundlegung’ are the implication threads associated with the tenet that the world is open to different forms of apprehension, and correspondingly it is ‘humanised’ in different ways. Thus ‘Grundlegung’ is connected with the assumption that to lay foundation to a specific field of activity or specific field of studies is to provide for, or to show, the (logical) conditions of its possibility.

Further, underlying that assumption is the notion of ‘natural reason’, the emergence of which was traced back in section 5.3 to a transference of the anchorage of the context-invariance of knowledge from the Aristotelian category of nature (because of its elimination through the advent of maker God) to the speciality of human nature as delineated by Aquinas. The tenet that the world we live is a humanised world is a consequence of the formulation the notion of ‘natural reason’ received in the hands of Kant: it started a mode of philosophical study seeking the unity of the world, not in the nature of it, but in that of its human maker, the way 194

See chapter 2 and section 3.3.

or ways the apriori forms of making the world cohere in human nature. Thus it delineated a philosophical task of seeking the underlying apriori forms that make different human activities possible.

This also opens one’s horizon of interests: one gets interested, for example, not merely in the way man makes the world in science, legal institutions and Christian theology, but also in myths, which were originally supposed to be the pre-Christian form of religiously coloured world view. Thus, Schelling, Cassirer and Jaspers were interested in the nature of ‘mythical language’ and its relation to philosophy and science (i.e. to see the relation between ‘mythos’ and ‘logos’). Perhaps the conceptual interest in ethnography on the one hand, and artistic expression on the other - both started off their career in the central European tradition195 owes to this opening up of the new horizon of interests by the Kantian theme of the ways of making the world.

7.2

The Human Animal and its Angelic Faculty

To recall what was said in the section 3.4.2: most of the distinctions that were to later become prominent in the philosophical tradition while thinking about human affairs were identified there in a passage from Aristotle196; I summed up the thrust of the passage as the thesis that both speech and other human institutions (polis), though belong to the category of made, nevertheless the process of their making is a process of an actualisation of a nature of man. This thesis is developed by Kant and the German philosophy of history into a theory of the human institutions in the altered logical landscape of the concepts inherited from the medieval mediation of Aristotle. This means effectively a combination of two themes: (i) a theme of the agency not located in the form but in the bearer of the forms - in the context of human institutions, effectively, in the man, the maker; (ii) a theme of the contrast between the sensibility and intelligibility, and the man being the intelligible being.

As far as the first theme is concerned, I indicated the perceived task in the last chapter while discussing Kant’s Naturgeschichte: there is the task of accounting for human being as the product of nature and history even while considering him the maker of that history or

195

See Ernest Gellner on the central European roots of even the English Cultural Anthropology: Gellner, E. (1995), p. 74-80. 196 Cf. Aristotle, cit. 1995, Politics, bk. I, 1253a 5-20.

tradition:197 how to conceive agency in such a way that it reconciles to the removal of its location away from the Aristotelian form (or away from the Aristotelian self-generating physis), without however transferring it either to the individual maker or to a transcendent Creator, but simultaneously recognising a sort of a role of agency to the individual? As discussed in chapter 6 Kant attempts to solve this problem by bringing the other theme into picture: he interprets man’s intelligible nature as being equivalent to his being a species-being (Gattungswesen), and the individuals being human to the extent they participate in the process of this species being unrolling itself all its capacities, i.e. in the process of its developing into a community of moral individuals living in an ‘outer’ constitutional State of liberal order and an ‘inner state’ of obeying the Moral Law.198 This story of ascension of man from necessity to freedom, from his animal sensible nature to a state of being governed by his intelligible nature, is what unites Kant, the German philosophy of history and the later transformation of it into the sociological models of modernisation in the hands of Weber and Talcot Parsoms.199 Apart from its relevance to the contrast dealt with while considering Kant’s Naturgeschichte, that of ‘self-regulating’ individuals versus ‘nature-bound’ humans, the question of agency pertains more to the domain of the philosophy of history than to the field of culture theory. Therefore in this chapter I will not focus on the aspect of agency in the blending effected by the German tradition of the two themes.

The other theme is both more conspicuous and more basic, conspicuous in its influence in shaping the concepts to talk about culture; more basic in that it constituted the terms of formulating the strategy of solving the problem of agency, thus giving rise to the plot of the story of man’s ascension from the realm of necessity to that of freedom. The German tradition brought the assumption that sense-knowledge is context bound and intellectual knowledge is context free (as delineated in 5.3) to bear upon the characterisation of human nature. Translated from a characterisation of the nature of two sorts of knowledge to a characterisation of two sorts of capacities existing in human beings, it would mean that the exercise of the sense capacity binds one to the context and the exercise of the capacity for intellection frees one from the context. A lot of discussion in the theory of culture is a variation of this theme. I will illustrate this by following up one strand, the mythical versus

Cf. the conception of ‘Naturgeschichte’ in the previous chapter and also Marx’s assertion that man makes history but in circumastances that he himself has not made. 198 See sections 6.5.3 and 6.5.4. 199 Cf. Parsons, T. (1971). 197

scientific form of thinking, and the corresponding characterisation of the ‘traditional societies’ as closed and the ‘modern societies’ as open.

If the exercise of the sense capacity binds one to the context and the exercise of the capacity for intellection frees one from it, then the characterisation of man as a rational animal would mean that he is human to the extent he frees himself from the confinement and binding arising out of the exercise of the sense-capacity. The interest in the way man has, and ought to, discipline or ‘sublimate’ the sense-capacity or/and the way the nature (Kant’s picture of her as a stern teacher referred to in the last chapter) disciplines him to bring about his real destiny to come to the forefront, can thus becomes one line of pre-occupation.200 When this interest gets tied to the evolutionary scheme, either structural or temporal, it yields most of the sociological models available now for characterising different ‘societies’. Of course, one of the pre-conditions for such models to work is to conceive societies as self-enclosed, and conceive them as analogous to a biological organisms, and development as a question of unrolling the essence of that ‘society’. The theoretical devices or subterfuge used for securing such conditions of identity of the investigated society is one of the interesting field for historical-cum-conceptual research. I will however confine myself to the conceptual undergrid rather than the thickets of over-growth, wherein to find the pathways and byways could be a laborious, though perhaps an enticing venture of rambling around.

In short, the German tradition drew a twofold contrast between the nature of the capacity or faculty of reason and the sense-capacity or the faculty of sensing: the latter is a capacity to get affected and its exercise is context bound; the former is spontaneous, i.e. an active capacity, and its exercise transcends the confinement of the context. A paradigmatic example of the way this contrast gets worked out as a theory of culture is provided by the way Herder develops the thesis presaged in Aristotle’s Politics that both speech and polis are rooted in a faculty that singles out man from animals.

7.3

Herder: The ‘Instinctless Animal’ and its Special Faculty

7.3.1

Language, the Prototype and the Centre of Human Institutions

200

Kant stresses, at least when it comes to speaking about education, the disciplining view; Herder and Schiller may be considered as holding to a sublimation view. How exactly the notion of ‘sublimation’ has to be understood, and how it differs from ‘disciplining’ is an interesting question in itself, and worth a separate investigation.

One consequence that may be drawn from the Aristotelian passage is that a theory of language is identical with a theory of human institutions. Herder’s Ursprung der Sprache draws this consequence and develops Aristotle’s idea from Politics into such a theory. The underlying idea of Herder is that if we can identify the specificity of human language and its development then we have also a key to answer the question why human beings have culture and how it develops.201 Of course, in this understanding, unlike for many currents of linguistics today, the language is not merely a system of (syntactic) rules. Rather, it is like the ‘Langage’ of Saussure, a totality of human inherited resource for thinking and orienting in the world.

In fact, for Herder to have language, to have culture and to be human are synonymous. For, his programme is to demonstrate the necessity of the origin of language in human beings by showing that there cannot be human thinking or apprehension (Verständnishandlung) without ‘marker sign’ (Merkwort), i.e. a mnemonic aid that does not depend on the vivid memory of the situation remembered. The strategy he adopts to execute this programme is to show that man, not being gifted with any marked sense-capacity, can and has to develop a substitute sixth sense to be able to function. In the above formulation, the ‘can’ is equally important as the ‘has to’: as we will see there are two influential readings of Herder the difference of which depend crucially upon how much stress is laid on ‘can’ in the above formulation. It determines the status of this sixth sense - whether it is an expression of a mere deficiency of ‘instincts’ or or an extra faculty that only human being is gifted with. This sixth sense, to which Herder invents the word ‘Besonnenheit’, is conceived as synonymous with both ‘human understanding’ and the ‘language ability’. The outward expression of it is the Merkwort. Not merely the language but also all other human institutions such as family and community, as well as the traditions that bind the individual across the generations, in short, all those expressions that single out human form of life from that of the animals are traced back to the Besonnenheit. „Wenn Verstand und Besonnenheit die Naturgabe seiner Gattung ist, so mußte dies sich sogleich äußern, da sich die schwächere Sinnlichkeit und alle das Klägliche seiner Entbehrungen äußerte. Das instinktlose, elende Geschöpf, [...] das sich selbst helfen sollte und nicht anders als könnte. Alle 201

This last is the assumption, and in fact almost the formulation of Cassirer. Cf. Cassirer, E. (1979).

Mängel und Bedürfnisse als Tier waren dringende Anlässe, sich mit allen Kräften als Mensch zu zeigen; sowie diese Kräfte der Menschheit nicht etwa bloß schwache Schadloshaltungen gegen die ihm versagten größeren Tier-Vollkommenheiten waren, [...] sondern sie waren ohne Vergleichung und eigentliche Gegeneinandermessung seine Art! Der Mittelpunkt seiner Schwere, die Hauptrichtung seiner Seelenwirkungen fiel so auf diesen Verstand, auf menschliche Besonnenheit hin, wie bei der Biene sogleich aufs Saugen und Bauen, Wenn es nun bewiesen ist, daß nicht die mindeste Handlung seines Verstandes ohne Merkwort geschehen konnte, so war auch das erste Moment der Besinnung Moment zu innerer Entstehung der Sprache.“202

This passage when compared with the pssage quoted from Politics in the section 3.4.2 would provide one more evidence to corroborate the suggestion put forward in the section 5.2 that there is a continuing thread running from Aristotle’s Politics to the present day culture theory using identical distinctions, and very often even identical examples, like in this case, the contrast of the activity of bees with that of the human beings, to make the point that human capacity for communication as well as for making the artefacts is different from that of the animals. To come back to Herder’s thesis, the Merkwort, and Besonnenheit of which it is an expression are, on the one hand, the inverse aspect of man being weak in his instincts or sense capacity, but on the other hand, they are what make a human animal into a human being, and they constitute the logical pre-conditions of every human institution. In the next few sections I will elucidate and elaborate this thesis in a little more deatil.

7.3.2

A Not Sense-bound Species and the Besonnenheit

The specificity of human language is traced back by Herder to the ability to change the attention from one focus to another in the field of perception. This ability to turn away from the presence or the ‘immediacy’ of the sensible is what ‘Besonnenheit’ is. This term can only be very weakly translated as ‘reflective capacity’, for Herder’s term also conveys the nuances such as ‘moderation’ and ‘drawing back’ which the word ‘reflection’ in English is not directly associated with. Nevertheless, even though they do not catch all the nuances of the German original, I will use here onwards ‘reflective capacity’ and ‘reflection’ to translate Herder’s ‘Besonnenheit’ and the exercise of the Besonnenheit. The exercise of the reflective capacity is described as ‘sich freidenkende Tätigkeit’, ‘the activity of freely thinking’ which

202

Cf. Herder, J.G. (1772, cit. 1981) p. 81.

can only be understood as a contrast to the cognition when sense capacity is exercised. This latter, as already mentioned earlier, is supposed to bind one to the context. It is not merely that the term ‘Besonnenheit’ is given sense by Herder in a contrastive fashion; he also conceives the existence of reflective capacity in human beings as an inverse aspect of their not being equipped with better sense-capabilities or instincts. (As already indicated in the section 4.6, from the time of Aquinas the sense-capacity, the capacity for ‘natural inclination’ and ‘instinct’ are identified as the same. Thus in Herder ‘sense-capacity’ and ‘having instincts’ are used synonymously.) This has led to a reading into Herder an empirical biological thesis about human species which gives a biological rooting of the human institutions: man is deficient in instincts and consequently he has compensated for it by developing special features; social institutions are one such special compensatory development. Though this thesis put forward by Gehlen may be an interesting thesis by itself, its attribution to Herder is problematic.203 For, even though Herder does draw out various features that single out human beings as being a consequence from the idea that man is not bound to the sensible or ‘sense-content’ of experience, he couples this with the Aristotelian assumption that nature does not endow something without purpose. How to give an empirical content to this dictum that nature does not duplicate and therefore it has made human being capable of reflection by compensating for the capacity withheld from him, the capacity of stronger instincts? However, it is true that in Herder’s thinking a close conceptual connection does exist between man being not bound by the ‘sensible’ content and he being an intelligible being. He draws out the various characteristics that single out human beings as a consequence of his being endowed in such way that there is less capability pertaining to his senses when compared to other animals. He, unlike other animals, is not equipped with appropriate sorts of sensecapacities for discerning the dangers haunting in the environment. Consequently, again unlike in the case of other animals, there is no species-specific natural environment for man to which he is well-adapted, that would make him unsuitable for living in other environments; thus any natural environment is equally suited or unsuited for him. 7.3.3 ‘Merkwort’: ‘Clear’ versus ‘Distinct’ Thinking

203

Cf. Section 9 in the introductory chapter, in: Gehlen, A. (1972).

Similarly, the need to recognise the dangers without being equipped with the sharpness of senses results in the development of a memory form that is not sense-bound, in contrast to that memory of the animals which is sense-bound. To express this Herder uses a classical pair of contrastive terms, ‘distinct’ (‘deutlich’) versus ‘clear’ (‘klar’), a contrast familiar to us from the theory of definitions: defining the term by providing examples is providing a definition that fulfils the condition of being ‘clear’; defining it through providing rules for connecting its implication threads is fulfilling the condition of being distinct. Thus, according to Herder, human orientation is more through being equipped with rules for moving from one situation to another rather than through situations being impressed in memory. Consequently the human language is the medium, or rather the embodiment of a ‘distinct’ rather than that of a ‘clear’ memory. Herder’s formulation of this thesis is to say that the human understanding depends upon the ‘Merkwort’ which in turn is explained by mentioning three contrasts with regard to the conceptual pair ‘clear’ and ‘distinct thinking’. First, the clear thinking is sensible memory („sinnliches Gedächtnis“) and distinct thinking is not dependent on sense bound memory. Secondly, the distinct thinking generalises the experience, thereby making an experience available for others and usable by them, thus making it possible to use the experience of one to improve the living conditions of the species204. Thirdly, whereas the clear thinking is a manifold without a discernible unity205, the distinct thinking orders the manifold of experience into a distinct unity. In human being even in the state of utmost sense awareness (sinnlichster Zustand) the reflective awareness (Besonnenheit) governs.206 We can say that the capacity to think distinctly is conceived as a capacity to grasp the events in terms of concepts, thereby the experiences of the past and the possible experiences in future can be bound together. 7.3.4 The ‘Instinct’ versus the Creations of the ‘Unfinished Animal’

204

ibid. Cf. p. 75. cf. „ein Traum sehr sinnlicher klarer, lebhafter Vorstellungen, ohne ein Haupgesetz des hellen Wachens, das diesen Traum ordnet“, ibid. p. 76. 206 „Beim Menschen waltet die Besonnenheit selbst im sinnlichsten Zustande“, ibid. p.76. 205

This characteristic of dependence on the ‘distinct’ memory, and more generally, on the distinct mode of thinking’ in contrast to the clear mode of thinking to which animals due to their sensible nature are confined to, has two consequences for the human animal: (i) it necessitates the development of a form of learning that is not based on senseexperience. (ii) dependence on a mode of thinking that is dependent on learning rather than the senseequipment gifted along with the birth, makes the human animal in need of care by others in his infancy, and instruction by others for getting equipped for life. Thus it lays the basis for the bindings of family and community.

Human being can and has to develop a generalised form of learning, i.e. a learning that is not specific to specific contexts. This in turn has two further consequences: First, the human capacities are predominantly the learnt capacities, and secondly, a non-context-bound nature of the learning makes it both possible and useful to transmit it across the generations.

Human capacities being the learnt capacities has another further feature: learning and perfectioning in human beings has no end to it. „Das unwissendste Geschöpf, wenn es auf die Welt kommt, aber sogleich Lehrling der Natur, auf eine Weise wie kein Tier.“207 „Im ganzen Universum gleichsam allein; an nichts geheftet und für alles da, durch nichts gesichert, und durch sich selbst noch minder, muß der Mensch entweder unterliegen oder über alles herrschen, mit Plan einer Weisheit, deren kein Tier fähig ist, von allem deutlichen Besitz nehmen oder umkommen.“208

Whereas the animals remain from the beginning to end with almost an unchanged fund of capacities, human beings develop their capacities till the end of their life. Thus human being has a constitutive unfinishedness and a necessity to learn. This fact connects the characteristic of the ‘activity of freely thinking’ (freidenkende Tätigkeit) with the other specific human characteristic, that of unfolding of his powers in the snow-balling type of progression (‘sich seine Kräfte in Progression fortwirken’), both at an individual level and at a species level. Reminiscent of what we have come across in Kant - human animal is human to the extent he participates in the historical process of species getting enlightened - Herder too asserts that the essential aspect of our being is not the enjoyment but progression: „Das Wesentliche unseres Lebens ist nie Genuß, sondern immer Progression, und wir sind nie Menschen gewesen, bis wir zu Ende gelebt haben; dahingegen die Biene Biene war, als sie ihre erste Zelle baute.“ 207 208

ibid. p. 84. ibid. p.79.

This continuous perfection of the capacities is rooted in the Besonnenheit or reflection. That does not mean that every human action is a reflectively carried action. It only means that the ability is developed through reflection.

The other consequence, the possibility to transmit the experience across the generations gives rise to traditions. Thus language, the embodiment of the distinct mode of memory (as against clear mode, as elucidated earlier), is also the embodiment of traditions, and the binding element that creates communities and ‘Nations’209.

7.3.5

The Critique of Utility as the Root of Language and Society

This possibility of traditions is also connected with the necessity of them. Human infant which depends for its equipment on learning, that too on a learning not based on the individual sense-equipment, makes man an animal in need of care by others in his infancy.

Herder draws attention to the empirical fact that the human infant both depend on the care of the parents and community, and does get such a care; this disproves the Hobbesian and utilitarian thesis regarding the natrure and possibility of human institutions based on the selfinterest. If utilitarians were correct, it should be that human beings develop an interest in the infant out of the utiltity which may accrue out of it. Man being capable of more calculation than the animals, he should be having more callous attitude towards the laborious task of upbringing which hardly has tangible benefits for him. He must be having less emotions than the animals. But in fact the contrary is the case. The utility theory would make the human being to be just careless to their children. But the opposite is the empirical fact.

It is not the instinctual endowment that brings the human animal to develop the care and emotional bond towards its community, but rather the other way round: the lack of instincts make humans depend on the parental care, and this gives rise to the bonds of family and community, and the very nature of man being a social animal. „Und so weiß auch im Ganzen des Geschlechts die Natur aus der Schwachheit Stärke zu machen. Eben deswegen kommt der Mensch so schwach, so dürftig, so verlassen von dem Unterricht der Natur, so ganz ohne Fertigkeiten und Talente auf die Welt, wie kein Tier, damit er, wie kein Tier,

The word ‘Nation’ is used in Herder in the sense of a community that is bound by the tradtions embodied in language. The idea of nation as an ethnic entity, though perhaps derivable from some of his utterances - especially because of the centrality of the family in the conception of the community, is not explicitly conceived. Similarly, the notion of ‘Nation State’ is not traceable to Herder. 209

eine Erziehung genieße und das menschliche Geschlecht, wie kein Tiergeschlecht, ein innigverbundenes Ganze werde!“210

Nature has made man such a creature that to him the binding through instruction and teaching is essential.211 This makes language, the outer expression of the special faculty of the instinctless animal, simultaneously the embodiment of the familial memory and bonds.

Dependence on such bonds is simultaneously the root of there being the differences between customs and languages and thus giving rise to antagonisms and rivalries, as well as communities and ‘national feelings’.

As pointed out earlier, human being is not adapted to any particular natural environment as a consequence of his having no particularised and well developed sense-capacity. This makes his binding not to that of a territory but to that of the communities the focal point of which is the traditions learnt in the laps of his parents and the community surrounding them. Both the sociality and the differences between human groups are not ‘naturwüchsig’212 i.e. they are not out-growths of the ‘natural man’, but yet they are connected with human nature: they are connected with the nature of man being other than that of an inchoately feeling type of animal213, thus making him require the Merkwort for his memory and learning.

Once such a device is there it has its own logic: the memories and thoughts take shape as words and they travel from mother or father to son or daughter, binding in the process one generation to the next, and thus becomoing the traditions of this and not that community. Thus it sows the seeds of the differences which make the antagonism, competition between the groups as well as co-operation between them, both possible and necessary. Necessary, because only through such antagonism, as also Kant suggests214, the groups develop their capacities by rivalry and a co-operate based on the goods (both of a material and of a cognitive sort) deficient in each others possession.

210

ibid. p. 96-97. Cf. „Natur hat den Menschen durch Not und Elterntrieb zu einem Wesen gemacht, dem das Band des Unterrichts und der Erziehung wesentlich ist.“ ibid. P.97. 212 see 4th Naturgesetz, cf. Herder, J.G. (1772, cit. 1981). 213 „Der Mensch ist nicht bloß eine dunkel fühlende Auster“, see ibid. p. 77. 214 But see for the difference between Kant and Herder in the section 7.3.5. 211

Thus the nature of family, of education, of sociality of man, and the constitution of the individual through dialogue and tradition, all are traceable to a faculty that stays in an inverse relation to the fact of human Instinktlosigkeit.

7.3.6

Human Institutions: Creations of a Special or a Deficient Animal?

Max Scheler uses the term ‘weltoffen’ to refer to the nature of man arising from his not being bound to the ‘sensible’. This term signals a competing reading of Herder to that of Gehlen: arising out of the assumption that man is not sense-bound we have two formulations in the 20th century philosophical anthropology. (i) Man is a deficient being (Mängelwesen). i.e. he is deficient of those things needed to survive in the natural world, and therefore he has to compensate those deficiencies through developing special strategies. Human institutions including language are the results of this compensatory developments. (ii) Man is characterised by a special faculty (Ausstattungswesen), reason, which singles him out from the whole of animal kingdom, and it is through this special endowment man shows his speciality of his institutions. Both these formulations historically derive inspiration from Herder. Whereas the second retains the theological component, the first attempts at deriving from Herder an emprical biological thesis, but nevertheless retaining the notions of ‘reason’ and ‘progress’. It is an interesting case for study of what dangers lay in store when theological doctrines are transformed into scientifc theories without them being purged of normative functions and regulative claims.

As already mentioned, Herder specifically makes use of the Aristotelian slogan that nature is economical and does not do anything without a purpose. This would bring him nearer to Scheler, and make his thesis more akin to the assertion that man has a special endowment rather than that man is a deficient being. Nevertheless, it is important to note the close link that exists for him between the lack of natural ‘instincts, i.e. the lack of the binding force of the sense-capacity, and the ‘reflection’ (‘Besonnenheit’) in the human animal. 7.3.7 ‘Individualism’ versus ‘Communitarianism’: a Historical Footnote Perhaps this is a place to add a note on the difference between Kant and Herder and the essential continuity of their difference in the present day debate between two conceptions of the liberal democracy. The difference centres around the role of antagonism and perhaps

much more basically about the way the earthy feature of the sensible in the nature of man need to be transformed. Kant and Herder share the distrust against the atomic individualism since both consider it as conceiving human being only in terms of his animal nature. But Herder distrusts the cosmopolitanism based upon the Kantian view of the emanicpation from the sensibility as both the task and the origin of human institutions.

Kant’s theory of ‘league of Nations’ as envisaged in his philosophy of history 215 takes the fact of different nations as given, and aims to explain when the condition for the development of all the natural capacities of man is fulfilled and what the ultimate goal of history (history considered from a ‘pragmatic standpoint’) is. He is not interested in the question why different ‘Nations’ - nations understood as ‘substantive wholes’ as gainst mere ‘distribuitive wholes’ - exist. Herder on the other hand appears to be interested in the question, ‘why such substantive wholes as nations exist?’, and he answers them in terms of the nature of the reason as expressing in contrasts. Whereas for Kant ‘antagonisms’ is merely an instrument of nature in the historical process to discipline and educate man into a moral being216, for Herder it is the essential aspect of expression of the family bonds. Thus Herder conceives community on the model of family in contrast to Kant who takes a legal view of it similar to that embodied in the social contract view of the State elaborated by his naturalist (a pre-form of utilitarianism) predecessors like Hobbes and Locke, and known to Kant and respresented in Herder as Condillac’s writings. This perhaps also explains Herder’s interest in the ‘national character’ or ‘mentalities’ and Kant’s disdain for it.

Similarly, there appears in Herder, at least sometimes, a line of thinking that counter-poses will to reason, meaning in such contxts a counter-posing of the force (Kraft) of tradition as against the individual considerations. This stress on the non-deliberate dispositions and the consequences drawn on the basis of it is central for the theory of culture 217 in T.S. Eliot as against the Enlightenment position (and also that of Kant) that conceives the institutions as either due to the Naturgeschichte or due to the beliefs and maxims of the human agent. For Kant the ‘spontaneity’ has to be understood as a rational will; for Herder, however, the spontaneity has the touch of power of traditions working through the individuals. Howver, Herder is less of a systematic thinker, and these assertions are yet to be worked out in terms of their systematic conceptual context.

These differences however are within the same paradigm of human being as the intelligible being, and consequently a species being (Gattungswesen), and whose species-essence expresses itself in the creation of communities and history. The difference between Kant and Herder within this common framework is still continuing with variations of nuances in the

215

See section 6.5.4. See section 6.5.3. 217 See the section ***** 216

contemporary debate surrounding the controversy between those espousing individualism and the others espousing communitarianism.

The theories of culture as understood in such a paradigm, it may be noted, do not attempt the task of elucidating what it is to speak of cultural differences as against individual and biological differences, but rather take the fact of distinction between cultures as a given phenomena and attempt to explain them in terms of building a theory of human nature. In other words, they are the answers to the question why human beings have culture and not answers to the question, what constitutes a cultural difference? The reason for this is that they are underpinned by the conception of givenness, now, unlike in Aristotle, not the givenness of nature but that of human nature.

We will see next how such human nature haunts the theories of culture in the 20th century.

7.4

Cassirer: Mythical versus Scientific Symbolic Forms

7.4.1 Kantianism as a ‘Philosophy of Culture’ The theme I have delineated so far, the sensible versus the intelligible, and the human form of life as shot through the latter, is the underlying thread that connects Cassirer’s voluminous works through and through. His central question is ‘how are cultural forms possible?’ and his answer is that they are made possible through the different modes of organisation of the sensible through the intelligible. The best evidence to support this thesis, now even bringing the theological undercurrent of the tradtion to the forefront, is the following rare criptic formulation by Cassirer where the motto of his whole philsophy of symbolic forms is summarised: „A difference between ‘real’ and ‘possible’ exists neither for the being below man nor for those above him. The beings below man are confined within the world of their sense perceptions. They are susceptible to actual physical stimuli and react to these stimuli. But they can form no idea of ‘possible’ things. On the other hand the superhuman intellect, the divine mind, knows no distinction between reality and possibility.“218

218

Cf. Cassirer, E. (1944, cit. 1992), p. 56.

Generally, Cassirer uses the word ‘symbolic form’ in place of ‘intelligible’, my formulation of the thesis above is the exact repetition of what he says in many places. Even the substitution of the word ‘form’ to ‘intelligible’ has a tradition to it, especially since in Kant: ‘forms’ are what the intelligible beings impress upon the sensuous manifold to make the latter the human knowledge. That he belongs to the Kantian tradition is is both a biographical fact219 and vouched for by Cassirer himself. He claims that Kant’s theory of knowledge can be transformed into a philosophy of culture and this as his achievement.220 What this term, ‘philosophy of culture’, means for Cassirer will be elucidated by focusing on the one of his intellectual bete noirs, the contrast between myth and science.221This preoccupation, of course, stems from the intellectual milieu of his times, but for Cassirer it provides for illustrating a central point of method and therefore it is not merely a question of historical importance, but rather the crux for understanding his very model and method. 7.4.2 The Task of Providing ‘the Logic of Humanities’ First, on method. In an essay titled Die Begriffsform im mythischen Denkens222 he situates his preoccupation with the myths in the context of providing what he calls a general logic of humanities (allgemeine Logik der Geisteswissenschaften). As his style, the meaning of this phrase doesn not get explained in a straight forward manner, but in terms of a narration of the events in the intellectual history. The general logic of humanities is supposed to have been first posed as a task in the modern times by Vico.223 The further narration is aimed both as a critique of different approaches to this question as well as elucidating the insights that need to be incorporated in the proper accomplishment of the task.

What does the word ‘logic’ mean in this formulation?

219

He is a student of Herman Cohen and stems from the Marburg school of Neo-Kantianism. With regard to his Neo-Kantianism see his autobiographical remarks in: Cassirer, E. (1956), p. xxiv. 220 Cf. ‘Critical Idealism as Philosophy of Culture’ in: Verene, D.P. (ed.), 1979. 221 An alternative way of approaching Cassirer’s philosophy could be focusing on his understanding of the emergence of the ‘individuality’. Then also the connection to the notions appearing in the epitome of the chapter 2 is evident. If this theme is chosen, we are equally within the framework of Kantian philosophy of history, since the classical theme that connects the history of the emergence of science and the history of the emergence of individual freedom is the focus theme of German idealism. The idea of law being central to both. Cf. Rudolph, E., (1994) 222 Cf. Cassirer E. (1983). 223 Cf. ibid. p. 5.

In many places the logic is equated with the a general theory of science, and it is also conceived as connected with the investigation of the ways the concepts are constructed (Begriffsbildung).224 Further, this logic is conceived in two separate senses, in a narrower and in a more comprehensive one. In a narrower sense, it is equated with the task of investigating the pure forms of knowledge - what is meant is the investigation into the forms available in theoretical or scientific knowledge. In the other more comprehensive sense, it is conceived as a task of investigating the totality of the mental forms of world apprehension (Totalität der geistigen Formen der Weltauffassung).

In other words, logic is conceived as that discipline which investigates the forms - whether that of knowledge conceived in a narrow sense of scientific knowledge, or, in a more comprehensive sense, as any mode of dealing with the social and natural environment. Consequently, the task of providing the ‘logic of humanities’ he sets before himself has to be understood as a task of giving an account of ‘forms’ made use of in humanities. Though the German expression he uses in this connection ‘Logik der Geisteswissenschaften’ would suggest that he is interested in the forms used in the academic disciplines that investigate the human affairs, as will become evident soon, his intended focus is much wider: the forms made use of by all different human activties, and not merely the academic ones, are to be included in the investigation of the ‘logic of humanities’ envisaged by him.

Historically the logic made its appearance, according to Cassirer, in Socratic dialectic. Further, according to him, in that historical gestalt there was an appreciation that the form and content cannot be thought of in separation from each other. But the tradition of logic that emerged later, the formal logic, is one that he considers as the point of departure for him. Here the focus is on the form in abstraction from the content. He faults this tradition on two counts. (i) It got tied to naive realist presuppositions.225

(ii) Its understanding of forms is limited by its narrow focus on scientific to the exclusion of all other forms of thinking.226

What needs clarification at this stage is on how he uses the terms 'form' und 'concept'. These terms are used in a way that their senses need to be understood relative to each other: he speaks of ‘form of a concept in a particular thought modality’ (Form des Begriffs in einer Denkmodalität); he also mentions ‘form’ in connection with the type and species of concepts

224

See the following passages (a) 'Logik als allgemeine Wissenschaftslehre' (p. 5) and (b) 'Vor völlig neue Fragen sieht sich dagegen die Logik gestellt, sobald sie versucht, ihren Blick über die reinen Wissensformen hinaus auf die Totalität der geistigen Formen der Weltauffassung zu richten.' (p. 7), (c) 'Schon der Name Logik weist darauf hin, daß in ihrem Ursprung die Reflexion auf die Form des Wissens mit der Reflexion auf die Sprache sich aufs innigste durchdringt. ' (p. 8), all in: Cassirer, E. (1983); also see Cassirer, E. (1928). 225 Cf. Cassirer, E. (1928) ‘Zur Theorie des Begriffs', in: Kant Studien (33) 1928, p.129-136. 226 Cf. Cassirer, E. (1983), p.3.

of a discipline such as physics or chemistry.227 That is, ‘form’ is used to demarcate the type of concepts of a particular discipline from the type of concepts of another discipline, or the type of concepts of a particular modality of thinking from another modality of thinking. The notion of ‘a modality of thinking’ is applied variably in accordance with the context, sometimes to contrast the thinking characterising the particular disciplines such as physics and chemistry, sometimes that of natural sciences as against the humanities, and still some other times to contrast the ‘scientific’ (which includes the mode of thinking of both natural sciences and humanities) as against the ‘mythical’ forms of thinking. By making use of another of Cassirer’s terms, the ‘Weltganzen’, we can say that the form differentiates a particular world - in which particular classes and concepts are constructed - from other worlds.228 How a world and a variation of a world are to be distinguished and identified depends on the context in which discourse is conducted.229

7.4.3 The Tradition of Logic versus the Contrastive Method Coming back to Cassirer’s identification of the faults of the ‘tradition of logic’: he accuses that tradition to have conceived the concept formation (Begriffsbildung) as a process of ‘mimesis’ (Nachkonstruktion), i.e. a process of consturcting the objects by copying them. By using the term ‘symbolic activity’ to refer to any cognitive activity, we can formulate Cassier’s criticism as following. If concept formation is conceived as a procedure mimetic reproduction of the real there is possibility of separating the investigation of the semantics and syntax, the content, on the one hand, and the organising principles of symbolic activity, on the other. That is, the investigation of form can be conducted in abstraction from the content captured by the symbolic activity. But if it is the case that the concepts provide the very perspective for an object construction, the content is something that is formed by the very form and not available independent of it. This latter position is expressed by Cassirer by saying that the form ‘determines the direction of objectification’.230

To this mutually opposing understanding of ‘forms’ the contrasts in the tradition of philosophy such as ‘synthesis versus analyis’, ‘subjective versus objective’, ‘idealist versus realist’ are traced. For example, the realistic and idealsitic world views are contrasted in the following way. „Wo die realistische Weltansicht sich bei irgendeiner letztgegebenen Beschaffenheit der Dinge, als der Grundlage für alles Erkennen beruhigt - da formt der Idelaismus eben die Beschaffenheit selbst zu einer Frage des Denkens um.“231

227

ibid. see p. 9-10. cf. "Alle Begriffsbildung [...]. Die Form der Reihung bestimmt hierbei die Art und die Gattung des Begriffs." Cf. p. 9-10. 229 Cf. the use of the World by Goodman in contexts such as Ways of Worldmaking. Cf. Goodman N., (1978). 230 Cf. ibid. p.9. 231 Cf. Cassirer, E. (1985a), p. 4. 228

Similarly, to Leibniz the credits is given for discovering the the siginificance of ‘synthesis’ in relation to mathematics as of an activity of ‘free and constrcutive gestalting of the content’ in contrast to the conception of analysis which merely differentiates the aspects by taking the ‘given’ as its directing principle. „Das Entscheidende des Gegensatzes von Synthesis und Analysis liegt in der Hervorhebung einer Funktion der freien, konstruktiven Gestaltung des Inhalts im Unterschied zur bloßen nachträglichen Zergliederung eines Gegebenen. Diesen Begriff des ´Synthetischen´ aber hat Leibniz in seiner Lehre von der ´kausalen´Definition als Bedingung der Möglichkeit des Gegenstandes für die Mathematik entdeckt und gestaltet.“232

A similar sort of contrast is expressed, but now explicitly making use of the Kantian terminology, „dasjenige, was nicht im Objekt (als dem ´Ding an sich´) vorgefunden wird, sondern vom Subjekt´selbst verrichtet´werden muß - aber diese Verrichtung erfolgt selbst nach einer allgemein gültigen Regel und besitzt demgemäß in ihrer Idealität zugleich realisierende Bedeutung. Indem der Einzelinhalt, kraft der sprachlichen Formgebung, nicht als solcher bezeichnet, sondern auf das Ganze der möglichen Inhalte bezogen und gemäß seiner Stellung in diesem Ganzen charakterisiert wird, wird er in dieser Beziehung auf die Einheit des denkenden Selbstbewußtseins auch erst nach seinem gegenständlichen Gehalt vollständig bestimmt.“233

In line with its mimetic understanding, according to Cassirer, the tradition of logic conceives the of the task exaplaining the construction of concepts as that of providing a theory of abstraction. But, it is in fact a task of finding out the characteristic ‘rule of construction’ underlying each domain rather than abstracting from a given differentiation of a world (Weltgliederung): „Alle Begriffsbildung gleichviel in welchem Gebiet [...] ist dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß sie ein bestimmtes Prinzip der Verknüpfung und der ‘Reihung’ in sich schließt. Erst durch dieses Prinzip werden aus dem stetigen Fluß der Eindrücke bestimmte ‘Gebilde’ [...] herausgelöst. Die Form der Reihung bestimmt hierbei die Art und die Gattung des Begriffs. [...] Die traditionelle logische Lehre vom Begriff pflegt freilich eben diese entscheidende Differenz zu übersehen oder sie zum mindesten nicht zur scharfen methodischen Ausprägung zu bringen. Denn, indem sie uns anweist, den Begriff dadurch zu bilden, daß wir eine Gesamtheit gleichartiger oder ähnlicher Wahrnehmungen durchlaufen, und daß wir aus ihr, indem wir ihre Unterschiede mehr und mehr fallen lassen, nur die gemeinsamen Bestandteile herausheben, geht sie dabei von der Voraussetzung aus, als liege die Ähnlichkeit oder Unähnlichkeit schon in dem einfachen Inhalt der sinnlichen Eindrücke selbst, und sei von ihm unmittelbar und unzweideutig abzulesen. Eine schärfere Analyse zeigt indes genau das Umgekehrte: sie lehrt, daß die sinnlichen Elemente je nach dem

232 233

Cf. Cassirer, E. (1962), p. 534. Cf. Cassirer, E. (1923), 123f.

Gesichtspunkt, unter dem sie betrachtet werden, in ganz verschiedener Weise zu Ähnlichkeitskreisen zusammengefaßt werden können. An sich ist nichts gleich / oder ungleich, ähnlich oder unähnlich - das Denken macht es erst dazu. Dieses bildet somit nicht einfach eine an sich bestehende Ähnlichkeit der Dinge in der Form des Begriffes nach - sondern es bestimmt vielmehr, durch die Richtlinien der Vergleichung und Zusammenfassung, die es aufstellt, selbst erst, was als ähnlich, was als unähnlich zu gelten hat.“ 234

In other words, a discipline has to be conceived not in terms of a given domain; rather the domain is the result of a modality of thinking. The investigation of ‘forms’ is therefore the investigation of a ‘rule for constructing’ a particular ‘content’.

Consequently, the question concerning method for Cassirer is: how can one discover these rules of constrcution of different domains, or more generally, the rules of construction constituting different spheres of human cognitive activity? His answer is to suggest a method of counter-posing (das Gegenüberstellen) the very diverse modalities of thinking: the more diverse the modalities are, the more suited they are for this purpose.235 As already mentioed in the previous section, he makes a relative distinction between ‘a modality of thinking’ and ‘the concepts and classes’ within that modality of thinking, and thus speaks of his task as that of exhibiting the form of concepts by counterposing one mode of concept with another.236 To discover the rule of constructing concepts is to make the form of concepts appearing in a particular modality of thinking apparent or conspicuous, and for this the best suitbale method is to counter-pose one modality to another.

To repeat, this method to bring out the form of concepts would work optimally when the modalities of thinking contrasted are different and even estranged from each other to the maximum extent. This requirement of the method would also lead us in the direction of overcoming the other weakness identified with of the tradition of logic, namely the weakness of an exclusive focus on the scientific modality of thinking. First, the specificity of scientific thinking cannot be apprehended fully without counter-posing it to non-scientific modes of thinking. Secondly, ‘humanities’ (i.e.Geisteswissenschaften) by its very definition is a study of all forms of human activities, and a ‘logic humanities’ must attempt to clarify the forms of human existence in contrast to that of natural existence by taking into account all different modes of human existence.237

234

Cf. Cassirer, E. (1983), p. 9-10. Cf. 'Auch die verschiedenste [...] des mythischen Bewußtseins gegenüberstellen." Ibid. p.10-11. 236 Cf. 'Zur Theorie des Begriffs' in: Kant Studien (33) 1928, p.129-136. 237 'Die Eigentümlichkeit des geistigen Seins, seine Unterscheidung vom natürlichen aufzuweisen, muß man den Blick 'auf Totalität der geistigen Formen der Weltauffassung richten'. p. 7. See also p. 10 -11. 235

To appreciate what Cassirer is saying here one has to remind oneself the Kantian idea mentioned in the beginning of this chapter that the world we live in is a humanised world.238 To investigate the conditions of possibility of different disciplines and activities is to investigate the modes of humanising the world. But if we take this stance, then there is no reason why the attention should be confined to only certain forms and not to others. Artistic and religious practices too become the candidates for attention as specific modes of thinking. These are, however, accepted, sometimes grudgingly sometimes generously, amongst the philosophers as serious activities requiring philosophical attention. But, according to Cassirer, they are all still within the fold of familiar modes of thinking for the scientific community. This however is not the case when it comes to myths and magic. But they too are modes of dealing with the world, and therefore are fit candidates for the Kantian notion of the forms of humanising the world. Thus formulating a ‘logic of humanities’, must involve a consideration of mythical mode of thinking too.

There is another reason why myths become methodologically much more interesting. They can serve a double function in the method of counter-posing. First, there is the usual interest in difference, where mythical thinking is put alongside of science, art, language etc., in order to bring out the different form-nuances and varieties of human mental activity, and the specific forms underlying all these different modes of activities.239 But, secondly, there is a special role for the contrast with the myth, because, the myth is considered as quite antithetical to scientific mode of thinking. If the assumption of the antithesis between science and myth is taken seriously it should be expected that such a counter-posing would lead to discovery of completely different variety of difference than the differences otherwise considered. One is tempted to see here a variety of argument that we came across in Herder while claiming that human beings not merely differ from each of the animal species, but differ from the animal kingdom taken as a whole. A similar consideration appears to haunt Cassirer when he speaks about myths: other modes of thinking familiar to modern man all taken together as one class differs from mythical form of thinking. When Cassirer speaks of the specificity of theoretical mode of thinking he means more than what is usually considered as ‘theoretical’; he means the whole of the modes of thinking familiar to modern man. Theoretical mode understood in this way is characterised by carving out a domain of nature distinct from the culture; all distinctions of of modes of thinking in the modern world assume such a distinction even when they sometimes bemoan it. The best way to bring the specificity of such a mode is by counter-posing it with a mode of thinking that does not handle the social and natural environment as ‘nature’.

To put it in terms of our theme in this chapter, for Cassirer mythical thinking is not only different, but different in a special way such that a comparison of it with the scientifc or theoretical mode would throw light on how the very constitutive features of the human 238 239

See section 7.1. Cf. p.6.

cognitive appratus, the sensible and the intelligible, are realted. One can exhibit the possible modes of that relation when the extremest way of conceiving the relationship between the general and the particular are visualised and contrasted Cassirer appears to find these extremities in the mythical and scientific thinking. He focuses on the contrast between myth and science by posing it as the following question: What are the respective principles of differentiation of these modes thinking? This is the same question for Cassirer as the question of the way in which the relationship between ‘the general’ and ‘the particular’ is conceived, and that in turn, is the difference between the way these two modes of thinking approach the question ‘why?’. According to Cassirer, the notion of causality is invented to answer the question ‘why?’, and the world as a law governed unity of causal nexus is a common assumption for both mythical and scientific mode of thinking.240 But though both myth and science ask the question ‘why?’ the scientific thinking answers it by transcending the concrete existence, the mythical thinking on the other hand, does not transcend the limits of the concrete.241

In his analysis of the difference between the causal notion in myth and that in science Cassirer makes use of the following two contrasts: (i) ‘substantial causality’ versus ‘causality as constitution of the particular’; (ii) primacy of spatial to temporal thinking versus the reverse. In fact the first and the second contrast amount to the same, and they both are meant to make the same assertion as the one in the last sentence of the previous paragraph, namely, that the myth does not transcend the concrete as the scientific mode, but the latter is faced with a reverse difficulty, the difficulty of reaching the concrete level.

What Cassirer means by the ‘substantive causality’ can be gleaned by what according to him is the motivating question of the mythical mode of thinking. The mythical thinking, he says, is characterised by the question of genesis or the ultimate source, and as a result, it looks towards one substance transforming into another substance, presumably like water becoming earth in the Thalles’ conception of genesis, as an answer to the question ‘why?’. That is, the causal principle for it is an individual concrete ‘substance’. For mythical thinking, says Cassirer, both cause and effect are two gestalts of things (Dinggestalt), and thereby causal process is conceived as a transition from one thing-gestalt to another thing-gestalt. The essence of everything is defined in terms of the conditions of arising of something in terms of the conditions of arising of the parts of that thing. As a consequence of this, the whole world The world „als eine gesetzliche Einheit, als ein in sich geschlossenes kausales Gefüge zu denken" is according to Cassirer common for both ‘Wissenschaft’ and ‘Astrologie’. Cf. Cassirer, E. (1983), p.34. 241 „[Die Wissenschaft] begnügt sich keineswegs mit der einfachen Frage nach dem 'Warum' des Seins und Geschehens, - sondern sie gibt dieser Frage, [...] eine spezifische neue Wendung und Prägung. Auch der Mythos fragt nach dem "Warum" der Dinge. [...] Aber er geht trotz allem Bestreben, in den letzten 'Ursprung' der Dinge zurückzugehen, doch letzten Endes über sie selbst und über ihr einfaches konkretes 'Dasein' nicht hinaus." Cassirer, E. (1983), p.36. 240

remains a concrete single thing connected to each constituent in a part -whole relationship. Thus connections that can be discerned at the sensible level, i.e. the spatial connections, become the guiding principle of causal exaplanation. The ‘substance’ remains the individuating factor.

In contrast, says Cassirer, the scientific thinking is characterised by the idea of law as constitutive factor that gives each constituent its individuality. It looks towards the form of change, the functional law that constitutes the existence. The sensible vanishes from the picture and is replaced by an abstract principle, the ‘function’ through which something is conceived as what it is.

At this stage of Cassirer’s explanation enters the Kantian conception of schematism. The concept of causality involves either a spatial or a temporal schematisation, i.e. building a scheme of connections. Whereas in the scientific thinking, the schematism occurs through the temporal factor in the mythical thinking supposedly the spatial schematism is the principle of causality. In the former, the temporal continuity, and not spatial contiguity is the determinant factor for discerning the causal connection, in the latter the reverse is the case.

7.5

Herder’s Themes and Cassirer’s Formulations

7.5.1

Possession of Language, the Propensities for Standards, and Darstellungsfunktion

In handling Herder’s thinking I left out one important assertion of his, that speech and the propensities for standards - i.e., the perfectibility and corruptibility - are closely linked. For it is through language that concepts are formed and they in turn make the formation of standards possible. Again this assertion echoes the Aristotle’s assertion in Politics.

But Herder connects this with the creation of objects or objectivity, which later Bühler conceives as the Darstellungsfunktion of language. Thought and standards mediated by language create a certain distance between the self as a subject and self as an object.

[The possession of language makes it possible to have a purposive creativity. It is this capacity to act from choice rather than from sheer necessity (the Aristotelian mere ‘affectedness’) which underlies man’s understanding of himself as a self defining agent, just as the capacity to reflect upon himself as a self among others underlies his self understanding as an accountable agent, among others. In becoming conscious of themselves as selves among others, human beings become conscious also of what unites them with or differentiates them from others. Thus arise the collectivities.]

Herder puts forward the thesis that language originates neither through emotion nor through perception, but through the reflection (die Besonnenheit) - that is, man’s ability to change the attention from one focus to anther in the field of perception as the productive force that brought out language. The ‘emotional language’ (or the language of interjections), though much more differentiated in man than in animals, is of a type the same as that of animal language242. It is mere ‘expression’. Thus, one way of conceiving Herder’s thesis is that it is a theory of culture that distinguishes man as having language to which the function of ‘Darstellung’ is basic.

But this formulation still leaves it open whether ‘expressive’ function is pre-representational, or post-representational. He suggests that the early stage of language is expressive and ‘poetical’, the later scientific and abstract. (From such assumptions, sometimes a further consequence is drawn, that the common man’s language is more expressive of immediate experience, the scientific language is more symbolic and abstract. The gain in clarity of the scientific language is bought with the loss of immediacy. We can find sentences similar to the last one in Cassirer’s writings). Thus it appears that in Herder there are two different uses of ‘expressive’ - the interjection view (Herder’s term in the first section, first part) and a more Bühlerian view that human expressiveness is part of a language where the three functions of representation (Darstellung), expression (Ausdruck) and appealing (Appel) are logically distinguishable, but not separable aspects, when he suggests that ‘Mensch empfindet mit dem Verstande und spricht, in dem er denkt“243 (Is this really a view about ‘expression’?!). Similarly, there are varied understanding in Cassirer: he has used the ‘expression’ in an interjectionist sense244 in many places; one succinct formulation is found in his critique of Collingwood’s theory of Art as Expression, „Every gesture is no more an work of art than an interjection is an act of speech. Both the gesture and interjection are deficient in one essential and indispensable feature. They are involuntary and instinctive reactions; they possess no real spontaneity. The moment of purposiveness is necessary for linguistic and artistic expression.“245

But then what is the understanding of this second sense of expression, of expression in art, which is dependent upon the ‘form’? Cassirer is not clear about it than saying that it involves ‘purposiveness’.

The first section of the first part of the Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache begins with „Schon als Tier hat der Mensch Sprache (p. 5). Cf. „Die Sohnn des Waldes, der Jäger versteht die Stuimme des Hirsches und der Lappländer seines Renntiers - doch alles das folgt oder ist Ausnahme. Eigentlich ist diese Sprache der Natur eine Völkersprache für jede Gattung unter sich, und so hat der Mensch seinige“.,ibid. p. 7. 243 Ibid., p. 78. 244 Cf. chapter III of Cassirer, E., An Essay on Man, titled, ‘From Animal Reactions to Human Responses’ (cit. Cassirer 1992). 245 Cassirer, E., An Essay on Man, cit. Cassirer 1992, p. 142. 242

Following are some of the further themes which Herder connects with the theme of explaining language. (i) The fact of not instinct rootedness of human language implies that it is postrepresentational. (ii) The poetic language versus scientific language. (iii) The speciality of human emotion which again is post-represetational: that man perceives through his ‘Verstande’.

7.6

Universal History versus the Plurality of the Pasts

In this section I want to develop a question to be pursued in chapter 8: I want to develop this question by drawing out certain consequences of the internal logic of Cassirer’s own thesis, which he himself fails to draw because of the deep rooted assumptions fostered by the question why human beings have culture.

Cassirer’s thesis: „There exists not only a grammar of science, but in the same sense a grammar of art, and a grammar of mythical and religious thought. [...] this expression, of course, must be understood in a very wide and free sense. To grasp this sense we must cease to regard grammar as the arid thing we were taught in our school days. [...] we must [...] consider it as a study of living forms of thought ad expression.“ 246

If this is the case, then we must consider not merely particular area of thought of a particular culture as having a grammar, but also different cultures as having different grammars. That is, different cultures differentiate their environment differently and have different conceptions of domains and disciplines of study. Cassirer and many others could not conceive this only because they had implicitly the notion of an underlying common human nature that give expression to some fundamental divisions of their surroundings. But this is empirical hypothesis and need to argued by building an empirical theory of common human nature. One can not simply postulate the latter . On an empirical basis, one may be convinced that all human beings have hunger, and the corresponding activity of seeking and preparing food. But can they have such abstract activities as ‘religion’ in common? Is it plausible to believe this simply on the basis of our common constitution of biological and other needs?

It appears plausible only on the assumption of human being as a ‘Gattungwesen’ and therefore has a common history. The existence of such an assumption in case of Cassirer is confirmed by the fact that he explicitly mentions Hegel’s Philosophy of history and Phenomenology of Mind and brings it in relation with Warburg bringing the label 246

Cassirer, E. (1979), p. 76-77.

‘Mnemosysne’ at the door of his conceived Library, as the guiding principle of a certain division of human knowledge. Inherited human knowledge is ‘Erinnerung’ crystallised in books and library.247

7.7

An Addenda: The Rationality Debate

In order to show that the discussion so far is not merely that of historical interest, I want to briefly go into a recent discussion in the Philosophy of Anthropology, the so called Rationality debate that raged in the seventies and eighties. The main question that was discussed was the notion of ‘traditional thinking’ versus the ‘modern thinking’ on the one hand, and the question of rationality of magic in the so called ‘tribal’ or ‘traditional’ societies.

Central question: Are there standards of rationality which are valid across cultures? Against the claim that Zande notions of witchcraft are irrational (or at least less rational than Western beliefs), because they contradict each other, Peter Winch argued that Azande notions of witchcraft do not constitute a theoretical system in terms of which Azande try to gain a quasi-scientific understanding of the world. So, it is a misunderstanding to try to press Azande thought to a contradiction.248 Taylor says that the concept of rationality is not exhausted by ‘logical consistence’. Rationality is related to theoretical understanding and articulation. The demands of rationality are to go for theoretical understanding where this is possible249 Theoretical understanding aims at a disengaged perspective250 He then makes a distinction between theoretical and atheoretical cultures. Theoretical cultures „have this activity of theoretical understanding which seems to have no counterpart among them“ (i.e. a-theoretical cultures).251

Taylor goes on to compare certain practices (in this case magic and science & technology). „We can all too easily find analogies between primitive magical practices and some of our own, because they do overlap.“252

These practices are different, „yet they somehow occupy the same space“253

247 248 249 250 251 252 253

ibid. p. 79. ibid. p. 88. ibid. p. 80. ibid. p. 89. ibid. p. 89. ibid. p. 93; italics added. ibid. p. 98.

„The real challenge is to see the incommensurability, to come to understand how their range of possible activities, that is, the way in which they identify and distinguish activities, differs from us.“

From this Taylor concludes: „Really overcoming ethnocentricity is being able to understand two incommensurable classifications.“254

Incommensurable activities are rivals; they seem to raise the question insistently of who is right.255 „One set of practices can pose a challenge for an incommensurable interlocutor, not indeed in the language of the interlocutor, but in terms which the interlocutor cannot ignore, And out of this can arise any valid trans-cultural judgement of superiority.“256

Trans-cultural judgements of rationality between theoretical and a-theoretical cultures can be made. „They can arise precisely where there are incommensurabilities, such as between the set of beliefs underlying primitive magic [...] And modern science.“257

This is because: (i) Both lay out different features of the world and human actions in some perspicuous order.

(ii) In this, both are involved in the kind of activity central to rationality. (iii) One culture can lay claim to a higher/fuller/more effective rationality if it is in a position to achieve a more perspicuous order than another. Conclusion: At least in some respects theoretical cultures score successes which command the attention of a-theoretical ones and have invariably done so when they met.258

Hollies and Lukes have argued that all cultures share a common core of259 (i) true beliefs („statements which rational men cannot fail to believe in simple perceptual situations“); and (ii) rules of coherent judgement („simple inferences, relying, say on the law of noncontradiction“).260 This ‘common core’ covers „universal, context-independent criteria of truth and rationality, which all men recognise and are disposed to conform to.“261 This core 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261

ibid. p. 99. ibid. p. 100. ibid. p. 103; italics added. ibid. p. 104; italics added ibid. p. 104 Barnes/Bloor (in Hollies/Lukes, 21-47) ibid. p. 35 ibid. p. 35.

must a priori be assumed if the possibility of communication and understanding between distinct cultures is admitted. It makes translation possible. It is the basis upon which simple equivalences between two languages can be initially established so that the enterprise of translation can get off the ground.262 Against the common core postulate Barnes and Bloor argue that it fails „as soon as it is measured against the realities of language learning and anthropological practice“.263 The common core postulate hinges on the assumption that understanding another culture is a matter of translation. However, to understand an alien culture „the anthropologist can proceed in the way that native speakers do“.264 A child learns a language under guidance of culturally competent adults.265 Basically, when the child learns its language it learns how to apply concepts. (Concepts are „arrays of judgements of sameness“. From a slightly different perspective you can say that when the child learns a language, the particulars of its experience „are ordered into clusters and pattern specific to a culture“.266 Referring to Bulmer’s „why is the cassowary not a bird?“ Barnes and Bloor argue: Learning even the most elementary of terms is a process that involves the acquisition from the culture of specific conventions. This makes apparently simple empirical words no different from others that are perhaps more obviously culturally influenced. There are no privileged occasions for the use of terms - no ‘simple perceptual situations - which provide the researcher with ‘standard meanings’ uncomplicated by cultural variables.267 They conclude: no array in one culture can be unproblematically set into an identity with an array from another culture. Hence perfect translation cannot exist: there can only be translation acceptable for practical purposes, as judged by contingent, local standards.268

7.9

Clifford Geertz: Human Sciences as Purveyors of Local Knowledge

7.9.1 ‘Cultural Difference’ and ‘Local Knowledge’ For a casual reader our question, ‘what constitutes cultural difference?’ may appear to be the central focus of recent Anthropological literature. This chapter will examine whether this 262 263 264 265 266 267 268

ibid. p. 36. ibid. p. 36 ibid. p. 37 ibid. p. 37. ibid. p. 38; italics in original ibid. p. 38. ibid. p. 39.

impression is correct. While doing this, it will also attempt to identify the concerns and the characteristic themes of the Contemporary Anthropology, and thereby examine whether light can be thrown in the direction of our question. I select Clifford Geertz for this purpose and examine the role of his characteristic conception of ‘thick description’. The following is Geertz’s very influential definition of culture269, “an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic form by means of which men communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge about and attitude towards life.”270

It is interesting to compare this definition with the equally influential definition of a hundred years earlier given by E.B.Tyler. „Culture or civilisation, taken in its widest ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.“271

The behaviouristic and naturalistic tone of the definition of the 19th century has been transformed into an interpretative understanding of culture. This is another kind of taking in the first person view urged by the protagonists of Culture in the 19th century. But nevertheless culture is not exactly conceived as an educational ideal as those upholders of culture wanted. The confident naturalism of the third quarter of the 19th century has given place to more unsure and, ostensibly at least, to a tone moderated by sceptical attitude. 7.9.2 The ‘Thick Description’ This concept is borrowed from Ryle. He introduces this term in the context of denying that ‘mentality’ is something over and above what is inter-subjectively observable behaviour. Geertz uses it in order to deny that culture is any special object accessible only to the bearer of a ‘culture’. There is no need for any special access to mentality of the people whose culture is studied. Geertz retains the term, ‘meaning’ but suggests that meaning is available as a ‘public’ object as anything else.

One can approach the question of culture in two ways (a) in terms of method of presentation (b) in terms of the peculiarity of the object.

269

For the influence see, Shweder, R. A./ LeVine, R. (1984). Geertz C. (1973), reprinted (1993), p. 89. 271 Tyler, E.B. (1958). 270

‘Thick description’ is the main concept through which Geertz brings out his specific conception of both the object and the method of the discipline of Anthropology.

As object, ‘culture’ is something that involves thick description - i.e., specific forms of discourse are what constitute culture. The knowledge about such discourses can be made available only through a specific form of description - the ‘thick description’. In other words, both the object of Anthropology and the method of it involve a specific form of discourse, and the interaction between the two bring about a specific knowledge - the local knowledge

7.9.3 The themes: Anthropology with its specific institutional infra-structure like journals, specific methods and associations took birth sometime in the 20s and 30s of this century. The characteristic conceptions themselves are in reaction to some of the trends against the background of which the institutional rooting of the discipline of Anthropology took place.

Varying one of dictums of Harris about the language, we can say that ‘cultures vary indefinitely’ is one of the assumptions of Anthropology from the beginning of this century.

7.9.4 The Story of what Anthropology is 7.9.4.1 First version: ‘Seashell View’ of Anthropology as depicted by Ruth Benedict. The interest in stressing the multiplicity and variability of cultures has remained till now. Second there was the attitude of looking at the other cultures with a protective attitude to the peoples who were their field of study. In addition there was the idea of showing that Anthropology contributes to the great heritage of knowledge - the establishing of the museums, showing the vast variability and exotic and fantastic customs. The view of the people investigated was one of ahistorical self-enclosed communities.

7.9.4.2 Second version: Wolf’s World System Approach The situating of the supposed isolated communities in the midst of the history and showing that the losers and winners of the history are part and parcel of one and the same history. Anthropology thus becomes showing through snap shots the nodal points of societies constituted by web of relations. But in that case, what is it that is studied? Are there structures that can be identified as starting here and stopping there? In other words the famous question of what defines the boundaries of the society that is to be considered as the of the defining the limits of the ‘society’ that is the object of theoretical elaboration become urgent.

Geertz could brush aside these questions by focusing on the discourse rather than on the specific ‘society’. The interaction of discourses can be identified and sense of the interaction can be made clear through analysis and construction. This is the task of Anthropology.

Thus Geertz’s view is conceived against the background of the classical themes of Cultural Anthropology: It is conceived against the (a) the notion of uniformity of human nature. (b) the notion of ‘primitivity’, (c) the notion of ‘scientificity’. In arguing against these tendencies, a specific comparative method is espoused and the classical theme of ‘cultures vary indefinitely’ was given a new formulation. The question it need to answer is what is to be identified as culture? Older answer was customs, beliefs, rituals. Geertz’s use of the concept of ‘thick description’ also dispenses with a need to postulate a unchanging ‘essence’ - thus at one stroke denying the Enlightenment-Absolutist idea of human nature, or the Romantic-relativist notion of ‘primitivism’. The term ‘local knowledge’ is meant to oppose both a notion of global essence capturable in nomological model, and ‘local essence’ capturable through the access to special ‘meanings’ entertained by the bearers of a culture. The Anthropologist captures the variety of discourses that is necessary to deal with the situations.

However, one has to identify, hazily at least, the theme one is interested in - through some criterion of importance - and then see how the discourse concerning them vary variously. how, for example, the notion of morality and law, varies in different cultural fields. Cliffod Geertz elaborates Herder’s thesis that human being is an unfinished animal into thesis that to have a knowledge of man (i.e. the knowledge that the discipline of anthropology is supposed to deliver) one has to have the knowledge of specific ‘cultures’, what Geertz calls as the ‘local knowledge’.

But this thesis is again an answer to the question why human beings have culture?’ rather than to the question, what it is to investigate cultural difference.

-----------The Speciality of the West and the Problem of ‘Reason’

When contrast is made between modern and traditional society in terms of ‘rationality’ or ‘rationalisation’ it is not clear what the nature of the contrast is. Max Weber has a clear criterion - the existence of science versus the existence of myths. But this only transfers the unclarity to the terms of science and myth. Obviously the difference should not be conceived of in terms of specific theories, but two different ways of thinking scientific and mythical. In Weber, sometimes it appears that he means by myths one sort of belief as against sciences, which are of another sort. It is not clear whether these sorts are to be disinguished in terms of the way they have been arrived at or in terms of the content of these beliefs. If the latter, then they cannot be distinguished from two different theories. If the former, then there must be two ways of thinking or methods of thinking. But what is the criterion for these two different ways?

The contrast between myth and science is one of the favorite candidate resorted by those who want to assert and give an account of the speciality of the West. But the trouble is that the account functions only when it is taken as a theory of development of the general human thinking. Myth is a not yet developed form of thinking which when subjected to ‘rational standards’ falls well below the line. When it is taken out of such frameworks, the contrast begs the question: Is it meant to say that the one form of thinking, the scientific one, is subject to standards and the other, the mythical, is not? One can make this distinction by defining the terms in that manner, but then as an instrument of characterising the speciality of the West it is not very useful. Surely all the known societies have some notions of perfection and disciplines that are aspired for. Should we conceive that subjection of one’s conduct and thinking to evaluative standards is characteristic prevailing only in some societies?

Ryle tries to give an account of intellectuality - not meant to say only some societies have this and others not, but to give an account of a particular mode of thinking in contrast to others in daily life. We may call the ‘passion for reason’ or ‘perfection’ and this is how both Mathew Arnold and T.S.Eliot define ‘culture’. Ryle’s account of intellectuality is the following:

„A person’s thinking is subject to disciplines if, for example, he systematically takes precautions against personal bias, tries to improve the orderliness or clarity of his theory, checks his references, his dates or calculations, listens attentively to his critics, hunts industriously for exceptions to his generalisations, deletes ambiguous, vague or metaphorical expressions from the sinews of his arguments, and so on indefinitely. His thinking is controlled, in high or low degree, by a wide range of specific scruples ...(p. 431)

Now, at last we can begin to see more clearly than before how the ideas of rationality, reasonableness and reasons are internal to the notion of thinking that needs to be graded as intellectual work. For this thinking essentially embodies the element of self correction. Hunch, native sense of direction, following good examples, though indispensable, are no longer enough. The thinker cares, at least a

little bit, whether he gets things right or wrong; he at least slightly concerned to think properly.“ (Ryle, ‘A Rational Animal’ in CP vol. II, p. 432)

Ryle associates these ‘scruples’ with the disciplines of subjects such as history or science which are practised and passed on by special institutions. But this sense of ‘intellectuality’ does not help us to single out the speciality of the West in the required sense that science is characteristic of the West. At the most, it allows us to make empirical observations regarding the different degrees of prevalence of intellectuality in different communities: because of various historical contingencies at certain places and times, - which can now be termed as West - the people with intellectual standards predominate than in other places and times. This distinction is more in the nature of distinguishing a locality where more trained intelligentsia lives from another locality where the downtrodden live. This distinction is more a socio-economic distinction rather than a ‘cultural’ distinction.

Cassierer provides a criterion to distinguish the myth from science in terms of the different schematisations involved: one uses the spatial schematisation and another the temporal, and this has presumably the consequence of looking at something in terms of a rule and something in terms of a part-whole relationship. This may be interesting, but empirically useless, because it is difficult to identify a society where rules do not exist. Is it in terms of the rules being not formulated or rules not existing? The existence of rules in the context of teaching cannot be disputed. The very existence of grammar, and the elaborate rule system for rituals belies the assumption that traditional societies do not have temporal schematisation. Perhaps what is meant is not the general absence of rules, but their absence in the context of theories about nature. But then it comes to the existence of theory of nature as the demarcating feature of Western Society and not so much the existence of this or that form of thinking. Or is it approaching any phenomenon as nature that makes for the speciality of the West? The predominance of theoretical form of thinking in the sense of approaching everything as phenomenon - this is what it comes to.

Ryle’s association of ‘scruples’ with the disciplines of subjects such as history or science which are practised and passed on by special institutions links the disciplines, and thereby the ‘culture’ (in the sense of drive for perfection) with the ‘tradition’ - and this is what T.S.Eliot insists on. An attempt to bring something to perfection one does require a stable society over a long period of time.

The connection of the standards of judgement and the ‘tradition.’ Eliot’s essay on the relation between the individual and the Tradition. His conception of ‘impersonality theory of the poet’ and the notion of ‘tradition’

--------------The characterisation of man as a rational animal would mean he is human to the extent he frees himself from the confinement and binding arising out of the exercise of the sensecapacity. The interest in the way man has, and ought to, discipline or ‘sublimate’ the sensecapacity therefore becomes one of the special pre-occupation of the German tradition.272 When this interest gets tied to the evolutionary scheme, either structural or temporal, we have most of the sociological models for characterising different ‘societies’. Either different societies become the parts of the one universal human entity or they become different societies at different stages of the embodiement of the human essence. Of course, one of the pre-conditions for this to work is to conceive societies as self-enclosed, and conceive them as analogous to a biological organism, and development as a question of unrolling the essence of that ‘society’. The theoretical devices or subrefuge used for securing such conditions of identity of the investigated society is one of the interesting field for historical-cum-conceptual research.

------------

This along with the suggestion that human cognition is of the nature of ‘distinct thinking’ suggests that Herder intends to take a departure from the Cartesian dualism of the theory of knowledge: in the sense that different instances of experience can be brought under one unified concept. The ‘Empfindung’ and ‘Verstand’ are not two separate capacities - as act, it is ‘Empfindung’ as capacity it is Verstand. Similarly, thinking and speech are not two activities, but rather thinking is capacity, speech is act.

Similarly, language is conceived with the following three characteristics.273 (i) language is different aspects of the things (ii) Language as repetition of these aspects in experience (iii) language as the capacity to differentiate and order the things differentiated. ]

272

Kant stresses the disciplining view but Herder and Schiller, may be considered as holding to a sublimation view. 273 ibid p. 78 and 79.

The concept of symbolic form 1. „Das Entscheidende des Gegensatzes von Synthesis und Analysis liegt in der Hervorhebung einer Funktion der freien, konstruktiven Gestaltung des Inhalts im Unterschied zur bloßen nachträglichen Zergliederung eines Gegebenen. Diesen Begriff des ´Synthetischen´ aber hat Leibniz in seiner Lehre von der ´kausalen´Definition als Bedingung der Möglichkeit des Gegenstandes für die Mathematik entdeckt und gestaltet „(Cassirer 1962, 534).

2. „dasjenige, was nicht im Objekt (als dem ´Ding an sich´) vorgefunden wird, sondern vom Subjekt´selbst verrichtet´werden muß - aber diese Verrichtung erfolgt selbst nach einer allgemein gültigen Regel und besitzt demgemäß in ihrer Idealität zugleich realisierende Bedeutung. Indem der Einzelinhalt, kraft der sprachlichen Formgebung, nicht als solcher bezeichnet, sondern auf das Ganze der möglichen Inhalte bezogen und gemäß seiner Stellung in diesem Ganzen charakterisiert wird, wird er in dieser Beziehung auf die Einheit des denkenden Selbstbewußtseins auch erst nach seinem gegenständlichen Gehalt vollständig bestimmt“ (Cassirer 1923, 123f.).

3. „Wo die realistische Weltansicht sich bei irgendeiner letztgegebenen Beschaffenheit der Dinge, als der Grundlage für alles Erkennen beruhigt - da formt der Idelaismus eben die Beschaffenheit selbst zu einer Frage des Denkens um“ (Cassirer 1985a, 4).

4. „Da das ´Wirkliche´für uns, gemäß der idealistischen Einsicht, nicht anders als in diesen Funktionen zu erfassen ist, da Sprache und Mythos, Kunst und Religion, da methematisch-exakte und empirisch-beschreibende Erkenntnis für uns nur gleichsam verschiedene symbolische Formen sind, in denen wir die entscheidende Synthese von Geist und Welt vollziehen: so gibt es für uns ´Wahrheit´nur insofern, als wir jede dieser Formen in ihrer charakteristischen Eigenart begreifen und uns zugleich die Wechselbezüglichkeit vergegenwärtigen, in welcher sie mit allen anderen zusammenhängt. Will man die Darstellung dieser Zusammenhänge noch unter dem Begriff der Érkenntnistheorie´befassen, so nimmt docg jetzt dieser Begriff einen weiteren und umfassenderen Sinn an. Denn jetzt handelt es sich nicht nur uzm die Theorie und Methodik des wissenschaftlichen Denkens, sondern um den Versuch eines Überblicks über alle Mittel und Wege, vermöge deren sich uns die Wirklichkeit überhaupt zu einem bedeutungs- und sinnvollen Ganzen, zu einem geistigen Kosmos gestaltet“ (Cassirer 1989b, 69f.).

5.

„Unter einer symbolischen Form´soll jede Energie des Geistes verstanden werden, durch welche ein geistiger Bedeutungsgehalt an ein korrektes sinnliches Zeichen innerlich zugeeignet wird. In diesem Sinne tritt uns die Sprache, tritt uns die mythisch-religiöse Welt und die Kunst als je eine besondere symbolische Form entgegen. Denn in ihnen allen prägt sich das Grundphänomen aus, daß unser Bewußtsein sich nicht damit begnügt, den Eindruck des Äußeren zu empfangen, sondern daß es jeden Eindruck mit einer freien Tätigkeit des Ausdrucks verknüpft und durchdringt“ (Cassirer 1983c, 175).

II-1. „der Philosophie der Kultur, solche Grundzüge zu erfassen und sichtbar zu machen, so hat sie damit ihre Aufgabe, gegenüber der Vielheit der Äußerungen des Geistes die Einheit seines Wesens zu erweisen, in einem neuen Sinne erfüllt - denn diese letztere erweist sich darin am deutlichsten, daß die Mannigfaltigkeit seiner Produkte der Einheit seines Produzierens keinen Eintrag tut, sondern sie vielmehr erst bewährt und bestätigt“ (Cassirer 1985a, 51f).

II-2. „Die Philosophie der symbolischen Formen will keine Metaphysik der Erkenntnis, sondern eine Phaenomenologie der Erkenntnis sein. Sie nimmt dabei das Wort ´Erkenntnis´ im weitesten und umfassendsten Sinne. Sie versteht darunter nicht nur den Akte des wissenschaftlichen Begreifens und des theoretischen Erklärens, sondern jede geistige Tätigkeit, in der wir uns eine ´Welt´in ihrer charakteristischen Gestaltung, in ihrer Ordnung und in ihrem ´So-Sein´, aufbauen (Cassirer 1983b, 208).

II-3. „die nicht in ´mir´besteht, sondern die allen Subjekten zugänglich sein und an der sie alle teilhaben sollen. Aber die Form dieser Teilhabe ist eine völlig andere als in der ohysischen Welt. Statt sich auf denselben raum-zeitlichen Kosmos von Dingen zu beziehen, finden und vereinigen sich die Subjekte in einem gemeinsamen Tun. Indem sie dieses Tun miteinander vollziehen, erkennen sie einander und wissen sie voneinander im Medium der verschiedenen Formwelten, aus denen sich die Kultur aufbaut“ (Cassirer 1980b, 75).

III-1 (Herder) „Die Einheit des Bewußtseins ist nach Leibniz nur durch die des geistigen Tuns, nur durch die Einheit der Verknüpfung möglich, in der der Geist sich selbst als beharrliche und identische Monas erfaßt und in der er ferner ein und denselben Inhalt, wenn er ihm zu verschiedenen Zeiten entgegentritt, als ein und dasselbe Wesen wiedererkennt. Diese Form des ´Wiedererkennens´ ist es,

die bei Leibniz als ´Apperzeption´, bei Herder als ´Reflexion´, bei Kant als ´Synthesis der Rekognition´gefaßt wird“ (Cassirer 1985a, 96).

IV-1 A difference between ´real´and ´possible´exists neither for the being below man nor for those above him. The beings below man are confined within the world of their sense perceptions. They are susceptible to actual physical stimuli and react to these stimuli. But they can form no idea of ´possible´things. On the other hand the superhuman intellect, the divine mind, knows no distinction between reality and possibility“ (Cassirer 1990, 92 / 1944, 56).

-2 „Das ´Ist´der Kopula ist die reinste und prägnanteste Ausprägung für diese neue Dimension der Sprache, die man - mit einem Terminus, den Bühler im Anschluß an Husserl eingeführt hat - als ihre Darstellungsfunktion beschreiben kann“ (Cassirer 1985c, 10).

-3 „Die Form des sprachlichen Denkens und die Form des Werkzeug-Denkens scheinen hier nahe miteinander verknüpft und aufeinander angewiesen zu sein. In der Sprache wie im Werkzeug erobert sich der Mensch die neue Grundrichtung des ´mittelbaren´Verhaltens, die ihm spezifischeigentümlich ist. Er wird jetzt in seiner Vorstellung der Welt wie in seinem Wirken auf sie von dem Zwang des sinnlichen Triebes und des nächsten Bedürfnisses frei. An Stelle des direkten Zugreifens bilden sich jetzt neue und andere Arten der Aneignung, der theoretischen und praktischen Beherrschung aus: der Weg vom ´Greifen´zum ´Begreifen´ist beschritten. Es scheint, als wäre der aphasische und apraktische Kranke auf diesem Wege, den die Menschheit sich langsam und stetig bahnen mußte, um eine Stufe zurückgeworfen. Alles bloß Mittelbare ist ihm irgendwie unverständlich geworden; alles nicht Handgreifliche, nicht direkt-Daseiende entzieht sich seinem Denken wie seinem Wollen. Wenn er das ´Wirkliche´, das konkret-Vorliegende und das augenblicklich ´Nötige´noch zu erfassen und im allgemeinen richtig zu behandeln vermag, so fehlt ihm doch der geistige Fernblick, die Sicht auf das nicht vor Augen liegende, auf das bloß ´Mögliche´“ (Cassirer 1982, 324).

-4 „Aber in dem Maße als die wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis fortschreitet und als sie sich ihre eigenen methodischen Werkzeuge schafft, lockert sich mehr und mehr das Band, das den Begriff unmittelbar mit der Anschauung verbindet. Er bleibt nicht mehr an die ´Wirklichkeit´der Dinge gebunden, sondern erhebt sich zur freien Konstruktion des ´Möglichen´. Was sich nie und nirgend hat begeben - gerade dies zieht er in den Kreis der Betrachtung und stellt es als Norm und gedanklichen Maßstab auf. Eben dieser Zug ist es, der die Theorie, im strengen Sinne des Wortes, von der bloßen Anschauung trennt. Sie vollendet sich als reine Theorie erst, indem sie die

Schranken der Anschauung durchbricht. Keine Theorie, insbesondere keine exakte, keine mathematische Theorie des Naturgeschehens ist möglich, ohne daß sich das reine Denken vom Mutterboden der Anschauung loslöst, ohne daß es zu Gebilden fortgeht, die prinzipiell unanschaulicher Natur sind“ (Cassirer 1982, 372).

-5 „Looking back at our general analysis of myth, language and art, we may perhaps be tempted to condense the results of this analysis in a short formula. We may say that what we find in myth is imaginative objectification, the art is a process of intuitive or contemplative objectification, that language and science are conceptual objectifications“ (Cassirer 1979a, 187).

7

The Creations of the Unfinished Animal: The Human World Myths, Sciences and other Wonders of the Earthy Angel

7.1

The German Tradition: the ‘Humanisation’ and the ‘Grundlegung’

In the field of culture theory it is possible to identify a characteristic German stream. Though including such varied thinkers as Herder, Kant, Hegel, Dilthey, Marx and Weber, still there is a certain flavour in the questions they ask that unites them. It is sometimes traced back to the influence of the German idealism, and sometimes to the specific hermeneutic approach. Though both the suggestions have much to commend about them, my suggestion is to look at this phenomena by situating it within the context of the narrative of this book, that of secularising the theological assumptions underlying the world of objects and customs. Which could be the thread binding the varied pre-occupations of this diverse group of individuals? In raising this question I am not presaging a detailed discussion of these thinkers; for my concern is not with the subtleties of the answers they gave but to isolate the characteristic category habit if any that inform the questions they have asked.

We saw in the second chapter that Mill in effect identified the contribution of the German school of his time with ‘evolutionism’ This is a very perceptive judgement both in its reading of the German philosophy of the time and in its identification of the theme of significance for the social sciences: the evolutionism was to have a far more wide ranging influence on the human sciences than Mill could imagine at the time of his writing, and it is still refreshed from time to time for new theoretical applications and endeavour. But, as must have become clear through the elucidation of Kant’s Naturgeschichte in the last chapter, evolutionism was derived from the thesis that human being is a species being (Gattungswesen) and the corresponding view that there is a need for humanisation of the human animal before the proper human form of life can begin. This last, in its turn, is built on the notion of man occupying the middle space between the heaven and the earth, i.e. sharing the angelic nature of being intelligible and the animal nature of being sensible.

Thus my suggestion is to identify the characteristic contribution of the German tradition with the influential theme in the thinking on culture that man differs from animals to the extent he has emancipated from his sensible nature either by ‘transcending’ it or ‘sublimating’ it. The

contributions to the philosophy of culture by the ‘German School’ that Mill commended274 is a derivative of this theme, and it can be considered as the main stay of the German tradition from Kant onwards: Hegel’s story of ascension of man to freedom, Marx’s story of primitivism through capitalism to the future communism, Weber’s story of modernisation, the efforts of Neo-Kantianism as well as that of the philosophical Anthropology at ‘Grundlegung’ of the sciences through rooting them in the speciality of the human nature, and Cassirer’s story of humanisation of the world through the symbolic forms - all owe to a contrast between the sensible and the intelligible on the one hand, and the need for a transformation of the former through the latter for the human form of life, on the other.

A much more detailed and richer story can be told than I have done of the transformation of the notion of ‘humanisation of individuals through education’ into a notion of ‘the humanisation of the human race’ as found in Kant and the subsequent German philosophy of history. Equally richer narration is possible of my next cursory glance at the field opened up by the Kantian tenet that the world we live in is humanised. The focus in the following is confined to identifying the motivating question of a tradition rather than going into the subtleties involved in answering it.

Perhaps we can begin by reflecting on the characteristic German word ‘Grundlegung’ which is used to speak about launching a research question or a discipline. Though it can be translated as ‘laying the foundations’ and in this idiom can lay claim to a tradition going back to Descartes and Hobbes, such a translation misses thereby the characteristic Kantian flavour of the German term. Surrounding the notion of ‘Grundlegung’ are the implication threads associated with the tenet that the world is open to different forms of apprehension, and correspondingly it is ‘humanised’ in different ways. Thus ‘Grundlegung’ is connected with the assumption that to lay foundation to a specific field of activity or specific field of studies is to provide for, or to show, the (logical) conditions of its possibility.

Further, underlying that assumption is the notion of ‘natural reason’, the emergence of which was traced back in section 5.3 to a transference of the anchorage of the context-invariance of knowledge from the Aristotelian category of nature (because of its elimination through the advent of maker God) to the speciality of human nature as delineated by Aquinas. The tenet that the world we live is a humanised world is a consequence of the formulation the notion of ‘natural reason’ received in the hands of Kant: it started a mode of philosophical study seeking the unity of the world, not in the nature of it, but in that of its human maker, the way 274

See chapter 2 and section 3.3.

or ways the apriori forms of making the world cohere in human nature. Thus it delineated a philosophical task of seeking the underlying apriori forms that make different human activities possible.

This also opens one’s horizon of interests: one gets interested, for example, not merely in the way man makes the world in science, legal institutions and Christian theology, but also in myths, which were originally supposed to be the pre-Christian form of religiously coloured world view. Thus, Schelling, Cassirer and Jaspers were interested in the nature of ‘mythical language’ and its relation to philosophy and science (i.e. to see the relation between ‘mythos’ and ‘logos’). Perhaps the conceptual interest in ethnography on the one hand, and artistic expression on the other - both started off their career in the central European tradition275 owes to this opening up of the new horizon of interests by the Kantian theme of the ways of making the world.

7.2

The Human Animal and its Angelic Faculty

To recall what was said in the section 3.4.2: most of the distinctions that were to later become prominent in the philosophical tradition while thinking about human affairs were identified there in a passage from Aristotle276; I summed up the thrust of the passage as the thesis that both speech and other human institutions (polis), though belong to the category of made, nevertheless the process of their making is a process of an actualisation of a nature of man. This thesis is developed by Kant and the German philosophy of history into a theory of the human institutions in the altered logical landscape of the concepts inherited from the medieval mediation of Aristotle. This means effectively a combination of two themes: (i) a theme of the agency not located in the form but in the bearer of the forms - in the context of human institutions, effectively, in the man, the maker; (ii) a theme of the contrast between the sensibility and intelligibility, and the man being the intelligible being.

As far as the first theme is concerned, I indicated the perceived task in the last chapter while discussing Kant’s Naturgeschichte: there is the task of accounting for human being as the product of nature and history even while considering him the maker of that history or

275

See Ernest Gellner on the central European roots of even the English Cultural Anthropology: Gellner, E. (1995), p. 74-80. 276 Cf. Aristotle, cit. 1995, Politics, bk. I, 1253a 5-20.

tradition:277 how to conceive agency in such a way that it reconciles to the removal of its location away from the Aristotelian form (or away from the Aristotelian self-generating physis), without however transferring it either to the individual maker or to a transcendent Creator, but simultaneously recognising a sort of a role of agency to the individual? As discussed in chapter 6 Kant attempts to solve this problem by bringing the other theme into picture: he interprets man’s intelligible nature as being equivalent to his being a species-being (Gattungswesen), and the individuals being human to the extent they participate in the process of this species being unrolling itself all its capacities, i.e. in the process of its developing into a community of moral individuals living in an ‘outer’ constitutional State of liberal order and an ‘inner state’ of obeying the Moral Law.278 This story of ascension of man from necessity to freedom, from his animal sensible nature to a state of being governed by his intelligible nature, is what unites Kant, the German philosophy of history and the later transformation of it into the sociological models of modernisation in the hands of Weber and Talcot Parsoms.279 Apart from its relevance to the contrast dealt with while considering Kant’s Naturgeschichte, that of ‘self-regulating’ individuals versus ‘nature-bound’ humans, the question of agency pertains more to the domain of the philosophy of history than to the field of culture theory. Therefore in this chapter I will not focus on the aspect of agency in the blending effected by the German tradition of the two themes.

The other theme is both more conspicuous and more basic, conspicuous in its influence in shaping the concepts to talk about culture; more basic in that it constituted the terms of formulating the strategy of solving the problem of agency, thus giving rise to the plot of the story of man’s ascension from the realm of necessity to that of freedom. The German tradition brought the assumption that sense-knowledge is context bound and intellectual knowledge is context free (as delineated in 5.3) to bear upon the characterisation of human nature. Translated from a characterisation of the nature of two sorts of knowledge to a characterisation of two sorts of capacities existing in human beings, it would mean that the exercise of the sense capacity binds one to the context and the exercise of the capacity for intellection frees one from the context. A lot of discussion in the theory of culture is a variation of this theme. I will illustrate this by following up one strand, the mythical versus

Cf. the conception of ‘Naturgeschichte’ in the previous chapter and also Marx’s assertion that man makes history but in circumastances that he himself has not made. 278 See sections 6.5.3 and 6.5.4. 279 Cf. Parsons, T. (1971). 277

scientific form of thinking, and the corresponding characterisation of the ‘traditional societies’ as closed and the ‘modern societies’ as open.

If the exercise of the sense capacity binds one to the context and the exercise of the capacity for intellection frees one from it, then the characterisation of man as a rational animal would mean that he is human to the extent he frees himself from the confinement and binding arising out of the exercise of the sense-capacity. The interest in the way man has, and ought to, discipline or ‘sublimate’ the sense-capacity or/and the way the nature (Kant’s picture of her as a stern teacher referred to in the last chapter) disciplines him to bring about his real destiny to come to the forefront, can thus becomes one line of pre-occupation.280 When this interest gets tied to the evolutionary scheme, either structural or temporal, it yields most of the sociological models available now for characterising different ‘societies’. Of course, one of the pre-conditions for such models to work is to conceive societies as self-enclosed, and conceive them as analogous to a biological organisms, and development as a question of unrolling the essence of that ‘society’. The theoretical devices or subterfuge used for securing such conditions of identity of the investigated society is one of the interesting field for historical-cum-conceptual research. I will however confine myself to the conceptual undergrid rather than the thickets of over-growth, wherein to find the pathways and byways could be a laborious, though perhaps an enticing venture of rambling around.

In short, the German tradition drew a twofold contrast between the nature of the capacity or faculty of reason and the sense-capacity or the faculty of sensing: the latter is a capacity to get affected and its exercise is context bound; the former is spontaneous, i.e. an active capacity, and its exercise transcends the confinement of the context. A paradigmatic example of the way this contrast gets worked out as a theory of culture is provided by the way Herder develops the thesis presaged in Aristotle’s Politics that both speech and polis are rooted in a faculty that singles out man from animals.

7.3

Herder: The ‘Instinctless Animal’ and its Special Faculty

7.3.1

Language, the Prototype and the Centre of Human Institutions

280

Kant stresses, at least when it comes to speaking about education, the disciplining view; Herder and Schiller may be considered as holding to a sublimation view. How exactly the notion of ‘sublimation’ has to be understood, and how it differs from ‘disciplining’ is an interesting question in itself, and worth a separate investigation.

One consequence that may be drawn from the Aristotelian passage is that a theory of language is identical with a theory of human institutions. Herder’s Ursprung der Sprache draws this consequence and develops Aristotle’s idea from Politics into such a theory. The underlying idea of Herder is that if we can identify the specificity of human language and its development then we have also a key to answer the question why human beings have culture and how it develops.281 Of course, in this understanding, unlike for many currents of linguistics today, the language is not merely a system of (syntactic) rules. Rather, it is like the ‘Langage’ of Saussure, a totality of human inherited resource for thinking and orienting in the world.

In fact, for Herder to have language, to have culture and to be human are synonymous. For, his programme is to demonstrate the necessity of the origin of language in human beings by showing that there cannot be human thinking or apprehension (Verständnishandlung) without ‘marker sign’ (Merkwort), i.e. a mnemonic aid that does not depend on the vivid memory of the situation remembered. The strategy he adopts to execute this programme is to show that man, not being gifted with any marked sense-capacity, can and has to develop a substitute sixth sense to be able to function. In the above formulation, the ‘can’ is equally important as the ‘has to’: as we will see there are two influential readings of Herder the difference of which depend crucially upon how much stress is laid on ‘can’ in the above formulation. It determines the status of this sixth sense - whether it is an expression of a mere deficiency of ‘instincts’ or or an extra faculty that only human being is gifted with. This sixth sense, to which Herder invents the word ‘Besonnenheit’, is conceived as synonymous with both ‘human understanding’ and the ‘language ability’. The outward expression of it is the Merkwort. Not merely the language but also all other human institutions such as family and community, as well as the traditions that bind the individual across the generations, in short, all those expressions that single out human form of life from that of the animals are traced back to the Besonnenheit. „Wenn Verstand und Besonnenheit die Naturgabe seiner Gattung ist, so mußte dies sich sogleich äußern, da sich die schwächere Sinnlichkeit und alle das Klägliche seiner Entbehrungen äußerte. Das instinktlose, elende Geschöpf, [...] das sich selbst helfen sollte und nicht anders als könnte. Alle 281

This last is the assumption, and in fact almost the formulation of Cassirer. Cf. Cassirer, E. (1979).

Mängel und Bedürfnisse als Tier waren dringende Anlässe, sich mit allen Kräften als Mensch zu zeigen; sowie diese Kräfte der Menschheit nicht etwa bloß schwache Schadloshaltungen gegen die ihm versagten größeren Tier-Vollkommenheiten waren, [...] sondern sie waren ohne Vergleichung und eigentliche Gegeneinandermessung seine Art! Der Mittelpunkt seiner Schwere, die Hauptrichtung seiner Seelenwirkungen fiel so auf diesen Verstand, auf menschliche Besonnenheit hin, wie bei der Biene sogleich aufs Saugen und Bauen, Wenn es nun bewiesen ist, daß nicht die mindeste Handlung seines Verstandes ohne Merkwort geschehen konnte, so war auch das erste Moment der Besinnung Moment zu innerer Entstehung der Sprache.“282

This passage when compared with the pssage quoted from Politics in the section 3.4.2 would provide one more evidence to corroborate the suggestion put forward in the section 5.2 that there is a continuing thread running from Aristotle’s Politics to the present day culture theory using identical distinctions, and very often even identical examples, like in this case, the contrast of the activity of bees with that of the human beings, to make the point that human capacity for communication as well as for making the artefacts is different from that of the animals. To come back to Herder’s thesis, the Merkwort, and Besonnenheit of which it is an expression are, on the one hand, the inverse aspect of man being weak in his instincts or sense capacity, but on the other hand, they are what make a human animal into a human being, and they constitute the logical pre-conditions of every human institution. In the next few sections I will elucidate and elaborate this thesis in a little more deatil.

7.3.2

A Not Sense-bound Species and the Besonnenheit

The specificity of human language is traced back by Herder to the ability to change the attention from one focus to another in the field of perception. This ability to turn away from the presence or the ‘immediacy’ of the sensible is what ‘Besonnenheit’ is. This term can only be very weakly translated as ‘reflective capacity’, for Herder’s term also conveys the nuances such as ‘moderation’ and ‘drawing back’ which the word ‘reflection’ in English is not directly associated with. Nevertheless, even though they do not catch all the nuances of the German original, I will use here onwards ‘reflective capacity’ and ‘reflection’ to translate Herder’s ‘Besonnenheit’ and the exercise of the Besonnenheit. The exercise of the reflective capacity is described as ‘sich freidenkende Tätigkeit’, ‘the activity of freely thinking’ which

282

Cf. Herder, J.G. (1772, cit. 1981) p. 81.

can only be understood as a contrast to the cognition when sense capacity is exercised. This latter, as already mentioned earlier, is supposed to bind one to the context. It is not merely that the term ‘Besonnenheit’ is given sense by Herder in a contrastive fashion; he also conceives the existence of reflective capacity in human beings as an inverse aspect of their not being equipped with better sense-capabilities or instincts. (As already indicated in the section 4.6, from the time of Aquinas the sense-capacity, the capacity for ‘natural inclination’ and ‘instinct’ are identified as the same. Thus in Herder ‘sense-capacity’ and ‘having instincts’ are used synonymously.) This has led to a reading into Herder an empirical biological thesis about human species which gives a biological rooting of the human institutions: man is deficient in instincts and consequently he has compensated for it by developing special features; social institutions are one such special compensatory development. Though this thesis put forward by Gehlen may be an interesting thesis by itself, its attribution to Herder is problematic.283 For, even though Herder does draw out various features that single out human beings as being a consequence from the idea that man is not bound to the sensible or ‘sense-content’ of experience, he couples this with the Aristotelian assumption that nature does not endow something without purpose. How to give an empirical content to this dictum that nature does not duplicate and therefore it has made human being capable of reflection by compensating for the capacity withheld from him, the capacity of stronger instincts? However, it is true that in Herder’s thinking a close conceptual connection does exist between man being not bound by the ‘sensible’ content and he being an intelligible being. He draws out the various characteristics that single out human beings as a consequence of his being endowed in such way that there is less capability pertaining to his senses when compared to other animals. He, unlike other animals, is not equipped with appropriate sorts of sensecapacities for discerning the dangers haunting in the environment. Consequently, again unlike in the case of other animals, there is no species-specific natural environment for man to which he is well-adapted, that would make him unsuitable for living in other environments; thus any natural environment is equally suited or unsuited for him. 7.3.3 ‘Merkwort’: ‘Clear’ versus ‘Distinct’ Thinking

283

Cf. Section 9 in the introductory chapter, in: Gehlen, A. (1972).

Similarly, the need to recognise the dangers without being equipped with the sharpness of senses results in the development of a memory form that is not sense-bound, in contrast to that memory of the animals which is sense-bound. To express this Herder uses a classical pair of contrastive terms, ‘distinct’ (‘deutlich’) versus ‘clear’ (‘klar’), a contrast familiar to us from the theory of definitions: defining the term by providing examples is providing a definition that fulfils the condition of being ‘clear’; defining it through providing rules for connecting its implication threads is fulfilling the condition of being distinct. Thus, according to Herder, human orientation is more through being equipped with rules for moving from one situation to another rather than through situations being impressed in memory. Consequently the human language is the medium, or rather the embodiment of a ‘distinct’ rather than that of a ‘clear’ memory. Herder’s formulation of this thesis is to say that the human understanding depends upon the ‘Merkwort’ which in turn is explained by mentioning three contrasts with regard to the conceptual pair ‘clear’ and ‘distinct thinking’. First, the clear thinking is sensible memory („sinnliches Gedächtnis“) and distinct thinking is not dependent on sense bound memory. Secondly, the distinct thinking generalises the experience, thereby making an experience available for others and usable by them, thus making it possible to use the experience of one to improve the living conditions of the species284. Thirdly, whereas the clear thinking is a manifold without a discernible unity285, the distinct thinking orders the manifold of experience into a distinct unity. In human being even in the state of utmost sense awareness (sinnlichster Zustand) the reflective awareness (Besonnenheit) governs.286 We can say that the capacity to think distinctly is conceived as a capacity to grasp the events in terms of concepts, thereby the experiences of the past and the possible experiences in future can be bound together. 7.3.4 The ‘Instinct’ versus the Creations of the ‘Unfinished Animal’

284

ibid. Cf. p. 75. cf. „ein Traum sehr sinnlicher klarer, lebhafter Vorstellungen, ohne ein Haupgesetz des hellen Wachens, das diesen Traum ordnet“, ibid. p. 76. 286 „Beim Menschen waltet die Besonnenheit selbst im sinnlichsten Zustande“, ibid. p.76. 285

This characteristic of dependence on the ‘distinct’ memory, and more generally, on the distinct mode of thinking’ in contrast to the clear mode of thinking to which animals due to their sensible nature are confined to, has two consequences for the human animal: (i) it necessitates the development of a form of learning that is not based on senseexperience. (ii) dependence on a mode of thinking that is dependent on learning rather than the senseequipment gifted along with the birth, makes the human animal in need of care by others in his infancy, and instruction by others for getting equipped for life. Thus it lays the basis for the bindings of family and community.

Human being can and has to develop a generalised form of learning, i.e. a learning that is not specific to specific contexts. This in turn has two further consequences: First, the human capacities are predominantly the learnt capacities, and secondly, a non-context-bound nature of the learning makes it both possible and useful to transmit it across the generations.

Human capacities being the learnt capacities has another further feature: learning and perfectioning in human beings has no end to it. „Das unwissendste Geschöpf, wenn es auf die Welt kommt, aber sogleich Lehrling der Natur, auf eine Weise wie kein Tier.“287 „Im ganzen Universum gleichsam allein; an nichts geheftet und für alles da, durch nichts gesichert, und durch sich selbst noch minder, muß der Mensch entweder unterliegen oder über alles herrschen, mit Plan einer Weisheit, deren kein Tier fähig ist, von allem deutlichen Besitz nehmen oder umkommen.“288

Whereas the animals remain from the beginning to end with almost an unchanged fund of capacities, human beings develop their capacities till the end of their life. Thus human being has a constitutive unfinishedness and a necessity to learn. This fact connects the characteristic of the ‘activity of freely thinking’ (freidenkende Tätigkeit) with the other specific human characteristic, that of unfolding of his powers in the snow-balling type of progression (‘sich seine Kräfte in Progression fortwirken’), both at an individual level and at a species level. Reminiscent of what we have come across in Kant - human animal is human to the extent he participates in the historical process of species getting enlightened - Herder too asserts that the essential aspect of our being is not the enjoyment but progression: „Das Wesentliche unseres Lebens ist nie Genuß, sondern immer Progression, und wir sind nie Menschen gewesen, bis wir zu Ende gelebt haben; dahingegen die Biene Biene war, als sie ihre erste Zelle baute.“ 287 288

ibid. p. 84. ibid. p.79.

This continuous perfection of the capacities is rooted in the Besonnenheit or reflection. That does not mean that every human action is a reflectively carried action. It only means that the ability is developed through reflection.

The other consequence, the possibility to transmit the experience across the generations gives rise to traditions. Thus language, the embodiment of the distinct mode of memory (as against clear mode, as elucidated earlier), is also the embodiment of traditions, and the binding element that creates communities and ‘Nations’289.

7.3.5

The Critique of Utility as the Root of Language and Society

This possibility of traditions is also connected with the necessity of them. Human infant which depends for its equipment on learning, that too on a learning not based on the individual sense-equipment, makes man an animal in need of care by others in his infancy.

Herder draws attention to the empirical fact that the human infant both depend on the care of the parents and community, and does get such a care; this disproves the Hobbesian and utilitarian thesis regarding the natrure and possibility of human institutions based on the selfinterest. If utilitarians were correct, it should be that human beings develop an interest in the infant out of the utiltity which may accrue out of it. Man being capable of more calculation than the animals, he should be having more callous attitude towards the laborious task of upbringing which hardly has tangible benefits for him. He must be having less emotions than the animals. But in fact the contrary is the case. The utility theory would make the human being to be just careless to their children. But the opposite is the empirical fact.

It is not the instinctual endowment that brings the human animal to develop the care and emotional bond towards its community, but rather the other way round: the lack of instincts make humans depend on the parental care, and this gives rise to the bonds of family and community, and the very nature of man being a social animal. „Und so weiß auch im Ganzen des Geschlechts die Natur aus der Schwachheit Stärke zu machen. Eben deswegen kommt der Mensch so schwach, so dürftig, so verlassen von dem Unterricht der Natur, so ganz ohne Fertigkeiten und Talente auf die Welt, wie kein Tier, damit er, wie kein Tier,

The word ‘Nation’ is used in Herder in the sense of a community that is bound by the tradtions embodied in language. The idea of nation as an ethnic entity, though perhaps derivable from some of his utterances - especially because of the centrality of the family in the conception of the community, is not explicitly conceived. Similarly, the notion of ‘Nation State’ is not traceable to Herder. 289

eine Erziehung genieße und das menschliche Geschlecht, wie kein Tiergeschlecht, ein innigverbundenes Ganze werde!“290

Nature has made man such a creature that to him the binding through instruction and teaching is essential.291 This makes language, the outer expression of the special faculty of the instinctless animal, simultaneously the embodiment of the familial memory and bonds.

Dependence on such bonds is simultaneously the root of there being the differences between customs and languages and thus giving rise to antagonisms and rivalries, as well as communities and ‘national feelings’.

As pointed out earlier, human being is not adapted to any particular natural environment as a consequence of his having no particularised and well developed sense-capacity. This makes his binding not to that of a territory but to that of the communities the focal point of which is the traditions learnt in the laps of his parents and the community surrounding them. Both the sociality and the differences between human groups are not ‘naturwüchsig’292 i.e. they are not out-growths of the ‘natural man’, but yet they are connected with human nature: they are connected with the nature of man being other than that of an inchoately feeling type of animal293, thus making him require the Merkwort for his memory and learning.

Once such a device is there it has its own logic: the memories and thoughts take shape as words and they travel from mother or father to son or daughter, binding in the process one generation to the next, and thus becomoing the traditions of this and not that community. Thus it sows the seeds of the differences which make the antagonism, competition between the groups as well as co-operation between them, both possible and necessary. Necessary, because only through such antagonism, as also Kant suggests294, the groups develop their capacities by rivalry and a co-operate based on the goods (both of a material and of a cognitive sort) deficient in each others possession.

290

ibid. p. 96-97. Cf. „Natur hat den Menschen durch Not und Elterntrieb zu einem Wesen gemacht, dem das Band des Unterrichts und der Erziehung wesentlich ist.“ ibid. P.97. 292 see 4th Naturgesetz, cf. Herder, J.G. (1772, cit. 1981). 293 „Der Mensch ist nicht bloß eine dunkel fühlende Auster“, see ibid. p. 77. 294 But see for the difference between Kant and Herder in the section 7.3.5. 291

Thus the nature of family, of education, of sociality of man, and the constitution of the individual through dialogue and tradition, all are traceable to a faculty that stays in an inverse relation to the fact of human Instinktlosigkeit.

7.3.6

Human Institutions: Creations of a Special or a Deficient Animal?

Max Scheler uses the term ‘weltoffen’ to refer to the nature of man arising from his not being bound to the ‘sensible’. This term signals a competing reading of Herder to that of Gehlen: arising out of the assumption that man is not sense-bound we have two formulations in the 20th century philosophical anthropology. (i) Man is a deficient being (Mängelwesen). i.e. he is deficient of those things needed to survive in the natural world, and therefore he has to compensate those deficiencies through developing special strategies. Human institutions including language are the results of this compensatory developments. (ii) Man is characterised by a special faculty (Ausstattungswesen), reason, which singles him out from the whole of animal kingdom, and it is through this special endowment man shows his speciality of his institutions. Both these formulations historically derive inspiration from Herder. Whereas the second retains the theological component, the first attempts at deriving from Herder an emprical biological thesis, but nevertheless retaining the notions of ‘reason’ and ‘progress’. It is an interesting case for study of what dangers lay in store when theological doctrines are transformed into scientifc theories without them being purged of normative functions and regulative claims.

As already mentioned, Herder specifically makes use of the Aristotelian slogan that nature is economical and does not do anything without a purpose. This would bring him nearer to Scheler, and make his thesis more akin to the assertion that man has a special endowment rather than that man is a deficient being. Nevertheless, it is important to note the close link that exists for him between the lack of natural ‘instincts, i.e. the lack of the binding force of the sense-capacity, and the ‘reflection’ (‘Besonnenheit’) in the human animal.

7.3.7

‘Individualism’ versus ‘Communitarianism’: a Historical Footnote

Perhaps this is a place to add a note on the difference between Kant and Herder and the essential continuity of their difference in the present day debate between two conceptions of the liberal democracy. The difference centres around the role of antagonism and perhaps

much more basically about the way the earthy feature of the sensible in the nature of man need to be transformed. Kant and Herder share the distrust against the atomic individualism since both consider it as conceiving human being only in terms of his animal nature. But Herder distrusts the cosmopolitanism based upon the Kantian view of the emanicpation from the sensibility as both the task and the origin of human institutions.

Kant’s theory of ‘league of Nations’ as envisaged in his philosophy of history 295 takes the fact of different nations as given, and aims to explain when the condition for the development of all the natural capacities of man is fulfilled and what the ultimate goal of history (history considered from a ‘pragmatic standpoint’) is. He is not interested in the question why different ‘Nations’ - nations understood as ‘substantive wholes’ as gainst mere ‘distribuitive wholes’ - exist. Herder on the other hand appears to be interested in the question, ‘why such substantive wholes as nations exist?’, and he answers them in terms of the nature of the reason as expressing in contrasts. Whereas for Kant ‘antagonisms’ is merely an instrument of nature in the historical process to discipline and educate man into a moral being296, for Herder it is the essential aspect of expression of the family bonds. Thus Herder conceives community on the model of family in contrast to Kant who takes a legal view of it similar to that embodied in the social contract view of the State elaborated by his naturalist (a pre-form of utilitarianism) predecessors like Hobbes and Locke, and known to Kant and respresented in Herder as Condillac’s writings. This perhaps also explains Herder’s interest in the ‘national character’ or ‘mentalities’ and Kant’s disdain for it.

Similarly, there appears in Herder, at least sometimes, a line of thinking that counter-poses will to reason, meaning in such contxts a counter-posing of the force (Kraft) of tradition as against the individual considerations. This stress on the non-deliberate dispositions and the consequences drawn on the basis of it is central for the theory of culture in T.S. Eliot as against the Enlightenment position (and also that of Kant) that conceives the institutions as either due to the Naturgeschichte or due to the beliefs and maxims of the human agent. For Kant the ‘spontaneity’ has to be understood as a rational will; for Herder, however, the spontaneity has the touch of power of traditions working through the individuals. Howver, Herder is less of a systematic thinker, and these assertions are yet to be worked out in terms of their systematic conceptual context.

These differences however are within the same paradigm of human being as the intelligible being, and consequently a species being (Gattungswesen), and whose species-essence expresses itself in the creation of communities and history. The difference between Kant and Herder within this common framework is still continuing with variations of nuances in the

295 296

See section 6.5.4. See section 6.5.3.

contemporary debate surrounding the controversy between those espousing individualism and the others espousing communitarianism.

The theories of culture as understood in such a paradigm, it may be noted, do not attempt the task of elucidating what it is to speak of cultural differences as against individual and biological differences, but rather take the fact of distinction between cultures as a given phenomena and attempt to explain them in terms of building a theory of human nature. In other words, they are the answers to the question why human beings have culture and not answers to the question, what constitutes a cultural difference? The reason for this is that they are underpinned by the conception of givenness, now, unlike in Aristotle, not the givenness of nature but that of human nature.

We will see next how such human nature haunts the theories of culture in the 20th century.

7.4

Cassirer: Mythical versus Scientific Symbolic Forms

7.4.1 Kantianism as a ‘Philosophy of Culture’ The theme I have delineated so far, the sensible versus the intelligible, and the human form of life as shot through the latter, is the underlying thread that connects Cassirer’s voluminous works through and through. His central question is ‘how are cultural forms possible?’ and his answer is that they are made possible through the different modes of organisation of the sensible through the intelligible. The best evidence to support this thesis, now even bringing the theological undercurrent of the tradtion to the forefront, is the following rare criptic formulation by Cassirer where the motto of his whole philsophy of symbolic forms is summarised: „A difference between ‘real’ and ‘possible’ exists neither for the being below man nor for those above him. The beings below man are confined within the world of their sense perceptions. They are susceptible to actual physical stimuli and react to these stimuli. But they can form no idea of ‘possible’ things. On the other hand the superhuman intellect, the divine mind, knows no distinction between reality and possibility.“297

Generally, Cassirer uses the word ‘symbolic form’ in place of ‘intelligible’, my formulation of the thesis above is the exact repetition of what he says in many places. Even the substitution of the word ‘form’ to ‘intelligible’ has a tradition to it, especially since in Kant: ‘forms’ are what the intelligible beings impress upon the sensuous manifold to make the latter the human knowledge.

297

Cf. Cassirer, E. (1944, cit. 1992), p. 56.

That he belongs to the Kantian tradition is is both a biographical fact298 and vouched for by Cassirer himself. He claims that Kant’s theory of knowledge can be transformed into a philosophy of culture and this as his achievement.299 What this term, ‘philosophy of culture’, means for Cassirer will be elucidated by focusing on the one of his intellectual bete noirs, the contrast between myth and science.300This preoccupation, of course, stems from the intellectual milieu of his times, but for Cassirer it provides for illustrating a central point of method and therefore it is not merely a question of historical importance, but rather the crux for understanding his very model and method. 7.4.2 The Task of Providing ‘the Logic of Humanities’ First, on method. In an essay titled Die Begriffsform im mythischen Denkens301 he situates his preoccupation with the myths in the context of providing what he calls a general logic of humanities (allgemeine Logik der Geisteswissenschaften). As his style, the meaning of this phrase doesn not get explained in a straight forward manner, but in terms of a narration of the events in the intellectual history. The general logic of humanities is supposed to have been first posed as a task in the modern times by Vico.302 The further narration is aimed both as a critique of different approaches to this question as well as elucidating the insights that need to be incorporated in the proper accomplishment of the task.

What does the word ‘logic’ mean in this formulation?

In many places the logic is equated with the a general theory of science, and it is also conceived as connected with the investigation of the ways the concepts are constructed (Begriffsbildung).303 Further, this logic is conceived in two separate senses, in a narrower and in a more comprehensive one. In a narrower sense, it is equated with the task of investigating 298

He is a student of Herman Cohen and stems from the Marburg school of Neo-Kantianism. With regard to his Neo-Kantianism see his autobiographical remarks in: Cassirer, E. (1956), p. xxiv. 299 Cf. ‘Critical Idealism as Philosophy of Culture’ in: Verene, D.P. (ed.), 1979. 300 An alternative way of approaching Cassirer’s philosophy could be focusing on his understanding of the emergence of the ‘individuality’. Then also the connection to the notions appearing in the epitome of the chapter 2 is evident. If this theme is chosen, we are equally within the framework of Kantian philosophy of history, since the classical theme that connects the history of the emergence of science and the history of the emergence of individual freedom is the focus theme of German idealism. The idea of law being central to both. Cf. Rudolph, E., (1994) 301 Cf. Cassirer E. (1983). 302 Cf. ibid. p. 5. 303 See the following passages (a) 'Logik als allgemeine Wissenschaftslehre' (p. 5) and (b) 'Vor völlig neue Fragen sieht sich dagegen die Logik gestellt, sobald sie versucht, ihren Blick über die reinen Wissensformen hinaus auf die Totalität der geistigen Formen der Weltauffassung zu richten.' (p. 7), (c) 'Schon der Name Logik weist darauf hin, daß in ihrem Ursprung die Reflexion auf die Form des Wissens mit der Reflexion auf die Sprache sich aufs innigste durchdringt. ' (p. 8), all in: Cassirer, E. (1983); also see Cassirer, E. (1928).

the pure forms of knowledge - what is meant is the investigation into the forms available in theoretical or scientific knowledge. In the other more comprehensive sense, it is conceived as a task of investigating the totality of the mental forms of world apprehension (Totalität der geistigen Formen der Weltauffassung).

In other words, logic is conceived as that discipline which investigates the forms - whether that of knowledge conceived in a narrow sense of scientific knowledge, or, in a more comprehensive sense, as any mode of dealing with the social and natural environment. Consequently, the task of providing the ‘logic of humanities’ he sets before himself has to be understood as a task of giving an account of ‘forms’ made use of in humanities. Though the German expression he uses in this connection ‘Logik der Geisteswissenschaften’ would suggest that he is interested in the forms used in the academic disciplines that investigate the human affairs, as will become evident soon, his intended focus is much wider: the forms made use of by all different human activties, and not merely the academic ones, are to be included in the investigation of the ‘logic of humanities’ envisaged by him.

Historically the logic made its appearance, according to Cassirer, in Socratic dialectic. Further, according to him, in that historical gestalt there was an appreciation that the form and content cannot be thought of in separation from each other. But the tradition of logic that emerged later, the formal logic, is one that he considers as the point of departure for him. Here the focus is on the form in abstraction from the content. He faults this tradition on two counts. (i) It got tied to naive realist presuppositions.304

(ii) Its understanding of forms is limited by its narrow focus on scientific to the exclusion of all other forms of thinking.305

What needs clarification at this stage is on how he uses the terms 'form' und 'concept'. These terms are used in a way that their senses need to be understood relative to each other: he speaks of ‘form of a concept in a particular thought modality’ (Form des Begriffs in einer Denkmodalität); he also mentions ‘form’ in connection with the type and species of concepts of a discipline such as physics or chemistry.306 That is, ‘form’ is used to demarcate the type of concepts of a particular discipline from the type of concepts of another discipline, or the type of concepts of a particular modality of thinking from another modality of thinking. The notion of ‘a modality of thinking’ is applied variably in accordance with the context, sometimes to contrast the thinking characterising the particular disciplines such as physics and chemistry, sometimes that of natural sciences as against the humanities, and still some other times to contrast the ‘scientific’ (which includes the mode of thinking of both natural sciences and humanities) as against the ‘mythical’ forms of thinking. By making use of another of Cassirer’s Cf. Cassirer, E. (1928) ‘Zur Theorie des Begriffs', in: Kant Studien (33) 1928, p.129-136. Cf. Cassirer, E. (1983), p.3. 306 ibid. see p. 9-10. 304 305

terms, the ‘Weltganzen’, we can say that the form differentiates a particular world - in which particular classes and concepts are constructed - from other worlds.307 How a world and a variation of a world are to be distinguished and identified depends on the context in which discourse is conducted.308

7.4.3 The Tradition of Logic versus the Contrastive Method

Coming back to Cassirer’s identification of the faults of the ‘tradition of logic’: he accuses that tradition to have conceived the concept formation (Begriffsbildung) as a process of ‘mimesis’ (Nachkonstruktion), i.e. a process of consturcting the objects by copying them. By using the term ‘symbolic activity’ to refer to any cognitive activity, we can formulate Cassier’s criticism as following. If concept formation is conceived as a procedure mimetic reproduction of the real there is possibility of separating the investigation of the semantics and syntax, the content, on the one hand, and the organising principles of symbolic activity, on the other. That is, the investigation of form can be conducted in abstraction from the content captured by the symbolic activity. But if it is the case that the concepts provide the very perspective for an object construction, the content is something that is formed by the very form and not available independent of it. This latter position is expressed by Cassirer by saying that the form ‘determines the direction of objectification’.309

To this mutually opposing understanding of ‘forms’ the contrasts in the tradition of philosophy such as ‘synthesis versus analyis’, ‘subjective versus objective’, ‘idealist versus realist’ are traced. For example, the realistic and idealsitic world views are contrasted in the following way. „Wo die realistische Weltansicht sich bei irgendeiner letztgegebenen Beschaffenheit der Dinge, als der Grundlage für alles Erkennen beruhigt - da formt der Idelaismus eben die Beschaffenheit selbst zu einer Frage des Denkens um.“310

Similarly, to Leibniz the credits is given for discovering the the siginificance of ‘synthesis’ in relation to mathematics as of an activity of ‘free and constrcutive gestalting of the content’ in contrast to the conception of analysis which merely differentiates the aspects by taking the ‘given’ as its directing principle. „Das Entscheidende des Gegensatzes von Synthesis und Analysis liegt in der Hervorhebung einer Funktion der freien, konstruktiven Gestaltung des Inhalts im Unterschied zur bloßen nachträglichen Zergliederung eines Gegebenen. Diesen Begriff des ´Synthetischen´ aber hat Leibniz in seiner

307

cf. "Alle Begriffsbildung [...]. Die Form der Reihung bestimmt hierbei die Art und die Gattung des Begriffs." Cf. p. 9-10. 308 Cf. the use of the World by Goodman in contexts such as Ways of Worldmaking. Cf. Goodman N., (1978). 309 Cf. ibid. p.9. 310 Cf. Cassirer, E. (1985a), p. 4.

Lehre von der ´kausalen´Definition als Bedingung der Möglichkeit des Gegenstandes für die Mathematik entdeckt und gestaltet.“311

A similar sort of contrast is expressed, but now explicitly making use of the Kantian terminology, „dasjenige, was nicht im Objekt (als dem ´Ding an sich´) vorgefunden wird, sondern vom Subjekt´selbst verrichtet´werden muß - aber diese Verrichtung erfolgt selbst nach einer allgemein gültigen Regel und besitzt demgemäß in ihrer Idealität zugleich realisierende Bedeutung. Indem der Einzelinhalt, kraft der sprachlichen Formgebung, nicht als solcher bezeichnet, sondern auf das Ganze der möglichen Inhalte bezogen und gemäß seiner Stellung in diesem Ganzen charakterisiert wird, wird er in dieser Beziehung auf die Einheit des denkenden Selbstbewußtseins auch erst nach seinem gegenständlichen Gehalt vollständig bestimmt.“312

In line with its mimetic understanding, according to Cassirer, the tradition of logic conceives the of the task exaplaining the construction of concepts as that of providing a theory of abstraction. But, it is in fact a task of finding out the characteristic ‘rule of construction’ underlying each domain rather than abstracting from a given differentiation of a world (Weltgliederung): „Alle Begriffsbildung gleichviel in welchem Gebiet [...] ist dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß sie ein bestimmtes Prinzip der Verknüpfung und der ‘Reihung’ in sich schließt. Erst durch dieses Prinzip werden aus dem stetigen Fluß der Eindrücke bestimmte ‘Gebilde’ [...] herausgelöst. Die Form der Reihung bestimmt hierbei die Art und die Gattung des Begriffs. [...] Die traditionelle logische Lehre vom Begriff pflegt freilich eben diese entscheidende Differenz zu übersehen oder sie zum mindesten nicht zur scharfen methodischen Ausprägung zu bringen. Denn, indem sie uns anweist, den Begriff dadurch zu bilden, daß wir eine Gesamtheit gleichartiger oder ähnlicher Wahrnehmungen durchlaufen, und daß wir aus ihr, indem wir ihre Unterschiede mehr und mehr fallen lassen, nur die gemeinsamen Bestandteile herausheben, geht sie dabei von der Voraussetzung aus, als liege die Ähnlichkeit oder Unähnlichkeit schon in dem einfachen Inhalt der sinnlichen Eindrücke selbst, und sei von ihm unmittelbar und unzweideutig abzulesen. Eine schärfere Analyse zeigt indes genau das Umgekehrte: sie lehrt, daß die sinnlichen Elemente je nach dem Gesichtspunkt, unter dem sie betrachtet werden, in ganz verschiedener Weise zu Ähnlichkeitskreisen zusammengefaßt werden können. An sich ist nichts gleich / oder ungleich, ähnlich oder unähnlich - das Denken macht es erst dazu. Dieses bildet somit nicht einfach eine an sich bestehende Ähnlichkeit der Dinge in der Form des Begriffes nach - sondern es bestimmt vielmehr, durch die Richtlinien der Vergleichung und Zusammenfassung, die es aufstellt, selbst erst, was als ähnlich, was als unähnlich zu gelten hat.“ 313

311 312 313

Cf. Cassirer, E. (1962), p. 534. Cf. Cassirer, E. (1923), 123f. Cf. Cassirer, E. (1983), p. 9-10.

In other words, a discipline has to be conceived not in terms of a given domain; rather the domain is the result of a modality of thinking. The investigation of ‘forms’ is therefore the investigation of a ‘rule for constructing’ a particular ‘content’.

Consequently, the question concerning method for Cassirer is: how can one discover these rules of constrcution of different domains, or more generally, the rules of construction constituting different spheres of human cognitive activity? His answer is to suggest a method of counter-posing (das Gegenüberstellen) the very diverse modalities of thinking: the more diverse the modalities are, the more suited they are for this purpose.314 As already mentioed in the previous section, he makes a relative distinction between ‘a modality of thinking’ and ‘the concepts and classes’ within that modality of thinking, and thus speaks of his task as that of exhibiting the form of concepts by counterposing one mode of concept with another.315 To discover the rule of constructing concepts is to make the form of concepts appearing in a particular modality of thinking apparent or conspicuous, and for this the best suitbale method is to counter-pose one modality to another.

To repeat, this method to bring out the form of concepts would work optimally when the modalities of thinking contrasted are different and even estranged from each other to the maximum extent. This requirement of the method would also lead us in the direction of overcoming the other weakness identified with of the tradition of logic, namely the weakness of an exclusive focus on the scientific modality of thinking. First, the specificity of scientific thinking cannot be apprehended fully without counter-posing it to non-scientific modes of thinking. Secondly, ‘humanities’ (i.e.Geisteswissenschaften) by its very definition is a study of all forms of human activities, and a ‘logic humanities’ must attempt to clarify the forms of human existence in contrast to that of natural existence by taking into account all different modes of human existence.316

To appreciate what Cassirer is saying here one has to remind oneself the Kantian idea mentioned in the beginning of this chapter that the world we live in is a humanised world. 317 To investigate the conditions of possibility of different disciplines and activities is to investigate the modes of humanising the world. But if we take this stance, then there is no reason why the attention should be confined to only certain forms and not to others. Artistic and religious practices too become the candidates for attention as specific modes of thinking. These are, however, accepted, sometimes grudgingly sometimes generously, amongst the philosophers as serious activities requiring philosophical attention. But, according to Cassirer,

314

Cf. 'Auch die verschiedenste [...] des mythischen Bewußtseins gegenüberstellen." Ibid. p.10-11. Cf. 'Zur Theorie des Begriffs' in: Kant Studien (33) 1928, p.129-136. 316 'Die Eigentümlichkeit des geistigen Seins, seine Unterscheidung vom natürlichen aufzuweisen, muß man den Blick 'auf Totalität der geistigen Formen der Weltauffassung richten'. p. 7. See also p. 10 -11. 317 See section 7.1. 315

they are all still within the fold of familiar modes of thinking for the scientific community. This however is not the case when it comes to myths and magic. But they too are modes of dealing with the world, and therefore are fit candidates for the Kantian notion of the forms of humanising the world. Thus formulating a ‘logic of humanities’, must involve a consideration of mythical mode of thinking too.

There is another reason why myths become methodologically much more interesting. They can serve a double function in the method of counter-posing. First, there is the usual interest in difference, where mythical thinking is put alongside of science, art, language etc., in order to bring out the different form-nuances and varieties of human mental activity, and the specific forms underlying all these different modes of activities.318 But, secondly, there is a special role for the contrast with the myth, because, the myth is considered as quite antithetical to scientific mode of thinking. If the assumption of the antithesis between science and myth is taken seriously it should be expected that such a counter-posing would lead to discovery of completely different variety of difference than the differences otherwise considered. One is tempted to see here a variety of argument that we came across in Herder while claiming that human beings not merely differ from each of the animal species, but differ from the animal kingdom taken as a whole. A similar consideration appears to haunt Cassirer when he speaks about myths: other modes of thinking familiar to modern man all taken together as one class differs from mythical form of thinking. When Cassirer speaks of the specificity of theoretical mode of thinking he means more than what is usually considered as ‘theoretical’; he means the whole of the modes of thinking familiar to modern man. Theoretical mode understood in this way is characterised by carving out a domain of nature distinct from the culture; all distinctions of of modes of thinking in the modern world assume such a distinction even when they sometimes bemoan it. The best way to bring the specificity of such a mode is by counter-posing it with a mode of thinking that does not handle the social and natural environment as ‘nature’.

To put it in terms of our theme in this chapter, for Cassirer mythical thinking is not only different, but different in a special way such that a comparison of it with the scientifc or theoretical mode would throw light on how the very constitutive features of the human cognitive appratus, the sensible and the intelligible, are realted. One can exhibit the possible modes of that relation when the extremest way of conceiving the relationship between the general and the particular are visualised and contrasted Cassirer appears to find these extremities in the mythical and scientific thinking. He focuses on the contrast between myth and science by posing it as the following question: What are the respective principles of differentiation of these modes thinking? This is the same question for Cassirer as the question of the way in which the relationship between ‘the general’ and ‘the particular’ is conceived, and that in turn, is the difference between the way these two modes of thinking approach the question ‘why?’. According to Cassirer, the notion of causality is invented to answer the 318

Cf. p.6.

question ‘why?’, and the world as a law governed unity of causal nexus is a common assumption for both mythical and scientific mode of thinking.319 But though both myth and science ask the question ‘why?’ the scientific thinking answers it by transcending the concrete existence, the mythical thinking on the other hand, does not transcend the limits of the concrete.320

In his analysis of the difference between the causal notion in myth and that in science Cassirer makes use of the following two contrasts: (i) ‘substantial causality’ versus ‘causality as constitution of the particular’; (ii) primacy of spatial to temporal thinking versus the reverse. In fact the first and the second contrast amount to the same, and they both are meant to make the same assertion as the one in the last sentence of the previous paragraph, namely, that the myth does not transcend the concrete as the scientific mode, but the latter is faced with a reverse difficulty, the difficulty of reaching the concrete level.

What Cassirer means by the ‘substantive causality’ can be gleaned by what according to him is the motivating question of the mythical mode of thinking. The mythical thinking, he says, is characterised by the question of genesis or the ultimate source, and as a result, it looks towards one substance transforming into another substance, presumably like water becoming earth in the Thalles’ conception of genesis, as an answer to the question ‘why?’. That is, the causal principle for it is an individual concrete ‘substance’. For mythical thinking, says Cassirer, both cause and effect are two gestalts of things (Dinggestalt), and thereby causal process is conceived as a transition from one thing-gestalt to another thing-gestalt. The essence of everything is defined in terms of the conditions of arising of something in terms of the conditions of arising of the parts of that thing. As a consequence of this, the whole world remains a concrete single thing connected to each constituent in a part -whole relationship. Thus connections that can be discerned at the sensible level, i.e. the spatial connections, become the guiding principle of causal exaplanation. The ‘substance’ remains the individuating factor.

In contrast, says Cassirer, the scientific thinking is characterised by the idea of law as constitutive factor that gives each constituent its individuality. It looks towards the form of change, the functional law that constitutes the existence. The sensible vanishes from the The world „als eine gesetzliche Einheit, als ein in sich geschlossenes kausales Gefüge zu denken" is according to Cassirer common for both ‘Wissenschaft’ and ‘Astrologie’. Cf. Cassirer, E. (1983), p.34. 320 „[Die Wissenschaft] begnügt sich keineswegs mit der einfachen Frage nach dem 'Warum' des Seins und Geschehens, - sondern sie gibt dieser Frage, [...] eine spezifische neue Wendung und Prägung. Auch der Mythos fragt nach dem "Warum" der Dinge. [...] Aber er geht trotz allem Bestreben, in den letzten 'Ursprung' der Dinge zurückzugehen, doch letzten Endes über sie selbst und über ihr einfaches konkretes 'Dasein' nicht hinaus." Cassirer, E. (1983), p.36. 319

picture and is replaced by an abstract principle, the ‘function’ through which something is conceived as what it is.

At this stage of Cassirer’s explanation enters the Kantian conception of schematism. The concept of causality involves either a spatial or a temporal schematisation, i.e. building a scheme of connections. Whereas in the scientific thinking, the schematism occurs through the temporal factor in the mythical thinking supposedly the spatial schematism is the principle of causality. In the former, the temporal continuity, and not spatial contiguity is the determinant factor for discerning the causal connection, in the latter the reverse is the case.

8

8.1

Cultures: Phenomena versus Learnables

The Pilgrim, the Mountain, the Wanderer, and the Heathen

The narration of chapter two to seven has concentrated on showing the connections between the Christian theme and the concepts in use both to talk about nature and, especially relevant to the focus of this book, culture. One may look at this narration as neglecting the use value of such concepts to tell truths and concentrating on their contingent connections to the Christian theology. The emphasis on the Christian connections may even be misunderstood as an assertion meant to deny the use value altogether.

If that were the case, my project would indeed befit the madness of a Don Quixote. The heuristic fruitfulness of what is bequeathed by the Christian tradition as instanced in conceptions such as ‘mechanism’ is there for all to see. The objective in building the narrative of the origins of certain distinctions by emphasising the contingent Christian circumstances of their birth is meant to emphasise, to use the Kantian-Christian terminology, the made as against the given character of the world we have discovered, and to emphasise, now in contrast to Kant, the local as against the universal character of such making. I hope chapters 2 to 7 have made it clear how massive the presence and the continuity of the tradition is even in the most mundane concepts we use to talk about culture. If an element of making in contrast to givenness is accepted for the concepts we use, then this continuity of tradition is also an indication of the local as against the global character of our concepts, however massive the felt usefulness of these concepts may be. To say this is not to attribute provincialism in any negative sense; nor is it belittling or denying the enormous use value of that tradition in the history of the growth of knowledge. It is just to reject the story of the making of our knowledge as that of a pilgrim’s progress equipped with the divine directions to the only possible summit that exists. Indeed great discoveries are made, but they are the discoveries of a wayward wanderer who had the chance equipment of a Christian sketchbook of directions. That chance possession of a scribbled map has led us to a thick mountain of knowledge.

If the present achievements in knowledge are seen in that light, the next suggestion I make, though ambitious in scope but still making only the moderate demands on the credulity of the reader, may be accepted as a plausible venture: somewhat different discoveries may be

possible to make with different sketch books found in the hands of the non-Christian wanderers. This is not a suggestion to give up what we possess. Such a suggestion would be foolish indeed. But one may ask for a venture onto the other side of the mountain without assuming that it is dark or desolate there. Or, to mix the metaphors a bit, this is an effort by a heathen to overcome the awe created by a sudden discovery that, unexpectedly, the mountain has come to his doorsteps. Sure, it has transformed the living locale and opened to him that network of clearly laid avenues leading to wonderful spots with ravishing sights. The warning by the wise that there should be no nostalgia for the landscapes, perhaps lost for good, is also well taken. Yet, there may be a place for a reminiscent curiosity about the pathways his and others’ ancestors were using. Perhaps there are equally interesting paths to wander lying out there on the other side of the mountain. Similarly, there must be room for doubts over the appearance of flatlands in the maps made by those whose vision has the penchant for seeing the distant surroundings from the summit of their magic mountain.

But how to get hold of those sketch books in the hands of the heathen wanderers? Perhaps they don’t even have sketch books but only the disposition that a Cassirer would recognise as ‘instincts’ for the spatially felt directions rather than the temporally conceived schema of rules for map reading? However, Cassirer’s tools of classification are, at best, tools for evaluation when a familiarity can be assumed. But what are the tools of the research tradition for the prior activity pre-requisite for an evaluation, that of becoming familiar with other cultures? Why are ‘religion’ and ‘myth’ the stock in trade to talk about Non-European traditions? They don’t have science and technology, all right. But why should we assume that they have ‘religions’ and ‘myths’? Perhaps they don’t have these things either. These questions, I hope, will look more thoughtful than brash when some conceptual unpacking of them is offered.

8.2

The Pragmatic Turn

One central idea of the 20th century epistemology is that the distinctions we make are literally that: they are made, and not the given fact of nature. This assertion is less dramatic than those worries of some realists suggest: to them this appears as the incredulous denial of existence of the trees and the oceans without man starting worrying about them. No, the assertion in question does not deny that there were stars long before man started worrying about his stars. It only insists on one implication of the logical distinction needed to be made while talking about descriptions, that between the ‘object’ and ‘signs’ or ‘representations’.

To identify something as an ‘object’ is to imply that it cannot be exhausted by description, which is another way of saying that any ‘description’, or more generally, ‘representation’, is necessarily selective. Consequently, the criterion of relevance is an important aspect of our identifying something as a representation of something else. If so, the ‘representation’ is bound to the context of purpose for which that representation is made. That is, the distinctions we make are tied to the purposes we have. This, it should be noted, is not the same doctrine as saying that we can get away with any distinctions we like. What the assertion amounts to is only the following: though there does exist the objective pull321, it makes itself felt only in the fact whether the distinctions we make are serviceable enough for our purposes or not; there is no way of justifying for a set of distinctions the claim of a unique effectiveness and superiority over all other sets, unless of course a Godly purpose is postulated in which all of us partake.

The assumption underlying this pragmatic turn in the conception of knowledge can be rephrased in the idiom of ‘concepts’ instead of the above idiom of ‘distinctions’: the concepts we use are not given but made, not individually but through the joint efforts of groups and generations of human beings. Though less dramatic than the realist’s grim warnings suggest, nevertheless this pragmatic turn in the conception of knowledge has some far reaching consequences.

One of them is that it makes the propositional knowledge or knowledge made available in intellectual disciplines (which we saw that Descartes wanted to demarcate as context-free from the context-bound sorts that are rooted in bodily habits such as artisanal skills, and more generally the knowledge involving the sensible aspect322) akin to the skills. The intellectual disciplines have the status of the Aristotelian techne and not that of the episteme. I used the repetitive adjective ‘Aristotelian’ in the last sentence deliberately to foreclose the misidentification of it with the way the Christian successors of Aristotle could understand the techne, as the skill comparable to that in the hands of God, the Artisan of Creation whose Words are the Law governing the universe. In this latter understanding, as described in chapter 5, it attains the status of a universal sort of knowledge.

321 322

The term ‘objective pull’ stems from Quine. See section 2, chapter 1 in: Quine, W.V.O. (1964). See the section 5.3.

As relevant to the purpose of this book there is another consequence related to the first above. Unlike the first however, this second consequence is still to be appreciated adequately. Suppose knowledge has to be approached more as skills rather than as propositions, then it will imply that most of the research carried out by the Anthropologists in the last hundred and fifty years, whatever else it is, is not likely to be concerned with the knowledge possessed by those different groups about whom the research is being done. In fact this was never conceived explicitly as the objective of the discipline of Anthropology. But still one often encounters the assumption that Anthropology delivers the knowledge possessed by those groups which the Anthropologists study. Does it?

Since clarification on this point is a necessary pre-condition of the project envisaged (of which this book is only a part) to take off, I will go into it in the next section. By its very nature it is a sketch of an argument rather than a detailed examination of the whole field of Anthropology. As any discipline today, Anthropology as an institution is enormously diverse with thousands of practitioners all over the globe. One can hardly expect a survey of Anthropology in a book like this. The purpose of the next sections is rather to introduce the distinction between two different ways of approaching the practices of others, i.e. as knowledge or as objects.

8.3

Investigating ‘Cultures’: What, When and Why?

8.3.1

Anthropology, Context and ‘Ethnocentrism’

This book started by identifying a widely prevailing sentiment that was designated as the ‘traditions as heritage sentiment’. The question was raised what it means to take that sentiment seriously. As an effort in the direction of an answer, I began by stating two obvious but nevertheless significant assumptions: (i) any knowledge is worth preserving and we have an obligation to see to it that knowledge once produced is not lost, (ii) groups with different pasts are likely to have inherited different dispositions to behave, and these different dispositions, since they are the ways and means of mastering the problems of life for the respective groups, can be considered as knowledge dispositions.323 Both these assumptions can be taken as not involving any difficulties to understand. They are merely a formulation given to the educated common sense of our time, and as such anyone who has grown up in

323

For a more detailed statement of this, see the section 1.1.

the metropolitan countries, and the elite in non-metropolitan countries too, would on reflection concede them. Yet from these assumptions a not yet well realised conclusion can be drawn as to an important research task: (iii) since the consequences to group behaviour arising from their different pasts are often referred to as their ‘culture’, we may say that we have an obligation to enquire into the knowledge embodied in different cultures. For our purpose, the problem of the range of extension of the term ‘group’ can be left open. Perhaps in any decision to extend the range or narrow it down, a certain level of validity has to be conferred to the broad distinctions prevalent such as the ‘Western culture’, ‘Indian culture’, ‘Chinese culture’ and ‘African Culture’ etc., which pick out significant traditions, the knowledge dispositions of which may be presumed to differ. But we will be confronted with a problem as soon as we reflect on this task of conceptualising the knowledge dispositions. As far as the ‘Western’ or European Tradition is concerned one can presume that there is no further need to conceptualise that inheritance as ‘knowledge’, both because European tradition has been the source of most of what we take to be knowledge, and further because its contribution and singularity has been the theme of so many scholarly attempts at conceptualisation. But what about the Non-European traditions? How to go about in the task of enquiring into the knowledge dispositions embodied in them?

Once one formulates the task as above, it is natural to look for guidance from those disciplines that have a history of concerning themselves with Non-European Traditions, foremost amongst which is Cultural Anthropology. For a century or more Anthropologists have laboured to record, interpret and explain all and sundry beliefs prevalent around the globe; studying and recording the 'world-views' subscribed to by different groups of people has been at least part of its objective. Therefore, one is likely to consider the enormous knowledge gathered by Anthropology as something that can be looked at as a model of an approach to other traditions as knowledge. How far is this assumption valid?

We can examine this possibility by focusing on one specific theme. It is often said that the main danger an Anthropologist must guard against is ‘ethnocentrism’, the problem arising from a projection of one's own ethnie's habits and values onto another. On the face of it, this appears to be a concern to profit from the experience of groups foreign to the researcher (or to his tradition). That is, overcoming ethnocentrism appears as part of a project of overcoming the confinement of one's own habits and methods of going about in the world in

order to discover the available alternatives to them. Is that the case? In what connection is ‘ethnocentrism’ considered as a defect to be overcome in Anthropology?

8.3.2

Represented versus Representer’s Context

Anthropologists are exhorted to pay attention to the ‘context’. But this term is ambiguous; at least it has been used in two different senses: in the sense of a situation describable and in the sense of something presupposed in any successful description. For example, when it is enjoined that behaviours, activities, institutions and texts have to be understood in terms of the context in which they are embedded, the directive is meant to say that we should not take these items in isolation but consider them as parts of a larger whole, and look for the role of respective items in that larger whole. But this latter is as much the object of empirical enquiry as the items embedded in it. That is, the ‘context’ is open to description just as other items of investigation. I will call this 'represented context'324 and it can be contrasted with ‘representer's context’.

The latter is something that is the focus in some recent theories where Anthropology is conceived as a genre of writing. The writer has some definite audience in mind and he knows and makes use of the shared conventions and expectations. When one speaks of context in this connection, it is in a sense something already known by the writer and the reader. Enquiry into it is in the form of reflection and elucidation of it rather than in the form of investigating it as an empirical object. If indeed one wants to do the latter, then the writer, the reader, and the practice - of which the writer and reader along with their contexts are parts become ‘objects’, within a meta-representation, i.e. the investigated context is no longer the representer's but a represented context. But this does not eliminate the representer’s context. Like all descriptions meta-representations too proceed from some specific purpose and are tied to some specific (meta-) representer’s context.

If representation is context bound then knowledge too is so, since it necessarily depends on representation. This is what underlies the issue of 'ethnocentrism' which arises because of the recognition of the following two facts: (i) the phenomena of which Anthropology seeks 324

The emphasis on context in the tradition of Anthropology goes back to Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown. In their recommendation to use the method of functional analysis of society by attending to the ‘context’, the term is meant in the sense of 'represented context'. The approach of these authors established the academic Anthropology in between two world wars, and has been influential ever since in the institution of 'participatory observation' as a compulsory element in the training for an aspiring Anthropologist. Cf. Harris, M. (1968).

knowledge - the beliefs and practices - are, partly at least, constituted by the representation of the bearers of those practices and beliefs; (ii) members belonging to different 'societies' or 'cultures' have different background histories and traditions and therefore they do not share the same conventions and expectations; i.e. they do not share the same representer's contexts. This gives rise to the question as to the status of knowledge acquired through representing the representation.325 This question is not something specific to the predicament of Anthropology; one can even claim that the present discussion in Anthropology is just taking over the discussion carried under the rubric of 'hermeneutics' to the question of ethnographic representation.

8.3.3

Ethnographic Representation and Philosophical Hermeneutics

But there is an important difference of nuance. Philosophical hermeneutics arose in the context of classical studies, of well acclaimed texts (and art works or semiotic artefacts) of the past.326 Its focus was the question of the status of 'humanistic studies': in contrast to sciences of the past that do get antiquated, something from the past masters needs to be presented as of contemporary relevance. Instead of postulating some a-historical content made available in each of the texts of the past, philosophical hermeneutics sought to specify a different kind of cognitive gain than that of receiving the sciences of the past. For this the inevitability of the admixture of representer’s and represented contexts was seen as an opportunity rather than as a problem: it provides for the extension of one’s thinking horizon through the ‘fusion of horizons’, i.e. it extends the scope of the domain of meaningful talk. It was asserted that encounter with the past masters though begins with our questions and prejudices (Vor-urteile), yet occasions a transcendence of them by confronting us with unfamiliar lines of thinking.

But unlike in the case of the acclaimed texts (and artworks) of classicists, the Anthropologist does not have anything specific to go by. Texts passed on by the intellectual tradition, along with one or many traditions of understanding them, are made familiar by the very process of one’s socialisation. Thus interpretation is an effort at understanding what has already been identified as something communicated, i.e. as signs. Such a starting point does not exist in

325

See Berg, E./Fuchs, M. (1993) for a documentation of the various issues discussed in recent Anthropology arising out of the problem of representing representation. The Einleitung gives a comprehensive overview of the conceptual and practical issues tackled in the recent Socio-Cultural Anthropology. 326 See the Einleitung in: Gadamer, H-G./Böhm, G. (1978), p. 7-39.

the case of study of aliens. Anthropology began in the wake of the demarcation of modern society from that of ‘pre-modern’ - the 'primitive', the 'traditional' etc. Seeking, collecting and interpreting the practices and beliefs all over the globe was in order to enquire into the ‘other’ or ‘predecessor’ to the thought forms as well as social forms of ‘modernity’. The fact that what was found elsewhere belongs to the pre-history of 'modern' (meaning, European) forms was taken for granted. Further the interest in them was as phenomena and not as signs. Even when texts and artefacts of aliens were collected the impulse for it came from a curiosity about the phenomena represented by them rather than on something said through them.

These are not mere historical legacies which could be given up at will. Unlike the texts of the classicist, what an Anthropologist encounters is an array of unfamiliar behaviour and practices out of which he has to select something as important and collate them into his data. He does not simply discover religion, ritual, or magic, but rather identifies some practices in terms of such categories as ‘religion’, ‘ritual’ and ‘magic’, thereby introducing a way of grouping the practices which may or may not correspond to the groupings and distinctions shared by the group he is studying. It is from his background tradition that the researcher brings to his observation such categories, and also some criterion of what is important and what is not. Thus in an unexpected way the Anthropologist may ‘enlighten’ the subjects he is studying by infusing in them those background categories of his tradition that he has brought to bear on the practices of his subjects. To make clear the enormity of the irony of it all, let me make a slight detour and discuss an example for this.

8.3.4

‘Mother India’: Amnesiac or Barren Mother of her Religions?

For a ‘Western’ reader India is a birth place of many ‘religions’. This supposition is so well entrenched that even the Indian government brochures advertise India being the ‘mother of many religions’, and the Indian elite either uses this supposition to claim the greatness of its past or to bemoan the backwardness of its present, depending upon whether one is nationalistically or progressively disposed. Either way, one hardly takes time to reflect on the fact that none of the Indian languages has a word for ‘religion’. After the so called ‘Bengal Renaissance’, the Indian elite started using the word ‘dharma’ to translate ‘religion’, even

though the original connotation of that much misused word is anything but ‘religion’.327 It can be ‘habit’, it can be ‘obligation’, it can be in some circumstances ‘law’, but in none of the circumstances in its original connotation in Sanskrit and other Indian languages it was used in the sense of a ‘confession’, or in any other connotations that the reader in European languages associates with the word ‘religion’. Of course, one can turn this fact onto its head, and claim that Indians are so ‘religious’ and all their practices are infused with religiosity through and through, that they don’t need a word for distinguishing it from other things they do. Assertions to this effect are not uncommon even in serious academic publications.

I can bring any number of my own reminiscences of my family milieu and similar reminiscences of my friends’ to corroborate the assertion that amongst people in India, who are described as highly religious, there is no notion of ‘religion’. But from a country like India, with both a vast territory and a large and varied populations, one can equally find someone who gives the opposite kinds of reminiscence. Since this book is not conceived as discussing data of empirical research, discussions of that sort is out of place here. Moreover my present interest in discussing this issue is not one of proving, or disproving, that in India there do, or do not, exist religions. Rather my purpose is to provide an illustration of how using the familiar conceptions to grasp unfamiliar cultural aspects can be an obstruction in the task of conceptualising the alternative ways of going about in the world inherited by different groups of people. Therefore let me chose an example of a typical approach to the Non-European traditions where an indicator for the existence of an alternative way of going about in the world is treated casually, and those ways are made to fit the familiar conceptual mould inherited from the Western intellectual tradition.

Not unimportant are the historical circumstances in which ‘dharma’ began to be the word with which to translate ‘religion’. The Indian elite in the third quarter of the 19th century was well versed in the European discussions and started claiming to the Indian past an, in its opinion, advanced view of religion as professed by the Protestant theologians and philosophers of the time, who wanted to emancipate religion from its particularities (the older motive of freeing religion from the ‘idolatry’). The religions of India were therefore claimed to have been clothed in a more universal idiom than their Western counter-parts. ‘dharma’ appeared to connote the best of all the possible worlds, because it is religious and secular simultaneously, ‘secular’, in the sense of being free from the confessional dogmas. On these historical circumstances, and the consequences thereof for the emergence the ‘Hinduism’, Paul Hacker is illuminating. He however tends to considers this as the emergence of ‘neoHinduism’, implying thereby that there was more pristine Hindu religion earlier. All the evidence he himself provides speak against such an assumption. Cf. ‘Der Dharma-Begriff des Hinduismus’, (p. 510-524) and ‘Schopenhauer und die Ethik des Hinduismus’ (p. 531-564) both in: Paul Hacker, H. (1978). In fact the whole of the section, E of the book, p. 510-580 has lots of interesting things to say regarding the emergence of the present understanding of ‘Hinduism’ as a religion and its relation to the Bengal Renaissance. 327

The late B.K Matilal, a reputed philosopher from India, and one who has also the credentials of being an analytical philosopher, uses the following ingenious device to belittle the paradox of India being considered as mother of many religions but yet none of her languages having even a rough equivalent to the word ‘religion’. „If ‘religion’ is not an original Indian word, does it follow that the concept of religion or the thing we may call religion is non-existent in Indian culture? I see no a priori reason that it should. A phenomenon may remain unrecognised, uncategorized, and hence unnamed in a society or a culture. In such a case, a name to identify that particular phenomenon may not exist for the time being in the language of that culture. Later on, when the word is formulated and with it a concept to fit it, attention can be focused upon it as a distinguishable fact. Something like this seems to be true of such words as ‘religion’ and ‘mysticism’, for neither of them are of Indian origin. But phenomena answering these words have been present in Indian culture for a long time, and the concepts are not entirely foreign to it. This partly takes care of the caveat that says that when we are talking about ‘religion’ and ‘mysticism’ in the Indian context we are probably superimposing foreign notions in a culture where they do not belong.“328

To get rid of one minor irritant from out of our way: the question of ‘foreign’ versus ‘native’ used in its political nationalistic rhetoric is irrelevant for the issue of whether or not there exist religions in India. The issue, however, is whether one can meaningfully speak of ‘religion’ existing in a community without that community being aware that it exists. Surely, when we talk about ‘religion’, we are not talking about a natural phenomenon? The latter can indeed be spoken of as existing long before one is aware of it, like, for example, someone possessing some cancerous cells in its initial stages without having the slightest idea of having it. But presumably Matilal is not speaking of a natural phenomena, but about the ‘cultural’ phenomena. Matilal chooses the ambiguous idiom of talking about ‘a phenomenon existing in a culture’. If he means by that phrase a behaviour of a people that a researcher can classify as ‘religion’, then a certain arbitrariness is introduced. As Goodman has argued, anything can be considered as similar to anything else by choosing some perspective or the other.329 If I define some breathing exercises as ‘religious’ practice, then it is a religious practice, whether those people who do it have any inkling or not of what I am talking. However, what is the purpose in issuing such definitional fiats? Should we take ‘religion’ as something like, say, anger or sexual attraction, i.e. a biologically conditioned feature of which we seek instances when we encounter different groups of people? Presumably, the point of

328 329

Matilal, B.K., (1982), p. 154. Cf. ‘Seven Strictures on Similarity’ in: Goodman, N. (1972).

constructing a term by issuing a definition is to forge a tool or tools to identify some important aspect of life on the basis of some criterion of importance. In that case, is it not interesting to ask what criterion of importance the researcher uses and what different criterion is used by the subject he is studying? Is not the absence of a notion such as ‘religion’ significant in this connection? One standard reply to questions of the above sort is to say that as researchers we have to use some notion or the other. We are justified therefore in using the notions familiar to us from one’s own tradition, meaning hereby the European research tradition. But my objection is not that some notion or the other is used. Rather, it pertains to the unclarity as to what aim is pursued in using a notion such as ‘religion’ and claiming that it is something like an universal feature characterising every people, even though there are enough indications that lots of communities do not have such notions. The example of Indian languages is of interest because it can be a counter-instance, not only to a dominant assumption that India is a land of religiosity even though hardly any one has done any empirical study on this matter, but also to the assumption that religion is a ‘cultural universal’. So far probably while talking about religions hardly anyone has thought about that it is as an empirical issue whether every community has the notion of religion or not. Thus, perhaps, one is at a loss if asked how to go about it if one wants to test the hypothesis that there is, or there is not, religion in India. ‘Religion’ has been used so far as one of the basic categories of dividing the domains of life within any community, irrespective of whether the subjects of the communities studied do, or do not, use such division of domains by themselves.330 Religion is a high grade notion unlike, say, ‘hunger’, or ‘food gathering’, or even ‘fear’, ‘sadness’, ‘love’ etc., those of which, presumably, one cannot avoid using to fix a context of human inter-action. Do we require a notion like ‘religion’ or ‘myth’ for such initial fixing up of the context of interaction? If not, then there must be some other cognitive interest in attributing to people notions like religion, when for all practical purposes they can go about in the world without them. More, in an investigation of other cultures, as understood as investigation into the alternative ways of going about in the world than what is familiar to us, such non-existence of notions that the researcher’s tradition considers as important and

For some of the contradictory definitions offered of ‘religion’ in order to overcome the difficulties of applying this category to describe the practices in India, see chapter 1 in: Balagangadhara S.N. (1994); for how recent the identity of Hinduism as one religion is and the role of the discipline of Indology in forging it, see Stietencron, H.v. 1984, especially the section, titled, „‘Der Hinduismus’: ein von Europäern geprägter Begriff“. 330

universal, is exactly what is interesting, and exactly what signals the existence of an alternative way of doing things. The absence of the word ‘religion’ is not merely an absence of a particular phonemic unit. When we use the word ‘religion’, say, to ask a question, ‘which religion do you profess’, or ‘are you an atheist’ we are structuring the possibilities in such a way that some answers are considered as relevant, and some others are not. Suppose this question cannot be asked in another language, it means that the structuring familiar to us is not available to the people using it and knowing no other language. Similarly, it means the structuring of experience that they do is not available to us. The phrase ‘not available’ does not mean that one will not be able to learn another way of structuring than what is familiar; but conceding that one will be able to learn implies also conceding that there are different ways of doing things, some of which are learnt through the process of socialisation by one group, and some others by another group: those who have the category of religion as a means of structuring their socialnatural environment, and those who do not have it, differ in their way of doing things. The structuring effected through linguistic means is what can be called ‘implication nexus’. In other words, the absence of the word ‘religion’ in Indian languages suggests that there exists a division of the practices embedded in a different nexus of implications than what we are familiar with when we use the word religion. What is that nexus of implications?

This is a very significant question for investigation if we are interested in the differences in the inheritance from the pasts. An approach like that of Matilal makes us incapable of seeing the significance of the question. To clear away the obstacles to see the significance of such questions is what I was referring to in chapter 1 as the conceptual under-labouring needed in order to launch a project of investigating different traditions as different knowledge dispositions. Matilal’s attempt at belittling the significance of the absence of the word ‘religion’ is part of a much more general approach. The approach he represents can be characterised as looking for in the Indian text tradition precursors to the notions and arguments we find in the European intellectual tradition. Thus a study of Indian traditions gets reduced to a historical study of particular arguments in some texts and showing the similarities to some of the currents found in the European tradition. When inconvenient discrepancies arise, they will be explained away, instead of looking at them as signalling interesting alternative possibilities. The

underlying category habit is to think that there is one set of significant conceptual distinctions, and the march of the history of thought everywhere, sooner or later, makes the discovery of those distinctions. Consequently, the non-existence of a notion equivalent to that in the European tradition is looked at as an instance of a deficiency rather than the existence of another conceptual gestalt. Such an approach can exist both as a variety of historical materialistic study of Indian tradition331 or in a nationalistic variety. In the latter sorts, claims get made to the Indian past the discovery of things made by Europeans at a later date.

This variety of study of Non-European traditions is ubiquitous not merely with regard to that of India, but also with regard to that of China, of Africa etc. The language is sometimes reverential, sometimes condescending, sometimes out-right dismissive, but the basic assumption prevails that all human traditions run on the same track to make the same kind of discoveries, some doing it earlier, and some later, and some failing to do it altogether.332 This is a more subtle, and for that reason more invidious, legacy from the Kantian model of universal history which we discussed in chapter 6. It leads to a barren approach to the traditions other than that of Europe, since a consequence of it is to make the cognitive value of those other traditions a nullity, for they do not have anything to add to what is made available by the European tradition, except by way of foreshadowing the conceptions found well developed in the latter.

8.3.5

Adventures, Holy Duties and Administration in Strange Lands

Investigation or theory building takes place within the ambit of some pragmatic directive that provides a criterion of importance and relevance.333 Though, as in the case of any discipline, Anthropology has multiple roots including the purely theoretical dynamics created by the intellectual tradition within which it took birth, still, three non-theoretical contributory streams going into its formation are worth noting. Again, as a precaution, let me remark that my purpose in mentioning these is neither to revile the past of a discipline, nor to provide a historically nuanced and well textured narrative of what went on. It is just to remind fairly well known facts to emphasise that the question of the present book, finding alternatives to

331

An instance of this is Debiprasad Chattopodhyaya (1974). Elsewhere I have distinguished two varieties of this approach, one that of considering the Non-European traditions as constituting the pre-history of European ones, and another considering them as counter-images of them. I have used the term ‘Gegenbildkonstruktion’ for this variety of approach to the study of other cultures, see Rao, N. (1989). 333 Gellner, E., (1993b). 332

available ways of doing, was neither implicitly nor explicitly conceived as the objective of Anthropology. First, there were the traveller’s tales meant to advertise one’s exploits in the strange lands rather than to report accurately on them. To be sure, the travellers of the past had closer contact with the ways of those they were visiting than the present day tourists, and often their accounts are more illuminating than the comparable accounts of today’s journalism. But even if their reports were, here and there, used to emphasise that there are customs different than what European guardians of morals considered as inviolable, still, relevant from the point of view of the theme of this book, the reports did not much bother to distinguish the feature of exoticness, say, that characterising the flora and fauna on the one hand, and that characterising the human customs, on the other. Often it is this feature which gives to those reports their present use value when compared to the work done with a more holy, but, for that reason, not necessarily more worthy motive, that of describing the wretchedness or the innocence of the heathens who are yet to receive the message of the true religion.

In these days of restoration of the lost reputations of the past heroes of Europe, it is often emphasised how the Christian missionaries, a few of them at least, fought for the rights of the natives against rampages of the greedy and the powerful. Perhaps they did. But moral uprightness does not necessarily lead to an openness to knowledge. The interest in religion and myths that Anthropology retained for a longer time, originated in the pre-occupation of the missionaries, of the more intellectually oriented amongst them at least, in the natural as against the rational religion - the italicised words echo their use by Aquinas, and are in conformity with his use. On the whole, the view of the missionaries with regard to the natives were very much in line with the evolutionary story of from the sensible to the intelligible that Kant later elaborated. Perhaps one of the hotly discussed themes of the late 18th century as epitomised in the title of Hume’s book, The Natural History of Religion, owes more to the works of missionaries doing their holy duty in the outer regions populated by the heathens than due to the compulsions arising out of the internal logic of the conceptual development within the European tradition exclusively. The tenor of the missionaries’ understanding of the modes of life elsewhere than in Europe is captured in the following two passages from Hume’s book: „In the very barbarous and ignorant nations, such as the AFRICANS, and INDIANS, nay even the JAPONESE, who can form no extensive ideas of power and knowledge, worship may be paid to a

being, whom they confess to be wicked and detestable, though they may be cautious, perhaps, of pronouncing this judgement of him in public, or in his temple, where he may be supposed to hear their reproaches. Such rude, imperfect ideas of Divinity adhere long to all idolaters; and it may be safely affirmed, that the Greeks themselves never got entirely rid of them“. 334 „But [to] barbarous, necessitous animal (such as a man is on the first origin of society ), pressed by such numerous wants and passions, [...] an animal compleat in all its limbs and organs, is [...] an ordinary spectacle. [...] ask him whence that animal arose; he will tell you, from the copulation of its parents. And these, whence? From the copulation of theirs. A few removes satisfies his curiosity, and set the objects at such a distance, that he entirely loses sight of them. Imagine not, that he will so much start the questioning, whence the whole system or united fabric of the universe arose.“335

Apart from the purpose of indicating the current ideas of the 18th century as to what the heathens were capable of, and what not, the passages above are chosen to emphasise the historical continuity of themes that still haunt us in the pages of 20th century academic journals: the notion of abstract versus concrete thinking, and certain communities being incapable of abstract ideas. This is also the contrast that is elaborated by Cassirer as the contrast between myths and science. It continued as a theme in Anthropology for a long time to come, and has even now its followers.

Incidentally, there is an irony involved here: in the above passage Hume is implicitly making a plea for the famous cosmological argument for a creator God by counter-posing it to the satisfaction with the procreation series as an explanation of generation by the ‘primitive’. 336 The ironical fact is that the former argument is considered to be fallacious by many 20th century philosophers, and the not finding a need to close the infinite series of procreation is the philosophically more respectable attitude. Apart from such historical ironies which abound if we delve into the literature concerning the ‘primitives’ and the ‘heathens’, what is intriguing is that the contrast between abstract and concrete thinking is often used without bothering to look at the nature of this distinction.

Though a distinction can be made by considering abstract and concrete thinking as logically distinguishable but in reality not separable modes that has meaning only as relative to each 334

Cf. Hume (1757), p.353. Cf. Hume (1757), p.312. 336 Hume, contrary to what is commonly believed, is not sceptic in connection with faith in God. The point he makes in the same section from which the passage is often quoted to prove his having foreshadowed the logical positivist classification of meaningful sentences, is that Theology is better founded upon faith rather than on natural reason, a position which has a direct ancestry from St. Augustine and has a long theological tradition in Britain which includes such names as Ockham in it. See, Section XII, part III in: Hume D. (1777). 335

other, in somewhat similar manner as the distinction between ‘type’ and ‘token’, it hardly makes sense to conceive them as two separate modes of thinking. A community that can structure the seasons and thinks in terms of ‘auspicious’ and ‘inauspicious’ time for the sowing to begin, and capable of an operation of counting of both the days and the mangoes as ‘seven’: what form of thinking is followed by such a community, the concrete or the abstract?

Obviously, the contrast, for all its Kantian technical clothing of spatial and temporal ‘schematism’ by philosophers like Cassirer, is more a continuation of a distinction in the tradition between the sensible and the intelligible than based upon either a logical investigation or an empirical investigation of the different forms of thought. One finds the need to formulate the inchoate impression of less sophistication of the ‘natives’ than the Europeans, and the distinction provided by the philosophical tradition becomes handy: what was originally made as a distinction between two faculties possessed by a human being (the sense and the intellect) becomes transformed into two modes of thinking exhibited by two communities, one supposedly developed, and another in the initial stages of development.

What is perhaps the most valuable is the third stream that went into the formation of Anthropology: the work done in order to satisfy a practical need rather than the other above two needs of edification of the practitioners themselves. It was the need of the colonial administrator for knowledge of the, to him alien, 'natives' in order to dispense his duties efficiently. For example, what later became one of the stock in trade examples for the discussion of myths amongst primitive people, the Polynesian myths, was first collected by Sir George Grey, an administrator for New Zealand in the mid 19th century. Incidentally, the preface he wrote for the collection of Polynesian mythology is of some theoretical interest: it can enable us to question the assumption made in much of the theoretical work in Anthropology, that the existence of the isolated communities is an empirically unproblematic fact. In the literature until the late 70s, the Polynesian communities were treated implicitly as the unproblematic example for isolated communities. But long before the idea of an empirical research on such things began, already in the mid 19th century, Sir George Grey speaks of the disintegration of the Polynesian society, and its youngsters no longer knowing the myths and traditions of their forefathers. He says that such a fact, along with the need for knowing the

people he is administering, motivated him to collect and publish the Polynesian mythology.337 The determinant factor as far as other work of a similar nature were concerned was the perceived need that a different kind of administrative or management practice is needed than that fit to ‘us’.

This need of the colonial administrator, however, coincided back in the metropolis with the need for demarcation of ‘modern’ from ‘pre-modern’ and an attempt to specify the ‘modernity’. As a result, the idea that the natives are ‘different’ and ‘less civilised’ gets embedded into a scheme of speculative history inherited from the German philosophy of history, and thus giving it a quasi empirical touch: ‘their’ present condition becomes the source of a theoretical construct of ‘our’ past condition, which then can provide a starting point for the enquiry into the processes of emergence of ‘our’ or ‘modern’ forms of thinking and society.338 Thus Anthropology becomes a unified discipline: the domain it studies is the ‘non-western’ or ‘non-modern’ social phenomenon.339

In spite of lapse of time and political changes, this determinant factor of Anthropology is still operative. Usable Anthropological knowledge is still sought in the context of need for expertise for guiding policy decisions regarding the ways to deal with Non-European groups or ‘societies’ - whether this is in the field of foreign policy decisions (think of the debates on how to handle the Middle east situation or dealings with China, or the Far East), or a demand of theoretical models for investigating the conditions and processes of 'industrialisation' of non-western regions, or models for ‘understanding’ the ‘specificity' of the supposed enigmatic phenomenon of Japan or the Far East. In all these cases a notion of the ‘other’, in the sense that a situation requiring a different management practice than in ‘our case’, is coupled with an use of theoretical models heavily cast within a framework derived from a contrast between ‘modern’ versus ‘traditional’ societies, now of course not necessarily using these terms, but terms like ‘societies with individual-centred ethos’ versus ‘communitycentred ethos’.340 337

See Preface in: Sir George Grey (1855, cit. 1956) p. III-XII. For a detailed discussion of how even in the structural hierarchies used by the Anthropologists such as people thinking in a ‘mythical mode’ as against in a ‘scientific mode’, the temporal scaling of ‘the Others’ in a past plays a role, cf. Fabian, J. (1983). 339 The idea of ‘Western’ got formed simultaneously as the idea of ‘Modern’. Though these terms are not always used as synonyms, very often one comes across their being used as co-extensive terms. See Giddens, A. (1990). 340 One can corroborate this by doing an experiment: take any book on Japan, China, or India, or for that matter on some Latin American milieu, and look for some general description of those milieus not confined to the detailed description of some particular practices (in fact even the description of particular practices are imbued with the 338

The reason why ‘ethnocentrism’ was perceived as an issue is because of an additional thesis in conceiving the domain of Anthropological investigation - that only an idea of culture as viewed by the bearers of that culture can provide a right conception of the phenomenon under investigation. The specific method of the discipline of Anthropology, the participatory observation, was devised in order to fulfil the researcher’s scientific obligations of conducting his observation carefully and accurately. But ‘the culture as viewed by the bearers of that culture’ is collected not because it has a value in itself, but because it is supposed that it makes a necessary contribution to an accuracy of knowledge about the group under study. Suppose we question this assumption that the view of the bearers of a culture contributes to an accurate comprehension of their behaviour. In that eventuality the natives’ views have no place in non-trivial anthropological theory.

Of course, one can consider Anthropology as providing us eternal verities of human beliefs. In that case too, those beliefs are of interest as phenomena, and not as knowledge. Certainly, Anthropology provides us knowledge about these beliefs - that there exist such and such beliefs among such and such groups etc. But showing what beliefs exist is not the same as showing that they are knowledge. In other words, within the framework in which the discipline of Anthropology has functioned, the expectation that it may provide a model for investigating knowledge possessed by different human groups, cannot be fulfilled. Again, as a note of caution, my contention is merely that a study of another culture per se is not a study of it as a knowledge disposition. To say this does not imply that, therefore, the discipline of Anthropology has to change its course. The latter kind of statement is possible only when we presume to answer an additional normative question, namely, what the domain of anthropology ought to be. This latter question is not the one I am addressing. All that I am saying is that the Anthropologist’s task has been conceived as that of making available the knowledge about alien human groups and their beliefs, and this is not the same as the task of making the knowledge possessed by them available.

8.3.6

Representer’s Purpose and Constitution of Domains

idiom I am suggesting), and you are sure to find assertion in the mode of the epitome (referred to in chapter 2), to the effect that they are less individualistic and more communitarian in their ethos, thereby meaning either to apportion blame or praise.

The above section, besides as a potted pre-history of Anthropology, can also be read as an illustration of a consequence of the pragmatic turn in the conception of knowledge: how a domain of study is structured depends upon the purpose for which the study is intended.

This fact can be overlooked, especially when once a discipline is established, one tends to think that the domain presumed by a discipline is something like a natural object out there waiting to be discovered and described. In pursuing any novel type of question such an attitude is one of the main obstacles. For instance, consider the above mentioned contrast, made in the very beginning of social theory, between ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’. This is a conceptual contrast as applied to two sorts of phenomena. This can very easily be confused with another kind of contrast, that between tradition and the current activities. This latter is a contrast as applied to disposition and its actualisation, the type and the token. If we want to study a group or ‘society’, it is an important question, how to arrive at the notion of a particular ‘tradition’ or ‘culture’ shared by this group, when all that we can observe is only the supposed instances of it, i.e. how to identify a type from among the observed data without presupposing that type? In justifying the choice of something as the token of the supposed type, obviously, we can not avoid taking recourse to the researcher's purpose and the usefulness of the choice in terms of it i.e. the representer's context in the terminology introduced in the section 8.3.2.

To illustrate: from a common sense point of view, it can very well be argued that no traditions in the sense of action-dispositions can be immutable, since re-appropriation of them by every new generation inevitably introduces alterations - all the more so, and not less, when the populations are illiterate and do not preserve their experiences in the form of texts committed to paper. Less conventions and institutions to ‘preserve the past’, one presumes, the more should be the alterations sneaking into the modes of behaviour of a community.

Yet in the history of social theory not only the contrast between Non-European and European ‘societies’ was made in terms of the characteristic of ‘change’, but also an exactly opposite characterisation was made the basis of such a contrast: European societies were conceived as instances of a dynamic sort of social phenomenon, the ‘modernity’, and Non-European societies as instances of another sort, the immutable sort, the ‘traditional’. About the supposed ‘immutability’, whether it is expressed in the reverential idiom of the ‘hoary traditions’ or in the deprecatory idiom of ‘static society’ (as in the famous case of ‘Asiatic

mode of production’), we should become sceptical, especially in the light of the instance just mentioned in the previous section: the Polynesian society of the mid 19th century which Sir George Grey saw as disintegrating, nevertheless at a still later date of its existence provided the paradigmatic instance of the self-enclosed, supposedly unchanging and unchanged ‘primitive society’.341

Originally, apart from the influence of the German philosophy of history, the assumption of a relatively ‘static’ society was meant to serve the purpose of drawing out the specificity of the industrial economic constellation by taking the predominantly agrarian social milieus as a backdrop.342 The contrast was meant more to stress the structural need for expansion of the industrial economy as against no such compulsion existing in the non-industrial agrarian economy. But the contrast was taken over to investigate the nature of ‘cultures’ per se, especially due to a particular reading of Max Weber, and ‘immutability’ was made the very characteristic of being influenced by traditions, change occurring was always seen as due to the ‘Western’ influence or ‘modernisation’. Once such and analogous contrasts get established in a discipline, one becomes oblivious to the underlying purpose in terms of which originally the domain of investigation was construed.

The above is not meant to say that in recent Anthropology there is no review of the nature of its domain and its objectives; in fact, an hypochondriac preoccupation with the methods and objectives characterises this discipline compared to any other discipline. I will make a whirlwind tour of the nature of that discussion as relevant to the project of this book in a later section. But before that, let me come back to the question posed in the section 8.3.1: is there in the research tradition a model for looking at the ways of doing unfamiliar to us as knowledge? What kind of basic concepts are needed in order to formulate questions and theories concerning cultures as knowledge? Where can we look for help and directions to develop such concepts?

8.3.7

Cultures: ‘When?’ versus ‘Why?’

For a demonstration that the object of the supposed field work of the ‘primitive societies’ simply did not exist, and tracing the origin of the ‘myth of the primitive’, see Kuper, A. (1988). 342 Giddens identifies the problematic of ‘industrial society’, and the corresponding contrast between ‘tradition’ versus ‘modern’, as the focus that gave rise to Sociological theory, see Giddens (1989). Amongst the two German thinkers recognised as the founding fathers of Modern Sociology, Marx is well known as the inheritor of the tradition of the German Philosophy of History. A similar influence on Weber is not that well recognised but ably argued by Alexander von Schelting (1934, cit. 1987), p. 178-247. 341

Let us first identify the point of contact between the common sense intuitions and the concepts derived from the tradition to articulate them. In the sense we are concerned with, ‘culture’ becomes an operative word only by occasions such as the felt differences between the familiar and the alien ways of going about in the world. On that level at least, the differences, and therefore the assumption that plurality of cultures exist, are constitutive of the very concept of ‘culture’. But applying standards to judge the ways of doing things is as much part of the common sense orientation. The question ‘are their ways right or our ways?’ could be the point of contact between the notion of culture as constituted by differences and the notion of ‘cultivated way of doing things’ in contrast ‘the not so cultivated’. Apart from the specific inheritance of the theory tradition of array of concepts concerning the speciality of human being, and the historical specificities connected with the distinction ‘cultivated’ versus ‘non-cultivated’, it is the question of standards that underlies the tendency towards the view that there must be one right set of customs.

Thus, a theory of culture that starts off as a reflection on our ways of doing things is required to satisfy the following two demands: (i) to provide the conceptual means to make sense of the felt differences in the ways of doing things encountered normally when two groups meet, and (ii) to make room for the application of standards of right and wrong. The latter demand does not necessarily mean that the standards one is accustomed to should be applicable, but that some standard or the other, probably a standard that itself gets formed in the process of reflection, is applicable. How this second demand can be met without falling into the trap of thinking that there is, or there should be, one world of customs is a crucial question for cultural theory.

This book is meant as delineating the tasks and not as accomplishing them. So the reader is forewarned that the second issue, the issue of standards, will not be addressed in adequate detail in this book. But I will attempt to identify one of the paths that begins with a consideration of standards but leads onto a morass.

We can reasonably ask what other, to us non-familiar, ways of doing is exhibited by a group, and raise a question why they prefer that way and not another way. This ‘why?’ is a question regarding the objective followed by them. In its turn, the objective itself can become the target of the question ‘why?’: why do they have that objective and not another that is familiar to us? A question about objectives, and rightness or wrongness of them, is a question about

the consequences of following a particular mode of action, and how far those consequences are desired and desirable. The discussion about the desirability of the consequences is also not a question of formulating a maxim to decide which consequences ought to be considered as desirable and which not. There are various considerations that one puts forward one’s preferences, but these in turn depend upon the whole lot of other inherited modes of values and ways of doing things. Entering into a discussion of the desirability when two or more different ethos are involved, is a process of acquainting with another mode of life than the one we are familiar with.343 The ‘why?’ in this context can be rephrased into a ‘when?’ question: when, i.e. under what conditions can we still say that it is this particular sort of action and not that? when is it this particular way of leading the life and not that? Such when-questions are part of learning process of identifying an unfamiliar mode of action, or way of life.

But one may easily slip from such questions about actions into questions of the sort, why he or she or a particular group has the nature he, or she, or it, has. Whereas the former question is of the sort that helps us to learn another way of doing things than our own, the latter sort is not part of such learning. It is part of seeking explanation to something which is identified as an interesting phenomenon. Assuming that in the original Chinese no straight forward lexical items exist to make a distinction between cheese and butter, we may ask the question why this is the case. An explanation such the following may be offered in answer to such a whyquestion: unlike in many other areas of the world, in mainland china until recently milk was not part of the staple food; consequently the lexical items concerning milk and milk products are not differentiated to the extent as found in those languages that are spoken in areas where milk is a staple food. For learning Chinese I don’t require this explanation, and what I require is what devices to use in what succession in order to distinguish butter and cheese when I find them: for example, when is a particular expression a device for distinguishing and when for identifying something as similar to something else. Thus in the context of learning an action, the why-question is in fact a when-question in contrast to the question ‘why?’ asked to seek an explanation to a phenomenon.

343

Here I am taking a consequentialist as against the Kantian type of ethical position. But my consequentialist position is not, and need not be, that identifies itself with an utilitarian position. My point is merely that the question of desirability of something cannot be decided by way of deducing the desirable from one or a set of maxims. For different nuances of the position regarding consequentialism, see Scheffler, S. (Ed.) (1988).

While reflecting on knowledge, the confusion between a ‘why?’, in the sense of a whenquestion, with that of ‘why?’, in the sense of asking for an explanation, is a real danger. For example, one of the concerns underlying the question of method in the epistemological tradition from Bacon to Descartes and Locke is that of finding the ways and means of increasing human knowledge. But this concern was mixed up with other two: (i) the relative merits and demerits of perception and ‘reason’ as modes of justifying knowledge, (ii) to give an account of the powers of human understanding or human reason, which was bound up with the assumption that providing a theory of how to increase knowledge is a task of providing a theory of the nature of human reason conceived as a special faculty or object.

In fact, this latter assumption amounts to conceiving the task of theory of knowledge as a task of explaining the speciality of human being. This side-tracks the issue of how best we can increase and make different sorts of knowledge available, to an issue of why human beings have knowledge that they do. This latter question handles the question of knowledge as if it is a question about a sort of objects, and it commits the fallacy of identifying a when-question, the one regarding a criterion of distinguishing different types of cognitive actions, with the ‘why?’ of seeking explanations on something that is identified as a phenomenon.

Translated onto a theory of culture, this confusion would mean confusing the task of identifying the differences of culture in order to make different ways of doing things available, with the task of explaining why human beings have culture. The philosophy of culture of Cassirer that we discussed in chapter 7 is part of this tendency of the epistemological tradition. In him, what starts as an effort to delineate the differences between the different modes of thinking ends up as a theory that professes to explain why different cultural forms are exhibited by different human departments of action and different groups of people. The explanation is that human beings in contrast to animals have symbolic forms as the instrument of mediation between sense-experience and action.344

My suggestion is that such explanations, even if they are true by themselves, are not relevant to the task of identifying the cultural differences. The theory that is both relevant and needed is one that answers an entirely different question. Though ‘culture’ becomes an operative

344

See, ‘a clue to the nature of man: the symbol’, chapter 2 in: Cassirer, E. (1992).

word by occasions such as the felt differences between the familiar and the alien ways of going about in the world, in itself those felt differences are not sufficient in order to identify the domain of cultural research: logically speaking, anything is different from anything else in innumerable ways; what kind of difference should count as a cultural difference and not, say, a biological or social or an individual difference? Answer to this question is a precondition for a programme of cultural research as envisaged in this book.

8.4

Knowledge versus Phenomena

8.4.1.

Concepts versus Objects

In the previous section the task of culture theory was implicitly identified as a continuation of the tradition of reflection on how best to increase knowledge. It is further asserted that ‘epistemological tradition’, if understood by disentangling it from questions such as the relative merits and demerits of perception and inference as modes of justifying knowledge, as also the confusion of the questions about knowledge with that of an object question of explaining the speciality of human being, can be considered as efforts in the direction of reflecting on the methods of increasing knowledge. But there is another limitation exhibited by the philosophical tradition. It is that of considering only propositions to be the right candidates for the title of ‘knowledge’. The task before us is that of bringing even the nonpropositional modes under the focus of the question, how best to increase our knowledge.

One of the claims made in the last paragraph is just a restatement of one of the founding slogans of the analytical philosophy: To reflect on knowledge is not the same as conducting a psychological enquiry. Frege suggested that not distinguishing the object and concept is the source of psychologism in logic. Ryle as also later Wittgenstein have drawn the fuller implication of this by saying that enquiry into concepts is not the same variety of enquiry as enquiry into objects.345 In the further course of the history of analytical philosophy, however, the strict distinction between object-questions and conceptual questions are not only watered down, but questioned outright. In their place positions similar to naturalism and transcendentalism identified in the 5th chapter have re-emerged, now, of course, in a more sophisticated versions of them. I will not be able to go into these developments, and their influences on the field of investigation of culture. I will proceed by stating why it is necessary to retain the distinction between conceptual enquiry and object-enquiry, and even to enlarge

345

The whole of Rao, N. (1994) is on the nature of the conceptual enquiry as contrasted to the object-enquiry.

the scope of that distinction by bringing a criterion of learnability as the criterion to distinguish the domain of conceptual enquiry from that of object-enquiry.

8.4.2

Reasons versus Causes

Briefly stated, the justification for retaining the distinction between conceptual and object enquiry is the following. The pairs of concepts such as ‘reasons’ vs. ‘causes’, ‘understanding’ vs. ‘explanation’, etc. available in the European philosophical tradition mark out an important difference. Suppose I am invited to a party tonight by my Korean friends who have bought the choicest wines for it. I may tell my neighbour that I am going to get drunk tonight. This statement may be understood in two ways: (i) as a prediction of the outcome of my going to the party tonight, (ii) as a declaration of my decision to get drunk tonight. Suppose I am asked for reasons for my saying so, in case my statement is of the first sort, the reasons I give would be saying things such as the following: my previous experience of such circumstances tells me that one ends up drinking a lot of wine, and in addition also takes some blue-label whisky at the end, and one inevitably gets drunk. Though these are also called in the common sense usage as ‘giving reasons’, they are in fact, in the terminology of the philosophical tradition, ‘explaining’ the outcome in terms of some ‘causes’ i.e. in terms of causal conditions operating in a party of the sort I have been invited.

In contrast to it, suppose my original statement is a declaration of my decision to get drunk; in that case, the reasons I give to justify my decision are of a different nature than the above. It could run something like the following. The party I have been invited is of my close friends, it is a nice company, choicest wines are going to be offered, and I have been immersed too long in work, today I have a right for complete relaxation. These are ‘reasons’ I give to justify the decision I made to act in some particular way, and not the ‘causes’ in terms of which a predicted event can be explained.

The elucidation above is given in terms of the distinction between the reasons for a decision and causes in terms of which something is predicted. But the distinction is much more general. It can equally be between justifying a claim and explaining a phenomenon. The enquiry into the nature of valid and invalid justifications of an action or a claim is not the same as an enquiry into the nature of causes operating in a situation. Thus the pairs of

concepts such as reasons versus causes, and understanding versus explaining are meant to mark out the difference between approaching something as concerned with knowledge and its variants (such as fallacies, ignorance etc.) as against approaching something as phenomenon. One and the same statement can be approached as a phenomenon or as a knowledge claim. In the first case, for example, one can investigate the statement in terms of the psychological or sociological causes that makes the person to put forward such a claim. But then we are no longer approaching the statement as a knowledge claim; rather we approach it as a phenomenon. To do the former is, for instance, to enquire the exact sense of the statement, its validity, and the nature of grounds that are relevant to decide its validity, and such things.

The next step that I want to take is to suggest that the investigation of cultural difference, as conceived in Anthropology is mainly that of approaching it as phenomenon. Instead, the project this book hopes to initiate is that of approaching cultures as embodying different knowledge systems, inherited and exhibited by different groups or societies. To specify what constitutes a ‘knowledge system’, however, the contrasts such as ‘reason’ vs. ‘causes’ are inadequate. As indicated earlier, the distinction though important was conceived within a tradition which was preoccupied with separating intellectual knowledge from context-bound varieties of knowledge. As a result, the model of knowledge within the context of which the distinction between knowledge and phenomenon is made is that of the propositional model: a model where to know is to know that something is the case, or to know that a certain rule has to be applied. If this model is taken as the basis for investigation of the knowledge systems, then it would be conceived as a task of identifying beliefs (the stated or implied ‘reasons’) behind the encountered actions. Investigating ‘cultural difference’ would thus become a task of documenting the differences in beliefs prevailing amongst different groups that presumably result in their different ways of going about in the world. This approach which can be designated as ‘beliefs approach’ was fairly wide spread, and still has its adherents in Anthropological Research. So, a short detour may be in order to indicate the conceptual weakness of such an approach.

8.4.3

'Making Sense of a Situation': Beliefs Inadequate and Unnecessary

One question the beliefs approach is intended to answer is: why someone acts in a particular way? What orientation one has that expresses itself in actions? Postulation of beliefs, it is hoped, would answer this question. Thus, for instance, many Anthropologists use the concept

of ‘meaning-aspect of an action’ in giving an account of what they are doing. This is in fact a notion borrowed from, or highly influenced by, Max Weber’s conception of ‘Sinnzusammenhänge’ or ‘Sinnhaftigkeit der Handlung’. The basic idea is the following: since communities differ in the way they deal with their environment (both social and physical) they must be structuring their environment differently. Such structuring embodied in actions can be termed as ‘meaning-aspect’ and enquiry into it is a legitimate interest. Two questions, however, are pertinent. First, what for, an explication of ‘meaning-aspect’ is sought? What is considered as appropriate elaboration of ‘meaning aspect’ of an action depends on, what for, i.e. in what context, and for what purpose, it is offered.346 Secondly, what kind of an approach to meaning aspects of action is fruitful? The main approaches so far can be identified as the variations of the assumption that it has to take the form of excavating a system of beliefs.

I venture to say that very few people have neatly expressible beliefs (in fact, even less so in the so called ‘traditional’ societies), and in general, hardly anyone conducts his or her life by looking for directives derivable from this or that belief.347 Now, whatever may be one’s scepticism regarding the worth of this as an empirical assertion, it can easily be shown that there is no conceptual need to postulate beliefs in order to account for the human ability to orient in different situations. A precondition of orienting oneself is only that one has to differentiate the environment in some way. Suppose we call this aspect of an action as that of ‘making sense of a situation’, it is important to note that it is not the same as having a belief and applying it. In fact, beliefs are neither adequate, nor necessary, for that purpose. A belief, even if it exists, need to be interpreted anew in every context if it is to be useful to guide one's actions. This implies that the usefulness of beliefs for a person possessing them depend on his having already some capacity to interpret them and apply them to different contexts. This latter is part of a more general capacity to use words or concepts (or more generally, signs) as instruments of differentiating the environment and thereby orient oneself in the world. Thus a capacity to differentiate the environment i.e. to make sense of a situation, is a different, and a logically prior, capacity to that of having beliefs and applying them to master a situation. The question of the reliability of the ‘informant’. There is considerable discussion in Anthropological literature on the problem of contradictory information given by the informants. An extreme case of explaining this is to attribute to the informants a motive of deliberate misleading of the Anthropologists. 347 Such a picture of human conduct is perhaps derived from a wishful idea of an ideal Christian conduct - the conduct derivable from, and justifiable by, recurring to the Biblical or Moral commands. 346

A second problem with the beliefs approach can be formulated in parallel to the logical maxim that an object cannot be exhausted by description: an action cannot be exhausted by any set of beliefs that may be given as reasons for it. Just as for the purpose of evaluating descriptions, one has to have some criterion whether a description is relevant or not, similarly, to judge the rightness or wrongness of the belief-system offered as an explication of an action, one need to have some criterion of relevance of the offered beliefs for the concerned actions. This implies that to judge what beliefs account to which set of actions, one needs to recur to the context and purpose of the explication. In other words, constructing a belief-system is itself a context-oriented action. If we assume the contrary, we will land in a hopeless position, because we will have no conceivable procedure available to construct the beliefs: the elementary basis for understanding a divergence of opinion is a (real or imagined) situation of acting together in the context of which a divergence from a familiar way of doing things becomes apparent. To make sense of an opinion one has to form an idea of alternative courses of action ensuing from assenting or dissenting to it. That is, at least, as an epistemological procedure an action has to be taken as prior to belief, and as that in terms of which a belief can be made sense of. In that case, any explication of action in terms of belief begs the question.

Accounting for meaning-aspect of an action in terms of beliefs is part of a notion of understanding as that of getting into the ‘original’ context of performance of an action. This, in turn, is based upon an idea of overcoming the representer's context. To conceive such a possibility one has to assume that there is (in Thomas Nagel's phrase348) a ‘view from nowhere’ or a universal context within which all human beings have their actions and thinking, and capable of communicating with each other by relating to that universal context. We have already come across the theological roots of this conception. I think that the notion of a ‘universal context’ is incoherent, but instead of arguing that out, let me raise the question, what could be a reasonable framework which provides such an universal context? Even if we grant the validity of the most favourable candidate of the philosophers for such a framework - a physical conception of absolute space and time - still, it is not yet enough for constructing a reasonable set of ‘meanings’ or understanding actions.

348

Nagel, Th. ( 1986).

Any reasonably adequate notion of context must involve the educational and historical background of participants as constitutive elements of that context within which communication takes place. This already introduces a level of variability that is sufficient to make the notion of ‘universal context’ less useful an instrument for the purpose of investigating ‘meaning aspect’ of actions.

In elucidating the pragmatic conception of knowledge I have already alluded to the fact that the notion of a 'universal context' is a result of overlooking a logical difference between object and its description: an object is more than the sum of its descriptions or representations; that is, a description or, in more general terms, a representation, necessarily means selection, and selection is always tied to some purpose, and this purpose in turn is as much context bound as the representation arising out of it. The idea of freeing the representation from the subjective purposes through a meta-representation of the context of the original representation is an illusion; because, such meta-representations can be replicated infinitely (an infinite regress) and an articulation of a meta-representation is equally bound by what purpose and in what context it is offered.

In short, the impossibility of getting out of the representer's context is part of the very nature of the representing activity. This implies that an attempt to represent other traditions cannot be free from the present purposes. So, the question is not so much getting at the original background of a ‘tradition’ one is studying, but rather to specify in terms of what present purposes those traditions are approached.

8.4.4

Learnable versus Manipulable

As against the context-invariant conception of knowledge of which the propositional model is a legacy, it is mentioned already that there is an option to take a pragmatic turn in the conception of knowledge, and conceive knowledge in the sense of techne. In the context of the latter, the distinction between knowledge and phenomenon can be drawn using a distinction between two classes of pragmatic orientations: We can look at the observed patterns of behaviour of a community either as something manipulable or as something learnable.349 In the first case the observed something can be confronted in our practical dealings either with an adjustment to it or with a manipulation of it; since both these types of This is an attempt to make the distinctions developed in chapter titled ‘Animal Symbolicum’ in: Lorenz, K. (1990a) and also in: Lorenz, K. (1996): ‘Subjekt’ fruitful for culture research. 349

dealings involve manipulation - either of oneself or the objective situation - they can be considered as issuing from the manipulative stance. Alternatively we can look at the observed patterns as instances of ways of doing things: the presented way of doing can be considered as an efficient or a deficient way and accordingly we can take a learning or a teaching attitude, both of which I want to subsume under the term ‘learning stance’, because both involve looking at the observed as a learnable something. Thus, the criterion to distinguish knowledge from phenomenon is to see whether something is the result of conceptualising by taking a learning or a manipulative stance.

When something is approached as a phenomenon the appropriate question would be one of asking what causes or sustains that particular state of affairs, irrespective whether these states are that of institutions or of beliefs. That is, ‘causing’, ‘sustaining’ and ‘state of affairs’ as used here are conceptualisable in very many different levels and ways: we may speak of physical states and mechanical causation or psychical and social states and functional causation. Saying that traditions are knowledge dispositions, on the other hand, implies that they can be conceptualised in such a way as to make them available for teaching or learning. Two things need to be said about the use of the ‘learnability’ above. First, to say something is ‘learnable’ is also to say that it can be looked at as a possible way of doing things which is further improvable. This implies further that as a way of doing things, it can be investigated as a domain in its own right with a view of improving and perfecting it. Second, as used here, ‘learnable’ is a contrast notion to that of ‘causal’ and correlative to the notion of knowledge. Just as one can distinguish between different kinds of knowledge (such as skills or information), one can also distinguish between different kinds of learnability. ‘Learnable’, however, is often used differently. On a Kantian use, for example, the capacity to estimate (Urteilskraft) is not ‘teachable’ or ‘learnable’. What is meant is that there are neither any set procedures of teaching how to estimate a situation, nor clear criterion of testing one’s ability to make such judgements.350 Similarly, Aristotle suggests that teaching ‘practical wisdom’ to young who do not have practical experience is futile; a process of

350

"so zeigt sich, daß zwar der Verstand einer Belehrung und Ausrüstung durch Regeln fähig, Urteilskraft aber ein besonderes Talent sei, welches gar nicht belehrt, sondern nur geübt sein will. Daher ist diese auch das Spezifische des sogenannten Mutterwitzes, dessen Mangel keine Schule ersetzen kann;" I. Kant : Kritik der reinen Vernunft, cit. 1975, A 133-34 / B 172-73. Also see Prange, K. (1974).

intellectual ‘maturation’ is a precondition of their being able to profit from a political education.351 But this does not mean that Aristotle wants to claim that ‘wisdom’ is a biological ripening process. Similarly Kant’s claim is not that ‘Urteilskraft’ is inborn. Therefore in my use of the term both these are ‘learnable’ even though there are important differences in kind to be thematised amongst learnables: learning ways of living or ‘attitudes’ is a different form of learning than learning an academic discipline, and this again differs from learning of skills such as cycling. But in order to demarcate a stance to something as knowledge from a stance to it as phenomenon a generic notion of learnability is sufficient.

To summarise, actions are not necessarily consequences of ‘reasons’ in the sense of beliefs. But they can be looked upon as exhibiting learnable skills. Therefore the term ‘knowledge system’ we spoke of earlier has to pick out knowing how exhibited in actions rather than the beliefs supposedly underlying them. Accordingly, the criterion of picking out ‘knowledge’ against ‘phenomenon’ is not that of identifying occasions of providing ‘reasons’ as against that of providing ‘causes’; it is rather that of identifying something as learnable as against manipulable.

Further, the dispositions to action that are learnable can be termed as knowledge dispositions. The two constituents of this term are chosen with the following considerations. (i) The expression ‘knowledge’ is used in order to emphasise the contrast to behaviour. By ‘looking at something in terms of behaviour’ are meant the situations where we may consider an expression of a habit as either a result of a fortunate or an unfortunate formation in an individual, but we do not bring upon it the bearing of judgement in terms of a standard of perfection. In contrast, an action which is an expression of a learnt skill or a learnt ethos will be looked upon as either more or less perfect, adequate or still more perfectible in terms of some standard of perfection. (ii) The expression ‘disposition’ is used to emphasise two contrasts. First, what we are concerned with are conceptualising actions in contrast to the results or resources used in an action, such as sentences and texts. Second, the action we are concerned with is in the sense

351

Aristotle: Nikomachean Ethics, cit. 1975, 1095 a 2-14.

of the type or schematic aspect in contrast to the token or actualisation aspect - the latter is meant in an inclusive sense to refer to both individual acts and assertions

8.5

Varieties of Knowledge and ‘Configuration of Learning’

The strict distinction between approaching something as learnable and approaching it as phenomenon not only does not preclude a recognition that there are different kinds of learnables, but it even enables us to identify and conceptualise those differences. There are different skills and different grades of skills requiring certain other skills as pre-condition of their learning. And learning strategy, used and discovered while learning one kind of skill, can be generalised to learn other skills. In this process of wider and deeper generalisation of the strategies of learning more complex forms of learning how to learn emerge.

Broadly, the knowledge dispositions prevailing in community or society can be distinguished into (i) technical skills, both useful and artistic ones, (ii) disciplines that involve methods, information and standards of evaluation, (iii) attitudes within the ambit of which both skills and disciplines are practised.

With regard to the items of this classification, skills and disciplines are well recognised as forms of knowledge. In the case of attitudes, however, the situation is different. Many factors are responsible why this is the case. One of them is certainly, that, unlike skills, attitudes can not be easily or perhaps not at all conceptualised into learnable procedures. Nor can they be equated with the information that a person possesses. But attitudes, in the sense of possible types of stances towards life, do express themselves in many complex ways of dealing with the world, and therefore they do have a claim to be considered as a form of knowledge. In fact, what is often identified as ‘world views’ are attitudes, even though, in such identifications, already a theoretical approach how they are to be conceptualised is embodied, i.e. it is assumed that attitudes are a system of beliefs. However, to say the least, one has to distinguish ‘world view’ in the sense of a belief-system from the attitudes exhibited in the way one acts and leads one’s life. This latter need not be expressed and most of the time are not expressible as beliefs.

Whereas skills and disciplines are comparatively easy to transfer from one culture to another, it is the attitudes, which are neither easily conceptualisable nor easily transferable, that gives a culture its characteristic specificity. It is this that can give substance to the notion of ‘cultural difference’.

As part of his or her socialisation, an individual learns not only technical skills but also, along with them, certain ways of learning: one not merely learns but also learns to learn. A way of learning when it is present in an individual or a milieu does influence other ways of learning prevailing along with it. That is, ways of learning necessarily form a configuration and do not remain separate and discrete. Thus one can speak of a configuration of learning getting formed in a society over the generations, and it is this that gives a holistic rounding off to the way of going about in the world of a community - that is both conspicuous to a visitor and also has an air high intangibility.

To sum up, the concept of ‘configuration of learning’ is one of the means we can fruitfully use in order to identify the cultural difference. But forging this concept is only an opening up of the vast investigative horizon.

8.6

A Whirlwind Detour to the Scene of Recent Anthropology

For a casual reader the question suggested in this book as the central question to be answered in order to approach knowledge dispositions prevailing in different traditions of the world, the question ‘what constitutes cultural difference?’ may appear to be the central focus of recent Anthropological literature. I want to claim, however, that the discussion there often oscillates between conceiving the task of Anthropology to be that of describing a phenomenon and that of claiming that it conceptualises the ways of going about in the world available in different groups. This oscillation is to some extent influenced by the philosophical currents that exist. In this section, I want to take a quick glance at the theoretical efforts to define the domain and objectives of Anthropology: To give some focus to such a swift whirl-wind tour I take efforts of Clifford Geertz as illustrative of the more general trend.

8.6.1

‘Thick Description’

The following is Geertz’s very influential definition of culture,352 “an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic form by means of which men communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge about and attitude towards life.” 353

It is interesting to compare this definition with the equally influential definition of a hundred years earlier given by E.B.Tyler. „Culture or civilisation, taken in its widest ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.“354

The behaviouristic and naturalistic tone of the definition of the 19th century has been transformed into an interpretative understanding of culture. Though this echoes the first person view urged by the ‘protagonists of culture’ in the 19th century,355 nevertheless ‘culture’ is not exactly conceived as an educational ideal as wanted by the ‘protagonists of culture’ in terms of the designation given to them in chapter 2. Though the definition signals the sharing of the specialist claim of an academic discipline as also envisaged by the naturalism of the third quarter of the 19th century, still the discipline is conceived more as a ‘humanistic discipline’ rather than that of a ‘science’. That is, the earlier confident naturalism and the temper of the missionary zeal hoping through the discipline an enlightenment has given place to more unsure and, ostensibly at least, to a tone moderated by sceptical attitude. The behavioural institutional view of what the object of Anthropology is replaced by the notions of ‘discourse’ and ‘symbol’, thus conforming to the 20th century pre-occupation with symbols and language. Whereas Tyler’s definition is meant to launch a new discipline, in the case of Geertz, the established discipline with a history of reflection about its past mistakes, and criticisms of them, makes itself felt in the sceptical tone.

The main question that is confronted by Geertz is: how to take note of the criticisms of the past of the discipline but nevertheless give a justification for the existence of Anthropology.

352

For the influence see Shweder, R. A./ LeVine, R. (1984). Geertz, C. (1973), reprinted (1993), p. 89. 354 Tyler, E.B. (1958). 355 Cf. chapter 2. 353

His justification can be considered by looking at the main concept he makes use of, the ‘thick description’, a concept borrowed from Ryle. Suppose we distinguish two main aspects through which a discipline can be considered, namely, (a) in terms of method of presentation, and (b) in terms of the peculiarity of the object, ‘thick description’ is the concept through which Geertz brings out his specific conception of both the object and the method of the discipline of Anthropology. The term ‘thick description’ is forged by Ryle in the context of denying that ‘mentality’ is something over and above what is inter-subjectively observable behaviour. He suggests that what we consider as ‘mentality’ is nothing but different descriptions given by bringing an enlarged context to bear on the event described. Suppose we see someone stretching his arms, and bring to this act the context of the soldierly situation and thus describe it as ‘obeying order’, there is no extra event than the stretching of arms, but still the act of stretching the arms and the act of obeying are two different action descriptions.

Geertz uses it in order to deny that culture is any special object accessible only to the bearer of a ‘culture’. There is no need for any special access to mentality of the people whose culture is studied. Geertz retains the term ‘meaning’, a notion against which Ryle’s effort was directed at. But now the meanings are no longer the special entities or accusatives of action; they are for Geertz just meant to indicate that the object of investigation of Anthropology is discourse. Discourse is ‘public’ but involves construction by the participants; there is no such thing as a purely given discourse that the Anthropologist seeks an access to. He is engaged in an activity of interjecting in the ongoing discourse with his trained capacities of looking for nuances of differences on a theme that interests him.

As result of this view that an Anthropologist interjects into an ongoing discourse, the object, ‘culture’, becomes defined in terms a ‘thick description’, that is, it is enlarging the contexts of narration by the participants. If the Anthropological object is such a processes of enlarging the context of narration, the same is the case of representing such a process. Thus, the Anthropologist, on the one hand brings his background tradition to bear upon the ongoing discourse in the milieu he is doing his field work, and on the other hand, in constructing a representation to the readers back home, brings interjects through his experience in a different milieu in the milieu of the reader. In other words, both the object of Anthropology and the

method of it involve a specific form of discourse construction, and the interaction between the two bring about a specific knowledge - the local knowledge. A further illumination of the nature of Geertz’s conception can be cast by putting it in relief to the background concerns of the earlier Anthropology, against which Geertz constructs his conceptions.

8.6.2

The Story of What Anthropology is

Anthropology with its specific institutional infra-structure like journals, specific methods and associations took birth sometime in the 20s and 30s of this century. The characteristic conceptions themselves are in reaction to some of the trends against the background of which the institutional rooting of the discipline of Anthropology took place. Against the Frazer’s evolutionism, the revolt by Malinowski was to stress the field work.356 But this field work tradition was not necessarily free from the assumptions inherited from the 19th century evolutionism. Instead of the temporal scaling, a structural hierarchy of the societies was built, even when some of the terminology used earlier were eschewed. But one slogan did get established: varying one of the dictums of Harris about language, we can say that ‘cultures vary indefinitely’ is one of the formative assumptions of Anthropology from the beginning of this century. But this meant speaking of communities as self-enclosed units. This is epitomised by the metaphor used by Ruth Benedict in her Patterns of Culture357 of seashell to describe the fine structured differences between the communities. With such assumptions of self-enclosed view of communities, the application of structural methods was easy. Thus along with the overt rejection of evolutionism the conceptual inheritance of evolutionism continued such as the contrast between primitive society and advanced society, each of them being separate formations having separate trajectories. Also, in spite of the assumption of plurality, the approaches like functionalism had to assume the uniformity of human nature in spite of their expressions may differ in different circumstances. This is needed as part of the explanatory framework. For the same categories must be applicable to explain the societies in different places. Thus scientificity and the notion of uniformity of human nature are not given up even when the variability is stressed.

356 357

See on Sir James Georg Frazer in: Malinowski (1944). See Benedict, R. (1934).

The recent discussions that started around the late 60s were governed by rejection of this inheritance, i.e., the rejection of (i) self-enclosed view of the community as assumed in the sea-shell view, (ii) the implicit evolutionary approach embodied in concepts like ‘primitive society’. Both these rejections are embodied by Wolf, in his landmark book, Europe and People without History (1982).358 It can be also considered as rejecting one dominant assumption inherited from the Kantian model of philosophy of history: the history as the unrolling of the human species essence, or the nationalist derivatives from such human species essence conception, i.e., that history is the unrolling of the essences of ‘peoples’ or ‘nations’. Instead of both these, an interaction view of the social formations was brought to the fore, and a world-historical context of contingent circumstances giving rise to different economies, and group-identities, and state formations were stressed.

Wolf asserts that his aim is to situate the supposed isolated communities in the midst of the history and showing that the losers and winners of the history are part and parcel of one and the same history. Anthropology thus becomes showing through snap shots the nodal points of societies constituted by web of relations. But in that case, what is it that is studied by Anthropology? Are there structures that can be identified as starting here and stopping there? In other words, answering the famous question of what defines the boundaries of the ‘society’ which is the central concept for both Sociology and Anthropology of earlier periods becomes an urgent task. Similarly, Wolf’s World-system analysis appeared to give up the very notion of culture, speaking only of nodal points of interactions. In another way it is a continuation of the assumption of scientificity assumed by the 19th century theorists, especially by Marx.

8.6.3

Human Sciences as Purveyors of ‘Local Knowledge’

Thus Geertz’s view is conceived against the background of the classical themes of Cultural Anthropology: It is conceived against (a) the notion of uniformity of human nature. (b) the notion of ‘primitivity’, (c) the notion of ‘scientificity’. In arguing against these tendencies, a specific comparative method is espoused and the classical theme of ‘cultures vary indefinitely’ was given a new formulation. The question a

358

Cf. Wolf, E.R. (1982).

theory of Anthropology needed to answer was: what should be identified as ‘culture’? Older answer was customs, beliefs, rituals. Geertz’s use of the concept of ‘thick description’ suggests, as elucidated earlier, that it is discourse. In suggesting this and giving a specific idea of discourse construction, Geertz could also dispenses with a need to postulate an unchanging ‘essence’ - thus at one stroke distancing from both the uniformity thesis and primitivism thesis. It also distances thereby from scientism. The term ‘local knowledge’ is meant to oppose both a notion of global essence capturable in nomological model, and ‘local essence’ capturable through the access to special ‘meanings’ entertained by the bearers of a culture. The Anthropologist captures the variety of discourses that is necessary to deal with the situations.

However, one has to identify, hazily at least, the theme one is interested in - through some criterion of importance, and for this purpose the researcher’s tradition does become the point of departure. Thus, his main study is connected with religion on the one hand and the notions connected with law on the other - both the classical themes inherited from the days of 19th century. However, Geertz brings to these themes, an approach inherited from Herder: he elaborates Herder’s thesis that human being is an unfinished animal into a thesis that to have a knowledge of human being (i.e. the knowledge that the discipline of anthropology is supposed to deliver) one has to have the knowledge of specific ‘cultures’, the ‘local knowledge’. But this thesis is again an answer to the question ‘why human beings have culture?’ rather than to the question, what it is to investigate cultural difference. It speaks of ‘local knowledge’ but in the process the claim to study the more enduring aspects of the inheritance formed through the experiences of many generations of the past are given up. In contrast, the project envisaged in this book gives up the oscillation between the approach that considers man as a phenomenon and that which focuses on knowledge exercised by him, and does claim that there is a longer term research task concerning the inheritance from the past of different human groups.

Appendix:

Samkhya: Developing Discriminatory Capacities as the Educational Ideal

Here I want to illustrate how a possible approach to doing philosophical research (as ontrasted to historical and philological research) in Indian Tradition can look like. This is only the bare outline, and meant only for illustrative purpose. Samkhya is one of the six systems, traditionally considered as the division of the ‘orthodox’ systems, within the ‘vedic’ fold as contrasted to systems that come under the folds of Buddhism and Jainism, traditionally considered as outside the vedic fold. But for our purpose this fact does not make much of a difference. For the style of philosophising in the Indian tradition is that of a debating style (Vada); this makes the concepts of one particualr system the focus and point of departure for developing alternatives to it. Therefore, if we can capture the central concerns of Samkhya in terms of issues relevant and understandable today, we will be opening up a fruitful approach.

One aspect of Samkhya is that it provides conceptions

Samkhya as elaborated in the Samkhya Karika asserts that there are two ultimate principles, Purusa and prakriti, both being involved in the process of bringing about and dissolution of the world characterised by suffering as well as dissolving that world.

Purusa

Prakriti

Mahat or Buddhi

Ahamkara

Manas

five sense

five action

organs

or motor organs

tanmatras

five gross elements

Purusa and prakriti are characterised by using contrastive predicates. (cf. Larson’s chart and explanation) se also page 169 in the Encyclopaedia. Purusa is ‘witness’ (sakshi), not characterisable through having parts(kevala), ‘indifferent’ (madhyasthyam), one who sees (drastrtvam), and ‘inactive’ or ‘non-generative’(akartrbhava). In contrast to prakriti he is neither prakrti nor vikrti, thus nether manifest (vyakta) nor unmanifest (avyakta), and thus free from Trigunya, and is something for which the generation and dissolution takes place (Bhoktrtva).

The plurality of Purusa is argued for in Karika XVIII. Prakriti is characterised as Trigunya and Buddhi is conceived as the first ‘evolute’ out of the generation process. This Buddhi is described as the discriminating capacity and it is attributed a central role both in the generation and dissolution process.

What should we make out of this?

For my purpose I want to begin with two pairs of distinctions: (i) type vs. token or schema actualisation (ii) action vs. sign action or epistemic action.

Samkhyan assertions can be made understandable in terms of the above two pairs of distinctions. In Samkhya the interest is in the epistemic or sign process and not in the process of action of making something. It is the ‘making’ or ‘generating’ involved in the sign-process that is of interest. As every action sign action too involves an actualisation and a schema aspect. In terms of Schema aspect it is ‘inactive’, ‘unchanging’ etc., but without the schema aspect the actualisation is not thinkable. In terms of my scheme the schematic aspect a signaction is the Purusa aspect. The actualisation is the Prikriti aspect. The ‘generation’ and ‘change’ are characteristics attributable to the actualisation aspect and not to the schemaaspect. Since the exercise of Buddhi or discriminating capacity is both possible in terms of a pragmatic orientation and in terms of a reflexive orientation - i.e., reflecting or epistemically probing the exercise of discriminative capacity itself - it is both responsible for ‘evolution’ where many discriminations of the world of objects take place, and for ‘devolution’ where the discriminating capacity is distinguished into schematic and actualisation aspects - the

former then gets recognised as not capable of change, generation etc. The latter is a necessary adjunct for the functioning of the discriminatory capacity, but it in itself is powerless to initiate the generation or dissolution unless there is the schematic aspect. Schematic aspect on the other hand is not the generating and dissolving principle; it is the Prakrti that is the generating principle.

Both the principle of generating and the principle of Schema involved in the discriminating capacity are not available for perception, but rather have to be inferred through Anumana. That is, they are made available through the means of Anumana. Sankhya conception of ‘Buddhi’ as discrimiatory capacity, and various conceptions of of Samkhya can be conceived as the different modes of discriminatory (or differentiating) capacities (e.g. different sense discriminatory capacities, and different abstract dscirminatory capacities. Even differentiating the Prkriti and Purusha, thereby overcoming the discrimiations, is the result of development of the the discrimiatory capacity.