Cuba and the United States: Will the Cold War in the Caribbean End? 9781685851651

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Cuba and the United States

Woodrow Wilson Center Current Studies on Latin America Published with the Latin American Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Joseph S. Tulchin, Director

Cuba and the United States Will the Cold War in the Caribbean End? edited by

Joseph S. Tulchin Rafael Hernández

Lynne Rienner Publishers • Boulder & London

Published in the United States of America in 1991 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 1991 by The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publlcation Data Cuba and the United States : will the cold war in the Caribbean end? / Joseph S. Tulchin and Rafael Hernandez, editors. (Woodrow Wilson Center current studies on Latin America) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-55587-375-8 1. United States—Foreign relations—Cuba—Congresses. 2. CubaForeign relations—United States—Congresses. I. Tulchin, Joseph S., 1939- . II. Hernandez, Rafael. III. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. IV. Centro de Estudios Americanos (Havana, Cuba) V. Series. E183.8.C9C824 1991 327.7307291—dc20 91-24790 CIP British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.

Contents

Preface Introduction JosephS. Tulchin and Rafael Hernández

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1

Part 1 • Cuba and the New World Order 1 Changes in Policy and Performance of the Cuban Economy, 1986-1989 José Luis Rodriguez

9

2 Changes in the World Economy and Their Impact on Cuba Sergio Roca

21

3 An Opening, Cuban Style Pedro Rojas Lorenzo

23

4 Cuban Youth Today José R Vidal Valdés

27

5 Cuban Culture in the 1980s Esther Pérez

33

6 A Cheap Glasnost: Writing and Journalism in Cuba Today Enrico M. Santi

37

7 Cuban Security Interests in Perspective Rafael Hernández

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8 Where Have All the Comrades Gone? Cuba Retreats from a Brave New World Juan M. del Aguila

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CONTENTS

Part 2 • T h e United States a n d the New W o r l d O r d e r 9 Changes in the World Economy and Their Impact on the United States RobertJ. Lieber

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10 The United States and the New World Economic Order Pedro Monreal González

77

11 The Role of Culture and the Media in Shaping US Society Edwin Yoder

81

12 The New Shape of US Society: Ideology and Politics Nora Palou

85

13 Rethinking Great-Power Confrontation: A New Foreign Policy for a New World Order Marshall Brement

91

14 A New Security Agenda Carlos Rico F.

101

Part 3 • C u b a a n d the United States in a Changing World Order 15 Cuba-US Relations and the Latin American Security Agenda Pedro Monreal González 16 Cuba and the Latin American Security Agenda Carlos Rico F.

107 Ill

17 Changes in Eastern Europe and Cuba-US Relations José Luis Rodriguez

115

18 The International Context of Cuba-US Relations Richard Betts

121

Part 4 • T h e Cuban-American Community 19 The Cuban-American Community and US Domestic Politics Enrique A. Baloyra

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CONTENTS

20 Fallacies Regarding the Cuban Community in the United States Rafael Hernández Index About the Book

135 139 145

Preface

Even with the recent changes in the technology o f publishing, the time that must elapse between my composition o f these few sentences and the appearance o f the volume itself seems so long, so agonizingly long, compared to the rate at which stunning changes occur in the relations among nations, the structure o f the international order, and the very nature o f the nation-state. While history is nowhere near its end, however much that phrase may strike the public fancy, it does give the impression o f being on fast forward at the present time. The notion that events are racing forward at a precipitous clip imposes a certain caution on anyone who would publish a book about world affairs. How much more cautious should we be when we publish a book about Cuba! Cuba, alone in the world, with the possible company o f North Korea, is holding out against the changes that have rocked the communist bloc. Cuba, defiantly, is holding out against recognizing the need such changes might impose on its posture toward the United States and the rest o f the hemisphere. Cuba, according to the official line, sees no need to change the way it is running its affairs, and reiterates that position in the face of declarations by nations in Eastern Europe that they will no longer trade with Cuba as they have been, and in the face o f declarations by the Soviet Union that it will withdraw its troops from the island. Indeed, it is this obdurate posture, together with the stiff-necked policy o f the US government toward Cuba, that suggests that the papers in this book, presented first at a conference conducted at the Wilson Center in May 1990, have not lost their relevance or their poignance. T h e papers define the major elements in the dispute between the United States and Cuba, as well as the most likely options open to both in exploring solutions to the impasse that characterizes their relationship. In the year and a half since the conference, the dramatic events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have emphasized the importance of dialogue both between Cuba and the United States and within Cuba itself. In the same period, as was suggested during the conference, the Latin

ix

PREFACE

American nations have come forward to assert for themselves a role in the reincorporation of Cuba into the hemispheric community. That role will grow over time if the US government continues to allow its policy toward Cuba to be shaped by the extreme conservative minority of the Cuban-American community. These are emotional issues. But for that reason it is vital to continue an open, fair, and reasonable dialogue among representatives of different points of view. That was the goal of the conference. That is the goal of this book. I want to thank Andrew Rudman and Lucy Hetrick of the Latin American Program for their assistance in putting on the seminar. Leah Florence, a cross between a stern disciplinarian and Merlin the Magician, turned the raw discussion into coherent text. The Ford Foundation was generous in support of the project. Rafael Hernández was a delightful and conscientious collaborator. He and his Cuban colleagues were meticulous and professional in their participation. JosephS. Tulchin

Introduction Joseph S. Tulchin & Rafael

Hernandez

The conference f r o m which this book emerged was held on May 3 and 4,1990, in Washington, D.C., cosponsored by the Wilson Center and the Center for American Studies, Havana. The principal objective of the conference was to discuss the future of the relations between the United States and Cuba from the perspective of the political dynamics of each country, as well as to consider how those internal political dynamics might be affected by the rapidly shifting international configuration of forces, especially in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Our purpose was for the Cubans to provide a first-hand impression of the changes that were currently taking place on the island, and for the North Americans to present the situation in the United States. With this in mind, we invited a number of experts who had not previously participated in dialogues between Cubans and North Americans and deliberately established a parallel structure for the presentations that was designed to deflect the exchange from the customary obsession with bilateral relations between the two countries. The starting premise was that each country had domestic issues worth considering in their own right and that each had international concerns, which would be affected by the shifts in East-West relations, that should be understood independently of the relations between the two. We also invited several US experts in Cuban affairs and Cubans who study the United States. The preparations for the seminar stimulated considerable interest among a variety of government bodies and elements of the policy community in Washington. A large number of US government officials attended the seminar, and they were particularly interested in the newer faces among the Cuban delegation and the positions adopted by these scholars and practitioners. In the course of the two days, more than 125 people attended the sessions, most of them f r o m academic institutions

Joseph S. Tulchin is director of the Latin American Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Rafael Hernández is senior researcher for the Center for American Studies.

1

INTRODUCTION

in the United States, the multiple agencies of the United States government, international agencies, the Congress, and a small number of lobbyists, on the Left and on the Right. The conference was divided into three sessions: the United States and the new world order, Cuba and the new world order, and Cuba and the United States in a changing world order. The issues most discussed were: • Cuba as a strategic issue for the United States; • The insertion of Cuba into Latin America; • The impact of the changes in US-Soviet relations on relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union; • The process of "rectification" in Cuba and its economic, political, and ideological aspects; • The current nature of aid to Cuba from the Soviet Union and the most likely future trends in that aid; • The nature of the current political debate in Cuba; • The role of the communication media in Cuba; • Human rights in Cuba; • The roles various actors—Cuba, the United States, the Soviet Union, the US Cuban community, and Latin America, among others—might play in the reestablishment of relations between Cuba and the United States; • The role of Fidel Castro in the current political system of Cuba and in its possible reform; • The Cuban community in the United States, its role in the US political system, and its influence in the formulation of US policy toward Cuba; • Themes for a possible agenda for talks between the United States and Cuba. The conference was distinguished from similar gatherings in the past by several characteristics, most of which contributed to the richness of the discussion, but which also made that discussion more complex than is normally the case. The agenda did not focus on international conflicts, such as in Central America or Africa, that might have affected Cuba's relations with the United States, nor on bilateral issues, such as Radio Marti, TV Marti, or Guantanamo, but on the tendencies for change both domestically and internationally. The composition of the panels and the audience was different from earlier conferences on relations between the two countries and provided a much broader spectrum of opinions, 2

INTRODUCTION

with many fresh ideas. The presence of US scholars who were not specialists in Cuban affairs was particularly helpful in placing Cuba in a broader strategic perspective and in providing a broader view of US foreign policy, in which Cuba might be placed. At the same time, the presence of Cuban-Americans, who do not normally attend such meetings, increased the emotional tone of the exchanges. Their presence, the powerful positions they hold throughout the US government, and the sharp edge to their hostility toward Cuba was an educational, if not always pleasant experience for the Cuban visitors. Nevertheless, throughout— although it was not always easy—an academic, civil tone was maintained. The objective of the conference was not completely achieved. We did not answer the question put in the title: "Will the Cold War in the Caribbean End?" And we did not manage to draft the scenarios for solving the Cuban-American conflict, despite the earnest efforts of some specialists in conflict resolution. But we did manage to establish the basis necessary for a clearer understanding of the domestic factors involved in these scenarios. O n more than one occasion, we felt that the debate was stuck in a morass of competing or conflicting ideological paradigms. The discussion was dominated by the Cuban-Americans who attended the conference sessions, even though they were far from a majority of those in attendance. More than one US academic commented on the obsessive quality of the discourse between Cubans and Cuban-Americans. There often was an anguished tone to the exchange, especially on the part of those seeking a "way to yes." The Cubans had no difficulty in admitting that some form of change was inevitable in Cuba due to world events. The dramatic decline in East-West tensions, the cessation of privileged trade with the nations of Eastern Europe, and the economic decline in the Soviet Union thoroughly transformed the strategic position of the island and put in question the political and economic system there. But, precisely because of these changes, added to the constant, strident claims of the Cuban-American community, Cubans felt themselves besieged and a siege mentality was not conducive to open discussion and a willingness to accept change. And, insofar as the siege mentality could be directed against the US, it strengthened the historical nationalism on which the Castro regime was founded. Attempting to come to grips with Cuban reality and the reality of US relations with Cuba—for the two are inseparable—is very much like coming to grips with a play by Pirandello: a play within a play, reality confounded by perceptions and wholly or partly imagined actions as well as by the tortured past of the actors. Indeed, the existential or intensely personal definition of reality even affects the way in which we study one another, whether it is in the academy or in the government itself. If the

3

INTRODUCTION

most serious students of Cuba in the United States and their counterparts in Cuba are locked in this reality play, how are we to engage in an academic dialogue—much less a diplomatic or political dialogue—that expands our understanding of one another and contributes to the resolution of differences between our countries? We are concerned with this dilemma on three levels, the personal, the intellectual, and the political. O n the personal level, I empathize with my many friends caught u p in this reality play—the search for self and mutual immolation to which Enrico Mario Santi refers in his paper. O n the intellectual level, I am struck by the rigidities of the models we use to study one another, which are the result of existential factors as much as ideological ones, and how that rigidity limits the forms with which we perceive one another. This, in turn, leads to my preoccupation o n a political level. How can we expect a reasonable discourse leading to the dissipation of tension between the two nations if the information we have about one another comes to a large extent from studies conducted within extremely narrow and rigid confines, whether economic, political, or cultural, conducted to a large degree by those caught up in an existential dilemma. At the outset, the Cuban revolution attracted considerable attention f r o m scholars of all types, on the Left and on the Right. For nearly a decade, scholars attracted to social experiments, many but by no means all on the political Left, flocked to Cuba to study the health system, education, housing, civil defense, and the "new man." Then, beginning in the 1970s, a new generation of Cuban-American scholars turned their attention to the study of Cuba and, more significantly, most non-CubanAmerican scholars gradually turned their attention to other issues, such as Chile, military dictatorship, or Central America. Today, the vast majority of students of Cuba in the US are part of the existential drama to which we referred earlier. We do not question the objectivity or the quality of these students. What we suggest is that their studies are conducted within a narrow paradigm that is insulated against more open discussion and debate because of emotional and ideological factors. This situation among a small group of academics would be of little or no consequence if it were not for the manner in which it affects the policy process in both countries. How do we learn about Cuba in the United States? How do we discuss Cuba within our government? The Cuban-American community has become over the past decade, as the interest in Cuba in the broader society, in Latin America, and in Europe has declined, a single issue group that virtually dictates the contours of US relations with Cuba. Thus, we have seen that US policy has come to reflect the same existential conflict to which we referred earlier. The Cuban-American community is like the tail that wags the elephant. In 4

INTRODUCTION

part, this has to do with the intensity with which Cuban-Americans participate in the policy process, as Enrique Baloyra indicates in his paper, but it has to do also with a lack of countervailing pressure within the system. What can we learn from the experience of the conference and f r o m our reflections on the papers and the discussions? Principally, we believe that those concerned with Cuba, with the study of Cuba, and with establishing the basis for peaceful relations between the United States and Cuba—a basis that allows Cuba a dignified, independent existence as a sovereign state—must consciously engage in paradigm shock: deliberately seeking the outer edge of the model that guides our understanding. At the same time, Cubans who value the same basis for stable relations between the two countries must understand the powerful influence on US policy that the Cuban-American community exerts, they must understand how to distinguish between that exile community and the larger nation of which it is a part, and they must, in turn, test the edge of their own ideological paradigm in order to ask themselves how Cuba can accommodate to the modern world. This does not mean cave in to the United States. The transition to democracy in Poland or Albania is not a concession to the United States; it is a victory for the people of Poland and Albania. Democracy and human rights are global issues. Cubans must learn how to deal with them in order to play an effective role in the world community. It would be an historical tragedy if Cubans used the United States as an excuse to deny themselves the joys of democracy. O n e central concern identified in the debate was the need to explore with greater care the theoretical paradigms dominant in each of the two countries. The impact of these theoretical paradigms on planning, policy formulation, and even strategic planning is too little understood and certainly not taken adequately into account in bilateral discussions at the official level. We have some very specific suggestions that we think might appropriately serve as the agenda for future conferences. We suggest that Cubans who study the United States must learn what issues move the general US public, not just the Cuban-American community, and attempt to learn what is the political price that the US Congress and the Executive will pay to act in opposition to the extreme right wing of the Cuban-American community in order to establish a peaceful dialogue with Cuba. At the same time, Cubans in this country must achieve a more complete appreciation of the world view of the Cuban "everyman." For their part, Cubans should ask themselves whether nationalism or Marxism is the central feature of their experience over the past thirty years and which is likely to be more important in the modern world over the next thirty. Similarly, Cubans should confront objective reality in a more

5

INTRODUCTION

honest fashion—inside Cuba and in meetings with colleagues around the world. What is the real value of the ruble, the true price of sugar? We can find out and we must base our studies on these realities. The Cubans must realize, too, that in Latin America, as Carlos Rico points out in his chapter, Cuba counts for less. They have their own troubles. The Cuban model and command economies are emphatically out of fashion. That may or may not last. We think it is likely to last at least for the next decade. If the Cubans truly prefer a command economy, they will have to adjust to the fact that everyone else is operating within a market framework. We came away from the final sessions convinced that we had only begun our task; it will be necessary and useful to have further sessions, structured in the same manner, to pave the way for a process of reconciliation between the two countries. Our exchanges and discussion demonstrated that the gulf that divides the two is much wider than the ninety miles of ocean that separates the two countries. We came away convinced that an ever-widening dialogue between the academic communities of the two countries was a valuable first step in the difficult process of political rapprochement.

6

PARTI CUBA AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER

7

1 Changes in Policy and Performance of the Cuban Economy, 1986-1989 Jose Luis Rodriguez

Advances and retreats occur in every revolutionary process and are, in turn, indissolubly linked to a process of development that encompasses not only economic growth and the upgrading of basic social services but also the transformation of man as a social being.1 The adoption of measures to ensure the fulfillment of these objectives requires consideration of numerous factors in each historical moment, a task that has not always been accomplished successfully. In that sense, the recent changes in the Socialist countries of Eastern Europe confirm the failure of a model of socialism in which such a wholistic approach was absent. The construction of socialism has also been complex in Cuba, a country that has confronted these transformations from a low level of development in every respect. Thus, although the economic policies of the Cuban revolution have made undeniable advances, they have also suffered from the shortcomings and errors normally associated with the process of development augmented by the hostility that Cuba had to confront due to its Socialist orientation.2 On the other hand, perhaps one of the most relevant peculiarities of the Cuban case has been that Cuba has maintained a flexible and self-critical position, which has allowed for correction and innovative experimentation without abandoning its Socialist orientation. Taking these elements into account, the current process of the rectification of errors and negative tendencies can be construed as part of a historically continuous task in the search for the most adequate means to build socialism in Cuba in the midst of substantial world changes that would seem to deny such a possibility. Nevertheless, by examining the specific characteristics of the Cuban model of development in the last thirty years, it is possible to understand why the Socialist option remains viable in the face of the failure of other experiences in Eastern Europe. José Luis Rodriguez is senior researcher at the Center for the Study of the World Economy.

9

CUBA AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER

The Bases of Economic Policy Before 1986 The causes that led to the deformations detected in the mid-1980s are associated with a multitude of factors that began with the uncritical application of the experience of other Socialist countries without adapting it to the Cuban reality. To this was added the lack of the necessary political evaluation of economic processes, which is indispensable to the socialist system. 3 In evaluating the economic policy implemented in the period 1976-1985, undoubtedly the gravest error was the absolute belief in the capacity of economic mechanisms to solve all the problems confronted by the new society. Additionally, errors were made in the implementation of the very system of management of the economy. Positive material stimuli were given priority without combining them with controls and penalties, which are indispensable for an adequate balance between management and incentives. The adverse climatic conditions that had already caused havoc in the previous five-year period became more acute; the negative effects of the long drought, which began in May 1983, and Hurricane Kate, which caused serious damage at the end of 1985, stand out in this regard. 4 The international capitalist economic juncture was also highly unfavorable at that stage. Between 1980 and 1982, a new economic crisis started, which, added to the reinforcement of the US economic blockade and the fall in the price of sugar, provoked serious external financial difficulties in Cuba. The combined negative impact on Cuba led to the need to renegotiate external debt service payments in hard currency. 5 In spite of these negative circumstances, industrialization of the country was kept at the core of the economic development strategy between 1981 and 1985. Global performance of the economy yielded a 7.2 percent average growth rate of Cuba's gross domestic product. Except for the agricultural sector, which suffered from the negative effects of the adverse climatic conditions, and the problematic transportation and communications sectors (which were sensitive to unfavorable external factors), the rest of the economy showed a positive performance in terms of value in the first half of the 1980s as compared with the 1976-1980 period. 6 Nevertheless, this performance was obtained on the basis of extensive growth, characterized by loss of efficiency of the basic production, especially in manufacturing, accumulation of inventories, and investments in process. 7 From a macroeconomic point of view, there was a growing disparity between the rate of growth in terms of value, on the one hand, and the declining availability of finished products, on the other. In practical terms, the system favored measuring economic efficiency by profit, which led enterprises to prioritize only the most profitable activities 10

CHANGES IN THE CUBAN ECONOMY

without accounting for their social usefulness. The uneven growth of the economy also manifested itself in a growing external trade imbalance, which tripled in five years. This made Cuba's financial difficulties even more grave. At the entrepreneurial level, serious problems developed with the violation of the principle of distribution according to the amount of work done. Excessively low labor norms were established, and the consequent payment was above what could be considered socially necessary. The corruption, waste, and other negative phenomena associated with such practices became more common. 8 The imbalances engendered by these errors were also manifest in the social arena—particularly in education, health, and housing—and had equally serious repercussions in the realms of ideology and politics. By the end of 1985, there had been an increase in complaints regarding (1) health services (especially in the capital); (2) violations of the wage policy and signs that the income of independent workers was out of control; (3) the number of profitable operations that had developed out of the enactment of the housing law; and (4) anomalies in the operation of the agrarian cooperatives, especially with respect to their links with the free peasants' market. 9 Throughout 1986, a process of analysis was undertaken to assess the real magnitude of the errors made and to determine the measures to correct them. 10 Changes were introduced in the economic and social policies to set the basis for a system of economic and social management in accordance with the objectives of the construction of socialism in Cuba.

The Economic Evolution of Cuba Between 1986 and 1989 The first changes adopted were in the sphere of economics. 11 Among the most significant was the elimination of the free peasants' market (Mercado Libre Campesino) in May 1986. This market, created in April 1980, deformed the process of agricultural cooperativization and stimulated the a p p e a r a n c e of intermediaries and speculators. T h e resulting redistribution of income favored socially unproductive groups without substantially solving the problems of supply for which that market was created. 12 Also, Decree Law 92 was enacted in May 1986. This law established the material responsibilities of leaders, officials, and other workers with respect to their administrative deeds. In 1986, limitations were established on self-employment, in order to control an area that encouraged illegal enrichment and the misuse of state resources; in 1987, guidelines for the establishment of bonuses were annulled 13 and dining and transportation services for workers were no 11

CUBA AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER

longer provided free of charge; and, in 1988, rules were enacted to reduce administrative personnel and regulate employment policy.14 Measures aimed at correcting serious limitations in economic management were also implemented. In 1987, the minimum salary was raised to 100 pesos per month, which benefited 186,000 health-service workers. The salaries of 13,700 workers in the bread manufacturing sector and of more than 200,000 agricultural workers were raised, along with summer wages for certain groups of agricultural workers. All these measures were taken without altering the median monthly wage, which had remained at 188 pesos between 1985 and 1989.15 These advances were also achieved without raising the unemployment level, which since 1985 was estimated at 6 percent of the economically active population.16 The creation of a new style of work, which took form in October 1987 with the inception of the Blas Roca Calderío contingent for work in construction, is worth special mention. This type of labor collective, which combines high political motivation with payment incentives, has brought about extraordinary results in the completion of work with a high level of economic and social efficiency. By mid-1989, sixty-one contingents had formed, employing twenty thousand workers.17 In the social sphere, priority attention was given to increasing construction to address the need for day-care facilities, health facilities, and housing, particularly in the city of Havana. A decisive step in that direction was the reactivation of the microbrigades in September 1986, aimed not only at building houses but also at doing social work. A new General Law on Housing, passed by the National Assembly in December 1988, eliminated the shortcomings and errors of the former law, which, among other things, included the use of houses for profit. In the area of social security, the pensions of more than 725,000 disabled persons and retirees were increased in January 1987. The resources earmarked by the state to cover basic social services increased 7.3 percent in housing and community services and 12.1 percent in education and public health between 1985 and 1988.18 Between 1985 and 1988, exports paid in hard currency grew 14 percent and imports decreased by 24.6 percent. More efficient management in services contributed to a reduction of approximately 25 percent of the negative balance in the current account.1 Efforts to balance trade with the Socialist countries also increased, but the expected results were not achieved due to a combination of negative external and internal factors. During 1986, income in hard currency was abruptly reduced, partially as a result of the fall in the price of petroleum,20 in an amount equivalent to 320 million pesos—to which can be added the loss of an additional 120 million pesos resulting from the devaluation of the US 12

CHANGES IN THE CUBAN ECONOMY

dollar.21 Combined with the losses associated with the unfavorable climatic conditions, the estimated decline in hard currency income was 600 million pesos in a single year in the face of minimum hard currency import needs estimated at 1,600 million.22 This situation created strong tensions in external finances, which caused a delay in the payment of debt service after July 1986. Cuba requested renegotiation of payments that had been previously agreed upon with banks in 1983,1984, and 1985, and of future payments in 1986 and 1987. Cuba proposed that payment of previous debts be made in twelve years, including a six-year grace period. Additionally, Cuba requested fresh credits that would cover the net losses of hard currency caused by the new international situation, which totaled 430 million pesos.23 However, such proposals were not accepted and since 1986 the process of renegotiation of the Cuban debt in the framework of the Paris Club has stalled.24 The freezing of loans after the summer of 1986 created the need to renegotiate even short-term credits for trade. The external financial situation that the country confronted caused its hard currency debt to increase from 3,621 million pesos in 1985 to 6,450 million in 1988. Nevertheless, in September 1989 the debt was reduced to 6,201 million pesos.25 However, out of this increase, only about 377 million pesos were fresh credits between 1986 and 1988, representing 13.3 percent of the total change.26 Variations in the rates of exchange also increased the debt level. Cuba modified the exchange rate of dollars for pesos from 1.21 in 1986 to 1.00 in 1987, which caused an increase in debt of 1,062 million pesos. This represented 37.5 percent of the total variation in the period examined.27 In the same sense, the shift in the rate of exchange of the US dollar with respect to other hard currency caused a growth in the Cuban external debt estimated at nearly 768 million pesos between 1987 and 1988, representing 27 percent of the total increase between 1986 and 1988.28 Toward the end of 1986, the severe external financial restrictions forced the adoption of a twenty-seven measure plan aimed at attaining a higher level of savings in the country.29 After 1986, a contraction took place in many of the areas that promote development. The net savings rate decreased from 23.3 percent in 1985 to 16.2 percent in 1986, and to 12.0 percent in 1987, with only a slight recovery in 1988 to 14.1 percent.30 This decrease can be explained, in part, by a policy aimed at concluding works already begun and guaranteeing those central to the development of the country. Work productivity decreased by 1.5 percent in 1986, 6.1 percent in 1987, 1.7 percent in 1988, and 2.4 percent in 1989. The effectiveness of the basic productive funds declined from 54.4 percent in 1985 to 40.4 13

CUBA AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER

percent in 1987. 31 Here, the major role was played by the acute external restrictions that the Cuban economy suffered at that stage, to which were added internal restrictions. The continuation of adverse climatic factors, such as the irregular rainfall that affected the agrarian sector (especially sugar), also influenced the economy negatively. In general, in 1988 the trade imbalance was kept at the 1985 level but with a decrease o f hard currency and an increase o f fixed currency (moneda convenio) with Socialist countries. Worldwide exports grew at 14 percent in hard currency, whereas exports to Socialist countries decreased 10.5 percent. Here, the consequences on exports o f the fall in sugar production can be clearly seen: a decrease from approximately 4.7 million tons in 1985 to 4.3 million tons in 1988. 32 At this stage, the continuous effort to diversify exports can be appreciated. In turn, imports in freely convertible currency fell by 24.6 percent between 1985 and 1988 and amounted to the equivalent o f 59.6 percent o f the miminum estimated needs, a fact that had strong repercussions in the economic performance o f the country during these years. Also, the imports from Socialist countries decreased by 1.4 percent. An element that has partially compensated for the external trade imbalance has been tourism. From more than 240,000 tourists, who yielded 100.4 million pesos in hard currency income in 1985, there has been an increase to more than 309,000 tourists and 152.9 million pesos in 1988. 33 From an internal point of view, after 1986 the Cuban economy was subject to the combined effect o f the adverse international economic situation and the errors made in economic management in the previous years. T o be sure, the country would have to confront a difficult and necessarily long process of change in the system of economic management that was in force until 1985, in the face o f complex internal economic and social poblems, in the midst of a difficult moment in the relations with the developed capitalist countries, and within a process of negative transformations in the system o f the Socialist international division o f labor.

Perspectives of Economic Development in Cuba Among the factors that exert a positive influence on development in Cuba are the technical and professional level o f its labor resources, its industrial production capacity, the extent o f its infrastructure, and the cohesiveness and political support o f the m£y ority o f the people for the government and its economic and social projects. The fundamental restrictions on development can be summarized 14

CHANGES IN THE CUBAN ECONOMY

as the deficit on the current account, related to the deficits in the trade balance and the service of the external debt; the effects of the US blockade; the effects of the changes taking place in the economic policies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union; the internal financial imbalance and its corresponding inflationary tendencies; and the low efficiency of economic management. Cuba can overcome the limitations that have slowed its advancement until now. The technical and professional level of its available labor resources will allow for high value-added production, including some high technology sectors for which there are industrial facilities. This is complemented by an infrastructure—especially energy and roads—that is quickly being completed in the agrarian sector and that ensures conditions for efficient economic performance. In confronting its external imbalance, Cuba has started to create conditions to increase its earnings in hard currency, assuming that there will be no essential changes in the external credit conditions in the short term and that the blockade of Cuba by the United States will be maintained. This decision is manifest in the concentration of resources in sectors with high levels of recovery of investment, such as tourism, and in a combined policy of expansion of exports and contraction of hard currency imports. With respect to export growth policy, the expansion of traditional products such as nickel, citrus, and su^ar (including its derivatives), as well as of biotechnological products and electronic components, is contemplated.35 However, the changes that are taking place in the economic policies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have a restrictive effect on Cuban economic development in the short run because the preferential pattern on which it was structured is being modified and a policy of mutual benefits on the basis of the world market is being adopted. Nevertheless, the impact of the most radical changes that are taking place in Eastern Europe will affect only 15 percent of Cuban trade. In the case of the Soviet Union, which covers approximately 70 percent of that trade, the transformations present different characteristics and their effects are therefore less in the short term.36 The measures adopted by Cuba to confront this situation are diversification and an increase in exports of goods and services to the Soviet Union, including high technology products and tourism services. At the same time, measures are being adopted to substitute imports, particularly of food and spare parts. With respect to the internal financial imbalance, a number of measures have been taken, including the expansion of the supply of products in the internal market, especially food;37 stimulation of a policy of savings by the population; and reduction of expenses by the state. 15

CUBA AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER

Finally, the current restructuring of economic management on the basis of an adequate combination of material and moral stimuli should lead to an increase in the economic efficiency of the country. The short-term strategy for the development of Cuban society includes the implementation of a food program, a program for obtaining hard currency, and a program of social development, all in the framework of a selective scheme of long-term industrialization. These measures will stimulate development and allow Cuba to confront adequately the factors that limit that process.

Notes 1. Essential and pioneer ideas in this respect were proposed by Comandante Ernesto Che Guevara in "El socialismo y el hombre en Cuba," in Escritos y Discursos, 9th ed., (Havana: Ciencias Sociales, 1977), p. 8. 2. Different assessments of this can be found in Andrew Zimbalist and Susan Eckstein, "Patterns of Cuban Development: The First Twenty-Five Years," in Andrew Zimbalist, ed., Cuban Socialist Economy Towards the 1990s (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987); Claes Brundenius, Revolutionary Cuba: The Challenge of Economic Growth with Equity (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984); Carmelo Mesa-Lago, The Economy of Socialist Cuba (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1981); José Luis Rodríguez, Dos Ensayos sobre Economía Cubana (Havana: Ed. Ciencias Sociales, 1984); and José Luis Rodríguez, "El desarrollo económico y social de Cuba: Resultados de 30 años de revolución," Cuba Socialista, No. 39 (Havana, May-June 1989). 3. At the Third Congress of the Association of Economists of Latin America and the Caribbean (Havana, November 23-26, 1987), Fidel Castro remarked that when "the Party at a certain moment dedicated itself to the internal life and other tasks, it neglected the field of economics. That was for the experts. The very Party, I believe, developed a negative tendency." (Por el Camino Correcto, 2nd ed. [Havana: Editora Política, 1988], p. 264). 4. Up to 1986, the cumulative effect of both factors caused the loss of 1,240 metric tons of sugar, whose value was estimated at $160 million. Banco Nacional de Cuba (BNC), Informe Económico (Havana, May 1987), p. 3. 5. The service of the debt in hard currency reached 3,745 million pesos, which accounted for 56.7 percent of the value of exports in such currency for the period. José Luis Rodríguez, "El desarrollo de Cuba en el contexto de la crisis económica latinoamericana de los años 80," Temas de la Economía Mundial, No. 19 (Havana: CIEM [Centro de Investigaciones de la Economía Mundial], 1987), p. 18. 6. CEE (Centro Estatal de Estadísticas), Anuario Estadístico de Cuba, (Havana, Comité de Estudio Estadísticas, 1986), pp. 104, 109. 7. The efficiency of the basic funds in manufacturing decreased from 57.7 percent in 1982 to 49.3 percent in 1985. CEE, Anuario Estadístico de Cuba, 1985, pp. 136, 166. A. Unanue and R. Martinez, "El desbalance financiero en el desarrollo de la economía cubana," Cuba, Economía Planificada, No. 3 (Havana, 16

CHANGES IN THE CUBAN ECONOMY July-September 1989), pp. 71-72. 8. The median monthly salary rose from 148 pesos in 1980 to 188 in 1985, whereas the money supply grew by 867 million pesos in the same five-year period. CEE, Anuario Estadístico de Cuba, 1987, pp. 173-174. 9. "Segundo Pleno del Comité Central del Partido Comunista de Cuba. Versión de las partes fundamentales de las intervenciones de Fidel Castro durante los debates y las conclusiones," in Cuba Socialista, No. 23, (Havana, September-October 1986), pp. 166-167. 10. Steps were taken to suppress the more aberrent errors and deformations, a process that extended through 1987 and 1988. "Plan of Action Against Administrative Irregularities and the Errors and Weaknesses of the System of Management of the Economy," released in July 1986, and "Orientations to the Organs of the Central Administration of the State and to the Local Organs of Popular Power," released by the C E T S S (Comité Estatal de Trabajo y Securidad Social) in February and August 1987, as well as February and September 1988. 11. C N S D E (Centro Nacional del Sistema de Dirección de la Economía), "Decisiones adoptadas sobre algunos elementos del sistema de Dirección de la economía," March 1,1988; CNSDE, "Decisions adoptadas sobre algunos elementos del sistema de Dirección de la economía II," J u n e 1988; "Normas sobre la unión y las empresas estatales de subordinación nacional." Legal documents published in Cuba, Economía Planificada, No. 4, (Havana, October-December 1988). 12. Sales reported from the free peasants' market reached only 1 percent of the retail market circulation and, in 1985, produced earnings of 70 million pesos (CEE, April 1987, p. 394; Fidel Castro, "En el Segundo Encuentro Nacional de Cooperativas de Producción Agropecuaria," in Cuba Socialista, No. 5, [Havana, 1986], p. 55). 13. Payments for bonuses decreased from 90.5 million pesos in 1985, to 87.8 in 1986, to 52.3 in 1987, and to 45.4 in 1988. Boletín Estadístico de Cuba, (Havana, January-December 1987), p. 116; (January and March 1989), p. 120. 14. A decrease of 6,300 administrative workers and 16,400 leaders was reported in 1988 ("Efectuado el VII Pleno del Comité Central," Granma, Havana, December 2 6 , 1 9 8 8 , p. 1). 15. CEE, Anuario Estadístico de Cuba, 1987, p. 174; CEE, La Economía Cubana, 1989, p. 10. 16. Fidel y la religión. Conversaciones con Frei Betto, (Havana: Oficina de Publicaciones del Consejo de Estado, 1985), p. 33; data offered by Mayra Lavigne, vice president of CETSS, January 1989, quoted in Caribbean Insight, 2, no. 2, (February 1989), p. 9. 17. Trabajadores, Havana, July 31, 1989, p. 11. 18. B N C , Informe Económico, (Havana, May 1987), p. 17; (May 1989), p. 12. 19. B N C , Informe Económico, (Havana, May 1987), p. 13; (May 1989), p. 7. CEPAL, Notas para el estudio económico de América Latina y el Caribe, 1988, Cuba, L C / M E X / L - 1 1 8 , October 3 , 1 9 8 9 , p. 48. 20. Re-export of oil provided to Cuba by the Soviet Union—on the basis of the policy of energy savings implemented in the country, which allowed a reduction of 25 percent in the use of energy per peso of production between

17

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1980 and 1985-provided 1,509 million pesos between 1983 and 1985. These re-exports provided 42 percent of earnings in hard currency in 1985. Fidel Castro, "En el Segundo Encuentro Nacional," p. 3; BNC, Informe Económico, (Havana, March 1986), p. 23. 21. BNC, Informe Económico, (Havana, May 1987), p. 4. 22. Ibid., pp. 3, 15. 23. BNC, Balanza de Pagos. Perspectivas para 1986-1987, (Havana, April 1986), pp. 16-19. An analysis of the Cuban debt can also be found in an interesting work by A. R. Ritter, "El problema de la deuda cubana en monedas convertibles," Revista de la CEPA:, No. 36, December 1986. 24. As late as July 1986, official creditors accepted a delay in the payment of $116 million of the principal that was due in 1986 and later reassessed payments due in 1987, at the same time offering fresh credits for 75 million pesos. However, in the face of Cuba's renegotiating position, the commercial banks proposed additional loans for $85 million, a one-year extension of the commercial credit lines for $600 million, and rescheduling $75 million that was due in 1986 to be paid in eighteen years with a grace period of six years. Because the conditions proposed by the private creditors differed so much from what Cuba was requesting, the agreement fell through (Ritter, "El problema," and Cuba Business, April 1987). The Cuban position maintains that it was impossible for the country to achieve the conditions that would allow servicing of the debt without fresh credits. On the other hand, the creditors demanded guarantee of a profound economic restructuring in Cuba for the approval of new credits. As of September 1989, negotiations remained stalled. 25. BNC, Informe Económico, (Havana, May 1987), p. 41; (May 1989), p. 38; BNC/CEE, Cuba. Informe Económico Trimestral, (Havana, September 1989), p. 28. 26. The net credit received in 1986 reached 249.4 million pesos; in 1987 it was 84.8 million; in 1988 short-term credits totaled only 42.5 million. BNC, Informe Económico, (Havana, May 1987), p. 28; (June 1988), p. 21; (May 1989), p. 19. 27. BNC/CEE, Cuba. Informe Económico Trimestral, (Havana, September 1987), p. 7. 28. In 1987, this caused a 299.8 million peso increase in the debt and in 1988 the debt increased by an estimated additional 460 million pesos. BNC, Informe Económico, (Havana, June 1988), p. 22; (May 1989), pp. 18-19. 29. Granma, (Havana, December 27), 1986. 30. CEE, Anuario Estadístico de Cuba, 1988, p. 99. 31. Calculations based on CEE, ibid., pp. 135, 171,195; BNC, Información estadística seleccionada sobre la economía cubana, (May 1989), p. 4; and CEE, La economía cubana en 1989, 1990, p. 10. 32. BNC, Información estadística seleccionada de la economía cubana, (May 1987), p. 22; (May 1989), p. 14. 33. BNC, Informe Económico, (Havana, May 1987), p. 19; (May 1989), p. 9. On this issue, see Ramón Martin, "El turismo y su desarrollo," in Economía y Desarrollo, Nos. 5, 6 (1988). 34. The sale to Brazil of ten million doses of meningitis B vaccine, through barter exchange, totaled $100 million in 1989. IPS (International Press Service), 18

CHANGES IN THE CUBAN ECONOMY

Economic Press Service, Boletín Quincenal sobre Cuba, No. 32, October 31, 1989, p. 724. 35. Nontraditional exports grew at an annual median rate of 18.8 percent between 1981 and 1985. Andrew Zimbalist and Claes Brundenius, The Cuban Economy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), p. 147. 36. The result of negotiations that shaped the accords for trade exchange in 1990 confirms this point of view. 37. Among the fundamental goals of this program are to produce, by the end of 1995, 100,000 tons of pork per annum, 172,500 tons of fowl, and 3,250 million eggs, and to reach self-sufficiency in rice and milk products. IPS, Economic Press Service, Boletín Quincenal sobre Cuba, No. 7, April 15, 1990, pp. 3-5.

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2 Changes in the World Economy and Their Impact on Cuba Sergio Roca

I would characterize the Cuban economy today as being at a crossroads, in much the same way as it was in the mid-1960s when the Cubans chose to adopt what I call the moral economy, the leftist economic model. Or, indeed, the same kind of crossroads in which they found themselves in the mid-1970s when they attempted to engage in market-type reforms under the Economic Management and Planning System (SDPE). But this crossroads is a more complicated one. Cuba is faced with unfavorable external conditions not of its own making. And Cuba also confronts detrimental internal conditions that are of its own making. This combination is likely to produce an untenable situation with potential for turmoil and probable change. Economic growth rates have been essentially flat or even negative since 1984/85. Labor productivity has been declining. Capacity utilization of industry is low. The level of the deficit in the state budget has been multiplied by seven. The economic policies undertaken since the start of rectification in late 1984 and early 1985 seem to be conspiring against efficiency in the Cuban economy. In the sugar industry, output has remained flat, seven or eight million tons for the last five years, even though world market prices have picked up. And, of course, the hard currency debt has doubled in the last five years, and Cuba has not had any fresh loans since 1986. The Eastern European countries export record to Cuba since 1984, well before the present troubles, is mixed, with only East Germany and Romania showing sustained growth. However, Castro and other Cuban leaders have been skeptical about the continuation of economic relations with the Eastern bloc; shortages of raw materials and lack of spare parts deliveries have already affected Cuban output. A review of prospects for Cuban trade with individual Eastern

Sergio Roca is professor of economics at Adelphi University.

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European countries shows that the potential loss of trade with East Germany probably will have the greatest overall impact simply because that country was Cuba's most important East European trade partner. There will also be specific losses from secondary trading partners such as Hungary. However, for the time being Cuba and Eastern Europe will continue as a kind of "partners of last resort"; that is to say, they will consider each other residual outlets for output unwanted or unsold in the world markets. This will be a temporary condition while Eastern Europe adjusts to trade in the new world markets. Conditions for Cuba will harden and become less subsidized, but supplies will keep flowing, albeit at a reduced level for the next two or three years. The economic relationship with the Soviet Union holds the key to the survival of the Cuban economy. Soviet deliveries to the island have remained flat for about five years. Soviet pressure to increase the efficiency with which Havana manages its resources has been at an all-time high for the last year or so, and it promises to get even higher. That has meant a great deal of pain and suffering to the Cuban people and the Cuban economy, but they have survived.

22

3 An Opening, Cuban Style Pedro Rojas Lorenzo

Cuba is living through one of the most complex and delicate moments of the last thirty years. Characteristic of the times are international economic limitations, with consequences for the availability of consumer goods for the population, the increasingly aggressive activities of the United States, and the influence of complex social phenomena that are taking place elsewhere. Although some abroad predict the imminent fall of the Cuban government, and others forecast a militarization of Cuban society, the revolution continues to strengthen itself and there is progress on the road to wider democratization of the society. Journalism is at its crucial hour. For years, information as a public service in Cuba had to be presented under the enormous external pressure of the constant economic, political, and military siege of the country by eight North American administrations. This created conditions such that the defense of the nation took precedence over all activities, including journalistic discourse, which was replaced by propaganda about administrative activities and national celebrations. The end result was that distortions took root in Cuban society and in the mid-1980s caused the rise of formalism, double moral standards, hypocrisy and opportunism, cases of corruption, and other phenomena f r o m which it had been immune in the first revolutionary years. If earlier sins were caused by idealistic errors, in the mid-1980s we were on the verge of strategic errors. The Cuban press continued to be laudatory. Not a single defect that later brought about the process of rectification of errors and negative tendencies was made known through the mass media. This demonstrated that no antidote existed in the press to protect society with respect to internal problems. It was precisely this laudatory and triumphalist style—based on the untenable assumption of doggedly defending the revolutionary process—that turned the press

Pedro Rojas Lorenzo is a journalist for Radio Rebelde.

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against the most vital interests of the country. Even without lying, the press could create the illusion of a country where everything was going well and everything was positive and unanimous, whereas the real country confronted serious ethical and economic problems. There were two Cubas, that in reality and that in the press. The current informational policy, agreed u p o n by all journalists at their congress and submitted to public debate in 1986, is conceived as an instrument to perfect socialism, to strengthen internal democracy, and to deepen the peoples' confidence in the program of the revolution. What is the extent of this opening, and are there any guarantees that the process will not be paralyzed? Today, it is not just the press that is being reformed, but the whole country. Current changes in the press, in the midst of a rectification process that affects all sectors of national life, are rooted in the conviction that without a deep and conscious evolution in the work of the mass media, this rectification would not even be imaginable. O n e of the central questions under debate is the problem of what the press can and should be, searching for our ideal in the very historical roots of Cuban journalism. If the people are the natural subject of the process, public opinion must play a more active role, and broad and complete information is necessary. In other words, a new type of journalism should promote dialogue and public debate and open a space to all those who want to render an opinion about and even disagree with our project toward socialism. There are obstacles to the implementation of this policy. The long stage of formalism and bureaucracy in the press, which produced a gray, boring journalism estranged from daily life, reduced the role of journalists to that of intermediaries, devoid of opinion. Hence, many are poorly trained in the practice of investigative or interpretive journalism, engage in self-censorship, and feel dominated by inertia, skepticism, or puerile comfort. It is far easier to practice laudatory journalism. Of course, it is also idealistic to assume that all leaders and officials in the country are actually in agreement with such a policy. Some are used to the existing ways of administering information. Some have developed a "siege mentality," which makes it difficult for them to understand the role of information in a modern society. Others are intent on maintaining a naive informational monopoly to hide the facts and ignore events. In some cases, understanding the information policy ends when any critical analysis by the press refers to those who—because of their own arrogance and conceit—think of themselves as untouchable and react bitterly when their shortcomings and errors are exposed to public light. Another fundamental problem is the insufficient availability of diverse 24

AN OPENING, CUBAN STYLE

opinions that would demonstrate, without preconceptions, the true feelings of the people and thus stimulate dialogue and debate. This is not exclusive to the press; it is a problem of society. It is not easy to uproot the image of formal unanimity, nor the rhetorical formulations to which we have been accustomed for many years. There is a great diversity of opinion among the Cuban people—a diversity marked by the effort to improve socialism and to find solutions adequate to the realities of the country. That debate, however, does not reach the pages of the press, although encouraging steps are being taken to come closer to the interests and thoughts of the workers. A new editorial practice is about to unfold that will encourage debate and critical analysis as a way to improve and dignify our own work. This will teach us to listen to divergent ideas within the revolution and to search for truth in the confrontation of such opposing ideas, and it will reveal that truth is not proposed a priori but must be demonstrated. We are far f r o m having created a culture of information. We are only at the threshold of the changes that we seek, although what has already been accomplished confirms the fairness of and need for this process, and indicates that it would not be possible to regress. We are currently in the struggle between theoretical clarity and the practical difficulties of advancing this transformation. If we compare the present with the situation in 1986, progress has been made, although limitations and errors are also apparent. Cuban radio as a whole—made u p of fifty-five stations in the country—has made a 180-degree change in its search for total access to information. This is evidenced in the reduction of taboo themes, the elimination of conservatism in those who direct the medium, and a deeper and more analytical treatment of the more prominent problems of the country. Compared to the medium in 1986, Cuban television time does not belong as much to broadcasters and artists as it does to journalists whose programs concentrate on debates highlighting the opinions of the population. It is in the realm of information, basically in its prime-time news programs, that changes are not yet evident. In print, Juventud Rebelde, the information journal for Cuban youth, takes positions through debates of national scope in which strong criticisms emerge about the party itself, about governmental management, about the operation of parliament, and about many other subjects of current interest. Trabajadores, the means of expression for the trade unions, also carries strong debates with respect to labor issues and against administrative negligence and inefficiency. In the provincial newspapers, which number fifteen, printing a total of one-half million issues per day, matters of daily life in the interior are treated more broadly, although we believe that much more can be done. 25

CUBA AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER

Granma is the most conservative of our journals, which is, to a certain extent, logical, although not justifiable. Especially with respect to the international audience, we have not been able to convey the idea that what is published there under ajournalist's signature is generally his own opinion or that of his wife, his children, or his friends. Everything in Granma is associated with the opinion of the Central Committee of the party, for which it is the organ of expression. With criteria particular to each of the institutions that promotes them, there are more than seven h u n d r e d diverse periodicals that address matters of national interest in depth and present polemical opinions on philosophical and artistic questions, youth problems, scientific matters, and economic themes. Another problem that we confront is our considerable backwardness in research. O u r lack of current knowledge about modern advances in this field prevent us from utilizing new techniques. We do not have a scientific feedback system—except for mail, telephone calls, and some other limited attempts—that would allow us to measure and systematically analyze the relationship between the message and the resulting policy, the effectiveness of such messages in different social sectors, and the press-public relationship. Of course, we are still dissatisfied. Much is yet to be done to uproot the vices that were bred in our press, creating the tendency to indoctrination and agitation. Cuban journalists have become convinced that journalistic adulation is the "AIDS of politics."

26

4 Cuban Youth Today —

JoseR.

Vidal Valdes

The fate of the Cuban revolution depends on how the generations that played a prominent role in its history will transmit to their children the motives that assisted them in carrying out their political program; it also rests on getting these new generations to make these motives their own. Cuban leaders proclaim that the new generations have within them the same spirit that made the establishment and consolidation of a Socialist regime possible in Cuba—overpowering both the resistance of those classes within Cuban society that opposed it and the major efforts of successive US administrations since 1959 to make this regime a failure. Their adversaries hope that this spirit will disappear along with the generations that made the revolution—or even before—and that other ideological tendencies will end this period in the history of Cuba.

Young People in the Cuban Population In 1972, gross birth rates had reached about thirty per thousand. Although the rate went down dramatically after that—as a result, among other things, of increased use of contraceptives, the elevation of the educational level of the population, and the massive incorporation of women into labor activity—by 1988, 54.9 percent of the population was less than thirty years old. At first, the demographic explosion generated a strong demand for nurseries and other children's institutions. Then the arrival of this group at school age focused attention on their interests and needs at that stage. At the end of the 1970s, the first elements of this demographic boom began arriving on the labor market. Then, priority shifted to employment opportunities, the age composition of leadership groups, the formation of new families—with the corresponding increase in the demand for J o s é R. Vidal Valdés is a journalist with Juventud Rebelde.

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housing—and greater demands on the cultural and recreational infrastructure. The high educational level of these generations makes them the best informed of the whole Cuban population and a decisive factor in the functioning of society: nearly sixty of every hundred professionals and technicians are less than thirty-four years old, and 45 percent of the members of the working class are young people.

Some Characteristics of Cuban Youth The young play an important role in Cuban economic and social development, as well as in scientific and artistic activities. Creativity, the struggle to adopt what is new and more advanced, the energy to face difficulties and acute critical judgments characterize their participation. There is often a subordination of individual interests to social ones; one can find youngsters who are separated f r o m their families and living in unfavorable conditions, but who nevertheless show real satisfaction in what they are doing. This general tendency does not hide the problems or the contradictions that limit the social potential of these young people. A delay or reduction in the investment process, together with deficiencies in planning, produced a disjuncture between the low demand for skilled labor and the number of secondary-school graduates. This led to unemployment among youngsters, the majority of them skilled workers. Most of the work available is hard labor, which is not well paid. In many cases, a family would prefer to support a youth rather than have him be far f r o m h o m e or do work beneath his level of training. A government response has been a form of social security called the Skilled Labor Force Reserve. Each unemployed worker receives a stipend and is placed as an extra at some kind of j o b related to his skill until a definite contract can be made. Through this method, tens of thousands of skilled workers have been employed. Among the methods used to find a solution for the nonskilled labor force is the construction of communities in rural areas with low population, mainly in the mountains, to attract young families and stabilize the agricultural labor force. A short list of other problems and contradictions in the system would also include the poor relationship between a too theoretical educational preparation and actual practice; the training of technicians and professionals with too narrow specific skills; and inadequate training for the youth to be independent in their work life. The social sciences, mainly psychology and sociology, also include the young among their main themes, not only concerning their prepara28

CUBAN YOUTH TODAY

tion for and insertion into the labor force, but also in other spheres of society. In 1985, a study of more than thirteen hundred students from all educational levels confirmed that they were well informed about essential aspects of Cuban social life and were able to evaluate equitably both the positive and negative aspects of Cuban society. The youngsters showed confidence in the development perspectives of the country, optimism about the possibilities that society offered them to realize their aspirations, and a high esteem for patriotism. The investigation did disclose some difficulties in the level of selfevaluation of these students, however. Although there was a growth in self-evaluating expressions proportional to the increase in the age of the youngsters, these students were generally not very self-critical, evidenced by the low level of demands made on themselves and the fact that they focused mainly on the positive aspects of themselves, referring only infrequently to deficiencies that, in general, concerned personality traits. The Cuban family has also undergone important changes. Due to the democratization of social relations promoted by Cuban society, family discussions tend to be more open and frank; extreme rigidity and authoritarianism are being left behind. However, many traditional ways of functioning have not yet been eradicated, and unequal development still exists. Women often continue to assume the majority of the household chores and educational responsibilities; the image of the self-sacrificing mother still prevails. At the same time, few responsibilities are given to children, who thus become passive and dependent. Objectively, the time required for domestic chores often reduces the time available to communicate with children and the family in general; to this must be added the difficulties of getting a house and the problems of intergenerational relationships.

Youth in the Present Political Situation After the first half of 1986, a critical analysis of the functioning of society and the course of the revolutionary effort in general began to take place. This process, which has been called the rectification of errors and negative tendencies, coincided with a worsening in the economic situation of the country, the virtual disappearance of the Socialist community in Europe, and the renewed perception by the US government that a policy of harassment and pressure could produce changes in Cuba similar to those in Eastern Europe. The effects of the worsening economic system have been tempered by the understanding by most citizens that external factors have been the major cause of this situation. They realize that the negative impact on 29

CUBA AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER

the standard of living is relatively small compared to the situation that prevails in much of Latin America and that, as a result of the rectification, the economy will tend to improve in the long run. The influence of perestroika and the transformations that took place in Eastern Europe has changed gradually in accordance with the evolution of events. At the beginning, the youth were critical of the problems in Socialist societies, which is understandable, given the points of contact between Cuba and the Eastern European countries, the existence of similar problems, and the coincidence with a local process that sought similar objectives, although by different paths. However, the results obtained by those societies has raised the esteem in which those ideas and the concomitant political processes are seen and understood. The renewed politics of hostility and pressure u p o n Cuba by the US government—in the form of radio transmission directed at Cuba, the firing u p o n the S.S. Herman, the increase in military activity at the naval base at Guantanamo, and the TV Marti project—have deepened patriotic feelings and rallied the people, including the youth, around the revolutionary leadership. An important factor in the political dynamic has been that institutions have reinforced their prestige and authority by eradicating bureaucratic methods—removing excessive formalities in their functioning, rigidity in the work style, and a certain aloofness from affairs that interested and worried young people most. In the rectification process, youth have played a leading role in two events that have had serious repercussions in national life and that have lead to the transformation of its institutions. The first was the Fifth Congress of the Young Communist League in April 1987, which was characterized by the frank discussion of themes of importance to the whole country. The youth showed they were not only well prepared, but capable of expressing their opinions and demonstrating maturity and political consciousness. The dialogues among the young delegates, widely disseminated by the mass media, increased the confidence not only in our youth b u t in the process of rectification itself. For the young people, the congress meant an increase in their consciousness of participation in the political life of the country, a greater identification with the Young Communist League, and an increase in their commitment to the revolution. The congress was not an isolated event; it was a catalyst for new transformations. The League discarded its tendency to work only with its members or, at most, with nonmembers with similar orientation, and turned in a more determined way to the wider masses, incorporating in its agenda concerns of the whole younger generation. Examples of this are the move to eliminate the right to keep a j o b only by virtue of seniority, the establishment of a new system for entering institutions of SO

CUBAN YOUTH TODAY

higher education, the attempt to improve job-finding mechanisms and increase employment, the backing of inventions and innovations by young technicians, and the modernization of clothing fashions, among other changes. The national newspaper, Juventud Rebelde (with the second largest circulation in the country), and nine magazines that reflect different segments of the young population play important roles here. Other mechanisms have been created, such as open assemblies, where not only members of the Young Communist League participate, but young people f r o m different work or study centers can state their worries and ideas. Student organizations have been revitalized, particularly in their function of representing student interests. A common trait of these organizations during the last five years has been the development of democratic electoral mechanisms with open candidacies, more candidates than positions, and ballots that take into account proposals that come f r o m the rank-and-file. The other movement that became popular after December 1989 led young people to "take to the streets" to express their backing for the revolution. This movement, stimulated by the patriotic fervor generated by the increase in the US government's hostility toward Cuba, is characterized by its popular, innovative, and youthful language as well as by the diversity of its forms and expressions. The general messages of these mobilizations have been the support of the revolution, Castro, and Cuban socialism; the rejection of any attempt to impose changes f r o m the outside; the obligation to continue improving the work of the revolution; and the struggle against vestiges of generational confrontations. The visible consequences of this process have been that the message of the revolution is frankly on the offensive. The prestige of the youth and their organizations have grown in the eyes of the leaders of the country as well as the revolutionary masses, and a certain political and ideological prejudice—based on differences linked to fashion, musical inclinations, and conduct—has been eliminated. Greater attention is being given to the questions the youth have and to the attempt to find answers to them. The basic characteristics of the Cuban youth of today are a sense of independence and a sense of social justice, both fully identified with the revolution and the achievement of socialism in Cuba. From that emerges the confidence of the leaders of the Cuban revolution that their work will continue beyond their individual existence.

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5 Cuban Culture in the 1980s Esther Perez

Two of the most important lines of development in Cuban artistic-literary culture o f the 1980s are the emergence of new institutions in this sphere and the emergence o f a new generation of artists and writers. Both developments are intimately related to one another and are mutually reinforcing. I will not attempt here to make an assessment of the stages and generations o f Cuban culture in the last thirty years. Also, this is necessarily only a partial account o f artistic and literary activity. Several generations o f creators coexist in Cuba, and the most interesting productions do not come only or necessarily from the youngest. In my opinion, the most important novel published in the last few years, Las iniciales de la tierra, is by a writer more than fifty years old—Jesús Díaz. In 1976 the Ministry of Culture was created. This institutional upgrading of cultural activity—coupled with the fact that Armando Hart, the person placed at its helm, elicited consensual support from the intellectual community by his revolutionary, intellectual, and personal prestige—would bear fruit at the end o f the 1970s and the beginning o f the 1980s in a variety o f ways. Hart assumed the task o f searching for new institutional forms to fulfill the demands of the grass-roots artistic-literary movement: administrative zeal would be substituted with a type of organization in which there would be direct participation of the creators o f culture, with their differences and tendencies; regroupings in decisionmaking; and the implementation of cultural policies. The new ministry gave equal weight to the multitude o f voices that comprised the choir of Cuban culture. This was due not only to the publication and relegitimization o f authors who had been kept relatively silenced, but also to the creation of new groups, spaces, tendencies, and debates, the revitalization o f cultural press organs, and similar phenomena that have given the Cuban culture of the 1980s a dynamism Esther Pérez is vice president of Casa de las Américas.

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far superior to that of the preceding decade. This included two institutions that proved, in the midst of vicissitudes and avatars, the advantages of concentrating on a single issue: the Cuban Institute for Cinema Art and Industry (ICAIC) and Casa de las Américas. The centralizing Ministry of Culture thus dedicated itself to the apparently paradoxical task of decentralizing cultural activity, insisting on autonomy for all purposes and all institutions that it strived to create. In organizational terms this restructuring has consisted of the following: • Reduction of the ministerial structure (e.g., vice ministers were reduced from seven to three); • Creation of national councils or institutes for each type of artistic expression (film, theater, fine arts, music), whose cultural management is in the hands of an artistic council that (ideally) represents all tendencies and criteria of the artistic and cultural landscape of that form of expression; • Creation or strengthening of centers for promotion, research, and development of artistic expression—whose presence is increasingly felt in the national cultural realm—on the basis of a self-definition that is still in the process of taking form. At the same time, these centers are seen as spaces for experimentation and debate among creators, critics, and the public (Centro Alejo Carpentier, Wilfredo Lam, Juan Marinello, and others); • Search for administrative and financial mechanisms that are specific to each artistic expression and coherent with the essence of each; • Strengthening of participation by the Union of Writers and Artists of Cuba (UNEAC) and Asociación Harmanos Saiz in the debates and decisions relating to the organization of culture. A second process of interest here is the rise of young artists and writers who are contributing new voices to Cuba's intellectual generations. This group—made up of children of the "baby boom" that took place in the decade immediately following the revolution—is the first that grew up and was formed entirely within the revolution. The problems proposed by this new generation of artists and their social repercussions would be difficult to understand if we ignored the level of general education reached by the Cuban population in the twenty-eight years since the literacy campaign, or the establishment and successive broadenings and transformations of the system of artistic training and the growth of spaces for cultural consumption in the country. It would also be 34

CUBAN CULTURE IN THE 1980s

difficult to understand fully the proposals of this intellectual sector without a knowledge of the dogmatism and sectarianism of that period in Cuban cultural policy, which has been characterized as "five gray years." Moreover, it is not possible to appreciate this stage without understanding its relation to the impoverishment of the Cuban social sciences which, in turn, is related to a certain dogmatic Marxist thought and to the prevalence of technocratic and bureaucratic criteria in the management of a variety of sectors of the economy and the society. Several theoretical attempts already have been made to characterize the basic elements of the new poetry. The most evident traits have to do with the clear subordination of the aesthetic search to the ethical message and the need for the work to be a vehicle for the communication and debate of ideas. This becomes clearly evident in the plastic arts, where conceptualism has become almost universally prevalent. Nevertheless, at the deepest level, what is expressed in its poetry is the tension between the assimilation of all the vanguards and post-vanguards (a ripe fruit of a system of artistic training that is broad, sophisticated, and informed) and the consciousness of belonging to a pre-modern world. This awareness already shows a radical difference from the intellectuals who led the debates on the role of intellectuals in the revolution. They understood each other as supporters of the Third World because of their recognition of the revolutionary fact that they were members of a learned minority in a country with only a secondgrade level of schooling. By contrast, the new artists come from all sectors of the Cuban population and are therefore bearers of a more genuinely popular message as much in its content as in its need for communication. Hence, this tension is expressed in two basic characteristics of artistic and literary production: 1. Relegitimization of eclecticism and experimentation, but in the service of exploring real national issues. This explains the kitsch, the neo-originist poetry, and the meditations on "here and now." It is also related to explicit incursions in the social sciences. The youngest artists often develop into psychologists, philosophers, and sociologists (the title of a recent exhibit of paintings was "Science and Ideology") to compensate for the impoverished Marxism that they received in their formative years. 2. The search for communication with broader sectors of the population: painting not only leaves the gallery, but becomes performance, plastic action; or a group of plastic artists sings poems in the style of Nueva Trova. Anything goes as long as groups not previously reached by traditional means are incorporated in the most active manner possible. At the same time, an attempt is made to abolish the distance 35

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between art and the public, removing the barriers between what is "learned" and what is "popular," a movement that had been initiated by the previous generation (e.g., in music, Leo, Frank Fernández, Pablo y la Sinfónica, Conjunto Lírico). O n the road to a broadened social communication, the young people are addressing the distance between the code in which their proposal is expressed and the possibilities of aesthetic reception by that broadened public. In other words, these artists openly contradict the other powerful "shapers" of taste at the social level—school and the mass media. Awareness of that contradiction had already caused the rise of new vocations and methods of work. Hence, there has been an insistence on the need for including artistic training in the curricula of primary and secondary schools, and a number of graduates in art find this the way to effectively socialize their proposals. Some young writers, theater people, filmmakers, musicians, and plastic artists are already having a visible influence on the Cuban mass media—video, film, soap operas, musical programs—which could be highly influential given the power of those social broadcasters in our country. Some of the youngest artists work with the traditional wisdom of popular culture, making progress through the path of comprehension and use of common sense in search of a higher level of social selfknowledge. Work with proverbs (folkloric or plastic arts), the constant questioning of attitudes and values, and the ferocious criticism of double moral standards could all be the beginning of an important contribution f r o m this generation to the broadening of the culture of creation and cultural participation to which the Cuban model aspires. The rejection of technocratic deviations that are vulgarly pragmatic and anti-utopian have caused this generation to be acutely aware of the need to recover and rebuild its historical memory. The identity crisis that all generations go through has coincided in these young people with a broader search for national identity within socialism. In other words, the process of rectification has proposed to them the need to recover their history. A reflection of that is their obvious interest in knowing the experiences that—in society in general and in the cultural realm especially (Teatro Escambray, Nueva Trova, Cuban thought)—took place in the first decade of the revolution. This will have to give way (and perhaps it is already giving way) to a richer and more mature reflection about artists and intellectuals and their roles in society and in socialism.

36

6 A Cheap Glasnost: Writing and Journalism in Cuba Today Enrico M. Santi Carlos Diaz-Alejandro, a Cuban economist I used to know at Yale, would often muse, when facing the predicament of the exiled Cuban intellectual, that at times like this it would be perfect to become Scandinavian: "¡Chico, quién fuera sueco!," he would cry, in his unavoidable Havana accent. I, obviously, am not a Swede. Nor am I, unlike my three peers, a functionary working for a particular government. Therefore, my own thoughts on our topic are necessarily those of an independent reader of the Cuban cultural scene. Instead, my sole guide through the following reflections is a recent lesson: History is full of surprises, and if this meeting shows anything, it is that we cannot run away from ourselves. I will return to this theme at the end of my paper. Our conference asks—Will the Cold War in the Caribbean end? I take this to be a rhetorical question, half-truth and half-wish, that actually asks something else: How can we end the Cold War between the US and Cuba? In turn, our own particular session deals, like its counterpart this morning, with the way Cuban society is shaped by culture and the media. I share the organizers' belief that there is a relationship between these two broad topics, though I do not believe that the relationship is a simple one. One first objection: I am not convinced that the premise upon which these two sessions are built is entirely true. Its premise is not so much false as insufficient. Societies are not shaped by culture and the media. Societies are shaped by other things. Among them: values, interests, and goals. Values can be historical or moral; interests can be political or economic; goals can be collective or individual. Within these shaping forces, culture and the media do play important roles, of course, but their relationship to society is dialectical rather than static. Society is shaped by forces within people as much as by its external products or effects—what Marxists call the superstructure. And so culture and the media are shaped by society as much as society Enrico M. Santi is professor of Spanish and Latin American literature at Georgetown University.

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is shaped by them. As stated, then, our premise exaggerates somewhat the role played in it by culture and the media, and in so doing makes society appear as a passive agent that is acted u p o n by external forces. I would therefore rephrase the premise of our own session in the following way: the dialectical relationship between Cuban society and its culture and media can contribute to ending the Cold War between the United States and Cuba. I take the converse to be also true: the end of the Cold War between the United States and Cuba would have an effect on the dialectics of Cuban society and culture. Let me begin with this second point. I shall return to the first eventually. That the end of political tensions between the United States and Cuba would have an effect, presumably beneficial, on Cuba's domestic situation is a point the present Cuban government and its apologists have stressed or at least suggested repeatedly throughout the years. Lift the embargo, normalize diplomatic relations, and cease aggression (including the most recent so-called "air waves war" of Radio and TV Marti) and we will reciprocate. Other panels throughout the day have explored the impact of that hypothetical Cuban response within the respective fields of economics, foreign policy, and international security; yet another panel tomorrow will explore the same issue among the Cuban exile community. To confine ourselves to the subject of this particular session—culture and the media—it would seem logical to postulate that, in this field at least, such a release of tensions would have the effect of lessening ideological control within the island. In contemporary terms, we could describe such a relaxation of tensions as the creation of conditions that would favor a Cuban glasnost, or, climate of openness— precisely the same kind of "openness Cuban style" [apertura a la cubana] that we have heard Pedro Rojas, our fellow-panelist, allege has already developed in Cuba despite the lack of those international conditions that would foster such a relaxation of tensions. And yet what seems logical is not always true. For in truth, so-called "openness Cuban style" has little to do with glasnost. Any internal relaxation of ideological control being experienced in Cuba today would have to take place under the broad policy known as proceso de rectificación de errores y tendencias negativas (Process of rectification of Errors and Negative Tendencies) that for the past four years the Cuban Communist Party has enforced throughout the island. As we will see, under such a policy of rectification, there is more, rather than less, ideological control by and of the media—that is, precisely the opposite of what has been argued here. Still, we are working with a hypothetical model. In terms of the media, specifically, this could mean displacing attention from the obsessive subject of United States foreign policy toward other issues, internal to the island, that require more urgent attention. In terms of domestic policy, relaxation of tensions

38

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would have a different effect: the Cuban government could, among other actions, go so far as to stop the crackdown against vocal dissident groups, such as the many human rights organizations that have arisen in Cuba since 1987; in turn, these groups would channel their vocal criticism of the human rights situation in Cuba onto the legal system, where they legitimately belong, insofar as that system would be willing to listen to its citizens and guarantee their equally legitimate rights. Similar hypotheses could be drawn in the area of culture. So as to draw the best possible scenario—though one that would seem not entirely impossible, given the recent precedent of the Soviet Union—the works of Cuban dissident artists and writers, like Néstor Almendros, Reinaldo Arenas, Guillermo Cabrera Infante, Jorge Camacho and Heberto Padilla, to cite but a few, could be shown and published in the island. Two caveats would have to be added to this: only by allowing the free-flow of works by these openly critical artists—and not limit it, as has happened of late, to recycled dead writers, like Lezama Lima and Novas Calvo, or relatively apolitical living writers, like Lydia Cabrera or Sarduy—would such a hypothetical openness gain credibility. Neither should the free-flow of the work of these writers and critics replace what would be truly legitimate about such openness: that a true dialogue be initiated with them and their points of view be taken into account in a reform of political culture in Cuba. To restate this hypothesis in ideal terms: a release of tensions between the United States and Cuba could result in a decrease of the ideological effects of rectification. It is precisely this point, one could argue, that would seem to justify this very conference. Its assumption, as we all know, is that the Cold War between the United States and Cuba has now reached a particularly low point, in the wake of recent events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, not to mention the recent violent and unjustified US invasion of Panama—this last one an issue, I might add, that none of my peers from Cuba has so much as mentioned at this meeting. Given such a context, it certainly makes sense to include a session like this, on Cuban culture and the media. One could go so far as saying that, modesty aside, this is in fact the central session of our conference. Such at least would be what a glance through our program suggests: our session physically occupies the central position in the proceedings (the fifth of nine separate sessions). Ours, moreover, is the only one of all nine sessions to include three, rather than two, panelists, two of whom represent two forms of the Cuban media. As I look over our own panel's composition, I am at a loss to know how it could possibly represent culture and the media in Cuba when it lacks a single writer, artist, or critic from the island. Why didn't the delegation from Cuba include at least one of them? Why did the Woodrow Wilson Center agree to it? I shall attempt an 39

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answer. For the moment, let me describe what I see as the main focus of our session. As I wrote this paper I could only hazard, in the face of all this highly suggestive evidence, that my two peers were b o u n d to bring u p the subject of TV Marti—as they in fact have. After all, in recent days TV Marti has become: (1) an aggravating factor in the Cold War we are all presumably trying to end, (2) a major obstacle in the normalization of relations between the two countries, and (3) the cause of both an internal personnel crisis in the USLA (United States Information Agency) with political ramifications in the Cuban exile community. It is still too soon to tell whether TV Marti might turn out to damage more than help US interests. My own view is rather skeptical: so far, TV Marti has only served to distract substantive attention f r o m political repression in Cuba. I wish here neither to justify nor to condemn TV Marti but instead use the subject in order to drive the broader point that I am trying to make. In my view, the relaxation of tensions between the United States and Cuba, although certainly desirable, will not decrease the ideological effects of rectification and therefore will not serve to relieve the ideological control associated with such a process. The reason for this is simple: rather than an agency of foreign policy, rectification is the result of domestic policy, a reaction to what the Cuban government perceives as its ideological slippage during the mid-1980s as a result of domestic market policies (the Mercado Libre Campesino [free peasants' market], among others) that were operative then. It is significant that rectification should have been conceived in early 1986, just as Gorbachev's reformist policies were beginning to take shape in the Soviet Union and the power struggle around him was getting under way. As a planned policy, the subject of rectification began to be discussed in Cuba in J u n e of that year, though only after the draft of the Third Congress of the Cuban Communist party, where the issue was never raised, had begun to circulate in the island. Be it a timely restraint or repression, rectification turned out to be the result of political cunning; not of the Party, which never conceived it, but of Fidel Castro and his cohorts. Our political scientists have not yet told us about rectification what appears to be most significant: had it not been implemented when it was, the slippage detected earlier would have probably by now sent the Cuban regime the way of other Eastern European countries. As such, rectification has worked so far as a stop-gap mechanism, though for how long it will continue to work is anybody's guess. /This summary of the political background of rectification seems necessary in order to highlight what is more pertinent, for the purposes of our panel discussion. In order to make rectification stick, so to speak, 40

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the Second Plenum of the Party Central Committee (which met in July 1986) emphasized especially (and I quote from its report) "the decisive role that belongs to the written, radio and television press in the struggle against errors and negative tendencies." The Plenum report added further: "The Plenum agreed that the critical work of our press has been frequently misunderstood, thus lacking the consequent support in, above all, the Party's own structures. Thus the need to reflect the spirit and practice of criticism and self-criticism within the middle levels of the Party, the UJC [Communist Youth League] and the mass and social organizations." Fidel Castro himself underscored, in the same Plenum meeting, the crucial role of the press in carrying out the party's objectives, and urged the press, in turn, "to liberate itself totally from stereotyped and triumphalist schemes." (Cuba Socialista 23, September-October 1986, pp. 146,147). I n s u b s e q u e n t m e e t i n g s o f t h e Unión

de Periodistas

Cubanos

(in

September 1986) and of the Writer's Union (injanuary 1988), the crucial role of the press in reaching the objectives of rectification was underscored. Carlos Aldana Escalante, current director of the party's increasingly powerful Departmento de Orientación Revolucionaria [Department of Revolutionary Orientation] as well as Secretary of the Central Committee, made rare speaking appearances at both of these meetings. Indeed, the composite remarks of Aldana Escalante along with those of Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Cuba's vice president, at the Writer's Union meeting bear a significant message, I think, for our understanding of the status of culture and communications media in today's Cuba. On that occasion, no sooner has Aldana reminded the audience that "we encourage a growing protagonism of journalists, writers, and artists [notice the order in which the three are mentioned] in the present stage of the rectifying process," then he immediately goes on to chide "intellectuals" [his word] for "not giving us, with a few honorable exceptions, some sign of the tense situation that our society was going through at the beginning of the eighties decade." Aldana's condemnation of Cuban intellectuals, in a clear allusion to the events surrounding the Mariel exodus of May 1980, finds an echo in Carlos Rafael Rodriguez's remark, at the same meeting, to the effect that "it is of great importance that Cuban writers and artists [notice that journalists are not mentioned] understand more and more that they are far indeed from being society's 'critical conscience.' They never have been." Rodriguez added, finally, that "thus freed from the pretensions of becoming the critical reservoir of society, enriched by their historical modesty, our writers and artists will be able to approach their being 'witnesses to the truth.'" (El caimán barbudo, Special Issue, March 1988, pp. 8, II). All of us would agree, I think, that writers and journalists, in all 41

CUBA AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER

societies and at all times, have never found it easy to cohabitate, so to speak. But if that relationship has never been easy, judging f r o m statements such as these, the writer in today's Cuba finds him/herself in even worse straits: actually kicked out of bed. By stripping writer-intellectuals of their traditional role as society's conscience, the Cuban Communist Party, under rectification, has reasserted its own control over that conscience. Gone are the days when intellectuals were called u p o n to defend the revolution publicly, as Roberto Fernandez Retamar did in the midst of the "Padilla Affair" with publication of his Caliban (1971); now they cannot even draft a telegram criticizing a wayward ally, such as it happened with Pablo Neruda in the halcyon days of the late 1960s and 1970s. In exchange, the Party has appointed the journalist as spokesperson in an effort, as the Plenum report states, to foster "the spirit and practice of criticism and self-criticism." And so if writer-intellectuals are now merely "witnesses to the truth," the journalist has become in turn the privileged "creator of the truth." Thus, according to this argument, today's Cuban Vanguard can be found in Granma,Juventud Rebelde, and Trabajadores, rather than in Casa de las Americas or Pensamiento Critico. The essence of that truth, as my peers on this panel have just confirmed, is "criticism" or at least what passes for criticism within the climate of rectification. Within that climate and as reflected by the Cuban media, there is, more than a spirit of criticism, one of complaint. In Cuba today, everybody complains about everything. This spirit of complaint, sanctioned of course by the Party, is the basis for the popularity of consumer magazines like Opina; for the effervescence of stories like "Sandra's Case," Cuba's first exposure (and therefore admission) of illegal prostitution; or for the meteoric rise of newspaper columnists like Soledad Cruz ofJuventud Rebelde. Besides creating the illusion of a democratic spirit—a cheap glasnost—such complaints allow the masses to exercise, as a commentator of the Cuban scene recently put it, "a catharsis of their frustration and impotence." Complaints abound, to be sure, but only insofar as they are confined to immediate, practical aspects of everyday living and avoid questioning the political system itself or the country's leadership. T o put it in terms dear to our social scientists: such complaints fail to have structural repercussion. Scapegoats abound as well: whose fault it was, rather than how it happened, is the question most often asked. Such hypercriticism leads eventually to a dead end: middlelevel bureaucrats fall but the system and leadership that put them there remain in place, seemingly invulnerable. That the so-called "openness Cuban style" has nothing to do with Soviet glasnost thus seems evident. O n e has only to compare the sad pages ofJuventud Rebelede or La Gaceta de Cuba with those of Moscow News or Oqonvok (or, lacking those, with the useful summary offered by Alec

42

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Hove in his recent book Glasnost in Action [London: Unwin Hyman, 1989]), to witness the difference. What in the Soviet Union is a rending process of historical and structural criticism, in Cuba is but the setting-up of a national customer-service desk. Sadder still would be to think that the Cuban regime, in its desperate search for selfjustification, is deluding itself into passing off this spirit of complaint as its own credential of democratic reform in order to obtain last-minute economic concessions f r o m the Gorbachev administration. All of which points to one thing: my countrymen seem never to have learned that complaining and criticizing are not the same thing. The difference may be subtle but it is crucial nevertheless. Since the eighteenth century we know that critical reason, as the leading principle of modernity itself, does not admit any system to which it would be invulnerable, including political systems or seemingly invulnerable leaderships. That is why true criticism never rests and constitutes itself as an object of analysis, doubt, and negation. T o criticize means to follow a method whose sole principle is to examine all principles, including its own ability to criticize. And it is for this reason that far f r o m affirming an atemporal principle, criticism, in modern times, has meant only one thing: change. The conceptual basis for that change lies in the Greek root of the word "criticism," krinein, which, as we all know, has an equally crucial meaning: to choose, to decide. Neither change nor true criticisim—in the sense of a space of decision—form part of Cuban rectification. And it is the absence of these crucial traits that mark its radical difference with Soviet glasnost. That under rectification the writer-intellectual should find h i m / h e r self displaced by the journalist ought, therefore, not surprise us. As a discourse, the language of journalism creates the illusion of a transparent screen between the reader and the reported or exposed event. T h e journalist erects this screen, and his/her success will consist in the degree to which s / h e can achieve its transparency, thus making events shine in their assumed "truthfulness"—the same "truth," that is, to which Vice President Rodriguez now wishes Cuban writer-intellectuals simply to "bear witness." But the writer-intellectual has a relationship to language, and therefore to the reality that that language represents, which is far different from that of the journalist. No longer responsible for the illusion of the screen's transparency, the writer and intellectual assumes the freedom to interpose him or herself between reader and event. In moral terms, the writer-intellectual is free to choose, and therefore to criticize, the "truth" to which he or she wishes to bear witness. That this is the writer-intellectual's burden we have known at least since Plato—the first to kick the poet or writer out of the Republic because of his or her unorthodox use of language. (Plato, you see, was the first to practice rectification.) It may be, of course, that a journalist may choose at times 43

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this heterodox use of language—in our tradition, Jose Marti would be the perfect example; a more recent one would be Jacobo Timmerman—but in that case s / h e would cease being a journalist to become a writer. The writer-intellectual has a privilege, a power-base if you will, that the journalist lacks: the power to say "no." And s / h e has that power, of course, so long as that "no" springs out of his or her conscience, rather than out of tactics, ideology, or out of the needs of a given political party, whatever its political persuasion. All of which leads me, in turn, to answer the question I posed earlier: if our own session lacks a writer, artist, or critic from Cuba, it must be because under rectification such people have become discredited. I would like to think at least that my own side of the discussion (and I am referring to the side of culture as opposed to that of media, rather than the side of ideology or place of work) is shared today by Cuban poets like Tania Diaz-Castro or Ernesto Diaz-Rodriguez, two writers who could have been here today, who should have been here today, were it not for the fact that they are both prisoners of conscience in Cuba. And yet I still have faith in journalists. In fact—and this constitutes the thrust of my paper—I believe strongly that only the dialectical internal relationship between Cuban society and its culture and media, rather than an external diplomatic process, will eventually end the Cold War between the United States and Cuba, as it did end the Cold War in Eastern Europe. There are already some hopeful signs. Barely two days ago, I picked up the latest issue of The Village Voice (May 1, 1990) and began reading an article on Cuba by Marc Moore. What struck me about Moore's article was not so much the author's remarks about Cuba, f r o m which I learned little (except perhaps one or two jokes about Fidel), but f r o m his quoting of a Cuban journalist whom Moore described as "the brightest and most articulate" of the ones he met during his trip. "Too often," said this bright and articulate Cuban journalist, according to Moore, "we have confused unity with uniformity. So we have to continue opening u p the debate. The biggest mistake we could make would be to halt this process of change." I could not help but be surprised by these words: they sounded like Soviet glasnost in the unlikely person of a Cuban functionary. Thus I proceeded to look for the name of this person, which I had mindlessly glossed over before, and found that he was "the youthful editor-in-chief ofJuventvd Rebelde, José Vidal," one of the two people with whom, two days from then, I was to share a session on Cuban culture and media at the Woodrow Wilson Center. Having read this, I returned to the rest of Vidal's quotation, but then my earlier flash of delight turned into my more customary despair: "But we have to do it," Vidal added then, "without providing an opening for the enemy. We have to move slowly 44

WRITING AND JOURNALISM IN CUBA TODAY

but surely." When I came to the Woodrow Wilson Center last September I never thought I would finish my fellowship year discussing Cuban politics. I doubt, for that matter, that Vidal himself ever thought, at the time he let Marc Moore interview him in Havana, that one fellow countryman would be quoting his words aloud when he came to Washington. If it is true that we cannot run away from ourselves, it is also true that the road to ourselves runs through the other. For more than three decades Cubans on both sides of the Florida Straits have told each other that they are enemies. The result of this war, which has run both hot and cold, has not been victory for either side but the mutilation of the Cuban nation. No Cuban alive today, neither in Miami nor in Havana, has been able to escape the terrible sadness and pain of its wounds. Before the spectacle of that pain, that today I regret is not just mine, I recall some words of Octavio Paz that might serve us all as consolation for the present and advice for the future: "It's easy to say four truths to our adversary; what's hard is to say them to our friends and allies. But if the writer keeps quiet, he betrays not only himself. He also betrays his friends." Postscript: Throughout our two-day meeting in Washington, my fellow Cubans kept saying that great changes were about to take place in the Cuban political scene. They pointed to the next Party Congress and the Pope's forthcoming visit. Most insistent among them was a bright economist by the name of José Luis Rodriguez who toward the end of the meeting offered to return to Washington soon to inform us about the changes that are sure to occur. Upon hearing this, I offered that instead of sending an emissary to inform us, we ought to have a similar meeting, with the present or another group of specialists, in Havana—a meeting I would gladly attend so long as our agenda were unrestrained and its proceedings open to the public. Nobody picked up the glove. But I hear rumors that such a meeting is now in the works. To be continued?

45

7 Cuban Security Interests in Perspective Rafael Hernandez

The challenge of a superpower neighbor has made security a vital issue to Cuba and a key feature of its foreign policy. Certainly Cuban security interests converge with those of other international actors, particularly the Soviet Union and some Third World countries, even though their relations with the United States are not as antagonistic as those of Cuba. Most countries in the hemisphere do not consider these alliances a threat to US security, but the US government describes Cuba as a serious menace and makes it a target of hostility. To that extent, Cuba's national security may be defined as a defense policy to preserve its independence and to help balance its asymmetrical position vis-à-vis its superpower neighbor. Cuba's rejection of the notion of "spheres of influence" is not just an ideological feature of a revolutionary framework, but enlightened self-interest. In fact, the very existence of the Cuban revolution rejects the geopolitical bloc definition as determining the future of small Third World countries next to a superpower's borders. It also implies a view of international security and peace at a global level that goes beyond the East-West axis. Cuba does not perceive changes in US policy toward the Soviet Union as necessarily implying changes in US policy toward the Third World—rather the contrary. It is true that Cuba-US policies have clashed over a number of issues in different regions of the world. Cuba is the only Latin American country to have implemented a military policy, as part of a complex foreign policy design, in three different regions—Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. But that does not mean that every Cuban involvement is aimed at confronting US policy. Cuban military involvement in Africa is a component of a foreign policy committed to building u p alliances; it is not aimed directly at fighting US domination in the Third World. In fact, rather than the superpowers politics model, Cuba Rafael Hernández is sénior researcher for the Center for American Studies.

47

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promotes the balanced participation of regional actors as the basis for negotiated settlements of conflicts. Cuban concern about a US threat might be considered an overreaction. Nevertheless, as inconceivable as it may seem in much of US public opinion, the Cuban perception responds to actual US pressure on the island, implemented through concrete measures such as destabilization plans, military intelligence flights over Cuba, propaganda, promotion of economic and political isolation, military maneuvers around the island, and military interventions in other Caribbean countries. The open reaffirmation of the Bush administration policy that seeks to change the political regime in Cuba is a crystal-clear expression of the nature of US policy toward the island. Therefore, Cuban national security has a sort of structural definition: regardless of the political conjuncture, "illusions of peace" with the United States are to be avoided because US policy toward Cuba has responded more to the geopolitical imperative than to changes in US administrations or East-West détente.

Cuba-Soviet Relations One of the consequences of the US-Soviet agreement in 1962 was that military cooperation between Cuba and the Soviet Union was considered a deterrent to counterbalance US superiority. Instead of working out politically a new international security structure in the Caribbean, the United States accepted Soviet military supplies for Cuban defense. Instead of an arrangement based on restructuring US hegemony in the Caribbean basin, the rules of domination prevailed. Cuba had no choice—this was the consequence of the 1962 missile crisis. As long as the Soviets did not deploy any more nuclear weapons on the island, Cuban military relations with the Soviets were accepted as they were after 1962. In spite of this détente, the United States is still raising the issue of Soviet military aid to the island. But a cutback in arms supplied to Cuba would jeopardize international security in the Caribbean, not bring about a relaxation of tensions. First, it would affect the security status quo and break the rules of the game established twenty-eight years ago. Second, if Cuba felt abandoned or less backed by its Soviet allies, the situation might call for more security measures, such as mobilization, special economic controls, the allocation of more resources devoted to defense, and so on. Third, a Soviet military cutback might increase Cuban concern about US plans and intentions and thus decrease the chances for negotiation. And fourth, the mere possibility of such a reduction might make the Cubans more reluctant to reduce the current military 48

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budget, estimated to be 10 percent of government spending, second only to public health and education. Are there any serious signs of a Soviet military withdrawal? In spite of their increasing internal security problems, the Soviets have confirmed their support for Cuba. Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to the island in April 1989, and the signing of an unprecedented bilateral peace and cooperation treaty, was considered by most Cubans to be a message to the United States. A year later, with Vice President Leonid Abalkin's visit, aid to Cuba was maintained as an important issue on the Soviet foreign relations agenda. The recent delivery of MiG-29 aircraft to Cuba is also a demonstration that the Soviet-Cuban military program is being maintained.

What Does Security Mean for Cuba Now? Since 1981, Cuban military strategy, which was centered on regular troops and the classic Soviet art of war, hits been replaced by a more decentralized and flexible organization. The new defense policy, called Guerra de Todo el Pueblo (GTP), was an important departure from the stagnant bureaucratic practices in the Cuban defense system. To some extent, GTP was a predecessor of the general framework of rectification. The Grenada setback in 1983, as well as the Reagan administration's reiterated threats to "go to the source," renewed the focus and emphasis on this policy. GTP involves 80-90 percent of combat-able-bodied persons, including regular troops, the military reserve, militiamen, and the civil defense. The vast majority of them are workers and students who spend some weekends in military training. The Cuito Cuanavale military campaign in Southern Angola in 1988 was a test of Cuban military proficiency abroad and played a decisive role in bringing about a negotiated solution to the conflict there. In the last fifteen months, Cuban forces abroad have been severely reduced on the basis of mutual agreement with the respective governments. Cuban military withdrawals from Angola are honoring the 1988 trilateral agreements on Southwest Africa. Cuban troops in Ethiopia have all returned to the island, as well as Cuban advisors in Nicaragua. Military institutions are playing important roles in the economic strategy of the rectification process. Troops are supporting agriculture programs aimed at increasing the food supply, and military enterprises are developing successful experiences in the field of economic management. A modest military industrial sector is also contributing to the process of import substitution and to the development of a more self-sustained Cuban defense system. 49

8 Where Have All the Comrades Gone? Cuba Retreats from a Brave New World Juan M. del Aguila

The foreign policy of a consolidated revolutionary state such as Cuba can be examined from several perspectives. On the one hand, realists focus on a nation's place in the international system, and point to its size and its military, economic, and political strength as determinants of its foreign policy behavior. From this standpoint, states rely on themselves above all for survival, often entering into convenient alliances or pacts in order to compensate for weakness. The pursuit of foreign policy goals is intended to maximize a state's position in the international system so that its security is guaranteed and its core interests protected. Others maintain that historical forces affect behavior more than external factors, and point to variables such as the colonial experience, the quest for independence and sovereignty, and the search for a national identity as keys. The past and how it is interpreted weigh heavily in the minds of policymakers, who constantly refer to "lessons" and historical experiences in their deliberations. For instance, states that have been invaded often, such as Poland, or nations that feel threatened by powerful neighbors, such as Cuba under the revolutionary regime, crystallize the present in terms of historical experiences considered damaging to the nation. Nationalism and antiimperialism shape foreign policy, and defiance and strategic rebelliousness characterize behavior. Small states in particular maintain adversarial postures against more powerful neighbors without trespassing known limits of forbearance by the stronger power. This is particularly true in Cuba where a sine qua non of revolutionary policy remains its defiant anti-Americanism. A third group examines a nation's domestic order—its leadership, institutions, social arrangements, and economic system—arguing that foreign policy behavior is directly linked to domestic politics. Foreign policy serves to advance domestic interests and reinforce domestic J u a n M. del Aguila is associate professor o f political science at Emory University.

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values. Behavior is shaped not only by the reality of a hostile external environment, but also by the need to project certain values into the international system. For instance, democracies presumably reflect values such as pluralism, diversity, human rights, and openness in their foreign policy, whereas authoritarian states opt for dealing with the world order as is and do not attempt to change it. States that live under a monolithic ideology such as Marxism-Leninism use it as a road map, and partly frame policies with messianic goals in mind. In the Cuban case, scholars differ on the extent to which location in the international system, history, sociopolitical arrangements, or ideology influence foreign policy behavior. The revolutionary experience presumably fused these elements and produced a coherent foreign policy characterized by nationalism, anti-imperialism, and the assertion of sovereignty and independence. In large measure, Cuban foreign policy dovetailed with Soviet interests, or at least did not challenge Soviet aims, particularly in the Third World, and Soviet-Cuban military collaboration in regional conflicts was a common feature of global politics in the last two decades. New influences that come from close association with the Soviet Union, like economic dependence, are clearly part of the picture for a small actor like Cuba, where limited resources impose constraints on foreign policy behavior. To be dependent does not necessarily mean that one's will is systematically subordinated to accommodate the stronger power, and in fact small nations often circumvent their dependent status by aggressively asserting their own interests. Cuba's dependence on the Soviet Union is essentially economic rather than political, so that as perestroika advances in the Soviet Union it produces a substantial impact on Cuba itself. In other words, the degree to which Cuba is in control of its foreign policy is debated, as is whether or not its behavior is conditioned by an asymmetrical relationship with the Soviet Union. From this perspective, Cuba is perceived as "a senior client" of the Soviet Union, one that must take into consideration the interests of its stronger sponsor in framing strategic or tactical foreign policy decisions. Its autonomy on some issues is greater than on others, depending on how its own behavior impinges on Soviet desires. The loosening of the bilateral bonds between Cuba and its superpower patron is analyzed here, as are the choices that Cuba now faces. The framework adopted here follows the work of Jorge Domínguez, who views Cuba's aims as largely its own but recognizes the objective systemic limitations that constantly face the Cuban leadership. These limits come from the correlation of forces in the international system; from Cuba's own sense of security and vulnerability; from Soviet sources; 52

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and f r o m the always-present balance between means and capabilities. Domínguez argues that Cuba's most persistent aim has been "to make the world safe for revolution" and that, despite finding objective resistance to its behavior, Cuba manages to assert its presence in a manner that is not necessarily determined by its resource base. In order to maximize its own strengths and minimize its weaknesses, Cuba frames its goals carefully, mindful of the strategic, regional, and national environment. From this perspective, the Cuban government "has attempted to create and defend a revolutionary regime at h o m e and to establish the relations abroad that will secure and protect that regime; to support Marxist-Leninist regimes in the Third World; to establish relations with other existing governments that do not directly threaten its security"; and to support revolutionary movements hostile to the United States and its allies.1 In other words, survival, the search for like-minded friends and allies, and opposition to one's principal antagonist are Cuba's aims.

The New Systemic Environment Of unprecedented significance are the dramatic changes in the Communist world and in Soviet foreign policy evident in the past few years. These changes reshape systemic trends in place for much of the postwar period and directly affect the underlying tensions in East-West relations. The position and foreign-policy behavior of a privileged client state like Cuba, with a multipronged and multilayered foreign policy, cannot escape global impulses, especially when these point in a less confrontational direction. Neither a Soviet satellite nor a completely independent actor, Cuba must carefully calculate its foreign policy interests in a context of rapidly changing balances. A state with a highly assertive revolutionary vocation that often speaks in absolute and universal terms finds itself losing ground as the comfortable stability of a bipolar world gives way to new international alignments yet to be defined. Paradoxically, the East-West struggle created opportunities for Cuba, and it advanced revolutionary causes that at times shifted regional balances in Africa and Latin America. Bipolarity offered strategic protection, but as the international system enters its "third detente," rigidity and confrontation lose their currency. Cuba's place in the system has three dimensions: (1) as a member of the former Communist world (its location in it disintegrated as did its strategic utility to its former allies); (2) as a developing Third World state with extensive diplomatic, political, and military relationships with other developing countries; and (3) as a Latin American actor excluded f r o m 53

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the formal regional system, yet able to initiate bilateral connections and find them reciprocated. As will be made clear, with the comfort of membership in the former Communist bloc gone, Cuba retrenches and sends messages into its immediate environment in an effort to realign itself. A fluid process of transition from membership in the former Communist world is under way for Cuba, but it has yet to find a new niche in either the international order or the regional subsystem. Many analysts recognize the value of universalism in Cuban foreign policy and the value of its explicit ideological content, but few have yet to analyze how Cuban foreign policy comes out as the international system reorders itself. A basic paradox of Cuban foreign policy lies in the fact that its universalist ideology makes of Cuba a revisionist actor despite its limited capabilities, and so coherence is not always achieved. In addition, new conditions in several theaters, such as Africa and Central America, force Cuba to reassess its presence abroad at the same time that it strives to maintain political credibility in Third World circles and deepens initiatives in Latin America. In summary, as a revolutionary state that for nearly thirty years has pursued a foreign policy that carefully calibrated its desire for autonomy with a realistic appraisal of Soviet hegemony over key decisions, means, and goals, Cuba now finds itself directly at odds with its superpower patron on the value of revolutionary violence, armed struggle, and support for national liberation movements as means of "challenging imperialism" and changing the correlation of forces. This forces a reassessment in behavior and calculations. Calculating how Moscow's interests would be affected by its foreign policy does not necessarily determine Cuba's weltanschung, nor has it always stood in the way of Cuba's tactical or strategic moves in various regions. For instance, Cuba's reaction to the US invasion of Grenada in 1983 was politically violent but militarily prudent, in contrast to Moscow's benign indifference. Respected analysts have consistently argued that "the notion that Cuban policy responds mainly to Soviet dictates is a gross oversimplification," and yet one sees a "convergence and correspondence between Soviet and Cuban policies, especially with regard to the Third World." 2 This convergence facilitated geopolitical collaboration particularly in the 1970s and early 1980s, as each partner promoted its own interests and engaged in a profitable zero-sum game. On the other hand, there is much evidence to demonstrate that convergence is breaking down, and that estrangement and bilateral isolation characterize the Cuba-Soviet relationship. Moscow's deideologization of its foreign policy sharply contrasts with Cuba's renewal of a radical vision, and whereas Moscow speaks of cooling down regional conflicts, Cuba positions itself as an assertive spokesman for the Third 54

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World. This trend is not fully developed, and conceivably a role reversal can occur, but each actor's role departs f r o m past behavior. For strategic, political, and economic reasons, Moscow retreats from commitments in the periphery and redirects its energy toward internal matters, deemphasizing foreign interventionism and at times contributing to the resolution of regional conflicts. 3 Several reasons account for this, namely a redefinition by Moscow of where its strategic priorities lie; an evident need to reduce burdensome economic commitments that do not bring satisfactory political dividends; and a crushing domestic situation absorbing more and more of the leadership's time and energy. The net effect is to redeploy inward, gradually reduce costly ventures abroad, and become less of a threat to the West. As ideological factors become less central to Moscow's foreign policy and are increasingly dismissed as the root of dangerous misperceptions and irrational responses to complex geopolitical stimuli, the exact opposite occurs in Havana. Indeed, President Castro reaffirms basic antiimperialist principles precisely because others are rapidly dismissing them. In a time of confusion, ideology provides a convenient road map for a regime that is besieged but proudly asserts that it is the last bastion of authentic communism. In other words, Cuba proclaims itself to be the last crusader fighting for a universalist cause in which very few regimes now believe, one that has also lost its expansionist will. Cuba compensates for its limited resources by articulating what it believes is ultimately its strength. Cuba's position in the international system is increasingly affected by changes that it cannot influence and in fact has rejected. The comfortable niche that it had found in the Communist bloc becomes a vise generating pressures on several fronts. For instance, Cuba's relations with its principal trading partners in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) are in disarray; largely because CMEA must shift to commercial relations with market economies, it demands payment in hard currency and no longer has the strategic incentive to subsidize an unreformed member. Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzkhov recognized the obvious during CMEA's 1989 meeting in Sofia, Bulgaria, when he stated that "Soviet enterprises have no interest in trading with the socialist countries" largely because their economies need massive subsidies and are not competitive. Despite the signing of a new $14.7 billion trade protocol for 1990, the Soviet Union will be less and less able to maintain its massive subsidies to Cuba in the coming years. In fact, the pervasive economic crisis affecting Soviet society suggests that key provisions of the trade agreement will go unmet. That will reduce resources and worsen Cuba's economic difficulties, leading to more scarcity, tighter rationing, and 55

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drastic reductions in the availability of basic commodities. Thus, Cubans face the prospect of severe declines in their standard of living in the coming years. Between 85 and 90 percent of Cuba's foreign trade takes place within the highly inefficient COMECOM system, and Cuba has failed to diversify its foreign commerce during the past thirty years. It is caught in an inexorable process of reform in CMEA over which it has little if any influence and for which it is not prepared. At the meeting in Sofia, Cuba found itself alone and completely isolated in its effort to slow down CMEA's search for markets in the capitalist world. According to Ryzkhov, "Cuba wanted to preserve the current state of things in CMEA," and did not support CMEA's decision to change the method of payment. Clearly, the reliability that Cuba needed in order to avoid making structural changes is demonstrably slipping away, as is the protection offered by CMEA itself. In addition, the propitious international context that allowed Cuba to project military power directly into Africa in the 1970s and to support several revolutionary movements in Latin America is itself rapidly changing. It is not fully clear whether Cuba has readjusted its behavior in order to remain engaged despite new conditions. In other words, Cuba has been taken seriously partly because it has had crucial support from Moscow at critical junctures and because in some cases it has led ventures that brought gains for it. And yet, as the Soviet-Cuba partnership in "internationalist missions" and other collaborative projects is downgraded, Cuba would have to rely even more on its own resources in order to remain actively engaged abroad. A hard calculus between means and ends forced withdrawal from Angola and Ethiopia at the same time that events in Central America, such as the election of Violeta Chamorro in Nicaragua, placed additional pressures on Cuba's regional position. For a rational actor with limited means, that would mean fundamental readjustments between means and ends and a recognition of new empirical realities. Cuba's rational purpose is fused with aggressive ideological convictions as well as with self-imposed burdens regarding its obligation to Third World allies and selected revolutionary regimes. As reshaping takes place, the centrality of ideology declines and the international order itself deemphasizes ideological consumption. Thus, the basic dilemma that the Cuban leadership faces is how to reestablish a balance between means and objectives at a time of strategic retrenchment by Moscow, when vigorous internationalism itself is losing its strategic utility. The Soviets are moving through a period of Thermidor in their global strategy, and their orthodox defense of revolutionary socialism is rapidly losing currency.4 Internationalism and the 56

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advocacy of revolutionary socialism are core principles of Cuban foreign policy and have provided a philosophical foundation for Cuban behavior. As these ideas lose their power, actors who articulate them are b o u n d to find their universe constricting.

Retreat and Refocus: Themes in Cuba's Discourse The tripartate agreements signed in January 1989 among South Africa, Cuba, and Angola, calling for a phased withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as well as the holding of UN-supervised elections in Namibia, effectively end Cuba's military role in support of Luanda's Marxist regime. 5 Minister of Defense Raul Castro hailed Cuba's participation in Angola's civil war as the highest manifestation of Cuba's internationalist tradition, and maintained that Cuba's military victories convinced Pretoria that a negotiated outcome to the conflict was preferable to continued warmaking. The minister holds that Cuba's persistence finally convinced the United States of the need to include Cuba in any agreement, and so Cuba earned considerable respect from its principal adversary. 6 Cuba interpreted the outcome in Angola not as the product of a rational compromise among governments facing escalating costs and the prospect of indefinite conflict, but as a vindication of its military strategy and its internationalist vocation. The Communist party newspaper Granma reported that several generations fulfilled their duty or offered their lives not for national glory or sinister ( mezquinos) material interests, but out of fidelity to the revolutionary ideology. In fact, the accords link Cuba's withdrawal from Angola to South Africa's retreat from Namibia and do not directly affect Luanda's ongoing civil war with UNITA's (Union for the Total Independence of Angola) rebels, which continues. Cuba's claims of victory are not entirely convincing, partly because its Angolan ally is no closer to winning the war than was the case when Cuba originally intervened, and because there is evidence of Soviet influence over Cuba's decision. Consequently, the accords provide a face-saving cover for Cuba and South Africa, both of whom can claim partial victories and still withdraw from the conflict. Because all the parties claim that either some or all of their aims were met, the accords proved viable. The Cuban government praised the United States for its credible mediation in the negotiations, implicitly confirming that without outside intervention, the war would go on. These efforts legitimated long-standing claims by the United States and other Western powers in the region, and these interests were so recognized by Cuba. In addition, it is widely held that Moscow made it plain to Havana that the need for settling the 57

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dispute was consistent with its own reassessment of interests in regional flashpoints and with its need to maintain stability in East-West relations. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola's (MPLA) military failures were seen in Moscow as evidence that the war could not be won, that it simply drained resources for no appreciable gain, and that it complicated relations with the West. Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Charles W. Freeman, Jr. wrote in Foreign Affairs that Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly Adamishin and African Director Vladillen Vasev worked reliably with US officials behind the scenes as partners, and closely monitored the negotiations. 7 Moscow's input was therefore substantial and crucial, but Cuba did achieve limited gains during its Angola venture. Moscow's role in the settlement has been purposely deemphasized by Cuba because Cuba insists that although it listens to its friends, its foreign policy is not subject to u n d u e pressures or direct intervention from them. President Castro had stated that Cuban forces would remain in Angola "until apartheid disappears" and had consistently rejected any "linkage" between Cuban and South African participation in the conflict. Those positions assumed continued Soviet support and had to change once Moscow changed its policy.8 Escalating costs at home were probably factored into the decision to settle, as well as major substantive disagreements between the political and military leadership regarding what was increasingly seen as a no-win strategy for Cuba in Angola. Still, both of these pressures could have been managed by the regime if Soviet policy itself had not changed. It is also clear that because Moscow preferred a settlement by 1988, Havana would have had to oppose it openly in order to remain engaged. A new and perhaps fundamental tension has emerged between Cuba's commitment to internationalism and Moscow's willingness to underwrite it, so that the assumed convergence between Soviet and Cuban interests is increasingly open to question. More importantly, Moscow has nearly repudiated the notion of "armed struggle" and dramatically reduced its political and financial support for "wars of national liberation." This imposes severe constraints on Cuban behavior because Cuba lacks the logistical wherewithal for sustaining military ventures abroad and would not risk a major political confrontation with the Kremlin. It is in such cases that declining resources impinge on Cuba's activism, so the relationship between aims and means can no longer be neglected. O n the other hand, Havana has not renounced its revolutionary obligations and is in fact deriding Moscow for improving relations with the United States and other Western countries without forcefully demanding that they moderate their alleged aggression against vulnerable Third World countries or Cuba itself. Mindful of the risks, Cuba

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plays the maverick through defiance and principled stubbornness. This is not without domestic value, nor is it completely wrong-headed if one assumes that revolutionary fires at home are often fueled by activism abroad. For Cuba, the Cold War has not ended and it must remain in the front lines of the global struggle between imperialism and communism. Indeed, President Castro believes that detente between the superpowers means that East-West tensions may abate and reduce the prospects that nuclear war will break out, but that in turn will intensify imperialist threats against revolutionary forces and states in the Third World. Speaking at the thirty-second anniversary of the founding of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), Castro articulated his view of the new détente, asking: "How does the imperialist government of the United States interpret peace, how does the empire interpret peace?" He answered with the following: It is possible, it is almost for sure that what the empire conceives of as peace is peace among the powerful, peace with the Soviet Union, and war with the small socialist countries, revolutionaries, progressives, or simply independent countries of the Third World . . . peace with the powerful and covert and open wars with other countries.

Finally, two basic themes of President Castro's speeches are (1) Cuba's revolutionary obligations during "times of confusion," and (2) its need for ideological clarity. Indeed, Castro maintains that "we are conscious of the obligation that our revolutionary process has before the people of the world, before the workers of the world, and fundamentally before the peoples of the Third World, and we will always meet that responsibility."10 By making its displeasure with "the new détente" so public, Cuba reaffirms its Third World identity and signals that it will neither lay down its guard nor eschew its internationalist principles. The threat of imperialism is permanent, and fewer and fewer defenders are willing to meet it. But this is precisely why Cuba must assume a leading role as a spokesman for and defender of the Third World. Despite recent setbacks, history's ineluctable march will vindicate communism in the end. Consequently, as President Castro has repeatedly stated, in matters of principle there can be no compromise. Socialism or death, if that is what is required.11 The president's speeches serve several purposes, foremost among them to outline the official interpretation of domestic and foreign affairs and presumably to inspire the masses. The president's tone is increasingly apocalyptic and foreboding of what the future holds for Cuba. He demands more sacrifices from the masses and is roundly convinced that Cuba can resist pressures even if it means going on a permanent war footing. The president views the 59

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situation as a crucible in which his (and the nation's) revolutionary mettle will once again be proven. In an uncompromising way, President Castro's invective spirit is aimed at former allies and "Communists who allow themselves to be killed," as well as against reformers. He has denounced the rise of an opposition movement in Poland; economic and political reforms in Hungary; the introduction of market and capitalist concepts into planned, Socialist economies; and the loss of prestige affecting several ruling Communist parties. With a cruel sense of irony, the president laments "whether it would not be better for the new generations that were born under socialism in Poland and Hungary to have a little taste of capitalism to learn from capitalism how selfish, brutal, and dehumanized the society is." Needless to say, much evidence indicates that Communist reformers are introducing market mechanisms in their own societies not in order to create a nineteenth-century type of Manchesterian system, but rather to modernize stagnant and uncompetitive economies ill suited for survival into the next century. Elites in several Communist countries have been forced to introduce economic reforms not out of conviction, but rather out of necessity and fear. Finally, speaking to the rising tide of ethnic violence in the Soviet Union itself, and wondering about the consequences of strikes, rebellions, and separatist tendencies evident in that country, the president raises the ominous prospect that the motherland of socialism could crumble from within and leave its smaller friends unprotected. The collapse of the center would lead to the triumph of capitalist democracy over communism, something that is nearly an unbearable prospect for Cuba because it always believed itself to be on "history's winning side." Cuba's return to the ideological radicalism of the 1960s represents not only a direct challenge to Moscow's "new thinking" and to reformers elsewhere in the Communist world, but is meant to limit the influence of reformist currents in Cuba itself. Castro has blasted "imitators and copycats" for wanting to practice in Cuba what is being done elsewhere, and has warned them not to have such illusions. Publications such as Moscow News and Sputnik, which publish intellectual and historical criticism in the Soviet Union, have been censored in Cuba. In an ironic role reversal, Cuba upholds Lenin's legacy against Soviet critics in an effort to maintain historical truths in the Soviet Union and elsewhere buried and unchallenged, so that now the "real" Lenin is to be found in Havana, not in Moscow.12 In sum, Cuba's political discourse is once again emphasizing outdated utopianism, Guevarism, and ideological purity. These infuse Cuban foreign policy at a time when their international legitimacy is weak. No longer perceived abroad as lofty principles on which to build 60

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a new international order, nonetheless they are not entirely dysfunctional for Cuba. The discourse may well move further in that direction as the artificial cohesiveness of the Communist world erodes, or MarxismLeninism loses its organic power completely and becomes an empty shell. Cuba believes that the transition f r o m communism to capitalism taking place among its former allies represents a return to "prehistory." It finds virtue in others' retreat, strength in their weakness, and it rejects advice f r o m friends and former allies. Cuba's foreign policy discourse is increasingly disassociated from emerging forms of communication shaped by technological imperatives that require real expertise and depend on substance, not sloganeering. Not surprisingly, President Castro is now one of communism's last advocates, willing to commit the nation to the apocalypse in order to defend the faith. And yet his grim view is not shared by other practitioners.

Foreign Policy in a New Context Political changes in several regions where Cuba has been very active— namely sub-Saharan Africa, Central America, and South America—have altered the character of regional politics. This presents Cuba with new opportunities. At the same time, Cuban gains in Central America in particular have turned into setbacks, due to the elimination of General Manuel Noriega's regime in Panama and the defeat of the Sandinista Front (FSLN) in Nicaragua. This is forcing Cuba to reassess its policy. As the strategic climate itself goes f r o m confrontation to a limited relaxation of tension, it loosens traditional alignments and allows for greater foreign policy flexibility among actors of different capabilities. In other words, Cuba may be freer to pursue initiatives that were once precluded due to its association with the Soviet Union. Indeed, actors may be more willing to engage Cuba if they perceive that its military collaboration with the Soviets is downgraded. Consequently, Cuba may gain politically what it loses strategically, especially if its discourse on the legitimacy of revolutionary violence is properly articulated. And yet, Cuba has a proven record of turning setbacks into partial victories by turning inward and defying the hostile external environment. It has shown strategic sophistication as well as tactical flexibility, and it carefully manages complex relationships among its Third World friends, Western nations, and nonstate actors. Cuban scholar Rafael Hernández writes: Cuba's foreign policy attained in the 1980s a better fit within the consensus of the international community. Cuba's present insertion and location in the international system enables it to display world and

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regional perspectives that are not limited to its national interests. This has been acknowledged by Cuba's Third World allies as well as by many Western actors, among them the governments of Spain, France, and Sweden, and organizations such as the Socialist International.

In short, the scope of Cuba's policy reaches beyond its isolated position in the rapidly changing Communist world, now seeking options that would mitigate the deleterious effects stemming from the crumbling of its previously reliable ties. This is not beyond the possible, especially if the focus of new initiatives leads to more conventional and less ideologically driven behavior. O n the other hand, it is not clear whether Cuba can restore its standing in the Third World, partly because the internal politics of several African countries evince a shift away from the radical developmentalism and aggressive internationalism that Cuba still advocates. Economic and political reforms are gradually reshaping states such as Angola, Mozambique, and others, with which Cuba had stable ties. In these states, the ideology of capitalist development is favored over radical socialism and statism, so the Cuban model of society and development is no longer attractive. Cuba's internationalist contributions to technical, health-related, educational, and socioeconomic projects in several Third World countries will remain, but with a lower political profile. In addition, Cuba is unlikely to find new targets of opportunity for new internationalist military commitments. African governments are less disposed now to call for Cuba's military help than was the case in the 1970s, nor are the Soviets inclined to offer the logistical support that Cuba needs for military ventures overseas. In light of this, Cuba will maintain key relationships with developing countries, but these will be qualitatively different from earlier periods. Ideologically, economically, and militarily, the Cuban presence has lost much of its gloss. The political equation in Nicaragua turned against the FSLN, doing away with "the revolutionary project" envisioned by Cuba and the Sandinistas following the latter's overthrow of Somoza. Toward the end of Sandinista rule, Nicaragua itself was critical of Cuba, and its regime had concluded that Cuba stood for economic stagnation, political repression, and regional isolation. 14 A source of tension between Cuba and N i c a r a g u a s t e m m e d f r o m President Castro's j a u n d i c e d view of democratic elections, which he consistently derided. For Cuba, elections represent an ideological abdication to bourgeois practices, an illegitimate way to redistribute political power. The Sandinistas suggested that, contrary to some commonly expressed beliefs, Cuba's influence on Nicaragua may have been exaggerated. Rather than respecting the will of an ally, Cuba's behavior evidently alienated influential members of the Sandinista leadership who 62

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may have concluded that association with Cuba was becoming too costly. In all likelihood, the FSLN perceived the deepening strain in Cuba-Soviet relations and felt the negative fallout from it; forced to choose, they opted to stay on good terms with the stronger actor. In any case, Cuba's military a n d economic contributions to Nicaragua are b e i n g scaled back dramatically following Violeta Chamorro's victory in the February 1990 Nicaraguan elections. All Cuban military personnel have been withdrawn f r o m Nicaragua on the g r o u n d s that f u r t h e r military collaboration (between C u b a a n d Nicaragua) makes no sense. Doctors and other medical personnel will also be withdrawn, and only small contingents of construction workers will remain. Diplomatic relations will invariably be affected even if they are not broken off formally, because the new government of Nicaragua is mindful of Cuba's comprehensive collaboration with the FSLN. This situation affects Cuba's ties to the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador, and it considerably weakens Cuba's regional position and contributes to its isolation. Cuban arms will no longer reach the FMLN via Nicaragua, and the political network that facilitated the guerillas' operations will be dismantled. Cut off f r o m the mainland, Cuba thus finds its erstwhile allies retreating and in fact politically discredited. The FMLN failed to defeat the Salvadoran government militarily, nor did the guerillas lead a successful popular revolution. A negotiated peace and a reinsertion of the guerillas into El Salvador's democratic framework is a far cry f r o m the goal of a Marxist-Leninist regional revolution in Central America aided and abetted from Havana. Finally, the ouster of General Noriega's regime in Panama dealt a severe blow to Cuba's regional standing, depriving it of an operating base and a commercial link through which to circumvent the US economic embargo. Cuba had reliable intelligence assets in Panama, as well as a growing web of political and military relations with the now defunct Noriega regime. Cuban advisors were strategically placed in the security forces, intelligence services, the (former) Panamanian Defense Force itself, and other sensitive locations within the regime. Political prestige is lost as well due to the fall of a nationalistic, anti-US government perceived by Cuba as an ally. As the 1990s begin, the regional realignment is clearly unfavorable for Cuba following the demise of friendly regimes in Nicaragua and Panama. Defeats abroad led to massive demonstrations at home, reenergizing nationalism and anti-imperialism, b u t the damage cannot be undone. Prudence dictated Cuba's behavior, rather than any aggressive response to changing situations, and so the political losses do not necessarily impinge on core security issues. It is also evident that the emergence of democratic regimes 63

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throughout South America and the repudiation of "armed struggle" as a strategy and radical Marxism as a governing doctrine by influential political parties and sectors from the non-Communist Left to the various shades of social democracy means that the context of political competition has changed. Radical elements close to Cuba are at bay, and Marxism-Leninism is losing its cultural protection. The region's thinking classes maintain their attitudinal schizophrenia regarding the relative merits of authoritarianism and democracy, but no serious group advocates violent revolutionary change. With a changed context, the political landscape is less receptive to Cuba's revolutionary message and intrusions than was the case a decade or so ago. Cuba's response is characterized by a new strategic priority, namely to reestablish conventional government-to-government relations with Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Venezuela, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, and others. Cuba perceives Latin America to be more independent of US tutelage than in the 1960s or 1970s—a key variable in Cuba's calculations. Political differences are accepted but largely respected, and the calls for radical revolution have been muted. Still, suspicions linger and Cuba in particular must prove its bona fides. It is clear that Cuba is shifting to Latin America in order to reduce its isolation and capitalize on evolving realities. An updated version on the "natural fit" thesis reappears, explained in the following: Latin America (and the Caribbean) do not merely constitute one more region for Cuba's foreign policy. Rather, Cuba truly belongs to the region geographically, ethnically, historically, linguistically, and culturally. Cuba identifies with the region's current and future strategic interests, and considers it the natural realm for its endeavors toward economic and political integradon. Latin America (and the Caribbean) also share the common inheritance of the liberators and of the ideals of unity and independence.

Ideologically, Cuba is committed to class confrontation, anti-imperialism, armed struggle, and assistance to revolutionary movements. It also supports Latin America's unity, its economic independence, and greater international prominence. These two dimensions—the ideological and the practical—permit Cuba to stand on principled ground and yet shift to a more conventional approach. Reasserting its Latin American vocation and curbing its intrusive impulses requires a delicate balancing act for a regime whose foreign policy is shaped by both ideology and realpolitik, and so the long-term success of this shift is far from certain. This process was facilitated by the fact that social democratic regimes came to power in several countries in the 1980s following the demise of 64

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military dictatorships. Democratic governments articulate a forceful brand of nationalism, advocate regional unity, call for economic and financial cooperation among Latin American nations, at times defy US policies in the region, and increasingly assert a growing sense of democratic solidarity. Reinforcing democracy throughout the region is a major priority of the new regimes, because inchoate institutions are vulnerable to economic stress and political destabilization. On the other hand, democratic governments reject revolutionary violence and Marxism-Leninism, and have at times been critical of Cuba's involvement in the internal affairs of Latin American states. Cuba and the new democracies have cooperated in specific cases. For instance, Cuba supported the Contadora group as well as the Arias plan, although it refused pleas from Costa Rican President Oscar Arias and others to stop supporting the FMLN in El Salvador. Cuban policy has not broached the limits of Latin America's tolerance, and that is why it has paid political dividends. The foreign policies of the new democracies are not inherently anti-United States, and they remain members of the Western financial, commercial, and trading systems. The democratic regimes prefer capitalism and a market orientation to statism and centralization, shading their protection of private property rights without neglecting the state's social obligations. In its approach to Latin America, Cuba simply asserts the common view that each state's internal affairs, and the nature of its political system and institutions, are purely domestic matters. As a practical matter, Cuba emphasizes common interests with Latin America without necessarily sacrificing its strategic aims in the region. In fact, Cuba's agenda often overlaps Latin America's, especially on North-South issues, on regional unity, and on opposing US military intervention. Cuba has been particularly outspoken on the external debt question, but has been less successful in rallying Latin American opinion to its call for nonpayment of the debt. That may stem from the fact that Cuba fails to demand the cancellation of its own $24 billion debt to the Soviet Union and makes regular payments on what it owes capitalist countries. Cuba's policy is one of calibrating the temperature of each issue in order to set the proper climate in the broader relationship and sustain it with a normative foundation. Latin America's reciprocity is viewed by Cuba as an expression of political solidarity and a demonstration of independence from US influence. A major factor in Cuba's Latin American policy is the degree to which a Latin American government eschews US pressures to isolate Cuba. In other words, the more independent from the United States a government is perceived to be, the greater the probability that Cuba will try to get close to that government. 65

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The best example of this attitude comes from the long-standing but peculiar relationship between Cuba and Mexico, and the same yardstick is used to measure the relative utility of improving or deemphasizing ties with other Latin American governments. Cuban diplomats venture into Latin America regularly, as do trade missions, cultural and artistic delegations, and political officials. The economic gains that come from these contacts are limited because Cuba's foreign commerce is still overwhelmingly dependent on markets in the former Socialist world, and because Cuba lacks hard currency. Nonetheless, these contacts bring genuine political dividends and expanded opportunities. President Castro himself attended recent presidential inaugurations in Ecuador, Mexico, and Brazil. During each visit, he emphasized the common elements binding Latin America together, the need to obtain relief for the region's external debt, the growing "independence" of Latin America from US tutelage, and the need for economic integration.16 Other senior officials attended the Argentine and Bolivian inaugurations, and Cuba praised Michael Manley's electoral victory in Jamaica. Castro's presence at important mini-summits such as these presidential inaugurations indicates that influential Latin American governments see less virtue in isolating Cuba now than was the case in earlier periods. Castro, in turn, finds new democratic regimes to be legitimate. Some governments prefer to maintain contacts in order to keep open communication channels; others do it out of realism and pragmatism. In any case, renewing bilateral cooperation leads Cuba into wider multilateral arrangements and toward the behavior of a conventional actor. The transition to democracy in Latin America multiplied opportunities for new contacts between Cuba and nonmilitary, nationalist regimes less fearful of revolutionary subversion than their predecessors. None of them perceives Cuba as a threat, and some may hope to influence Cuban foreign policy behavior through indirect or subtle pressures. Their foreign policy is driven neither by anticommunism nor by East-West security conflicts, focusing rather on external debt or other financial and economic issues. They hold the view that Cuba has tempered its radicalism. Political momentum has swung away from President Castro, and his legendary personal charm produces few dividends. The fact that democratic leaders do business with President Castro suggests that Latin American regimes believe that isolating Cuba is no longer strategically sound; moving closer to Cuba also resonates well with the domestic Left. But the contrasts are profound between a veteran revolutionary and popularly elected civilian leaders who are neither impressed with Castro's discourse nor with his political obstinacy during rapidly chang66

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ing global conditions. In summary, Cuba's more pragmatic and less ideological approach is realistic, simply because the context has changed and the prospects for radical gains have been severely reversed. As Marxists never cease to say, the balance between "objective and subjective conditions" has shifted against Latin America's radicals, and Cuba now aims to be on relatively normal terms with democratic regimes. Dealing with these governments permits Cuba to demonstrate its Latin American vocation, earn political goodwill, and reduce its isolation. It also demonstrates diplomatic flexibility and a clear willingness to overlook substantive ideological differences between its brand of Marxism-Leninism and an increasingly democratic Latin America. 17

Conclusion Cuba's political discourse is qualitatively different f r o m that of its principal ally, the Soviet Union, and Cuba continues to defend revolutionary socialism at a time when the very viability of socialism is questioned. Cuba maintains that it must defend socialism precisely because it is u n d e r duress elsewhere, and that it would do so even if the citadel of socialism itself is torn asunder by ethnic divisions or civil war. It assumes unprecedented and unnecessary political responsibilities at a time of dwindling resources, eroding stategic protection, and waning faith in socialism. A renewal of the ideological struggle shows Cuba willing to maintain orthodoxy in the face of "friendly" revisionist currents. Regimes that replaced former Communist rulers are branded as traitors and dupes of imperialism. The focus is on domestic politics b u t the message is also sent abroad. Consequently, Cuba is willing to isolate itself from its former allies in order to limit the impact reformist currents may have on what is an increasingly hard polity. Obstinacy in the face of escalating crisis remains a key to understanding Cuban behavior. The relationship between economic dependence and foreign policy behavior is associational rather than causal for Cuba, but it is inescapable. Resource availability either facilitates or detracts f r o m the attainment of foreign policy goals, and Cuba's most abundant resource in the early 1990s is orthodox Marxist rhetoric. The new strategic climate directly affects Cuba's policy of military internationalism, which was highly dependent on Soviet logistical support. The loosening of commercial relations with its (former) principal trading partners in Eastern Europe raises ominous economic prospects for Cuba, breeding uncertainty and a sense of betrayal. Objectively, this creates unprecedented pressures because the country is still massively 67

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dependent on foreign subsidies and trade. Left without a strategy that would replace traditional markets with new sources of economic assistance and inputs means that neither capital flows nor technological innovations will fuel a badly needed economic recovery. O n a more practical political level, Cuba gradually reshapes its foreign policy by carefully establishing the proper limits between aims and capabilities. As its universe constricts, it is forced into a more effective balance between external commitments and domestic needs. Disengaging from wars in Africa, but not repudiating the principle of internationalism, strongly suggests that core revolutionary convictions are "not for sale" despite severe difficulties. Indeed, President Castro excoriates those who "run to Washington" expecting to receive millions of dollars. Cuba maintains a decidedly pro-Third World outlook, asserting that it has particular obligations to developing societies. It is unlikely that Cuba will project military force abroad as it did in the 1970s because it can hardly count on Soviet assistance to do so, and because the political climate is now less receptive to Cuba's military internationalism. In effect, the ideological commitment to internationalism remains a basic element of Cuban foreign policy, but the means to put it into practice are increasingly limited. Finally, Latin America gains prominence as Cuba shifts f r o m an activist strategy to one in which conventional rules of interstate behavior are observed and relations consolidated. Ideological intrusiveness is balanced with a realistic sense of what the new context will tolerate. Gains in trade and other fields come from Latin America's willingness to concede political recognition to Cuba and include it either in a particular regime's bilateral calculations or in an emerging multilateral order. It is an evolving process characterized by mutual interests and mutual suspicions, and it is hazardous to predict how far it will go.

Notes Helpful comments o n the manuscript were made by Wayne Smith, James Morris, and Gregory Haley. 1. The most comprehensive analysis of Cuban Foreign Policy is Jorge Domínguez, To Make a World Safefor Revolution, Cuba's Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989). One of the basic themes of this work is the tension between policies that promote revolution and Cuba's need for conventional relations with different regimes. 2. Jorge Domínguez and Rafael Hernández, "Introduction," in Jorge Domínguez and Rafael Hernández, eds., U.S.-Cuban Relations in the 1990s (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989), p. 6.

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3. See Olga Nazario, "Cuba's Angolan Operation," in Sergio Diaz-Briquets, ed., Cuban Internationalism in Sub-Saharan Africa (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1989), pp. 102-123. 4. For a comprehensive assessment of Soviet policy in the Third World, including analysis of Cuban-Soviet relations, see Edward Kolodziej and Roger Kanet, eds., The Limits ofSoviet Power in the Developing World (London: Macmillan Press, 1988). 5. Different assessments are Armando Entralgo and David Gonzalez Lopez, "Cuban Policy for Africa," in Domínguez and Hernández, U.S.-Cuban Relations, pp. 141-153; and Jeffrey Herbst, "The Angola-Namibia Accords: An Early Assessment" in Diaz-Briquets, Cuban Internationalism, pp. 144-153. 6. Minister of Defense Raul Castro stated that only the military defeats inflicted on South Africa demonstrated to the racist regime the end of its superiority in the war and forced the United States to admit that only with Cuban participation could an agreement be reached. Granma Resumen Semanal, January 22, 1989, p. 4. 7. Freeman, Charles W., Jr., "The Angola/Namibia Accords," Foreign Affairs, Summer 1990, pp. 135,137. 8. Nazario, "Cuba's Angolan Operation," pp. 109-111. 9. Granma Resumen Semanal, December 18, 1988, p. 2. 10. Granma Resumen Semanal, January 15, 1989, p. 3. 11. "Socialism or Death" has been appearing at the end of Castro's speeches since December 1988. It is meant to convey the notion that should Cuba be faced with that fateful choice, the nation will not retreat from the apocalypse. 12. The editorial went on to say: "Several times we have taken up these preoccupations with Soviet comrades, and we have discussed concrete cases. And we must say that in more than a few times, the explanations have been as surprising as the articles themselves" (Granma Resumen Semanal, August 13,1989, p. 9). More evidence of the deepening rift is found in "Soviet Press Snaps Back at Castro, Painting an Outdated Police State," The New York Times, March 8,1990, pp. 1A, 10A. 13. Rafael Hernández, "Cuba and the United States: Political Values and Interests in a Changing International System," in Domínguez and Hernández, U.S.-Cuban Relations, p. 52. 14. "Cuba Loses Allure for Nicaraguans," The New York Tim«, January 18, 1990, pp. 1 A, 9A; "Castro amenaza con barrer toda oposicion," El Pais (Madrid), January 30, 1990, p. 7; "Developments in Eastern Europe Put Cuba's Castro on the Defensive," Caribbean Report, January 25,1990, p. 1; "Castro admite aislamiento por reformas," El Nuevo Herald, February 22,1990, p. 5A; and "Cuba Feeling Effects of Perestroika," Caribbean Report, March 1,1990, p. 4. 15. Juan Valdés Paz," Cuban Foreign Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1980s," in Domínguez and Hernández, U.S.-Cuban Relations, p. 180. 16. All of these themes appear in President Castro's declarations, press conferences, and informal exchanges withjournalists and others during his visits. For example, see Granma Resumen Semanal, August 21, 1988; January 23, 1989; February 12,1989; April 9,1990.

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17. Cuba's definition of democracy is peculiar in light of modern views of democracy, and it contrasts sharply with what former Communist countries themselves are doing to bring it about. For example, Juan Valdes Paz writes: The Cuban position on the issue of (struggling for democracy) differs from any formal approach to this question. It is rooted in the Marxist tradition, for which democracy is a result of the greatest equality and social participation. In this way, the forms of political democracy—representative democracies, populist authoritarian governments, popular democracies and People's Power—are seen in terms of the representation of class interests through political power (Juan Valdes Paz, "Cuba's Foreign Policy," p. 187).

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PART 2 THE UNITED STATES AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER

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9

Changes in the World Economy and Their Impact on the United States Robert J. Lieber

My starting point is to observe something about the US role in the new world economy. The US role in the world, which is something we have taken for granted for the last half century, was described by a very different paradigm prior to 1940. In the interwar period, in particular, this role tended to be rather more isolationist than interventionist. Whether one looks at security issues, in which the United States deliberately refrained from involvement in the League of Nations and in efforts to halt the movement toward war and the rise of the Fascist powers in Europe and Japan, or whether one looks at the global economy, in which the United States was unwilling to take an active role in shaping international economic regimes or institutions in the 1920s and 1930s, the frame of reference for the United States in dealing with the world was largely one of limited involvement rather than deep participation. This changed dramatically with the start of World War II and then the revolution in world affairs marked by the onset of the Cold War. The "containment" consensus, that is to say, the broad, deep-seated agreement of US institutions, the US public, and US foreign policy elites, which was sustained for more than forty-five years, now needs to be re-examined, specifically with the end of the postwar era now upon us. There is a need, whether one is a policymaker or a scholar, to reassess what the organizing concepts and basic purposes of US foreign and economic policy will be—what international relations students refer to as a grand strategy. There are several possibilities. One is that some new organizing principle or concept will emerge around which the expectations, beliefs, ideas, and purposes of US citizens will rally and be focused. Suggestions include a commitment to democratization as the principal theme or keynote. President George Bush suggested that the threat of "narco gangsters" might provide that focus. This somehow lacks the resonance of either John F. Kennedy's 1961 inaugural address, calling Robert J. Lieber is professor of government at Georgetown University.

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on the people to bear any burden, or Harry Truman's doctrine as a concept to galvanize the energies, enthusiasms, and ideals of the US populace. Another possibility would be policy incoherence, that is, that no new concept or organizing principle will emerge, or some form of muddling through—not quite incoherence but tending to extrapolate from existing policies to deal in an ad hoc way with different regions and issue areas. Nonetheless, a return to the isolationism of the pre-1940 era is inconceivable. This is not a matter of right thinking or good intentions so much as an observation that the objective circumstances in security and economic and other realms are such that the United States is inextricably involved in a global role, whether or not that role is organized or conceptualized around some grand organizing principle. Even the most uninterested of US citizens have discovered that events happening halfway around the world can disrupt their daily lives. The October 1973 war in the Middle East and, a half dozen years later, the fall of the shah had impacts on people who really had no particular interest or involvement in foreign affairs. The problems of debt, immigration, even the environment may have equal or greater impact in the future. I want to sidestep a recent debate about whether or not the United States is "in decline." It seems to me a more fruitful focus is the "diffusion of power" that has quite obviously occurred in the years since World War II. Here it is not a question of the rights and wrongs of US policy, of whether the United States is "still number one," but of objective changes in the world, some of which are testimony to the success of US policy, others of which happened independently. These changes include the recovery of Germany and Japan after World War II, as well as the recovery of the US allies who had been so badly hurt by the war; the emergence of the Third World, or Third and Fourth Worlds, if you like, which really did not count on the world's stage prior to the end of World War II; the rise of the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs); and the rise of major regional powers—countries that may not have a world presence but have become formidable hegemons in their own region, such as Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, Iraq, Indonesia, or India. So the effect of diffusion of power is a reality, and regardless of the assessment one wants to make of either the relative or absolute level of US power, this diffusion does subtly and sometimes not so subtly mean a different global picture in economic, security, and political terms. Even so, the United States is still the only country that is simultaneously a military and an economic superpower. It is essential to bear in mind the relationship of the end of the Cold War to the US world economic role. For the two generations that mark the postwar era, the impact of the

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Cold War kept the Western economic order together and dampened quarrels among the advanced industrial democracies. The existence of the Soviet threat, the bipolar division of Europe, economic issues involving the United States, Japan, and Europe, and so forth generally were seen as secondary to the global competition between the two blocs, or, indeed, two ways of life and two ethical systems. With the decline of the Soviet threat, especially in East-West terms, however, one can anticipate a more uncertain economic picture overall; that is to say, in the complicated and high-stakes economic relationships involving North America, Europe, and East Asia, there will be less willingness to put aside otherwise mzyor disagreements. O n e could, therefore, see problems of increased rivalry, difficulties in sustaining cooperation, and so forth. Certainly this is evident in US relations with Japan, and there is at least a latent possibility that after 1992 US economic relations with Western Europe could become more uneasy. Third World developments also affect the United States in a variety of ways, mostly economic but sometimes noneconomic. Indeed, the situations in other major blocs in the advanced industrial world are similar. In each case, the so-called North-South division is obvious. For North Americans generally, the fracture lines vis-a-vis Mexico, the Caribbean, and Central America are evident. In Europe there is an analogous picture, which we often ignore but which is no less real for the Europeans, and that is the whole set of relationships involving the Southern Mediterranean, North Africa, the Middle East, and so forth. Even the Soviet Union (if one considers the Soviet Union part of the First World, which is debatable) has enormous problems, not only with the countries to the south but even with its own southern republics. O n the other hand, it is worth bearing in mind that although there is a great interdependence in these North-South relationships, they remain asymmetrical—that is, the players are not mutually vulnerable to one another; there are clearly considerable advantages to the northern players. In any case, some possibility of bloc fragmentation a m o n g the northern industrial countries remains conceivable, even more likely, now; here again I think in terms of relations among North America, Western Europe, and Japan. What about the relationship of these issues to regional conflicts as a consequence of the end of the Cold War? A first cut would suggest that there ought to be less regional conflict. After all, the United States and the Soviets would be far less likely to play out their confrontation directly or by proxy in the Third World. And we have seen a number of bitter regional conflicts move in the direction of resolution or at least of mitigation—one thinks here of Namibia, Angola, Nicaragua, and even, in a more complex way, Afghanistan. And, at the same time, it is certainly 75

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the case that the United States and the Soviet Union have been finding it rather more feasible to cooperate or at least to act in a more businesslike fashion in international forums, such as the United Nations. O n the other hand, in some regions the basic level of conflict has remained unaltered and could even deteriorate beyond present levels. If one looks at the Middle East or the Balkans, it is by no means evident that the reduction in the East-West tension will effect any alleviation of conflict. Moreover, in many instances these conflicts are exacerbated by mounting ethnic hatreds, themselves fed by the consequences of modernization and by the introduction of weapons of mass destruction. And, theoretically, there is debate in international relations about whether a bipolar world may, ironically, have been more stable than one in which power is more diffuse. Clearly, the United States does not have the luxury or the relative primacy in addressing regional issues that it had perhaps forty-five years ago. But we need to differentiate between major involvements—that is, major for the United States in terms of cost, political weight, and so forth—and minor ones—that is, involvements that are not so costly to the United States. Of course, in bilateral regional terms, the US involvement may look total to regional players, even if it is a "side show" for the United States. US policies toward Latin America and the Caribbean, regardless of the overall global picture, may represent a relatively modest commitment of political and economic resources as the US debate about foreign policy gets played out. In short, even though no major organizing principle to replace containment in the Cold War is visible, it would probably be unwarranted to anticipate a significant change in US policy toward the Caribbean. And even though the costs of US policies of foreign involvement have grown considerably on a global basis, the issues of involvement in the Caribbean and in Central America must be discussed on an ad hoc basis by specialists such as those contributing to this volume.

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10 The United States and the New World Economic Order Pedro Monreal Gonzalez

The restructuring of the world economy has been one of the most conspicuous phenomena of recent years and has coincided, not by chance, with the accelerated pace of political processes related to the dismantling of communism in Eastern Europe. During the last twenty years, transnational corporations and developed countries have reinforced their control over technology, production, and markets, and the gap between developed countries and the rest of the world has grown. There has been an increasingly global integration of production and services, but without any benefits for the majority of the world's population. A t the international level, contemporary production does not need a permanent work force but rather a functionally flexible "core group" for technological change and a numerically flexible "peripheral group" to respond to market changes. T h e complex relationship among the United States, Western Europe, and Japan is the centerpiece of this new economic order, and technology and market size are the key elements within this relationship. There is also a tendency toward the formation of large economic zones: the North American Common Market, the European Common Market, and an Asiatic zone structured around Japan and other Southeast Asian countries. So far, these zones have not developed into economically closed areas. The United States has kept its central role within this new world economic order, although there have been changes in its conditions and forms. The United States can no longer be seen as having an independent economy, and the world economy is no longer a by-product of the "external" economic links of the United States with other countries. Rather, the United States is part of the world economic system and is subject to its tendencies and irregularities. Although unique for its size, resources, and high level of economic development, the country cannot Pedro Monreal González is an economist with the Center for American Studies.

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escape from global economic processes. In fact, current debates about the economic challenges and opportunities facing the United S t a t e s even when "domestic" affairs are involved—reveal the problems associated with the efficient integration of the United States into the world economy. The huge internal market, the technological capacity, and the economic power derived from the largest state apparatus in the world have secured for the United States its leadership in the world economy; however, this leadership is different f r o m the US hegemony that prevailed for the first twenty-five years of the postwar era. Nonetheless, the dynamics of the world economic system are relatively independent of the interests and policies of the United States as a national state, and the processes of the world economic system can overcome even the "national" interests of the most powerful country on the planet. During the 1970s, transnational banks—particularly those of the United States—transferred to Third World countries vast amounts of credits, effectively bypassing the official policy of the US government and other industrial countries opposed to committing resources to developing countries through international financial institutions. More recently, the banks have even been powerful enough to oppose or modify official schemes of the U.S. government, as in the cases of the Baker Plan and the Brady Initiative. Opportunities for the United States in the 1990s will largely be determined by the US role in the world economic order and by the existence of several important noneconomic factors from which the country benefits. It is important to bear in mind that no country in the world simultaneously poses economic, political, and military challenges to the United States. The Soviet Union, its main military adversary, is beleaguered by serious domestic problems and the need for urgent strategic adjustments due to the crisis of socialism in Eastern Europe. Conflicts with other important countries such as Japan and Germany are mainly of an economic nature, not political, ideological, or military. Nonetheless, numerous conflicts of interest that arise from the contradictory nature of the principal tendencies and processes of the world economic system could paralyze or lessen the effectiveness of the policies of any national state, even those of the United States. This is perhaps the biggest economic challenge for the United States in the 1990s, and it will be present not only in international affairs but in domestic issues as well (most domestic issues are in fact parts of these processes, i.e., the restructuring of the US financial institutions and markets). The United States will also have to adjust its global strategy (including "geoeconomic" elements) away f r o m containment of the enemy and toward strengthening alliances and helping to guarantee a system of global economic interaction among the main centers of the 78

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world economy while trying to avoid the emergence of closed regional trade blocs. The United States will also have to bear many of the economic and political costs associated with the effective assimilation of Central Europe, and eventually the Soviet Union, into the world economic order. "Forgotten" areas of the world economy (particularly Third World countries) must also be brought within the world economic system and security arrangements; in these areas, "too little too late" can be devastating. The growing marginalization of these countries is one of the most potentially dangerous developments in the contemporary world. World leadership of the United States in economic affairs will be a fact of the 1990s, but the formulation of policies responsive to the world economy, while still in accordance with national interests, will be a difficult task for the US government. The growing economic dependence and marginalization of Third World countries plus the crisis of one of the possible alternatives to this (socialism) seem to indicate a dim future for developing countries. A worsening of the economic and social situations in these countries—and eventually those of Eastern Europe— within a vacuum of policies to ameliorate the impasse, could be a preparatory stage for the development of other alternatives (e.g., nationalism) in the "back yard" of the United States. Will the United States be willing to lead a serious restructuring effort to control such a situation, and will this effort be timely and adequate? There is also the question of the impact of this situation on US alliances and the response of important allies like Japan or Germany to unilateral actions of the United States in the world economy. The contradictory nature of the world economic system and the inability to forecast important developments suggest that complacency about the strength of the United States could be dangerous.

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11 The Role of Culture and the Media in Shaping US Society Edwin Yoder

In the United States, we have never been noted for patience with the past when it tends to interfere with our impulses of the moment. W e are inclined to kick things aside and press on. Any impressions of US public reaction to the rather startling changes in the world of the past year must begin with this fact. A distinguished US public servant of the World War II generation—who has been, among other things, under secretary of State and ambassador to West Germany—told me that he had recently undertaken a small experiment. H e looked u p "Lithuania" in his encyclopedia to see what he might find. Two points struck him forceably. The first was that Lithuania had, on occasion, dominated Russia militarily; the other was that Lithuania had enjoyed exactly twenty-two years of national independence, depending u p o n how one counts. In the same way, I was struck by a letter to the editor of The Washington Post signed by Harry Odell, identified as a retired Foreign Service officer. He noted that at Yalta in 1945, Stalin, when seeking to maximize the representation of the Soviet Union in what was soon to be the United Nations, insisted on a separate seat for each of the Soviet republics. When all of the bargaining was over and d o n e with, both the British and US representatives at the conference were happy that Stalin was content with only three (none of which was Lithuania). Odell went on to mention that we missed at that point what he called an "obvious opportunity to assert that Lithuania was not a mere Soviet republic, but a sovereign nation robbed of its independence in 1940." H e pointed out that a 1934 Rand-McNally atlas showed Vilnius not as the capital of Lithuania, but as a provincial city of eastern Poland. H e speculated that although these odds and ends of history are probably well known to President Bush's professional advisors as well as to the Europeans concerned, "they are not as familiar as they might be to those American politicians who are busy telling us what we should do about Edwin Yoder is a columnist with the Washington Post Writers Group.

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Lithuania's relations with the Soviet Union in 1990." Nor, I would add, to the journalists who seem to be serving in a similar self-appointed advisory capacity. I note these small items not to prejudge the merits of the secession movement in Lithuania, but to reinforce my point that these are the sorts of material facts we tend to brush aside rather impatiently with a thousand other details of geography and history. Indeed, they tend to be noticed only rarely if at all in the great effusion of press and television reporting and comment. O u r great historical myth—and our continuing pattern and paradigm forjudging all confrontations such as that between Vilnius and Moscow—is the great original morality play of 1776: the story of how thirteen oppressed colonies, unjustly taxed without representation, rose u p and threw off imperial rule. This primal myth was greatly reinforced by Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, on the wings of which we soared off in 1917 to fix Europe. Their main focus was, of course, self-determination and the unassailable virtue of romantic and linguistic nationalism. And so these elements, a blend of the Declaration of Independence and the Fourteen Points—you might recall that Clemenceau rather naughtily said that God Almighty had only ten—continue to form our pattern forjudging developments in the outside world. The US press, so far as I can see, rarely transcends this habit. And perhaps it should not. The end of the colossal struggle of some forty-five years, known as the Cold War, has not been complicated to a great degree in the United States by the recognition that smaller and older quarrels, less threatening but in their own ways perhaps quite deadly enough, may rise to replace them. When something called "the Russian problem" fades, by a sort of reciprocal dynamic something called "the German problem" reappears; or we maybe in the process of being catapulted from the nuclear standoff of 1988 back to the Balkan quarrels of 1912 or 1914. This is not the way US citizens or the US press like to think of things. We like to think that problems tend to be solved sooner or later and when they are solved, they stay solved. What is true for the United States generally as a matter of national habit is equally true of the press and, indeed, the two cannot escape a kind of mutual interaction. Surely, the most astonishing journalistic fact of the last six months was the discovery that while the Berlin Wall was being taken apart, and vast crowds were gathering nightly in Prague and Dresden and other places, and while our network anchormen were hastening to the scene to herald what I think might be called the most stunning political events in nearly two generations, the US public was yawning. The audience for the evening television news was not rising; it was falling. 82

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I think the conclusion to be drawn is that the habits the United States formed before the age of the long-range bomber, the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), and the nuclear submarine tend to die hard. It may not be correct to say that we in the United States are insular people. We discovered in the late 1940s that a coup in Czechoslovakia or a civil war in Greece or the demands of the Soviet Union on Turkey or Iran were things we might have to worry about and spend money on. When the United States officially declared an end to isolationism in foreign policy between 1946 and 1948, it was in the main a decision taken at the top—in the White House, the State Department, and the Pentagon—and was miraculously successful in drawing public opinion along in that it defied the warnings of our political demagogues from Jefferson to Taft. I am not sure that these basic attitudes have been changed a great deal by the rise and the fall of the Cold War. It is not surprising, as the Balkans and other remote places resume the familiar troublesome roles that some of us remember f r o m o u r study of world history, that the US public should be inclined to dismiss the complexities of the past. We heaved a great sigh of relief that the immediate danger of nuclear war was passing, b u t it is simply too much to think that, for example, Iraq might be attempting to develop a b o m b or a missile capable of striking Israel or Iran. Attempting to look at the changing world through the eyes of the press, it would seem that complexity is always and increasingly a problem. What someone has called "infinitainment" has become the mode of much of our commercial television news; events of infinite complexity are likely to get three minutes on the network evening news and a paragraph in USA Today. There was genuine consternation last year when Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger observed in a speech that the end of the Cold War might have its momentary disadvantages. The Cold War relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union had come to be characterized by considerable stability and predictability, a wellworked-out style of managing and containing unsettling contingencies. But it was apparently thought in much of Washington that Eagleburger was expressing a misplaced nostalgia for the Cold War—that was the gist of some comments made in the US Senate and soon echoed in parts of the press. As I read his remarks, however, Eagleburger was merely saying that when the world is divided into a kind of two-sided Manichaean confrontation, and when that is the pattern to which all matters of detail and lesser interest must be referred, it does indeed greatly simplify matters. Now that a major threat seems to be receding and making way for diversity in the world, it remains to be seen whether North Americans are any more patient with complexity than we ever were, or whether the 83

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press in the United States has the stamina and the diligence to make that new world intelligible to the public. So far, I am only mildly encouraged.

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12 The New Shape of US Society: Ideology and Politics Nora Palou

US society has not been unaware of the changes that have taken place in the world during the 1980s. O n the contrary, it might be said that the United States pioneered in breaking with the established order when it elected Ronald Reagan as president in 1980. After eight years of presidential mandate, analysts agreed that the most important result of the "Reagan revolution" was that it built a new national consensus—a new political and ideological order that would set the terms of political debate far beyond the Reagan years and the dynamics of US society in a new world context. US policy in this decade has developed in an environment of the changing perceptions, attitudes, and orientations of the US people and its leaders. The current popular opinion with regard to the internal and external problems that face the country differs substantially f r o m that found by Ronald Reagan when he was inaugurated in 1981. We might say that there is an improvement in many of the indicators of peoples' attitudes toward their own political and economic expectations, which differs f r o m the "discontent and trust crisis" of ten years ago. Opinion polls showed that 56 percent of the people interviewed in 1988 were satisfied with the "evolution of the country" as compared to 46 percent who had this positive view the year before. 1 The inquiries also showed the revival of certain values and beliefs traditionally shared by a large number of people, the deterioration of which formed the basis of the discontent evident at the beginning of the decade. The restoration of such values has led to a political attitude that has provided a sense of the strength and recovery capacity of the nation: US citizens continue to value their form of government and to believe in the legitimacy of democracy and of its major symbols—political parties, the president, and freedom of speech. People are giving less support to any growth in war expenditures and Nora Palou is research fellow with the Center for United States Studies.

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greater support to social programs; they show an increasing concern about the arms race and poverty and hunger throughout the nation. This indicates that there are underlying principles that may be considered as liberal. However, there is a widely held consensus that many of the services now provided for historical or political reasons can no longer be provided by domestic resources. In this respect, defining which government resources should be provided, and at what level to fulfill the social service needs of the people, may imply taking measures considered as conservative. A major characteristic of the new political order is related to the structure of the political coalitions of the Democratic and Republican parties. Various groups of voters have significantly changed their political identities. White Southerners, who for a long time were strong supporters of the Democrats, are now giving their support to Republican presidents. Elderly voters, strongly Republican, are now one of the weakest groups. Men and women who, until the past decade, voted almost identically now show significant differences: women cast most of their votes for Democrats, whereas most of the men vote for Republicans. This "reconstruction" of the political coalitions means far more than a change in party identity. There has been a weakening of voters' ties to the parties and a new alignment that in the past decade has favored the Republican party in presidential elections and the Democratic party in local and state elections. A second characteristic is that confidence in the presidency and the mythical role of the president of the United States has been restored, giving a sensation of strength, unity, and identity of aims. A third characteristic is related to the agenda of future political debate and the themes that cannot be overlooked, such as the reduction of the budget deficit, the reduction and reform of taxes, the fiscal deficit, the trade imbalance, and financial instability, all of which are considered as great obstacles to economic expansion. In general, this new ideopolitical context shows that a weakening of extremist positions has taken place, which indicates the feasibility of a movement toward the center of the political spectrum, and both parties have had to adjust to this reality. Within the conservative movement there is a feeling of expectation about the future. O n e of the reasons for this is that there has been a dispersion of its ranks; contradictions began to emerge among the forces and organizations that work as political activists and form part of the government and the representatives of the great economic interests of Wall Street. At the same time, the position of rightist groups has never been definitely determined, and it is difficult for the Republican party to reconcile the themes and priorities of these groups with prevailing orientations.

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The liberals within the Democratic party are trying to find an image to offer in the midst of internal confrontation among groups, positions, and interests. Although less homogeneous, the major trend is the one that combines centrist and moderate forces. They have been unsuccessfully trying to formulate a political agenda as an alternative to so-called "Reaganomics." The situation in social movements has also changed, even though most of them are being guided by ex-civil rights, antiwar, and "New Left" activists. They are composed of a new generation of political activists acting in the public interest. The themes of their campaigns correspond to the new preoccupations and political priorities of the people: abortion, consumer protection, environmental protection, and so on. Membership in civil action groups of the "common cause" type also has increased. Their aim is to make public life healthier, and their field of action is basically at the local level. A process of reconstruction of the priorities of the US public in matters of foreign policy has also taken place. This cannot be overlooked in analyzing the integrating factors of such policy, inasmuch as it influences the perceptions of the elites in charge of formulating and executing foreign policy, as well as the perceptions of the people who support or reject it by imposing certain limitations on its enforcement. Besides enforcing an internal economic recovery and deflationary policy, President Reagan appealed to national pride and inspired confidence in the attainability of his promises. H e skillfully used not only the "success" of a foreign policy as such but also its impact on US society. 2 The foreign policy of the Reagan administration centered on presenting the Soviet Union as an enemy threatening destruction and chaos who could be handled only through military superiority or as a partner in a process of relaxation of tensions. Negative views about the Soviet Union began to decline at the end of the 1980s. In 1981, one-third of the people accepted the view that "Russia was capable of leading the world to the brink of war with the aim of attaining worldwide domination." In 1984, only one-fifth of the people supported this view. In 1980, 36 percent of the people considered that the Soviet Union could not be trusted and that the military power of the United States should be increased as a future deterrent. In 1984, the percentage of supporters of this criterion was reduced by one half. The feeling that the United States was weaker than the Soviet Union as far as nuclear power was concerned decreased in the same p e r i o d - ^ 3 percent in 1980; 27 percent in 1984. Something similar happened with the evaluation of US military power in conventional arms. In 1980, the majority of the US public considered that the military budget of the country was small; in 1984, only 17 percent shared this view.3 87

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These tendencies confirm the internal "success" attained by the Reagan administration's program of military reinforcement: the people felt more secure in 1984 than in 1980. But, at the same time, this feeling of greater security undermined support for the government to increase defense expenditures. As support for the strong-arm policy of the administration decreased, the image of Reagan as a "man of peace" increased. By the end of the decade, the conservative foreign policy of the Reagan administration succeeded in restoring a feeling of leadership to the US public—a feeling of military and national security. It also succeeded in securing the support of those who demanded a strong-arm policy and won the confidence of public opinion on the grounds that neither the peace nor the security of the nation would be endangered. Reagan's "success" was due mainly to the fact that two essential US values—peace and strength—were involved in his foreign policy program. He accurately interpreted the feelings of a people who wanted to regain their strength, but who were also more sensitive to the risks of involvement as a consequence of the Vietnam War. This created a qualitatively different psychoideological climate in the nation: on the one hand, it guaranteed the continuity of such a policy in its basic content and, on the other hand, it also guaranteed its adjustment in accordance with the new political priorities. The message received from the US public by George Bush when he was inaugurated as president centered on three objectives: to concentrate on internal problems, to give priority in the foreign policy agenda to economic competitiveness, and to show concern about the future.4 The United States seem prepared for a new kind of relationship with the Soviet Union, even though it does not seem to be anxious for its establishment. Even though there has not been a definite change in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union toward détente, there are signs of significant changes in the psychoideological climate and in the perceptions and orientations of the US public toward the Soviet Union that justify the sensation of "relief" and the belief that the era of the Cold War has ended. Opinion polls show that at present US citizens have a more global perspective of their potential risks. They consider that the position of US economic power has changed not because of the Soviet Union, but because of the existence of new competitors in different parts of the world. On the other hand, they feel that the threat of a world war does not come primarily from the Soviet Union but from the new nuclear powers. They have also admitted that new risks of global proportions, such as drug addiction, AIDS, and the problems of ecological contamination, have appeared.5 88

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The present ideological atmosphere has reinforced in US society the conviction that the United States is the best country in the world. However, specialists have warned against the negative aspects of this attitude, asking if the US public is more or less prepared to make a critical analysis of their society and of the international actions of the United States in the framework of a new world order.

Notes 1. Michael R. Kagay, "Personal Satisfaction Rises in U.S., Poll Shows," The New York Times, January 25,1988. 2. Seymour M. Lipset and William Schneider, "The Confidence Gap During the Reagan Years, 1981-1987," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 102, No. 1, (Spring 1987), pp. 1-23. 3. William Schneider, "Rambo and Reality: Having It Both Ways," in Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, and Donald Rothchield, eds., Eagle Resurgent? The Reagan Era in American Foreign Policy (New York: Litde Brown & Co., 1987), pp. 42-44; Latinoamericana, No. 21 (1987), p. 46. 4. Judith Havemann, "Ordinary American Agrees with the Experts on Deficit," The Washington Post, November 30,1988, p. F 1. 5. William G. Hyland, "Setting Global Priorities," Foreign Policy, No. 73 (Winter 1988-89), pp. 24-35.

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13 Rethinking Great-Power Confrontation: A New Foreign Policy for a New World Order Marshall

Brement

The time has come for a radical restructuring of US foreign policy and the defense system that supports it. O u r current military posture is based on two fallacies—that only nuclear deterrence prevents a Soviet attack on us and our allies and that, if deterrence should fail, we have only several weeks to get ready for war. Both these suppositions were always dubious, but the profound changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have now deprived them of even the most marginal plausibility. We would have many months, not weeks, to prepare militarily for war. And the political changes that would be necessary before the Kremlin decided to go to war would take years, not months, to come about. This gives us time. We should use it to reorganize our defenses, to bring our alliances into line with twenty-first century realities, to discard the scare doctrine of nuclear deterrence, and thereby to alter our relationship with the only nation that has the physical power to destroy us. This would not only immeasurably enhance our security, but would also allow us to save hundreds of billions of dollars, which should be applied to urgent domestic needs. We spent almost two trillion dollars to defend ourselves and our allies against Moscow in the past decade. We cannot afford that in the next decade. We must first recognize that a determined reduction of international tensions is not just the policy of Gorbachev; it is the likely policy of even the most hardline of his possible successors. It was, in fact, the general policy of his short-lived predecessors Andropov and Chernenko, who learned from Brezhnev that détente could not be maintained in tandem with a series of confrontations in the Third World. It was not lost on the Soviets that the annual US defense budget grew from $ 134 billion to $273 billion in the six years after they invaded Afghanistan. By this existential budgetary act the United States had conclusively demonstrated that confrontation resulted in a defense competition that the Soviet Union could not maintain. Marshall Brement is guest scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

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Gorbachev has been exposed to a barrage of criticism of his leadership unparalleled in Soviet history. But very little of that criticism has focused on his foreign policy, on the new thinking about the importance of mutual security with the United States, or on his conviction that the Soviet Union must "abandon outmoded views on the world revolutionary p r o c e s s . . . abandon isolation of socialist countries f r o m the mainstream of world civilization . . . 'and abandon understanding of progress as a permanent confrontation with a socially different world." There is now no political group in the Soviet Union—however radical, however nationalistic, however conservative—and no potential successor on the horizon who has come up with an alternative foreign policy or who would oppose the Gorbachev program of nonconfrontation with Washington, of diminishing support to Third World clients, of abandoning dreams of a genuine blue water navy, of withdrawal of forces not only f r o m Hungary and Czechoslovakia but f r o m Cam Ranh Bay and Socotra as well. This phenomenon is a result of the inward focus that the Soviet Union is undergoing, and will be with us for a long time. In such circumstances, it has become impossible to convince the Soviet population that events in Benin, Mozambique, or North Yemen really matter. The perestroika road will take decades to traverse. Before it sorts itself out it will—as we have already seen—create imbalance, instability, and enormous popular grumbling at empty shelves, corrupt officials, rising prices, and broken dreams. To allay such dissatisfaction and keep the process moving, Gorbachev needs some quick economic fixes. These can be obtained only through direct help from the West and, even more important, through a massive transfer of investment and resources f r o m the military to the civilian economy. Yet this also requires assistance from the United States in the form of strategic cooperation to demonstrate that the perceived threat to the Soviet Union is genuinely diminishing. Perestroika depends in both the short and the long term on using the resources of the military economy, which account for somewhere between 17 and 40 percent of the Soviet gross national product, to regenerate the country. It therefore requires an extended period of relaxation of tension in the international arena. A decade of benign behavior is not just a prediction. It is a factual description of what has actually happened not only during Gorbachev's time in office—a period that has substantially surpassed that of a US presidential term—but also the five years that preceded it. For the first time in fifty years we have lived through a decade—the 1980s—in which Soviet conduct could receive at least passing grades. Everything we have objected to in their conduct over the past decade is the result of a

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continuation of situations that were well in place before 1980. The Kremlin itself in this period has initiated no egregiously objectionable action anywhere in the world. This is the dog that did not bark. It is the most important fact of our time. It gives us a chance to change the world. Yet the United States is not picking up the challenge. Instead of acting we are constantly reacting. Having finally concluded that Gorbachev is not really—in the words of the presidential spokesman—a "drugstore cowboy," the administration now clearly wishes him well and is looking for ways to help. But our reaction still is piecemeal and tentative. We are being pushed by events rather than making events happen. Missing is a strategic concept of what we want a US-Soviet relationship to be and how far we should go to obtain it. Caution is understandable, especially in the face of Soviet history and the enormous military power still at the disposal of the Kremlin. But there are important reasons to act decisively and immediately. First, we have urgent needs of our own—to reshape our society, to restore our environment, to build up our tattered economic infrastructure, to resolve our fiscal crisis, and to improve the scandalous state of our educational system. Second, key aspects of our own defense and foreign policy are themselves barriers to the changes we want from the Soviets. There is, for example, a critical contradiction between whipping up US popular support for nuclear deterrence and ending our confrontational security relationship with Moscow. Third, we cannot go on conceding the moral high ground to Gorbachev indefinitely without suffering permanent damage to our role in the world and without undercutting public support in this country for US involvement in international affairs. By digging in our heels and focusing exclusively on the maintenance of outmoded security arrangements, we miss the opportunity to lead the world into the next century. Finally, not acting to change the confrontational relationship with the Soviet Union in the face of inevitable decreases in our defense budget is in effect making a whole series of strategic decisions by default. We must not be caught in the trap of dealing piecemeal with issues such as arms control, defense realignment, trade, and burden sharing. We are today building weapons platforms that are meant to be the mainstay of our armed forces thirty and forty years from now. This means that unless the United States puts such purchases in a strategic framework, it not only risks wasting billions of dollars, but also is taking actions that might undercut a desired strategic goal. Closing a base in Arizona may save a great deal of money, but it has no effect in Moscow. Not building the MX, on the other hand, carries an existential message to both Gorbachev and the general staff. Now is the time to think through

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what we want our defense reduction to convey to the Kremlin and how it can be fitted into the structure of perestroika so that we benefit strategically as well as financially. But altering patterns that have been woven into place and endured for decades is no simple matter, especially when such patterns are now widely being given credit for "winning the Cold War." Myth and misconception permeate the entire fabric of US-Soviet relations. Permanent hostility between the superpowers is, in fact, an axiom that underpins a national security framework that consumes the lion's share of our budget, provides the livelihood for millions of US citizens, and is central to our alliance structure and to our role in the world. This framework is based on the tenet that only the military strength of the United States has deterred the Soviet Union from attacking the West—a highly arguable proposition. It is a framework whose components—the US system of defense, the Soviet system of defense, our alliance system, and the doctrine of nuclear deterrence—form four strands of a rope wound together by five decades of history and the expenditure of trillions of dollars. These disparate strands cannot be attacked in sequence, deferring basic changes in US security policy or alliance relationships until a fundamentally new b o n d with the Kremlin is firmly established. All should be disentangled simultaneously and for this we must have an overarching strategy, a major key to which each section of the orchestra plays in relative harmony. We should begin by articulating what more the Soviets must do in order to persuade us that they no longer pose a threat to our vital interests. If the Cold War is over, what need does Moscow have for tens of thousands of nuclear warheads and standing armed forces of more than five million men? The unilateral cuts in manpower and equipment announced by Gorbachev in December 1988 were bold measures. A CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) Treaty will further vastly reduce the most threatening conventional weapons west of the Urals. But the Urals are no magic barrier; it is a week's train trip from Irkutsk to Berlin. And the Soviet capacity for generating forces, their cadre system of reserves, and their mobilization capabilities remain highly impressive. Even with markedly reduced forces, the Soviets will continue to be the dominant land power in Europe. So if we are to fundamentally transform our relations with the Soviet Union, it is reasonable for us to request Moscow to declare its intentions. We should ask the Soviets to commit themselves to the following sixteen-point program: 1. Reduce the total Soviet armed forces strength f r o m five million to two million. 2. Convert a significant p o r t i o n of Soviet military industry to

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3.

4.

5.

6. 7.

8.

9. 10. 11.

12.

13. 14. 15.

16.

civilian purposes. Accept foreign inspectors at appropriate command and control centers, arms depots, airfields, railheads, and fuel dumps to monitor preparations for going to war. Set a date for the promised removal of all Soviet forces from foreign soil—Mongolia and the Kuriles as well as Eastern Europe—and demilitarize the Sino-Soviet border. Halt production and deployment of, and destroy or reconfigure for space launch purposes, all land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. (One cannot build a relationship of trust with a neighbor who has a loaded fifty-caliber machine gun pointed at one's bedroom.) Publish accurate data on the Soviet military budget in accordance with agreed cost-accounting methods. Stop meddling harmfully in various trouble spots throughout the world, particularly in Central America and the Middle East, and join the United States in constructive efforts to settle these problems equitably, thereby laying the framework for genuine cooperation in peacekeeping and conflict resolution. Bolster fine words about preventing chemical warfare and missile proliferation with tough action against clients and friends bent on acquiring such capabilities. Limit lethal arms shipments to participants in Third World conflicts. Grant Soviet citizens reasonable and convincing guarantees that their fundamental rights will be respected. Join the international economy, including rationalizing pricing and foreign exchange controls with the ultimate objective of making the ruble fully convertible. Increase scientific and space cooperation and significantly relax spurious definitions of what are considered to be state secrets in this area. Permit the opening of foreign university-level institutions in the Soviet Union. Increase exchanges to the point where they reach a critical mass, including tens of thousands of student exchanges. Cut out disinformation programs designed to discredit the United States. (Soviet media to the contrary, the AIDS virus was not invented in biological warfare laboratories in Fort Dietrick, Maryland.) Stop engaging in espionage activities and in a massive, government-sponsored program to steal commercial and technological secrets. 95

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Asking the Soviets to commit themselves to such a program and thereby laying down a benchmark by which we can measure the progress in our relations would have seemed hopelessly naive only two or three years ago. Had we done so, however, we would have seen clearly by now that Moscow has moved forward, in some cases substantially, on every one of these points. It is no longer unrealistic, or even unduly optimistic, to expect eventual satisfaction on all of them. Concurrently, we should understand what a Soviet Union willing to pursue such a program can legitimately ask of the United States. Soviet military men would not be earning their salaries if they did not paint a rather grim picture of the threat to the Soviet Union generated by the United States. It was no accident that former chief of staff Akhromeyev, when he visited his US counterpart, was carrying a map that delineated the ring of United States bases circling his homeland. On these and other bases are enough weapons with enough nuclear megatonnage to destroy the Soviet Union many times over. Much of this force is, furthermore, kept on constant alert—on a hair trigger—and it relies on a doctrine of nuclear response to conventional attack. In fact, the United States has no credible nonnuclear defenses, which suggests a conviction that any conflict will automatically escalate into Armageddon. At the root of the problem is the theory of nuclear deterrence, which underlies everything the United States does in the defense area. Axiomatic to that theory is the assumption that if the United States did not possess such a massive nuclear arsenal, the Soviet Union would engage in unacceptable acts, including an invasion of Western Europe. The doctrine of nuclear deterrence therefore locks us into the status quo. Winning congressional and public support for the staggering costs involved requires portraying a hostile Soviet Union constrained from wrecking our way of life only by our maintenance of at least nuclear parity, accompanied by an unremitting search for technical if not numerical superiority. Nuclear deterrence always has been a con game. Although nuclear capability is credited rhetorically with preserving the peace by two generations of NATO politicians, if nuclear weapons had not existed there is no convincing evidence that either superpower ever would have contemplated attacking the other, and the historical record and all logic argue against it. Indeed, the horrors of nuclear war neutralize any use of such weapons for either military purposes or political intimidation, because the potential victim well understands the physical, political, and psychological penalties that a nuclear aggressor must pay. Stalin knew that we would not use our nuclear monopoly to stop his seizure of Eastern Europe. Peking and Hanoi attacked US forces in Korea and Vietnam and inflicted hundreds of thousands of casualties on us, despite 96

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our possession of nuclear weapons. Some have argued that without US readiness to use its nuclear arsenal the Soviets could take advantage of their enormous military strength to intimidate our allies. But proponents of this dubious theory have never been able to come up with a single example or a credible scenario to support this view or to explain precisely what Moscow would have bullied the West Europeans into doing. Furthermore, because the newly independent East Europeans will soon be a physical buffer between the Soviets and the West Europeans, Moscow's hypothetical temptations and its practical opportunities to practice "Finlandization" will be eliminated. And even if we continue to believe that nuclear deterrence is necessary, we can have it without nuclear weapons themselves. The current Soviet leadership paid heavily in fiscal, human, and prestige terms as a result of the nuclear accident at Chernobyl and the subsequent evacuation of a city of forty thousand people. The recent elections in the Ukraine demonstrate that this is a bill that is still coming due, one that is far from being paid in full. And because we have the capacity to hit nuclear reactors with conventional weapons, we can create a hundred Chernobyls without the use of a single nuclear weapon. Another argument will be that we could never be sure that the Soviets had eliminated all of their nuclear weapons. But if nuclear weapons cannot be deployed, exercised, and especially tested, no power will long have confidence in their utility. The problem of verification can best by solved by eliminating whole classes of weapons and deployments, or better still, by eliminating all nuclear weapons. The zero solution is the best solution. Yet another argument will be that proliferation will inevitably occur and that irresponsible Third World leaders would still have nuclear weapons, whatever the United States and the Soviet Union did, and so we must maintain a nuclear capability to deter them. But the deterrent value of modern conventional weapons will be even more persuasive to a Third World state than to the Soviet Union. Furthermore, a restructuring of our relations could allow both Washington and Moscow to declare that nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons use against any other nation was an act of war against both of them as well. If such a declaration were backed up by concrete plans for ajointly enforced total military and economic blockade of any such outlaw nation, the problem of proliferation might well be resolved. If the Soviets are willing to match us, we should embark on a carefully phased reciprocal program, which on our part should involve: • Abandoning nuclear deterrence as a bedrock theory and as the 97

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rationale for a major share of our defense budget; • Reaffirming the commitments of former presidents Carter and Reagan to a program of elimination of nuclear weapons, and beginning negotiations with the Soviet Union to achieve that end; • Ending production of new strategic weapons; • Halting routine Strategic Air Command and Trident deployments; • Agreeing to a testing moratorium; • Reducing and ultimately eliminating central systems. Land-based ICBMs—the most destabilizing of weapons because our leaders have to decide whether to use them or lose them within twenty minutes—should be the first to go. Our more secure sea- and air-launched nuclear weapons should remain intact until, as trust builds, they too can be eliminated. Nuclear weapons, of course, are just one aspect of the problem. Rightly or wrongly, the Soviets also see a conventional threat from the United States and are concerned in the long term about the vulnerability of their Pacific Maritime Provinces. Against the decreased threat that is evolving and the much greater warning time we can expect, it now would make far more military sense for US forces to be used as a strategic mobile reserve, rather than being permanently positioned to defend a major segment of NATO's front line. Former secretary of the NavyJohn Lehman, even before the remarkable developments in Eastern Europe in 1989, had already suggested that we must move rapidly to revise our military structure to field fewer active forces, with greater reserves and mobilization capability. This is necessary for us, he said, because of both the Gorbachev phenomenon and inevitable cuts in the defense budget. The only alternative would be to take cuts piecemeal, without any plan or rationale. In view of the extraordinary change that has taken place since Lehman first made this proposal, it would now be reasonable to reduce our force structure further and to transfer more of our strength from the active forces into the reserves. In this context, it would make sense to have an army consisting of six active and twenty reserve and cadre divisions. This would not result in weaker conventional forces, provided that we strengthened our reserves seriously. In tandem with such a force restructuring we should close most US bases overseas and bring ground combat units home, leaving Air Force, Navy, and support forces in place, at least for now; rely on stored heavy equipment and allied-maintained air facilities in Europe, Israel, Korea, and Japan; and increase lift capacity 98

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to transport troops and equipment overseas should the need arise. Such a program on the part of the United States, if matched by the Soviet Union, would give both countries assurance that they were not only spending hundreds of billions of dollars less on defense, but also getting more security in the bargain. This shift in the US defense policy should cause no military concern to our allies, who will be facing a far less threatening Soviet Union. Warning time of any attack f r o m the East will have increased f r o m weeks to months—plenty of time for the United States to come to their assistance. It is time in any case for the Europeans to do the primary worrying about their own defense. But this obviously will have profound effects on our broader relations with Western Europe, which heretofore have relied so heavily on the Europeans' perceived need for our military presence. It also will exacerbate nervousness among our European partners about a united Germany. These are not trivial problems. But they will not be alleviated by trying to force European security issues into a bloc-to-bloc framework that Europeans increasingly will see as irrelevant, or by causing the Germans to feel that US forces are staying in their country to control rather than defend them. To achieve a radical change in US-Soviet relations, measured and reciprocal negotiations are not the only answer. Too many officials see such negotiations as a way to get hold of a situation that is moving too fast and bring it back under control. To proceed cautiously in a series of mutually agreed, lockstep negotiations—trading narrow concession for narrow concession, being infinitely careful not to mix apples and oranges, giving each of our bureaucracies and services a piece of the action—will be the overwhelming preference of even those bureaucrats, arms controllers, diplomats, and alliance managers who sincerely want results. Negotiations can be a sure formula for stagnation and will be used by opponents of change on both sides to block creative moves that probably must be unilateral, and only ultimately reciprocal. We should also keep in mind that verification concerns are in many instances yet another codeword for slowing things down and making ultimate agreement either impossible to achieve or too complicated to be grasped by anyone b u t the pharisaic hairsplitters who often seem to dominate arms control negotiations. Major issues can be solved only at the top, often even without the prior knowledge of most officials. It is usually a mistake to wait for solutions to emerge from the great dismal swamp of the Washington "interagency process" or the negotiations droning on in Geneva and Vienna. After agreement in principle is reached, officials can work out the details, but even that will require constant presidential vigilance to keep guerrilla warfare among government agencies, or outright sabotage

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efforts, from gumming u p the works. There also is considerable scope for moves outside the negotiating arena. In important areas we could propose unilateral action and challenge Moscow to make radical reciprocal changes. To cite just one example, we could announce our willingness to eliminate all land-based ICBMs by a specific date, on a specific drawdown schedule, if Moscow would do likewise. O u r preannounced schedule would be implemented only if the Soviets made proportional cuts on the same schedule. This could easily be verified by national technical means. And the process could be jump-started by an announcement that we were suspending development of the MX or the Midgetman, or both, pending a Soviet reaction. In sum, what is needed from our leaders is a broad, overarching strategic framework. We cannot deal effectively with our place in the world or with the US-Soviet relationship without a coherent concept of the kind of world we want and a strategic program for bringing it about. We must first recognize that by constantly responding to Gorbachev's prodding rather than initiating new ideas and proposals of our own we could lose the worldwide public relations battle—a battle that is b o u n d to have important effects on democratic states in the long run. But this is not just a public relations problem. We have the first serious chance of the postwar era both for major improvements in European security and for fundamental changes in US-Soviet relations. It is, of course, quite possible that Gorbachev (or a successor) might not be willing to undertake so radical a restructuring of superpower relations, or that he will face the kind of internal chaos that could make change, or even structured dialogue, impossible. This calls for careful, phased implementation of important agreements to ensure that our security interests are protected at each stage as a hedge against Soviet reversals. But it also reinforces the need to act boldly and rapidly—in fact, immediately—in conceptualizing and articulating our vision of what a new relationship with the Soviet Union will require from both nations. We should be leading this process, not tagging along. And if what now seems promising proves to be yet another false dawn, it should be apparent to all that the reason was not lack of vision or will on the part of the United States.

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14 A New Security Agenda Carlos Rico F.

Before 1989, we already had seen both a decreased economic presence of the United States and the emergence of the alternative economic centers ofJapan and of what some people would call the "new Europe." The end of the Cold War in Europe in 1989 produced a set of interrelated events that will have even more complex consequences for the US security agenda. Three of those developments—changes in the Soviet Union, changes in Eastern Europe, and German reunification—make our pre-1989 ideas of the new Europe obsolete. We can no longer make predictions about 1991 with the same certainty of even a year ago. A key to any new agenda will be the close relation between security and economic interests. On the one hand, the Soviet Union will still be a military power in the next ten years or so. But how can a simply military power compete for attention in the process of the creation of a new Europe? Germany, of course, will be basically an economic power. But will it remain only an economic power, or will we see a shift to military dimensions of power, in order to compete as a gravitational force in the European context? Economic dimensions of security are even more clearly expressed in the Asian context, which we tend to forget in our euphoria about 1989. In the case of Japan, we can see in the United States a concrete expression of how economic concerns can rise to the top of the security agenda and complicate things tremendously for the management of a whole set of alliances. Some items on the new security agenda are not new; it is only their relative priority that will increase given the descent of the Soviet threat. Others are relatively new, and some key assumptions of postwar strategic and security thinking will have to be reviewed—from how to respond to the European theater of confrontation to how to organize an alliance that does not have a common enemy. One of the points that will have to be taken into account is the nuclear question. The Soviet Union will Carlos Rico F. is professor of international relations at El Colegio de México.

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still be a nuclear power and will have a nuclear capability with tremendous implications for the rest of the world. Another question is how not to impede but rather to promote the changes taking place in Eastern Europe. How will we deal with the new Europe once the Soviet threat is removed and with the potential for disruptive developments as a result of a relative withdrawal of the Soviet Union? It is not democracy that is usually at stake, but nationalism and good old national feelings against a superpower. Instead of one wracking conflict, several more diffuse conflicts may emerge; but conflict will be here. Of course, there is the "German problem" and Japan. After the Cold War, we may get ourselves into a new war with Japan—infracapitalism, someone called it. There are other new items on the agenda, most of them related to the Third World, which is one of the most likely candidates to supply a new sense of mission if not a new excuse for budgets for US military presence. There are four key problems in relation to the Third World that will be on the security agenda in the future. First is nonproliferation. Nonproliferation—not only of nuclear but of chemical weapons—will force the continuity of some of the facets of the Cold War regime that have been dismantled, such as export controls. The United States is finally agreeing to loosen up some controls on exports to the Eastern bloc countries; but export controls will also play a role in relations with potential Third World military powers. The second, of course, is regional conflicts. This will be one of the most difficult areas for agreement among former alliance members. Neither the Latin Americans nor the Europeans have been eager to follow US leads regarding regional conflicts. One view is that although the Soviet Union let go of East Germany and other countries in Europe that were supposed to be key to Soviet security concerns, it is still committed to regional Communist regimes, as they call them, such as Cuba and Libya. This view holds that the Soviet empire may be rotten at the core but still very much alive at the periphery. If the United States goes in the direction of thinking that what happens in the Third World is still the work of the Soviet empire, then, of course, the security implications of regional conflicts and the possibility of taking those conflicts out of an East-West perspective will be very interesting, to say the least. There is need for a deeper understanding of the regional and domestic sources of those conflicts and the relations between the Soviet Union and those regional powers allied to the Soviet Union, and to see that we are dealing with a two-way street in which it was often a regional power that influenced the Soviet Union and forced it, in a sense, to take stands that it would rather not have taken on its own. 102

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Some think that the United States will have a freer hand in regional conflicts precisely because the Soviet Union will be less of an enemy to take into account. I tend to agree, but I would also complement that with a second notion that it will be increasingly difficult for US strategic planners to convince domestic actors that action is warranted in relation to security threats and regional conflicts. There will be a distinction between what some might call proper regional powers—that is, powers that have a regional theater of activity— and what some might call Third World global powers, of which Cuba would be a case—that is, countries that have a reach beyond their immediate region. There may be an increased demand by the United States that the Soviet Union let go of Cuba and relinquish all regional claims. This second item thus sees the need for common US and Soviet control of potential wild cards in the game. The third item on the agenda involves other security threats: drug trafficking, terrorism, even migration. The final of the four items will be the emergence of new challenges or new opportunities in relation to topics such as the environment. This leads to two conclusions: There will be an extremely complex security agenda in the next few years, and there will be no clear rules of thumb for either US domestic behavior or relations with allies, no overarching concept to organize that complex security agenda. Cuba will be less difficult for the United States to deal with in terms of its domestic politics, but it will be one of the toughest problems to deal with in terms of relations with allies or at least friends in either Europe or Latin America. In that relation, Cuba will have more space than some people would like or would expect.

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15 Cuba-US Relations and the Latin American Security Agenda Pedro Monreal Gonzalez

If we consider the Latín American security agenda as a background to Cuba-US relations, two types of issues need to be identified: those related to inter-American or hemispheric security—such as those related to the Central American conflicts, immigration, and narcotics traffic—and those that are more properly Latin American security problems. Both are connected, but in the latter (for instance, border conflicts and the geopolitical regional perceptions of the Brazilians) there is more room for maneuver for Latin American countries than in the former. Some events, such as elections in Nicaragua, have been useful for US purposes; others have accentuated the negative side of US management of security problems: intervention in Panama, the preparations for military interdiction off the shore of Colombia, discriminatory policies against several Latin American and Caribbean countries, militarization of the fight against drug traffic, and renewed US aggression toward Cuba. US foreign policy vis-á-vis inter-American security problems continues to be permeated by Cold War perceptions. Latin America, especially the Caribbean basin, is perceived as an arena for East-West conflict, and US security priorities here are based on the principle of "Communism containment." However, forced by reality, the United States has introduced several economic problems to the inter-American security agenda. Each day, Latin American perception of the economic and social nature of inter-American security problems grows. The severity of the economic crisis in Latin America and the Caribbean has accentuated this perception. Furthermore, the crisis of socialism in Eastern Europe has exposed as absurd one of the pillars of US regional security tenets—the menace to Latin America of Soviet expansionism and international communism. From the Latin American perspective, priority must be given to issues of economic and social "insecurity" in the region. If there Pedro Monreal González is an economist with the Center for American Studies.

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is something to be contained, it is the economic crisis. "National security doctrines" inspired by US Cold War concepts prevailed in Latin America for many years, and "internal wars" against a wide spectrum of individuals and organizations were standard. But economic, social, and political changes in the region have modified this approach. This is not to say that national security doctrines have been completely abandoned (for example, in Guatemala and El Salvador), but in general "counterinsurgency" has been modified to be compatible with more democratic environments. There have been other changes in Latin American perceptions regarding security problems: first, a growing concern about economic factors as the roots of insecurity; second, a greater—but not yet adequate—understanding about the need for regional coordination as a way to solve the problems of Latin America; and, third, an explicit Latin American opposition to the US use of force within the region. These changes do not represent a radical challenge to US perspectives on hemispheric security, nor do they imply a complete modification of Latin American views. But they are important because they open new spaces and new possibilities for inter-American and inter-Latin American relations and for relations of Latin America with other world areas as well. From the Latin American perspective, Cuba does not pose a security threat and there is a growing recognition of Cuba as a legitimate actor within the regional context, even as the US has persevered in its efforts to isolate the island. Cuba has been a fervent advocate of Latin American coordination and integration and has defended the need for a new international order as a mechanism to overcome economic and social stagnation in Latin America. Cuban views do not necessarily represent the Latin American consensus, but they are useful in forging that consensus (the case of Latin America's foreign debt is a clear-cut example). The Cuban view of the Latin American security agenda also corresponds with the views of several of the other countries involved in these issues: securing greater self-reliance on energy and military supplies; the need for an orderly and nondiscriminatory military policy on the use of marine resources; politically negotiated settlements of border disputes, trying to avoid manipulation of these conflicts by the United States or other powers; the right to exploit nuclear power; the need for better coordination of raw materials production and marketing; and a national sovereign approach to the management of ecological issues. Cuba's willingness to speed up economic integration, including an important role for Latin American private sector investors, is another factor to bear in mind in evaluating developments in Cuba-Latin America relations. This relationship will be complex and contradictory, but it will 108

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surely have effects on Cuba-US relations. As a result of the strengthening of Cuba-Latin America relations, especially economic relations, US pressure to isolate Cuba will be less acceptable to Latin American countries and Cuba could become an issue on the agenda of bilateral and regional relations of Latín America and the United States. This could open new spaces for Cuba, as an active Latin American advocacy in favor of Cuba could initiate the normalization of relations between Cuba and the United States.

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16 Cuba and the Latin American Security Agenda Carlos Rico F.

Three decades ago, when Cuba expressed its commitment to socialism and reinforced its ties with the Soviet Union, the Cold War reached the Western Hemisphere. A good part of the Latin American security agenda was shaped in the 1960s and 1970s by Cuba and by US responses to the Cuban revolution. There was disagreement among Latin Americans, and among Latin American governments, first, as to what the US role had been—some considered that it had pushed the Cuban revolution into the Soviet camp—and second, as to what would be the best ways to deal with what was perceived as a critical threat to existing governmental structures by the appeal of the Cuban revolution. Most countries decided to join the United States in attempting, at least in the first decade or so, to isolate the Cuban revolution as the best way to solve the security dilemmas posed by the presence of socialism. Other countries decided to have normal, if not friendly (because they were never friendly) relations with Cuba; they thought that the best way to deal with the potendal threat was to have a more or less decent government-to-government relation to defuse the potential for Cuban action at other levels. To understand which of these two policy prescriptions was more correct f r o m the Latin American point of view, we have to try to understand the nature of the Cuban threat to most of Latin America, or, if you will, the dimension of the East-West conflict in the Cuba-Latin America relation. The superpower aspect of the East-West confrontation was really a minor part of the Cuban presence in Latin America, other than in moments such as the missile crisis. It was not so much a threat posed by Cuba's connection with the Soviet Union, which could lead to a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union in Latin America, as it was the broad appeal of the Cuban revolution for many sectors of Latin America's population; that is, the threat to existing governments was Carlos Rico F. is professor of international relations at El Colegio d e Mexico.

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commensurate with the appeal that the process had to some groups in Latin American societies. Some were attracted to the Cuban revolution because it was seen as a popular democratic movement involving the active participation of significant sectors of the Cuban population; for others the appeal lay in the Socialist nature of the revolution. But for a significant sector of Latin Americans, the C u b a n revolution was attractive because it was nationalist: they saw a country being able to stand up to the United States and get away with it. Cuba-Latin America intergovernmental relations have become a normal dimension of the hemisphere's activities. For some years, Cuba was diplomatically isolated, except from Mexico. This started to change when Chile and then Argentina finally established diplomatic relations with Cuba. When Brazil followed suit, participation of Cuba in Latin America was a fact. Another dimension of the changes in Cuba-Latin America relations has to do with the commensurate decrease of Cuba's appeal. Latin America has a more balanced view than the United States regarding the successes and the failures of the revolution and who is to blame for those successes and failures, which takes into account both domestic and external pressures. Those from the US side of the border feel that the end of the Cold War and conflicts in such places as Africa poses a potential threat to Latin America, for example from the return of troops to Cuba (Cuba has, of course, the most combat-ready army in the region). This is not a perceived threat by the governments of Latin America, which are focusing on the implications of the transition in Cuba. The transition, and how that change is achieved, will have tremendous implications for Latin America. Again, it is not so much the implications of the Cuban transition in and by itself, as much as what the US government may do to speed that transition that concerns many people in Latin America. Latin America was divided at the very beginning as to how to deal with the Cuban revolution; it is divided today as to how to deal with the problems caused by the transition in Cuba. And there are basically two views as to what a Latin American security agenda may be in the future. O n e view has been expressed by the Rio Group, which is not interested in having an inter-American definition of joint security actions, only a Latin American view of security questions. The second view argues that South America should develop its own security agenda and not be mixed u p with the Caribbean basin. South America should let the Caribbean basin, Mexico included, deal with the United States and develop its own security agenda, in which Cuba looms quite low. In the early years, the Cuban revolution was seen as democratic because of broad popular participation in the process. That is, in fact, 112

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no longer the case. Even most of the Latin American Left accepts political democracy as a value in and of itself. Those segments of the Latin American Left that are still committed to such notions as dictatorship for the proletariat are no longer looking to Cuba as an example of what they should do. In a sense, Cuba has lost its claim to use the word "democracy," in both senses—neither as the nonliberal democracy of the Socialists, nor as a Third World democracy (that is to say democracy as national unity against foreign aggression). O n e of the key obstacles to Cuba reincorporating itself fully into Latin America will be the problem of being seen as the last bastion of nondemocractic rule in the region. However, the Third World version of democracy, emphasizing the role of nationalism, creates some empathy in Latin America, particularly in countries in the immediate vicinity of both the United States and Cuba. As the United States reverts to hegemonic activities in the area, the nationalist dimension increases in appeal, and Cuba finds a little space in a situation in which it had otherwise lost most of its potential allies in the region. Nationalism is also important because it gives Latin Americans a more sanguine view of the potential for transition in Cuba. As opposed to the Eastern European situation, in which anti-Soviet nationalism is an important element, in Cuba, nationalism reinforces the regime: it is not anti-Soviet nationalism, it is still anti-US nationalism. Latin America thinks that the United States contributed to part of the nationalistic concerns in Cuba through harassment and its policies on migration. Some countries in Latin America also understand the concerns that Cuba may have regarding the opening of its economic system: the more market oriented one becomes, the greater the tendency to become tight with the United States. As the Mexicans can attest, a free market will lead to stronger ties with the United States. The lessons that Latin America and the United States are getting from what is happening in Eastern Europe may be somewhat different. In the United States, the transition in Eastern Europe is seen as a result of Reagan's military pressure on the Soviet Union. In Latin America, it is seen more as a result of what Willy Brandt started many years ago, increasing nongovernment ties between Eastern and Western Europe. That is the kind of policy option we prefer, rather than the confrontational approach. We would like, as Carlos Fuentes said, to kill the Cuban revolution with kindness. That is to be preferred because it respects something of general value for middle-level countries—the rule of international law—and because it would be less costly to Cuba and the Cuban people. Additionally, the countries in the immediate vicinity of Cuba, for no other reason than their own national security, would like to have as smooth a transition as possible. T h e Cuban revolution is no longer attractive, and precisely because 113

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it is no longer attractive and therefore not a threat, it does have some space provided by its immediate neighbors. But it is not a space that will help to maintain the current situation in Cuba. It is a space that could be used to help the Cuban revolution find a way to transform itself into a well-liked neighbor in the new Latin American community of neighbors.

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17 Changes in Eastern Europe and Cuba-US Relations José Luis Rodriguez In the last years of the 1980s, dramatic changes occurred in the international situation that had a significant influence on relations between Cuba and the United States. It is of interest to stress here the consequences of the disintegration of the Socialist system on a world scale. We must consider, on the one hand, Cuba's condition as a Socialist country and, on the other, its affiliation with the Third World, and what influence such changes would have on its relations with both types of countries. The disappearance of a set of European Socialist states during 1989 was the culmination of a series of negative tendencies that highlighted the limitations of the model of socialism developed in Europe after World War II and, at the same time, showed the shortcomings and errors in the Soviet experience that were reproduced in those countries almost without exception.1 However, this does not invalidate the historical adoption of socialism as an alternative for development, nor does it nullify the shortcomings and contradictions of capitalism, especially with respect to underdeveloped countries. The impact of these changes on socialism as a concrete historical experience and the consequences that they have on Cuba can be summarized in two ways: 1. The partial or total questioning of a significant set of historically applied solutions to problems that are crucial in the construction of socialism. This leads to reconsideration or reinterpretation of the theoretical heritage of real socialism, and requires proposing alternatives that are valid and congruent with both the classics of Marxism and the experiences gained in revolutionary practice, as much in the theoretical realm as in that of concrete political practice. The process of rectification in Cuba is aimed precisely in that direction. 2. The disappearance of the world Socialist system produces a José Luis Rodriguez is senior researcher at the Center for the Study of the World Economy.

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change in the correlation of forces that is favorable to capitalism, resulting in increased harassment of the countries that still adhere to the Socialist option. At the same time, the economic, political, and military possibilities of confronting such harassment are reduced. The major factors that counteract these forces in Cuba are certain historical peculiarities in the construction of socialism there: the transition to socialism was on the basis of the specific demands of national development; there was an absence of strategic errors in the construction of socialism, especially those associated in other parts of the world with the Stalinist phenomenon; there was flexibility and the ability to historically and independently rectify errors committed by Cuban revolutionaries;2 and there was cohesiveness and majority support of the population for the revolutionary leadership, which has continued for more than thirty years. The changes taking place in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are not homogeneous. Whereas in some countries (Poland, East Germany, and Hungary) whatever variety of socialism was presented has been electorally rejected, in others (Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria) the possibility of keeping a Socialist alternative is very unlikely; yet in the Soviet Union, the Socialist orientation remains strong.3 If the political, economic, and military weight of Cuba's relations with the Soviet Union are taken into account, the importance of these differences for Cuba can be appreciated. Many analysts concentrate on Cuba's economic links with the members of what used to be the Socialist bloc. In that regard, it would be useful to mention the following elements, which contrast with the above-mentioned negative tendencies: the Soviet Union's specific share of Cuban foreign trade is currently about 70 percent, compared with Eastern Europe's 15 to 17 percent; the orientation of formerly Socialist economies toward the world market seems to demand a period of transition, so that all parties can adjust gradually to the new conditions; and the introduction of the principle of mutual benefit in trade relations does not nullify the demand for the products that Cuba has been exporting to the Socialist countries. Indeed, in the case of sugar, the purchase from Cuba by the Soviet Union offers comparative advantages with respect to the high cost of domestic production or its acquisition on the world market.4 Cuba covers about 20 percent of the Soviet demand for nickel and 40 percent for citrus fruits.5 In these cases, as well as for biotechnological products, the purchase of Cuban articles also appears to offer comparative advantages to the Soviet economy. In the same manner, albeit to a lesser extent, there remains a certain level of interest in Eastern Europe for some 116

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Cuban exports.6 The transformations involved in the transition from commerce with Eastern Bloc country members to the conditions of the world market include variations in prices and rates of exchange, the effects of which will not be unidirectional. On the one hand, preferential prices paid for Cuban exports will be subject to reconsideration under the new conditions;7 on the other, the prices of exports from Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union will also have to be reconsidered under the new conditions, taking into account their level of competitiveness. Nevertheless, the modification of the relation of terms of exchange will take place gradually, and its final economic effects cannot a priori be assumed to be completely negative for Cuba. Conditions for the payment of the external debt to countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are subject to rescheduling agreements8 and are not expected to change substantially if the prevailing international tendency in the treatment of debt persists.9 The Cuban economy is getting ready to initiate modifications in its external economic links and to operate under emergency conditions in the short term. The North American perception of these changes is neither balanced nor objective. It is assumed that Cuba is going to repeat the process in Eastern Europe. The effects of these changes, especially in the economic realm, are seen as being uniformly negative for Cuba, without accounting for the factors that may neutralize such effects. The disappearance of the Socialist bloc has had equally negative repercussions in the countries of the Third World. The change in the correlation of forces now favoring capitalism reduces the possibilities of overcoming underdevelopment because the support that the Socialist countries have historically offered to the Third World has disappeared and because Socialist ideas have retreated in underdeveloped countries. The disappearance of the Socialist system also opens up the possibility of an increasingly unipolar world, where North-South relations of economic, political, and military domination are strengthened. These negative effects tend to stimulate the economic and political links among underdeveloped countries as an alternative to confronting the crises to which they are subject. In the context of these changes, relations between Cuba and a significant set of Latin American and African nations are reinforced. The North American assessment is that Cuba is becoming increasingly isolated among the underdeveloped countries merely because of its Socialist affiliation. Evidence against such supposed isolation can be found, for example, in the current support for the reentry of Cuba into the Organization of American States and in the election of Cuba to the UN Security Council. In general, it can be said that the significant recent changes in the 117

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international arena have negatively affected relations between the United States and Cuba. This is because the North American perception extrapolates the crisis of the Socialist countries in Europe to Cuba, without accounting for either the peculiarities that differentiate the Cuban process from that in Eastern Europe or the presence of factors that attenuate the existing negative tendencies. The triumphalist view of the current US administration leads it to increase its hostility toward Cuba, convinced that it is witnessing a canceled historical process. That is, without a doubt, a serious error.

Notes 1. Among the factors that could be mentioned in this regard are the evident underestimation of the peculiarities of backward capitalist national development in the period before 1945; the strategic errors made in the construction of socialism; the effects of systematic hostility from capitalism and the shortcomings in its confrontation; the varying level of development reached by the different countries; and the conditions created by the changes in the Soviet Union that trigger those processes. 2. The Socialist process in Cuba recognizes the need for changes in the system—a need that results from its own dynamics—not only because of errors made, but also apropos of the requirements of a changing reality; namely, the process that started with the call for the Fourth Congress of the Cuban Communist party in March 1990. 3. Even in Poland, where changes have been more abrupt, its leaders have recognized that there is a need for a transitional approach to the reorientation of its external economic links. 4. "The price paid by Moscow for Cuban sugar must be assessed not only in comparison with the prices and the quality of the Soviet goods delivered in exchange, but also against what it costs to produce sugar in the USSR. There is no doubt that Cuba is a much more efficient producer of sugar than the Soviet Union" (G. B. Hagelberg, The Sugar Side of Perestroika," in F. O. Lichts Internar tional Sugar and Sweetener Report, vol. 122, no. 6 [February 8, 1990], p. 94; retranslated from the translation into Spanish by J. L. Rodriguez). 5. IPS, Economic Press Service, Boletín Quincenal sobre Cuba, No. 35, December 15,1989, p. 786. 6. With respect to nickel, the countries of Eastern Europe recently ratified their interest in continuing their cooperation to build a new plant by around 1996 that will produce thirty thousand metric tons per annum. From a cablegram of IPS, Havana, April 18,1990. 7. However, there is no evidence that such changes have been planned for the near future. Moreover, in the case of the Soviet Union, the will to support preferential treatment in relations with Cuba has been expressed, although aimed at more efficiency in the use of aid. From a speech by M. Gorbachev, April 1, 1989, in "Una amistad inquebrantable," Editor Política (Havana, 1989), pp. 16-17. 118

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8. In the case of the Soviet Union, postponement of payments servicing the debt is arranged until 1991. 9. The Soviet position on the debt issue was presented by Gorbachev in his speech to the UN General Assembly in December 1988.

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18 The International Context of Cuba-US Relations Richard Betts The collapse of communism in Europe should not be seen as a demonstration of what is to come wherever it remains elsewhere (I would not use the term "Socialist" in place of "Communist" in the same sense that the Marxist-Leninists do, because social democratic parties in the West can also claim the socialist label). The essence of the change has been political—the ending of dictatorships in Eastern Europe, and of Soviet political dominance in Cuba and the Communist countries in Asia. One important difference is that in Cuba, communism came through internal revolution and was not imposed by Soviet tanks. Also, many who objected to the regime were allowed to leave—thus letting some of the steam escape from the boiler—another difference from Eastern Europe. The United States should not expect events in Europe to be repeated in this hemisphere. Nevertheless, the principal phenomenon in international politics that now forms the context of what the United States and the Soviet Union are absorbed in is the unfolding revolution of 1989, the collapse of communism in the center of the East-West conflict, that is, in Europe. It is not too great an oversimplification to say that the Cold War is over because, in a sense, the Soviet Union surrendered, at least in terms of the goals that the United States has had. That is, the Soviet Union gave Eastern Europe its freedom back, began the pluralization of its own internal politics, and pulled back from adventurism in the Third World. As a result we are seeing the peripheralization of Marxist-Leninist regimes. Cuba's national ideological compatriots now are further removed—countries such as North Korea, Vietnam, and in some sense Albania, or China since the events in Tienanmen Square. This is a different global situation in terms of the balance of power and ideological competition than it was three years ago. This has implications for Cuba-US relations, but what those implications are depends on how events unfold and how people in power react to them. These global Richard Betts is professor of political science at the Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University.

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changes could cut in two directions. One would be toward détente, if the United States becomes more indifferent to peripheral Communist states because it has less reason to see communism, now divorced from Soviet power, as a threat in any of its national manifestations. It is easier than it used to be for the United States to consider these regimes powerless, perhaps eventually bound to crumble internally like those in Europe, even if that is not likely to happen. Primary attention in US foreign policy and in US-Soviet and great power relations will shift to the consequences of German reunification, to economic integration, to Asia, and probably away from Latin America, in general. The main reason for Cold War competition in the Third World—indeed, the main reason for US interventions in past decades—was concern for how the progress of Leninist movements in those areas related to alliance systems and central East-West competition in Europe—concern with the global balance sheet between the US and Soviet power blocs. In fact, the main reason we came to see Cuba as a threat was its relationship with the Soviet Union. If Cuba had been Yugoslavia, there probably would not have been quite the same problem. But now that the dominoes have been falling in the other direction, the question should obviously be, why worry? We could let benighted Marxist states that are now more peripheral stew in their own juices, confront the bankruptcy of their ideology without having the US threat to use as an excuse for what we find objectionable, such as repression of their populations. These global developments, however, could almost as easily cut the other way, toward more pressure or tension. The rationale would be that without the distraction of the Soviet threat and with resources and energy released from the confrontation in the center in Europe, we now have more freedom of action to clean up the periphery, to complete the global victory by rubbing out the remnants of international Marxist-Leninism. Many suggest that it is paranoid or unrealistic for Cuba to focus on the US threat; I do not think that is true. If I were a communist in Cuba, I would definitely see a US threat, for the same reasons that countries in that position and in other international political competitions in history have seen a threat—for the same reasons the countries in Western Europe saw a threat from the Soviet Union. This is not because premeditated, calculated, self-conscious aggression is probable, but because of what can happen in situations of tension and conflicts of interest between countries for what both sides believe to be defensive reasons. Which of these possibilities is the more likely? To the extent that the United States operates according to the logic of realpolitik and Cuba avoids egregious provocations, the tendency toward more indifference, a relaxed US view, and the possibility of détente should dominate. But that puts aside the force of history and inertia. It also does not take 122

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complete account of the very nature of the West's victory in the Cold War and the ideological content of the international political events of 1989-1990. The revolutions in 1989, at least as they are seen in much of the West, have been a triumph for liberal democratic ideology. The United States, contrary to much folklore, is an ideological country, but in a different sense from the way in which the term is often used. The Constitution, the Bill of Rights, the Declaration of Independence—that is the ideology that has at various times in US history produced a crusading spirit seen as a liberal, benign, positive force, at least by those behind it, if not by some of its targets. This ideological crusading spirit can be unleashed by a number of events. Events could lead the United States to violate Clausewitz's injunction against passing the culminating point of victory, that is, overextending its successes and pressing the international revolution of liberalism perhaps further than it might be safe to try. The main inhibitions against this possibility are the US Congress and the Army. Ardent hawks among politicians in this country are now on the defensive, as they were in the early 1970s, and no longer as influential as they were in the 1980s, at the height of the popularity of Ronald Reagan and US anti-Sovietism. And US military leaders have a great aversion to the prospect of committing US power without a popular consensus in favor of the action, for all the reasons articulated in the so-called Weinberger doctrine. So, the possibility that renewed tension between the United States and Cuba could lead to even more dangerous interactions remains but is not extremely high. Current trends, in any case, amount to a refocusing of the superpowers' attention on Europe and the Middle East, on the demobilization of military power on both sides, and on various ways of groping toward cooperation or more amicable relations. The history and the passions of the particular case of Cuba-US relations aside, international relations in the strategic realm today seem to be evolving in a fairly happy and harmonious direction, compared with the first forty years of the postwar era. These overall developments, more than regional issues in Latin America, will be the major focus of the United States and the Soviet Union. There are a few caveats about these generally positive global trends that form the overarching context for other regional interactions between the great powers. There is always a tendency, implicitly, to extrapolate the future from the present, to predict what is going to happen as an extension of what is happening. And that is always a prescription for surprise. After all, what would have happened if we had projected the future five or six years ago from what the trends seemed to be at that time? Some seeds of problems can be seen even in the current positive 123

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situation. First, euphoria in the West about the positive things that have been happening politically could in part be a prescription for some disappointment, because setbacks in East-West relations, if they occur, may have worse consequences than if expectations had not reached such heights. We are in some danger in the West of getting too used to things going our way, becoming too accustomed to the Soviets giving away the store, as it were; if this changes, if events move in the other direction, it will be more of a rude shock. There are all sorts of problems that can lead to the derailing of current happy events in Europe—for example, economic problems in Eastern Europe. The problem of economic reconstruction, of making up for forty years of Marxist-Leninism, is a daunting task, and even with aid from the West, there is no assurance that it will be accomplished. An economic crisis could lead to all sorts of nasty developments that move away from a democratic direction. And economic problems are not confined to formerly Communist regimes. We have economic problems in the West, not to mention, of course, the economic problems of the nonaligned. Also, the revolution in the postwar security order that had been based on bipolarity in Europe is fostering great instability. After 1962, at least, the competition between East and West has been remarkably stable. We were never complacent about it. We always maneuvered and spent money to maintain our position, but it was stable because the lines in Europe were stark and clear. That stability of bipolarity was purchased at the expense of the freedom of millions of people in Eastern Europe. Although the current instability may be inevitable and not to be regretted, it is dangerous because in unleashing Eastern Europe—in giving freedom not only to those populations but to political forces within the Soviet Union, and potentially even independence to parts of the internal Soviet empire—potential crises over ethnic problems, economic dislocations, other national animosities, in short, things that had been suppressed by the bipolar division of the continent, are latent within the instability of the new freedom. In a short time some strategists in this country have gone from worrying about Soviet power to worrying about the consequences of Soviet weakness. The danger of major war, war in the center, a war that could involve the great powers, is greater now than it was in the 1980s, not less. By that I do not mean to say that the danger of war now is high, only that it has been negligible. And it was largely because the lines of division were clear and neither side challenged them fundamentally in Europe or in the center that the East-West conflict was diverted so much to the Third World in the second half of the postwar era—the lines there were more fluid. 124

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The greater chances of disorder and miscalculation in conflict that now arise in the center, together with the fact that there is no clear evidence of either a definite increase or decrease of these possibilities in the more peripheral areas, are not grounds for assuming that the current positive trends are going to continue. So we face less East-West conflict today for precisely the same reasons, in a sense, that we could face more of it in the future.

Notes This chapter is a transcription of the author's oral presentation.

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19 The Cuban-American Community and US Domestic Politics Enrique A. Baloyra

The first aspect of this topic could be titled or subtitled "landfall," which is how and when and where we landed here, and how we have been treated. The first major wave of Cubans arrived in the United States in a place that was a little bit like Peoria by the ocean. There was not much there. One wonders, had we arrived in such a critical mass in Chicago or New York or San Francisco, if things would have turned out the samewould we have built an enclave, would we have been on the verge of really being a hegemonic factor in the community? We might, then, qualify our success, such as it is, with the fact that perhaps we did not have to compete against the best and brightest. To be sure, there were excellent professionals and academicians in town; but it is as if a wave of immigrants arrived in Varadero, Cuba, and had taken over the town, instead of arriving in Havana. Many of the Cubans in Cuba claimed their experiences to be exceptional; so ours has been, to a degree. Regardless of whether you buy the image of the golden exile or the success story of Cubans in this country, the fact is that experiences were different; this runs the gamut from reception to induction into the military, to serving in the military as a homogeneous unit around the time of the missile crisis, to our experience in college and in integrating ourselves into the society, up to a point, and then having a resilient self-image that resisted all of the abattoirs of cultural diffusion and adaptation, and triclde-up or trickle-down economics. So we have a group that sees itself as different, and where the empirical and historical reference justifies this, the self-image is that we are different. How we came to be depends on whether you listen to critics or chroniclers of the community, "Miami Vice" or "¿Qué Pasa, U.S.A.?" In "Miami Vice" the success story was based on money previously siphoned off the island, much of it made from drugs. In reality, it had a great deal Enrique A. Baloyra is associate dean of the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Miami.

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to do with Juan and Pepe, two contemporary equivalents of Lucy and Desi, raising the family in Miami, both of them working in factories, babysitting, and the kids picking up a newspaper route. The affluence now seen in Miami has been well researched by sociologists such as Alejandro Portes, Lisandra Perez, and even Juan Clark. It shows that our income and vocational levels are above those of other Hispanic, minorities; but there are many different incomes and Cuban households. Therefore, there is a sense of vulnerability that adds to the life history, in the sense of life as a relentless struggle to get ahead, remain viable, and maintain dignity. Politically, our fortunes are inseparable from those of the Kennedy family. But gradually there has been estrangement between the community and the Democratic party. This estrangement is a result of circumstances that had to do with national politics and the presidential nomination process in the party. It has to do with the weakening of a series of structures within the Democratic party, and to things that in general have weakened parties in US society over the last fifteen years and increased the power of political action committees (PACs) and single-issue, interest-group liberal-type politics. There was an ideological drift in the party that most Cubans—being white ethnic Catholics—did not like. They were part of the traditional constituency of the party that presumably was progressive on social issues—universal health care, access to education, housing, Social Security benefits for old age, and so forth—and tough on foreign policy. That was the way that Jack Kennedy Democrats defined themselves, and Ronald Reagan tried to steal the thunder of that in his first term, with limited success. Today there are visible links between conservative Cubans and the national structure of the Republican party. Those links at the level of state politics are not so great. They are more tenuous particularly because the Republican party at the state level in Florida is not such a potent force. Parallel and gradual to this link between setting limits in the community and the Republican party inside or within the Democratic party, there has been a process whereby a number of Cubans have been gaining experience at the national level in skilled positions such as running campaigns, preparing media presentations, or just being in a bureaucracy. These Cuban Democrats are invisible, but they do exist. Culturally, Cuban conservative Democrats and establishment Democrats and Republicans of the East are light years apart, and the sources of increasing conservatism among Cubans are not exactly comparable to those of former Democrats in the South who were disenchanted for a number of cultural reasons. The Cubans were disenchanted for ideological reasons—essentially, betrayed once again by Rita Hayworth and JFK, being driven into the other party not because ISO

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they did not fit culturally, but because they were ideological protesters against certain crucial decisions at one point or another. As for the Cuban issue, it matters not only how many you are, it matters how strongly you feel. That strength and that intensity thus far have been sufficient to overcome the voices of people who have wanted to change the policy or alter the consensus with respect to Cuba. At the local level, Cubans are engaged in what community power theorists of some twenty years ago would have defined as rancorous conflicts. Cubans are not the best liked in the neighborhood; and they do not care. Cubans are unable to delay gratification. They are unable to flinch on the language issue. They are unwilling to yield on the matter of adopting what Alejandro Portes calls the hegemonic discourse. Rightly or wrongly, they refuse to be lectured, to be indoctrinated on US values, and to accept the etiquette of political conventionalism because in some instances this is perceived as WASP hypocrisy to delay the access of an important segment of the community to the power that is due it. The use of democratic discourse, with a lower case "d," makes it difficult, because you are using the language of the adversary; you are telling Cubans that they have to be more open, more plural. You want to be able to say "Tu hablas como un Americano" ("You speak like an American"). In typical or in classical Federalist tradition, Republican district attorneys have gone after a number of our democratically elected, Democratic representatives. Recent Governor Martinez fired Major Martinez, and replaced him with Councilman Martinez in the city of Hialeah. Ramón Cernuda had to render accounts for certain paintings that he had brought from Cuba, in connivance with Jerry Scott, the cultural attaché in Havana. And Nicolasito Guillen was caught in the middle. These are things that the editorial board of the Miami Herald has difficulty understanding, but they are real. If campaigns at the state and local levels do not harp on profound ethnic themes in the next ten years, Cubans could get a governorship (not necessarily Florida) and perhaps two to four seats in Congress (again not counting Florida). What are the problems in Florida? Well, some of the better organized groups apparently want everything and it is absolutely unacceptable that the agenda for Cubans and the agenda of the right wing of the Republican party are one and the same thing. If we break into rancorous conflict among ourselves we would be a much less potent and effective political force. The Soviets have insisted that the solution to the Cuban problem has four different sets of actors in Washington, Moscow, Havana, and Miami. As far as Miami is concerned, there has to be a distinction established between those who want to act like a Greek chorus and those who want to protagonize; between those who are bent on an agenda of redress, of 131

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recovering thirty years, and those who, following the charge given to his disciples by a contemporary US philosopher, are just content to win, baby. Up to now, Havana has tried to resolve the issue, saying that the Cuban-American community is a minor annoyance, that this business is really to be transacted between Washington and Havana. And they have for a long time tried to provide strategies to go around, over, under Miami; but it does not work. And it does not work for the same reason that shooting at Cuban vessels on the high seas is counterproductive: because that tends to increase unity—not unanimity, but unity. And so, therefore, we are forced to present a common front. It has to be abundantly clear, whether you like their poetry or not, that as long as those whom we see as our homologues in Cuba are sent three or four hundred irate neighbors, all of whom have short hair, seventeen-inch biceps, and can be produced in fifteen seconds, we cannot reconcile ourselves. I mean, what you heard here today was sincere, although you may think it was exaggerated. As a matter of fact, there were some very valiant testimonies on your part, but as long as that is there, there is no deal—no deal, because you're producing in Miami the same effect that silly capers of US foreign policy produced in Cuba, which is exactly the opposite of what supposedly you want to achieve. The matter of dignity is not going to go away. This is why the conflict is so profound, because it is not something that can be settled in the court of international settlements. We have the dead, the wounded, and the political prisoners to consider. Governments normally do not apologize for these things, but in 1979 and 1980 Cuba did something that sounded a little bit like an apology. Cuba released, thanks to the effort of the Carter administradon, a large number of political prisoners. But then we wound up with the Mariel episode. So, what can we do? Whether you agree or disagree with the perception, we think that as long as Castro is calling the shots, we cannot safely stick our necks out to argue for a guarantee that the United States will not interfere with domestic politics were a process of change launched in Cuba. So I know that it is annoying to suggest that 90 percent of what happens in your country is the result of the act of one man. We do not necessarily see that as the case. We do not see you as being unanimous on everything, but we see an important figure there with the ability to disconnect things, to prevent change. So, therefore, whether the poetry is good or bad, whether the experiences are genuine or spurious, we have for the first time in 120 years of exile politics the ability to cut a deal, part of which is predicated on the fact that the majority of those who are outside will not return, and those who could enter into a historic alliance to return can create by ability, by parity, a bright future for a common 132

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fatherland. And so, therefore, that is a challenge. And that is a long-term challenge. But we do not have an opportunity that is going to last forever.

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20 Fallacies Regarding the Cuban Community in the United States Rafael Hernandez

In spite of the studies carried out in both Cuba and the United States regarding the Cuban community in the United States, a number of prejudices remain regarding its social and political composition. O n e is that the majority of the Cuban community is made u p of "active counterrevolutionaries who left Cuba for political reasons." Of course, political difference, based on antagonistic class interests and ideologies, was the major impetus not only for the first wave of Cuban immigrants that left for the United States b u t for many who followed. The weight of political and ideological motives has been decreasing in importance, but it is difficult to distinguish nonpolitical motivations in a setting where all migrants, because of the intense conflict between Cuba and the United States, are treated as refugees by the US government. Studies done in Cuba since the years of the "air shuttle" (1965-1973) show that the principal cause for migrating were the shortages in Cuba. Later investigations indicated that access to consumer goods available in the United States—and not conscious counterrevolutionary ideologywas the major attraction. Cubans have left predominantly for family and economic reasons, similar to the majority of migrants from other Latin American countries. Independent of their ideological preferences, most Cubans traditionally have not left as exiles, but rather as migrants. It is also held that the success of Cubans in the United States reflects the advantages of free enterprise, political pluralism, and ideological liberalism. Cubans have f o u n d themselves privileged for strictly political reasons with respect to other groups of Latin migrants. The program for Cuban refugees created exceptional opportunities f r o m the political point of view; that is to say, it permitted access to power. Those migrating in the early 1960s were given extraordinary advantages for starting businesses. More than just free enterprise, the financial facilities made available in return for services rendered to the US government facilitated Rafael Hernandez is senior researcher for the Center for American Studies.

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the emergence and prosperity of a new Cuban-American bourgeoisie and middle class. Many small businessmen in the Cuban community benefited from the lavish credits granted by the US government, others from the ability to circulate freely in the Caribbean in armed cruisers "combating Communism," virtually immune from surveillance by the US Coast Guard. It was logical that Cubans appeared able to "walk on water"; in reality, they walked on stones placed there by the invisible hand of the US government. Those who came in the 1970s and 1980s found themselves converted into a work force exploited by those who had arrived first. Most of the Cubans in the United States are neither entrepreneurs nor executives; according to the US census, 60 percent of them are salaried workers. Of course, the standard of living of a worker in the United States is higher than that in Cuba or in any other Latin American country. Nevertheless, the idea that Cubans in the United States have generally achieved the status of middle class or lower middle class is a myth. Some feel that the organizations established by the Cuban community represent the interests of its lower echelons, from whom they receive their mandate, legitimacy, and material support and whom they can mobilize effectively. The organizations of the far Right, the paramilitary terrorists so typical of the 1960s, are no longer functional in the ideological climate in the United States today, although their presence rises and falls with the level of US hostility toward Cuba. In 1989, the FBI awarded Miami the title of "capital of terrorism" in recognition of the number of bombs that exploded there as part of the rivalry among such groups. The modern right-wing organizations, such as the Cuban American National Foundation, are elitist, exclusivist, and lack representativeness. Their style is that of money and political favors and does not reflect the politics of the masses. The new organizations, inspired by liberal center-rightist ideologies, do not have substantial internal support at lower levels either. They are externally directed parties that try to take advantage of the international organizations of the traditional parties—Christian Democrats, Liberals— to promote the "salvation of Cuba." They are relative newcomers to the community. Paradoxically, their leadership, ideas, language, and areas of focus sound as strange in the ideological climate predominating in Miami as they would in Cuba itself, although for substantially different reasons. These sectors and groups have never had a believable policy that was their own, independent of that of the United States. Their intention is to offer a democratic alternative, although their policies are not based on a democratic structure, not built from below, but rather based on deals arranged at the top. They promote ideological pluralism but practice ideological terrorism against Cuban socialism. Its form is the 136

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old-fashioned "criollo" or North American style; its real reference point is Miami politics, not the politics of Cuba today. The organizations whose agendas do not correspond to the concepts of exile, but rather to those of migration—that is, they are not based on political interests but on family and economic ones—form a separate group that is trying to establish relations between Cuba and the community in Miami. They express the interests of that large segment of Cubans who aspire to better living conditions. The principal challenge facing them is to prove their efficacy at mobilizing masses while confronting the liberal pressure groups that tend to tie their political agenda to the internal situation in Cuba. Although a minority, there is also a leftist faction in the community whose importance is limited by the little relevance given it o n the ideological scale of values within the community and by the pressures of the Right and of the US government itself. There is a common opinion held by many North Americans that Cuban-Americans are a powerful political force that, in regard to Cuba, plays a role similar to that of Jewish pressure groups with respect to Israel. It is felt that this group constitutes the principal obstacle to improving relations between Cuba and the United States. Cuban-Americans are blamed for maintaining a hostile image of Cuba in the press and, more generally, in public opinion. This is debatable on at least two counts. First, Cuba has a symbolic meaning for the United States. More influential than the impact of the Cuban community itself is the perception by North Americans of the perpetuation of an insult to their imperial pride just ninety miles offshore. Second, if the right wing of the Cuban community could dictate policy concerning Cuba, there never would have been, for example, the agreements about southwest Africa or about migration. This Cuban-American group would gain a favorable position only to the extent that US policy toward Cuba becomes more hostile—for example, in projects like Radio Marti or TV Marti. The conclusion that emerges f r o m this line of reasoning is that the right wing of the community can move only within the space that North American policy creates for it. But when the United States identifies a question of national interest deserving of dialogue with Cuba, it will hold that dialogue in spite of the opposition of any right-wing Cuban-American group. There is an assumption that Cuban-American businessmen in Florida would not be only a political pressure group, but also an economic one, working against the establishment of relations with Cuba, because its interests are opposed to those of the Cubans. But the fact is that there is a great potential for trade in agricultural products, such as citrus fruits, tobacco, and rum; in cultural exchange; in tourism; and in many other areas. Cuban entrepreneurs are strong in medium and small 137

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business in metropolitan Miami. When the effectiveness of the blockade was reduced, as in 1977-1979, these businessmen were quick to seek trade opportunities with Cuba. To believe that they would remain inactive in the face of reestablished economic relations between Cuba and the United States would be to negate their capitalist mentality. Is the Cuban community waiting for fundamental changes to occur in the Cuban regime in order to build a "new Cuba"? Some CubanAmericans believe—or say they believe—that they would go back to Cuba tomorrow. It is possible that this is the sincere dream of some of them, but it is difficult to believe that there would be many willing to renounce permanently everything that brought them to the United States. The Cuban community seems monolithic because of ideologicial and political terrorism. The established press is dedicated to reiterating their rejection of socialism, to feeding on hate and on dreams of repatriation. Those who visit Miami find themselves faced with adopting this ideology or being stigmatized. Many prefer not to look for trouble should a radio interviewer ask them if they have escaped from a "totalitarian regime." The fact is they would stick to their decision to leave even if they could have stayed in Cuba and been able to form a new party or allowed to write books against socialism. Some of those newly converted to the idea of "dialogue" and "national reconciliation" are only trying to get today by political means what they could not obtain before by other methods: reconquest of the island. In reality, this group does not represent the interests of the majority of the Cuban community, either. Cuban emigrants have interests that are typical of any ethnic community—to improve their social and economic status, to help their relatives in Cuba and to be able to contact them, and, eventually, to help some of them to migrate to the United States. These interests can better be carried out by means of a more constructive relationship with their country of origin, which does not necessarily imply that they support socialism; neither must they convert themselves into militants supporting the US policy of hostility. These Cubans are the silent majority of the community.

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Index

Abalkin, Leonid, 49 Adamishin, Anatoly, 58 Afghanistan, 7 5 , 9 1 Africa, 54, 61, 62, 68, 75, 112, 117; Cuban military in, 47, 56 Agricultural sector: Cuban, 1 0 , 1 2 , 1 4 , 15,19(n37), 49 Aid: military, 4 8 4 9 Albania, 121 Almendros, Néstor, 39 Andropov, Yuri, 91 Angola, 49, 56, 62, 57-58, 75 Anti-Americanism, 51 Anti-imperialism, 51, 55, 63, 64 Arenas, Reinaldo, 39 Argentina, 64, 6 6 , 1 1 2 Arias, Oscar, 65 Arias plan, 65 A r m e d forces. See Military A r m e d struggle, 63-64 Arms. See Weapons Arms control, 99-100 Arms race, 86 Art, 33; promotion of, 34, 35-36 Artists, 4 1 4 2 Asia, 75, 77 Asociación Harmanos Saiz, 34 Authoritarianism, 64 Baker Plan, 78 Banks: transnational, 78 Benin, 92 Biotechnology, 15,18-19(n34) Birth rates, 27 Blas Roca Calderío contingent, 12 Blockade, 1 0 , 1 5 , 1 3 8 Bolivia, 64, 66 Bonuses, 1 1 , 1 7 ( n l 3 ) Brady Initiative, 78 Brazil, 64, 6 6 , 1 0 7 , 112 Bread manufacturing sector, 12

Brezhnev, Leonid, 91 Bulgaria, 116 Bush, George, 48, 73, 81, 88 Businesses: Cuban-American, 137-138

136,

Cabrera, Lydia, 39 Caliban (Retamar), 42 Calvo, Novas, 39 Camacho, J o r g e , 39 C a m Ranh Bay, 92 Capitalism, 61, 62, 6 5 , 1 1 7 , 1 1 8 ( n l ) Caribbean, 3, 75, 7 6 , 1 0 7 , 1 1 2 . See also various countries Carter, Jimmy, 9 8 , 1 3 2 Casa de las Américas, 34 Casa de las Américas, (journal), 42 Castro, Fidel, 2, 3, 16(n3), 31, 40, 41, 55, 58, 62, 66, 68; on communism, 59-60,61, 6 9 ( n l l ) Castro, Raul, 57, 69(n6) Central America, 54, 56, 61, 75, 95, 107. See also various countries Centro Alejo Carpentier, 34 Cernuda, Ramon, 131 C F E . See C o n v e n t i o n a l F o r c e s in Europe Chamorro, Violeta, 56, 63 Chernenko, Konstantin, 91 Chernobyl, 97 China, 121 Christian Democrats, 136 Citrus industry, 15 Clark, J u a n , 130 Class confrontation, 64 Climate, 1 0 , 1 3 , 1 4 C M E A . See C o u n c i l f o r M u t u a l Economic Assistance Coalitions: political, 86 Cold War, 3 , 3 9 , 4 4 , 5 9 , 1 2 2 ; end of, 82, 8 3 , 1 2 3 ; impacts of, 74-75 139

INDEX

Collectives: labor, 12 Colombia, 107 C O M E C O M , 56 Communism, 61,77,121,136; support for, 59-60 C o m m u n i s t party, 2 6 , 3 8 , 4 0 - 4 1 , 4 2 C o m m u n i s t Youth League (UJC), 41 Communities: construction of, 28 Conflicts, 48, 95; East-West, 124-125; 75-76,102-103 C o n j u n t o Lirico, 36 C o n t a d o r a group, 65 Contraceptives, 27 Conventional Forces in E u r o p e (CFE), 94 Cooperation, 6 6 , 9 5 , 1 1 8 ( n 6 ) Cooperatives, 11 Corporations: transnational, 77 Council f o r Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), 55, 56 Councils: art, 34 "Counterinsurgency," 108 Credit, 13 Criticism: media, 42-43 Cuba, 1 , 3 , 3 6 , 4 9 , 5 6 , 1 2 2 , 1 3 2 ; African policy of, 57-58; economic policy of, 10,116-117; foreign policy of, 47-48, 51, 60-61; a n d Latin America, 2, 62-67, press in, 23-24; revolution, 113-114; security of, 52-53; a n d Soviet Union, 54-55, 61, 118(n7), 121; a n d T h i r d World, 61-62; trade w i t h , 55-56, 67-68; a n d U n i t e d States, 5, 39, 44, 48, 59, 107, 115, 121-122; in world system, 53-54, 117-118 Cuban-American National Foundation, 136 Cuban-Americans, 129, 135; politics of, 136-138; role of, 2, 3, 4-5 C u b a n Institute for C i n e m a Art a n d (ICAIC), 34 Cuito Cuanavale campaign, 49 Culture, 28; C u b a n , 33-34,3940; shaping of, 37-38 Currency: devaluation of, 12-13; fixed, 14 Czechoslovakia, 83, 9 2 , 1 1 6 Day care facilities, 12 Debt, 18(n28); external, 10,13, 21, 65, 108, servicing of, 16(n5), 18(n24), 119(n8)

140

Defense, 23; C u b a n , 4, 49; U n i t e d States, 93-94,98-99. See also Security Democracy, 5 , 5 2 , 60,69-70(nl7), 102, 123; in Latin America, 64, 6 5 , 1 1 3 Democratic Party, 86, 87,130-131 Democratization, 29, 63-64, 73 Departmento de Orientación Revolucionaria. See D e p a r t m e n t of Revolutionary Orientation D e p a r t m e n t of Revolutionary Orientation, 4 1 Destabilization, 48, 65 Détente, 5 9 , 1 2 2 Devaluation: of US currency, 12-13 Development, 9, 13, 29; capitalist, 62, 118(nl); a n d labor, 14-15 Diaz, Jesus: Las inciales de la tierra, 33 Díaz-Castro, Tania, 44 Díaz-Rodríguez, Ernesto, 44 Disinformation, 95 Domínguez, J o r g e , 52-53 D r u g trafficking, 1 0 3 , 1 0 7 Eagleburger, Lawrence S., 83 Eastern Europe, 1, 39, 78, 95, 96, 97, 113; changes in, 15, 29, 30, 79, 91, 102, 121; trade with, 3, 21-22, 116117,118(n6) East Germany, 22, 102, 116 Economic growth, 9,10-11, 21 Economic M a n a g e m e n t a n d Planning System (SDPE), 21 Economy, 16(n3), 6 0 , 6 2 , 8 6 , 1 0 2 , 1 3 5 , 137; changes in, 11-12, 15; C u b a n , 2, 6, 10-11, 21, 29-30, 52, 113, 116117; international, 95, 101; Latin American, 66, 107-108; restructuring, 16, 77, 116-117; Soviet, 3, 92; US role in, 73, 74-75, 77-79 Ecuador, 64, 66 Education: Cuban, 4, 27, 38, 31, 62 Elections, 31, 62; in Namibia, 57; in Nicaragua, 63; in Ukraine, 97 Electronics industry, 15 El Salvador, 63, 6 5 , 1 0 8 Employment, 1 2 , 2 7 , 3 0 Energy, 108 Escalante, Carlos Aldana, 41 Espionage, 95 Ethiopia, 49, 56 Europe, 75, 77, 79, 97, 98. See also various countries

INDEX

European Common Market, 77 Exchange rates, 13, 117 Exports: Cuban, 14, 15, 19(n35), 116117. See also Trade Families, 27, 28, 29,137 FAR. See Revolutionary Armed Forces Faribundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), 63, 65 Fernández, Frank, 36 Fifth Congress of the Young Communist League, 30 FMLN. See Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front Foreign policy, 51-52, 53; Cuban, 4748, 54, 60-61; United States, 3, 38, 87-88,91,93,107,132 Formalism: in press, 24 Fourteen Points, 82 Fourth World, 74 Freeman, Charles W., Jr., 58 Free peasants' market, 11,17(nl2), 40 FSLN. See Sandinista Front Gaceta de Cuba, La (journal), 43 General Law on Housing, 12 Germany, 74, 78, 79, 99 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 49, 91, 92, 98, 100

Granma (journal), 26, 42, 57 Greece, 83 Grenada, 49, 54 GTP. See Guerra de Todo el Pueblo Guantanamo Bay, 30 Guatemala, 108 Guerra de Todo el Pueblo (GTP), 49 Guillen, Nicolasito, 131 Hart, Armando, 33 Havana, 12 Hayworth, Rita, 130 Health care, 4,11,12, 62 Hegemonic discourse, 131 Herman, S.S., 30 Hialeah (Fla.), 131 Housing: in Cuba, 4,11,12, 28 Human rights, 2, 5, 39 Hungary, 60, 92,116 Hunger, 86 Hurricane Kate, 10 ICAIC. See Cuban Institute for Cinema

Art and Industry Ideology, 2,55,123,135,136 Immigration, 107 Imperialism, 59 Imports, 15. See also Trade Import substitution, 49 Inciales de la tierra, Las (Dia2), 33 Income, 11; hard currency, 12-13, 14 Industrialization, 16 Industry, 15, 21,49 Infante, Guillermo Cabrera, 39 Information policy, 23, 24-25 Infracapitalism, 102 Infrastructure, 15, 28 Institutes: cultural, 34 Intellectuals, 35,41, 42, 43-44 Intelligence services: Panamanian, 63 Internationalism, 56-57,62 Interventionism, 55, 73 Investment, 15, 28, 108 Iran, 83 Isolationism, 73, 74 Israel, 98 Jamaica, 66 Japan, 74, 75, 77, 78, 79,98; economic role of, 101, 102 Journalism: Cuban, 23, 24, 26, 42, 43, 44-45. See also Media; Press Journals, 25-26, 31, 42 Juventud Rebelde (journal), 25, 31, 42, 43,44-45 Kennedy, John F., 73-74,130 Korea, 96, 98 Kurile Islands, 95 Labor: Cuban, 11,14,15, 21, 28 Lam, Wilfredo, 34 Latin America, 76, 117; Cuban relations with, 2, 53-54, 62-67,111-112; security of, 107-109, 112. See also various countries League of Nations, 73 Lehman, John, 98 Leo, 36 Liberals, 136 Libya, 102 Lima, Lezama, 39 Literature, 33, 35, 39 Lithuania, 81-82 Loans, 13, 21 141

INDEX

Manley, Michael, 66 Manufacturing: Cuban, 10,16(n7) Mariel episode, 132 Marinello, Juan, 34 Market, 21, 65; world, 113,117 Marti, Jose, 44 Marxism, 5, 64, 115 Marxism-Leninism, 61,64,65,67,121, 122,124 Media, 2, 30, 36; Cuban, 37-40, 42-43. See also Journalism; Press Mediterranean, 75 Mercado Libre Camposino. See Free peasants' market Mexico, 66, 75,112,113 Miami, 130, 131-132; politics in, 136137 "Miami Vice," 129 Microbrigades, 12 Middle East, 75, 95 Migration, 103,129,135,137 Military, 108; Cuban, 47-49, 56,57,58, 63, 112; Soviet, 92, 94-95; United States, 30, 48, 65, 85, 88, 91, 98-99, 102,107 Ministry of Culture, 33-34 Money. See Currency Mongolia, 95 Moore, Marc, 44,45 Moral standards, 36 Moscow News (journal), 60 Mozambique, 62, 92 MPLA. See Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola Namibia, 75, 57 Narcotics. See Drug trafficking Nationalism, 51,63, 82,113; Cuban, 3, 5, 65 NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization Neruda, Pablo, 42 New economic order, 77-78 Newspapers. See Journals New world order, 2, 60-61 Nicaragua, 49, 56, 61, 62, 75 Nickel industry, 15,118(n6) Nonproliferation, 102 Noriega, Manuel, 61, 63 North America, 75 North American Common Market, 77 142

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 98 North Korea, 121 North Yemen, 92 Nuclear deterrence, 91, 96-97 Nuclear weapons, 48,83; reduction of, 94, 95, 97, 98; in Soviet Union, 101102 Nueva Trova, 35, 36 Odell, Harry, 81 Oil. See Petroleum Opina (journal), 42 Organization of American States, 117 Organizations: student, 31 Pablo y la Sinfónica, 36 PACs. See Political action committees Padilla, Heberto, 39 «Padilla AfTair," 42 Painting, 35 Panama, 39, 61, 63,107 Panamanian Defense Force, 63 Peace and cooperation treaty, 49 Pensamiento Crítico (journal), 42 Pensions, 12 Perestroika, 30, 32, 92, 94 Pérez, Lisandra, 130 Peru, 64 Petroleum, 12,17-18(n20) Planning, 5, 28 Plastic actors, 35 Pluralism: ideological, 136 Poetry, 35, 44 Poland, 60,116,118(n3) Political action committees (PACs), 130 Political prisoners, 132 Politics, 2, 61, 121; Cuban-American, 130-132, 136-139; and foreign policy, 51-52; United States, 81-82, 135 Popular culture, 36 Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), 58 Population: Cuban, 27 Portes, Alejandro, 130,131 Poverty, 86 Power: of United States, 74-75 Presidency: United States, 86 Press: Cuban, 23-24,25,33,41; United States, 82, 83-84. See also Jour-

INDEX

nalism; Media Prices: sugar, 21,117,118(n4) Proceso de rectificación de errores y tendencias negativas.See Process of Rectification of Errors and Negative Tendencies Process of Rectification of Errors and Negative Tendencies, 38,40-41,42, 43-44 Productivity, 13-14, 21 Profit, 10-11,12 Propaganda, 23 Proverbs, 36 Public opinion: in United States, 83, 85-89 "¿Que Pasa, U.S.A.?," 129 Radio: Cuban, 25; United States, 30,38 Radio Marti, 38 Reagan, Ronald, 49,85,87-88,98,113, 123,130 "Reaganomics," 87 Recreation, 28 Rectificación. See Process of Rectification of Errors and Negative Tendences Refugees, 135 Republican Party, 86,130 Retamar, Roberto Fernández: Caliban, 42 Revolution, 4, 36, 65; Cuban, 111-114; support of, 31,53, 64 Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), 59 Rio Group, 112 Rodriguez, Carlos Rafael, 41, 43 Rural sector, 28 Ryzhkov, Nikolai, 55, 56 Salaries. See Wages Sandinista Front (FSLN), 61, 62-63 "Sandra's Case," 42 Sarduy, 39 Savings, 13,15 Scott, Jerry, 131 SDPE. See Economic Management and Planning System Security, 63,92,124; Cuban, 47,52-53; Latin American, 107-109, 111, 112; United States, 73, 88, 93, 99, 101103

Self-determination, 82 Self-employment, 11 Services: worker, 11-12 Sino-Soviet border: demilitarization of, 95 Skilled Labor Force Reserve, 28 Socialism, 9, 11, 24, 25, 31, 59, 78, 118(nnl, 2); disappearance of, 115116; revolutionary, 57, 67 Social movements, 87 Social security, 12, 28 Social services, 9,12, 86 Social work, 12 Society: Cuban, 23, 28-29, 37-38 Socotra, 92 South Africa, 57, 58, 69(n6) South America, 61, 63-64,112. See also various countries Soviet Union, 1, 22, 39, 43, 75, 78, 81, 82,91,123; African policy of, 57-58; arms control by, 99-100; and Cuba, 61, 65, 69(nl2), 118(n7); economy of, 3, 15, 79, 117, 118(n4); foreign policy of, 53, 54; military aid from, 48, 49; on nuclear deterrence, 9697; as nuclear power, 101-102; political changes in, 121, 124; and United States, 2, 76, 83, 87, 92-93, 94-95, 98, 103, 113; trade with, 5556,116 Sputnik (journal), 60 Stalin, Joseph, 96 Standard of living, 30,136 Students, 29, 31 Sugar industry, 10, 14, 15, 21, 116, 118(n4) Teatro Escambray, 36 Technology, 15, 62 Television, 25, 82, 83 Terrorism, 103,136,138 Third World, 53, 54, 74, 75, 97, 113, 124; Cuban role in, 55,56,59,61-62; economies of, 79,117; Soviet Union and, 91,92,95; US presence in, 102, 122

Timmerman, Jacobo, 44 Tourism, 14,15 Trabajadores (journal), 25, 42 Trade, 13,15,19(n36), 138; balancing, 12,14; Cuban-Eastern European, 3, 21-22, 67-68, 116-117; Cuban143

INDEX Soviet, 55-56 Truman, Harry, 74 Turkey, 83 TV Marti, 30, 38, 40 UJC. See Communist Youth League Ukraine, 97 UNEAC. See Union of Writers and Artists of Cuba Unión de Periodistas Cubanos, 41 Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), 57 Union of Writers and Artists of Cuba (UNEAC), 34 Unions, 25 UNITA. See Union for Total Independence of Angola United Nations, 76,117 United States, 1, 2, 54; and Africa, 57, 69(n6); and Cuba, 5, 39, 44, 48, 58, 59,115,118,121-122; Cuban migration to, 129, 135-136; currency devaluation in, 12-13; defense of, 91-92,93-94; economic blockade by, 10,15; economic role of, 73, 74-75, 77-79; foreign policy of, 3,38,81-82, 87-88, 113,132; hostility by, 23, 30; and Latin America, 65, 111; military restructuring of, 98-100; on nuclear deterrence, 96-97; politics of, 123,

144

136-138; press in, 83-84; public opinion in, 85-86,89; security in, 47, 101-103,107-109; and Soviet Union, 76, 92-93,95 United States Information Agency (USIA), 40 Uruguay, 64 USIA. See United States Information Agency Values, 37, 85 Vasev, Vladillen, 58 Venezuela, 64 Vidal, José, 44-45 Vietnam, 96,121 Village Voice (newspaper), 44 Wages, 11,12,17(n8) Weapons, 95, 97, 98, 102. See also Nuclear weapons Weinberger doctrine, 123 Wilson, Woodrow, 82 Women, 27 Work, 12; productivity of, 13-14 Workers: services for, 11-12 Writers: Cuban, 39, 41-42, 4344 Writer's Union, 41 Young Communist League, 30-31 Youth, 25; in Cuba, 28-29, 30, 31

About the Book

Covering a wide range of issue involving Cuba and the United States— from an even wider range of perspectives—this book is the result of a Woodrow Wilson Center coonference convened to discuss the future of relations between the two countries. The contributors focus on the political dynamics in each country and consider how those dynamics might be affected by the rapidly shifting international configuration of forces. The book captures the conflicting ideological paradigms and the deep and powerful emotional content of the discourse between Cuba and the United States. Deliberately balancing Cuban and US views of Cuba, it casts into high relief the issues that complicate a rapprochement and, in so doing, establishes the basis necessary for a clearer understanding of the domestic and international factors involved in any scenario for resolving the Cuban-US conflict.

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