Crowded Orbits: Conflict and Cooperation in Space [2 ed.] 0231207069, 9780231207065

Citation preview

CROWDED ORBITS

CROWDED ORBITS Conflict and Cooperation in Space

JAMES CLAY MOLTZ 2nd edition

Columbia University Press

New York

Columbia University Press Publishers Since 1893 New York Chichester, West Sussex cup.columbia.edu Copyright © 2024 Columbia University Press All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Moltz, James Clay, author. Title: Crowded orbits : conflict and cooperation in space / James Clay Moltz. Description: 2d ed. | New York : Columbia University Press, [2024] | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2023027771 | ISBN 9780231207065 (hardback) | ISBN 9780231207072 (trade paperback) | ISBN 9780231556798 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Outer space—Exploration. | Planets—Exploration. | Astronautics and state. | Astronautics—International cooperation. | Space law. | Space security. Classification: LCC QB500.25 M67 2024 | DDC 629.4/1—dc23/eng/20231016 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023027771 Printed in the United States of America Cover design: Christopher Sergio Cover image: Sergey Nivens/Shutterstock

CONTENTS

Preface vii

Introduction 1 1. Getting Into Orbit

13

2. The Politics of the Space Age

37

3. Civil Space: Science and Exploration 4. Commercial Space Developments

61

101

5. Military Space: Expanded Uses and New Risks 6. Space Diplomacy

167

7. Trends and Future Options Notes 215 Index 239

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137

PREFACE

This book offers students and the general public a comprehensive understanding of space dynamics from the context of past, present, and future international competition and cooperation. Its focus is on whether conflict in the space environment can be avoided, even as human activity increases, critical orbits close to the Earth become more crowded, and military activities expand. The various chapters cover scientific basics, space history, space politics, the economics of space, military space activity, and space diplomacy. The book does not assume any prior knowledge of space and is aimed at reaching anyone with an interest in learning about this promising but fragile domain of increasing human activity. I am grateful to Columbia University Press and, specifically, to editor Caelyn Cobb and associate editor Monique Laban for supporting this second edition. Much has changed since the original edition appeared in 2014, as space technologies, actors, and problems have proliferated, along with new space opportunities. My goal is to provide an engaging and informative short volume on key policy issues facing nations in this crucial arena of international relations. The book seeks to give readers a full picture of the civil, commercial, and military dynamics that are likely to shape the future in space, as well as the diplomatic initiatives that might keep it peaceful. Those who finish reading the book should be able to discuss and analyze space policy issues intelligently and more easily track and understand emerging developments in an international context.

PREFACE

I wrote this second edition over the course of 2022 and early 2023. My main goal was to update readers on major space developments since 2014, including space policies under several new U.S. presidents, the worsening of U.S.-Chinese-Russian tensions, and the rapid expansion of commercial space activity over the past decade. When I wrote the first edition, the notion of satellite mega-constellations was just a dream. Small, inexpensive, yet technologically sophisticated cubesats were only just beginning to be sent into orbit. Launch services were also more expensive and much harder to find than they are today, when several commercial rocket companies have lowered costs by developing the technology to land and reuse spent boosters. In terms of satellites in orbit, their number has increased sevenfold in just the past decade: several companies have more than one hundred satellites in orbit, and one has over four thousand. Literally hundreds of new space companies have also been created in the past decade. Many more countries are also active in space than in 2014, and some are seeking military capabilities. All of these factors mean that space is not only more crowded but also more important to life on Earth than it was a decade ago. Yet it faces serious challenges in such areas as traffic control, debris mitigation, and conflict prevention. This narrative and analysis draw on my more than thirty-five years of professional experience studying space politics and writing about their international dimension. Although considerable academic literature has been published on space competition and cooperation, almost all of it is written in scholarly and specialist jargon. This volume is an effort to bring the key concepts and problems to students and the interested public, who often struggle to find accessible studies on international space policy. The overriding question is: Can we avoid conflict and collectively develop space to benefit all of humankind? In terms of thanks, I want to recognize Capt. (U.S. Marine Corps) Matthew McClure and Capt. (U.S. Space Force) Mitchell Young for reading and highlighting areas requiring updates in the first edition and for offering their informed suggestions. Each had their tours at the Naval Postgraduate School extended in 2021 because of assignment complications caused by the COVID pandemic, and they volunteered to read the first edition and provide comments on areas needing updating. viii

PREFACE

I also want to thank Lt. Col. (U.S. Marine Corps, ret.) and Space Systems Engineering and Acquisition chair at the Naval Postgraduate School Gary Thomason, who generously reviewed chapter 5 for accuracy and provided useful comments and insights. In addition, I am grateful to astrophysicist Dr. Aaron Boley of the University of British Columbia (and codirector of its Outer Space Institute) for his willingness to answer my technical questions on the evolving orbital debris problem. Dr. Patrick Besha at NASA headquarters kindly tutored me on the finer points of China’s civil space program and answered other questions about NASA. Finally, Dr. Michael Byers of the University of British Columbia (the other codirector of the Outer Space Institute) and an anonymous reviewer graciously agreed to review the whole draft manuscript. Both provided valuable suggestions and corrections. I greatly appreciate all of these individuals who contributed to this volume. Last, but not least, I want to thank my wife, Sarah Diehl, for tolerating all of the time and attention I had to devote to writing this second edition. Despite the strength of all this assistance, I remain responsible for any errors or oversights in this book. In addition, all opinions expressed here are my own and should not be interpreted as the official policies of the U.S. Navy or the Department of Defense. Nevertheless, it is my firm hope that readers will come away better educated on this subject and, just as important, interested in learning more.

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CROWDED ORBITS

INTRODUCTION

Countries have thus far competed in space but have managed to avoid direct conflict. Given past wars over new territories and their resources as well as conflicts in the world’s airspace soon after the development of the first planes, the record of humans in space since the first satellite launch in 1957 is impressive. But will countries be able to keep the peace as space becomes more crowded? This is a simple and yet important question that requires greater attention from our national leaders, the media, commercial actors, and even the general public, given our collective dependence on space. The Star Trek television (and now streaming) series is based on a cooperative organization—the United Federation of Planets—that polices the galaxy to protect its citizens, prevent conflict, and promote law-abiding behavior in space. It includes all countries on Earth and

INTRODUCTION

also beings from other friendly and like-minded civilizations. But the route to this cooperative federation, as described in the program, is an extremely costly one: catastrophic nuclear wars on Earth, battles in space, and only a “last chance” recognition that the nations of Earth have fundamentally shared interests in keeping space peaceful, or they will destroy humankind. Like the actual rapprochement of states in Western Europe following World War II and between the countries of Western and Eastern Europe after the fall of the Soviet-bloc communist regimes in 1989, this basic revelation comes at the cost of decades of nearly disastrous conflict. In the Star Trek series, if the nuclear wars that occurred on Earth had turned for the worse, this cooperative escape route might have been snuffed out entirely. This fictional metaphor is hardly a positive one for the coming generations of humans on our planet and in space. Can we do better? If so, how? The risks of space conflict or environmental catastrophe by uncontrolled orbital debris raise a number of troubling challenges as we stand on the threshold of a major expansion of scientific, commercial, and military space activities. To prevent space warfare or space’s ruination by dangerous debris, we need to understand the preconditions for bringing about greater collaboration among Earth’s nations in orbit. Can we achieve cooperation sooner than in the Star Trek series and do so without having to go through the possibly disastrous effects of nuclear or space war or, almost as dangerously, the loss of access to critical orbits because of debris? Might efforts like the U.S.-led return to the Moon and the cooperative Artemis Accords serve as the first step? Perhaps, but China and Russia have thus far rejected these principles and laid out plans for a rival lunar base. International tensions on Earth have recently increased, making at least a near-term space rapprochement seem doubtful. Destructive military tests in lowEarth orbit since 2007 by China, the United States, India, and Russia and threats by other nations to develop similar antisatellite capabilities are worrisome. Finally, commercial plans for mega-constellations consisting of ten thousand satellites or more raise serious questions about whether the space environment can be preserved for sustainable development. 2

INTRODUCTION

Fortunately, humans have an amazing potential to learn and to engage in self-restraint, once they figure out that it is in their best interests to do so. If a single lesson can be drawn from the Cold War in space from 1957 to 1991, it is that both sides eventually learned that unrestricted military behavior risked possibly uncontrollable conflict, nuclear escalation, and even the ruination of the near-Earth space environment, thereby worsening their individual and mutual security. For this reason, Washington and Moscow exercised remarkable self-control even during the most hostile years of the space race, created a military satellite noninterference agreement, and never fired shots in anger in orbit. Ironically, in some respects, we seem further from such cooperative policies in the twenty-first century. Achieving a peaceful and sustainable international approach to space will require an even firmer commitment to responsible behavior among today’s emerging space actors because useful orbits are becoming more crowded than ever. What each country, each company, and each spacefaring individual does has the potential to affect everyone else in orbit. But can we shift from a traditional focus on self-interest and beating our rivals to a focus on broader goals for humankind, such as peaceful development, joint policing, and collaborative settlement of space? Perhaps if we step back to recognize that we exist in a rough place for human life—at least judging by the apparent rarity of our species within the known universe—we can begin to broaden our perspective of what is truly important. But many expert predictions are pessimistic on this score. The current debate about future space policy encompasses three basic points of view. First, some people believe that space will inevitably become a struggle for military hegemony by one nation or a group of nations, despite the dangerous consequences of even limited space warfare. They chalk it up to human nature, which they say is inherently imperfect, and to international mistrust, which they predict is likely to continue. Second, other people believe that harmful space conflicts might be avoided by some form of gradual global engagement based on new knowledge about space and the risks posed by certain activities (such as nuclear testing), an approach that has worked in the past. Finally, at 3

INTRODUCTION

the far end of the spectrum, yet others foresee the prospect for cooperative global governance through the creation of empowered international institutions. They predict that new conditions of increasing space activity, growing costs for strictly national programs, and environmental hazards like orbital debris will create “demand” for more comprehensive space organizations and more institutionalized forms of cooperation. Such an evolution might move us toward more of a “humankind” approach to space, rather than one based on competing nations, as in the past. But even if advocates of this last perspective are right, the road to getting there could be a very rocky one. Will that be good enough to preserve safe access to space in the future? The United States issued a “Defense Space Strategy” in 2020 that outlined a series of challenges in the orbital domain. It noted the “reemergence of great power competition” and stated that the “actions, intentions, and military strategies of potential adversaries have transformed space into a warfighting domain.”1 President Donald Trump ordered the creation of the U.S. Space Force in part to address these concerns, matching space services already present in both Russia and China. Nevertheless, all countries say that they are pursuing “peaceful purposes” in space, yet some are developing weapons for “defense” of their space assets that could also be used for offensive purposes. The political scientist Dr. Daniel Deudney of Johns Hopkins University predicts that this path will lead to space’s weaponization, which then will lead inevitably to space warfare, adding to “the lengthening list of catastrophic and existential threats to humanity.”2 If correct, this is not a happy prognosis. Sadly, the historical record of human behavior with regard to new frontiers (unsettled continents, the oceans, and the world’s airspace) has established a self-destructive pattern of competition over resources settled by war, raising questions about whether human civilization has really advanced at all. In space, however, the conflicts could be quite a bit more dangerous, particularly given the close linkages between space security and nuclear stability among the great powers. Even limited conflict in space could lead to the possible loss of the near-Earth orbital region because of the creation of harmful debris. Moreover, if nuclear 4

INTRODUCTION

weapons are used, thousands of satellites could be disabled and radiation from charged particles would remain in orbit for years. In popular space movies like 1977 Star Wars and its sequels, spaceships destroyed in orbital battles typically just dissolve into particles and “disappear” into the ether. But that’s a fantasy. What actually happens was depicted in the 2013 film Gravity, in which a Russian weapons test creates thousands of small fragments that continue to hurtle around our planet at speeds of eighteen thousand miles per hour: destroying dozens of spacecraft, including a crewed space station. Unfortunately, space is not a self-cleaning environment, except over very long periods of time. This equates to decades near Earth, centuries in higher orbits, and virtually forever above about a few thousand miles. Thus, it is imperative that we learn “fast enough” to prevent such destructive cascades that could deny us the ability to use near-Earth orbits. The nature of future relations among actors in space is not predetermined and could either become a hostile competition or be characterized by joint development. The Biden administration’s 2021 “United States Space Priorities Framework” describes a situation of “intensifying strategic competition,” but it also asserts options to reduce these threats, concluding, “Confrontation or conflict, however, is not inevitable.”3 But this dual reality of increasing threats and the presence of cooperative opportunities suggests that some form of collective action— possibly among like-minded countries, commercial companies, and scientific actors—is needed if we are to succeed. The outcome of this ongoing mix of factors will be a choice made by the actors themselves. It will also be affected by whether the major participants can form new governance mechanisms for space and how effective these measures will prove in practice. Developing responsible space policy requires answering a series of difficult questions, as well as undertaking a careful examination of lessons from the past (both in space and in other environments). It also calls on interested people and government officials to review existing trends in space activities, politics, and technology. This book covers these topics and provides readers with the tools they need to analyze current and emerging issues in international space policy. It assumes no .

5

INTRODUCTION

particular background in space science, history, or politics, and it provides a foundation in each of these areas so that the reader can approach complex subjects regarding the future in space with new knowledge and understanding. This learning process must begin with the basics of space physics and orbital mechanics (discussed in chapter 1). Space poses many challenges because of its unique characteristics. It lacks atmospheric pressure, objects traveling through it experience alternating extremes of hot and cold (depending on their relation to the Sun), and spacecraft require fuel sources to move into or out of orbit. Dead spacecraft and orbital debris lack such propulsion, meaning that they are essentially speeding “rocks,” which can collide with anything else in their paths, creating even more debris. In the 1970s, two NASA scientists, Donald Kessler and Burton Cour-Palais, predicted that a condition could occur in which orbital debris collisions become uncontrollable and cascade without any human ability to stop them.4 All of these characteristics profoundly affect what can (and cannot) be done safely in the orbital environment. Also critical to understanding the future of space is the history of what humans have done in this environment, some of which is little known to the average citizen. For example, few people know that the United States and the Soviet Union tested nuclear weapons in orbit at the dawn of the space age, nearly halting the development of satellite communications and preventing further progress in human spaceflight. Only a treaty between the two superpowers averted what could have been a true dead end for human activity in space. Immediately after the end of the Cold War space race in 1991, remarkable U.S.-Russian space cooperation emerged in joint commercial launch ventures and in the construction of the International Space Station with the European Space Agency (ESA), Canada, and Japan. But growing tensions since Russia’s aggressive behavior against Ukraine have strained this relationship. In regard to China, U.S. space-related sanctions since 1999 as a result of concerns over technology theft and, more recently, China’s active space weapons program have sharply constrained Sino-U.S. space cooperation. ESA has maintained only a few joint space science 6

INTRODUCTION

missions with China. As a result of this situation, states seem to be reconstructing two rival blocs in space, one of the democratic states (led by the United States, the European countries, India, and Japan) and one of authoritarian states (led by China and, to a lesser extent, Russia). That said, thus far, there is much more space cooperation within the Western-leaning group, including the high-profile Artemis Program aimed at returning humans to the Moon and establishing a permanent scientific base. But China now operates its own “international” space station and has plans to build a lunar base in cooperation with Russia. Overall, these trends suggest that space’s near-term future will continue to be a mixture of competition and cooperation, but with the risk of conflict between the two blocs. Compared with the Cold War, many more countries are now involved in space. Besides those already listed, a whole range of new spacefaring nations—from Peru to Ethiopia to Bangladesh to Laos— now own and operate satellites for scientific, commercial, or military purposes. Since 1991, several additional countries have conducted independent space launches—including Iran, North Korea, and South Korea—and a number of others have plans to either host foreign commercial launches or develop their own national launch capabilities. The number of yearly launches could jump from just over one hundred today to as many as several hundred by 2030, as new launch services begin, orbiting perhaps tens of thousands of new satellites. What is unclear is whether this increasing orbital crowding will lead to conflict, or whether new international mechanisms can help ensure that nearEarth space remains peaceful. Space activity can be divided into several different functional areas. Government-run space science and exploration of space are often described as “civil” space activity, to distinguish them from those for military or commercial purposes. Before 2000, the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia dominated this field, launching all of the crewed spacecraft and carrying out all but a handful of the major missions into deep space (i.e., the region beyond the Earth and the Moon). The Soviet Union accomplished many of the initial “firsts” thanks to its large R-7 rocket: orbital satellite, human spaceflight, and space walk. 7

INTRODUCTION

Key U.S. accomplishments included the first Earth observation satellite, the first communications satellite, and the 1969 Moon landing. Later missions included the massive Skylab space station in the early 1970s, the operation of a fleet of reusable space shuttles beginning in the 1980s, and exploratory missions to Venus, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, and Neptune as well as other celestial bodies. European countries also have a long history in space science and have conducted increasingly wide-ranging and sophisticated missions since the formation of ESA in the late 1970s. Japan has been active in space science missions for decades as well, conducting leading research on the upper atmosphere and lower reaches of space and, more recently, on asteroids. Newer entries into the realm of major civil space missions include China and also India, spurred on by its rival’s accomplishments. (These programs are discussed in greater detail in chapter 3.) Finally, a range of smaller countries have sponsored space science missions in just the past decade, including Israel, South Korea, and the United Arab Emirates, among many others, showing that entry into space is no longer limited to just a few nations. The continuing expansion of countries involved in civil space activity heightens chances for both future competition and new forms of cooperation. Commercial space activity is also developing rapidly in the early twenty-first century. Although initial U.S. achievements in satellite technology spawned the emergence of the space communications industry in the 1960s, a rapidly expanding range of new companies across the globe are now entering the commercial sector with new technologies and services. Since the 1980s, traditional voice, data, and video communications have been supplemented by a range of new information-based products, such as those made possible by the commercialization of U.S. positioning, navigation, and timing technology (through the Global Positioning System [GPS]), the commercial marketing of various Earth-imaging systems (including synthetic aperture radar offering all-weather coverage), and the advent of satellite broadcasting for television, radio, and Internet broadband. Some of the most dynamic innovation is coming from small, start-up companies offering new technologies to the space marketplace. (These topics are 8

INTRODUCTION

discussed in chapter 4.) Thanks to its distinct ability to provide an environment with a skilled workforce, ready venture capital, a strong technical infrastructure, and legal protections in such areas as banking and taxation, the United States has been the home of much of this new activity. But the growth of space commerce has created certain problems, particularly related to crowding of the radiofrequency spectrum, shortages of slots in the valuable geostationary orbital belt, and the proliferation of mega-constellations in low-Earth orbit. Also, cases of national governments jamming commercial communications signals are increasing, raising fears of service denials. This means that international organizations responsible for managing the space broadcasting realm, space traffic, and the allocation of geostationary locations will have to become more active in enforcing existing rules, protecting lawabiding operators, and sanctioning violators, if space commerce is to remain safe, reliable, and profitable. Finally, scientists worry about new concerns being raised by commercial mega-constellations, including light pollution from satellites (harming astronomy), more black carbon and alumina particles released by the growing numbers of rocket launches (harmful to the atmosphere), and microdeposits of aluminum and other materials from larger number of satellite reentries (possibly harmful to the upper atmosphere).5 Few of these risks have been adequately studied. Another worry among many observers is the spread of military space technology. Some of these new defense capabilities have a positive dimension, particularly when they contribute to finding terrorists, directing precision weapons against evildoers (and avoiding innocents), and enforcing arms control and nonproliferation treaties. Space-based communications, meteorology, imagery, and signals intelligence systems have proven to be important “enablers” for the U.S. military. But the emergence of kinetic, microwave, laser, and other weapons systems are  putting these assets at risk, given the transparent nature of space. (These issues are covered in greater detail in chapter 5). To counter these  threats, some national militaries are undertaking new efforts to reduce satellite vulnerability by orbiting more “distributed” constellations involving more, smaller, and cheaper spacecraft, developing the 9

INTRODUCTION

ability to replace satellites more quickly, and loading them with more fuel so that they will be able to avoid attackers. China, the United States, and Russia have all conducted tests of a variety of potential space weapons, including kinetic systems meant to collide with their targets, electromagnetic systems meant to jam signals coming to or from a satellite, lasers that could blind a satellite’s optical sensors, and grappling devices capable of damaging or even capturing a target satellite. These tests highlight the absence of clear rules with regard to weapons systems that do not employ weapons of mass destruction (which are banned by an international treaty). Space diplomacy is a field that has received comparatively little attention since the 1970s, despite the recent rise of multilateral space tensions. During the Cold War, U.S.-Soviet preeminence in space  made  it possible for bilateral arms control treaties to resolve many of the most pressing concerns. Today, the realm of relevant actors is larger and more complex. Newly developing space countries are reluctant to see new agreements possibly locking in advantages for the more-advanced militaries. Meanwhile, political disagreements and mistrust among the United States, China, and Russia, exacerbated by nationalistic actors in these countries’ domestic politics, have prevented bilateral actions that might help kick-start a broader arms control process. (These topics are analyzed in chapter 6.) China and Russia have proposed a treaty banning space-based weapons, but it lacks a verification regime and fails to include other weapons that might be used against spacecraft from the Earth, sea, or air. By contrast, the United Kingdom has proposed an alternative plan within the United Nations that seeks to define “responsible” and “irresponsible” behavior in space to start a process of creating norms and best practices for space activity. These two efforts are both ongoing, but some experts believe more substantial agreements will be needed, combining formal arms control treaties with international monitoring of space behavior. The questions of who will lead these negotiations, provide the necessary space systems to verify them, and fund the organizations needed to enforce them remain to be answered. 10

INTRODUCTION

Overall, determining where we are headed in space requires addressing a series of complex questions, among them: • Will shared, humankind interests prove to be more powerful than those of nationalism in motivating civil space activity? • Will commercial actors agree to accept the additional costs necessary to rein in the hazards posed by orbital debris and other forms of crowding in space? • Will national militaries agree to self-restraint to limit certain technologies and behavior if they can verify that other countries will do the same? There are at least three of the possible scenarios for space activity, depending on the answers to these questions: military control by one nation or a group of countries (military hegemony); gradual problemsolving by interested space actors across various fields (what we might call “informed incrementalism”); or expanded international treaties and empowered cooperative institutions (global governance). History suggests that future competition among nations may be inevitable and could have beneficial effects in stimulating space innovation. But experience shows that excess competition can also lead to self-destructive conflict. The countries in the Star Trek series learned this the hard way. Will actual twenty-first century space activities fulfill this dangerous prediction or accomplish something better? Everyone would agree that we have shared interests in protecting human civilization and expanding into the solar system and beyond. The challenge is how to get from here to there. To start, we first need to understand better what has taken place in space thus far.

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1 GETTING INTO ORBIT Rocket and automobile engines . . . have a basic similarity: Both are internalcombustion engines using the burning of a fuel-oxygen mixture to produce hot gases which create tremendous pressure. . . . In the automobile, the gases push a piston which . . . eventually pushes a wheel against the ground. In the rocket, the gases push . . . directly on the vehicle itself . . . making the rocket, in effect, a single, huge piston. . . . The automobile merely sucks [oxygen] from the air. But the rocket, designed to operate in space, must carry its own supply. —Willard E. Wilks, The New Wilderness: What We Know about Space (1963)

Thinking of a rocket as a self-propelled piston is a helpful analogy for a more complex system. Getting into space involves mastering the physics of propulsion, the chemistry of combustion, and some fairly sophisticated tasks of mechanical engineering. A self-taught Russian mathematician calculated the necessary fuel-to-weight ratio to achieve spaceflight in the late 1890s, but he lacked the technology to build a rocket. A lone American physicist succeeded in demonstrating the technology for the first liquid-fuel rocket in the mid-1920s, but he lacked the material and financial resources to scale up his prototype to reach space. If it were not for the fact that rockets could be used as ballistic missiles, space exploration would have occurred much later than it did. However, the goal of Nazi Germany’s military on the eve of World

GETTING INTO ORBIT

War II to bomb European cities that were more than a hundred miles away finally commandeered the massive funding necessary to build the world’s first rocket that reached the edges of space. Unfortunately, it soon served deadly military purposes,1 not scientific ones. After the war, both the United States and the Soviet Union seized German military scientists, blueprints, and hardware to jump-start their missile programs, bringing space activity within their respective reaches. Their vast resources and fierce geopolitical rivalry facilitated the development of much-longer-range ballistic missiles designed to carry highly destructive nuclear weapons over intercontinental distances. These delivery systems offered lower vulnerability than bombers, promising to save the lives of pilots, and could transport weapons across the globe at tremendous speed, making attacks possible in less than thirty minutes. Fortunately, for scientists, long-range ballistic missiles also made excellent space rockets. But the uncomfortable fact is that space exploration first emerged largely as a spin-off of these military programs. Spaceflight probably would have been accomplished before now by some country’s scientists or an eccentric entrepreneur even in the absence of military incentives and large-scale government funding, but it would certainly have occurred much later than the Soviet Union’s Sputnik launch in 1957. As the historian Walter McDougall observed on these competitive dynamics in his Pulitzer Prize–winning book on the U.S.-Soviet space race: “The international system absorbed space just as it absorbed the atom.”2 These points highlight an essential fact about space technology: its dual-use nature.3 A space booster can launch an intercontinental missile or a civilian scientific probe. Similarly, communications satellites can broadcast a movie, transfer financial data, or transmit military orders to troops or to an unmanned drone. By the same token, a military imaging satellite meant to track enemy forces can also survey Earth to monitor deforestation, facilitate city planning, or check on the progress of agricultural crops. The real questions are often not technical ones about a spacecraft’s capabilities, but instead political and practical ones: who controls the spacecraft and to what specific use is it being put? Today, old lines separating military and civilian space programs are becoming increasingly blurred, as budget pressures and the 14

GETTING INTO ORBIT

growing sophistication of civilian technologies make it more efficient for military users to lease transponders on commercial satellites or buy commercial Earth observation data on an as-needed basis than to buy and operate large military constellations for these purposes. The result is that the former line between commercial and military space is, in some cases, being blurred. This saves money and strengthens military capabilities, but it also makes commercial satellites potential targets in war, although their large numbers could make such attacks ineffective. To discuss space activity intelligently, we need first to understand the technologies required for spaceflight and the physics that affect them. Once basic orbital mechanics and rocket technology had been understood and mastered in the 1950s, a new set of challenges arose in developing equipment that would enable living beings (dogs, apes, and then humans) to survive in the harsh environment of space. Given the risks involved, only a few countries have thus far launched humans into space. The Soviets got there first in 1961, but the United States soon followed and has launched the most astronauts who have reached space to date. China joined this group in 2003, and India plans to do so within the next decade. Finally, we need to examine military space technologies and applications, which drove much of the U.S.-Soviet space race and today continue to motivate many national space activities. Consistent with the notion of dual use, not all of these technologies are weapons. In fact, few are. The main benefit of space for national militaries has been and remains information. A key takeaway from this brief history is that while the first space powers had to invent all of these technologies, many of them can be purchased today in the international market. That availability has accelerated the recently rapid expansion of spacefaring countries.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF SPACE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY Astronomy

In the past several hundred years—a mere blip in human history— scientists have gained a remarkable amount of information about Earth and its relationship to the rest of the universe. Though we won’t delve 15

GETTING INTO ORBIT

deeply into this long history, which has already been well covered by others, it is important to run through a quick review of these still fairly recent (and radical) changes in human understanding.4 About five hundred years ago, after spending millennia viewing Earth as the center of all creation, philosophers and astronomers began to challenge long-held beliefs and religious doctrines regarding the planets. While Aristarchus of Samos in ancient Greece had conceived of a Sun-centric solar system in the third century BC, the concept failed to take root and was forgotten. But by the mid-1500s, a wider scientific community and the first reasonably powerful telescopes had helped convince others that the observations of the Polish Catholic cleric Nicolaus Copernicus provided proof that the Sun (not Earth) must be at the center of our planetary system. Copernicus argued that the prior notion of larger celestial bodies racing around a stationary Earth made no sense, and that furthermore Earth must be moving, as well as rotating on its axis relative to the Sun, to provide periods of day and night. Knowledge about Copernicus’s ideas began to spread throughout Europe’s budding scientific community. By the 1590s, the German mathematician Johannes Kepler used observations by the Danish astronomer Tycho Brahe to prove further that because of the differential effects of gravity in relation to distance, the planets must move in elliptical orbits around the Sun rather than in circles. The Italian physicist, mathematician, and astronomer Galileo Galilei built on this knowledge to prove the rotation of the planets, while identifying through telescopic observation a range of celestial bodies (such as planetary moons) never seen before in space and confirming earlier ideas about the distance of the stars. Although his radical findings ran afoul of the Catholic Church, forcing Galileo to live under house arrest, the truth could not be held back any longer. During the 1660s to the 1680s, the British philosopher and mathematician Isaac Newton developed new understandings of gravity and highly accurate laws of motion that created unprecedented levels of predictability regarding the celestial bodies and their relative movement with respect to Earth. With the cosmos largely in place, it now fell to engineers to get us there. Unfortunately, this technological ladder had many steps. 16

GETTING INTO ORBIT

Launch Vehicles

Various peoples in Asia had developed simple bamboo rockets powered by gunpowder and other incendiaries by the 1200s.5 But these weapons lacked range and accuracy and could not be controlled once launched. The British military leader William Congreve updated certain Indian designs that had been employed against his troops in the late 1700s by using metal tubes and more standardized production. Such rockets figured prominently—if ultimately unsuccessfully—in the famous British attack on Baltimore in September 1814. It was these rockets’ “red glare” that the eyewitness Francis Scott Key memorialized in “The Star-Spangled Banner.” But the next leap for rocket technology required a new conceptual foundation. A Russian high school teacher who overcame the challenges of deafness, Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, became the unlikely father of this revolution in 1897 by coming up with the “rocket equation,” which described the thrust required for a rocket to leave Earth’s atmosphere.6 Although Tsiolkovsky understood the benefits of using supercooled liquid hydrogen and oxygen fuels to accomplish this task, his limited financial resources and lack of requisite tools and materials did not allow him to attempt building such a complex system. Enter U.S. physicist Robert Goddard. Working at Clark University in Massachusetts in the 1920s, Goddard used his knowledge of both physics and engineering to develop and launch the world’s first liquidfuel rocket in 1926.7 He crafted an odd A-shaped rocket powered by gasoline and liquid oxygen linked by metal tubing to create a controllable liquid-fuel engine. Ironically, despite his accomplishments, Goddard—like many of his predecessors—faced ridicule in the American press for even proposing spaceflight. Poorly versed but influential critics in popular newspapers at the time rejected the whole idea of propulsion in the vacuum of space by arguing that a rocket would have nothing to “push against” and would therefore quickly stop moving (neglecting the idea that it might push against itself ). In the short term, Goddard was unable to prove them wrong, as his rockets still lacked the thrust needed to reach space. But, in 1936, German engineers Wernher 17

GETTING INTO ORBIT

von Braun and Walter Thiel used funding from the Nazi military to scale up Goddard’s conceptual breakthrough and build the first rockets to leave the atmosphere, albeit on suborbital trajectories. Their eventual A-4 rocket represented an invulnerable missile capable of bombing Western European cities from a distance of up to two hundred miles, although their accuracy remained quite poor. Hitler used more than 2,600 of the renamed V-2 (Vengeance) rockets against French, Belgian, Dutch, and British cities during World War II, killing more than five thousand people (almost all civilians).8 After World War II, a new and more powerful series of space boosters was developed based on Germany’s V-2. Now working in the United States for the U.S. military, von Braun built the Redstone intermediate-range missile in the early 1950s and the larger Jupiter C rocket to test reentry vehicles for planned nuclear warheads, which would pass through space en route to their targets. Although the Jupiter C had the capability to launch a satellite, the U.S. Army had no authorization to do so and thus pursued only testing of weapons delivery systems.9 The Jupiter used a mixture of hypercooled (cryogenic) propellant in its first stage with solid-fuel upper stages. Rockets that travel into space are normally configured into stacked sections called stages. The first stage, responsible for lifting the whole rocket and its fuel load, is the largest and requires the most thrust. After around two to three minutes, its job is done and—to remove unneeded weight—it separates from the rocket, falling back to Earth (or into the ocean), although recent innovations bring some back for a controlled landing.10 The second-stage engine then ignites and carries the rocket closer to or into space. The final stages are normally for releasing payloads or positioning them in the proper orbit. The critical actions required to put a satellite into space usually take only six to eight minutes, although putting it into its target orbit may require an additional few hours or more, depending on its inclination and altitude. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union undertook similar missile research. In 1948, a team of engineers under chief designer Sergei Korolev conducted the first successful Soviet test of an intermediate-range missile with a range of 550 miles, although this information remained a 18

GETTING INTO ORBIT

secret of the Stalinist regime.11 The program continued at an urgent pace to counter the U.S. advantage in bomber forces. Korolev’s team began to scale up the capability of successive rocket engines to achieve a range that could reach the United States. Finally, in August 1957, the Soviet Union successfully tested its R-7 missile (with a cluster of four first-stage engines) for use as a long-range delivery system. Afterward, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev gave chief designer Sergei Korolev permission to attempt the world’s first satellite launch using the R-7. This two-stage rocket using conventional kerosene fuel and a cryogenic oxidizer launched the simple Sputnik 1 broadcasting satellite into orbit in October 1957, shocking the rest of the world. In the United States, congressional opponents of President Eisenhower sharply criticized the administration for allowing this apparent technological gap to emerge, putting at risk both U.S. security and its reputation.12 The United States had planned to launch a civilian satellite aboard a modified Navy-derived Vanguard rocket but had failed to provide the project with adequate funding or technical support. Its first attempt, in December 1957, failed miserably, with an embarrassing explosion on the pad. This situation forced the Eisenhower administration to turn reluctantly to former Nazi scientist von Braun. Using a modified Jupiter missile (or four-stage Juno 1 rocket), von Braun’s team successfully launched the first U.S. satellite (Explorer 1) on January 31, 1958. As the Cold War rivals raced to launch ever larger and more complex payloads, the Soviets undertook the first human spaceflight (Yuri Gagarin in April 1961), and the competition soon escalated to multiperson spacecraft and planned Moon landings. For these missions, they needed more powerful rockets. Because of a variety of technical and organizational problems, the Soviets failed in their efforts to develop the multi-engine, three-stage liquid-fuel N-1 lunar rocket.13 The United States succeeded, however, in developing the massive three-stage, liquidfuel Saturn V for its lunar missions, including its December 1968 orbital flight around the Moon and culminating in NASA’s historic Moon landing in July 1969. Several additional lunar missions followed. The Saturn V could lift three hundred thousand pounds (or the equivalent of about two hundred satellites) into low-Earth orbit (LEO), making it 19

GETTING INTO ORBIT TABLE 1.1 Selected Cold War Space Launch Vehicles

Vehicle (Country)

First launch

Height (ft.)

Initial thrust (lbs.)

Fuel

R-7 (USSR)

1957

108

877,000

Liquid

3,300

Juno 1/Jupiter C (United States) Soyuz (USSR) Titan II (United States) Diamant A (France) Saturn V (United States) Proton (USSR) Long March 1D (China) Lambda 4S ( Japan) Satellite Launch Vehicle 1 (India) Space Shuttle (United States) Energiya (USSR)

1958

71

83,000

Liquid and solid